Report of Missile Sighting in Cuba

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73B00296R000100180041-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2003
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: June 3, 1971
• Content Type: MFR

Approved ForWease 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP73B0029 00100180041-7
SECRET SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT
Report of Sighting Strategic
Missiles in Cuba
25X1
a. Every element'of the Cuban's stony
has been checked against relevant documentation,
photography, and analytic data.
b. The emigre himself has been brought
to Washington and interrogated at 25X1A
length,
SECRET SENSITIVE
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SECRET SENSITIVE
. Our conclusions at this point are:
a. That the emigre is telling the truth;
that is, he is being truthful about what he
believes he saw.
b. Because of the very short glimpse he
had of the missiles and the adverse conditions
under which he observed them, we can never be
sure that he was in a position to have guaged
accurately such matters as length, diameter,
and relative sizes of the smaller and larger
missiles. However, it should be noted that
he has an "engineer's eye", The dimensions he
supplied on the "land-to-air" missiles he says
he saw in the cave, as well as on display in
Cuba on another occasion, are compatible with
those of the SA-2 sustainer with the booster
removed.
c. There areanomalies in his story,
some of them fairly serious, For example, we
have searched all photography of the area taken
since late 1961 and have been unable to locate
in photography a cave storage area which would
correspond precisely to the facility he says he
visited. On the other hand, the photography
shows an underground bunker serving as an entrance
or ante-chamber to a larger installation. The
Cuban indicated during the debriefings that this
was probably the facility he visited.
d. We have no other hard evidence that
strategic missile systems have been introduced,
to Cuba since 1962, nor that any were left behind,
following the crisis period. We do know from
repeated photographic coverage of the whole
island that two or four pad fixed field launch
sites comparable to those employed in the
Soviet Union are not to be found in Cuba.
SECRET SENSITIVE
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SECRET SENSITIVE
e. On the basis of the evidence now in hand
we have re-examined our long held position,
i..e., "We do not believe'there are strategic
missile systems in Cuba." Our conviction is
now less strong than before, but we are
obliged to stick with the essential thrust of
our previous judgement, based as it is on five
years of careful surveillance and analysis.
We do feel very strongly, however, that the
ex-,
traord.nary quality of the emigre's report
impels us to take extraordinary measures to
seek confirmation or repudiation of it.
3. In light of the emigre's report it is
recommended that the highest priority possible be
assigned to the collection of additional information
on the site in question. We have instructed all
personnel to exploit any lead'on this general subject.
This applies to clandestine operations, emigre re-
porting, diplomatic reporting, photographic readouts,
map studies, etc. Irk particuI r it is,..,essential
that the frequency of f lights over Cuba 25X1A
be increased. As already noted in paragraph 2,photog-
raphy of the Santiago area has disclosed no prepared
launching sites. However., the SS-3 and SS-4 missiles
with their associated supporting mobile equipment could
theoretically be assembled and set up on a cleared,
level, hardened area, such as an aircraft landing
field in a matter of hours., '
4. Immediate Steps to be Taken. There would
appear to be little to gain from fur her questioning
of the emigre. His story has not changed .in its
essentials since first received several weeks ago.
Officers in DIA are aware that we have been checking
out the original report of the emigre. Further delay
in revealing our findings to DIA and to State is not
warranted, an4 could result in speculation leading
to leaks. We believe the'Dirdctor should call. in
General Carroll and Mr. Thomas Hughes and lay our
findings before them. They could be asked at this
SECRET SENSITIVE
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SECRET SENSITIVE
point to quash speculation on the original report,
if any, In their shops.
5. Next we recommend that steps be taken to
inform the highest levels of the White House, State,
and Defense. One purpose of such a meeting would
be to work out a common statement that could be used
in the event the emigre's observations become common
knowledge. Consideration could also be given at such
a meeting to the proper procedure for handling the
problem before Congressional committees.
6. finally, we feel that the Director's ap-
proach should be in low key. Much needs to be done
before we can finally validate this report.
DE$MOND 'ITZGERALD
Deputy Director for Plans
R. J. 'SMITH
Deputy Director for Intelligence
CARL B. ''DUCKETT
Deputy Director for Science & Technology
Attachments:
(29 May 1967) w/map
(TAB A)
(TAB B)
(TAB C)'
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 DDCI w/o map
1 - DDP w/o map
1 - DDS&T w/o map
1 - DC/WH/DDP w/o map
_4-
(3 June 67)
SECRET RENEYTIVE
1 - DDI w/o map
1 - C/WH/0 ?Ep
1 - D/OCI w/o map
1 - C/IAS w/o map
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 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000100180041-7
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000100180041-7