CONGRESS AND THE INDOCHINA WAR: 1970 CHRONOLOGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73B00296R000300020005-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2001
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: December 18, 1970
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

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Congress and She War ? 3
Congress and the Indochina War: 1970 Chronology
Feb. 2. Senate Foreign Relations Committee made
public a report., "Vietnam: December 1969," criticizing
the Administration's Vietnamization policy. (Weekly
Report p. 336)
Feb. 18. The President issued a 40,000-word mes-
sage to Congress, "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A
New Strategy for Peace." (Text and summary, Weekly
Report p. 509)
Feb. 25, 26, 27. House Appropriations Subcom-
mittee on Defense heard a report on the Vietnamization
progress from Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird.
(Weekly Report p. 684)
March 6. President Nixon lifted the official lid of
secrecy on U.S. military involvement in Laos with a
3,000-word statement which drew sharp comment from
members on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
(Weekly Report p. 761)
April 12. After a delay of more than five months,
a Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee
released a censored transcript of closed hearings held
in October 1969 on U.S. military involvement in Laos.
(Fact sheet, Weekly Report p. 1243)
April 30. President Nixon announced that
American troops had been sent into battle in Cam-
bodia. (Weekly Report p. 1151)
May 2. Senators George McGovern (D S.D.),
Harold E. Hughes (D Iowa), Alan Cranston (D Calif.),
Charles E. Goodell (R N.Y.) and Mark 0. Hatfield (R
Ore.) announced plans to offer an amendment to elimi-
nate spending for military operations in Vietnam, Laos
and Cambodia by the end of 1970. (Weekly Report p.
1208)
May 5. A May 1 Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee report on a resolution (S Con Res 64) to repeal
the 1964 Tonkin Gulf resolution was recommitted to the
Committee. (Weekly Report p. 1207)
May 6. House passed a bill (HR 17123) authoriz-
ing $20.2 million for military procurement and research
in fiscal 1971 and rejected amendments that would have
restricted use of U.S. troops in Southeast Asia. (Weekly
Report p. 1209)
May 13. The Senate began debate on the
Foreign Military Sales bill (HR 15628), the vehicle for
an amendment offered by Senators Frank Church (D
Idaho) and John Sherman Cooper (R Ky.) designed to
prohibit U.S. military activities in Cambodia. (Weekly
Report p. 1272)
June 6. The Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee released a report, "Cambodia: May 1970," disput-
ing the military reason given by President Nixon for
ordering the intervention into Cambodia and indicating
that the military gains were outweighed by the risks of
a broadened war in Indochina. (Weekly Report p. 1534)
June 24. Senate adopted an amendment to repeal
the 1964_,-Tonkin Gulf resolution. (Weekly Report p.
161T5)-) )
( June 30'. The Senate by a 58-37 roll-call vote
passed--41--tr1'odified: Cooper-Church amendment and the
Milmtry,A441900.00TifillleSSMitG14#08/07
weinkst of debate, (WitiMilieport p 1671)
President Nixon issued a statement on the o0-day
U.S. operation in Cambodia stating it had been nuccuss-
fully concluded and that no American ground personnel
would re-enter Cambodia in the future. (Weekly
Report p. 1673)
July 6. A special House committee issued a report
on "U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia" (II Redt 9i-
1276), after undertaking a two-week fact-finding mis-
sion to the region.
July 9. The House rejected a motion to instruct
House conferees to agree to the Senate-passed Cooper-
'Church amendnie:rit....(Weekly Reporrp.-17797"--
July 10. The Senate Adopted by a 57-5 roil-call
vote a concurrent resolution (S Con Res 64) reaffirming
the repeal of the 1964 Tonkin Gulf resolution. (Weekly
Report-p77777)----vm
Aug. 20, .21:-The Sensitp :approved amendments
to t e-defenie procurement bill (Hir17123) to (telly
T:17K-a11oWances to allied troops in South Vietnart.
to be any higher than those paid to American troops and
to forbid use of U.S. funds to pay foreign troop; fighting
for Cambodia and Laos. (Weekly Report p. 2)72)
Sept. 1. The Senate defeated by a 39-5i-, roll-call
vote the Hatfield-McGovern amendment to I lit 17123
which would have imposed a deadline for withdrawal
of U.S. forces from Vietnam. (Weekly Report p. 2170)
Oct. 7. President Nixon in a televised speech pro-
posed a cease-fire in Vietnam and widened peace talks
to include nations not present at the Paris peace talks.
(Congressional reaction, Weekly Report p. 2495)
Nov. 16. The House by a 288-39 roll-call vote
passed a joint resolution (H J Res 1355) defining the
war-making powers of the President. The bill then went
to the Senate. (Weekly Report p. 2817)
Nov. 18. President Nixon sent a message to Con-
gress requesting $1 billion in supplementary foreign aid
including $65 million for Vietnamization and $255
million in military and economic aid for Cambodia.
(Weekly Report p. 2834)
Nov. 23. Debate over U.S. policy revived in the
aftermath of an attempt to rescue American prisoners
of war near Hanoi and large-scale air strikes over North
Vi nanC(Wechty Report p. 2874)
Dec. 3./The Senate Appropriations Committee
a ded. a-prohibition against the entry of U.S. ground-
combat roops--in.to7"::Catribodia when it considered tile
SW:billion fiscal 1971 defense .appropriations. bill (HR
19590). The Senate pIsied the bill Dec. 8. (Weekly
Report p. 2933)
Dee. 7. The House approved a resolution (H Res
1282) commending the courage displayed by the official
command, officers and men involved in the Nov. 21
attempt to rescue U.S. prisoners believed to be held
captive near Hanoi. (Weekly Report p. 2937)
Dee. 9. The House Appropriations Committ;,e
reported HR 19928, a $990 million suppletncntal foreign
aid bill for fiscal 1971 including $255 million for Cilin-
bodia. The House by a 249-102 vote passed a bill
:1001-RDIEhla iHi-
@26R@.CtO&0Ot2W3O5R2aid, incfuo-
ing $255 million for Cambodia. (Weekly Report p. 2935.:
roved Ftrdkuteit 6R000300020005-2
January 26, 1971tPP HANINICITE:6911151---)F-71198(49 El 201
health service areas, with advisory coun-
cils on matters of administration at each
such level. Local offices would have the
responsibility of serving as ombudsmen
for the consumer in the health system
and of investigating complaints regard-
ing the administration of the program
made by consumers or providers in their
area. Through its regulations, the Board
would guide performance under the pro-
gram; it would coordinate various activ-
ities with the State and regional plan-
ning agencies; it would provide an ac-
counting of activities to the Congress;
Ind it would engage in studies and proj-
ects for evaluation and for progressive
improvements of operations.
The financial operations of the pro-
gram would be managed through a
health security trust fund?similar to
the social security trust fund. One-half
of the income for the fund would come
from Federal general revenue with the
other half coming from taxing individual
Income up to $15,000 annually, employ-
ers' payrolls and non-earned income.
Each year, the Board?with the partici-
pation of the Advisory Council?would
make an advance estimate of the amount
available for expenditure?to pay for
services, for program development, and
for administration?and would make al-
locations to the several regions. These
allocations would be subdivided among
categories of services and designated for
the health service areas, with paraticipa-
tion by the advisory councils. Advance
estimates, constituting the program bud-
gets, would be subject to adjustments,
as may become necessary, in accordance
with guidelines in the act. The alloca-
tions to regions and to service areas
would be guided initially by the latest
available data on current levels of ex-
penditures; thereafter they would be
guided by the program's own experiences
in making expenditures and by evidences
of need toward meeting the program's
obligations and objectives equitably
throughout the Nation.
Thus, Mr. Speaker, the Health Se-
curity Act we submit to the Congress and
to the people of the United States differs
from all previous proposals for national
health insurance. It is not just another
proposal for insurance. It is not merely
an extension of medicare by stages to
everyone. It is not an ill-conceived open-
ended design for pumping more dollars
into a chronically strained "nonsystem."
It is not simply a bigger categorical pro-
gram for the production of manpower
and facilities without creating a system
to employ them.
Our program will build for the resi-
dents of this country a rational system
of national health security. It will not
require an increased expenditure of
funds, but will instead allow citizens to
pay for their medical security during
their income producing years in accord-
ance with their level of earnings. The
funds which we as a people can afford
to provide will finance and budget the
essential costs of good medical care.
Simultaneously we will strengthen our
capacity to deliver health services, and
make good health care available without
financial hardship for all families and
individuals in the Nation,
We take cognizance of the fact that
organized medicine shares our concern
that America faces a crisis in health
care. We know that our goals are the
same?to provide adequate health care
services for all Americans. We would
hope and expect organized medicine to
make a substantial contribution in set-
ting up the mechanisin for the health
security program so that its long years
of experience and the expertise of its
members would be available for the ef-
fective functioning of the program. As
lay groups, the various advisory boards
and advisory councils established under
the Health Security Act would, I am sure,
want to rely heavily on the cooperation
and advice of organized medicine so as
to insure that the highest possible qual-
ity of medical care would be available to
everyone and that an equitable dis-
tribution of available funds would be
maintained.
We expect that the introduction of the
bill and consideration of its companion
that is being introduced in the Senate
will spark the most intensive public de-
bate on this subject in 20 years. We are
aware that there are several legislative
proposals for national health insurance
before the Congress. But we hope that in
the course of public discussion and con-
gressional debate the all-inclusive pro-
visions of the Health Security Act will
be contrasted to the piecemeal ap-
proaches of the other proposals. And we
hope, too, that our colleagues realizing
the seriousness of the health crisis in
America will not delay in enacting this
measure during the 92d Congress there-
by insuring, for the first time in U.S.
history, health security for all Ameri-
cans.
GENERAL LEAVE
Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Mr Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent that all Members
may have 5 legislative days in which to
revise and extend their remarks on the
subject of my speech, and to include ex-
traneous matter.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the request of the gentlewoman from
Michigan?
There was no objection.
BANNING U.S. AIR OR SEA COMBAT
SUPPORT FOR ANY MILITARY OP-
ERATIONS IN CAMBODIA
(Mr. BINGHAM askecl'arnas given
permission to address the House for 1
minute and to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. BINGHAM. I am today reintroduc-
ing with additional cosponsors the legis-
lation I introduced last week amending
the compromise Cooper-Church provi-
sion adopted in the closing days of the
91st Congress so as to ban any "T.12S.
air or sea combat supoort for any
military operations in Cambodia." This
brings to 69 the total number of Members
who have cosponsored this measure.
Reintroduction of this legislation to-
day occurs amid renewed reports from
Southeast Asia that the administration is
violating both its own policy assurances
with regard to the U.S. role in Cambodia,
and the intent of the Congress r approv-
ing the compromise Cooper-C it rch lan-
guage as part of the Special I 3: sign As-
sistance Act of 1971. Today's -?.w York
Times reports that U.S. milit a officials
in Southeast Asia have workec o it a plan
by which U.S. military per, ,a nel will
oversee the delivery and use 1 military
aid to Cambodian troops with u ? assum-
ing the role of "advisers." Su( ai plan is
an exercise in "doublethink" a I a clear
violation of the spirit and in cit, if not
the letter, of the Cooper-Chi.rci policy.
The argument made by U S officials
that this program is made n .a 3sary by
the rapid increase of U.S. mill a v assist-
ance for Cambodia is a perfc a illustra-
tion of the same cycle of en aaglement
that we experienced in Sout rietnam.
It was anticipation of just ich en-
tangling developments that rompted
some of us in the House to v t against
this special military aid to .'-' 4mbodia.
The clear intent of Cooper-C larch was
to prevent us from repeatin he mis-
takes we made in South Viet a m. That
overriding intent was never co a romised.
Yet, the administration is nov a fain fol-
lowing the same misguided ingiC, the
same path of deepening invo f nent, in
Cambodia that we have lived -egret in
South Vietnam.
Reports from Southeast a act this
morning also indicate that I rnerican
combat forces, carrying we la ns and
wearing combat boots but b i rwise in
civilian clothes, have been eng ;e. !cl in op-
erations in Cambodia to resc Le helicop-
ters damaged in recent Com a mist at-
tacks. How will this step la 4 cplained
away?
Mr. Speaker, we must ma -! clear to
the administration, if it is m lear al-
ready, that the Cooper-Churc anguage
enacted by Congress must be i erpreted
and observed as a strict bar n. direct
or indirect U.S. combat suppo or mili-
tary operations in Cambodia. !I at is the
intent and purpose of my arm lament to
Cooper-Church. I strongly m gc prompt
hearings in the House on this ru asure so
that the House may take pro a- .t action
on it before it is too late.
HEW AND SOCIAL SECUI 1( ARE
CHEATING MILLIONS (F MEDI-
CARE PATIENTS BY PAY N ) ONLY
50 PERCENT OF REP 34 )NABLE
COSTS INSTEAD OF 80 1 E /CENT
(Mr. STRATTON asked was a yen per-
mission to address the House 'a ? 1 min-
ute, to revise and extend h remarks
and to include extraneous ms t r.)
Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Spea .e I take
this time this morning to bi to the
attention of Members the fa that for
some months now the U.S. L artment
of Health, Education, and Na 1 are and
the Social Security Administi .4 on have
been seriously shortchanging i Ions of
American senior citizens or iedicare
rolls, in violation of law, w I ut any
public admission or explan A n, and
with widespread hardship anc c nfusion
among one group of citizens f3st able
to defend themselves from ti s icind of
fiscal sleight-of-hand.
It has come to my attention a ,at since
last summer Federal medica e officials
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26, 1971
have been paying medicare clients en-
"oiled under the voluntary doctors plan,
and also under the hospital plan, ap-
parently, only 50 percent of the cost of
their doctor bills instead of the 80 per-
'ant legally mandated in the medicare
law. What is more, they have done this
without any public announcement or
publicity, without any advance notice to
medicare clients and without any ra-
aal explanation.
in fact the whole shortchanging opera-
tion has been carried out with a degree
secrecy and surreptitiousness that
-volld put even the CIA to shame. Last
January I wrote a detailed letter to
'3ecretary Richardson to ask for a full ex-
planation of what was going on, and to
his day I have received nothing in writ-
ing- from either the Secretary or anyone
:n ,he Department that would even admit
-the actinn that has been under way, let
done give me the legal authority by
which they claim to have justified their
action.
:Unofficially and over the phone I have
Peen told by subordinate officials that
cast summer the Department instituted a
new, and obviously very quiet policy of
iifiimbursing doctors services under which
ithe year 1968 was arbitrarily selected to
tetermine what "reasonable" charges
amounted to, rather than fixing them
;.in the basis of current cost-of-living
ures.
Now where they get the authority to do
where they get the legal right to
-cake senior citizens, already more ii av-
Jly hit oy inflation than anybody else,
bear the full burden of inflation in the
:iiedicare field I am still, 3 weeks after my
otter to Secretary Richardson, at a loss
to mderstand. But the practical effect of
what the Department has done has been
Jo .theat millions of medicare patients out
of 30 percent of the money which Con-
-cress authorized them back in 1965 to
receive, and which they had a right to
axpect when they first signed up for the
voluntary reimbursement program.
can only conclude that the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare
:;rying to balance its internal budget
,ialt of the hides of retired American citi-
dms whom it was created primarily to
(telp.
Taresualably the Department is also try-
ng to shift the blame for this cruel and
underhanded action onto the doctors
:themselves But if HEW is aware of what
aaf; been happening to our economy in
';ite past 2 or 3 years, or if HEW has done
Anything at all to order a freeze on doe-
sirs' fees under medicare, or a rollback
in fee increases, the record is thunder-
oisly silent on both points.
Obviously this policy cannot be tol-
crated and the practice must be brought
Lo a hal'. I am presently in the process of
drafting legislation designed to do ex-
icily that.
Mr. Speaker, early in January, after I
hal addressed my letter to Secretary
Richardson there was some nationwide
press covel-age of the questions I had
raised with the Secretary. In response to
fliese published reports I have received
many letters from around the country
substantiating the charges I had heard,
and listing individual cases in point. Un-
der leave to extend my remarks I include
a sampling of some of these letters Also
I include a letter to the 'Washingtor Post
Cl November 16, 1970, which prompted
nay original letter to the Secretary, a
copy of that letter, and the Department's
replies to me to date.
'ine material follows:
MEDICARE PERCENTAGES
Recently my father sent to Medicare his
current docsor bills amounting to aperoxi-
mately $10C. The check he received qaam
wh.ch was supposed to ccaer 80
pel cent of medical bills, was for a Attie
than $5C, instead of about $80 which he
eeaected.
f,e called r;he accounting office of the linic
where he receives medical care. He was told
thew had been getting numerous compL lints
o'. the same -,ype.
He then Le, ephoned long distance te the
Richmond cffice which handles Medicare for
his area. Hi' was in:formed that orders had
come from the Social Security Administra-
Lee to pay 80 per cent of the rates 7, hich
vieee in effect in 1968 instead of 80 per cent
? iihe actual bill at 1970 races, beginning in
.1 ay, 1970. In effect, instead of paying al per
cent of mecical bills, Medicare is now pay-
ing only 50 per cent.
Social Securit'y gives as an excuse fcr this
policy their effort to indace the doctors to
cut their rates. This measure has no effect
w liaisoever en doctors. A great many of hem
atm probabli unaware that this practiae is
going on. Besides, they still get their money?
f-ern the patients rather than from Social Se-
ci iritv The peoole who are penalized by it are
tziose least able to afford it--the old pectole on
1:mited fixed incomes. It merely means that
these poor old folks are not receiving the
benefits they had been led to believe they
y a.e. entitled to, and were counting or
a; far as I can determine by inquiring of
a :umber of people, this matter has not
t e'n given any publicity. None of there had
"rd it on a news broadcast or read i; in a
nea,spaper. Li fact, even the people who
vierk at the Social Security-Medicare iefor-
ciation office had never heard if it until I
called them back to inform them about it
a Ler I had talked to someone in the Medi-
c.", claims department.
lt is obvious that those responsible fir this
nctinn did not wan; the general public to
kn. )w what -,hey were doing. Why was in kept
se quiet?
Naturally I do not relish the idea oi laav-
nisi, more or on salary withheld for soc'el se-
c ii Howeaer, I do think the people who
i- still working and earneng money an" the
? who can better afford it. But in at elec-
tiee year what politician would sugges- -such
a lining? It would be much better stratee,y to
flake the noir, sick, retired neonle pay? with-
? . prior nctice of tnis added expense.
E,RA N :3ES A. BROW
.1.RLING TON.
NGRESS CF THE UNITED STATES,
FO USE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
We shington, D.C., January 5, 1:,71.
Fon. ELLI01 L. RICHARDSON ,
:i,-cretary, Department of Health, Educcticni,
and Welare, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: There came ii my
at ention the other day a rather star iling
report included in a letter to the edie a? of
the Washington Post with respect to en-rent
c aerations cf Medicare, which I am brir ging
to your attention and which I belie,. 4- re-
gores imnieciate and much fuller ciarifi-
cai ion.
.a.icording to this letter, a copy of which is
c ',aimed, the Social Security Administeation
ordered its regional offices to repay ledi-
care accounts, beginning July 1970, 50
percent of the total bill rather than 8) per-
c ens.
Such action would appear to me to be not
only contrary to the law but will obviously
place very severe hardships on thousands of
needy older citizer.s.
I would appreciate it if you could tell me
whether this account is true, and if so why
this order was issued.
Furthermore, I would like to know who
issued the order, under what rules or regu-
lations or legal authority it was issued, and
in particular I would like to know whether.
as the enclosed letter suggests, a deliberate
effort has been made by the Social Secnrity
Admtnistration, to keep this change of policy
secret from the American public.
I would also like to know, in view of the
recent announcement that Medicare pre-
miums will rise effective July 1971, just what
the significance of this action will be for the
future operation of the Medicare system. I
will be interested in your reply.
Sincerely yo ars,
SAMUEL S. STRATTON.
Member of Congress.
--
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,
January, R, 1971.
Hon. SAMUEL STRAL TON,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR Mn. STRATTON : The Secretary has re-
ferred your January 5 letter requesting in-
formation regarding the current operation
of Medicare, to the appropriate office.
A reply will be forwarded to you as soon
as possible.
Sincerely,
JERRY W. POOLE
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Con-
gressional Li 2ison.
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION, AND WELFARE.
Washington, D.C., January 14, 1971.
Hon. SAMUEL S. STA ATTON,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. STRATTON: Thank you for your
letter of January 5 concerning the method
used in determinir.g medical insurance pay-
ments under Medic-are.
I have asked Robert M. Ball, Commissioner
of Social Security, to look into the specific
questions you raised. Commissioner Ball will
furnish me a repo:at and I will be in touch
with you again as soon as I receive it.
With best regards,
Sincerely,
ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON,
Secretary.
PHILADELPHIA, PA.,
January 1, 1971.
Hon. SAMUEL STRATTON,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.:
I am deeply grateful to you for calling
public attention to this article appearing in
the Philadelphia daily news. Thank you.
Sincerely,
MEDICARE PATIENTS BEING SHORTCHANGED?
Is the Society Security Administration se.
cretly refunding only 50 percent of Medicare
charges instead ce' the legally required 80
percent?
That's the highly pertinent question Rep.
Samuel Stratton ( D., N.Y.) has bluntly put
up t3 HEW Secretory Elliott Richardson.
In a letter to the latter, Stratton states he
had read a "startling report" that the Social
Security Administration quietly ordered its
regional offices to repay Medicare accounts.
beginning July 1970, at 50 percent of the
total bill rather than 80 percent.
"Such action wculd not only be contrary
to the law," Stratton told Richardson in a
lettee, "but will obviously place very severe
hardships on thousands of needy older citi-
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January 21, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks
boro by his devotion to high principles. These S. Moorhead, John E. Mos, tAtvid R. Obey, portrays a downhome, goofy, hapre, v lucky
were best exemplified by his determination James G. O'Hara; character that has become one of 2 most
to make the Sun a servant of the commit- Bertram L. Podell, David Pryor, Charles B. popular in all of television.
nities which it served. He realized early in Rangel, Thomas M. Rect. Henry S. Reuse, Every Monday night he's lust pi ,IJ "Goo-
his career that a newspaper must be a part Teno Roncalio, Benjamin 8 Rosenthal, J. ber," but the rest of the time hi u George
of the community in which it lives; that it Edward -toush;Lindsey, a busy and happy man ; never
R b 1 William IF Ryan Fer- misses an opportunity to pia in ug for
nand St Germain, Paul S. Saroanes, James H.
Scheuer, John F. Seiber mg, Louis Stokes,
James W. Symingtor ;
Frank Thompson, Jr., (Wow t 0. Tiernan,
Morris K. Udall, Charles .11.. Vanik, Jerome R.
Waldie, Lester L. Wolff, sidnev R. Yates, and
Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.
E 31
must supp
munity; that they both will decline or pros-
per together.
This policy has never changed at the Sun
and it will continue as a fitting memorial
to this man whose dedication to the respon-
sibilities of his profession guided him
throughout his lifetime.
t t( that coin- Edward R. oy a ,
AIR WAR IN CAMBODIA
HON. JONATHAN B. BINGHAM
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, January 21, 1971
Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, the air
war now being carried on by the United
States in Cambodia clearly violates the
intent of the Congress in adopting the
substance of the Cooper-Church amend-
ment as a part of Public Law 91-652, the
Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971.
It also violates President Nixon's own
statement of June 30, 1970, that:
There will be no 'U.S. air or logistic sup-
port (for South Vietnamese military opera-
tions in Cambodia).
Accordingly, I am today introducing,
with the support of 64 of my House col-
leagues, an amendment to the Cooper-
Church provision of the Special Foreign
Assistance Act so as to make clear that
the prohibition contained in that act
must apply to all American combat op-
erations and all American operations in
support of combat operations.
The text of our clarified version of the
Cooper-Church provision follows, along
with a list of the House Members who
have joined me in this effort:
REVISION OF COMPROMISE COOPER-CHURCH
Section 7(a) of the Special Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1971 (PL 91-652) is amended to
read as follows:
"Section 7(a). In line with the expressed
intention of the President of the United
States, none of the funds authorized or ap-
propriated pursuant to this or any other Act
may be used to finance the introduction of
United States ground combat troops into
Cambodia, to provide United States advisers
to or for Cambodian military forces in Cam-
bodia, OR TO PROVIDE UNITED STATES
AIR OR SEA COMBAT SUPPCIRT FOR ANY
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA."
LIST OF ROUSE MEMBERS WHO JOINED
IN EFFORT
James Abourezk, Bella S. Abzug, Joseph P.
Addabbo Genn M. Anderson, William R. An-
derson, Herman Badillo, Bob Bergland, John
A, Blatnik;
Edward P. Boland, John Brademas, Phil-
lip Burton, Shirley Chisholm, William Clay,
John Conyers, Jr., Charles C. Diggs, Jr., John
G. Dow;
Robert F. Drinan, Don Edwards, Joshua Eil-
berg, William D. Ford, Donald N. Fraser, Rob-
ert N. Giaimo, Ella T. Grasso, Edith Green;
William J. Green, Augustus F. Hawkins,
Ken Hechler, Henry Helstoski, Robert W. Kas-
tenmeier, Edward I. Koch, Robert L. Leggett,
Torbert H. Macdonald;
Spark M. Matsunaga, Romano L. Mazzoli,
Abner J. Mikva, Farrell J. Mitchell, William
JASPER, ALA., l'AYti its Th TO
GEORGE "GOOBER L,INDSEY
"Jasper, Alabama.
And those opportunities are 1-a Iv. His
recognition as a humorist has mat in the
demand of such talk showii as ' i:- Mery
Griffin Show," "The Johnny Cars Show,"
"The Mike Douglas Show," 'The J, 3ishop
Show," and "The Steve Allen SI " As a
popular country singer and hurnot .1 George
has guest starred on "The Junath i Hinter
Show," "Kraft Music Had," " 4 t. h-In,-
"Love, American Style," anti num( visits
as special guest star on "The Gies C ambell
Show."
He has just finished guest sta i on a
"Johnny Cash Show." which will i shown
in early February, in whicii he - a 13-
minute segment about Jaspiir.
George made his television deb. .A "The
Jack Pear Show" in 1961. The sa e year he
made his Broadway debut, as t ,omedy
lead in. the musical "All A merle i at the
Winter Garden Theatre. From t] s. George
received his first movie role in "I it gn Pul-
ver," directed by Joshua Logan e a had di-
rected "All American."
Last year, George returned to I 3 ey Stu-
dios as the voice of the leading el .iters in
"The Aristocats," a two-hour anin- t d movie
now showing at the Alabama The i in Bir-
mingham with an attempt. bele nade to
book it at the Jasper Theatre i "George
'Goober' Lindsey Day", January 2 it .
Versatility is a definitive part George
Lindsey. He has appeared as t ost any
conceivable character on more th et major
television shows including "( imoke,"
"The Alfred Hitchcock Hour," rage To
The Bottom Of The Sea," Twil Zone."
and Disney's "Wonderful World Color."
Than came "Goober" on "The A i Griffith
Show," and his co-starring role ; Goober"
on "Mayberry RFD."
As a recording star, his first Ca it ii album
"Goober Sings," was so sticcessf :oat the
recording company rushed his 'I nd one,
"96 Miles To Bakersfield' into enediate
release.
George has served as a judge c lie "Miss
Universe Contest", makes a year nest ap-
pearance on "The Gran Ole Op , the an-
nual Country Festival of Mush t id tours
on the midwest rodeo circuit.
Humorist, singer, performer, a t 1 among
stars, George's biggest pride is ii family:
his wife Joy, and two children, 'urge Jr.,
and Camden Jo, with whom. he r. in San
Fernando Valley, California , , t he still
reserves a warm spot in his hea or class-
mates and friends of Walker Co) -it Walker
County High and Jasper Eleme: : -v school
days.
This is the man whom ), e wil i-laim on
Friday, January 29th . . this the man
who claims us every day cf the This is
George Smith Lindsey!
Jasper, Alabama yields - inly I layberry
RFD" for 30 minutes eaiih M? iv night
The rest of the time he's Jaspe Favorite
Son."
HON. TOM BEV1LL
kV1
IN THE HOUSE OP' RE!'keP.L.;NTATIVES
Thursday, Januory z 1, 1971
Mr. BEVLLL. Mr. Speaker. Friday,
January 29 is George 'Goober" Lindsey
Day in Jasper, Ala. The entire day has
been set aside to honim Goober, one of
Walker County's outstanding native
sons.
We are all proud of Goober. He is cur-
rently appearing in the weekly television
series "Mayberry RFD," He has appeared
in several movies and made guest appear-
ances on numerous other television
shows. His warmth and spontaneous
humor has made Goober a Hollywood
favorite. And wherever Goober's busy
schedule takes him, he never fails to
put in a plug for his hometown and State.
He is often referred ,e as Jasper's one
man chamber of Commerce.
I am pleased to have the opportunity
of extending my vel y best wishes to
George "Goober" Lindsey as Jasper hon-
ors him with this special recognition.
Under unanimout, consent, Mr.
Speaker, I am enclosing, along with my
remarks, a newspaper article taken from
the Daily Mountain Eagle, of Jasper,
which describes the activities planned to
honor Goober and lists some of the ac-
complishments and achievements he has
earned during his illustrious career.
LINDSEY 'S A BILJ SY Mt, ti uER'S No PLAIN
GEL) it, 4,
Friday, January 29th. Is George -Goober'
Lindsey Day" in Jasper!
The Jasper Area Chamber of Commerce
has named it so . . . Lie Jasper City Com-
mission and Mayor has proclaimed it so. . .
but the versatile, warn., 'A v, movie and re-
cording star, who will be (moored on that
day, has made it so hv ta,Ing a -one loan
chamber of commerce' Ior !as beloved Jas-
per and Walker coi nes. Manama.
A full day of actim ies aCid honors has
been planned by the ipasner Area Chamber
of Commerce for th,t UI y i. ncludes school,
college and plant, visaataais, motorcades,
bands, representatmus. couri.aouse step cere-
monies and entertanimait
The day will be cufninatect with a "Fa-
vorite Son Award' at tile h annual mem-
bership meeting anci Ifainniet of the Cham-
ber to be held at Walktr College at '1:00 p.m.
with George Lindsey as guest of honor. Tick-
ets for the event are now on sale for chamber
members and will be at anarne to the general
public after January 12 at the Jasper Cham-
ber office. Who is (iieorglAnasey?
As "Goober", the co-star of CBS TV's
"Mayberry RFD," Jasper's George Lindsey
REFORMING FOREIGN ME I LABEL-
ING PRACTICE.F.
HON. ROBERT PR C
OF TEXAS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESE I \FIVES
Thursday, January 21 171
Mr. PRICE of Texas Mr. ,aaker, I
rise to introduce legislation n ring im-
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CONGRESS IONA L RECORD ? Extei,,:tons of Remarks ,Tan uai it 2 1971
ted meat and meat products to be
led "imported" at all stages of the
distribution chain.
' n. present laws and regulation,e.
ign meat imported for manufactur-
Ma or processing purposes is normally'
.shippeet frozen and in 50- to 60-pound
c)i-itairters. While these container,:
seeeily countries of origin, no further
'c tcri.i identification is made after the
ni ear, itself is processed by U.S. concerns
As a matter of commercial practice, a
sieniticant amount of this imported meas.
,iiawed, ground, blended with fa-.
Ist .n.mings from domestic beef and then
acid over the counter as hamburger. As s.
cotise.quence of this, when a housewife,
purchases a package of hamburger at her
cieet et- grocery store, she has absolutebe
no wav of determining the kind of mea:
sho ,s getting for her money.
on its face this seems innocuous
enough, a moment's reflection reveal.
that the current state of the law does
present some undue health hazards for
Un American consumer. Most obvious is
the fact that since the imported meat is
normally frozen before entering this
century then thawed for processing, a
subsequent refreezing by the ultimate'
consumer raises potential problems. The
very real danger of this is attested to by
U.S. Department of Agriculture bulletins
which state:
.,tawed meat immediately or keep for
e a esort time in a refrigerator. Avoid
thawed meat.
lespite this knowledge of the
,a.rcis of refreezing meat, we stand idly
by while housewives across the country
1-1,12.1 that very same risk by refreezing.
through their ignorance. packages of
iiamburger containing previously thawed
imported meats.
, qn simply appalled, Mr. Speaker,
thar, this condition has been allowed to
perEii:3t. The public interest has been com-
pletely ignored in favor of certain special
interests. I say enough is enough. The
rights of the American consumer to know
what they are purchasing are more im-
portant than continuing the privileges of
S few to profit from legal loopholes.
ere- my colleagues to -expedite ap-
-al of this proposal: this is a non-
partisan and nonpolitical matter. It
thould be a mator concern to all those
interested in maintaining high standards
hadicr quality in the American diet.
leRNEST PETINAUD
HON. THOMAS P. O'NEILL, JR.
OF MASSACHUSETTS
IN 'V;-i ROUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
:fsday, , January 21, 1971
. O'NEILL, Mr. Speaker, one rarely
enter:- the House Restaurant without
being, warmly greeted by Ernest Peti-
sauce, maitre d' of the House Restaurant
no friend to all in Congress.
?.'?ia-e,,Es,:day was his 66th birthday and
LIPA, is roe perfect opportunity to express
thanks to Ernest for 34 years of superb
service and the touch of elegance he has
eontrf mted to the House. He as, over
these years, made Lie more hjoyable,
not only for thousands of Members of
Congn ess.. but also many Sri s ads and
visitor3 to the Capitol. He pet torms his
duties with dignity and clip stn, con-
stantb- striving to maintain perfection.
More valuable than his amazi ig ability.
to graciously host the dining mom is his
friendship which he so generoi.sly offers
to many leg-islators. Often, it is a sooth-
ing word from Ernest that can. calm or
cheer t weary Congressman.
It has been my personal phstsure to
have known Ernest for 18 yeals. These
have been 18 years in which nothing but
consideration has been shown so me. I
owe mar.y happy moments to Esoest and
I know rhat all in the House dn with
me in wishing Ernest Petinau a very
happy birthday,
SWAN SONG
HON. RICHARD BOLLING
OF MISSOURI
IN TEE HOUSE OF REPRESENT 'IVES
garsday, January 21, 1)71
Mr. ROLLING. Mr. Speaker, Kenneth
Crawfoe is at his best in the follow-
'rig coli mm in Newsweek of Deo' .inber 28
in which he philosophizes about -onie of
the events he has covered since he ar-
ived ir Washington in toe 192,:,:s. It is
sits last column before his retirement.
His observances on the Washin hon
scene will be missed:
SWAN SONG
By Kenneth Crawford)
Anyone who his lived as an ad:nil arough
the last half century aware of what - Las going
in has seea more history in the male ag than
anyone who ever lived before him. T are has
been mo :e change, more cataclysm, 211ore in-
eention, more progress; In some a e'as and
more deterioration in others than c er hap-
pened in any previous 50 years.
Anyone who has been a profess iai ob-
:server of public affairs through this period,
most of tee Lime here in Washington, as I
.ave, has; never had a chance to Li ? bored.
'lett:her us he had much of a ceance to
cogitate alicut the whither of ever, s or to
acquire an- special wisdom. Anyway. :turnal-
Lets aren t paid to be wise, only to ee agile
--nought.clescribe what's happenin: while it
,)appens. It is left to Winer Men , think
:enks to add it all up. 'racy try, bu im two
,ettks get quite the same answers.
recers aelieve thn.t man
euectle with the nuelear :Weap01::
ntlity provided. Others are c
? en,t he still destroy his environ
eedy cirpidi--,T Still others exj
breed lurnself out of living spec
eel that laa ingenuity, cupidity a
arrpetnatire urge, the very qualir
-nreaten aim, will also save him, tha
: .ine to ee that none of his ambit
)e realized withont exercise of restri,
iext 50 years will be crucial
RESILIENT SPECIES
This beir g my Last column before ::etire-
ment, I mesh I had the :prescience tc 'redict
lee outcome. All 3: have is a hunch. erived
witr eta or the past, that man-- eotahly
it merican man?has a future. He is .1 Lough
rind resilient species. In my time he L been
through two world wars and seven,. lesser
wars, a Greet Depression and uncoun Cl coo-
corn-
ets in-
vinced
erit to
him
A few
self-
- that
he well
;As can
le The
nomic recessions; he has survived Prohibi-
tion, flood, hurricane, riot and his own fol-
lies. He is not easy to stamp out.
When I arrived in Washington in the
1920s the world was at peace. Coolidge slept
in the White House and established Wash-
ington correspondents wore spats, carried
canes and gave themselves airs. Had there
been cooling apparatus, a later development,
this Capital would have been as comfortable
as it was smug:. Hie Mencken jabbed at corn-
:placency from one side and Norman Thomas
from the other but nobody so much as said
'ouch." Hoover would soon be projectinetin
liars for every garage.
When Hoover failed to deliver, the laiasez-
faire bubble burst, materializing Roosevelt
and the New Deal. Washington has never
been the same since. Neither has the
try, nor, indeed the world. At last it was
being recognized that a society run out of
l'rontiers, sustreined by an increasingly com-
plex and interdependent economy, had_ to
submit to more government direction and
control than ie liked if it was to avoid pe-
rinclic paralysis and chronic chaos.
SASS PLAY
The second world war interrupted. but did
not stop, the Roosevelt revolution. Europe
had to be saved from Hitler and was. Few
foresaw that Stalin would replace Hitler as a
world menace once the war was won. But
Stalin did and hot war passed into the eold
war that is still going on, much as its on-
going is denied by those determined to see
no evil. Meanwhile, the struggle continues to
achieve a workeble mixed economy, prive; ely
ran but government manipulated, and a .ttel-
fare state capable of giving practical expres-
sion to the nation's compassion and sense of
fair play, much as these sentiments are
denied by those determined to see no god.
To some of -is who have lived with his
struggle over the years, the young and their
journalistic spckesmen, who think they in-
vented compassion and sensitivity to pit hire
morals, are a little hard to take, Even their:
ultimate example of immorality, the war in
Vietnam, was in its genesis highly, if mis-
takenly, moral--an undertaking to protect
a weak but poientially free nation from a
strong but regimented neighbor. We wceild
perhaps be more tolerant of the young if we
occasionally parsed to remember hcw we be-
deviled the "merchants of death" of the first
world war and the national leadership in 'he
Coolidge and hover Administrations.
As for myself [am hopeful that my grand.
children will have a decent world to live in
and that the nation will muddle through, as
it always has. And I am grateful that wheel I
left the campus, a certified B.A. but with
no immediately useful equipment except
ability to write a declarative set tenet'. I
could think of no way to earn a living except
in journalism.
MAN'S INHUMANITY TO MAN----F1()W
:LONG?
HON. WILLIAM J. SCHERLE
OF IOWA
:24 SHE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, January 21, 1971
Mr. SCHERLE. Mr. Speaker, a child
asks: "Where is daddy?" A mother asks:
"How is my son?" A wife asks: "Is my
husband alive or dead?"
Communist North Vietnam is sadisti-
ca:ly practicing spiritual and mental
genocide on over 1,500 American prison-
ers of war and their families.
How long? ?
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S 638 CONGRESSION.X KEtA)RD ? SENA ?
As was shown in Wons
Is notoriously hit-or-mis;
and maps of highly orgl
the targets are jungle tr;
fined villages on indeten
rigged form of Russian ro
The ultimate form of
is the free-fire zone. In
now also in Cambodia, El.:
target where bombs ma!,
criminately.
So devastating is. the .: ct of the suffer-
dence to the genocide convention. ing civilians seen I; I, first .1. / that Americans
Again I turn to the testimony of Philip of a world order, tit a faith in the govern- working in Vietnam wed loved recently to
Perlman before the McMahon Subcom- merit of law aim riot of men. This con- speak out. Forty-six doct Leachers, nurses,
mittee on Genocide in 1950: vention ii neither the first nor will it social workers?some ve t U.S. government
"The passage from the case of Geofroy V. be the last convention we evaluate. It is agencies, others with untary groups--
Riggs which speaks of restraints arising from my fervent hope Li /at it is one of a long wrote President Nixon d United Nations
the nature of Government and the States, line of international law which will rid Secretary General U TI I The letter is a
deeply disturbing (loom that got far too
nations" (United States v. Smith, 5 wheat, ject. In addition. lite Constitution grants
157 (U.S. 1820)). to the Congress in article I, section 8,
Thus, as the result of the situation created power to define and punish "offenses
by the very terms of the convention itself, against the law ot nations." The world
there is removed from consideration any
notion that the treaty, if accepted, will bypass communit y by its widespread ratiflca-
the Congress, or will in itself legislative tion of the Genocide Convention has de-
Federal criminal laws (p. 30-31, Hearings), fined genocide as a crime against the law
Last, Mr. President, I would like to - of nations.
