GREECE: FEBRUARY 1971

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73B00296R000200030022-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: March 4, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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92d Congress l
1st Session I
COMMITTEE PRINT
GREECE: FEBRUARY 1971
A STAFF REPORT
THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
50-939 0 WASHINGTON : 1971
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
J. W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, Chairman
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
GALE W. McGEE, Wyoming
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine
WILLIAM B SPONG JR. Virginia
r
GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota
CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, Kentucky
JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas
CARL MARCY, Chief Of Staff
ARTHUR M. KUHL, Chief Clerk
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CONTENTS
Pago
Letter of transmittal_______________________________________________
v
1. The Political Situation_________________________________________
1
II. The Economic Situation_______________________________________
9
III. The U.S. Military Assistance Program___________________________
11
IV. The Embassy and the Regime -----------------------------------
V. Concluding Comments_________________
1113
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
FEBRUARY 26, 1971..
Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On January 25 you asked us to visit Greece
and to report back to the Committee "on the situation in that country,
the considerations affecting the need for furnishing military assistance
to Greece and the status of and prospects regarding U.S.-Greek
relations." By letter you informed Secretary Rogers, Secretary Laird
and Mr. Helms of our trip and its purposes, and you asked them each
to arrange for us to be briefed in Washington before our departure
which was done. The Department of State cabled the Embassy in
Athens quoting your letter and asking the Embassy to arrange brief-
ings and "appointments with appropriate Greek officials."
One of us (Mr. Lowenstein) spent a day and a half in Brussels on the
way to Athens examining the question of the importance of Greece to
the alliance. He saw Ambassador Ellsworth and various members of the
U.S. Mission to NATO; General Goodpaster, the Supreme Allied
Commander, and Admiral Henderson, Chairman of the Military
Committee; and a number of other Ambassadors to NATO.
We both arrived in Athens on January 31 and left one week later.
In Athens, we talked to Ambassador Tasca members of the Embassy
staff, Major General Hightower, Chief of the Joint United States
Military Advisory Group Greece (JUSMAGG) and members of his
staff. We met with the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the
Minister of Education, the Under Secretary to the Prime Minister,
who is the official spokesman of the government, the President of
the Council of State, which is the supreme administrative court of
Greece, and the Governor of the Bank of Greece. We also met with
a number of political leaders active in previous governments including
former Prime Ministers Kanellopoulos and Stephanopoulos, former
Foreign Minister Averoff, former Ministers Mavros and Markezinis,
and the President of the last parliament, Dimitrious Papaspyrou.
The appointments with those in the Greek Government were arranged
by the Embassy. Most of the others we arranged ourselves. In addi-
tion, we saw several experienced foreign observers and Greek private
citizens.
When we arrived in Athens we were told by the Embassy that, on
its own initiative, the Foreign Ministry had informed the Embassy
that the Prime Minister (who is also. Foreign Minister and Defense
Minister) and the Chief of Staff were considering seeing us. Several
times during the course of our week in Athens we said to the Embassy
that while we did not want to appear presumptuous we were anxious
to see whoever in the government would be willing to see us so that
we would have the fullest possible exposure to the Greek Govern-
ment's point of view. The Embassy's response was that appointments
(V)
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vi
with the Prime Minister and the Chief of Staff were pending. But on
the next to last day of our visit, the Embassy informed us that they
had been told that appointments with the Prime Minister and the
Chief of Staff were "not possible." The Minister of Justice, who had
fixed an appointment on the next to last day of our visit, called an
Embassy officer the night before to say that he was too busy.
For much of the last three days at, least, and perhaps for more of
the time, we were followed by plain clothes police both in cars and on
foot. We found ourselves followed when we were in taxis as well as in
Embassy cars. We were followed even when going from the hotel to
the Embassy. On the last day, a police car followed us to the airport
and one of the plain clothes police then entered the airport building
and, while pretending to read his newspaper, watched as we cleared
through passport control.
When we presented our classified report to the Committee in
Executive Session on February 18, we were asked to prepare an
unclassified report. That report, in which we have followed our usual
practice of avoiding direct attribution, follows.
Sincerely yours,
JAMES G. LOWENSTEIN.
RICHARD M. MOOSE.
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Greece: February 1971
Asked to describe the present political situation in Greece, one high
ranking Greek official said to us: "Greece today may have the attributes
of a political dictatorship but the tendency is not to reinforce these
attributes." He went on to point out that since World War II there
have been 42 changes of government and that over the years since
World War I there have been coups, attempted coups, dictatorships,
democracies with a King, democracies without a King and a civil war.
The Embassy made the same argument somewhat differently, empha-
sizing that there have been 45 changes of government in the past 30
years and ten military governments since 1909. The point of these
statements, of course, is that one should not speak of the present
situation in Greece, or of the future, without bearing in mind the
country's turbulent political past.
Other observers commented to us that in order to achieve the
totals cited above for the period since World War II, it is necessary
to count as changes every transition to and from caretaker govern-
ment in connection with parliamentary elections. They note that these
totals also give disproportionate weight to the five-year period im-
mediately following World War II and obscure the fact that between
1952 and 1965 only three individuals served as Prime Ministers head-
ing a parliamentary government, as distinct from a caretaker govern-
ment, and the further fact that one of these Prime Ministers-Mr.
Karamanlis-was in office continuously for eight years.
The present Prime Minister often refers in his speeches to the chaotic
situation which led the group of military officers who constituted
themselves the "Revolutionary Council" to take over power in April
1967, although it is said on good authority that he and others had
begun preparing for such a move at least as early as 1956. At the same
time, he continues to emphasize the transitional nature of his govern-
ment and his desire to return to parliamentary democracy.
