CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE MAY 20, 1971: BREAK THROUGH IN STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

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May .2 0, 19 71 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 7463
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. With-
out objection, the nomination is consid-
ered and confirmed.
The assistant legislative clerk read the
nomination of Walter R. Mansfield, of
New York, to be a U.S. circuit judge,
second circuit.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. With-
out objection, the nomination is consid-
ered and confirmed.
The assistant legislative clerk read the
nomination of William Hughes Mulligan,
of New York, to be a U.S. circuit judge,
second circuit.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. With-
out objection, the nomination is consid-
ered and confirmed.
U.S. DISTRICT COURTS
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to read sundry nominations in the
U.S. district courts.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the nominations
be considered en bloc.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. With-
out objection, the nominations are con-
sidered and confirmed en bloc.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
The assistant legislative clerk read the
nomination of Jack T. Stuart, of Missis-
sippi, to be a U.S. marshal for the south-
ern district of Mississippi for the term of
4 years.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. With-
out objection, the nomination is consid-
ered and confirmed.
U.S. MINT
The assistant legislative clerk read the
nomination of Jack Herbert Keller, of
Pennsylvania, to be Assayer of the Mint
of the United States at Philadelphia, Pa.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. With-
out objection, the nomination is consid-
ered and confirmed.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I am glad
to see the confirmation, as Assayer of the
Mint of the United States at Philadelphia
of Jack Herbert Keller, of Pennsylvania.
He is a man for whom we have the high-
est regard. This honor which comes to
him now is well deserved and I am very
much pleased that he has been so
appointed.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the President
be immediately notified of the confirma-
tion of these nominations.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
LEGISLATIVE SESSION
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
move that the Senate resume the con-
sideration of legislative business.
The motion was agreed to, and the
Senate resumed the consideration of leg-
islative business.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under
the standing order, the distinguished
majority leader is now recognized. Does
he wish to speak?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
have no remarks at this time.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I yield back
the remainder of my time.
TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE
MORNING BUSINESS
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under
the previous order, there will now be a
period for the transaction of routine
morning business, not to exceed 30 min-
utes, with statements therein limited to
3 minutes.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
METRO SYSTEM
Mr. SPONG. Mr. President, the sup-
plemental appropriation bull passed last
night by the Senate contains the District
of Columbia contribution of $34 million
for construction of the area's metro sys-
tem. Although the House did not include
these funds in its version of the bill, I am
hopeful that the House conferees will ac-
cept the Senate provision.
Mr. President, a great deal depends
upon prompt release of this money. The
Metro system is already experiencing dif-
ficulties in the bond market where in-
vesters quite properly insist upon some
assurance that the subway system will
be built and will be built according to
the original 98-mile plan. The continued
delay in releasing the District of Colum-
bia's contribution not only welakens
Metro's position in the bond market, but
it is unfair to the local jurisdictions of
Northern Virginia and Maryland which
have scrupulously lived up to their agree-
ment.
Mr. President, I am not unsympathetic
to the desire of certain House Members
to see progress in the construction of
new highways in the Washington area.
These highways wial be necessary to help
carry the predicted traffic increase of
the next decade only a balanced trans-
portation system that includes both sub-
way and adequate highways will meet
the area's needs. In this connection, it
should be noted that the subway system
was designed with the highways in mind
and unless that construction is under-
taken, the subway system would be in-
adequate from its first day of operation.
Nevertheless, just as we cannot afford
to emphasize the subway to the neglect
of highways, we cannot insist upon high-
ways at the cost of Jeopardizing the sub-
way system. In short, we need balanced
transportation and we may need legis-
lation which will assure that balanced
transportation will become available.
For that reason. should the confer-
ence committee not approve the District
of Columbia money in this supplemental,
I intend to propose as a rider to either the
fiscal year 1972 appropriation bill for the
District of Columbia or the District of
Columbia revenue bill, an amendment to
tie highways and subway funds together.
Under this amendment, money would be
provided for both developments or there
would be no money for either.
Mr. President, f would prefer not to
take this course of actioi.. 4Lnd I hope it
will not be necessary. . lo want the
Senate to know, however that I will not
stand by while the subw, y is allowed to
wither from failure of tb - ~ederaa Gov-
ernment to honor its obl: etion.
CHANGE OF REFEREN('E OF A NOM-
INATION
Mr. BYRD of West Vir,_irda. Mr. Pres-
ident, at the request of the distinguished
Senator from New Jere ti (Mr. WrL-
LIAMS), I ask unanimous corsent that the
Committee on Finance be discharged
from the further consideration of the
nomination of Merlin K DuVal, Jr., of
Arizona, to be Assistan Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare, which
was referred to that committee on May
13, 1971,. and that the nomination be
referred to the Committe on Labor and
Public Welfare for appr?)priate consid-
eration and action.
The PRESIDING O T'ICER (Mr.
BENTSEN). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
QUORUM CALL
Mr. BYRD of West Virt iria. Mr. Pres-
ident, I suggest the absentt.e of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFI JER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The second assistant l vslative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. SAXBE. Mr. Prosident, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinc ed.
The PRESIDING OFF GER. Without
objection, it is so ordered,
LEAVE OF ABSENCE
Mr. SAXBE. Mr. Prn silent, I ask
unanimous consent that t he senior Sen-
ator from New York (14Ir JAVITS) be
granted official leave of tl:e Senate from
duty to the close of busside.s Thursday,
May 27, 1971.
The PRESIDING OFF: CER. Without
objection, it is so ordered
QUORUM CA Ll.,
Mr. SAXBE. Mr. Presi, tent, I suggest
the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFB ER. The clerk
will call the roll.-
The second assistant le-gislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. SCHWEIKER. Mr. ) resident, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescind ?d.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objectiop, At is so ordered.
BREAKTHROUGH IN 'z'RATEGIC
ARMS LIMITATIOI ` TALKS
Mr. SCHWEIKER. Mr President
I
,
rise to commend Presider t Nixon for a
truly significant breakthrough in our
strategic arms limitation aks. The an-
nouncement at 12 noon t. day may well
go down in history as the first real
breakthrough in the arena ni.nt race and
the first real breakthroug. in our situa-
tion in the cold war since -)r1d War II.
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S 7536 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE May 20, 1971
on an amendment to be offered by the Sen-
ator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD) to title V
of the pending amendment by the Senator
from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCHWEIKER), with
the time for debate on that amendment be-
ginning after the foregoing vote, to be equally
divided and controlled by the Senator from
Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD) and the Senator from
Mississippi (Mr..STENNIS) ;
Provided further, That a vote be taken
not later than 7 p.m. on Wednesday, May 26,
1971, on an amendment to be offered by the
Senator from Colorado (Mr. DoMINIci) to
title V of the pending amendment by the
Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr..9, cHwzixzR),
with the time for debate, beginning after
the vote on the amendment offered by the
Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD), to be
equally divided and controlled by the Sena-
tor from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK) and the
Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) ;
Provided further, That a vote be taken at
4 o'clock p.m. on Tuesday, June 1, on title
V of the amendment offered by the Senator
from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCHwEIKER), as
amended, if amended, with the time for
debate, beginning after the vote on the
amendment by the Senator form Colorado
(Mr. .DOMINICK), to be equally divided and
controlled by the Senator from Pen.-sylvanda
(Mr. SCHWEIKER) and the Senator from
Mississippi (Mr. STENNIB).
Mr. GRAVEL. I object.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Will the
Senator withhold his objection?
Mr. SCOTT. Will the Senator with-
hold his objection and give us an oppor-
tunity to make comment?
Mr. GRAVEL. I reserve the right to
object.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the
distinguished assistant majority leader
yield?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, we are
faced with the fact that we have only a
certain number of weeks in the year in
which to get the country's business done
before we go out to the people to apolo-
gize for it. If we are going to spend 6, 7,
8, or 10 weeks on each bill we will be
here until Christmas, with a lot of un-
finished business. We will be confronted
with the same sorry, shabby mess we had
at the end of the last session, which was
a disgrace, in my opinion, in the way it
was shuffled about, without adequate or
constructive treatment in many cases,
and I am not speaking critically of any
individual, but Congress did not give a
good accounting of itself.
Here we are doing our best to work out
some sort of satisfactory agreement with
Senators who have every right to be
assured of adequate time on the con-
sideration of each of their amendments.
Various suggestions have been made and
these suggestions would carry us so far
into June there would hardly be time
for the conferees to gather or for action
to be taken and, thereby, we would be
confronted with the Situation that the
chairman of the Committee on Armed
Services has pointed out, which would be
extremely unfortunate for the continued
operation of the military services.
So the distinguished assistant majority
leader, the chairman of the Committee
on Armed Services, and myself, with the
approval of the distinguished majority
leader, have proposed a unanimous-
consent request. If that is not satisfac-
tory, and the one suggested by some of
the Senators does not seem to us to be
one which we could live with, speaking
from the point of view of the party lead-
ership, we do not feel we can indefinitely
be a party to such delays in the Senate's
business, as would bring the country
down-around our ears again.
Therefore, we are heading toward a
situation, I regret to say, where we will
have to present a cloture motion on the
entire bill and all amendments there-
to, and amendments to amendments, and
see whether or not the Senate wants to
get on with the business or whether the
Senate is going to be confronted by con-
tinued and interminable delays. Again,
I have no criticism of those Senators who
agree to 3, 4, or even 5 hours on
amendments. We are willing to accom-
modate ourselves to that end, but we
cannot accommodate ourselves to the
paralysis of the Senate's business. When
it comes to that point, we are going to
put the burden on the Senate. We are
going to say to Senators, "We have done
our best but we are going to be forced be-
fore very long to circulate a cloture- mo-
tion and, if that fails, another and an-
other and another, so that the country
will know which Senators want to end
the debate and which do not."
It is an unfortunate situation. I hate
to say it. I think the distinguished chair-
man of the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices would not normally favor cloture.
I think he believes, as I do, in free and
extended debate, but I am bound to make
the statement. because I cannot meetmy
duties as leader on one side of the aisle
unless I say it.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. SCOTT. The Senator from Alaska
has the floor.
Mr. GRAVEL. I am happy to yield.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, as our
leaders have said here, we are faced with
a situation where there must be action.
The power to induct under the Selec-
tive Service Act expires on June 30. Be-
ginning with that date and counting
back on the calendar I estimate that we
must pass this bill not later than June
15, if we are to have adequate considera-
tion, a conference, preparation of rec-
ords, and the bill brought back here for
final approval of the. conference report,
and then sent to the White House.
This subject matter is important, but
it has been under consideration and de-
bate off and on in this Chamber, in our
committee, and elsewhere, since about
June of last year when the major amend-
ment was passed. We had most thorough
and searching hearings. We have a com-
plete report. There is unusual interest.
In these amendments there is a question
about sending draftees to Indochina; an-
other question deals with withdrawal
from Indochina by a certain date; an-
other matter is the length and extension
of the draft; and another question is the
question of manpower levels. Those mat-
ters cannot be taken lightly.
As the leader has said there is no blood
in my veins that wants to run in here and
holler that a cloture motion will have to
be applied for and voted. I have never
voted for cloture. I have always made
strong reservations in my mind and ex-
pressed them many times that if there
ever arose a situation where national se-
curity was involved I would be ready to
make full acceptance.
There is no doubt in my mind that
to carry on our military services, opera-
tions that are directly for the protection
of our shorelines and our people-leaving
out the war In Vietnam and troops in
14urope, but only speaking of the opera-
tion of our missile bases, our Barriers at
sea, our poTai'is submarines, our ground
missile groups, and. many dbhers-the
record shows it is absolutely necessary
under present conditions to have the in-
ducement of the Selective Service Act.
1: feel I know what would happen if we
(lid not have a continuation for a while;
and I am willing to go all out, to a rea-
sonable extent, to get it.
I appeal to the membership of this
body.. Let us join hands and settle our
differences of opinion about the provi-
sions of this bill in the right way, by
argument, and then by vote, and put to-
gether whatever bill'the majority of this
body thinks we should.
May I just speak further now, I think
in considering this bill, there are many
amendments, and there is some choice
about which ones will come up first. I do
not control that, but we are going to
spend the time here. However, I want to
reel free, not to call up any amendment,
but to debate it and discuss it after noti-
iying the author that I want to discuss
it. I want to get it in the RECORD, and
before the press, and before the public,
and I want to feel free to call up a Sen-
ator's amendment if necessary, and get
it to be the pending business if possible,
and start the debate on it if necessary.
I do not want to do that, but something
has to be doneto get this bill passed.
I hope all Senators can agree now to
some reasonable voting pattern. I will
accommodate myself to almost anything.
The leaders say they can accommodate
themselves to the problem, but we will
have to move the bill along. I put it ua
to our leaders in conference, and I put it
to them now, and I know they are going
to discharge it, but it falls on them as
our chosen leaders to move this bill along
as fast as they can, of course, in con-
formity with the rules and procedures of
the Senate. I think a delay cannot be
tolerated.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the request of the Senator
from Virginia?
Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I
object---
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr.
President, I believe I have the floor. '
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from West Virginia has the floor.
Mr. GRAVEL. Mr.. President, I would
like to make a few comments in answer to
my distinguished colleague from Penn-
sylvania..
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr.
President, I yield to the Senator from
Alaska with the understanding that I
retain my right to the floor.
Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, with
respect to the comments of both distin-
guished Senators-and let me say for
myself, I know the Senator from Penn-
sylvania (Mr. SCHWEIKER) and possibly
the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES)
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E 4642 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks 1 ay 19, 1
times, there has seemed to be a tendency for
some of the courts to undertake general
oversight over the whole government, to sec-
ond guess officers of the executive branch In
matters which would clearly seem to be of the
sort which are properly allocated to the
executive branch for decision.
Of course, executive officers should be kept
within their proper limits. They are surely
subject to the law and should be held to it.
But executive officers have great responsibili-
ties, particularly in these sometimes some-
what trying times. There is inevitably an ebb
and flow in allocating the powers in this
area. If there is something of an ebb in the
assertion of judicial power at the present
time, it- is not clear to me that that Is in-
consistent with the course of history, and
with the genius of our tri-partite govern-
mental system.
But it is the legislative branch on which
our interest focusses this evening. All federal
legislative power is in the hands of 535 men
in Washington, and we are gathered this
evening to attest our friendship and respect
for one of them. The task of Congress, and
of Congressional leadership, is an awesome
one. As I have sat on various boards and
committees from time to time, I have often
pondered about the process by which group
decisions are made. It is hard enough to come
to a conclusion In a group of five or eight or
twelve. Think how difficult it Is when there
are 435 members in the House of Representa-
tives-and they cannot function unless they
can get the concurrence of a majority of the
Senate, with 100 members, representing
rather different interests. The wonder is, I
suppose, that any legislative progress is made.
And sometimes it is discouragingly slow.
There are many problems in the organization
of Congress, in its committee structure, in its
time consuming procedures, and its failure
to find a way to let the majority speak. Yet
Congress is a deliberative body, and it is wise
to see that there is ordinarily appropriate
deliberation on the important matters that
come before it.
Too many people forget too often that gov-
ernment is inevitably the resultant of many
competing forces. On the legislative side,
these are focused through Congress. On most
questions, effective government can only be
achieved through compromise. In a demo-
cratic government, many decisions are made
with which many persons disagee, some-
times deeply. As we were long ago told,
"Politics is the art of the possible." Or, as
Winston Churchill wrote about his ancestor,
the Duke of Marlborough, "The best ob-
tainable was nearly always good enough for
him." Very few people can be successful in
politics if they are doctrinaire. Perhaps
Charles Sumner, who represented this Com-
monwealth in the Senate a century and more
ago, is an exception, but he served during
an unusual period, and his recent biographer
makes it seem unlikely that it would be wise
for anyone to try to emulate him. One is
reminded of the definition of a fanatic-he
is doing what God would do if Be only under-
stood the facts.
if compromise is the essence of govern-
ment, particularly on the legislative side,
the caliber and the character of the people
in Congress becomes of first importance.
There Is, of course, partisanship in Congress,
and that is as it should be, for that is part of
the process of reaching the consensus which
Congress is expected to formulate. But most
of the problems that confront the country
are not partisan problems. They are real
problems, directly affecting masses of human
beings. There will always be differences of
opinion about how to resolve these problems.
But there should be few differences about
the ultimate objective, which Is a better,
freer, cleaner country, In which every citizen
has an opportunity to make his own way,
freed at least from poverty and discrimina-
tion. In large measure our task is to establish
national priorities, for we cannot all at once
do all of the things that ought to be done.
On such questions we need men who can
provide constructive leadership, men who
can make moral and humane judgments. I
know of no one who is better qualified to
make such judgments than Father Drinan.
It was a century and a half ago that Goethe
said: "We hear many complaints about the
growing immorality of our times, but I see
no reason why anybody who wants to be
moral should not be so all the more, and
with all the more credit," I may not always
agree with Father Drinan, but I will never
doubt that in his heart he is on the right
side. We can ask no more, of a man, or of a
legislator.
Perhaps there is a time for me to do a
little lobbying- I hope that Father Drinan
will look with favor on President Nixon's
welfare proposals, which are measures, I
think, whose time has come. And then there
is revenue sharing. Perhaps the President's
proposals can be Improved. No one asks a
legislator to be a rubber stamp. But the
basic scheme is one with great possibilities.
Too long the states and the federal govern-
ment have been fighting each other; this
proposal will help them to work together.
Finally, since Father Drinan Is a member
of the House Committee on Internal Secu-
rity, I would ask him to do what he can to
advance the bill which would repeal the
provision of the McCarron Act, passed twenty
years ago over President Truman's veto,
which sets up detention camps in this coun-
try. This law has always been an embarrass-
ment to the executive branch, as well as an
affront to our citizens. The present adminis-
tration has sought its repeal, and I charge
Father Drinan, who is at least closer to the
seat of power on such matters than any of
the rest of us are, to bring it about.
There is much impatience in the land.
Some of this Is understandable. It is only
human to want what you want and to want
it now. To a considerable extent, the im-
patience is good, for It is a source of motive
power, and that is always needed in a democ-
racy. But the results In government are not
produced by impatience. They are produced
by people. Some of the problems are extraor-
dinarily difficult. In the long run, however,
they will be resolved only by the thought
and effort of the people who work on them,
and eventually by the votes of our repre-
sentatives in Congress.
