THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE NATIONAL PRIORITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73B00296R000200150005-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 109
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2002
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 11, 1971
• Content Type: OPEN

STENOGRAPHIC INUTt S
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for duplication or reprinting
Vol.
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
Report of Proceedings
Hearing held before
ommittee on Pr ior 117,1 e and EO ?now in Ijoy
THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE
r --day. Auguot 11, 191
Washington, D. C.
WARD, SMITH, PAUL & ALDERSON
General Stenotype Reporting
410 First Street, S. E.
Washington, D. C. 20003 Washington, D. C. 20024
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ATEA S
STATAMTaT OF PAGE
Jeroina Cohen,
Professor of Lw,
Harvard UniverEity
John. K. Fairbank,
Director,
east !.sin Research Center,
ilarvard University
Allen S. Uhitin-J,
ProEessor of Political ScieAce,
Associa.ce,
Cent= for Chlr.c:so StudiQ,s,
Univursity of Michigan
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1 11 kil.;TIONTJ.4 PRIORITIES
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Wednselay, August 11, 1971
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Congress of the United States,
Subcommittee on Priorities and
Ecoz:omy in Government of the
Joint Economic Committe,
Washington, D. C,
The Subc)lomittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:,05 a.m.,
in RODM 1202, New Senate Office Building, Honorable William
ProYmire (ChaLvman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
I).RE'8LT4'2,1 Senator Proxmire,
ALSO PRMEi7ST: John R. Stark, Executive Director;
Lucy A. Falcone, Economist; Richard F. Kaufman, Economist;
LcAighlin r. McHugh, Senior Economist; Walter B. Laessing,
Minority; and Leslie J. Bender, Minority Staff EconomiSt,
an. akim Jamb
catoc P.re Tbittct--.2 will come 't.o order.
In fiscal year 1971 over $163 billion of the conventional;
forces portion of our defense :;-,1d ,et was allocated for Asian
contingencies. The conventiol !es portion of the budget
arrounted to $40, billion in tiu_ "Etc..: This figure, of course, 1
does not include the nIttni_s spey,t G- strategic forces. Neithex:!
1 does it ircld th coscs o the wa:: in Vietnam.
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{;
il The $16 billion conventional forces figure for Asia was
sacond only to the $19 billion spent in Europe. Obviously if
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Vietnam cests were added to the other military expenditures in
11 Asia, those outlays would represent the largest portion by far
7` ii in the conventional forces portion of the defense budget.
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. Recently serious questions have been raised about our
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official views of the People's Republic of China. It is clear
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that much of our foreign and military policies in East Asia
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and the budgetary expenditures associated with them are a
revoonse to the threat we perceive from the People's Republic
of China.
What is the nature of that threat? Are we spending too
muah or too little to meet it?
Those issues stand out vividly in light of President
Ni'xnes recent announcement that he intends to make an officiall
visit to Peking next year.
These mntters and others are the subject of today's 1
discussion with three of the tountry's foremost experts on
Caima and Asian affaLrz7,
Jerome Cohen is Professor of Law at Harvard University,
a graduate of Yale Law School and Yale College. He is a
bpacialist in as Asian legal studies, particularly China. He:
has published a number of books in this field and is about to
complete a study of China and international law.
John Fairbank rec,Aved his Ph.D. from Oxford. He has beeni
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on the faculty of the Department of History at Harvard since
1936 where he is presently Higginson Professor of History. Ha
hz,s been History Director of the East Asian Research Center sine
1959.
Mr. Fairbank was with the Coordinator of Information and
the OSS in Washington in 1941 and 1942. He was Special
Assistant to the American Ambassador in Chungking, China, in
1942 and 1943; with the Office of War Information, Far Eastern
Ooerak:ioits, Washington, D. C., in 1944 and 1945; Director of
the U.S. Information Service in China in 1945 and 1946, and
ho La: been a womber of the National Commission, U.S.-China
Relations since 1966.
Mr rairbank is the author of several books, including:
United States anl Chinar "Modern China;" "A Bib1iographica1
Guide to Chinese Works, 1898-1937;" "A Documentary History of
Chinese Communism;" "Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast:"
"China's Response to the Wast;" 'East Asia: The Great Tradition;"
"East Asia: The Modern Transformation."
Allen S. Whiting received his Ph.D. from Columbia. He was
former Director of Research and Analysis, Far East, Department ;
of State, from 1962 to 1966. He was Deputy Counsel General,
Hong Kong, from 1966 to 1968. He has taught at Northwestern
University, Michigan State and Columbia. HO was With Rand
Corporation from 1957 to 1961. He is the author of "China
Crosses the Yalu;" "Soviet Policies in China, 1917 to 1924;"
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co-author of "Dynamics of International Relations," and other
works.
Dr. Whiting is currently a Professor of Political Science
and an Associate with the Center for Chinese Studies at the
University of MichigEm.
Gentlemen, we axa honored to have you present.
Mr. Cohen, will you proceed.
I might say I would appreciate it if you would hold your
remarks down to ten or fifteen minutes and thert the balance of
your statement, what you can't cover, will be printed in full
in the record.
Sr2ATI2NENT OF jEFOME COHEN, PROFESSOR OF LAW, HARVARD
UNIVERSITY
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Hr. Chairman. I am very pleased
to have this opportunity.
I do haw.: a longer statement that / would like to submit
for the record, but I will be relatively brief in my informal
presentation.
rentation addroz itself to the two principal
questions that your Committee is seeking to investigate. Ono
is, how do wo assess the threat of China. And the second is,
how do we respond to that threat.
I would say with respect to the first question that for
over 20 years our assessment of China reflects misperceptions,
myth and mistakes. Bviefly, one can tick off what what almost
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coee,,titutes e litany of mistakes and misperceptions. At the
verv outset, as a number of people have pointed out, the U.S.
leaders sought to depict what was going on in the Chinese
revolution and the Communist takeover in 1949 as a Soviet
sate/lite installed in China. At one point Dean Rusk called
China a "Slavic Manchekuo."
Secondly, Wean North Korea irvaded South Korea in June,
1950, the United Stats
perceived this as being largely a
Chineau-seoneored invesion and used this as the pretext for
ieteevaning our fleet and eventually posting our military
rces, between Taiwan which had been recognized by us at part
of China until than, and Mainland China. -We didn't realize,
anparently we didnt care, that this would be
by woi,le,
in Asia, but in China epecifially, as
seen not only
intervention
and aggreesion against China's territorial integrity, even
though that had ear-?r been our poSition.
We eventually male an even more profound mistake, ot
perhaps one of equal Dlagnitude, when We decided to seed troops
eeeose the 38th parallel, China's border of N)rth gorea,
and the Yalu River, despite the most repeated Chinese warnings 1
that China would deem itself threatened in security if we sought
established in 1949. We didn't apparently take into account thit
to being down the North Korean regime. Again, what we under-
estimated was China's determination to defend the Chinese
revolution, which was then only a year old, having been
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the Chinese had rememl)ered western intervention against the
Lik 'Revolution in 1918: that the Chinese had remembered
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that Japan's invasion of China started with interference with
Taiwan in 1395 and proceeded in 1910 to take over Korea, and
thcu py...oealaed thence north into Manchuria. To the Chinese, asi
P:-Dfssor Whiting's a',)le study of 1960 shows, the United Statee
' .to be repeatinj the Japarese pattern of infringing on
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C1iri security and territorial integrity.
110.1, we eqded tae Korean War, and China adopted a policy
3 of peaceful existence from 195d to mid-1957. And at that time 1
c.ontiuucd to jm.tify our rebuff of China's repeated initia-
":MS to have peaceful co-euistence, not merely with the United
Stz,It5 but with the w3r1d, by invoking the myth of aggressive
Citinno After all, ths United Nations, which had been a party
in the Korean conflic*z, had condemned China as the aggressor.
To the Chinese, however, this looked rather Odd since china's
t:060 ',?0 had not takeA part in North Korea's attack on South
Korea and since they only entered the war, as X indicated
tyii after the Un:Lted Ctatas advanced toward the Chinese
border.
Well, the period of peaceful co-existence didn't really
wiL any great gains for Peking. And in 1959 she shifted to a
more militant policy. And in parte as I think Professor
Whiting's paper today will also support, that policy reflected
a
covert United State t sponsorship of many hostile acts toward
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cnina. we saw, koy: ?1?xampIe, that Peking's new emphmais on
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liberatinc! by force Taiwan in 1958, the offshore oil lands
which sLonW have been perceived as renewal of the civil:
war eraphasis, was by us transformed into an international
pzoblem because of the fact we said Taiwan was no longer part
of China. We ignored the fact that it was United States sponsozt-
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ship of Nationalists initiatives in the is/and area i
that brought out Peking's renewed hostility.
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We also aaw that whea Peking suppressed theithamba tribes- 1
melx's rebellion in Tibet in 1958 we sought to portray that
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ce an international problem, even, though theta were no protests'
agait China 'S reincoxperation of Tibet which had earlier boeni
p3Irt of China in 1950, and even though we were covertly
sponsoring and supporting sore of that revolt activity against
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aice rule.
'4419Iniin probb.-5m of 1962 and the overt hostility, at that
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r.oint, I think, also Y.I.a7e been part of the aggresbive China
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7 iz..dictmnt that we have heard so much About in the late)O'S
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and early '60's, as Professor Whiting's paper again, I think,
suppcol-ts, The Indian problem was brought out in part by
20 1 China's concern about covert and hostile activities against
Chita in the area of Tibet and elsewhere along the Indian border,
22 So, by the early '60's this country was haunted by a
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23 specter -- and it was a specter -- of aa aggressive, militant 1
94 China. And it was this specter that made possible the mobilital
P
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tion of public support in this country for odr tragic Vietnam
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irterventioa.
Today in self-juetification, sore of the former high
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officiale of the Keneady and Johnson Administrations argue thati
although in 1971 we have all recognized that China is no longer!
expansionist in the conventional border-crossing sense, it was
reasonable in 1965 to see China an being aggressive, and
therefore it was reasonable to challenge China's co-called
indirect aggression in Vietnam by sending American combat
troops there.
They saw, in other words, in 1965 the existence of an
Asian Communist conspiracy -- as one once Said, its capital
w4a. Poking, China -- but they say today, of course, it has
dioappenred.
This reminds ma in a curious way of the story About the
Iad who at 13 thought his parents were quite Ignorant about thei
affairs of the world and was amazed by the time he reached 21
at how much hi z parents had learned in three years. I think
the orIginal image of China emu inaccueate; but it would be
equally inaccurate, however, if WG were to see China as wholly ?
benign today. But in neither case can we justify the indictmen11'
tremendous expenditure of resources by the United States, not
merely in money and other resoUrces, but in people, in order tol
combat and contain this aggression.
that China is unively aggressive and therefore justifies the
I think the establishment is now coming to reeize that
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, tele hes beena grosely exaggerated view, a carieatuse of the
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, Chinese image, and that it has been a tremendously expensive
one and one that has cost us very dearly. Even if one turns
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to so-called indirect aggression and Chinese subversion, one
finds that the Chincee have allocated relatively insignificant 1
amounts to helping was of national liberation abroad, and that,
even their propaganda, weapons training and other forms of
support for these wars of national liberation have not been ve
O successful, and that we shouldn't exaggerate the danger there
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lO (that any healthy society in Asia that is led by genuinely
neticealistic leaders with some popularity would have from this 1
i2 kiild of a threat from China,
13 Finally, on the military front, i think it is fair to say .
thee Chou En-lai as rot grossly exaggerating the other day in 1
45 hie interview with Mr. Reston when he described China's
16 atomic-nuclear attainnents as merely in a preliminary stage of
1!?esaarieantation, and that not in our lifetimes will we find the
10 CMnese nucleax threat comparable to the Soviet or the-. American
19 tl.)::ez.t to other powerz's froze the existence of nuclear weapons.
20 And even with China s predominantly rural nature, with its urban
21 shelter probe:am, with its perhaps ability to absorb nuclear
V aacks greater than others, because of these factors X think it
23 would be the height of irrationality for Peking to resort to
nuclear weapons. And indeed P%king has repeated its request thai:
2.3 other powers join it in a no-first-use pledge of nuclear weapons,
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IAnd I would urge that we take very seriously a response of
a favorable nature te talking about under what conditions could
3 we indeed come up with a no-first-use pledge.
So I thiak we have to understand that Peking wants nuclear
weapons because Peking, althoegh it talks about itself as a
0 middle power that wants to group itself with the Junior powora
In the world ageinst the superpower conspiracy of the United
States and the Soviet Union, really had-aspirations for equalitr
0 with the United states and the Soviet Union. One has to under-
stand a great deal about the Chinese past -- and I ma sure
Peo!!essor Iliairbaek will mention this peculiar emphasis upon
equality, upon :reciprocity, upon being treated not as some
junior member of the world community, but as a leading power --
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to enderstand why Peking leaders have this extraordinary
sensitivity and want to have equality and therefore want
nuclear weapons uhich represent the ticket to equality with
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the suporpowere.
Before leaving the subject of our ausessment of China and
eur mistakee in the past, I think it is important to question
whether ee axe now oerrently.laboring under another misappre-
hension about the nature of China's po/icies and China's
determination to achieve equality in the world. President ;
ke
Nixon hate repeatedly announced the belief that we can norealizel
relations with the Peeple's Republic of China while still main-
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taining our friendly relations and our defense commitment to
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thc Republic of China on Taiwan.
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Now, perhaps this is simply something that has to be saidl
at the moment in 02:del: to quiet the obviously unquiet rightwinj
elements in bW-11 political parties. Perhaps it is simply a
domestic political maeeuver to distract us from our internatiodal
domestic problems. But my hope is that the President is
eeofoundly sorions ebout believing that he may succeed in
normalizing relations with China. But if he is, I think we
have to realize that the Chinese are not kidding when they say
we can't have our cake and eat it too, we cannot recognize two
geveenments as being the legitiMate government of China and
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that we will have to break diplomatic relations eventually withl
1 ch o Nationa1i0t Government on Taiwan if we hope to.normalize
relations, ae I think we have to do for our security position,
with the People's Republic on the mainland. Otherwise the
rresilent'e journey for peace, I fear, will in Shakespeare's
femoaa phrase, "keep the Word of premise to ear and break it
to mu! hope."
Vinally, Mr. Chairman, I want to talk briefly about
roe:pone-ling to this threat.
I think the threat is exaggerated. I say the threat is
LaLud on misperception and perhaps deception of the /)merican
public to a certain extent, and exiggerated fear.. Nee?, should
we so respond? Obviously if we are really going to Vtite a new
chapter in Sino-American relations we are going to have to
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3 is Chinese territory, going back on our pre-June, 1950,
4 1 position that it in part of China's territory, and we are going
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normelize relations, I or:6y, with Peking, we are going to have
to recogniv
. a legitemate basis for Peking's claim that Taiwan
to have to somehow implement the vague prescriptions of the
Nixon doctrine in a way that will respond to
Washington s perceptions
of their legitimate
both Peking and
security intereste.
/ am not a epecialiet on military affairs, and I won't
burden the Committee with my remarks on this subject. But I am
a specialist on international law and I would like to conclude
- testimony with a few remarks on its relations to our
pelitical-military problems with China.
By adopting a new attitude toward international law, the
14 United States could help significantly to reduce Sino-American
tensions.
6 Now, I bell ee our present attitude can be summarized as
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oae scholar, Bari Ravenal, did recently, by saying that this
nation behaves. according to the principle that we have a
peivileged puepoee that ee must impress upon the rest of the
world. Now, 1 think that has been obvious in our relations wit
China. And let me simply illustrate it by two recent examples.
Last week in
the New York Times it was reported that the
United States in order to facilitate the President's trip,
would discontinue flights over China by our manned SR-71 spy
planet end our =manned reeonaaissance drones. We would continle
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our satelliee reconnaissance because that did not take place
in Chiraa'sairspacebut above it, and therefore it was not
provocative. Now, ceetain Admi
that. we have ever flown SRe71's
overflown North Korea with them.
that we have flown our unmanned
eance-missions.
Now, on the
nistration sources have denied
over China, saying that we have;
But they concede, of course,
drones into China on reconnaleei
face of things this looks like a very enlighter
ed thing to have done. We suspended these overflights., and
ohould eliminate the possibility of another U-2 fiasco such
es we had in 1960 that cancelled the BisenhowereKhrushchev
conference. But what virtually no one see es to recognize is
thet this very announcement
years
the United State has
ir apace.
implicitly conceives that in formerj
been violating China's territorial I
No, this is contrary to the accepted rules of
international law.
This ie no news to Peking, of course. It has issued
elmoet BOO protests againet this and it ha e ehot down a number
of our drones. One eaa imegine the outrage ihateAmerlcan
leaders and American public opinion would feel if Chinese
military aircraft were repeatedly violating our airspace But
somehow it seems rights to Americans that the United .States
should be violeting the airspace systeuatieally of China, and
not merely China, North Vietnam, Worth Zorea, Cuba and other
Comunist states. We want them to abide by the rules of the
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interaational game that says invading airspace is out of line. I
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And yet we zacpect them to tolerate our failure to observe the
same rules.
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Similarly, we castigated China for refusing to observe the
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principles of non-intervention in the affairs of other states,
but we have sought to rationalize our intervention in Vietnam
because we weee combatting this kind of Chinese subversion, thi;..i
indirect aggreseion I mentioned earlier. And yet we tend to
ignore the evidence that enterprising journalists and scholars
uncover from time to time of the extent to which our own
government hen engaged in hostile activities of a covert
netuee -- not merely propaganda -- against the People's
Republic, as in Tibet, and in sponsoring Nationalist raids
eel/Lest the Chinece.