That transitional government has, however, now been in power for
almost four years. The constitution has not yet been implemented in
most important respects. Martial law remains in effect for political
offenses, and as a result civilians are still being arrested for political
offenses by military police. If they are charged or tried at all, it is
before courts martial. The Prime Minister referred in a press inter-
view, early in 1970, to the efficacy of the "shadow of martial law,"
tacit admission of its deliberate use as a tool of intimidation. What
talk there has been by government leaders of elections has been to
the effect that they will not take place in the foreseeable future,
although in a recent statement the Prime Minister issued a veiled
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threat to his colleagues in the regime that, in effect, if they did not
fall into line under his leadership, elections might be held sooner than
they might wish.
It is against this background that recent U.S. official statements
seem incomprehensible to many Greeks, foreign observers and even
some officials in the Executive Branch. When the United States
announced on September 22, 1970, the lifting of the selective embargo
on the delivery of heavy military- equipment to Greece, imposed im-
rnediately after the coup in April 1967 and maintained since then ex-
cept for a brief period in the fall of 1968 after the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia, the announcement stated that the decision to resume
the shipment of suspended items rested "entirely" on considerations
relating to the strategic advantages to the NATO alliance and the
United States which were of great importance to the West. But the
announcement went on to say: "The trend toward a constitutional
order is established . . . Major sections of the constitution have
been implemented . The Government of Greece has stated that
it intends to establish parliamentary democracy . . "
As for the importance of the strategic advantages to NATO and the
United States, both NATO authorities and U.S. officials do indeed look
on Greece as a valuable and important ally. They refer to its vital
strategic position on the eastern flank of the alliance, its willingness
to increase defense expenditures, the fact that it has the longest term
of military service of any NATO country, the excellence of its armed
forces, their fighting spirit, Greece's attachment to the west and
abhorrence of communism and the common boundary that Greece
shares with three communist countries-Albania, Yugoslavia and
Bulgaria.
For the United States, still other important factors were pointed out
to us. In a Mediterranean increasingly inhospitable to the United
States, and in which there is a growing Soviet naval presence, Greece
provides an unrestricted port of call and supply for the Sixth Fleet as
well as valuable communications sites. (Last fall, during the Jordanian
crisis, there were several hundred ship visits during a three month
period at a time, when political conditions in Turkey permitted only
a few ship visits, and we were told in Athens that there is an average
of about 2,000 U.S. fleet personnel ashore per day in Greek ports.)
In addition, Greece affords important operational and logistics mili-
tary facilities which, in view of current anti-Americanism in Turkey,
would be of great potential value in the event of direct U.S. involve-
ment in the Middle East. During the recent Middle East crisis, Greece
permitted the United States to evacuate 150 Americans from Jordan
and also allowed us to airlift mobile hospitals to Jordan through
Greek airfields. In this connection, however, some question whether
Greece's willingness to allow its territory to be used in connection
with possible direct U.S. involvement in the Middle East can be
taken for granted. They note that while providing a safe haven for
American civilians does not jeopardize Greek interests in the Arab
world, any proposal to use bases in Greece as a staging area for direct
intervention could involve risks which no Greek government might
consider worth taking. They refer, for example, to the presence of
some 25,000 to 50,000 Greek nationals in Arab countries and to
Greece's interest in those countries as an outlet for exports. As an
illustration of Greek sensitivity to such considerations, it was pointed
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out to us that although Greek-Israeli relations are friendly, and there
is a Greek representative with the personal rank of Ambassador in
Israel, out of deference to Arab countries Greece does not maintain
an Embassy in Israel.
As for the second part of the aforementioned Department of State
announcement, the Greek Government has indeed stated that it
"intends to establish parliamentary democracy" (perhaps a better
term would have been to reestablish parliamentary democracy) but it
certainly has never stated when it will actually do so. Even in the
October 1969 statement of the late Greek Foreign Minister Pipinelis
to the Council of Europe, the nearest approach so far to setting a time-
table for implementing the constitution, Pipinelis refused to fix a date
for elections. A high Greek official told us that five conditions would
have to be fulfilled before a "healthy" parliamentary system could be,
established. These conditions, which have been set forth in various
public statements over the last few months but which have no basis
in the constitution, were that Greece must move to a developed state
economically with a per capita national income of about $1,050 it
year (the present level is about $700 and the official estimated that
it would take "two to three years" for it to rise about 500/0i although
others estimate that this will require at least five to seven years),
a fairer distribution of wealth, a reorganization of the machinery of
government, the necessary conditions for a healthy "new political
life" for which there must be new kinds of political parties and it
better press, and reform of Greece's system of education. When all
five of these goals are realized, he said, then there could be a return
to parliamentary government without danger.
Over the past year and a half, the government has issued a number
of statements promising full implementation of the constitution and
the lifting of martial law and has then withdrawn those promises or
undercut them by its actions. On August 25, 1969 the Greek Govern-
ment submitted a note to the Council of Europe stating that the laws
envisaged by the constitution would enter into effect by December
1970. In his statement to the Council of Europe in October 1969, Mr.
Pipinelis repeated the assurance that the entire constitution would be
implemented by the end of 1970. In a speech on December 15, 1969,
the Prime Minster said, in a somewhat more qualified manner, that
"the passage of institutional laws will be completed" in 1970 (and,
incidentally, also said in the same speech: "We are not ... about to
proceed to elections"). But on December 19, 1970 the Prime Minister
said flatly that there would be "no change in the coming year" in the
constitutional field.