In a sense, I am sorry to see Father Drinan
leave the law school world. He was an im-
portant figure there, not only for his teach-
ing and scholarship and energy and enthu-
siasm, but because of his example, and his
stimulation to his students to make them-
selves count. But in a larger sense, I am
glad that he has gone to Congress. It is not
that he is the first Catholic priest in Con-
gress, though I welcome that, for it means
the breaking down of a barrier which has
divided us. It is not just that he is a law
school dean who has made good in the larger
world, though I welcome that, for I have long
believed that American law schools should
not be ivory towers. It is not just that he
is a scholar in politics. We have room for
that, and his scholarship will help. It is
rather because of the kind of man he Is,
quite apart from his cloth. By this, I do not
impugn the countless other members of Con-
gress who are honest, upright, moral and
humane. But to me, there is something very
refreshing that Father Drinan is a member
of our American Congress. I know that you
join with me in tribute and respect to him,
and in that deep warmth which comes when
one salutes a friend.
May God be with you, rather Bob.
GA2.,A3,1
HON. MICHAEL J. 1ARRINGTON
OF MASSACH7 iE rTS
IN THE HOUSE OF RE] W SENTATIVES
Tuesday, May 1i . 1971
Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Speaker, the
United States is today ?r, gaged in Stra-
tegic Arms Limitation Talks with the
Soviet Union, aimed at deescalating the
arms race. At least thi: t our public in-
tent; our private inte -e,t is less dis-
cernible.
There is a growing ix al Lzation that we
are rapidly developing weapons systems
while erstwhile espous ii;. the cause of
limitation. While preaci r:g disarmament
we are stoking our own tit es.
Perhaps one of the f nest attempts at
analyzing this situatio: las been done
by Samuel Orr in a tv.o-part series for
the National Journal. FF e focuses on how
policy is developed for 7 T. >. participation
in the SALT talks as we I s covering the
issues involved and ref ct.ion to the ad-
ministration's handlinE_ cc F the negotia-
tions.
It is one of the most k owiedgeable and
in-depth accounts of tl e SALT talks to
date and I recommend it tt my colleagues.
PART I
DEFENSE REPORT/NATIONAI S:CURITY COUNCIL
NETWORK GIVES WHITE I( USE TIGHT REIN
OVER SALT STRATEGY
(By Samuel ( tirr)
The United States is tuc o ig more systems
into its nuclear weapons belt, while calmly
talking with the Soviet Ui io.i about halting,
or at least easing, the bur' ei some arms race.
This arm-w1 ile-you-ta K policy is the
handiwork of an elaborate a ,paratus created
by the Nixon Administrat or to control U.S.
participation in the Stral ,g c Arms Limita-
tion Talks with the Soviet Union.
The intermittent talks, i o' in their fourth
round at Vienna, began 16 months ago.
Controversy: The U.S. i ol:cy-making ma-
chinery for SALT is oilev v rid operated by
the White House through t e National Se-
curity Council. The full tine engineer is
Henry A. Kissinger, assistai t to the President
for national security affe r, and NSC staff
director.
Under the guidance of tl i omplex NSC in-
terdepartmental system, ; r.-Aost all aspects
of the U.S. strategic weapc riF program would
receive substantial increaa -s under the pro-
posed $76-billion defense b fidget for fiscal
1972.
Some arms-control supp r, ors say that the
Nixon-Kissinger policy jeo] aiizes chances of
any meaningful agreemel at SALT. They
fear that continued am escalation will
generate countermeasures uy the Soviets at
a time when the two s iperpowers are
roughly balanced In deters ei t strength, and
thus are In a good positic o negotiate an
arms limitation pact.
But Administration spol ?s nen defend the
strategy as essential to ce -p pressure on
the Soviets in the negotia u pis.
The United States, they si y, is 1R danger
of losing its superiority n weaponry and
technology within a few e? rs, and cannot
unilaterally surrender an ,r' its bargain-
ing chips at SALT.
Administration officials a so defend the
NSC-dominated policy-maxi fig mechanism.
They argue that it gives cc is der&tion to the
viewpoints of all interested agencies-from
the giant Pentagon to th- i ny Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament AL,( if
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a 19, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD -- Extensions of Remarks E 4641
change for the good. We are all Americans. We
all believe deeply in freedom of religion, as
well as many other things. Surely it Is meet
that we should work together.
But there are other reasons for my being
a bit surprised that I am here tonight. You
know, when Father Drinan came to be Dean
(f the Boston College Law School, I resented
it a, little bit. This was because I had come
to have such high regard for Father Kennealy
that I hated to see him give up his leadership
of this fine law school. I still have that high
regard for Father Kennealy; but I have found
that there is room for high regard for Father
Drinan, too. In the course of my years in
Cambridge, I had many contacts with him, in
many fields-in relations between our two
law schools, which were, I think, good, in re-
lations with the American Bar Association,
and with the United States Commission on
Civil Rights. I soon found that Father Drinan
was an activist, and a working activist. When
there was work to be done, he was doing it.
He was one of the principal founders of the
Section of Family Law of the American Bar
Association. He was Chairman of the Massa-
chusetts State Advisory Committee to the
Civil Rights Commission. And now he is a
Congressman.
(Years ago, thinking I knew him fairly well,
I tried to write to him as "Dear Bob". But my
good Secretary always made it "Dear Father
Bob." Of course, I did not mean any disre-
spect, quite the contrary. But he will be
Father Bob tonight.)
For further reasons for surprise at my being
here, I will observe that he is a Democratic
Congressman, and I am a Republican, serving
in a Republican administration. I may add,
too, that Father Bob defeated a Harvard Law
School graduate in becoming a Congressman.
But despite all these differences-perhaps
because of them-I am glad to be here to-
night. In less time than it usually takes for
an outsider to be accepted here, Father Bob
has made himself a citizen of this commu-
nity, and I am happy to join with you in pay-
Ing great respect to him, and to his fruitful,
and for a churchman, unusual career In the
law.
With these preliminaries, I will turn to the
theme of my talk tonight, which is that the
greatest achievement of mankind on earth is
effective self-government-greater than nu-
clear physics, or putting a man on the moon,
greater than art or music or literature,
though one of the fruits of effective self-
government is that they may flourish. I do
not overlook religion, but for many it has an
outside source. For government, though, we
are on our own.
Of course, fully effective self-government
is never accomplished. There are always
problems. We are always striving. We do a
good deal if we keep the ship afloat and
generally moving ahead. Those of us who
have grown up with our system sometimes
take it for granted, and do not recognize
how inherently complicated it is. We are
a country of more than two hundred mil-
lion people, a number which has consider-
ably more than doubled in my lifetime. We
are a people of widely divergent backgrounds
and interests, inevitably divided into inter-
est groups, factions and sects. We are geo-
graphi;ally divided into fifty states, some
relatively small and simple, some huge. New
York wad California, for example, have more
people than nearly all of the members of
the Uniled Nations.
We art a country of paradoxes. We have,
C believe,more freedom than any country in
aistory, yet many of us are more concerned
about our freedom than at any time in the
past. We lave great national wealth, widely
spread, ye, we also have great poverty in
this country. The figures show that the
iverage per capita income is higher now
than a, and previous time in history; and
the number'iving in poverty is proportion-
atety lower Iran any time before. Yet we
are, I think, more concerned than ever
before.
We have a beautiful country, filled with
natural resources, which, in the past, we
have squandered. We have an economy
which is based on growth. Indeed, this has
been a kind of religion of the economists.
Some years ago, when I was on a Committee
at the Brookings Institution, I asked in the
course of our discussions: "What is so good
about growth?" The shock that resulted was
clearly discernible. It was equally clear that
I made no converts. Yet most of our prob-
lems are the consequence of growth, of the
rapid increase in our population, and the
escalation of consumer demands. For years
we havetotted up the Gross National Prod-
uct, with evident satisfaction, and without
taking into account any of the negative fac-
tors involved, such as the costs which should
have been incurred to control pollution. We
have treated the air and the water and the
soil and the beauty around us as inexhaust-
ible. Now we know they are not. Fortunately,
through our great governmental machine,
we are beginning to do something about it.
But haw do we go about doing something
about this, or any other large scale problem?
There is little, if anything, which is mono-
lithic about our governmental structure.
In the first place, we are divided into fifty
states, and literally thousands of counties
and cities and political subdivisions in those
states. And this is good. There are things we
do in Massachusetts which do not concern
the people of Texas or California-and vice
versa. Even in the states and subdivisions,
we usually achieve results through repre-
sentatives. The essence of our government
state and federal, is representing democracy.
Thus the individual citizen is rather remote
from decision making, though we should not
forget that this is inevitable in a country
as large as ours. The citizen hs,s his oppor-
tunity to vote; and there are various ways in
which ire can make his voice heard. Whether
he can bring about any change in results
however, depends on how many other citi-
zens feel as he does. For we do believe, on
most things, in majority :rule. The thought-
ful citizen understands this, and does not
become frustrated when government does
not go his way. Instead he works harder to
find ways to bring about the result he
wants-Dr accepts the majority's decision if
he finds little likelihood that a change can be
achieved.
We have a federal governmen? too, as well.
as state and local governments. And there
are many difficult lines to draw between
state and federal powers. Generally speaking,
for example, the responsibility for the control
of crime is with the states. Burglary and rob-
bery, assault and battery, murder and man-
slaughter-including death on the high-
ways-are state matters, with which our
state authorities are struggling valiantly,
But if you rob a post office, that is a federal
crime, since the Constitution allocates post
offices to the federal government. And if you
rob a national bank or most state banks, that.
is a federal crime, too, since most banks are
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, an organization which Congress
has established in the exercise of its power
to regulate interstate commerce, and to regu-
late the value W money.
Recently I had a case before the Supreme
Court which involved the question whether
"loan sharking" could be made a federal
crime, without any proof that there was any
effect en interstate commerce ;n the par-
ticular ase. The case was a sad one. A young
man had worked in a butcher shop for ten
years. He decided to set up his own shop,
and got off to a good s.art. He wanted to
expand. He needed $2,000 to increase his in-
ventory, and to put in shelves and counters.
His credit standing would not enable him
to get a loan from the bank, and the Small
Business Administration said it was inter-
ested but that it would take six to eight
weeks to process his application. At that
point a friend said that he could get the
moriey frora Louey at the corner beer hall. So
he went to see Louey, who said he would have
to see his people, and shortly returned with
the money. To make a long story short, after
a few months, he had paid back $3,000 on
the $2,000 loan and still owed $5,000. Threats
were made to his wife and to him. He sold
out his establishment at a heavy loss-and
told the police. The defendant, who had
made the loan to him, was prosecuted under
the Consumer Credit Act of 1968-a section
of the Truth in Lending Law, passed by
Congress. In writing the statute, Congress
had tied its action to its power to regulate
commerce by including extensive recitals
about the relation of loan sharking to or-
ganized crime, and the deleterious effect of
organized crime on interstate commerce.
The defendant claimed that his crime was
merely local, and that there was no federal
power to make it subject to prosecution in
the federal courts. He lost, and there was
thus established a new area for the applica-
tion of a basic federal power.
I have mentioned this case not only be-
cause it involves the division between state
and federal power in our governmental sys-
tem, but also because it illustrates another
device we have used in an effort to make our
government workable and fair. This is the
separation of powers. More than any other
governmental system, I think, we have al-
located powers to the three branches of the
government, and have maintained a rather
firm separation between them. Indeed, in
many respects the success of our system de-
pends upon the extent that each branch of
our government (a) meets the responsibili-
ties assigned to it, and (b) refrains from
undertaking to exercise responsibilities
properly allocated elsewhere.
What has been called "the least dangerous
branch" i:; the judiciary. The responsibili-
ties of the judiciary are very great, and we
properly pay it great respect. We look to the
judges to see that tl'ials are fair, and that
constitutional guarantees and legislatively
established procedures are maintained. But
the highest courts of the states, and partic-
ularly the United States Supreme Court, have
the further and high responsibility of draw-
ing the ultimate constitutional lines, such
as that involved in my loan sharking case.
There we had an example of all three
branches in operation. Congress made the
law, exercising a considered judgment of the
representatives of the people that the exer-
cise of federal power in this area is desirable
and necessary. This was peculiarly a, legis-
lative matter, a complex and difficult one,
hammered out in the committees and on
the floor of Congress.
The law having been made by Congress,
it became the duty of the executive branch
to seek to enforce it. Under the Constitution,
the President has the duty "to take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed." When
complaint was made to the police in New
Ycrk, the executive branch, through the De-
partment of Justice, moved into operation
and started, a prosecution, in the federal
court, since Congress had expressly author-
ized that action. It then became the respon-
sibility of the courts, ultimately the Supreme
Court, to decide whether, under the Con-
stitution, Congress had power to make such
conduct a federal crime.
For our government to work effectively, all
three branches must play their role. In many
periods of our history, the judicial branch
has been rather passive, acting only in nar-
rowly circumscribed ways on the cases that
come before it. At other times, as in the
recent past, the judicial branch has seemed
to be more activist, reaching out for new
areas in which to operate, sometimes extend-
ing old precedents beyond what they were
commonly understood to stand for. Some-
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we have to participate in this matter
which so affects the lives and fortunes of
all citizens.
This period of extension will also en-
able the Congress to have the benefit of
1 year's experience with those innova-
tions contained in the bill that are de-
signed to bring about an all-volunteer
force before we are obliged again next
year to decide whether the draft should
be continued.
The most important of these innova-
tions is reflected in the second amend-
ment which I am cosponsoring. This
amendment will substitute the amount
of the $2.7 billion pay increase as passed
by the House for the approximately $1
billion recommended by the adminis-
tration.
As one who first called public attention
to the spectacle of military families on
welfare, I can do no less. For 13 years,
from 1952 through 1964, the basic pay of
enlisted men with less than 2 years serv-
ice remained unchanged, and since 1966
personnel in this category have only re-
ceived across-the-board increases which
served to maintain their position of rela-
tive penury. Under the terms of the
amendment which I am supporting, 86
percent of the increase authorized will
go to enlisted men and junior officers
with less than 2 years service, thus lift-
ing virtually all in this category from
below the poverty level of income.
If enacted, this pay increase, which
will be close to the amount recommended
by the Gates Commission as necessary
to man a volunteer force, should also be-
gin to test the assumption that increased
compensation can in fact attract suffi-
cient volunteers to man our Armed
Forces.
It goes without saying that if the draft
is to be retained, it must be made more
equitable. A number of other amend-
ments for this purpose. will be offered,
and I, of course, will support those which
advance this purpose.
QUORUM CALL
Mr, SCHWEIKER. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
BUCKLEY). The clerk will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The ]~RE,sIDING OFFICER. Without
HE SALT TALKS-PRESIDENT
NIXON'S STATEMENT ON RADIO
AND TELEVISION TODAY
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, to-
day, at noon, the President of the United
States made a brief statement on na-
tionwide radio and television which is of
singular importance to the Nation and, I
think, to the world.
The President brought us a message of
good news as it relates to the strategic
arms limitation talks now being held
in Vienna.
The substance of the President's state-
ment is as follows:
The Governments of the United States and
the Soviet Union, after reviewing the course
of their talks on the limitation of strategic
armaments, have agreed to concentrate this
year on working out an agreement for the
limitation of the deployment of antiballistic
missile systems (ABM's). They have also
agreed that. together with concluding an
agreement to limit ABM's, they will agree on
certain measures with respect to the limita-
tion of offensive strategic weapons.
The two sides are taking this course in
the conviction that it will create more
favorable conditions for further negotiations
to limit all strategic arms. These negotia-
tions will be actively pursued.
Mr. President, this is part of the Presi-
lent's statement. I ask unanimous consent
that the entire statement be printed at
this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the state-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
Goad afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.
As you know, the Soviet-American talks on
limiting nuclear arms have been deadlocked
for over a year. As a result of negotiations
involving the highest level of both govern-
ments, I am announcing today a significant
development in breaking the deadlock.
The statement that I shall now read is
being Issued simultaneously in Moscow and
Washington; In Washington at 12:00 o'clock
and in Moscow at 7:00 p.m.
The Governments of the United States and
the Soviet Union, after reviewing the course
of their talks on the limitation of strategic
armaments, have agreed to concentrate this
year on working out an agreement for the
limitation of the deployment of antiballistic
missile systems (ABM's). They have also
agreed that, together with concluding an
agreement to limit ABM's, they will agree on
certain measures with respect to the limita-
tion of offensive strategic weapons.
The two sides are taking this course in
the conviction that it will create more favor-
able conditions for further negotiations to
limit all strategic arms. These negotiations
will be actively pursued.
This agreement is a major step in breaking
the stalemate on nuclear arms talks. Inten-
sive negotiations, however, will be required
to translate this understanding Into a con-
crete agreement.
This statement that I have just read
expresses the commitment of the Soviet and
American Governments at the highest levels
to achieve that goal. If we succeed, this
joint statement that has been issued today
may well be remembered as the beginning
of a new era in which all nations will devote
more of their energies and their resources
not to the weapons of war, but to the works
of peace.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I rise
to commend this statement. The Pres-
ident's announcement concerning the
SALT talks is encouraging. The under-
standing that we will proceed toward
working out an agreement on limita-
tion of the deployment of antiballistic
missiles represents a significant first
step in strategic nuclear arms control.
The further understanding to seek an
agreement on offensive weapons repre-
sents a major breakthrough in the SALT
talks. These developments, I would point
out, are in accord with the principles and
suggestions which I made in my Senate
speech on March 25.
The next step to slow down the arms
race would be an understanding to freeze
the deployment now of both offensive and
defensive missiles.
On March 25, I N a-; imploring the ad-
ministration-the I'r?sident and his rep-
resentative at Vier no-to show consid-
erable flexibility in tl e talks on strategic
arms limitations.
I pointed out in tr a March 25 speech
that the Soviet Uni ,n had indicated a de-
sire or willingness 1 o discuss a limitation
on defensive missil 's. At the time of the
March 25 speech, the administration's
position was that there had to be an
agreement simulta eously on both of-
fensive and defensi re nuclear missiles.
Mr. President, i teas been my view
that progress in th trategic arms limi-
tation talks should p_-oceed step by step.
