SOVIET SATELLITE BELIEVED ABLE TO INTERCEPT OTHERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73B00296R000200230001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 23, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 14, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

4Cl:C197
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Soviet Satellite
Believed A Me to,
"Intercept Others
neuter
A Soviet satellite has for the
first time destroyed a target
below an altitude of 160 miles,
indicating the Russians can
.now intercept reconnaissance
satellites, the authoritative
Aviation Week magazine said
yesterday.
"Ability to intercept recon-
naissance satellites would be a
major advantage to a major
power. The Soviets now ap-
pear to possess this capability
along with the capability of in-
tercepting high-flying commu-
nication vehicles," the maga-
zine said.
The U.S. Defense Depart-
ment refused to comment on
the report.
The magazine, which did not
give any source for its report
said the. Russians launched
Cosmos 459 Nov. 29 at an alti-
tude of 156 miles.
Four days later Cosmos 462
was' launched by the Soviet
Anti-Cosmos Defense Forces
(PKO) at the same inclination,
as Cosmos 459. "Cosmos 462,
exploded during an approach
to Cosmos 459, breaking into
13 identifiable objects," Avia-
tion Week said.
Two Soviet Cosmos satel.
lites were earlier intercepted
at altitudes of 360 and 550
miles, the magazine, said.
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 VFW YORK T I1I S
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UEU
SOVIET MAY HAVE
NEW MISSIVE IN'72
Penagon Aides Say Tests
Appear Near Conclusion
By WILLIAM BEECHER
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Dec. 2-Pen-
tagorl analysts say the Soviet
Union appears to be nearing
the successful conclusion of
tests of a new long-range sub-;
marine missile and may deploy
the weapon next year.
The missile, called the Saw-!
,
fly by Western analysts, has a
range of up to 3,500 miles, ap-I
proximately twice that of the
best Soviet operational subma-
rine missile. The best American
submarine missile, the Posei-
don, has a range of about' 3,000
miles.
Analysts say there have been
about 15 tests of the Sawfly!
since mid-1969, with a flurry of
firings this fall. All but four
of the tests were successful,
sources say, and the failures
came early in the program.
"We think they can and
probably will deploy next
year," one senior official said.
Most analysts believe the
new missiles will first be car-.
Tied by one of two existing
types of Soviet submarines, the
H-class or the Y-class. Later, it
is expected they will be car-
ried by a new submarine de-
signed for them.
Earlier this week, the De-
fense Department awarded a
contract to Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation to develop a
longer-range submarine , mis-
sile. Unofficial estimates are
that it will have a range of
about 4,000 miles, It will not
be available, however, for sev-
eral years.
The importance of longer
range, analysts explained, is
that it provides a larger area
of ocean for submarine to hide
in while still being able to
reach its target.
Sources say there have been
at least four Sawfly test fir-
_ings since September. The niis-
siles are launched from a na-
val missile testing center near
the White Sea across the So-
viet Union, landing in the Kam-
chatka', Peninsula in Soviet
Asia. '
Sources say the Sawfly car-
ies a "significantly larger"
warhead than the Soviet SSN-
6 missile, 16 of which are car-
ried on each Y-class subina-
rine. The SSN-6 is estimated to
carry a warhead of from one
to two megatons. A megaton
is a measpre of explosive force
equal to a million tons of TNT.
Megaton Warhead for Poseidon
Most American Polaris mis-
siles carry a one-megaton war-
head. The Poseidon missile,
which is being placed on 31 of
the 41 Polaris submarines, car
ries from 10 to 14 warheads
of about 40 kilotons each. A
kiloton is equivalent to 1,000
tons of TNT.
Sources note that while the
Soviet has been actively test-
ing various multiple warheads
on their missiles, none of
these tests has been specifi-
cally associated with the Saw-
fly,
Some analysts are particu-
larly concerned about the So-
viet missile submarine program
because the Russians now are
credited with having at least
42 Y-class submarines afloat or
under construction and are cur-
rently doubling the size of
their construction facility at
Severodvinsk, on the White
Sea, where most of their mis-
sile submarines are built.
The United States is attempt-
Ing, in arms-control negotia-
tions, to persuade the Russians
to stop building missile sub-
marines as well as land-based
missiles. So far, knowledge-
able administration sources say,
the Russians have been cool
to including missile submarines
In a strategic weapons freeze.
In addition to Y-class 'sub-
marines, the Soviet Union also
has about 10 H-class crafts,
which carry three-600-mile mis-
siles each.
There has been considerable
speculation that the Russians.
might place the Sawfly first in
the H-class submarine, because
600-mile missiles require the
Russians to come too close to
shore in order to hit inland tar-
gets. The closer the submarine
comes to shore, the greater the
chance of its discovery and
destruction.
But just as the United States
has started a program to place
its advanced Poseidon missile
on all but 10 of its 41 Polaris
submarines, the Russians might
want to modernize their Y-class
fleet the same way, some
analysts suggest.
In addition to missile sub-
marines, the Soviet also has
about 35 submarines that carry
from six to eight cruise missiles,
each with a 400-mile range.
These are regarded as primarily
designed for use against surface
ships, rather than targets
ashore.
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 NEWSl'JEII K
8 NOV 1971
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BY STEWART ALSOP
I -RP (,1 29 Q W200-2 N- 010-
GROSS RAMOVII.Al
WASHINGTON--What in hell has hap-
pened. to this country's sense of simple
fairness? More specifically, what in hell
has happened to the Democratic Party's
sense of national responsibility?
These anguished questions must now
be asked, as a result of the Senate vote
on the, foreign-aid bill, and above all
the Cooper-Church amendment to that
bill, The amendment failed by one
vote. It required. an end to all logistic
support for South Vietnam. If it had be-
comc law, it would, of course, have
ensured the occupation of South Viet-
nam by the North Vietnamese Army
and the installation of a Corrununist
regime in Saigon.
i 3eas
Il:cre a personal yvord seems called
for, Some months ago, The New York
Times described me as a "dedicated
supporter of the Indochina war," and
others seem to have that impression.
The fact is that I was-and in writing-
highly dubious about the American
commitment in Vietnam long before
Sen. William Iulbright was leading the
fight for the Tonkin Gulf resolution.
CHECKING BACK
Way back in February 1964, for ex-
ample, I wrote in The Saturday Eve-
ning Post, "Direct intervention in South
Vietnam, this time without U.N. sup-
port, could mean a war as long, as un-
winnable, and as internally divisive as
the Korean War--perhaps more so."
Two themes, I find on checking back,
are tediously repeated--that it is an
"American delusion" to "suppose that
air power can be substituted for ...
infantry" ()une 1964); and that it is
also a delusion that regular U.S. troops
can deal effectively with an essentially
political war in an alien culture.
In early 1966, after the commitment
of U.S. combat troops, I wrote that
our intervention was based on a "great
miscalculation," and in 1967 I wrote
from Vietnam that "The American com-
' bat troops . . . in the populated areas
are like blind giants, stumbling among
pygmies, stepping on some and killing
them, being pinched and pricked and
bitten by others." Therefore it would
be a "tragic error" to comtiiit Arned-
can troops to the pacification mission.
In September 1969, in a column pro-
posing rapid withdrawal of ground
troops from Vietnam, I wrote that "the
war ... is poisoning the body politic of
the United States; ... it is better to risk
military disaster in Vietnam than politi-
cal disaster in the United States," This
theme has also been tediously repeat-
ed in this space. ,,-
All this is not to suggest that I have
always been right about Vietnam-I
have often been wrong. It is to suggest
that I am not a "dedicated supporter"
of the war, with a deep emotional con-F
mitment to our involvement there. And
this seems a necessary prelude to what
is after all a most serious charge--that
those who voted for the Cooper-Church
amendment, who include several men I'
deeply respect, thereby committed a
grossly immoral act.
LAVISH SUPPORT
Consider certain undisputed facts.
First, the North Vietnamese have been, i
and are still being, lavishly supported
logistically and economically by the So-
viet Union and China. Their support
has been estimated on the order of $2
billion to $3 billion a year, but such dol-
lar estimates mean little, What means
a lot is that the North Vietnamese
Army has been equipped with very
fine weapons, including tanks, anti-air-
craft guns, and infantry weapons better
than we have been able to supply to the
South Vietnamese.
Second, there were over 100,000
North Vietnamese regular troops in
Laos and Cambodia before so much as
an American or South Vietnamese pla-
toon crossed the border into either
country. And this Communist invasion
of Laos and Cambodia was in support
of a. larger invasion of South Vietnam.
Third, the U.S. Army, inevitably, re-
made the South Vietnamese Army in
its own cumbersome image. The South
Vietnamese are now as dependent on
logistic and economic support from this.
country as a baby on its mother.
Fourth, the U.S. Army in Vietnam
has already for all practical purposes
ceased to be a fighting army. And yet,
as our Army has withdrawn, the securi-
ty situation in South Vietnam has stcad-
ily improved, as almost evel;yone who
has had a first-hand look agrees., The
reason is obvious-the South Vietnam-
ese, as John Kennedy once remarked,
have to fight their own war if they are
to survive, and that is just what they
are at 1 a st doing.