I
concern myself with the relationship of stroni;ly urge me Senate to consider
the Genocide Convention not only a body
State jurisdiction in criminal jurispru-
? of international law, but a building block
ey 1, 1971
ar II, bombing
sspite the charts
ed areas. Where
and vaguely de-
ate maps, it is a
to.
deadly roulette
os, and perhaps
1 zone is an open
unloaded indis-
and restraint against change in the charac- this cart h nct only of the scourge o
that of one of little attention.
ter of the Government or in
genocide, but war, famine, repression,
tie ratification of this charter of the Nnembe
the States, is used as another argument for It points to repeats
and barbaric iniVernment. Geneva and other conve
the existence of a constitutional limitation
on the treaty power. It is argued against the I again unn? ; v
convention as a whole that to impose a new convention the conduct of war. The e er quotes from a
l
body of treaty law which will become the do- paper of the Military : stance Command
.
describing the effects I the Communist
nestic law of the United States is a change
r
in the structure of the relation of the States THE TOLL OE' ' ' AIR WAR IN troops of the bom,sing o i, ,-> Vietcong hospi-
?;olations of the
ms, including the
'ribunal, covering
and the Federal Government, and that toi.c.:?. A MBODIA tals in the Queson mu, e tins south of Da-
deprive the States of a field of criminal juris-
nang. "The two-hospil I finds could seri-
Mr. CEURC'H. Mr. President, as Amer- e,
Amer-
prudence and place it in Federal jurisdiction
ican ai ously hurt the NVA (Nr Vietnamese) and
as to be in violation of the Constitution. r operations above Cambodia ex- vc (Vietcong) operatin i the Queson area
If there were matters of criminal jurisdic- pand, many thousands of peasants are by almost eliminating 1 chance of inten-
tion confided to the States so vital to their added to the list of helpless victims of sive medical care"
existence that a change by the Genocide the widening Indochina war. In a per-
;
Article 19 of the Gene / lonvention of 1949
Convention would destroy our dual system ceptive column, Mr. Marquis Childs states that "fixed entail ments and mobile
of government, conceivably the problem sug- points this tragedy out: medical units of the / e' i cal service" shall
under no circumstances s. attacked but shall
fact is quite the opposite. Congress is in- -
gested might be more than hypothesis. The
Ilse voicelese deienseless peasants in the at all times be respects ad protected.
vested by the Constitution with the power
Jungle and 1.1e i ice paddies have no pro- "Nearly a third of the . sple of South Viet-
to provide criminal sanctions for offenses tection I root the destruction rained down nam and Laos have hi r inoved from their
against the law of nations, Constitution, from the skies. Even the choice of defection homes," the letter says. I est of them are the
article I, section 8, clause 10. It has had that
from the Vietcong. if they should want to victims of forced trans r oy the allied min-
defect, is denied lhem, since the bombs and tary or saturation born rt i., or are farm pee-
power since 1789, and the States expressly
committed that field of jurisprudence to the
the napalm knov, no political distinctions. plc who have seen thei I lid become unpro-
Federal government. It is therefore of little More and (no] e, U.S. conduct in Indo- ductive because of the I 1 oliation."
or no consequence in comparing the effect china is being seriously questioned by It is, to be sure, a g s -.11a war?a war of
of the exercise of Federal criminal juris- unmitigated cruelty, tl ,.oby trap, the land
many American citizens Mr. Childs cora:-
prudence upon residual State criminal juris- s - ? ? mine. The inhumane t a; Anent of American
diction that Congress may exercise its power eludes his column by raising this issne:
prisoners of war eiolats . te Geneva Conven-
tion on many scores. Es i presumably, some-
day this conflict will e I ind the question is
what will happel i to a pie ground down so
close to the survival I a oy years of war.
Sen. Edward M. KP '' .fly's subcommittee
on refugees has been .. tost the only focus
of concern for -he pi i L of helpless civil-
ians showing how emp :- the official Ameri-
can rhetoric out of V t sun about refugees
resettled in supposed ./acified areas have
been underwritt en by 1 General Account-
to punish genocide pursuant to the au
sty provided in article I, section 8, clause
10, of the Constitution, or pursuant to both
sources of power. It is wholly unwarranted to
say that, because another offense has beefl
added to the list of the few now punishable
as offenses against the law of nations, the
States have been deprived of a field of crimi-
nal jurisprudence. This area of the field
they never possessed.
Last year, in hearings before the sub-
committee presided over by the Senator
from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) , Rita E. Haus-
er II S Representative to the United
One of the seri, as charges leveled against
the "good Germens, the solid middle class,
under the Nazis was their professed igno-
rance of or indtherenee to the systematic ex-
termites./ ion of the Jews. Will the time come
when we, the Americans, suffer in world
opinion the ( barge of shutting our eyes to
mass sutecim.i io.(i something like extermi-
nation?
I ask usiamilinde consent that Mr.
Childs' column. entitled "Cambodia Air
War: The ton Grows," be printed in
the RECORD.
Ther, being no objection, the article
Nations Commission of Human Rights, was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
pointed out that "ratification of the as follows:
Genocide Convention is a proper exer- CADA B')DIA AIR WAR: THE TOLL GROWS
cise of the treaty power." The conven- ( By Marquis Childs)
tion flows from the provisions of the The expanded air war in Cambodia, con-
U.N. Charter on human rights by which tradicting the President's pledge of June 30,
an international organization was estab- is adding new thousands of helpless victims
lished but which also comprises a code of to the iiwl in toil ei the conflict in Indochina.
conduct binding to all members. The The voiceiet,s, usdenseless peasants in the
scope of treaties since 1945 has been di- jungle and tile use paddies have no protec-
tion
verse; genocide is a matter of concern to from the dsvetruction rained down from
the ski,s. At en ii:e choice of defection from
all states and one requiring common the Vietcong, if I hey should want to defect,
treatment. Massive horror anywhere af- is denied 1 i din since tne bombs and the
fects all the world and is usually asso- napalm know i to political distinctions.
elated at some point -with threats to or 'I'lle plighc 01 thousands?probably over
breaches of international peace and se- the live yea's ot the bombing hundreds of
curity. The fact that '15 states have en- thousands?of men, women and children is a
grim side o- the war to which most of us
toned into a treaty on genocide in and
shut our e3 es. 1,1v hen to this is added the hap-
of itself makes the subject one of inter- less stite o? several hundred thousands of
national concern. And, if genocide is a refugees, together with the destruction of
matter of international concern, then one-fifth to one-fourth of the productive
the United States has the constitutional land by deloliation. a whole people is seen
power to enter into a treaty on the sub- to be nearing a ;mini of no return.
Ing Office.
One of the serious
the "good" Germans.
under the Nazis was it .1
of or indifference to 1 E
nation of the Jews. W
we, the Arneric:..ns, s 1
the charge of shuttin
fering and somethim
This is not willful ix
the Nazis, but in tit'
of a war. In the GI
gooks, faceless Asian E
also human beings :
and sorrow as thougt
rges leveled against
solid middle class,
professed ignorance
systematic extermi-
ne time come when
r in world opinion
ir eyes to mass suf-
ke extermination
ermination, as with
? is the prosecution
rot the victims are
sants. But they are
,tpable of suffering
cir skins were white.
TRADE POLICY E .7iFt THE 1970'S
Mr. BENNE'IT. President, in a
speech given by I n Harold B. Scott,
Deputy Assistant Lr ctor of the Bureau
of International cc nmerce on Janu-
ary 11, he sets fort , onsiderations for a
new trade policy fo le 1970's. Mr. Scott
outlined several ne- ? leas, which I found
to be interesting, i; f rmational, and de-
serving of our atte 1 t
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1, 1971 CONGTF..!-- ()NM, RECORD SEN TE
us It is one that should life
ea, and is one eiso that should build for
il of us the sarem-r,th we are going to need
lietanci tne barbs of our critics."
wIlea a President; speaks that way to the
eion iiround him and when you see how fer-
,eally he means villa', he says, you under-
? id why he inspires such loyalty and corn-
initnient in I he ninin around him. It needs
to be iransmuted itaore widely, which is the
aandat0 task in ali but I believe it will be
rie
Ce)NORESSIONAL POWER "UNDER
e'lLe CONSTITUTION
sliPROXMIRE, Mr. President, last
discus-seri the objections to rati-
ng -me Genoci.de Convention concern-
me. ifro,r.at Imitectich of persons that might
.tried Ly an international tribunal for
e of genocide. At the same time,
, aiso disaussed the question of extradi-
ion, (ally explained by George H. Ald-
Deputy Leerol Adviser to the De-
oartment ot State
Today, I would like to concern myself
1.1 an examination of the constitutional
s of support tor U.S. ratification of
Geoo.-tide (717(07 vention, and w`tether
sooport alter.,. in any way the power
aTess limier the Constitution.
se Live points have been the topic of
eritecisra and objection of the U.S.
,.ial ratiftcarion. of the Genocide
Corover, hon. I 1r1l,,l to show that these
,!riticeens and non "tions are wholly un-
armed.
The McMahon Subcommittee, in 1950,
iititt.rci iron the ?ten Under Secretary
oc state Dean Rush., who made some key
1 ai.tits come/ming r he Genocide Conven-
he ooinT:ed out that in the history of
Ole Convention in the United Nations,
nt hi 't international orga-
n-ISO' taa,.. declared that geno-
is matter of international concern
ni his t genocide is a crime under inter-
i,i.i-Jfldl taw. All nave declared that in-
7 . Caorott on is needed to stop
.ntice and 1.1-i it States have a duty
such prachees within their own
Thus. gen eoide is a subject with-
onotitotleiri power of the Fed-
t---: ho Congress?to de-
offenses against the law
ali?i T., section 8, clause
i[1:7 P'S(7) noted
'UI cm does not repre-
i t which the United
,,operated with other nations to
lirdreil or enasiecreminal conduct
toe , 'atter of In
I.
It. treaties raferred to
,--reetner t relating- to the ni-o-
lOIS
. protection of fur
T-rth Pacific?I 911?sup-
teade and. slavery--
of the abuse of
liatv-1.97.2?all of
polaht-ir.o.t of those
on der-In:A in the
hi the excellent
r General Philip 13.
a the constitutional
laass eapport far the U.S. ratification
of the Genocide Convention:
(l) L., treaty power. In otr view the
United ed ales has complete authority to en-
ter int the Genocide Convention. The
treaty pe -Cr is being invoked, and "that the
treaty pe yea of idea United States extends to
all prinni. subject of negotiation between
our got ieurnent Ind the governments of
other Ii: I, is Ci ser (Geofrey v. 1?;ggs, 123
U.S. 258 .i.1i6 ( 1w-it) ? A.,;alo,:ra Seattle, 265
If S. IS The treaty making
...ower omad enough. ti iinver all subjects
that prere.rly pertain to our foreign rela-
tions ' iSanto -.,taiceneo v. Eger., 284 U.S.
:eh 40 fit.;
The cottention inv.lneed by some of the
critics ot the Coirivontion that these subjects
must be ,ixclusivay "f)reign" or "interna-
tional" t -external" overlooks the whole
history treaty-dial:Mg which has, from
the first dealt wit h matters having direct
impact, subject: Intimately of domestic
and lora ;?ticerti.
To ci at some len!i-th from his teati-
flit-ny, Is see I hat:
Cienoceid is. . subject appropriate for
action in, ,a? the treaty-making power seems
to us ar wescapable conclusion. The his-
torical biJ7 kground if the Genocide Conven-
tion indica I es the view of the representatives
In internal onal affiles of practically all the
governmt ins of tilf World on the appropri-
ateness at I desirahil tit of in internatamat
agreemeri to -outlaw the world-shocking
crime 0/ ienacide.' This government has
shared ii ;his vieaa; in fact, has taken a
leading pt et in thaping the convention.
Mr. Pee: man. neet addressed himself to
the question of coo stitutional limitations
on the traE:aty power:
It is aceerate to say that the treaty power
extends t dl propel: subjects of negotiation
,vith other governrneLts, and tha.t genocide
er the Genocide CC mention appears to be
such a proiner subject of negotiatio.n. How-
ever, it hie; been siegeated. by ceiti.cs of the
convention that the treaty power "is not
Without limitations. iind that the conven-
tion or per, ; of it may conflict with these.
The argui ants are ;rounded prim:lot-illy in
statement contained in the case of Geofroy
.Riggs (1 iS HS. 258 267 (.1890) ) :
"The ti ;y power, as expressed in the
Clonstituti ? e is in iehns unlimited except
by those r.,i -mints hich are found in that
instrumeni, ;against f it aration of the Govern-
ment or of its depa.rianentia aid those arising,
from the itiature of the Goeernmer.t itself
and that or the Status, ft would not be con-
tended thit: i.;. extents so far IS to at
what the ..t.tritittritit n forbids, or a change
ti:IP Ch': ["-" Lin* Of e Cr in
that of cr,r, df cur c,,,,s1,)n if
aiy oortarOOt , the ter,l; totr [17 Liiii[1.9.1"^c[t kv[[ -
itS But with these
tions, it is tit perce ilea that there it any
ilmtl:a to ti questio.,s thrit earl be ail j Led
touching a it? matter which is properly the
sub,ject ,,2,;?:i.latio's with a foreign. ooilr-
tiy."
The coi . itutipm I re-araints or mi-
lotions stee:::ested by this stateme.nt DP-
pear to bf,- ri;,,t two kinds?exoress prohi-
bitions, aloe those implied from the na-
ture of Go;; .rnment and the States. As a
matter of fact the Supreme Court may
have wiu-C led dowr the breadth of the
suggestion its lan7T opinion in itscikitre7
v. Seattle !265 iJ na R41 ,192.4)!)
it. can 10 [117 [
[i[[; Vir[i;[`r the Tllitted
;States is n. ninited b-7 any ,Ixpress
:ion of the uustitutior, and though it does
not extend ti rt far as to, authorize what the
Constitutie "nrhtcp,," t- does not eyterd to
all :proper -31.1.bjects of nfgc)tiations bet ween
our Government and other nations,
In It is.!;ouri. v. Holland (252 U.S. 416
1920)), the Supreme Court specifically
eliminated the 10th amendment to the
Constitutlon as a possible limitation on
the treaty power. What Mr_ Justice
Holmes had to say for the court on the
existence of limitations on the treaty
p,awer generally is also of importance:
Airts of Cotigress are -tile supreme law of
:lie land only when made in pursuance of
Constitution, while treaties are deetarea
eiIsFC it, [:[i en made under the authority rsf
lie United States. It is open to question
.Ifiether the authority of the United States
liteans more than the formal acts presc:ibed
7 make the convention. We do not mean
imply that there are no qualifteations to
he treaty-making power; but they must be
se;certained in a different way. It is obvious
hat there may be matte-es of the she rpiest
nxigency for the national well-being that
an act of Congress could not deal with but
treaty followed by such an act could and
is not lightly to be assumed that, in mat-
eirs of requiring national action, "a power
which must belong to and somehow reside
I: . every civilized government"- is net; to
found. The case before 118 IMUSt
ae considered in the light of our whole ea-
eerience and not merely in that of what
;as said 100 years ago. (2E2 U.S. at 433).
It is signi:qcant, in this respect, that no
! reaty of the United States has been held
,nconstituti.onal.
I would like here to delve into the
ioestion of the express power of Cm-
:!ress to define and punish offenses
gairst the law of nations and whether
tiiis is a limitation on the treaty power.
J,JTain referring to Solicitor General Perl-
man's testimony, we find:
.A.n. argument is made by those who oppose
e at, Genocide Convention as a whole that
litticle 1. section 8, clause 10, of the Con-
e itution, confers on Congress the power "to
.ie rine and punish piracies iind felonies cern-
edted on the high seas, and offenses against
ai law of nations; and that for the Prest-
!: int and the Senate to bind this country to a
--eaty obligating the 'United States to pin-
an offense under international law (per,
t :en I of the Convention) is a usurpation of
C legislative power, particularly if the
is self-executing,,
r order not to obscure the real argument
assumpticns that are not factual,
,cold be observed at once that article V of
Convention specifically contemplates
theistic legislative action, in particular to
eniacrihe penalties since none is provided.
. e part; of the convention, requiring as
.hes legislative action, is not self-execht-
under the principles laid down by the
j;rome Court. Foster V. Neilson (2 Pet.
(U.S. 18291) ; and for the United eitaee1.e
:inert the necessary legislation to give
et to the 0rorision3 of the ronyeni : r
w:th r its; (onstitutionit ?
ovention art. V.), and tc try guilty per-
c "by a competent tribunal cf the State
inn territory of which the act was coed-
ied" (convention art. VI), requires ne-
n hy Congress prescribing the offenees
p iiehable and conferring criminal juriad
tt .n on the courts of the United States (
ri irds self-execution, see the exceilei;
,iysis prepared by the senhir Senator from
York, Jacob Javits, on page 220-2i1
Genneade Convention, May 22, 1e)70
not s?ay that Congress inay nor,
itt 1,r; discretion, use the de:at:rho:as of the
of' sses under international law, in tins
as contained in the convention, just es
it as validity provided punishment for the
C-7 f- privacy "as defined by tee of
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S 530 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE Javuo 29, 1971
In particular, the Ambassador wished
to clear up any misunderstanding re-
garding extradition.
On the subject of U.S. interpretation
and policy as regards extradition, he
said:
United Sates law provides for extradition
only when there is an extradition treaty in
force. The Convention does not purport to
be an extradition treaty. It would require
only that the United States provide for ex-
tradition for genocide in new extradition
treaties which we might negotiate or in
revisions of existing extradition treaties.
Mr. Aldrich added that there are no
such treaties now in existence in any
country; that is, those countries making
genocide an extraditable offense. He as-
sured the committee that the United
States would not negotiate such treaties
nntil Congress had. passed legislation
making genocide a crime in the United
States because it was our policy not to
make an offense extraditable unless it is
a crime in both states involved.
Another factor in any decision to nego-
tiate an extradition treaty is whether the
judicial process of the other country af-
fords the persons who may be extradited
a fair trial. Basic procedural protections
have been built into the treaty at the
beginning. For example:
(1) any extradition treaty will require the
State requesting extradition to produce suffi-
cient evidence to persuade both a United
States Court and the Executive that the per-
son sought would be held for trial under
United States Law if the offense has been
committed here;
(2) any extradition treaty will assure the
person sought the right to the remedies and
recourses provided by the law of the re-
quested State (for example habeas corpus)
and
(3) any extradition treaty will preclude
extradition when the person sought is under-
going or has undergone trial in the United
States for the same act.
Mr. Aldrich also pointed out that in
reference to article VI, on the trying of
persons accused of genocide in the state
where the act was committed, that?
This provision contemplates the obligation
of that State and does not exclude trial by
other States having jurisdiction. The nego-
tiating record of the Genocide Convention
makes clear, in particular, that trial for acts
committed in a foreign country could be held
in the State of which the defendant is a
national. We believe that the statute imple-
menting the Convention should cover not
only acts committed in the territory of the
United States, but, in addition, acts com-
mitted -eywhere by American Nationals.
In the event that a case is presented
involving an American national before
criminal proceedings have been initiated
in the United States, we would reserve
discretion to initiate proceedings our-
selves, rather than extradite.
Furthermore, in answer to questioning
concerning the policy of the Department
of State on ratification of the convention
and congressional passage of implement-
ing legislation called for in article V of
the convention, Mr. Aldrich referred the
subcommittee of the intentions of the
State Department, as enunciated in a
letter to the chairman, Senator FRANK
CHURCH, of May 22, 1970, as follows:
It is the Department's intention to recom-
mend to the President that this instrument
of ratification to the Genocide Convention
not be signed, and if signed not to be de-
posited, until after implementing legislation
for the Convention has been enacted.
The subcommittee chairman, Senator
CHURCH, also pointed out some legal
precedents which undertook to define and
establish an international crime and the
obligations assumed by each signatory to
pass domestic law that would conform.
The Convention of Slavery was cited and
the State Department furnished for the
record conventions to which the United
States is a party and in which the United
States has undertaken an international
obligation to punish as certain crimes
certain actions described therein. These
included the four Geneva Conventions on
Protection of War Victims (1949) ; the
Convention for the Protection of Whal-
ing (1935) . the International Conven-
tion for the Prevention of Pollution of
the Sea by Oil (1954) ; and the single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, (1961).
In summary, 1 would like to add the re-
ply of the American Bar Association's
Section of Individual Rights and Re-
sponsibilities:
One criticism of the Convention arose out
of the possibility that under Article VI, a
person accused of genocide could be tried by
an international penal tribunal possibly
without trial by jury and other safeguards
to which a United States citizen is entitled
under the Constitution. Again, the answer
is simple. No such tribunal has been estab-
lished. If one were established, parties to the
Genocide Convention would have the option
whether to accept its itirisdiction or not. For
the United States, that option would have to
be independently exercised through the
Treaty Power, that, is only with the advise
and consent of the Senate by two-thirds vote.
Lastly, I sincerely doubt that a tri-
bunal of International Law, set up under
the auspices of the United Nations, would
fail to have safeguards and protections
inconsistent with the UN Charter or the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
In this sense, such a tribunal would un-
doubtedly be consistent with the Ameri-
can legacy of safeguarding each and
every individual's sacred rights and
liberties.
I again urge this body to ratify this
extremely important document. Our fail-
ure to do so can only set back the noble
concept of international law and world
peace.
CORRECTION OF THE RECORD
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, Tuesday,
January 26, I delivered a speech on the
environment. It begins on page S158.
I request that a correction be made
and printed in today's CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD. The correction is as follows:
On page 5158. third column, after the
paragraph beginning, "From mercury
and pesticide pollution to massive waste
dumping at sea,' and before the para-
graph beginning, "Environmental lobbies
achieved hard-won victories from San
Francisco Bay to Everglades National
Park," add the following paragraphs
which were left out of the text of the
speech as I presented it:
By any normal standards in this society,
the environmental actions of the 91st Con-
gress. the President and the public, consti-
tuted signifioant progress.
With the participation o
leans, Earth Day last Apri c-monstrated an
overwhelming concern.
A Senate vote against II ST marked the
coming of age of the envi e mental issue as
a national political force.
Taking halmark init -es, Congress
passed the Clean Air. Env t ,mental Educa-
tion, National Envmromn t al Policy, Re-
source Recovery and Watei iality Improve-
ment acts, and the first :tide pollution
control measure. It also a r ved major new
national parks and recreati 1 treas.
The President's State t lie Union and
environmental messages Congress and
establishment of the Env' mental Protec-
tion Agency, and suoseqm administrative
conunitments against po ers were sub-
stantial steps in the right'tion.
a i[lions of Amer-
DEVELOPMENTS II" (APODIA
Mr. FULBRIGHT. P.!). President, I
ask unanimous consent It have printed
in the RECORD a compH a ion of state-
ments by administration di ricials relating
to developments in Cam ,0 Ha which was
prepared by the Librar). tF Congress at
the request of the COD 1 ittee on For-
eign Relations.
There being no objecti .1 . the compila-
tion was ordered to Ix i. tinted in the
RECORD, as follows
U.S. POLICY TOWARD CAMS ) SINCE MARCH
i970
(Statements by President I 2, in, Secretary of
State Rogers, Secretary o tense Laird)
1970, PRESIDENT RIC 1 D NIXON
March 21?News confere 3. :
". . . we have . . estab : ; ed relations on
a temporary basis with the r rnment which
has been selected by the Pt I, iment and will
continue to deal with th L government as
long as it appears to be t government of
the nation.
". . . we respect Camt c? a's neutrality,
We would hope that Nort -ietnam would
take that same position i -especting its
neutrality. And we hope ti it whatever gov-
ernment eventually preva ,s there, that it
would recognize that the ? a ted States' in-
terest is the protection of :s neutrality."
April 30?Address ?..o the Ni ,tion:
"Ten days ago . . . I ant s iced a decision
to withdraw an addit tonal 0 000 Americans
from Vietnam over the nex s ?ar, I said then
that I was making that de, t kin despite our
concern over increased e; a iv activity in
Laos, in Cambodia, and jr S uth Vietnam.
". . . I warned that if ? included that
Increased enemy activity in r of these areas
endangered the lives of /L .icans remain-
ing in Vietnam, I would nc, esitate to take
strong and effective meas1 ? to deal with
that situation.
"Despite that warning. N a Vietnam has
Increased its military aggre in in all these
areas, and particularly in ( m oodia. . . .
"American policy since ,54] has been
to scrupuously respect the i itrality of the
Cambodian people. .
"North Vietnam, nowec r has not re-
spected that neutrality.
". . . North Vietnam ha ncupied mili-
tary sanctuaries all along t Cambodian
frontier with South Viet's: . They are
used for hit and run atta on American
and South Vietnamese rs in South
Vietnam. . . .
"For 5 years, neither ti
nor South Vietnam has me
enemy sanctuaries because
to violate the territory of
Even after the Vietnamese
gan to expand these sani
ago, we counseled patienc
Vietnamese allies and impe
our own commanders
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t:nited States
against these
v, did not wish
eutral nation.
rnmunists be-
t iries 4 weeks
0 our South
restraints on
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faiwary 29, 1971 CONGR1 1.0NAL RECORD -- SEN ATE
eranis to the states and localities. Subtract-
ing eurrent federal expenditures for welfare
:aid Medicaid?programs whose costs would
ee absorbed in the future by our cash assist-
,1113.3.33 and National Health insurance propos-
rederaograins-Iii-aid now total $19 bil-
eudget cans for increasing that total
b,111.cai Oy 1975, a proposal which would
tie oatiected 1975 revenue gap an-
ore,. 4,tei
?' a t.e.b....c service employment pro-
each a.; toe one recently vetoed by
adeon represents another impor-
term tiseal relief. It would provide
eid cities ;,,rith the funds to train and
inn olovees needed to stag essential sem-
i te ,1fl,t budgets cannot now sup-
per, in areas in etcal demand Nch as health,
edit; attain ranee protection mad pollution
I Gill 222)1_
rieL311-33.3,33 a public servicet employ-
ment: prog,rarn by 1975 of 875,000 jobs'ait a cost
sm federat government of $4 billion.
f;;Iptementnig all of the above proposals
A:nein still le ive a sizeable disparity 'betcecen
state and local expenditure needs and rev-
C;a in 1975 simuld the states and localitiec
en:ea:ed.so saastantially increasing the
!ea- of time: -;ervices.
,a mare? to expect Washington to
etton am; lever difference remains even
Ottal reamrees of that magnitude were
R. For Congress might understand-
iat to turn over huge sums of
dee attronary teretral tax dollars without as-
fu, 'y- ...4,4bute to the achievement of
tiaeonally dented objectives.
-; eerefore ic m highly probable that re-
stra; fug iiscai health to state and local gov-
erre ;lents a ii require increased revenue-
r.1 etlert$ be these jurisdictions them-
a;. The federal government can help and
en, ',Itrage. no; cannot and should not do
the. mb alone
asertedingiv. we are recommending two
i-riei,et. reyeette :-baring programs which will
tribute ,o iridging the expenditure*
rca-ni;; gap 'Allele providing incentives for
eu Cs and came to increase the yields from
Ii,,- own tax tease:
iirst Is aeeneral sharing plan to divide
Hull . on in iederal revenue among those
at with gtaduated state income taxes.
; without such a tax would be ineligi-
b1 ro receive any; of these funds. Past-
. teta provistoits to ensure the cities a fair
uf tile funds also would be mandatory.
aerco3.1,1 r,!2,grain is one of general aid
; ;tar:aliens, could provide the states and
1,-ter;iilaes wi fa an additional $4 billion by
trike fen z,eneral sharing pian, this
iation assisatfice would be tied to changes
is and 1,4,M tax practices: under our
aould have to assume at least
. of coin:Masi state and local education
?ie e; .101e. This would have the
fect ree tieing the pressure on over-
burdened itsial aroperty taxes while provicl-
jije ,2itt!,1.Lion a tax lase with greater
potentiai.
dying the forms federal relief couid
te41 fowever. is only hal4 the task. Any
tibte ..tt,trosal for resetuing our states
-U; i.eaes Dada their financialduress must
tem; edit a Man oft: raising the additional re-
333,33_ i'ces required for this fiscal relief as well
as usk he ii icrt.:xpenclit ure increases we rec-
en meal I3utiget.
this additional revenue
tit be COile,2.;:ed from the following four
sr/eel:es:
Hann. vigorous national economic growth
'e 'h would produce additional federal tax
Cu" -ones of nearly $75 billion between now
9'15.
cats in existing federal programs
sit a as our recommendations to reduce the
cm- otoy budget $20 billion by 1975 and the
acearatiturai subsidy program by $1 billion.
Third: elimina Am of inequities in the fed-
eral tax ;4ystern.
And I ourth. a federal 10c,', tax surcharg
on pet:senal and eurporaW income beginning.
in 1974 tvhich, gtv en our assumptions abour
econotria: growth and tax reform, would yiell
about t;1"7 bielio n additional federal reve-
nues !n 1.975. Luetosition of this surcharge
WOUILI -make S0I1Se after we had returnee:
to a 1,..1.-employ.nent eccnonay and after re-
form. ,, rende:ed the federal income tax
gradual, td in reaft y as well as n theory.
Mr. Chairman, tne content of this strategt:
is submet to del a;.e. But the process for de-
vising I, is net.
Put .i c problem;. cal:111A be attacked nt -
tiena.;5 except in terms of conflicting neece
curnpet,i,ig for 1; felted re sou rces . At the nm
tiona level this means defining problems i,.
the context of lie entire federal budget; cal
eeeptid. LI:re tirc.sions.b3th in tern-,
of ay ti able esem rues and spending afte,
natiw-s
Yet. es this Craximittee is well aware, Cm -
gress et,,eks a vaitage point for such a corn-
prehteceve view. For at no time is the federi:
budget tfonsicierad in its entirety on Capite
Hill.
it, 13 ,:lear that a necessary con
diya,i_et reordering national priorities mu. t:
lee It- creation d apprcpriate structures 4:
Camps, ,a fur a ce tinning the bndget as .
whole.
'nos.i.rds tits t aid, the National Urban Coi-
lition freicome the opportunity to pr, -
sent eta; aiterna,i-re budget in public sessioi;;
before thte full Appropriations Committee o,
each sa 4.1:33V3 If I is members of this Commi:,-
tee hateve it would be helpful to establist;
this precedent we -would be pleased to ha--
youtoute.ristance,
liff VIEW OF THE GENOCIDE
C DNVENTION
XL . PROXMIRE. Mr. President,
April 2, 1969, Senator--.J. WILLIAM Fre -
BRIG]I, chairman of the Senate Foreit n
Heist ins Committee, indicated that
his view the committee could resume cun-
sideration of the Genocide Convention 11
any time. the members wished.' Ie noted
anie ..ommittee3 disposition mayi be infi- 2.-
enced .4' the A/Aerie:1n Bar Association were
LU re. ocuitend rat itication.
Or December 9, 1939, the Section on
Indfce.anal Rig h-is and Responsibilitiek t
the American Bar Association, under
Chan lean Jei ome J. Shestack, recom-
menden that ABA house of delegat
enaci. a resoluta :an calling for the ratifi-
cation of the Genocide Convention re
the e-tenate. The 41-page report whir I
amen ponied the resolution expanded on
five major areas::
Ti.: Genocide Convention is a doco-
ment of human liberty consistent
and in further a ace of the American tr
ditic- ii
Ar international convention or treat
is the most suitable form of addressin,
the dangers of genocide.
Ti.: Genocide Convention propel
focuses both on states, and on individuals.
The Genocide Convention is in all rt-
specs consistent with the Constitutic
the my vis and the ideals of the United
States:.
Tbe Genocide Convention remains lei
issue of current importance.
On February 19, 1970, just a few da: s
before the house of delegates of the
American Bar Association was to vote Da
whether to change its position on the
subject of ratification, President Nixon
requested the Senate to renew its con-
sideration of the Genocide Convention
and to grant its advice and consent to
ratification. The President asserted:
We should delay no longer in taking the
Med convincing, step which would reaffir:n
that the United States remains as streng:y
orposed to the crime of genocide as ever, by
giving its advice and consent to ratificatien
of the Convention, the Senate of the Unit al
States will demonstrate unequivocally 0,1r
country's desire to participate in the bullring;
of international order based on lew and
justice.
Secretary of State Rogers, in his re-
port to the President on the Conventio'a.
recommended "an understanding to
make clear that the, U.S. Government
understands and construes the words
'mental harm' appearing in article II(912.)
of this Convention to mean permanent
impairment of mental facilities."
Unforianately, on February 23, 1970.
the American Bar Association house of
delegates voted, 130 to 126, to adhere to
its 1949 position against Senate .ratiti-
cation of the Genocide Convention..
Meanwhile, the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee took action to reconsider
the Convention. A SPC eial subcommittee
of the Genocide Convention, chaired by
Senator FRANK Crroarn of Idaho. was an-
pointed on March 20. The subcommittee
held hearings on April 24 and April 27,
1970. In addition, hearings were brieily
held on May 22, 1970.
It is my intent this morning to answer
some of the particular questions and oo-
jections presented to the subcommittee
as arguments against action on the Cola-
ve.ntion.
I would first like ta quote an ()been
ton of my colleague from New Yo It
Senator JAVITS, concerning this matter
The protection of human rights is indeed
a matter cf international concern. The
United States has shown that it agrees \yid"
this view by ratifying the World War II peace
treaties, The United Nations Charter, tate
Slavery Convention of 1926, and more re-
eently the Supplementary Convention in
Slavery (1967) and the Supplementary C,,n-
vention on Refugees (1963).
Charles Yost, U.S. Representative to
the United Nations, testifying on April 24,
'1970:
, It is my strong belief that ratitic.ion of
tee Genocide Convention by the Uni.ed
tes would substantially serve our na-
-t,,,ohkal interest in two ways: First, by its ics.
pact'.on world opinion, and second, by Is
imp* on world law.
It has been argued that under tele
Genocide Convention individuals as tA, ell
as persa,ns exercising governmental
power would be subject to trial and
punishment for offenses which have al-
ways been regarded as matters fall; ag
within the domestic jurisdiction of the
various nations.
George H. Aldrich, Deputy Legal Ad-
viser, Department of State, in a state-
ment presented to the Genocide Conven-
tion Committee, replied in part to the
above criticism:
I shall direct my comments to the types of
acts the Convention deals -with and to the
ways in which such acts would be tried arid
punished.
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Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2
January 29, 1971 CONGRESSION AL RI CORD ?SENATE
"North Vietnam in the last 2 weeks has
stripped away all pretense of respecting the
sovereignty or the neutrality of Cambodia.
Thousands of their soldiers are invading the
country from the sanctuaries; they are en-
circling the capital of Phnom Penh. Coming
from these sanctuaries, as you see here, they
have moved into Cambodia and are encircling
the capital.
"Cambodia, as a result of this, has sent
out a call to the United States, to a number
of other nations, for assistance. Because if
this enemy effort succeeds, Cambodia would
become a vast enemy staging area and a
springboard for attacks on South Vietnam
along 600 miles of frontier?a refuge where
enemy troops could return from combat with-
out fear of retaliation. . . .
"Now confronted with this situation, we
have three options.
"First, we can do nothing. Well the ulti-
mate result of that course of action is
clear. . . .
"If North Vietnam also occupied this whole
band in Cambodia, or the entire country,
it would mean that South Vietnam was com-
pletely outflanked and the forces of Ameri-
cans in this area, as well as the South Viet-
namese, would be in an untenable military
position.
"Our second choice is to provide massive
military assistance to Cambodia itself. Now
unfortunately, while we deeply sympathize
with the plight of 7 million Cambodians
whose country is being invaded, massive
amounts of military assistance could not be
rapidly and effectively utilized by the small
Cambodian Army against the immediate
threat.
"With other nations, we shall do our best
to provide the small arms and other equip-
ment which the Cambodian Army of 40,000
needs and can use for its defense. But the
aid we will provide will be limited to the
purpose of enabling Cambodia to defend its
neutrality and not for the purpose of making
it an active belligerent on one side or the
other.
"Our third choice is to go to the heart of
the trouble. That means cleaning out major
North Vietnamese and Vietcong occupied
territories . . .
"Now faced with these three options, this
is the decision I have made.
"In cooperation with the armed forces of
South Vietnam, attacks are being launched
this week to clean out major enemy sanc-
tuaries on the Cambodian-Vietnam border.
"A major responsibility for the ground op-
erations is being assumed by South Viet-
namese forces. For example, the attacks in
several areas, including the Parrot's Beak
that I -referred to a moment ago, are ex-
clusively South Vietnamese ground opera-
tions under South Vietnamese command
with the United States providing air and
logistical support. . .
"Tonight, American and South Vietnamese
units will attack the headquarters for the
entire Com.munit military operation in South
Vietnam. This key control center has been
occupied by the North Vietnamese and Viet-
cong for 5 years in blatant violation of Cam-
bodia's neutrality.
"This is not an invasion of Cambodia. The
areas in which these attacks will be launched
are completely occupied and controlled by
North Vietnamese forces. Our purpose is not
to occupy the areas. Once enemy forces are
driven out of these sanctuaries and once
their military supplies are destroyed, we will
withdraw.
"These actions are in no way directed at
the security interests of any nation . . .
"We take this action not for the purpose of
expanding the war into Cambodia but for the
purpose of ending the war in Vietnam and
winning the just peace we all desire."
"I know that what I have done will ac-
complish the goals that they [those who
protest] want. It will. shorten -this war. It
will reduce American ewer:titles. It will allow
us to go forward with au r withdrawal pro-
gram . . . It will It inv opinion serve the
cause of a just peace in Vietnam....
"I found thai, the act ion that the enemy
had taken in Cambodia would leave the 240,-
000 Americans who would be there a year
from now without matte combat troops to
help defend them, woule leave them in an
untenable position. Tie, t is why I had to
act....
Q. "Do the South Vietnamese abide by the
same pull-out deadline as you have laid
down for the Americen tract?"
The President. "No, I ttey do not. I would
expect that lee South V:etnamese would
come out appr ixarti te,? at the same time
that we do becauee \Alice we come out our
logistical support at d ter support will also
come out with tnem.
"The action actually e; going faster than
we had anticipated 'lee middle of next
week the first uniti. American units, will
come out. The end of rleXt week the second
group of American unite will come out . . .
Americans of rh kiads, including advisers,
will be out 02 Cambodia by the end of
June....
". . . it is my betiet based on what we
have accomplished to date, that we have
bought at least 6 months and probably 8
months of time for tile training of the
ARVN, the Army of South Vietnam. We have
also saved, 1 think, hunareds, if not thou-
sands, of Americans . by buying time, it
means that if the ?inciny does come back
Ito those sanctuaries next time, the South
Vietnamese will be Axone enough and well
Grained enough to handle it alone.
"I should point out too, that they are han-
dling a majority 01 toe assignment now in
terms of manpower.
Q. "What is your police toward Cambodia's
future?"
The President. -The United States is, of
course, interested tr the future of Cambo-
dia. . . However, the United States, as I
indicated in what is called the Guam or
Nixon Doctrine cannot take the responsibil-
ity and should not take the responsibility
in the future to send American men in to
defend the neutrality oF countries that are
unable to defend teenteelves.
"In this area, what we have to do is to go
down the diplomatic trail . . [to find]
methods through v Lich the neutrality of
countries like Cairib.)dia and Laos, who can-
not possibly defend themselves, to see that
that neutrality is guaranteed without hav-
ing the intervention oi foreign forces."
June 3 ?Report to tne Nation:
". . . Between APY il 20 and April 30, Com-
munist forces launched a series of attacks
against a number of key cities in neutral
Cambodia. Their ollectiye was unmistaka-
ble?to link together bases they had main-
tained in Cairmodia tot 5 years in violation
of Cambodian neutralit . .
"This posed in au acceptable threat to our
remaining forces in Sib Vietnam. . . .
"I directed teat P nit; lean troops join the
South Vietnamese 1? roying these major
enemy bases alone, the Cambodian fron-
tier. . . .
"As of today call rcta,r1, that all of our
major military }bee- Ives have been
achieved. . .
"General AbrOM,1 eat'. i. es me that 17,000
of the 31,000 At/lei-Jo:tee who entered Cam-
bodia have already reter ned to Vietnam. The
remainder wit. return by the end of this
month. This incluil 1 American air sup-
port, logistics, and re tn Lary advisory per-
sonnel.
?The only rime-mine American activity in
Cambodia alter July be air missions
to interdict e mc vett tit tit of enemy troops
and material where I Mad that is necessary
to protect the liver; and recurity of our men
In South VIel 11 CI.
"Our discussions with the 1
ese Government indicate tha
objective remains the securiti
nam, and that their activity
the future?after their withd
sanctuaries?will be determi
tions of the enemy in Camt
"When this operation was
critics charged that it would
can casualties, that it would
that it would lengthen our in
It might postpone troop we
the operation was undertald
the opposite reasons?and it it
the opposite effect....
"... Sixty percent of all the - ps involved
in the Cambodian operatio t were South
Vietnamese. The effectivenes: le skill, the
valor with which they fungi 'or exceeded
our expectations. Confidence e morale in
the South Vietnamese Army 1 seen greatly
bolstered. This operation has arty demon-
strated that our Vietnemizan / program is
succeeding. . . .
"Secretary Rogers aidIlri been par-
ticularly encouraged lay the i ,olve of 11
Asian countries at the Djalit t Conference
to seek a solution to the pr o -en of Cam-
bodia. Cambodia offers an ?I n'tunity for
these 11 Asian ,nations, as e 'il as other
countries of the area, to coe a 'ate in sup-
porting the Cambodian Govt tent's effort
to maintain Cambodia': neut ty, its inde-
pendence, and its territoria itegrity. We
shall do what we can to mak i possible for
these Asian initiatives to sue
June 30?Report by the' tdent:
"Together with the South I namese, the
Armed Forces of the United t z- es have just
completed successfully the ti ruction of
enemy base areas along I he Ca dian-South
Vietnam frontier. All Americ r troops have
withdrawn from Cambodia c lie schedule
announced at the stall of -lit e)eration.
"The allied sweeps into t North Viet-
namese and Vietcong base t e t along the
Cambodian-South Vietiiames order:
Will save American and all-" lives in the
future;
Will assure that the withch
can troops from South Vietn
on schedule;
Will enable our pros-rain
tion to continue on its curre
Should enhance the pros/
peace.. .
"In assessing the April 30 do i
against the North Viet]sInes
sanctuaries in Cambodia. f, I
must be remembered.
"It was North Vietnam- ) we--which
brought the Vietnam ar int I imbodia....
"It was the presence of No Vietnamese
troops on Cambodian soil tha- etributed to
the downfall of Prince teihare . .
"It was the government t, teointed by
Prince Sihanouk and ratifte, N the Cam-
bodian National Assembly? a a group of
usurpers?which overt-I- rew F ,ith the ap-
proval of the National Asses . . .
"It was the major expansie e enemy ac-
tivity in Cambodia that uli / ? rely caused
allied troops to end five years i astraiht and
attack the Communist base 't . . .
"The prospect suddenly lot of Cambo-
dia's becoming virtually one a _e base area
for attack anywhere .nto h Vietnam
along the 600 miles of the C todian fron-
tier. . . .