Thus, for the moment at least, further progress on the most sig-
nificant aspects of the constitution is frozen. Eight of the twelve
constitutional articles which were suspended upon promulgation of
that document will, according to the Prime Minister, remain suspended
through 1971. These are Article 12, relating to the trail of civilians by
civilian courts; Article 14, relating to freedom of the press; Article 25,
relating to the role of the Council of State and the Parliament in de-
creeing a state of seige; Article 58, relating to political parties; Article
60, relating to parliamentary elections; Article 111, relating to trial by
jury and to trial of press offenses by regular courts; Article 112, relating
to the non-trial of civilians by courts-martial; and Article 121, relating
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It
to the election of municipal and community authorities. It is argued
by some critics of the regime that, in fact, 65 of the 138 articles of the
constitution are not being applied at present, in part in some cases and
in full in others, either because they are still specifically suspended, or
because the necessary enabling or institutional legislation has not been
put into effect, or because they depend for full implementation on
other articles that are not presently operative.
Putting an article of the constitution into effect involves a compli-
cated legal procedure. In brief, some articles must be implemented
through enabling legislation or institutional laws. These laws are first
published in the official gazette and may or may not be referred for
further study. In any event, they do not take effect until the Prime
Minister so decrees.
Fifteen institutional laws to implement the constitution that the
government has promised at various times would be enacted and put
into effect by decree by the end of 1970 were, in fact, gazetted on
January 5 of this year. The Prime Minister then decreed that six of
them were to take et:`fect immediately, the dates later this year on
which four would take effect were .given and five-among which were
the most significant of the fifteen-were simply gazetted without
specific dates being mentioned. These five relate to the state of seige,
the regency, political parties, the Constitutional Court and the func-
tions of the Commissioner of Parliament.
Government statements with regard to institutional laws do not
include any mention of articles of the constitution relating to elections
and the creation of parliament. 'These articles of the constitution
apparently simply remain suspended.
The regime has created a "Consultative Committee on Legislation,"
referred to in Athens as the "miniparliament." The decree establishing
the Consultative Committee provides that it may debate and com-
ment on draft laws, but it does not give the Consultative Committee
the power to initiate or enact legislation. Forty-six of the fifty-six
members of the body were chosen by 1200 government appointed
electors from among 92 persons nominated by local officials and the
executive committees of trade unions and professional associations
(membership in such executive committees is controlled by the
regime). The remaining ten members of the Consultative Committee
were appointed outright by the regime. In statements intended for
consumption abroad, the regime tends to portray the Consultative
Committee as the forerunner of a true parliament. One opposition
figure characterized it, however, as "worse than a farce."
* * *
The most discussed provision of the Constitution is Article Ten
which relates to due process. The Greek Code of Penal Procedure is
controlled by, and ultimately flows from, articles in the constitution
which detail the procedures that must be followed in arrests, the
issuance of warrants, search and seizure and pretrial detention.
Article Ten specifically states that with the exception of persons
caught in the act of committing an offense, no one shall be arrested or
imprisoned without a judicial warrant which must be served at the
time of arrest or remand in custody pending trial, that the person
arrested must be brought before the competent examining magistrate
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not later than 24 hours from the time of the arrest, that within three
days of the time of presentation the examining magistrate is obliged
either to release the person arrested or to deliver a warrant for his
imprisonment, and that the maximum term of custody pending trial
cannot exceed one year for criminal charges and six months for mis-
demeanor charges. The Greek Code of Penal Procedure also provides
that arrests cannot be carried out at night in a house unless the
occupant of the house requests it, or a person in the house is in the
act of committing a felony or misdemeanor, or a gathering is being
held in the house for the purpose of gambling or immoral activities or
the house is open to the public at night.
The Prime Minister has stated however, most recently in his
December 19, 1970 speech, that crimes "concerning the integrity or
security or constitutional order of the country" have been left under
the jurisdiction of military tribunals. The regime itself is apparently
the sole judge of what constitutes a crime against the state.
We were assured by several leading Greek lawyers that under no
provision of either civil or military law can the period in which
someone detained is held incommunicado exceed 20 days. Yet accord-
ing to many reports that we heard from the wives of persons now
detained, from their attorneys and from their friends, some people
are still being picked up without warrants by the military police and
are then removed to police stations or detained elsewhere incom-
municado for periods considerably in excess of 20 days.
Of course, the question of how Article Ten and martial law can exist
side by side is a difficult one to explain. Indeed, no one, including the
government officials with whom we spoke, offered an explanation
based on law. The government asserts simply that martial law takes
precedence over Article Ten and that all the arrests that have been
made are according to proper legal procedure.
In the early days of the regime, over 6,000 alleged communists and
known communists were rounded up and detained. U.S. and Greek
officials say that by April 1970 all but 1,200 of these had been released.
We were told that there are now somewhere between 335 and 355 in.
detention. The Prime Minister has said in a public speech that within.
the first four months of 1971 all of these detainees, most of whom are
on the island of Leros and have been there since immediately after the
coup, will be released "provided the internal security situation develops
as expected."
These detainees are known as Kratoumeni. There are two other
categories of prisoners. Those in internal exile, who have been sent to
remote islands and villages, are known as Ektopismeni. They are con-
sidered to have passed through the judicial system, although ap-
parently no specific charges have been made against them. This group,
now about 60, includes former members of parliament, high ranking
military officers and civilians. The Prime Minister has said that he
will release them, too, within the first four months of 1971 if security
conditions permit.
