SENATE, 47 TO 44, KILLS FUND CURB ON VIETNAM WAR

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73B00296R000300050001-3
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• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 23, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: NSPR

et:t.tik air101.0%
Approved For Release 2000/09/08
NEW YORK TIMES
SENATE, 47 TO 44,
KILLS FUND CURB
ON VIETNAM WAR
Rejects an Amendment That
Money COuld Be Used
Only for Withdrawal
By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Oct. 28?The
uossayjajaraczyza,
lav zejArtna a- przipaud
gmandrnerit that woulc?_laye
satafied that the auski Lit
Idgez_ast. jagjunda_in Indo-
china exceyt to with4raw
American forces.
The Senate action represent-
ed a major Administration vic-
tory in the running battle with
the doves on the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee.
The withdrawal amendment,
sponsored by Senators John
Sherman Cooper, Republican of
Kentucky, and Frank Church,
Democrat of Idaho, had been
included by the Senate Commit-
tee in the $3.2-bi1lion foreign
aid authorization bill. Amid
threats that President Nixon
would veto the bill if the
Cooper-Church amendment re-
mained, Administration forces
in a series of close votes suc-
ceeded in deleting the amend-
ment from the bill.
Scott Motion Wins
the Senate Re ublican
the..034PaZACI=11--alaartrItTIP
?The Administration, mean-
while, maintained an outwardly
neutral stance as Senators
James L. Buckley, Conservative-
Republican of New York, and
Peter H. Dominick, Republican
of Colorado, introduced four
amendments to limit United
States contributions to the Unit-
ed Nations. The amendments
\vere a reaction to the General
Assembly's expulsion of Na-
tionalist China Monday.
In the first vote on the
United Nations issue, the San-
late defeated, 55-28 one of the
;two Buckley amendments,
,which would have cut $102-mil-
lion from so-called voluntary
contributions to the United Na-
tions Development Program
and the Food and Agriculture
Organization's world food pro-
gram.
Javits Protests
Senator Buckley said that his
amendment was "not intended
as a punitive measure" but
rather reflected nothing more
nor less than a loss of confi-
dence in the United Nations.
Senator Jacob K. Javits pro-
tested that approval of the,
Buckley amendment would be,
interpreted as an act of "pet-j
ulance" against the United Ned
dons' for expelling Nationalist
China and warned, "If we take'
this road we're doing ourselves
-
a grave disservice."
"We can take on the world -
If we wish or we can live with
the world," Senator Javits said.
Put off until tomorrow were
votes on the other Buckley
amendment as well as on the
two Dominick amendments. The
second Buckley amendment,
which is believed likely to be
approved, calls upon the Presi-
dent to negotiate a reduction
In the annual United States as-
sessed contribution from the
current level of 31.52 per cent
of the United Nations budget
to net more than 25 per cent.
The two Dominick amend-
ments were more restrictive.
One would require annual Con-
gressional authorization for the
mandatory or assessed contri-
butions, which totaled $111.8-
million in 1971, as well as for
the so-called voluntary contri-
butions, exceeding $223.5-mil-
lion this year, to various spe-
cialized agencies of the United
Nations.
The second Dominick amend-
ment would specify that the
share of the United States
voluntary contributions to the
specialized agencies could not
exceed the United States share
of the mandatory payments to
the United Nations budget. The
effect would be to reduce the
United States contributions to
the specialized agencies, which
now rely upon the United
States for about 40 per cent of
their budgets.
: CIA-RDP73130029pR0003000500014
DATE -)Y1 :1 PAG I
Atter a White House confer-
elite, Senator Scott told re-
porters that the Administration
was taking "no position" on
the Buckley and Dominick
amendments.
Another Amendment Deleted
The White House, however,
made a major effort to defeat
the Cooper-Church amendment
on Indochina as well as an-
-,ther Foreign Relations Com-
Mittee amendment, which
would impose a $250-million
ceiling on all military and eco-
nomic aid to Cambodia in the
current fiscal year.
lirau_slusLagdgaLax-aDAW
lmeze...sa.umaned--ta-thR---Valite
for brpakfast briefing
Tirsriry Tnceingpr +be
Xxagidant:s......13,1LbanaL.SiCaZity
adviser,
ator
is-
president wou I veto t
e sr-
sign aid bill if the two amd-
rnen ? 44,w.qj'he
EffirimiStrati the SelMon or
said, would "rather have no
bill at all than a bill that re-
moves opportunity for further
negotiations in 'Paris."
The foreign aid bill has al-
ready been passed by the
House.
Among those attending the
Whte House meeting were
Senators Lawton Chiles, Demo-
crat of Florida, and Llloyd
M. Bentsen, Democrat of Texas,
both of whom had been ex-
pected to vote for the Cooper-
Church admendment but voted
against it. Combined with the
absence from the Senate of Sen-
ators Fred R. Harris, Democrat
of Oklahoma; George Mc-
Govern. Democrat of South Da-
kota, and Janie' K. Inouye,
Democrat of Hawaii, that was
enough to assure a rare mar-
gin of defeat of Cooper-Church
amendment.
bdrninicfratjon failed,
r b a52-3 vo e in .its
an amend-
,.. r.piliTag or militant ano-
nomic spending in Cambca.
tet-atirrni-vre-Vitrfr47-1TM-
agreed o
mm 4 s..4,0 apan4--O
A 1 amount t e
r
$' ig Vrh"
" Pln
in Cambodia this fiscal year.
In another t. -..ory for the
Administration, h Senate, by
a 43-40 vote, -ited a com-
mittee amendm n that would
have repealed t e 1955 resolu-
tion authorizint -? he President
to use the arme .orces to pro-
tect the securits Taiwan and
the Pescadores I ,lends.
Before the mted Nations
vote expelling ??1. ationalist Chi-
na, the commit of voted to re-
peal the resol, ti in regarding
Taiwan as a st o toward curb-
ing the warma dog powers of
the Presidency. Tie Nixon Ad-
ministration ha i -aken the po-
sition tht it v at- not relying
upon the autho it o fthe reso-
lution and had at , objection to
its repeal.
In the wake f the United
Nations vote, I, wever, pro-Ad-
ministration Si ai tors objected
that repeal of the resolution
on Taiwan wolk- be untimely
and would be re erpreted as a
sign that the i inited States
would no longer stand by its
commitments t he defense of
Taiwan.
The defeat 1 the Cooper-
Church am e id tient today
marked the Ii si time in two
years that th loves on the
Foreign Relat ors Committee
have failed in tieir moves in
the Senate to i apose legislative
restrictions or the President's
authority to tkdertake military
opeations in In loohina.
Still remain ng in the bill
was an amend rit nt by Senator
Mike Mansfie!1, the majority
leader, setting fcrth the policy
that the Unit" d States should
withdraw all it, forces from
Indochina in ix months, sub-
ject only to t le release of all
American pri ;oilers of war.
Rather than fighting the
amendment or the Senate floor,
the Administr ition decided to
rely upon a S in ite-House con-
ference come tee to modify
the amendme 1, as was done
when a si ii ar Mansfield
amendment a attached to
the draft extex sin
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DATE PAGE
THE WASHINGTON POST
Senate Kills Curbs
On War. Aid, 47-44
By Spencer Rich
Washington Post &aft Writer
In a major but bitterly con-
tested victory for President
Nixon yesterday, the Senate
stripped from the foreign aid
bill restrictions " on funds for
U.S. military operations in In-
dochina.
By a. 4740-44 vo.jke_Sen-
ainrove an nt
Minority Leader thigh
Seut.t.4.1.a.?1.1c.11/444-4...reerisie41
1.114-aaild.-11,1=a4Ltadi, all
muds for further U.S
ina?pgatigaiazadagLe.,112_Anklo-
.4.1j.ina_excapt-lor-tibet...p4opese
ofaughar.aluitzlia.k.aoPs?
Scott said the provision,
sponsored by Sens. John Sher-
man Cooper (R-Icy.) and Frank
Church (D-Idaho), was abso-
lutely unaccerifabIe to the
President and would wreck ne-
gotiations for a peace settle-
ment and preclude any aid to
Cambodia and Vietnam even
after U.S. troops were with-
drawn. "This bill is not going
anywhere if this amendment
is in it," he said. "It will be ve-
toed.
in another vote on a pro-
posal which was stimulated by
the ouster of the Nationalist
Chinese from the United Na-
tions Monday night, the Sen-
ate rejected by a 55-to-28 vote
an amendment by Sen. James
L. Buckley (Cons.-N.Y.) to
slash $101 million of the $139
million authorized in the bill
for U.N. technical assistance
(D-Nev.) requiring the Presi-
dent to suspend foreign aid i
any country that expropriate:.
the property of U.S. citizens
without compensation. The
provision is aimed at Chile.
Under existing law--the so-
called IIickenlooper provision
-the President ,ts given di';-
cretion whetlier- to .cut of; aid
to expropriating nations; ow
Cannon amendment removes
Ws discretion and requires
him to stop aid.
teiA4...:_lerokozer-Church
noxision was remoqc4,:ten.
No W. Rifec,,es (171.Wvo
*teed an ainendment_ta qtrip
gut another administrAtjananP-
posed provision that haLl been
Inserted by the Foreign Ite-a-
ti
OIlS" ? se al ? -
:I: ?
tYSjjconomic and military aid
te Cambodia to 5250 million,
jtfprl of the 2dmInigtrtjOfl's
promad-$241 iaillion
'llive-MeCee-ameadmel2Lwas
keiseter1,52_to_5jaLoilly
StuartSymington
ofir a
lkter amendment to raise the
Cgi1ll21-13LIIIL221.)232=11141 to
exactly the o 63,4nl million
acought-A h N n
Y Tnis-
tretioa.-
whludruat4tad
Astetionig of the_absent. See-
l Sersdees _Lagar t-
tee_Sjaeliman Joho Stennis
rIe
to developing nations.
- -
aijnto give the adrnirdstra-
Scott had Old reporters
' earlier that the administration:
tinn_11)-the-lunds it warted
neither favored nor opposed ?I for military _and- economie d.
this and other amendments re-
ducing U.S. conceibutions to
the U.N. Other amendments
to cut U.S. funds for the
United Nations sponsored by
Buckley and Peter Dominick
(R-Colo.) were not palled up
ior votes last night by their
sponsors.
Approved late yesterday by
a 4740-33 vote was an amend-
ment by Howard W. Cannon
to.d.paalig--w-the-horr-Noi-gov-
ernment as long as the nrinci-
iettingAgeil-
dminis-
unds
it wants-assumifl the Sym-
Itreri.9:ceillnWar 140;1.ay-1 ?itst
Congeessfor
axkv-thing
The Scott amendment kill-
ing Cooper-Church was the
crucial vote as far as the ad-
ministration was concerned.
cott nact been warning his
colleagues for two days that
Mr. Nixon would veto the
whole foreign aid bill-or per-
haps seek to defeat it in the
Senate and depend on emer-
gency financing for the aid
program for the rest of the
year-if the Cooper-Church
amendment were not removed.
Scott said the Cooper-
Church provision would
weaken the President's posi-
tion in peace negotiations, ap-
pear to be a "public expres-
sion of lack of confidence" in
the way he is handling the
'lending of the war and a curb
Ion the use of U.S. air power,
!both to protect U.S. soldiers
' withdrawing from Vietnam
and "to achieve our national
objectives in Indochina."
Both Church and Cooper
strenuously denied that their
oposal, which the Foreign
Relations Committee ap-
proved, 11 to 5, was a repudia-
tion of the President. Churn
said the provision was an at-
tempt to assert the power of
the purse in foreign policy, an
attempt to make it easier po-
litically for the President to
get out of Indochina by offer-
ing to "share the blame" for
withdrawal.
But most of all, both sena-
tors said, the Cooper-Church
provision-which set no final
date for getting out-was de-
signed to assure that the with-
drawal by the United States
would be absolute, leaving no
residual U.S hues, or U.S. air,
sea or logistical support for
further war anywhere in Indo-
china. The amendment would
also have barred any U.S. air I
t or other support operations '
once U.S. ground forces are
out.
"There are great pressures
I on the President to leave a re-
sidual force of ... 50,000 men
. air support, logistical sup-
(port; if that becomes the pol-
icy, we may remain indefi-
nitely," said Church.
Cooper said it was precisely
because they did not want to
hamstring the President in his
program of withdrawing
ground troops that his provi-
sion had been left with no
noel withdrawal date. Presi-
dent Nixon has said that the
United States would not fi-
nally get out of Indochina un-
less U.S. prisoners are first re-
leased aid
in a position
against the IC
er-Church pr
was intended
two condition
by law.
The admi
leashed a het
beat the Coop
sion, includim
meeting with
sistant Hear
yesterday by
tors.
Although th
44, the real
tually razor-cl
At the end
call, the vote
favor of kill
Church provh
lotions Chair
bright (D-Ark
against killire
his vote, mak
order to make
to force recon
initial vote.
A move to
1 h Vietnam is
o defend itself
r:ft. The Coop-
'!ion clearly
o nullify those
,f withdrawal
lit tration un-
? campaign to
T Church provi-
I White House
p-esidential as-
k. Kissinger
shout 20 sena-
vote was 47 to
n trgin was ac-
)s,- - one vote.
f the first roll
w ts 46 to 45 in
al the Cooper-
?t. Foreign Re-
n J. W. Ful-
, ,vho had voted
then switched
trf. it 47 to 44,
h mself eligible
,ineration of the
h wart reconsid-
'SUED
-WOUIV-118 i.suie2g
uOfl
-elquipasi punoj
2tnpu la ?TOMO atn OSIOA
-aa T TV& Rola-8aq am
trim 4A a it, ?rnrriati.
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THE WASHINGTON POST DATE PAGE
Senate Vote
On Change
In, Aid Bill
snc toted Press
Here is the 47-to44 vote by
which the Senate adopted yes-
terday an amendment by Sen.
Hugh Scott (R-Pa.) to ittrike
from the foreign aid bill the
Cooper-Church provision cut-
ting off funds for all U.S.
operations in Indochina ex-
cept funds for withdrawal:
DemocratsFvrm Fon 17
Allen (Ala.) Er
Bentsen (Tex.) F ulbrIght (Ark.)
Bible (Nev. G a mbrell (Ga.)
Byrd (Va.) Hollings (S.C.)
Long (La.)
BC.YarinrioniT(NVv.) McClellan (Ark.)
Chiles (Fla.) McGee (Wyo.)
Eastland (Miss.) Sparkman (Ala.)
Eilender (La.)
Republicans Fort 30
Ailott (Colo.) Griffin (Mich.)
Beall (Md.) Gurney (Fla.)
Bellmon (Okla.) Hansen (Wyo.)
Hrusice (Neb.)
Bennett cute,
Boggs (Del.) Packwood Ore.)
Brock (Tenn.) Pearson (Ken.)
Buckley (N.Y.) Roth (Del.)
Cook (KY.) saxbe (Ohio)
Cotton (N.H.) Scott (Pa.)
Curtis (Neb.) Smith (Maine)
Dole (Kan.) Stevens (Alaska)
Dominick (Colo.) Tbft (Ohio)
Fannin (Ariz.) Thurmond (S.C.)
Fong (Hawaii.) Tower (Tax.)
Goldwater (Ariz.) Young (N.D.
Democrats Against: 33
Anderson (N.M.) Mondale (Minn.)
BIM (Ind.) Montoya (N.M.)
Burdick (N.D.) Moss (Utah)
Muskie Main.)
Church (Idaho)
Cranston (Calif.) PNaesisotott (W(R.ls6
Eagleton (MO.) re
Gravel (Alaska) Pelt ( ..)
Hart (Mich.)
Proxmire :Vie.)
Hartke (Ind.) Randolph W. Va.)
Hughes (Iowa)
RIbtcoff ( rut.)
Humphrey (Minn.) Soong (Va.)
Jordan (N.C. Stevenson (III.)
Kennedy (MUS.) symington (Mo.)
magnuson (wash.) Talmadge (Ge.)
Mansfield (Mont.) Tunney (Cal.)
McIntyre (N.H.) Williams (N.J.)
Metcalf (Mont.)
Republicans Aealflet: 11
Mathias (Md.)
Percy (ill.)
Aiken (Vt.)
Brooke (Mass.)
Case (N.J.) Schwelker (Pa.)
Cooper (Ky.) Stafford (Vt.)
.)
Hatfield (Ore.) Welcker (Conn
Jults (N.Y.)
-FT-aright (D-Ark.) switched hje vote
In favor of the, amendment ter the
purpose of making ? motion tO re-
consider the vote.
Not voting but anounced u paired
on the amendment (pairs are Used to
denote opposing positions of Water))
when one or NMI are absent):
Jackson (D-Vvash.) esr net Harris
(D-Okla.) molts?.
Not vo,ing not paired but anitotinced
as for Me amendment.
Jordan. (R-Idatio) and Miler (.Iowa).
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THE WASHINGTON POST DATE t PAGE
Fulbright
Sees Aid
Approval
Interim Plan
To Curtail
? Military Items
By John P. MacKenzie
Washington Post Staff Writer
? Sen. J. W. Fulbright
(D-Ark.) said yesterday that
"some form of interim pro-
gram" for foreign aid may
be worked out--minus the
Nixon administration's "em-
phasis upon the military"
and other controversial
features.
Fulbright, chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, said his committee will
discuss today salvaging many
of the "least controversial" aid
items in the wake of Friday's
stunning 41-to-27 vote to kill
the administration's aid pro-
gram.
The administration mean-
while made plans for a pro-
posed continuing resolution to
maintain the current pace of
foreign aid funding beyond its
Nov. 15 expiration date, giving
the White House and Congress
time to devise an aid plan for
the future.
White House press secretary,
Ronald L. Ziegler said Presi-
dent NixOP, assessing the "se-
vere implication" of the
Senate vote, conferred with
William E. Timmons, his as-
sistant for congressional rela-
tions. Timmons in turn spoke
with Senate Minority Leader)
Hugh Scott (R-Pa.) and House
Minority Leader Gerald Ford
1
Fulbright warned that a flati
continuing resoffltion would
face strong atteimits to amend
it oil the Senate floor to elimi-
nate funds for what many
senators con4der -"the of
this program for the military
domination of other countries"
while maintaining "real aid" I
to the economies of underde-
veloped lands.
Interviewed on "Face the
Nation" (CBS, WTOP), Ful-
bright said he saw no need for
a filibuster to prevent exten-
sion of military aid to Greece
and countries in Southeast
Asia.
He listed among the "least
controversial" items aid to Is-
rael and continued help for
Palestine and Pakistan refu-
gees.
Fulbright called the Senate
vote one of the most encourag-
ng things that has happened
n Congress in recent years,
in assertion that the "old
ype" of aid sometimes called
welfare imperialism" would
e scrapped and "a new sp-
inach taken."
He said President Nixon's
ingry reaction to the United
iations vote expelling Taiwan
as one of many factors con-
ributing to the foreign aid
?ote. He charged the adminis-
ration with "over-lobbying"
ind "pressure" tactics in both
he United Nations and the
;enate and said the methods
iackfired hi both places.