"We thus faced a rapidly Cl 'ng military
situation from that which r ed on April
S 531
F Viet tii,m-
teir primary
-3outh Viet-
'ambodin in
til from the
by the ac-
,.
?mnced, the
'ease Amer--
len the war,
ernent that
rawals. But
'?//' precisely
tad precisely
,1 of Aineri-
an proceed
'Tietnamiza-
tmetable:
for a just
on to move
ti Viet Cong
basic facts
"Our military response to a enemy s es-
calation was measurer, in e respect. It
was a limited operation for I lilted period
of time with limited obiectivi . .
"We have eliminate? an ir T ,,iiate threat
to our forces and to the se y of soutn
Vietnam?and produced the I -.7 eect ol fewer
American casualties in the f e . .
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lutkis
ApprovietZelease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2
THE NEW YORK 17,L2VI_LilS DATE
Rogers, in Policy Report, Sees I
? 'Preoccupation' With Vietnam
By TAD SZULC
Specia to Tie New York Times
?
' WASHINGTON, March 27? lution new methods of interna-
Secretary of State William P. tional organization and cooper-
'Rogers told Congress today that ative action are required.
Secretary Rogers said that in
'7.ithe United States' "National
;7joreoccupation with Vietnam preparation for the 1972 United
as pre-empted our attention Nations Conference on the
--from other areas of concern" Human Environment, the State
the world. Department had recently named
rui In an introduction to hi's re-
a citizens' advisory committee
-4>ort to Congress on "United to advise the Government.
"An awareness has also come
>-taites Foreign Policy-1969-
ZO," Mr. Rogers commented: upon the world dramatically
zialliy ending our involvement in
that the increasing quantity of
e war we will restore per- life directly threatens the qual-
pective; by altering the char- ity of life,' Mr. Rogers declared.
He said that the United
Jacter of our involvement in the
,r`mworld we will re-establish a States was committed to a solu-
alance in the conduct of our tion of the worldwide problem
.telations." of population growth and that
The 617-page report discusses in the current fiscal year it was
dwAmerican foreign policy trends spending $100-million on re-
under the Nixon Administration lated international problems, 20
'and gives a detailed account of times the expenditure of , four
he 117 countries with which years ago. 4 ?
athe United States has diploma- The report noted that if pres-
' 'c relations. It also discusses ent birth rates continUed, the
? ealings with Communist China, world population wciuld rise
hich has not been recognized from about 4 billion this year
iplomatically by Washington. to 7.5 billion in the year 2000
The State Department's re- and to 55 billion within 100
dxort follows President Nixon's years. It stressed that:hi 1970
l?.-tate of the World Message last alone the world's population
.-Month to Congress. The depart- grew by 70 million.
ent noted that the first such In his discussion of foreign
, sport by a Secretary of State policy, Mr. Rogers said that the
issued by Thomas idler- Nixon Administration sought a
on in 1790 and the last pre- "national style which reflects
;Timis one by Richard Olney in confidence in our strength mod-
(rover Cleveland Admin- crated by awareness of our
tration in 1896.
Periodic Report Planned "The objectives and policies
,kra' It said that the Secretary of the President has established,"
- tate would henceforth issue he said, "reflect a national atti-
,.foreign policy reports every tude that is neither ?domineer-
wo years. The current report, Mg nor isolationist, neither
7-Containing Mr. Rogers' main messianic nor introverted. They
"ail)olicy speeches and the texts reflect, I believe, an attitude of
of international agreements practical involvement in the
igned by the United States in world of today and tomorrow."
..o-the last two years, as well as Mr. Rogers sfressed tthat the
the names of all United States American policy in Vietnam
?'Ambassadors abroad, will be on aimed primarily at "leading the
sale starting Monday at the United States out of the war."
.eGovernment Printing Office It was in this context that he
-Jiere for $2.75 a copy- declared that the United States'
? Although Mr. Rogers devoted preoccupation with Vietnam
much of his attention to ques- had "pre-empted" national at-
? tions of international security. tention.
awsuch as the Indochina war, the The Administration seeks '10
--Middle Eastern crisis and the bring about a more normal pat-
talks with the Soviet Union on tern of relations with the peo-
'limitation of strategic arma- ple's Republic of China," Mr.
ents, and to economic affairs. Rogers said, even though it has
added ecology as a new di- "no expectation" that its over-
menension of foreign policy. In tures to Peking "will produce
, his field, he said, "the realize- rapid changes.'
ion that many solution must In the negotiations with tApproved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2
THE NEW YORK TIMES DATE r "
Appraising
tylideaA
Intelligence
? By MILES COPELAND
LONDON?For reasons comprehen-
sible only to those who have worked
in a diplomatic service, no govern-
ment can afford to keep its public
fully informed on what it does in the
' field of international relations. Some-
times it must conceal the reasons for
its actions, and sometimes the actions
themselves. In some rare instances.
it must pretend to be takir
ecklE
of actions while actually t mer
-r.
other, and to present the pi whosi
a largely fictional picture o and b
is doing and why.
ph
This is especially true 1:11.?Inbe(c
State Department comes up and
problem such as the Arab-Isp.-ran
filet. A diplomat newly assiiejur
this particular problem finds the
in the possession of "estimaterwarr
situation" provided by the CdexP?
Pentagon, and embassies ret?
from Israel and the Arab cerravs
then he begins to feel pressureto' ,
"domestic considerations"w hirlstro
him and his colleagues toward p
-
other than those which the "est4
-v,
of the situation" would clearly dictate.
Finally, he tries to devise solutions
which make sense in the light of the
intelligence estimates, and which can
be justified by explanations which
have no relation to the estimate but
which accommodate to the domestic
considerations.
For example:
L Our intelligence estimators pre-
sent frightening information concern-
ing the Soviet build-up in Egypt, the
increasing Soviet "presence" in the
whole Mediterranean area, and the
gains of Soviet naval strength east of
Suez at the expense of the British. At
the same time, they suggest, first, that
Soviet gains have not been the result
of Soviet actions, but of ours. The
more we support Israel, the more the
Arabs and their Afro-Asian friends wel-
come the Soviets. Second, the Soviet
build-up is not in preparation for con-
quest?the Soviets would hardly try
to gain by fighting what they can gain
peacefully.
2. Daily, policy makers of the State
Department read newspaper accounts
of hawkish statements of Arab leaders:
Syria's President proclaims loudly
that his Government will "never" ac-
cept the existence of Israel; Iraq's Pres-
ident bitterly attacks Egypt's President
for "defeatist tendencies," even though
the speech in which the Egyptian is
supposed to have shown such ten-
dencies explicitly threatened war un-
less Israel withdrew "from every inch
of Arab territory." And as our diplo-
mats read such accounts they are
aware that these are also being read
by American opinion makers who take
them at face value. At the same time,
they know from the Department's own
information that the most belligerent
sounding Arab governments have iri
effect made peace with Israel already;
such military preparations as these
governments are making are strictly
for internal purposes.
3. Our own press plays up the Soviet
build-up in Egypt, and reports that
"hot-headed young officers" are anx-
ious for another round with Israel. Yet
our State Department, depending not
only on its highly competent diplo-
matic staff in Cairo but also on infor-
mation coming from decades-old intel-
ligence penetrations of the Egyptian
armed forces, knows full well that
Egyptian officers are possibly "fascist"
but certainly not Communist, that they
have little confidence in Soviet military
assistance and don't like their Soviet
advisers any more than the Turks and
the Iranians like American advisers,
that they are ready to fight for Egypt
but not for Palestine or for "the
Arabs," and that without the irritat-
ing presence of the Israelis in Sinai
they would lack the motivation or
morale to fight anyone at all.
4. Finally, our State Department offi-
cials know that Israeli intelligence
estimates are roughly the same as our
own. Thus, it is inconceivable that
Israeli spokesmen could be sincere
when they argue that unqualified sup-
port to Israel is the only way to halt
the growth of Soviet influence in the
area, that they are in constant dread
of being overrun by the Arabs, and
that they must hold on to Shann el-
Sheik as a means of insuring passage
through the Strait of Tiran. The Is-
raelis know very well that they can
take Shann el-Sheik any time they
wish, no matter who occupies it, and
that their presence there will only
provoke revival of Egyptian hostilities.
?AC ;
The Egyptians, seeing I e Israelis'
reluctance to seize this un iuc oppor-
tunity to make pea-e, at mt that
they want a no-war-no-pea, a ittuation
such as Nasser once want d and for
similar (domestic) reasons. ?.oparently
some of our NATO friend: hare the
suspicion; so, increasingly, io some of
our own diplomats. For vol. or for
had, right or wrong, and w ,a ever the
intimate effect on purely A at rican in-
terests, we are behind the sraells one
hundred percent. But we u.st make
Our own policy in Washingt r and not
let the Israelis make it fo i.s in Tel
Aviv. If domestic considera ic ns stand
in the way, our diplomats a lc uld clear
a path for themselves by re Taling the
truth about the Arab-Israt; .;ituation
they have known all alone ,ut have
withheld from the public. Surely the
American people will appr v of any
position which is uncoi r romising
enough in its support of I .r.tel, even
though it leaves it 10 Mr Meir to
handle her own "domestic c,,nsidera-
tions."
Miles Copeland is a former i 4h-rank-
ing official of the Contra/ i iligence
Agency and author of "Th. ?;ame of
Nations."
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VIA-A-244- '444?i"t-
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2
THE NEW YORK TIMES DATE A-PC1 PAC :
ES, SELLING ISRAEL
12 MORE F-4 JETS,
WEIGHS NEV BID
Deal Made Last Autumn to
Balance Mideast Arms-
8 Already Delivered
MIG-23's NOW A FACTOR
Soviet Aid to Egypt Is Said
to Cause Further Request
?Allon in Washington
By WILLIAM BEECHER
Spedal to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, April 19?
The United States is delivering
12 more Phantom fighter-bomb-
ers to Israel and is considering
a request for more, according
to Administration officials.
Officials said that the deci-
sion to deliver the planes, pre-
viously unreported, was made
last fall to maintain Israel's
balance of power wtih the Arabs
and to convince Israel that the
United States would continue
the flow of advanced arms de-
spite differences between the
two countries on tactics in the
Mideast negotiations.
The latest request, the offi-
cials said, stems from the ship-
ment to the United Arab Re-
public of nearly 200 Soviet
fighter planes and fighter-
bombers since the first of the
year and the recent introduc-
tion of a small number of very
advanced fighters, identified as
MIG-23's.
The planned federation of
Egypt, Libya and Syria might
also affect Egypt's air power.
But the French Foreign Minis-
try said today that the deliv-
ery of Mirage jets to Libya
would be blocked if Paris found
they were going to other coun-
tries.
At Rate of 2 a Month
The 12 Phantoms for Israel
?8 have been delivered, the
United States sources said?
will bring to 80 the number
of F-4 fighter - bombers that
Washington has agreed in the
last three years to sell Israel.
Six reconnaissance versions or
the F-4 are also being deliv-
ered this year.
On the matter of an addi-
tional request, the Israeli De-
puty Premier, Yigai Allon,
speaking at Dulles Airport to-
day, said that Israel was mak-
inf no new requests for equip-
ment "for the time being."
The sources say that the
newest deliveries have been
made at a rate of two a month
since the first of the year. The
four remaining fighter-bombers
are expected, to be sent next
month. Deliveries of the
Continued on Page 6, Column I
mx reconnaissance Phantoms.
which were part of a commit-
ment made by President John-
son, are scheduled to be com-
pleted this month.
Since the United States
started delivering phantoms to
Israel, in the fall of 1969, about
nine F-4 fighter-bombers have
been lost over Egypt or in,
crashes, sources said.
Soviet Shipments Described
The Soviet shipments to!
Egypt continue undiminsihed,
one source said, adding that
earlier this month two Soviet
ships brought 18 combat planes
to Egypt. So far this year, So-
viet deliveries are said to have
included more than 100 MIG8
21's nearly 60 MIG-17's and
about 30 Sukhoi-7 fighter-bomb-
ers.
These shipments are in addi-
tion ?to previous Egyptian air
force totals, which are put at
130 MIG-21's, 150 MIG-17's
and nearly 100 Sukhoi-Ts be-
cause the Egyptians are short
if fighter pilots, some Ameri-
can analysts fear that the Rus-1
dans -may have to fly more of ,
he planes themselves, beyond
.he 50MIG-21's they are be-
ieve to have been operating
n Egypt since early last year. [
Russian pilots will also fly
:he MIG-23's, the experts be-,
ieve.
The analysts point Out that
vhile the MIG-21 is a very
naneuverable aircraft, having
t maximum speed of 1,300
niles an hour, the 1,400-mile-
in-hour F-4 is generally con-
ddered a better all-around
tircraft, not only in dogfights,
nit in long-range bombing and
trafing.
Even with Russian pilots,
our MIG-21's were shot down
.ast July by Israeli F-4's near
the Suez Canal.
The MIG-23, the experts say,
Is believed to have a top speed
approaching 1,950 miles an
hour, and can also fly higher
than the F-4. At altitudes be-
low 25,000 feet, it probably
would be less maneuverable
than the Phantom, the analysts
say.
But if it has an effective'
radar-missile system capable of
attackin low-flying aircraft,
they continue, it could present
problems for F-4's that came
within its operating area. The
MIG-23 can fly effectively at
70,000 to 80,000 feet; the F-4
has a maximum operating alti-
tude of 71,000 feet.
Israel's Air Force, the
sources say, will have by the
end of next month more than
70 F-4 fighter-bombers, more ;
than 100 A-4 close support at-
tack planes, nearly 50 Mirage-'
III fighter-bombers, 20 Mys-
tere-IV fighter-bombers and
about 150 miscellaneous older
fighters and training jets.
No Immediate Threat Seen
But since the Israeli Air Farce
is considered markedly superior
to the Egyptian Air Force both
in terms of skilled pilots and
maintenance men, American of-
ficials generally do not be-
lieve the comparatively larger
numbers of planes in the Egyp-
tian force immediately threaten
a shift in the arms balance.
Analysts are watching the
situation closely, however, and
one source said that if modern
jets continued to pour into
Egypt, the United States might
agree to let Israel have 12 to
18 more phantoms later this
year.
Administ a ion officials have
repeatedly ,e .d that the United
States wov d not allow Mideast
air power w develop animbal-
wee to 1. reel's disadvantage.
In the Icsing ciays of the
John son xi .ministration, the
United Sty te, agreed to supply
Israel witl 4 i F-4 fighter-bomb-i
ers and 6 roconnaissance ver-
sions, the e?mnaissance planes
to be del \it red in 1971.
Last Ju v the Nixon Admin-
istration -treed to supply 6
more F-4 ighter-bombers to
take care of losses. Later in
the sum- or the United States
agreed to provide 18 more by
December
Then, i the fall, a decision
was mad' .0 sell 12 more F-4
fighter-be rn -iers, with the deliv-
eries o rade in the first five,
months o :971.
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POST
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DATE
PAGE I
t Renortedlv Gets New Air Defense Mil
4etl er
Daft Writer
indications
Union has
ypes of mo-
ockets ? the
alto Egypt in
ueording to
weapons,
like vehicles,
le SA-2 and
air missiles
ets emplaced
around Cairo
iez Canal last
Israeli deep-
ds.
n, the new
ned to repel
high-altitude
both missiles
would be har-
pilots to find
new missiles
a large-scale
wiet personnel
equipment in
1y this year. It
200 additional
_ack planes, in-
-six of the hot-
et jet ? the
lore Soviet per-
been sent to
ast two months,
-otal to about
rig to informed
s say their re-
; additional So-
ent remains re-
hat most of the
pment currently
1 to Israel is de-
- the Pentagon is
give Israel elec-
.4 and jamming
3r Israeli planes
3viet anti-aircraft
anti-radar mis-
wk surface-to-air
officials maintain
en no new agree-
more F-4E Phan-
3ombers to the Is-
last fall, when
agreed to provide
es ? six of which
were replacements for Israeli
losses ? to augment the 50
originally granted by the
Johnson administration.
U.S. policy is to replace
planes lost in combat or train-
ing.
At that time, Israeli Prime
Minister Golda Meir had
asked for 100 more A-4 Sky-
hawk attack planes to double
the number Israel already
had, plus 42 more Phantoms.
Aside from the 24 planes last
fall, the rest of the Israeli
shopping list remains on file
at the Pentagon.
Phantoms Feared
Whatever else the United
States gives the Israelis, it is
the Phantoms that the Egyp-
tians fear. Not only is the
plane an excellent fighter?
which the Israelis are modify-
ing to make even better?but
it can carry three times more
bombs than anything the Sovi-
ets have given to Egypt.
Thus, despite the Soviet
buildup, U.S. officials do not
view the balance of power as
having been tipped in favor of
Egypt now. Israel needs con-
tinuing supplies of relatively
unprovocative def ensiv e
equipment for the time being,
Pentagon officials say. Un-
doubtedly, more planes would
be provided if the situation
should worsen.
Defense Secretary Melvin R.
Laird stressed in a news con-
ference April 13 that the
United States would not allow
the arms balance to tip and
that the administration hoped
for a solution to the Middle
East tension through "quiet di-
plomacy."
Recent press reports that
the United States was in fact
delivering an additional dozen
Phantoms to Israel touched
off a furor in the Arab press
and led to Arab demands for
U.S. explanations.
Yesterday, State Depart-
ment spokesman Charles W.
Bray said that Arab govern-
ments had been apprised of
"inaccuracies either in fact or
implication" in these reports.
Visit by Rogers
U.S. officials were at pains
to clarify the situation be-
cause of reports that anti-
American demonstrations were
being prepared in some Arab
capitals that Secretary of
State William P. Rogers is
planning to visit in early May.
Before the recent buildup of
Egyptian air strength, Egypt
was estimated by informed
sources here to have about 365
jet fighters and fighter-bomb-
ers.
Now, the figure reportedly
totals slightly more than 550,
with about 200 of these be-
lieved to be Mig-21s, the stand-
ard Soviet fighter.
Normally, the Mig-21 would
give the Phantom a hard time,
but the Israelis have been suc-
cessful in shooting it down. To
improve even more the Phan-
toms superiority against the
lighter, highly maneuverable
Mig-21, the Israelis are said to
be installing special slats on
the leading edge of the Phan-
tom's wings to make it turn
more sharply.
Another 100 of the Egyptian
planes are said to be Su-7
fighter-bombers, a plane with
far less fire power than the
Phantom.
Included in the new ship-
meats are al o said to be
about a squad -0 1?perhaps a
dozen planes- o e the brand
new Su-11 figh ei -bomber, and
the six or so iii -23s. The re-
mainder of th 1 wee is mostly
older model M
Although th vfig-23 can fly
faster and h gner than the
Phantom, mo t Pentagon ex-
perts view ti e plane in the
Middle East t n text primarily
as a high-fl ilig reconnaiss-
ance craft.
Deploymen i .) Egypt of the
new plane h aid to be the
first time it b es left the Soviet
Union by sl as mg high, the
Mig-23 can i?main out of
reach of any v capon the Isra-
elis now have
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The plan
a new rad
spot enem
guide in i
for the k
gon expe.
hard evict
capability
U.S. fight
a few mor
To coi
forces, ti
about 50
jets, whi
t,ghters,
Phantom
T ??a
French]
kin
planes,
400.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? S NATE Jaiuuiiy 29, 1971
-Ws have ended the concept of Cambodian
eeetuaries, immune from attack, upon
:relish the enemy military had relied for five
Now that our ground forces and our logis-
and advisory personnel have all been
tierawn. what will be our future policy
Cimbodia?
e?he following will be the guidelines of our
ri' in Cambodia:
There will be no U.S. ground personnel
C-,nabodia except for the regular staff of
Falb:is:iv in Phnom Penh.
?_! 'here will be no -U.S. advisers with Cam-
-sic'outs
We ,vill conduct?with the approval of
e is Cambodian Government?air interdic-
d, missions against the enemy efforts to
a eve supplies and personnel through Cam-
bedia toward South Vietnam and to re-
ash base areas relevant to the war in
narn< We do this to protect our forces in
aou th Viet nani.
4 We will turn over material captured in
base areas in Cambodia to the Cambodian
covernment to help it defend its neutrality
a ci ndependence.
0. We will provide military assistance to the
untodian Government in the form of small
:ms and relatively unsophisticated equip-
out in types and quantities suitable for
,eeir army To date we have supplied about
0 to Ilion of these items principally in the
r,171fl of small arms, mortars, trucks, aircraft
rts communications equipment and medi-
.1 el:pplies.
ii We will encourage other countries of the
.r,: e.!'7011 to give diplomatic support to the in-
d-:meadence and neutrality of Cambodia. We
eseleorne the efforts of the Djakarta group of
eountries to mobilize world opinion and en-
erage Asian cooperation to this end.
7 We will encourage and support the ef-
esas of third countries who wish to furnish
o aetiodia with troops or material. We ap-
p :cud the efforts of Asian nations to help
e-,mlodia preserve its neutrality and inde-
es,idence.
Our undereianding of Saigon's intentions
4,4 i
Vietnamese forces remain ready
so prevent reestablishment of base areas
a.ong South Vietnam's frontier.
e South Vietnamese forces will remain
aside to assist in the evacuation of Viet-
esmese civilians and to respond selectively
es appeals from the Cambodian Government
snould North Vietnamese aggression make
t.4 ttecessarv.
3 Most of these operations will be launched
e :in within South Vietnam. There will be
:.?s U.S. air or logistics support. There will not
i3 J_S. advisers on these operations.
-The great majority of South Vietnamese
. so leave Cambodia.
:a The primary objective of the South
:eihamese remains Vietnamization within
ir country. Whatever actions are taken in
eamtiodia will be consistent with this ob-
esti y I-- Television interview:
sp. 'Do you feel that you can give cate-
e sical assurances now that we will not
eeld grmind troops back into Camobdia no
e, esier
'eh President. "I can say now that we
no time to send American ground
e into Cambodia. We have no plans to
at antedyleers into Cambodia. We have
oniy to maintain the rather limited
rl.
at. natio establishment that we have in
;nom Penh and I see nothing that will
s.otM-2,`e that at this time. . .
Cite President of the United States has
intension to send ground forces back
Camboola, and I do not believe that
see avdl be any necessity to do so.
"When 1,01.1 say, can I be pinned down to
t cat under no circumstances would the
States ever do anything, I would not
say t hat, but I will say that our plans do
not ssountenaace it, we do not plan or. ie,
and inder the circumstances, I believe I at
Clue success or the operation which we ve
uneertaken, a.; well as what the South V '1--
nameee will be able to do, will make it n-
necsesarys.
With regard to the South Vietnamese in
Car ibodial, I pointed out on April 30th I at
our air support would stop and there wc
be a ) adviser.; with toe South Vietnam,- as,
thas eny activities of the South Vietnam :se
atter we left would have to be on t ,sir
iiiriodia is in toe same category as
incionesia. ft is. a neutral ccuntry. It a
noemignaci comitry. We have 110 treaty v
it.
' ,a; tar as Cambodia is concerned, ur
onl s commitment to Cambodia is the c; 'n-
mit talent that the United States for 190 y.irs
has, had to the principle of international iw
Lbs e a country that chooses to be nem-al
slim 1 Lli have its neutrality respected.
aew that means that we are iurnishine as
you know, am Ili arms to them for their ,s.vn
or'! lice. It means that, in addition to 1,
we :ire trying to give them the moral E
por mat we (eel We are supporting the iv-
tiw 0'43 of the 11 Asian nations who are
tea. p Ling to stand with thas governmen in
its aeutrality, but as far as military sum:, rt,
the United SI ates moving forces into C ars-
bathe for the purpose of helping them ,le-
fent against enemy attack?tort we are I,ot
req ered to do under -;reaty and that W4 do
not intend to do. .
. I am no: as bearish as some c so-
meeiators have been about the future- of
Cambedia. If I could digress a momeie I
think this is a question thae our listeeers
wostio be interested in?Cambodia's chan :es
of s 'reviving as a neutral country are infine sey
bet er now than they were on April leen,
Arm they are oetter, first, because the Ni rth
Vie: r amese have a 500-mile supply ne
ratuer than a 40-mile supply line back to
the sanctuaries which we have destroyed
"Teey are better, also, because the C., _re
bob can Government has far more sure et
among the people, and the reporters Seam
Phenin Penh generally have reported
Thi-v are better, too, because the Cambocsan
Go; ernment also has support from the- 11
Asian nations representing 300 million vet-
ple. and I think also they are better tar
the reason that the South Vietnamese ve
been very effective when they have taker. on
the North V esnamese in the Camboc .an
area. . .
" . we co not plan to go back , s to
Cambodia. We do plan, however, and I e ill
use slots ,bows,r?I am going to use, ss I
shottA, the ar power of the United St, -es
to 1r terdict all ows of men and aunt ees
whica I consider are directed toward Si:- th
Vie- raim.
"Teat is rriv role Of defending Amer, an
me s . ,
Mr. Preeident, in view of the COC,7
Amendment passed yesterday in he
Senate, do yoi feel now obliged to suspend
the negotiations with Thaila-nd about or
paying and equipping their izoops that I ey
were going to send into Cambodia?"
'foe Presidene 'Fortunately, our Fou ? 1-
hag Mal great wisdom when they et
lip v,.1 Houses of Congress. . . .
". think tie performance of the Ser ,te
over she past seven weeks, going up ad
down the hil. on Cooper-Church, has ct
par e.:ularly datenguished that august is
and the Cooper-Church that came out 'ass
not a particularly precise document, sed
wee somewhat ambiguous.
"stow, fortunately, it now goes to ae
Weise . And I believe that the confers: cc
of ale. Senate and the House, when I. ev
consader all of these factors, will first be
sure that the power of the President of he
United States to peatect American fcrces
whenever they come into attack is in no
way jeopardized....
"If this [the Cambodian operation] had
been what some thought it was, an attempt
to expand the war into Cambodia. to launch
a war into Cambodia, then of course, I would
have gone to the Senate. You can be sure
that in. my administration we are not going
to get involved in any more Vietnams weere
we do not get the approval of theCongress.
I will :not do this because I think we need
Congressional support for our actions, and
trust we do not hase to go to the Congress
for that kind of support.
"But when we have this limited, very
precise action which 'Was limited in terms
of the time, limited in terms of 21 miles as
far as we were going to go, and which had
for its purpose the protecting of American
lives, I had to take the action when I did ...''
October 7?Address to the Nation:
"When I authorized operations against the
enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia last April,
I also directed that an intensive effort be
launched to develop new approaches for
peace i:a
"I am tonight announcing new proposals
for peace in Indochina.
"This new peace initiative has been dis-
cussed with the Governments of South Viet-
nam, Laos, and Cambodia. All support it....
"First, I propose that all armed forces
1.1iroughout Indochina cease firing their
weapons and remair. in the positions they
now held....
"A cease-fire should encompass not only
the fighting in Vietnam but in all of Indo-
china. Conflicts in this region are closely re-
lated....
"A second point of 1:he new initiative for
peace is this:
propose an Indochina Peace Conference
. . . North Vietnamese troops are not only
infiltrating, crossingl,00rders and establishing
bases in South Vietnam?they are carrying
on their aggression in Laos and Cambodia
as well.
'An international conference is needed to
deal wath the conflict in all three states 01
Indochina. The war in Indochina has been
proved so be of one piece; it cannot be cured
by treating only one of its areas of out-
break.
"The essential elements of the Geneva Ac-
cords of 1954 and 1962 remain valid its a
basis for settlement of problems.,.,"
November 18?Message to the Congress
Proposing Supplemental Foreign Assistance
Appropriations:
"The operations in the Cambodian border
sanctuaries in May tend June helped assure
the continued success of Vietnamization and
of our trbop withdrawal programs. As we
new at the time would be the case, the
operations seriously impaired the enemy's
ability to operate in South Vietnam, and
contributed to the progress which has re-
duced our casualties there to the lowest level
since 1965. Continuing operations by South
Vietnamese and Cambodian forces in the
border areas will make possible continued
progress.
"Cambodia itself ,aas mobilized its own
manpower and resources in defense of its
independence and neutrality. . . . It is es-
sential that we supp:Eernent Cambodia's own
efforts by providing resources which are
critically needed to enable it to continue to
defend itself. Its ability to do so is a vital
elemens in the continued success of Viet-
namizstion.
"Cambodia's needs have been urgent, and
as Congress has been informed, I have di-
rected that funds be transferred from other
already severely limited programs to meet
these critical needs. I am requesting $100
million to restore funds to such vital pro-
grams as those for Taiwan. Greece Ind
Turkey . .
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January 29, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL Ri A_c.)tt ? SENATE
"To meet Cambodia's urgent needs for the
remainder of this fiscal year, I require that
the Congress provide $155 million In new
funds to be directly allocated to the Cam-
bodian program. . ."
December 10?News conference:
Q. ". . Can you foresee any circumstances
whatever under which we would use ground
troops in Cambodia?"
The President. "None whatever. . . .
Q. "Mr. President, how do you plan to keep
your quarter billion dollar aid program for
Cambodia from escalating into a guarantee
of the survival of the Cambodian Govern-
ment?"
The President. "The quarter billion dollar
aid program for Cambodia is, in my dpinion,
probably the best investment in foreign as-
sistance that the United States has made
in my political lifetime.
"The Cambodians, a people, 7 million only,
neutralists previously, untrained, are tying
down 40,000 trained North Vietnamese reg-
ulars. If those North Vietnamese weren't in
Cambodia, they'd be over killing Americans.
That investment of $250 million in small
arms of aid to Cambodia so that they can
defend themselves against a foreign aggres-
sor?this is no civil war, it has no aspect of
a civil war?the dollars we send to Cam-
bodia saves American lives and enables us to
bring Americans home. . . ."
1970, SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM ROGERS
March 23?News conference:
"In Cambodia we recognize the neutrality,
sovereignty and independence of Cambodia.
We had nothing to do, directly or indirectly,
with the events that transpired in Cambodia.
We would hope that the events that trans-
pired in Cambodia will not cause the war to
be widened in any way . . . our program in
South Vietnam . . . will not be affected by
the events in Cambodia. , .
Q. "Regarding the neutrality of Cambodia,
I believe the policy of the U:nited States still
is to sanction American troops going across
the border if they are threatened. Does this
in any way compromise U.S. respect for the
neutrality and sovereignty of Cambodia?"
A. "Not at all; and I don't believe that
any troops, since the change of government,
have gone into Cambodia. But we respect
fully the neutrality of Cambodia and its
territorial independence . . . Cambodia has
not made any request for military assist-
ance . . . No request has been made, and we
don't anticipate that any request will be
made. . ."
Q. "Do you endorse the idea of having the
ICC return to Cambodia to cheek on what
is happening?"
A. "Well, we don't endorse it, because this
is a propose: made by Cambodia without any
discussion with us or any activity on our
part at all. As I say, this is a problem that
primarily concerns Cambodia. We do think
it is a very sensible Idea...."
Q. "Is military aid [to Cambodia] incon-
sistent with neutrality?"
A. "No, I didn't say ? that neutrality and
aid were inconsistent . . . Cambodia has
not requested any such aid and we don't
anticipate they will. If they do, we will have
to consider it on its merits."
April 18?Speech to the Cornell Alumni
Association:
"The rise of Cambodian hostility over the
North Vietnamese presence came rapidly and
dramatically. Most governments, including
ours, were surprised at the ouster of Prince
Sihanouk by the Cambodian Parliament. This
was an internal Cambodian development...
the Cambodian government remained cam-
mittPd to a policy of neutrality and did not
seek alliance with the West.
"A year ago, before we reestablished diplo-
matic relations with Cambodia with a small
mission, we affirmed publicly our recognition
and respect for the 'sovereignty, independ-
ence, neutrality, and territorial integrity' of
Cambodia within its praseiii, it outlets, The
policy we expressed toward Cambodia then
remains our policy toward Chrobod1a now
We respect recent Camoodiae proposals to
seek diplomatic measures of protection
through United Nations actions and through
a return of the International Control Com-
mission established ka tae 1054 Geneva
accords....
"rite possibility in unit warfare in
Cambodia [has] midersaantiably caused con-
cern among Americans. They ask if the war
in Southeast Asia Is widening . . . They
wonder if this mean:, that the period of
American involvement will be lengthened
. . . The objective of the Nixon administra-
tion is to avoid both these results.
"It is true, of course, that we cannot be
indifferent to the military pressures by North
Vietnam on the indepencietiae and neutrality
of Laos ana Cambodia. raiev affect the safety
of our own forces in South Vietnam . . . We
continue to believe that eao ultimate settle-
ment to the Vietriazneae wet must take Laos
and Cambodia into accaunt However, we are
determined not to reverse the long-term di-
rection of our policy I oward fostering more
self-reliance among Aiaaii states. . . ."
April 25?Speeeh to American Society of
International Law:
". . The violations of Liaise accords [1954
Geneva accords] by Nor to Vietnam in Laos
and Cambodia are explicit, uncontested,
open, and without any shred of international,
sanction. Is it not time tor nations which
are signatures to international agreements
actively to support them? .
May 3?Television tterview:
"The reason
for the Cambodian oper-
ation] was to protec, tie. lives and safety
of American men Ugh dug in Vietnam . . It's
limited in the extent purpose and duration
. . . We're not going to exceed those limita-
tions of the sanctuaries on the border . . the
purpose is to destroy the sanctuaries them-
selves . . The President has made it clear
that it's not going to last more than 6 to 8
weeks at the must . At that point the
American troops and the South Vietnamese
troops will withdraw iroin Cambodia. .
"We made every possibie effort to get nego-
tiations started in good taith, negotiations
dealing with Laos end Cambodia . . . We
would hope, now Lied, a's clear that the
North Vietnamese have invaded Cambodia
and it's clear that we've taken this action,
that all states wouid become interested in
discussing what they can do to guarantee
the neutrality or Can ibtalia.
. . this is a limited action. If we were
going to stay in Cambodia on any sort of a
permanent conditioa, permanently, or even
of longer duration. then obviously we'd have
to have the support of die American people.
But I think the American people are going to
support the Presider:a
May 13--News conielence:
"What is the policy el the United States
Government on Sooth Vietnamese military
assistance or eooperation with the Lon Nol
government in Ca.mboitia?"
A. "There is sonic iiooperation between the
two governments. Naturally, we encourage
that. The whole Nixon doctrine as pronoun-
ced at Guam is that the Asians should work
with each other to take care of their com-
mon problems . I think there's a limit
to what we shout' bat' ithOUt what South
Vietnamese troops :ire aoing to do. Originally,
it was contemplated teat most of the troops
would be out of Cambodia by the end of
July, but I don't know that I'd want to make
commitment on behalf of the South Viet-
namese . . the Atrium mean troops will be out
of Cambodia by iale na of July and all the
American troops nlh e out, including ad-
visers. . . .
"I said that if we did that, if we got in-
volved in the support of the present govern-
ment of Cambodia or any other government,
that it would be oicooaistent with the policy
of the government . . to we
troops in an orderly way trom
man . . . the United States hat
tion of getting involved in Can
American troops in support of
government of Cambodia or ant
ernment of Cambodia. . .
"Are we concerned if South e earn be-
comes active in Cambodia with e 1- troops,
if that will make it more diffice I or us to
withdraw our troops from Sou i Vietnam
. . . Yes, we have made that poi 1 to South
Vietnam, and they fully underst I that. In
other words, that is not goim t disrupt
the Vietnarnization program. .
Q. "Could you clarify for us t e peratioa
off the coast of Cambodia
A. "Its purpose is limited. Its ; pose is to
intercept shipments of ammurin e and sup-
plies to the base areas in Can < ea which
would be conducted by the Nomh k ortnamese
or the Vietcong. It does not al to other
powers, it applies only to re -nnent of
supplies and ammunition t canctuary
are"Haso.w.
the Cambodians and th. .ath Viet-
namese cooperate in the futur , going to
have to be worked out betwei ?nem. Ob-
viously, we will play a role i that; but
whatever role we played would a be incon-
sistent with the policy we hal. enounced,
of getting out. . . .
Q. "Are all those American c s lions, in-
cluding the coastal patrols, to -1 ,topped,
far as the Cambodian theater peration is
concerned, by the end of :lune?'
A. "Well, I wouldn't want ay that. I
think we've said enough wit we've said
what we are going to stop
"Insofar as the riverine ope am is con-
cerned, the Americans have ne e,.weeded the
21-mile limit, and we don't it to.
"Insofar as getting America a out of the
river in Cambodia is concern, the answer
is: `Yes, that would be include(
"So far as patrolling inter', d .nal waters
is concerned, that's different I .mm not sure
what we will do. My guess wo a be that we
will continue. We have had tI. trol of in-
ternational waters all t tie tin his is just
extending it a little bit?so I 1 let want to
make any predictions about ti
Q. "Mr. Secretary, are you I mg out?or
not ruling out?U.S. air acti t over Cam-
bodia past the June ao dew i .e?"
A. "No, I haven't ruled it on e all. We had
air activity over Cambodia be e ? the change
of the government, and we h said any-
thing one way or the otner ac t it.
Q. "And it also seemt post" that the air
support, however, interdictin oe sanctuar-
ies may continue. What at,. airpower in
support of the Cambodian et ."
A. "Well, that would appr o. We don't
intend to become involved i m iarily in the
support of the Lou Nol got alent or any
other government.. , .
"Now, in terms of aasistsa a. military as-
sistance by way of supplies m therwise, the
President has announced the are going to
provide some assistance coo A mint with the
present authority that we ha
"Obviously, any larger pr . an would re-
quire congressional approval ain't think we
have crossed that bridge. We 1 ve no present
plans to embark on that ki i a program.
Q. "What you're ruling I only, is that
we will not get involved di ,:y, militarily,
in supporting the Lon Nol i ?ernment.
A. "That's correct. ."
June 8?"Pace the Nation
"We certainly hope that t it government
[of Cambodia] doesn't. fall; u the President
has made it perfectly clear that we will
not support the Lon Nol o ernment with
U.S. troops. . . .
"It is possible that the v :^r will be fought
in a different place and it - sissible that It
will continue with South I. tnamese forces
and Cambodian forces, a ,c even possibly
Thai forces, fighting a cor 1 )n enemy. But
'3 533
c ..111 our
+C Viet-
inten-
t's with
present
tier got-
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531 CON1-; RESSION AL RECORD? ,,ENATF
tioistidi mean that the United States
sicea wad ha enmeshed in a combat in Cam-
' -? is interesting that for the first
ie eta un eesintries in the area?Thailand,
s? ales, Laos, and South Viet-Nam?are
together.
-The Sinitis Vietnamese have made it clear
,is the enemy tries to return to the sane-
hey will reenter the sanctuaries, .. .
Ai the ?nsiternment of Cambodia came into
eplartientet it would be an renfavor-
:tins ties?-S.:?esuent. We would hope that that
it be `unacceptable' "?
hogers: "No. not unacceptable in
we would use American forces
e government. .
s is irrevocable that there will
se American troops used in Cam-
?esi a, is natter what'?"
eieerai - emgers: "There is no intention of
s im forces in Cambodia? _ . Our
hishe arts ee rig to be out of Cambodia by
will have no military people
.eartt at aii aelvisers or anything else. And we
i.? rue-ition of having any American
z?L,t,s, o Cambodia. Now. South Viet-
, ???.at,-.1,ii, '' -- may return_ The President said
!tc Interdiction to protect our
, -.s - will not use American forces
"-?in0testa, tf we did, it would enlarge the
?.. :i.e. and might mean that we'd be there on
!. vai!ii-nerreattent basis, and we're not going
: ?"..; Leh.
Line -i---at?tement before Rouse Foreign
:ore ??tee ?
he Presegient decided that an attack on
hiesies was necessary so that Viet-
- heti ,itel the withdrawal of. our forces
o could proceed. As far as
i???? concerned, we want for it
watt for itself?to he free soy-
-- i.,. and unmolested.
.ions, as the President said
ley, have achieved our major
tax anives and will facilitate and
-.Test of our overall Viet-Nam
mise- I add that the effectiveness
?-?e he South Vietnamese have
ehodia increases our corifi-
. tietnamization is the right
.e --essess, conference ;
e isseehtent's policy on air interdic-
? sa. the present time and after
Cambodia, our Air Force
.1 permitted to interdict the
communication lines in
? .of cenress that there will
es whet:. in the process of interdicting
communication lines of the
sieet will be of direct benefit
government in Cambodia,
ee main thrust of our policy
e HT Force for the purpose of
tine "7', ply lines end communica-
tect Americans in South
ary. I believe yesterday a
the Cambodian Military
El that American fighter
-ing, missions in direct sup-
ran fierees_ Now, was he
I perceive a change in our
that I ean See very well
I might think it was help-
ement when we fiv those
,t -lose to Interdict coin-
ea:theme ,,rek supply lines of the enemy.
titat s our purpose. That Is our
. iTelmaints-s. ft may have a dual bene-
tease eters, rem purposes and at the
' tine the Cambodian Govern--
stare,' .
Satireei: re. you said that the main
rim...et-he of Amarican air activity in Cambodia
seise I
in toteretseg American troops in. South
rest-Nam. rs it not essential to the si ? urity
&' :American troops that the governm it to.'.
, hal, or at least some government n ??, un-
esndly totally to the United States, certain
Phnom Penh?"
..?. "I'm nee sure it's essential, but; thvi-
c. i.e.y it's quite helpful if the governrn ? te: in
Cs-Iliadia is neutralist and if there's Ste e.lity
i , thsnabodi is . .
I. we have a great in terest the
!ease ri penple all over the world. a..I we
assist, rig In some ways in Cambodie hut
or purpose esas not to affect the cou of
e_ .a.; in Cambodia as far as politic are
e
ei "Mr. Ste:al:tare, if it is our policy I. de-
Si ai a neat-al or friendly goternmeie. in
C ae-e we willing to provide arm: and
tr ? 7'71 to keEp such a government in pc sr?"
tWe have encoaraged Asian naticese to
et end, thee could to help other Asia; :ta-
n rI We are encouraged by the fact hat
ef-te itedia,, for the fast time in :many rears,
hes friendly relations and diplomatic ?!.:ea-
tie e? with al: of its neighbors. .