I was of the mind, a:. I am now, that to
try to arrive simult tr:eously at an agree-
ment on both off n ive and defensive
weapons might be v 'ry difficult, if not
impossible.
The President's a,r.nouncement today
subscribes to the I rccedure, first of all,
of seeking an agree Went within this year
on defensive weapi II ?y. This agreement,
of course, is cond .ieined upon the un-
derstanding that 'o lowing the agree-
ment on defensive missiles there would
be work toward at agreement on offen-
sive missiles.
This is exactly t ie position I pursued
in my argument o'. March 25. I said at
that time that what ev or agreement would
be arrived at or defensive missiles,
should be linked to fc, ture agreements on
offensive missiles.
The President's tittement today tells
us that the Soviet 'Jr ion and the United
States have agreed ?o concentrate this
year on working cut an agreement for
the deployment of anti-ballistic-missile
systems. Then, as a second step, these
two countries have also agreed on the
necessity of conclu ting an agreement to
limit offensive stra e:cic weapons one to
follow the other.
Mr. President, I i m so pleased that the
administration ha., shown this flexibil-
ity. I do believe th it matters of foreign
policy, and natioral security, particu-
larly with respect o arms control must
be considered over i .d beyond any par-
tisan questions. I believed that in my
votes of yesterday cn matters dealing
with our NATO for ei . I believe that even
more strongly wit reference to arms
control. The subje~.t of arms control is
one of the most se_ is us ones facing this
Government and, i think, one of the
most important or es facing mankind.
It is my consider 'd judgment that the
building of weapon 'y does not gain new
strength or new s ?cuu-ity, because it is
matched by our ad 'e,?sary or, in this in-
stance, the Soviet Tn;on. In other words,
there really is no wt y to get ahead. There
is only a way, if we so desire, to elevate
the level of danger by the arms race.
The other way is tee lower the level of
danger and the co: t by a limitation on
arms, what we call arms control agree-
ments.
It should be ncLe .i that the state-
ment of the President does not repre-
sent in unilateral rddllction on our part.
It represents a neg atiation directed to-
wards a mutual frem a of deployment or
a mutual limitation on the deployment
of anti-ballistic mi s' Ie systems. It re-
presents an under;tlinding to seek a
mutual agreement ~r the limitation of
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quoted a Department of Defense official as
saying that post exchange and non-appropri-
ated fund jobs were filled by American de-
pendents if possible. This is a small minority
of the civilian jobs in Europe with the U.S.
Forces. Most civilian jobs are appropria.tted-
fund jobs and most of these jobs are filled
by Europeans.
To help lower ranking enlisted men in the
U.S., there are many welfare services avail-
able. Federal Food Stamps and public assist-
ance are available in many states. Military
commissaries in the U.S. have been author-
ized to accept Federal Food stamps from
military families. In Europe there are com-
missaries near almost all military units, yet
there is no way provided for families to buy
food stamps in Europe. Even though U.S.
servicemen in Europe pay federal and state
taxes, they do not receive the many helpful
services of the Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare or the services of the
state welfare agencies.
The points so far mentioned in this dis-
cussion place a great deal of emotional stress
upon the soldier, his family and his marriage.
Nearly all of the married, lower ranking en-
listed men are in the early years of their
marriage--the adjustment period. The prob-
reins of the enlisted men mentioned in this
paper are deterrents to the marriage adjust-
ment of the U.S. soldier in Europe. Prolonged
separations and financial difficulties in mar-
riage are recognized by mental health pro-
fessional as deterrents to a happy marriage
in the great majority of cases.
4. Conclusions:
a. There are many military families living
in poverty in Europe.
b. There are few jobs available in Europe
for soldiers and American dependents to sup-
plement family income.
c. There has been an ever-widening gap
aetween the incomes of the lower ranking
servicemen and that of the officers and NCO's.
d. Officers and NCO's receive many flnan-
eial benefits that the lower ranking service-
men do not receive.
e. Welfare services for military families in
Europe are few and inadequate.
f. The effectiveness of U.S. forces in Europe
:is being lowered by the social and emotional
problems caused by the poverty of many of
Its members.
5. Recommendations:
a. A sizable pay increase for lower ranking
enlisted men to raise ail military families
shove the poverty level.
This is the heart of the amendment
that is before the Senate at this time.
This is, in fact, the Hughes-Schweiker
amendment. That is what it is designed
to do. That is what it does. It does what
the House has already had the courage
to do-add $1.7 billion to this bill for
pay. It is the essence of what the Gates
Commission and the former Secretary
of Defense from Pennsylvania recom-
mended in their study. This is what
everyone who has anything to do with
the problem is considering and recom-
mending. Yet, here we are, on the floor
of the Senate, battling for the right to
have decent pay for our enlisted men.
b. "Command sponsorship" for all married
servicemen to include these financial bene-
fits: dislocation allowance, travel pay for all
dependents, station allowance for high cost
housing areas, government shipment of
household goods.
All of this we do not give them:
c. End of sending a soldier on two eon-
secutive overseas assignments, unless re-
quested by the soldier.
Believe me, this is not the exception;
this is the rule. I have any number of
complaints coming into my office, as a
Senator and as a member of the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, about men
who have just gone through Vietnam
and have been shipped to Germany, with
no opportunity to see their families for
any extended period of time, unless they
pay the bill to take their families to Eu-
rope. How unfair can we get?
d. Unless all military families have their
incomes raised above the poverty level, Fed-
eral Food Stamps and other financial welfare
services should be provided to the military
families in Europe.
e. Make changes in civilian jobs with the
U.S. military in Europe so that all jobs pos-
sible will be given to American dependents
instead of Europeans.
This study is the personal work and opin-
ion of the undersigned and does not repre-
sent the views of the U.S. Army, Europe.
Most assuredly, it does not. It is signed
by Capt. Fletcher Hamilton, Medical
Service Corps, and Steven S. Sitnring,
major and psychiatrist with the Medical
Corps.
This brings me to one more point.
Since uncovering the memorandum. I
brought out a few days ago and read
again today, whereby the commanding
general of the European exchange sys-
tem, General Phipps, had recommended
that only local nationals be considered
for these jobs, the Assistant Secretary of
the Army, Roger Kelley, has personally
taken over the investigation of this mat-
ter. He has assured me that they are go-
ing to rectify that particular merrioran-
dum, that that memorandum will from
now on correspond to the alleged policy
that has been operating over there for
some time, of giving American nationals
some preference. Senators may rest as-
sured that I will follow upand make sure
that is done, because I think this is the
greatest injustice of all.
I have in my hand a copy of the latest
memorandum, which has gone out as a
result of my bringing these facts out in
committee just a few weeks ago. We hope
this will begin to straighten out the mess
and the terrible way in which we are
treating GI's. It is a memorandum that
has gone out to Germany and to Euro-
pean forces:
A. HQ EES Management Information Let-
ter N. 30, February 1971, as amended by EES
commanders Newsletter No. 37, April 1971.
1. This is it joint DA/DAF Message.
2. Department of Defense Policy an-
nounced 6 March 1961 requires that nonap-
propriated fund activities in foreign coun-
tries make maximum utilization of US de-
pendents already in country and enlisted
personnel employed during off -duty hours, in
lieu of local foreign nationals. This policy
remains in effect.
3. Referenced documents should be
amended and other pertinent command in-
structions reviewed to insure continuing
compliance with policy cited in Pars 1. above.
4. You should anticipate additional in-
structions on this subject in the near future.
While this, according to the books of
the Defense Department here, allegedly
has been the policy since March of 1961,
it obviously has not been. The policy has
been followed more in the breaking of it
than in the observance of it. Had it not
been for Captain Hamilton and his lead-
ership there, I doubt that we still would
know that the Commanding General of
Europe has sent out a policy totally con-
tradicting what the alleged policy of this
Government supposedly has been since
March of 1961. I do believe that Assistant
Secretary Kelley is going tosee that this
mess is cleaned up. I commend him for
his efforts.
I am sorry that it took all this trouble
to do what our GI's are entitled to do in
the first place. This, itself, tells us what
we are doing wrong in Europe--the fact
that we have to debate a situation such
as this and have to consider it-the fact
that I had to offer an amendment in
committee, which was accepted by the
chairman-and I commend the distin-
guished chairman of the Committee on
Armed Services for accepting my amend-
ment.
My amendment reads:
At the end of the bill add a new section
as follows:
Smc. 15. Unless prohibited by treaty, no per-
son shall be discriminated against by the
Department of Defense or by any officer or
employee thereof, in the employment of
civilian personnel at any facility or installa-
tion operated by the Department of Defense
in any foreign country because such person
is a citizen of the United States or is a de-
pendent of a member of the Armed Forces
of the United States. As used in this section,
the term facility or installation operated
by the Department of Defense shall include
any officers' club, non-commissioned club,
post exchange, or commissary store,
I think it pretty well tells the story
to know that a U.S. Senator has to write
into a bill an amendment that says we
will not discriminate against our GI's
and our exchange bases with our pay
or with servicemen's facilities. It is a
pretty sad day in American history when
a Senator has to present an amendment
like that.
I commend the chairman for his will-
ingness to tackle the problem and get it
straightened out. To me, this shows the
whole problem of why we had seriously
to debate the NATO question, why we
wonder about, the cost of paying the bill
there, and why we are facing up to the
situation there. The debate was healthy
and long overdue. It is another aspect of
what has been happening.
It is our own GI's that are the guinea
pigs. It is our own GI's who are, in fact,
being discriminated against. R is our
own GI's that a Senator has to write an
amendment to protect so that they will
not be discriminated against.
That pretty well sums up the case why
we have to start to treat our GI's as citi-
zens of the United States and give them
the same kind of pay, the same kind of
consideration, the same kind of emolu-
ment, the same kind of service and re-
spect that all other people in our Ameri-
can society get today.
Mr. CASE. Mr. President, today I have
joined in cosponsoring the Schweiker-
Hughes amendments to the draft bill
currently before the Senate.
The first of these amendments will
provide for a 1-year extension of the
draft, rather than the 2-year term re-
quested by the administration and rec-
ommended by the Senate Armed Services
Committee.
A 1-year extension will require the
Congress to consider this issue next year
and to exercise the responsibility which
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Development of the V.S. SALT policy is
cited by Administration officials as a model
of how the NSC system is supposed to work.
Because of the sensitive nature of the
SALT talks, which are secret, few of those
involved in the planning-past or present-
would speak on the record in National Jour-
nal Interviews. But, several talked on a not-
for-attribution basis.
Stakes: A comprehensive arms-control
agreement, limiting both offensive and de-
fensive weapons, would sharply reduce pres-
sure for spending on several major strategic
weapons programs under development by the
Pentagon.
Defensive-But the limited proposals be-
ing discussed at SALT thus far would cur-
tail only the Safeguard antiballistic system
(ABM) among U.S. programs. The Admin-
istration has begun deployment of Safe-
guard, which has an estimated cost of $11.9
billion.
The United States has offered to halt de-
ployment of Safeguard, provided that any
SALT agreement covers both offensive weap-
ons and ABMs. The goal is a limit on the
Soviets' powerful SS-9 missile, which can
carry up to 18 warheads.
In line with Its stated desire to go slow
on ABM because of the negotiations the
Administration requested only $1.3 billion-
a relatively small amount--for Safeguard in
the fiscal 1972 budget.
Offensive-In the past year, the Adminis-
tration also began deploying two major mis-
sile systems, the sea-based Poseidon and
land-based Minuteman III, both having
the controversial qualitative improvement
known as MIRV (multiple Independently
targetable reentry vehicle).
The military services and their allies in
Congress have resisted demands from arms-
control advocates that deployment of MIRV
warheads be stopped to avoid possible ad-
verse effects at SALT.
The Administration also has begun work
on two additional strategic systems, the B-1
bomber and ULMS, a submarine missile sys-
tem. First described as hedges against the
possible failure of SALT, the two systems are
now defended by the Pentagon simply as
replacements.
No SALT agreement has been considered
that would preclude deployment of B-1 or
ULMS. Both are now in the research-and-
development stage and would be enormously
expensive to procure in large numbers. The
B-1 bomber program has an estimated price
tag of $9.8 billion. The Pentagon has given
no firm estimate of ULMS' ultimate cost.
Over-all scope-National Journal deter-
mined in January that nearly $68 billion
remains to be appropriated for 52 major
weapons systems, strategic and tactical, in
various phases of development. About 100
other systems, also being planned, could add
billions in development and procurement
costs. (For cost figures on the 52 systems, see
No. 4, p. 170.)
NSC SYSTEM,
The White House holds tight control over
U.S. participation In the SALT talks.
The NSC staff under Kissinger sits at the
center of a complex interdepartmental com-
mittee system through which all preliminary
analysis for SALT was coordinated. The day-
to-day monitoring of the talks is closely tied
to the NSC system. Changes in the basic,
prearranged U.S. positions are cleared.
through the same structure.
In other areas bearing directly on strategic
arms policy, the committee system has re-
sponsibilities for:
Review and articulation of broad policy,
in documents like the President's Feb. 25
foreign policy message to Congress;
Review of Pentagon weapons plans and de-
velopment of broad policy directives to guide
Pentagon force planning;
Assessment of the Soviet threat.
The membership of the various commit-
tees, generally at the under secretary or as-
sistant secretary level, includes considerable
overlap among officials from the Defense De-
partment, State Department, Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency and Central In-
telligence Agency.
To a large extent, the committees consist
of the same officials wearing different hate.
Structure: President Nixon moved early to
revive the National Security Council as the
formal mechanism for high-level review of
issues requiring Presidential decision.
The NSC is composed nominally of the
President and his Cabinet, with other policy-
making officials sitting in when invited.
The council functions as a court of final
appeal on military policy issues involving
substantial disagreement within the govern-
ment.
The distinctive feature of the NSC sys-
tem under Mr. Nixon is the strong, independ-
ent role of the large NSC staff assembled for
the President by Kissinger. The 110-member
staff is the focal point for a multilevel struc-
ture of interagency committees and working
groups reaching deep into the national se-
curity bureaucracy.
The committees are chaired by Kissinger
or other NSC staff members and composed
of a shifting cast of officials from the depart-
ments and agencies concerned. These groups
meet at irregular intervals to review the
work of lower-level working groups and staff
analysts drawn from throughout the
government.
Verification Panel- -The focal point of NSC
control over the U.S. position Is the Verifica-
tion Panel, which served as the central in-
terdepartmental forum during the extended
period while U.S. SALT positions were be-
ing worked out. The panel focused its anal-
yses on how to verify Soviet compliance with
an arms-control agreement and what dan-
gers might come from Soviet cheating.
It continues to serve as the forum for
preparing summary analyses of the pros and
cons of possible shifts in the basic U.S. bar-
gaining position.
The panel is chaired by Kissinger. Its meet-
ings are usually attended by Gerard C. Smith,
ACDA director and chief U.S. negotiator at
SALT; David Packard, deputy secretary of
defense; John N. Mitchell, Attorney General;
John N. Irwin II, under secretary of state;
Richard Helms, Central Intelligence Agency
director (or Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman,
Jr., deputy CIA director); and Maj. Gen.
Royal B. Allison, Joint Chiefs of Staff officer
for SALT and a member of the U.S. negotiat-
ing team.
Working group-Below the panel is the
Verification Panel Working Group, which
monitors the specific detailed analyses asked
for by the panel, delineates the conflicting
agency positions where they exist, prepares
the initial summaries of the Verification
Panel and assigns specific analytical tasks
to staff analysts, or to special study groups
and government offices with special expertise.
The chairman of the Verification Panel
Working Group is K. Wayne Smith, Kissin-
ger's chief deputy for analysis and former
special assistant to Alain C. Enthoven, as-
sistant secretary of defense for systems anal-
ysis under former Defense Secretary (1961-
88) Robert S. McNamara (For a report on
the Systems Analysis office, see Vol. 2, No. 49,
p. 2643.)
The Verification Panel Working Group is
composed of the designated representatives
of panel members (except Mitchell). The
group's current members are Gardiner L.
Tucker, assistant secretary of defense for
systems analysis; Spurgeon M. Keeny Jr.,
ACDA assistant director for science and tech-
nology; Ronald I. Spiers, director of the
State Department Bureau of Politico-Military
Affairs; Gen. Marvin C. Demler, Joint Chiefs
of Staff special assistant for arms control,
and a CIA representative ass gied on a ro-
tating basis.
The Verification Panel V'o~king Group
often breaks down into ad hoc se ;sions during
the development of an analyt eai effort, with
the formal members frequen 1y represented
by designated subordinates, w;,o can work
full time on SALT problems. 'u'ker's special
assistant for SALT, Archie 37ood, and Col.
Paul R. Von Ins, Gen. Allisc 'r staff assist-
ant, often sit in when their sup,riors cannot
be present.
The detailed analyses of st; ategic weapons
issues and SALT strategy aid the written
summaries of agency view: ,.re prepared
initially by staff assistants of w )rking group
members or are farmed out - - specialists in
the various agencies, in part velar the office
of the director of Defense ] iei,artment re-
search and engineering, ACD l nd the CIA.
Where the work is done a id the level at
which interagency coordinator begins vary
widely. Some basic policy pal ere are written
by the NSC staff, while dashed technical
assessments originate with th, s?ientific staffs
of the departments and ages -.iz,s concerned.
Detailed analytical work ( is SALT issues
is coordinated by Col. Jack uh rritt, Wayne
Smith's principal deputy on the NSC staff.
"Backstopping committee"- -Pay-to-day li-
aison with the negotiating te, ir. clearing in-
structions to the delegatio) nd deciding
negotiating tactics, is handled l,y a so-called
SALT "backstopping commi te, " Philip J.
Farley, ACDA deputy directs-, is chairman,
with Keeny acting as chairria>t in Farley's
absence. Membership on th. ? ; ?ommittee is
basically the same as for i ne Verification
Panel Working Group and i':ciudes Tucker,
Demler and Spiers. The NS( I, represented
by Helmut Sonnenfeldt, seni,r itaff member
and an expert in Soviet affair:
Much of the routine busing s if supporting
the U.S. delegation at the t tl].s is handled
without formal meetings.
On occasions when deveh_ pinents at the
talks raise the question of a aasic change in
policy, the issue is sent to h,. Verification
Panel-and ultimately to th, President-for
decision.
