MEETING WITH (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72R00410R000200240001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 15, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 19, 1969
• Content Type: MFR

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Ti's RFXOIID
SUBJ T: Meeting with Spencer K. Anderson R presenting
President rrieds ea, ITT Corporate Office
(Aerospace Group) on the West Coast
25X1A
1. 13 D ece~Rber Mr . Anderson net wt t,
25X1A of lD/S&T apparently to review technical
program in ITT of possible interest to DD/ShT. A preliminary
check disclosed that Mr. Anderson has a SECT Contact clearance
and a pending WBCRET Contract clearance. Actual yam, "wring his
discussion Mr. Anderson a ated that ITT was formulating plans
for a small corporate group to represent the interests of the
intelligence eoaepetusi ty by applying over-all ITT resources
(including independent research) to assist the Agency and
the community. Tee was primarily interested In knowing what
the Agency'u requirenenta were so that the planning in ITT
could concentrate on those areas of maximum interest to the
Agency.
25X1A 2. advised Mr. Anderson that at some
future date the DD/S&T R&D coordinator (who to also the Agency R&D
coordinator) would be in a position to advise selected groups
of contractors of special Agency R&D Interests In the hope that
such contractors could devote attention to meeting these re-
quire nts.- However, he noted that in the interim there was
no basin on which Agency requirements across the board could
be wade known to an individual contractor. It was stated,
hta ever, that it is normal practice for contractors with
particular developments of interest to the Agency to smoke
these products or ideas known to Agency office and that
this could be dose by establishing appointments with interested
Agency people from time to time.
3. ,r. Anderson said that one of the problems facing ITT
corporate to that be does not know where the Agency is contract-
ing within ITT plants and divisions because of security
conpartnentati . $e pointed out to us that this tended
to defeat their plan to channel more corporate resources
WWI
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A doctor diagnoses global crises
POJ
ould the course of history have been altered if, in 1956,
the Suez crisis had not hinged on a desperately sick
Anthony Eden and an aged John Foster Dulles who was
at the point of a physical breakdown? Or could the U.S.
today afford to have the office of the President occupied
for nearly a year and a half, as it was in Woodrow Wilson's
administration, by an incapacitated man fiercely protected
and kept in office by his wife, his secretary, and his physi-
cian?
Ever more threatening are the world crises that could
be precipitated by the physical or psychological disability
of a kev statesman. And Dr. Hugh L'Etang, a London phy-
sician, is sounding a warning. He has assembled the signifi-
cant medical data on many historic figures, from pre-
World War I to the present, demonstrating how often the
shape of destiny has been determined by the illness of a
powerful leader.
Dr. L'Etang's book, The Pathology' of Leadership, just
published in England, may well reverberate in the halls of
government and in the councils of medicine. The threat of
a leader's incapacitation, combined with the swiftness of
events, today could menace the entire world.
The months and weeks leading to World War I are
brought back in vivid detail as Dr. L'Etang rapidly
sketches the unhealthy state of significant men of the great
powers: "Ministers and diplomats of this period were
weak in the widest sense ... They were weak in body and
weak in mind and dissolved into tears at moments of
crisis."
Military commands on both sides were shot through
with ailing, aged, and disabled officers, some of them called
back from retirement as new fronts opened in various
parts of the world. Germany's General Erich Ludendorff,
one of the chiefs of staff, grew so tense he "could control
neither his nerves nor his armies." He collapsed and re-
signed in 1918. Years later, his condition was diagnosed as
toxic goiter. After thvroidectomy, he said that if the opera-
tion had been performed earlier, Germany would have
Avon the war.
In the U.S., President Woodrow Wilson maintained
reasonable health until the Armistice. Then his deteriora-
tion came on so swiftly as to cause international as well as
national havoc. Always rigid in personality, he grew worse.
He suffered an infection of prostate and bladder and was
thought to have had a stroke. He had severe headaches and
fl\
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asthmatic attacks and was "tired and absent-minded."
A severe stroke in October, 1919, so disabled the Presi-
dent that the office of the chief of state was virtually
brought to a halt. As Dr. L'Etang reports, the presidency
was sustained by "a self-elected council of three: Mrs.
Wilson. Joseph Tumulty (the President's secretary), and
Dr. Cary T. Grayson." Only they could attest to Wilson's
incapacity, and none of them would.
Britain was still plagued by sickness in high officials as
events began their slow swirling toward World War II.
Sir Nevile Henderson, ambassador to Berlin, was operated
on for an abdominal cancer in 1938. When he returned to
duty shortly afterward, German leaders took advantage of
his physical incapacity. "They would keep him waiting all
evening at a reception and then grant him an interview in
the early hours of the morning," reports L'Etang. "Goering
would invite him to his hunting lodge, tire him out with a
day's shooting and a heavy and presumably alcoholic din-
ner, and then summon him to an important diplomatic dis-
cussion."
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the chief executive whose
state of health must have engendered more rumors, specu-
lations, and malicious reports than that of any earlier his-
toric figure, had been struck down by polio in 1921, at age
39. This did not deter him from twice winning the gover-
norship of New York, and going on to be elected four
times as President of the U.S. But by the end of his second
term, .Roosevelt's health was visibly deteriorating.
