MEMO TO THE DIRECTOR FROM GEORGE A. CARVER, JR.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73B00296R000200050081-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 81
• Publication Date: September 28, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS STAFF
Appr6 QEFOf Rd1e ft /g9NT?4-1 VIM9296R000
TO:The Director
FROM:GACarver, Jr.
SUBJECT:
DATE: 28 Sept 71
1. Per our conversation attached is
the checklist of estimates produced since
1947 or, actually, since 1950 (there
having been no estimates as such in 1947,
48 or 49).
2. As we commented, the numbering
system gets slightly snarled in 1953
because two papers (11 and 12 in the
attached) were superseded or redesignated.
On numbers, you might also note that
there are three ORE papers in 1950
which are listed separately from the
NIEs/SNIEs whose series also begins in
1950.
eor a A. U arver, J r.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
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Is
a
0
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Pre-1950 "Estimates"
19+7 - Negative
1948 - Negative
19+9 - Negative
1950
1. ORE 92-49: The Crisis in Indochina, 10 Feb 1950
2. ORE 29-50: Consequences to the US of Communist
Domination of Mainland Southeast Asia, 13 Oct 1950
3. ORE 50-50: Prospects for the Defense of Indochina
Against a Chinese Communist Invasion (and) Supplement:
Prospects for Chinese Communist Action in Indochina During
1950, 7 Sept 1950
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Listing of NIEs and SNIEs on Indochina and Related Subjects
since 1950
1950
1. NIE No. 5: Indochina: Current Situation and Probable Deve-
lopments" 29 Decemb er 1950
1951
2. NIE 20: Resistance of Thailand, Burma, and Malaya to Communist
Pressures in the Event of a Communist Victory in Indochina in
1951", 20 March 1951
3. NIE 35: Probable Developments in Indochina During the Remainder
of 1951', 7 August 1951
1952
1+. NIE 35/1: Probable Developments in Indochina Through Mid-1952,
3 March 1952
5. SNIE 22: Consequences of certain possible US Courses of Action
with Respect to Indochina, Burma, or Thailand, 1+ March 1952
6. SNIE 27: Probable Effects of Various Possible Courses of Action
with Respect to Communist China" 1+ June 1952
7. NIE 35/2: Probable Developments in Indochina Through mid-1952"
29 August 1952
8.
1953
Nl-E 47: Communist Capabilities and Intentions in Asia Through
Mid-1953" 31 Octob er 1952
9. SNIE 1+5: Thailand's Ability to Withstand Communist Pressures
. or Attacks through Mid-1951+" 2 June 1953
10. NIE 91: Probable Developments in Indochina, 4 June 1953
un:i9t--Press:zres
o ticks, Sw#evoedec{ 13y SNIT N'a"
12. N . ommunist Cour c n in Asia Through Mid-1955,
13. SNIE 52: 9Probable Consequences in Non-Communist Asia of Certain
Possible Developments in Indochina Before Mid-1951+, 16 Nov 1953
11+. SNIE 53: Probable Communist Reactions to Certain Possible US
. Courses of Action in Indochina Through 1951+, 18 Dec 1953
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195+
15. NIE 10-3-54+: Communist courses of Action in Asia, Through
Mid-1955" 15 March 1954-
16. NIE 63-54: Consequences Within Indochina of the,Fall of Dien
Bien Phu, 30 April 195+
17. NIE 10-3-54: Communist Capabilities in Indochina, 1 June 195+
18. sNIE 63-2-54-: The Effects of Certain Possible Developments on
the Military Security and Political Stability of Laos and
Cambodia Through 1954, 9 June 1954
19. SNIE 10-4-54: Communist Reactions to Certain US Courses of
Action with Respect to Indochina, 15 June 195+
20. NIE 63-3-54: Probable Military and Political Developments in
Indochina Over the Next 30 Days, 21 May 1954
21. NIE 63-4-54: Probable Military and Political Developments
in Indochina Over the Next 30 Days, 15 June 195+
22. NIE 63-5-54: Post-Geneva Outlook in Indochina,
3 August 1954
23. SNIE 63-6-54: Current Trends in South Vietnam,
15 September 1954
24. NIE 63-7-54+: Probable Developments in South Vietnam, Laos,
and Cambodia Through July 1956, 24 November 195+
25. NIE 10-7-54+: Communist Courses of Action in Asia Through
1957, 23 November 1954
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1955
26. NIE 63.1-2-55: Possible Developments in South Vietnam
26 April 1955 (one copy only in 0NE)
27. SNIE 63.1-2/1-55: The Current Saigon Crisis
2 May 1955 (one copy only in ONE)
28. Na 63-1-55: Probable Developments in North Vietnam to' July 1956
19 July 1955 (One copy only in ONE)