Last week the Waehington Post discoveredandreported that
the Urrited States has just ordered the CIA to stop sending into
China Lao tribesmee whom we have been using to infiltrate
into China for variety of purposes. Peeviouely, high
Administratioe officlals net only in public but in private have
denied that these raids have been going on since the NiXOn
Administration toe!; officio. They conceded they wpre going on
earlier. And ye e it has become very clear now that it is not
only Peking and Moscow that hav been fostering subversion in
behalf of the universalistic ideology.
Now our ideoloey is different from theire. I prefer it.
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3ut the question is, does that really justify us and not them i
in covert departure from the rules? Even if, as it appears,
the Chinese Communists regard international law as an instru-
ment of policy to be adopted and used when deisrable, but to he
ignored when necessary, we should4.'t overlook the extent to
which this attitude of their reflects their perception of how
we and others play their game.
I could go on at length, but I will simply tick off other
instances in which they see us as having manipulated inter-
national law to our interests,
I have mentioned our overnight change on the legal status
of Taiwan. One can go back to the United States for peace
resolution in 1950, where we Changed the role Of the General
AmGembly far beyond what was contemplated at the time the
tnited States Charter was passed. They regard, of course,
the label of aggression on them in Korea as being inappropriatel
We held up a truce in gorea for well over a year because of a I
new interpretation we grafted upon the 1.949 Geneva Convention
with respect to prisoars of war. We announced in 1954 that we
were wrong in 1950 in saying that there was no veto in the
Security Council on the question of China's representation.
I was glad, by the way, to see that Mr. Rogers appears to
be retreating from that position and saying that at least the
United States will assert a veto on China's representation in
the Security Council.
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in odditio?? to this manipulation of the rules, we
baea to he continulo,g, as I have indicated, covert violations.
My own college classmate, who has been in a Chinese prison
for nlost 20 years, was engaged in CIA air operations against
China, which we have denied.
And we have used meteorological balloons over China as an
excuse for getting reconnaissance information.
And we have used foreign fishermen and other means of
getting data inside Chinese territorial waters against their
will.
And the Chinese haven't ignored either how we play the gami
in international law, not only in Vletnam but also in the Bay
Pios -- but with respect to the overthrow of the Arbenz
regino in Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic in 1965 is a
beautiful case. The State Department legal adviser, Mr. Meekero
then aid, while it is true that one could argue from a mechani-:
cal, legalistic point of view that we may not have complied with
aU. the rules of interactional law, properly viewed one could
sea euo action in the Jcminican Uepublicas another chapter in
the croative development of international law. Well, that is
fine for domestic public opinion, but if you are looking at it
from tho point of vita/ of Peking and other capitals, it doesn't!
look very persuasive.
Sc) I an hoping, Mr. Chairman, that our new cessation of thci
houtile ground pwietration of China, our new cessation of the
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overflights into China's airspace, represent not merely some
tactical decision to facilitate and assure the President's
trip to China, but represrznt more than that, represent a new
policy of dealing with the Chinese, one that is based upon
respect, respect for China's territorial integrity, respect
the other forms of international law, and respect for the
principle of reciprocity. I think if we adopt such a policy
and combine it with a more realistic and less fearsome assessmeitt
of China's capabilities and intentions, we will be making a
substantial contribution to the relaxation of tensions in
China, to our own security and to the conservation of our own
human and material resources.
Senator Proxmire. Thank you very much, Mr. Cohan.
(Prepared statement follows:)
for'
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Senator Proxmire. Mr, Fairbank,
STATEMENT OT PROFESSOR JOHN K. FAIRBANK,
EAST ASIAN RESEARCH CENTER, HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Mr. Pairbank. Mr. Chairman, I agree with praceically
everything Mr. Cohen said.
I would like to look back a little bit and begin with the
point that President Nixon's visit to Peking is part of a
general trend toward greater contact with China. And this kind!
of contact cannot be handled by purely economic and
military means. It will require academic cultural, educationeil
and informational means on a much larger scale than heretofore.
Since these latter means are a great deal cheaper than the
ueual military and economic means, this trend can benefit the
American taxpayer'
Historiana look back at past cases to get a longer view
of our experience. In Chinese historical studied we try to
take account of the psychology of the Chinese people. In the
new and as yet neglected field of American-East Asian relationt,,
we study the values .0ad attit=det: of the peoples on both sides
of the Pacific ad how they interact.
The first point revealed by such studies is that the
Chinese attitudes and values are very different from those of I
the Americans. Their war aims and peace aims are both
different. We have recently found that the Vietnamese
peychology, values and attitudes'are different than we thought/
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and for this reason our firepower has not had the effect we
who used to be Confue.ans and Buddhists and are now claiming tel
be Conmunists, whereas we ourselves have not been any of those
I expected it to have
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in Vietnam. We have been
fighting people
things. How could we expect to understand their psychology?
I suggest that just us men is a creature of hit, so
nations are Creatures of history. One way to foresee their
future conduct is to look at how they have behaved in the past.
As we prepare to deal with China, what has been the Chinese
record, first of all, as a military power?
Histeriane have long since exploded the fiction that the
Chinese have always been a very pacifist people. Actually,
their history has as muds warfare in it as that Of most
countries. However, warfare in China has Occurred in A
diffeeent context and sometimes for different ends than we
might expect.
filled
have seldol
countrleb. In
and is so
an extremely
have been the
Take the simple question of expansion over surrounding
peoples. The Chinese record shows that once the Chinese
up their own subcontinent that they now occupy, they
gone abroad with expeditionary forces to foreign
fact, China stretches so far from north to south
self-sufficient economically that they have been
stay-at-home people, while the Western Europeans
expansive peoples.
We can understand this if we look back to China in the yew
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exploration, maritime trade colonialism and taking over the
world in the 19th century.
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1000 or in the time of Marco Polo in the 13th Century, when thei
Chineu Empire vas a commercial area with a great deal more
population and production ad a higher technology than medieval;
Europe.
Probably one reason the Chinese did not expand much beyond!
their frontiers was their self-sufficiency. in contrast, the :
European countrice on the small peninsulas of northwest Eurasia
Iwere relatively poo:. For example, they lacked products like
cotton and sugar, which they got from the Eastern Mediterranean
and warmer countries. The Europeans were have-nots with an
incentive to expand abroad and this led them into foreign
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In the last SOO years the Chinese have been concerned
primarily with their can affairs, as usual. Unfortunately for
them, in the period of the Renaissance and industrial revolu-
tions the Mines? fell behind the western countries. They are!
now trying to catch up, but they still have a long way to ger
and they are trying to oateh up in a rather different way than
we would eepect. They are not interested in a great foreign
trade and have nhown no signs of wanting to develop a worldwid
naval power. They claim they have plenty to do at home and
observers of their recent progress all agree that there is a
great deal to be done there.
Let me illustrate China's non-expansiveness with referencl.
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to Southeast Asia. By the first century A.D., the Chinese were,
in touch with Southeast Asia and could zee there were trading 1
possibilities in the area. It was quite easy to sail with the i
monsoon winds from tha coast of China to the Straits of Malacca
and back again with the seasons. The Chinese in South China anil
in North Vietnam -- where the unified Chinese Empire had begun
to rule in the second century B.C. -- had more than 1500 years
of opportunity to expand their trade and political power into
Southeast Asia, right down to 1500 A.D.
Indian and Arab traders were at first more active in this
region, but eventually Chinese also began to go to Malacca for
trade. But the Chinese government never followed up with
colonies or political control. In the 1300'a and 1400's, the
Chinee gOvernMent at Peking tent fleets to the south on the
0.?
established rouei of trade and they got sea* of the Southeast
?
Asian rulers to send tribute missions to Peking. These Chinese
fleets found overseas Chinese trading communities already
established in places like Malaya and Sumatra. ficwever, there
Wa3 no governmental e:tcmpt tc cztab1is11 colonial contra. The
Chinese fleets went back to China and did not come again after
1435.
IAlmost a century later the first Portugese got to Malacca 1
in 1511 and to China in 1514 and began the process by which
European colonialism took over Southeast Asia. the Portugese
were succeeded by the Dutch and the British and the French, and
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now in receet years the Americans have been active in that same,
area, all comiag half way around the world from a great
;
distance. Chena has remained close at hand all this time, bothl
in the 1500 years before the Europeans arrived and in the 400
years after that. Yet China has not even tried to establish
colonies in Southeact Asia.
This does not indicate that the Chinese are incapable or
1
stupid, but rather that they have different aims and a different:
govoramental tradition. Their military tradition is defensive
and throughout most of their history has been concerned with
In sr Asia, wheee the Russians now pose a menace to their
feentiere. Predeceasors of the Russians were, first, the Huns
ie tha period B.C. and then later, the various Mongol tribes,
leading up to the Mongol conquest of China in the 13th century.
This record of conquest of China from Inner Asia, which
was repeated by the Manchus in the 17th century, has led to a
Chinese strategic concentration on tho landward side of their
realm. Their concern for Russia today carries on this traditio,
Tho Great Wall eas built in the poeiod before Christ to mark
this frontier and help keep these foreigners out of China.
There was no menace from the ocean and no tradition of defense
by naval power.
All of this land-minded defensiveness has resulted in
China having a very weak naval tradition. This was not a resul
of technological backwardness. Far from. it. The Chieeee were
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the early inventors of the watertight bulkhead, the use of
transoms in naval architecture and also were the early inventort
of the axial or stern-post rudder. They were the first to use
the compass in navigation and developed a very efficient
lateen-sail rig. Nevertheless, all this did not go on to produce
a navy in the modern sense. The Chinese were simply not
concerned about nava/ expension overseas, nor did any naval
power menace them until recent times, when it was too late. it
is significant that the Mongols who invaded China by land also ,
tried twice to invade Japan by sea in the late 13th century,
but the Chinese never made the effort. Just as they have not
colonized under government auspices, io they have not had
striking forces going by sea against foreign powers.
What about the new missionary zeal of their Maoist revolu-
tion today? They claim today, as they used to do centuries
ago, that their systen is a model for other countries to
follow. How much missionary zeal and subversive proselytism arm
they going to put behind this idea? They have very little
tradition of the adventurous young man who goes abroad to conquir
the world and have a career in foreign parts.
China has produced very few missionaries. The rather few I
Chinese laborers, who in the 19th century contracted to work e3i1
foreign cuuntries? did so mainly in order to send remittances !
back home. China it, the center of the Chinese world and not a
place to go away from. We cannot judge them by ourselVeea. We
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have been reiaed on the idea of enpansionism, and Americans
today are gzeat travelers around the world. It seem fairly
normal foz. us to be-No a mIllion troops overseas and a million
tourists going to Europe. rn3 Chinese have no such tradition.
Sending even a few thousand people abroad is for China a great
new achievement.
In addition to their attitudss and values being different
from ouro, the Chinese capacities are strictly limited. Of
course, being such a big country, they can mobilize talent and
resources to build a euelear weapon, but I have seen no evidenct
that they are going into a production program of nuclear de-
vices in any way comparable to ourselves or the Soviets. Their
etaneard of living is still low and they have many prior
denande on their resources., The American public, if it has
30 million handguns and other firearms for hunting and sport,
may have as much firapoeer as the whole Chinese army today.
Eow shall we deal with this very different society and its
different ways? Surely the first thing to do is to find out
more about China, not a u mattar of intelligence or statistics
though these are useful, but as a matter of aims and attitudes,
lite style and basic values. In recent weeks the so-called
China experts in the United States have been deluged with
requests for background information and evaluations.
Speaking as one of these characters, I can say that both
el. questions and the answers in our publie discussion have
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lacked depth and background. Americans who know the difference
between a Catho3.ie and a Protestant cannot tell you the
difference between a Confucian and a Buddist. Even we so-called
China experts have an only superficial grasp of some elements. I
We are one-eyed men who currently play a role only because the I
1 public is practically blind.
Chinese studies in the United States are in their infancy
and have far to go to catch up with the studies of other
countries that we take as a matter of course. Many Americans
speak Prenchp German and Spanish but our military problems do
not now lie in that sector. Very few Americans can read or
steak Chinese or Japanese. We are very poorly quipped for
contact with those countries, and this lessensi, our chance of
avoiding mutual destruction.
What mechanisms can We set up to right the imbalance in
our approach to the Western Pacifie? It is easy to make a Asti
of needs. I have ne doubt these needs will be Met before the 1
decade is over, because it Will become apparent in no lot* time
that raeating these needs is goieg to maximize our chances of
survival in the nuclear age.
Need number one: Funds on the order of 6.0 million a year!
!or support of Chinese and Japanese and Vietnamese and Korean
libraries in the United States, not only at the Library of
Congress but also in the major university centers across the
country.
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Need numbar twoZ Say $10 million a year -- rising to a
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larger figure in later years -- for the support of advanced
training and research of undergraduates and graduate students
in Americaa education in the field of East Asian studies.
Universities have thus far depended upon the Ford and Rocke-
feller Foundations, the Carnegie Corporation and other private I
agencies for their start in East Asian studies. This taPk is
becoming too big for foundations, /t is a national need of thei
first importance.
Weed number three: Say $10 million for exchange arrange-
meats, for travel of American scholars to East Asia and of East!
Asian scholars to the United States, in other words an increasei
in the Fulbright and similar programs and a logical expansion
and development of their activitiea. The atm here is a give-
and-take between the American and East Asian peoples, helping
able individuals to go back and forth and understand each othert
better on a two-way street.
Federal government and state and private universitieS havel
Federal funds of $30 million or so a year can be handled througt
all sorts of channels which we already know haw to operate.
We know that the government is not obliged to dictate to the
hed a good deal of experience in doing these sorts of things.
educational world. The two can cooperate. But the national
need has to be rocognieed by the Congress before the talent
among our citizens can find adequate opportunities for training
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/ Our national need is to understand East Asia before it is too
2 late.
3 We all recognise, 1 am sure, that the most heavily armed
4 nations are likely to be the most completely destroyed whenever
5 we loae our grip on peace. The intellectual resources needed
for warfare are rather small compared to the intellectual
1 resources needed for avoiding warfare and maintaining peace.
Today we know enough to fight in East Asia. The question
1 is whether we kaow enough to save ourselves from further fight-
;0ing in the future. The Chinese are never going to threaten US
7 1 in this country. The preblem is how to stay in contact with
Eest Asia and still stay out of trouble with the East Asian
1
peoples on their home ground. For this the requirements are
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less military than diplcmatic, less material than psychologicer
intellectual.
conclude thnt we Americans are in deep trouble becatter I
as between our two great public institutions, the armed Servideb
and the educational system, our national priorities have been
unbalanced onto the military side. It is tis we redressed
the balance on the side of educatiOn, ideas and understanding.
Senator Proxmire. Thahk you, Dr. Fairbank.
Dr. Whiting,
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STATEMENT QF ALLEN E. WHITING, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL
IENCTE. AND ASSOCIATE, CENTER FOR CHINESE STUDIES,
UOIVEESITY OF MICHIGAN
Mr. Whiting. X, too, lik Professor Cohen, would like to
brief: my statement and have the full statement received for the:
racord.
senator Promire. The entire statement will appear in the
xecord,
mr. Whiting. Our military expenditures in Asia have
irrgeAly been in reopousa to a non-threat. Moreover, to some
extt they have actually provoked a latent Chinese military
41.,faava posture whidh in turn we use to justify further expiandi
t-4zzes.
in conjunction with the Chinese nationalists we have
sponsored
guorrilla
1 and supported a wide range of espionage, saboatage an
activities on the mainland. Those activities created
crises in tho Taiwan strait in 1954 and 1958, and furthered a
rzwelt in Tibet in 1959.
Covert operations heightened Chinese
alaro over Indiaa advancaL on the Tibetan frontier in 1962,
cniminating in the Sino,-Indian war that fall. These crises
triggered Chinese Communist military reactions which, in turn,
hava been used to justify a'vast expanae of U.S. military bases,
alliances and military assistance programs throughout Asia,
ostensibly to contain he threat of Chinese Communist aggreasionf
1
The Chimove Fationalists have, with the knowledge and
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support of the United States, carried out clandestine air,
sea and land operetione against mainland China and neighboring
areas for 20 years. From 195D to 1953, hostilities between
Chinese Communist anf.' United Nations forces in Korea may have
justified our support for these activities. However, our
Shadowy involvement with Mao's civil war enemy steadily grew
after the Korean War and the Geneva Conference of 1954. The
Pentagon Papers throw new light on the air operations in
particular.
According to a top secret memorandum from Brigadier
General Edward Lansdale to General Maxwell Taylor, President
Kennedy's chief military adviser* a Chinese kationalist
airline* Civil Air Transport --CAT-- ostensibly "engaged in
scheduled and non-scheduled air operations throughout the Par
East" was actually "a CIA proprietary." CAT furnished "air
logistical support under commercial cover to most CIA and other,
U.S. Government agencies requirements.
Down to 1961, according to General Landdale, CAT carried
out "nore than 200 owlrrlighto oil mainland China andTibet."
These were not reconnaissance but airdrops of supplies and
pc,asibly men for guerrilla warfare.
The 1959 Tibet revolt evoked specific accusations from
Peking of outside support, openly conceded by the Chinese
Nationalists on Taiwan. These claims and counterclaims, howeve
now gain fresh credibility. Ultimately Tibet was to become so
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posed by the Soviet Union's subversion in Sinkiang, by India's
209
eerious concenn in Peking by 1962, partly because of increased
overflights, as to spark a war between China and India.