In his chapter, "The Invalids Who Worked With
Roosevelt," Dr. L'Etang names a frightening number of
sick, aged, or disabled men appointed to high office or
heavy responsibilities by FDR. Among them are Louis
MacHenry Howe, a special assistant who was an asthmatic
invalid; and Harry Hopkins, whose partial gastrectomy
exacerbated many other conditions, and whose final mis-
sion was the ill-fated Yalta, where he spent all his time in
bed when he was not taking part in the conference.
FDR's appointed attorney general died before he could
take office. Secretary of the Treasury William Woodin
died after one year's service. The Secretary of War, George
H. Dern, was too ill to attend many cabinet meetings, and
died of bladder and kidney ailments in 1936. Secretary of
the Navy Claude Swanson, appointed in 1933, was ad-
mitted to the hospital for high blood pressure that same
year, and by 1937 had to be led in and out of meetings,
could not stand unsupported, and could not be understood
when he spoke.
Then there was James Forrestal, a Roosevelt Secretary
of the Navy and later the first Secretary of Defense. Driven
by compulsions and delusions that he was being followed
and his telephone tapped, he careened into severe depres-
sion, and fell to his death from a hospital window in 1949.
Pathological changes in the arteries were responsible
for Roosevelt's death, says Dr. L'Etang-but not for other
signs and symptoms that had been present for more than
a year. Loss of weight and cachexia were so evident at
Yalta that photographs were suppressed. Long-term
"bronchitis" and his heavy smoking habit suggested car-
cinoma of the lung. But most dramatic of all is a medical
incident four years after his death.
D .73 1 ~ -i L ~ Ll"'), I= ji" P111
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A pigmented nevus above FDR's left eyebrow did not
appear in photographs taken after 1943. Then in 1949, a
medical paper by surgeons from Walter Reed Hospital, on
'treatment of malignant melanoma, was given at a St. Louis
:meeting. All the slides and specimens shown had a serial
number, reports Dr. L'Etang-with one exception. This
was a section of brain with a large metastatic melanoma
in the right hemisphere. It bore only a date-14 April
1945. It was the same day that Roosevelt's body arrived
in Washington from Warm Springs.
President Dwight Eisenhower, aware of the problems in
both the Wilson and Roosevelt administrations, took two
major steps toward ameliorating the risks in having a dis-
abled President. First, he directed the release to news
media of full clinical details on every illness he suffered in
office-even though he winced at the worldwide disclosure
of his bowel habits. Second, he made arrangements for
delegation of authority during any period of incapacitation
of the President. In 1958, in a detailed letter to Vice Pres-
ident Nixon, Eisenhower tried to design machinery for
running the government if the chief of state became dis-
abled. But an effective plan was not forthcoming, for the
Piesident's directions called for the patient to judge his
own disability.
Floods of medical-interest copy, but less candor, char-
acterized the short term of John F. Kennedy, as Dr.
L'Etang reports. Exuding attractiveness and vitality, and
stressing the need for Presidential fitness in his campaign,
JFK is seen by Dr. L'Etang as the candidate with the most
precarious health. Indeed, he wore a back brace as a result
of a 1937 injury, and he was rejected by the Army in 1941.
Just before election day in 1960, a congressman de-
manded that Kennedy confirm or deny a report that he
had Addison's disease. Guardedly, the Kennedy organiza-
tion revealed a "partial adrenal insufficiency." He had
been receiving replacement therapy, including cortisone,
almost continuously since 1947. JFK later told an aide:
"The doctors say I've got a sort of slow-motion leukemia,
but they tell me I'll probably last until I'm 45."
As Dr. L'Etang describes it, long-term cortisone ther-
apy, even when carefully administered, may trigger strong
mood and energy swings. This is reflected, in his view, in
the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco when Kennedy was charged
with defective judgment and poor leadership, in contrast
with brilliant statesmanship during the Cuban missile crisis
a year later.
When Lyndon Johnson was swept into the Presidency
by Kennedy's assassination, he was eight years past his
first heart attack. The strains of office might well have led
him to expect another, considering his natural exuberant,
explosive disposition. But he was to fill the unfinished
Kennedy term and serve one of his own before his volun-
tary retirement, apparently in good.health, in 1968.
Many important questions are raised by Dr. L'Etang.
Is a predominantly sick leadership the product of a sick
society? Can medicine and government ever achieve safe
guidelines to prevent state crises when the leader is dis-
abled? Should our statesmen as well as our military leaders
have to meet stringent physical standards? And finally,
should the physician of a famous person release full med-
ical details, as did Lord Moran with Churchill, for the
benefit of history?
As the London Times comments, the fact that Dr.
L'Etang raises the questions without giving answers is in
no way a criticism of his study. His presentation should
point the way toward action. ^
IN TIMES OF MOMENTOUS DECISION, THESE LEADERS SUFFERED SEVERE ILLNESSES
194'5 (Yalta): Churchill, 71; was sick
with fever; FDR, 63, may have
had advanced cerebral arteriosclerosis.
Aro4ecl Poi- Rele
195.5 (`Summit'): Ike
had heart attack that fall.
Republic): LBJ had gull
bladder surgery.
~.J 1924 (fire Years after
1961 (Buy of Pigs): JFK 1 had remained unpublicised.
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4435 WISCONSIN AVENUE. N. W.. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20016. 244-3540 CPYRGH
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
PROGRAM COMMENT
STATION WWDC Radio
DATE December 4, 1969 9:00 PMM1-1:20 AM CITY Washington, D.C.