See FULBRIGHT, All, Col. 1
tne charge
Ambass t-I
Gen" ush said, "That ,s
Sala ppie say (ft e
esident) didn't do enough
*ad therefore the foreign aid
31 died. itou get it coming
One way aud they slug you an-
other."
rtlush, appearing on "Issue'
Id Answers" (ABC, WMAI.)
said administration official:
took a middle course of lobby
ing vigorously "for the things
they believed strongly." He
said that although the admin
istration failed "you are going
to see a continuation because
there are a lot of humanitat-
ian things in there."
I Support for several non-mil-
itary aid items was voiced yes
tkrday by Sens. George S
cGovern (D-S.D.) and
arles Percy (R-Ill.). 'Mc-
Govern, a presidential eandi-
date, said he would offerilegis-
, lation today to restore refugee
, aid and aid to Israel but bar
military help for the "repres-
sive" Greek regime.
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NEW YORK TIMES DATE ( keiV I PA
FULBRIGHT SEES
CONGRESS VOTING
INTERIM AID PLAN
But Indicates Opposition to
Administration Package
of Military Assistance
SENATE UNIT SITS TODAY
Chairman Pledges Support
of Relief for Refugees
and Aid to Israel
By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Oct. 31 ?
Senator J. W. Fulbright, Chair-
man of the Foreign Relations
Committee, predicted today
that Congress would approve
an interim solution to keep
foreign aid alive, but he indi-
cated opposition to the formula
being devised by the Nixon
Administration.
1?,14.44laggas_I22220141.1e
of the leaders in the_agnit4e's
dafeat of the_Adrainiatraticues
fqggjgn aid bill Friday.jjat,
pledged his personal backing
for...vz la at. _hecalled t
controversial" eaneets....44or-
Oen aid, such as
lief and and military aid to Israel.
But, affirming his well-known
opposition tat ot5e7_,Aaaariegn
military assistance 43adagealaks,
l, crud h ?tlaat?akd-
ministration efforts ja_zrag,ip
a II ? - ?? ? ? ?
ri am sod T ang?p c waiLas.to
eireee wonidgin bt 4e'
fe?Lby the muld
4LICAlat-Prndura-A-1Q3B fight,
Expiration on Nov. 15
Administration sources said
today that they hoped to push
through a resolution to extend
economic and military prod
grams for 90 days after thd
existing continuing resolution
expires on Nov. 15. This would
continue aid at the rate ei? last
year's expenditures, or $2i
billion a year.
In addition, officials plan
ask for a supplemental appropi A
nation of
lion for Pakistani refugee relief
and $150-million for South V1et4 '
namese economic programs.
Approval of that package
would carry the aid program
into 1972, by which time the
Administration would have a
new coordinated program to of-
fer Congress, aides said.
Senator Hugh Scott, Repub-
lican of Pennsylvania, and Sena-
tor Jacob K. Javits, Republican
,of New York, have already in-
Idicated their desire to carry
;the Administration's fight for a
!continuation bill.
Fulbright Indicates Opposition
I But Senator Fulbright, reflect-
ling the views of the liberals
'who opposed the aid bill, large-
ly because of anger over the
I Administraton's role in Cam-
'bodia, Laos and South Vietnam,
indicated that he would not
support such an administration
package. The Senator appeared
on the Columbia Broadcasting
Company's television program,
"Face the Nation."
Senator Fulbright said thot
when the Foreign Relations
_
Committee met tomorrow morn-
ing, its members would discus
:-
the situation and see w tat
could be done.
laawn41 say?withp,pjajAv-
Iked to
II ?
? ?? - rinrdr71 ?
probably will - arn /g.it& YI?S.c.14:
The coi----iii?nittee -chatman. "?.
"There are various ways of ap-
proaching if: We do not like-1
do not like?the continuing yes-
olution approach." .
"I am thinking generally
along the lines of an interim
program which would take care
of those parts of the program
which are the least controver-
sial," he said.
"There are such things. The
children's program is universal-
ly applauded, the Palestinian
refugees, the Pakistan refugees.
No one is opposed to them. A
number of things of this char-
acter can be put together.'
Cites Military Domination
"The really controversial
things," he said, "are the use
of this program for part of the
military domination of other
countries."
Critics of the Administra-
tion's bill cite the fact that
some 55 per cent of the $3-bil-
lion dollar request was for
military aid.
Asked if he would support a
filibuster on the Senate floor
if the Administration intro-
duced a continuing resolution,
Mr. Fulbright said that that
depended whether the Adminis-
tration would seek to keep
things as they are now, with
military aid included. If the
Administration did so, he said,
he predicted "great opposi-
tion."
Israel, he noted, was "a spe-
cial case," and should be sup-
ported.
A Turnhis Point
In general, Mr. Fulbright ex-
pounded his own critical think-
ing about the way American
foreign policy had developed
in the postwar years, particu-
larly his view that the defeat
of the foreign aid bill was
something of a turning point.
He said the vote was "the
beginning of a new era?a
change in our basic foreign
policy."
Foreign aid, he said, started
out as a worthy endeavor, but
"turned into a tool of the cold
war." He said it was a form
of "welfare irriperialism" by
which the United States exerted
influence on many countries.
.J think Thiq is the becinnin
pf a re-emainAtian nf ur for-
eip'n nnlirv." he raid. "This is
of it an im ortgnt
ye
dominate hthpr rim intripq arid
thpm hp Rnhcervient to
carazill."
Senator Fulbright rejected
suggestions that the vote was
indicative of a newrise in iso-
lationism in the country: "the
idea of neo-isolationism is ab-
solutely a misuse of language,"
he said.
Citing his support for the
recent passage in the Senate of
a $2-billion appropriation for
international organizations?as
distinct from direct aid, which
he largely opposes?he said:
"The true internationalist is
the one who wants to interna-
tionalize these things, who sup-
ports things like the United
Natinns or the International
Bank."
Direct aid, he said, is "a
vehicle for imperialism, not
internationalism."
He said tt a the military sec-
tions of the A .-1 bill were used
"for the in 't) incing and per-
petuation of a isiting regimes."
"This has l sett part of the
policy of p e crvation of the
status quo, tl c prevention of
any change ix so many coun-
tries that I eel change," Sen-
ator Fulbrif al said. "And this
has?this h; .;enerally, I think
?eroded tic basis for the,
whole grog at "
i.
Bush Se Hope for Aid
In ano itr development,
George Bus a iiie United States
representat a at the United
Nations, t o) caring on the
American lr Adcasting Com-
pany's pr.( im "Issues and
Answers," ;au there had been
much disc( ni nit with the for-
eign aid pi ip cam, "but I think
in the final aaalysis, when cairn
and consi a ation take over,
that there v ill be a program
because pt le recognize there
are some ft ndamental things
being dont Caere that affect the
self-intere: of everybody in
our count- a
Mr. Bus said that the Ad-
ministratit a would take into
considerat a some of the,
complaint itade by Senator
Fulbright a id Senator Mike
Mansfield t e majority leader,
but that' ' are not going to
forgo OUT ,bligations around
the world e are not going to
withdraw
Asked 0 le felt there was a
mood of i olationism in the
country, I r Bush said: "I think
some feel ti at way and I think
the Fresh j t is determined that.
that mot 1. not be furthered."
Mr. Nix( t, he said, "realizes
that we a root withdraw into
some Fm r .ss America."
Senatm eorge S. McGovern,
the only 'It sidential hopeful on
record a; 1 1st the foreign aid
bill, we: at of Washington
Friday ni the vote was
taken.
But h ,ssued a statement
today th tIre would introduce
a bill I miorrow that would
restore a $300-million credit
to Israe -a- purchase of air-
craft, c rn inue assistance to
Pakistan lefugees and bar aid
to the trek regime. He also
said hi bill would contain'
funding o the United Nations,1
at prese t levels.
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!NIXON WILL IGNORE
CALL BY COWES
FOR VIETNAM CUTS
Signs Money Bill Including
Request for Early Pullout
Linked to P.O.W. Action
HE REBUKES THE DOVES
House Then Rejects June 1
Halt in Funds for War but
Trims Pentagon I3udget
By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times
ASH1EI Nov. 17?
President Nixon, in at= e
ta....cangreSailanal?dOle&
=peed today that he would
disre:ard an amendment set-
? rtommtwgi 'arra ed
should be with-
drawn promptly orThao-
clip. subject only to the re-
le?ase of American nrigIALea of
That restriction was con-
tained in a military procure-
ment authorization bill that the
President signed into taw today.
tives, responding to a Presi-
? hat such le is-
io r
the.saarcalwegotiated set-
gatkin a victory by refusing to
Wail opin.a -after
-
1.
Two Days of Debate
Byq,...23114, -LOA vote the
House rejected an amendment
to the defense appropriations
bill that would have provided
that none of the funds could
be used to finance military
combat or support operations
in or over Indochina"after June
1 it American prisoners of
war had been released by then.
The amendment was offered by,
Republican Edward P. Boland,
Democrat of Massachusetts.
After two days of debate the
'House went on to pass the
,bill, which provides $71-billion
iin new funds for the Pentagon
?about $2.5-billion less than
requested by the Administra-
tion.
The vote was the first direct
test of Congressional reaction
to Mr. Nixon's announcement
last week that 45,000 troops
would be withdrawn in the
next two months but that a
residual force would be main-
tained in South Vietnam until
there was a negotiated settle-
ment of the war.
The relatively one-sided vote
indicated that the Administra-
tion was still in control in
Congress on the Vietnam issue,
particularly in the House,
which has been more hawkish
than the Senate.
Since the last test in the
House in October ? when a
non-binding amendment on
trOop withdrawal was defeated
by a vote 215 to 193 ? the
doves have lost strength, large-
ly because of many members,
reluctance to cut off funds for
the war.
The apparent effect of the
President's statement challeng-
ing the withdrawal policy laid
down by Congress was to hard-
en the lines between the execu-
tive branch and the doves and
to encourage a new Senate
move to impose a policy of
complete withdrawal on the
President.
ips - e
.W4y reaches the ahe_slafense a? a ro
t
'Frs. an
/1112Y,D-11.,CAPears1
amendment specifiving th t the
=Min can use_the
1.11641.4o-agithilta21"taa14-4:441?
Mr. Nikon's statement, issued
by the White House press office
a few hours before the House
vote, was made as he signed
the bill authorizing $21.4-billion
in weapons production and re-
search by the Pentagon.
Congress had attached a i-
fi?tah-
?
.I 1 ?? 0 ? e
The amendment, still in the
Senate-passed bill, calls for total
withdrawal in six months, con-
tingent on the release of pris-
oners. As modified in a Senate-
House conference, it declares it
to be "the policy of the United
states to terminate at the ear-
liest practicable date all mili-
tary operations of the United
State in Indochina and to pro-
vide for the prompt and orderly
withdrawal of all United States
military forces at a date cer-
tain, subject to the release of
all American prisoners of war."
Mr. Nixon, in his statement,
did not take direct notice of the
fact that the modified amend-
ment represented a statement
of national policy rather than
just an expression of Congres-
sional opinion. But he made it
clear that he did not feel bound
by it.
"To avoid any miscon-
ceptions," the President em-
phasized that the Mansfield
amendment, in his opinion, "ex-
pressed a judgment about the
manner in which the American
involvement in the war should
be ended" but "does not rep-
resent the policies of this Ad-
ministration."
- amen kment h ? co
d , antinglaap g
, orce or e qct and it ? oes 4ot
? ? II a ? CO ?c .t th
way in which t e war s ould
? ? ? bigittig
the bm?cofitdining Mans-
field amendment, therefore, he
said, "will not change the poli-
cies I have pursued and that 1
shall continue to pursue toward
this end."
"Our goal?and my hope?is
a negotiated settlement provid-
ing for the total withdrawal of
all foreign forces, including
our own," the President said,
"for the release of all prison-
- ers, and for a cease-fire
throughout Indochina.
"In the absence of such a
settlement, or until such a-set-
tlement is reached, the rate of
withdrawal of U.S. forces will
be determined by three factors:
by the level of enemy activity,
by the progress of our pro-
gram of Vietnamizationsand
progress toward obtaining the
release of all of our prisoners
wherever they are in South-
east Asia, and toward obtain-
ing a cease-fire for all of
Southeast Asia."
'Hinder Rather Than Assist'
Mr. Nixon added that "legis-
lative actions such as this hin-
der rather than ?assist in the
search for a negotiated settle-
ment."
Basically the same argument
was used by the Administra-
tion's supporters in opposing
the Boland amendment. Repre-
sentative Gerald R, Ford, the
House Republican leader, said
it would stop troop withdraw-
als and jeopardize efforts to
free the nricnr...
the Pr I.,cratic side of the
Et-e-tire et tilki7rwarte. H.
ort-o-f?
e:-as, t of
ous-e-211V
121'?
tea ktrnuk eqpse-
s;encg,5" mstat 2--tbn? then
.pire 11P it jilt. Atilt!! of the
Arguing 111 t his amendment
would "imi le nent" the policy
contained in the Mansfield
amendment Mr. Boland said a
fund cutoff was necessary be-
cause the I resident, in his lat-
est troop-w thdrawal announce-
ment, had 'o?ffered no encour-
agement bout ending the
United Stat Is military role" but
had talked ilL terms of main-
taining a r siclual force.
"The wa to bring the war
to an end mid secure the re-
lease of pr- icaers of war," Mr.
Boland add "is to set a date
for Americ?n withdrawal."
To applause from the Demo-
cratic side 'qr. Boland found
it "incomp ?ehensible and inde-
fensible" f ir the president to
say he w,,u d "ignore a law
passed by ngress."
Senator ;rank Church, Demo-
crat of Id aho, who will lead
the move ii the Senate to
impose a f Ind cutoff, protested
in a stater ent that "the Mans-
field amer dment is now part
of the law a Id, as such, is not
subject tt dismissal by the
President.'
Noting bat Mr. Nixon had
accused Via: the amendment
was not '$ir ding, Mr. Church
asked: "Vt hut is he going to
do next? Thpatch Henry Kis-
singer, hi. 'oreign policy ad-
viser, to C ipitol Hill to disband
the Congr ;?
"It is t le height of fashion
these day: in Southeast Asia
to establit it one-man rule, one-
man elet Ions, and disband
pie's a ;semblies. It has hap-
pened in outh Vietnam, in
ambodia a Id in Thailand to-
ay. But ,u s is a government
f law."
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House Rejects
End-the-War
Move Again
By Richard L. Lyons
wmhinsion post Staff Writer
The House approved a $71
billion defense appropriation
bill yesterday after decisively
defeating another end-the-war
amendment.
The bill was passed by a
vote of 342 to 51 and sent to
the Senate, where the amend-
ment will be offered again. It
would have forbidden using
any of the $71 billion for U.S.
combat operations in Indo-
china after next June 1.
Yesterday's effort was the
fourth in the House this year
to set a deadline for ending
U.S. military involvement in
Indochina.
In the previous three votes
the war opponents' strength
had incresed from 158 to 176
and then to a high of 1b3. Yes-
terday the rising trend was
halted. The vote was 238 to
164.
Both Rep, Edward P. Boland
(D-Mass.), sponsor of yester-
day's amendment, and Minor-
ity Leader Gerald R. Ford (R.
Mich.), who opposed it, said
this was the toughest antiwar
provision ever put before the
House. It would have invoked
Congress' constitutionai con-
trol of the purse to cut off
See DEFENSE, A9, Col. 1
DEFENSE, From Al ltial election day. Jacobs said
Imost people believe President
funds, an at the President Nixon will end the war before
the election. "I offer this just
to make sure," he said. Jacobs
was beaten, 161 to 52.
Mahon's committee cut the
administration's Defense De-
partment spending request by
$2.5 billion, but it is still $1.5
billion above last year's fig-
ure. Inflation was cited as a
principal reason. Rep. Les As-
pin (D-Wis.) said that since the i
war is ending and the size of
the armed forces will be small-
er this year than last, the new
budget should not be any larg-
er. His attempt to cut back to
There was some question ,as,
t year's figure was beaten.
whether Boland's amendment
could not have ignored. Pre-
vious votes were on. policy
directives which he might
have been able to get around.
A spokesman for Common
Cause, a citizens' lobby, which
fought for the funds cutoff,
said that when it came down
to this tough decition, a num-
ber of House members appar-
ently did not want to take the
responsibility of withholding
funds
278 to 114,
would require total withdrawal
upon release of all American
prisoners. Boland insisted that
it did, but opponents insisted
that it did not.
Ford also argued, as leaders
of both parties in the House
have all year, that setting a
deadline would tie the hands
of the President in trying to
negotiate withdrawal of troops
by both sides and release of
prisoners. Ford said the Presi-
dent would be going to Peking
and Moscow with "one trump
card less . . . If you want the
prisoners back, defeat the Bo-
land amendment," he urged.
Rep. George H. Mahon (D-
Tex.),.' Chairman of the House
Appropriations Committee,
said the President is ending
the war and will have with-
drawn 80 per cent oi the peak
American troop strength by
February. Adoption of the Bo-
land amendment would "make
it cert fl that our sacrifice and
a
losses have been in vain," he
said.
But Etep John Flynt (D-Ga.),
arguing for the amendment,
said the armed threes are be-
ing denied needed new equip-
ment because et billions of
dollars b e tag 4-poured down
the rathole" in Vietnam.
. Rep. Andrew Jacobs Jr. (D-
Ind.) offend nother amend-
ment that would have ordered
all U.S-. troops out of Indo-
china by heXt Nov.7, presiden-
The bill would provide $21
billion to pay and support an
armed force of 2.5 million
$20.4 billion for maintenance
and operation; $18.2 billion to
buy new major weapons such
as planes, ships and missiles,
$7.5 billion for research and
development; and $3.8 billion
for pensions.
All efforts to cut the bill or
to delete specific items, such
as $800 million to buy the new
F-14 Navy fighter plane, were
defeated. The closest vote was
211 to 183, defeating a prof]
bition on any president sene
ing troops into combat for
longer than 60 days withoi
approval by Ci?ngress.
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vm.a. tztj:A?
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THE EVENING STAR r)A TE
PAG
Soviet on Arab Jets
By GEORGE SHERMAN lAmeri
Star Staff Writer
Secretary of State William R
Rogers has sought personally t
warn Soviet Ambassador Anat
ly F. Dobrynin about the dan-
gers of escalating Soviet air-
plane deliveries to Egypt.
Roaers? at an unpublicize
meetine in his office mnrednes-
day. informed II of ?th
Jigle_TUI6 bomber-
reconnaissance *lanes have ar-
rived at airfiel
andria since Nov. 1. They repre-
sent the ifrst rraler_augefie-
-(lixer-Y---13)?Et from ?see
auce-luly.
Planes Fire Rockets
More important, these planes
called "Badger," are equipped
for the first time in Egypt to fire
air -to-ground "kennel" rockets.
The medium-range $ sonic
plane, akin-TO- he outdated B-47
in the Amencan arra1, nas neen
licpd previnusly ' re-
cvnaissance over the Mediter-
ranean against tne bttrintet.
Dobrynirr,71=rolid, did
not offer Rogers any explanation
of the new deliveries or why the
planes have been given the addi-
tional missile capabilities.
? shows torn F-4 supersonic jet fighter-
flown by bombers to Israel.
pilots and, like le Yesterday, Bray said that
ers already in since Nov. 1, "we have received
bear Egyptian markings. indications of some augmenta-
is not Sur tion of Soviet aircraft in Egypt."