To be cure, as border tension escalated, Indian air recon-
naissance missions undoubtedly expanded. However, the sensitiv-
ity of People's Daily in its heightened reactions to overflight
of Tibet suggests zin added dimension of concern consequent from
suspicion of American-Chinese Nationalist intentions which
earlier triggered a Taiwan Strait alarm in June. Peking's
fears linked an internal economic crisis with external threats
advances on the Tibetan border and by new invasion indicators
from Taiwan. The linkage between India's "forward policy" and
the Taiwan invasion threat was not were propaganda or paranoia.
It was rooted in tangible evidence of collusion between the
U..-Ching clandestine operations and Tibetan guerrillas.
Indian patrol advaaces in and of themselves posed more of a
politica/ challenge than a military threat; however, as seen
feon Peking in conoort with other hostile postures on China's
borders, they necoseitated halting. kailing that, they met a
firm rebuff.
U.S. activitiee involving Chinese nationalist facilities
or forces carry a latent threat to mainland security, whether
or not they are immediately aimed at part of China, such as
Tibet or the coastal provinces of Fukien and Chekiang. In this
regard, Taiwan's utilization and participation in the IndochinaI
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war had doubtleesly ben of particular interest to Peking. CAT
gradually gave way to a new competitor, China Air Lines -- CAL
formed in 1960. In 1961 CAL began charter operations in Laos;
the next year it moved into South Vietnam. Its contribution
came to encompass almost half the pilots and planes for Air
Vietnam, with significant contribution in pilots to Royal Air
Lao. In addition, it carried out "clandestine intelligence
operations" frankly characterized by CAL officials as more
dangerous missions."
Taiwan is also the headquarters for Air Asia, a subsidiary
of Air America, the latter notorious for its role in the CIA's
secret war in Laos.
facility in the Far
fighter maintenance
Air
East
Asia's admitted function is "the only
???????
excluding Japan
and overhaul contracts.'
????11.
with modern jet
Well over 600 combat aircraft ware serviced there in
Fiscal Years 1969. The interest interlock of China Air Lines,
Air Asia and Air America supports U.S. attacks in Laos, mounted
from bases in Thailand.
This places Peking's concara with this area in a different
perspective from that commonly held in Washington. With
Bangkok and Taipei supporting Vientiane s forces, at times
bombing up to or over the Chinese border, sensed security need
may explain much of Peking's expanding military presence in
road construction and antiaircraft activities in Northern Laos.
What is depicted elsewher as posing a threat to Thailand can
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also serve China as a buffer cone to protect against hostile
probes of Yunnan province.
Only a complete investigation of all Chinese Nationalist
4 activities in the area and clandestine U.S. support thereof can
fully clarify Chinese Communist motivations and objectives in
those portions of Burma, teas and Thailand adjoining the
People's Republic.
In sum, there is a credible case that overt and covert
U.S.-Chinese nationalist activities have aroused Chinese
Commenist security concerns resulting in heightened military
deployments toward and across China's borders. This actiVity,
in tern, haa been used to justify increased American and allied
military investment throughout Asia to guard against the so-
ca/led Chinese Communist aggreeeive threat.
Our moot provocative yosturee of course, exists on Taiwan,
where, only four years after the Korean War, we Wilt a major
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strategic bomber base capable of serving our B-52
s. Also at
that time we deployed to Taiwan nuclear-capable, 600 nautical
mile =Inge Matador mi.aaileo, the first in the Par East.
Again, in 1962, when foreign diplomats reliably reported
"vaeic in Peking," we moved the first U.S. combat air unit to
Taiwan. Today more than 1,000 American military personnel man
the $45 million base of Ching Chuan sang, supporting operations
in Vietnam. Meanwhile the Chiang regime has expanded other
airfields as potential strategic bomber facilities. In short,
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the past 13 years of our military activities on Taiwan have
brought a steady increase in the capability of that island to i
threaten mainland china.
1 liAsuming that our withdrawal from Vietnam removes the need
for Ching Chuan Kang and aasociated personnel, the remaining 1
1 American military presence also bears scrutiny. At least until
recently, we had more than 660 Air Force officers and enlisted
0 men there, unaffiliated with any specific base.
Another 190 U.S. military personnel comprised the Taiwan
/0 Defense Command, of whom 90 were identified in *communicational
11 and 50 in "intelligence.9 All these were, of dourse, separate
12 from the U.S. Military AeSiStance Advisory Group (!IAAG) which
numbered almost 500.
13
Although we have furnished more than $2.5 billion in
military aid 64er 20 years, as of fisdal year 1970 we still
15
authorize $25 million in MAP expenditures, supplemented by
1G
another $35.9 million in excess equipment deliveries. These
0 dalivories, unauthori un
zed, controlled and often unknown to the
Cougr so, promise to Taiwan a steat3y stream of cutrate Weapons
10
out
20 of the mammoth Vietnam stockpile. In fiscal year 1970 they
included a-squadron of F-104's, more than 30 C-119 transports,
21
SO medium tanks, thousands of M-14 rifles, a MIKE-Hercules
23 battalion and five destroyers.
tbviously, this is a sizable package for a military
1 establishment that already has almost 600,000 men-gnarding an
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island only 250 mil lona and less than 100 miles wide. Yet
this indivace military assistance has lain beyond Congressional
control, despite its implications for our relations with both
Peking and Taipei, not to mention mainlander Taiwanese
reletione ou tho island itself.
In this regazde assessment of our actual and perceived
involvement with the Chinese rationalists has been seriously
hampered by secrecy and censorship.
Now, however, we must see the problem in all its ramifica-
tions. So long as we provide concrete evidence to Taipei and
Peking alike that our military and intelligence interests are
tied to Taiwan and the nationalists both Chinese regimes will
draw negative conclusions concerning our expressed desire that
they settle the Taiwan problem peacefully and between them-
selves.
Moreover, in Peking those responsible for military con-
tingency planning will continue to allocate resources against
a U.S.-Chiang threat of subversion, if not of invasion.
In Taipei, demands will coetinue for increased military
aid to match mainland developments. And in Washington, the
military-intelligence complex will argue that helping our ally
helps ourselves through continued involvement with and support
to the Taiwan regime.
Last, but not least, important groups in Japan will press
for retaining Taiwan by any means, with or without Chiang,
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becaece of its straeeeic im ortance. This is the ultimate
danger az oaen from Peking. James Becton, direct from an
interview with Chou EL-lei, reports "on the highest authority
that officials here axe * * * furious because they think this
(U.N. formula) was reaehed as a result of pressure from both
Japan and Chiang Rai-chek."
The eminent New York Timea reporter continues, "At the nub
of the problem here, if one hears these top officials clearly,
Jaeanese economic power and military potential, and the
Taiwanese independmnee movement -- independent of both Chiang
Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung -- are this capital's nightmares."
It i5 no coincidence that the Chinese eoumenists as well a!
the Chinese Nationalists suspect that escape from Taiwan of
2rofesson Peng Ming-min in early 1970 waa a plot by U.S. or
Japanese intelligence, or both. Recently Chou En-lai in an
impracade ted interview pereonally attacked Professor Peng and
the Taieanoze Inde oe&ence Movement as instruments of a foreign
power, Nor are these auspicious ircredible. Our military and
intalligonce investmeet in Taiwan eonvincee all observers,
wheth r in Taipei Peking or Tokyo, that this is seen as an
important asset which must be retained by whatever means,
whather directly in U.S. hands or through allied control.
But the path to peace in the Pacific does not lie throUgh
.increasing Japan's ammaments, much less acquiescing in. Japanese
aspirations foe nucloar weapons as hinted by press badkgroUnder4
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dvr:.ng the cct vuit of Sec2:eary of Defense Laird. It lies
?
zn a coac'Eteel offo:ct with the Peop/e's Republic of China to
arrive at a.zmii control agreements and nuclear free on arrang.r
merits which can to the mutual escalation of military expendi- 1
turas. Only a convincing and credible reversal of our own
military-intelligence use
of Taiwan c2n lay the basis for
confidence necessary to mAke President Nixon's 'journey for
peace" a successful raality.
Senator Prormire. Thank you, Professor Whiting.
(Preparod statement Zollews;)
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s:czrenornil:e. Professor Whiting, as a former State 1
2 i Dapartment oici3. I should ask you
would like tht7i other witnesses to address it also.
A 1 Each of tha opening statements underline the question
this quilstion first, but
im,31icit in my own larlier remarks; Are we spending too much
5
g 1 or too little in military outlays in Asia? If we have been
+1 4 wrong the Many year in viewing China av an expansionist,
, e.'?(t.iressiv.a nation, if her real intent is to live peacefully
?,
within her borders, how can our enormous military expenditures
Mr. t:hiting. I think that the Korean War did cause our
of the threat to the West Pacific in an entir,ay
difmt fracuwork from that which had been entertained by
tho Ttu.Tian &drainivtratiozi. Prior to that war there was no
enUcipation of the North Korean invasion of South Korea as is
Cloar from the rceora, nor indeed was the Chinese willingness
tc.tak reai ricks E:nd sacrifices on behalf of its security
vnti'it,atod at tK.n :117Tler leTels of government down from
Novel,t,,: of 19;30. Ant in the hock o2 discovery that other
interests weLe taken that seriously, there was an
e..:avgeration of what lay nhead. The image of hoards of
Chiteve wt.pwer pot,ring into 7,,roa was a reality. Hoards did
c.x-Jio in, at a tr-mendous sacrifice. And it was then assumed
that si,oilar sittaticA19 might arise in the China peninsula and
"vistnam Wac autl that iLdced the Chi:?esc support and
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suhversiQn elcswhere would lead to an expansion of power beyond,
all reascnable fe,eano of containment and the mass retaliation
doctrine was annonced. .It required axtra-strategic forces
in that theatre separate from those of the Soviet Union. This
5 was never questioned because of the policy of McCarthyism and
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even challenge to that notion became tantamount to treason not
only in the goverment but cextainly in the academic community
of the United States.
T think that. it has taken time, and it has taken the
raFaDval of that inhibiticn against speaking out for us to
1
1
tt-focus our concL,rn to realize that there is not that military 1
1
k.:rezit to the Wilted States or the area coming out of China, 1
and that the situation in the Korean Peninsula is a function I
i
of Eorean actiolls and not Chinese actions. The capture of the 1
1 PU1173L0 and the rihoting down of our intelligence aircraft off
f., Kor.?a was nnt triggered from Peking; indeed, the Chinese
rezp.nso at the ::,iale was rather reluctantly supported by Pekin
Aor was the Vlatnalits:Jse war directed from Peking but obviously
and clearly from Hailoi.
If we then accept these past errors as a function of the
limited experience at the time, the domestic Politica of the
United States aad the trauma of the Korean War, I think we can
under tend how they have evolved and hopefully correct them
today and in the context --
1
;
Senator Proxmire. When you say correct them today, you 1
i
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mc:an are spIncling too much? Can you give us any notion of
how much too much? Eow much can we safely reduce our immense
commitrient over there?
Mr. Whiting. I would say our WILARIS-POSEIDON force in
the Qestern Pacific is so great in ts strategic deterrent
eer over the ne:e. &Dcade that we have virtually no need for
any etrategic bomber bases in that theatre, that instead of
increasing we could decrease to a minimum presence uutah to
rassuro those countries to whom we are allied that we are
indeed mumitted to those defense treaties we have signed; an
am speaking here priaarily of South Korea and Japan.
1
Senator Prolalliro, I indicated in my opening remarks that I
we exe spending
$16 billion in the Asian theatre, not counting'
th,a amount we are spe,Ilding in the Vietnam War, and I pointed
ut that this vras a vary large part ol! our total conventional
the $16 billion compared to the $19 billion that we,
are spentning in Lurepe.
Can you giv, us any notion of what this would mean in
, of savings of ouv owa resoilrces?
14r. Whiting. I am afraid( sir, am not a cost analytt,
and I would not maka any pretension to Vantifying in dollar
terms whet the ovings could be. I see no real utility for our
;0,000 or 40,000 men in South Korea, and that entire cost can
be eliminated without jeopardy to the credibility of our
commitment or to the 2,acurity of South Korea.
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see no rola for any of the bases
or
hope to keep alilm in Japan.
219
that we have maintained
can be closed
Certainly our entire establishment in Taiwan
forthwith, and should be.
The type of forQes that we have maintained in Clark in
the 'Philippines have been expanded because of the Vietnam War,
' and if the Vietnam iv, as the President promises, eliminated as
cost factor in ths very near future, than presumably that
force structure in the Philippines could also be collapsed.
0
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And I would suggest i..hat this kind of line item approach would
i give you a better figure than something I would grab out of the
Senator Proxmire. Dr. Pairbank?
Mr. Pairbank. I fdel this situation that Mr. Whiting
has just revealed about the American military activity under
the guise of Argerican aid is all of a piece with our Vietnam
problela. Sere wo have had a relationship with Taiwan. The
public has not realiAmd the extent to which we have used Taiw
for this ofte1?.
4nr,
W., have bean outraged in this
country in recent months with the idea that the civilian
administration did not keep the public informed as to Vital
62cizions of involvemat in war in Vietnam. We have or
should be equally outraged, if we have any of that sentiment
1 ft, about the way in which the military had their cap set
under the argument of secrecy of operations in the CIA, to
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conduct were whieh in turn produced responses as from the
People's Republic without the American public knowing about
This is a very enair situation for any people to be placed
They are coefronted with the feet that the Chinese for some
reason are extremely militant toward us. The Chinese seem to
be threatening us and claiming we should not do this or that
and not be aggrensive. And yet the American public lacks the
evidence to Understand why they seam to be aggressive. And the
inatitutional structure that we have is such that we are not
seeposed to know that thea secret military things are being
done. It is not possible to have your Secret operation known 1
1
to the public, and the regult is that we have been led, and theli
the period Hr. Whiting has been discussing and Out of ignoranc1r
ricee pbelic has been lad, into animosity toward China in
?
the. :1!iclt that we also have contributed to the animosity.
Neuf this is nt a baste on which we an survive. And to
put it very eimpIy, X don't think we are going to make it. We
have a military institution in this country that is too big to
be brought under public centrol, unless a Committee such as
yours, ait? can bring it to public information.
Senator Proxmire. One of your conclusions is that the
Chinese Vial toyer threaten this country. Now, of course, our
concern with the Chinese power goes far beyond this country.
We are ect civply looking at our own interests here -- meybe
we should but we are e t -- we are also concerned with our
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intores'cs in tlro; Pacific.
Would
you
221
extend that observation to say that the Chinese
will never threaten our interest as a Pacific power?
Mx. Faitbank. Any Chinese threat to us is part of the
3 balance of forcos. And the thing I have just mentioned is
r.
) that We don't know the balance of forces. We are using force
not knowing it with cur left hand secretly; and we are then
outraged when the other side, the Chinese, respond in some way.
'.1
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Now, we can build up a Chinese threat very easily. And we can
also get into having a
Ae..A?or
Senator Proumite. You say we build up a Chinese threat.
What I am getting at is, would you conclude that most of the
$16 that wta seem to be spending in the Pat East, in
addition to the $13 billion or so we are spending in Vietnam,
moat of that $16 billion Is unnecessary, it i built on our
own myth, our own misunderstanding, our own self-deception?
Mt. Faithank. I am personally of the vital,: that theSe who
arm are most likely to be destroyed. And I simply ft hot
believe that our armamcnt licy at present is a defense policy;
it is rathar like putting our finger in the door and waiting
for the door to close, or putting our necks on the block and
waiting for tho knife to fall. Insofar as we have built up
our military posture in the name of defense, we have collaboratbd
with the mi/itary people of other countries to do the same. 1
1
There is no end to this and the only out it to stop the defense
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effort.
Now, this .s a vaey simplistic approach. But I have not
seen anybody who has a better idea. Once you start talking
about countering the threat of others, you are off in the game
of the escalation
Senator Proxmire. Dr. Fairbank, many undoubtedly share
that view, but many do not. Supposing we do not share that.
View, supposing we think we have to be prepared to meet any reat
threat to the teeth, we have to be prepared to meet and over-
whelm any threat to this country. On the basis of your testi-
mony as an eXpert on Chine, and the teetiMony of Dr. Whiting,
and Or, Cohan this morning, I would aesuMe that you would still
argue that just from the standpoint of deployment of military
forces on the ausuuption you have to have them to meet Any real
threat cannot be justified in the Par East simply beoiaie China
doesn't ropeeeent 4 threat, they don't haVe the economy to
represent a threat, they don't have the force in being or the
potential force to de it, they don't have the havy, they don't
have the iniustry, they don't have the air force or the capa-
bility of building an air force, there just isn't anything
there that can really threaten this country, possibly in
Balthaa6t Asia, possibly in the Korean penineula, period.
The faeter that persuades me on this e- and I would like
to be disabused if / an wrong is that they are not even
threatening Quemoy and Matsu two or three miles offehere, let
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alone Formeoo, it alone the Philippines, let alone Hawaii or
any other 1)eee ia the Pacific. What really are we concerned
aLout? Why are wo deploying these billions and billions of
dollars worth of degee.as on the assumption -- again, I don't
-want you tr.) take any notion -that the best way to meet force is 1
for us to redues our :force, with the feeling that they may do
the same -- I am 'assuming that we have to recognize force and
!
meet it hard and headon. When it is not there we are just
throwing our money away.
Mr. Whiting. If I could intervene at this point, Mr.
1
Chaileaan, I would like to say that in the South Noreen situatiot
a great deal lei? this investment is directed not at Peking
primarily bet against the North itorean threat.