LYMAN KIR.KPIITRICK INTERVIEWED
FRED GALE: We have one guest with us in the studio
toni~;'it and Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick is his name and he has written
a book called CAPTAINS WITHOUT EYES and it is all about intelligence
failures in World War Two. Some of the big battles the United
States was involved in, in Austria, Germany and different countries.
Mr. Kirkpatrick is the former executive director of the CIA.
Where on the level of the top echelon is the executive director
as far as the CIA?
LYMAN KIRKPATRICK: Number three. The director and
deputy director are appointed by Congress and the number three
man, the executive director, the executive director controller
now, is the number three man, the top career man in the agency
so to speak.
GALE: I see sir. The other two men are political appointees
that more or less come and go with the administration.....
KIRKPATRICK: Well they are. But of course the present
director, Richard Helms, is a career officer who has risen up
and became deputy director under Admiral Rayburn and for the
last, since 1966 has been the director. So the executive direct-
in the line is more or less the general manager of the agency,
FftE and the chief of staff, whatever you want to call it.
FICES INt NEAPPVOVed. o+NRWe (P.2000MID3-pCM4kOJ2ROG44OR 2OG 4b - CHICAGO
OF
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2
GALE: I see. In other words there is nothing clandestine
about, you don't go out in the field necessarily and ......
KIRKPATRICK: No I don't. My cover is pretty well,
my cover,.when I left in 65, was pretty well gone.
GALE: I have a couple, I had a couple of friends that
used to do this for fun every once in while. And I guess you're
not supposed to do it,like kidding around with the party and
would not actually come out and tell anybody that they were
with the CIA but more or less intimate it. And I guess that's
not the right thing to do, is it?
KIRKPATRICK: Well, it used to be fun and games in the
Washington cocktail circle, but I don't think it is anymore
I think, I think Washington has probably grown a-little more
mature and sophisticated in that regard. It used to be I think
that quite a lot of people would say where do you work? And
they would say, I work for the government, which was a dead
give away. But I think that's pretty well gone these days.
The people recognize now that intelligence is a pretty serious
business.
GALE: But there are CIA people that are involved in
just about every business in the country, are there not?
KIRKPATRICK: No. I think that's a popular mythology.
I think in the great orgasim the country had a couple of years
ago of exposing, or trying to expose everything they thought
CIA was involved in, that we ended up with CIA men under every
bed.
GALE: That's true. I remember talking to a few people
that thought that, and still do as a matter of fact.
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outfit, and a top notch one in a country like the United States
where we do have many more freedoms than most'countries? Because
Congress and a lot of politicians"in the last campaign mentioned
the CIA as a government within a government. And they were
upset because the CIA does not have to let them know every move
they make. That they are free and very flexible to do many things
that the Congressmen and the politicians do not know of.
GALE: Isn't it a little difficult to have an intelligenck
3
KIRKPATRICK: Under the beds or otherwise.
GALE: Everywhere, and otherwise.
KIRKPATRICK: Well the answer is that it isn't quite
that way. I think Allan Dullas once made a very classic remark
after commenting about some Russian allegation on CIA activities.
I think the gist of which was he said that CIA did everything
that the Russians alleged that they did they would have every
angel in heaven, everybody else on earth working for them.......
GALE: Excuse me.
KIRKPATRICK: Go ahead.
KIRKPATRICK: Well, you've mentioned so many things
in that one brief statement to comment on. First, the congress
does know what CIA does. Not every congressman but the three
committees that are charged with CIA responsibilities do know
what CIA is doing. Secondly, it has become a popular political
plaything, and a fairly easy one because most politicians that
take a crack at CIA know that it is not in a position to reply,
generally speaking. And I don't consider these comments to be
particularly responsible from the point of view of the country.
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And third, back to your original premise, your opening statement.
Yes, there is no more difficult job in a free society than operating
a secret organization like the CIA. It's an exceedingly difficult
job and I'must say I have the utmost of admiration of people
that work for CIA and take the slings of ignoble fortune that
are so often cast at them, for things that quite frequently
aren't their doing.
GALE: But they do make mistakes, don't they?
KIRKPATRICK: Of course tbey do. But in a human society
that happens to be a natural fault. The CIA makes mistakes
and the CIA is not one to say well forgive us for our mistakes
because we're secret. But what they do say is at least give
us a chance to do our job without making it too difficult.
GALE: Nobody knows what their job is.
KIRKPATRICK: Well I think the President does and I
think the key members of the executive branch and I think the
35 or 40 members of the CIA committees in the Congress do.
And I think that if the public is intelligent about it, they
know what CIA is trying to do.
GALE: Well, I get the feeling in talking to a lot of
people, let's say people with the new left or the new politics,
whatever you want to call it, that are not dummies, generally.
They are fairly intelligent people, considered intellectual.
They are forever mentioning the CIA, they are mentioning as
if the CIA is tapping their phones looking over their shoulders,
know all of their movements, and that sort of thing.
KIRKPATRICK: Well they're hitting at the, wrong target.