29. NIE 63.3-55: Probable Developments in Laos to July 1956
26 July 1955 (one copy only in ONE)
30. NIE 63.2-55: Probable Developments in Cambodia to July
1956 16 August 1955 (one copy only)
31. sNIE 63.1-4-55: Consequences of Possible US Courses of
Action with Respect to Vietnam 13 September 1955 (one copy
only)
32. = 63.1-3-55: Probable Developments in Vietnam
to July 1956 11 October 1955 (one copy only)
33. NIE 63.3/1-55: Probable Developments in Laos to July 1956
20 December 1955 (one copy only)
1956
34. NIE 63-56: Probable Developments in North and South Via tnam
Through mid-1957 17. July 1956 (one copy only)
1957
35. NIE 63.2-57: The Prospects for North Vietnam 14 May 1957
(one copy only)
36. NIE 68-57: Probable Developments in Laos over the next few
Months 20 August 1957 (one copy only)
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1958
(no Estimates on these areas were published in 1958)
1959
37. NIE 68-59: The Outlook for Laos 19 May 1959 (one copy only)
38. NIE 63-59: Prospects for North andSouth Vietnam 26 May 1959
(one copy available)
39. NIE 67-59: Cambodia's international Orientation
26 May 1959 (one copy available)
40. SNIE 68-2-59: The Situation in Laos 18 September 1959
(one copy only)
1960
41. sNIE 63.1-60: Short-Term Trends in South Vietnam
23 August 1960 (one copy available)
l.2. SNIE 68-60: The Situation and. Short-Term Outlook
in Laos 6 December 1960 (one copy available)
2+3. SNIE 68-2-60: Probable Communist Intentions in Laos
29 December 1960 (one copy available)
1961
4+. SNIE 58-61: Probable Communist Reactions to Certain US
Courses of Action with Respect to Laos 21 Feb 1961
(one copy)
4+5. NIE 50-61: Outlook in Mainland Southeast Asia 28 March 1961
46. SNIE 10-2-61: Likelihood of Major Communist Military
Intervention in Mainland Southeast Asia 27 June 1961
(only one copy available)
27. SNIE 58-2-61: Probable Reactions to Certain Courses of
Action Concerning Laos 5 July 1961 (one copy available)
48. NIE 1+.3/53-61: Prospects for North and South Vietnam
15 August 1961 (one copy available)
S E-C-R-E-T
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4+9. SNIT{; 58-3-61: The Situation and Short-Run Outlook
in Laos 28 September 1961 (one copy available)
50. SNIE 53-2-61: Bloc Support of the Communist Effort
Against the Government of Vietnam 5 October 1961
(one copy available)
51. SNIE 10-3-61: Probable Communist Reactions to Certain
SEATO Undertakings in South Vietnam 10 October 1961
(one copy available)
52. Si iO-4-61: Probable Communist Reactions to Certain
US Actions in South Vietnam 7 November 1961 (one copy available)
1962
53. SNIE 58-62: Relative Military Capabilities of Opposing
Forces in Laos 11 Jan 1962
52+. SNIE 58/1-62: Relative Military Capabilities of Opposing
Forces in Laos 31 January 1962
55. SNIE 10-62: Communist Objectives, Capabilities and Intentions
in Southeast Asia 21 Feb 1962 (only one copy)
56.
SNIE 58-2-62:
Consequences of Certain US Courses in Laos
11 April 1962
57.
SNIE 58-3-62:
Implications of the Fall of Nam Tha,
9 May 1962
58.
SNIE 58-4-62:
The Current Military Situation and Outlook
in Laos l4+ May 1962
59. SNIE 58-5-62: Probable Communist Reactions to Certain
Possible US Actions With Respect to Laos
31 May 1962
60. SNIE 58-5/1-62: Communist Reactions to Additional US Courses
of Action in Laos and North Vietnam 12 June 1962
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61. SNIE 58-6-62: Short-Ruxi Outlook for the LaotiaXI Coalition
Government 26 September 1962
1963
r7PRI4
62. NIE 53-63: Prospects in South Vietnam 17 spa4l 1963
(one copy only)
63. SNIS 58-63: Communist RE actions to US Actions Taken with
Regard to Laos 18 June 1963
64. SNIE 14.3-63: The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Dispute
on North Vietnam and its Policies 26 June 1963
65. SNIE 53-2-63: The Situation in South Vietnam.
10 jIu2y 1963 (only one copy)
1964
66. SNIE 50-64: Short-Term Prospects in Southeast Asia
12 Feb 1964
67. SNIE 14.3-64: The Outlook for North Vietnam
4 March 1964 (one copy only)
68. SNIE 50-3-64: Probable Consequences of Certain. US Actions
with Respect to Vietnam and Laos 25 May 1964
69. SNIE 53-64: Chances for a Stable Government in South Vietnam
8 September 1964 (ones copy only)
e
70. SNIE 53-2-64: The Situation in South Vietnam
1 October 1964
71. S]fl 10-3-64: Probable Communist REactions to Certain
Possible US/GVN Courses of Action 9 October 1964
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1965
r
72.