The President proposes rapidly to re-
duce the American commitment to be-
tween 30,000 and 50,000 support troops
-the figure should be much closer to
30,000, if the generals can be badgered
into cutting back the vastly extravagant
U.S. staff and personnel system. The
men remaining in Vietnam will continue
for a time to give the South Vietnamese
a minimum of air and helicopter sup-
port, on which we have also made them
dangerously dependent. ? These men
will all be professionals and volunteers
-and what, after all, are professional
soldiers for, if not to take some risks in
the national interest?
The Northern Democrats, and the
eleven Republicans, who voted for
the Cooper-Church arnendruent, voted
quite simply, to cut the South Viet-
namese off at the knees: Time chief ex-
cuse for so doing is that the South Viet-
namese have failed to produce a model
democracy, and thus the South Viet-
namese people lack a "choice."
SILLY CHARADE
The attempt to produce aim Ameri-
can-model democracy in wartime Vi-
etnam was a silly charade from the,
beginning, Put on for purely U.S. do-
rnestic political purposes. In fact, the
South Vietnamese do have a choice.
Just about every able-bodied man in
the country is now armed, and if they
want to choose the Communists, all
they have to do is turn their guns the
other way.
For this country to remove the
choice, forcing the South Vietnamese to
surrender by cutting off 'all logistic sup-
port, would be a signal to the whole
world, and especially to - Moscow and
Peking. The President has repeatedly
told his Congressional leaders that the
,Communists' interest in serious negotia-
tions "ebbs and flows." It ebbs fast
when the new isolationists seem to be
winning control of Congress.
But that is not all. To force those
who have fought on our side to surren-
der would be a terrible betrayal, an act
of gross immorality. It is hard to believe
that men of the stature of Edmund
Muskie and Edward Kennedy and IIu-
bert Humphrey and Walter Mondale
could vote for such an act, however po-
litically expedient such a vote may be.
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s r ' Y the Nation S
a _ir .sirength Is Dec . in
By DREW MIDDLETON
Air Force Commanders be-
lieve their service has entered
a critical period in which
American strategic and tacti-
cal air power is declining while
that of the Soviet Union is
expanding.
The three chief elements in
the Air Force's problem, ac-
cording to senior generals, are:
1. The Air Force's basic
weapons systems, the B-52
bomber and the F-4 fighter-
bomber, are nearing obsoles-
cence and must be replaced,
,at high cost, by the B-1 and
the F-15.
bomber force consists of about The B-5211 has a speed of
195 aircraft, Bears and Bisons, 650 miles an hour, a range of
with 50 of the latter normally
used as tankers. Beam regular- more than 10,000 miles, a ceil-
ly patrol in the North Atlantic. ,ing of more than 50,004 feet
Prototypes of a new swing-and a bomb load of score than.
wing, supersonic bomber, given X20,000 . pounds.. In Southeast
Asia E 52D's have been modi-
h
e
kfire by t
the code name Bac
According to. a report last
month by the Senate Armed
Services Committee, "as yet
there is no evidence that they
[the Russians] have actually
made a decision to produce
and deploy [the Backfire]. How-
ever, if it so elects, the Sovietlsound travels at a speed of
Union can certainly build and' 1088 feet a second.)
deploy this bomber and this Newest )loiter
would require a reassessment
f our air defense' The FB-111 which came into
fled to carry 60,000 pounds of
conventional bombs.
The Air Force-also has 75
FB-11.1's, a medium - range
bomber with a payload of 37,-
500 pounds and a speed of
Mach 2.2, or 2.2 times the
speed of _sound. (At sea level
(1
requirements." service last year, is the newest
inal
Th
e orig
'Hardware' problem Air Force bomber.
Every airman consulted, from F-111 model encountered grave
generals at the Pentagon to difficulties, largely because o
mechanics at Da Nang in South the mechanism controlling its
swing wing. But this trouble
Vietnam, emphasized that has not affected the FB-111
weapons and equipment, notmodel.
morale., is the Air Force's first" After?a long period of testing,
2. Intelligence gathered by
satellites indicates that the So
viet Union has established ai
solid lead over f.he United)
States in land-based intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles, is
building emplacements for
de
d h
as
larger missiles an
had 12`x,000 officers and 6?.5, neral Holloway. But
toed the Fractional Orbital Inv to General y 000 enliste(Pmen.
Bombardment System, or FOBS0This all-volunteer force has the Air Force insists that the
which enables Sovit cam- FB-111 cannot be considered a
minders to bring their missiles benefitted from the draft. The substitute for the B-I because
down on a target from any consensus is that li if of the its range at low altitudes is
direction. This makes it pos-i Air Force's enlistments are limited and its capacity to ac-
induced, although some
% for the missile to escape draft-
senior officers believe the fig- commodate advanced penetra-
sible
man of the existing means of tion aids is restricted.
y i ure may be closer to 70 per of the Air Force's 2,350 ac-
detection. cent. The Air Force, like all
fitly more than
3. These developments are tive fighters, slig1
taking place against a national the services, will face a prob 11,000 are F-4's, which have a
background of budgetary 1em if the draft is abandoned speed of Mach 2.4 and can be
in favor of a volunteer army, armed with bombs and missiles.
Gen. stringency.
Bruce K. Holloway, Gen. John D. Ryan, the Air But it was designed in the
commander in chief of the Force Chief Of Staff, main- nineteen-fifties and went into
Strategic Air Command, de-, tamed that morale was good,; service nine years ago. The Air
91 -wr nt acttn0d by con- c,...,... ne ,
year the Soviet
'
d the
placed what he terme lack of understanding [and]
the indifference to the threat
we face," and emphasized that
the Air Force "must get the
needed modernization" if the
United States is to have a
credible deterrent in this
decade.
Soviet Build-Up Seen
The Air Force generals are
aware of the Nixon Adminis-
tration's commitment to the
tegic arms. And they say tinat ~ o -a ,- - -- now has about
they, too, hope that the talks i rho Air Force
will succeed. But their intelli-13,675 combat planes-bombers,
r,* titers and fighter-bombers,
tinuing build-up of Soviet nu-
clear weapons.
Air Force promotion of the
new B-I bomber has encouti-
t.ered opposition basea on itus- SAC received its first. B-52 in
sia's de-ern ihasis of the heavy 1955 latest model,
bomber. 'Mppro dh . ' `e s oo/a 1Q80:
problem. the aircraft proved "superior
Last June 30, the Air Force to what we expected," accord-
ficers and airmen at bases in
this country and abroad. Gen-
eral Ryan said that racial and
drug problems in the Air Force
were not as pronounced as in
the Army because the Air Force
"attracts a higher-quality man."
modernization Needed
"Tire main problem is mod-
ernization," the general con-
tinued. "Over 50 per cent of
g
and interceptors.
The Strategic Air Command's
manned nuclear bomber force
is built around the B-52, of
which about 490 are active.
MIG-21J to be superior in
speed, maneuverability and ac-
coloration.
Other fighters include the
A-1, the A-7, the F-5, the F-86,
the F-100, the F-104, the F-105
Modernization of the Minute-
man has continued since Oc-
tober, 1955, when Minuteman
2 was accepted. Minuteman 3,
which evolved from Minuteman
2, has a range of 8,000 miles
and more penetration aids to
counter an antimissile defense.
It carries three MIRV (multi-
pie, independently targetable
re-entry vehicle) warheads of
about 200 kilotons each. Eachi
kiloton is the equivalent ofl
1,000 tons of TNT. I
The Minuteman 1, which has
been in service since 1962, is
to, be phased out. By the end
of 1974, SAC. will have a mis-
sile force.of about 500 Minute-
man 3's and 500 Minuteman 2's.
The Titan 2 has been opera-
tional since 1963. It carries a
payload of five to 10 megatons
---largest. of the American in-
tercontinental ballistic mis-
siles-and has a range of
7,250 miles. The Air Force has
three Titan 2 squadrons, con
sisting of 18 missiles each.
Brig. Gen. Harry N. Cordes,
SAC's Deputy Chief of Staff
for Intelligence, views the So-
viet missile threat as a "mix"
in which offensive and defen-
sive weapons a- .-c blended to a
degree unkngwn in the West.
The offense is represented
by an ICPM force of about
1,600 launchers. Dr. John S.
Foster, the Defense Depart-
ment's research chief, reported
recently that the construction
of new silos, or launching sites,
has reached the same high rate
at which SS-9 and SS-11 sites
were built last year.
Early ])Missiles Retained
Since the early nineteen-
sixties, the Russians have de-
veloped a large number of
ballistic missile systems. Two
of the earlier systems, the
SS-7 and SS-8, were deployedi
in limited numbers. Although'
they have been overtaken by
Air Force's 430 active newer systems, they have been
interceptors are F-101's, retained.
F-102's, F-104's and F-106's. The 5S-11 is one of the,
Three Basic Types three ICBM systems now he-
The Air Force deploys two ing deployed. There are more
than 900 SS-11 launchers,
of America's three basic types more than for any other type.
of strategic offensive forces:
manned bombers and land- The SS-11 has a range of 6,500
based intercontinental ballistic riles and a warhead yield of
missiles. The Navy's ballistic i one two o i 13, ega code ns - named
missile (Polaris or Poseidon) I The Union'
submarines are the third mis- Savage, Soviet
silo system in what the Penta- first operational solid fuel pro-
gon calls the triad. pellant ICBM. It has a range of
The current level of the 5,000 miles and a yield of one
Minuteman force, 1,000 mis- megaton.