The third group are known as Fylakismeni. They are prisoners
convicted and sentenced who are now serving terms for political
crimes the regime has charged were clearly felonious in intent. We
heard various estimates of the number of those in this category
ranging from 340 to 380.
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Arrests, it should be noted, are still continuing, although when the
government or the Embassy refers to the release of detainees no
mention is made of these new additions to the number of those being
held. The new wave of arrests apparently began in November. Esti-
mates we heard of those arrested ranged from 40 to 180. The govern-
ment links these arrests to the setting off of a small bomb on October 3
in the garden adjacent to the Prime Minister's office at the time
Secretary of Defense Laird was with the Prime Minister and the
explosion of a bomb on November 28 at President Truman's statue
at downtown Athens.
It should be noted that the policy announced by the Prime Minister
of releasing detainees and those in domestic exile on remote islands
will have the effect of freeing all known to have, or suspected to have,
communist convictions. But it will leave in prison, or in an indefinite
status awaiting trial, non-communist regime opponents-that is,
those who are center or conservative.
Often when the number of prisoners, detainees and those in exile is
discussed by the Embassy or by government officials it is contended
that the numbers involved are lower than under any previous govern-
ment. Even opposition sources in Athens say that when Karamanlis
became Prime Minister in October 1955, there were 4,338 political
prisoners sentenced by ordinary or military courts (most of whom had
been imprisoned as a result of antigovernment actions during the
occupation and cavil war) and 833 deportees. They contend, however,
that by the time Prime Minister Karamanlis left power there were only
959 political prisoners and no deportees and that in the course of the
following four years all but 17 of the political prisoners were released.
One cannot talk of prisoners in Greece without referring to the
emotionally charged and heavily publicized question of torture. We
felt that there was little we could do to gather direct evidence on this
question during our brief stay in Athens. Suffice it to say, then, that
on the one hand government spokesmen continue to deny that any
tortures have taken place. On the other hand, we talked to former
prisoners who said that they had been "tortured" and to wives of other
prisoners who said their husbands had been "tortured," although
these tortures were never described and we did not feel we could ask
for particulars. Sometimes wives talked about the torture of solitary
confinement, and other times it seemed to us that the word "torture"
was used as a synonym for such brutality as severe beating. It seems
clear, however, that there have been cases of "falanga" or bastinado.
'l.'he general feeling among Western observers is that there is less
torture today than there was before, and perhaps even none at all
now, although there were reports during the time of our visit that
some of the students recently arrested who are still being held incom-
municado were being tortured. Most observers believe it, likely, never-
theless, that prisoners are still being mishandled and even brutally
treated in police stations. As the agreement between the government
of Greece and the International Red Cross, which expired in No-
vember of last year, was not renewed by the Government, there is no
way to check on such questions. (One of the explanations offered on
this point was that the regime may now have less need to resort to
torture because people think they may be tortured.)
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Since the present regime took power, it has never put its popularity
to a free vote, and there seems no way of measuring accurately the
extent of its popular support. It is generally accepted among political
observers in Athens, however, that the regime is supported by the
business community, including the foreign business community (which
is actively courted by the regime and obviously prefers a stable
political situation-"an oasis of tranquility" as one put it-with no
labor unrest, continuing economic growth and favorable terms offered
by the government) ; much of the army (which has been the recipient
of salary and pension increases from the regime) ; and many members
of the church hierarchy (church salaries have also been increased).
Some say the peasants are more favorably inclined to the regime than
opposed to it because the government has brought more roads and
electricity to the countryside. Some say the reverse. Some say the
peasantry is politically apathetic. The regime is said to be opposed
by most intellectuals, the professional class, civil servants and students.
Those who contend that more people are opposed to the regime
than in favor of it argue that were this not the case it would not be
necessar for the regime, after almost four years in power, to continue
martial law in force and that if the regime did enjoy popular support
it would have held elections by now if -for no other reason than to
improve its image abroad.
There are at least five major resistance organizations in Greece,
some more active than others. They are PAM, an organization of the
extreme left, many members of which, including the nominal leader
of the organization, Mikis Theodarikis, are communists; PAK, the
Pan Hellenic Liberation Movement which is led by Andreas Papan-
dreou; Democratic Defense, a centrist group; the Free Greeks, an
organization composed principally of former army officers loyal to the
King; and the Righas Ferraios, a student group. All are dedicated to
the overthrow of the present regime, and some are even willing to use
violent means.
As far as legitimate political activity is concerned-if indeed such
can be said to exist at all-leading personalities of the former center
and right parties-many of whom have been in detention or prison at
some time since the present regime came to power-continue to speak
out to visitors and some occasionally issue messages to the foreign
press. They are extremely careful in their activities, however, acutely
aware that they are continually under the "shadow" of martial law.
The left has been quiet, some believe because they feel that a natural
polarization will result and, in the long run, play into their hands.
The status of the press is difficult to define-it is neither free nor
completely under government control. There is no longer pre-censor-
ship, but the subjects prohibited under the constitution and the new
press law are so broad and vaguely defined that the press is reluctant
to take chances, particularly in view of the fate of those who have.
The Prime Minister said in his April 10, 1970 press conference that
offenses described by Article 52 of the new press law-that is, pub-
lishing "texts, pictures or illustrations which may revive political
passion"-would come before military tribunals. Other offenses
come before civilian courts but, under Article 34 of the press law,
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those who can be punished for acts committed by the press are "the
author of the publication, and regardless of responsibility the Publisher
and the Managing Editor . . "
Furthermore, the press is subjected to indirect measures of control.