___arrLeaa He added that "we are going to
since the see whether these deliveries
is on the may not have opened a gap in
t what we have described as re-
to be used as straint."
taerliuers against either Step Up Pressure
rtaval targets or Sloy7-r-nOvidk
ts of the israell forties teethe But neither Bray nor any oth-
er U.S. official said the new
The recent deliveries come as TU16 deliveries upset the mili-
an embarrassment to the admin- tary balance. Because the 1301-
istration. On Monday, in an in- er is described as a "jalopy,"
terview in U.S. News and World even equipped with missiles, and
Report, Rogers had noted that because of the small number
U.S. findings up to Nov. 1 were
added so far, officials are skepti-
that the Russians had been exer- cal that they will have much
cising "some restraint" in ship- new military impact.
ment of arms to Egypt. The decision by the adminis-
That same day, department tration, however, has been to
spekesanan Charles W. Bray III bring maximum pressure on the
indicated that because the U.S. Russians, through public expo-
felt the Middle East situation sure, to prevent further aircraft
was still in military balance, deliveries. The U.S. government
Washington was still deferring still is unsure about the Soviet
decision on sending more Phan-
tian President ?rwar Sadat Oct.
14, to strength( n Egypt militari-
ly.
Yesterday, t le chief State De-
partment aid( in the Middle
East, Joseph . Sisco, called.in
Israeli A mbas .1( tor Yitzhak Ra-
bin to give IF n the American
information .,bilut the new
planes. After Vi ehalf-hour meet-
ing Rabin, illF; returned from a
five-day visit t lirael, said he is
convinced Sol ie deliveries of
supersonic jets have
continued?M contradiction to
the State Der J'ment position.
Rabin also ,ad he did not be-
lieve the Ri :4( rs assessment t
that the milit . situation was
in balance. e, en before Nov. 1.
He said Isr le has learned
"not to take lo for an answer"
in its dealing:, v ith the U.S. on
aircraft purch.s?s.
The Rogers 0 Ibrynin meeting
on Wednesda was their first
alone since Ai ust. In prepara-
tion for the a ,nounced Nixon
visit to Mosc w next May, the
pledge, given to visiting Egyp-t-two discussed f, r more than the
Middle East- r linly East-West
force reductio .s al Europe.
Delays moy U.S.
The admin st -ation has been
disturbed by Aioscow slowness
in respondim t overtures from
NATO on mi la al and balanced
"orce reducte rk in Europe. Rog-
?ts asked D-o ynin why the So
tiet gavernn 1. still had not al-
owed the ?,./ TO "e x p1 o r-
,r"?former NATO secretary
eneral Man to Brosio?to visit
loscow for i, it al soundings.
Dobrynin pears to have re-
ponded that i. is just a matter
f time. Ye terday, Bray said
lat "we an c mfident that Bro-
io will be to ng to Moscow."
le also sal( he United States
elieves Bre -is will be able to
ive an initi d assessment to the
meting of I A ro foreign minis-
Hs on Dec. t.
The Rogei robrynin meeting
s also a ba 'k irop to the strong
2riticism th, ecretary of state
issued yeste d iy of Senate ap-
propriation nmittee moves to
cut 60,000 f om the 310,000-man
American f, -t e in Europe. Rog-
ers, speakin irough Bray, said
unilateral Q1 F would undermine
the Presidf et s efforts to get
i"reciprocal i gotiated actiions"
with the Re - ins in Europe.
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E 43414,p proved For fte1esestaitiM09/138calit-RDIMBOMERPM0005099,1g3/3, :1971
field, outdoor theatre, basketball court,
swimming pool, tennis court, parking lot
and even benches and a picnic area. They'll
make a plaster of paris model and paint it.
All these learning experiences are part of
an educational idea dreamed up by James
Moffett and he wrote a book about it called,
"Student Centered Language Arts Curricu-
lum." In essence, it says, take what children
are doing, what they like to do and go from
there. The Bartlett School, to go one step
further, is planning to launch an open class-
room by the end of the year.
CTC HAS PROGRAM
Community Teamwork Inc. already has a
skills training program. CTI pays a per-
centage of the intern's salaries. This is not
teaching per se, but "presenting a learning
experience," similar to the way pioneer chil-
dren in the start of this country learned
things by watching or helping their parents.
But, again, each program, designed by the
professional staff, is built around the inter-
ests of the children . . . that's the impor-
tant aspect. The interns see what the
children need . .. then the professionals de-
sign a program to fit it. Afterwards, said Lynn
Packard, the professionals, ". . . guide them
(the interns) but we don't tell them."
Mrs. Packard is working with a girl who
had trouble understanding logical sequence.
She played checkers and chinese checkers
with the girl to show her consequences and
planning. And the end result, believe it or not
is language arts.
Language is nothing if not sequential. To
communicate well, one must explain well
and logically. All these programs thus relate
in the end to a better ability in language,
clear thinking and being able to picture
things in the mind which is only, after all,
imagination. Man thinks and then he makes
or says. It's that simple.
At the Green School, it's much the same,
but the learning experiences are presented
next door at the Smith Baker Center. A girl,
blindfolded, is rubbing her index finger over
felt letters on a cardboard piece. Before she
couldn't read letters. With this method, she
can now recognize 35 words. All this In a
mere five weeks. She's transforming a sen-
sory touch into a visual image in her mind.
Ronald Platt, her intern, is helping.
Intern Gerry Paquin has a genius on his
hands, one Danny Gagnon in the fifth grade.
Danny didn't like to read last summer. Now
he memorizes books verbatim. It was Check-
ers and chess for the first two weeks, then
a story board (sounds and pattern kit) in
which Danny decided what each character
was doing and wrote a sentence about it.
Now he takes the characters and makes up
stories, poems and even songs, and types
them out.
Under a "Little Miss Muffet" character,
Danny wrote "a girl saw a bug." Another
sentence shows "a boy being burnt by a fire
dragon." Danny was writing a song about a
king, a ghost and a piema,n as he was visited
by this reporter and was much too busy to
bother explaining it all. His intern is frankly
amazed at his scope of learning. It just took
that personal interest to bring it out. "He
uses me as a kind of dictionary," said Paquin.
A picture story by Danny, will be made into a
five-act play and slide show.
In another room, a video projector shows
stories but draws no conclusions in the
narration. Children make up their own end-
ings. At the Smith Baker Center there are a
lot of materials and the children are free to
pick what they want.
Gagnon's brother, Mark, is only in the
second grade, but he has been designing a
fancy soapbox derby racer and checks it out
after each redesign in the aisles of the cen-
ter's auditorium. His cart has steering wheels
front and back. Note that the interns don't
tell the kids how to do something, but offer
suggestions as to result. Mark redesigns by
seeing a problem, defining the problem, and
figuring a way to beat it. His intern, Mrs.
Elmer Hall gives him lots of attention and
praise and might help him define the prob-
lem after he's discovered it, but he decides
how to solve it.
It's the freedom that's important.
Another boy, Joseph Sullivan in the fourth
grade is making a lighthouse out of this same
mechanical advantage kit.
And on stage, ladies and gentlemen, pre-
senting those great American actors, Bruce
Callicutt, Manny Athenais, Eileen Call and
Albert Potter wowing their two intern help-
ers as they devise a play on the spot. Callicutt
is the lunch thief, Athenais catches him, Call
had her lunch stolen and Potter is "Frank",
the one who saw the lunch thief break a
window. One of the interns plays the prin-
cipal and the action is hot and heavy. The
kids really get fired up and for all intents and
purposes the play is real. They make up their
lines as they go along.
A teacher in the program noted, "Young-
sters get very little air-time, time to express
their feelings at home or in large classes.
Here they do."
In the old days, children were supposed to
be seen and not heard. At Model Cities Educa-
tion, they'i?een, heard, helped and ap-
preci d.
ETNAM: PAST AND PRESENT
HON. BARRY M. GOLDWATER, JR.
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, May 12, 1971
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. Speaker, dur-
ing the past decade there has been much
rhetoric relative to the facts on the Viet-
nam war. Unfortunately, both the facts
and Vietnamese people have been lost in
the shuffle from the debate emanating
from both sides. What America needs is
less hawks and doves and more owls. We
need to approach matters wisely, not
from emotion ridden ideas.
For far too long we have attempted to
view the situation through Western col-
ored glasses. This is very naive and un-
wise. It is interesting to note that the
average Army basic trainee receives no
relevant information about the Vietnam-
ese people; their culture, values, or tra-
dition. This is like sending a man un-
armed into a political revolution warfare
situation. Understanding these afore-
mentioned facts are as important as his
rifle and his knowledge of how to use it.
Certainly this is shocking but it has
been a prevalent Western attitude too
long.
The following information was pre-
pared from the best sources available on
the Vietnam history and conflict. I wish
to present this material in the hopes that
this one candle will help to diminish
some of the darkness surrounding the
true situation in Vietnam.
The material follows:
VIETNAM PERSPECTIVE 1954-70
THE GENEVA ACC0RD'S-1954
The Geneva Conference held in 1954 to
settle the Indochina War resulted in Accords
signed by only two powers: France and North
Vietnam. The Accords provided for a military
cease-fire, a regroupment of military forces,
the provisional division of Vietnam into two
zones divided at the 17th parallel, and the
free movement of the population between the
two zones for a period of 360 days. The Ac-
cords also called for the creation of an In-
ternational Control Commission (Canada,
Poland and India) to a
mentation of the provisio
In declarations attacI
(and unsigned by any po
lated that free elections
accordance with dem,
should be held in July
States and South Vietn:
effective United Nations
pervision for these electie
then and now, totally re.
in Vietnam. The U.S. a
therefore refused to sigi
Accords. No powers signs
tions attached to the Accr
,pervise the impie-
:d to the Accords
vers), it was stipu-
M secret ballot in
ea rtic procedures
1956. The United
in each had urged
el ification and su-
n., North Vietnam,
ected any U.N. role
ad South Vietnam
he 1954 Geneva
I he final declara-
rear.
NGO DINH .11 M
In South Vietnam, the oc:itical focus rest-
ed on Ngo Dinh Diem. Iran was appointed
Prime Minister of the 5- ate of Vietnam by
Emperor Bao Dai in 1954 before the Geneva
Accords were drawn up. Be was supported
by the United States as esult of his long
record as a nationalist, r or -Communist po-
litical leader. Diem was r.ot an American
puppet nor was he Cardi la Spellman's silly
putty. He had only come to the attention of
Americans in 1951 but Dent was the son of
the grand chamberlain )f the emperor at
the Imperial Court in Int city of Hue in
Central Vietnam. Born i Ito a family which
had a long tradition of a holicisrn (nearly
two million Vietnamese 1r South Vietnam
today are Catholic) Dia i was educated at
the same high school the I lo Chi Minh had
attended in Hue city.
Diem became well-knot n throughout Cen-
tral Vietnam as a dedicatt d. honest and com-
petent nationalist. In 19O, following service
as a District Chief, Diet .'s talents come to
the attention of the Frei al, administration.
The French subsequentl ,isfered Diem the
position of Minister of i merlon Diem took
the post on condition the t he French grant
genuine concessions tow rc increased Viet-
namese independence. IN: en it became clear
that the French had no mentions of keep-
ing their word, Diem resig after 18 months
of service warning the French that they
would lose their hold on ac tnam-as a result
of denying Vietnamese ieal role of par-
ticipation.
In 1940, Diem refused v ith equal stub-
borness to collaborate wh Is the Japanese oc-
cupation forces in Vietna:n He remained an
obdurate Central Vietn rmese patriot. In
1945, Diem's brother was buried alive by Ho
Chi Minh's forces in Nor Is Vietnam?a fact
that Diem never forgot m forgave. Ho later
offered Diem a position ]n North Vietnam's
short-lived "coalition" rcr.-ernment. Diem
refused the offer.
THE EMERGENCE OF THE 4 01 IMUNIST THREAT
In 1951, Diem was encc mitered by Ameri-
can scholars in Tokyo. H N., as searching for
help for Vietnam, just as Ho Chi Minh had
left Vietnam in 1912 ne, er to return until
1941. Subsequently, Diem "ane to the United
States. He felt the need or help was more
urgent than ever due to 1 ie events that had
taken place in Southeas Asia. A coalition
government formed with n: tionalists, Com-
munists and neutralists I Iianoi by Ho Chi
Minh had been destroy d in six months
during the summer and a It trim of 1946 and
Ho Chi Minh had abolish al the Communist
party which had only a ev months before
destroyed the nationalists in the coalition.
By 1951, with Mao Tsal.1 irg in control of
the Chinese mainland at d involved in the
Korean War, Ho Chi M had felt bold
enough to abolish the hr a,i national front
and resurrect the Commt, iLt party in pub-
lic position of leadershil Named the Lao
Dong (Workers) Party, a: Vlarch 1951 this
antagonistic non-Vietnam -s' organism once
again was in the saddle. ( k heory of a Ger-
man named Hegel and a 'tson of a German
named Marx was going to or. translated into
a dictatorship of the pro] 'teriat on the un-
willing backs of a people war were fighting
for genuine Vietnamese a lependence and
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tecting the rights of our citizens and the
principles of American justice without
which democracy could not survive. All
too often, our policemen are critized un-
justly. They are rarely recognized for the
services they perform. As we witness the
increase in domestic ills?such as drug
abuse, violent crime, and civil disobedi-
ence?the role of the policeman in our
society becomes all the more important.
Rural America is not isolated from the
domestic problems which plague the
large urban areas. All law enforcement
agencies share common responsibility
regardless of their locale and that is to
protect the public domain. They have ful-
filled that responsibility in an exemplary
manner. During this National Police
Week and throughout the year I know
that all law-abiding citizens join with me
in saluting our law enforcement agencies
and in pledging our continued support of
them in the same loyal manner as they
have served us.
MODEL CITIES?NEW CONCEPT IN
EDUCATION
HON. F. BRADFORD MORSE
OP MASSACHUSETTS
ES THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, May 11, 1971
Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, there is cur-
rently underway in Lowell, Mass., a most
unique program in education, operated
under the auspices of the model cities
program and with the leadership of its
education director, Patrick J. Mogan.
The individual skills education pro-
gram, as it is called, seeks in new and
highly creative ways to enhance the
learning process and to make the learn-
ing experience a more successful and cer-
tainly a more enjoyable one, for both the
disadvantaged child as well as the ex-
ceptionally skilled one, and for teacher
as well as pupil.
It calls on the abilities of a corps of
high-trained professional specialists, and
with financial assistance from Commu-
nity Teamwork, Inc., is able to combine
learning with teaching for some 15 in-
terns.
The program is being successfully em-
ployed as a supplement to standard
teaching practices in several schools and
will be expanded in the future. Indeed,
I look forward to more of the same re-
sults that have been described in the fol-
lowing article from the Lowell Sun. It
makes for heartening reading, and I am
pleased to include it at this point, for the
attention of my colleagues:
[From the Lowell (Mass.) Sun, Apr. 15, 19711
MODEL CITIES?NEW CONCEPT IN EDUCATION
(By Lee Wood)
Lowaia.?The scene is one of utter con-
centratioh. As one enters in Bartlett School,
three young boys and a young man are hud-
dled on the floor, in the hallway, near a win-
dow. On the floor is a map of Lowell. On top
of the map is a transistor radio, laying on its
back.
What is happening?
Simple. The boys are learning the direc-
tion of the radio stations on the map. This
leads to eaplanatiorts by the young man of
the directions streets are laid out and even-
tually into mapping. The approach is to take
what the boys are interested_ in and go on
from there.
And it works. Ten minutes later Wayne
Colby has the avid attention of the three boys
as he explains the layout of the City of
Lowell. Saturday, he and the boys will take
a hike, make a tape of the sounds heard in
the woods during the hike and take slide
pictures. Later they will narrate a slide show
and talk of what they saw and heard.
Wayne Colby is an intern. But not in a
medical hospital. He's one of 15 interns, all
studying to be teachers, that are led by three
professional specialists and two staff ad-
ministrators in a highly effective Individual
Skills Education Program through the
auspices of the Model Cities Program.
At the Bartlett, just one of seven schools to
eventually enter in the program, 44 students
were deeply engrossed in writing plays, put-
ting out a newspaper, designing a town,
learning word combinations and making col-
leges among other subjects. Step by step they
were allowed to make decisions and work to-
ward a reachable goal . . . all based on their
own interests. Students are free to roam
around and look at the other projects. But
most were so interested in what they were
doing that they had to all but be pried loose
to talk about it. The groups are gathered in
bunches of one to three children per intern.
The results have been good. One boy re-
fused to read in school. Now he can memorize
entire short books and narrate the story back
verbatim into a recorder days later. He's
writing plays and songs.
A girl, who somehow couldn't get the shape
of letters clear in her mind, has learned to
recognize 35 words on sight in a couple of
months.
Four children at the Green School are act-
ing out plays on the spot, improvising their
feelings, problems and imagination in such
a way that one feels the play is real.
Each group of children is making a book
as a history of his project and Polaroid pic-
tures and illustrations are profuse through-
out each book.
INTERNS AGED 18-27
The interns range in age from 18 to 27.
Most come from the Acre and this is where
the program is oriented. Each presently han-
dles 12 children overall, in four programs of
one hour each. The idea, mainly, is to use a
series of steps in learning for skill develop-
ment.
The programs are designed. by professional
teachers who circulate through the rooms
the cafeteria at Bartlett) while the interns
help the students. The program offers assist-
ance to all sorts of children, from those with
reading disadvantages to those of exceptional
skill.
It is a service to the-school ... giving chil-
dren individual attention for at least three
hours per week, Monday, Wednesday and Fri-
day and is meant as a supplement rather
than a replacement for standard teaching
practices. One result is to boost language
arts. The interns learn just as much from
the kids as vice-versa and it helps them to
win credits toward their teaching certificates.
Mr. and Mrs. Leonard K. Eisenhood are
developing a bi-lingual approach. Both are
fluent in Portuguese, Spanish and French
besides their native English, and both have
been involved in the Migrant Education Pro-
gram and have college degrees.
The three professional teachers all with
Master's degrees, are: Sister Frances Gill
with 35 years in the education field and co-
ordinator for the Mor-Harris, with a back-
ground in Just about everything, including
exceptional students (both retarded and
highly intelligent), the Bartlett and Green
School coordinator and Lynn B. Packard,
with teaching credits in Holland, this state
and in newspaper work and communications.
PATRICK MOGAN DIRECTOR
Patrick J. Mogan, the director of educa-
tion at Model Cities is well known in Lowell
and was the assistant superintendent of
schools in this city for four years. His assist-
ant, Peter S. Starnes, is a Harvard University
graduate, attended Massachusetts State Col-
lege at Boston for his Masters in Education
and is going for his doctoral degree at Boston
University.
Mogan personally picks the interns whose
greatest qualifications seem to be their pa-
tience, quiet competence, ability toadapt to
the directions in which the children want to
go and most of all to their way of relating to
the kids as people-to-people rather than
teacher-to-student. There is a built in evalu-
ation program as each student is rated on an
attitude scale.
Hey wait! What's that kid doing over there?