64k'00020023004t4nue d
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be the most powerful Soviet
JCP,M system. Silos for more
than 300 SS-9's have been
completed or are under con-
struction. The S5-9 can deliver
a single 25 megaton warhead
or, when fitted with MIRY,
combinations of smaller mega-
ton-range multiple warheads.
The missile can carry three
five - megaton warheads to a
range of over 5,000 miles.
Avoiding the implications of
the current talks on limiting
strategic arms, the Air Force
reports, "Although we are un-
certain of their future force
goals, based on the level of
activity in recent years, the
Soviets could achieve a force
of well over 2,000 hardened
IC13M's by 19'75."
the Soviet Strategic Rocket
Forces also deploy about 700
medium and intermediate range
ballistic missiles; 70 cover tar
gets in China and Japan, and
630 cover targets in Western
Europe.
The Russian defensive sys-
tem ranges from antiaircraft
artillery to antimissile missiles.
Moscow is protected by 64
launchers firing the Galosh
missile. There are indications
that its antimissile defense will
be strengthened by the intro-
duction of the Tallinn system,
employing the SA-5 for use
against high - flying aircraft
and, probably, ballistic missile
systems.
These and other defensive
weapons are knit to new and
more accurate radar systems.
The Soviet union also has a
force of more than 3,000 fighter
interceptors; three new types,
have come into service in the
last five years.
Tactical Planes
Soviet. air strength is not
confined to missiles and bomb
ers. A tactical air force of
about 5,000 planes includes
such high performance air-
craft as the Mig-21J, the Yak-
28P and the Yak-28, a super-
sonic light bomber.
Tactical and strategic cen-
mandess of the United States
Air Force differ on many
points,. including the usefulness
of high-performance aircraft in
ground support. Tactical com-
manders also feel that their
fighters and bombers can do.
the job assigned to strategic
bombers if the tactical planes
call fly from advanced bases.
But the consensus is that the
Air Force must have the B-1
and the F-1.5.
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 #Aw
b ' t iy YORK T I ES
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air vs. Nixor>;
Secretary Laird's alarmist reports on the Soviet stra-
tegic missile . buildup at sea and on land contrasts
curiously with President Nixon's optimism about stabili-
zation of the nuclear arms race.
In announcing his plan for the visit to Moscow by an
American President, Mr. Nixon said the other day that
h to l 9o-let.-American summit meeting reflected
c c
o
t
The Soviet Union is cc~u iily_guilty_of building overkill.
S chosen instrument _is_theforce. of huts SS-9 ICBM's,
ext~ansion of whack might one day threaten the American
inutemanufgrce The rate of expansion of this fpce ha
'rimed from 55 a vear to about 40 a year. But someQ
' holes" have bean started since January-not 91t, as
some reports suggest. Two thirds of the "new holes" are
S, ~0~7 ak n the form of an improved silo or missi ie sir
0 pr
l..
- both,
1 b "bolls of us" that "neither major power
n
y
a cone uO1o
can get. a decisive advantage over the other ... which The Soviet Union has indicated a willingness to freeze
.might enable it to engage in international blackmail." further expansion of this and other land-based missiles
f' t t SALT Qreement But it wants to hold
a
--x-?- ---. -
Union would mnitch Americas 41 Polaris submarines
1973, said: '`I._helieve we would he placed at a very great
missile submarines, which the United States insists must
be incorporated in the agreement now under discussion.'
,ng:he United Mates, with a vastly superior Polaris-type The American, proposal wool : eeze the Soviet Union
Sleet off all our coasts and ouitdislance us by a large into a position of numerical infc:'urity in warheads, pond
aumher of missiles." ing Soviet MIRV development, which evidently is lagging.
What are the facts? The facts are that 100 American The Soviet Union evidently wants to be. free to press
nuclear warheads delivered on target can inflict unaccept- ahead with submarine deployment, in addition, as. a "bar
able damage on the Soviet Union. Beyond 400 delivered gaining chip" in the second-stage negotiation, just as the
warheads, which would knock Russia out of the twen- United States - is pressing ahead with Safeguard and
tieth century-inflicting 100 million Soviet fatalities and MIRV now.
destroying three-fourths of Soviet industry--no useful . Mr. Nixon .sees that none of this is of major signifi
increment of damage can be obtained by an increase in cane in the strategic balance. A few extra missiles or .
the numbers of attacking hydrogen bombs. The United submarines on one side or the other can make no differ-
States now has more than 5,000 separately targetable ence when both already have many thousands more war-
strategic warheads and is racing toward a force of more heads than they need to deter attack. but Mr. Laird
than 8,000 such hydrogen warheads. The chosen instru- insists that the United States, which has enjoyed vast
ment of Anier'ican nuclear escalation is the MIRV multi- nuclear superiority for a quarter-century, will not permit
ple warhead, already installed in the first four of 31 the Soviet Union to exceed parity, meaningless as that
projected Poseidon submarines, and in 150 or more Min- would be.
uteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).. Politically, Mr. Laird may be right--and Moscow would
MIRY was designed to penetrate a heavy Soviet anti- do well to pay heed to the consequences of pressing for-
ballist.ic'missile (ABM) system. No such system is being ward with futile and expensive further deployment of
built. The' Soviet Union has offered to freeze its small, nuclear missiles at a t?inre when a SALT agreement is
obsolete Moscow ABM system at approximately present within reach, But Mr. Laird could make a major contribu-
levels as part bf the pending first-stage strategic arms tion himself by curbing America's chosen instruments
limitation talks (SALT) agreement. An ABM agreement is of missile expansion, MIRV and Safeguard, as the Senate
virtually certain by early next year, before Mr. Nixon's long has urged.
Moscow trip, limiting ABMs to very low levels. The tre-
mendous expansion of American offensive delivery vehi-
cles noiv under way will be overkill then and, in fact, has
been nothing but overkill for a long time. The four Amer-
ican Poseidon submarines already operational can fire
many more warheads than the 25 Polaris-type submarines
the Soviet Union now has at sea.
r. Laird, however, in announcing that the Soviet to a zrs -s age
out for a second-stage agreement a freeze on ballistic
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 AP/M 19Ew YORK T110S
Approved For Release 2000/0I08QTCClRDP73B00296R000200230001-4
Nuclear Build-Up in Soviet
o~os
By WILLIAM BEECHER
Special to The Ni'; York Times
--
WASHINUAVIV, -
number of officials charged early last week, Secretary of
-
with responsibility for. national Defense erect Melvin R. Laird de.liv a guarded statement of
security are increasingly sound- concern in language that for
ing the alarm-privately more him was uncustomarily emo-
titan publicly-over the Soviet tional.
build-up of strategic nuclear "The American people today
weapons. They are doing so may perhaps be willing to ac-
cept strategic parity, he told
despite President Nixon's public a meeting of the Association
insistence that he is encouraged for the United States Army.
by progress toward achieving "But I can conceive of no
h the
hi
i
c
n w
at least a limited halt in the circumstances
y American Polaris fleet in one)
American people would accept
arms race, inferiority. And so long as I an for two years, and they argue
Essentially the concern of a Secretary of Defense, I would istrenuously against the United
growing array of analysts- never recommend and would States being allowed to build
.norninal hawks and doves alike certainly oppose any-national more antiballistic missiles than
-
is that the Soviet Union ap-1 security program which would they.
parently does not share the place us in an inferior position The United States since 1has
American nuclear philosophy of '-a position that might force has had 1,054 ICBM's, and has
having a nuclear force that can any American President to started to place two- and three-
ride out a first strike and re- crawl to a negotiating table." part multiple warheads onto
taliate primarily against cities, 550 of them. The Russians have
rather. than against against other Unease Is Increasing well over 1,600 ICBiVl's, both
'side's remaining nuclear weap- Mr. Laird offered no facts operational and under con-
ens.. By maintaining such a and figures on the shifting nu- st.ruction. They have started to
potential for "assured destruc- clear balance, either then or at put' three-part multiple war-
tion," the American stratgy a Pentagon news conference heads onto some of their large
seeks to deter nuclear war. I last Wednesday. But senior an- SS-9 missiles and have tested
The United States as a riiat- alysts in the Defense Depart- similar warheads for their
ter of policy has avoided build-I went and other Government smaller SS 1.1 ICBM's.
ing big, accurate warheads that agencies say his remarks were'. U.S. Also Taking Action
'could threaten to destroy large) a pale reflection of the mount-' The United States also has
numbers of hardened or re-1 ing unease within the Adminis begun to install 10- to 14-part
inbreed Soviet. missile silos, tratiou on the implications of multiple warheads on 496 of its
-either in a first strike or in the continuing Soviet strategic x656 submarine-based missiles,
.retaliation. build-up. - Fall of which have a longer range
American strategists con= It does not appear to be a 'than comparable single-war-
'cede that if both-sides chose) case where hard-liners in Gov-'head Russian weapons.