In this rceard I think it ie faaCinating that Premier
Chou EA-lai's interviews with Scotty Reston of the New York
Times ealt rather heavily on the Kotean 4ue3tion as another
one that he would like to see explored. I think that i itself!
a genuine concert to the Chinese, as it should be, that another
war in the Korean penentula would be fxightfa to contemplate,
that forces now in the area could escalate that far beyond the
last war, and perhaps lead to the introductien of nuclear
weapons. And yet wa have assumed that the only way to live with
the Korean situation is to increase the defense capabilities
of the south as the defense capabilities of the north increase,
which is a perpetual arms race gambling on the restteint of the!
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men in Pyongyang, Prcnnier Chou En-lai is not saying that we
shoul- withd-,aw, paniod. He in saving that there should be
nsgotiont to nnd the Korean War. He has gone back to the
1954 failure at Geneva. I think that it is futile to talk abou:
simply increasing Japanese ezpenditures and our investment in
the arsa to meet the C%inese threat. We should take up the
earlier Chinese proposu for nuclear agreements in the area and
nne 'chat /rind of convergent intoreat and shared costs might lie
in the joint sharing pn:ograms of that type, instead of unilater
ly 9amoing more meney nnd more weapons in on all of our allied
cnuatries to produce this defense credibility.
Hr. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, could I just comment on these
preblaxa?
tanntor Proxmire. Yes.
Mr. Cohen. I think, first of all, what Mr. Whting has
372at said about South Eorea and that the Chinese desire for
some .ort of settlement there, not merely the withdrawal of
U.S. forces, it corra?zt. It also appears to coincide: With the
wisaes of both Pyongy,14 and Seoul.
In recent weeks both sides made a statement that they weal
12,ka to begin talking to each other About the problem of
event al unification. And I think we should certainly do what
we can to encourage that. Now, Choi./ En-lai pants us to withdra
our troops not only from South Korea and vietnan but he wants u
to and any pressure for Japanese rearmament, and also to
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withdraw troops from Thailand aad the Philippines as well as
Taiwan, of ars. Mr. Rcuton seemed to indioetithat Chou -
was asking to mech in asking us to withdraw the troops from
the Philippines and Thailand. I don't frankly understand that I
myseaf because it seems to me as the Thais have made clear,
once the Vietnam oonflict is over our troops should not have
any real role in Thailand; Thailand would be better equipped,
'C think, without the preseace of American troops to handle its
1
own modern insurgency problems.
I think the instability of government in the Philippines
cone for not only a more vigorous Philippine governments more
eeeponsive to tho neses of that Society, but ago the withdrawal,.
of the stivelue that :American troops presence seems to
provide the leftist elemente for anti-American posture that in
turn weakens the government that entertains the troops.
don't eee the problem in gradually withdrawing, in
accordance with the 'Aeon Doctrine troops from Thailand arid
the Philippiaas as well as these other places.
think we have got to dietinguish very clearly Taiwan r
these othee places. The Chinese claim Taiwan is Chinese
territory. They do not Claim that the Philippines or Thailand
or Japan and gorea are Chinese territory. And we have to
distinguish Chinese aims and ambitions with respect to Taiwan
compared to the other places. It doesn't Mean that the Chine ,e
1
aro prepared to take over Taiwan by force. The evidence
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suggests that they nre hoping Taiwan will be reunified with
the mainland through 'Leans other than force.
The Chinese are tlot naive. They realize they have a very
grave problem on their northern border. It has just been
accentuated by the Soviet treaty with India. They understand
that action against Taiwan would leave them open on the northe
border as well as elsewhere; and they would also be creating,
kindling, you might say, the later Taiwanese independence
nationalism, one might call it -- if they sought to use forte
against Taiwan.
So even with respect to TaiWan, which they distinguinh
from these other areas, we don't see a great emphasis on the
use of force.
I would think we certainly could withdraw our troops from
South Korea. But I would say that Japan should also be
distinguished froal all these other areas.
Th.7. Chinese would like us to sever our security treaty
as well as withdraw troops from Japan. And they would really
like to see us liquidate our entire operation in Asia. I den t
think we can ignore what Chou himself conceded to be a contra-
diction in the Chinese policy. They want to see us Athdraw
from Asia but they also don't want to see Japan rearmed and
fill the gap that would be perceived to exist by the Withdrawal
of American power.
So we have the problem, the U.S. wants to Withdraw troops
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5 under the Nixon Doctrine. We d n't want to limit our commitmen
1
1 however. So hc are we going to make up for the existing force
i that presumtbly will help us implement these commitments?
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Senator Proxmire. L t ma interrupt to say, again and again,
being Chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the
Appropriations Committee, I have heard the Administration
witnesses argue that the Nixon Doctrine means that we will
withdraw our troops, we will replace our troops with foreign
troops equipped and funded by this country.
Mr. Cohen. Precisely. And that is what the Chinese
fear specifically in the Japanese case, that we are going to
try to have our cake ,Knd eat it too by withdrawing American. ,
troops, bnt increasing Japah's armed force as well as the armedl
forces of other countries. And this worries them even more 1
than the PL;sence of American forces. I would think we must
not vreudce our relations with Japan, we must Make Japan
continue to feel socue in Atia, and we must not encourage
Japan to go nuclear anmament and I would think that the Chinese
realistically, if they tee us not only withdraw from Vietnam
but also from the Philippines and Thailand and South Korea,
(
iand other places, will understand that it is in their interest
as cell as ours that VA not rock the boat in Japan, and that we 1
even -- although we cannot expect them to pay lip service to
this -- maintain our security arrangement with the Japanese.
would hope that az we implement the Nixon Doctrine as our new
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policy towax Peking, we will be moving in close coordination 1
with the Japanese who I think have been profoundly shaken by Min
Ninon 's overture tnward Peking and who want to go along and 1
=ordinate with un. I think we have to distinguish, therefore,
the Japanese situation from that of other countzies.
Mr. ?airk. I:1 I could amplify just one question about I
Taiwan
exab
it seems to me that it is of first importance that we
pull out American troops and cease these offensive activities.
On the other hand, it seems to me that we can easily get a
dwagon psychology or some kind of enthusiasm in this country!
1 I
1 :::aniz:wpdr:1:::hc::nag, add mis/ ad onrselvei into thinking
t c 1
easily Solved by a complete switch.
do et think things can be worked out that way. It takes a
1 i4 40 lot f time, - lot 04 work. Talk with Chou is just a beginning.
onsequently, 1 'bink that we have to kedp that defenSe
itn-zalt about Taiwan for some time to come.
I hope that the Taiwan government will cease to be a rival
of PokincF. 1 would hope that sometime they would have sense
encngh to say that they ace mily governing a part of China
antonomouslv, but not as a rival to Peking; they are not OlaiWi
all of China.
Senator Proxmire. You would say that it would binWide for
us to withdraw our troops and to follow the prescription that
the 11.6ministration seems to propose to increase out foreign
military asaiStaice, at least to Taiwan, and to continue it withi
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respect to South Mee a end other areas?
Mr. Fair:eank. I see no point in increasing military
assistance, unleea this is proved in the public discussions
whioh are brought before you. We need figures; we need
, comparative figures. And we need to know whether there is a
a 1 buildup going on, or just a maintenance of a situation. But
7 I in particular we nee C to have some assurance that we do not
0 I have offeneive activities emanating from Taiwan. If the
1 place can be no longer an offensive threat to the mainland,
3 i
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then the mainland can perhaps tolerate it, and will have to
tolerate it for a time. But we cannot expect the mainland
people to accept an offensive Taiwan still on their front door.
And I would argue thet it is possible to have a non-offensive
Teiwan situation with our defense commitment if it doesn t
leave these offeneive aspects to it. In other words, it is an
eleutent of stability in a traneition period for us to continue
or trea0:a. with Taknen to defend the island from attack providag
we make it plain, and carry it out in practice, that we are
not readying it for any ofEnneivo action or using it for such.
Mr. Whiting. Mr. Chairman, I would like to go further
than Profeseor Pairbank. I would advocate termination of all
military expenditures, direct and indirect, that support the
military establishment of the Republic of China while main-
taining our treaty Commitment. These expenditures are surplus
to any logical analysis of that ialandus needs agaixut any
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q
foreseeeEre tereat. We lei.ve eeent $2.5 billion and while I ,
,
,
,) p realize that your figure of $13 billion makes a saying of
if
o
,1 $50 millioa sound insignificant, to a mere taxpayer $50 millioni
3 i
A h. saved is $30 million that might be used in another way. And i
!--e
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5 1;
;
; if our direct and indirect expenditures approximate $50 million
HL
- II then I think that should be eliminated. There is no credible
11 1
, ll threat from the mainland offered by the testimony of such i
1
reknowned military analysts as Colonel William Whitson, now i
I
;
with Rand, and recently retired from the U.S. Army; of Morton I
I
Alpern, formerly with CIA and the National Security Council, i
10
- now with Drookines Institute; or any analysis of which I am 1
i
el), awere in the U.S. Government. If there is no threat, and if well
1
1 1
i havo a very large defense establishment there, why spend a i
3 ' i
I
dollar on it? Every dollar spent is going to be unnecessary, i
1
i
if not provocative nationalist posture, whether it is defensivei
,
I
;
or offensive.
1 Mr. Cohen. vre Chairman, I would like to endorse what M.
Whiting has said and simply emphasize not merely the sayings
in dollars and cents which you obvioUsly have been reoccupied
with, but I am sure you are also aware of the profoUndly hostil
eymbol system that our continuance of military aid to Taiwan,
to the Republic of China, really represents at a tine When
it is extremely important for our larger security intermit
we genuinely, not just for public relations, but genuinely
move toward a new era with Peking. And We cannot expect them tc
that
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entertain out initiatves toward the leadership of Peking if
we art going to continue any form of military assistance or
presence on islanc of Taiwan.
!.1
?
nator prox,ara. Yesterday and today we have had witnesses
s 1 on the Soviet Union. And they contended that one element in
c dissuading the Soviet Union from increasing their military
co:amitments was for us not to increase ours -to the extent
;;?
that wa increase ours they tend to match by corresponding
increase. Governor Farriman pointed out, for example, that it
was his und3rsta,dtnia that in 1964 or 1965 the Russians
; 1:!?lair.1)d that it was their understanding that we had reduced
our military budget, and that they had reduced theirs because
of that understanding. We didn't do that. We increased ours.
Of conrse, the Vietnam War was the principal reason. But we
increa d ouzo. Patd I think that was a very useful observation
Oil their part, because it indicated that in their view at least
I to the extent that we do not escalate, they agreed that that
Alld bring a corr,sponding deescalation on their part.
The reason 1 give you that background is because I wonder
if thee is a corresponding reaction on the part Of China. /
would. 'Ake to ask you, pr. Pairbank, as a clogs Student of
China's internal development, could you tell WI something about
way resources are allocated between civilian and military
sttort3 in that country? Can you &ascribe briefly how the
? de,c4i'.7iort-ranking process works and how i ififors from ours? Are
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ers 53
232 !
neee tensieue el-eilee to those in the Soviet Union as a result;
2 military, consm-er and industrial demands fox resources? Ana
, hee ere these tensions resolved?
4
;4r. Fairbanh. 'net is a very intexesting question. I
V
- oeeeee possibly give you the answer. I don't think anybody inl
!
thi,e r uutry knows. If anybody does, he certainly hasn't
P
7 ti eetetlished it. 1
ii
, Senator Proxmire. If you don't know, no one else does.
1
mr. Fairbank. One thirg ,youCansay about the Chinese
ei,teation is, the milLtary are under the control of the so-
calle-2 civil government. In other words, the civil governtent
iu eztremely Militant, and they call themselves revolutionaries.
tehen has been a commander of troops, Nao Tse-tung a
miP.tery strategist, 'They don't make the division between civil
Ireee m:!_litary that ee hew! got. So they don't have this situatici!
la that we have where we call in the military, who are given a
Ty i issioa to perform, and they tell us how they are going to do
it after they have done it, perhaps. On the contrary, the
chins e leadership dscides the military questions as well as the
,1 civil questions all in one bag. And that gives them a great
ee lachantage over us in any ways. They understand what is going
\on,and what their position is militariely an..3 otherwLse. We i
'3 11hae ,.1 problem, by giving the military their ialssion we then
advoeate that when they have won pee, or whatevar they have go
23 they come back ad report it.
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ii
sirs 54
1
, 1
I..
Chinese civilian leadrs really envision themselves as military
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233
Senator Pronmire The trotble we have with that, and I
think many people, is that I think they would say that the
k
peoplo in a senrm. That is the way many Americans look at it.
F 1
zi
r They reel that Mao, for example, and Chou, and so forth, are 1
1
primarily viewing tHeIr role as one of military revolutionariesi
t
and consequently when you say the civilians are in control, it
t
!
1
r
,
i
li
1
, 1 0,
,3 4
11
{
improving consumer 1.;ei.1 being as much as there is a group that
TO iv determinud fanatiAlv to achieve revolution.
Wow, I don't say that that view is correct, but I say that
.., is a very widespread view.
7 ? II
---, Now do 7ou meet that?
1 Mr. Fairbanh. FAist of all, there are people who are
1
11
I dedicated to a revolution at home, and they are stuck with the
d
I;
;
i oblem of Chita, which ia an enormous problem such as the worlil
? r: il has never dean before, so big, so many people, and how do you 1
; 1! intain a goveangtent Nobody has ever done that before. It 1
1 1
I
is a job that ;Eates aL..1 your time and attention. And this in
!f i
fact has he3d China back. Maintaining unity is slow work. We f
dosn't mean that there is an element that is interested in
2?
can be sure of one thing, that unity of China and the governMen;
of China and the situation in China comes first in their
considerations. They do not have a country which is oriented
toward the outside. They do not have a country which is
dependent upon foreign tratia. It has no lifelines abroad. It
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zix:;t 55h 234
. 1 does not depend on thic cz tha kind of commodity from abroad.
e H Thera is RD stale trade from vh!.: southern realm, for instance.
0 They are self-contexed; they always have been; they cover
enough lattitude north and south so that they don't need to
expand for eny of their goods.
G d
.:2
,3
C. '7
/
20
In this situaticn the Chinese leadership has to keep its
eye on the domestic scene. And foreign relations is the
framowork within which they try to carry on their revolution.
The fact that they have the idea of themselves as a model for
ether countries iJ an ancient Chinese tradition. They always
felt they were a model for nearby countries; and they felt the:
they were a model for Korea and Vletnam in the early days, and
evzli Japan. And they continue in that rather superior train
of thought, they are the center and model.
This dace not mean that they have been able to develop the
;1d of overseas &subversion or foreign aid abroad comparable
to the Russians or ourselves. They simply don't have the
resoerces, and they haven't put that much into it. The prosPect
f their doing so in the future is not very great.
Mr. Whiting. Mr. Chairman, could I answer your question
a bit?
In terms of the Chinese nuclear story, I think the developJ
ment of Chinese nuclear weapons is one of the most misperceived
i
and misunderstoed stories of this country. We threatened the
I Chinese with nuclear weapons in the Korean War in the spring of,
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235
1953. Presideet Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles sent nuclear
threats to Peking in February and May of that year, and forced
their acceptance of our terms. In 1970 we deployed, aas
indicated in my testimony, nuclear missiles that could fire 600
miles into Chinese territory from Taiwan. It was not until
Mao Tse-tag want to Noscow in Novembor of 1957 that he won
from the Russians any kind of nuclear weapons assistance
program. In 1958 we gave the Nationalists 8-inch howitzers
on the island of Quemoy and indicated that they could have
nuclear heads In them to wipe out the Chinese batteries on the
mninland. The Ri res2onded to the Chinese demand and for
years gave them important ingredients in what has subsequently
become an independent nuclear capability.
Weem we say, why would the Chinese go for nuclear weapons,
uhlle it may be the ticket of equality that Professor Cohen
hae eeforred to, but ie also has had an important atrategio
response to our utraece c threat. Former Secretary of State
rean Rusk said only a month ago: "/ cannot imagine a war with
China that would net be nuclear.? If the U.S. Leadership
LSSUMOS that nucloae weapons are an option against China, then
surely China is going to have to develop some nuclear deterrent.
capability at least against the bases in the Western Pacific
which they can hold hostage against a first strike from us. It
may be a crippled response, but it is the only response a self-
xesp cting governeent would take under the circumstances.
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cannot peetenf. to know whether there is a military-
2. aoitplex in Peking that argues with civilian
ecca
o
1'
236
;icanalysto as to how to allocate resources. Presumably
there is a consensus. We have very little to spend, says any
Chinese leadership, but the first need is for defense, I think
the remarke of both Mao Tse-tung to dgar Snow and Chou En-lai
to Jamea Reoton are honest assessment of the point I have
their resoueces and the case for nuclear weapons that they
would rather not have, but the necessity has been forced on thezil
by oue ectivitioe and to the extent that Secretary 4aied looks
to Jaean encourage the Japanese to spend more, and we provide
h offshore peocurom nt or backup fee any escalation of arme,
thee wifl not b any argument between civilian and and milita
23
24,
,,L that thn Chineza leadership will feel itself threatened
and it first prioeity will be for deferiSe needs.