He's destroying- a tree. Nope. That boy is
breaking branches off a small dead tree on
the school stage. And he will take those pieces
of stick and will build a log cabin. This will
be included as part of a model village (in
plaster of pails) to include other houses
built with rocks and other materials. It
allows the youngsters to learn how a basic
material ends up as part of an overall fin-
ished product that is still a part of a larger
product, the community.
LEARN TO RE LATE
The boys and girls, in this program, get to
relate to other youngsters and adults in a
unique way. It's free expression on their part.
Intern Ross Hanvey is helping Michael Lau-
rent in the 5th grade, and 5th graders, Daryl
Phillips, Dolores Sylvester and Debra Fierley.
The program has shown a gradual growth
in the children's work and their books.
Another example: An intern brings in a
motorcycle helmet full of collages to show
the children just one of the ways art can be
done with collages and one end use of same.
But what are those sixth graders doing
playing with blocks? Isn't that childish for
their age? Not at all. Calvin Burdick and
Robert Daigneault are doing free expression
with blocks. They make individual buildings
with these plastic parts, draw a picture of
the building, then make another until they
have a picture made of a small city. And
when it's finished, it will be their city, that
they made themselves. "This gives them a
concept of the way a city is structured," said
Bud Prevette, the intern. "They're able to
see one-way streets and the reasons for them,
for instance."
One girl is off by herself typing a story
(-typewriters are very common in the pro-
gram), Steven Cochran, fifth grade, is de-
signing a puppet stage for his group's pup-
pet allow.
COMPOSE PLAY
Meanwhile, Tina Cox and Paula Camille,
both sixth graders, have composed a 17-char-
acter play about drugs. "This is to prove that
drugs aren't any good," said Tina. The girls
are leaving the play ending open so the audi-
ence will think about it. Intern Albert Kehoe
is helping them. He said it will be a three
act play and the girls have even made the
characters :sign "contracts" so the players,
"hate to show up."
Intern Mrs. Elmer Hall is assisting Barbara
Burdick, Efry Stavroulias, Christine Minezzi
and Cathy Kanellos in making a newspaper
to be called, "The Legend.." It will be an-all-
girl newspaper and articles will include items
on the four seasons, the different projects at
the Bartlett School, poems, the girls' play,
plus reviews of other plays, and even a fash-
ion section.
Sixth graders Charles Cooper and Phillip
Ting:as don't like the North Common area.
So, they're redesigning it to be a recreation
center. Intern Patricia Brogan said they even
want to put a plastic dome over it for all-
weather protection. The boys outdid them-
selves with the design to include: a baseball
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fought against the Lao Dong Pat y Two di-
visions of North Vietnamese re ;trar army
troops were sent in to suppress 1) is rebel-
lion, but the troops could not er s -the fact
that the people of North Vietnarr v. ere emu-
lating the revolts flaring in Polan ; nd Hun-
gary a half a world away again he same
system of totalitarian Communis
This was the atmosphere in 1) 56 when
the North Vietnamese might otr: 'r vise have
held the Geneva-prescribed ele tims. The
precincts in North Vietnam r ens rotten.
There were no model unificati n elections -
there either. Ho wept on natio; al radio in
North Vietnam and apologized lr errors
and mistakes of the land reform o> ecutions:
"My children, Land Reform is lie hot soup,
it must be taken slowly." GI Giap,
hero of Dienbienphu and Defel st Minister
of North Vietnam apologized bef a formal
meeting of the Party Congress, s' re :sing that
the murders and tortures that 1 at occurred
during those two years were a r n it of over
zealous actions.
the freedom in village self-government terms
that has characterized the three regions of
Vietnam for centuries.) The Lao Dong Party
was in fact but another reincarnation of the
first political brainchild of Ho Chi Minh fresh
from his 1923-25 training in Moscow?the
Indochinese Communist Party of 1930.
DIEM AND 9'HE U.S.
Diem's quest for U.S. support was redou-
bled after the emergence of the Lao Dong
Party from behind the mask of the broad
national front against the French in March
1951. Diem was favorably regarded by Sena-
tor John F. Kennedy, Senator Mike Mans-
field and a host of American political spokes-
men who regarded him as a genuine Viet-
namese nationalist.
In 1954, the United States decided to sup-
port Diem for the post of Prime Minister
when he was being considered by Emperor
BaO Dai for that job. One reported French
reaction to Diem's selection was: "He is the
last cigarette in the pack." It was a French
estimate that Diem would last only a few
weeks. Diem proved to be adept at survival,
becoming Prime Minister in 1954 and in 1955
defeating Bao Dai in a national referendum
for the position of President. Diem remained
President of South Vietnam until November
1963.
REBUILDING IN THE SOUTH
As President of South Vietnam, Diem was
able to restore telecommunications, rebuild
roads, triple educational enrollment, increase
health facilities in the countryside, re-settle
nearly a million refugees, meet the chal-
lenges of armed political-religious sects
threatening the government's authority, de-
stroy the Binh Xuyen, (a Mafia-like organi-
zation which controlled the opium, gambling
and prostitution in Vietnam which was one
of the troublesome legacies from the days of
French control) and register a very large in-
crease in rice production. Diem had set
South Vietnam on an impressive course of
economic reconstruction. Professor Hans
Morgentha,u lauded Diem and his impressive
efforts in 1956 as "a living miracle."
THE DEMISE OF VILLAGE ELECTIONS
On the other hand, confronted by the il-
legal presence of some 5,000 Communist
troops in five hold-out areas in South Viet-
nam, Diem was deeply worried about security
in the countryside. He reacted by repressing
political opposition. In June 1956, Diem
abolished village self-government in South
Vietnam. The election of village councils had
been a cherished Vietnamese tradition dat-
ing back to the 1600'3. Diem's action though
perhaps understandable in terms of mili-
tary security opened a deep political vul-
nerability in the countryside which the Com-
munist cadres skillfully exploited during the
following three years. It should be noted that
the many local grievance groups that existed
in the countryside proved to be fertile tar-
gets for the Communist organizers who were
determined to prepare the political battle-
field in South Vietnam.
DIEM AND THE GENEVA ELECTION ISSUE
Control Commission teams which were sup-
posed to be available to all. Only those who
could reach the ICC teams in the former
French-held areas of the Red River Delta had
much chance of stating their choice. Others
forged papers and tried to slip past the Com-
munist Party security squads which sought
to prevent such contact.
U.S. OPINION ON THE 1956 ELECTION ISSUE
Diem was adamant in. his reservations. It
was certain that the Communist regime
would regiment more votes at the ballot box
than the South's voting age population could
match. The ICC with its pro-Communist
Polish representatives could not provide any
assurances of a free electoral test. Without
U.N. supervision, Diem felt any elections be-
tween North and South would be meaning-
less. American spokesmen such as Senator
John F. Kennedy and Senator Mike Mansfield
agreed. They continued to press for an elec-
tion formula calling for effective interna-
tional supervision and warned against "forc-
ing Diem" into these rigged and unrepresen-
tative elections.
THE POST-GENEVA RECORD
The fact that South Vietnam had never
signed the Geneva Accords, added to the
strength of Diem's refusal to submit to the
Communist demands on this issue. By July
1956, France, one of the two signatories of
the Accords, had departed South Vietnam
and North Vietnam had consistently violated
important provisions of the Geneva agree-
ment by several significant policies. More
than 5,000 regular army troops loyal to the
Lao Dong Party, the Communist Party of
North Vietnam, were left in the South in
1954 -55. Their refusal to regroup to the
North as the Geneva Accords had prescribed
provided North Vietnam with a built-in
military threat to South Vietnam's develop-
ment and survival.
The size of North Vietnam's regular army
at home was trebled in open defiance of spe-
cific stipulations in the Accords that no in-
crease would take place. In South Vietnam
meanwhile, 685 U.S. military advisors were
assigned to training tasks in answer to a
request by President Diem and in accord-
ance with the Accords provisions permitting
rotation of training personnel. At the same
time, South Vietnam's regular army was
reduced in size to keep within the Geneva
stipulations even though neither South Viet-
nam nor the U.S. were signatories to the Ac-
cords.
Diem had profound concern about any
election contest with North Vietnam. He
knew the record of North Vietnam's Stalinist
regime ruled out the possibility that the
North would hold democratic and free elec-
tions by secret ballot. The record of Ho Chi
Minh's systematic betrayal of Vietnamese
nationalists to the French during the pre-
vious decades was further cause for caution.
Diem also knew that the North (even after
the flight of nearly a million refugees to the
South) simply outnumbered the South in
terms of voting population. Ho Chi Minh had
violated the Geneva Accords signed by North
Vietnam on the stipulations concerning free
choice of movement for the people of the
North and the South. Communist roadblocks
prevented most of the people of North Viet-
nam from ever reaching the International
INSIDE NORTH VIETNAM 1954-1956
Ho Chi Minh's regime in North Vietnam
by 1956, was experiencing widespread unrest
and resistance to the bloody "land readjust-
ment" campaign which killed small farmers
and landholders as a preparatory step to
turn their lands into collective farms. There
were a minimum of large landlords in North
Vietnam which had traditionally been a?
country of small farms and land worked by
the owners. Nevertheless, more than 50,000
people were executed by the Communist
Party campaign in two years. By 1956 more
than a half a million people were in forced
labor camps or re-education centers and
countless families had been destroyed by
wives being forced to -divorce their husbands
who had been branded "reactionaries." In
August 1956, intellectuals in Hanoi publicly
demanded the overthrow of the Lao Dong
Party publishing their demand in the news-
paper "Nhan Van" (Humanity). The Lao
Dong Party closed the protesting newspapers
and periodicals, suppressed the university
students and jailed the dissenters.
REBELLION IN NORTH VIETNAM-1956
In November 1956, despite regime apolo-
gies for the "tortures and murders" of the
previous two years, the farmers of Ho Chi
Minh's home province of Nghe Anh, rose
against their Stalinist masters, seized guns
from the Communist Party armory and
HO CHI MINH
When Ho took power as a C Immunist
leader in North Vietnam in 195.1 le had al-
ready traveled a long and specs) road. He
had been born in 1890 with the ni-me: Ngu-
yen That Thanh. (Nguyen W to Will Be
Victorious). In his lifetime he vc old adopt
and discard 21 aliases to mask ; identity.
His father was a functionaire ai d was alter-
nately working for and being p 'o..ecuted by
the French. In 1912 Ho left VI, train under
an alias as a cabin boy on a Fre ship and
in time sailed from Marseilles, F -a.lce on the
maritime routes that took hLi to Africa,
New York City and London. In tl e years of
World War I he was in France ?re he was
known as Nguyen 0 Phap tg-iyen Who
Hates the French). In 1919 he re ited a top
hat and tails and attempted o present a
petition for Vietnam's indepen ie Ice to the
Big Four peace conference mei- ti g at Ver-
sailles. They were too busy to a e
ALIAS NGUYEN Al QI.B
In 1920, re-inforcing his yea s of contact
with the Socialist movement i T.urope, he
attended the socialist Congre s at Tours,
France and when the meeting ol t into two
factions, he followed the Comrr ,11 ist faction
into session and became a four ii ig member
of the French Communist Part- 'le adopted
the name: Nguyen Al Quoc E:guyen the
Patriot). His French Communi t 'arty roots
would show clearly years later a hen he, in
1946, negotiated the return o he French
to Vietnam (the French Corn annist Party
felt it had a good chance o 'onquering
France by parliamentary actice 1 1946 and
issued orders that year to th ? Vietnamese
Communist Party that "unde :o circum-
stances should any attempt be :la tde to pre-
vent the return of French tr.ops to Viet-
nam in 1946"). Ho Chi Minh ia--gained the
French in to get the occupyim Chinese Na-
tionalist troops and influence 31 t of North
Vietnam. Southern Commun :t: protested
the entire arrangement chargir go with be-
ing a nation seller and a betn yer. This was
not a new allegation on Ho's re ?ord.
After the 1920 founding o he French
Communist Party, Nguyen Al ni.)0 was sent
to Moscow to the Lenin Instil rt for train-
ing at the Toiler of the East Sc hool. There
from 1923-1925 he refined h s skills as a
Communist organizer.
In 1925, he was assigned to 'a iton, China
as a member of the Russ' An Consulate
headed by Borodin. Nguyen A: Quoe was
listed as a clerk and an inter) reamr, but his
real job was to organize Comm n st activities
in Southeast Asia. One of Ngt ei Al Quoc's
first acts upon arrival in Canto v as to invite
to Shanghai the leading Viet, at aese fighter
against the French, Phan Bc -emu. Chau
had been leading the strugg .r1 against the
French for more than 25 yea. qiside Viet-
nam. Nguyen Ai Quoe's org, inzation sold
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Phan Bel Chau to the French security police 'SITE LEGACY or NGUYEN AI Quocsatese Front and the believers in local grievance
in Shanghai, China in 1925. A trip to talk After France lost at Dienbienphu in 1954 causes. Once again the Front, well along the
shout revolution had ended in betrayal and
nationalist struggle against the French was ond the Geneva Accords were signed in road to what it assumed to be victory, was
Prance and North Vietnam, Ho had a difficult effectively abolished in favor of Party control
weakened by the actions of the Communist time explaining to the Southern Communist of policy and apparatus.
erganizer, Nguyen Ai Quoc. Two hundred
movement of his organization why. having THE CRUCIAL YEAS 1954?sHouLD THE NORTH -
other ether nationalists of various parties were
lost the war in 1954, France was to be per- ERN ARMY GO IN?
subsequently invited to China by Nguyen Ai netted two more years to hang on in South
In 19C4 most of the effective Southern
Quoc to study revolution. After a year's
Vietnam. One reason was that the Sov:tet
study at Whampoa Military Academy many of manpower pool cf re-groupees that had been
Union had insisted that Ho give France two
them refused to join the Communist move- sent North for training in 1954 had been
more years in Indochina as an incethive for
mans and they too were betrayed to the used up. There still had been no uprising
the French to vote against the European De-
French Surete as they attempted toof the masses in South Vietnam to the Corn-
tense community plan then being considered
munist banner, though Diem was increas-
clandestinely return to Vietnam. Nationalists
in the French Parliament. Thus it was for
ingly unpopular as a result of his deterior-
who had thus encountered Nguyen As Quoc's
the International Communist prierity of
organization had the contemporary opinion ating administrative apparatus in the coun-
weakening the Western European defenses
trysicle and those who carried out programs
that Nguyen Ai Quoc was betraying Viet- which denied the 250 Soviet army divisions,
Siamese nationalism not fostering it. Nguyen that Ho Chi Minh sold out the liepes of in negative fashion using his name. POT the
Al Quoc had to flee for safety to northeast tee Southern Communists. North the real question was: "if Southern
Thailand when the coalition arrangement be- cadres trained in the North are now in short
LAD NEWS POR THE SOUTHERN COMMUNISTS
tween the Chinese Nationalists and the supply, could the regular Northern army
Chinese Communists broke down in 1928. Between 80,000 to 100,000 Southerners had be sent in to wrap up the war fast?" In 1964,
T EIE "DEATH" 01' NGUYEN AI QUOC
teen ordered to go North at the time of the Lao Done Party moved the NVN army
Geneva to train and prepare in the North into training camps preparing for such a
fn 1930 Nguyen Al Quoc held a Congress of for the return-to South Vietnam to organize shift in policy and in September and ?e-
ine quarreling factions of the Indochina the Communist vote in the South in 1956. tober 1964 the first regular units of the
Communist groups in Hong Kong. There he For these Southern Communists who were North Vietnamese Army began to move down
founded the Indochinese Communist Party in North Vietnam, the North's land reform the Ho Chi Minh trail through Laos and
thus surfacing his Communist allegiance so revolt and the Party's eroded political con- into South Vietnam. The numbers increased
repugnant to Vietnamese nationalists. In dition were bad news. The need was plain, as she months went by. From an initial ad-
1933 Nguyen Al Quoc was reported dead and The balance between HOr'S problems and vance party of 300 in November and Decem-
his death was accepted as genuine by COM- Diem's progress had to be corrected by a her 1964, the Northern involvement rose to
inunist and non-Communist Vietnamese shift in tactics. several thousand by the spring of 1965 and
alike. The Communist Vietnamese were
grieved, but the nationalist Vietnamese were SZTURN TO THE SOUTH TO ORGANIZE AND KILL eve:ntually to the 10 divisions (160,000 men)
in the South today. It was these troops,
more restrained in their mourning since the The Southern Communist re-groupees,
betrayer of their colleagues had passed to trained in North Vietnam went back into the wearing uniforms and insignia, coming in
regular unit formations, that constituted the
his next reincarnation. Some were plainly South to focus the local grievances in the beginning of an actual invasion of the South
relieved that the leading menace to the villages of the countryside, to organize re-
sistance to the central Government 1/1 South by the North. The pattern of the war had
nationalist movements was gone. They buried
changed.