Negotiating team-The 1_S negotiating
team at SALT is headed b, Smith. Other
members are Paul H. Nitze, fo:?ir.er deputy de-
fense secretary (1967-69) ; H trold Brown,
former director of defense re, earth and engi-
neering (1961-65) and Seer. Lary of the Air
Force (1965-69), J. Graham Parsons, deputy
for SALT in the State Depa trient's Bureau
of Politico-Military Affairs, . Oft Allison.
DPRC: Weapons systems ai d force require-
ments, which could have a bearing on the
bargaining at SALT, are rev awed at a high
interdepartmental level by t is Defense Pro-
gram Review Committee, a n aj )r cgmponent
of the NSC structure.
Roles, composition-The DPRC, also
chaired by Kissinger, is comm for ed essentially
of the same officials, at the wider secretary
level, who sit on the Verificat`:01 Panel.
The WPRC is the forum fir integrating
Pentagon weapons plans into the Administra-
tion's broad policy objectives including arms
control efforts, and for relat: np the whole to
the federal budget.
The DPRC serves the duo purpose of in-
tegrating high-level NSC re isw of the De-
fense Department budgeter.,, i-rocess and of
bringing Joint Chiefs of Sta' officers directly
into the process. The Joint ''b!efs are repre-
sented at all levels of DPRC r'vews and anal-
ysis. (For more on the defen,, ' budget system,
including the DPRC's role, . rye Vol. 1, No. 1,
p. 9; Vol. 2, No. 49, p. 2642; nil. Vol. 3, No. 3,
p.166.)
NSC analysis-The DPR( vas organized
late in 1969 in an effort to see tnat NSC guid-
ance on Pentagon programs It, d the kind of
detailed analytical base that SALT policy was
afforded by the Verification Pa nel structure.
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The DPRC was set up as a multilevel com- CIA-Although the CIA evaluates Intelli- through levels of synthesis, passing through
mittee system similar to that of the Veri- gence, it scrupulously avoids making policy Kissinger's hands and arriving on the Presi-
fication Panel. It includes several of the same recommendations. dent's desk as a clear set of options with
people, with Wayne Smith coordinating the Helms told the American Society of News- the arguments for and against fully spelled
detailed analyses for NSC. paper Editors on April 14 that the CIA "can out.
Intelligence: Most discussion about pos- not and must not take sides." If he were to But :VSC officials are quick to place their
sible SALT agreements and, in theory at advocate a particular position, he said, those role in perspective.
least, the rationales for U.S. weapons sys- recommending another position would sus- Rather than subordinating the traditional
teams, derive from intelligence about the peer "that the intelligence presentation has departments and agencies, they say, the
Soviets and other potential enemies. been stacked to support my position; and the system ensures that conflicting agency posi-
Richard Helms is chief intelligence advisor credibility of CIA goes out the window." tions are clearly laid out for the President
to the President, by statute, and the CIA, DIA-Defense Intelligence Agency anah sts and are not lost in a compromise negotiated
which he heads, has primary responsibility coordinate work done directly for NSC at lower levels.
for evaluation of intelligence, through Col. John V. McLain, DIA special The NSC interdepartmental system has
CIA officials and analysts sit as members assistant for NSC matters. been clearly predominant in the articula-
of all the NSC committees and study groups. ACDA-Teclxnical analysis for ACDA, tion of broad policy goals in documents such
But evaluation of the evidence is an inex- which does not collect intelligence and as the President's foreign .policy message. It
act science often colored by the differing which does not participate directly in the has also dominated the Administration's
missions of the agencies using intelligence. USIB process, is carried out primarily In the SALT policies, but it has had a much less
Fundamental to disagreements over policy Science and Technology Bureau, headed by central role in decisions on U.S. strategic
and program rationales among the intelli- Keeny. Before going to ACDA in March 1989, weapons programs.
Bence agencies are their differing evaluations Keeny worked on strategic weapons issues NSC role: Administration officials questioned
of the threat. at the CIA and then as a member of the NSC by National Journal generally agreed that
USIB-In addition to the CIA, all other staff. His deputy, Sidney N. Graybeal, was centralizing SALT policy analysis in the NSC
departments and agencies involved in na- a strategic weapons analyst at CIA. system has worked out well.
tional security affairs have some intelligence State Department: -State Department Views represented--According to NSC offi-
evaluation capability. An effort to reach a analysis of strategic weapon:; intelligence is cials, the interdepartmental committees,
working consensus on what constitutes the centered in the office of Strategic and Gen- such as the Verification Panel, are organized
basic threat is made through the U.S. Intel- eral Research of the Bureau of Intelligence to ensure that views of the departments in-
ligence Board, chaired by Helms. and Research, which has a direct role in the volved are fairly represented.
Other members of the USIB are Howard C. USIB process. The office is headed by Frank "The President has to know what his top
Brown Jr.. assistant general manager, Atomic H. Perez. advisers think," one NSC staff member said.
Energy Commission; Ray S. Cline, director Both Keeny and Perez played vigorous The major agencies in strategic weapons
of the State Department's Bureau of Intel- roles in the length process of analysis that deliberations-ACDA, CIA and the Defense
ligence and Research; Lt. Gen. Cushman, went into the U.S. position at SALT. Department-are represented at all levels by
deputy director of CIA; Lt. Can, Donald V. Director of Defense Research and Enci- officials with enough rank and staff resources
Bennett, director of the Defense Intelligence veering-A particularly influential role in to strongly represent their agency interests.
Agency; Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, director of evaluating strategic intelligence and project- Kissinger's staff plays an important role in
the National Security Agency; and William ing the long-range threat Is played by the pointing the direction of analysis-by posing
C Sullivan, deputy director of FBI. Office of the Director of Defense Research questions, challenging agency positions and
USIB is charged with overseeing and coor- and Engineering, headed since 1965 by John structuring the summaries presented to the
dinating the exchange of intelligence within S. F'nter Jr. Verification Panel or other high-level
the government, assigning intelligence gath- Foster is the principal technical adviser groups. The NSC staff also has the primary
ering tasks, working out general priorities to Defense Secretary Melvin R. :Laird. Foster's :role in writing the Administration's policy
on collection of intelligence and supervising office has control over the military services' statements after decisions are made.
the preparation of National Intelligence research and development money, reviews `If you have ever read any of Kissinger's
Estimates. the services' research-and-development books, you know who was behind the Presi-
''ollection-Basic Intelligence on strategic budget requests each year for Laird, and is dent's foreign policy message," one former
weapons comes from several sources. the focal point in assessing the progress :)f Pentagon official said.
'fhe Air Force's National Reconnaissance weapcns research and development programs But, one NSC staff member said, "The sys-
Officer spends about $1 billion a. year, prin- under way. tem. doesn't give anybody a veto, during the
cipally on satellites that photograph in great According to Foster's chief deputy, Eber- preliminary work or later. The top people
detail designated areas of the Soviet Union hardt Rechtin the principal responsibility can question anything that goes on and can
and China. of the office is to guide the long-range direr- back out of anything the lower-level people
this and other reconnaissance gives a tion of U.S. weapons programs and ensure might have agreed to."
fairly accurate count of missile silos (old or that U.S. research and development pro- One high official said, "We don't have any
under construction), activities in Soviet grams are undertaken that will avoid a "mil- Illusions about standing astride the access
naval shipyards and many other military itary Sputnik" some time in the future. to the President. The top people can and do
activities. "Our main worry is that the roof will fall make their views fully known in NSC meet-
Technical intelligence about the capa- in during the 1974-78 time period," Rechtin ings and the NSC system isn't the only
bilities of Soviet strategic weapons is derived said in an interview. channel open to the President."
from a number of other sources including Foster's office developed a, strong incle- Function-The NSC official said, however,
technical and military journals, reports pendent threat-assessment capability and that Kissinger and his staff "are not exactly
about accomplishments of the Soviet space Foster has assumed a principal role in pre- intellectual eunuchs, mechanically balancing
program, seismological monitoring of nuclear paring the rationales for major research other people's arguments."
warhead tests, radar and visual monitoring and development programs based on that "Henry is the President's foreign policy
of missile tests and analysis of the external capability. adviser and he gives advice. So do a lot of
configuration of weapons seen on parade or The de facto role played by Poster's office other people," he said.
in photographs. in threat assessment has been formalized The kinds of analyses that are done, the
eietween $5 billion and $6 billion is spent by Laird with the recent creation of a "next way the choices are presented to the Presi-
every year by the various agencies on the technical assessment group" within the dent and the NSC and the shape of the re-
collection and evaluation of intelligence. Pentagon headed by Foster and assigned the sulting policies inevitably reflect the biases
The AEC has primary responsibility for responsibility of making detailed evaluations of the President and his leading officials, such
information about Soviet nuclear testing, of Soviet weapcns. as Kissinger.
The National Security Agency, which em- "Model system": Several top NSC officials "Obviously, there's no such thing as pure
ploys over 90,000 persons, many of them milt- said that the interdepartmental structure analysis," one top NSC official said. "The
tary personnel from the security branches put together by Kissinger, In particular the cliche is `the assumptions drivethe analysis,'
of the three services, spends nearly $1 billion Verification Panel, is, as one official put it but the point of the kind of analysis the
annually monitoring radio transmissions and "a model process for analyzing issues for the NSC has clone Is to make sure the assump-
radar emissions around the world. President and putting everything on a firm. tuns are explicit, spelled out, understood."
n addition, the CIA, State Department factual basis." SALT example-The detailed and pro-
"Its important to emphasize that it is a a tracted analyses that vent Into preparation
and the military intelligence operations of the U.S. positions at SALT are bring together vast amounts of political analytical process, not a decision-making P regarded by
intelligence from open and covert sources, process," this official said. "We aren't hashing the officials involved as an example of the
out a final consensus to NSC system at its best.
including spies, defectors, foreign pu.blica- present to the Presi- Administration officials interviewed by Na-
tions and statements by officials, dent for ratification, the way the system
operated under Eisenhower." Panel Journal agree that the Verification
Threat assessment: According to NSC affi- Panenel system under Kissinger has dealt
t
cials. all departments and agencies directly CENTRALIZATION fairly with all sides in its analysis and sum-
concerned with strategic weapons and policy On paper, the NSC committee system maries of issues for the President.
have the technical expertise to evaluate the gathers the reins of power into the White "Everyone had his clay in court at every
basic technical intelligence. House, with every issue and analysis rising stage in the process," an ACDA official said.
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"By trying to ensure that conflicting views
were clearly represented, the system pro-
tected against things being forced into a
simple-minded consensus."
A full hearing for ACDA in the highest
policy councils has not meant that eventual
U.S. policies have reflected ACDA's position
on major SALT issues. As an example, the
basic disagreement between ACDA and the
Pentagon over whether a ban on MIRVs can
be adequately monitored to prevent cheating,
has been resolved on a number of occasions
in favor of the Pentagon view that no MIRV
ban is feasible.
Despite these occasional setbacks, an-
other ACDA ofiicial'said, "the system gives
agencies like ACDA a full-fledged role in
formulation of military policy, instead of
treating them as appendages off to one side."
He added that the Interdepartmental dis-
cussions have had an educational benefit.
"The fear of the unknown that generally
makes top officials suspicious of arms control
has been reduced. Just knowing what the
technical pros and cons are may supply the
confidence in the arms control approach that
will be needed among high-level officials to
get an agreement."
Differences: The Pentagon holds the edge
when technical disagreements arise over cur-
rent Soviet capabilities, the time frame for
future Soviet technological advances, the
technical problems of verification and other
issues.
Here the relative technical analysis capa-
bilities of the agencies involved in SALT
policy come into play.
Resources--Oifrcials involved in the analy-
sis process acknowledge that the Secretary of
Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff have "al-
most limitless resources to call on," as one
NSC staff member described it.
"They have the technical manpower and
some very influential people," he said, "and,
of course they have a lot bigger constituency
than the other agencies, but this is all recog-
nized. The important point is that it really
doesn't do them that much good if their
arguments are bad."
NBC officials describe the ACDA technical
staff as small but very capable. An ACDA
official emphasized that they were under no
constraints in making their views known.
The total ACDA budget of $10 million Is
less than the cost of one of the new F-15
fighters emerging from the Pentagon research
and development mill. But ACDA officials
emphasize that they have no inferiority com-
plex in evaluation of technical intelligence
or other technical assessment issues.
Estimates-The National Intelligence Esti-
mates prepared by the U.S. Intelligence
Board are intended to be an agreed-upon
summary of the range of possible future de-
velopments in Soviet weapons.
The estimates are seldom the last word for
U.S. weapons planning or the development
of rationales for those weapons.
The format of the estimates ("If the So-
viets do this, then they may have x capability
within y number of years") leaves a lot of
room for interpretation. In addition, there is
provision for carrying through disagree-
ments over specific estimates in the form of
footnotes.
Institutional biases-The different missions
and perspectives of the offices contributing to
threat assessment lead to differences in em-
phasis on what factors to emphasize in policy
planning.
"Of course there are blares In threat pro-
jections, but they are well understood," one
NBC official said, "Part of our job is to make
sure all the positions are represented."
An ACDA official said, "Johnny Poster's
office has responsibility for developing U.S.
weapons technology and a reasonable case
can be made for his insistence that he has
to assume the worst possible, realistically
possible, threat for planning purposes.
"We have different responsibilities and we
tend to emphasize the improbability of the
worst possible case."
The CIA, as the principal official evaluation
agency, often is caught in the middle. Helms
was called to appear in secret session before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in
April 1969, when committee members ex-
pressed skepticism about intelligence used
by Laird in defending the Safeguard ABM
and about Laird's claim that the Soviet mis-
sile deployments proved they were "going for
a first strike," a claim not based on any
agreed USIB assessment.
More recently. Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D-
Wash., disclosed the discovery in satellite
photographs of Soviet missile silos, which he
said were larger than those normally associ-
ated with the largest Soviet ICBM, the SS-9.
Laird said in a New York speech April 21
that the new silos signal a whole new genera-
tion of giant missiles for the Soviets and
that this "must be of major concern . . . 11
He said the United States might be forced
to take unspecified "additional offsetting
actions" to balance the Soviet activity,
if the SALT talks fail to produce an agree-
ment.
ACDA low profile-The high visibility of
these and similar interpretations of the
Soviet threat has led. according to ACDA
officials, to private criticisms from arms-
control advocates that ACDA should be do-
ing more to publicize alternative viewpoints.
A top ACDA-SALT official told National
Journal that Smith. Farley and the other
ACDA participants in the SALT process de-
cided in the beginning to try to Influence
Administration policy from the inside, with-
out attempting to make their views public
through friendly Metnhers of Congress, the
academic community or leaks to the press.
"The country has a military policy. Our
role is to try to influence that policy," he
said. "It was decided in the beginning that
the quickest way to lose credibility and kill
our effectiveness was to get involved in try-
ing to build up outside pressure."
OUTSIDE ADVISERS
Strategic weapons policy Is influenced
from outside the government by a diffuse
array of advisory committees, contract re-
search organizations, academic consultants
and scientific advisers.
Many of the current precepts guiding
strategic weapons analysis and doctrine may
be traced back through 20 years of academic
theorizing and technological change.
Advisory committees: The President is ad-
vised on aspects of strategic weapons policy
by a number of high-level committees of
outside experts.
FLAB-The Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board is charged with reviewing operations
of the entire U.S. intelligence community
and suggesting way:; to improve the collec-
tion and coordination of intelligence activi-
ties. The board is composed of nine leading
businessmen and former government officials,
including Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller, R-
N.Y.; Frank Pace Jr., former Secretary of the
Army (1950-53) and retired chairman of
General Dynamics Corp.; Edwin H. Land,
founder of Polaroid Corp. The current chair-
man is retired Adm. George W. Anderson Jr.,
former Chief of Naval Operations (1961-63).
The board has been given a formal role in
the annual review of the Safeguard ABM
program.
Scientists-A special panel on strategic
weapons of the President's Science Advisory
Committee reviews specific weapons research,
when asked, and offers the President its
opinion on whether they seem worthwhile.
The Science Advisory Committee is headed
by the director of the Office of Science and
Technology, currently Edward E. David Jr.,
former scientist for Bell Telephone Labora-
tories. The committee's special strategic
weapons panel was disbanded in August
X970, with the resignation of Lee A. Du-
Bridge as OST director. Dt i, has not yet
named a now panel.
The former strategic wet pc us panel was
headed by Sidney D. Drell, t ss ;tant director
of the Stanford Linear Act tA'rator Center,
Standard University, Drell c it cized the Ad-
ministration's Safeguard AB 'A plans in con-
gressional testimony last ye: r.
ACDA committee-The C er.? eral Advisory
Committee for the Arms C ;n rrol and Dis-
armament Agency is comp a( d of a blue-
ribbon list of former gove n lent officials,
including former Secretary A State (1961-
69) Dean Rusk; John J. '&Cloy, former
Military Governor for Geri is, iy (1949-52),
former president of the Wo td Bank (1947-
49) and arms control advs. ar to President
Kennedy; Cyrus R. Vance, f. ,rmer Deputy
Secretary of Defense (196e -i 7i , Secretary
of the Army (1962-64) ar., 1 deputy chief
negotiator at the Paris Peac t'onference on
Vietnam (1968-69); and Wi ii-.m C. Foster,
first director of the Arms C r: trol and Dis
armament Agency (1961-69).
The group proposed in it ai ah 1970 that
the President seek at SALT : freeze by both
sides on the deployment o- -iew weapons,
including MIRV and imprc e surface-to-
air missiles.
On several occasions the gi v p has advised
the President that the Unite t -states should
abandon Its insistence that . MIRV ban re-
quires on-site inspection an( should seek an
agreement halting testing ar i )roduction of
MIRV systems.
Committee members have aken an in-
creasingly actAve role in pu ti= criticism of
Administration SALT polio . one member,
Foster, has been advocating p iblicly in re-
cent months a total ban or i uclear weap-
ons testing, a complete bas ci on ABM de-
ployment, production and to ?tiag and a ban
on MIRV testing.
None of these suggesti n has been
accepted.
Pentagon advisers: Each f the military
services supports a scientific advisory board
of defense-oriented scientis+- o advise on
weapons research and deve] p nent.
Science board-In additic the Defense
Science Board, currently heaa ec by Gerald F.