Because the CIA is not domestic, the CIA is overseas. The CIA
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has no internal security functions domestically. And incidentally,
I talk to new left too, I'm on a university campus, I see them
all the time. I was interviewed recently on the campus for
a television program NET is producing in the general area of
the formulation foreign policy and some of the students and
some of the new left interviewed me and one of them made the
comment about not believing anything that CIA said or that anything
the government said about CIA. Well what I would say about
your comment about the new left and other intellectuals making
this type of comment, is that I can only equate it to what the
former foreign minister of Indonesia said, when he was tried.
Doctor Sabandrio, the former foreign minister who was tried
by the present government. He blamed everything that happened
in Indonesia on CIA until finally the prosecutor said to him,
well Doctor Sabandio, did all of these things, did the CIA really
do them? He said no, but it's the most convenient scape goat
to blame all of our problems. I think this is a good part of
what the allegations are made today, because I don't think many
of these people know what CIA is doing and they hark back to
some classics in the area where the agency has been involved
and blame it for that and assume that it is still doing that
sort of thing.
GALE: Well when I started to read your book, I thought
oh boy, were going to find out all of the terrible mistakes
that CIA has made.
KIRKPATRICK: Well of course that book your talking
about CAPTAINS WITHOUT EYES, is pre CIA. CIA was not in existence
during World War Two. The previous book I wrote THE REAL CIA,
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is the one that should have been the primer before the secondary.......
GALE: I know. That's why I say I started, well I
was thinking oh boy we're going to find out about all the CIA
little bungles, and it has nothing to do with CIA.
KIRKPATRICK: No it doesn't
GALE: CIA came in what 48, 49.....
KIRKPATRICK: No, CIA was established by the National
Security Act in 1947, which was passed in July 1947 and CIA's
official birthday is September 13th, 1947. It's now in its
twentysecond year. It will be 22 years old next September.
But prior to CIA we had no National intelligence agency, never
had had one in our history.
GALE: Why was that? I mean the Russians had them the
Germans had them. You talked about the Russians having one
of the most extensive intelligence networks and organizations
in the world.
KIRKPATRICK: Well, I think part of the reason was we
didn't think we needed one. After World War One we had made
the world safe for democracy and we slipped back into the euphoria
of isolation with two vast oceans to defend us. And if you
review the history up to the outbreak of World War Two and then
even in the early stages of World War Two, why we thought that
we weren't going to get involved in the wars of Europe. And
Pearl Harbor brought us into the war and Hitler did us the,
perhaps the advantage of declaring war on us, we didn't need
a national intelligence agency. Why would we need a national
intelligence agency when we weren't really concerned with the
affairs of the world?
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GALE: But we did have some intelligence agents scattered
about, but they were mostly connected with the military.
KIRKPATRICK: Yes, Yes we did. They were our Army and our
our Navy agents. Of course I always perhaps lapse into the
technology of the jargon of the profession, an agent is a spy.
We probably didn't have an awful lot of spies, we had officers
in our services trying to collect information. But intelligence
service per se generally speaking, we didn't have one.
GALE: Well, did those officers do a pretty good job
or wasn't it very difficult for them, being connected with the
military services to do the kind of job that the civilians .........
KIRKPATRICK: Well, they weren't doing the spying, you
see. The officers connected with the military. services were
trying to get the informers, or the agents so called, or the
observers to work for them. And I think based upon the environment
of the country and the attitude towards intelligence and all
of the other factors, I think they did a pretty good job, yes.
But there were very very few of them. Our services didn't really
regard intelligence as something that was very essential.
You never need intelligence until its desperate and then you
need it desperately.
GALE: Yes, I notice you write about Hitler and how
he, he really didn't think too much of his intelligence outfit,
or his ego overwhelmed him so much, or them so much, that he
felt that he really didn't have the need.
KIRKPATRICK: No, I think Hitler is a very good example
of it. Because in the first place, he distrusted his military
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intelligence service, the Ab Fhar, who were indee'; treasonable
in many respects from the German point of view. But happily
from our point of view they were more or less in accord with
Western ways. And each Hitler victory made him more sublime
and more less susciptible to influence from intelligence so
that by the time he attacked Russia he really didn't feel he
needed intelligence. He disregarded all the intelligence about
Russia which was available. So this incidentally is a factor.
One way I think the policy make-rs-, the leaders occasionally
don't think they really need intelligence until suddenly there's
something they don't know. And they want to press buttons and
have it produced before them. Intelligence doesn't work that
way.
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GALE: But now of course,'the important factor, I think
most of your countries, and most o,f, the leaders in the countries
realize that in the Cold War atmosphere that is vitally important.
KIRKPATRICK: I think so. Except the new left who you
mentioned earlier, who perhaps don't consider it so vitally
important.
GALE: That's because I think that a lot of the people
that I know in the new left feel that they are they are possibly
becoming victims of some organization of this type.
KIRKPATRICK: Yes. But I do hope we can try to delineate
this fact that the Central Intelligence Agency is engaged in
collecting foreign intelligence. Or even more specifically,
positive foreign intelligence and is not directly concerned
with the internal security in the United States. It is a mistaken
target, it's a very good target, because it has been public
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far beyond anything of a desire. But it is engaged in finding
out what's happening in the world and why it should interest
us.
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GALE: In other words, I have a feeling you want to
make this very clear. That the CIA never involved itself in
internal problems.
KIRKPATRICK: Well the law that created the CIA is very
specific in this regard. It says that CIA shall have no police
or subpoena powers. It clearly delineates between its role
and that of the FBI, The Federal Bureau of Investigation. Which
I think is fine.