' you kit a, the United States has !iro-
etted, and ie provid.ng now, assistant, to
Cemisodia. this fiscal year it; amon ed
9 millien. and we are now consid,- eiag
the eregram for next year. We do want I , do
wIrv? we car to support the neutralit;of
caeishodia, but we want to be sure the :s's
no.: done in a manner which suggests -.eat
e take reser the ?itesponsibility militaril to
iris i inn any government in office. We w
hose and We Are somewhat entionaageei
eve I!. that Cs mboala will remain a tu-
trs
Ce 'Can p u state, Mr. Secretary, ?it
Anthestan aircraft, or American pilots will hit
fly !iiase air siipport for Cambotinn unit
Styr tes Viet-mt.:mese units defending C n-
boti i!,I positicn t'?"
A I am not ming to make any stater. 'it
tha. ? ''sight limit the use of our airpower
eery -bat I have already said. And I d eet,
see 1,1y reas.sn why the United States she, Id
constantly be put in the position where sie
tell tee enemas exactly what we are goini to
dn. fr? sr pol.c 5 as I have stated. And vs
also slave saki that we would expect T.
urns if the air flights of that tyne will at
now In' South Vietnamese for(!es. ?
Q hr. Secretary, can you tell us
sten negctiations to send. Thai troaas
into cambodia to support the governmen.
A STall, Thailand now leas that uni-r
crin!,?ii? 'ration. Whether they will, and
who: etent aed so forth they haven't rot
a U, ci un yet. So we haven't made a
deck ois on oar mutt-tort.
"I: tee is-upper/a Thai troops Ir Carnborn ???
we ,X .-V id have do it from Cambodian Me, is
I ti or, ."
7?Coat 'Terme for Editors ter el Bross :.-
caeteri?
"Ci.i 7 purpose in Cambodia was limited - -
to istaties the North Vietnamese saaictuat
whiee ;sere -..Tp,rtl he the enemy V Isondu
the--a in Vlet-Nam and to capture and !? ?
desta ,e his sepoltes and equipment . .
'Tat militare r peratic.ns in Carn'eodla,
? e have si!dieeded. First the cantle, ?
of the enemv to c?anduct attacks against ot
force.. . s Viet-Nase has been seventy 'tan
nt. tiseie bete been a dramatic ii
crease in the cm fidence and canahility ?
the I - th the-on:mese foreee. And time ?
prospeies for the Vietnernization nrogran
hate ? !r tecre
'Ti:s isTorth Vas-I.:name:se are attempting t
use C. e!bodian .!reeritory to reesta"stish the, 7
diSrlip" ,e1 lines; e f supplies and communica -
tion te earry on the war :as South Viet-Nan
Anairisen airpower is being used to faustrat,
these ,Vorts. PT,-sident 'Itileu has said tha :
South ihetnamese ferries may cont .nue te
engage the enemy in Cambodia; thus?anti
I think 'his is a pcint that should be under--
scored-ethos the P1107,7 rnn no lOng,er emir'
January 29, 1971
on a, safe haven in Cambodia to attack out
forces
"We are providing limited amounts of
small arms to the Cambodians and will con-
tinue to provide additional amounts of arms
and other equipment, to help them maintain
their independence and neutrality.
"We support and encourage Cambodia";
expressed desire to remain neutral. We have
no other objective than to have its neu -
trality respected be all nations. We have no
desire to associate it with SEATO or to seek
to have it aligned with ourselves or with
anyone else.. ,
"Some have asked if our e'forts in Cam-
bodia modified our basic policy in Viet-Nam
The answer is no. We will, of coarse, adeast
our actions in the light of events. and Presi-
dent Nixon has made it clear that if the
enemy takes action which endangers our
troops, he will respond. But our policy re-
mains; constant: We would prefer a nego-
tiated settlement which results in all foreign
troops leaving South Viet-Nam. ..
"The situation in Cambodia has, af course,
highlighted the regional aspects cf the Viet-
Nam war
"We are continuing to press our effort for
negotiations on the problems of Indo-
china....
"There's nothing about a war that's pleas-
ant, and we have made every effort to avoid
any ciiiilian casualties. And certainly in Cam-
bodia we've made very strenuous efforts to
be sure that they wouldn't occur.
"But the Government of the United States
regrets the whole war....
"We believe . . that the difference be-
tween the future and the past is that in the
future they the Communists] will have to
face Cambodian troops, South Viermaraese
troops, and possibly interdiction by Ameri-
can airpower?whereatt before, they could
maintain these sanctuaries with complete
safety. They didn't have to concern them-
selves with the safety of their bases, which
probably was an anomaly of warfc re. . .
Q. "lit the war goes badly against the pms-
ent government in Cambodia, and if the
Communists win, as they seem to be tieing
right now, will the United States da nothing
except provide air support?"
think we've been pleasantly surprised
about the stability of the Cambodian Gov-
ernmeni up to this lime, and I would not
want to make any predietion about the milt-
?iary future in Cambcdia except to say t tat
we are pleased at the way the young people
are supporting the present government, she
way this Intellectuals are supporting the
present government, and the way the pres-
ent government has been able to recrult
srmed forces. ...
"We will not send American ground troops
into Cambodia again . We will use cur
airpower to interdict the supply lines, the
communication lines, but we will not use
American ground troops. Our policy both
in Cambodia and South Viet-Nam, is to re-
place American troops with Asian troops. , _
"We hope that the present government, or
a; least a neutral government of Cambodia,
continues to survive in Cambodia . ,.?
July 15--News conference:
"In Japan we had a meeting,
the Ambassadors front 14 nations its the
"In the course of my discuss:ohs, hr if
is lot of time to deal With the topic tie
nature of Cambodia; and al-though we didn't
make clireca requests of any government, 'es
did make it clear that we thought that the
Arian nations should help the present Gov-
ernment cif Cambodia maintain its neatrality.
Paid contrary to some o I the stories that, I've
seen written, I feel quite confident that '-here
will be geod results from those discussions.
"I am not at all pessimistic about tilts
prospect of Asian nation; assisting Cambodia,
beitaisse they recognize the importance or tb,
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January 29, 1971 CONGRESSION AL RECORD ? SENA
neutrality of Cambodia to the security of "But despite a high degree of national
that area. . unity, Cambodia still lacars the wherewithal
"I think that the success of the incursion to carry on the fight . . For the immediate
in Cambodia, because it contributes to the future?and particularly in the face of a pos-
success of Vietnamization, does increase the sible enemy offensive during the coming dry
probabilities that the enemy, somet'here season?additional aid will be urgently
along the line, will negotiate. . . needed. .
"The South Vietnamese forces are quite "The $70 million requested for economic
strong now. They have well over a million assistance is essential to sustain the Cam-
men well equipped, well trained; and now bodian defense effort and is designed only in
they've?at least to some extent?have part to offset the loss of normal export earn-
proven themselves in Cambodia. And they ings. Cambodia is not creating an elaborate
have a morale that didn't exist at all last military machine. Rather it is set on keeping
year . . . So we think it's quite possible that in the field units that can be rapidly trained
they can defend themselves against the corn- to cope with the North Vietnamese efforts to
mon enemy. . . .
reestablish supply lines and harass the Com-
"I found that the Asian nations . .. realize bodian Government wherever possible,
that the only obstacle to the neutrality of "Over 70 percent of the military assistance
Cambodia is the presence of North Vietnam- request for Cambodia is for ammunition. The
cue troops remainder will be used jar small arms, trucks,
. . . ."
October 9?News conference: a small number of propeller-driven aircraft,
"We haven't attempted to make any state- communications equipment, river patrol
meat about who might attend an Indochina boats, and similar items
peace conference, because we think it is pre-
"The United States is not alone in pro-
mature. We do feel that the principal parties aiding help. Military or humanitarian aid
has also been forthcoming from neighboring
are the governments now in power and those
South Viet-Nam and Thailand, and from
who are opposed to them on the battlefield.
"As far as Sihanouk is concerned, he Australia and Japan
doesn't enter the picture, I think, here. The Our basic objective in Cambodia is to
forces in Cambodia facing the present Gov-
protect Vietnarnization and our withdrawal
ernment of Cambodia are North Vietnam-
program. . . We believe the best way to gain
ese. . . ."
the objective is to assist?with air support
October 11?"Issues and Answers": and aid, not military advisers or ground
"Our troops are not going back into Cam-
troops?Cambodia's efforts to defend itself.
bodia. President Nixon. has made that quite This request for military and economic assist-
clear. We think that the Cambodian Army ance would do just that. If Cambodia proves
and the South Vietnamese Army, working to- unable to wit hstand North Vietnam's ag-
gether, can handle any situation that might gression, Vietnamization and the troop with-
develop there. . . ." drawal program will suffer a serious set-
November 25?Statement before the House back . . In may testimony before Congress
Committee on Foreign Affairs: last April . . . I stressed our determination
"Cambodia's involvement in war is the re- to avoid a lasting military presence and a
suit of events over which that small country military commitment to the Cambodian gov-
has had little control. The North Vietnamese, ernment I made clear that we had no inten-
who had long occupied Cambodia along the tion of letting Cambodia become, in terms
border provinces, decided last April to corn- of American involvement, another Viet-
pound their violations of Cambodia's tern- nam. . . .
tories by undertaking actions throughout "We adhere to those principles. . . .
much of the country. This left the Cambo- ". . . we feel that the money involved is
dian Government no choice but to defend certainly a small price compared to what
itself. Realizing this would require a good we believe is the salety of American lives.
deal of outside help, the Cambodians reacted We have not planned, and we have no present
initially by submitting to us a request for plans for providing, any sophisticated mill-
$400 million in assistance. The aid they asked tary equipment . . . They are also getting
for would have included many expensive and help from South Vietnam. so we believe that
sophisticated weapons. they will be able to maintain their armed
"Sympathetic as we were to Cambodia's forces succstully with this help.
plight, and much as we realized that what "The Cambodians provide intelligence in-
it contemplated doing would contribute to formation to the South Vietnamese. And we
our own goals in Viet-Nam, we did not agree in turn get that information. Now we still
to this approach. We recognized that if we are pursuing a policy which is to prevent
complied with the Cambodian request we Cambodia from being used as a base for
might have had to establish a large American attacks against mu forces, and in that con-
presence to go along with the aid. We were nection we try to interdict supply lines and
concerned that we would be gradually sucked communication lines. So from time?and
Into greater and greater involvement as we there has never been any hesitation in saying
had been in Viet-Nain and finally would be this?we do bomb in Cambodia. and I can see
pressured into extensive use of ground forces, why some Cambodian might have said that
"Instead, we decided to use our aid in a he has sent word out to the South Vietnamese
totally different way, taking advantage of about the presence of North Vietnamese
Cambodia's principal assets: its strong sense troops and later on attacks were made.
of nationalism and patriotic determination
to repel the North Vietnamese invaders. Thus
it was that our cross-border operations last
spring were limited in time, in area, and in
objective. They succeeded in depriving the
North Vietnamese of free use of the border-
sanctuary areas, and they greatly assisted
our troop withdrawal program in Viet-Nam.
They also gave the Cambodian Government
an opportunity in cooperating with other
neighboring nations to establish its own sub-
stantial military forces.
"Since last spring, our aid to Cambodia has
taken the form of providing weapons and into Cambodia has increased the prospects
ammunition that the Cambodians are fully for a negotiated settlement . . . I think the
capable of using themselves . . . We have no incursion into C'embodia would have in-
military forces or advisers in Cambodia, nor creased that incentive .
do we intend to send any. Q. "When did we first get an urgent re-
"The Cambodians have made it clear that quest for arms lino material from Cam-
they want to do the job themselves. . . bridle?"
"We have no treaty obligation with Cam-
bodia, and we have made no commitment
with them . . . we do not plan to build up
a large mission in cam buena. We are going to
do it with a modest number of people . . .
we are going to do aii we can to keep our
presence small .. we on not considering the
type of ?pet talon that we considered in
Vietnam."
December 10? 9'est,mony before Senate
Foreign Relai ions Committee:
"it is my judgment that the incursion
TE
S 535
A. "It was . . . sometime u :arch of this
year . . . the Cambodian g4 mment has
reduced the amount that a -y have re-
quested by a great deal, and a have com-
pletely changed the chara.cte the equip-
ment they asked for . . . ti 'quest they
make is now quite realistic I think it
would be a very serious matt, or the Cam-
bodian government if this applemental
is not approved . . . But I ti . the intelli-
gence that we get indicates I f, the present
government is doing quite s L. . . this re-
quest will undoubtedly be fo ved by other
requests. The magnitude of a use requests
will depend on events . . . a a we ask for
military assistance and emu 1'3 in assistance
for Cambodia, we cerUinly c ake on some
Obligation for some continui
"We have not taken on any t urnitment to
the government of Cambodi We have ex-
plained to them clearly th. . any fighting
has to be done by the Camber a is and by the
South Vietnamese and no my American
forces. . . .
"We do not intend to hay: s MAAG or an
aid mission ... We do not int r- i to use mili-
tary advisers....
"What would happen if or r -coops in any
particular spot were 'rimer , I wouldn't
want to say. That would be :c to the Presi-
dent. But I think that, in vi .% of the place-
ment of our troops, that is t it likely . . .
I don't think we would get ar .ply involved
in Cambodia and certainly 'a t in war un-
less we send U.S. troops in. .
"Some Cambodians will trained in
South Vietnam, but they al I be trained
largely by the South Vietne .1! se . . . There
will be some training in Thai .1 d...."
1970, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE A [VIN R. LAIRD
May 6?News briefing:
"... I supported fully the rations to de-
stroy the facilities in the a .1, 'mary areas. I
supported the use of Amen i .A ..s as required
to carry out this very im i Cant mission,
which I thought was needcl ind necessary
in order to protect our Viet .a!nlzation pro-
gram and also to reduce t :.e possibility of
American casualties.. .
"In the Parrot's Beak are; entlemen, it's
a little different mission lit as use you have
to use tactical air there. Yo- annot use the
B-52s because of the civ :1; a population
that's involved. There is no '; rnbodian pop-
ulation in this other area, i -ompletely oc-
cupied by North Vietnames nd VC forces.
When you're in these target t !at sort of op-
eration has to be approved n me. . . .
"Many people fail ta reali a that we [had]
had incursions into the e ctuary areas.
These particular incursion tarted during
the month of April and the ere carried on
an in-and-out basis entire oy the South
Vietnamese and by the Arm ( the Republic
of Vietnam forces. As far qoing forward
with the introducing Soul.] ' ietnaxnes and
American troops for 7 10 clw C. ,erations, that
particular plan had been ked on and I
had presented it to the a ,L1 onal Security
Council but the National -e tufty Council
decision and the Presidenth ecision to im-
plement the pl...n did not ss i illy take place
until Monday evening or To a. ay morning...
Q. "Mr. Secretary, was th a any amphibi-
ous undertaking under cone .1, ration regard-
ing Silianoukville at any tis a "
A. "I tell you, we have a sorts of con-
tingency plans....
"I want to make it clear We're not go-
ing to become bogged dos ci these sanc-
tuaries....
?
Q. 'Why didn't you ask 'c igress for ap-
proval for the Cambodian m) eration before
you did it?"
A. "It was not necusary c use this Cam-
bodian operation is a pari the Vietnam
program....
May 22?Television inter a :
". . . the time table wh al has been set
by the President for the wit :d awal of Amer-
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36 CONG R ESSIO \ AL RECORD ? S ['NATE Jamtary c, 1971
an troops from. the Cambodian sanctuary the std. of teat unit. Can you foresee 'tat above what the Vietnam war was costing
ration will be met in every respect. I hatesenin.g irk the months or years to come? otherwise?
it would be a mistake, however. to P General Wheeler: "I can only cite 'e .at A. Secretary Laird: "There will be no midi-
:eke a firm time table and establish it the President said, He said he was going to tional cost as far as the Vietnam operations
here tor the Vietnamese forces. I personally use air power to interdict the movement of are concerned. This s'S budgeted in. the I.970
763 stecretary of Defense, if the occasion emitter supplies and men within Comb:seta, operational budget for our troop operations
sore when the South Vietnamese if -Piet prover tifteeesary to :protect the lises within Vietnam. . .
' tee emed eh into the sanctuary areas at of emerican troops. I don't think I cot eh Q. Me. Novak: ". . ,. Do you think they
tiealien the sanctuaries are rebuilt: wit si propriete, go any further than tiseat, (the South Vietnamese) could have handled
theire are North Vietnamese occupy- Mr l'hancellor, the incursion into 'Cambodia without the
iste oartitiular territory, I would recom-. Ci Mr. Beecher "Mr. Laird, I would eke help of U.S. troops?
that tery be used if they so desire, to up a little bit on that qua' )n A. Secretary Laird: "No, the operations
stated be a decision that would be worked abchr Amere ati air power in Cambia:ea could not have been carried out as success-
-, ceeperation with the Cambodian Gov- aga -t in , eleton and supply targets : fully, but I do not want to take away from
istit and the South Vietnamese ? low re the tvi ,hdrawal of our ground tries es the South Vietnamese by answering that
r wet he no American advisors in the ?1-7 at the end of the month, particular question.
di,., an:er .June 30th. The President has " I a we assume that such. air strikes ill Q. Mr, Novak: ". . Why do you say it
see: this Ca r This operation has been a not h. limitee so the approximate depti. of couldn't have been carried out without
:sit ractissat success and it has exceeded 21 iseies from the Vietnam herder that , American troops, since they have done so
tape/state-ins of General Abrams thus ?nee to our ereund combat. forces, but .n well?
- ter as destroying facilities, uncover- fact could extend far Into Cambodia if Ole A. Secretary Laird: "In the Fish Hook
intelinition and food. This was the pri- tareees ere far trio Cambodia? area we would have had to move the 25th
e ere miesson -room a tactical standpoint . A eetsretary Laird: "We w,,11 carry cn ie division or the First Air Cavalry Division be-
the things that had a tre- best kind ef :IL: interdiction campaign ssse cause they had the security responsibility
riseirmue umilence. I think, on this whole
ie-ration hat( possibly can, Whether that air interdict sen opposite that area. So we would have had
been the successes of the can carried sort the best in Laos or in Cas,:e. to move the Americal out and move the
isth Vietnamese. ? the morale has been bodes is a question that will have to ise South Vietnamese in. It would have been a
aamendnits--,the morale buildup?they'll be resm ved after tee 30th of jtsine, when ell tremendous logistics problem.
eiire to go in-country and strengthen their Amerioans yell be withdrawn from Cambre,..i, Q. Mr. Novak: "Wouldn't the logistical
ty efferts within country . Q. Ser. Beecher, "In other words, if I untie:- Mconvesnience have been worth it, consider-
-every American will be out of Cambedist stard you, sir---let me ask this at a cense .ng the political' damage done to your
' 30th of June. We've already reduced lion Should the North Vietnamese est-'- Administration at home?
emerican presence in the sanctuary nsh a new supple system deeper inside Cass a A. Secretary Laird: "Personally, I believe
eta. and the only place they have operated hod a ought we apply air power there as e that the political damage that you talk
hoer. In the sanctuary areas?the cc- have along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Li- ts about will be non-existent in a few months,
rest- m territory of Cambodia which is CC- for serne time^ because this operation can be judged on the
roe" by the North Vietnamese . . . The A. ericretary Laerd: think a judgm t short term tactical successes, which have
e Vietnamese have had the major re- would have to be made at that time, and I been tremendous. But the operation really
atensi hintv .
wou a not wart to make that judgment ea will be judged on the long term strategic
Link. OW primary interest in Cam-
sesita and (Roo i this program. But it wculd seem to me ti t successes, and that will be based on the
s the effect that Cambodia
arm the eiterdiction might be carried on mete progress towards Vietnm
aization. .
. eres have Orion our Vietnamization pro- reasenably in the Ho Chi Minh Trail becai -se Q. MI', Spivak: ". . . Our operation in
grain end the American presence and the
and protection of the American troops of th 2- row number of choke points that woe Cambodia highlights -the importance of
seis site
ete ,eh are en Vietnam be ire:shied. But I don't believe that; it wotad having it friendly got ernment there. What
e
eerie: any useful purpose for its to disci.' s will the U.S. do if the government is min-
s far as rebuilding the Army of Cam- the -peciflcs of operational orders. These tarily threatened by the enemy, as it may
this would be a very long process. You ordeis will be cerried out in the best vele well be?
,(1i: go forward in the matter of weeks that '1.ey can be carried out in order to pe - A. Secretary Laird: "Personally, as Secre-
or ,noriths to modernize that particular army. tect entericans that are serving in Vietnate. tary of Defense, I believe that we best keep
siee problem that we have to look at here and 'I,,' purpose of any air interdiction ; ." our eye on the ball, and that is Vietnam.
' etf,ci the North Vietnamese in- supp.ies or material commg down from Nor- I believe that the success of the Cambodian
-on and occupation in certain areas of
sad ea-tein areas of Cambodia on our Vietnam. through the Ho Chi Minh Tr's ,1 operation should be judged in terms not of
s
VI-, naftt program . ." throi elsi Laos Is ti Cambodia, the purpose :f the success of the government in Carnbodia.
4,---"Nfeet the Press" (with Genera/
any enerdiction eampaign will be to proteti. but the success of the Vietnamization pro-
Amertcans and reduce American casualtic gram arid our withdrawal program. Per-
es- a Wheeler, Chief. JCS):
as ic is a m
s Americans a:7e present in Sous:. smelly, as Secretary of Defense. I believe
Sit Per-
ot-alloy': "Will the South Viet- ittlraw fromVieti. eel. that the emphasis must be on the Vietnam-
Cambodia corn- Q. Or Brandon: "General Wheeler, wot, ieation program and not on the rise or fall
'lacy rtaird: "I would not antic:-
you re e out I'M, reentry of American grotme 0.1 any other government.
t tile South Vietnamese would eye
troop m
.; into Cabodia? Q. Mr. Chancellor: ". . . What if the
A. eatt I' ieral Wheeler: " would have to, be si
- Rusans are reading the ability of the
tee sai le time table that the United States 4: cause .tie Priest le ye e nt has said that we American. President to move in an unprif-
(0. o. Hewever, the South Vietnamese
i edieated that they have a primary withdraw from Cembodia, and while I can detable way, a way thet the policy planners
77.117 an within th.eir country, and I would be back within forest a ail of the circumstances that miget cannot predict? This was at least part of the
ea : i
arise the tutu re, I think his intent is the: Cambodian. operation. And If it makes this
s ; t hat teat- would soon
sauritre we wsi not reenter Cambodia, cciuntry have a sort of nervous breakdow sit
/teesl feet night the President said Q. ,,t, Brandt ni "We have atm been tot' as it went through for a few days after this
. ,
21117 remaining American activity
that a" North Vietnamese are row buile operation, do you believe that that limits
. rta
erelta will Ise air missions to interdict ing tp a new tiaaettrary in South Laos,, the options of the President for acting in
tnevement or enemy troops and mate-
woridsr now uneertant is it and what yo : other parts of the world? . . .
in. :etre teed the President, 'find this is plan si tie about ic? A. Secretary Laird: ''I first want to sey
- orrtitect the lives and security A. late-feral Weeeler: "What thin/ are at that it never was anticipated by anyone that
,-,tirr,Fis 7, ernith Vietnam, tuella doing, Mr. Brand:tn. is that they ars there would be a Kens State or a Jackson
this reeen helicopter gun ships or extending the hese complexes farther to the situation developing, ar.d that was indeed an
1:17 t, the military prognosis on north in a sense but also nether to Ms.- unfortunate tragedy in both cases. But I 1-.0
smith. 'old we mill take the appropriate A," fest that the importane thing that is being
I imarese rier inheeler "I think be was talk-
Chancellor, about the use i tion -Ctn. we na re taken against other ba' accomplished in this Administration is tie
e,' :
areas, 0th :aaos and es in Cambodia. Lt cablishrnent of credibility, as far as ties
s
tr-hen nem aircraft, or larger aircraft
other iterds, we vie use air power agonise. WAS is co:acerned. And the important Jude-
i
:-
that E ;actuary area, or that base area. merit will be made on the 30th of June tha t Ile iitiils--,triter gun ships, Again. how-
wou it,tt, like to foreclose on the Q. Mr grandma "Only air power" we meet this deadline the time that has
been set by the President of the United
!
sseee esss , because it will depend A. c:reeral WI eider: "That, Is corntrt, Srtates, just as he has met every other dead-
ii : ..1 target which would be the Q. I tr. Novak: ",!ecretary Laird, when ye ? lir.e on troop withdrawal. I think this is the
r taruriEn ;? of war to use. were , ?a.eittniale cengressman yrs' were important thing in the long run, to restore
(iisit.tietilor: "Theoretically, sir. a very c teal of tie', Democratic AO tYli nistrs. - this credibility, as far as Southeast Asia is
: I - are worried that if a unit tion I not lath t the truth ahteit how concerned, and to move forward towards the
s melte emsnarnese Army is in trouble much mey the war- was Posting. Could yoi Nixon doctrine, which :des as its overridine
ar might be ineluctable say le w much th s Cambodian artry?thit goal the ;avoidance of "hi s kind of groun.I
on the United States to come to cane)/ exert- Si' Is goingto cost over ant, involvement in Southeast Asia. ?
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January 29, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL R LCORD ? SENATE
June 26?Interview by Newsmen:
Q. ". . . has the policy of interdiction and
bombing of Cambodia been extended to in-
clude the combat air support of both the
ARVN and the Cambodian armies in Cam-
bodia?
A. "I made it very clear, as I testified before
the Foreign Relations Committee back early
in May, a policy that our government would
pursue as far as air support was concerned.
After the Cambodian operation, which will
end as far as Americans are concerned on the
ground on June 30, we will carry on an air
Interdiction campaign and any airpower that
is used in Cambodia will be based upon the
interdiction of supplies, or personnel, that
threaten the Vietnamization program, that
threaten Americans, that are engaged in mili-
tary operations in Vietnam.. The primary em-
phasis will be on the interdiction of supplies,
materiel and personnel.
". . . the primary reason for the air activi-
ties will be the protection of Americans in
South Vietnam, but I would be less than
frank or candid with you if there would not
be a side effect as far as Cambodian and
South Vietnamese troops operating within
Cambodia, but the primary reason for the air
operations still will be in accordance with
the testimony which I gave to the Foreign
Relations Committee of the United States'
Senate. . . .
Q. "Do you rule out close air support for
the Cambodians in the future?
A. "I do not believe that it's good practice
as far as military planning is concerned to
give fiat answers on operating orders as far
as the future is concerned. I can assure you,
however, that the primary reason will be as I
stated before the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, the primary reasons for carrying on
air activities in Cambodia, will be the inter-
diction of supplies and materiel, interdic-
tion of personnel, to protect Americans in
Vietnam, to protect our Vietnamization pro-
gram, to make withdrawals of American
troops a continuing process and to reduce
American casualties.
". . . the supply routes through Cambodia
have had in the past, and could have in the
future, an effect as far as our Vietnamization
program is concerned, and we will continue
to carry on an interdiction campaign in this
area in order to protect our Vietnamization
program. . . .
Q. . . would a Communist takeover of
Phnom Penh jeopardize ....Vietnamiza-tion
seriously? .
A. "We have had periods of time when the
supplies coming in through Cambodia were
a very serious problem as far as the IV Corps
and the III Corps area is concerned, and I
would be less than frank with you if I did
not indicate that the supplies through Cam-
bodia, coming through Sihanoukville, have
had an effect, a very substantial effect, on
the war effort in Vietnam, and we are going
to do everything we can to see that our in-
terdiction campaign of these supplies and
personnel is successful in order to protect
our Vietnamization program. . , ."
July 23?Speech:
"As the threat from the Cambodian sanc-
tuaries has been, blunted, and as the Viet-
namization Program continues to move for-
ward, evidence multiplies that the Presi-
dent's strategy and his doctrine are pro-
ducing the desired results. Concern for the
lives of our servicemen and for their safe
return to the United States was the key
deciding factor that caused the President to
conduct the limited operation in Cam-
bodia. . . ."
August 6?News conference:
Secretary Laird: "I think the situation in
Cambodia today is better than I had ex-
pected it would be at this time. .. .
"As far as the improvement of the Cam-
bodian Army, I think they have shown good
progress....
". . . I am concerned about the use of the
sanctuaries, the use or supplying forces that
can attack Americans and can jeopardize the
Vietnamization program, and our troop
withdrawals, and the reduction of American
casualties. ...
"... I also am concerned about the use of
the harbor at Sihanoultville?and the use
that was made of abat harbor for logistics
support operations, ooth for the VC and the
North Vietnamese. It is very important?and
it has been of considerable help?to have
that avenue or logistics support shut off. I
certainly feel it is te the interest of our pro-
gram in South Vietnam to keep the sanctu-
aries shut off, to interdict the supplies and
personnel, whether ahey are coming through
the opening of the He Chi Minh Trail on
down through Laos, the use of the Mekong,
or efforts to reopen Sihanoukville.
Q. "There has been some rather explicit
reporting out of Cambodia that American
airplanes are provitiing direct combat sup-
port to the Canibodian troops.
Secretary Laird: 1. am not going to dis-
cuss operating orders, but I can tell you that
we will continue to interdict supplies, per-
sonnel and logistic routes. There will be cer-
tainly ancillary benefits, too, that will affect
Cambodian operation.s. however, our primary
mission, as far as the use of our air?whether
it be in the southern part of Cambodia or
along the sanctuary areas, or along the river
routes?will be interdiction of supplies and
personnel. I have been noticing these news-
paper stories. I would Just direct your atten-
tion to when I was hit at Andrews Air Force
Base as I came back fromn my trip to Europe
and the NATO meetings. I outlined that
policy very clearly at that time. [See June
26 entry]. I have had personal contacts with
General Abrams, prior to his going to the
hospital, about. the use of air interdiction in
Cambodia. We are still following that policy.
Q. "Mr. Secretary, I am very much dis-
tressed . at the difference between the
policy that we are told exists and the per-
fectly obvious. implementation of it, and
most specifically John Wheeler's story from
the scene this morning in great detail . .
That is not interdiction by any stretch of
the imagination. sir; that is close air sup-
port operations All tile talk between the
airplanes and the ground controllers was
recorded in this dispatch. Bow do you square
the difference between what is reported by
an eye witness with long experience with
the stated policy et interdicting only those
things which can jeopardize us in the South?
This is an operation in a new part of Cam-
bodia. . .
Secretary Laird: -Well, in that particular
area it is very much related to the opening
up of the sea area lor supplies, etc. I would
merely state that the neclsion was made by
the Commanders in the field that it was an
important interdict ion mission to destroy?
I believe, in ,his case, personnel. But this
Is a decision which certainly can be made
by the commander COMUSMACV has that
authority to interdict. personnel and to in-
terdict supplies.
"We have stayed by [hal authority and he
(COMUSMACV) has used that authority. I
have no criticism of the use of the author-
ity in Cambodia. I saw one report that every
request was adhered so. That certainly is
not the case. These interdiction missions are
flown when it is felt personnel, or supplies,
or the buildup is 01 sufficient magnitude, or
it has an effect upon the overall program
which we have in Vietnam.
Q. "But 300 yards in !runt of ground forces
under control of forward ground controller
In. an OV-10, sir. is not interdiction.
Secretary laird: -Well, it depends on
what you refer to as at. interdiction, I think.
I believe it is. It is von % difficult to get these
forces together in large numbers and to get
concentrations of supplies. The VC and the
North Vietnamese tire now. following the
S 537
policy of trying to coacent their sup-
plies and their buildup of sir .p les, material
and men around popuiatio enters. You
have to have forward air con ?.( iers, so that
you can, be in a pos tion 're you can
protect civilians.
"I can assure you that C USMACV in
his use of this interdiction as t rrity is mak-
ing every effort, with a bsolui )ositive con-
trol, so that civilians will i 0 be involved
in any way with the Interc ,on missions
flown by the United S:ates r gorce. I be-
lieve that it was wise to -r forward air
controllers under conditions 3 .ch as these,
in order to protect the 11% .1 of innocent
people.
". . I know that it has .5 .1 helpful to
us as far as our program in a 11am is con-
cerned. Now as far as wving I ctual assess-
ment of its effect on he Cu a .odian situa-
tion, I am sure it has. beet t .ipful, but I
can't give you a percen age n ;Lye you that
kind of a judgment. . ? .
". . . MACV's judgment. It .ed upon its
effect upon our operations.
Q. "I'm just trying to find how serious
the military situation was i r Cambodia.
Could that government haw rvived with-
out the benefits they receivei le side bene-
fits they received from our Gerdiction?
Secretary Laird: "I would I irk that this
would have helped materia a but I can't
make the positive judgment it and give
you percentages. I think, ce :nly, the an-
cillary benefits have been ul from the
interdiction campaign.
Q. "Mr. Secretary, are th many cases
where they asked for help I ii, they would
consider close air support ant a a denied it to
them, because it was not Sr in benefit to
do so?
Secretary Laird: "Yes, of ae, there are
cases. There are cases when v e can't posi-
tively control the aircraft ii re we would
be in a position where we a 'old not use
them.
Q. "Can you break that it ell with any
kind of percentage basis, 0 number, or
total number of requests, r. a, many are
honored?
Secretary Laird: "I can't g 't you the per-
centage. No, but it is a sue s Alai number
that aren't, because they d fit in with
our overall guidelines in th irea and our
overall operations.
September 2?News aonfei r. .e:
"When I have been asker le questions,
even before the Senate Fr a an Relations
Committee, in early May, v nether there
would be a limit on the us airpower in
Cambodia and whether the A ,Tle limit ap-
plied to ground forces I ant -ed that very
categorically that there WC be no such
limit. I just don't be ieve t. anyone can
find a case where I've shied v ay, have not
given you complete md information.
"The number of sot- les is natter which
I have not released, 10 d we riot releasing
the sortie levels . . . we're IS r.g air power
in Cambodia to destn.y sup .1 'ti, to destroy
buildups, to destroy ,terser s buildups as
well as supply buildups, been we feel that
this is important from the s ipoint of our
activities in Vietnam. I've t % you that we
have a commitment to Cam tra, our com-
mitment was a free and op, -1 -ommitment.
it's $8.9 million in :Minas issistance in
Fiscal Year 1970."
Q. "Did you say there wa i lommitment
to Cambodia?"
A. "$8.9 million as far as a- nary assist-
ance, this is a commitmen hat we have
made. It is $40 million of m: zy assistance
in Fiscal Year 1971 and ti .t commitment
soon after it was made, as S on as I was
asked about, I told of that ? imitment. In
addition to that, we have i commitment
which has been made on s a ral occasions
by the United States, as wc LS the Soviet
Union, to the neutrality of ii Government
of Cambodia. This was ma a in April 16,
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58 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SI NATE Javoitarti 29, 1971
we came out and outlined this commitment
strough the Australian Amlaasador in Phnom
Penh.
When I was asked the qudestion of
synether we had a military commitment as
'at! the use of American manpower to
ratinbodia ? , I answered that question in
negative because as far as military man-
r is concerned, we have no commitment
there, The SEATO commitment that was im-
rated by the SEATO agreement when the
einATO treaty was signed, that particular
military commitment was renounced by the
Cambodian Government itself, This is a mat-
ter en record I can go through this and
item:anent every statement I have made in
rearard to Cambodia, Now, when you ask me
about sortie rates, I've always said we weren't
geetg to arnoonce the sortie rates. ,
altarber I l?,Television interview:
-That question of [Communist control
n" 'r that rano area is merely a control
ti tine the Cambodian Arm.y is not making
, it the area.. ..
its it:e question of control in a stand-
pia . er an ,npla,ce cease-fire, I don't think
yeti wouie find that the North Vietnam-
on e are in a position where they would
aelmalty truly control that land area. They
are controlling certain sections of the land
area, because they are not being challenged
at :he ,aresent rime except along the Vietnam-
ese border They are being challenged along
Um Vietnamese border by South Vietnamese
lot': es and by some Cambodians that have
ho ii trained in South Viet-Nam,,,,"
attober 12--News briefing:
"stvery effort is being made by our forces
to interdict, suoulies and personnel as they
move into hams and as they move within
Cambodia.. This interdiction campaign is
pregressing very well and the results have
exceeded our expectations. , ."
N] "would we consider going back to pre-
vent them I the Cambodian sanctuaries]
omit, building back up"?
,t
"the South Vietnamese have come in
contact with North Vietnamese operating
alma?: the border areas of Cambodia. There
hatm not been substantial movements, how-
eve?r or North Vietnamese forces and Viet
Coag forces into these sanctuary areas. The
contact in these areas is being made by the
Sou in Vietnamese at the present time and
we believe that. the South Vietnamese forces
earl tra.ndle the situation very adequately."
wember 35 Statement before the House
Foreign. Attairs committee:
tsre support we have provided them [Cam-
bodia's forces is directly related to our own
interests because Cambodia's ability to de-
fent t ttaelf is a vital element in the continued
sumess of Mietmunization. Of particular im-
porriterme to the fact that the diversion of
theimands ot North Vietnamese main-force
troops to Cambodia, has resulted in a sharp
;fret, in EaS casualties in Military Region III
af :Matta Viet-Nam.
convinced that our continued
atmeact of Cambodian self-defense is a mat-
ter er high priority. As an indication of the
?arneecy; of this request, I would mention
lam: 70 percent, of the supplemental funds
li be used for ammunition,
N,,vember 25--Testimony before the House
committee on Appropriations:
e; net believed that the increase in
military and economic assistance to Carnho-
' ei getting the United States too deeply lil-
ted in Cambodia. We have made and are
:i ng every snort to restrict our presence
anti itivalvement in Cambodia. We have pro-
aided military assistance to maximize the
eapacity or the Cambodians for 'doing it
enetirselyest as envisaged under the Nixon
doctrine, As the President explained on June
ere we have no ground personnel in Cam-
bodia e.scept sox the staff of the Embassy,
which is small, nor do we have an U.S. ad-
eaters with Cambodian units, We do conduct
;.,,ir interdiction in a portion of Cambodia.
but lois is to protect our farces in Soil h
Vietnam. In atm, our aid is designed to is se
the am bodiars tee wherewithal to fight Me
North Vietnamese, rather than uf, doing it r ,r
there The Cambodians have shown good he:-
rale and great resolve to run their cm I..
affair: .
will ec-iduct--with tart approval d
the tr tambodia i Goverliment--air intecd: ?-
tion nission against the enemy efforts ? o
mos - supplies FlUil personnel through Cat -
hod: toward 3outh Vietnam and to re a
tablis I base area; relevant, to the war in V ?-? ? -
narn We clo this se protect our forces it
Soul -i Vietnam .
"Tarere art, undroximately 1.4.000 of Me
enenir tinerating in Cambodia. It is of very
grea' .mportan re to our Vietnamization pl., ,-
grar, that the Cambodians have the capab.?-
ity 1,,, meet that military force. We are co.,-
fidete, that the Cambodians can make it e
kind ef effort that is necessary to protes?t
thentsiaves if tire can. go forward with fl
mill's asistance program
"A- t he time of the Cambodian sanctus
otter Men. in w rich American forme were -
volvc it along with South Vietnam forma
then vas a total of about 38 North Vietnam-
ese battalions finaaged in that area. Carnes -
than farces, alones with some help from tee
Sold 1 Vietnamese forces, are meeting Um t,
milita iv challenge at this time. If we are g e-
ing t ; continue our troop reduceions in Vie' -
nam beyond the May 1 announcement win; a
has already been made by the President
the I i, red States, it is absoltmely essent:?., I
that `A', keep the enemy's Cambodian logist i?-
supp,y route to \nettle:en closed, particular:
the r art formerly called Sihancukville. TI: is
has a ttibstantial effect on the protection '
the I VPS of Ameriean service :aereonnel, aim
stabi I v of HI and IV Corps as tar as Viet-
nam s ooncerned
"Pmer to the change of policy by Cane
bodia ,ind the strutting off of the logiste
supple routes, most of the logistic supplim
for III and IV corps carte in thr?augh Cam-
bodia Closing t hese routes has been of vet:,
great ;assistance to the force; in Vietnam,
It is e real plus aa far as providing increased.
possibilities for f .tether troop reductions
Vietre en are ceneerned. It is a very sine it
investment to provide this tnoney in the
form re:: militate/ assistance to the forces at
Carnleatia, whet'. arm considers the daily co e
of this war in Vietnam, partioularly at
high level at I Jets
Dec', idler It- neestimeny be fors the Sc.
ate Pareign Relations Comrniatte:
"In nambodie at the present time, Use
Cambedian. regain, forces are tying don
over M.000 regular North Vietnamese force
In ad ttion to (sat, they are tying down ie
000 or more Vet forces that are operati r:
within their no intry We b,ilieve thie
when the CamIxellart governin,srit has it
volun 1 curs, but does not have the militate
equip esnt they reed. it is better for us
equip : hose volormeers to meet this fort
than i involve American eornbat forces..
Q " Carnhotlia is in danger of fa
ing. ? what tw tad yee recommend tlh;
we do
' Wee the erim thintr, that would re; -
ammo it . wo 11,1 be to enenitrage a great ?
em use of South Vietnamese foreP.S thou,
they te requested by the Cambodian govern ars seeing the Nixon Doctrine at work. Asian
men t nations are joining together in ground corn-
There ore no approved 'contin
? bat against the Communist aggression, There
gency I://IS which contemplate the use
nations am providing the manpower for their
Amen:17,S in Carabedia as erourat combs,
forces . own defense. As has been stated repeatedly
since the. President enunciated the Nixon
Dc,ctrine in Guam in 1959. the United States
would be and is prepared to provide mate-
rial assistance and air and sea assistance te
our allies and our frienes in Asia.