Tape, performs in advisory f :notion for the
Secretary of Defense and the d rector of de-
fense research and engineers g
Tape is an academic physi is and former
Atomic Energy Commissioner (:963-69).
The board has had a contix ?.ung role in re-
viewing the Safeguard progra a and has been
asked for opinions on a m tr ber of other
programs currently under d, v( topment in-
cluding the Army's Hardsite d 3M4 concept, to
which the board gave high p- ority in a 1969
review.
Consultants-Countless a v emit scien-
tists and industry researcher. and engineers
consult on a full- or part-t r basis with
offices throughout the Pent g in. In addi-
tion, the Pentagon and the r r ices support
a long list of contract researc . organizations
for both policy analysis an ethnical re-
search and development.
The most prominent of th e is the Rand
Corp. of Santa Monica, Call_ "ormer Rand
associates are scattered throt-_1 out the gov-
ernment and the academ community.
Richard Latter, a long-time R ntagon con-
sultant from Rand, a mern yet of the De-
fense Science Board and a ri icipal figure
in developing the Safeguard 'Pkf, is serving
as a technical adviser to the U.5. delegation
at SALT.
O'Neill panel-The efforts of a group of
scientists, called together by 3c fin Foster to
review the Safeguard plans - fiscal 1971,
offer an example of the role tLose advisory
groups play in strategic weap n policy.
The panel of seven scient A;, called the
Ad Hoc Group on Safeguard, v.:s headed by
Lawrence H. O'Neill, presider. of the River-
side Research Institute in N. w York and a
professor at Columbia Univer it v, The panel
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was selected by Foster to include scientists
who favor and scientists who oppose
Safeguard.
Foster asked the group only to comment on
the technical capability of Safeguard to meet
the Soviet threat as projected. It was asked
specifically not to consider strategic, political
or diplomatic factors.
After three days of Pentagon meetings, the
panel reported it felt Safeguard was adequate
for the "thin" area defense missions in its
rationale, but that if the primary mission
were to protect Minuteman, the Pentagon
should move ahead quickly on the Hardsite
concept.
This qualified endorsement was later cited
by Foster in congressional hearings as en-
dorsement that the Safeguardsystem could
'do the job the Pentagon wanted it to do."
The assertion led Sen. J. W. Fulbright,
D-Ark., Foreign Relations Committee chair-
man, to charge that the panel's conclusions
had been distorted to provide "window dress-
ing" for Safeguard.
The charge of window dressing was also
raised about the President's Advisory Com-
mittee on Strategic Weapons, which passed on
the Safeguard plan after a meeting with
Foster March 17, 1969, three days after Mr.
Nixon announced his ABM decision. Defense
intellectuals: Kissinger came to prominence
in the closed world of the so-called "defense
intellectuals," academic theorists whose in-
fluence has been immense on the rationales
behind deterrence strategies, if not on the
actual course of weapons development.
Among the most prominent of these theo-
rists and writers on weapons strategy are
Thomas C. Schelling, a Harvard professor;
Herman Kahn, director of the Hudson Insti-
tute; Albert Wohlstetter, professor at the
University of Chicago; and Donald G. Bren-
nan, Hudson Institute staff member. They
consult regularly with Pentagon and other
government officials and testify frequently
before congressional committees .
Kissinger himself wrote prolifically on
strategic weapons issues and NATO policy
while a Harvard professor and served as con-
sultant, at various times since the late 1950s,
to the Pentagon and ACDA, and to the Na-
tional Security Council during the Johnson
Administration.
CRITICISM
The Administration's machinery for pro-
ducing national security policy is not uni-
versally admired.
A former high-level scientific adviser to
the Pentagon, who asked not to be named,
said in an interview:
"The most important thing is whether the
system really confronts its own biases and
produces truly objective assessments of the
relative risks involved between a something-
less-than-foolproof arms-control agreement
and a continuation of the arms race into a
new era of particularly threatening and
costly technology.
"I don't think the NSC debates have done
this; but even worse, a lot of dubious mili-
tary hardware is being justified in the name
of arms control-bargaining chips, as they're
called-and the public has been softened up
for blaming it on the Russians if the talks
fail."
ABM villain: A number of the Adminis-
tration's critics point to the decision to
deploy the Safeguard ABM as a principal
Source of subsequent inhibitions on U.S.
SALT policy.
The Nixon Administration inherited an
ABM program, the Sentinel, when it came
into office, as well as a rising groundswell of
opposition in Congress and the scientific
community to the ABM concept. It was also
faced with Army proposals for expanding
Sentinel.
Stone-Jeremy J. Stone, head of the Wash-
ington office of the Federation of American
Scientists, said that the Administration de-
cision to go ahead with its revised version
of Sentinel, renamed Safeguard, has vas:a y
complicated all subsequent thinking on arms
control and strategic weapons.
Stone said the Safeguard ABM concept has
been very costly politically because its ra-
tionales emphasized the vulnerability of
Minuteman missiles. The Administration was
emphasizing the vulnerability of one weapon,
Minuteman, to help sell Congress on the idea
of another, Safeguard, he said.
Scoville-The projections of the threat TO
Minuteman that the Soviets could be capable
of posing by the mid-1970s, which are the
basis for Safeguard deployment, have been
central to most subsequent SALT analysis,
in the view of Herbert Scoville Jr., a leading
critic of Administration strategic weapons
policy and a -former assistant director for
science and technology for ACDA. Scoville
left ACDA in the early months of the Nixon
Administration.
Scoville said that many of the arguments
offered by the Administration in explanation
of strategic weapons policies are familiar to
long-time participants in strategic weapons
debates and represent the "predominance of
Johnny Foster's shop."
Blitz: Scoville said that Foster and other
weapons experts viewing strategic weapons
"as essentially a series of technical problems
to be solved" prevailed in the early months
of the Administration debates because they
used strong and imaginative projections of
weapons advances the Soviets are technically
capable of making.
These projections of a possible Soviet
threat. were derived in part from new intelli-
gence about Soviet SS-9 deployments and
multiple warhead testing.
According to Scoville, "The basic problem
with new intelligence is that it is easy to
have differing points of view about what it
implies. One can construct quite plausible,
highly technical interpretations and, even
Inadvertently, overwhelm people for whom
the intelligence and the arguments are
somewhat new."
Scoville thinks that .ethnical assessments
are getting a much more skeptical look in
Administration debates now.
Elrects: One former ACDA official says that
the assigned role of the Verification Panel
and the pressures that led to its formation-
dissatisfaction with the earlier treatment of
verification problems and the possible dan-
gers from Soviet cheating-have served to
reinforce the technological, "worst case" ap-
proach to strategic arms problems at the ex-
pense of other, softer arguments.
"On the one side there Is given a strong,
not totally unrealistic technical argument
emphasizing what they (the Soviets) could
do if they wanted. On the other is the argu-
ment, perhaps in equally technical terms,
which says, 'well, maybe it is possible, but it
is highly improbable,"' he said. "The cur-
rent system seems to me to favor the first
way of thinking."
NSC officials say that projections of what
the Soviets are technically capable of doing
within a given time frame have to be the
primary basis for prudent policy making.
The President's Feb. 35 foreign policy mes-
sage says the existing military balance "does
not permit us to judge the significance of
Soviet actions only by what they say-or even
what we believe-are their intentions. We
must measure their actions, at least in part,
against their capabilities."
Yardstick-The principal measuring rod
for interpreting intelligence about Soviet
weapons is what is known, for example, about
missile accuracy or silo hardness, from U.S.
experience.
This is the argument frequently used by
Foster and other Pentagon officials to bol-
ster their case for continued heavy expendi-
tures in weapons research and development.
Rebuttal-Scoville and others, including
Herbert York, former director of defense
research and engineering (1958-61), and self-
described longtime "participant in the arms
race" now turned opponent of Safeguard,
:.ay that measuring Soviet capability by U.S.
experience can create a self-contained action-
reaction cycle within U.S. weapons develop-
ment, which may bear only indirectly on
actual Soviet progress and contributes to a
self-generated arms race.
One former top Pentagon analyst notes
that the NSC interdepartmental committee
ystem "probably serves the President well
to the extent that it makes sure that every-
one is arguing about the same things."
"But In strategic issues, it's very dangerous
if the interdepartmental coordination serves
to give all arguments a kind of artificial
equality," he adds.
"This is particularly important in arms
control issues because some of the crucial
variables are not really susceptible to qualita-
tive analysis or even perhaps to fully arti-
culate expression on paper.
Scoville says that this is a basic danger
deriving from the rise of "worst case" tech-
nical analysis to the position of primacy in
arms-control policy making.
"What's needed is a President with the in-
clination to challenge all the technical gob-
bledygook and say 'Well, 'why is that im-
portant?'" Scoville said. Limited options:
Several factors have joined, in the view of
some critics of Administration policies, to
produce an overly cautious, limited view of
the choices available on strategic weapons
questions.
One former Pentagon systems analyst says
that the original ABM: decision was made on
the basis of options and arguments that
really left little choice.
The inherited Sentinel system was already
well along, with production engineering al-
ready under way alr.d 7,300 employees of
prime and first level subcontractors already
working. In addition, nearly $6 billion had
already been spent since 1958 on developing
ABM technology and the Army was wholly
committed. These factors and the strong
arguments demonstrating the potential So-
viet threat made killing ABM an unlikely
choice.
The choice of expanding Sentinel was chal-
lenged as a destabilizing move in the strate-
:gfc weapons balance and as being too
expensive.
Support of the basic Safeguard concept,
primarily the work of Poster, was widespread.
Other ABM concepts, such as the Hard-
site concept of strong silo defenses, were not
offered as short-ranfe options.
The. President's foreign policy message, in
discussing the broad alternatives studied for
NATO deterrence, presents a similar limited
set of choices: "reliance on conventional
forces alone; early response with nuclear
weapons; a flexible strategy that does not
preclude or force either kind of response."
The Pentagon and the NSC analysis struc-
ture have been directed to study the means
of implementing the third choice.
Choices known: NSC officials say that the
system serves the President well. They em-
phasize that the President has a strong per-
sonal interest In strategic weapons issues.
"The President gets detailed papers on
these issues," one NSC staff member said.
"None of those one-page summaries you hear
about in other areas."'
One ACDA official said that Kissinger is
a "powerful source of continuity in arms
control debates" and that he has placed
particular emphasis on having all sides fairly
represented.
A former NS'C staff member who partici-
pated in the SALT preparation process told
National Journal, "If it turns out that the
Administration is not taking the right ap-
proach to SALT, it won't be because alterna-
tive courses weren't known."
:KISSINGER: MASTER STRATEGIST
Henry A. Kissinger, 47, assistant to the
President for national security affairs, is a
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powerful and controversial figure in the
Nixon Administration.
,Many in Congress, the press and the public
believe-rightly or wrongly-that he and his
staff wield more influence in the making of
foreign policy than the State Department or
the Pentagon.
Kissinger's role has been criticized because
his power is not balanced by accountability
to congressional committees. He has been
the key figure in the Administration's revival
of the National Security Council.
Academic background: Kissinger estab-
lished himself academically by elaborating a
refinement of the balance-of-power approach
to diplomacy. In 1957 he criticized the "mas-
sive retaliation doctrine of the Eisenhower
Administration, and argued instead for
developing a flexible capability to fight
limited nuclear or conventional wars.
Kissinger taught at Harvard University
from the time he received his doctorate in
1954 until December 1968 when he was
designated as Mr. Nixon's national security
adviser. (In January 1971 he resigned from
the Harvard faculty to remain at the White
House.)
Consultant: While at Harvard, he held
advisory positions in the foreign policy estab-
lishment, including posts with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (1956-60), and the Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency (1961-68). He
advised Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and
Johnson in a personal capacity. He also
directed foreign policy studies for the Rocke-
feller Brothers Fund and the Council on
Foreign Relations. He was foreign policy
adviser to Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller of New
York during his unsuccessful campaign for
the Republican Presidential nomination in
1968.
Kissinger is the author of three books on
U.S. foreign policy and defense strategy.
NIXON GOALS: STRENGTH AND STABILITY
President Nixon spelled out the Adminis-
tration's approach to strategic forces plan-
ning in his Feb. 25 foreign policy message.
Mr. Nixon said that while he is committed
to keeping strategic forces strong, "I am
equally committed to seeking a stable stra-
tegic relationship with the Soviet Union
through negotiations."
He added: "There is no inconsistency be-
tween these goals; they are in fact
complementary."
World view: The President's message re-
peatedly reaffirms the U.S. commitment to
act as peacekeeper in a world where the
United States and the Soviet Union, as the
two most powerful nations, "conduct global
policies that bring their interests into con-
tention across a broad range of issues."
Linkage-The President emphasized in a
number of contexts that the basic aim of
U.S. policy is to demonstrate to the Soviets
that they should not be tempted into "bolder
challenges" as their strategic power ap-
proaches parity with that of the United
States
The President cited the Soviet Union's
policy in the Middle East and its naval exer-
cises in the Caribbean as examples of policies
and actions that, in his view, may stem from
a Soviet "failure to appreciate the risks and
consequences of probing for advantages or
testing the limits of toleration."
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, carried this argument
a step further in March 10 testimony before
the House Armed Services Committee.
"We will pay a very high price In the effec-
tiveness of our diplomacy if we permit the
Soviet Union to achieve a clearly evident
strategic superiority, even were that supe-
riority to have no practical effect on the out-
come of an all-out nuclear exchange," Moorer
said.
Carrot and stick-In the President's esti-
mate, U.S. and Soviet strategic forces have
reached a level of rough parity that affords
a basis for structuring a stable balance of
power between the two superpowers.
The President's message held out the
promise of accommodation through SALT
and other negotiations-on Berlin, force
reductions in Europe and mutual efforts to
reach stability in the Middle East. At the
same time, U.S. policy embraces a steady
buildup of new weapons.
Most of the major research and develop-
ment programs in the new Pentagon budget
would receive substantial increases in pro-
posed funding for fiscal 1972. Pentagon wit-
nesses at several congressional hearings
argued last year that spending on Safeguard
ABM, the B-1 bomber, the Navy's new bal-
listic missile sub)narine and deployment of
multiple independently targetable reentry
vehicle (MIRV) warheads on the Minute-
man and Poseidon missiles all give added
credibility to the President's foreign policy
efforts. (For a summary of the fiscal 1972
defense, budget, see No. 6, p. 290.)
The threat: The Administration is confi-
dent that U.S. forces are designed to conform
to the nation's policy of nuclear stability.
This confidence is coupled with doubts about
Soviet intentions.
"Soviet deployments make us uncertain
whether the USSR has made a similar na-
tional commitment to strategic equilibrium,"
the President said In his foreign policy
message. "By any standard, we believe the
number of Soviet strategic forces now ex-
ceeds the level needed for deterrence."
Flexible response: Defense planners fear
that a strengthening of Soviet strategic
forces will weaken any deterrent effect that
U.S. strategic forces have on Soviet military
moves that might trigger a nuclear exchange.
This link between strategic forces and
possible Soviet boldness is of particular con-
cern in North Atlantic Treaty Organization
planning, where ensuring the credibility of
the U.S. pledge of its strategic forces has
been a central problem since NATO was
formed.
President Kennedy in 1961 had character-
ized the situation as a "choice between
humiliation and all-out nuclear action."
Similarly, Mr. Nixon said in his message:
"No NATO leader should be left with the
choice between capitulation and Immediate
resort to general nuclear war."
DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. SALT POSITION
The U.S. negotiating position at the Stra-
tegic Arms Limitation Talks is the product
of lengthy deliberations that have gone
through several phases since the Nixon Ad-
ministration began.
Groundwork: The SALT talks were slated
to begin in August 1968, during the Johnson
Administration. But they were postponed
when the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia a
few days before the scheduled opening ses-
sion. (For details of events leading to SALT,
see Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 136.)
A U.S. position calling for a ban on ABM
systems had been prepared by an ad hoc
group in the Office of the Defense Secretary.
According to a former Defense Department
systems analyst, who declined to be quoted
by name, there was little interdepartmental
coordination or special analysis of that orig-
inal proposal.
Internal Pentagon disagreement over the
Administration's decision in 1967 to proceed
with an ABM. the Army's Sentinel system,
was the impetus for an ABM ban.
Nixon reassessment: At the start of the
Nixon Administration a wide-ranging reas-
sessment of U.S. policy was initiated. The
SALT talks were delayed further.
An early National Security Strategy Mem-
orandum directed the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency to study SALT options.
A group was then set up, headed by Philip
J. Farley, AODA deputy director.
The AODA study produce( our possible
combinations of limitations ei )ffensive and
defensive weapons, and press: t(d arguments
about the risks and benefits o: each.
The President gave the go ahead in June
1969 for U.S. participation ii' the talks,
which began the following 1? rv,tmber.
Verification Panel: Henry . Kissenger,
assistant to the President f-(r national se-
curity affairs, organized a Ve if cation Panel
in the early summer of 1969 tip prepare for
the upcoming talks and to s u,ly arms con-
trol issues on an interdepari n' ntal basis.
Laurence E. Lynn Jr., for narly with the
Pentagon Office of Systems A: a vsis, directed
Verification Panel analysis is chairman of
the Verification Panel Work n; Group.
Lynn's principal deputy a: c)ordinator of
working level analysis was WV. lter B. Slo-
combe. Slocombe and his assa,t..nt, R. James
Woolsey, were both alumr? )t Pentagon
systems analysis.
Analysis-The National S, ci rity Council
directed a thorough study o' :,ALT options
by the Verification Panel, fo u- ing on a de-
tailed technical assessment , f the problems
of verifying compliance with es -h of a num-
ber of possible agreements. S )e::ial attention
was directed to "lead time" pr >btems-assess_
ing what threats might be p es(d to the U.S.
deterrent from the lag in ti sic between the
discovery of cheating by the 3( viets and the
deployment of a U.S. response
Various ways of limiting e ~c' of the cate-
gories of strategic weapons- b 'mbers, land-
based missiles, sea-based Missiles and
defensive systems-were stu lied in light of
the NSC directive.
Post-talk studies-Studies bt the Verifica-
tion Panel were the basis fo i utial probing
and preliminary discussions vi h the Soviets
at the first round of SALT t .l:,e at Helsinki
in November 1969.