GALE: In actuallity if anything is found of an internal
nature is turned up at CIA, they turn it over to what, the FBI?
KIRKPATRICK: Well, they'd not only turn it over to
the FBI. But if somebody comes in and says well look my neighbor
down the street is not a good guy, or whatever it might be,
they urge that the neighbor take it to the FBI and not bring
it to them. They want to stay clear of that for very good reasons.
Now I think what has gotten a lot of people feeling that the
CIA may be involved domestically, is because naturally it has
to base some of its things in this country in order to operate
abroad, and this is what came out in the recent couple of years.
GALE: You mean the NSA, the National Student Association?
KIRKPATRICK: The National Student Association and all
the rest of that jazz.
GALE: Well, probably is at the crus of most of it,
because the students themselves were quite upset to think that
they were being funded by or to find out that they were being
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funded by an organization such as this. So that probably has
spread now and people are becoming a little bit paranoid over
it too.
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KIRKPATRICK: I-Jell I think that's true. But I think
it all goes back to what's more fundamental basically and that
is the so called gap, credibility gap. It started to develop
between the government and the people in the country, or some
of the people in the country.
GALE: That's true. Listen can you jump ahead in your
book a little bit to this chapter or kind of skip over Germany
a little bit. Although there is a major invasion of Russia and
a few other things. But to Pearl Harbor which is interesting,
most of the people are still talking about Pearl Harbor. They
are still talking about the fact'that we really knew that something
was going to happen at Pearl Harbor. That dispatches had been
decoded, or dispatches with their, that there was subliminal
information somehow. In your chapter you deal with Pearl Harbor,
and you deal with the dispatches, and what happened here in
Washington, which is very interesting, a lot of background material.
I still remember, not vividly, but I recall the fact that the
Japanese had a group of men here in Washington, Ambassadors,
what have you, talking to, I think it was Roosevelt at that
time. And, so could you give us a little background on what
happened as far as CIA, what was the involvement there?
KIRKPATRICK: Once again, there was no CIA.
GALE: Well, excuse me. Intelligence, intelligence.
KIRKPATRICK: Intelligence. Yes. There,was no CIA
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at the time of Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941. Very directly
for a period of eighteen months or two years before Pearl Harbor,
the United States and Japan had been in a stage of confrontation
which was riot favorite word then but which is a favorite word
today. In which we had, the United States had, more and more
directly been trying to pursuade Japan to give up its aggression
in Asia. It then had been fighting in China most vigorously
for nearly a decade, but very aggressively for five years. And
it was very clear that they had aspirations towards establishing
what they quite clearly said in their public statements, a greater
Asia cope for prosperity sphere.
GALE: The fact they were fighting in the area that
is now Vietnam or Indo China.
KIRKPATRICK: Well they had moved in to Northern Indo
China in 1940. And you spoke of their representatives here
in Washington they had Ambassador Kurusu, who was the Ambassador,
the Japanese Ambassador here in Washington during these very
intensive negotiations which went on through late 1940 and early
1941 on into the fall of 1941 and then the Japanese sent another
Admiral, Admiral Numura, to associate with Admiral Kurusu in
their negotiations. And the people negotiating with most specifically
were Cordell Hall, our then Secretary of State. And the Japanese
Ambassadors occasionally saw President Roosevelt and they made
many other contacts here in Washington. What developed of course,
was that it was very clear in Washington that the Japanese were
bent on aggression, and when they finally moved into Indo China,
the United States embargoed all oil shipments to Japan and this
was followed immediately by embargoes the Netherlands, Holland,
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12
their Admirals put it very bluntly, if the embargo continues
for two years we will surrender without firing a shot. If they
didn't have oil they couldn't, their Navy simply could not fight
and Japanese industry would colapse.
GALE: Interesting enough, I notice you wrote in here
about the build of of the Japanese fleet before Pearl Harbor
and this was back in the 30's, 32 the pact was signed, limiting
the .:Japanese.....
KIRKPATRICK: 1922 the Washington Naval Agreement of
course delimited the fleet to 5 5 3 bases. Great Britain
and the United States got 5 5, Japan on three. And then there
is second conference in London in the 30's and finally the Japanese
broke this in the middle 30's and started to build their big
fleets.
GALE: It actually limited the Japanese fleet to 60
percent of the size .....
KIRKPATRICK: That's correct.
GALE: Of Britians and the United States.
KIRKPATRICK: That's correct. ANNOUNCEMENT
GALE: This is Fred Gale, our guest is Lyman Kirkpatrick.
He is the former Executive Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency now a professor of Political Science at Brown University
and living in Rhode Island. And his new book is out, it's called
CAPTAINS WITHOUT EYES. He mentioned his previous book, which
was called what, inside, no THE REAL CIA. And I have to go
back and read that one. So I can find out more about the CIA.
So I can argue about it.....
KI RKPATIRI CK: Wel 1 , if you' re going back to read that
one to f i Apprmvibd stop EZel boej %00; /x',2/(t3I A9IAllg[?P7 R0 Wg gggog?M001-p
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t?
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think you'll find out a lot about how the CIA actually works.
But if you're going back to find out fascinating spy stories,
wily.......
GALE: No, no, no, no .....
KIRKPATRICK: It's not in the real CIA.