Article 20 of the press law imposes a penalty on newspapers of large
circulation (and it is the opposition newspapers that have the largest
circulations) by providing that publications with a circulation of 25,000
or less can be printed on newsprint imported duty free while those
with a circulation of between 25,000 and 50,000 receive a discount of
50%, those whose circulation is between 60,000 and 75,000 a discount
of 25%, those whose circulation is between 75,000 and 100,000 a
discount of 10% and those with a circulation of more than 100,000
copies a discount of 5%. The regime is also said to interfere with the
distribution of opposition papers outside of Athens and to penalize
offending papers by withdrawing government advertising. Finally,
the fact that heavy sentences, ranging up to five years, were given
the publishers and others on the staff of Ethnos, an anti-government
newspaper, in April. 1970 for publishing an interview which referred
to the need for a "national government" to deal with the Cyprus
crisis has had an intimidating effect.
The radio and television networks, being state owned, are completely
controlled by the government. Thus the paradoxical situation
exists of the United States using Voice of America transmitters in
Greed to broadcast about democracy to communist countries,
transmitting these broadcasts from installations located in a country
where the radio is completely controlled by a regime which has no
elected parliament and denies many fundamental civil liberties.
On the other hand, the press apparently feels that it can reprint
official documents of foreign governments without punishment. The
entire record of the Symington Subcommittee hearings on Greece was
published, for example. And there is no restriction on the sale of
foreign newspapers and periodicals. All can be found at newsstands in
Athens.
Political observers in Athens say that the leadership of the regime
is not monolithic in its views. It is said that four or five members of the
inner council of about 15 are unwilling to go even as far as the Prime
Minister in returning to parliamentary democracy, and some argue
therefore that the most likely alternative to the present regime is a
government even less willing to return to a democratic order. There
are also reports that there is a small Troup of younger Army officers
who look to Colonekk Gaddafi, the Libyan leader, as their example.
Highly nationalistic and chauvinistic, they are said to favor authori-
tarianism at home and a policy of complete independence from all
blocs.
Among the opposition politicians of the center and right, there are a few
who believe that they could, under certain conditions, work with the
regime, acting as a bridge between the present military government
and a civilian government. Others in the opposition feel that a political
government cannot evolve from the present military government and
that there must be it transitional stage with a government of mixed
character under the King.
The regime seems to have a firm hold on the administration of the
country. While mayors and village presidents were formerly elected,
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they are now appointed by the government, and many of them are
ex-officers. Similarly, there are military officers attached to every gov-
ernment ministry, in many cases in the post of secretary general, and
to university faculties.
Greeks have, of course, been generally pro-American, but now there
are reports of growing anti-Americanism, reports which the Embassy
seems inclined to discount. On the one hand, the regime seeks to
exploit national resentment of outside interference, just as Andreas
Papandreou sought to exploit it in the period immediately before the
coup. On the other hand, those who are opposed to the present regime
blame the United States for strengthening the government's hand by
appearing to support it. (As an example, we were shown a student
flyer which said that the Embassy "should stop talking about this
country on which Americans have imposed the most corrupt, the
most immoral and the most backward form of government so that
Greece does not become a European state but an American Protecto-
rate.")
Among opposition leaders-most of whom have the reputation of
having been strongly pro-American-there is a feeling that the United
States has betrayed its true friends and natural allies in the Greek
population, selling out these friendships for immediate strategic ad-
vantages. Opposition leaders feel that they have been purposely ig-
nored by the Embassy and some, if not all, are obviously becoming
progressively disenchanted with the U.S. role in Greece. They point
out the existence of what appears to them to be a vicious circle: the
Greek people believe the United States supports the regime, and there-
fore consider opposing it futile, while the United States interprets
absence of outward opposition as evidence of support for the regime.
None of those who took this view advocated direct intervention to
depose the regime. Instead, they suggested that the United States
could afford to put some distance between itself and the regime by
means such as restricting the exchange of high-level visits, limiting
public appearances by U.S. officials in Greece with leaders of the
regime, and characterizing the regime's failure to live up to its prom-
ises more realistically in U.S. official statements.
II. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION
In almost lyrical terms, the Embassy's unclassified analysis of the
Greek economy, which is given to visiting American businessmen, be-
gins by stating: "The Greeks have a word-apithanos-magic-
which might well be used to describe how Greece through August 1970
was able to raise GNP at constant prices by 7% percent while holding
the rise in the consumer price index to 2.8 percent. . . ." The paper
goes on to say that "Greece's economic performance has continued to
sparkle" and adds that "the steady progress of one of America's
closest allies in twenty years from a backward, agricultural country
to a more prosperous, partially industrialized one, is bound to strength-
en our political and economic position in this critical part of the world."
The Embassy analysis also notes that since 1953 U.S. investors
have provided some 40 percent-the largest single share-of foreign
capital; that over one-quarter of Greece's foreign tourists and 60 per-
cent of its tourist earnings are from America; that the United States
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has traditionally been the second largest supplier of imports to Greece;
and that, in sum, "the United States is far and away the most im-
portant source of foreign exchange for Greece."
The following favorable economic factors are cited:
(a) The GNP at 1958 prices rose by 7.1 percent in 1970,
according to the Bank of Greece, thus returning to the high rate of
growth which began years before the coup but was interrupted in
1967 and 1968.
(b) Manufacturing output rose 10.3 percent in the first nine
months of 1970, again according to the Bank of Greece.
(c) Agricultural production rose 7.5 percent over 1969,
according to the Embassy
(d) The average I.
of consumer prices rose 3.1 percent
between January and October 1970, compared to the same
period in 1969--a lower rate of increase than any other European
country, according to the Bank of Greece.