". . They [the Cambodians} have tee
support on the ground of their neighbors, the
forces of the Republic of Vietnam. The pee-.
plc'of Cambodia know that there will be no
(American) ground combat forces committed
missions are limited to ground concentra-
ttons, movement of supplies, at cetera,., The
South Vietnamese are conducting some close
air support. We do net have U.S. ground
spotters positioning our U.S. Air Force at-
-tacks. We have very stringent rules . Those
rules provide that there will be no use of in-
iterdietion missions by the 'U.S. Air Force near
villages or cities where there are concentra-
tions of population . . If a target involving
personnel or logistic supplies is in an area
where it can be hit without damage to civil-
ians or populated areas, we do use air power
to destroy it....
We have flown interdiction missions
in all areas of Cambodia at the request of the
Cambodian government....
"The only involvement we have with Cam-
bodia is in the military assistance area, and
in the economic area . . I would assume
that we would continue for some period of
time to give military assistance and eco-
nomic assistance, but that is the extent of
our involvement,.,,"
1971, SECRETARY OF DEI`ENSE MELVIN R. LAIRD
January 11?On Arrival at Hickam A.B.,
Q. "Mr. Secretary . . could you give us an
idea if in fact, it seem, to you that the Com-
munists are switching focus of their offense
in South Vietnam to Cambodia?"
Secretary Laird: "I think the enemy threat
in South Vietnam is not as great as it was, a
year ago. The threat in Cambodia remains
about the same, but the threat in South Laos
is increased considerably during the last
twelve months....
". . members of my party visited Cam-
bodia and reports on the progress being made
with the new military assistance program,
which has been approved by the Congress by
an overwhelming vote, would indicate that
the military situation was improving, and
that the Cambodians were making some
progress with the Military Assistance Pro--
gram. Of course, it's only had about four
weeks to be implemented, but the 'progress,
thus far, I believe, is adequate.
Q. "Sir, do you read the Congressional
mandate on the non-use of American troops
in Cambodia to permit the use of American
airpower that you feel is necessary to break
the stranglehold on the highways around
Phnom Penh?"
Secretary Laird: "Yet, I do. ,
Q. "Is there going to be an airlift in Phneem
Penh'?"
Secretary Laird: "There has been an airlift
in Phnom Penh. There has beers material
that has been airlifted. The South Viet-
namese have had several airlifts in there, and
I would assume that air, waterway, the other
means, would be used to deliver the military
equipment that has been authorized by the
Congress. I think it was a rather substantial
development as far as the Congress was COI, -
cerned, that we had this overwhelming von'
in favor of the Military Assistance Program
for Southeast Asia. It shows the true applica-
tion of President Nixon's Guam Doctrine, in
which we move from military manpower in
Southeast. Asia to military assistance.
January 20?News conference t
"Members of my party. including Adminit
Moorer, visited Cambodia. In Cambodia we,
"If ;r el take toe soma- Lion tha t exists!, t
earlier tins year the air war in Cambodi
has detreased. IT has substantially increased
durine the past month ES far as the South,
Vietnamese forces ore concerned. but to
number of missions flown by U.S pilots mm
compared with South Vietnantese pilots, i
much smaller. .
"The t7 S. Air Farce is flying irterdictior:
MiSSiO in Cambodia. These interdiction
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January 29, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
to their country, but they also know?and
this is most important?that they have the
support of the American people as expressed
In the overwhelming vote of the United
States Congress in favor of military assist-
ance to that country to help themselves in
their defense.
"In short. the United States is fulfilling
its pledge under the Nixon Doctrine to assist
our friends and allies, but not become in-
volved in ground combat. This is really a
case of ground combat personnel, no; mili-
tary assistance, yes. It is a case of manpower,
no; but assistance, yes. . . .
Q. ". . . In June of 1970, Mr. Nixon and
others in the White House indicated that
there would be an end to combat air sup-
port and our logistics support directly in
Cambodia once our troops on the ground had
left there. This policy seems to have changed
In recent weeks. Can you explain what this
change in policy is?"
Secretary Laird: " . . the President said,
I believe on June 30, that air support would
not be used or not necessary during the
termination of those sanctuary operations.
This was a correct statement, because the
South Vietnamese Air Force at that time
felt that they could perform the air support
that was needed and necessary to finish up
those sanctuary operations prior to the rainy
season setting in, which of course terminated
that phase of the Cambodian operation as
far as the South Vietnamese were concerned.
"We did, however, use air power in Cam-
bodia, and we have continued to use it, al-
though it was not directly related to the
South Vietnamese sanctuary operation. We
have continued and as the President said in
that same statement on June 30, he said we
will conduct with the approval of the Cam-
bodian Government?I am paraphrasing
this?air operations against enemy forces as
they move supplies and personnel through
Cambodia towards South Vietnam and re-
establish their sanctuary areas.
"I don't want to get into a semantic prob-
lem here of what this mission is called, or
that mission. I have always called it 'air ac-
tivities,' 'air support' as far as Cambodia is
concerned. and I don't care to get into a
question of semantics on that. We will use
air power, and as long as I am serving in this
Job, I will recommend that we use air power
to supplement the South Vietnamese forces,
as far as the air campaign in South Vietnam,
Laos and Cambodia. . . .
"The South Vietnamese will be in a posi-
tion, as the Cambodians will be in a better
position. The South Vietnamese are acquiring
the air capability, and the movement that
we've made with the transfer of well over
300 helicopters in this last year, I think is
significant progress. The progress we are mak-
ing as far as the fixed wing aircraft is con-
cerned is important. But we are going to
supplement as far as air power is concerned.
"I don't want anyone to leave this room
with any other understanding. I have out-
lined that to the Congressional committees.
We have this authority. It was spelled out
clearly in the Congressional legislation which
passed. The authors of the amendments
which limit ground combat activities, which
I support, and which I will see are lived up
to by this Administration and by the Depart-
ment of Defense.
"We will follow those Congressional man-
dates. But as far as air and sea activities, the
law is very clear that as far as the sanctuaries
or as far as protecting the Vietnamization
program, protecting American lives, insuring
withdrawal, all of these terms are written
very emphatically and clearly into the Con-
gressional legislation, which passed in this
last session of Congress. We will abide by
those Congressional mandates and we are
living within those Congressional mandates
today.. . .
"... supplemental air power has been used
to supplement the forces of South Viet-
nam . . . the vas,, maiority of all of the
supplies that moved MLO III and IV Corps
did originate in 'hal area near the Port
of Sihanuokwhe This route to the sea
is important, and every effort will be made
to see that it eannot he used as far as a
supply route by the enemy.
"The South Viel daniese contrary to some
reports went into this area on the ground,
and there hat. been seine airlift within the
area, which both Lee south Vietnamese and
the United States have provided. There has
been air support 110w ii by the South Viet-
namese, the Carrtiodinos and `the United
States Air Fen ces. I consider this an import-
ant use of ftil POA,O.r. :111d believe that it is
important to see :hal. the logistics supply
routes and the reilocking of the sanctuaries
be made as difficult; as possible during this
very important dry seii,;on . We have re-
cently received a avrrabie vote, an over-
whelming vete if-nrn ne House and the
United States Senate to support a military
assistance program lot Cambodia. . .
Q. "Mr. Secretate , von are talking about
the Nixon Doctrine and Voll are talking about
material assistance have you broadened it
by saying It a,so includes air assistance and
seapower assis.,ance?"
Secretary Laird: " We are making it
Clear . that our assistance will be in the
way of material: vial be maintained in the
form of sea and air power but that we do
not place the reliamte on the commitment of
ground combat fon es I eat the previous ad-
ministration die in this tires,.
Q. "Are you iavin ?; that the Nixon Doctrine
only preclude:- the use of ground combat
forces, period?"
Secretary Laird: "The Nixon Doctrine ap-
plies to building up the strength of our allies
in that area .Lnd. performing the needed and
necessary support requirements in order for
us to maintain an adequate deterrent as we
move towards nence in that area, and it does
place the emphasis Le the idea of partnership
and strength
Q. "Does that mean an open ended com-
mitment to all nountries of the Southeast
Asia with the exeentien that no combat
ground troops win a- .0n-emitted there?
Secretary 1,airci " the emphasis
Shifted away horn tee reliance on American
ground combat forces We're not, using any
ground combat forces in Cambodia. And I
Can assure you that we will not.
Q. ".
Does this mean that there might
be other ground ferees ,etroduced? Second-
ly, does the Nixon VirrontRtratiort feel that
no matter what has been said at one time,
that it has no right to ehaege its mind and
take a different stet) if tee exigencies of the
situation demand it lout it is not outlawed
by Congress?"
Secretary Laird: nink it is important
that we maintain our reeltionships as clearly
ELS possible and live within the Congressional
mandates that we have and we are doing
that . . . We ate gime do our best here
in the Department of Defense and within
this Administration o feffaire that this mili-
tary assistance prop's II will be carried out
as effectively and a, efficiently as possible.
"This will reisiiirs ..irse that we audit
the delivery of equialec I and ammunition
under the milli ary Les, amae program . . .
that audit re ;r..on- , will be carried
out by our Ili lt ..'!.iipment delivery
teams . . we will he in delivery
assistance teen s at a If ry minimum level.
I think yon !),',.1 iff Cod that the Gen-
eral Accounting Office w f have more people
checking it the we lot he-sure we are mak-
ing an all-out effcte, if, keep the military
presence, as far La tlis 'VI!! f-irv delivery teams
are concerned r) 11, 31,, hire minimum.
Q. "Mr. Secretary is o your contention
that if anyone it, irp, at the use of
helicopter guwhifis end nr other aircraft,
which appear to be triei,, ling close air sup-
port, that they did 1 Ot ,,tiersan-nd properly
S539
what you and Secretary Re a said in your
appearance on the 11111 WI a some people
got the impression that wit ,,ou were say-
ing is that you planned to C ee or sharply
limit or indeed even ban the i lerican use of
close support air power to getting us
involved deeper in Canibodif: '
Secretary Laird: "As I hi e ,aid here be-
fore, I don't want to get ie ) -lie semantics
over what we call it I in e .:ailed it 'air
support.' It's to stop the n I Lnent of per-
sonnel; to stop the moven t of supplies;
to put a halt to enemy buil L. is and to give
the kind of air and logistics rport that are
needed and necessary where : c. South Viet-
namese forces cannot sup ei it for them-
selves and the priority first L to the South
Vietnamese forces to use th m jr asset and,
as they are acquiring more L ii more, they
will have more and more fonsibility in
this area.
". . . If you will read ovt 1.e "Meet the
Press" statement, witri all s apologies to
you, in which I was of, a pre to with Sena-
tor Church and Sem tor C loll, you will
find that both of them in 1 erpreting the
most restrictive language th lad been pro-
posed . . . indicated . . tit . hat language
did not limit air support.
Q. "Mr. Secretary .. . is It dr inference
to conclude that if the Soul aetnamese in
any operations get in over ti ,4 heads in the
area of transporting troop r supporting
them with firepower Tt'om air, that we
will help them out?"
Secretary Laird: ".. . I th I !.?ou will find
that we did not give air sup' r as the sa.nc.
tuary operations closed up i, far as the
South Vietnamese were cot e ned, but we
were flying air operatiens in a ebodia, Laos,
South Vietnam. I thnk tl must be a
misunderstanding on the pa r,at some over
the number of sorties. The n 'a her of sorties
being flown at the present in the last
two months, or compared s t the sorties
flown during the summer of a t year, there
were more sorties flown last s. n riser than are
being flown today in Cambod the situation
Is such that we have de-esca r the war...
Q. "Mr. Secretary, have v art ourselves
committed to the defense t nmbodia, to
the point that if it anpearc lout to fall
because of its importance is continua-
tion of the Vietnamieation 'ogram, you
might have to consider gel 2 to Congress
and ask permission for them Ise American
ground combat troops in Ca' I ,dia.
Secretary Laird: "No, the - ire no such
plans. The situation it, firs- e are going
to make every effort to see ti t 'his military
assistance program, wl ich v a loproved by
such an overwhelming vote. . iccessful as
far as Cambodia.
"Secondly, and I wil' repe els, we will
not?and I repeat it again, in commit U.S.
ground combat forces to Ca; I elia directly
or indirectly.
"In the third place, as Cambodia
is concerned, we are sapper the ARVN
in Cambodia with air activ a; which are
designed to prevent the reel t lishment of
the sanctuary areas and the stic supply
routes into those sanctuary a
"It is obvious, I think, the - ese air and
logistic activities help all e le friendly
ground forces as far es Cmi: .ita is con-
cerned. But the primer.' ernr t _a, as far as
we are concerned and s-;. far or Govern-
ment is concerned, is that th being car-
ried on as part of the ce?erall et to inter-
dict and to stop the now mae emy forces
which would have an cpport' to attack
U.S. personnel stationed in Vi sm.
"I recognize that there f hose that
criticize this position which I ^ and which
is the position of the Admi .atiaa. But
so long as I am Secre;,ary q'ense and
have this responsibility, I wou ouch rather
endure the criticism than ? permit the
enemy by an uninhibited ft a ef supplies
and personnel to be in a posit, LI where they
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CON GR I NE RECORD --- SEN E January zo, Jo, I
could ientee, i ties anu attacks on Amex:I-
-ea!: isl Itary personnel as we continue, as we
C011t,1111.1e LO remove Americans from South
Vieet
"You haven't said what we would do
taint:a:ha male. Mr, secretary.
earE tare Laird: "I don't anticipate that
Ca :abodia will fall if our military assistance
pa teram is successful. This is a critical period,
as I have said earlier, When you go from
30.,,ed to ever 200,000 in the military force,
k,ave Cue will, they have the desire
to 3tiet L tile enemy, the invaders from the
Nearth. I aro confident that they will be sue-
ui in 61.,eir efforts. But I want to make
earn:Ian civ evident to you, Bill, tnat there
in no ground ferces involved and there will
aoi noah forces involved.
qr. Secretary, as I read the President
ea:, Jule ad, he would permit interdiction
au ...tatty it Cambodia after the withdrawal
of ,:mr troops, but would preclude both close
I >pat t and logistic support. As I understand
you say that close support and
lett:Pith: support however described, are now
p oil ted.
erFitary Lanci: "I don't use those terms.
.1X :Mout air support. have always talked
a" it air support.
t,-). 'That kind of activity, however de
n: bed, is permitted by two things: One, a
definition of what the Nixon Doctrine is
ically all about: and, two, the fact that the
Ceogress Mein t preclude this kind of activity
it t Vo-:,ing a supplemental and restricting
ground comoat activity?"
tteggetary Laird: ''You are correct in both
ea. The Congress did not preclude this,
aiid I, hats always been anticipated by me
-ii al,3f my testimony that air support would
used,
-laic use ol rielicopter gun ships and the
it, ..irovemente :.hat we have made in the last
the helicopter gun ship has been
portant It s been much more effectively
and some of the other gun ships are
aeb snore effective than they were a year
av.ia; far as stepping logistic movement. . .
.. 'Do yatu anticipate that this commit-
:tact of air support, as you put it generally,
eiing to he nh-permanent or for the next
years"?'
getary Baird: "No, I don't. As a matter
e ? fttet, inst we are In this period when the
Cembodialia are building up their military
gth and they are going forward with
et tirogram and have made what I believe
toed progress for a short six months.
tar aSt he Phase II of the Vietnamiza-
program which I have discused with all
ye- you many times, that program does take
thaii the turn over of the ground
eerehat reimorisibilities because of the train-
halie utvolved. But the South Viet-
eemeee oe in a position where they will
?- have ce eall on additional assets in the
- LAD luture.
1ori-t -vane to give the number of months
atuoteet of time that's involved in
eat, beta:Ise we are not making forecasts
? p !ojeo tons in this department as long
?t. :nu -tie-irridiry of Defense. We make cer-
e,iti stia temen ts and we deliver on them, but
:41 not :waling up some target goals that-
- can't il.diiver on. I can assure you that the
gee'ees is with that training. As far as
wina aircraft is concerned anci as far
tarv ittritaft, the South Vietnamese are
=,t1 sisiteLtig good progress.
-Does rte letter and the spirit of your
,i late .r,tit the Congress and from the
indiude U.S. ground forces in Cam-
i widen are not combat troops? In other
woMil your mandate permit the send-
a ,,t, turn ,shications unit or a held hospi-
lit which is not directly cam-
.
,:rctaly leiird: "So far as the law is con-
e:ellen, it woulh not prohibit that. It does not
,,e e terse military assistance delivery
team:, does a it prohibit seas ea aim rose ,
opera
e einrit and the letter of the law woul -
be 10. wed and you could do the things the:
you 1 et imed I don't want to give the
that we have plans to go beyonte
the I ntary delivery teams whieb we wIt
have -;,ipervisin ; the programs.
Q. !low many et those will be ,nvolvec
Se, tatt-,ary Laij d: -The number of people
Q. 'sea, sir
Secret ary Laird "The number of people Ii
volteti :it the jaresent time in military de
liver - don't Mild me to this too closelv.
three 1e- four on either side, give me a litt
leeway is 12
Q. AS the let:gelation is drawn lie you a:
discue fag it. d you consider yourself pre -
eluded from operating, say, divisaen or ree -
men :al level act:tie:ors, to the Cambodians al,
the -"loath ale ;Lam ese operating in Cas -
bodi:- -
Set retary Lai 'd:
Q,
Q. "Mr. Secretary, how much more a r
power are we lirepared to use in Cambuc
Ibidtile present itt els'?"
Secretary Litra: I would (loam that
wouel get up t( the level os last year, but a a
coOl'I don't want to be in a position
putteig a sortie lunitation as fir as Ow: -
bodhe if that s what you atant. am 1.1,
goine to do that. Because I have told Ge, -
eral Abrams that I want nira to do eves -
thing lie can to continue to keep Americe,i
casu,-Ities
Q ? Mr. Secietary. does that mean ti
there ere no 1r hibitions of any kind on I t
use t?.,1 American air power in CamOodia?'
Se atetary Ls rd ? "I don't care to discii s
the eperating orders I have never discuss t d
the aierating orders which 1 have approN.
in Sill Lance. I can only say tc, you that th,--e
are certain, protections written into the e
orders, there are certain controle that . e
writ cil into tlf3se orders.-
Emphasizes that aged Americana use
on less than half the income of those
under age 65, despite the stopgap 15-
percent social security increase of DP-
comber 1969..
Report's that a new group of aged poor
may be n the making among those now
55 to 59, because one ,out of every six men
now in that age group will be out of the
work force by the time he reaches his
65th birthday if present trends continue.
Points out that so-called older work-
ers?those 45 years or older?are hard
hit by current unemployment. Since Jan-
uary 1969, the number of jobless men in
this age group has jumped from 596,000
to 1,017,000. The report says:
Their unemployment lasts longer than that
of younger workers, and the older person has
greater difficulty in finding work at the same
pay level after a prolonged layoff.
Descrbes the problem of the elderly
homeowner who finds it increasingly
difficult to pay property taxes, including
one woman who paid more than half of
her total income of $1,958 for taxes and
a special assessment. Household costs
take about 34 percent of the average re-
tired couples budget.
Criticizes the forthcoming Mores se,
from $5.30 to $5.60 a month, in the medi-
care part B premium. The report says
that the average health bill in fiscal year
1969 was $692 for a person past age 65,
six times that for a youth and 21/2 times
that for persons from 19 to 64. Medicare
pays less than half of the total medical
care costes a the elderly.
Warns that inflationary pressures are
especially severe on elderly homeowners
because of the direct relationship be-
tween the local property tax and high-
cost local government services.
Among the recommendations made in
the report were the following:
That Congress speedily enact the :so-
cial security amendments adopted by he
Senate; modified to include the House-
passed provision for financing cost- of-
living increases.
That the 92d Congress gives early at-
tention to major changes in social secu-
rity benefit levels that are needed to pro-
vide meaningful economic security for
those who retired and to assure that
workers retiring in the future will real-
ize their full stake in retirement security.
That serious consideration be given to
the use of general revenues in the
financing of the social security program.
with the share identified through a for-
mula spelled out in the legislation..
That the Federal commitment to the
elderly undertaken through the Family
Assistance plan be translated into a
whole-hearted corainitment, with 100
percent Federal fiaancing and Federal
administration.
Turning to private pe:nsions, the com-
mittee recommended that immediate at-
tention be given to the special problem
of safeguarding the retirement income of
workers who lose their jobs as a result
of plant shutdowns, commonly after long
service and who?like the deteriorating
. plants that are first to be shut down?
are likely to be middle-aged and older.
That the 92d Congress give prompt
consideration to legislation?establishing
an Institute on Retirement Income. The
"ECCeNOMIC El OF AGING" REP01-: 1'
PRESENTS GRIM FACTS
Nee_ WILL P MS. Mr. President,
Sen ite Special Committee on Aging Is:
wition recent days, released a rep, st
called "Economics of Aging: Toward a
Ful' Share in Abundance."
Tnet repent follows a 2-year inqu,
dune which the committee took me ce
thao 2,000 pages of testimony and e
lath] ahdition, the committee re-
ceis iin eight working papers or :inforn.
ton sheets peepared by task forces or L
d1171.:ilsal nut! or;.
I: es no exaggeration to say that Hie
committee effort is the most .searcheig
con eressiona: evaluation of what mie ht
be elled the oersonal economics of agte.g.
Our goal wes to show exactly what is
ha seeming tc, individual older Americei
who inust ateempt to live on inadeque,:e,
fife'e. income while expense:; of daily Ly-
ing steadily rise. The committee ts.ok
mc j..1 testimony, not only from authe
tot e expert but from the elderly the:a-
sel 'es. Our firril renort includes extene. ye
eat ':'pts frem the testimony of b,,th
sumnisr.ze very briefly, the reps, st:
la,elares t..-eit poverty increased among
65-- Has Americans by 200,000 between
191,e and 1969, and by 12,000 for th fse
from ages 10 to 64, or ail other 'Age
firel ins, poverty declined by 1.2 million
s Amer cans are twice as likely as
:o,!tiler persons to be poor: 4.8 mil eon
65 -plus indiaiduals were living in pole-sty
in 1069,
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utttsNIONAL R WORD SENATE
rounding the world became seriously
harmed by thick, noxious clouds of pol-
lution. Toxic pesticides and detergents,
oil slicks of frightening proportions, un-
controlled waste and effluent spoiled and
destroyed our rivers and lakes. Eminent
biologists warned us that the precious
oceans might be devoid of productive
sealife in 50 years at the present rate
of pollution.
This policy of trading away the future
for the luxurious and easy present led
us, perhaps by default rather than by
design, to a point where we found our-
selves, in the words of Pete Seeger,
"standing knee deep in garbage, throw-
ing rockets at the moon."
The issues comprehended within the
Genocide convention are almost always
associated with threats or breaches of
international peace and security because
of armed conflict. Yet the threat posed
by an environmental catastrophe is just
as serious as that posed by genocide or
war. The right to a decent, environment
is protected by the United Nations in its
Declaration of Human Rights. Both are
vital to preserving human liberty and
freedom.
Each day as we read the newspapers,
we hear of one more animal being placed
on the endangered species list; one more
lake or ocean being ravaged by oil; one
more timberland being cut to ribbons by
the menacing jaws of the lumber indus-
try. We hear of watersheds and grass-
lands, owned by the public, being de-
stroyed by the hooves and teeth of flocks
of sheep. One Member of this body de-
scribed this tragic state of affairs as
buying "environmental disaster on the
national installment plan."
Again and again, we hurl crude clubs
against the fragile web of life on earth.
Again and again, we dismiss the warn-
ings of eminent biologists and scien-
tists. One-third of the world's original
forests are gone; over 280 million acr
of crop and range land have been de-
graded in our history as a country
one-third of our 9 inches of preciou I
a
Ii
es
tional cooperation is necessary to p
vent genocide and ?reserve human di
nity and freedom vet it is also
extremely important, to prevent enviro
mental destruction,
The challenge bei ore us is one of ep
proportions. All the talent, resourc
and energy of mansand will have to
harnessed if we are to restore the heal
of Mother Nature. It reauires not onl
a reordering 01 priorities, but almost
total change in national outlook a
thinking; it requires a concern for t
quality and not quantity of life: a s
ciety that conserves resources and do
not consume them at hizarre rates;
society that values its environment
something more precious than all th
trinkets o consumerism : a people th
cherish all life, animal or human. Th
environmental crisis a Ilbrds us, ironica
ly, the opportunity to engage in fa
reaching intern at:lo ne] cooperation , t
harness the common concerns of man
kind for a healthy, 1101 and dignifie
life. Nations who one oelv spoke to eac
other with weapons, can open dialo
of international concern over the de
struction of the environment. Tt is to th
hope of international cooperation tha
the Genocide Convention sneaks; it is t
this dream of r nein. ind that we mus
address ourselve;
We cannot spook ( f re-eventing geno-
cide and preserting human dignity and
freedom and ignore the threat of en-
vironmental suicide The challenge of
preserving man's health and that of
Mother Nature addresses itself to the
question of how tar man can use knowl-
edge and human re, mirees in shaping
his destiny. For top rr a nv veers we have
stood aloof from this ritieition as regards
the Genocide Convent on T hope the Sen-
ate will act on the Gencir rite Convention
at the earliest poseible oneertuniy.
S 461
re- battlefield in South Vietnan ir another
g- in Cambodia and Laos. Jus s we seem
so to be vacating one area eierations
n- where military success wa rapossible,
we are plunging hip deep s a worse
ie place.
es, The political stabiliy oi rabodia is
be far less than that we mans i to bring
th into being in South Vietni :/ Any in-
? volvement in Cambodia brii about al-
a most immediate intertwinen in Laos.
nd Military ability of this inner v r of Indo..
he chineses states is as lacking a l ieir polit-
e_ ical stability and institution
es We are plunging into the .1 crior of a
a vast area replete with more i= raphical
as obstacles than South Vietna -I Virtually
e impenetrable jungles lenge(
at ranges. Diseases medicine ha,
e heard of. Wildlife that preset-
dangers to troops. Is this Sf
r_ our decade-long involvemer
O Vietnam not taught us irnytl-
_ doomed to repeat past mists
d Mr. President, as the mint/
h deteriorates, we are faced wi
a, predictable timetable. All-on
_ by our forces has not &Howe
bodians, even with substai
t Vietnamese military aid. to fi
topsoil has been washed away. The iri-
dustrial nations of the world, like
hungry beasts, scour the earth to sat-
isfy their rapacious appetites. In the
board rooms of giant corporations, de-
cisions are made that vitally affect the
life of millions and the health of Mother
Nature herself.
In this decade, it would be wise for us
to ponder what it means to go to the
moon and still have millions starve; to
transplant human hearts, yet continue
to refuse "medical aid" for the environ-
ment; to travel to Paris a little faster in
a giant boondoggle SST, yet find it im-
possible to travel to work easily and
cheaply; to have instant replay for mil-
lions of TV viewers, yet find our priceless
wilderness areas vanishing from sight,
impossible to bring back by any techno-
logical feat.
It is clear that international coopera-
tion on an enormous scale is an impera-
tive if mankind is to avert ecological
catastrophe. With the ratification of the
Genocide Convention, we can take a
much needed step toward building a
body of international law?a prerequisite
for international cooperationi. Interne,-
mountain
-ely even
ncounted
ble? Has
la South
a 2 Are we
v ituation
an easily
: ir action
he Cam-
South
C: the mili-
tary tide. Deepening nivolt ent can
only drag us in on the grout-.
Reports of an airlift ea Them -,ops into
southern Laos adds another r a. nous as-
pect to this total picture. lie Red
Chinese have a substantial m: 1 try pres-
ence in that area. A road ha: 1 'en built
from the Chinese border acrr s much of
Laos. Thousands of Red Chi r troops
are in segments of Laos, gut r rag that
artery. If our surrogates the ' s s, come
with
1 oe back
I 'eater of
aerican
if these
may be
into actual contact ai.d co
these Red Chinese troops, w
them? Will we open up anothe
war against Red China Tin
, people have a right to kncr
Zazuations and the decisi, tl
sked to make.
I feel strongly that we she! c -lot ex-
change one arena of futile / eat for
another at may prove even r we use-
less and draining. Congress a. spoken
firmly against commithant , e Indo-
chinese interior of America.n I r rss. The
administration can and must s :ilia this
solemn drawing of lines. hay - desire
to see more billions of doll: -: hurled
away into the teeth of an all- turning
Asian wind. Those boys are ne here,
Those dollars are despei a tely tired at
home?in a thousand cities an ,wns.
I am not a peace-at-any-p; Mem-
ber of this body. Yet there is at a con-
sideration as the exercise of e lantary
commonsense.
America's people want an e Go our
massive involvement in South I Asia.
Arms and training for out ante : le well
and good. But another Vietnal ' elever.
--17? 'ffets7Ve
YET ANOTI IP P. Cn. (MIRE?
Mr. MONTOY.a Mr -13,-esictent it is
ncreasingly obvious that thr situation in
ambodia is deteriera tine alarmingly in
ilitary terms. The te ration's armed
orces are unable to cape with the mill-
ary situation. Much. if not most, of its
erritory is under effective Communist
ontral. Phnom Penh, tee capital, is in
virtual state of siefe es vital supply
nes are choked off is 'useless to deny
he actuality of i slip)
In retrospect, itailitainns of American
strike forces into the so-called sanctu-
aries last year have pr'01.7(s11: to be futile
from a military viewncinr_ Our efforts to
assist the Cambodians to defend them-
selves seem to have erre/aea as a sterile
exercise. Yet now it seeim t hat even more
substantial American nee tary involve-
ment is underway. As I read matters, this
would be a twin mistiike Toirst, it is a
violation of restrictions ipid upon such
involvement by Bat of the Senate of the
United States. Second, it is futile in a
strictly military sense. We are throwing
good resources after wasted ones. If such
steps were useful in a political sense, I
could see necessity for it Yeti it is not.
We are again thrashing anout in the in-
terior of Indochina, gaining.. no signifi-
cant geopolitical advants.ee. Further, we
are seemingly exci
lararInc ,rtt. military
LABOR UNIONS
Mr. FANNIN, Mr. Preside,t labor
unions hold awesome power in S ir Na-
tion. Labor officials are virtual I_ eators
in a number of industries.
I am concerned about wh t these
unions have done and are .c. ng to
American business. Unreasoi ma de-
mands have driven wages so Ii el as to
wipe out many plants, busine ; and
even entire industries.
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162 CONC RESSIU.NAL RECORD ? EN ATE January 0, 1971
nut more important is the fact that
aiese powerful union leaders hold such
anirer over the economic life and death
et individual Americans.
( was; appalled that the Supreme Court
ad the United States recently struck down
a Georgia law authorizing a person to
!iiet off dues checkoff at any time. It is un-
reasonable to require a person to con-
tinue paying union dues for a year or
in re atter fie has declared his desire to
rant a union.
Another battle against unreasonable
anima ...aewer has been launched by
iseumnist - commentator William F.
eickley, ?fa. He is challenging the Ameri-
eeviesation of Television and Radio
rtiste_
'rhe Tuceon_Daily Citizen, in its Jan-
tiny LO, till, editions, ran an editorial
,satceroing this suit. I ask unanimous
itertsern that the editorial be printed in
no Roeue
Thera being no objection, the editorial
teas ocaeja,a to be printed in the RECORD,
leWS
Braeetutz's BATTLE
that William F. Buckley, Jr. has
elertaken in attacking the constitutionality
foreed limon membership has meaning for
ail Americans.
Tlec, hooular editor and columnist (whose
),...auron will begin appearing on this page next
monda ) has sued the American Federation
et 're E?eits.ion and Radio Artists. He charges
union shop, of which he is an
, ?vc,,iii)a,are member in order to moderate the
weekly discussion program_ "Firing Line,"
r,e)itna II a, "form of vassalage."
Mr. ;3)f ckley told a news conference that
)(le ;rement that an individual pay
dile; L.) a private organization in order to
).)e)rk es a modern writ of indenture, the
?ep;:ct zee. that he do the same in order
tAprees an opinion over the public air-
ways involves an act of coercion by a private
rgani4at)on operating under government
'and fa et.' ?
Bee:, use Arizona is a right-to-work state,
)zetes are not subject to such coercion.
Jul t ri it tai tely for Mr. Buckley, New York
':4 iiit,41.,2 of the 19 states that bans the
,.aoecti ma p.
Tlea rient, to work simply means that an
intli.,1)1da) has the right to join a union and
careliare right to refrain from joining a
amen )A,ii_ilout losing his job.
It ) ; a right that should be in effect in
.fvery t:r. Perhaps that will be the case if
Mr. d ick..,ey succeeds in his suit.
Bee HIALSe Mr. Buckley's suit claims that
his c als;ttutional rights under the first,
lift') a71,1 ninth amendments are being
bre.):eied. its results could have nationwide
imoate
itaeVISED PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT
ti ,PULAR ELECTION OF THE
nt,ESIDENT
Irk finlY1.1. Mr. President, nothing is
15101? important to the confidence of the
Artoeuean people and to the permanence
and stability of our Government than
the lust and equitable- selection of the
r' 'a and Vice President. For 5
yours I nave fought for enactment of a.
constitutional amendment allowing di-
re 'L popular election of the President
and Vice President. And in the 92d Con-
e-ries:a am introducing a revision of my
proposal for electoral reform, designed
to maintain this vital principle while
reroginaing the threat of electoral chaos
w eon we riust avert before the '1'2
n evidential election.
My revised proposal contains liree
in al or features.
First, the proposal would retain the
fur damental principle of election direct-
ly by the nxyple, the only system that is
truly democratic, truly equitable, and
ti lily reflective of the will of the m ijor-
a.
Second, the proposal eliminate- the
fie titre of direct election which has
provoked the most vocal, and ren sited
csiticism, the runoff election. Instead, in
ie unlikely event that no candidwe re-
c yes 40 percent of the popular vol 'J.. the.
President and Vice President would be
!cted in the alternative manner Jirig-
litany suggested by Senators Glt
? :1 Ty din gs.
Third, because direct election J ould
rejuire a 2-year period for the peasage
, f implementing legislation after rati-
ecation, il could not be in effect it time
15 prevent the danger of electoral mis-
in 1972 Therefore, my propossd re-
Helen lipflies the so-called autnnatic
sn to any election during this :-year
interval, eliminating the dangers - t the
faithless elector and the archaic ani un-
lencocratia procedure in elections de-
aided by the Congress.
Arthur Kroek wryly commenter: more
then 20 -years ago:
The road to reform in tie method ol boos-
. A", the Presdents and Vice President: of the
IThited States is :,ittered with the Nrecks
? previous ;attempts.
For more than a century and half,
Mr. Pres dent, we have recognized the
eerils of s system that leaves the ,Jhoice
of President to a group of independent
cle.ctors--electors whose freedom 'o dis-
regard the will of the people is presently
atiarannext by the Constitution. We have
nicegnized the inequities in a etheme
that allocates all of a State's ejectoral
votes to the candidate who wins a popu-
lar vote plurality in that State, iegard-
live of W ?-iether that plurality is c ne vote
er 1 minion votes?a scheme, I should
;add, that is nowhere to be found in the
a'onstitution itself. We have rectionized
tile grave risks that the popular will of
the people can easily be thwarter' either
by the strange arithmetic of the ?1,?ctoral
.7,7stem or by the mischievous iejeds of
a handful of power brokers.
Having long recognized these abvious
inadequacies, we have yet to correct
'Why? Because repeatedn in the
last we have failed to achieve agreement
? Lo tli? most desirable route to reform.
For that matter, there has alw lys been
near unanimous agreement as to '.tie need
referm. but never before h s there
been a n.ationai concensus as la what
specific type of reform was needee.
Tadao we have that elusive eational
concensu.s. That is why now is he best
time to reform.
In February 1966, Mr. Presiesnt, the
American Bar Association estateished a
special commission on electoral: reform.
As sonic Members of this body will re-
call, the American Bar Association, with
a similar commission, was very helpful to
us in preparing the groundwora for the
consideration of the 25th amendment,
and :I thought it would be heltaful, and
indeed it has proved to be very helpful,
for the bar association to appoint an-
other such commission to help us with
this different constitutional problem.
The commission was composed of dis-
tinguished political scientists, lawyers,
legal scholars, public officials, and other
leaders from every section of the coma-
try and reflecting various political views
It studied the present electoral system
and considered all of the various pro-
posals for reform After an extensive 10-
month study, the commission concluded
that:
The existing electoral system is archaio.
undemocratic, complex, ambiguous, in direcl
and dangerous.
The bar as focation's blue-ribbon
commission further concluded that
While there mal be no perfect method ))!'
electing a President, we believe that direct.
nationwide popular vote is the best of )ill pos-
sible methods. It offers the most direct and
democratic way of' electing a President and
would more accurately reflect the will of time
people than any other system.
In urging the abolition of the present
electoral system and replacing it with
direct popular election, the commission
foreshadowed an emerging national con-
census on the Question of electoral re-
form.
The Harris and Gallup polls have
shown, for exact pie, that 78 percent and
81 percent of the American people, re-
spectively, favor direct popular election.
The extent of this feeling, it is important
to note?is nationwide?and fairly evenly
distributed throughout the country. To
quote excerpts from one of Mr. Gallup's
polls, the figures reveal that 82 percent
of the people in 'the East, 81 percent in
the Midwest, 76 percent in the South,
and 81 percent in the West think direct
popular election is both desirable and
necessary,
lfri addition, direct popular election has
been publicly endorsed by a unique and
formidable array of national organiza-
tions, among them the American Bar As-
sociation, the chamber of commerce,
the AFL-CIO, he United Auto Workers,
the National Federation of Independent
Business, the National Small Business
Association, and the League of Women
Voters?indeed a rather prestigious
group of organizations representing'
broad philosophical and nationwide
support.
For years, one of the arguments often
raised against direct popular election was
that it could not be ratified by the legis-
latures of three-fourths of the States. In
fact, even a few direct popular election
supporters, including the late Senator
Estes Kefauver and Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge, were deterred from push-
ing it becauee of their doubts as to
whether direct election could be ratified.
In 1966, the distinguished Senator
from North Dakota (Mr. Buitoicx) dra-
matically refoted this argument by poll-
ing 8,000 State legislators and finding
that of the 2,500 who responded, nearly
CO percent favored direct election. The
results, once, again revealed very little
variation from State to State. More re-
cently, Senator GRIFFIN polled 4,000 leg-
islators from the 27 States thought most
likely to oppose direct election?and 64
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January 27, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL Ritt )RD - SENATE
ment of U.S. Forces from Sowthe
to aid in the release of Americo
prisoners of war.
On December 28 the Semite (.1
the conference report because
another proviso added in conferei
TRIBUTE TO THE LATE SENATOR
RUSSELL
Mr. BEALL. Mr. President, although I
did not have the pleasure of serving with
the late Senator Richard B. Russell, I
was very much aware of the significant
role he played in guiding our Nation
during the past four decades. My father
served with Senator Russell and was, in
fact, a member of the Armed Services
Committee when it was chaired by our
late colleague from Georgia. My father
always spoke of him in the highest terms,
describing him as a man of great
strength, fairness, competency, and
above all great dedication to his State,
to his Nation, and to this Senate.
Senator Russell dedicated his life to
the cause of constitutional government
at home and unquestioned military
strength broad. His constancy in the pur-
suit of these goals made him a pillar of
strength to six Chief Executives.
Those of us who are new to this body
have been denied the opportunity to
serve with a great Senator and a great
American.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES OF THE
RESTRICTIONS RELATING TO
gaija0DIA
Mr. FULBRIGHT, Mr. President, in
view of recent developments in Cam-
bodia, I think it would be helpful to
Senators and readers of the RECORD to
have available a summary of the some-
what complicated legislative history of
the restrictions passed by Congress last
year concerning U.S. involvement in
Cambodia.
I ask unanimous consent that there
be printed in the RECORD two memo-
randums, one setting forth the most sig-
nificant actions on the Cooper-Church
amendment and the second summariz-
ing actions concerning the prohibition
on U.S. financing of South Vietnamese
or other forces in actions in support of
the Cambodian or Laotian Governments.
There being no objection, the memo-
randums were ordered to be printed in
the RECORD, as follows:
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS RELATING TO THE
COOPER-CHURCH AMENDMENT
I. FY 1970 DEFENSE APPROPRIATION BILL
On December 15, 1969, Senator Church of-
fered an amendment as a substitute for an
amendment offered to the Defense Appro-
priation bill by Senators Cooper and Mans-
field. The Church amendment, as modified,
read:
'Sec. 643. In line with the expressed in-
tention of the President of the United States,
none of the funds appropriated by this Act
shall be used to finance the introduction of
American ground combat troops into Laos
or Thailand."
It was adopted by a vote of 73-17 and the
Cooper-Mansfield amendment was subse-
quently adopted by a vote of 80-9.
It FOREIGN MILITARY SALES BILL-H.R. 15628
Following the President's decision to send
U S. military forces into Cambodia, Senators
Church, Cooper, Aiken and Mansfield intro-
duced an amendment to H.R. 15628 designed
Debate on the bin began in the senate on
May 13 and endea on Julie 30 after the
amendment, with ceri sin cnanges, was
adopted 58-37. The conenonielita offered to
it, and the action takei, in them, were as
follows:
1. Cooper--Rewrite of Lilo prearYlOAtiar lan- bill was returned to the conferen
guage; adopted 82-1) on May Sb. tee. It was reported from conte'
2. Dole-Make amendinee I. inoperative if on December 29 after deletng bc.
President determines POW', were being held viso and "Cambodia" fron. cove
in Cambodia; rejected 3e-54 un June 3. amendment, thus leaving i lie ter
3. Byrd of W. Va.-Al:ow President to re- adopted in the FY 1970 Defense
tam U.S. forces in Camoodot ii he thought tion Bill. In the meantime, t
it necessary to prol eel; toe oves of American Church amendment to the Si
forces -defeated 47-50 i,n one fl. Foreign Assistance Bill was as
4. Mansfield-No iinnugnifig of the Con- December 22.
stitutional powers ./1 Da foesident---adopted Iv. SUPPLEMENTAL FOREIGN A&
91-0 on June 11. AUTHORIZATION BILL- -1-I.R
5. Byrd of W Va --13.elating to the Con- On December 13 the Commit/ .5 adopted,
stitutional powers of toe President as Com- without opposition, an arnendn to the
mander-in-Chief -adopted '79-b on June 22. Supplemental Foreign Assiatanc/ Ithoriza.