Senator Proxvire. I take it that the consensus of this
panel is that the extent to which the Chinese commit their
resources to defense or to military purposes or to aggression,
potential aegreesion, is very much a function of what we do,
to the extent that we seem to threaten them by our activities
in Taiwan and the Vietnam War and elsewhere, they react by
increasing their military commitments. And it is very hard for
them to do it because they have an extremely limited economy
with enormous demand for feeding their people and clothing thei
people and housing their people, they have so many of them, and
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237
of coarse, this ecoaomy is one-twelfth as productive as ours,
aderatend.
would like to aek, though, Dr. Cohen, if you would agree
aith what aaoms to be the views of Mr. Fairbank and Mr. Whitingi
3 I although paleampa X have paraphrased it too much, that the military
j is many not a factor in the same way it is in this country.
7 we hoar a lot abeut the military on mainland China. Apparently
ir military establishment, however, occupies a somewhat
1
th
different role in the society than does the military in this
co try. Can you d scrit7e that role for us and can you say
whethar China is in any sons a a militaristic nation, is she
daminatod by military Values, do military requirements have the
hit priority, is her aconcmy determined by military needs,
that is, do the military get what they need first and then what
is le2t in nada available to the economy?
mt. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I want to emphaa
what I have said earlier and what others I think have said
here this morningc that China:3e policy is very often reactive
rather than active. We often think that they are taking the
anitiatives and we are always responding. But actually the way
they see it it is often the other way, but obviously there Jai al
dynamic process at work here.
Just a2 the Soviet Union cannot afford to be exclusively
23 II
cencernad with what we spend, but now has to look incteasingly
1 25 1 to its onern about what China is spending ant what ;Japan
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110 will be spending, I think we have got to understand that it is
dum
d net a bilateral world for the Chinese either, that they will
4.,
obviously take into account and to acme extent respond to
el! reductions in our own military expenditures, but they also have
r j to take into account that they zee not confronted by about
238
800,000 fully armed for defensive purposes So.4et troops plus
about 200,000 Mongolian troops on their border. And no matter
what we do, they would have to maintain or obtain enough
cepaeity to guaranteeaome modicum of security against that
threat, apart from any American threat
New, specifically with respect to your question, I would
agree with the other eitnesses that it is very difficult to haw
a ceaventional kind of separation between military in China
and political in China. Piret of all, the Chinese are at a mudt
less advanced degree of economic development than the United
States and the Soviet Union and therefore fenetional speeiali-
zation and departmentalization have reached a lesser degree of
attainment there. But they have ideologically committed to
prevent that kind ol! departmentalization and specialization.
Ti- whole debate they have had about whether to be a specialist
has downgraded the role of specialistseincding people who are
exclusively military specialists. As you know, their slogan
has been, politics commands. Although all of these people come
from a civil war background as military leaders, they are not
exclusively military leaders; indeed they properly perceive
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239
the failure of Chiang Kai-shek to govern China effectively and
to prevai3. in the civil war was largely due to the fact that hel
was exclusively a military leader. Chinese Communists have
been truly aware that if you are going to run a society you
e must deal with politics and they are aware that politics is thel
10
-
15
Arlp
!o
21
2.i
thing, and the militaey must be the tool of implementing what
your military goale are internally and externally. And I think
that is the predominant kind of focus that they have.
Now, withospect to their goals, I think strength at home
is slightly critical. Just at we have seen how we can be
debilitated and wtakened by Out Vietnam Witethey have no
illusiche that they must bring Up the standard of living of
the masses of Chinese people. And I think the reporters who
recently visited Chins from this country have Made this 'eery .
clear, that although for the elite in past Chiba there haS been
obviously some loss Of status and deprivation of Privileged .
position, that for the overwhelming masses Of people they have
done an incredibly good job in bringing up the level of the
standard of laving. And that cannot be ignored oven in the
world's most retaliatory internal syStem.,
New, as to their defense needs, I think there are prefeUnd
disagreements within the Chinese elite. That has been Clear,
it is becoming even clearer; and even the small group that hes
been running China in rodent years seems to be fractured. We
have just been reading now about Chen Po-ta, who is apparently I
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y o,e1.C30 :-1.13re rrly otr i c-,e Llavra state.
ana t77, L?c o look incxeasingly li%e the
24()
hz:ve very Eexious -- it is not to oay
thcy defense must con before anythiug,
?
ticin
ig you do it; do you defend China thigh 7
,
mizry mre kollcAng, say, the Soviat
-, .-, 44.4,'Fg-1i r=:.-1:e.,, 4.1.1-';'Dc,11 C^7,tilatVld 1,J .0., ,...?-1,-,,- ."--.7.J. .,,,,,,?.
_
-7,7 i(,:..'" "?A of vic--1---1 11 1
-*i,..:.!,:,.i,s2 Do v;,-,, a.,137,=,,,1:, a primarily desnsive pozture on the ,
,
_
.. ..
,
,
,
. - . . . t
,,,..ha t,.,,,,,,:-,,,,,,,...; c...-.,3vincT .0ana and tima to th,'L., lrvaae:;:, al.,
H him o34, in, ynn will eventually take him :7,1!:1? Do you
,
..?
:. Y',??'-'-?Z.','.r-14''' '7:S:.:,41 l''::::!il '..:1;:',1 ,aeAcd? fonwzrd strtegy7 7.-hse
.., A ,.., ?, .... _...... . ,
,
,
,
. i
..,--....--:?,f,,,,....;,:,....t t?...t.,......:z.c..,;-!?.:;?,?::....,?.....,;.,..,?-t-.1..: ..,,.j.l. L.-...il'....;k:: '17.1 r.....,- to :::,..17.:; cp.,10t7, 'LA C.31 of lv:!?,?-?,..' 17,172,,:',-.3-4.??,,,
Y1%. evnvrax..,?onco.
the Qh.inere elite has really been fracJtrxed.
then R2 a group that obviolt.31y has
6aZfencos of opirtion about questiontaboUt
" ?
we EZ.4.1 lloud have differencios of opinion. ;And 'within
vou have cl:fwzeAt kiiJs of allianc-s-s in ter04;.:Of the
little, L;urprisiagly-little, about4
HerL rt e at the top, and also how it funotiens
-
c rIt tW.L11 1oca.1
H
;1ator Prori., Both Brofegao2 Cohen and Profesor
'a.itir? haveabout the 1J in in the
voi36Y2ing, 17,2,:efioor Cohen, that the U.S.
? r
;
!! engaged covel:t in Eviyve.-.7n, in Tibet, and
H,
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,
;
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241
Chin csz ?ifespEse 'Lhat has basnlabe1 aggression
yee7Ts?
Pr,;.74fss,,,1:c Whiting's stritement provides more
'v own. But .7". would agree tJa what we
is to foster --I an. not say.Ing we axe alone W3
Lcd looel co.Jpar.7,.tion within the area
3.959 th..2! r,i_velt of the Nhamba trib
4
1,1",c c,7v,-,Irn-Leat of T_bet. Now, I must oay that
t vea-: k7z.rve klen rclTeatod ns stories,.
Hews Service; I believe
it La!,72:43? esmlbing in taetail, namizg names,
r
'11 wIlo were sending these Laos tribesman
,
,..3 SL.;.!.,., Cl. P.,:p.:a 4 ,,)fi: t?,y,:'1 'gvincipal people was named as someh,
?
1"..4
.. ti .
,
l,
ii telt.= 17; i,,11 the 1959 operation against Tibet. Now;
,
-
. ,
!
'Y-,..u.atoly with 3 high ,7,1dministratiOn officiels ,
J i
, ;i di,.Ao4a it aLe.1 zas'.2Alred ma the Central Intalligenco Agency
,r;,-.3, Alw.: w:,,s 271.t.) bn31,.. fcir this, these were aertainly reoortarct
,
1-1 Vi
,
.. .
..L;..f.d to nit LIvo,ud Laos with nothing to and were obligated
siluoly making thi3ss thir,4--s up
? ,
a yeaz ago;this was sln
1:.1.1cze.) cl:Loils from LOW; iUtC4 Chin& weroinot, Itappcniy,q,
r2Jf-Lurda1ly dsntial bani2; prbly.
uo 1.1.,z;1? hs I me!ntioned in my st!it(imsnts all
s..11.3j.:11 the citionz that w,,,3?...e .r.civer going o:ti :Aara been
And '1 titha3 vory? important, that they have
723 .
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242
aael I Lr forff'',L0 and hope it will be a continuing
1 ein't w.!,7 can afford to ignore what China
3Jre,7, pi1ic haG had concealed from it,
that
wo ongojinc: in a lot of hanky-panky; we have inter-
1
fcr,,fi with the Lffair,-.; of other countries. Just aswe wouldn't
t:,)n to ;qo it to un, t17,3y don't like to have it done to
:1.thi 4c' a reciprocal kind of interaction and
oiar now pel:!cy toward China will involve a ceasatioA
Q actri. think they may, percoiving a
also out a diminution of their efforts,
haven't groat by and large, to subvert their
jit:-x)rs
Sc,natar 1-.?reocAre. Professor Whiting, you have spoken
covext ,---Jtivities aimed at mainland China. You
'
,i
,
*?I'l Ila,- 9 o! -;z.4z17.- ::,tatement that "there is a credible case
;
tj '',"q:11' n,,sr:.; and,,:ovzr:: U.S .-Chinese NationEklist activities have
Clrina;!Je Cc,..LItnist security concerns, resulting in
hAOtz).:1c,2 military: 6sployments toward and across China's
11
.'
t , To alLke o11,0! ln accv4-3ation stick you need more than just &
1,
h ible case, i'k: s2,7,:zo to me. What you are saying is that we ,
k` 4
i
n .
17, i01y on7,/^keii the Chinese into enlarging their ,
;
1
military capa:oilities and that we have then used those enlargedi
'
1
-
.;
i;` capabiliti ,!is :,in ,,sxclase for incraasing our own military
,- i
.9nvo, end ,2ilitry ,,,z,Astance activities in that part of i
1
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,
I
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J:k:s 6i1
i3 the proof for this accusation?
243
Kr. 1.ting? d:U-1 act say that ue did this iatentionally
iTlouse 2r:aF;poace, which wa would then upe to justify
cr
.1 ,t 4,1,:tad:Ltuzco,,I nplaining a ceazsal relationship, not
ti
? k a nAatinship wuz effective by U.S. design. We have
arouzed thia. But I did not zay that we intended those respont*.
u
? Til:et or azUsting revolt in Tibot
think that any of the persons involved anticipated, for,
atno-:mlian war. No do I think that those persons
' tnat i-tvolvad f%n the cov6rt operations from the offshore
1
inlieved that they would trigger the crises of 1962.
Yes. But you seem to imply that by ,
-,
,
41 ?
......'
6 l,.q tho3a ieti3n:?; ,;:e certainly should have recognized that .
,
, thi), aJill-A rc-1.7..)e.1% An ..,7(Le Chinese increasing their military
,
1 and ITalitany reaction.
Whitinc. art ae you realize, the government of the
Un1t2S. lar; the left hand and the right hand
not what c.:Jah other is doing. The operations taken
?
t.11 ortainiy net cl:anked into the
estimate cf the Department of Defense when we look at
what th Chinese develop in airfields, air capacity and
2. 1li tryresponse, and than project that through time five yearel
ti hence, and then aay, we must have this kind. cd capability in
thz ayicsa.
;
25 1 SenaV= PrcYfildro, They certainly ought to look at it.
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hi
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,
0,
244
ceLq-,aialv zhould. Were it not for the
t f1..72.ree to go into it. But
L.of "7,igadier General Lansdale documents
, corad hava gone much further than I
? .4
Pr,7aL I fien't want to suggest a .7.,.:mspiratoriat
3
on their K;,ert, bocause I don't believe in cr..aspiracy. I
wa have 17:ne people in the Pentagon and they are well
A;',.71.vA7,to.d, and thy doing :her 'acJst for their country,
- a vny to,,:J.gh, difficult job. But it seems to te by
t,1cj iiean?Jrioteimsidcring the consequences of their.
-
I by thr.. Pentagon I m,c,an the CIA, too
pu?',', it i the budget of the Pentagon they seem
c?m'cing a situlttion whet-3 it is inevitable that the
""It7 Yould thcjreact militarily,. and so they
n7 e need a greater defense establishment,
t?o ntc2ur resources frau domestic areas into military
I!
aeas.
_ Mr. tti?h esZ:ablichment of the strategic busineSs
?:;) 4i
?
In 1957, for ;nstc,rves; he never been examined in the context
the Chise uze of their own air force in 1958. This actioni
-)
:foaction syndrene 1..arely is linked together in the kinds of
....
ci
.'.3.,efense deployment that w have made over the last 15 years in
-,
Wostcyn
:TA
aithEP-. bcen oxcusc'd zu3 exaggerated suspicions and unfounded
And when the Chinese have moved it has
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,91,awAs, or a 3.4.2n that cenly aqgressive ane initto
245
Mr. wc4i..1.4. (..!ould afid, 14r. CMirpt,m, it seeTs to me
thi3 dynaiism which on military do their jobs, their very
;z*st anC as you say, thoy are not conspirators, they are
patriots -- aad then othor parts of the government.do their
jO3 th& vsmy bost
but oparattng on a pluralistic basis
this is the re0, C0,4: of our dyilamic expansion we have
f.nen ao nany -liZferent elements that az doing their jobs rd
.andIv.g? hasiness eni missionarieE, and everybody
and y.,zeL-...,Isors, And as this e:Tansion goes alcag, it
the ClinE:so with a .k.ulti-headed sort of hydra, in
vhien arst there iu this hind of expansion and then that kind;:;
it is ocntrol; e do not expand under control in
this ccx.ntY.-y. And 01,i3 cE the things that we may find in the case
,.
,1 uZ Cl.tina in a littlu. hit of ho oe in their system. They do have:,
-
,
14 a .c.,,er dasz'c'2, of cntrol, because they do not wish for
..; i..
-.
0 g
0 a pluralistic to oE operation either. Their business 1
'-
P activity is under a degree of control in foreign 'trade. And
?
P
0'
,1
1,
::',) li
.., 1.
.,i
;.,
.:. . i
0
i
)1
Senator Proy.a-Are. Let ma ask you to convent, Dr. Fairbank
on a very interesting observation with rIspept to ChinaTs
agrimatural problem.
that.
YOu have uiven us tIm picture of a self-contained country
is celf-sufficieat that sually hab locked inward during
"
11 most* of its h1etory, .and to continue to if
-4 0
i
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t
c.,.:,sr,tml:!ohm.c,,It from wr,'.%hout. That picture
ar%:i.cle in Lusiness Weak, / think,
ahi very p.,-1%-otlir, and very intoresting, soid this:
Ahezdi however, economists see some
.for China. It is hard to see how an
r, C".%.f r..?1,1 3n agricultural output can 14-,E.t sustained
Ch31,ese yeilds already ar not much
Yi
.hc'-.;s7;. in J,1::;,):z.L in the next decade or so the Chinese
to I .serious food bind again. In the past
f
s.Adnaumption has risen from 2 million tons 1
;
r:i1M.G2 In Zhe ne%t derpde it will have to i
* 50 wia.1.1 CO tons a veer fas- output to kespl
5
, it
N07,U11 (51,(7,Qth6
t+
Dzpartent estimates that even if
. _
H ,\-,,cklologv could b*, brought- up to, and keep
, Hp. th:;.t of th2 U.0.0 which is utnlikely -- the:best it
ovwr tkvr) 50 years would ka to miltiply farm outpu4
5 ?tT0c. Tito 7.),72,. Csnsus Bureau estimatesthatdUring
H
prIrio6 pogulaUc.-1. will triple.."
ti s ciives then a very favorable assumpt On, bepAase
-)
g
rlortainly ant going to be able to meet oet:standard.
-
tw, r3c car aherltd of the Soviet Union and China ii our
outp-et.
,
'2tose grin statistics pose the danger that China will
' iouner under the wo.ight of population. To date.?-Poking!s
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Gn pcTulatit'o. 31t3 been eramtic. :Lt first
130.hed a f,?,i1v-p1aaulng program in 1956. That
tO -0T:;711 LeLp Fcruard. zavived ir
1 1L.62, oRly ts elown FA.ga:"Il during the Cultural Ravolutien."
'Under the:-Aza oa-cumstElnce. China is certain to remain
intano and mounting social and political strain.
Stble growth .ppear to L,A,a difficult to maintain. Some
Q.2T.6,Ltzi, in fact, think that China mut change so fast to
sl..1Kviv that .--?A.t :x.17Alal.to remain in a permanent revolutionary.
corAltione contolli2AtIc for long oaly by fanatics."
Nr. Tht is a great dope story, and always
the lavel la:Lca so3I.1,o7 debating, where they take a
? ? ?
; vhiQh ravs a p-:?.ulation will triple, and then quote it as a
at
statistic '
H
Let's forget about tha population
?
triOing; let's for;et about aay likelihood t*.lat they can
-
.7',T,cIeusa their L,,:::;rienitur&I output e47.
m,,ch as it projects
,111),, ;T:It p7L'. It a simpler way.
g
n:.; it 1.21o.s.sLA:LA2 i.d..zoblvm of E.roO,ucing enough food
fox their inore,FoIng 1..or..n1ation would put them into a position
') k
; whare the?q might 17.3 able to do it, and therefore their previous
17.1?3tory o2 internal coacern might turn to looking outward, and
,
it; ii
? ,1
?
supple.s$
?
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mnay c!c'Intries have done in the past when they need
kb4o, ma 1E1 to engacre in military aggression to get !
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, Farbank.