Vietnam, and to kill by assassination and
their grin:lees with the memory of Nguyen
Ai Quoc. terror those serving the government cause THE U.S. REEPONSE?MISCALCTJATE ON
AL/AS HO CHI MINH al the countryside. It was this pattern, using BY T:HE NORTH
lie 5,000 hold-out stay-behind Communist The U.S. was now to be tested. Did it mean
After the false report of his death, snxms that Ho had ordered to remain in what it had always said? Would the South
Nguyen Al Quoc, under a variety of other s.row in the South, that enabled these local Vietnamese be overrun? The North could well
aliases worked in Thailand, Malaya, and the ,aouthern re-groupees to carry out their tasks, reflect in 1970 that they had made a major
Soviet union. In 1941, eight years later, They killed the corrupt first, the efficient miscalculation in 1964. For the U.S. response
Nguyen Al Quoc emerged from a Chinese eecond and never touched, the mediocre. A with the combat forces arriving in March
Nationalist prison and under the alias of Ho lot of Vietnamese started to get medicare in and June 1965 prevented the collapse of
Chi Minh?"Ho who is determined to be en- I be performance of their tasks simply to get South Vietnam and remains today the ma-
iightment"?was sent into Vietnam by the 1.0 the next year. The killings started in 1957. jor element blocking a North Vietnamese
O.S.S. to organize an escape net for allied The Communists never publicly mentioned military victory on the battlefield. Moreover,
pilots in Japanese occupied North Vietnam, Communism nor did they create a public in 1969 President Nixon's Vietnamization pol-
ite was also sponsored by a Chinese nation- Communist organization. They simply rode icy for the first time turned priority atten-
allets warlord who wanted to wrap IED North the tiger of local grievance, joining and sup- tion to the training and equipping of the
Vietnam for himself as a V-J day present. porting whatever the local organizations and South Vietnamese in a role of leadership
As Ho Chi Minh, new in name and appear- memories would respond to and at the same which places the burden for the defense of
mice (tuberculosis had aged and emaciated time the network of clandestine Communist the South on the shoulders on the South-
him, prison had grayed his hair) encoun- agents and membership spread carefully in erners. The on-going U.S. troop reduction is
tered Vietnamese nationalists, he avoided any a technique the Communists professionally timetabled to enable the South-to prepare to
identification with Nguyen Al Quoc's record, called "bead-stringing." There was much meet this challenge. Such a shift can only
downgraded the Communist Party Nguyen local grievance to exploit. The scene Was represent anathema to the North. For
Al Quoc had created and asked people to set for the next three years of Communist Southerners have never in 2,500 years of
loin in a Front against the Japanese. Under assassinaticn, terror and organizing. them Vietnamese history been ruled by Northern-
this name and with this' organizational grew increasingly repressive in response to ers and a trained and equipped Southerner
mask, Ho Chi Minh became the war hero and the deteriorating security situation, in his own back yard is the strongest psy-
liberation hero of most Vietnamese. (Not , chological barrier to a North Vietnamese
inril 1960 in public print in Hanoi did Ho cREATION OP THE NLP?A N OTHER "FRONT'
regular army intruder into the South. That
Chi Minh admit that he was Nguyen Ai In December 1960 the National Liberation is why the North has attempted to preserve
Quoc.) Front was formed since Diem was nearly the fiction for so long that it really has no
BEHIND THE MASK?THE COMMUNIST oeerthrown by a coup the previous month troops in the South and at the same time has
PARTY 0"14 the Communists were still publicly op- insisted that the U.S. must withdraw uni-
e -as ing entirely through the diversity and laterally and precipitately get out so that
Consistently throughout the years from variety of local grievances. They had to have there will be a guaranteed Southern collapse
1941 through 1945, the Communist move- a national organization that the people could of the non-Communist nationalists. That is
,nent hid under the mask of a Front. In 1945 join if Diem was toppled. The National Lib- the only way North Vietnam (with the mask
with the Jaoanese surrender the Commu- eration Front was a spin-off of Ho Chi Minh's of the NLF shredded and torn by the Tet
nist movement emerged, entered a coalition long experience in masking his unpopular offensive of 1968 which resulted in the ex-
government in 1946 which was nationalists, Communist Party's identity behind broad ecution by the Southern Communists of
communist and neutralist in representa- popular facades. But the- people's Revolu- 5,700 people in the city of Hue in 26 days of
Lion. In six months, the Communists had tionary Party (PRP) was also included in- occupation) can hope for a military saccess
murdered, arrested or terrorized the nation- side the Front. This was in fact the Southern in South Vietnam. They had never thought
alists into flight, and the iron control of the branch of the Lao Deng Party and ite con- the U.S. would in fact come to the aid of
any had been established. However, when troiling role in the Front, which was largely South Vietnam with troops when for seven
the war with the French began a month later, a propaganda facade and apparatus, became years South Vietnam was being cut to pieces
Ho once again found it necessary to abolish painfully evident in 1962 when the PRP an- and the U.S. had tent only a few advisors.
publicly the Communist Party and create a flounced publicly that it was a "Marxist- Now the North is equally worried about how
broad popular front which nationalist non- Leninist Party, the vanguard of a Commu- to get the Americans out fast. President
Communists could be expected to join. flls R,evolution." This was sad tidings for the Nixon has indicated that one of the ways
,',1i,4111110#111.11101111WEOWEIN
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May 13, 1
that the war can be most speedily resolved
is by meaningful negotiations at Paris or
elsewhere. If the Hanoi leadership refuses to
negotiate then the Vietnamization program
will be a constant reminder that as they
dally, the South Vietnamese who have a deep
residual abiding rivalry with the North are
being given more time and tools to get ready.
NEW POLITICAL GROWTH AT THE RICE ROOTS IN
THE SOUTH-1967-1970
It is in this context that the series of
elections from the village to the Presidency
in South Vietnam should be viewed. Village
self-government is back. The present Saigon
leadership reincarnated this venerable Viet-
namese tradition in 1967. It also fostered a
budget and leadership role for the _village
councils that more appropriately equate with
the 20th century needs for services and de-
velopment. Village elections were held in
1,000 villages in 1967. Another 1,600 villages
were able to conduct elections as a result
of the inability of the Communist forces to
keep government contact away from the vil-
lages following the 1968 Tet offensive which
cost the Communist more than 230,000 dead
and opened up, as a result, communications
and access to nearly 1,000 more villages in
the following six months. Thus 2,000 of the
total 2,300 villages in South Vietnam today
have ignored Viet Cong threats, have voted
for their own local leadership and are busy
'trying to rebuild their own local society de-
spite the decade of war. The national elec-
tions, which also have ignored the VC have
resulted in a House and Senate, a Presidency
and Vice Presidency being created and candi-
dates elected. In the summer of 1970, 1,000
villages held re-elections for their councils.
With five candidates trying for each seat
available the 44 province councils (they ad-
vise the 44 province chiefs or governors) were
elected, and in August 1970 30 seats of the
60 seat South Vietnamese Senate were the
subject of re-election. Sixteen, ten-man
slates vied for the three ten-man slate posi-
tions contested, and the winning slate was
the Buddhist, with Opposition Independents
second and a pro-Thieu slate third. Even the
losers said this was the most honest election
in their experience.
provegRoggirmAlowymo_:_ciAIRDE73iBD0296R0003000500014351
THE NORTH /WIER tie The establishment of an Indoc dna Peace
In the North, Ho Chi Minh died in 1969. Conference;
His heirs debate the correctness or the blun- Negotiation of an agreed timets 31. for the
der of the policies of 1964, the sending of complete withdrawal of all U.S. I it ies from
Northern troops and the resulting cost of Vietnam on the basis of North its tnamese
the war at home. Hanoi has lost its major reciprocity and international ver 11( ation;
industrial development throughout the coun- A fair political settlement ref -iciing the
try. More than 700,000 Northern regular ar- will of the South Vietnamese per pi., and of
my soldiers have been killed in the South. all the political forces in South 'X ie nam;
Since 1968, the Northern wounded are corn- The immediate and unconditir iv I release
lug home bearing witness by their condition of all prisoners of war by all side.
of blindness, loss of limbs or crippled con- The United States has also s ipported
dition to the fury of the battle. Since 1969, South Vietnam's proposals of Ji iy 11, 1969
calling for free elections in whici i 11 people
and parties of South Vietnam, in ieeding the
National Liberation Front (NLF - ean par-
ticipate and for a mixed electoral :o nrnission
on which all parties including t ie NLF can
be represented to work out the I todalities
and verification procedures for siich elec-
tions.
death benefit payments have been instituted
to the families of Northern soldiers killed
in the South further surfacing the public
knowledge about the terrible human cost
of Northern invasion of Soutn Vietnam.
During the time of the bprabing of North
Vietnam by the U.S., the war was described
as being a resistance against American air
raids aimed at softening up the North for
invasion. The fact that Northern draftees
had been sent to South Vietnam was not
publicized. Northern sons were defending
the coast against such an invasion. Today
with the bombing ended. Northern families
ask why their sons have not returned since
the post-bombing condition of North Viet-
nam is described by Northern writers and
dramatists as ''a time of peace." In some
plays and short stories in North Vietnam,
there is often a subtle protest role surfaced.
The "mother" saying: "Why should I send
my son South, so many have gone, so few
have returned." In the same pattern, there
are hippies in Hanoi, sons of the elite, or
drop-outs from the revolution whose dress
and life style infuriate the party. In 1971,
a rock and roll band was sentenced to 15
years for playing "golden music" in psyche-
delic cellars in Hanoi luring the youth from
the path of revolutionary endeavor. Above
all, there is the debate within the Party
about the priorities of the war in the South
and the need to build and reconstruct in
the North. There are constant warnings in
the Hanoi Party press to tight the increased
corruption and decay that is appearing in the
society. The events of 1970-71 concerning
Cambodia and Laos offer little comfort to
the Lao Dong Party and the 21 million people
of North Vietnam under its rule. The war
and its costs are very real. Yet for Hanoi
there is still no victory in sight.
THE BIG QUESTION FOR HANOI
In 1971, the whole country of South Viet-
nam votes again for the Presidency, the Vice
Presidency, the Lower House of the National
Assembly and the village councils in 1,000
villages. The big question for the Southern
Communists is what role they will play in
these elections. The U.S. and South Vietnam
have offered them a chance to negotiate, to
cease firing and come in and compete politi-
cally, joining in determining the arrange-
ments for the rules and the supervision of
the balloting. Hanoi and the VC have re-
jected these proposals and instead repeat
the tired refrain that the U.S. should simply
unilaterally get out and that prior to any
elections a coalition government of "progres-
sive" forces must be imposed upon the people
of South \Vietnam as we go. Yet non-Com-
munist nationalist South Vietnam remem-
bers the brief coalition experiences with
North Vietnam's Communists in 1946 when
the nationalists were terrorized and deci-
mated within six months. And South Vietnam
remembers the preview of Communist rule
in the city of Hue where In 1968 5,700 people
were executed by local Communist forces
during 26 days of occupation. The U.S. is
willing to talk about any settlement that
preserves for the South the right to choose
its own path free from outside attack, there
will be no surrender. North Vietnam didn't
make it through a military invasion of the
South and she will not be allowed to pick
up the victory politically by a U.S. cut and
run. The South Vietnamese will have their
increased capabilities, their test and their
choice.
THREE-DIMENSIONAL FOCUS?NEGOTIATION AND
VIETNAMIZATION
These are some of the factors which make
it necessary for those who seek to under-
stand this problem to place the Vietnamese
in three-dimensional focus. This is unlike
any war or situation we have ever encoun-
tered and that is why President Nixon has
decided to follow a policy that on the one
hand offers peace through negotiation and
on the other continues to turn responsibili-
ties over to the South through Vietnamiza-
tion.
ALLIED PEACE STEPS
In addition, the United States h is under-
taken major steps toward pea e. Each of
these steps was urged by the ciiimmunist
side and its American support as con-
structive contributions designed cs it, only to
reduce U.S. involvement but a cc to open
the door to negotiations. These si ip, include:
The 1968 halt to the hombi g of North
Vietnam.
Agreement on the participatioi r the NLF
in the Paris talks;
U.S. agreement to the princi lc of troop
withdrawals;
U.S. troop withdrawals total it g 265,000
by May 1,- 1971, to reach a tot 1 if 365,500
U.S. troops withdrawn by Demi ;la ir 1, 1971.
The authorized ceiling for U.S. ii itary per-
sonnel in Vietnam will have d 'tipped from
549,500 in January 1969 win 1 President
Nixon took office, to 184,000 1 y December
1971. Further reductions are ex' ted under
the Nixon Administration's Vi 0 amization
program;
A series of de-escalatory steps u istantially
cutting back B-52 activity and U S. tactical
air activity in Southeast Asia;
Appointment of a new senior it ,istiator in
Paris.
SETTING A DATE IN VIETNAM?THE IMPACT ON
THE NEGOTIATIONS
Setting a date for a unilateral, final and
total withdrawal of all American forces from
South Vietnam will undercut the Allied effort
to negotiate a just peace and will end any
incentive whatsoever for Hanoi's leaders to
negotiate seriously. It will deliver the victory
the Communists have no hope of achieving
on the battlefield and which they have never
dared to seek via a test of verifiably free po-
litical competition.
ALLIED PEACE PROPOSALS
President Nixon, supported by South Viet-
nam's President Tbieu, on October 7, 1970
proposed a five point program for a just peace
calling for:
An internationally supervised cease-fire in
place throughout Indochina;
COMMUNIST INTRANSIGI 511
Hanoi and the NLF have r 1eted these
and all other proposals and ste a for peace:
They refuse even to considi r the Allied
proposals as agenda items at the -'aris talks.
They have continued to rejei t ill notions
of reciprocity, verifiably open e ections or
international verification.
Despite their promises, th y refuse to
negotiate with the Governmen r Vietnam.
They demand that the United S ;bates com-
mit itself unilaterally and um :a ditionally:
To total unilateral withdraws ; f all troops
and war materiel, and the d iniantling of
all 'U.S. bases.
To the overthrow of the b ad ers of the
Government of Vietnam (Pi ,s dent, Vice
President and Prime Minister .
to the arbitrary imposition if a so-called
"coalition" government establ led prior to
any elections and in the Wiser sic of any in-
ternational verification. It wo ilc, consist of
the NLF's "Provisional Revell ti inary Gov-
ernment" and various persona ie defined in
the NIS's views as "really stan ii g for peace,
independence, and neutrality.'
In exchange for such a tc :a unilateral
commitment by the U.S.. Hamsod the NLF
have pledged absolutely nothi ig They have -
at best indicated that if all is s was done
they might "discuss"?i.e. nc -elease?the
prisoners of war.
While Hanoi continues to den- that there
is a single North Vietnamese ?Sher outside
of North Vietnam, 100,000 Nor ih Vietnamese
soldiers are in South Vietnam lil,000 are in
Laos and 50,000 are in Cambo is continuing
to wage wars of aggression Against North
Vietnam's neighbors.
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In assessing the unwillingness of th
Vietnamese Communists to accept the men
Vietnamese
of reciprocity, cease-fire, open politica
competition, international verification, etc
one must look at their record.
First, the Politburo of Hanoi's Lao Don
(Communist) Party has massively violated
all the international agreements it has signed
concerning South Vietnam, Laos and Cam-
bodia while it denies that it has a single
soldier outside of its borders.
Second, Hanoi's self-proclaimed Marxist-
Leninist ''peoples' dictatorship" has never
dared risk the revealing political litmus test
of tolerating the slightest diversity, political
competition or international inspections in
areas under its control. In contrast with
South Vietnam's diverse political parties,
highly competitive electoral system and live-
ly parliament and press, Hanoi runs a Stal-
inist state on the basis of a single slate of
candidates, a dormant parliament and total
police control. The Hanoi regime is built on
the liquidation of all earlier non-Communist
"coalition" and "Front" partners and on total
monopoly in all political, economic, cultural
and military affairs.
Third, the southern branch of Hanoi's Lao
Dong Party, the Peoples' Revolutionary Par-
ty of the National Liberation Front, is a self-
proclaimed Marxist-Leninist party. It is com-
mitted, as it demonstrated via systematic
political assassinations in the city of Hue
during the 1968 Tet offensive, to imposing a
rigid Communist "peoples' dictatorship"
upon the South Vietnamese.
Fourth, far from involving simply a small
Independent group of nationalists fighting a
-civil war" in South Vietnam, tens of thou-
eands of Communist Hanoi's regular army
troops have for years carried on assassina-
tion and warfare against North Vietnam's
neighborsVietnam's interna-
tionally recognized borders.
Fifth, along with their masters in Hanoi,
these North Vietnamese forces are dependent
on the doctrines, the diplomatic support and
for 100% of their arms on the two Commu-
nist super-powers, the Soviet Union and Com-
munist China.
Those who urged Allied submission to the
demands of the Vietnamese Communists
would do well to consider whether the hy-
pocricies involved in those demands should
not be rejected in favor of a rational, recip-
rocal approach.
If the Hanoi leadership can obtain a uni-
lateral U.S. withdrawal date without under-
taking its own withdrawals and accepting the
principles of international verification, open
elections, prisoner releases, etc., it will have
no incentive whatsoever to negotiate seri-
ously and will be encouraged to continue its
war policies.
To undercut the chance for a just settle-
ment and to accept the enemy's unilateral
demands, would be to betray President
Nixon's solemn pledge of May 14, 1969 that
the United States, understanding the stakes
and sacrifices involved, has "ruled out either
a one-sided withdrawal from Vietnam, or the
acceptance in Paris of terms that would
amount to a disguised defeat."
? x ensions of 'emar s May 13, 1971
e U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE WAR SHARPLY
REDUCED
I Redeployments: During 1970, about 135,
? 000 US troops redeployed. US troop strengtl
at the close of the year was 335,000, compare)
g to the 543,000 peak strength in April 1969. A(
of March 20 there were about 313,000 troop
Iii country, a 22,000 man reduction since tin
beginning of the year. By May 1971, III
strength in Vietnam will be below 234,001
men?the lowest level since July 1966 ant
about half of the peak strength two year:
PROGRESS IN VIETNAM
rhe war in South Vietnam has wound
down to a point well below the levels of pre-
vious years as a result of progress in Viet-
namization and reduced enemy strength and
capability. As a result, the US involvement in
the conflict has dropped sharply. The mo-
mentum of the pacification program was
preserved during 1970, the economy of SVN t
is beginning to show signs that stability will
return, and the political climate is viable.
No discernible progress has been made in
Paris, despite President Nixon's five-point
peace proposal, which provides a fair and a
equitable basis for a negotiated peace.
g ?
US Combat and Non-Combat Deaths: US
combat deaths in 1970 were the lowest of
any years since 1965. They were 55% below
1969 levels; 71% lower than in 1968. rn the
last half of 1970 they were 54% below the
first half rate and were lower than any six
month period in the past five years. Combat
deaths in December were tower than in any
month since October 1965. Since the first of
this year combat deaths have averaged about
44 per week (even lower than the 51 per week
during July-December 1970). Non combat
deaths have declined at about the same rate
as US troops have redeployed--despite press
allegations to the contrary.
Sortie Rates: In 1970, US planes flew 36%
fewer attack sorties in SEA than in 1969. They
flew 45% fewer sorties than. in 1968. The con-
sumption of air munitions showed similar
declines (1970 was 25% below 1969, 27',l t be-
low 1968). In South Vietnamalone, 52%
fewer attack sorties were flown than in
1969 and 53% less than in 1968. So far
this year, we have flown one-fourth the
number of attack sorties in SVN that we
flew last year. And, despite a great deal of
air support to ARVN in Laos recently, the
2S5Dtwide attack sortie rates are down about
Costs: The cost of the war to the US de-
clined about $5 billion during FY 70, and will
drop about $4 billion further in FY 71. We
expect war costs to decline an additional $3
billion or mc.re during FY 72. To date, esti-
mated savings as a result of Vietnarniza elan.
since 1968 are $10 billion.
IETNAMIZATION/PACIFICATION GOING WELL
in the southern half of the country, partly
due to the outstanding success of the Cam-
bodian operations.
i; A survey of the rural population reveals
that economic problems (concern over rising
5. prices) have superseded physical security as
3 their greatest concern--a further confirma-
tion of pacification progress.
3 ENEMY STRATEGY AND CAPABILITIES LIMITED
The enemy has moved away from a mili-
tary type conflict, turning to guerrilla war-
fare in most areas. Battalion sized enemy at-
tacks declined more than 60% during 1970;
only one was reported in South Vietnam dur-
ing the last half of 1970, none thus far in
1971. The enemy has been primarily using
terror and harassment?targeting Territorial
Forces (RF/PF), paramilitary forces and
civilians, while avoiding Regular Forces?a
possible sign of weakness.
There were about 103,000 enemy killed in
action in 1970 compared to 157,000 in 1969,
and 18.1,000 in 1968. The 34% decline in 1970
is further evidence of the winding down of
the war.
Enemy infrastructure (VCI), the political
and subversive machinery, remains a serious
problem, but is estimated to have declined
about 20% in strength during 1970. The Gov-
ernment of Vietnam is increasing the pressure
on this subversive threat, mainly by improv-
ing the National Felice forces.
THE ECONOMV OF SVN IMPROVED
Economic Reforms: Rampant inflation and
the economic instability generated by the war
have led to recent reforms in exchange rates,
advan ce deposit requirements for financing
certain imports, and increased interest rates.
These economic reforms were taken to
dampen inflation, increase GVN revenues, and
to strike at the black market for US dollars
goods.and The reforms have temporarily
stabili Zed the Saigon retail price index, and
dramatically cut black market conversion of
dollars into piastres.