After the Helsinki round in rt throughout
the winter of 1970, the Verific at-on Panel sys-
tem inaugurated so-called " "a -k Y" studies
of specific arms control of ti, ins, based in
part on an assessment of So, ie views gained
at the first talks.
Twelve major studies of ax ne control prob-
lems were made. Specific q;:estions were
studied in a number of ad icc interagency
groups.
Several technical studies oncerntng in
particular the "leadtime" q testion, were
farmed out to Pentagon oft` ~e:-. The process
was coordinated by a SAL'' .ackup group
composed of officials from the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Defense Research g. n< Engineering,
Systems Analysis and other ( fS'es. They were
supported by analysts from tl a Rand Corp.
and other research firms.
The analyses were subjec e( to challenge
where disagreements arose ),,=r interpreta-
tions of Soviet capabilities. - h, difficulties of
detection, the probability o cheating and a
number of other issues.
"Building blocks"- Seven n fferent pack-
ages with variations of posts dt combinations
of offensive and defensive veapons were
readied for the second sou id of the talks,
which began In Vienna in A ril 1970. The
arguments within the Admi (i~ ,.ration on the
risks and benefits of each cr the options
were summarized, further r' ni ted in sessions
of the Vertification Panel ts, if and passed
up to the NSC.
These options, called "I ni' ding blocks,"
give flexibility and coheres ce to U.S. posi-
tions at SALT, since, in th- - dministration
view, they can be combine( (r reordered in
different clusters or comb n: Lions to give
alternative proposals, witk - fie risks and
benefits of each worked ou . Beforehand.
This allows quick respons' t Soviet moves
at SALT because substam iv'~ elements of
policy have already been w , ,rl ed out within
the Administration. It als? ,minimizes bu-
reaucratic jockeying over a ci new point as
the negotiations progress.
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Lynn, Slocombe roles: NSC officials, past
and present, credit Lynn and Slocombe with
major roles in pushing through the kinds
oI studies wanted by Kissinger.
"They kept the working level people do-
ing good analysis," one former NSC staff
member said. "They ensured that there was
no falling off into rhetoric and, probably
most important, they made sure all sides
were treated fairly."
The studies were drawn together in a
,ome believe, others believe" format, ac-
cording to one participant in the process.
Many of the longer studies were summarized
for the Verification Panel. The whole was
refined into a series of options for the NSC
and the President. The resulting options
remain the basis for U.S, policy on SALT.
Lynn, Slocombe and Woolsey all have left
the NSC. Lynn, who is on the faculty of
the Stanford Graduate School of Business,
still serves as a consultant. Lynn was nomi-
nated April 21 to be an assistant HEW
secretary.
PART II
DEFENSE REPORT/SLOW PACE OF SALT NEGO-
TIATIONS PROMPTS PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
IN U.S. POSITION
(By Samuel C. Orr)
The Nixon Administration is under increas-
ing pressure to shift its basic negotiating
position at the Strategic Arms Limitation
alk:; with the Soviet Union.
With the nuclear arms race showing little
sign of abatement, several Democratic Sena-
tors have joined Influential scientists in
suggesting that the United States be more
conciliatory toward an ABMs-only agreement
proposed at SALT by the Soviets.
Under the Senators' proposals, an ABM
agreement would be tied to a freeze on of-
fensive weapons while the talks continue.
The Administration has been adamant that
any agreement must cover both offensive and
defensive weapons systems.
Congress generally has had little to say
about SALT bargaining strategy, although
two-thirds of the Senate would have to
ratify any treaty resulting from the talks.
The slow pace of the negotiations has spurred
Members to seek ways of removing stumbling
blocks to an agreement.
SALT issues: The overriding U.S. aim since
the talks began in November 1969 has been
an agreement that would limit the Soviet
Union's powerful SS-9 missile.
This aim and the basic' U.S. negotiating
strategy at SALT are products of an elaborate
interdepartmental committee system estab-
lished under the aegis of the National Se-
curity Council.
The system centralizes SALT issues in the
Verification Panel, which is headed by Henry
A. Kissinger, assistant to the President for
national security affairs and staff director of
the NSC.
The Administration has used this com-
plicated machinery to grapple with the com-
plexities involved in negotiating arms
control limitations.
one of the most intricate problems
concerns the difficulty of verifying Soviet
compliance with any ban on the deployment
or testing of multiple warheads.
The Administration has begun deploying
a sophisticated multpile warhead system
(NIIRV) on its land-based Minuteman and
sea-based Poseidon missiles.
Meanwhile, the United States has refused
n i; SALT to pursue a MIRV limitation because
of the verification difficulties involved.
opposition: The Administration's SALT
strategy is challenged-in Congress and
among the President's critics in the scientific
community-as exaggerating the verification
problems, as risking the long-term advan-
tages of an ABM agreement in trying to get
an offensive weapons agreement that will
solve few problems, and as rationalizing the
continued deployment. of U.S. weapons, such
as MIRV and ABM.
Arms control advccates argue that an
agreement which does not cover MIRV sys-
tems would not be meaningful and that con-
tinuing U.S. deployment of MIRV missiles
may have jeopardized the chances of getting
a ban on MIRVs at SALT. But they maintain
that the future stability of the arms race
requires renewed efforts to get a ban on
MIRV weapons.
Secrecy: By agreement with the Soviets,
details of the negotiations are secret. But
much of the substance has been reporter: in
the dress. And the President, in his Feb 25
foreign policy message, gave a general ac-
count of what has happened and his inter-
pretation of what the issues are.
The U.S. aims and negotiating strategy
clearly reflect the doubts about Soviet in-
tentions that are expressed throughout the
President's message.
They also reflect an acute sense of the
threat that the SS-9 and other Soviet missiles
might pose to the United States.
Because of the sensitive nature of the taiks,
and the protective secrecy surrounding them,
few of the officials involved in making U.S.
SALT policy would speak for attribution in
National Journal interviews,
NEGOTIATING STRATEGY
The Administration's cautious, step-'by-
step approach to SALT calls for continuing
major U.S. weapons programs while positions
incorporating basic U.S. aims are being pre-
sented at the talks.
Leverage: U.S. weapons programs, in par-
ticular the Safeguard ABM, are defended by
the President as supplying needed incentive
for the Soviets to negotiate seriously. The
prc;;rams have regularly been defended as
essential bargaining chips in the Overriding
aim of negotiating a halt in the deployment
of the Soviet SS--9 missile.
Administration officials questioned by Na-
tional Journal defended the bargaining chip
notion strongly, arguing that Safeguard
complicates the targeting problems for Soviet
planners who might be considering a first-
strike policy and that it signals to them that
it will be very expensive for them to try.
The alternative of negotiating should ap-
pear more desirable to the Soviets, in this
view, if the United States demonstrates. its
willingness tc respond with weapons of its
own to any continued deployment of Soviet
weapons.
Bargaining: Administration officials also offer
the argument that it is simply bad negotiat-
ing strategy to give up something unilaterally
during a negotiation.
Signals: The President, in his foreign policy
message, emphasized that the United States
has tried to signify its interest: in stability in
the strategic balance through. the defensive
intent of the new systems ccming into he
U.S. arsenal.
Officials say the United States has no new
offensive missile, has not expanded the num-
ber of Minuteman sites or Polaris/Poseidon
submarines, dpes not have tie combinations
of yield, accuracy and total numbers of war-
heads-even in its MIRV (multiple indepen-
dently targetable reentry vehicle) system---to
launch a first strike, and has tailored the
Safeguard ABM to emphasize its stabilizing
effects on the arms race.
A. senior NSC staff member acknowledged,
however, that any prudent Soviet planner
would have to assum.e that the United States
could acquire the capacity for a first strike.
"That's all the more incentive for him to
negotiate, jus'; the way we're trying to ne-
gotiate away their first strike threat," he
Said.
Caution: NSC officials say another general
view guiding U.S. bargaining at SALT is the
need to approach the talks with cauftion
and a realistic assessment, reached after p_,e-
liminary discussions with the Soviets, of
what kind of agreement can be expected to
emerge.
"You don't start out In any negotiating
situation by putting all your cards on. the
table," one NSC official said.
First: things first--This has led to a nego-
tiating strategy that emphasizes strict focus
on achieving the minimum short-range U.S.
aims, the principal one being a limit on the
Soviet SS-9 missile, and leaves complicated
secondary options until later.
This is a principal reason offered for not
responding to the Soviet desire to include
in the current talks the U.S. fighter-bombers
based in Europe and on carriers in the
Mediterranean.
Administration officials feel these weapons
should be discussed in negotiations on mu-
tual force reductions In Europe, along with
Soviet missiles targeted on Europe.
Other possible areas off agreement--on
antisu"amarine warfare systems, or an-ti-
satellite systems-are not on the agenda, and
the extremely complicated process of nego-
tiating mutual reductions or controls on
specific kinds of weapons has been given
secondary priority in the U.S. proposal for
a general ceiling on all offensive weapons.
Rejected measures-In addition, to main-
tain pressure behind the basic U.S. aims, the
Administration has rejected several interim
measures. Consideration was given at various
times by the Administration to moratoriums
on all deployments of new strategic sys-
tems, on MIRV deployments and on ABM
deployments, pending the outcome of the
formal talks.
ARMS CONTROL OPTIONS
The Administration studied during prepa-
rations for SALT-and has reconsidered at
various times since--a wide range of
approaches to controlling strategic weapons.
Offensive and defensive weapons each pre-
sent different sets of problems, and the
problems are complicated by the numerous
possible combinations of different approaches
to limiting offensive or defensive weapons.
Actual negotiations are made more dif-
ficult by the basic assumption in arms con
trol discussions that no agreement is viable
unless compliance with its terms can be
verified by both sides independently.
Disparities: The differences in the strategic
forces of the United States and the Soviet
Union further complicate negotiations.
The United States has many more bombers
and ballistic missile submarines. The Soviets
have deployed larger numbers of ICBMs
and tl1.Le large SS-9 missile, for which the
United States has no counterpart. The
Soviets have a limited ABM system around
Moscow, while the United States is just
starting deployment of the Safeguard system.
The U.S. lead in every significant area of
strategic weapons technology-missile ac-
curacy, reliability and retargetability; mul-
tiple warheads; solid-fueled rockets, and a
wide variety of advances in penetration aids
for bombers and missiles-further compli-
cates negotiations.
The Administration's pre-SALT analysis
produced several alternative approaches to
SALT, joining combinations of offensive and
defensive limits, with each containing a num-
ber of variables in certain details.
Gross ceiling: Limiting offensive weapons
presents problems both in agreeing on the
form of the limitations and in satisfying
strong concerns about the possibility of un-
detected cheating, a particular worry for the
Pentagon.
One approach to offensive limits is to settle
on the number of delivery vehicles-missiles
and bombers-each side will be allowed to
have, without setting limits on each cate-
gory of weapons.
Within this gross ceiling, bombers, for
example, could be replaced by missiles, or
land-based systems, by ballistic missile sub-
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marines. Also, old weapons could be replaced
by newer ones.
Negotiating a gross ceiling is considered
relatively easy, once both sides are agreed
on what weapons on each side constitute
strategic weapons. But setting a ceiling
leaves a number of problems unsolved.
Improvements in existing systems, in par-
ticular, the addition of MIRV warheads of
increasing accuracy, would be permitted. Re-
placing old systems with more advanced ones
would continue.
Pressure for ways to preserve land-based
systems in the face of increasingly accurate
MIRV warheads could result in expensive ef-
forts to "super-harden" missile silos or deploy
mobile ICBMs, which make accurate verifica-
tion of the agreement difficult.
Categorical ceilings. Another approach to
limiting offensive weapons is to negotiate a
ceiling for each category of weapons-
ICBMs, bombers and subrarines-with no
allowances for changing the mix.
The asymmetries between U.S. and Soviet
forces complicate this kind of approach. One
suggestion under the approach is to allow the
Soviets to build an agreed-upon number of
additional missile submarines, while the
United States agrees to eliminate some of its
bombers.
In another variation, large missiles such as
the SS-9 would be distinguished from smaller
missiles, like the Minuteman and the SS-11,
with ceilings for each.
The categorical approach helps avoid the
problems of large numbers of more effective
new weapons being substituted for obsoles-
cent weapons, missile for bombers, for ex-
ample. But qualitative improvements such as
MIRV would still be allowed, as well as new
generation improvements in existing systems.
Freezes: Another approach to limiting offen-
sive weapons would be an agreement by both
sides to freeze the stocks of strategic weapons
at existing levels.
The freeze might either permit or restrict
improvements to existing systems-such as
adding MIRV. These improvements are diffi-
cult to detect in any case.
The differences between U.S. and Soviet
arsenals make negotiating a permanent freeze
difficult, and there is strong Pentagon opposi-
tion to halting the U.S. MIRV programs.
Allowance would have to be made for the
Soviet submarine program, and the United
States would have to accept the Soviet lead in
land based missiles.
Short-term freezes on deployments or on
deployment and testing of new systems have
been proposed several times over the last two
years, generally with the freeze tied to achiev-
ing formal agreement in further negotiations.
ABM limits: The feasibility of any limits on
offensive weapons requires a complementary
defensive ABM agreement in the long run.
Without ABM limits, controls on offensive
weapons, whether ceiling or freeze, could give
impetus to efforts to expand or upgrade ABM
systems. In the end, this could upset the
strategic balance by eroding the effectiveness
of offensive missiles.
In addition, a ABM agreement would re-
move the primary potential threat to the
effectiveness -of each country's submarine-
based missiles, an increasingly important goal
as missile accuracy makes land-based systems
more vulnerable.
MIRV codiplications: Highly accurate mul-
tiple warheads are within technical reach of
each side. Current argument centers mainly
on how soon both sides can have warheads
capable of knocking out land-based missiles
in their silos with a high degree of effective-
ness, regardless of efforts at further harden-
ing the silos.
Soviet missiles-U.S. planning had been
based since early 1969 on the estimate that
the Soviets could have the capacity by the
mid-1970s to knock out 95 percent of U.S.
Minuteman missiles.
This projection of Soviet capabilities as-
sumed 420 SS-9 missiles, each carrying three
highly accurate warheads. It was based on
Soviet testing of multiple warheads ob-
served by U.S. intelligence and the extrapo-
lation of the rate of SS--9 deployments since
1965.
The Pentagon announced a slow-down in
deployments of SS-9 missiles last December.
Persistent press reports over the past year,
never confirmed by the Pentagon, have stated
that no new starts on SS-9 missile silos were
discovered between August 1969 and July
1970. The Pentagon estimate of the number
of SS -9s deployed or under construction has
fluctuated between 275 and 300.
Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash., recently
disclosed that new Soviet silos have been dis-
covered under construction. The new silos
are larger than those generally associated
with the SS-9.
Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird told
the American Newspaper Publishers Asso-
ciation on April 21 that the new silos indi-
cate the Soviets have launched "a new-
and apparently extensive-ICBM construc-
tion program."
A slowdown in SS--9 deployments, if not
offset by deployment of a new missile, would
stretch out the time period assumed for the
original threat projections used to justify
the Safeguard. If the Soviets do not deploy
the projected 420 SS-9s, then more than
three warheads per missile would be needed
for the equivalent threat to Minuteman to
materialize. This would further alter the
original timetable, since no tests of more
than three warheads have been announced.
U.S. missiles-Each new generation of
Minuteman missiles features improvements
in range, payload, reliability, retargetability,
penetration aids . and other technical ad-
vances.
No estimates of the accuracy of the
Minuteman are available to the public.
Scientists on both sides of the Safeguard
issue assumed accuracies for the Minute-
man varying from 0.5 mile to 1.5 miles. One-
quarter mile is the assumed accuracy re-
quired for a warhead the size of those on
the current Minuteman to have the capa-
bility to knock out a hardened silo. The
smaller warheads of the Minuteman III
would have to have somewhat greater ac-
curacy.
Administration officials from the President
down are firm in stating that the United
States does not have-and has no plans to
seek-a hard-target capability.
No serious effort lies been made at SALT
to halt MIRV developments.
SALT POSITIONS
The AdminLstration's formal proposal at
SALT, put forward at the second round of
the talks last summer, combined ceilings on
offensive systems with a full or partial ban
on ABMs.
The link between offensive and defensive
limits has remained basic to the U.S. posi-
tion. In his foreign policy message the Presi-
dent said, "To limit only one side of the
offense-defense equation would rechannel the
arms competition rather than effectively
curtail it."
Elements: Within the broad U.S. position
are a number of detailed provisions defining
more fully what would be covered.
The substitution of one type of system for
another within the over-all ceiling would be
permitted, with the exception of increases in
the numbers of large missiles, such as the
Soviet SS-9.
Improvements, introduction of new sys-
tems, MIRV warheads and other qualitative
changes would be allowed.
ABM systems would be eliminated or lim-
ited to an agreed number of launchers
around each nation's national command
center-Moscow and Washington.
According to press reports, the Soviets
agreed generally at SALT to tb r ' mited Mos-
cow and Washington ABM 3i .ems. There is
continuing discussion of the pi cific details
on numbers and types of radar I, be allowed
and of a U.S. proposal to subs it ite an ABM
system protecting a Minutems i case instead
of Washington.
Definitions: There ha:; been )a ac disagree-
ment throughout the talks ovi r vhat consti-
tutes a strategic weapon. Th :soviets have
insisted on including the U.S. forward based
systems" (carrier-based and 1 n,i-based U.S.
fighter-bombers in Europe), i acy of which
are capable of reaching the & viA Union.
Options deferred: In choo:rg to seek a
ceiling on offensive systems -a her than a
freeze, whether permanent o -vith a time
limit, the Administration ha. r ccepted the
view, strongly held in the 7'er.tagon, that
verification of a freeze is no: f-'asible. Offi-
cials also note that difference , . ,etween U.S.
and Soviet forces make ever short-term
freeze difficult to negotiate.
The NSC on several occasi n, considered
other options that would h a : e relaxed the
Administration's insistence or trying to get
limits on both offensive and defensive sys-
tems in the initial agreemer t.
One approach suggested ref, b ing a formal
agreement on ABM limits, b t making the
agreement conditional on re i.c:ring a later
agreement on offensive systc ms within an
agreed time limit.
Another proposal suggeste coupling an
ABM agreement with a mu u+.1 freeze on
new deployments of offensive w apons, both
conditional on later formal agreement on
offensive limits.