GALE: No I really don't, I'm not, I don't read spy
books anyway. I try to deal with reality, sometimes sort of
difficult, but I try to. I'd like to up to headquarters and
just look around and pick up some-materiel about the agency.
But I don't think you can do that, can you?
KIRKPATRICK: No, I don't'think they really do that.
It's not on the usual Washington tour.
GALE: But as a member of the Press they'll let me just
go and look around a little bit.
GALE: Why? I know a friend of mine that has been trying
to get into the White House because he contends there are ghosts
there and he wants to go in and take pictures of them. And
they won't let him in either. Maybe it's the same, the (unintelligibi
the same. They think I'm a little wierd too. Alright let's
get back to the book, and the Pearl Harbor, because that's an
'important part of our history. And most people remember that,
and recall that. We were talking about the fact that the Japanese
fleet was limited by a pact that was signed, and then of course
they, they served notice on the United States that they were
not going to abide by that.
KIRKPATRICK: That's right Goyle. How clear the notice
was I think is subject to some debate. But they very obviously
started to violate the pact and the Washington Naval Agreement
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and started to build, and started to build large battleships
and aircraft carriers, and so on. So by the middle of the 30's
the pact was void and the naval race was on again, perhaps in
some respects comparable to the present arms race. Japanese
aggression in Asia had started in the 30's with their attack
and seizure of Manchuria. And then in the late 30's in their
war with China which became more and more aggressive and the
Japanese obviously were intent upon gaininq a major influence
in Asia. And of course I think ohe very interesting aspect
of this was the change inside Japan, which we saw the military
becoming very powerful and the Army eventually assuming major
command. I think that as far as the Navy was concerned, I think
the Navy had very high respect for both the United States Navy
and for the British Navy. So this was the build up to this
episode and intelligence was a very, important aspect of it.
I think in your original statement you made some comment about
a lot of people thought that they were going to attack Pearl
Harbor. That really wasn't, a lot of people may have thought
they might attack Pearl Harbor.
GALE: No, no, no. I said that that now, other people
have come to the conclusion that the United States knew ahead
of time that Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked...
KIRKPATRICK: Well, that's just as wrong. That's just
as wrong as it could be. Nobody knew that Pearl Harbor was
going to'be attacked. In fact most people, I would say 99.9
percent did not believe Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked.
As far as evidence was concerned of the attack on'Pearl Harbor,
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there was one clue that came out of Japan, that Ambassador Joseph
Grew, one of the outstanding foreign service officers the United
States, man who served in Japan for a decade, reported back.
Turned out to be something that had been heard by the Peruvian
minister at a cocktail party and it was purely speculation and
there was a good deal that as soon as some of that brew that
infects cocktail parties probably had something to do with this.
Where somebody said they were going to attack Pearl Harbor.
The plans for the attack on Pearl-Harbor were developed in great
secrecy by Admiral Yamamoto, who had become fascinated by the
British attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto, in Italy. And
by the fact that the British had very successfully used torpedo
planes in shallow water to sink three Japanese, three Italian
battleships.
GALE: Yes, I notice, he had the, you mentioned that
he had the naval attache .....
KIRKPATRICK: The naval attache in London, the naval
attache in London, Genda, who was recently in this country as
a matter of fact, assigned to the Imperial Navy Staff to work
with Yamamoto in planning for Pearl Harbor. Because one his
surprises at Pearl Harbor was of course the fact, that it was
not believed that torpedo planes could not be effective in shallow
waters, and when I speak of shallow waters I'm speaking of 30
or 40 feet deep, because of the trajectory of the torpedoes
coming out. And this of course was one of the great successes
that the Japanese achieved at Pearl Harbor. If in hindsight
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people think that we knew that they were going to attack at
Pearl Harbor, the answer is no. If we thought, if they say
well we thought the Japanese were going to engage in further
offensives in the Pacific, the answer is categorically, very
yes. Because on November 29th a message was sent to all commands
in the Pacific that started off.with the. sentence this is war
warning.
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GALE: This is on November 29th?
KIRKPATRICK: November 29th. Pearl Harbor was December
7th. And the cable that went out started off, This is a war
warning. Well my feeling, after having studied this at great
length, and all of the cables that we sent out, plus the intercepts
of the Japanese cables, gave me the clear feeling that this
was about the eighth wolf call. That we,had been sending out
war warnings, and war warnings, and war warnings and the commands
there had been excercising and remembering the fact that we
had not been in combat for a generation, for twenty five years,
they felt they probably were alert.
GALE: I guess all that is very important when you think
about it. The psychology of ........
KIRKPATRICK: I think that is tremendously important .....
GALE: You tend to become a bit complacent about that.
You mentioned wolf calls.
KIRKPATRICK: Yes, yes, very definitely. And I think
too, that there was great deal of feeling that the Japanese
would have been in to the our military felt that the Japanese
would have been insane to attack Pearl Harbor. ,
GALE: What about all the communication with the Japanese
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Ambassador here? And you mentioned also a couple of naval attaches
in Washington who were as ill informed as the American po; ticians
at that particular time. They were not let in on the surprise......
KIRKPATRICK: Well, yes, well what you are saying is
that nobody in the Japanese Embassy in Washington was advised
by their government they were ready to attack Pearl Harbor.