Serious economic problems remain, bas-
ically the result of a growing GVN budget
deficit and the long range need to promote
sound economic development. U.S. Embassy,
MACV and USAID advisors continue to work
with GVN officials in efforts to extend the
recent reforms, establish a sound tax struc-
ture, foster economic development and ex-
ports, and attract private investment capital.
The Rural Economy: Despite the problems
noted above, a quiet economic revolution has
taken place in rural Vietnam. While urban
income has declined from inflation, the peas-
ant has been getting higher and higher
prices for his rice and his real income has
risen significantly.
The shift stems from four factors: (11 in-
creased security in the countryside, (2) road
networks re-opened or built, enabling the
peasant to get his rice to market, (3) the
translates' revolution whereby his radio tells
him the latest prices of rice in the cities and
thus improves his ability to bargain with the
rice buyers, and (4) the new "miracle" rice.
1450 miles (2400 km) of roads have been
built and opened. An additional 360 miles
(600 km) are currently under construction,
to be built by mid 1972, The GVN will main-
tain about 2000 miles (3200 km) of all
weather roads in 1971.
"Miracle" rice (a fast growing, disease
resistant variety) was cultivated on more
than 700,000 acres in 1970. Current programs
call for expanding production to 1,858,000
acres in 1971-72, This year Vietnam will pro-
duce enough rice to feed itself.
The recently enacted land-to-the-tiller pro-
mam will ultimately Nest ownership of about
1,250,000 acres of rice land in more than
300,000 rural families. Through 30 Novem-
ser 197(1, 20,552 titles for 68,666 acres were
ssued be 17,049 farmers. Nearly one million
term of land are Scheduled for distribution
n 1971. The program Is expected to be corn-
Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
(RVIVAF): Strength increased 7% in 1970,
and 15% since U.S. redeployments began in
July 1969. Most of the increase occurred in
the forces necessary for pacification--Re-
gional "and Popular Forces (RF/PF). The
tempo of RVNAF' operations has increased as
they assume the major burden of the war:
RVNAF' now accounts for more than 60 `,'; of
the reported enemy killed in action.
Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF): The num-
ber of aircraft has increased nearly 70%
since Vietnatnization began. Total VNAF
sorties flown during 1970 increased 64% com-
pared to 1969, and are holding at those levels
so far this year.
Vietnamese Navy: The majority of U.S.
naval assets in RVN has been turned over to
the Vietnamese. The U.S. naval effort within
South Vietnam is now limited to an advisory
and support role. (There are, of course, U.S.
Navy ships operating in waters off the coast
of Vietnam.)
Pacification. During the 1 year period of
U.S. redeployments, pacificatzon progress ( as
measured by the Hamlet Evaluation System-n-..
1979) continued. The HES/70 A-B-C (rela-
tively secure) score rose 14 percentage points
(to 95% ) ; the A-B (secure) score gained over ,
20 points. Captured enemy documents con- ;
tinually confirm the success of the GvN ,
pacification program by exhorting their cadre
o attack it.
Experienced observers returning to Viet- :
nam after long periods out of the country
unanimously agree that security conditions 1
n the countryside are better than ever before, i
nd that the allied main force military I
ampaign has achieved most of its objectives i
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May
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CONGRESSloNAL-Icrxx?pni -.1-,37serrssou apusoo00300050001-134353
plete by the end of 1973 at a cost to the GVN
of $400 million (the US, subject to Congres-
sional approval, is to provide $40 million for
the program) .
THE POLITICAL SCENE NOW LIVELY
Elections of senators, provincial councils,
and local officials took place in 1970. All of
the elections were judged reasonably fair,
even by the most critical observers. More-
over, there were indications of increased in-
volvement and sophistication on the part
of the average citizen. For example, more
than 60% of the rural population now feel
that the way to remove ineffective or un-
popular officials is to vote them out in the
next election.
In 1971, the Vietnamese are scheduled to
elect the entire (187 seat) lower House and
the President and Vice-President. Election-
eering has already begun. Thus far, the three
candidates mentioned most frequently for
the presidency are President Thieu, General
Minh and Vice President Ky. The An Quang
Buddhists emerged as a powerful interest
group in the Senate elections and are ex-
pected to be a strong factor again this year.
Enemy attempts to disrupt the elections in
1970 were inconsequential. It is possible
that they intend to play a larger role in
1971.
PROSPECTS
U.S. redeploym6nts coupled with Vietnami-
zation, will continue during 1971. The en-
my is expected to continue his wait-and-see
strategy, largely avoiding military action in
RVN.
Despite President Nixon's five point peace
proposal; a ceasefire in place, an Indochina
peace conference, negotiation of a timetable
for complete U.S. withdrawal as part of an
overall settlement, search for a political set-
tlement fair to all parties, the immediate
and unconditional release of all POW's held
by both sides', the Paris peace talks continue
to be stalemated. The proposal provides the
basis for meaningful negotiation, if only the
other side were willing to engage in serious
talks. It recognizes the desire of the Viet-
namese people and the rest of the free
world for an end to hostilities, recognizes
that a permanent solution must encompass
the whole of Indochina, and recognizes the
existence and continued involvement of the
other side in the political future of South
Vietnam. It does not call for a surrender or
even tacit admission by the other side of
their deteriorating military and political sit-
uation. It assures that the interests of all
parties to the conflict can be acknowledged
and served.
VIETNAM BIBLIOGRAPHY
General surveys
Bain, Chester, Vietnam: The Roots of Con-
flict, 1967. $1.95. (Prentice-Hall Inc., Engle-
wood Cliffs, N.J. 07632)
Trager, Frank. Why Vietnam?, 1966. $4.95.
(Frederick A. Praeger, I 1.1 Fourth Ave., New
1969. (Center for Research in Social Systems, Trail in Lacis demonstrated the growing
5010 Wisconsin Ave., Washington, D.C. 20016) strength of the South Vietr ar lese forces
Hosmer, Stephen. Viet cong Repression in facing the best of the enen e remaining
and Its Implications /or the Future, 1970. forces on the enemy's terrain 1 erge stocks
$8.50. (D.C. Heath & Co., 125 Spring Street, of war materiel were capture c - destroyed,
Lexington, Mass. 02173) several tens of thousands of e ,sealties were
Pike, Douglas. Viet Gong: The Organization inflicted on North Vietnam forces and
and Technique of the National Liberation Hanoi's offensive timetables ' 'e Le set back
Front of South Vietnam, 1966. $2.95. (MIT by a year. At the same time set 'is ly was pro-
Press, Massachusetts institute of Technology, vided to South Vietnam's pop died regions
Cambridge, Mass. 02142) and American troop reductime plans were
The Vietnamese people safeguarded.
And even in the midst of ev, e. 'south Viet-
Hickory, Gerald. Village in Vietnam, 1964. nam has continued its path of e( nstitutional
$3.45. (Yale University Press, 149 York St., development. The National le ,embly, the
New Haven, Conn. 06511) Supreme Court, and the locall e.ected coun-
$4.95. (Alfred A. Knopf, 201 East 50th St., playing increasingly importe it roles. Last
ells at hamlet, village and pn el Lee level are
Sheehan, Susan. Ten Vietnamese, 1967.
New York, N.Y. 10022) August's Senate elections we re marked by
The early years the participation and victor .d the Bud-
Shaplen, Robert. The Lost Revolution, dhist opposition slate who till Lel the elec-
1966. $2A5. (Harper st Row, Scranton, Pa. tions fair, and political pal inpation and
18512) progress are expected to con rite as South
Scigliano, Robert. South Vietnam: Nation Vietnam approaches new na o eel elections
Under Stress, 1964. $2.9b. (Houghton Mifflin this fall.
Co., 53 West 43 St., New York, N.Y. 10036) The U.S. has maintained I I exible nego-
Fall, Bernard. Viet-Nam Witness: 1953-66, tiation posture in Paris in thi- e- ent that the
1966. $6.95. (Frederick A. Praeger, 111 Fourth other side will recognize the d ,sirability of
Ave., New York, N.Y. 10003) concluding the war througl F erious nego-
Higgins, Marguerite. Our Vietnam Night- tiations rather than prolong 'd combat.
mare, 1965. $6.95. (Harper & Row, Scranton, President Nixon on Octob Lr 7, 1970, an-
Pa. 18512) nounced a five-point propc La for a just
Tanham, George. War Without Guns, 1966. Peace in Indochina calling I ,r (1) an in-
$4.95. (Frederick A. Praeger, 111 Fourth Ave., ternationally supervised cea e- ere in place
New York, N.Y. 10003) throughout all of Indochin ts part of a
general move to end the wa Si Indochina:
The Southeast Asia context (2) establishment of an I ,dechina Peace
Warner, Denis. Reporting Southeast Asia, Conference; (3) negotiatior - .1 an agreed
1966. $10.50. (Tri-Ocean Inc., 62 Townsend timeable for complete recipn .1:e withdrawals
St., San Francisco, Cal. 94107) from Vietnam; (4) a fair ,elitical settle-
Shaplen, Robert. Time Out of Hand, 1970. ment reflecting the will of - te South Viet-
$2.95. (Harper & Row, Scranton, Pa. 18512) namese people and the potieal forces in
Nuechterlein, Donald. Thailand and the South Vietnam; and (5) the immediate and
Struggle for Southeast Asia, 1965. $6.50. (Cor- unconditional release of all re ;tillers of war
nell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y. 14850) by all sides.
Leifer, Michael. Cambodia: The Search for The President has also e 'poorted South
Security, 1967. $6.00. (Frederick A. Praeger, Vietnam's proposals of Jul L 11, 1969 and
111 Fourth Ave., New York. N.Y. 10003) October 8, 1970 calling for re' elections in
which all the people and i :Le-Ldes of South
V1E1NA NI Vietnam, including the Nat real Liberation
President Nixon has taken a number of Front, can participate, all -1 for a mixed
significant steps toward ending the war and Electoral Commission in w 11,11 all parties
winning the peace in Vietnam. The United can be represented.
States is fighting to deter North Vietnam's In his February 25, 197, sport to the
aggression, but at the same time is attempt- Congress, President Nixon eceunted major
Ing to achieve a just and honorable peace. steps toward peace taken b ' ? he Allies.
Vietnam has shown steady progress in the "Since 1968 the U.S. h .s done almost
two years since President Nixon took office everything that various p, el ies-including
in January 1969 and since the Vietnamiza- Hanoi-told us would kin' negotiations.
tion program got underway. We halted the bombing al a other acts of
The phased reductions under the Admin- force against North Vietna. i. We agreed to
istration's Vietnamization program reduced NLF participation in the Re els talks. We
the authorized American troop ceiling of agreed to the principle of w thdrawal and
549,500 and in-country strength of 542,000 made initial withdrawals of is lerican troops.
men in January 1989 to 335,000 by January We made substantial with in wals, soon to
1971 and to 284,000 by May 1971. On April 7, total 265,000. We agreed ir peinciple to re-
1971 the President announced a further re- move all our troops. We tor e a. series of de-
duction to 184,000 by December 1971. escalatory steps, such as ( it ling back our
American combat deaths had been reduced B-52 and tactical air sort es And we up-
York, N.Y. 10003) from the levels of 14,561 or 278 weekly in pointed a new senior neg( .l,, tor in Parise'
Fall, Bernard. The Two Vietnams, second 1968 to 4,183 and 80 weekly in 1970 and were "These steps, except for t le bombing halt,
edition, 1967. $7.95. (Frederick A. Praeger'
111 averaging 40 or fewer a week in early 1971. were unilateral measures, e 's ened not only
Fourth Ave., New York, N.Y. 10003) In 1968 the war was costing an additional to reduce our involvement. but, also to open
Fishel, Wesley, ed. Vietnam: Anatomy of a
$22 billion. In early 1971 the additional costs the door to negotiations. F Lc 1 of them was
Conflict, 1968. $5.95. (F. E. Peacock Publish- are running at half that and are steadily de- urged by the other side i . t constructive
em, 401 West Irving Park Road, Itasca, Ill. creasing. contribution. None of the ,i. has generated
60143) Since security in the countryside has sub- movement by the other siC .?
Thompson, Sir Robert. No Exit From Viet- stantially improved, local and national goy- It takes two to negotiate b er, thus far the
nam. 1969. $4.50. (David McKay Co., 750 ernments are perterming with increased a- Communist side has. reje( e I each of the
Third Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017) fectiveness and a number of agricultural and Allied proposals and conti elire to press its
Duncanson, Dennis. Government andRev- economic programs are underway. attacks. As a condition lo ( yen discussing
oiution in Vietnam, 1968. $9.50. (Oxford Uni- With carefully tailored U.S. assistance un- these proposals, they ins- s' ' hat we accept
versity Press, 1600 Pollitt Drive, Fair Lawn, der the Vietnamization program, South their demands for total a ,6 unconditional
N.J. 07410) ' Vietnam's regular and local forces have U.S. withdrawal and end tl e Vietnamization.
The Contmunist sphere greatly increased their capabilities and have assistance program for the p 'tor removal of
Hoang Van Chi. From Colonialism to Com- taken over the major share in effectively de- the elected leaders of the (lovernment of
munism: A Case History of North Vietnam, fending their country against North Viet- South Vietnam and for tee imposition of an
1964. $6.50. (Frederick A. Praeger, 111 Fourth nam's attack. NLF run "coalition" !-,overs a, at prior to any
Ave., New York, N.Y. 10003) The limited cross border operations against elections.
Spinks, Charles et al. The North Viet- North Vietnamese bases along the Cam- Finally, any evaluation el' the American
namese Regime: Institutions and Problems, bodian border and against the Ho Chi Minh role in assisting the Sou e. Vietnamese in
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1CD ? xtenszons Of Remarks May 13, 1971
their struggle against North Vietnam's ag-
gression must consider the fact that the
South Vietnamese people have much to fear
from the pattern of massive repression sys-
tematically practiced by North Vietnam's
Communist Party. In North Vietnam this
Stalinist Party operates a "peoples' dictator-
ship" which permits no forms of opposition
or diversity. Its liquidation policies against
its short lived "coalition" partners of 1945-
1946 and of those who differed with Commu-
nist policy after 1954 in the North are mat-
ters of public record. It is this record and the
record of the party's southern branch, the
Marxist-Leninist Peoples' Revolutionary
Party of the so-called National Liberation
Front (who in the city of Hue, for example,
Systematically assassinated thousands of
their opponents) that perhaps explains
South Vietnamese desire for help in resist-
ing Hanoi's armies and its front.
In his February 25, 1971 report to the Con-
gress, President Nixon restated the goals of
American policy in Indochina.
"I will continue to do what is necessary
to protect American men as they leave Viet-
nam. Throughout I will keep the American
people and the Congress fully informed.
"A negotiated settlement for all Indochina
remains our highest priority. But if the other
side leaves us no choice, we will follow the
alternate route to peace?phasing out our
involvement while giving the region's friend-
ly countries the time and the means to de-
fend themselves."
VULTURES TOO FULL TO FLY
HON. CORNELIUS E. GALLAGHER
OF NEW JERSEY
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, May 12, 1971
Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Speaker, I rise
today to comment briefly on the situa-
tion in East Pakistan, or Bangla Desh as
the Bengalis and their supporters prefer
it to be called. On May 11, my Foreign
Affairs' Subcommittee on Asian and Pa-
cific Affairs held a hearing on this mat-
ter. We were scheduled to meet May 13
to hear the witnesses from the Depart-
ment of State and the Agency for Inter-
national Development in executive ses-
sion and professor Robert Dorfman of
Harvard University in open session. Un-
fortunately, that day of nearing Must
now be postponed and it will be re-
scheduled as soon as possible.
Whatever the politics involved in this
region, I firmly believe that one of the
great human tragedies of modern times
may be in the process of being created.
As additional background material for
the continuing debate over the American
role and the role of the world community
in mounting a humanitarian assistance
program. I would like to call my col-
leagues' attention to the testimony of
Senator EDWARD M. KENNEDY before my
subcommittee yesterday, a position paper
of the Ripon Society dated April 3, and
a news dispatch from the Washington
Star of May 12.
The phrase in the news dispatch about
"vultures too full to fly" may be re-
garded as vulgar by many people un-
familiar with the history and the poten-
tial for tragedy in this region. However,
it does graphically reflect the position of
many who are intimately familiar with
past events and with informed future
predictions.
Mr. Speaker, I ask that the materia
referred to be inserted into the RECORD at
this point, as well as my opening state-
ment at the hearing yesterday.
OPEN/NG STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN C OR -
NEL/US E. GALLAGHER
The Subcommittee will come to order.
We are beginning hearings today looking
into the situation in East Pakistan with
particular emphasis on the related problems
of refugees and famine.
I think it would be useful to briefly sum-
ize events leading to what may be one
of the worst human tragedy in modern times.
In November 1970 a cyclone and flood
killed thousands in East Pakistan and crip-
pled the main port of Chittagong. The recent
fighting has prevented most crops from being
planted. Because East Pakistan is a food
deficit region in the best of times, as many
as 30 million people may starve, according
to reports said to have been submitted to
the Agency for International Development
and the World Bank. Right now, refugees
are streaming from East Pakistan into India
at the rate of 60,000 each day, swelling the
already strained Indian food supply by an
estimated 1.5 million new mouths to feed.
The refugees and the potential famine are
the result of civil war which broke out on
March 25, 1971. While politics of Pakistan
and the Subcontinent are not the focus of
this hearing, it is important to remember
that in the election for a National Consti-
tutional Assembly in December 1970, the
Awarni League captured 167 of the 169 seats
contested in the East. Ths gave them an
absolute majority of the 313 seats contested
in all of Pakistan.
While the government of Yahya Kahn now
is in apparent control of the cities, those
Who embrace autonomy for Bangles Desh
claim the countryside. Factually, the coun-
tryside of East Pakistan is the equal of the
countryside of South Vietnam in providing
natural surrounding for insurgency and the
fighting thus far has produced reports of
savage atrocities on both sides.
1 hearings will underscore the urgent need to
further encourage the initiatives underway
to meet the needs of the Bengali people.
Official reports from our government and
elsewhere express very serious concern about
the condition of the people in East Pakistan.
These reports say that within a month the
condition of the people will become "acute".
The precarious situation which exists today
Will evolve into a nightmare of death for
millions?unless immediate and concerted
efforts are made to meet the needs of the
people involved.
Although reports from East Pakistan sug-
gest that violence has subsided considerably,
reports also indicate that feelings are tense
between the people and the army of the
central government. In fact official reports to
our government suggest that the great bulk
of the population is alienated, perhaps for-
ever. Regretably, this ca.n only complicate,
and perhaps delay, the organizing of a mean-
ingful relief program, and the solving of those
political problems which generated the recent
violence.
Moreover, reports also indicate that the
army effectively controls only the cities and
towns, and that throughout most of the
countryside, government administration and
services do not exist. The transportation and
distribution of available foodstocks and
medical supplies are at a standstill?even in
the area struck by the cyclone last fall, where
conservative estimates say a million persons
have been solely dependent for their survival
on effective relief operations. Food reserves?
not confiscated by the army?are very low.
The tragedy, finally, has now spilled over
into India, which so far has found it neces-
sary to give asylum to nearly 2,000,000 refu-
gees?of whom at least 526,000 are in camps.