SNIE 53-65:
Short-Term Prospects in South Vietnam
4 Feb 1965
73.
SNIE 10-65:
Communist Military Capabilities and Near-Term
Intentions in Laos andSouth Vietnam 1. February 1.965
74.
sNIE 10-3-65:
Communist Reactions to Possible US Actions
11 Feb 1965
75. SNIE 10-3/1-65: Communist Reactions to Possible US Courses
of Action Against North Vietnam 18 Feb 1965
76. SNIE l0-4-65: Probable Communist Reactions to Deployment of an
ROK Combat Division for Base Security Duty in South Vietnam
19 March 1965
77.
SNIE 10-5-65:
Communist Reactions to Certain US Actions
28 April 1965
78.
SNIE 10-6-65:
Probable Communist Reactions to Certain US
Actions 2 June 1965
79.
SNIE 10-6/1-65:
Probable Reactions to Certain US Courses
of Action 4 June 1965
80o SNIE 10-7-65: Implications of A Certain US Course of Action
4 June 1965
81. SNIE 10-9-65: Communist and Free World Reactions to a
Possible US Course of Action 23 July 1965
82. SNIE 58-65: Short-Term Prospects for Laos 5 Aug 1965
(one copy only)
83. SNIE 10-10-65: Reactions to a Certain US Course of Action
in Southeast Asia 10 September 1965
8i.. SNIE 10-11-65: Probable Communist Reactions to a US
Course of Action 22 September 1965
85. SN2E 10-12-65: Probable Communist Reactions to a US Course
of Action 10 December 1965 (one copy only)
S-E-C-R-E-T
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1966
86. SNIE to-1-66: Possible Effects of a Proposed US Course of
Action on DRV Capability to Support the Insurgency in South
Vietnam 4 February 1966
87. SNIE 10-3-66: Probable Reactions to a Possible Course of
Action in South Vietnam 19 May 1966
88. N E 14.3-66: North Vietnamese Military Potential for Fighting
in South Vietnam 7 July 1966
89. NIE 57-66: Sihanouk's Cambodia 6 Octob er 1966 (one copy only)
South
Next Year or Political
90. Vietnam Over the Problems
So 15vDeceemmber 1966
1967
91. SNIE 10-67: Reactions to a Possible US Action
5 Jan 1967
92. SNIE 57-67: Significance of Cambodia to the Vietnamese
Communist war Effort 19 January 1967
93. SNIE 11-11-67: Soviet Attitudes and Intentions Toward the
Vietnam Wax 4 May 1967
91.E NIE 58-67: Short-Term Political Prospects for Laos
18 May 1967
95. SNIE 10-1-67: Reactions to a Certain US Course of Action
13 J'u~ 1967
96. SNIE 14.3-1-67: Problems of Viet Cong Recruitment and Morale
3 August 1967
97. SNIE 14.3-67: Capabilities of the Vietnamese Comm1}nists for
Fighting in South Vietnam 13 November 1967 (1 copy)
98.