In fact very few of the Japanese government in Tokyo new they
were going to attack Pearl Harbor. This was a highly kept secret.
And I might add, a very highly debated issue in the Japanese
government.
GALE: But Mr. Kirkpatrick, back to my original premise,
the thought that I had was the fact that there is still some
argumentation about the United States government having known
hours before, days before, that there was going to be an attack
on Pearl Harbor. Have you not heard this?
KIRKPATRICK: Oh. Let me make sure we're not talking
at crossed purposes here. We did, we were intercepting their
cables. We were reading their diplomatic and some of their military
traffic. And when I say reading their traffic, I mean this is
a, this was encoded diplomatic traffic and we were breaking
their code and reading it. In this book I have tried to quote
from the pertinent cables in that. regard which led to the build
up of the tensions. And there was a fifteen part cable that
started to be received in Washington on December 5th, and we
got the bulk of it, we got all thi rt, we got thirteen of the
fourteen parts by the night of December 6th. And on the morning
of December 7th the fourteenth part was received.and broken
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and reported. And that part made it very clear that this was
more or less termination of the negotiations. There has been
a great deal of controversy as to whether that reached the President
and Secretary Hall and Secretary Simpson and Secretary Knott,
Simpson being Secretary of War and Knott Secretary of Navy,
and,the chiefs of staff in time. Chief of Staff of the Army
being General Marshall and the Chief of Naval Operations being
Admiral Stark. The answer is it reached them not in time from
one point of view, because Pearl-Harbor, the attack had already
started. The other point of view was that by the time it reached
they had already agreed that it meant war, the fourteen part
message they were already reading. In fact they were reading
it as soon as the Japanese Ambassador was reading it.
GALE: So how would it have change anything had they
received it different .....
KIRKPATRICK: It wouldn't have changed anything. They
might have sent out in fact .....
GALE: Another wolf call?
KIRKPATRICK: General Marshall and Admiral Stark talked
on the phone about sending out an even more urgent message,
and they finally agreed to send it out. And it didn't get there,
because we were sending it by commercial cable, and it wasn't
clearly understood in the Pentagon incidentally, that it was
going by commerical cable, where it would be carried by bicycle
messenger to the command, the attack was coming in at the time ......
GALE: Perhaps yes. Perhaps that is where the argument
exists, the fact ...... it was sent by commerical cable and the
guy riding the bicycle and some people possibly feel that had
they senApprmvtdFoG le $~ ~4 y2/Rr bA;R~~7 4~ R? D001-0.
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19
KIRKPATRICK: Or picked up the phone and called them
and said duck, or something to that order or that regard ......
GALE: But if they had done that, when would they have
done that, the night before, possibly or what?
KIRKPATRICK: Well, if they had done it at the precise
time that the last message was received and General Marshall
and Admiral Stark confered by phone, and after a certain amount
of discussion back and forth, finally agreed that another warning
should be followed. Remember November 29th, just less than a
week before they had sent a this is a war warning. And George
Marshall's feelings was that message. And if it had been sent
at that precise moment and there had been no delays in going
through, with the speed of messages as they were then carried,
it might have gotten there a few minutes before the attack,
but not much before. It might have gotten-, as a matter of fact
one thing I think people don't really recognize is that the
fleet did respond to the attack. Fifty percent of the guns
were firing before the attack was over.
GALE: It was just a well planned attack.
KIRKPATRICK: It was an exceedingly well planned attack
with great surprise and one thing I tried to point out with
the few maps we do have in CAPTAINS WITHOUT EYES, was that they
came through the empty seas. The empty seas being to the north,
the attack was expected to come from the southwest, if there
was an attack. And they came in a way that the Japanese planned,
too beautifully through the seas that had no merchant lanes
in them, or no shipping that might intercept them. In fact the
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Jap fleet order was if they were intercepted to recors ; t e
attack and perhaps turn back.
GALE: I understand from other readings that I have
done on Pearl Harbor that they had perfect weather conditions,
that there was a low lying fog, or something of that sort on
that particular morning that they came in,so it would have been
hard to see them anyway.
KIRKPATRICK: Well, they came down from the north in
miserable the Coral Islands where the fleet had convened and
the reason that the fleet had gathered in that particular harbor
was because they knew it would be'free from any foreign observation.
There were no foreigners up there, that's for sure. And then
they sailed north from there up towards the Alutians an(! got
close to the Alutians and then came down almost directly towards
Hawaii. And they figured this was, the way to stay in the bad
weather area and out of observation. And they did have, from
their point of view, good weather conditions.
GALE: Obviously they figured it just about right.
KIRKPATRICK: Yes, they did. From the point of view
of a planned attack, they must be given credit.
GALE: Looking back....I just wanted to discuss that
particular area ....... the communications doing back and forth
and the question in a lot of peoples minds about how fast Pearl
Harbor could have been warned. The officials at Pearl Harbor
could have been warned if at all. There was a story going around
for awhile that somebody had written that there was a young
lieutenant somewhere at the Pearl Harbor base that had received
a message, but didn't turn it in, and all sorts of things .....
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KIRKPATRICK: Well I think....There were several things that
happened, I mean in addition to the fourteen part cable that had
been intercepted that was presented to the President. There were
two young airmen in the Army/Air Corps as it was then, manning
a radar station on one of the outposts in Hawaii, and they blits
on their screen which actually were the Jap attackers coming
in. And they reported these blits back to the headquarters
and were told to ignore them because Pearl Harbor was expecting
some B17's coming in from the w%ies,t coast of the United States.