The recent daily influx into India has re-
portedly been some 50,000. The State Depart-
ment informs me that the influx will con-
tinue at a high level, "at least until the
beginning of the monsoon in a few weeks,
when both military operations and travel will
become more diffibult". The continuing heavy
influx of refugees into India is a stark re-
minder of how bad conditions have become
in East Pakistan.
Over the last month I have repeatedly
communicated my ccncern in these matters
to officials in the Department of State and
elsewhere, in an effort to encourage and sup-
port reasonable initiatives by our government
and the international community to help
meet the urgent political and humanitarian
problems in East Pakistan. I have strongly
believed these initiatives should be taken
through the United Nations.
On the humanitanan problems, at least,
some progress is being made.
On the Indian side of the border, and at
the invitation of the Indian government,
representatives of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are
eurrently assuming relief needs and develop-
ing a plan of international action. According
to a coramunication I received from the De-
partment of State this morning, our govern-
ment has "authorized up to $2.5 million in
food and other assistance as our initial con-
tribution to the international relief effort."
While the UNHCR effort is being organized,
the U.S. is providing emergency food assist-
ance for 217,000 refugees in West Bengal. The
food assistance is being distributed by CARE,
Catholic Relief Services, and Church World
Service/.Lutheran World Federation.
Far less progress in meeting relief needs is
being made in East Pakistan. Initiating an
adequate relief program is undoubtedly be-
ing hampered for a number of good reasons?
but, on the basis of talks I have had, the
primary cause may very well be a simple lack
of candor in recognizing the vast dimension
cf human need brought on by the conflict.
Let us not quibble over how we label the
situation. Whether we call it a minor dis-
turbance, a disaster, or an emergency?the
Putting this together, we seem to have
a situation which is potentially equal, in
terms of human misery, to a combination of
Vietnam and Biafra. Because of our military
aid to the Central Government it appears
that our arms, in conjunction with those
supplied by other governments, are being
used to defeat the people who won the elec-
tion.
While these and other questions are as
important as they seem to be unanswerable
at this point, our focus is the immediate
threat to the lives of millions. To emphasize
that concern, we are very pleased to wel-
come this afternoon Senator Edward M. Ken-
nedy of Massachusetts. His Subcommittee on
Refugees of the Senate Judiciary Committee
has produced extremely valuable information
about the impact of policy on people and
the dimensions of the suffering and the dis-
location in countries where war has been
conducted. The humanitarian aspect of the
East Pakistan situation must be considered
by all the parties involved and it will be a
great pleasure to hear Senator Kennedy dis-
cuss the information developed by his Sub-
committee.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR KENNEDY ON CR/SIS
IN EAST PAKISTAN BEFORE THE HOUSE
FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN
AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
I appreciate very much the opportunity to
be here this afternoon--because, as Chair-
man of the Judiciary Subcommittee on
Refugees, I share your deep concern for the
victims of natural disaster and civil war in
East Pakistan. I am hopeful these hearings
will contribute toward a better understand-
ing of the undeniable problems which exist
In relieving this basically humanitarian
problem. And I am also hopeful that the
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LIZEK4
T HE wAVRTgsgoic&pilpase 2000/09/08r:)/94-RDR3k0g9911000300050001-3
F GE
Key U.S. Official
Sent to Highlands
By Peter Osnos
Washington Post Foreign Service
SAIGON, April 27?John Department desk officer for
Paul Vann, perhaps the most Caribbean affairs. Long,
experienced senior American sources said, will be reassign-
civilian in Vietnam, is being ed outside South Vietnam.
sent to head the pacification As he has in the delta (and
program in the troubled Cen- before that in the Saigon re-
tral Highlands. gion) Vann will oversee the
Informed American sources highlands branch of the or-
said today that Vann, who has ganization called Civil Opera-
directed the U.S. pacification tions Revolutionary Develop-
effort in the Mekong Delta ment Support (CORDS), the
since February, 1969, would regional and provincial teams
take over the new post in the of American militarymen and
second half of May. civilians who advise the Viet-
Overall, the neavily popu- namese on everything from
lated delta countryside is con- land reform to police training.
sidered the securest in South The job is known by the
Vietnam, while some of the acronym "depcords" and is
least pacified areas of the filled by civilians, while the
country are in the highlands, regional commander is always
Observers here saw the shift a military man. Vann is the
of Vann, who has been in only one of the four present
South Vietnam both as a sol- depcords who had any experi-
dier and civilian for most of ence in Vietnam prior to tak-
the past 10 years, as recogni- ing the job.
tion that the situation in the The pacification chief in the
highlands requires special at- northern sector of South Viet-
tention. nam was the director of AID
Known administratively as in Panama and his counter:
Military Region Two, the high- part in the Saigon region wait
lands covers a broad band of ambassador to Gabon.
13 provinces across the central Vann, a blunt-spoken ener7
part of South Vietnam from getic Virginian, is one of the
the Laotian-Cambodian border few American officials here
to the South China Sea, whose reputation has been
In the past month, the enhanced by his work in
enemy has concentrated its of- South Vietnam over the years.
fensive actions in the area, es- As a lieutenant colonel in the
pecially around Fire Support early 1960s, he fell out cif
Base 6 in western Kontum favor with the U.S. military
Province and Phunhon district establishment because of his
in the southern part of Pleiku critical assessment of the way
Province, things were going.
U.S. advisors in Phunhon He returned in 1965 as al-
estimate that Vietcong and vilian to work for CORDS and
North Vietnamese activity, lately has become known ai a
which included a siege of the prime exponent of "the ew
district headquarters on optimism"?the notion that
March 15 and occupation of at the war has been turn d
least nine villages, has set around, for a variety of miii-
back pacification there at tary and economic reasons, n
least a year. favor of the Saigon govern-
Vann, 46, will be replacing /tient.
Edward T. Long, 48, a career Vann is often mentioned as
foreign service officer who a possible successor to Ambas-
came to Military Region Two sador William E. Colby as
last June from a job as State head of CORDS countrywide.
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UtASLA
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THE WASHINGTON POST DATE 411,--1-4-- -7
Soviets Seen Sending
SA-3s to Hanoi
LoNtxp;, April 26 tUPI)?1
l The Soviet Union is sending l
11 SA-3 surface-to-air missiles l
\
l and Soviet "advisers" to Northl
Vietnam to reinforce its defen-
ses against possible new U.S.
I air attacks, SEATO sources
l said today.
?'i The sources said the advis-
ers are to help install the mis-
siles and train Vietmanese
i crews Lu operate the sophisti-
I rated rockets. Egypt is the
only other tuountry known to
, have been pi uvided with SA-3.
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parts question their effective-
ness so far arid' are skeptical
about the soundness of the new
plan.
Their main criticism is that
the whole pacification effort
depends too much on the 8,000
United States officials and ad-
visers in the Civil Operations
and Rural Development Sup-
port programs, an agency
known as CORDS.
.I.b.e.agencv. which supervises
not, 'ects_ fromloe
o rura economicro ams,
PACIFICATION PUSH
BEGUN IN VIETNAM
New Program, Most Costly
Yet, Aimed at Vietcong's
Political Apparatus
By TAD SZULC
specie to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, April 6?The
most ambitious and costly paci-
fication program yet planned
for South Vietnam has been put
into effect by Saigon and Wash-
ington.
Reportedly costing the United
States considerably more than
$1-billion and Saigon an undis-
closed sum, the 1971u-
aity_Datense and Local Devel-
opment Plan would FratiTy ex-
pand pacification activities,
which are aimed at destroying
Communist subversive forces
and widening self-government
and development.
The 304-page plan, a copy of
which was made available to
The New York Times, lists as
the "top priority" for the year
the "neutralization" of the en-
trenched Vietcong political ap-
paratus.
Authenticity Confirmed
The authenticity of the docu-
ment was confirmed by Admin-
istration sources who declined
to discuss the contents because
of the plan's confidential char-
acter.
Already in operation since
March 1, and endorsed by the
American command in Saigon,
the new plan is reportedly the
subject of wide controversy
among United States officials,
some of whom term it unrealis-
tic and artificial.
Administration officials were
unalprovide....nest tiguLfs I
to the United States pravi- ?
gat pacification programs, but
financed almos entire' in its
an
,iarv. sec
aspects ,bz the Defense Deprt-
-runt and the C,enfriTI:Intelli-
Itcy?wAs inItal_Mgre
cojoltly ecause of its increased
atc2Re.
Acknowledging for the first
time that the activities of the
Vietcong apparatus remain a
major problem in 8 of South
Vietnam's 44 provinces, includ-
ing four an the allegedly paci-
fied Mekong River Delta, and
that South Vietnamese forces
often prefer to "accommodate,
rather than resist, the enemy,"
the plan provides for:
(Expansion of the People's
Self-Defense Force?the civil-
ian antiguerrilla combat or-
ganization in rural areas?from
500,000 to four million. Women
would be enlisted in combat
units and childr& of bothi
sexes over the age of 7 in sup'
porting units.
(Establishment of an elab-
orate "people's intelligence net-
work" to inform on enemy ac-
tivities.
(Elimination an the year
'starting last month, through
killing or capture, of 14,400
Vietcong agents under expan-
sion of the three - year - old
Operation Phoenix, an intelli-1
fence-gathering program thati
is supported by the United
States military.
Wider Social Benefits
The new pacification plan.'
which went into effect March 1,,
also seeks to complete the pro-
gram of holding elections in all
villages and hamlets: spur land
reform by setting a goal of dis-
tributing nearly a million acres
of land to farmers. and widen
social benefits. This would be
done by providing new assist-
ance to ? 216,000 war veterans,
and increasing aid to 43,002
disabled soldeirs, 33,743 par-
ents of dead servicemen, 71,005
war widows and 284,000 war
orphans. In addition, the plan
hopes to resettle 430,000 war
refugees in new homes.
Other innovations in the 1971
pacification plan include pro-
grams for ethnic minorities and
for cities where crime is in-
creasing.
Endorsed by Abrams
Elaborated upon by the
South Vietnamese Government
approved by President Nguyen
Van Thieu and his Cabinet and
fully endorsed by Gen
Creighton W. Abrams, the
United States conunander in
Vietnam, the plan is designed
to dovetail with the Nixon Ad-
ministration's policy of Viet-
namization, under which com-
bat responsibilities are being
gradually assumed by the South
Vietnamese forces.
While the Administration
here and the Saigon Govern-
ment report success for paci-
fication programs that 13egan
in 1969, some American -
?
?e
Danartment
ra ntel'
t.gence Agency
oug_ it inducesna-is?of
t State Department - the
? ? - ?. ? - call . eisc7
ense
etas.. .11 it' I
ta es
los.= onAency.
rom the field Indi-
a* the CORDS officials are
_
errects on c rity Orate peo-
ple. The mc t effective way of
assuring sen n ay of the Viet-
names:: pc'ctr: is to keep
enemy fora i-way from them
and by ner Lrilizing the Viet-
cong infraF trneture. Without
the V.C.I., -ncmy main fortes
cannot al nan intelligence,
manpower , na food, nor will
they be at a to prepare the
battlefield or move.'
The plan strphasizes that the
"strategic c-mcept of national
security" is not dependent on
the preset of American
forces and 'plves the way for
the transfe f the responsi-
frequetttry not aware of thel
true state of affairs in districts
and villages and that their col-
leagues in civilian government
and the police fail to carry out
their tasks.
Critics of the pacification
program point to this state-
ment in the 1971 plan:
"In some areas, the people
are reluctant to associate with
the Government of Vietnam l'or
fear of retaliation by the
enemy. Civil officials often be-
come the target of enemy ter-
rorism and assassination and
thus are reluctant to perform
their goVernment tasks.
"Some police hesitate to con-
duct operations against the V.C.
because they fear retaliation,
and local security forces; under
the threat of terrorism, often
accommodate, rather than re-
sist, the enemy."
The critics raise the question
of what will happen if CORDS
is phased out and ask whether,
as an alternative, the agency
may not have to be maintained
in South Vietnam indefinitely.
Three Major Objectives
As expressed in the 1971
plan, the over-all concept of
pacification consists of the
three objectives of "local self-
defense, local self government
and local self-development."
The philosophy of the pro-
gram is stated as follows in
the plan:
''In his efforts to achieve
political control of the Repub-
lic of Vietnam, the enemy at-
tempts to demonstrate that
the Government of ?Vietnam is
not capable of governing the
country or of providing credi-
ble security to the - people. His
offensive operations an the re-
sultant reaction operations by
friendly forces produce adverse
PP
bility for e unity from mili-
tary agenci o civilian ones."
To assist this proposed trans-
fer and su),ervise the new po=
lice fund"( ns the South Viet-
namese ant I 'tilted States Gov-
ernments a-,e turned to Sir
Robert Th, meson, the British
counterinst -gcncy expert.
Sir Robe t. who carried out
two confic r nal missions for
President I i) on in Vietnam in
1969 and IF. 70, has been in
Saigon sin e February. In an
interview i i imbed in the cur-
rent issue ( f U.S. News &
World Rep rt, Sir Robert said
that Saigoi s ability to counter
subversion las steadily im-
proved all nr time."
The, peel nc Won plan empha-
sized that n-ong the 1971 tar-
gets is the eduction of "enemy
terrorist i .cnients" to 6,010.
The (locus Cit did not report
how man) iich incidents oc-
curred in 1970, but said that
the curren target was to re-
duce them by 75 per cent in
"secure air -a ." and by 50 per
cent in art' at "still undergoing
pacification
Statistic included in the plan
showed thi t the military region
that inch ds 15 provinces
south of Saigon and in the
Mekong D poses the most
serious set arty problems.
The delti has been declared
by the Sa gen Government to
be virtuall pacified, except for
U Minh I crest area, and all
Arnerican u't *las left the area
in 1969. 3,ut the plan reports
serious pr)b,ems with an en-
trenched 1, ieTcong apparatus in
the prov nt es if Vinhlong,
Dinhtuong I ienhoa and Anxu-
yen. Simi IT problems are re-
ported in linhdinh province in
the centra r art of the country
and in Qui ni nam and Quangtin
Provinces n the northern part,
adjoining he deittattarized
zone.
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GE 1
THE. YOAK DATV 4r ` 7
Text of Mansfield's Pullout Amendment
Spedaq. to The New Yu& Tapes
WASHINGTON, June 22 ?
Following is the text of the
Mansfield amendment adopted
today by the Senate calling for
withdrawal of U.S. troops from
Indochina within nine months
subject to release of all prison-
ers of war.
It is hereby declared to be
the policy of the United
States to terminate at the
earliest practicable date all
military operations of the
United States In Indochina,
and to provide for the
prompt and orderly with-
drawal of all United States
military forces not later than
nine months after the date of
enactment of this section
subject to the release of all
American prisoners of war
held by the Government of
North Vietnam and forces
allied with such Government.
The Congress hereby urges
and requests the President to
Implement the above ex-
pressed policy by initiating
immediately the following
actions:
1. Establishing a final date
for the withdrawal from In-
dochina of all military forces
of the United States contin-
gent upon the release of all
American prisoners of war
held by the Government of
North Vietnam and forces al-
lied with such Government,
such date to be not later
than nine months after the
date of enactment of this
act.
2. Negotiate with the Gov-
ernment of North Vietnam
for an immediate cease-fire
by all parties to the hostili-
ties in Indochina.
3. Negotiate with the Gov-
ernment of North Vietnam
for an agreement which
would provide for a series of
phased and rapid withdrawals
of United States military
forces from Indochina in ex-
change for a corresponding
series of phased releases of
American prisoners of war,
and for the release of any
remaining American prison-
ers of war concurrently with
the withdrawal of all remain-
ing military forces of the
United States by not later
than the date established by
the President pursuant to
Paragraph 1 hereof or by
Etch earlier date as may ne
agreed upon by the nego-
tiating_ parties.
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kii.7; Nei; W YORIK DATE dr WV ii 'LG
61/91?,Wilr"
MAlls o
WASHINGTON, June 22 ?
The Senate adopted today an
amendment calling for the with-
drawal of all American forces
from Indochina within nine
months if American prisoners
of war are released.
Over Administration opposi-
tion, the Senate by a vote of
57 to 42 accepted the troop-
withdrawal amendment to the
Selective Service Bill that Was
offered by Senator Mike Mans-
field of Montana, the Senate
Majority Leader.
The Mansfield Amendment
must still be passed upon by
the House once the Senate cOM-
pletes action on the bill extend-
ing Selective Service for two
more years. Whether the arriend:
meat would be accepted by the
more hawkish House was ques-
tionable.
Opposition Is Certain
In a House-Senate confer,
ence, the amendment was cer-
tain to be opposed by con-
ferees from the House Armed
Services Committee. But a shtft
of some Southern conservatives
in the S, nate to suppert the
Mansfield Amendment raised
the possibility that in a floor
fight a similar shift might oc-
cur in the House.
The White House press sec-
retary, Ronald L. Ziegler, said
that the amendment was not
binding and that President
Nixon would continue his pres-
ent policy. Mr. Ziegler added,
"it states what 57 Senators
think our policy should be. It
is not the view of the Congress
as a whole."
Adoption of the Mansfield
Amendment represented the
first major victory of critics of
the Vietnam War in months of
attempting to find some legisla-
tive formula to end the war.
The amendment would estab-
lish the policy that the United
States should "terminate at the
earliest practicable date all
military operations" in Indo-
china and undertake "prompt
and orderly withdrawal" of all
American forces within nine
months after enactment of the
amendment. The withdrawal
would be made conditional;
upon the release of all Amen'
can prisoners of war held by
North Vietnam.
In
In line with this policy, the
amendment calls upon the
President to establish a final
date for troop withdrawal. to
negotiate an immediate cease-
fire with North Vietnam to be
followed by "phased and rapid"
withdrawal of American forces
in return for phased release of
American prisoners of war.
No Fund Cut-off Date
Unlike other troop-withdraw-
al amendments that have been
rejected by the Senate, the
Mansfield AAmendment would
not cut off the funds to require
a withdrawal by a certain date.
In a Senate reluctant to use
the Congressional power over
appropriations to impose a
withdrawal schedule on the
President, this feature of the
Mansfield Amendment was in-
fluential in persuading 11 Sen-
ators, largely froth the South,
who last week had opposed the
cGovern-Hatfield Amendment,
which would have required
withkawal by the end ol the
year.
_
The Mansfield Amendment,
however, is more bindine upon
the President than a sense-of-
the-Senate resolution in that it
establishes a policy of with-
drawal within nine months,
subject only to release of the
prisoners.
As interpreted by Mr. Mans-
field, the amendment would fill
the policy void created, by the
repeal last year of the 1964
Tonkin Gulf resolution, which
gave approval to all necessary
steps taken by the President to
repel Communist aggression in
Southeast Asia.
Since the repeal of the Ton-
kin resolution, President Nixon
has been relying upon his in-
herent powers as Commander
in Chief to take all necessary
steps to insure the safety of
American troops as they are
withdrawn from Vietnam.
Should the Mansfield Amend-
ment be adopted by the House
and then the legislation signed
into law by the President, Mr
Nixon, it is argued by Senator
Mansfield, would then in effeei
have accepted the policy ot
withdrawal laid down by Con.
gress and his authority would
be limited to withdrawing the
troops, subject only to the re-
lease of the prisoners of war.