6. Javits-Relating the Constitutional tion Act, proposed by Senat Cooper.
powers of the Congress-- ariopted 73-0 on Church, Javits, Case, and Man: which
June 26. prohibited sending U.S. groin. 'crops or
7. Griffin-To permit s to pay for for- military advisers into Caanbodi second
eign military advisers arm mercenaries in amendment, sponsored primarily r Senator
Cambodia--rejected 45-50 (a. June 30. Javits, specified that ani U.S. i should
8. Jaekson--Allowing air activities if not be construed as a commitme .) defend
not in "direct' support. oh Cambodia,- Cambodia. The text of the two odments
adopted 69-27 on Julie ace follows:
The text of the Couper-clirirch amend- ..sec. 6. (a) In line with 1.1 rxpressed
=Lent, to H.R. 15628. ak. ha.,,r,ea by the Sen- intention of the President of United
rite, was: States, none of the funds auth/ or ap-
"Sec. 47. Limitations on United States In- propriated pursuant to his o . ny other
volvement in Cambodia.----in concert with Act may be used to finance t. ,/ mtroduc-
the declared objective:, of the President of tion of United States ground ai at troops
the United States to avoid the involvement into Cambodia, or to provide t ed States
of the 'United States Camoodia alter July advisers to or for Cambodian Sr. iry forces
in Cambodia.
"(b) Military and economic 9.1- ance pro-
vided bsathe United States to C iodia and
authorized or appropriated pur. ? r ot to this
or any other Act shall riot be a/ .1- rued as a
commitment by the United St, / to Cam-
bodia for its defense."
The amendment was not con
Senate and the bill passed on
The amendment was accepted I
conferees--and both the Hea
Senate agreed to the coo:fere/ e
December 22.
S 369
Asia or
acid as
reed to
his and
and the
..nnmit-
.e again
-,he pro-
of the
? it was
propria-
Cooper-
"mental
o to on
; -(NCR
1, 1970, and to expedite the withdrawal of
American forces from Cambodia, it is hereby
provided that unless specifically authorized
by law hereafter enacted, no funds author-
ized or appropriated porsuant to this Act or
any other law may be expended after July 1.
1970. for the purposes of-
" (1) retaining U nu hi,o les iorces in
Cambodia;
"(2) paying the compemation or allow-
ances of, or otherwise supporiing, directly or
indirectly, any Unitea Stales personnel in
Cambodia who furnish military instruction
to Cambodian forces Or engage in any com-
bat activity in support of uambodian forces;
"(3) entering 1111:0 or carrying out any
contract or agreemen:. m provide military
instruction in Cameo/nit or to provide per-
sons to engage in any can, oat activity in sup-
port of Cambodian ror. es, or
"(4) conducting any (,,inbat activity in
the air above Cain0000t le direct support of
Cambodian force;."
Subsequently, in view oi .111- passage of the order to authorize specifically
Cooper-Church a menenie, i to the Supple- of Vietnamese or other Tree"
mental Foreign Assisrait.,e mil, the amend- operations in the "sanctuary ;
ment was deleted from 11 11,028 by the con- bodia. The Senate Armed Servo
ferenco commit tee report on the bill stated. howe,
was "... no intent to pm mit 1,1
In. FY 197 I DIF T1N ;OTT, ;1?;
appropriations under this auti
port Vietnamese and other fre
The Defense Api ruprla Bill was in actions designed to provide
amended by the ;ieviati Appropriauions Com- port and assistance to toe Ca
mittee at the reque .1 Senators Cooper ernment." Senator Fulbright
and Church to add Carnbouat to the prohibi- amendment to the bill t,-,/ carr
tion against invellement or U.S. ground per- tent and to prohibit U.S. fin,
sonnel in Laos and Thailand. The bill was such activities in Laos as va
approved by the Sei4rte mi December 15, Fulbright amendment proil
without any objection to Inds provision. The special allowances to foreign
conference committee reported back with a than the rate of combat ray pa,
proviso which made the eeetiOn read as fol- The amendment was odopte
lows (proviso added ia s derence is under- ate without opposition on A
lined) : was accepted without coange
"SEc. 843. In hoe w ine expressed inten- conferees. The text of the
tion of the President of toe United States, with the Fulbright amenda
none of the funds appropriated by this Act follows:
shall be used to finauce ihe introduction of "(a) (1) Not to exceed $2,801
to prohibit further U.S. involvement in Cam- American ground comeat troops into Laos, funds authorized
bodia, except the furnishing of military aid. Thailand, or Cambodia: Provided, That noth- use of the Armed Forces of tlx
and limited air action, without Congressional ing contained in thi, section shall be con- under this or any other Act
approval. On May 11 the amendment was straed to prohibit the Pi esident from taking to be made available for tie
adopted, with modification, by the Commit- action in said areas acsigned to promote the poses to support: (A) Vietnai
teo by a vote of 9 to 5. safe and orderly twi/Buadya OT disengage- free world forces in support
/id in the
ember 16.
.he House
and the
leport on
SUMMARY OF THE LEGISLATIVE H 1 ;IT OF THE
FULBRIGHT AMENDMENT RI:LA : TO PAT -
MENT FOR FOREIGN MILI i?ARY ATIONS IN
CAMBODIA OR LAOS
I. DEFENSE AITTHORIZATIO;s7 BD,'
The Defense Authorize, ion B
language carried in defense
and appropriation bills in pre,
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- R. 1712:1
evised the
? borization
r, years in
I financing
.rid forces
of Cam-
? _ ommittee
r 'hat there
;e of DOD
ly to sup-
, orld forces
iitary sup-
dials gov-
r an
It that ill-
ag of any
A secono
, a paying
,ps greater
' S. troops.)
; the Sen-
f: ost 21 and
the House
ire section
Italicized
,,,000 of the
on for the
? ited States
t, authorized
? stated pur-
.e e and other
.1 Vietnamese
7;)
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CW-J7,RES:?:ION A FCORD - SF NA TE
;eree., d teral tercee In LaOS and Thailand:
etr related costs, during the fiscal year
et7t
an mirth terms and conditions as the
era of Defense may determine. None
eeei mule appropriated to or for the use-
-'erdied Forces of the United. States
eerie tie used tor the purpose of paying any
allowances per diem allowance, or
eny ether addition to the regular base pay
eerson serving with the free world
)7e,e in south Vietnam if the amount of
lea] nlvrnent would be greater than the
aeeeet ,e special pay authorized to be paid
iemivalent, period of service, to mem
'au Armed Forces of the United States
on 310 of title 37, United States
eer,dng in Vietnam or in any either
i area, except for continuation of
e dm-let-ire; of. such additions to regular base
is ieed in agreements executed prior
. a70. Nothing in clause (A) of the
-0.-?c? of this paragraph shall be con-
i.ialltori.?iing the use of any such
??itt, '0 ricpport Vietnamese or other free
,I' in actions designed to provide
, port and assistance to the
ai,,e 4 44 atimondia or Laos.
,? ??? -,? ' APPROPRIATION BILL-51,5. 1 959 0
eiefeiage in the authorization bill_
.e- neeeeing the funding of Vietnamese and.
)reien. tomes, has traditionally been
in the Defense appropriation bill also.
The el bright amendment added to the au-
reorizafton bill was not included in the
Itouse version of the Defense Appropriation
l3111, tI It 19590. If the language had not been
earriett ,)ver from the authorization bill there
-.1111( have been no practical restrictions on
eee teet'enee funds to pay for Vietnamese
or 'fat,' emerations in Cambodia or Laos_ At
der:ever Fillbright's request, the restrictive
la 11g1.1.:te was included in the bill reported by
-.be Se1e':,7 Appropriations Committee and no
eldece 07 'NaS raised to the item on the Sen-
iii': . .-rencp added a proviso to the
late mete t which made it, read as follows
oroviee edeed in conference italicized) :
areeeeeied. further, That nothing in clause
. or hrst sentence of this subsection
tai eeneerued as authorizing the use of
-I lids to support Vietnamese or
-'rid forces in actions designed to
eeldary support and assistance to
eeerement of Cambodia Cr Laos: Pro-
-, thee; That nothing contained in this
be construed to prohibit sup-
, Torld or local forces in actions
promote the safe and orderly
? r disengagements of U.S. Forces
'at Asia or to aid in the release
ns held as prisoners of war," .
emee report, was rejected by the
..ice vote. on December 13 be-
do; item and the addition of a
III 'as mr,-.1.so to the Cooper-Church amend-
he second conference modified, but
ttO, tn., ill ate, the proviso. After consider-
..eie uselon in the Senate about the
.a,!tin;-:, and intent of the provision, the
-ee -,,,reeee report was afTeed to on Decem-
.. 'tele entire text of the section as
eeeeel. wit's the revised proviso italicized,
?St,',r_fport of free world forces
? , Nlot to exceed $2,500,000,000
aipriations available to the Dc-
"-'tense during the current fie-
be available for their stated
emend,: (1) Vietnamese and
Id forces in support of Viet-
4-u' e (2) local forces in Laos and
.ert or related posts, on such terms
as the Secretary of Defense
fie1,1' le ea
. Toat none of the funds appro.
hy in Act may be used for the pur-
e:eying any overseas allowance. per
wa:i.ce, or any otheraddition to the
-e],e oav of any person serving with
:he free emeld f)rees in South Vietni ,n if the
.).mounr. ef such payment would be greaeer
,itan the -1.rnount of special pay auth,dzed to
OP paid, 'Or' an equivalent period of service,
-o trier/there of the Armed Forces oft.)e Unit-
"5 fetes (ender section 310 of title Unit-
ed States Cede) serving tri Vietnam c r in any
0-her hot: el!e fire area, eXcept for cc i;tintia-
! ion of peyenents of such additions -a- regu-
ler base pee- provided in agreements f ,..nUted
:etter Sr j ily 1. 1970. Provided furth., -, That
t,hiij ia -,lanse ;11 of t.ne first sen .-;nce of
tet eadise el ion shall be construed as eethor-
, Thg the it of any auch funds to etpport
e el.- other ftec world force.. in as-
'a,- date ailed to peevide military eipport
eels) 411.57:.;51 Ince to the Government Ccam-
or I. Ptorided further, Tho!- noth -
? eonere nee?. 1:n this section shall ?.?
con-
t y rohtOit support 91 actions ;itfuired
it? 0isitre ;he safe and orderly withthlwal or
eeigareete Of of ft S. Forces from So;- itheast
or to aid in the release of ''cans
ar .soee rs of war."
? T ,.T 3 A COMMU:';IST
71:7,ICE STATE
ALLOTT, Mr. President, ti evi-
&lice cart:rams to inaunt?steadil and
fredictalry--that Chile is becom ng a
,minunist police state.
The sad but undeniable fact that
nem: President, the Corm amist
....1.1vador Allende, acts like a Comm .mist,
meals the U.S. Government must
vive high priority to high-level policy
decisions about how we can isolate this
hemisphefe s newest Communist dicta.-
rship.
recei t days a number of new, :stor-
from Chile indicate Allende's deter-
aation cc- establish conuriunism with
otire. that, deliberate speed. For evam-
on Jr nuary 10 the Baltimore Sun
ca Tried a story by Mr. Robert A. Erland-
sdn cone amp the establishment 4c so-
(-Al led peoples tribunals in Chile. The tri-
unals will judge the antisocial behavior
f citizens who seem insufficiently en
about the emerging dictato74up.
on January 15 the New York Times
c ?o.rried a story from Chi:e by Mr. Ju ..n de
Oris, reuniting on the arrival in Chile of
7'1, Brazilian revolutionaries who had
freed hi exchange for a kidnapped
diplomat. It is obvious thar the
...luticnaries knew they would be afel-
u-1?.0 in Cl lie, This must raise anx eties
a.tiong Chile's neighbors.
2,1r. President, Allenele's behavie: in
guiding Ch lo into the Communist t -drip
,1041 ey 27, 1971
Frein the Baltimore Sun, San, 10, 1971/
Crui.E's 'PEOPLES COURTS.' MAY BE A DANGER ?
'ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOR.' WILL BE TARGET OP
:LOCAL TRIBUNALS
(By Roeert A. Erlanctson)
R10 DE JereEnec.---Chile's Marxist president.
Salvador Allende, has taken his first?and
peehaps most potentially dangerous--step to-
ward communizing Chile wish the announee-
ment that "peoples tribunals" will be set up
to judge "anti-scci-il behavior."
Such tribunals, which amount to "revolu-
tiorutry justice" or drumhead colirts-martiel.
are point 38 of the 40-point "basic progrem
of the popular unity government," which is
Clule's new bible, and which calls for,",, Ii
end to class justice."
EMASCI7 LATER) P Y ITS. St
However, they will merely establish utie
class of justice for another, and from the
traditionally Denmeratic Chilean viewpoint
Will effectively emasculate the judicial sys-
-t err.
Sloth -peoples tribunals- have an historic:di
record of permittnig personally vengeful de-
nunciations, spying on one's neighbors,
friends and family--an in the end giving the
government a network of informers which al -
Iowa near-absolute control of the population
by fear.
Those with the best political cormectione
become the judges of their less influential
countrymen, and the term -anti-social be-
havior" has extensive, and potentially eve.
ramifications.
"People's tribunals" are the mark of total-
itarianism, and the hand of Presider],
Alle:ade's Communist supporters can be seer,
In their creation.
Although the Communists represent only
one faction of hit six party popular unitt
coalition, they are the best organized, dis-
ciplined and financed, They also provide the-
new president wide his ideological "braie
truTs1-1,:e.-
Communists, according to informed
sources in Chile, controlled more than 80
per cent of the 8.000 "popular unity com-
mittees' formed to work in the Allende, cam-
paign.
Immediately after the election, it was re-
ported that new committees were being
formed and that I-he Communists were ac-
tively extending their control over the exist-
ing ones,
This then was a grass-roots netwerk of
control which, in combination with the nes
"peoples tribunals' should, within a feu
years give the Coirununists an almost ull-
breaka3le grip on Chile.
With the court announcement was another
of lesser importance, but nonetheless signi-
ficant, that honoriacs such as ' excellency"
and "your honor," traditional in Spanish-
speaking countries will be abolished
is arlditioitvfly depressing?if red un- President Allende and his cohorts refer to
d:.r.5.--evicicnce of the extent to whic:i the the people and each other as "carnpanero"?
which can be translated as companion?or
Monroe Doctrine is a dead letter, dead "comrade.'"
fisfal exposure to the weak and vac 1 hit-
ii, policies of the early 1960's.
leviollsie- there le little this Natior can
or :nould da to influence the election.a in
ail,
her sovereign nation. But that L: not
the issue. Calle has probably had its last
nee election. Now the question is how to
iselate the discs, cc that has infected nat
1)11 I/eric na tion
r President, so that all Senators :an
P0A.der the grim facts about Allen de's
err tring despotism, I ask unanimaus
co.asent for Mr.. Erbincison's and Mr de
01:1;?s ilium la a ting articles to be priifed
in zife Recoan.
"I'aere being no objection, the articles
we ordered to be printed in the Rsc, MD,
as fofiows
[Prom the New York Times, Jan. 15, 19711
SEVENTY FREED BY Brtazre FOR ENVOY i',RRTVE
JUBILANTL 2' IN SA NT [AGO
(By Juan de Onisp
SANTIAGO, CHme.--4.3eventy Brazilian revo-
lutionaries, jubilant over their release from
prison in exchange for a kidnapped Swiss
diplomat, arrived in Chile today and were
granted political as3;lurn.
The leftist Chilean Government of Presi-
dent Salvador Allende. Gossens, while giv-
ing the Brazilians a warm welcome, took pains
to prevent any statements by them that
might offend Brazil s military Government.
The freedom of the prisoners had beer, de-
manded by the kidnappers of the diplomat
Giavanni Enrico Bucher. He was ;abducted
in Rio de Janeiro Dec 7_
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WIII OVERSEE
LONIBODIANW USE
OF ARMS SUPPLIES
Delivpry Teams Will Tour
Countryside to Assure
Proper Deployment
ADVISORY ROLE BARRED
But Pentagon Says Aides
Might Show Allies How
Equipment Works
16-Man Force
It was described as an effort
by the United States to make
"end checks" of the rv.,arly
$200-million allocated since
last spring to the Cambodian
military effort to defeat the
Vietcong and North Vietnam-
ese invaders.
As authoritatively described
Ihere, the program would in-
volve at the start about
American military men under
Ithe jurisdiction of the Unite.:1
1States Ambassador, who wou!cl
;check on how effectively
..American military aid was be-
ing used by the Cambodians.
The Americans would have
no authority to advise the
_
Cambodians on how t use that
equipment more effectively.
the sources said. They asserted
the program would not conflict
with the Congressional prohi-
bition against United States
ground combat forces or advis-
ers in Cambodia that was
adopted last month in a $1
billion supplemental military
aid bill.
In fact, the sources asserted
Congress would probably wel-
come the program as a check
on the deployment of United
States military? aid in Cam-
bodia. At present, they said.
the United States has no wa
of ascertaining what happen:
to the American military equip.
ment granted the Cambodians
"We only know what tilt,
Cambodians tell us," one high
official said. The program
would be centered in Saigon.
!
seat of the United States mili
tary command for Vietnam asi
well as Cambodia and Laos.I
The program would use the ac-
counting facilities of the com-
mand in Saigon while operatim;
By RALPH BLUMENTHAL
Special to The New York Times
PNOMPENH, Cambodia, Jam
25 ? American officials have
developed a program for a
"military equipment delivers
team" that would send United
1States military representatives
through the Cambodian coun-
tryside to check on deployment
of American military equip-
ment.
Qualified American officials
who disclosed the plans said
the Americans "would not fall
into an advisory role."
[In Washington, a Pentagon
spokesman said, however,
that those military men work-
ing out of the American Em-
bassy in Pnompenh who turn
over military aid equipment
to the Cambodians might
from time to time show them
how it works.]
Officials said the program
was still being discussed be-
tween United States authori-
ties in Washington, Saigon and
Pnompenh, but it was under-
stood that plans were well ad-
vanced and awaiting final
American approval and agree-
ment of the Cambodians, who
have not yet been informed of
the program.
under the Ambassador. }mon-
C. Swank, in Pnompenh
through the office of his mili-
tary-political counselor, Jona-
than F. Ladd.
Rapid Increase in Program
The program was made
necessary, officials said, by the
rapid increase of the United
I states military assistance pro-
gram for Cambodia.
When started last spring,
shortly after the overthrow of
Prince Norodom Sihanouk by
Premier Lon Nol, the United
States military aid prograrn
totaled less than $9-million. It
Approve Tyr iftWitehrtf
by nS14-hiillion.
otticrais sate tnere now was
to accurate way of determining
how the military equipment
nought with that money was
being used by the Cambodians.
In anticipation of the pro-
gram's start, the embassy's mili-
tary political office under Mr.
Ladd, former commander of
,pecial forces in Vietnam, has
recently been increased from
three to nine with prospects
of adding seven more.
Those Americans, described!
as military men by qualified
sources, would travel around
the country wherever United
states equipment was being
sent to make sure the equip-
ment reached the proper hands.
Drawing a Fine Line
Ihey would not be authorized
to advise the Cambodians how
to use the equipment, the
sources said. However, they
conceded there was a fine line
between overseeing the use of
the equipment in the field and
.uggesting how it might be bet-
ter employed.
The 300-man program, the
sources said, was "nothing"
compared with the United
States military advisory assist-
ance program installed here
since 1963. The sources said
I the date for the start of the
jprogram would probably be de-
cided upon in the next few
I weeks.
Cambodian officials have for
some time asked the American
Embassy for an advisory pro-
gram but they said they were
always rebuffed by the Ameri-
cans.
Meanwhile, it was learned
I
today that the United states,1
had already flown in two heli-
copters to replace two of the 1:
four destroyed in the Fridayli
raid on the Pnompenh airport. il
Another two helicopters will i
be flown in soon, authoritative
sources reported.
In addition, the sources said, I
the United States will replace
imost of the 15 aircraft de-
stroyed in the attack. However,
the
-
the replacements will come out
of the $185-million military aid
budget for Cambodia this fiscal
year and thus. the Cambodians
will have less funds for other
military purchases.
Pentagon ib
Maeda/ to The
WASHINGTC
Pentagon spoly
Friedheim, said
gressional limit
terpreted them.
the sending of
tary instructor
so long as the
signed as advise
military units.
Responding
his daily new
Friedheim sal
States had no
tablishing an A
training progri
But he said flu
men working o
can Embassy
turning over m
ment to the C;
from time to -r e show them
switch is."
E !tense Melvin
r Ars conference
oade the first
o the fact that
,tt were being
if to oversee the
v Ty of military
id equipmen- o Cambodian;
forces. He Mit
would be ser
sources later
,ins Stand
ork 'Times
L Jan. 25?A
?
S 16384
Approved For immogy=pmr fpffliv_31499moo30002oo8i2oi,
And the article reports that the Defense
Department is going ahead with plans to
expand MEDT?the Military Equipment
Delivery Team?forces to 500 by the end
of next year.
According to Newsweek?
There are signs that the military men al-
ready in Cambodia are getting more directly
involved in the fighting there. American heli-
copters have reportedly begun transporting
Cambodian troops into battle areas and sup-
plying them with ammunition. And at Po-
chentong Airport in Phnom Penh, U.S. forces
recently opened a radio center (officially
called a "navigation aid") to coordinate air
support for Cambodian troops.
But planned escalation is not confined
to personnel increases alone. Although
this year's aid program for Cambodia
calls for $211 million in military aid, $110
million in economic assistance and $20
million in agricultural commodities for
a total of $341 mllion--a net increase of
$59 million over last year?the Joint
Chiefs of Staff apparently want another
$52 million for military aid.
According to a story in the New York
Times October 13, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff have designed a costly program of
"pacification" and other "unconventional
warfare" for Cambodia, as well as ways to
get more money to implement it than
Congress is willing to authorize.
According to the Times, the Joint
Chiefs have devised a battle plan to out-
flank the intent of Congress. According to
this report the Chiefs offered four differ-
ent ways of generating--on the sly?the
additional $52 million they want:
The first way would be simply to transfer
$52 million from the economic aid program
to military spending, which can be done later
in the fiscal year simply by the Administra-
tion's notifying Congress. The second way
would be to use the economic aid fund for the
purchase of all "common use" items such as
trucks and jeeps, which have military RS well
as civilian value, thus freeing other mili-
tary funds.
A third way would be to increase procure-
ment for the United States Army by $52 mil-
lion and give the materiel to the Cambod-
ians, for "repayment" later. The fourth way
would be to make some exceptions in De-
fense Department supply regulations, declar-
ing additional equipment to be "excess" and
delivering it to the Cambodians.
Mr. President, if these reports are true,
and past experience suggests that they
probably are, it appears that the United
States role in Cambodia is escalating
significantly as more American dollars
and more American personnel are becom-
ing more involved in the war there.
The pattern is all too familiar to re-
peat: A tentative commitment becomes
firm; a temporary presence becomes
permanent; a limited role expands, and
the executive branch of Governmeent cir-
cumvents or ignores the advice and in-
tent of Congress, if not the actual provi-
sion of laws.
And the unanticipated results, as we
have found in Vietnam, can be disas-
trous.
Mr. President, the Senate will soon be
making important decisions regarding
the amount, scope, and type of aid to
Cambodia when the Foreign Assistance
Act comes to the floor.
The Foreign Relations Committee has
taken an important step toward limiting
the scope of our growing involvement
there by voting to impose a $250 million
ceiling on military and economic aid and
to limit the number of T.T.S. civilian and
military personnel to 200.
Since I came to the Senate in 1969,
Congress has been attempting to restore
the constitutional balance in the war-
making power. Many Senators have rec-
ognized that executive branch ability to
snake war Unilateral y is a very real dan-
ger to democracy As Senator Ram STEN-
NIS stated the other day before the For-
eign Relations Comnuttee while testify-
ing on bills dealing with congressional
war powers
The President is lectid with difficult day-
to-day decisions in the Executive Branch in
the field of foreign policy and the temptation
is great to rely upon the threat of military
force against a parthailarly troublesome or
recalcitrant opponent
But he went on to point out:
But the ccostit,itif,n has placed the re-
sponsibility for deryol tIF whether or not that
force is to be tiseo in the hands of the Leg-
islative Branco_ Thus il is not only our right
but our Constitutional duty to insist that the
President obtain the sanction of' the Con-
gress, the peoples- representatives, before he
actually involves I i.e nation in war.
Mr. President, it is clear that Executive
decisions have shaped the course of the
Indochina war and that an indifferent
Congress provided little or no restraint
on Executive actions. I recognize that
some politicians will continue to prefer
inaction or deference to the Executive
in the exerciae of a policy that could re-
sult in war. for scapegoats are often pop-
ular in polities and the assumption of
responsibility often is not.
I feyerently hose that such failure to
accept responsibeity is a thing of the
past.
If the renorts al Cambodia are true,
as I believe they are it should be clear
that current and planned executive
branch actions could take us into another
ill-advised military adventure.
Congress has the ability to set wise lim-
its on such dangerous Executive policy.
The Foreign Relations Committee has
given us a vehicle, in the Symington-Case
amendment. for setting a proper limit in
Cambodia.
Mr. President. I am pleased at this
time to yield the remainder of my time
to the Senator from New Jersey (Mr.
CASE).
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The
Senator from New Jersey is recognized
for '7 minutes.
[THE NEED FOR ABSOLUTE CEILINGS
ON U.S. SPENDING AND PERSON-
NEL IN CAMBODIA
Mr. CASE. Mr President, I thank the
Senator for yielding to me. I commend
him for the remarks he has made and for
the activities he has engaged in on this
matter on several occasions in the past.
He has been most helpful to the Senate
and to the Nation M regard to the prob-
lems we are facing here. I am happy that
his remarks preceded mine on this sub-
ject Mr. President the time has come for
the United States as a. Nation to decide
what to do about Cambodia.
-EvL157ttAL_
19, 1971
Recent press reports it ate what the
Joint Chiefs of Staff fe.( oust be done
if we are to bring about , nilitary solu-
tion in Cambodia. The ri Chiefs' plan
calls for a doubling of sr ary expendi-
tures and almost a five I I increase in
the size of the Cambodia rmy.
Those are very disturb ii proposals.
In no event, however, 1 'uld the fun-
damental question of wilt I tr the United
States becomes even more It eply involved
in yet another Southeas jsian country
be decided within the it: S etive branch
under a veil of secrecy.
I thought we had pa ally learned
this lesson from our Viet] se experience,
but the reports on the e tit Chiefs of
Staff plans for Cambodst v ould seem to
indicate the strong post o ilty that we
may be about to repeat ? mistakes.
My own view is that th erwhelming
majority of Congress an. ee American
people do not wish to rept the Vietnam
example.
We on the Foreign I bons Com-
mittee have on several isions asked
the Secretary of Defense f, r the 5 year
plans for military Assist - it programs.
We have always been re i ,1:1 access to
these documents.
It is indeed unfortunai hat we have
to rely on leaks of secre ; apers to re-
ceive the plans for Caml is. But con-
sidering the vast scope the Joint
Chiefs' proposals for that s ,tintry. I can
understand why the Pen' on has been
reluctant to expose its th 'II ing. The aid
levels and force levels d a -ibed in the
New York Times and c Washington
Post are so large that it it A ificult to be-
lieve they could stand Am either con-
gressional or public -:crut:
If the proposals of ti': Toint Chiefs
were put into effect. Cam '0 ha would be
turned into an armed Cl i e absolutely
dependent on us for its stence. And
this would not just he foi A year or two,
but for the indefinite flu The Joint
Chiefs project an expans i of the cur-
rent 170,000 man Care c, ban armed
forces, 863,000 by.1977. I country of
less than 7 million people. would then
be supporting a military e tablishment
which would be the mot tional equi-
valent of more than 5 mi i ( ri Americans
under arms.
It is of course the Ile the Cam-
bodians to decide how la ii their army
will be, but it becomes much our
concern when the Americ 1 taxpayer is
asked to pay the bill A i !.here is no
question that the United I i. es would be
paying virtually all the 4 e tit The war
has left the Cambodia s themselves
nearly without resources tong as the
fighting continues, they v it be deprived
of their three principal t1. eces of for-
eign exchange: rice, rubbe .nd tourism.
Moreover, as we found (a ti Vietnam,
our other allies will do lit r if anything
to share the costs.
The Joint Chiefs In .1 er propose
that we get involved at all e 'els of Cam-
bodian society with pat fi !ation pro-
grams, psychological war' it programs,
and even unconventional e arfare pro-
grams directed by the CIA ...gain, as we
learned in Vietnam, these I .1 ds of Amer-
ican supported programs tad to deep-
er and deeper entanglemer
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CONGRE1ONAL RECORD ?SENTE
- 19. 1971
ihey do dot have access to all the
texts that the President has.
i Members are angry about the Prest-
neat s refusal to give Congress all the facts,
,lekdot
no anything because it is uncoil-
s 1 it i i i Lona,. to subpoena a Presidential fact
,viiiii .ifid askaiim 'what's going on in the Gov-
eentue ot
Nothilig can be dour in February be-
'ins e ,to ,i many meembers have out-en-town
coear.tng engiu;ementaat Lincoln Day dinners
lierfon-Jackson Day dinners.
la Nothing can ioe -Came about foreign
?ff apt , oecame it is unconst1Vmonal for mem-
hers ;,) interfere with the lqesidem a con-
dues oil foreign pc icy. \
14 P,fothing can be done abo* the Presi-
\
dent c usurpation of Congress's con itutional
rigiS to declare War because it is sill in this
inotiern day anns age, for a rinkydinallotatlit
1:ke t :.)tigress to :accuse the President oun-
cons ..i ii.utional behavior. , \
; iehe semort - v system prevents memoeits
t sen' 'tong anytiiing. \
If. Nothing c.: a be done because of the
il 'ter iiialde of the leadership.
is !I,nitit:r and members' wives and
it pen] are eraeybeating them to go away
pa' aca [Mils. IL this strained atmospnere
o, cern airead.- tired of long months of
turieus idleoess, are in no mood to do any-
Linea',
1- The peiis suggest that nobody has
ht aboila Congress for months, but may,
fibers do anytning.
Atter Mt.:firing months at not cutting
, he 1imi,agoit c iv.eapons budget, Congress is
,..:pen i; iai. no 5 dything.
7:? Although members suspect that the Air
Force's new it .clear-powered, supersonic,
: tio 4 -takeoff- a mIslanding surrey with a
irinee on the Lop will be a multibillion-dollar
'mat dc thing can be done because the Penta-
:nus is only as.kang for token funds for a
- 'fifty sittelV
Altinnien members realize that the
'11,5 an eihnsfrite underwater tank leaks
Vi: ' Lirotigh r.:iie TV aerial holes and sinks
N-1. heavy icss of life every time it is tested,
:feu eig can be done about spending $1 bil-
ffei: more or perfect it because, otherwise,
1hie jafi billion affeady spent would have to be
wriiitin oil iis wEsted.
in be done because of the
fil i ? i "ter.
Since ;he President will do anything
th,r:. needs to be done, there is no point in,
ceie,-ress done, anything, particularly sincee.
tn.: 'Supreme Court, will have to do it if th.e
lei7 e aite sit 5,:tinie :. .
? Not ceong anythine is safe.
'There Ir: ED, modern precedent foR'cioing
nines .
in .te oi i .p e and seenti. 111,-futfid other
hen itia for is Cace.clity. Congress/is not en-
163
6
people .tipprove of the President's post- Missouri is now recognized ior
freeze eeonornica plan. exceed 15 minutes.
The-e being no objection, the surven
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD
- ? THE AMERICAN PROFILE IN CAM.-
a
Do ? Cr APPROVE. OF PE.ESIDENT :Nif:SON'S
:D.:01,70MV-s PLAN'?
:HON "YOU y
Yes:i O 1 9 percent
No' oercen:-..
sAMPI,E "CiS (7;
"Nis: is doine his best to help coon
try" . .. "The unions needed to of? put it
their p. n'e" . . "Let's g.ve the poor guy
chance' . 3elieve Nixon has saved is -
from another depression" . . "I hope la? ?
freezes flakes, too' . . "Although it might ts
too lit it e. too late" .....It's the only way b?
keep pieces and unions from going wild"
"This should be adopted on a permaneu
basis" "I'm far anything that will bene-
fit our ,ffnintry" shotild nave hap -
Nened -.-Yo years ago' ..."It's about time the
g e nt took over frcm the unions- .
?.7 or can't lead us around by the nose,'
BOLD ACTIONS 13.Y THE PRES ti/EN
\, T. 'ST WEEK
Mr titCOV, Mr. President, ts,L wee
was .a very 'good weec for pile Unite
State t. The Pr ident achieved tnree nn
objecti- .
Firi,t . his anllo1Mceflle,kn cif the forth -
comini journey to Voow for the put
winch can leaiii
pose iiDt discussing
to pear, is and a relaxt-a n of tensions.
Second, the Prasiden skillfully man-
aged to obtain the coop iation of lathe:
and inalustry in his pay ai price boare
setup The Presid.ent will sec.d up a bi
coveratia phase II of his ecoNanic pla
today. whith will provide for av impor-
tant extension of powers unqer
Emeriti incy Stabilization Act ari alst
standby powers on interest and divi nd ,
with itanialties :Ind provisions for judi
review
"In a very real sense, this is one wEr. satl
BOD] A
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President. a
months ago, on April it) and11, 1 wen ti
to Phnom Penh, Cavibodia, to a,: ses4peasonally the situayan and the extenL
of direct America involvement in ti'a
war there.
I was plea d and impressed as Am-
bassador ry Swank pointed with
pride to e "low American profile
there any expressed his desire to itreea
it that y/ay. Swank asserted:
ri trouble comes, our Einbasy stc
eah ck up and get out on one plane,
hree days later I visited ikitlit the
an who was responsible for our low
/profile in Cambodia, Jonathan Fred
Ladd, who was hospitalized in solaces
with a bad back. Ladd had been a Spe-
cial Forces commander in South Viel -
nam. He knew the value of relying' on
the Cambodians' will to fight rathrr
than on ever-increasing dependeltce on
U.S. advisers, air support and the so-
phisticated weaponry of war with which
we have smothered the South Vietnam-
ese. He believed that if the Cambodians
had the will to fight they would sut-
vive, but that if they lacked the will,
the United States could not save them.
Sophisticated U.S. weapons, methodii.
and advisers would create more prob-
lems than they -solved, Ladd believed.
Again, I was impressed. From what
I could gather, Cambodia appeared to
be the first real test for President
Nixon's "Guam" doctrine of limited ti-
sistance and self-help. When I returned
from Southeast Asia I wrote a reprea
which, then, included the following
observations:
-lease c
Asian
for en
t? the President secured the rt
t the import surcharge to severe
,tountries, notably Japan in retur
important textile agreement.
Mr President, this is real action. IN..
othei ll'resident has been as innovatn
and i., -,)old in n .y time or has int roducf
a lid ,uccessfullY foliov, ea up such -
men:- valuaidi.5 objet Lc, es as ,ins Pres
dent.
enpotent. Sometime late n'ext year the ?
Al
members /will persuade
Of tea
1,1 ita, deserve to tic/re-elected.
?
N PRESIDENT NIXON S Supre
GAME PLAN miss,
Mr/President, on Onto-
Non outlined phase two
ic/ game plan. It is very
Is n A'ri, lie American peotLe. Just v'cl-1
r a people quickly supported
iu esicie at 'Iter his initial announce-
of ,ne ..yage-price freeze in Ad-
r support will continue into -I-
t ?: period. A telephone sue-
tit:rider:tee by the Philadelphia In-
- sivricer..: those approving of tile 110'E1
bent s et-et ,notnic policy leading by a
'oh St
-nous consent to slate tile
_ in the RECORD. Wincil
of the rnericin
n" us have seen and heard crit
President, completely- devoid
ho hEivi. sought vainly to crit
IUS notions as non ior Li ,
se Court in mil, ante of their so
by toe President.
? It iii 01(1 oe 1,11 01.St Oi grace u,..t
of goed judgment if the over.
and overly ambitious crit-i
eathhol 1 judgment until they fit i
the F resident is going to noir
athink .hen iu?,h ,o -.CUE tht ,fl
Itt ove.:' that of the President
y. It dixs not ieflect on the Pre: -
dein much as it does on then.
:TIESIDENT pro tem pore. T ?
mile 'Senator has ex:pired.
aR'ThF F, OF
i'iZESI.DENT pro temp :)re Un, r
t attars order, Cr n a t ffr tic
, Ambassador Emory Swank as he briefed
\on my arrival at Ph110M, Penn the capi?
ettv.
t is "one war" now, e)Vering tbr.,
Fre
snug
In
d et ermt.
sive ITS,
properly.
imdians to
ch :Indochina. And yet,
defferently in Cambodia.. ..
nbcdia, the United Sten, .Se
not to stumble into anotlier ni.,
orrunitment like Vietnam. Qu I''
emphasis is on supplying CA: --
ht for triernselves, SrII,,
fighting for
What Camboi. needs is time to a
build its army Wi out the nustal:eil or 'iit-
namiz?ation. Su far, that time In: 10
purchased by a am ive American t,resen
and I was impressed Ambassador S?Jiali
determination that it tit not be. .
Last year, I voted agalst
military and economic ai to Cambxlia ' e
cause I feared it would be t opening wee ge
of a Viel.nam-type commitm This :fear I
would support U.S. economic a istance. ple-
yided that the present hands-ol direction DE
cur policy in that country is Con. - 1,1 ,
That American policy in CarniNoell a a o_
rears to be changing The October,13 e,li-
tion of Newsweek contains a distress.ng
article which indicates that our -low p!o-
file" policy in Cambodia is being esii
Now Ambasasdor Swank reiers t)
profile" as the American pres-
ence in Phnom Penh has jumped from
few ET 60 officials to more than I i0.
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October 19,
Last year Congress expressed its clear
will to avoid such an entanglement when
it acquiesced in what was described by
the administration as a modest level of
assistance for Cambodia. Aid was given
to Cambodia only with the accompanying
limitations that no American military
forces or advisers would serve in Cam-
bodia?Cooper-Church amendment?
that the aid was not to be construed as a
commitment to the Cambodian Govern-
ment?Javits amendment?and that
there could be no transfers of additional
assistance to Cambodia without prior no-
tice to Congress--Case-Symington
amendment.
Congress insisted on these limitations
because it wanted to assure that Cam-
bodia would not become another Viet-
nam. The President concurred and signed
into law all the congressional limitations.
Yet the thrust .of the Joint Chiefs' me-
mo goes considerably beyond the clear
intent of Congress to limit our involve-
ment. And the Joint Chiefs apparently
plan to do this without any additional
legislative authority or public debate.
Perhaps the Congress and the Ameri-
can people are now willing to make the
kind of commitment to Cambodia that
the Joint Chiefs propose. My own view
is that they are not willing. If anything
is clear, it is that the United States wants
to disengage itself from Southeast Asia.
In any case, these are questions for the
Congress and the people to decide in con-
cert with the executive branch.
The press reports listed four methods
proposed by the Joint Chiefs that could
be used to skirt congressional authoriza-
tions on spending in Cambodia. I cate-
gorically reject this approach of sur-
reptitiously siphoning off money from
other parts of the budget to provide
funds for Cambodia above and beyond
what Congress approves.
Such methods are totally inconsistent
with our constitutional system. If loop-
holes exist in the law that allow funds
to be shifted around so easily, then those
loopholes should be closed. The so-called
discretionary powers contained within
the foreign aid laws were only included
in order to give successive administra-
tions sufficient flexibility to react
quickly to unforeseen events abroad such
as an earthquake in Peru or famine in
Pakistan. The intent of Congress was not
to provide the kind of flexibility which
would allow the Executive to request a
certain amount of money for a program
with the expectation at the time that
more money would immediately be
needed and that it could be secretly di-
verted from other parts of the budget.
I have had drafted legislation which
would attempt to close each one of the
four loopholes listed by the Joint Chiefs.
But on reflection, I have decided that to
close specific loopholes is not the an-
swer, although I might later introduce
such legislation if other efforts fail. The
Executive, if it is so determined, can
always find ways to get around particu-
lar prohibitions.
A good example is the case of Thai
troops in Laos. Last year the Congress
passed an amendment banning the use
of foreign troops in Laos paid for by U.S.
funds. The President. signed this provi-
sion into law. Then this year, we learned
that the United States was indeed pay-
ing for Thai troops in Laos, but some-
how these Thai troops were not consid-
ered to come under the ban because they
were so-called volunteers and thus not
foreign troops.
In July, I introduced an amendment
which would tighten the language on the
use of foreign troops in Laos to include
"volunteers." Similarly. I have pending
five additional amendments which would
close other loopholes or loosely worded
provisions. But the law seems like a leaky
dike with new holes appearing just as
quickly as we close the old ones.
It is for this reason that I have intro-
duced with the senior Senator from Mis-
souri (Mr. SYMINGTON) an amendment
which would place an absolute ceiling on
all American expenditures in Cambodia.
Moreover. Senator SYMINGTON is joining
me in my earlier amendment which
would freeze the number of Americans
in Cambodia at 200 U.S. Government em-
ployees and fix third-country employees
at 50.
Our amendment states that total
American spending in or for Cambodia
cannot exceed $250 million. This figure,
unfortunately, if considerably below the
$330 million the administration is re-
questing and even further below the
roughly $380 million the Joint Chiefs
would like to spend. However, it would
maintain our programs in Cambodia at
about current levels.