248
Ib a poi-ate here. The first
nat the havci a very serious food supply
pzoblem, anTK
a ;?1,F,tion. inomase which is formidable -- while
rato may not ry high, it is
such a big be, you get
0 million e-M;y-t a year, or something like that. The point is
they tolo shown or,0ereh1s capacity fo;: reducing the population
1110-2-oaL..2, ratc3r1, r_h,y have now a progrcm that jdoan had of free:
G-Lo-:tion clinc;; &1-1f. latex a9a of marriage is being encouxaged;
a,,ast -.7id of the idea that you have to have :
for .:r..,.ztx:Ity. tiais jfi the first thing that Till Durdelli
adW.,.;h-ic going in corresp,ndents have reported. They have
und connida:en7:je evideoe by talking at random -- and this
tTcacn't s(7.,m to be a line that they are being fed -- that
payttF4 Aler don't need large families as they used
to for old becirraze they do
svete:.u.
T.;,`?
m.c&ect: of
have
a social welfare
P
course, but it will remove the
la-tataltivo for 1-z.vy population production.
A socsna io that even with the best effort to reduce'
la.og-s-o7,1, ,..1? the fool: supply, they are
going to have a i>augh tri. And wh2ther they Are going to rake
is indeod a TIcsUon.
Ulti,IA we loot at this from the historical perspec-
I would suggest that those countries that have tried to
cx:Land for avA sz.pplv have soldom solved their population
lalm. You
your extra people. You have to.
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th to You. c--..ulf5n.'t begin to export 20
pe?lo -a of f,;Lonrse. AS you develop at home you
n,ty ant, te,t; aroad, L1.3?,; th3 implicatiaa that you have
to er2anariiliti1v;t:t a non ::euitur. It is an idea that
havehncL 7!''e Japanese, for example, ahen they had 70
2r...1t that they we: stranded and had to expandL
hey ICU i.i1ion at hz.,e, and they are expasIding
%ey bo.t rf-t militarily.
think T undou!atedly went too far in tie.
fk.tur-.:1 on th;s. (;/n on.ly Limit ourselve,; -- it seems to me 1
snly progreas that is helpful and useful--
. Zenator if I limit my questioning?to the
I WC o ruch to /earn in this area, so
10 or 15 or 20 yaars ahead, let's confinc:
?:-11c-; inlr..ediate future.
1.4%, M076 jAZO thi:3.
f:
hc,vE ?,????. co swiftly in Asia in the past few weeks A
=C. in the ntzat dcyo ?,:hat it is hardly possible to keep up ,
;
thcm. if onys' clear up some of tho confusion
a is vac.
11
' )
CI First, what is the significance of the recent discussion
;)etwoen Wushingtoa and Peking and of President Nixon's
' -
p
3 cnnouucod intentions to visit China next year? This is a very
!:
!..):road quqlstion czo parhaps we c:an restrict the response to the
signiaance in terms cq uar ralations with China.
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us really easing after all these
v,7,,rore Do r.w. Eao repwed trade and if so, how large
1=7.a
don't think the trade is going to grow
.Traativ.
al-cd tda with us if they can possibly avoid it.
-H ".r both rIre convinced that they need contact
- c:a,,Jh other; and it i;i; mainly because we see ourselves
the Chinese will remain diversified in
a !nulti-wer world. Th ,o two superpower confron-
I 3 passed; it is now multi-power.
Thr::4444
tl-fat is a factor, and Europe is
'
1
a :?.7.?lot.ol:. An-3. China wants to oome into the
, .:17c-power sitntion. An,q Is possible i
,-0.w.cg,ntration of power and not a super-
2Z1W countries fuzz*.
nAatOr :PrOA1:: You wanted to comnent?
'0: wanted to respond to your last, three question's,
Malrm,Ing didn't want to interrupt you.
1
;
4
4aw you -4ceeping notes.
Mr. Cohen. elft3: dealing briefly with this last question,
I? would agree with Professor Fairbank, our immediate?interest
tz'adc will be the: small. And thdre has been a?study
1 pthlishqd by the Vational Committecl on U.S.-China Relations that
tries to go into t.LA. in great detail. The Chinese have said,
Cz cos, that Ilyje therc is a noraielization of relations
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7:),ctvcm the U, S, Einl China thare wili ble no direct trade
tween. the tWO C7:17i0E1 One d.esn't know whether they will
'Icatinue -- I hryoe th:71a7 won't to adhere to that line, becaus4
?
4, T think that 0,irst trade will enhance businessmen's contacts-
and interest Lh 4,'thina and will have
"
evolution o': China
.
H
is nsw
an enliFihtened result on.
policy. Bt certainly indirect
at a very modest level, and will continue
with the help oZ the Pef,ministration's welcome change in China
-
ti gencla:a:Ay the Chinesf3, if one can credit Mt.
!!!
v.ntenoiva il.ltsrview published veoterday in the Times
"
k,ALO tahlavfairly mature, relaxed posture
a
here, recogniP;ing that we cannot change overnight, bUt indicat-i
that their F.laj goals will be ones that they will Continue
want to atAnp and that we have been in the wrong. by and
V ie aad we cioillg to haw, to do some changing. 1: think
-
t;
tzt it s laq to hz;t est lesson to make the American
4
awa.ce o?Z,
, -
1,loaso there is a good deal of need for chang6
- i
w.,,licg, :-.!-.1;.. v,-,f, .:.,:XiiZi C.21.Ct 1]:.r;) 1.4-ti aluoh more forthcoming than
) i
)
:1
;
'01,1x1e2s the i...,..:I.Gtration!is yet aware. ,
;
.. i
,
,
Viola, I won: 'ii:!. that we also have a vary high priority
,
i
'
i.a tn1hi,1 with them abvat nuclear weapons. And 1
.)
i _f:tc:., thwe g,o-Z; -i: 'Le reopmeive to their recent suggestionsd
,
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raEr
l&; but tocoine international concerns that
_
mi previously mentioned reference to
a--,Wax6
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wd hnsylA to diazz thiF problem of how do you control
:Juclear "A. 'rimy cleim they don't want to be involved in
4
4
a discussio wi::t 041y the nuclear powers. Obviously a
discuasion mat3n3 12:1 or 330 odd states, many of which might be
minuscule, might not !At the best forum to begin a discussion
of nu:clear contols. But we ought to be generous, I think, in
caming back with a ccunteroffer. Wo are trying to make the
1,)s- of soirs ialtiol discussion, but we have a very high
priority interest in this subject.
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Senatr Promairao
253
Before you leave that, how about
Cin, z capabilitar;
nuclear power?
lr. Cohen,
when will she become a full fledgoi.
Well, in the Soviet sense, I don't think we'
can anticipate when China
will begin to be anything like a full
anticipating, as my stateme0:
fledged nuclear power. aat we are
? I states, that as the 1970s unfold, China will eventually be
1 ,
1
9 1
'9 1
11
VI 11
i7,3 control
1
i GAO.
daploying ICII:is. And even though this may be a relatively
small capability, it is going to pose increasing concern to
US.
But there
Chine
4".
47.
03,"3
24
25
are many other reason, of course, for Wanting
cooperation,
And I think just the environmental
problem alone is a more long run but equally pressing
Senator Pre=ird.
You have referred to a no first use
pledge, and Dr. Whiting has rcderred, I think, to nuclear
1.17es 3ones. How can we do this with the Chinese?
We worked out very careeully our agraement With the
Soviet Union on the teat ban. And that if CCUITIO is subject
to inspection, and to determination on a unilateral basis.
Wa don't have to wurry about anything like that. But a no first
u-Je pledge, what would it really mean? How can it be enforced
Mr. Cohen. It All be pledged by each of the nuclear
powers that it will never be the force to usa nuclear weapons
wider any ciremstances. To them obvious ll- it has advantages.
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They have not raacliec our e_egreo of attainment of vuclear capal-
bi/ity. May aoula like to feel secure against? particularli
not from th US ow I shocld point out, but from the Soviet
Union -- a first strike that wouA demolish, for example,
mnny of th..Ar own ntIclear installations in northwest China.
It woald mean that ac matter what the threat, no side would us
tr.'Iclear weapons, that war would be conducted at: a conventional!
level.
Senator Proxmire. With the -- what is the quid pro quo,
w'lat does the ti5 ?out of it.
Cohen. Well the question would be, firat of all,
ue covad link any number of things that we are interested in
to what the? Chinese ere obviously interested in
Senator P,:(7.:ti.M!ul:G. Such as
DnoOen., one, for exatple, we could auk for a
reduction in conventional Chinese forces, Since we wodld see
that: we %mad be at a disalvantage if we gave Up our nuclear
strungth while we are puiline. our conventional forces out of
Asia.
???? ADO
And if we continue to be codserned about Chinese border
Senator Pr mire. 116v; do we enforce thatt
It. Cohen. There would be, for example, some opportunity
t would AS5UMC, if not directly, by US obsorvation to verify
the anocation of Chinese expenditure, perhaps through othea.
visitors, thrcuh ca:o'langes of information, and vie also tioula
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1
installatic,ns o.i! a wilitary nature through our satellites
have, of GoOrse, continuing observation of Lew Chinese
thlth are g)Ing; above Chinese air space. And we have a whole
panoply of intelligenoe gathering methods apart from any forma
method we might be able to agree with the Chinese on in terms
of inapootion and control of any agreement.
So I don't think we can despair of our ability to judge
s-,nat they are making gross changes according to their preScip ,on
in 3:d,e7: to bring abwt some forms .P arms control and disarm-
ament. I think what you say --
Senator Proxmire. Do you think that that might be a part
of tho Tn bringing greater stability in general to
Far E;a,5t.
Mr. Coholt. think it would be very welcOme.
Senator inor.mird. If they reduced their forCes: presumab
that would help us with the Japanese?
r. , - 1
Cohen. Ono would think AO. And certainly the JaPene d,
not being nuclear: and very Vulnerable beCaUse of their cOnfi ,ed
space on the island, would cirthally welCome seeing China boun
to e first no use ploage with respect to nuclear weaPon$L
So I think there is a lot td be talked about and negotiated he-e.
And I think we ought to respond in a serious way On that ghest
New, With respect to the other problems, I don't think
we should let the record stand as it now does to togOst that
becauze none of us believes in a conspiratorial theory that al
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256
wa have is a vision of the US cr(?vtirnment rannihg a foreign
policy through 1%Illtj2le arms w!th no checking or coordination
at the '..op that wcw:e. help to rez;train parAcp covert actions
by 030?op that -aight be inconsistc-nt with innocent actions
or estimates by another group.
If th Pentaqoz ratpors tell us anything, they make it
clear that although often this kind of uncontrolled hydra image
may represent in cne portion reality, that We shouldn't be 1
naiva, that they also show that on other'coCations there has
bean Conscious progranming and solleulinl of covert operations
and link,i.ng them to the public aspects of 4Ur operations at
the very highest levels of government. tbat id What the theani
cif all the Bundy and McNamara and MoNaUghton and Other thethorinla
Ut I is. ;
15' / They talk ,alout doing these things ih foreign bperations
A
T6 and blending ti d into e2t schedule full of ?ropaganda, Covert
i
i7 11 and overt oParations. This is really the ,ay international
!a il operations hava bean planned. I think there is more policy
11
10 li control and sophistication and direction uiing Covert ats well
20 I as other meand than we perhaps care to realize. Zut that
21
2,2
23
24
2:3
(seems to me to be the lecson of the Pontagn papers.
senator Proxmire. Would you tie that in with the specie
luestion which wa, related to the situation in Tibet, that we
deliberately ated to provoke the situation, in Tibet against
t.ha Pao2l3s Rnpablic that they in turn iicuid increase their
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milital:y forc2, so that wo in turn could then say, look, they
increas:&I t.hal.r military force, we have got to increase
ours, and therefore i:^ne Pentagon gets a bigs:er piece of the 1
pia, would you go that far.
I
M. Cohen. That goes to motivation and intent, and as I
Mr. Whitinc acid, different decision makers and people who fee4
iyata --
Senator ProXmire. Then you go back to the difficulty of
pluralism rather than the conspiratorial theory.
Mr. Cohen. Certainly pluralistic intent. X don't
?
think that there asIon't Some people who don't have that intent
otle ansuma that the cOaapiratory always conspires
for unpatriotic raaols.
Senator Prox..lire. No, we had at specific question,
WTA this related to to Peatai?on's effort to get biggiur
military aopropriatiols, is this the reason they did th1.4.
mr. Cohen. We will have to atlait 4 Mort vigerouS
Congressional inquiry into that incident than we haw have.
Senator 'Proxmire. At any rate, you wouldn't dismiss
that?
mr. Cohen, X wouldn't dismisa it. I doknelli from Other
operations that we conducted against China that peeple at
a higher level have been alerted that wc are conducting covert
operations against China, they have explicitly lied in public
about it, and sme a these op3rations have been revealed. Th ,t
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w.:31.1dnit shock me t 11 if that happened to be the case. Andl
what was the Iiay of Pigs .if not a covert operation that was 1
okayed and approved at the highest level? Wd know this
goes oi
al/ the time.
Senator Proxmit:). I certainly don't argUe, anybody in th
panel or anybody who has studied our history would not say
that %N) don't engage in covert operations. That is what the
CIA is all about, as X understand it. And many people feel
that we have to, including this Senator, we have to engage
in co4rert operations often. What I am saying, howaver, is tha
motivation is very import.ent. Wa eugave in covert operations
in crder for tha fienl:agon to get a bigger appropriation, and
they create a situation where the country tiiirespend by.
increasing its military ferce so that we in turn will have
to givf thcm more of cUr restUrces. X think that is quite
different than a covert oration tO achieVe:00ms kind Of more
. .
specific and direct purpose, Which I 44 Or iliaY not aripport.
Mr. Cohen. Let me go on to the last point, Mr. Chairman.
It seemed to me :Orofessor Pairbank was quite acCurate in dePic in
the measurcs the ChiAese have taken to get birth contrbi wider
control, if yo. will. T think we should realize that because
Chia 's intQrael oysten, now reinforced by the cultural
revolution, that China car impletvemt whatever Measures it de
appropriate much more effectiVely and rapidly than, oak, xndia
5
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D 1
li problem. And the airte.ocz do appear to ba looking some progress'
1
2 1 in in2luancing peo.eo judgments about the variety of ways
I
i
o 1
o II that should be used to get birth control.
1
I
Also I think Chinese agriculture seems to be on the road
to improvement again after a period of difficulty. Some of
our reporters in China seem to be a little euphoric about
it. They talk abont China being the only communistic country
a to have licked the agriculture problem. That may be a little
too strong, even if it is cast in relative communist state
TO comparisons. SUL,. 1 think progress is being made.
?1 tut I think ons of the mo%ivations of a leng run nat4re
that china may have tor voning in to the Itoited Nations, for
1,3 cooperating in other wayo in ocoromic Matters, is that China
nts to improve itz fertilizer, China wants to improve ite
rice, and I think China may oven need capital and technical
aid, although initiclly it mi4:47ht seem unattraftive.
i7 t In 1950 one of out leading economists on China affairs,
T, at that point, when I asked, is the Chinese pattern of SO perc ni
%re with the Soviet bloc and only 20 percent with tht rest
of the world like.7.y to change, assured me that it Would only
2? change to increasingly within the Soviet bloc. And yet when
000n within 10 years how it has absolutely reversed, and now
it is SO oercent with the non-communist world and 20 percent
24 with the communist world. And similarly I think we Shouldn't
ondeoestimate Chino's potential interest iL trying to attain a
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higtr:ar cf cononic developmertt throngh forms of cooperat.on
perhaps evel, with the US, only on a multilateral basis. Bat
Chinese have real insentives to coeperate with us in order to
meet this very problen that I referred to.
Senator Proxmire., Mr. Whiting, duvelppments in China are
also having a severe impact in the Soviet Union
.0011.
Mr. Whiting, Could Z answer the question your raised.
0eAatel- 2rermire. Yes. I am sorry.
Mr. Mixing. You asked about trade with China and
thc, prspects and implications of the President's trip to
PeXtng. Covad I address that quostion briefly.
I think thot beyond trade one must look at the developmen:
prospects of ne main:i.and. They have taken same unusual
:Aeps with differtmt countries in the past. They haVe reCentl.
informed the Canadians that they will permit, indeed they will
invite, C%;v1rIclirn entrepreneurs to come to China to install pl .t
and factory equipment, constraints which they have never lifte
for previous relationships. They have engaged in a long
negotiation Ath the vest Europe power consortiuM known at
CZNAG for a multi-billion dollar petrochemilial oomPle* in
ncrthwest China in the mid-60s. I see now reason why we
should concentrate so'...ely on China's capability in trade
for relatinc the economic emergence of interests between our
country and China. Indeed, turnkey projects, ae they tlre kn
are most likly co be vented by Om Peoples Republic. This
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of coveee wi . eequiea uertaie credit facilities, and indeed
Expozt-Imczt Eank approval. We wondered why the Chinese
seepect our de3ign on Taiwan. Yet at the same time that the
President is plemning to go to Peking, export-import bank
has (*proved a $93.5 million loan, approved by the Atomic
Enerey Commission, for the Republic of China to have a nuclear
powsr plant. Now, perhaps Peking thinks we aro going to trans
for that $93.5 million to Peking when it takes over Taiwan,
but I think that is rather fatuous. I think we foresee
retaining Saiwan for a long time tn -ome. In a sense
this is the left hand not knowing what the tight hand doeth.
If we are tarling about truck enOilitkis in the SoViet
Union while We know that the Soviet teniot poises a threat to
seeue!ty of China, and indeed is massing troops on China'
boraers, then should we not think aboet the Export-Xmport
Bank's faeiiieaeint e truck construction plant in the
Chinese ?copeee Repal,lia as e defense need against the
Soviet Union?