At least in principle, the pace
of withdrawal could no longer
be linked to the ability of the
Saigon Government to survive
af.fitAe factors in the Ad-
mitteneation's present with-
drama schedule, along with the
releaanof prisoners. The ametede
ment would also establish a
definite deadline for withdrieW-
al, something the Administra-
tion has opposed on the ground
that such a step would under-
cut the peace negotiations
North Vietnam.
in a statement issued fin-
mediately after the vote, Sen-
ator George S. McGovern, Dana-
eerat of South Dakota, aid that
the adoption of the Mansfield
Amendment was "a clear state-
ment in favor of the baeic
McGovern-Hatfield amendment
--establishment of a date cer-
tain for the withdrawal of all
American ground and air forces
from Indochina conditional only
upon release of all U.S. prison-
eis of war."
The Senate action, he said,
was "a clear repudiation of the
Administration's so-called 'Viete
naintation' formula" for with-
drawing. "It serves notice on
the President," he said, "that
if he continues to pursue that
course he will do so in defiance
of a strong majority in the
Senate."
Senator Mark Hatfield, Re-
publican of Oregon, hailed adop-
ting' of the Mansfield Amend-
ment as "an historic action a!-
ter years of apposition to our
involvement in Vietnam."
Senator Hatfield said that
while much remained to he,
done, a first step has beeU
taken "that assures us that onr
policy can be changed by the
will of the people."
By a 55-to-42 vote, the Sen-
ate. last week defeated the
amendment cosponsored by
Senator McGovern and Senator
Hatfield th
ye cu
off funds for deployment of
troops in Indochina by the end
of this year.
But today, several Senators
who normally support the Ad-
ministration's Vietnam policy
switched to support the Mans-
fieliamendmput. These includ-
ed Ileyd M. Bentsen of Texas,
RAM Y. Byrd of West Virginia,
David H. Gioia
Ernest F. Hot'.
Carolina, Len
Idaho, John e
Arkansas, Win
of Virginia, and
enadge of Geori
The Mansfie
was adopeed ai
tion forces, tie
able parr amen
ing, succeeded
feating an a,
would ha' e rec
al of all troc
months, with 11
the withdrawal
be susperded
within 60 dap
"firm commite
all Amerii
The etinanu;
sponsored by e
W. Cook if Kc
Stevens id A
whom are Rep
attempt lo bl?
Stevens amen(
John Stennis
chairman of tilt
Services Comm
that the provis
commitment" t
nam be replace
of the prisoners
prtested teat el
Stennis emeno
"gut" his amei
ting up n ire
tion.
e of Georgia,
e of South
e Jordan of
acClellan of
in B. Spong Jr
-J. amen E. Tal-
.a
I amendment
c Administra-
e.gh consider-
y maneuver-
n narrowly de-
eedment that
ii ed withdraw-
? within nine
-rovision that
d 'aniline would
orth Vietnam
cid not give a
e le' to release
s.,ners of war.
.t was co-
o cons Marlow
Lecky and Ted
sea, both of
'limns. In an
ei the Cook-
e nt, Senator
)f
enate Armed
:e a, proposed
au of a "firm
e North Viet-
by "release"
e.enator Cook
,ffeat of the
et was to
iant by set-
a: -eible condi-
The Stennis a ? dment was
irst rejected I a 51-ito-48
ate. But then a a series of
hree close vote:, the Senate
econsidered and finally adopt-
d the Stennis inenciment by
50-to-49 vote.
In the votes, Cl ator B. Ev-
rett Jordan, Den 0( rat of North
arolina, switcht J his position
o assure adopt(ii of the Sten-
is amendment. A It award, Sen-
ator Jordan, who .a week vot-
d for the McG o. ern-Hatfield
amendment. expeii ied that he
had misundersto d the import
of the Stennis E. n ndment on
the first vote. H isisted that
Senator Stennis a. not talked
to him between n votes.
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Vo A iV r I t? A-ye2E A./0
FOR Till Aso NDMENT?S7
Anderso, ' NM 1 lAaguuson (Wash.)
aV .1 Marl,9,1d (fiant)
Bentsen ( lex.) mci. lelian (Ark.)
Bible (Ncv.) McGovern (S.D.)
Rurdick (N.D.) McIntyre (N.H.)
Rvrd (W. Va ) Metcalf (Mont.)
Cannon (Nev.) Mondale (Minn.)
(lilies (Fla.) Montoya (N.M.)
Church (Idaho) Moss (Utah)
Cranston (Calif.) Muskie (Maine)
I- aglefon (Mo.) Nelson (Wis.)
f ulbrIght (Ark.) Pastore (R.I.)
Cambrell ,Ga.) Poll (R.I.)
UraVel (Alaska) Proxmire (Wis.)
Harris (04,1a.) Randolph (W. Va.)
.Hart (Mich) Riblcoff (Conn.)
Hark e (Ind.) Soong (Va.) . .
Hollings (').C.) Stevenson (114.)
Hughes (Iowa) Symington (Mo.)
Humphrey (Minn.) Tatmadge (Ga.)
Inouye (Hawaii) I .inney (Calif.)
.lorden (NC.) Williams (N.J.)
Kennedy (Mas.)
Republhans-12
Aiken (Vt.) Mathias (Md.)
Brooke (Mass.) Pearson (Kan.)
Case (N.J.) Percy (III.)
Hatfield (Ore.) Sc hweiker (Pa.)
Javits (N.Y.) Stevens (Alaska)
Jordan (Idaho) Young (N.D.)
AGAINST THE AMENDMENT-42
Thlriarrats-10
Allen (Ala ) Jackson (Wash.)
Ryrd (Val Long (La.)
) astiand (Miss.) McGee (Wyo.)
I: ITender (La.) Sparkman (Ma.)
Ervin (N.C.) Stennis (Miss.)
Republicans-32
Al(ott (Col.).) Goldwater (Mi.)
Bake; (Tevn.) C?rittin (Mich.)
.
BellMon (Okla.) Hansen (Wyo.)
Bennett (Utah) Hrushka (III.)
Boggs (Doll Miller (Iowa)
Brock (ten. ) Packwood (Ore.)
Buckley (N.Y.) Prouty (Vt.)
Cook (Ky.! ixoth (Del.)
Cooper (KY.) Saxhe (Ohio)
Cotton (NFL) Scott (Pa.)
Curtis (Neb.) Smith (Maine)
Dole (Kan.) -let (Ohio)
Dominick (Colo.) Thurmond (S.C.)
Fannin (Az ) ' o,,er (Tex.)
Fong (Hawaii) ?::1; kor (Conn.)
Abseui Muodl 1
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THE NEW YO:RX TIMES DATE 'ACE
HOUSE REJECTS
by taking to the floor to argue
that the establishment of a
withdrawel deadline would 'in-
terfere" with the Paris peace
VIETNAM plluolli ndeizgotAiamtioenrscaanndliv"ecsoul" d jeopar-
VOTED BY
Mr. Albert found himself vot-
sENATE ocrats. A total of 143 Demo-
ing with a minority of Dem-
crats and 33 Republicans voted
for what was, in effect, the
Mansfield amendment while 83
Democrats and 136 Republicans
voted against it.
To Conference Next
The issue now goes to a Senate-
-House conference committee
to reconcile differences between
the Senate and House versions
of the bill both of which extend
the draft authority for two
more years.
House managers of the bill,
such as Representative F. Ed-
ward Hebert of Louisiana,
chairman of the Armed Serv-
ices Committee, hinted at the
possibility of a compromise on
the language of the Mansfield
amendment. But if the amend-
ment is weakened significantly
in conference, the bill faces a
probable filibuster when it re-
turns to the Senate floor.
As a result, there was a
Continued on Page 37, Column 4 I
Amendment for Withdrawal
Based on P.O.W. Release
Is Defeated, 219-176
By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Timex
WASHINGTON, June 28
The House refused today to ac-
cept a Senate amendment call-
ing for withdrawal of troops
from Vietnam in nine months if
American prisoners of war
were released by North Viet-
nam.
By a 219-to-176 vote, the
House defeated a motion call-
ing for acceptance of the Sen-
ate troop withdrawal amend-
ment to the Selective Service
bill. The amendment, sponsored
by Senator Mike Mansfield of
Montana, the majority leader,
was adopted by the Senate last
week by a 57-to-42 vote.
For the critics in the House
of ?the Vietnam war, the vote
was their best showing in near-
ly two years of trying to press
the issue. They gathered 20
more votes than on a similar
but more binding troop with-
drawal amendment that was re-
jected by the House two weeks
ago. They contended that if it
had not been for absentees
their total would have been
around 190, just 14 short of a
majority.
White House Victory
But the vote was still a clear
victory for the White House,
which worked actively to de-
feat the Mansfield amendment
in the House. President Nixon,
for example, called Speaker
Carl Albert this morning, ask-
ing him to intervene in the de-
bate against the amendment.
Mr. Albert then split with the
-Democratic leadership in the
Senate as well as with the
Democratic whip in the House,
Representative Thomas P.
O'Neill Jr. of Massachusetts,
growing likelihood that Con-
gress would not extend the Se-
lective Service taw befbre the
present draft authority expires
at midnight Wednesday. Draft
calls have been set for July and
August, but Selective Service
officials have said they did not
plan to induct anyone until the
draft authority was renewed.
Under existing law, the system
could still draft college students
and others who have been de-
ferred.
Conferees Hampered
Ordinarily, the conferees,
drawn from the House and Sen-
ate Armed Services Commit-
tees, could be expected to op-
pose the Mansfield amendment.
But both sides now find them-
selves circumscribed by the
votes in the House and Senate.
The Senate conferees can-
not yield too quickly on an
amendment adopted by a de-
cisive margin in the Senate.
And the House conferees can
point to today's vote as a rea-
son why thy should not yield.
Critics of the war are holding
i he threat of a Senate filibuster
over both sides if the con-
ferees fail to reach an accept-
able compromise.
As in the past, the House
leadership resorted today to
procedural moves to prevent a
direct up-and-down vote on the
Vietnam issue.
A motion instructing the
House conferees to accept the
Mansfield amendment was of-
fered by Representative Charles
W. Whalen Jr., Republican of
Thrt
io. Rather than permit a di-
e
vote on the Whalen mo-
tion, Mr. Hebert moved to table,
or lay aside, the motion. It was
:he Hebert tabling motion that
vote.
was adopted by the 219-to-176
Against Instructing
Throughout the debate, Mr.
whert and the Republican lead-
ership posed the issue not so
much as whether the Mansfield
amendment should be accepted
but rather whether the House
nr.iould instruct and thus, as
they put it, "tie the hands" of
the House conferees. With this
argument they were appealing
to the traditional reluctance of
the House to instruct conferees
o accept a Senate amendment.
"In the interests of this coun-
try." Mr. Hebert pleaded with
the House, "don't shackle me.
Please don't put the handcuffs
or. my conferees."
In a similar vein, Representa-
, /VA Gerald R. Ford of Michi-
gan. the House Republican
ea der, asserted that the con-
terees should be given a "free1
1
hand" to see .hather they,
could work out tii to "reason-
able" substitute yr the Mans-
field amendment
The amendment v ould estab-
lish as "policy" ti is withdrawal
of all American f trees from
Indochina in nine n onths, sub-
ject only to the e ease of all
American prison e s of war. It
also calls upon th Presiden
to negotiate a c a e-fire with
North Vietnam, t. he followed
by the phased v it idrawal of
American troops n return for
the phased rt?least the prison
ers of war.
Leading the arg r clit for the
amendment, Mr C Neill said
it would give th louse a chanc
to "reaffirm Cs avressional re-
sponsibility in tie formation of
American policy
"Just as we 'e e irresponsi-
ble in letting t se war start,"
he told the lit "let us b
responsible in oiling it."
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te64.-s
Nigmcccmft -qE4ILitlease 2000/09/08 : CIA)RDP7013246-kb0030005900V3-2--
C.I.A. Says Plan Seeks to Embarrass U.S.
By TAD SZULC
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, July 8?
The Central Intelligence
Agency has told President
Nixon that the new Vietcong
peace proposal is aimed at
embarrassing the United States
"both at home and overseas"
and encouraging the opponents
of President Nguyen Van Thieu
in South Vietnam.
Other negative comments on
the plan were contained in a
detailed analysis submitted to
Mr. Nixon and other top Ad-
ministration officials last Friday
a day after Mrs. Nguyen Thi
Binh, the chief Vietcong dele-
gate, offered her proposals at
the Paris talks.
The agency's evaluation, ac-
cording to senior Administra-
tion officials, was one of
several top-level studies of
the Communist plan on which
President Nixon and Secretary
of State William P. Rogers
based their decision to in-
struct the United States dele-
gation in Paris to seek further
clarifications today from the
COmmunist side in "restricted
sessions," or private talks.
Reservations Expressed
The evaluation as well as the
parallel studies prepared in re-
cent days by the State and De-
fense Departments and the Na-
tional Security Council staff
Kissinger joins Mr. Nixon and upon whom Hanoi and the Viet- conciliation and r iasonable-
cong had looked with favor in ness without comr iting Hanoi
to anything specie '
The analysts ,1 Is warned
against pitfalls in lb Commu-
nist proposal for e, asing the
American prisonen h. exchange
for the withdraw. of United
States troops fr er Vietnam
under a set dead' -11 This has
appeared to be the n ost attrac-
tive aspect of Mrs B nh's peace
package.
But the analys s said that
while "the formu d on on the
prisoner-release it estion is
new," the Comm n-st demand
on total United Si ales military
disengagement "i is firm as
ever."
"Moreover, by n luding for
the first time civil at as well as
military prisoners tie Commu-
nists are openin -, the whole
thorny problem ,f the Com-
munist civilian a die who are
now held by Saigr ' it said.
Mr. Rogers in San Clemente on
Sunday. The next screduled
session of the Paris talks is
next Thursday.
Mr. Kissinger, the President's
special assistant for national
security affairs, visited Saigon
last weekend and is to confer
with Mr. Bruce in Paris on
Saturday.
Richard Helms, the Director
of Central Intelligence, whose
gency was reported to have
rafted the first analysis of
he Vietcong plan, participated
n the discussions on the United
bites response to the Commu-
nist proposals after he flew to
San Clemente with President
Nixon and Mr. Rogers last
Tuesday.
Officials familiar with various
Administration evaluations of
the Vietcong plan said that the
C. I. A. analysis was "perhaps
the most pessimistic?but also
the most realistic?of the lot."
Its over-all conclusion, con.
Wined in the first paragraph of
the document, said:
"The Vietcong's new seven-
point proposal softens the
Communists' position on the
prisoner-of-war release but re-
tains and amplifies a very
tough line on United States die-I
engagement from the war. In
addition, it repackages Hanoi's
demands for a political settle-
ment in South Vietnam in a
have expressed ,numerous seri- superficially more attractive
ous reservations about the Viet- fem.
cong plan. New Nuances Recognized
But all the studies also found said here about the Bruce pro-
new elements in the plan. The __The anal. y?sis recognized, hovel
that it soften?' the Cornmu- posal that "we regret that the
nist position on the American smith Vietnam" Vietnamese and the Viet-
% thec are lt,o ne,
C.LA. paper, for example, noted envueran'er
on on a political settlement eNarth
The principal features of Mrs.;
ong did not respond affirma-
s. ommunest poe.i
two new nuances on the }limn plan were the Commit.- 0? s?." pseufhgaetsttghoeny
prisoners of war and presents -fa itclovreitirnuteotothhisowill
/1,
South Vietnamese political set-
tlement. For, this reason, senior nist readiness to start releasing Nixon Expected to Walt
- ? '
mg
officials said, the Administra-
tion chose to seek to engage in
what officials here termed
"meaningful negotiatione'
Senior officials emphasized
that they did not consider the
fact that the Communists had
not responded immediately to
the proposal for "restricted"
sessions, made today in Paris
by David K. E. Bruce, the chief
United States negotiator, as an
outright rejection. <
They said that "something
resembling a negotiating proc-
ess may be in the making."
At San Clemente, Calif.,
where President Nixon and Mr.
Rogers conferred for the third
time this week on strategy in
the Paris talks, a White House
spokesman, Gerald L. Warren,
said that Mr. Bruce was at-
tempting to start "meaningful
negotiations."
The State Department press
officer, Charles W. Bray 3d,
the past.
The analysis said that the
Vietcong plan's first "new nu-
ance" was that instead of de-
manding a coalition regime in
Hanoi, it "simply demands that
the United States 'cease back-
ing the bellicose group' headed
by Thieu."
The other nuance, it said, is
that the Communists no longer
ask a "three-segment" regime,
including Communists, but a
broad "government of national
concord" to be negotiated by
the Vietcong with a "post-Thieu
administration."
"The Communists seem to be
trying to leave the impression
that the form of government is
open to negotiation," the docu-
ment said. "Moreover, the lan-
guage of this section?and in-
deed much of the statement?
is cast to convey an image of
United States war prisoners as
American troops begin with-
drawing from Vietnam after a
date "in 1971" is set by Wash-
ington, and the dropping of the
Communists' long-standing in-
sistence on a coalition regime
in Saigon as the condition for a
political settlement.
But after analyzing the plan,
the C. I. A. offered this assess-
ment of the Communist motives
in presenting their July 1 pro-
als-
,l`The Communists doubtless
hope that their iniatiative on
the prisoners?coupled as it is
with a 'restatement of their
basic position on United States
withdrawals?will make things
awkward for the United StisteS
Government both at home and
overseas."
"They may also believe that
their political proposals will
appeal to many in the United
States who are looking for a
face-saving way out of the war.
Highly-place! ,ofilicia s
cated their belief that President
Nixon would refrain from pub-
licly expressing his views on
the developments In ' the
talks until the situation became
"much clearer" through public
or private exchanges In Paris.
They said that only after
such clarifications would Mr.
Nixon address the nation on
Ithe state of the negotiations.
,They recalled that last year he
had waited nearly three weeks
after the Communists presented
their peace plan on Sept. 17
before making his counter-
proposal on Oct. 7.
"At this stage, we are not
I prepared to reject or to accept
1 anything as a package," a
senior official said. "We are
looking and we are probing
because this is the business of
diplomacy."
Other officials said that the
negotiating situation would be
reviewed again when Henry A.
They probab y are a -le hoping
that the new prop s I will fuel
worries in Saigon e eit Wash-
ington's longer-ter 4,upport.
"The new form .1.a for a po-
litical settlement 1 outh Viet-
nam, by its fuzz a is and air
of reasonablenese designed
both to encoureee Individuals
in South Vietnan ehose sup-
port of the war - wavering
and to give sorn immunition
to those who are cl eady work-
ing to build an ai u Ihieu, anti-
war constituence
Coincidence 4 Beliefs
This aspect o re analysis
was knowe :e ncide with
the belief in oth r Administra-
tio n quarters tie L he Commu-
nist peace plan ,s launched,
at least in part, I nfluence the
outcome of the etober elec-
tions in South 1- it nam, where
President Nguye -'Ian Thieu
seeking re-elece
In this conte: t, the analysi:
noted that "am e ni other thing
the Communists s,.em intent 01
creating the imT re ,sion that thi
election of Bi Mirth coulc
prove an heiti. 1 step tower(
peace."
"Big Minh" is Gen. Duong
Van Minh, a p itential but ure
declared presid indal candidate
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