to fire their vast arsenals of ernment are trying to sabotage American officials say the
.missiles at each other's cities, or undermine the strategic arms large numbers of relatively)
-no matter who fired first, both limitation talks. Most officials small multiple warheads are
gauntries would be devastated. say any agreement that slows designed to be able to over
Cuban Crisis Recalled the pace of the Soviet weapons whelm a potential, widespread'
But, recalling how the Soviet effort will be all to the good, missile defense and also to in-
But,
Union recalling g it e especially if it creates momen- sure that enough weapons
of superior down in he face e turn behind even more compre- would survive a surprise attack
,strength during the Cuban nris hensive agreements to follow. to retaliate and destroy at
rile confrontation in 1962, they President Nixon has ex- least 25 per cent of the Soviet
pressed a similar attitude. Last population and 50 per cent of
worry lost the Russians may be
month he declared that neither. its industry.
aiming for so large a lead in country "at this time" was in a But the Russian bullet-up,
numbers of missiles that they
might use It in future crises to position to gain clearcut SL u- which seems to date from just
. force a similar American back- pcrioriL' over,.tlip other. after the humiliating expe
down. rience of being forced to remove
And American `strategists The concern of some of his nuclear missiles from Cuba,
worry, too, that the Russians, top aides, however, looks not to continues to grow unabatedly.
by concentrating on very large present instability but to the More than 90 very large So-
intercontinental" ails- shape of the nuclear balance if 'viet ICBM silos, presumably for
riles, capable of being fitted in current Soviet nuclear construe-'advanced missiles, have been
the future Nti th swarms ofj Lion continues unabated. ;started this year. And the main
nuclear submarine building
accurate multiple warheads, Limit on Arias Pact Seen yard at, Severodvinsk, on, the
might also be seeking a second If the analysis of Soviet ob-
objective - a "war-fighting" White Sea, is being doubled s-
rather than a "war?-deterring"I jectives is correct-and incrcas- capacity, suggesting that Mos
b f PC; ( to t t sto
n a
b
nuclear capability.
p
e sou .
int, num err o o rcia s are i e- cow Will not
.luctantly concluding it may bei ping at missile craft. parity.
-the concern is that the Rus-1
sians would be. willing to nego
tiate only a limited sort of arms:
iagreement. This, the strategists!
say, would be one that would
not stand in the way of achiev-
ing either the numerical su-
periority in offensive missilesl
'that_ might be exploitable in!
political-military confrontations,
.or the kinds and numbers of
'weapons that might be used to
fight and win a nuclear war.
After two years of hard nego-
tiations, some point out, the
Russians now appear willing to
stop new construction of inter
continental. ballistic missiles, 'of
!which they have about 600
more than the United States.
They balk at halting new mis-
Isile submarine production, even
though if they finish" U-boats
!already under way they should
match in numbers the 41-boat
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 N~q
pproved For Release 2000C4DP73B00296R000200230001-4
16OCT1971
Severodvinsk, saying that four
new residential neighborhoods,
each housing 8,000 people, were
under. development on the
western outskirts of the city
of 145,000 population.
The seemingly innocuous S0-
word dispatch dealt with . a
place that is rarely mentioned
in the public information media
of the Soviet Union.
Moreover, the news item :was
special to The New YaZ Times
MOSCOW, Oct. 15 -'The
'Soviet Union said today. that
a major program of urban ex-
pansion was under way in a
northern city that was recently
identified as a.. nuclear-sub-
marine center in it Washington
dispatch on. a . reported build-
up of Soviet strategic weapons.
J ass, the official press
agency, isued.a brief news item
from the White Sea port of
? By THEODORE SHABAD
Moscow
a
news item on- Severodvinsk,
on the surface one of many
items in-, the Soviet press about
urban improvement. across this
vast nation.
Available Soviet publications,
in- keeping with the customary
rules . covering military and
other secret information, do not
identify Severodvinsk as.a sub-i
marine construction base. Nor:
do they ? provide any other spe-'
cific industrial information. The,
Tass dispatch referred to it as:a
"large industrial and cultural
center" of the So-,:-t Union's:
sub-Arctic regions. r
Severodvinsk; vdime popu
w from 79000 in
r
r'.
l
b
g
e
o
a
,.., 1959 to 145,000. last year, is
probably the largest of a num
The New York TImEs/Oct. 16,1971 leer of Soviet cities whose.eco-
d
released only a few days after
a Washington dispatch to The
e
nonuc functions are not. ma
public- because of their. 'stra-
tegic . character. Some_ places;
such . as spacecraft-launching
centers or nuclear-weapons
sites, are omitted from.. Soviet
maps for security reasons. .
Two bits of published infor-
mation about Severodvinsk pro-
vide "a.. clue to its industrial
activities. When founded in-
1936, on the. desoiate White
Sea shore 40- miles West, of
Arkhangelsk, it was- known" as
Sudostroi, . a name, .-.meaning
"ship construction." Some So-
viet reference .. books list a
'shipbuilding. technical school"
among :thecity's educational.
institutions.
In 1938, when the town al-
ready had. a . population .,of
about 20,000, its name was
changed to Molotovsk. This was
presumably to conceal its iden-
tity and at the.saine:tinie honor
Premier. Vyachestav M. Molo,
tov, -for -whom many places in
the ? Soviet. Union had been
named.
Mr. Molotov was removed.
in 1957...from all positions of
power by Nikita S.. Khrushchevi
and cities named for the for-
mer Premier were renamed.
The White Sea port became
known as Severodvinsk; for the
River Severnaya Dvina, or
Northern Dvina, which empties
authorized publication of, _ the into: the .White Sea nearby. ;
interpreted as indirect support
for United " States intelligence
findings.
Ii--was thought more plau-
sible, therefore, that Tass of-
ficials had not been aware of
the Western report when they
New York Times said that
satellite photos of the Soviet
Union had uncovered evidence
of a . build-up of more and
better . strategic weapons.
The build-up was said to in-
clude a doubling in size of the
principal - Soviet' nuclear - sub-
marine construction yard . at
Severodvinsk. And. some offi-
cials -said it increased the need
to insure at least. a. first-step
arnis control agrcement as. soon
as possible.
The.. sequence of - reports on
United States: satellite photo-
graphs . and. on the turban de-
velopment . program at the
Soviet submarine center was
not thought to be'directly re-
lated. But at the very least they
suggested an. odd coincidence
in view of the seerecy.that sur-
rounds Soviet defense industry.
The Soviet Government's
press agency, it was felt, was
unlikely . to intentionally re-
lease Information that could be
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 Approved For Release 2000109/08 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200230001-4
SAN DICGO, CAL.
TRIBUNE 1971
7
E -- 121,726
Stockpiles use it
' ' 'Sk ; Meanwhile in Mittenwald
Jllos e
Germany, Defense Secretary
Melvin R. Laird said Russia
and. the United States are
adding to, their nuclear mis-
sile stockpiles despite an
agreement to talk about lim-
! iting them.
:r! L Both superpowers are,
ground troops at present
th i
stre
t
l IJ
ng
n cen
ra
ut ope,
WASHINGTON - The new
missile silos under construe- although. Moscow now has in-
tion in the Soviet Union may dicated an interest in dis-
be for two separate missile cussing mutual and balanced
. rte,-..,,.,, reductions of these forces.
s
steme Defen
y
se
meat spokesman said yester- " `"".?.""' --' --
da lantic Treaty Oranization
y' g
(1`' TO) countries will under-
The spokesman, Jerry W. tai', exploratory talks with
1'riedheim, said new evidence Mo w immediately in
gathered over the past month hop" of learning within the
gives some indication the next six to eight weeks
Russians may be involved in whether the Russian interest
two separate systems of
silo improvement." is sincere, U.S. officials said.
Friedheini suggested the Eight nations attend
silos could be for either new These were the highlights
missiles, existing missiles or of a two-day meeting of
perhaps only represent an ef- NATO's eight-nation nuclear
fort to harden silos against planning group.
attack. Manlio Brosio, secretary
"We are not certain what general of NATO, told a news
the Soviets' intentions are, conference the defense mini-
he said. "That remains our s ters comprising the nuclear
current assessment." planning group "are trying to
CIA reports prevent war before waging it.
Mcamvlle; Senate Itepubli "You cannot have a good
preventive if you do not have
can sources reported that the 11 good deterrent," Brosio
Central Intelligence Agency Said.
has concluded that at least`
two-thirds of the new silos
recently detected in the So-
viet Union appear to -have;
been prepared for the rela-
tively small SS11 inter-
continental ballistic missile
rather than a large new
weapon.
Over the past ' months U.S.
intelligence has repotted the
Soviets were building 60 new
missile silos, raising alarms
that the Russians were cm-
barked on a new missile pro-
gram and seeking a first-
strike capability.
Friedheim said the Penta-
gon was still unable to make
any final determination of
what the Russians were up to.
He said the new silo construe-
tion is contin ling in areas of
their existiUpravediFor Release 2000/09/08 CIA-RDP73B00296R000200230001-4
 1nIQNY iii! L
For Release 2OU010-9/08-- CIA-RDP73B00296R000200230001-4
2 6 MAY W1
Riss's NeW MssHe X09
0 11
ons- weved Defe-Mive
By JOHN W. FINNEY
New York Times News Service
The Central Intelligence Agen-
cy has concluded that at least
two-thirds of the large new silo
holes detected in the Soviet Un-
ion are intended for the relative- I
ly small SS11 intercontinental-
missile and not for a large new
weapon as has been suggested
by the Defense Department.