We have another possibility in the ecoaomic realms The
Chinese have discovered oil reserves that are beyond
theit foreseeable neede for the balance of the century, laivekh
the etate of their eednomy. Japanue need for Oils is tole Well
documented to require elaboration here. But Japan's oil heeds
must be servized over long, valnereble sea leees and costly
Lines o traileportae on to the precarious Meddle East. It is
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quite coztcaivable thz? compatible interest between Chinese
economic oil ckiwlop.mant ctnd tlapanese economic development;
linked to :American prospecting and refining capital and produc
,
1 equipment Invested in china, with Chinese concern and control
5 i
of course, Wold show a new nexus of convergent interest in th,
1
northeast area, instead of conatantly looking at it in bilater
term, or in confrontation terms.
2411 c?.i these are the prcepectt that are opened up by the
President's trip, and they .literally do blow ones mind to get
cut of tha couvantional language of the past.
Sz.nator Proxmire, Along that line, of Cohrse,,developmen
In China axv.4 also having a severe impact in the Soviet Union.
wo c-.re all awarn of t17e Soviet-Sin? dispute and the friction
that: exists along thE:ir common border. China also seems to
? deeply corwernod over a possible preemptive Russian strike
aga;r1t Chiia's nuclear facilities. Hew serivis is the disput
atd is there a real poJsibilitv of a preemptive strike in
ycar vicw?
t.Whiting. I think the possibility of a Soviet
preemptive strike a)ant Chinas nuclear facilities Was rais
? Ws3COW
through its own media, and by Victor Luri, a Soviet
44pported unaUst in 1969. So we do not need to credit
? cls a Cine phcntasy, it is a real possibility, and it h s
beaa ealscd over the last five year. . I would not ptt A Prob
hi.1:ty es.timata to it. That is violy determined by men in
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Moscow and the shing 13.1ance, of eshimW:es among those
men in mosecv a5 to what the risks are. I ersonally think
the peak risk was in 1969, aad that it has diminished but not
disanpeared since that time.
It is because of this Soviet threat that I would disagree
with Professor Cohen's suggested development on Chinese
ceaventional force level. I think Chinese conventional force
levels are mueh more a function of tha Soviet border threat,
the subversive threat that the Soviets have manifested in Sink
lanee in Moagolia, than they are a function of the external
relatione of the US. And if I were hopefUl I would say that
aeme agreement wild be in the forward development of nuclear
?
weapons rnth-r than in existing force levels.
ilz ceLzanot negotiate the .Soviet Chinese relationship. The
is 0 g to be a funceion indirecte.Of our relation3hi0 eith
1- I that, but that it is eertainly justified in Showing to Moscow
1 Chin . And I think thiS adiinistration is not ekploiting
-/ tl---
I
it does not want a War between Russia and .China.
24
Ohat eill dee Moo between Mosoow and Peking after the dita
ok Mao Tse-tung io anether question that is implicit in any
co ideration. After Nao leaves the scene -- and that may be
soon or in the near future -- there are ObviouSly going to be
them in Moecew or Peeine who will eeek to revive it. /
du not fear a reaeprochement between Moscow and Peking, I woull
wic
it over the prospect of. Ein-Soviet war.
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And I thin z it toe is of genuine ineerest to this
administeation.
I would call your attention to the very
sophisticated analyvis by a SoViet American. specialist summari I,ee
in this morning's New York Times:
"Only by letting the Chinese, however, built their own
defenee base can they have enough deterrent strength to hold 1
off Any of those in Moscow who would like to take out 'Chinest:
nuolear facility
Senator ProXmire. / Will call: on Dr. When, I know he wjti
to respond. But the prospect is for rather remarkable persona
changes in Mina, notably Mao, but virtaaily all pf the leaderi
12 and whethee that will have a eignifloant 'effect. We can wegoeb
a.ahaneo-, I think, in the 10 or 15 years with the entire top
'..ayer of leaAeNship,
Mk. Ohiting. 1 think it is important that President
Nixon stcoaed in hi: endeavor no4 while there IA a secure
ead autheritative leadership manifested in the personalities
of Mao and Chou Ewveaai. X think that any residual problems
that we leave from cur past zecord with China for a sUcCeteor
regime to cope with might find a far less flexible situation.
Certainly a man who is in second or third after Mao Tae-tung
will have many peUeical problems at home to Contend with.
And many of the iCSUeri that 4aW1 has put out for the agenda
ee may seem cerious to a second or third stop euccessor in this
LS. leada;:ship. I don't wart to eay that aftee.Mao goes China will
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bs torribly insecure, But X certain/'r thin% that there is a
problem there that is perhaps one of the explanations for this I
overweening cult of Mao that we now see. Xf the cult of
mao has grown in the past four years, it may be a function
of their sensed belief that a successor governmeht will have
call upon Mao's thoughts as a first claim to legitimacy
AS you know, there is no national peoples congress,
tehre is no operatins Constitution, in fact there in not even
an official chief of state in that government today. Chou
En-lai hao cexried on a good deal of activity as premier Of
necessity, because this is ho one else th the governMental
position to whom he can delegate thete responaibilities.
would net predict the man or the section of that elite
that will emerge over the next decade.
But X would say that if a negotiatory record is laid down
succossfully by Mao and Chou, that it will Certainly SarViVe
this scceesoion to the extent that we make it a credible and
confidential basis of our relationship.
Senator Proxmire. Dr. Cohen.
Hr. cohort. COu1 I ay that what Professor Whiting has
correctly just said aboUt the importance Of striking while the
iron is hot -- while 'Zhine has a secured, mature leadership
could equally well perhaps be applied to our own domestic
situation. The Nixon Administration seams to be admirably
efiuippei AC.p7d to lake J:hatves iv, our China pc,licy than any
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zucce:wox, becaue i, to has its doma,stic conztituency worry
abc;.2t, and it way no: feel secure enough to make. Perhaps Mr.1
Ni %ch can
face dow::/. -.he right winv. of both patties that are
zow aQplying JItc.ueasing pressure against his China intentions.i
Dut we can't be sur.,:. that any successor administration,
particularly of the :)emocratic side, would be able in the li0;
oe. past experience to muster a similar kind of counter pressur
1
Now, I apparently failed to make myself clear with
rzr,'pect to your first no use pledge as to what we might get
in return from the Chinese. I was addressing myself to what X
brought up in my earlier discussion about the mnitilateral no
Me)
firs use pledge that the Chine have no4 suggetted. As
13 said earlier, we. can't ettpoct any bilateral alms bontrol.
rosponse from the Chinese, because they have got the nussians
to worry about.
So we have go o have a mUltiIateral situation here.
17 And I would quite ag:me with professor Whiting's View*,
I donut think there :14 hny difficulty at Al on that point.
;19 Now, as to the preemptive strike, 4 think it is a genuine
threat. I think if von will reca/1, Mr. ChairMano there was
20 I.
21
25
a period when this country debated very setiouSIY hating a
national shelter bnilding program against a contetplated
nuclear attack. We wore and still are, I think, the tiChest
country In the ;Toni& And yet we abandoned that Pregra*:
tecaute of it psychological implication's, because of the
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msallocation rozoureas for oven a very rich country. ,Chin
has undertaken a national urban shelte_ building program,
it h= bean going or me for so time. China is a very poer coun:
i
r
I
This is a Aisallocation 04 its resources unless there is a creti-
1
1:le basis fo.: China to Lear the possibility of a nuclear strike
by the Swiot Union. So / think the Chinese certainly are
taking it very sericusly. It is not rata in the sky or somethikg
they are makim7 out of whole cloth.
4,rd I might say that part of the significance of the
Indian treaty with the Soviet Union that has just been concludid
may be that it will offer the Soviets a pretext for acting
ac.,;ainit
China. If, for exatple, China should support Pakistan
too vigorously in any Pakistan-Indian clash, I think us might
find
the Soviet Unicn chcmping at the hit to txerCise Some
influence over the Chinese by threatening to come to India's
aid ii the most demonstrable way. The situation is beginning
to look a little like that in 1914 of Serbia and Austria-Hunga
each backed by its own prominent more powerful allies. And
this is & t ricns problem.
Senator ProxMire. This morning's paper carrie0 a report
of what is des=ibed as en "authoritative article in Pravda"
exp eSsing concern that an anti-Soviet coalition might develop
out of AMarican-Chinese contact . Is this realistic, Professo.
Fairbanks.
Ar. F,A7cbanks. I could read this aw the kind of counter
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ccettintf. Crom all these countries. Tha
Sevin,ts .ii i,1 polii way are exp::essing their concern lest we
are ,Jonnvirinv against them. The Japanase have been expressin,'
again ccacrn about or not consulting them over China. 1 am
not sure there is anythiag more to it than that. It is politi47,
pressure,
Mr. whiting. Mr. Chairman, first, may I suggest that you
us' the words "preventive war attack" rather than "preemptive
1 strihe" in referring to what mitht be in the Soviet mind, becatse
V) 1
1 1 Y woald not credit the Soviet Union with believing that
preemption, which p,Dperly dafiaed means getting your blow
'7 '"),
. I
ak-tzak would be all about. preventive war is removing any
futme capability of raising a throat. And I think that they
in bore tha other blows come at you, is what this kind of an!
nre striking so long in advance of the Chinese nuclear capabi l. ty
it could only ba des ribed a$ a preventive threat. And
ly if Mk. Abatoff.'s concern is there -- and if the French express. on
11 honi snit qui Mal - pense, does apply -- if the kuesians
1.,9 15 have t.nlen thinking about doing any harm to China then those
20 who Would bolster China's defense are in that definition anti-
21 Soviet, they are thwarting Soviet designs to blackMail or brut 1
ir punish China.
Benatna Proxmire. You understand that they are looking a.
241
;?;.55
it from tho 6oviet standpoint, that two other great power0 in
the`vorld, the US nnl China, into going to Ywie a detente, or ir
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d of rlat:icz,Ahip of aEolist?.1.no..3; of the kind you anscriO,
our businer. there to clp thew .4,3constxuct their
inCutvy.
Nr. wotld look at thi3 in two levels.
Soviet Union had not invente:d all of tha military
?
builaxyl ar,!ort Crosn 1963 o, at ,u time when tharo was no credil:lc
Cl'ineoe threat to th,l. Soviet Onion, then ore could say, soillethvls
b:yinniug at oU ititire r Chine initiative initiative which coulti
justly b?s. 5.;i::. th:Lnk that investmoliY:.
1 in militry encialaioont of Chinn on 0:4-a northeaSt
19
22
23 I
nts,rthw,:st l!rontiorrs mo.ke thin a 9o2evic not a practical 1
ellarge.
Rat secondly, il tarns of anit-Soviet beir ! collated as
con?ntiten for infLasnco, that is that wezld politica a=e all
:bout. .11.1%d i tt P viet Union has aa embzsny in eekiatg with
nn ambassad r edtr.i.de =citations, obviously parity i.
tha
W.IliMVA the US vould d,;AcInd witherat being called anti-Soviet.
I think ill the longt, statenent Mt atoff cOrrectly
Az.4.7erued saveral kinds of gzoups and several kinds o trends
in American policy. And he doesn't single out this one as the
donir,ait elemnt. Yndeed, I think his is nophisti tad'
reLuttal to craaar Soviet attacks to our policy which have comi
oarliez, but which '.-kave only talked about theL=ti-Soviet
cati as. .7,nd I am sitze that al Presidaut rinou and S'ocue.;7.ary
floccrs crry ttloAr mave 174., Fakj.agc the71 axe vary mindful
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id the Middle klast and alsewhere to
assure the RI1SF- '9 were it io reasonable, but not where it i
nnreasonable.
Se ator Prolcaire. 3:Ie.::: me just try to gat a little
blancl in tai y asking Dr. Cohen this.
think a lot of myths about Chiha are being d
spelled
these dayr. and that is bound to be a healthy thing. But /
wonder if the 1..endu1um play swing too far. Pnhaps China is no
the vioiet :cme nation sow have be1ie7ed her to be. But
how c you eplain China's role in the Pakistani civil war
iFt a n2.ation that claims to be dedicated to revolutionary
agails: of;pressivo colonial type regimes. The E
L'Jditnis rebel agaizet the more pouerful and apparently
repressive Wat the East ruthlessly crashes the rebellion,
ur3itundrods of thousands of her ptople and causeS
Ailli,-4ns to t1i CUflb, if we
to believe thd press
X'apoti n6, China uupports West Pakistan, how do you explain
thls7
Mr. Cohen.
&n& there are undoubtedly a nutber of
tIrceads here. Zovt I would think one thing to bear in mind
vir.n res cot to Chica's policy toward Pakistan is, the Chinese
of ooursc are dedicated to wars of national liberation and sel
uovoments. but they ate even more dedicated to
rzational uniflatinn, to China's territorial integrity.
th7;yik the Chilviscl ern vary careful, they are extraordinarily
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;
sene&tive t", this Pakstan question, Y. thin% extraordinatily
E3ensitiva. They are very Careful not- to act in such a way as I
wc1.1d jristHy retro3pective7.y the Tibetan revolt against China
or pzospectively ay need on Chirta' part to use force if.othei7
yleans should fail in the diiltant future against Taiwan.
They don't want to be in the position of witnetaing and 1
helping the Ealkanization of Asia through supporting self
&i7-z-rminatica overnont that would destrey Pakistan's national
g unity, China's national unity, and perhaps others. So
4
I;I think thwi are baing very careful, apart from other reasons
A
0,
1?9
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II
24 I
4.4
thv.t they hiTwt, AcIaL.9w1o1e question of misunderstanding wi
Sn-33a, the diffimity with ilho Soviet bnion. And they are als
plRyinq ia this azpact couvontional kinds of balance of Power
politica.
Cenator Pro=axt. Maybe to our eyes tht it tion is mor
horriZying than to the eyes cf the Chinese. And they
may be more used to or aapable of tolerating 4:ho kind
lf violence we rt.:ad about., nut we have the incredible
atrecities, and as I say, tha wholesale durdar of hdndreds 0
thousands of people, genocide.
Mr, Cohen. It iv a shodking thing --
Senator Prozmi.;m. To support that it stems to me it beyoJd
I would agraa that the break up of Pakistan woUld be
uni!critultaL,e - would suem to tae that they can take a positim
that wolAd bring as muctl prossua:a to bear on Wet Pakistanis
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eec,t, in this Iznd :If extermination without at the same
time supporng a separation
M. rairbz--ak. Sic, they are not giving arms to the Pakis
tani government: which is killing thclse people.
Senator Promire. That is true. And we certainly are,
according to everythinl we can deteline, zathough the
Defense Dope:I:I:ma:It has denied it to me when '4-ecre'cary Laird
c'lt up to %clotify befare my subcommittee. Ent I think the
doclamentatim Is pretty clear nlt.
Cohea. Wo ha Te got to be aware of their extraordinar.ly
sovitivity to China's borders4 to its territorial integrity.
Ve.cy have livud thrc.ji a co-called century of hUmiliation in
through (me protext or means or another Japanese power
4 has sought to detaoh from chin. various .ortions of China.
.0
china communist revolUtion really came to power on a pia.;
forill of restoring Chinl's self respect, its equality and its
tcrvitorial integrity, They are not going to be begUiled
13 , by sicvms of eel? dclt3rmination, they are not even going to b.ink
10 , trcmanilous, bton?:cndsus slarighter within neighbor states
23 1 that are going through their own convulsions, because they
21 fezIr interferonce by other states.
22 "
And that is the principle that takes priority over other
principlzo.
Senator Pronmire. How does
thvec,ten C^raina?
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-I .-2,tt,)4.- '.:fskIra, a X have indicated, by
prc(i(dall by ,vilalog70 becciuso of tho Tibet probl,sm. You
remenba.7hc th um-Ad ai te,:ribly upset when China put down
by fol:ce ;.he relolt in Tibet. The world was vary concerned
cbcu.:. what would happan with respect to Taiwim if the US shoul
remove its d'af.,:!n5e ctrert. It it this ly.::ecedent. I
think there is any direct security i.-7.terest that China
hal the co!V:inuet2 iLtagration of East Pakistan.
fortaZ:or Pro3tmir..1. This isn't Chins territory as Tibet
ma/ have been. East Pakistan, it seems to me, if separated
wcraid rapresant a lessor threat.
Y'. Cohen. Elactiy. But china is not going to be in
tha p sition as I tried to say earlie*, of supporting the
Lroa%up of a natio%al entity according to thci principle of
lf determination, because they see that as justifying them
callin9. for Tiet separating from China Taiwan separating
frola China.
X/f we use self determination highly selectively we can
usa south Vietnau to .,:gue for our intervent%on there. I
think as they see it that as the Chiang KU-shek forces lose
grocnd in this coent%ly the Chinese will shift t14eir rhetoric
fzt supporting the Republic of China to sUpporting self
determination for the people on Taiwan. We hatran t called for,
self daterninati,m in the yrs we have supported the Chiang
Ka4.-lht..?k regime becaust it would embarrass that regime, which
3
24
a5
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isn't baA ,:sn self determinatiol:a. But I know we are going t
have sorne itOerest A it.
Ana the Chinese have priorities of th.tgs just atrewe do.
Ad nuiaber oee for them is Chinese territorial integrity.
Mr. Whiting, I would like to place this in a different
perspective. I thik that. ? the "pactitis" of John Poster
Dulles aroused in Peking the --
Senator Proemire. Pactitis? You are not talking about P
istan.
Mr. Whiting. Vactitis, the use of pacts in foreign
relatione as was dote in the mid-59s when confronted with a p4 -
blem you solved it vith a pact.