I am extremely pleased that the Case-
Symington amendments have been tenta-
tively approved by the Foreign Relations
Committee.
It is essential in authorizing foreign
aid for 1972 that Congress shows that our
commitment to Cambodia is not open
ended. The Senate recently approved a
similar Symington proposal for Laos
which would place a $350 million limit
on expenditures in that country. We
should do the same for Cambodia and
with great urgency, for in Cambodia we
at least have not yet passed the point of
no return with our involvement.
It is now clearer than ever that the ad-
ministration should come to Congress
and the American people with our future
plans and intentions for Cambodia. We
should not have to be dependent on leaks
of secret documents for our information,
and we certainly cannot rationally make
decisions without sufficient information.
In the meantime. the United States
should take no action which would in any
way increase our commitment to Cam-
bodia. We should go no further without
a clear understanding of the stakes in-
volved in creating yet another client
state in Southeast Asia.
Mr. President. I ask unanimous consent
to have printed in the RECORD several
recent newspaper articles on Cambodia,
including the October 13 article from
the New York Times, an excerpt of which
was printed in the RECORD at the request
of the junior Senator from Missouri.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
S 16385
[From the New York Tim . Oct. 13, 19711
JOINT CHIEFS SAID TO I ISE COSTLY
CAMBODIA WAR AN
WASHINGTON.?The Jointiefs of Staff are
said to have designed a , ly program of
"pacification" and other nconventional
warfare for Cambodia to pi i ot South Viet-
nam's western flank as At !cans continue
their withdrawal from Inct Ina.
They have also prl nosed cries of budget
devices to augment I he fu 2 that Congress
will be asked to provide 1 r expanding the
Cambodian Army over the 1, xt five years.
The Chiefs submi, ted t ar program last
month to Secretary of D f use Melvin R.
Laird, according to Cong -i.onal sources.
Mr. Laird, who has been bu tining with the
Chiefs since June about t e cost of the ef-
fort, is described as still rt. u tant about the
latest version, which dot spending to
about $500-million a year .7. 1977.
The final decision. howe ti will rest with
a senior policy review gro r run by Henry
A. Kissinger, the Presiden adviser on na-
tional security affairs.
How to protect Cambott rom the North
Vietnamese forces and der nem the use of
Cambodian territory for r7,tacks against
South Vietnam's populatic !enters has be-
come a major probl,no for I a agon planners.
As the American forces it \ tetnam are re-
duced to 50,000 men, at tl nost, and come
to rely on air power for ope .1 ions in the rest
of Indochina, the planne are looking to
indigenous forces to can the burden in
ground combat.
With a first-year grant 1185-million in
military aid and $70-millio economic aid,
the Cambodian Army has a Ntady been ex-
panded from 30,000 men i- April, 1970--
when American troops n led the North
Vietnamese "sanctuaries" a Cambodia?to
a current strength of at a t 180,000. The
Cambodians are said to ha,. ought well, but
most of them are no mat. ,et for the 60,-
000 North Vietnamese I their country,
mostly east of the Mekong i er.
SAIGON TROOPS IP rITLAR
South Vietnamese troop. I. lye periodically
moved into Cambodia to 1 -'ii out, but they
are no more popular among ,mbodians than
the Communists forces fr, a the north and
will in any case be needed 'a. the defense of
their own territory.
When the Joint Chiefs .f Staff first con-
sidered the problem last Ji I, they proposed
a 1971-'72 military add pro a in of $350-mil-
lion, Congressional inforn m i report. Sec-
retary Laird said that h? tild not, afford
that much and that 'Oongr a. would not sup-
port such an increase.
The chiefs said that wi, i;200-million in
military aid they could no ) :crease the size
of the Cambodian Army, lx or $275-million
they could expand it to 2 .000 men. Mr.
Laird's' budget pruners s, ci that such an
increase in strength co k probably be
achieved with $252-millior
But as finally submitter Congress, the
Cambodian aid program ei I, 1 for $200-mil-
lion in military aid, $110-n? I on in economic
assistance and $15-million v irth of agricul-
tural commodities, for a ?1 LI of $325-mil-
lion. This was a net Imre a of $61-million
over last year's allocations.
ALTERNATE PLANS ,1 .ERED
Nonetheless, in el:plaint! :,heir elaborate
military plans to Mr. Lair n a memoran-
dum dated Aug. 30. the i a Chiefs indi-
cated that they could get ,und the limit
on military spending and a weed with the
build-up.
According to informant lie Chiefs of-
fered four different ways I generating an
additional $52-million so -s to add 40,000
troops to the Camib,odian A, .n 'and also raise
the "paramilitary" farce t rmed civilians
to 143,000. ?
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CUNGRE)SIONA RECORD ?SENATE Oober 19. 1971
eat would be simply to transfer
ii him from the economic aid program
titian, spending, which can be done later
.iscal year simply by the Administra-
eotitying Congress. The second way
00 to use the economic aid fund for
_._/11.1Le of all "common use" items such
c is sal 1cups, which have military as
ash n value, thus freeing other mill-
i midis.
rd way would be to increase procure-
air the S tilted States Army by $52-
nt 'tt .ui.l itive the materiel to the Camtio-
sita tr eepayment" later. The fourth way
vie ci se to make some exceptions in De-
11enee Departmeut supply regulations, de-
stataie, adchtimial equipment to be "excess"
to. ciiiiivertng it, to the Cambodians.
Pente.gen planners said they were
utr aa to further increases in the
so that it would number
i.e'ill Sit mid-1973 and more than
1100.i100 men by 1977. The paramilitary
beitc?me, must be augmented to
-100.000 he mid-1973 and more than
100 a0-i0 in 1977. This would mean arming
ateeit, i0 pc,rce n' of Cambodia's population
a earner:, or nearly half the adult male
arse, Mai ion,
:Jets would provide for a
;ne;:-.titi;ized bricsade, and artillery brigade
;Led coastal patrol units, as well as ground
irceies and eidasisive logistic support. They
south oak to the Agency for International
St lii mem sei help finance the parliamen-
;ars detente forces, including the police. The
itee ',rat Lntelireenc,e Agency would be asked
to ;aeon iteditsonal programs and to pro-
sicitii cli lift site-port.
a -se rarograrn of activity drawn up by the
Chiefs Ti. divided into four headings,
iii: ted 'Patent i, "Unconventional War-
or Operations" and "Civil
'The country would be divided into
pacification areas and this program
Cot 11 .me supervised by a new United States
bassaciar?as in South Vietnam?
e: new etetheasti structure.
iie.riette.on would also establish a three-
ealton. military eommittee with the Combo-
has:a and South Vietnamese, in which the
lieranse Department would be represented
Slir; tipli Gcn. Frederick C. Weyand, the dep-
uty ci unnallee.11 of American forces in
Vie :Atari.
ITS-it:re the Washington Post, Oct. 14, 1971i
CAllEcD.T.i. AID LIMIT PUSHED
? Spencer Rich)
ienete riareign Relations Committee
visaed 1' to 4 yesterday to clamp an absolute
M11; Of $250 mill ion on all forms of U.S. mill-
' sod economica.ssiatance to Cambodia in
01 1972.
arovisti was added to the foreign aid
tem: isti the motion of Sens. Clifford P. Case
lat--.4.J I anti Stuart Symington (D-Mo.).
use said IT is intended to prevent an "in-
:Ina-1i oscaiation- of U.S. outlays for Cam-
ton .s The Pascal 1971 aid level is also about
12. n this'll eat the administration had
anein $341 malion for Fiscal 1972.
e second part of the amendment puts a
;eel p ci tice, iie the number of U.S. person-
tie ',t to prevent a buildup of the
n ilitare equipment aid group. U.S.
el ',bete now nu.mebr 150.
1 a tI:prq trt of the amendment limits
.riber of third-country nationals who
be paid from U.S. aid funds to 50. This
aesitned -to prevent use of U.S. funds to
operators, mechanics and supply
acin sera nations as Thailand, the
Pa tipines and Korea. No such personnel
shire now, out sources said there were
Isle's; 1:i hire Lot, or more,
is Ii C tote was taken on the Case-
ii li:1,On amendment. sponsors accepted
a,cldit, al word ng by Sen. Jacob K. Javi
(R-ti Y I stating that the provision of mile-
tarp arid economic assistance to Cambodia
within the lam to imposed, does not cat
stitute it U.S. oommitmeht to she defense
that se entry.
The Oase-Eivralegton measure original''
imposed a $200 million EAU limit ard a 151--
man cev log on 11.3. personnel. But Case sat
the ffeetaii; were reamed ir committee to hid
cate its it "this wattle; intended to be a share
reduc i as of existing programs, but a lint
on indHi.nite e; c dation ' to give Congree -
time e studs low Ear the United Stati
shoula ars in sepporting the war in Can
bodia
aid he; ir eirelinont WE :S particularl
timet-, I view et' reports that the Jon
Chief .r Staff It a, -.idvisf.d Defense Secretai
Mel vi li, laied -t,-) bring about a mil-
tary ;Winn it Carriwtdia " J,i,fl militate
aid w t Id have rise to :noire than $500 me -
lion be 1977.
Ace acting to maneselonal soitrces, thi
Joint Chietc, adtised Laird that the numn
of reg ,t Ar Comb thirsts troops?now at 180,0C:
a year airo--would have to lump to 300,00(
by 1.91-1 and part pill [tree's to 500,0111-
by thee
The 1: ports so ci that the Joint Chiefs cot
siderea. the $211 million military assistant;
portion of the air -ministration's total resale; ;
for 1.9-1:: Eff $351 riblion too small, and had dc
viseci Lans for shifting $52 million froi...
other -; ances to the military aid program.
This :was intended to boost the reguls
Comb ;titan army' to 220,000 men by the en;
of Lao sear and the "paramilitary- forces 1-
143,000 The repons said the JCS had devise:
vantai a methods of transferring funds from:
one aeteunt to it other or of using "excess
rani Isr .equipmti t.
('as-- ,aid his Ennenament clotted all loot
holes aeainst a ma- such shifts,. Laird, at :.
press a inference, neither confirmed nor di
nied tte existence of the reported Joh
Chief,' iecommendatems, but did say no at
Our C tebodia beyond the $341 million a
ready requested varuld be sought this year.
Like an earlier Symington amendment it
the it i tory pr c cerement bill limiting Lae
aid te $350 million., yesterday's Cambodie
prOvi,-;U, cover only military and econorna
assastatire and tic not restrict spending
U.S. al seissiot a flown over Cambodia.
'11,1 'Ii- the vi te, Senate Majority Lead.
MikeMansfield (D-Mont.) said its a floes
speech that before the Sihanouk governmee
was eieit-thrown, Cambodia was "an oasis 4
order war-tam n Tndochina," Reit now, be
cause the United Stater had helped dra a
Cambodia into ;he war, "Cambodia is bean-
reducitil to chao; MCI devastation"
[Prose ihe New Vork Times, oot 14, 1971
Sistievoi *Tarr Viters $250-MitutoN LIMIT
C versos-mete AID
T'y ii ho W. Fix ney I
WA.. le laGTON.--1..the Senate Forcigia Relit
tions Committeo voted today to impose a
$250-1thiliOn cellirg on rrilitar3 and econorr
ic aid 7:: the Ca hoocican Government in tle
curreti I fiscal year
1.-ae \dministi a ion has requested author
ity t, spend ir. Cambodia-
about oa in military aid and the
eer in economic assistance.
Au smendmert Incorporated into the For
eign ii. Authorization 13111 by :the conunt
tee w -pad also Unit to 200 the number .'-
Amert :i.n civilian and m.litary personnel as.
signet: to Cambodia..
ADMINT3TaATION is oarosre
The sommittee amendment, co-sponsor."
by Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat o"
Misso in. and Sextator Clifford P. Case, Re
publican of New Jersey, was adopted by
10-3 eate over the opposition of the Adminis
tration, which Warned that the limitations
ivoitild undermine the Cambodian Govern-
ment and endanger American troops as they
are withdrawn from Vietnam.
In a letter to the committee, Under Sec-
retary of State John N. 'Irwin said that the
Administration's requeE.t was "the minimum.
Which is essential to helo Cambodians con-
solidate their independence."
The committee's action was prompted in
part by the disclosure that the Joint, Chiefs
of Staff had recommended a langrange pro-
gram that by 1977 would bring military pad
to Carnbcdta to $500-million, roughly donne
that now being spent.
The Joint Chiefs are reported to believe
that increased military assistance to Canis
bodia is necessary to protect South Viet--
mina's western flank as American troops are
withdrawn from Indochina. But to malty
members of the Senate committee, the pro-
posal represents a growing Americau con i-
mitment to Cambodia similar to that set a
decade ago in South Vietnam.
"AilmED AMD" :FoRESEEN
Senator 'Symington, in an interview, ex-
pressed fear that the meal intention of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff was to "shore up, the
borders of Thailand by establishing positions
of strength in Cambodia and Laos "where
we could remain indefinitely."
Senator Case, in a statement, said that; the
recommendations of the joint Chiefs "-would
entirely destroy Cambodia's own economy
and turn that country into an armed cama,
altogether dependent on United States dol-
lars, arms and food for its continued exist-
ence."
He emphasized that the limitation on
spending was a "holding action" designed to
force a full-scale review of future American
policy in Cambodia and said:
"We should go no but-them in increasieg
our commitment to Carnloodta. at least not
without a firm decision by Congress and
the American people that an expanded war
it Cambodia is the course our country
should fallow."
In a statement on tae Senate floor, Sen-
ator Mike Mansfield, the majority leader,
said:
"The Cambodian expesrien.ce is an admoni-
tion to curb the easy outflow of the financial
resources of the people of this nation which.,
for years, has been legislated in the name
oi national defense and foreign aid.
"In the case of Cambodia, the hundreds
of millions of dollars already spent in a year
and a half have done hardly anything for
the defense of this nation except, perhaps,
to weaken it by wastage. Nor have these
expenditures helped the Cambodian people,
Who have now been reduced to the cammcn
denominEttor of the -irrelevant devastation
which has been suffered in Laos and Vier:-
Senator Mansfield ionatested that "the
trend of present Cambodian policy, insofar
as I can see, runs strongly counter not or ay
to the expressed incliaations of the Con-
gress but also to the Nixon doctrine which
was supposed to provide the guidelines of
that policy."
In the year and a half since the Govern-
ment of Prince Sihanouk was overthrown
and the United States conducted military
'operations against Comm-mist sanctuaries in
Cambodia, he said, Carribcdia has become
"the enemy sanctuary,' the nation is "being
reduced to chaos and devastation," and
American support has 'oecome "the sole sig-
nificant prop which keeps the political-mili-
tary structure in Pncmpenh from falling
apart."
"T sometimes wonder,- he said. "how we
let ourselves get involved in these travesties
of foreign policy which, rather than serve
the interests of this nation, give every ap-
pEaranee of being at complete odds with
those interests."
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October 19, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE
[From the Baltimore Sun, Oct. 14, 1971]
SENATE PANEL APPROVES CEILING OF $250
MILLION ON CAMBODIA Am
(By Gene Oishi)
WAsIIINGTON.?The Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee approved by a 10-to-3 vote
yesterday a $250 million ceiling on expendi-
tures in Cambodia?$80 million under what
the administration is requesting for fiscal
1972.
The amendment to the foreign aid author-
ization bill also contains a declaration of
policy stating that the authorization of
funds for military and economic aid to Cam-
bodia does not constitute a U.S. commitment
to defend the country.
Senator Clifford P. Case (R., N.J.), who of-
fered the amendment together with Senator
Stuart Symington (D., Mo.), also issued a
statment expressing concern over a report
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have proposed
a plan for military aid to Cambodia that
would reach $500 million a year by 1977.
"These recommendations," Mr. Case said,
"would entirely destroy Cambodia's own
economy and turn that country into an
armed camp, altogether dependent on U.S.
dollars, arms and food for its continued
existence."
The Case-Symington amendment had
originally called for a $200 milion ceiling on
expenditures in Cambodia, but the spending
limit was increased to $250 million in com-
mittee.
The authorization for fiscal 1971, which
ended June 30, provided $185 million in
military aid and $70 million in economic as-
sistance for a total of $255 million.
For fiscal 1972, the administration is re-
questing $200 million in military aid and
$130 million in economic assistance.
Senator Case indicated to reporters that
the $250 million ceiling approved by the
committee could be further compromised
when the foreign aid bill reaches the floor.
The administration is opposed to a ceiling
on spending, because such a limit would
eliminate its flexibility in shifting other de-
fense funds into Cambodia.
Senator Case said the purpose of the
amendment was not to force sharp cuts in
U.S. expenditures in Cambodia, but rather
to hold the line on spending until a full
congressional inquiry into U.S. policy for
Cambodia can be made.
Mr. Case in his statement said It would
be "tragically wrong" to seek a military solu-
tion in Cambodia, and that 'is what Joint
Chiefs are apparently contemplating.
From the Washington Post, Oct. 17, 19711
REVIEW IS SLATED ON OPTIONS FOR NEW
BuILDOP IN CAMBODIA
(By Spencer Rich)
A high-level Nixon administration meeting
with grave consequences for the fate of
Cambodia is expected to take place this week,
according to congressional sources.
On Monday, a "senior review" group of
persons at the level of CIA Director Richard
Helms, Deputy Secretary of Defense David
Packard and Under Secretary of State U.
Alexis Johnson is scheduled to consider
"options" for U.S. policy in Cambodia.
One alternative expected to be considered
is an Aug. 30 "five-year plan" by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff on how to win in Cambodia?.
"winning" being defined as building up the
strength of Cambodian forces to the point
where they could drive all North Vietnamese
troops out of the country.
The Pentagon has never acknowledged
existence of the plan, nor plans for the meet-
ing. A spokesman said yesterday, "We have
nothing to add" to what Defense Secretary
Melvin R. Laird said last Wednesday. Laird,
questioned about the alleged plan following
press reports on it, had neither confirmed nor
denied its existence.
Congressional sources insisted, however,
that such a plan does exist, that it was
drafted as a result of a June 11 request for
"options" by Presidential Assistant Henry
A. Kissinger, and that it calls for a buildup of
Cambodia's regular and "paramilitary" forces
with U.S. supplies. to 863.000 men by 1977. A
congressional staff member estimated that
the cost to the U.S could reach anywhere
from $500 million co $1 billion a year by 1977.
He said Laird has !tuned down several earlier
versions of the plan as too expensive.
Emphasizing that neither Laird nor the
State Department has yet "bought" the
plan?and may even be somewhat dubious
about it solar?the staff member gave this
description of the proposal:
The plan would he a classic application of
the Nixon doctrine, with the U.S. furnishing
military supplies and economic aid to support
military operations by indigenous Cambodian
forces. It envisions a force structure with
"sophisticated" American-supplied trucks,
tanks, armored cars, and artillery brigade and
coastal patrol boats.
A key feature would be anti-guerilla war-
fare, with the establishment of a commando-
type Green Beret force manned by specially
trained Cambodians The JCS document is
said to state. "Cambodia represents perhaps
the classic case for the employment of un-
conventional warfare by the allies," and, fur-
ther, that there should be "the highest pos-
sible priorities given to neutralizing the
Khmer (Cambodian) Communist infrastruc-
ture," that is----infiltrating and destroying
the Communist Party inner structure.
The plan calls ior a massive escalation of
U.S. aid to Cambodia over the next five years.
At present, the U.S. aid level?already vastly
increased from two years ago?is $185 mil-
lion for military equipment, $70 million for
supporting assistance (special aid to the
economy to keep it going despite defense bur-
dens and $9 million from sales under the
overseas food program This is a total of
$264 million. The plan is said to call for a
boost to $377 million in fiscal 1972 and $390
million in fiscal 1973. Some $52 million of
the 1972 figure would not be drived from
congressional appropriations but from trans-
fers from other accounts or "excessing" of
U.S. military supplies. (Military supplies
which the Pentagon declares "excess" may be
sold or given away to other nations at well
below actual cost."1 No cost estimates for
years beyond that are contained in the plan.
The plan calls for increasing the Cam-
bodian regular army from 170,000 in fiscal
1971 to 220,000 In 1972. 256.000 in 1973 and
306,000 in 1977. ")'aramilitary" forces?local
militia and special forces--which are now
at an undetermined level?would rise to
143,000 in 1972, 197,000 in 1973 and 557,000
in 1977. Combined regular and paramilitary
forces would thus total 863,000 in 1977.
The number of U.S. personnel on military
equipment delivery teams in Cambodia?now
23?would jump to 104 in fiscal 1972. The
number of Americans in South Vietnam en-
gaged in channeling supplies to Cambodia,
now estimated at 60, would rise to 400. Some
96 nationals of other Southeast Asia nations
would be breught into Cambodia at U.S. ex-
pense to help provide a "clerical infrastruc-
ture" for the supply and training operations.
The village pacification program would have
eight different aspects, including village de-
velopment and primary education.
[From the New York Times, Oct. 17, 1971]
U.S. AND CAMBODIA 7 DOWN THE "SLIPPERY
--;D,Pr: AGAIN?
By Jonn vv Finney)
WASHINGTON.--When he issue of supplying
military and economic aid to Cambodia was
first before Congress last year, Secretary of
State William P. Rogers, with obvious refer-
ence to the Vietnam involvement, gave assur-
ances that -we have no intention of slipping
into the mistakes of the pa
question of whether the Un e
ing down the same "slippe
bodia was revived by the Se A
tions Committee as it set a 2
on United States spendin
the current fiscal year.
The ceiling?incorporau
ment in the foreign aid al 1
was at least $100-mIllion
ministration plans to pr
and economic aid to the ( .T
rnent this year. And it phi, (
in clear opposition to a i o
gram of the Joint Chiefs o
the Cambodian armed fora
The stage was thac set fc
contests between the Sen A
tions Committee and the -
that for 18 months- since a
Prince Sihanouk and the
sion"?have so often cent 1
policy in Cambodia. Last y
succeeded in passing an ;2.
hibiting the introducti.
ground combat troops or
into Cambodia. This year 1
over limiting military am
Cambodia, which started c t
last year and shows every i
a multi-year program cost' g
lars.
Not unexpectedly, the fi t administration
reaction was a dire warni, a John N. Irwin
H, Under Secretary of Stat . wrote the com-
mittee that the proposed It would "great-
ly disheartin" the Cambo a. ti Government,
"seriously threaten" its c a city to defend
Cambodia, "greatly encou aja. a step-up of
North Vietnamese aggress", (lion" in Cam-
bodia and "significantly in case" the threat
to American forces in Viete
But Mr. Irwin seemed o a significant
step further when he deft .e. the American
purpose in Cambodia as o e of "supporting
the Government of the R r. er Republic in
their efforts to maintain e . independence
and neutrality of Camboo a which in turn
enhances the prospect for .1. imate peace in
Southeast Asia." To inemb? s af the commit-
tee, that statement had a -'- 'dedly different
ring from the repeated A r inistration re-
assurances last year that itary and eco-
nomic aid did not represent a 'ommitment to
the survival of the (iambi i ii Government
but rather was designed, 1 livening North
Vietnamese forces, to prof the American
troops as they were withdra 'ram Vietnam.
For the dovish members f ,,he committee,
It was just that type of rh rical escalation
that contributed to the A, 'man entangle-
ment in Vietnam. And th r leers that the
United States was going dc ex the same road
In Cambodia were compour if I by last week's
report that the Joint Chief c Staff had pro-
posed a costly five-year p ) ram for Cam-
bodia, including paciticatic !id clandestine
warfare by the Central 1 o,-ence Agency.
The Joint Chief's repor ( rationale was
that such a program?we a could double
American spending :n Cat a dia, by 1977?
was necessary to protect S th Vietnam's
western flank as American tops are with-
drawn from Indochina. 0 he face of it,
that seemed to be a iogica e tension of the
original justification for m' I ay aid to Cam-
bodia. As American troops a >outh Vietnam
are reduced to a residual ( .ce or perhaps
withdrawn completely, the .th Vietnamese
forces, it can be argued, the -Ives need pro-
tection against Cominunis -anctuary" on
their Cambodian border.
But to members of the 2 ,ign Relations
Committee, the Administra: and the Joint
Chiefs seemed to be off en a a prescription
for indefinite military inve .7, nient in Cam-
bodia, with the undesiralal ale-effect of a
growing commitment to ti- . amvival of the
Pnom Penh Government, eenator Stuart
Symington of Missouri exp e sed fears that
the real intention of the Jc a Chiefs was to
S 16387
Last week the
States was go-
dope" in Cam-
Foreign Rela-
.0-million limit
. Cambodia in
as an amend-
.irization
than the Ad-
ea in military
.bodia Govern,
the committee
,,'ted new pro-
tiff to build up
'other of. those
Foreign Rela-
,,iutive branch
e overthrow of
ierican "incur-
1 on American
the committee
,endment pro-
of American
,litany advisers
e fight will be
onomic aid to
it $255-million
11 of becoming
billions of dol-
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CONGRI ,SIONAL RECORD SET.; ATE ()el o er 19, 1971
?ithe:e ,n" ite liorders of Thailand by estab-
lishing positions of strength in Cambodia
esici Laos **where we could remain indeti-
to be seen whether through the
.levniti: of a spendin.g limit the committee
reverse tbe trend in Cambodia. The
raie ilenal Approach has been to cut funds
I. tie carom:it:tee employed that weapon
chopped nearly $850-million
eilemnistration's $3.3-billicn for-
., lit reo !lest, including $140 million from
i15 1 Ui-in I'd requested for military aid
essigis rem:dries, including Cambodia.
saiing limitation is 1 new approach tor
.:e-arretteti. and one that apparently
the by surprise.
irtiei is-n absoleite spending limit,
nominee's standpoint, is that it
icionlioE,3:. the Executive branch has
ircraieer of funds or provision
lite; v.:eine:us?to increase aid to a
bseseri im amount appropriated by
vionsi aptinding limit, therefore, re-
sit-1e: I.hc. leideilitive's policy flexibility. Is
e: ;;t' bil,;t,e, the principle of Executive
:ass. i 9:I hi to Congress, on what it is
iii a esi
'I 01.01 o-. 'riding limit may also force
Mee at ihe Administration's long-
tin' Ililno tic C/ milaoclia. thus permi-Uting a
rad:: ei debaie before the nation has slipped
jai::: oopey u; Executive discretion. If so.
xc "reign Relvtions Committee, which ad-
s:Olt-die iormulate policy, will have
,cin ever. ore of its principal objectives of
Jolliet:ming honey before it is made.
MANSFIELD and Mr. SYMING-
e-Tr ie [dressed the Chair.
PI-ZanlIDENT pro tempore. The
time of the Senator from New Jersey has
expired.
MAINNFIT,MD. Mr. President, may
1 b. iecogtiO:efi?
ii PRESIDENT pro tempore. The
narrator frore Montana is recognized for
"eited
-kMBODIA
INSIPIELD. Mr. President, I
e ant the distinguished Senator from
tied Jersey as well as the distinguished
mane. Senator from Missouri for the
elet .arients tnev have just made, and also
I he distinguished senior Senator from
Midnead for Lie initiative he has shown
:1;.4 reenact.
1 'lare the eencern expressed by Sen-
who have spoken today and who
speak later on the continuation of
really amounts to a broadening of
1, he aaf.
e are eel:trig out of South Vietnam,
hut it looks like we are getting into
Can Wodia. appears to me that the old
eannen is peroaps being repeated; that
he handwritiag is on the wall for an-
tilt's Vietnam, despite all disclaimers
. a-m,,rary being in the offing.
:.ealernbe.r being in Phnom Penh in
,9Ca, after President Nixon recognized
hip government of Prince Norodom
Sitanioak. There were two people at the
,iini:as,sy their At the time of the over-
jig 'iv of Sihanouk, there were 11. Today
e are something in excess of 150, and
the tread ts no, The public press carries
,tortes to the effect that there is a 5-
yea- military plan in existence for Cam-
bodi a.
1. -ainuent it was the intention of this
(Lica 411-ument to get out of all the old In-
docamese states, and not to get into
anoth,r one on toe scale in which we ar
alreany in Cambodia, because Cambodia
has n.ye been opened by the Defense De-
pa,rtn,ent for ,:nilitary operations, oer-
tairfn; from the air. I would assume thar
the Cooper-Church intention is bein
overridden; that the intention of th7
Symine ton proposal is being ignored: an,:
it apaietrs to me that the only way in
which this Congress?this Senate, a -
least- aan avoid loopholes and angles i
to face ap to the IllEirmate weapon in on e
inven: ena, and :hat is to cut off funds.
iii, oing to de hard. It is going to tan,
a, lot oi determ.nation, but we have trie,
everyte mg we can to confine this wai
to limit it, to ?,.et us out, and it seemn
we are' ehwarted at eveey turn. So, as fa.'
as the Senate,: frcm Montana is con -
'conic, he has :nadir up his mind. Re ha
no in- cation to w-.)te for funds in the gra)
bag int own as the foreign aid authoriza-
tion t, el, nor win he vote for aopropria -
tons. The inter, hen of Congress has bee,.,
overreaten too many times and too con -
sistenth,' and it is about time to stand un
and be eounted. I am sorry am so lat(
but there is an old saying, 'Better latee
than ,adere'
I commend the distinguished Senater
from hew Jersey on his remarks todas
Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Sen-
ator T.
Mr. ,IANSF1.ELD. Yes, indeed.
Mr. nASE. a want to commend the
majon y leaden ]E-Ls leadership in thi
area is well known to all of us.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore, The
time 01 the Senator has expired.
Mr. ieYft`D 01 West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident. 1 yield ray 3 minutes to the dis-
tinguee led majority leader.
Tht- n-RESIDT,NT pro tempore, is there
?Oleo ? Wit hoot objection, it, is
order. e.
Mr vrANSFIIMD. Mr President.
yield to the Senator from New Jerse:v.
Mr. LASE. It is not he who is late. I
think it is all of us who are late in fol-
iowine nis leadership, and we are vera
grateit... as is the country, for it. I again
than1 ',he Senator, and I am deep],
gratel i.
Mr e resident, if I may-, I yield bacl:
the balance of lie 3 minutes to the Sen-
ator netm Mon;a.n.a so the Senator from
Missouri may have a:a opportunity to
engage in any actoquy with him.
Th. ,i'RESIDING OFFICER (Mr. AL-
LEN I, lalue Senator from Missouri is rec -
ognized for 3 minutes.
Mr. ,dYMIN(..)TON. Mr. :President,
thank the distraguished senior Senato:
from tic ?ler ;ey, have read his talk
and ant much impressed with his logic_
I would assanace myself with him in
cdnur ending the majority leader for the
work he has been doing with respect te
our potion in Cambodia, trying to geL
us reatiy out cf this war. We all knote
he is i expert ri this field.
I an: also giad to join with the abla
Senator froml\ew Jersey, as well as with
my die ,iinguished colleague from Mis-
souri, to supporting the pxition pre-
sented by the able Senator from Nen-
Jerse7a
Mr. President, it occurs tort remark':
made tint the President of the United
State e en June 30, 1970, are applicable ta
what we are discussing this morning.
President Nixon stated at that time:
Now that our ground forces and our
tic and advisory personnel have all bees with.-
drawn, what will be our future policy for
Cambodia?
The following will be the waidelineE of our
pclicy in Cambodia:
I. There will be no U.S. ground personnel
in Cambodia except for the regular staff of
our Embassy in Phnom. Penh.
But our regular staff has increasad
tenfold:
2. There will be no U.:3, advisers wita Cam-
bodian units.
I. We will conduct?with the approval et'
the Cambodian Government--air interdiction
missions against the enemy efforts to mose
supplies and personnel :though Cambodia te-
ward South Vietnam aud to reestablish bace
areas relevant to the war in Vietnam. We do
this to protect our forces in South Vietnam.
Note his words, "air interdiction mis-
sions.'" But we are now offering the South
Vietnamese troops in that -country close
air support:
I. we will turn over material capt.tred in
the base areas in Cambodia to the Canthr,diaii
Government tohelp it defend its neutralil y
and independence.
5. We will provide military assistance In
the Cambodian Government in the form of
small arms and relatively unsophisticated
equipment in types and quantities suitable
for their army. To date we have s applied
about $5 million of these items principally
in the form of small arms, mortars, truck 3.
aircraft parts, communications equipmeitt
and medical supplies.
Putting it mildly, however, the char-
acter of our military aid program has
changed:
6. We will encourage other countries of the
region to give diplomatic support to the in-
dependence and neutrality of Cambodia. We
welcome the efforts of the Djakarta group of
countries" to mobilize world opinion and
encourage Asian cooperation to this end.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator's time has expired.
Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I yield
my 3 minutes to the Senator from Min-
souri.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Missouri is recognized for 3
additional minutes.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the dis-
tinguished Senator from Louisiana:
7. We will encourage and support the re -
forts of third countries who 'wish to furniell
Cambodia with troops or material. We ap-
plaud the efforts of Asian nations to help
Cambodia preserve its neutrality and incir-
pendence.
The only trouble about that Mr. Presi-
dent, is the fact that n.o aid from other
ccuntries has been forthcoming.
The President continued:
I will let the Asian Governments speak fer
themselves concerning their future policies.
I am confident that two basic principles will
govern the actions of those nations laelping
Com.bodia:
They will be at the request of, and in close
concert with the Cambodian Government.
They will not be at -the expense of those
nations' cyvn defense?indeed they will con-
tribute tO their security which they see
Pound up with events in Cambodia.
The South Vietnamese plan to help. Of
all the countries of Southeast Asia, South
Vietnam :aas most at stake In Cambodia. A
North Vietnamese takecver 'would, of course,
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October 19, 1971 CONGRESSION Al,
have profound consequences for its security.
At the same time, the leaders of South Viet-
nam recognize that-the primary focus of their
attention must be on the security of their
own country. President Thieu has reflected
these convictions in his major radio and TV
address of June 27. Our understanding of
Saigon's intentions is as follows:
1. South Vietnamese forces remain ready
to prevent reestablishemnt to base areas
along South Vietnam's frontier.
2. South Vietnamese forces will remain
ready to assist in the evacuation of Viet-
namese civilians and to respond selectively
to appeals from the Cambodian Government
should North Vietnamese aggression make
this necessary.
3. Most of these operations will be launched
from within South Vietnam. There will be
no U.S. air or logistics support. There will
not be U.S. advisers on these operations.
4. The great majority of South Vietnamese
forces are to leave Cambodia.
But there are still some 10,000 mem-
bers of the South Vietnamese forces in
Cambodia:
5. The primary objective of the South
Vietnamese remains Vietnamization within
their country. Whatever actions are taken
in Cambodia will be consistent with this
objective.
In this June 27 speech President Thieu
emphasized that his government will con-
centrate on efforts within South Vietnam.
He pledged that his country will always re-
spect the territory, borders, independence
and neutrality of Cambodia and will not
interfere in its internal politics. His govern-
ment does not advocate stationing troops
permanently in Cambodia or sending the
South Vietnamese Army to fight the war for
the Cambodian Army.
Mr. President, I read those remarks
in the RECORD, because in themselves,
they emphasize the great importance of
the speech given this morning by the
distinguished Senator from New Jersey.
Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield.
Mr. CASE. I want to say to the Sena-
tor, as he know already, how deeply I
appreciate his assistance in this matter.
I think it is only fair to him and to
me, too, to say that the figures ? named
in the amendment we have under dis-
cussion are not our first choices. I would
have preferred a considerably smaller
amount of money, and I know the Sena-
tor would join me in advocating a con-
siderably smaller sized American con-
tingent in Laos than that permitted by
the amendment. We were dealing, how-
ever, not with a theory but with a con-
dition. We needed action, and this com-
promise proposal would at least hold
things approximately the way they are
now.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President. I
agree with the able Senator and have
been privileged to work with him on this
matter. We have one primary interest, to
get American troops out of Southeast
Asia.
I ask unanimous consent to have
printed in the RECORD at this point an
article published in the Washington Post
of Thursday, September 16 of this year,
written by Peter Osnos and entitled
"Cambodian Town Destroyed by Napalm
From U.S. Planes."
There being 21 oh leeti011, the article
was ordered to to ;31:flied in the RECORD,
as follows:
CAMBODIA 'ras Di sis
. :
Inty ic
Komeorm. finona Se-it
bombers leveled most
napalm lust two week,
rancid with tile SIT en
I he monsoon rains.
Nearby, villagers di-
In, NAPA1M FROM
iiniber 15. --American
01 this town with
wzo and the air is still
dampened by
bed today how the
planes, too fast in lie: the propeller-driven
'r-28s of tile tiny arida-Khan air force,
streaked by and (11.121I711 'heir stocks on the
Communist noon; who were fiercely resisting
government pressint ( it the ground.
Before the war, lime were some 10,000
people living here. a sough with almost
every building noiv destroyed, it's hard to
imagine where. The people have scattered.
Many fled closer to Pit am Penh, some went
with the enemy. a fens remain in the debris.
Kompong Thom is it, a strategic crossing
point on Highway 0 ar, a it 75 miles northeast
of the capital. No long after the Vietnam
war spread to can- tiodtt. in March 1970, the
iown and tine villages all around it fell to
the Vietcong :did t DDI 1 am hod] an allies, the
Khmer Rouge
There was neavy mg and destruction
in the towns of bloji. And Tangkouk some
twenty miles away. but Kompong Thmar was
spared and local oAle.,11: say that life under
the Vietcong went, on more or less as before.
Then, almost a mon, P ago, a 15,000-man
force. supported ainiotil daily by American
air strikes. began mitt is along Highway 6
in a determined ett,r1 retake the road and
sweep the Comnumist, Iroin the rice paddies
and rubber plan ha ion:, around it.
The eventual oh,erir a is in link up with
iroops operating IF .in :lie provincial town of
Kompong Thom, bit r !mounded by the
enemy.
It is one of I he Ofrensives mounted
by the Cambodians i I a tar tbal from Saigon
or Washington se( mi perhaps. more static
than it actually is
Lt. Col. Ph Snout ,.,.ailander of the 1st
Infantry Brigade Orono said his troops oper-
ating on the road 'net vol Ii little serious re-
sistance until they reat- lied Korn pong Thmar,
an important link in the Communist supply
system extending to lie capital from the
northeastern f( Vii I Kratie.
He said his troops, hr battalions. arrived
at positions around the Town about 5 p.m. on
Aug. 31, but the Viet non!r held them off with
Chinese-made 75 11:Elinialer howitzers
"It was a very had h, lie the colonel said
proudly, as he gazed Si a map of the area laid
out on a Sinai woo.ien able in lhe neighbor-
ing town ol Barav I be drive is now
neadquartentd.
N
What; made the
airpower. The colonel ,
geant, trainee la 001.1
United States aIr trikT
observation planes an; I
by the napalm-caiTi.i,,,
1,--4 Phantoms.
',lice apparently was
ish -speaking ser-
i Vietnam to call in
went to work and
Pd quickly followed
t, rainibers, probably
The colonel alor e wrong; his officers, said
the planes were tl, e i-maner A- 37s. He also
maintained, unlike the others, that much of
the damage to the town was caused by the
Vietcong who expIaled ;tramp/titian dump
they were keeping I nein
Casualties from g are unknown.
Cambodians claim none 01 their troops were
killed at the lime anti only one since. As for
the villagers. all were said to have fled before
the bombing began Only three enemy bodies
were discovered, ono officer reported, the rest
having been burneo or earned away.
Cambodian soldiers are I
destroyed school outside the
cong troops were camped Or
The Communists have pull
crackling sound of tmnfir
some are still very close by.
WIVES ANII CHM,
Beginning in Skoun, Cam
much in evidence dug in p.
the road (accompanied by
children) but none oL the
have retaken fared an vwher.
Kompong Thmar.
The heaviest U.S. itirstrii
concentrations in a rubber
Chankar Andong.
Col. Suong said his two no
gence reports show 200 ene
with a heavy regimebt On
them up. The plantation is a
highway, beyond the aopull
From the standpoint of
the current operation, know-
has been an enormous suct
ing back under Phno.n Per
portant part of a vita, popu
portation corridor. Even w
Kompong Thmar, the cost
low, Cambodian officers sal.
.1.
S 16389
ied now in a
a where Viet-
.i month ago.
,ack, but the
clieates t,hat
). Ian troops are
.ons alongside
1
-jr wives and
I towns they
ar as badly as
iit at enemy
tation called
.? recent intern-
soldiers there
way to back
lie east of the
areas.
government,
? Tchenla Two,
io far, bring-
:-.11trol an im-
,, on and trans-
he razing of
t teen relatively
PSYWAR CAMPP.
To consolidate its gains
the army has mounted a p
fare campaign headed up
brother of the prime minis'
terday in Baray a ceremony
renewed government pres
monk spoke, comedians per
awards were handed out.
people were on hand, and
11,000 people in all remain
Another part of the calm
publicize Communist atroc .
occupation. Much has be.
Phnom Penh press and rad'
of multiple graves where
nated by the Communists
government estimates that
killed this way, but fewer to
been turned up so far.
The Cambodians are anxi
to its old pre-war pat-erns
sible and, unlike South Vie
pacification seems relativel
port for the government ap
the most part.
But in Kompong hmar
recapturing of the past.
"We will wait for peace
will bebuild," said ..ne I
there.
lu the people.
Iological war-
- -ol. Lou Non.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE October 19. 19:1
te for ie. .1 purpose that the Senator
it Keinalcio: (Mr. COOPER) and I have
I another amendment to the for-
aid bill It is offered in furtherance
s_ same objective, pulling up on the
wan strings to restrict the theater of
A a.' alibi e.sbetiite the total withdrawal of
erican military forces still remain-
[radix, Inn a.
SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will
Senator yield?
I am happy to yield to
Senator irom Missouri.
?. S ymfr000; eaken steps to ms,i
the e,?,inomic burhens imposed upon tiles...
and not ,,rly held their own again.' t
enem? attack, bat have regained control
subs> ,tial pop da-ted areas which were prc
vioue overrun b,1 the enemy. We belie
that-e th continued United States assistan
at the .evels req Jested by the Administratior ,
the Cambodians with some exeernal logisti;
and ale intenan ie support 'wt.' continue 71
max& progre:is ii defending their count
-from in'. arum.