This CIA assessment, reported
yesterday by Senate Republican
sources, casts a new and differ-
ent light on Soviet strategic in-
tentions at a crucial time in the
negotiations to achieve some
limitation on defensive and of-
fensive strategic weapons.
60 Detected
administration, these Republi-
can sources declined to be iden-
tified by name.
The Defense Department de-
clined to comment on the report-
ed CIA assessment because, as a
spokesman put it, "We would
not have any comment on a
speculative report like that."
But the spokesman said the Pen-
tagon still held to the interpreta-
tion that the Soviet Union was
deploying a modified version of
its large SS9 intercontinental
missile or an entirely new mis-
sile system.
Rather than s e e k i n g to
achieve a first-strike capability
against the United States with
large new missiles-as was sug-
gested by some officials after,
the detection of the large new
missile holes-it now appears to
some arms control specialistts
that the Soviet Union is follow-
ing the U.S. course of trying to
protect its missiles against at-
tack with "hardened" silos.
Some 60 large new missile sil-
os have been detected through
reconnaissance satellites in re-
cent months in the Soviet Unin^.
The CIA was said to have con-
cluded that at least two thirds
were intended for the SS11 inter-
continental missile, which is
comparable to the U.S. Minute-
man ICBM. More specifically,
some non-governmental sources
with access to CIA intelligence
information said all but 15 of the
new holes were located in exist-
ing SS11 missile fields. 1
Informants Not Identified
The Senate GOP sources said!
they had been informed by
non-governmental arms control
experts who, in turn, had been
briefed. by the CIA. Out of a
concern not to offend the Nixon
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 AWApproved NEJVJSg'EEK
For Release 2000/bi/CPT 87!-RDP73B00296R000200230001-4
BY STEWART ALSOP
WHAT'S GOING IN THE HOLES?
I
WASHINGTON-In recent weeks, a shud-
der of uneasiness has passed through
the tiny community of people who
know, and care, about the nuclear-
strategic balance between this coun-
try and the Soviet Union. The uneasi-
ness has been reflected in veiled hints
from Secretary of Defense Laird, Sena-
tor Jackson and others. It is important
to understand the realities that lie be-
hind the hints.
Until a few months ago, when the
Russians were installing one of their
huge, 25-megaton SS-9 missiles, they
always went about the business in pre-
cisely the same way. First they would
build two fences, sometimes three,
around a 100-acre site. Then they
would dig a big, flat hole, about 100
feet across and 25 feet deep. This
hole, easily detectable to the all-seeing
eyes of the intelligence satellites, was
always a signal to the intelligence ana-
lysts that another SS-9 was going on.
Inside the first hole, the Russians
would then dig another, deeper, hole,
about 30 feet across and 120 feet
.down. They would line the hole with
concrete, put a steel liner inside that
and then lower the big missile into the
liner. In the remaining empty space
of the first big hole, they would build
a complex of work rooms, generators,
fuel pumps and so on, and cover the
whole thing with a thick, steel sliding
door.
Then they were in business, with an
.operational weapon about twenty times
as powerful as the American Minute-
man missile. Between 1965, when they
planted their first SS-9, and last au-
tumn, the Russians had gone through
this procedure in precisely the same
way again and again, installing some
275 SS-9 missiles.
WORK STOPS
Last autumn, digging had started on
eighteen more SS-9 sites, and the in-
telligence analysts assumed that the
Russians would soon raise SS-9 deploy-
ment to more than 300. Then, in Octo-
ber, work on these eighteen holes
stopped, totally and abruptly-the emp-
ty holes are still there, easily visible in
the satellite photographs.
Perhaps, it was thought, this was
good news. Perhaps it was a signal
from the Russians that they were seri-
ous about limiting strategic weapons
through the SALT talks. But then some-
the same size as the second, deep hole
that houses the SS-9-but it lacks the
first, big, shallow hole.
These different holes have been dug
at a furious pace-41 of them at last
count, suggesting that the schedule
calls for at least 70 a year. The holes
have been dug among the six existing
SS-9 complexes in South Central Russia,
and they could be for some new kind of
point-defense anti-missile missile. But
the experts think the odds are heavy
that the holes are, instead, for inter-
continental missiles.
TESTS CONDUCTED
At about the same time the Soviets
stopped construction on the eighteen
SS-9 holes, they conducted a series of
21 tests of their NIRV's-multip'e re-
entry vehicles. The Russian MRV's,
controlled by a rather primitive but ef-
fective system of pointing rails, are de-
signed to fall in a predetermined fixed
pattern on their targets-the primary
targets, the experts unanimously he-
licve, being the thousand U.S. Minute-
man missiles that constitute our chief
nuclear deterrent.
Because the pattern is fixed, the
NIRV's are relatively vulnerable to our
now-building ABM system. But two of
the 21 tests appeared to be, not MRV's,
but M[RV's-multiple, independently
targeted, re-entry vehicles. The MIRV's
would be far less vulnerable to a missile
defense-it was to counter the expand-
ing Soviet ABM system that our Min-
uteman 3 and Poseidon missiles were
equioped with MIRV's.
It is possible that the two seeming
MTRV's were simply malfunctioning
MRV's. Perhaps the Soviets are simply
redesigning their SS-9 configuration-
the upper hole and its contents are
more vulnerable to a near miss than the
missile itself, despite the steel door. But
if this is the case, certain questions re-
main unanswered.
Why should the Russians wholly
abandon the eighteen SS-9 holes and
start digging new and different holes?
Why not simply move the contents of
the unner hole to another place? And
why the extraordinary haste to dig the
new holes?
The experts have a working hypoth-
esis to answer these questions-that the
new holes are for a newly designed,
multi-MIRVed missile, at least as pow-
erful as the SS-9. If the hypothesis is
provides a much bigger nuclear pie to
slice, as it were, than the 1-megaton
Minuteman. The new missile could be
ten-MIRVed, or twelve-MIRVed, or
more, but the usual guess is that it will
be six-MIRVed. A six-MIRVed SS-9-
sized missile would provide six nuclear
warheads each more powerful-about
a megaton and a half-than a single
Minuteman warhead.
If a multi-MIRVed, 25-megaton So-
viet missile is what is going to be put
into those new holes, that means the
end of our Minuteman complex as a
credible nuclear deterrent, perhaps
within three years, or even two. The
peculiar nuclear mathematics make
that almost totally predictable. If the
Russians are as methodical as usual,
we shall know what is going into the
new holes by next autumn. According
to the almost unvarying Soviet sched-
ule, that will be the time for opera-
tional testing of the new missile-if that
is what it is.
There is another fact to be consid-
ered. In March, the Russians success-
fully completed their third test series
of a non-nuclear satellite intercept ve-
hicle. These then are the facts that
have caused the shudder-and they are
facts, for the intelligence in these mat-
ters is now absolutely "hard." No one
will know, until or unless the Soviets
test a new missile, just what these facts
mean. But any reader of detective
stories will discern a pattern of clues,
all pointing in the same direction.
A SOVIET CAPABILITY?
The Soviets are bargaining at the
SALT talks for eliminating AB1-[ pro-
tection for the Minuteman deterrent
complex. At the same time, they have
probably already achieved the capa-
bility (which we lack against them) to
blind our intelligence satellites. And
the experts are betting about 2 to 1
that they are also on the way to achiev-
ing the capability to knock out, with.
very powerful multi-MIRVed missiles,
our land-based nuclear deterrent.
In short, the available clues suggest
that the Russians are now going all-out
to achieve in the near future a really.
decisive nuclear-strategic superiority.,
This is no cause for panic-it does not
mean that the Russians are plotting to
knock out the U.S. in a first strike.
Even so, serious people do have a duty
t
i
th
f
l
o
o exam
ne
e
acts seri
us
y, without
thing happened to cause the shudder. correct, the MIRV's will almost certain- du k'n b iu y art -ntly fashion-
The Russians `ParPlease'2480i09i 1f0 RDRfr!a00~~d s lkAll~Q l~ v4f thinking
of hole. This nee in o hole is about sins flip 2.. --naci-tnn ec_a
 T -La W A 5~:I1V ~,x - 4~ .
Asks U.S.-Soviet Halt for aYear
jacksonU . ryes Missile
By Chalmers M. Roberts
washing'ton Post staff writer
Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D.
Wash.) yesterday proposed an
immediate one-year freeze in
deployment of the most im-
portant Soviet and American
land-based missile systems.
The senator, whose views
are close to those of the Nixon
administration, made public on
ABC's television program, "Is-.
2. "The Soviet Union wouifl Free to Continue
immediately halt the deploy- 1, Jackson was careful to point
merit of new ICBM (intereonti- rout that under his proposal
nental ballistic missile) launch. 'the United States would be,
ors and missiles including free to continue deployment
those now under construe- j of what he called "the much.
t.ion.