On the other hand, it is also rioted that:
(a) There are inflationary forces present as a result of a 15
percent increase in imports in 1970, a 9 percent rise in industrial
wages and a 5 percent rise in pensions of public employees and
low unemployment. As a result, the money supply was up last
year by 16 percent.
(b) Greece continues to have a chronic trade deficit which
reached a level of $1,003.8 million in the first eleven months of
1970, up from $842.3 million in 1969. Invisibles produced a net
surplus of $616.1 million in this period so that the balance on
current account for the period January through November 1970
was $387.7 million. (The final figure for the year was $406.8 mil-
lion, we were told, compared to $247.5 million in 1968). The
trade deficit in 1970 was apparently worse than planned and had
to be offset by borrowing from abroad in the amount of $28
million between January and November 1970, although this
amount was lower than the $47.1 million borrowed from abroad
in the first eleven months of 1969.
It is emphasized by NATO officials in Brussels, and pointed to
with pride by JUSMAGG in Greece, that in 1969 Greece devoted
5.1 percent of its GNP to defense expenditures (this figure is estimated
to be 6 percent in 1970). Greece is thus the third highest among
NATO countries in terms of the percentage of GNP devoted to de-
fense. Only the United States at 8.7 percent and Portugal at 6.2
percent are higher.
In 1966, before the present regime came to power, Greece contrib-
uted only 3.7 percent of its GNP to defense and was tied for sixth
place, with the Netherlands, after the United States, Portugal, the
UTK, France, Germany and Turkey. In fact, between 1966 and 1969,
the last year for which complete figures are available, only Greece
showed a significant rise in the percentage of GNP devoted to defense,
due in large part to increased pair and allowances. During this three-
year period, the percentage rose from 8.5 percent to 8.7 percent for
the United States, from 3.6 percent to 3.7 percent for Norway and
from 4.7 percent to 4.9 percent for Turkey. In the case of Greece,
the rise was from 3.7 percent to 5.1 percent.
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The 1971 Greek budget presented on December 30, 1970, shows
a surplus projected of $143 million of revenues over expenditures, a
surplus 16.3 percent greater than 1970. Expenditures in the sector
of "defense and public security" (there is no breakdown in the budget
between the two, and expenditures on internal security do not, of.
course, necessarily contribute to NATO defense purposes) will be
up $50 million (or 9.2 percent compared to a 10.8 percent rise in all
budget expenditures) and will represent 32 percent of total regular
budget expenditures. Of this $50 million increase, $13 million is
earmarked for increased military pensions which are now 131 percent
higher than they were in 1966. If the budget is implemented as
planned, Greek defense and security expenditures will have more
than doubled since 1966.
III. THE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
In presenting the justification for the fiscal year 1971 Military
Assistance Program for Greece to the Congress, the Department of
Defense stated: "Greece has been dependent on U.S. military assist-
ance programs to meet its military equipment requirements since
1957." That statement seems to be as true for the period during which
the heavy arms embargo was in effect as for any other period since
1947. Indeed, despite the embargo, lifted briefly in the fall of 1968
after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Greece received even larger
amounts of U.S. military assistance, taking all categories combined,
during the three years and five months the embargo was in effect
than in the equivalent period before the embargo was imposed.
Figures recently released by the Department of State for fiscal years
1968, 1969 and 1970 (a period that begins two months after the coup
and ends two and a half months before the embargo was finally lifted)
show military grant aid deliveries totaling $131.4 million. In addition,
the figures show that Greece received a total of $169.7 million in de-
livered excess equipment, at acquisition value, and $25.8 million under
the Foreign Military Sales program in this period. Thus, the total
military aid received in these three years was $326.9 million.
This figure does not, of course, represent the total value of military
assistance received while the embargo was in force because the period
of fiscal years 1968, 1969 and 1970 is four and a half months shorter
than the period in which the embargo applied. But the State Depart-
ment figures do show that the average total military assistance in the
three fiscal years preceding the embargo was about $95.2 million a year
while the average total program in the three fiscal years in which
the embargo was in effect was about $106.9 million a year. This rise was
due to the fact that while grant aid deliveries generally declined
during the embargo period, compared to the period before the em-
bargo, deliveries of excess defense articles and period before
Military Sales
deliveries both rose sharply.
While these deliveries were being made, a large amount of em-
bargoed material was accumulating. When the embargo was imposed,
about $60 million worth of grant aid was awaiting shipment to Greece.
When the embargo was lifted, the total "in the pipeline," over and
above the deliveries already cited, was $42.8 million in excess articles
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and $67.8 million in undelivered Military Assistance Program ma-
teriel, according to the Defense Department. In addition, the loans of
two submarines and six destroyers have been renewed for ten years.
The embargo of major weapons did not, of course, affect the
regime's military capability internally. The United States continued
to provide small arms, ammunition, communications equipment, and
trucks which could be used by the Army for internal security purposes.
Nevertheless, the embargo was not generally popular with opposition
leaders in Greece because they felt that it did weaken the country's
ability to defend itself. On the other hand, there was no pressure from
NATO countries for lifting the embargo and apparently some surprise
that the embargo was lifted when it was.
The personnel directory of JUSMAGG shows a total of 72 U.S.
military personnel, 38 U.S. civilians and 57 local employees. The
civilians include 1.5 "technical representatives" from General Electric,
Lockheed, RCA, Northrop, Hughes Aircraft, Pratt and Whitney,
General Dynamics, Grumman and Curtis Wright whose salaries and
expenses are paid by Military Assistance Program funds for "support
of Air Force MAI' materiel program," according to the Defense
Department. The 73 U.S. military personnel are accompanied by 170
dependents and the civilians by 74 dependents. The announced total
is thus 354 Americans.