SNIE 57/1-67: Significance of Cambodia to The Vietnamese
Communist War Effort 11 December 1967
S-E-C-R-E-T
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1968
99. SNIE 58-68: Communist Intentions in Laos
21 March 1968
100. SNIE 53-68: The Vietnam Situation 6 June 1968
101. SNIE 14.3-68: Detection of Infiltration During a Cease-
fire in Vietnam, 25 July 1968
102. SNIE 58-1-68: Communist Capabilities and Intentions in Laos
Over the Next Year, 31 October 1968
103. NIE 50-68: Southeast Asia After Vietnam
14 November 1968
1969
104. SNIE.14-69: The Pacification Effort in Vietnam
16 January 1969
105. SNIE 14.3-69: Capabilities of the Vietnamese Commi nists
for Fighting in South Vietnam, 17 July 1969
1970
106. SNIE 14.3-70: The Outlook from Hanoi: Factors Affecting North
Vietnam's Policy on the War in Vietnam, 5 February 1970
107. SNIE 58-70: The Communist View of the Situation in Laos,
5 February 1970
108. SNIE 13-9-70: Chinese Reactions to Possible Developments
in Indochina, 28 May 1970 (one copy)
109. SNIE 13-10-70: Chinese Reactions to Certain Courses of
Action in Indochina, 11 June 1970
110. SNIE 57-70:' The Outlook for Cambodia, 6 August 1970
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1971
111. SNIE 13-10-71: Communist China's Reactions to Developments
in Laos, 18 february 1971
112. NIE 53-71: South Vietnam: Problems and Prospects,
29 April 1971
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 1
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Zll 3oBB
ZI- ` 1AY A,,Mn
S.EPT MBEK 20 < 1971
--a .F .. rf-4 ,R# 013 t inns
& nt by Senator J,, W,. Fulbright on the
am of a port by t ? ? neral Accounting Office
ics Problem on Access to information
Es ty this year the, Committee . Frei Relations askdd tho-
G neral Accounting Office to compil+ a list of recent Instances
r-rr& it had btcn denied access to info.tma.tion on matt, rs involving
ovvrm t programs abroad,, Of the eight overseas reviews cited
the report. five were conducted at the r, cs Est of tho Gutsy
;j rhrwq; re in:iti.ated by GAO
o the GAO's basic right to acv=s8 to Ex*cutiv* Branch
wria1s the report stated:
b-fl rev : the Budget and Accounting Act
1.21, as rainf"occ:ed by recent expressions of
> t t by c o rs.ssf ai co ittt 'ts if avos no
r-uuu:bt but that Congress and GAO are v.xpc ctrd to
h; vv accsss to all ecords ? doc nts cor pap roi
n -c ssaty to ti":f ctiv*ly .valuatet the- various
programs oaf the Executtiv Branch,"
r port listed the following t,r:r*s of information which the
0 considered n ccg.ssary to, carry out ics respo'esibiiitits to
o gross which "have not ben provided zromptly or r ?fi.u.scd outright ? "
ruturrt planning information and, documents, both
al and informa 1. ;
int rnai working papers and staff recommendations
f r to programs plan t or in . proc ss;
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uw-gotiation documents, papers, memorandums, and
working papers, before, during and after nego-
tiations, regardless of whether or not the
information is considered sensitive;
management reports including recommendations or
conclusions reached, whether approved or
unapproved by higher authority, field trip
reports, observations, and records of conver-
sations pertinent to the matters under review;
access to records, documents or papers originated
or directly related to foreign governments but in
the possession of United States agencies, when
they relate to programs in which the United States
has a direct interest; and
access to all United States supported bases and
installations regardless of the geographical
location,
report emphasizes that outright denials of information are
are but that delays and referral of requests to "higher authority"
which result in "de facto denial of records" is the standard tactic.
"Normally the regulations and directives (regarding GAO access to
information)" the report said, "do not state that GAO cannot be
furnished the information, but rather that their personnel in the
Yield cannot furnish the information unless authorization is received
from higher authority; this normally means officials of the
Departments in Washington."
As an example, the report cited a directive of the U.S. European
Command Headquarters listing material which chiefs of military aid
missions could not release to the GAO without "approval from higher
authority." Prominentcn the list was "The Military Assistance Five-
'ear Plan for a particular country...", the type of plan which the
Department of Defense recently told the Committee did not exist.
The report contains the following example of the de=laying tactics
used by the Departments of State and Defense:
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"in connection with our current review of
utilization of excess defense articles in MAP,
vu- . requested a country-to-country agreement
between the United States and Australia on
March 31. 1971. The agreement involves the
overseas procurement transaction for the
acquisition of trucks and trailers in Australia
for delivery to Cambodia. The purpose for the
request was to enable us to ascertain why the
arrangement was made in lieu of alternatives
available and whether, in fact, the agreement
was a form of consideration to the Australian
Government for their participation in the
support of our efforts in Vietnam.
"We first made our *quest for the agreement
to the Department of State on March 31, 1971.
On the same data the Department of State
informed us that the agreement was dated March 4,
1971, and that they believed the document was
unclassified but that our request should be
channeled to the Department of Defense, rather
than to them. Upon addressing our request to the
Department of Defense on April 6, 1971, they
referred us back to the State Department because
State.' clearance was necessary for release of the
agreento The Department of State advised us on
the same day that they were unable to release the
document until they acquired clearance from the
Australian Government through the Australian Embassy.
On April 14, 1971, the State Department advised us
that the Department of Defense had sought this
clearance from the Embassy, however, on the same
date, we received a denial from the Department of
Defense of any such communication with the Australian
Embassy. On April 15, 1971, the State Department
informed us that the Department of Defense had
ceived the Australian Government1s clearance but
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that t Departo*nt of Defense must first present a
rl.t}pan reuu st for state Department clearance. vac
the saw. date, April 15, the Department of Defense
told us the Austra.ian clearance was still pending.
Four days later, the Department of Defense told us
that more internal coordination was necessary before
rai ase was possible. In a llowup concerning
thtp status of our request, on April 28, 1971, the
"artment of Defense otticial whom we had contacted
ate