Ve formed SEATO and CENTO. We used Pakistan as a massivel
intelligeeca effort directed against China and the Soviet
Union from the faciIitiee at Pedhawar. China had had from as
17 1 eaely ae 1954 to 19S5 to respond directly and conventionally
at a time when they were not in hostile array against India to
sae how that alliance could be eroded. Chou En-lai made appro
10 I es to Taiwan at the conference in 1955. The approachee to
eakisten were a little more oucceesful, becanse of Kashmir
21 i and because.of India. The Chinese tried to ride both at the
a same time: the FrleA7hip to Indian and the friendship to
ea 1
e.? ?alcitrtan.
24 Intimat3ly their border dispute with Tedia came ap and
5
they became
.c)
increasingly dependent upon tha pact against India
I
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t
'aut the ealergoe 0:!: their pact alliance as tacit one i
1
11
13
1
, -
22
25?
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P.1
WEL3 ao oug ,t,yr.plit alliance with Ppkistan. Once
Pakzs romavzid intIlligance facility at Peshawar, the
oculd e pcsf.tivo gains from -further cooN,eration with;
thu We3t Pakistani c'overnment.
As cn Et Pa%istan rebellion emerges, the Chinese betwael,q
vealpolitik rlod toto3 revolutionary grosspol tik is a very
na:-:d ono. Bat at this time and under the circuxstances that
T.,ht Chinese fac., in the agricultural reva'ation, tbey seem
tt) ba going 2o realpolitik.
an vausA in a sense by your question, because in the
past the nightTaare that IndiEn Policy has projadted would be
?
a Chinese se:peration of East Pakistan, and alliance there with
West Bengal oalmuaist party, one ef the stronaer forces, and
illetesid a sap:Aratica of that portion of the seeL;continent of
Assalli; end the Nacolites rebellion; and so forthr cutting
I
Indi;,.t down to , small part of what it is now That iS tiot whal
nocr,:xxod. In$ttlad, Peking made the choi06, as appears to 1
pportJmq the Pakistani govarnoont implicitly' or expliditly
rea bolitik,
ou 1
hait7 been the choice in thin country, of grt$s or
what I agreo with you is genocide.
But i31ace it in this earlier context of the alliance
1
cDrisolation IAlich tze indead forced on Peking by the formation 1
cP enNTo and SEATO.
Ematon I reali3e that the h4ur is late. But
4
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q have a few more cli.x?t,tions.
,i
0
J"
?,
, J 1
0 1 :fact between the Soviet Union and India. This too seems to
I
,.
1 I have been broui7;ht about, in some meas=e, by events in China.
t
,i
i China, of ,..-,our.se, haa sided with West Pakistan in the dispute
276
Anothr eNtremzly important now development is the recent!
J ithEast ?akistan .?,nd India, as we have already mentiOned.
4,7*.
23
24
25
1
gomo rather hard lines seem to be forming here, with Russia ant.
India on one side and Pakistan and China on the other.
We have taken uo formal position hut we have been sending
arms to West Pakistan and or gowilrameat seems more friendly '
to it than to India. What if.4 the significance of the Soviet-
India traaty aad what do you think the US would do if hostilit ez
broke out? And by the way do you think persons in this count
zight soma day ba ask.i.ng, Who lost India?"
Mrs Fairbanks No, X don't think no. We don t have tho a.rx
nt abov. InUa that wa have out China. Somehow it ii
a different co
T. think this Not from the tndian side seems to be taken
-lot au a vcry heavily military allianco. It isn't in the mili
alliance tlr's that ig CUttern!Lir7
. And the Indians May well
fnel that th:Is is jcst friendship, and the Russians are helpin'
In other words, it 6,oes not make American aid and American
relations any less easirable or feasible. Lila so while it-
may be a straw in the wind that tha Soviets wore moving into
the Indian Ocean --
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ow
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Senc,.;;or Prorp i,:,,-1? :::t m? make it haa:dar for ConvresQ ti;
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aporova. i
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Mr. .r.airbank. Wall, the domestc politics of India. the 1
4
1
. Soviets obviously want to p/ey in, onel I don't think we want ts1
i:
get into that. But this I don't think is a very ser ow, matte!.
"o
that we 3hould exercise ourselves a?'cut. It is part of a
cleneral trend of the Russian movament In that treat which I thizi
e0 have to accept.
Mr. Mitin5. There is, sir, an implicit contradiction .
bo-,:waen this pact and the reality of mutual alliance and frientl-
.
4,11o1uding with ths. Peoples Papublic of Chin ap of 1950. 1
Yoz. in the articlo that is aost operative the Soviet Union has;
1,;:adgod tl4at it win not vivo military assiztance to any gve.-
zt is :In hotility to the Indian govemment. The 1
Lthinese have had hortilities with the Indian government in 195.1,
13,62 and 1965 aud if read tnat article correctly, this
77
formerly praoludes thr. Soviet tinion from a.!itisting the Peoples,
23
27.2
23
24 11
L,74
$ibiicof China urAer any circumstances that axe hostiIe.
It doc,b not say defensive, offensive, who Wad attacking ,Whom,
but it simply ?Jreclude.e military aSsititance to a goVernment
which is in tt&litioa with the other signatcry,
thLak thal,
is going to he roai in reking with much more attention than
question ..kla!; ?7,.1 have raised namely ont cx.i our concerns over
what will happen in a Pak-India war;
But yo w question raises ancther
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It is a vary, very interesting
oi;s4vation, I complotell misssa that.
Mr. Whitina. But thore is other observation I would ilk
tc make. And that is found in the excellent journal of the
former ambi43sador to India, John Xenneth Galbraith, and in they
hook by Nevil MaLwell abont an Indian-China war. And that isFiin
D62 the US government moved precariously close to interventio
wth military action on behalf of India in what was a border
wan, which 1 bolievo the Indians brought upon themselves,
ve_thout reference to the Congress of the US, and under no mutu41
agreement or ocmmitmant for assLstanoe.
I think this pattern of elbowing and e'asing our way into
a military situation withcut reference to the Congress and
without reftronce to legal obligations should be examined,
as I knew it has been examined, by various pieces of legislati
introducod in ths Congress. And the preosdebta go beyond
the Vietnam war. We should certainly nail this one down befar.
313 slip or slide any further into what might be a holocaust.
cvl the subcontinent.
StInator 2rozmire. het Me ask YoU gentlemen We have been
Cisoussing what might be labeled the coming realignment in Ai
What will the eccnom_c consequences of all this be for the US*?
As you kac,4 we have a tremendous economic investment ia
Asia. Om: trade with 3aptn is huas and ow: investments there
are vary great. We have Eubstartial economic interests in thel
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1 "0 aavt really envisage the People*s Republic of China cooperati,g
Philippiac, in
tore theso
and militarily?
Dr. Cohen?
Mr. Cohen.
bo in a position
" C.,r1
???,'
esia and throucjhout Ai Wha.c. lies in
as z result c17 what f haPening politically
You have already indicated that we should
substantially ;:o out down out military
1 c-xoendituras, hopeftIlly Alot jut for combat troops but for mil.-
tary ext?ense for Aay Asian regilzen.
Senator Prosmiro. I asked that vostiono andI think the!
(Jiarc., of ubat you gontlemen told us am:gest:4 that.
M. Cohan tate it your qusstion now
future ot Atiloricnn private invastmant in Asia. This gives me,
chaitoe to ..;o= nt on the vision of the future and all the
onders that cld 17,11, Protease*. Whiting Oiritod out, if we
tld get some coopc.ration between Imerioan private if not
).?ub/IL.. soult'ens and the governments of East Zia on the exploi
tation of these racently diseoverad resources of oi/ in kast
China and tha South Chita Seas. But I would think that thd
prohlpectc4 for that in the naar future ara extreMely dim. We
I, with the nepablic of China or with South Korea or with South
Iietnam in 3040 joint venture with the Japanese to exploit
the zonour
Mr. Waiting. May Z interrupt. I was only referrin'
contiriental mainland reserve not offshore reserves.
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')fft of the
P
vatest rezouraen am thc world. But they can't be
ef.2ectively, exploited, X think until 14o have worked out at
,
least wheth6r it is going to be Peking or Taipei. It is
0 going to rcially hav the jurisdiction, or exam-pie, to award
WO
1,2
'Ltd
15
17
if:,47.1
?:.q";
cotre.cts to Americzn corporations, or Japanese corporations.
And indeed Peking's concern at efforts along these lines by th
Japansze, tha Scuth 1Wreans and the people on Taiwan to begin
exploiting '2Alese re:ionrces have really, I think, properly led
uz to be oatremcly cavtions c?bcat going ahead, because that
cotIld lez-4 to ao.i;ua lihooting ineiclenta jtist az disputes wlow
betwezr.,,
sFy,
;the PhiAppLnes nd both Chineac governMents are
leading to vary minor incideants of the other islands in south
Chind Sea.
So that is a problem. But in the long tun let's hope tha
thote on bc ams ecccnoMic cdoperation. I have already
indicated that wa ougLt to be working toward other fo:this of
econonic cooziarztion, such at the examples of Professoe
han ri to for elzaple: the Canadian, By the way, we
have had British and Vest German firms setting up plants in
China. tla -ould hope that Americana would tAke part in that.
1 Pzvit evsntaally American corporatio_s should be able te profit
one way or another, although We are never going to see Chine biking
very open in taros of permitting foreign Corpdtationt to ao
busine5v; in China.
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w:4,11 t;91f,ctL CU:1.7a ear to tt
otao tha OWL!A: UfA.,AM nw la thnt respsot. "Oey,
ot!l3..;7 co'xa.;:xis in may beca',7o Chizese presslam
a ,vzgg,:tic,n? Incrausngly natiOnalistic. The
5
h7o vy strong in nupporting Latin Zmorican
ef:fforte t.f,1 co.rb inwsztment? 121.)t merely by vovernmentG ouch
7 c,mtt? bt cnqPeru and other Latin Amert,mn
s, 1
4 couAt:;.:ie control of theLT, owr resourcas, And it may '
bcor tht. fus Thailand the Philippinc:s? az they
awa. fr-ct ar6ently anizmurist pottura, and vary
e
.114 1 cloa:J re1T'LLax3 with vs, that wo will see Inc
buvircas intarsts ther.
*?,f3?
2t)
22
DLO; ".): hlvl," got to zoco;niv) that in a uhaitgrg-
c.>.4r ,13?rigIf; detc=win Z:.110 allo=lti?n of
hc,;t f.an I fc is statfi contlwAla
mzlsoaabl. tr,:!zas of tha Le which that has got
to he df,,77Ae.
Senator Prevaire. Dr. tairsav,nk, .7: would like to osk you
to plrsucl this.
Aledng the Anes that uaz recently kind of a revolution
to my of us by former ambassador -- he pointed out
if the JarJanc!se continue to exoand their economy in the mxt
30 yaars al they have in the last 10, by the year 2000 they
oil1 have gross national oroduct oi r6(i trilliou, in other
words, in z:aftstant Ocellars it will be times as 1:1f.g ,As onr
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pof?rAction. Now, I :,,A4)7,,,ouct there are many 1itlit5ng
.?
?:1 novarcleLm, i:his is zm
4
V glani%0thfiiis Zth.-; clec,aomic giant o5,7 Esia. A,3 I ray, we
nraly inyclotont, nd have a great trada with Japan. WAat
c2focts this %.approcherc.ent with china have on cur in7est-
mant;i. in C.a-xln and,;,...Aaehwere.
-4
,4 Mr. Painban31.. tbe rproblem that the Japanese
A
ciconomy oala be quito a substitute for all our economic
An6 Ilavo competition. It seems to me for tha
^P
rt ri vis-a-vis Chlna the only help that we have is to get
iAc?*;.r.:%.77,ateral c?r laternaConal auspices refiadge
-) ozonic r4ctivity to a mrIch greater elegree than
13 i
1 hsretofore.
V,
If cl;:,Itracts now conduCmd by American corporations coulcU
,
,
P
0 .
!i b,) fie d through international body, regional committees, $
0
0 ,
P
cr: nultination commissions, that kind of thing, that there i
0
ii
17 might 'la less onus of immrialist capital expansion, as they c4L11
,
,
,
1G it in China. They sea a great menace in the 'Japanese economy
10 because it builds up interest abroad, which then becomes
endangered and are followed by military support, probably.
1
22 I
23
24
They accuse us of this same kind of thing. Now, in both oasesi
/ think the American and the Japanese are not following really,
a Leninist book, where the economic growth leads to military i
expansion, rather it is a mere complicated than that. But
the is n psychology of expansion in both cases. We have the
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11,c;61eratia cur ow
.11e1th,s SLAC: tiMO.
r;art sm71 ..'coaomy in a way. Tits Chinf3a this
the outlida.
very .;=.oxiaidab7,e proi,;pnot
wauld think that institutiorzl. Invelo?m-:nt .Z:he first
C thinc -1,111z). t ght to v,y1L, aur ninds to.
TM f,:thi)nnels thransh Ta;)ich thir.., kind of aid can cove
interno7,,12y ocxtenly can be worked on, and can be improvcv.L
t; ? Sol??!....(:7.? ting? would you like to comment
it, 1 cn that?:, is, thz: c:EferA of our relatiomhip, budding
anfl eAval,7G,ing );)latio7as1ip, that wa all hope is going to Cevaap
cunstmactivelv avd peaclefully with China, our investments elsoi
where and sconalic commitments elsew1i3re?
Nr. I think 1.:%at the prospect of US invento;
'i!7?
1 In Azia is going to be a depressing one, if we se ourselves 1
ie 1 in conpatition- with the aapanese. I think it is clear that
i
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17 i cur entire price-wage structure and tha value of the dollar 1
!
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70 J
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21 1
aa
23
24
in this ocuntry is a problem first of priority, and if it is
not aL;olvad tiithla the very near future, we will simply not
ba in a pocition to compete abroad. The confidence and the
coSt of Cloaling with the US as opoosed to dealing with Japan
will make us uncouTetitive. I think while this administrationi
%
has claim. to have solutions, they have at least not been
evieent ?:(1) my eyes. And I an not an economist, and -I cannot
perceive he much of a crisis lfl_es ahead for how long. But I I
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wc-a1C to ile:e prctior. until 2. am confi6ent
of th3 US lo goiug to Lis
solvod.
then) are ways in which the matual neeZs' of China
the US ccmturnity of ;:avestors ckirl deviot4 North:2..7A
11.71a0 cither with undz-trarit:7.nts Jf the world b3Jak? the Avian
Dave1.0Dment E.ay or w!Ith oLhe tN :%cstitutioas, this too i Ii
have tc .ccme?after tho resolution of our politi,a1 problems
with poli tkL-is public. Ani that is why I think the trip
that ..cesident Ni;s.con has prol?osat. has very fan reaching
BW: you don't U,C3 than consistently in tha fre-
i:13aic of the Vietnm wary or 1.n. tha framework of military secury
And that is ,:lhy / made such remarks as 1 did about complat.e
fresh and undonv&Itional appx.oaches to the economic convargen-
otos, rather than the economic confluence of China, Japan
aad the US.
Saaall.rir 1.)ozmire. Gentleman, thank you very, very much.
D. Cohen.
Mt. Cohen. could X just have one final remark about the
stobility in Asia.
It sems to me appropriate that we begin to revive
interest in this country than in the executive branch in the
idea of recognizing establishing diplomatic relations with
Mongolia. We were, as you know, 'zany close to doing that in Ji ;.:3,8
of 1969 when the State Departmlnt had recomraondad it. /Slit thre
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:!::ogima on Taiwan aga:Inst this. They
hi;,:';,nt,i17zast in .7aollaing or China ;;Imigolia.
Lad I think i rofound rTistake that wn didn't go ahead
d1,13pite that objeetiozi in reognizi-ag Mango/ie. I think we
now should do it, becanso it would accord with the
President's rocantly aapzessed objective of recognizing realitt,
and recognizing gwarnalts t.h ccTAtrol the bulk of areas
wa calle naion states.
And I think it would give 4, a very important listening
post on Taany-of these problems you have been asking questions
11
about, Mic. Chairma, it would *rovide some balance to the
Soviet Union alaost exClusiva ability to =erase influence 141
9'
41
Mongolia.
f4 I think the Mtngoliana have been long interestul in a
10 window on the .west for economic and politiocl rinfInflle and thqi:
16 Peoples Republic is not likely to ta 'upset by this move.
17 It has recognised Mongolia and made a barter agreement with it
13 although it doesn't like the way the Russians have treated
10 China with respect to Mongolia. And I think if properly
20 approached this point the Peoples Republic night welcome
21 having a US presence in Mongolia as a counterpoise to the
22 Soviet influence at a time when tha Chinese influence in
23 Mongolia is very/ very low.
24 For all these reasons I think it would be extremely
25 important for us to revive that idea and perhaps give the
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.. ttpr. 'Dr ". and c-D11g that it wou.3.d be
Er. Fail7hlank. Lir chairman, may I say we need funds
mora CtineJe studies in this country.
2enatorroxmire. lbsp inclose. And I think you hv,ve ad
for I
vztry. strong and compelling case for that. And I appreciatc
tt a qtt deal.
1 want to thank you gentlemen very mach.
Th' su:Lcemnittee will reconvene in September. We expect
tc have witne6ses from th'a Defense Department to give
just:;.fication, and their viewpoint, and their responses,
some extent to your testimony in the State
D3partnent and from other witnesses, because we feel that the
such a vital question that has not been explored or
developed. So We will continue to do it.
You have certainly made a contribution this morning.
Thank you very much.
Whereupon, at 12;45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned
s.lbject to the call of the Chair.)
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