JUSMAGG is, incidentally, excused from end-use reporting require-
ments because of "recent personnel reductions." We were told that
this exemption applies in a number of other countries which receive
U.S. military assistance.
The foregoing personnel figures are, of course, limited to the military
advisory mission. They do not include the approximately 7,000 other
military personnel, and their dependents, based in Greece. To see what
restrictions were imposed on us as representatives of this Committee,
we asked what bases we could visit, other than the principal U.S. base
at the Athens airport, and we also asked the Embassy for an updated
list of U.S. bases and facilities in Greece. The Embassy said that it
would have to ask for instructions on both questions. The reply given
us the next day was that the Embassy was instructed not to provide
us with a list of all U.S. bases and facilities in Greece, but that such a
list would be provided in Washington by the Defense Department. As
for visits, we were told that we could visit four bases. We were told
that we could not visit a number of other bases including a base that
had been visited two years ago by members of the Symington Sub-
committee staff.
* * *
It should be noted that the United States is the only NATO country
now giving Greece military assistance. The only other sizeable military
assistance program was that of West Germany, but that government
continues its embargo on military assistance imposed soon after the
regime assumed power. At the same time, NATO countries do not
restrict their commercial sales to Greece. According to press reports,
West Germany has sold Greece patrol aircraft and submarines and
France has sold patrol boats and tanks.
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The purchase of French arms is seen by some U.S. officials as ill-
conceived because of the drain on Greece's foreign exchange reserves.
But the Greek press refers to these foreign arms purchases, as did the
Prime Minister in a recent speech, as proof of Greece's ability to provide
itself with the weapons it needs. Most independent observers-and
some U.S. officials-have concluded that the motivation for weapons
purchases from France was primarily political, designed to put pres-
sure on the United States to resume shipments of heavy arms. And
indeed the prospect of Greece's buying arms from France, instead of
receiving them as gifts from the United States, does seem to have
given rise to some concern among American officials that the United
States was in danger of losing a source of leverage that could be
applied on the Greek Government and, as a result, to have had an
influence on the American decision to lift the embargo.
IV. THE EMBASSY AND THE REGIME
"Is the Junta deceiving the Embassy, is the Embassy deceiving the
State Department or is the State Department deceiving the Con-
gress?", a prominent Greek critic of the regime-known to be pro-
American-asked us. The question was repeated, in less well formu-
lated fashion, countless times during our stay in Athens. Those who
posed the question pointed not only to the statement that "the trend
toward a constitutional order has been established" but also to the
testimony of Executive Branch witnesses before Senator Symington's
subcommittee last June, specifically the statements by Deputy Assist-
ant Secretary of State Roger Davies that "we are informed that the
entire constitution will be implemented by the end of the year" and
that "it is my belief that the assurance we have received from Athens,
that the constitution will be implemented in full by the end of the
calendar year, will be carried out."
The Embassy appears to have operated on the assumption that the
regime was sincere in its declared intention to return to parliamentary
democracy and that the continuation of the arms embargo was harmful
to the development of the kind of relationship which would permit the
United States to exercise some persuasion on the Greek regime to
restore civil liberties and parliamentary government. It appears to
other observers with whom we talked, however, that the Embassy
tends to read more into the regime's statements than the regime
intends or than is warranted on the basis of the performance to date.
Certainly, the general attitude of the Embassy is defensive about the
regime-quick to praise during the period before the embargo was
lifted but slow to criticize now that the embargo has been ended and
the regime in default on its assurances.
Many in the Embassy tend to rationalize the actions of the regime
in terms similar to those the regime itself uses. For example, the
Embassy apparently believes that the proposed law on political parties
is basically democratic and compatible with local conditions despite
the fact that under Article 58 of the new constitution, which the new
law would implement when put into force, the charter of every political
party must be approved by the Constitutional Court which also can
supervise the functioning of the parties and has the power to dissolve
any party whose "aims or activities are manifestly or covertly opposed
to the form of government . . ."
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In this same connection, we noted that in Embassy meetings the
coup and its aftermath was often referred to as the "revolution."
Those Greeks opposed to the regime in Athens refer not to the "rev-
olution" but to the "junta" or the "Colonels." Others, less partisan,
refer to the "government," or the "leadership" or tie "regime." It
is only those who support the government who refer to the "revolu-
tion." The term is certainly not neutral.
The Public Affairs Office of the Department of State, presumably on
the basis of reporting from the Embassy in Athens, publishes an un-
classified quick reference aid entitled "Greece: U.S. Policy." The latest
version of that paper, published in January of this year, makes a
number of statements that do not seem to be accurate.
It states that: "From a high of over 6,000 in 1967, there are now
approximately 300 political prisoners. The Prime Minister has pledged
to free all remaining political detainees by the end of April 1971 if
security conditions permit." There are, of course, far more than 300
political prisoners if the numbers of those in exile (of which there are
60), detainees (of which there are about 345) and sentenced prisoners
(of which there are about 350) are combined. The 6,000 figure refers,
moreover, to those suspected of communist sympathies who were
detained immediately after the coup. The Prime Minister's statement
applied to the remaining detainees from among that group but not
to those sentenced for political crimes, to say nothing of those arrested
since November.
The State Department paper includes the remarkable sentence
that "With minor exceptions, all institutional laws necessary to put
into force the constitution were promulgated by the end of 1970 as
pledged by the Greek Government." As we have noted in this report,
the institutional laws not yet put into force are hardly minor since
they relate to the state of seige, political parties, parliament and the
constitutional court, Furthermore, the constitution is by no means
yet in effect; elections have not been scheduled or even promised and
martial law is still in effect superseding the guarantees of due process
for which the constitution provides.