Vic be n a-re it clear th.at there is
-
clvil act- in Cambodia. The Khmer people
have ;ea attac ted by the North Vietname.,.,
who itire not succeeded in drawing me.: ;
than ,i small number of Khmer to their site
We an- support sng tne OKR in their effort.;
to trnt dAin tile independence and neutron- e
of Ceebiudia inch in turn enhances tie,
pompa for c ltimate peace in Southea.,
Aena.
Tee, ^..dminlet 'salon's best judgment is th ?
an aelstance peckage of $330 million in F
72 is 1.17.e minimiun essemial to help the Call?
bodisis conso? le ate t.neir independenc,.
furthef more, the President must retain a ? -
thori- ?.0 so-rate additional amounts
assist., Ive if eineTencies arise. It may
be 1 he mix between economic and mil- --
tory ;..;...stance rar.y change somewhat as coll-
ditioi.s change norrig the course of the yete
We ; sire the c oiace.rn expressed by the Coe -
gross r sending large numbers of Americe
poise lel to Caerilladia and have made a el-.
libers:, effort I o keep our personnel ther
at the ()west no ;s?ble level. Of the 143 Amer. -
cans - irrently ,in-mloyed in the Embassy
Phooe; Penh. 511 are directly involved in tl
military assistan?x, program. Although
antic nate that ;; taff adjustments may
flares ?:in the future in order to assure
that aid to Cambodia is handled in 117-
crude are with c ix rent legislative and regull -
tory !eouireniertv., it will continue to be ce
nolt to maintain American staffing ?
C;ariale ,r1 is at a n Lini mum.
e;te eerety yours.
faun N. law iN
Acting Secretary.
At COOPER. Mr. President, I shiti.
addr myself briefly to the statement.;
of the Senator from New Jersey (Air.
CASE and the Senator from Missouri
(Mn'. 5VMIN,TOti I.
I may say ti at the amendments whie
have :seen offered cause me some diri -
culty. and I has expressed my probleee
to bo(ii my col Leagues.
Oi une one aand, the approval of as
amendment might be considered as ati-
proval of operations in these countria, ?
for ?Lich Con nests has given no au-
thorn.::. On the other hand, if supper.;
is 04., ? limited it could lead to an ee,:i-
patisitql of tile vtar such as we have see:t.
hi Vie
So atter mi .ch thought, believe lim
itations should be placed, as are offere
by m Lt colleague-s
I ? L hld poi it out that these amend
Merles, aticl the problems they cause brir
up a tain the 7,ragedy of this war. The,;e
coanrles are involved not because the
wan to be ni leaved, but because the
Unit ai States is involved in war in Vie;
nam with the North Vietnamese, wl,t)
were the first aggressors, without quo
tion [ believe that as long as we a
then: because of the involuntary iii-
volvement of these countries, we should,
as a of justice, provide them some
econanie aid mid some limited milita]?t-
aid io protect themselves. But I subrri
that iii this leacis to only one conclusion
The way these countries---the Mel
countries of Laos and Cambodia?as well
as the United States, will be freed from
this war is by the complete United States
withdrawal from the war, not a with-
drawal with a remaining residual force,
because if that occurs, fighting will con-
tinue in these countries.
The President has reversed past poli-
cies, he's winding clown the war, and
for this I praise him, and he should be
praised, but I hope he will determine
that we should withdraw completely all
our forces--land, sea, and air. If that
occurs, I believe that peace will come
to the poor countries of Laos and Cam-
bodia. There will be some chance for an
international arrangement for them to
have peace, at least surcease from fight-
ing, as there will be in Vietnam.
So I hope that this effort, which our
colleagues have so eloquently advocated
on the floor today, will be followed by
further action on the part of our Presi-
dent, who is reducing and bringing our
forces home, to simply say that we are
going to get out all .forces.
I hope very much that the amendment
of the Senator from Montana will be
approved by the House, as an expression
of the Congress, that it is our sense that
this war should be ended.
Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Sen-
ator yield?
Mr. COOPER. I yield.
Mr. CASE. I just want the time to ex-
press appreciation to Senator COOPER and
Senator CHURCH for their additional
backing of the effort we are making here.
I agree wholeheartedly with Senator
COOPER in his observation that we are
faced with no other real choice for end-
ing the situation than the one he sug-
gests. I have suppor'red his approach in
voting for the Hatfield-McGovern
amendment and then for the excellent
proposal of the majority leader. the
Ntansfied amendment. I hope the Mans-
field amendment will be accepted by the
House. If none of this is successful. I
plan to support the new Cooper-Church
proposal, which has not yet been un-
veiled, but which I am confident the Sen-
ator from Idaho and the Senator from
Kentucky will offer as a means of accom-
plishing this result. fhey are absolutely
right.
In the meantime, it,: is essential that we
do not increase either the size or the
intensity of the war in Cambodia or any-
where else in Indochina.
Mr. SYMINGTON Mr. President. will
the Senator yield?
Mr. CASE. I yield.
Mr. SYMINGTON'. Mr. President, I,
too, would express my appreciation to
the able Senator from Kentucky for his
remarks with respect to the efforts of
the Senator from New Jersey and my-
self and would also associated myself
with the remarks a! the Senator front
Idaho on this all important subject.
1: would again present to my colleagues
the apprehension growing in my mind
tnat the increased interest in Cambodia,
along with the long-standing interest in
Laos, is but outward expression of an
inward decision to c:?eate and support a
military bastion in Thailand, which
country is not a part of Indochina, with
plans to stay there indefinitely.
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'41 .
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October 19, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL it ECOR D ?SENATE
It is for that reason particularly that
I look forward to the new Cooper-Church
amendment currently being considered
according to the Senator from Idaho.
ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the
previous order, the Senate will now pro-
ceed to the transaction of routine morn-
ing business.
UNITED STATES-CANADIAN
FRICTION
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I would
like to take this moment to express my
deep concern about the increasing anti-
U.S. sentiment in Canada.
During the last decade, Canadians have
been moving toward the conclusion that
they are, in effect, subservient to the
United States, and they are searching for
peaceful ways to reassert their national
independence. Where this search will
lead them is still unclear, but the growth
of Canadian nationalism is a reality
which we, in the United States, must
reckon with and acknowledge.
Living, as it does, next door to an eco-
nomic and political colossus which en-
gulfs its neighbors with the incessant ex-
port of its capital and culture, Canada
is undergoing a serious identity crisis.
As Prime Minister Trudeau stated in a
recent speech, the "overwhelming pres-
ence" of the United States is endanger-
ing Canada's "national identity from a
cultural, economic and perhaps military
point of view."
Such an assertion is not altogether un-
founded. Statistics indicate that Ameri-
can investment in Canada totals almost
$34 billion, with about two-thirds of this
amount representing direct investment
in industry. U.S. businessmen own or
control about 85 percent of Canada's
mining companies, 90 percent of its elec-
tric utilities, and almost 95 percent of its
auto industry.
In reaction to this overreaching,
Canada has verred sharply away from
U.S. policies. In 1970, Prime Minister
Trudeau sought closer diplomatic rela-
tions with mainland China, and moved to
apply Canadian pollution standards to
shipping in the Artie within 100 miles of
Canada. He resisted President Nixon's
bid for a common policy for the use of
North American energy sources, and he
extended Canadian fishing limits by ex-
cluding foreign vessels from huge areas
of Canadian coastal waters.
This impulse of Canada to find a more
independent course in foreign affairs has
its roots in the events of the 1960's. The
shocked reaction in Canada to racial con-
flict, riots, and political assassination in
the United States, along with Canadian
distaste of the Vietnam war, fostered a
wave of anti-Yankeeism which swept
through Canada's intellectual and ar-
tistic community.
Unfortunately, these ill-feelings not
only continue to persist, but the admin-
istration's August surtax on imports
from Canada has exacerbated them still
further.
It is possible that President Nixon has
been badly informed about Canadian
circumsta nc, is a r d, as a result, is insen-
sitive to their predicament.
This is evident from the -U.S. rejection
of Canada's plea for an exemption from
Ihe import surcharge. Certainly, if there
is any one country Ulm deserves an ex-
emption. Canada is that country. Some
20 to 25 percent of Canada's gross na-
tional product in voives international
trade and two-thirds ot this is with the
United States. In la. our exports to
Canada amounted to s9 billion, nearly
.ivice as much as we export to any other
foreign country. Our imports from Can-
ada totaled $11.09 billion. The Canadian-
American Committee. sponsored by the
National Planning Association of the
United States ard the Private Planning
Association of Canada, stated in 1967
that the United States-Canadian trade is
not only the largest bilateral flow in the
world but the greatest trade volume that
has occurred between any two nations in
all of history.
Before the import surcharge, about
70 percent of our imports from Canada
entered this country duty free and some
64 percent of our exports to Canada
were similarly duty I ree. Moreover, Can-
ada has long since allowed her currency
to "float free" so as to avoid any artifi-
cial advantage in exchange rates vis-a-
vis the U.S. dollar.
Even though Canada refrains from re-
taliating in kind to our surtax, the Nixon
package may produce other harmful ef-
fects. This is the third time in a decade
that Canada has unsuccessfully appealed
to Washington for an exemption from a
balance-in-payments measure. Also Can-
ada's unemployment rate has now
reached 7.1 percent. clinsiderably higher
than our own.
Mr. Trudeau has always regarded Ca-
nadian nationalism as a regressive force.
Nevertheless, events and public opinion
are forcing him to make policy decisions
which reassert or even extend the area
of Canadian national control. As the
next Canadian election rapidly ap-
proaches, all signs seem to indicate that
it will be fought on fiercely nationalistic
lines.
I only hope, in order to stem the ris-
ing tide of anti-Yankeeism now swelling
in that country, that future U.S. foreign
policy decisions show more deference to
Canadian sensitivities.
In an effort to illustrate my concern,
I have assembled an assortment of art-
icles concerning Canada's political life,
economic develoments. and foreign af-
fairs. I ask imam m oils consent that these
articles on modern-day Canada be
printed at fins point in the RECORD.
There being no oblection, the articles
were orderel to he ; ,raded in the RECORD,
as follows:
PAHL" I.- -UN! ? ANADIAN
TioN r ATic:,Ns
!From the :New 111/les, pen. '7, 1971]
CANADA: .ff,CONONITO NVfloNALISAI?TNCREASING
AMERICAN ILNV!01,1, IS STIe RISING OP-
POSITION
swan
TORONTO - e.dert y once powerful mem-
ber of the Liberel oarty was asserting the
other day that the natty has become more
illtereSTea a t'ctt usa I,' /IR Ii0/1aliSITI in the
last year.
When asked wile party s nationalists
were, the former Minister
hers of the Ontario Legisla
liamentary backbenchers,
one Cabinet member whosi c
out of Canada's running 0)
and how to restrict United
In Canada for the sake ;
dependence.
Unintentionally, tile old
firmed that Canada's Lit t
governed this country for
years, are less susceptible t 1
the nationalists than hay' I
generally.
Yet, the present Lilac t
headed by an economically
posite, Pierre Elliott Tru
toward the new style of
days ago, after eight years
ises, it introduced ,egisla
Canada Developmen. Cor.
bination merchant bank
company charged wittl the I
the Canadian economy m* e
less American.
In a similar spirit the
ment has blocked America
finance company and a ura
by broadening earlier restr
investment in banks, ins* I
utilities, publishing end lar
undertaken a broad rev', *
vestment policy.
Last week, the Governm
everything possible" to bl
take-over of the Home (
largest Canadian-con trolls
Ashland Oil, Inc., of the Ur,
Historically, striving to
rate Identity has been par I
at least since the annexati 1
Some historians believe Si
19th century the infant 01
had not risked fiscal ruin
continental railroad, Cana [I
have succumbed to t-ae pol
of natural north-south tre
of trade and migration.
Traditionally, the Come;*
Canada's nationalists, at
In fact, their high tariff *
" foreign capital, a result th-
Only in the last decade r
alism come to mean oppe i
Investment. Now, even Tru 2
professional moneymen ar 1
that direction by a ,:urrer
ion that seems to be widei
In banking and securitie t
fashionable to say, "I'm a t
anat." One then hastens
kind?certainly not the
the socialist, left winq; of ti
party. More probable, om
who opposes restricting
vestment but favors tight ?
eign subsidiaries.
Why is Canada becomn
istic even as Western Euro
from nationalism? What re
dubious about American
vision, movies, maga.zines,
agers?
The answers have to do
sense of identity in a forr
that feels itself being sue)
of the superpower next dm
buys two-thirds of Canace
to do also with a new se:
States as a place not to e
is a 180-degree swing in C
with the Intellectual-: in 11
The view that UM ,ed St *
the entering hedge if poli
domination, not to ment
cost of such invest.nent, s
"Silent Surrender, sod Mt t
poration In Canada," by .;
Levitt is an economist in hi .
at McGill University in M.
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S 16391
led two mein-
r, several par-
t, tentatively,
!ties keep him
le on whether
'..55 investment
2anadian in-
nor had con-
is, who have
the last 35
teachings of
-en Canadians
Government,
!ervative corn-
has moved
otism. A few
Thiberal prom-
* to create a
ttion, a com-
a investment
. on of making
tianadian and
iBeau Govern-
ake-overs of a
:A mine, there-
ins foreign
ice companies,
casting. It has
of foreign-in-
vowed to "do
the proposed
Company, the
i company, by
1 States.
kytain a sepa-
Canadian life
War of 1812.
if in the late
a Government
-build a trans-
by now would
it implications
'order patterns
'yes have been
rhetorically.
fled to attract
ries desire.
=o has nation-
eon to foreign
ii Liberals and
ong carried in
public opin-
: each year.
tuses, it is now
*Allan nation-
explain what
ho belongs to
,tw Democratic
eans the kind
American in-
-mtrol of for-
t tore national-
moving away
Canada more
estment, tele-
!sic and man-
an emerging
British colony
nto the wake
neighbor that
'sports. It has
of the United
' ite?and that
dian thinking,
? -in,
investment is
and cultural
the economic
articulated in
-National Cor-
-: Levitt. Mrs.
who teaches
and is do-
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i399 CONGRI RECORD ?SENATE Oci`ober 19, 1971
fatup t-oittput study for the Dominion
fpareat of Statistics.
She tam that the $4.95 paperback edition
has said more than 4,000 copies, according
to lie publisher. Macmillan of Canada, To-
:am arobanty discloses something about
aiceativity to economic nationalism
'i-Amencanism.
if Cce'S:4 of "Silent Surrender" may be
latue'd o is good notices, to its polemical
sma te de timeliness. A small army of
rani ie,tive economic nationalists, mostly
armee and Eastern, has been waiting to be
armee with ammunition such as Mrs.
' , one reviewer, Hugh Thorburn of
Que University, said that Mrs. Levitt
he most scholarly and convincing
- American "ownership and con-
I'll rim ray.-
t, I f adduces figures that demon-
:drie lee growing American role in autos,
71mm:cals, electrical equipment, farm
mai,:linery, en and gas, mining and smelting.
it' 's to the share of capital under Ameri-
:am 'on ,roi exceeds 60 per cent.
.,?r Ut Itree relate research and develop-
eimentinures to manufacturing sales,
iii the ratio lower in Canada than in
ti .ed 1aie.
f,f,.(,ws that a large part of the
t?ree t if Memen. subsidiaries in Canada has
Heel, nnanoed hy them out of profits or do-
t al': ;)Orr.),Ar1.1.1g and not by the im.porta-
tresh eanital. This leads Canadians
:er, "They're buying us out
0,1u'Li money."
email'. salient Surrender" is not all eco-
ao I. Client are bracing passages of soul
sr ' Levitt... a soft-spoken, caring woman
wa.s raiseci in Vienna and who is the
faart Polanyi, the late eccinomic
lam 3.11.
%-ri" 'Although branch-plant in-
Mee es. braliril-Mant. trade unions, branch-
,:ulture aati branch-plant universities
- Ile : u.siermannat traditional Canadian values,
!; values persist. Respect for law and
I rd regard tor civil rights, abhorrence of
/eel' zaugsterism (whether practiced
our or the top of the social scale)
sliP tralitional respect for Ottawa as the
ill mai Government of the country are still
y felt in Ena,lish Canada. These are the
,qeiner1O1 of 6fo4 ash-Canadian patriotism and
ISO' define the English Canadian, as dis-
mm the American. This value system
an ne branch plants. It is the source
silt'rourislies English-Candian national-
reinforced by every action of
the bolted Slates which violates these
A SIt. 711n balk or boggle at this dis-
ame me A erawing number of Canadians
Al, 1 ete diets a theory of direct invest'.
.101 eill Lima'. aggression: "The global
blity of the international corporation
ed by every influence which elimi-
...aitural. resistance to the consump-
or patterns ex tne metropolis. The corpora-
baa a vested interest in the destruc-
, uleoral differences and in a hornoge-
',ray oi Me the world over."
ihaed answer to the nationalist is
Mat Canada needs more foreign capital. Mrs.
aeyi and otaers dispute that. "There is a
laek tenther of savings nor of opportunities
Mr ? imatable economic activity," she writes.
?ada prov.des the classical case of a rich,
ndertieveloped economy in which the capital
mart :et :s too narrow to channel local savings
fecal investments."
s: asraitely. Mrs. Levitt does not tell
late. e rechannel savings. More unfortunate-
alisent from her book is a con-
e bong chapter of prescriptions, or at least
app. ]acaes,
af should Canada do about Canadians
limest ip the New York stock market?
Sta, a the eacessive number of refrigerator
prti..: S e that overworked example of the
"mini e ere renIce.'" effect? About American
subsirliaries that refuse to sell to Cube
:-
About the making in New York or Detroit
decish,ms that affect Canada? About America t.
subsicE tries that borrow Canadian dollars
with welch to make more profits in Canada
for Atm-rican canal's? About limiting Unite it
State, ievestmer t in Canada without thwar -
ing tie search for new enterprises and joie
for hi eh dinemplaement regions such as No
Scot is sd Quebec
Mrs Levitt explained a few weeks age
that s'i., had onatied such a chapter because
it weir ? I, I have I alien another year of wor
and sae wanted ta get the book into prire
Howe er, in a Lam:, informal conversatio
she ne, de recommendations and also ex -
presse some of idte feeling that impel man
Canaan:. its to Want, to disentangle their comi -
try ft', er the Unh.ed States.
Some ief her real mks follow:
"I 1: to see c marnunities which are sma!
enougli that they in some way can sort ea
contri . heir destiav. I have a ratia horror
large eild huge political entities like the
Unite- States at d the Soviet Union becaus
I thin ie they have tote; of depersonalizing in-
fluent a
" eseet . too big. Any individue
is ver, very jar from the center of powei
In fae- ..ine son eAmes gets the impressich
that e me the Pr-tsclent. of the 'United State
iSn't in cor trot.
"cia mitt is lees el a jungle. There ?17 ?
more r ions 0,1 nf?ople'S antisocial be -
has to"Ms:
? A ne 'aIt. investment togetheJ
with : ee, y 'it tastes and culturai
patter trough: through the similar con ?
sumer aeciels his i ertalnly strengthened th
trend le''rd em .t. rental integration or an
nexat, ,
"Th:: entawa d merriment should set
some 't: of re:,,ulation governing take-
overs Can ad :al hi-ms by foreign companiee
but a neapally really directed at furtheo
take-a ere by American companies. There
shoe III re some sre.-is of aotivilies in whicle
take-c -ore shoelc. Ire probabited ... the media
. 5 really :era sensitive, sensitive?it
terms I a natioes eultural guts area,
"Timm ,s a ,i,rong case for same pub-
lic sec r investmerit in resources, some got -
ernme . prese ice tb insure th.t greater
benefli :ii: a res write an a covintry over .
long p
"Tb. Canacila,i Goaernm.ent hasn't bar .
gained enact enemata Canada has resource.
and tae, United States has markets. Whei
the Ual tad States. Leeds our resources, I thinl
we UI "I then, ...Way too easily, aecause
politic it pressures- -pressures from provincia.
govern :taints. pressures fcr elections,
an-I:Mem with Canada in some way
is just mat we'y affen too blasted rich. We
have ? pile of escurces and we have ti-.
sort os arise that We can always sell them ol
to matti, a fast b Itt,k. But if a country i
seriom- :Lbout ir si wing Mr its future viz, -
bility eld its fatiee prosperity, you dons'
just se a off ever-inane for a fast buck. An,
I thin this has been the mentality of Cr -
nadiar business Alid. Canadian Government:
Canad:sa business sells out anything for
fast a,ellar. Aml Canadian Government' ,
really .1 too nu sa: different."
[Front s Wash it .gton Post. Feb. 14, 197]
PENET, I I,,N BY 1,0REIGN BUSINESS MAKE.,
5,11,5 ,DA UNEASY
I By SI ix Harrelson)
OTT, i, t ?Caned ens are ueing remindec
constaiinv of the extent of Americans' hole:
on tips country's business affairs. Many o!
them axe chagrined, and effort; to curb the
increa. Lag foreign owners:alp of industry amt
resouo es are getting attention from Prime
Minister Pierre E.liott Tradeau.
The total U.S. Alike in Canada is reckonea
at more than $34 billion. 'They may not seen)
much to Americans, who have a trillion-dol-
lar economy and a gross national debt eN-
oe..eding $350 billion. Canada, however, has
only a tenth of the U.S population and a lot
less money and credit far development on its
own.
There is widespread concern that the cur-
rent trend, if continued, would threaten
Canadian independence.
A recent Gallup poll indicated that 62 per
cent of Canadians feel that the :country al-
ready has enough American capital, and
the Trudeau administration proposes the
creation of a development corporation "10
help develop and maintain strong Canadian.-
controlled and Canadian-managed corpora-
tions in the private sector."
There are signs that other measures are on
the way, most likely including tax revisions
placing foreign investoes at a disadvantage,
and perhaps limiting the scope of future
investments.
There is not much likelihood of such ex-
treme steps as nationalization, as arged by
the left-wing New Democratic party, or try-
ing to buy back controlling interests in com-
panies now owned by U.S. investors.
Spearheading the drive for curbs is the
newly organized Committee for an Inde-
pendent Canada, which is pushing for a
program of government action, generally ac-
knowledged to be moderate. In addition to
backing the creation of 1, development cor-
poration, the group seeks a federal agency
to regulate and supervise the conduct of for-
eign-controlled corporaeions and to pass on
proposed takeovers of Canadian firms
The issue is being pressed because U.S.
takeovers are continuing to increase. Ameri-
can invessors have obtained control of 1,000
Canadian companies since 1960. In all. about
8,000 companies are under foreign tIontrot,
which means mainly U.S control.
Foreign control of Canadian inclastry--
steadily increasing foe two decades?has
reached 57 per cent of manufacturing, 83
per cent of oil and gas, 42 per cent of metal
/Inning and 85 per cent of smelting.
Canada has already taken action to pro-
hiloit foreign ownership of such industries
as railroads, airlines, banking. insurance
companies radio, television, newspapers,
magazines and uranium raining.
Whatever actions the government takes it
must consider whether cuts in foreign in-
vestment would reduce the opportunities for
Canadians to earn a living
[From _11.S. News 4: World Report.,
July 19, 19711
Is CANADA TURNING AWAY FROM U.S.?
OTTAWA ?In a countey where anti-Amer-
icanism is a way of life for many, some
Canadians are starting to worry openly about
worsening relations witle the United States.
Main target of criticism is their colorful
andcontroversial?Prime Minister, Pierre
Elliott Trudeau. The worry is that Mr. Tru-
deau is turning the coantry away from an
old friend without making dependable new
ones.
Since he became Prime Minister in April,
19,38, Mr. Trudeau haa?among other ac-
tions?spoken out against U.S. policy in Viet-
nam and Cuba, halved Canada's troop
strength in the Atlantic Alliance, recognized
Communist China and signed an agreement
with the Soviet Union calling for periodic
high-level talks between the two countries.
OVERWHELMIN,S PRESENCE
While in Moscow in May--the first visit
to Russia by a Canadian Prime Minister--
Mr. Trudeau also criticised the "overwhelm-
ing presence" of the U.S., which he said is
endangering Canada's 'national identity
from a cultural, economic and perhaps even
military point of view."
Critics of Mr. Trudeau charged that he
was allowing the Soviet Union to drive a
wedge beaween the U.S. and Canada. Mr.
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Last year Congress expressed its clear
will to avoid such an entanglement when
it acquiesced in what was described by
the administration as a modest level of
assistance for Cambodia. Aid was given
to Cambodia only with the accompanying
limitations that no American military
forces or advisers would serve in Cam-
bodia?Cooper-Church amendment?
that the aid was not to be construed as a
commitment to the Cambodian Govern-
ment?Javits amendment?and that
there could be no transfers of additional
assistance to Cambodia without prior no-
tice to Congress?Case-Symington
amendment.
Congress insisted on these limitations
because it wanted to assure that Cam-
bodia would not become another Viet-
nam. The President concurred and signed
into law all the congressional limitations.
Yet the thrust 'of the Joint Chiefs' me-
mo goes considerably beyond the clear
intent of Congress to limit our involve-
ment. And the Joint Chiefs apparently
plan to do this without any additional
legislative authority or public debate.
Perhaps the Congress and the Ameri-
can people are now willing to make the
kind of commitment to Cambodia that
the Joint Chiefs propose. My own view
is that they are not willing. If anything
is clear, it is that the United States wants
to disengage itself from Southeast Asia.
In any case, these are questions for the
Congress and the people to decide in con-
cert with the executive branch.
The press reports listed four methods
proposed by the Joint Chiefs that could
be used to skirt congressional authoriza-
tions on spending in Cambodia. I cate-
gorically reject this approach of sur-
reptitiously siphoning oil money from
other parts of the budget to provide
funds for Cambodia above and beyond
what Congress approves.
Such methods are totally inconsistent
with our constitutional system. If loop-
holes exist in the law that allow funds
to be shifted around so easily, then those
loopholes should be closed. The so-called
discretionary powers contained within
the foreign aid laws were only included
in order to give successive administra-
tions sufficient flexibility to react
quickly to unforeseen events abroad such
as an earthquake in Peru or famine in
Pakistan. The intent of Congress was not
to provide the kind of flexibility which
would allow the Executive to request a
certain amount of money for a program
with the expectation at the time that
more money would immediately be
needed and that it could be secretly di-
verted from other parts of the budget.
I have had drafted legislation which
would attempt to close each one of the
four loopholes listed by the Joint Chiefs.
But on reflection, I have decided that to
close specific loopholes is not the an-
swer, although I might later introduce
such legislation if other efforts fail. The
Executive, if it is so determined, can
always find ways to get around particu-
lar prohibitions.
A good example is the case of Thai
troops in Laos. Last year the Congress
passed an amendment banning the use
of foreign troops in Laos paid for by U.S.
funds. The President signed this provi-
sion into law. Then this year, we learned
that the United States was indeed pay-
ing for Thai troops in Laos, but some-
how these Thai troops were not consid-
ered to come under the ban because they
were so-called volunteers and thus not
foreign troops.
In July, I introduced an amendment
which would tighten the language on the
use of foreign troops in Laos to include
"volunteers." Similarly, I have pending
five additional amendments which would
close other loopholes or loosely worded
provisions. But the law seems like a leaky
dike with new holes appearing just as
quickly as we close the old ones.
It is for this reason that I have intro-
duced with the :enioi. Senator from Mis-
souri (Mr. SYMINGToN ) an amendment
which would place an absolute ceiling on
all American expenditures in Cambodia.
Moreover, Senator SYMINGTON is joining
me in my eat lier amendment which
would freeze the number of Americans
in Cambodia at 200 U.S. Government em-
ployees anti fix third-country employees
at 50.
Our amendment states that total
American spenoine in or for Cambodia
cannot exceed $250 million. This figure,
unfortunately, is considerably below the
$330 million the administration is re-
questing and even further below the
roughly $380 million the Joint Chiefs
would like to spend. However, it would
maintain our programs in Cambodia at
about current levels
I am extremely pleased that the Case-
Symington amendments have been tenta-
tively approved by the Foreign Relations
Committee.
It is essentia. in authorizing foreign
aid for 1972 that Congress shows that our
commitment to Cambodia is not open
ended. The Senate recently approved a
similar Symington proposal for Laos
which would place a $350 million limit
on expenditures in that country. We
should do the same for Cambodia and
with great urgency, for in Cambodia we
at least have not yet passed the point of
no return with our involvement.
It is now clearer than ever that the ad-
ministration should come to Congress
and the American people with our future
plans and intentions for Cambodia. We
should not have to be dependent on leaks
of secret documents for our information,
and we certainly cannot rationally make
decisions without sufficient information.
In the meantime. the United States
should take no action which would in any
way increase our commitment to Cam-
bodia. we should go no further without
a clear understanding of the stakes in-
volved in creating vet another client
state in Southeast Asia:
Mr. President. I ask unanimous consent
to have printed in the RECORD several
recent newspaper articles on Cambodia,
including the October 13 article from
the New York Times. an excerpt of which
was printed in the RECORD at the request
of the junior Senator from Missouri.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
(From the New York Tin
JOINT CHIEFS SAID To
CAMBODIA WAR
WASHINGTON.?The Join
said to have designed a
"pacification" and othe
warfare for Cambodia to r.
nam's western flank as A
their withdrawal from Inc
They have also pr ,pcser
devices to augment the ft
will be asked to provide
Cambodian Army over th(
The Chiefs submitted ,
month to Secretary of
Laird, according to Cont
Mr. Laird, who has been b
Chiefs since June smut I
fort, is described as still r
latest version, which do
about $500-million a year
The final decision howl
a senior policy review gr,
A. Kissinger, the Presiden
tional security affairs.
How to protect Cambod
Vietnamese forces and de
Cambodian territory for !
South Vietnam's populatit
Come a major proble n for
As the American forces
duced to 50,000 men, at ti
to rely on air power for op( -a
of Indochina, the piano( ;
Indigenous forces to car
ground combat.
With a first-year grant I
military aid and $70-millie
the Cambodian Army ha: a
panded from 30,000 men
when American troops
Vietnamese "sanctuaries-
a current strength of a. r.
Cambodians are said to ha c
most of them are n mat a
000 North Vietnamese
mostly east of the IV1,-kong
SAIGON TROOPS
South Vietnamese troop
moved into Cambodia to
are no more popular among
the Communists forces fr ii
will in any case be needed
their own territory.
When the Joint Chiefs
sidered the problem last J a.
a 1971-72 military aid pr.( r.
lion, Congressional inforn
rotary Laird said that he r
that much and that Congr
port such an increase.
The chiefs said that wi
military aid they could no
of the Cambodian Army, b,
they could expand It to
Laird's budget pruners ft.
increase in strength Co
achieved with $252-millior
But as finally submittec I
Cambodian aid program ci
lion in military aid, 1.110-n _
assistance and $15-million w
tural commodities, jar a A
lion. This was a net mere
over last year's allocations
ALTERNATE PLANS ?I
Nonetheless, in exolainn
military plans to Mr. Lair
dum dated Aug. 30, the i
Gated that they could get
on military spending and a
build-up.
According to informant
fered four different ways f
additional $52-million so ts
troops to the Cambocian A.
the
the "paramilitary" f )rce
to 143,000.
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S 16385
Oct. 13, 1971]
VISE COSTLY
!. AN
,efs of Staff are
tly program of
unconventional
,ct South Viet-
mans continue
anti-
eries of budget
; that Congress
expanding the
xt five years.
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CONGRESSIONAL RE LOH D SENAl October 19, 1971
tint wears would be simply to transfer
nhiori from the economic aid program
ii liarS spending, which can be done later
escal year simply by the Administra-
tion. ; notifying Congress. The second way
wee, si be ie. use the economic aid fund for
met! ;i. lia.seof an. 'common use" items such
f ?it mu uns, wMcii have military as
i e iv I ie 0 rati ue, th us freeing other mei-
! I. CIS.
ioU way mold be to increase procure-
?r the steited States Army by $52-
in;Me mat:el-Jet to the Combo-
: 'zi,eavniclit" later. The fourth way
iii -.e some exceptions in De-
lieparimeet supply regulations, de-
' :Mei iniefe equipment to be "excess"
:ever-diet :t to the Cambodians.
.
planners said they were
further increases in the
, so that it would number
men ite mid-1973 and more than
men by 1977. The paramilitary
aey beheee. must be augmented to
0-0.000 ire mid-1973 and more than
in lee; i. This would mean arming
aifre(el: of Cambodia's population
rime,sr: Liearly half the adult male
on.
:foie , e.fs weirdi provide for a
.zed brieade, and artillery brigade
end.iii. sLid plier.(1 units, as well as ground
irfs:;;s enn exteesive logistic support. 'They
faief!.4. f -iota te ;Le Agency for international
iii aiei.'L ti eelp finance the parliamen-
; lerties, including the police. The
fee Intelligeece Agency would be asked
0 mil at addittanal programs and to pro-
eife- einift :support.
rogram m activitt. drawn up by the
Chiefs aivided into four headings,
(dee bed `Pael teed ton," "Unconventional War-
-'aseceoleeleal Operations" and "Civil
:fine The ceentry would be divided into
paced:idiom areas and this program
Teem. ire stip-ervised by a new United States
1.e Ambassattor?as in South Vietnam?
(few embaass structure.
eentagon :could also establish a three-
dee- .rnilitar); .omrnittee with the Cambo-
dia,i,; and SCULL: Vietnamese, in which the
Ire'partment would be represented
trip :age Clem Frederick C. Weyan(i, the ciep-
e111111a/Uil::: of American forces in
/hi
,trtItington Post, Oct. 14, 19711
ma AID LIDArr PUSHED
Spencer Rich)
aereign Relations Committee
ereet 9 to 4 yeseerclay to clamp an absolute
:111 $259 million on ail forms of U.S. min-
ter- artd eronl.tt:19ea9s166attee to Cambodia in
tee 97%.
provht;t) tAtas added to the foreign aid
tt. the rd,ttion of Sens. Clifford P. Case
she as next Symington (D-Mo.).
:laid it, entendeci to prevent an "in-
a siecaltifesei" of U.S. outlays for Cana-
n./;; :he tt4/ttt 1971 aid level is also about
sit the administration had
te; ia rei felon for Fiscal 1972.
perm of the amendment puts a
2f1e fin the number of U.S. person-
, bonia. to prevent a buildup of the
uliirr:2to t,t_ tilpmen t aid group. U.S.
f nee" /192:te now numebr 150.
ittticttt: :.,rt of the amendment limits
.laird-country nationals who
fie paid faren U.S. aid funds to 50. This
d to prevent use of :U.S. funds to
radio 'fin sirs, mechanics and supply
edefiri L'rore steer nations as Thailand, the
re !.:(rmines and Korea. No such personnel
ere there now.. but sources said there were
eiff es La iii7e 10(.' or more.
t the vete was taken on the Case-
eteare amendment. sponsors accepted
addite nal word! me by Sen. Jaccb K. Javite
(R-N.7-7.) stating that the provision of mili-
tary aeit econonde assistance to Cambodia.
within tre lirni e imposed, does not con-
stitute i U.S. comnitmere to the defense cef
that c eintry.
The Case-Syrr higton measure ortginalle
imposed a $200 million eel limit and a 150-
man c nine on I a. personnel. But Case sale
the lie Ares were -a sed in committee to indf-
cate Li a' "this wasn't intended to be a share-
reduc, .( .1 of ext.. Lug programs, but a lime
on indt,:laite es ;illation' to give Congrea;
time 10 study 1.ew ear the Uri:Jed State-,
eaeule a.) in se ?porting the war iT1 Cam-
bodia.
Gas- dlmi..mn endinelit Was pereculeal
timell, view o repoi Is that the Join :
Chiefs , .iitaff hi d advised Defense Secretar
Melt ii P Laird hat "to bring abcut a mili-
tary s lion it: Cambodia," U.S. militar -
aid ;sae I'd. have 0 io more than 5e00 mil -
lion b 1977.
Ace '-Smug to c mgressional sources, th
Joint efaiefs adiv eat Laird that the number
of reg ml trt Carnba d an trctsins?now at 180,00,.
a year eeo?wou d nave to jump to 300,00e
by 19 -7 and paeaeralitarv forces to 500,0(1.,
by Lin ri
The 'a, its 412 that the Joirit Chiefs eon -
sideree I lie $211 million military assistane -
portioil ei the at ministration's total reticles:
for 1.9:." of $351 n union too small, aed had de-
vised mans for shifting $52 million from
other iices to time military aid pn.gram.
l'hL,mois intUa,led to boost the regular
Cartiteatian armj :0 220,000 men by the en,i
of the pter arid (1 e ''paramilitary" forces .
143.0Ce. :The rept rt s said the JCS had devisee
various methods ci traniferring funds frome
one at e -int to eninher or of using -'excess
mill La ie equipmer
Caso :aid his Amendment closed all loop -
holes eeiirist amy such shifts. Laird, at
press eflierence .).either confirmed nor de -
Med he exists ice of ',he reported Joint
Chiefs recomme Mations but did sae: no at
for Li eodia bijou(' the $341 million a.
ready :t quested vi Slid be sought this year.
Liko earlie - Symington amendment
the film any procurement bill limiting Lac::
aid to $.150 mi lmon yesterday's Cambodil
prover a cover i my military lard econorn.f-
aSsister.ce and no not restrict spending fm r
U.S. inisstoAtts flown over Cambodia.
dittittt., the NJ( to Senate Majority Leade:
Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) said, in a flee t:
speecte that before the Sihanouk governmet
was a aria:mown. Cemoodia was "an oasis c
Order ill war-torn Indochina." Eut now, b.'
cause the United State; had helped dra
Camb Alia into the war, "Cambodia is belie::
reduc-e to chan; and devastat on."
"Pron.- t he New Nola-, Times, Get 14, 1971.
SENAT!'7 tsvr V. 'eta $25C?-Minnrcar Intiarr tie
C 5.7`neornALI Am
CPR re hn W. Finney;
i . GT07.4.- Senate Foreign Reif
.--
tions Committee voted today to impose 7,
$250-raelion ceiling on military and econone
lc aid to the Ca Mardian Government in t.17.
curve:, T ye,,r
The Adminisla a ion has requested anther
ity te spend $3,11-million in Cambodia-.
about :1",20-0-mill oa in military aid and the
rernale ier in ec;:rxnic aasistance.
tiendment Incorporated into the F02--
eign ::feld Authorization Bill by she commi:
tee a vs d also 'unit to :200 the number ef
Amer; civilian and military personnel at-
signeci Cambc:d: a.
ADMINI;TRA.TION IS OPPOSED
The committee amendment, coasponsorce
by Senator Staters Symington, Democrat of'
Missoice, and Senator Clifford :P. Case, Re-
publican of New Jersey, was adapted by a
10-3 I ote over tie opposition of the Adminks-
tretion, which Warned that the limitations
would undermine the Cambodian Govern-
ment and endanger American troops as they
are withdrawn from Vietnam.
en a letter to the committee, Under Sec-
retary of State John N. Irwin said that the
Administration's requess was "the minimum
which is essential to help Cambodians con-
solidate their independence."
The committee's actimi was prompted
part by the disclosure that the Joint Chiefs
of Staff had recommended a longrange pro-
gram that by 1977 wou:d bring military aid
to Cambodia to $500-million, roughly double
slut now being spent.
The Joint Chiefs are reported to believe
I-hat increased military assistauce to Cam-
boclia ts necessary to protect South
WeE torn flank as American troops are
withdrawn from Indochina. But to many
members at the Senate committee, the pro-
posal represents a growing American com-
mitment to Cambodia einiilar to that set
decade ago in South Vie triarn.
-ARMED CAMP" FORESEEN
Si-,na,.;Or Symington, in an interview, ex-
pressed fear that the real intention of the
Jient Chiefs of Staff was to "shore up" the
borders of Thailand by establishing positions
of strength in Cambodia and Laos "where
we could remain indefinitely."
Senator Case, in a statement, said that the
recommendations of the Joint Chiefs "would
entirely destroy Cambodia's own economy
and turn that country into an armed camp,
altogether dependent oa United States dol-
lars, arms and food for its continued exist-
ence."
He emphasized that the limitation cm
spending was a "holding action" designed to
fca:ce a full-scale review of future American
policy in Cambodia and said:
"We should go no further in increasing
or commitment to Cambodia, at least not
without a firm decision by Congress and
the American people that an expanded war
in Cambodia is the cc-urse our country
should follow."
In a statement on the Senate floor, See:-
ator Mike Mansfield, the majority leader,
said:
"The Cambodian experience is an admoni-
tion to curb the easy outflow of the financial
resources of the people of this nation which,
for years, has been legislated in the name
of national defense and foreign aid.
In the case of Cambodia, the hundreds
of millions of dollars already spent in a year
said a half have done hardly anything for
time defense of this nation except, perhaps,
to weaken it by wastage. Nor have these
expenditures helped the Caratiodia,n people,
Wao have now been realer:ed to the common
denominator of the irrelevant devastation
Winch has been suffered in Laos and Viet-
nam."
Senator Mansfield protested that "the
Lu end of present Cembodian policy, insofar
as I can see, runs strongly counter not only
to the expressed inclinatic)ns of the Con-
gress but also to the Nixon doctrine which
was supposed to provide the guidelines of
that policy."
In the year and a half since the Govern-
ment of Prince Sihanau.k was overthrown
and the United States conducted military
'operations against Communist sanctuaries in
Cambodia, he said, Cambodia has become
"the enemy sanctuary,' the nation is "being
reduced to chaos and devastation," and
American support has :aecorne "the sole sig-
reficatret prop which keeps the political-mili-
tary structure in Pnc-mpenh from falling
apart."
"I sometimes wondee," he said. "how we
let ourselves get involved in these travesties
of foreign policy which, rather than serve
the interests of this nation, give every ap-
pearance of being at complete odds with
those interests."
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