Based on Photos
That latter phrase refers to
what Jackson yesterday again
called a "new" Soviet missile
JL
sues and Answers" (WMAL),'
Stem a judgiuent based on
o new ,
the proposal he will make In sY u BU os
a Senate speech today. Aides:' Ireconnalssailice 1 111
constru e
ha d not dis si 1 11
iand lbella
p----
h
et
e
Russ
uroi ed tat t 1e Sovietsi
xi said, however,cussed it with the administra
tion, ac son ?agility to deploy
Have t11C termed, His proposal was in sharp 60 to 70 of what eemissiles, s
contrast to one made last week .:., ?such huge SS-9 typ
by his fellow Democrat who this Ycal' he said,,
ossible 1972 presidential; ent of 70,
1
is
p peploym ucs
nominee, Sen. Hubert H.'?: Id ?put into serious n sec-:.
r
posals are reflective of alarm;
in Washington over the dead-
lock at the Soviet-American
wou of ou
tion the credibility
wend strike f
nd 21)0 of the'.,.
arou
n .. ow have
strategic arms limitation talks': ':
(SALT) and over new reports
of Soviet missile development.
In the four meetings thus
far of the current Vienna
round of SALT the United
States has found itself on the
defensive in the face of a
Soviet proposal made last be-
cember for an initial agree-
ment to limit rival anti-missile
(ABM) systems.
Humphrey last Thursday in
a Senate speech, in effect, ad-
vocated accepting the Soviet
offer provided it is linked' to
later success in negotiating a'
limitation on offensive mis-
siles.
But Jackson termed the
Soviet proposal "completely
unacceptable." Instead he of-
fered this ? four-part one-year
plan:
1. "The United States would
immediately halt the deploy-
ment of Minuteman III mis-
SS-9s, a giant missile capable
of holding a 25 megaton war-
head.
3. "Both countries would re-
tain the freedom to assure the
survivability of their strategic
land-based forces so long as
they did not add to their of-
fensive potential." Jackson ex-
plained that by this he meant
the right to further "harden"
missile silos with more con
crete and steel.
4. "Neither side would de-
ploy a population-defending
ABM. Jackson, like the Nixon
administration, considers, the
American Safeguard ABM
system as a "light" rather than
a "thick" or population de-
fense. But the Soviet Union
at the SALT talks has indicat-
ed worry that Safeguard could
become a thick system.
Jackson's alarm about the
new Soviet silos is shared by
the administration although
thus far there is no agreed ad-
ministration intelligence esti-
mate as to just what the
Soviet Union is up to. Work
on new_SS_9 silos] somewhat
siles with their MIRV (mul-
tiple) warheads." The first 50
of these missiles were con-
verted to MIRV war 1 ds 1~gt
? PrEoY { dit,
year
,
calls for 550 such Minuteman,
Ills. , . - .r?- , ? .
Approved For Release 2000/09/08: CIA-RDP73B00296R00?p'0 230QO1-4
'.'''halted for some months. Tlie
new silo work was first photo-
ing that any SALT agreement
must have "some mix" of both
:offensive and defensive
,weapons systems. However,
many ? arms control experts
outside the government and
some in Congress favor the
"ABMs only" approach as a
beginning.
To encourage Soviet accept
ance of "somc mix" the adinin
istration has gone to Vienna
's m all e r warheads of the with a trimmed down pro
MIRVed Poseidon missile on ' posal. What has been elitni
our Polaris submarines." The . mated are what are termer
first such Poseidon sub will,.
go to sea this spring and 311
of 41 Polaris subs are to be
refitted to . take the now
MIRVed missile.
Thus far, the Soviet Union,
as far as 1s known, has not
deployed multiple, warheads
cer
n s
ze, a p
a
on either its land-based or signed to limit the SS-9s tba
sea-based missiles althou;;h- also would limit whatever thi
on
for has been going Soviets intend to put, into t.hi
on for some time. new, larger. silos now beint
Humphrey called for suspen- built.
'
sion of deployment of both -
Safeguard and MIRVs on
Minutemen and, in return,',,
called on the Soviet Union to
suspend its own land-based
d as. MIRVT
an
But Jackson, like the admin.
istration,,would have no part
":'of an ABM freeze. He argued..::
.that ' the Soviet propose' ,
"would accelerate the decline'-",..
President Nixon has publicly
"rejected the "ABMs only"
corollary conditions for limit
jug rival ICBMs. Essentially
this means the United State is asking only that the Soviet:
accept a numerical ceiling of
around 2,000 missiles for earl
superpower.
This number, however
would include a sub-ceiling bs
number for missiles ov r
rovision d
i
i
t
One reason for the strong
administration resistance ti
an "ABMVls only" agreement 1
pragmatic. It is feared in higi
administration circles that i
there were such an agreemen
it would be difficult, perhap
impossible, to get from Con
gross the money to either coi pletc the initial Safeguar
phases now under constructioi
near Minuteman sites in Moi
tana and North Dakota or t
protect Washington if thcr
were an agreement limitin
ABMs to the Washington an
Moscow areas.
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THE NEW YORK TIMES DATE -t 1rZf='i PAGE
A FISSILE FREEZE
URGED BY JACKSON
Senator Calls for One-Year
Halt by U.S. and Soviet I
By TAD SZULC
S,pecl&1 to The iN.eW York Times
WASHINGTON, March 28-l
Senator Henry M. Jackson pro-,
posed today a one-year agree-
ment with the Soviet Union
freezing the deployment of
most land-based missiles. He
said this would "arrest the de-
cline in the security" of the
United States nuclear deterrent.
The Washington Democrat, a
member of the Senate Armed
Services Committee who has
been mentioned as a potential'
Presidential candidate, called
for an immediate agreement
that would halt the, deployment
of United States Minuteman III,
Senator Henry M. Jackson
on TV show yesterday.
missiles with multiple war-
heads, as well as the deploy
ment and construction of new
Soviet intercontinental missiles
and launchers and installation
of antiballistic systems defend-I
ing population centers.
Appearing on "Issues andi
Answers," a radio and televi-
sion program of the American)
Broadcasting Company, Sena-
tor Jackson announced that he
He said such an agreement
was necessary because the So-
viet had started building "a
massive system that involves!
the deployment of an ICBM
linter-continental ballistic mis-,
sile] force that exceeds 25
megatons."
Earlier Disclosure
It was Senator Jackson who
disclosed three weeks ago that
.the United States had detected
the new Soviet construction ef-
fort. This was later confirmed
by the Defense Department.
Today, he said, "The Rus-
sians have an ability this year,
-and this is what is ominous
to deploy between 60 and 70 of
such huge SS-9 type missiles."
"If they should deploy 70 of
such missiles," he said, "they
would have a capability this
year alone of adding more
megatonnage, or destructive
power than we have in our en-
tire current land-based Minute-
men ICBM system."
On Feb. 25, President Nixon
said in ,his State of the World
Message that the growth of
Soviet strategic forces "leads
inescapably to profound ques-
tions concerning the threats we
will face in the future, and the
adequacy of our current strate-
gic forces to meet the require-
ments of our security."
Mr. Nixon stressed that dur-
-ing 1970 the Soviet Union had
further increased its lead over
the United States in the deploy-
ment of intercontinental mis?
siles. At the end of last year,
he said, the Soviet Union had
1,440 ICM's and the United
States 1,054.
Senator Jackson's appeal for
a freeze came amid growing
concern over the, new Soviet
strategic arms programs and
the apparent stalemate at the
talks in Vienna on bombing
strategic arms.
Humphrey Asks Moratorium
In a major Senate speech last
Thursday, Senator Hubert H.
Humphrey, Minnesota Demo-
crat, another potential Presiden-
tial candidate, introduced a
resolution calling for a mutual
moratorium on deployments of
offensive and defensive weap-1
ons and MIRV testing while the!
U. S. and the Soviet Union
negotiated a ban on antiballistic
systems.
Senator Humphrey criticized
the Administration for inslting
on a conprehensive agreement
with Moscow on both offensive
and defensive weapons, and
suggested that an antiballistic
accord come first.
The Senate disarmament sub-
committee, headed by Senator
Edmund S. Muskie of Maine, the
leading Democratic Presidential
contender, is scheduled to start,
closed door briefings this week
on the status of the Arms-
Limitation Talks and the Soviet
threat.
During his television appear-
ance, Senator Jackson said that
In the talks with the Russians,
resumed in Vienna on March
15, "the real problem that we
face is that, the Russians ap-
pear to be going ahead on an
unabated basis with a very
large offensive land-based sys-
tem."
He said the new Soviet ac-
tivities "would put into serious
question the credibility of our
second-strike force" and that
"if the Russians continue to de-
ploy these huge offensive sys-
tems we will have to take an-
other look at our whole deter-
rent posture" and "at the need
,for mce offensive systems."
vvould outline utline his proposal in a
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THE NEW YORK TIMES DATr. PAGE
Soviet Missile Site Pattern"
Called Hint of New;Sy.stem
By TAD SZULC
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, March 26-
United States officials said to-
day that the pattern of recent
construction of intercontinental
missile sites in the Soviet
'Union might, presage the de-
ployment of a new Soviet
offensive-weapon system.
United States observation of
new construction by the Rus-
sians, first detected last De-
cember, has shown about
20 holes large enough to ac-
commodate the Soviet SS-9,
the 'largest intercontinental
or even bigger weapons, these
officials said.
New information available to
the United States has' also
shown that the ? recently dug
holes are distributed in five
clusters along the wide arc
forming the, Soviet offensive
missile system. This stretches
from the Polish border to the
Chinese frontier.
struction is related to Soviet
development of the multiple-
warhead MIRV's.