A particular variation of th- pproach was
pushed by Arms Control ane Disarmament
Agency officials last June dun ig Administra-
tion deliberations over its for] a proposal.
The ACDA plan called fo=r arranging
simultaneous U.S. and So,, e' announce-
ments halting SS-9 and Saf'g lard deploy-
ments, pending progress in i lit talks.
Verification issues: The Jiff malty of verify-
ing compliance with agreed imits and the
dangers of clandestine ch of ing by the
Soviets are the reasons offerer b-,- the Admin-
istration for not pursuing 7 T.I7.V limits at
SALT and for insisting on ele ration of the
technical details of ABM lim tr
These verification issues ar, ' rt the core of
disagreements within the Adn iI, istration and
of outside criticism of 1cministration
proposals.
It was established early in h,. Verification
Panel analysis that there is o feasible way
to verify a ban on MIRV war) ea=ds once test-
ing has been completed.
Satellites cannot photogral I nside missile
silos. On-site inspection co, la be circum-
vented by switching warhead - even if both
sides departed from the pax ,pposition to-
on-site inspection that has tampered every
previous arms negotiation.
There has been, moreover t continuing
disagreement within the Adn n stration over
the technical feasibility of distinguishing
MIRV tests from other kinds )f ballistic mis-
sile tests.
The U.S. decision to insist o , nsite inspec-
tion of any MIRV ban reflecta d he view that
an agreement forbidding m alt ple warhead
tests could not be adequate v verified.
In the meantime, the Uni ec. States com-
pleted testing on its MIRVe and began de-
ployment as the second rou ru of the talks
were in progress.
John S. Foster Jr.. dire( sc of defense
research and engineering, Ir sued during
congressional hearings in 19E hat disagree-
ment within the "intelliger e community"
over whether the Soviets wer s esting MIRV3
or warheads that were not vidependently
targetable was itself a demo .s, ration that a
MIRV test ban could not I-e verified with
confidence.
Scientists working on U.t multiple war-
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E4650 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD--Extensions of Remarks May 19, 1971
heads claimed full confidence that they could
~iesign MIRV tests indistinguishable from
=ing:e warhead tests, so it would have to be
.._ssumed that the Soviet could do it, too.
Soviet ABM: Soviet deployment of a line
,'I defense missile and attendant radars-
a0-called Tallinn line-in the late 1960s
was first interpreted as the beginning of a na-
conwide area defense ABM system. After
engthy dispute, the intelligence community
;sessment, affirmed by Laird in his 1969
.,e:Ltement to Congress, is that the system
all advanced bomber defense.
llowever, Foster and other defense experts
;utinue to advise that the Tallinn system-
dong with the extensive Soviet radar net-
vork, the ABM system around Moscow, con-
Towing Soviet testing of ABM missiles and
?.iie large number of surface-to-air missiles
>ployed around the Soviet Union for bomb-
r defenses-gives the Soviets the potential
Eor secretly upgrading these elements into an
system.
The U.S. SALT proposal spells out clearly
sr ha?; changes in the Soviet systems, par-
i'ularly radars, would be considered a vio-
:,tion of the ABM limits.
OMPARISON OF U.S. AND SOVIET STRATEGIC
FORCES
,?i"orts by the United States and the Soviet
Union to reach an arms control agreement at
the SALT talks in Vienna are made more
,lithcult by the differences in composition and
s umbers of the strategic forces of the two
,ations.
The differences have led to disagreement
~:ver whether the strategic balance Is tipped
,a favor Of the United States or the Soviet
s nicn.
While there has been little dispute that
iie United States has been ahead in most
:.spects, Administration leaders have been
saying recently that the Soviets have nar-
e,wed the gap and even may have gained
strategic superiority. On the other hand,
=ome advocates of arms control say that the
Administration is being excessively pessi-
iistic to help justify heavier spending on
weapons systems.
The table below compares the U.S. and
; oviet strategic weapons being discussed at
re SALT talks, based on what is known
about the existing and planned weapons
_,,stems.
The United States has a substantial lead
it the number of solid-fuel missiles and has
e,^uun a planned program to increase several-
old its number of nuclear warheads.
The Soviets continue to rely mostly on
large liquid-fuel missiles and are slowly in-
reasing their numbers of solid-fuel missiles.
:several elements of the arms race that
rave figured in the talks are not included in
to table. One of the most important is the
L.S. tactical aircraft force maintained in
Europe and the Mediterranean. These air-
!raft, numbering about 500, could deliver
c:uclear weapons against the Soviet Union.
milarly, Soviet medium range ballistic mis-
;iies targeted on Europe have been excluded,
have the antiballistic missile (ABM) sys-
ins of both countries.
U.S. and Soviet negotiators have been un-
::hle to agree on whether the U.S. fighter-
omoers in Europe and the Soviet missiles
.,rgeted on Europe should be classed as stra-
ic weapons and thus placed on the bar-
un.ing table at Vienna.
sources for the information in the table
,n,;iuded the annual posture statements of
t)c Secretary of Defense, testimony by de-
' lse officials before the Senate Armed Serv-
res Committee and other congressional
.:.ands and the annual publications of Jane's
carbooks and the Institute for Strategic
ldies.
Authorities frequently differ on the range
ud megaronnage of various missiles. Where
.,xea.ble divergences exist, the table presents
ra ige of estimates.
UNITED STATE
Land-based ICBMs, solid-fueled
(Deployed)
Minuteman III (LGM-30Gi) : The number
of aeployed Minuteman III ICBMs Is slated
to reach an objective of 550 by 1976. Deploy-
men,& with MIRY (multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicles) began in June
1970. Minuteman III has improved targeting,
range, accuracy; its silos are being super-
hardened.
.clamber: 50, Range: 8,000:-.
r'irst operational: 1970, Warheads: three
(MIRV); 200 KT.
Minuteman II (LGM-30F) : The Minute-
man II is the principal component of U.S.
strategic forces. Fifty of them apparently
will be replaced by Minuteman III. Range,
accuracy, targeting are all improved over
Mio.nteman I.
]-umber: 500, Range: 7,000-
t Operational: 1966, Warheads: rie;
about 2 MT.
Minuteman I (LGM-30B): All are being
replaced by Minuteman III at rate of about
100 per year. An earlier version has been
pha.;ed out.
rs amber: 450, Range 6,300.
-,rt operational: 1962, Warhead: or-e: 1
Lo2MT.
(In research and development)
a; advanced ICBM for launch from 1i rd-
ened silos deep underground is in early de-
velopment. Annual funding is about $10
million, for preliminary studies only. The Air
Force is continuing work on advanced re-
encry system:; under the Advanced Ballistic
Reentry Systems (ABRES) program, funded
at $100 million in fiscal 1971. The Air Force
requested $87 million for fiscal 1972. The
program is directed toward Increasing the
survivability of warheads and ensuring ;heir
ab.L ty to penetrate enemy air defenses,
Land-based ICBMs. liquid-fueled
(Deployed)
tan II (LGM-25C) : Titan carries the
largest payload of all U.S. missiles. Earlier
versions have been phased out. Titan has
been retained because of it long range. but
is :>cheduled for phase-out beginning in _973.
I+umber: 54, Range: 7,250 to 9,250.
First operational: 1962, Warheads: one;
5 t : 10 MT.
(In research and development)
The United States does net plan to detalop
new liquid-fueled IC)3Ms.
11sbmarine--launched ballistic missile
(Deployed)
Poseidon C--3 (ZUGM-73A) : Initial dep,,ly-
menr, of Poseidon C-3, with MIRV, was
announced Aaril 1. Poseidon C-3 doubles Po-
laris payload, with improved accuracy. A
toai of 496 missiles is planned for 1976- All
31 of the 616-class nuclear submarines will
be converted to carry Poseidon, with 16 niis-
siles on each submarine.
Number : 16, Range: 2,880.
First operational: 1971, Warheads: 10 av-
era.ge); 50 KT.
1}r,laris A-2 (UGM-27C) : The Poaris A-3
is the principal sea-based U.S. deterrent at
present. It features an increased range over
A-' improved target coverage with three
MR.V (multiple reentry vehicle) warheads.
The system will be retained on five 608-class
and five 598-class submarines, for a total of
160 missiles.
N unber: 530, Range: 2,880.
First operaAonal: 1964, Warheads: 3 e:tch
(MRV) ; 200 KT,
Polaris A-2 (UGM-27B) : This sy; i.em
represented improved propulsion and range
wheal it replaced A-I. The 608-class nib-
mar'nes now carrying A--2 missiles will. be
converted to A-3s; the schedule is
undisclosed.
Number: 80, Range: 1,750.
First operational: 1962, Warheads: 1 each;
about 1 MT.
(In research and development)
ULMS (undersea long-range missile sys-
tem) : To counter Soviet antisubmarine
warfare efforts, ULMS would replace Poseidon
by the early 1980s. Each ship might carry 24
missiles.
Number: not determined, Range: Around
5,000.
Operational: About 1980, Warheads:
(MIRY); size is unl gown; likely to be com-
parable to Poseidon.
Strategic bombers
(Deployed)
13-52 G/H (Stratofortress) : These are
equipped with Hound Dog missiles (range
up to 700 miles) and Quail decoy missiles.
The bombers are undergoing modifications to
carry 20 SRAM (short-range attack missiles),
which are now in production (range up to
100 miles). The B-52 G/H could carry SCAD
(subsonic cruise armed decoys), which is in
an early development phase. The bomber's
power plant consists of eight turbofans.
Number: 255, Payload: 4 to 6 H-bombs.
First operational : 1958-61, Range: 12,500
(maximum).
B-52 C through F: Some are deployed in
Southeast Asia; others are in active storage.
All are scheduled for replacement by the
FB-111 and the B-1. The power plant is eight
turbos ans.
Number: 200 to 250, Payload: 4 to 6
H-bombs.
First operational: 1955, Range: 11,500
(maximum).
FB-111: These are planned as interim
replacements for B-52 C-F bombers until
the B--1 becomes operational. The originally
planned force of 263 FB-ills has been cut
back sharply. This aircraft can carry six
SRAM missiles. The power plant is two
turbofans.
Number 76, Payload: 2 to 4 H-bombs.
Firs, operational: 1970, Range: 3.800
(maximum).
(In research and development)
B-i (advanced manned strategic aircraft)
This proposed bomber is under full-scale
development to replace the B-52 G/H series.
It would carry SRAM and SCAD missiles,
and possibly other defensive missiles.
Number: 200 to 250.
Operational: Late 1970s.
SOV'I T UNION
Land-based ICBMs, solid-fueled
(Deployed)
SS-:'.3 (Savage) : This is the newest Soviet
missile, first displayed in 1965. The Defense
Department confirms that fewer than 50
have been deployed in four years. Range esti-
mates vary. The SS.--13 is not rated accurate
enoug:i for use in counterforce strikes against
U.S. missiles.
Number: Under 50, Range: 2,000 to 6,200.
Firs, operational: 1968, Warheads: one;
1 MT (estimated).
(In research and development)
A variation of the SS-13, developed as an
intermediate range missile (2,500 miles), was
displayed in 1967. U.S. speculation about a
new solid-fuel missile center on Soviet con-
struction of large new silos; however, no U.S.
observation of test flights has been an-
nounced to date.
Land-based lCB1VIs, liquid-fueled
(Deployed)
SS-1.1: The fuel of this ICBM is storable
liquid. The United f3tates does not rate the
SS-11 as a counterforce threat. Some are be-
lieved targeted on Western Europe. The de-
ployment rate is slowing, according to the
Defense Department.
Number: More than 900, Range: 6,500.
First operational: 1966, Warheads: one; 1
to 2 MT.
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offensive weapons, so that we are in no
way jeopardizing. our security. Mr. Presi-
dent, it is my judgment that by pursuing
this course we are enhancing it.
I do compliment the team we have in
Vienna, particularly Mr. Smith, the
head of Our arms control delegation.
Their work is highly sensitive, most dif-
ficult, and complex. I believe that we owe
them a debt of gratitude for this begin-
ning approach or this beginning success.
Let us hope that the understandings
that have been arrived at thus far can
be translated into concrete terms of a
signed agreement.
May I add that it would be in the in-
terest of all parties if, during the time an
agreement is being sought or during the
time of the negotiations on the hoped-
for agreement on the anti-ballistic mis-
sile system limitation, there could be a
freeze on the further deployment of
ABM's here and in the Soviet Union, and
a freeze on further deployment of land-
based missiles and the intercontinental
ballistic missile-type-the Soviets with
their SS-9's and the others of that
family, and we with our Minuteman,
Polaris, - and Poseidons.
It is my judgment ;that the interest of
the world's peace and security would be
best served by not only having an un-
derstanding on limiting weaponry but
also on freezing further deployment.
I am hopeful that the Committee on
Appropriations, as it now looks at our
defense requirements, will take very
seriously the suggestion I made on
March 25 of putting whatever funds
we have for missilery-the ABM's and
the MIRV-ICBM's-into escrow. That is
not to say that the funds should not be
appropriated; it is simply to say they
should be set aside during the time we
are working out an agreement. Why
waste those dollars, particularly if we
are going to have a limitation on strate-
gic nuclear weapons. We can always
protect ourselves simply because we have.
a technological lead, particularly in
what we call the MIRV, the multiple in-
dependent retargetable reentry vehicle.
We have a substantial technological lead
over the Soviet Union in this area, there-
by giving us that margin of safety we
should require if we go into a freeze
on deployment and if we put funds in
escrow during the time we seek an iron-
clad or firm agreement.
Mr. President, I take this time to
thank the President of the United States
for his message today and to encourage
him to proceed as he is with even more
determined effort. He will have my help
and my support. I do not seek to make
the life of a President difficult and try-
ing in fields of national security. I feel
it is our job to work with him; not to
be a rubber stamp, but to be consulted
and to be willing to be consulted, to be
helpful, and to be willing to advise and
to be advised.
QUORUM CALL
Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I suggest
the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, I ask unanimous consent that the
order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDINCx, OFFICER. Without
objection, it is,06 red.
-C A ,U
THE SALT TALKS-PRESIDENT
NIXON'S STATEMENT ON RADIO
AND TELEVISION TODAY
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, the an-
nouncement by President Nixon made
at noon today that an agreement had
been reached at SALT to begin working
out details on an ABM limitation and
on the beginnings of an offensive weap-
ons limitation has raised hope that it
may be possible to reduce the danger of
nuclear war and annhilation that hangs
over the earth.
The President's efforts represents a
step of the greatest statesmanship and
wisdom. The deadlock appears to have
been broken and we can hope that an
agreement limiting the further deploy-
ment of nuclear weapons will be worked
out in the near future.
I commend the President for his cour-
age and hope that the progress he re-
ported to the Nation today will result in
curbing the nuclear arms race which is
a growing danger to the security of this
country and the world.
The attitude of the Soviet Union in
joining the United States in this agree-
ment is a sign that offers great hope for
better future relations with that coun-
try.
I know I speak for many when I ex-
press my support for the step for peace
in the world made by the President to-
day.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD the
nationwide radio and television state-
ment which the President made at 12
noon today.
There being no objection, the state-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.
As you know, the Soviet-American talks
on limiting nuclear arms have been dead-
locked for over a year. As a result of nego-
tiations involving the highest level of both
governments, I am announcing today a sig-
nificant development in breaking the dead-
lock.
The statement that I shall now read is
being issued simultaneously in Moscow and
Washington; in Washington at 12:00 o'clock
and in Moscow at 7:00 p.m.
The Governments of the United States and
the Soviet Union. after reviewing the course
of their talks on the limitation of strategic
armaments, have agreed to concentrate this
year on working out an agreement for the
limitation of the deployment of antiballistic
missile systems (ABM's). They have also
agreed that, together with concluding an
agreement to limit ABM's, they will agree on
certain measures with respect to the limita-
tion of offensive strategic weapons.
The two sides are taking this course In the
conviction that it will create more favorable
conditions for further negotiations to limit
all strategic arms. These negotiations will
be actively pursued.
This agreement is a major step in breaking
the stalemate on nuclear arms talks. In-
tensive negotiations, however, .v?ll be re-
quired to translate this enders', ax ding into
a concrete agreement.
This statement that I have j is read ex-
presses the commitment of th( Soviet and
American Governments at the I g:iest levels
to achieve that goal. If we r is ;eed, this
joint statement that has been s, pied today
may well be remembered as t; e beginning
of a new era in which all natior ?:vill devote
more of their energies and th.;ir resources
not to the weapons of war, but o the works
of peace.
QUORUM CALL
Mr: BYRD of West Virginii .Mr. Presi-
dent, I suggest the absence o s. quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICK 1,. The clerk
will call the roll.
The second assistant legit !a Live clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Presi-
dent, I ask unanimous cons( iv that the
order for the quorum call be e;.cinded.
The PRESIDING OFF"CvR (Mr.
CRANSTON). Without objecti)r.. it is so
ordered.
UNANIMOUS-CONSENT t,IFQUEST
Mr. BYRD of West Virgini L. vIr. Presi-
dent, various discussions ha e been had
with the hope that we migb, ')e able to
enter into a unanimous-cor sent agree-
ment which would allow the.' senate, after
some additional debate, to d spose of the
amendment offered by the cis.inguished
Senator from Pennsyly iraa (Mr.
ScHwEIKER) and all amendm er:ts thereto
by no later than Tuesday, June 1, which
would be the first day fc ilnwing the
Memorial Day recess.
The distinguished managr~ -zf the bill,
the Senator from Mississipp (Mr. STEN-
NIS), and the equally distir gs fished mi-
nority leader, the Senator fr )ni Pennsyl-
vania (Mr. SCOTT), and I-a. the request
of the distinguished majority leader-
have prepared the following unanimous-
consent proposal.
I have talked with the (. istinguished
majority leader, and I have oiAlined the
proposal to him. He has giv 'n it his ap-
proval, and that leads me tc propose the
request.
The Senator from Alaska, Mr. GRA-
VEL), the Senator from I.)wa (Mr.
HUGHES), the Senator Iron, Mississippi
(Mr. STENNIS), the Senator from Penn-
sylvania (Mr. SCHWEIKER), the Senator
from California (Mr. CRANSI ON), and the
distinguished leader are all ra ily too late
to get a MIRV agreement because of U.S.
deployment. But, "it is exti un,ely myopic
from the standpoint of nation tl security not
to give it a try."