Finally, on the question of torture, the paper states that during
the operative period of the agreement between the Greek Government
and the International Committee of the Red Cross, "no instances of
torture of prisoners were confirmed by the Red Cross." The fact of
the matter is that, as a matter of policy, the Red Cross never confirms
or denies instances of torture or indeed ever issues public reports.
Its reports were made to the Greek Government and were confidential.
The implication of the statement quoted is that no torture has taken
place when in fact it seems far more probable that some tortures have
occurred.
During our visit to Athens, we were struck by the fact that while
the Embassy does not question the desirability of a return to parlia-
mentary government in Greece, it not only rationalizes the lack of
progress but often appears to be more concerned with the regime's
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"image" than with the substance of its actions. Time and again we
heard expressions of regret at the regime's poor sense of public
relations.
As far as arrests under martial law are concerned, the Embassy
stated to us that it assumed that the arrests were being carried out
under the letter, if not the spirit, of the law. Yet no one in Athens was
able to cite to us any provisions of the military or civilian penal code
which permits holding persons in detention incommunicado for more
than 20 days.
* *
We have already referred several times to the statement issued by
the Department of State at the time the embargo on the shipment of
heavy arms was lifted last September. A number of opposition leaders
told us that they had not objected to the resumption of heavy arms
aid on the ground that no patriotic Greek could oppose the provision
of U.S. arms to help safeguard the security of their country. But
they emphasized that they had regarded the kind of statement issued
in connection with ending the embargo to be of primary importance.
One opposition leader told us that the statement that was issued was
"pure nonsense", and he asked: "In view of the actual trend of
events in Greece, why did the United States become a lying witness
in favor of the regime?" The strongly pro-Western former Foreign
Minister Averoff gave us a copy of the statement he had issued on
September 23 to foreign correspondents. In that statement, he said
that he regretted the text of the announcement and that the assurance
in the statement that conditions had been created for a return to
normal democratic life signified "either that the responsible Americans
are badly informed by their services or that they seek for Greece the
masks of democracy in order to present those to their public opinion
in order to calm it." His statement went on to say:
"The reality in Greece is that the situation has been improved,
that we live under a dictatorship that is more lenient but that
individual liberties have not been reestablished, that human
dignity is trampled upon and that the conditions for a return to
democracy have not been created. On the contrary, it appears
that conditions are being created for a very long prolongation of
the dictatorship under the comic masks of democracy. Not to
recognize this reality, and to countenance the harmful hypocrisy
does not serve the prestige of the United States which until
yesterday was respected and loved by the Greeks."
* * *
V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Since the present Greek regime seized power, U.S. policy has had
two declared objectives: to maintain Greek military cooperation with
the United States and NATO, and to bring about the restoration of
democratic institutions in Greece. Both objectives became enmeshed
in the matter of the embargo on heavy arms.
The decision to lift the embargo was based on a judgment that con-
tinuing the embargo would, on the one hand, jeopardize military
cooperation with Greece and diminish Greece's ability to defend itself
against Communist aggression without, on the other hand, producing
any further movement toward the restoration of democratic institu-
tions. Furthermore, the Embassy had apparently persuaded itself that
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significant progress had been made in returning to democratic order
and that, on the basis of assurances given or assumed, even greater
progress would be forthcoming by the end of 1970.
In the military sphere, it would appear that our declared policy
objectives have been achieved. While there may be some question as
to the realistic limits of Greek cooperation in the event of a crisis
involving the United States in the Middle East, insofar as it has been
tested, Greek cooperation on military matters has been satisfactory.
It should be noted, however, that this cooperation continues to involve
a quid pro quo in the form of a large U.S. military assistance program.
By contrast, the declared policy objectives in the political sphere
have not been achieved. The "trend toward a constitutional order" is
at best ambiguous, and the confident predictions by American officials
with regard to the reestablishment of parliamentary democracy have
not been borne out by events.
To many with whom we talked, it does not appear that the United
States has placed as much emphasis on pursuing its avowed political
objectives as on pursuing its military objectives. Those who hold this
view believe that the United States has sacrificed its interest in seeing
it return to democratic institutions in order not to jeopardize con-
tinued access to military bases, access which they believe any Greek
Government would. grant. Others, putting aside considerations of
principle and morality, fear that we are being shortsighted from a
practical standpoint. They argue that the continued absence of
meaningful progress, toward restoring democratic processes works to
our long-run disadvantage and that the emphasis the United States
has placed on maintaining smooth relations with the regime has
strengthened the position of the regime in Greece and at the same
time has reduced the incentives for a return to democratic order.
Many observers--both Greek and American-pointed out to us
that, rightly or wrongly, most Greeks believe that the United States
supports the regime.. Given the importance Greeks attach to American
support, because of America's role in Greece since World War II and
the respect for the power of the United States, this belief, quite apart
from its accuracy or our intentions, constitutes the regime's greatest
asset and at the same time provides the United States with its most
effective potential leverage. As far as the pursuit of our declared
objectives in the political sphere is concerned, however, this potential
leverage does not seem to have been effectively applied. The policy of
friendly persuasion has clearly failed. The regime has accepted the
friendship, and the military assistance, but has ignored the persuasion.
Indeed, the regime seems to have been able to exert more leverage
on us with regard to military assistance than we have been willing to
exert on the regime with regard to political reform. We see no evidence
that this will not continue to be the case.
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