An explanation of the new
construction was requested last
week by American representa-
tives at the talks in Vienna
on limiting strategic arms. The
Soviet delegation has not re-
plied, officials here said. "
As detailed information from
satellite observation has been
obtained in recent weeks, the
Nixon Administration was re-
ported to be chiefly concerned
with the long-range potential of
new Soviet missile deployment
rather than with the present
size. of missile stockpiles.
Since it takes about ? 18,
Continued on Page 10, Column '4
This extensive deployment
pattern is increasingly suggest,
,ing to United States specialists,
that the Soviet Union may im
deed be building a new weap
ons system. This might be
related to improved SS-9's, or
still newer ? missiles, 'equipped
with accurate MIRV's, or mul
tiple .'independently targetable
re-entry vehicles.
The. White House is under-`
stood to be proceeding on the
assumption that the new con
(Continued From Page 1, Col. 71"we are not sure exactly what
months from the start of con-
struction struction until a missile site is
operational, the White House is
believed to be thinking of the
nuclear parity problem that will
exist by the middle of 1972--
with the assumption that the'
Soviet multiple- warhead will
then have become operational.
United States intelligence of-
ficials are aware that the Soviet
Union is testing MIRV war-
heads, but, do not know how
When the talks resumed
March 15, -after ia three-,month
recess, the United States was
awaiting an answer to its in-
quiries about the meaning of
the cessation of work on three
of six new SS-9 sites.
Officials said 'today that con-
struction of these three silos
remained halted and they spec-
ulated that the sites might have
been abandoned in favor of a
new system connected to the
approximately 20 new holes ob-
seryed in recent months. The
new holes, officials said, are in
locations different from those
of the three silos on which
work was stopped.
Signal Suspected
After American intelligence
agencies spotted the halt in
the installation of the three
silos - information indicated
that some of them Might have
been dismantled -- the Nixon
Administration publicly won-
dered whether this was a sig-
nal that the Soviet Union might
be amenable to a slowdown in
the deployment of offensive
weapons.
In his State of the World
Message on Feb. 25, President
Nixon expressed hope for a
slowdown. The United States
position in the stalks to limit
arms is that an agreement with
the Soviet Union must cover
both offensive and defensive
weapons sand not only defensive
ones, as proposed by Moscow.
The (first public disclosure of
the new Soviet construction
was made on March Demo-
crat Henry
crat of Washington, in a tele-
vision 'appearance. It was con-
firmed the same day by the
Pentagon spokesman, Jerry W.
Friedheim, who said that "pit is
correct that. we have detected
some new IOBM construction
in the Soviet Union", but that
tentions arc."
Since then, however, ad
with4 more detailed information
on the ; number of the new
holes and their deployment
pattern.
This knowledge, official'
said, has increasingly inclined
the Administration to consider
the possibility that the Soviet
Union may be working on a
new weapons system.
They added that such a new
system might indicate installa-
tion of missiles even larger
than the SS-9, conversion of
the SS-9 from liquid to solid
fuel or an altogether new gen-
oration of weapons.
The conversion of the SS-9
to solid fuei,.which would be a1
major technolo:;ic,il achieve-
ment, would give the missile ai
propellant that could be in-
stantly ignited. The use of 1iq-I1
uid fuel forces some missiles
to be maintained in constant
readiness, a costly and danger-
ous procedure.
Solid fuel also provides
greater thrust per unit of
weight of propellant.
Officials here also reported
tht no meaningful progress had
been achieved in the Vienna
talks in the last 10 days.
They said that while the So-
viet delegation had indicated
its willingness in principle to
discuss an agreement on defen-
sive and offensive nuclear
weapons, it still insisted that
an accord be reached first on
defensive systems.
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 1;i POST
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JF3eds
??' -if
By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer
Flight paths of two recently lites were used, two of them
launched Soviet satellites indi- hunters. It appears that only
cate a new test of a system to two were used in this latest
knock out unfriendly space vc- test.
hides. American radars in those
The two .Eussian satellites, two earlier markmanship ex-'
designated Cosmos 39-4 -and ercises detected debris from
explosions in the hunters,
397, also may have been sent with space specialists unsure
up from a different spaceport whether the target satellite
than the two previous shots, shot the hunters or vice-versa.
one in 1963 and the other in Although the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and Defense Dc-
1970. partmcnt study such Soviet
Space specialists theorized shots intensively, very little]
yesterday that the Soviet information is released to the
Union used the military, coinpublic. But a recent Library
plex at Plesetsk rather than of Congress report commented
on the satellite inspection na-i
Ithe more civilian spaceport of tune of the 1908 and 1970 tests,'
;Tyuratum? "Two suc-essive flights
If further analysis substan-Imade a reasonably close in-
tiates that theory, the change terccpt of a predecessor,"
of spaceports probably means wrote Charles S. Sheldon II
that the Soviet Union consid- in the Library of Congress re-
err its satellite inspection sys- port of Jan. 12, "and . then
tern in the operational rather moving away a bit were in
than experimental category. turn exploded into many
Part of the basis for sus- pieces of debris.
pecting a different launching "In the absence cf Soviet
site is the change in the in-announcements," Sheldon con-.
clinatioti of the Soviet space tinued, "an assessment cannot
craft this time as they crossed l be conclusive. But the, suspic.
the Equator. lion remains that a capability
. Cosmos 394-launched Fcb. 1to inspect and destroy satcl-
9- crossed at an inclination of lites had been created."
65.9 degrees and Cosmos 397
--launched Feb. 25--crossed
at 65.8 degrees. This compares
with an inclination of about
62 degrees for previous satel-
lito inspection lasts from
Tyrtratam. .
The Soviet Union in all
three series of shots used
"target" and "hunter" satel-
lites. The radar track showed
the hunters passing close
fenough to the target satellites
to blow them up-apparently
testing the ability to knock
out another nation's observa-
tion or navigation satellites.
In this new shot, Cosmos
394 flew a nearly circular or-
,bit about 370 miles above the
earth. The hunter - Cosmos
397 - flew an elliptical
course, zooming up as high as
1,390 miles and down as low
as 368 miles.
In the two earlier experi-
ments-the first beginning on
Oct. 19, 1968, and the second
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 no ?? 11I U}TALD
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Mlamt Herald-Washington Post Wire
WASHI 'GT0N` - The U.S.
Navy,'v; rich for years has been keep-
ing track' of Soviet submarines all
over the world, now is. afraid of los-
ing them in A`.heric r s; own back yard
- the Gulf of 'Mcaaco 'and Carib-
phones on the, ocean. bottom for lis-
tening to Soviet submarines sailing
southward.frorn Reykjavik along the
cast coast of the U.S., but not- for the
waters behind Cuba and along Ameri-_
ca's Gulf coast.'
This i 611U. n underlies the recent plctcd in April, is'focusiY19 on what
White House warnings to tlhe_, Soviet kind of "fence" should be put up
.Union that' the United States would ainrino;t Soviet` stabs so close to the
view a' Russian submarine base in aga some version of underwater
Cuba "with the utmost seriousness." U.S. caves-choppers or a h.rrrier of surface
The pros,5ect.that Soviet nuclear- 'ships, aircraft and killer submarines
powered submarines - armed with which patrolled the Gulf and the Ca-
either nhissiles or torpedoes - could rib',' on a regular basis.
ii . sneak into the Gulf undetected has Not that gulag 'barriers would
prompted the Navy to order a special keep 'lie expanding Soviet navy out
study on how to monitor submarines of those waters -any more than the
around Cuba. U.S. stays out of the Mediterranean.
It has also raised challenges to But the Navy at least wants'to keep
the v.av the navy' spends its e bil track of Soviet movements around
lion a year for aria-submarine-war= Cuba.
fare (ASW).. Sonic Defense specialists
Wayne Smith wrote in their book,
HowN Much Is Enough?
"It failed, in. part," they Wrote,
"because the T,,-1, Navy is made up of
t ree, corhoetinv brunches,.. each
proud of its, own cap bilities and tra-
ditions: FA submarine navy, a- surface
navy aind' an aircraft navy.
"When it came time to gather as-
suitjhptions on which to base the PR's
(probabilities of killing enemy subma-
rine) of the various Navy forces, each
branch competed with the others in
overstating performance claims' for.
its own preferred?wcaponsy-stenis.
"Each feared that if, it did', not,
Enthoven and Smith continued, "fu-
ture studies would show that all, or
most of the Soviet submarine. force
was being destroyed by one of the
other branches, which might then 'get
more of the total Navy budget . . . '
char"e the aircraft, ship and subma- REAR ADINI. John D. Haynes TI;i ItES.UL'3, the authors said,
rine traiAiti nches of the Navy are. con (Ret.). for one, contends the new "So- was that the Navy 's ov%n studies
cent)' ng more on betting ASW
viet naval forays"` into the Gulf of shoved it could handle the Soviet
money for themselves than on corn- iYlexico and the Caribbean Sea "are
ing up with a coordinated approach the most pregnant events in? U.S. for- submarine threat with case often
to the submarine threat. eign relations since World War 11 - "w.ith.even smaller forces than al-
Another argument heard is that 'and this is not forgetting the nuclear ready existed for ASW.
the civilian leadership of the Penta- explosions, tv:b bloody wars and. thy' "The diletmna tivas r.,eflected in tile,.
gon has allowed Vice'Adm. H. G. Cuban crisis of October, 1962." fact that, fo foin yeus in a tow
Rickovi2r to go his own way in He complaigs that the U.S goy- (196.3-66), the Secretary c~ Deftnse
building a new fleet of high-speed err:mcn* "has been less than entirely asked the Navy to hake an an a!1
submarines at the expense of slower ' frank' in explaining to the people of anti-submarine waif re htch
but quieter sums that have .the best this sea po%ve p; enonhenon at their cotiId.'be used as a oasis fo jt+o,g-
chance of finding and destroying an irnnhecr'a to door." meats on force levels and r lot, for
Tr(_, pies s r,t . $3 billion-a-year four years a row the N ?,vy made a
enemy sub in wartirhe.