A former Pentagon analyst s.tic: "Actually,
the Air Force should be lead n;- the oppo-
sition to MIRV, in its own it Lerest. MIRVs
are the biggest long-range lieat to our
land-based weapons."
The basic argument for the i easibility of
a ban on MIRV testing has be a that for the
Soviet MIRV to constitute t Ile first-strike
threat claimed for it, Soviet leaders would
have to have full confidence n its accuracy
and reliability.
While it may be hard to tie- ec- MIRV sys-
tem tests that are deliberate y designed to
disguise the system's capabi it,, it is im-
probable that the extensiv- testing the
Soviets would require to ac iieve a high-
confidence MIRV capability o alld go on
wholly undetected, arms cot tr ~J advocates
argue.
Once a test ban is agreed t , t becomes a
risky venture even to try c aeating, given
the onus of getting caught.
Military pressure: One former I entagon an-
alyst told National Journal th A current Ad-
ministration SALT policies rt dcct the dif l-
culty of overcoming the inhe, or t skepticism
of the military toward arms o.itrol efforts.
He said that the "almost I witless" tech-
nical arguments against the v at ility of arms
control agreements generally 'eltect "t' + ex-
treme caution about Soviet n' entions and
capabilities inherent in the ;e vices' plan-
ning."
"You can argue that. it's ha job of the
military to plan for the worst ' ce said, "but
at some point it all has to b- lot into per-
spective."
He said that the strong an ". sophisticated
analysis and debate on strate lie weapons is-
sues within the Pentagon un le ? former De-
fense Secretary (1961-68) R' Bert S. McNa-
mara still produced many mor, 1-'eapons than
were needed at the time.
"I don't see any signs th it the current
system Is succeeding any bet e:." he said.
Scoville says that for arms curtrol efforts
to succeed in the face of int. mal pressures,
"the President himself has o put his full
and enthusiastic support bet n i the effort."
CONGRESS
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President's foreign policy, Sen. J. W. Ful-
bright, D-Ark., has remained silent on SALT.
The Foreign Relations Committee, which Ful-
bright heads, would have to pass on any
treaty arising from the SALT talks.
Support: Leaders of the committees dealing
with Pentagon programs support the policy
of continuing U.S. weapons development
while the talks are In progress, even though
some question the approach.
Allen J. Ellender, D-La., chairman of the
Senate Appropriations Committee and its
Military Appropriations Subcommittee, said
in an interview that the Administration
polic=es are "the same old story."
"We talk peace and we prepare for war,"
he said. "You just can't get an arms agree-
ment trying to negotiate from strength. The
Russians aren't going to sign an agreement
while they're weaker, and neither would
we."
Ye Ellender feels that the President
should be supported. "He's the commander-
in-chief, and the people are more likely to
follow him than Congress on national se-
curity questions," the Senator said.
Rep. F. Edward Hebert, D-La., chairman
of the House Armed Services Committee, said
in an interview that he would not approve
of delaying U.S. weapons programs for SALT.
"I don't get any great comfort out of con-
ferences with the Russians," he said.
Proposals: A number of Democratic Sena-
tors have proposed ways to break the dead-
lock at the SALT talks.
The Democratic Policy Council proposed
Feb. 26 that the United States accept an
ABM agreement that is expressly conditioned
on a freeze on offensive missiles, while the
negotiations continue.
Variations of this plan have subsequently
come from Democratic Sens. Edmund S.
Muskfe of Maine, new chairman of the For-
eign Relations Subcommittee on Arms Con-
trol; Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota, and
Stuart Symington of Missouri.
Jackson, chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Subcommittee on SALT, has pro-
posed a one-year freeze on new offensive mis-
siles, including MIRV, while the talks
continue.
strov current chances for meaningful arms
control agreements.
U.S. weapons: The Pentagon's fiscal 1972
budget proposes increased spending for a
long list of strategic weapons development
programs.
Funds also are requested to continue de-
ploying the Minuteman III MIRV missile and
the Poseidon MIRV submarine-launched
missile.
ARM-The Administration's request for
funds to continue the Safeguard ABM pro-
gram is geared to developments at the cur-
rent talks.
The request is for $1.27 billion, but the
decision on precisely how the money will be
spent has been left open. The President
wants authorization to spend the money
either for initial procurement of components
for a fourth ABM site in Wyoming or for ini-
tial work on a site near Washington, D.C.
The Army's development work on an ad-
vanced ABM concept, Hardsite, has been
merged into the Safeguard program, and the
funding has been increased. Hardsite envi-
sions using large numbers of small, inexpen-
sive radars and Sprint missiles to provide ter-
minal defenses for the Minuteman silos.
Foster defends the concept as a long-range
upgrading of Safeguard's silo defense capa-
bility "in case the potential Soviet threat
materializes In the late 1970s." The Pentagon
contends Safeguard is needed as a "platform"
for later Improvements like Hardsite.
Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, director of the
Stanford Linear Accelerator and a leading op-
ponent of Safeguard, argued in congressional
hearings in 1969 and 1970 on the ABM that
the Administration should skip Safeguard
and use the money to perfect the Hardsite
concept.
He argued forcefully that Safeguard would
be ineffective at its primary mission-silo
defense-if the Pentagon is correct in its
projection of the Soviet threat. A more real-
istic assessment of how soon the Soviets
could achieve the projected threat, he said,
would allow time to develop and deploy the
more effective Hardsite concept.
The Senate votes in 1970 on Safeguard
were aimed at forcing the Administration
to defer ABM deployment and. conduct fur-
ther research on the concept. (For back-
ground on the controversy, see Vol. 2, No. 23,
p. 1177; for votes, see Vol. 2, No. 33,p. 1791,
and Vol. 2 No. 34, p. 1851.)
O'h.er programs-Other major develop-
ment programs would receive substanr fat
funding increases in the proposed fiscal 19'72
Pentagon budget. The programs, all in the
research-and-development stage, include the
new B-1 bomber, the Airborne Warning and
Control System (AWACS), new missiles
(SRAM and SCAD) for B-52 and FE-ill
bombers, satellite reconnaissance systems
and over-the-horizon radar for early warn-
ing of attack, all for the Air Force; the su.uc-
cessor to Polaris/Poseidon, ULMS (undersea
long-range missile system), for the Nay: y;
and a new surface-to-air missile, SAM-D, for
the Army. (For a report on the programs in
the budget, see No. 4, p. 166; for a summary
of the Pentagon budget, see No. 6, p. 290.:
Threat: These U.S. weapons programs are
nominally a response to estimates of Soviet
capabilities in strategic weapons in the fors-
seabie future.
SS-9-The chief worry is the Soviet SS 9
missile. Every increment in its gradual de-
ployment has been well publicized. The Pen-
tagon has estimated that the missile's power.
sufficient to boost a 13,500-pound payload
The United States has no military missile
so powerful. The U.S. Titan II, deployed in
limited numbers In the early 1960s-there
are currently 54 Titans in silos-has a 5- to
10-megaton warhead. Former Defense Secre-
tary McNamara chose to deploy large num-
bers of solid-tueled Minuteman missiles,
rather than larger liquid-fueled missiles such
as the Titan (and the Soviet-SS-9), because
the solid-fueled missiles are much less expen-
sive to maintain and more efficient to oper-
ate. Also, McNamara's deterrence strategies
called for large numbers of small warhead
missiles rather than a few missiles with high-
megaton warheads.
Defense officials repeatedly stressed during
the first two years of the Nixon Administra-
tion that the rate of deployment of Soviet
strategic weapons would threaten the U.S.
deterrent if continued during the next four
or five years.
The power of the Soviet SS-9 missile af-
fords the Soviets wide flexibility in mixing
the numbers and explosive yield of warheads
on each missile. Tests have been conducted
since late 1968 of a payload containing three
warheads of an estimated five megatons
each.
Other Soviet systems-The Soviets, accord-
ing to Laird, have deployed "over 900" SS-
11 missiles, which can carry warheads about
the size of the Minuteman, and about 45
SS-13 solid-fueled missiles. About 200 older
ICBM's have been retained by the Soviets,
but are not in hardened silos.
The Soviets are building a new class of
ballistic missile submarines-called the
"Yankee" class by the Pentagon-comparable
in capability to early versions of the U.S.
Polaris. Each submarine carries 16 ballistic
missiles with a range estimated at about 1,200
miles. About 17 are said to be operational.
The ABM complex around Moscow, begun
in 1964, and completed last year, employs
64 Galosh ABM missiles. In addition, the
Soviets have deployed large numbers-esti-
mates =run to as many as 10,000-of SAM
missiles as a defense against U.S. bombers.
The system includes the Tallinn line of high-
perforrnance missiles northwest of Moscow.
The Soviets are estimated to have about
145 intercontinental bombers, with another
50 of these planes outfitted as tankers.
Testing-Beyond the simplegrowth in the
numbers of Soviet missiles, which had been
increasing at varying rates since 1964, a
number of Soviet development and testing
programs have figured prominently in U.S.
estimates of the potential Soviet threat.
These include testing of improved ABM
missiles-said to have the capability of
"loitering" in the atmosphere before picking
a warhead to destroy--improvements in de-
fensive radars, development of a new bomber,
testing of orbiting attack vehicles to destroy
U.S. surveillance satellites and a variety of
testing programs aimed at improved capa-
bilities for their missiles.
Future threat-These assessments of Soviet
capabilities have been projected, with nu-
merous variations in timing and alternative
estimates of probability, to produce a long-
:range picture of Soviet advantage in the
:strategic balance.
Pentagon and NSC officials questioned by
National Journal said that, without U.S.
countermeasures or a SALT agreement, cur-
rent Soviet programs could produce a situa-
t,ion, in the long run, in which U.S. Minute-
man missiles are vulnerable to accurate
MIRV warheads on the SS-9, U.S. bombers
are vulnerable to Soviet: ballistic submarine
attack, and the effectiveness of the surviving
6TRATEGIC WEAPONS ISSUES
Laird has said that all U.S. weapons pro-
grams are designed to implement a policy of
"realistic deterrence."
President Nixon said early in the Adminis-
tration that the principle guiding strategic
weapons decisions is "sufficiency."
however they are described, the Adminis-
tration's strategic weapons policies call for
increased funding for every major develop-
ment program in strategic weapons and con-
tinued deployment of U.S. multiple-warhead
missiles and the Safeguard ABM.
As explained in various Administration
statements, this course puts pressure on the
Soviets to negotiate seriously at SALT, keeps
the President's options open pending the
outcome of the talks, and provides an essen-
tial protective hedge against the projected
threat if the taks fail completely.
1'he President emphasizes that a primary
aim of U.S. strategic weapons programs is to
convince the Soviets that the United States
will not allow them to gain superiority in
strategic weapons.
Policies are under review by the Adminis-
iration aimed at giving the President alter-
natives in the use of nuclear weapons other
than all-out attack. These policies have
underlined the importanec, in the view of
Pentagon planners, of MIRV warheads for
U.S. weapons.
The continued deployment of MIRV sys-
tenas and the trend of long-range planning
within the Administration has sparked criti-
cism cf current strategic weapons policies on
a wide range of Issues.
The greatest fear is that the SALT talks
are being used to justify the continuation
of weapons systems that may ultimately de-
into intercontinental traject=ory, gives the Minuteman missiles aad bombers is lessened
missile the capability to fire warheads up :o by Soviet ABM and surface-to-air missile
25 megatons at the United States. By corn- defense.
parlson, the U.S. Minuteman, according ::o The Pentagon's Foster also says that he
most estimates. carries a warhead of about Soviet SAM missile defense system and ac-
one megaton, companyying radars could be upgraded to
Current estimates put the number of ova- serve as ABMs, furthitr lessening the effec-
erational SS--9 missiles at about 280. tiveness of U.S. offensive missiles, and that
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7 9, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL
this potential must be taken into considera-
tion in U.S. planning.
These developments would, In this analysis,
leave U.S. Polaris/Poseidon submarine mis-
siles targeted on Soviet cities but with their
use deterred by the remaining Soviet SS-11
and SS-13 missiles. In a nuclear confronta-
tion, the President would be faced with what
he calls in this year's foreign policy message
the "agonizing choice between paralysis and
holocaust."
Doctrine: The U.S. strategic forces in-
tended to meet this perceived threat are sup-
posed to be guided by what the Administra-
tion calls the doctrine of "sufficiency." A
general review of U.S. strategic forces policy
in 1969 by the NSC produced four basic cri-
teria for judging sufficiency, which were set
out in a National Security Decision Memo-
randum at the end of that year.
Assured destruction-The criterion of as-
sured destruction, which was the basis of the
McNamara approach to deterrence, has been
adopted by the Nixon Administration.
McNamara developed a rough measure for
judging how many U.S. weapons were re-
quired to assure a level of destruction on the
Soviet Union that would deter a Soviet
attack.
In the McNamara calculation, used prin-
cipally to counter arguments from the serv-
ices for larger numbers of weapons than he
thought necessary, about 400 surviving U.S.
warheads, delivered on the Soviet Union
after an attack, would kill 30 per cent of
the population and destroy 76 per cent of
Soviet industry. Increasing the'number of
warheads to 800 would increase the number
of people killed to 39 per cent and the amount
of industry destroyed to 77 per cent-not
enough of an Increase to justify the added
cost.
Hostage equality-The criterion of hostage
equality means, in the Administration view,
that neither side should be allowed to achieve
an overwhelming superiority in nuclear
weapons, even if that superiority would have
only marginal effects in the total disaster of
an all-out nuclear war.
Crisis stability-This criterion emphasizes
the survivability of U.S. weapons, based on
the judgment that vulnerable weapons in-
crease the temptation for the other side to
strike first with nuclear weapons in a time
of crisis or conventional war. The adoption of
"launch-on-warning" strategies as a means
of overcoming the vulnerability of missiles is
rejected on the grounds that such strategies
increase the danger of miscalculation in a
crisis.
Stability also requires, In the President's
view, U.S. strategic forces and policies flexible
enough to respond to a Soviet attack at the
same level-to avoid the situation in which
"the indiscriminate mass destruction of
civilians is the sole possible response to
challenge."
Umbrella-The fourth measure of suffi-
ciency, as set forth by the NSC, is the con-
tinued ability to protect other nations with
the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
Japan, India and a number of other coun-
tries signed the nuclear nonproliferation
treaty with the understanding that the
United States would provide the protection
of its nuclear weapons as a substitute for
each country developing its own weapons.
This U.S. pledge will depend for its credi-
bility, in the Administration view, on the
"thin" population defense capability of the
Safeguard ABM, as China develops its ICBM
force.
A "thin" ABM would make credible a U.S.
threat of nuclear attack against China, in
the event that China were threatening an-
other nation. (For a discussion of "suffi-
ciency," see Vol. 2, No, 16, p. 810)
Weapons decisions: These criteria are ex-
pressed in three basic guides for the design
of U.S. forces: survivability, flexibility and
mix.
To increase the survivability of U.S. stra-
tegic weapons, programs for hardening mis-
sile silos have been approved. Improvements
in U.S. air defensef:, the ABM and MIRV
programs are all justified as improving
survivability.
MIRV warheads, more accurate missiles,
and improvements in command and control
are all seen as contributing,to the flexibility
of U.S. forces.
Survivability and flexibility both require,
in the Administration analysis, a full mix
of bombers, submarine-based missiles and
land-based missiles, to prevent the Soviets
from concentrating research and develop-
ment on defeating any one element. The
mix also complicates the Soviet's problems in
targeting and coordinating a first strike.
Each of these arguments supports the view
that the security of the nation requires the
full array of U.S. strategic forces.
McNamara coupled his basic concern with
maintaining an assured destruction capa-
bility with a secondary aim of developing
forces to limit the damage to the United
States that might result from a nuclear ex-
change. One approach to limiting damage is
constructing ABM defenses, Another is
developing offensive missiles capable of
destroying Soviet forces before they attack.
Counterforce strategies: The latter ap-
proach is called a "counterforce strategy"-
meaning that offensive weapons are targeted
on the enemy's offensive weapons, rather
than his population centers.
The Administration is considering such a
strategy, and it is for this reason, among
others, that it has been reluctant to put
MIRV on the bargaining table at SALT.
MIRV would be needed if the United States
were to develop a capability to knock out
Soviet missiles in silos-in a retaliatory sec-
ond strike, or, conceivably, in a first strike.
NSC officials questioned by National Jour-
nal say that Administration concern about
crisis stability and the credibility of the
U.S. deterrent, particularly in Europe, has
stimulated consideration of weapons and
strategies suitable for a counterforce ap-
proach to deterrence sometime in the future.
The Air Force chief of staff, Gen. John D.
Ryan gave his interpretation of the outlook
in a speech Sept. 22, 1970, in which he said
that the Minuteman III missile with its
MIRV "will be our best means of destroying
time-urgent targets like the long-range
weapons of the enemy."
Elsewhere in the speech Ryan made clear
that he was talking about a second-strike
counterforce strategy aimed at ". . . the re-
maining strategic weapons which the enemy
would no doubt hold in reserve."
A counterforce capability is being re-
viewed, as an alternative to immediate re-
course to general nuclear war in a crisis
situation.
Options.-Officials emphasize that coun-
terforce strategies have been considered
thoroughly in the past and that current
efforts are intended only to preserve these
strategies as options for force planning and
weapons development. Future development
of the necessary forces to carry out these
strategies depends, according to Pentagon
officials, on the terms of the final SALT
agreement.
Programs.-The services have paper stud-
ies under way on exactly what weaponry,
force levels and crisis management tech-
niques will be required for a counterforce
strategy.
According to Pentagon officials, current
U.S. MIRV systems were designed for de-
stroying cities and would have to be more
accurate than they now are if they were to
be used to destroy military targets.
The Army's Hardsite ABM program is be-
ing pushed as a means of enhancing the
capability of defending Minuteman silos.
According to testimony by Foster before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in
1969, the United States deve ol:ed, but did
not deploy, a method by whit U.S. missiles
could signal back whether tl.e warheads
had been sent off on the rig, t trajectory.
Development programs are iv der way for
satellites capable of sensing S -v at silos from
which the missiles had alrear? jean fired.
Special emphasis is being ; i