ASW efforter cC.n15V1SSe;; underwater.
ONE IRONY is that today's Navy listening systems, submarine hunting
is more prepared to find and track surface sups, planes, helicopters and.
Soviet submarines sailing off Reykja- killer subrr.ariner.
vik, Iceland, than off New Orleans. It , Ale in C. E.ithevcn, once the Pon
"happens that New Orleans - which tagon's top whiz kid as former De-
Soyiet subs might approach undetect- fence Secretary Robert S, McNama-
,.ed for lack of any ASW barrier - is ra's-chief',of systems analysis, qu.es-
part of the home. district of Rep. F. tIonen whether the nation was get-
i dward Hebert (D), new chairman of ting its .?honey's ;north from the ASW
the :House Armed Services Commit- investn,,cnt.,
tee, which p es on Navy spending.
"O JR EFFORT to come up with a.
Soviet st.bmarSnes entering the
Gulf of Mexico from south of Cuba convincing analysis of ASW, forces,
catch the U.S. Navy on its. deaf side. one that everyone would accept and
agree apon, failed,.' Fnthoen and K.
The Navy. has ? underwater. micro`
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 2000/09/0otaCl`,RDP73B00Seven Soviet 296R0002001230001-4 can
study, s,t eApprovedeFor Release
lemma and ended up disawningits be stretched across the sea frnm first Soviet cruise were joined by a
oewn analysis as. a basis for deter min- those points constitute the UKGI bar- nuclear-pov; eyed submarine in the
ing force levels. r,cl for the United Kingdom, Gulf for ASW exercises, about 300
Enthoven and Smith also charged Greenland and Iceland participation. Miles off the mouth of the ivlissis.sippi
that the Navy tailored its war gaming If the Soviet sub went through River. The submarine was armed
fit its desires for hardware - the U1CGI harrier at a time an elabo
to with torpedoes, not missiles, accord-
claiming ng in 19637, for example, that a rate AS1i' drill vras programmed, ing to reports at. the time.
new carrier-based ASW plane (the Arnorican submarines would team up
VSX) was needed because Soviet sub- with airplanes from both land bases IN NI'AY and June of I9-r0. a srr-
marines would be far at sea by the and aircraft carriers, helicopters and and force of Soviet ships sail 'd Jul'
time war broke out. destroyers to locate the Russian sub. Cienfuegos during the, ~:geld-wide sea
There are active and passive sys- exercise called "Okeon." 'Thu lint ,
"A year later, with, the \'S\ proj-
ect approved," the Navy produced "a terns for detecting the submarine. Ac- according to Adnl. HayCs,?thc nuclr,Ii
massjve study" to show it had to buy tive Systems include sound waves submarine c .r; ied the Shaddock 900_
more submarines so '-It could catch sent under the water. They bounce nrilr =range surface -to-surface nos ile.
So to subs as the trial to leave back when they hit a submarine in-
y dicating its 1position. Passive serns Tile an in Soviet foray enteral the
pork. in Wartime - an opposite set of a y=t Ca.rila, .n in Serit_mbcr, 79'x0, m nor-
ascuiliptions.-- just listen to the sounds made by the ing in Cienfuegos; This time there
Navy leaders' is interviews said submarine itself, was no situ of a submarine., but a
such charges are r.rnfair, that they South of the UKGI barrier,` the submr:rine tender was among the
have to cover all the possibilities in Soviet sub runs Lhrou; h another bar. ships doclcinf; there.
AS1V to insure the nation's security, rice- the so-called SOt15u5 system of Thus, President NixOrl last fall
that ASW spending will have to rise underwater microphones stretched had to worry about. the Soviet Union
to keep abreast of undersea technoio_ out on the ocean bottom' along the buildit, faeitiLres for missile-carrying
American east coast.
By. submarines in Cuba - just eight
They regard the Soviet forays into years after President Kennedy, went
the. Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean as IN PEAC[:?T1r,IT:, the idea is to thrnur,h the nerve-wracking missile
snatch Soviet submarine deployments crisis with Premier Nikila Khrush-
a pew bet for the Navy to cover. But around the world so policy makers in Chet'. The Nixon Administration's
the new Cuban threat is 'already Washingto
hii n can be forewarned of public warnings to Russia started on
n ;iuL a demand is somegovern- any tiu?eatening-looking activity. Scot. 25, 19'x0
Lent cir'clcs fora reordering o~ the t
Navy's priorities - not just changes Souses or any oil:er passive Hs- "Thu Soviet Union can be under
in AS`sV forces. teeing system is riot foolproof. The no doubt that we would view the es-
'1 st-rbmarine can hide its noise behind tablishinent of a strategic base, in the
icy nu ht to giveup this silly mountains under the sea or tinder Caribbean with the utnnost scriou.s-
iiJea of sending a fleet into the Indian thermal layers of water. -ness," a White house official said
Ocean and concentrate on the real Nevertheless, Sousus can hear So- bitch then. A Pentagon s okesman,
naval problem rioht, here at barge," 1
said one obvernment planner. viet submarines before they get with- also on Sept. 21i, said the U.S. "can't
in missile ran"e of the American east rule out" the possibility of the Soviet
THE S"TRA'1'I?GtC implications of coast. Union building a base for its Yankee
the current controversy are illustrat_ But henind Cuba is a different (Polaris type) suhmarines in Cuba.
cd by following a Soviet submarine matter. THE STATE Department, on Nov.
on a cruise from the Russian port of 13 and 18, said that an "undcrstafid?
Murtiransk to the Cuban port of Cien- ONC> the Soviet submarine on lot" had been reached, with the Sovi-
fue os. Whil,i mythical, the cruise de- this mythical trip has swung around CL Union?in October. It scented to bar
scribed illustrates the challenge of Ci- Cuba, she cannot be heard by the servicing nuclear submarines in
enfuegos. - east coast Souses. There are plenty Cuban ports, but the exact terms of
'111e, submarine sails submerged of places bciund Cuba for -a subma- the unwritten understanding have not
through the icy svato..rs of the Barents ];Tic to hic.e. Conceivably the Soviet been made public, So it is not knov;n
Sea, roundingthe North Cape of Nor- sub-could s=.il out of C. ienfuc os into Whether just nuclear-powered Polaris
way as it heads south toward Cuba. the Caribbean and sneak up into th?: type subnrar'ines ----- which constitute
Off the North Cape, oil z typical Gulf of Mexico undetected. There is "offensive weapons" -- were barred
deployment, American submarines lie no Souses barrier in thm Gulf. or all type of nuclear submarines.
silently in the depths. They listen to In wartime, a Soviet Polaris-type Di?tsel-powered submarines evidently
the traffic going by. Each submarine sub in the Gulf could shoot missiles are allmved in the Caribbean and'
makes a slightly different sound un? at American bomber bases from the Gulf under' the "understanding."
dersaater, its "signature." The Ameri- waters off New Orleans. An anti-ship Further, there apparently, is no
can sub may well recognize the sig- type suhntarine would threaten the ban on a Soviet sub tender being
nattu-e and identify the sub it cannot vital ports and sea lanes oT the based in?(ienfuegos and sailing out
see. crowded Gulf. 'file Caribbean would of there regularly to service Russian
Once the Soviet sub passes out of be open to Soviet subs out of Cuba. submarines in international waters.
soundr-range, the American sub could 'file Vice Adm. 'T'urner F. Caldv,,cli is
radio ahead to other monitors - like Soviets, in July, 7.959, sent
the first or three naval forces intq the in charge of keeping track of Soviet
a cop watching for speeders from be- Gulf of Mexico, rldru. Haves, in his submar9nes, svhctlner they are sailing
hin'd a billboard. Another "submarine article in the January "Interplay" off Wa_.iringtnn, DX., or ''eve OnIe-
cop" farther south is the force of the magazine, called this e~:pedition "the ans.
P-3 anti submarine?vr itfar'e airplanes first time that atarshi is of a foreign KRA~rng to k, ell track of Soviet
based at Reykjavik, power with less than1ftiendly intent strbmarirtes ins 'I Cuba -.- where
had been in the Gulf since the F?reneh the rnnrrntainrnis terrain under the
TIJL Si.AV'AY harrows in that invasion of Mexico during the Ameri- Caribbean mail-s it easy to hide and
tea, ,~ ith Greenland N .the and the can Civil .War, and in the Caribbean the thermal lavers in the shallows of
L t7itf d z