And the officer on duty thought these were flying fortresses
coming in. And besides these airmen were only practicing, it
was not a true operation, we weren't manning the radar right
around the clock as perhaps one would today, having been through
a Pearl Harbor.
GALE: I wonder why not in lieu, in light of the warning,
the war warnings that had come from Washington about the tense
situation that was possibly developing in the Pacific.
KIRKPATRICK: I think you have to put that in the same
context that you put the fact that they didn't have around the
clock reconnaissance going, which they did not. That when the
war warning came, the commanders felt that they were already
doing everything they should do, that a destroyer off the, off
Pearl Harbor, outside the submarine boom, had contacted a submarine
and had reported that. That actually didn't reach Pacific Fleet
Headquarters until I think two minutes before the attack on
Pearl Harbor. All of these combined simply to prove that what
I've become more and more convinces; of, and incidentally was
not convinced of when I started to write this particular chapter.
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That it was all part of the psychology of the time and the attitude
of the time. And that's an awful hard thing to change.
GALE: Yes, I think you have a very good point. I guess
that we haven't studied the psychology of, what complacency,
or between battles or what have you. And this may have a great
deal to do with i t .
KIRKPATRICK: Well, my feeling was that unless you took
that into account certainly from the point of view of the number
of warnings that were sent out, the number of times that Admiral
Kimel in Hawaii, who was Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet,
Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval'Operations had communicated
back and forth. It was a very steady correspondence between
the two, both in cables and in letters back and forth, and they
were close personal friends. And Stark, in several of his letters,
mentioned, "You know I don't know whether the Japanese are going
to do, in fact they might even attack Pearl Harbor." He said
that on I think three or four different occasions. And it was
all this back and forth, and I think if you went back and reconstructed
the attitude of these men, they would say and probably be quite
sincere, and probably quite right in saying that they thought
they had done everything that should be done.
GALE: Possibly so. Okay let's take another little
break here. Our guest is Mr Lyman Kirkpatrick who's written
a fascinating book called CAPTAINS WITHOUT EYES, intelligence
failures in World War Two. This is preClA. I keep saying CIA,
I mean just intelligence, military intelligence, Pearl Harbor,
the Battle of the Bulge, the German Invasion of Russia, and
a couple of others. ANNOUNCEMENT
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23
GALE: All right, let's get to the telephone. As I
said our phone number is LU 78283, LU 78338. Hello comment.
UNKNOWN: I'm sorry I didn't get the name of your special
guest. 1 just started listening a few minutes ago and discovered
he was talking about the attack on Pearl Harbor.
GALE: Yes mam, do you have a question?
UNKNOWN: I think I do know somethi nci about that and
would like to know more (inaudible).
GALE: All right. We don't really have a great deal
of time mam, can you.......
UNKNOWN: Please give me the individuals name, please.
GALE: Mr. Kirkpatrick. Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick.
UNKNOWN: Kirkpatrick.
GALE: Yes.
UNKNOWN. May I ask him if he's read certain books and
so on. See I was one of the few that was not surprised at all
at Pearl Harbor. I knew it was corii ng within a week. I mean
I had react the two articles in Time ,iagazi ne which let me know
that it would happen very soon. I didn't know how soon, but
I knew it would happen soon; however, I expected it to happen
in Southeast Asia instead. Because you know President Roosevelt
(unintelligible).
GALE: Pram, mam I hate to interupt you, but we don't
have a great deal of time.
UNKNOWN: I would like to ask him if he's read certain
things .
GALE: Well, would you please ask, would you please
ask we don't have much time.
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UNKNOWN: All right, what ~ would like to know I don't
find the man there, I haven't .~alked to the man.
GALE: ,dell, he's listening.
UNKNOWN: Oh, he's listening.
KI RKPATRI CK: I'm all ears.
UNKNOWN: Yes. Okay. Do you ever read the book FRO1'11
PERRY TO PEARL HARBOR?
KIRKPATRICK: I think I've read the book, yes. What
we're actually talking about is the book I've written in which
there's a chapter on Pearl Harbor which in view of your comments,
I think you'd find very interesting, it's called .........
U1N1KN0WN: What is your name?
KIRKPATRICK: Lyman Kirkpatrick.
UNKNOWN: Lyman Kirkpatrick. And what's the title of
the book?
KIRKPATRICK: CAPTAINS WITHOUT EYES.
UNKN-IO'v!N: CAPTAIN WITHOUT EYES
KIRKPATRICK: CAPTAINS WITHOUT EYES.
UNKNOWN: l,!ho publ ishes it?
KIRKPATRICK: Mic'Mi 1 l an
UNKNOWN: McMi 11 an
KI RKPAT RI CK: Yes.
UNKNOWN: (Unintelligible)
;KIRKPATRICK: Pardon.
UNKNOWN: Just recently
KI RKP/\TRI CK: Oc Lohnr 1069
UNKNOW : (Unintelligible)
KIRKPATRICK: No this is in regards to the attack on
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Pearl Harbor.
GALE: Yes mam. Read the book, please. It tells you
all about it.
GALE: Hello comment.
UNKNOWN: I'd like to ask a question, I think (unintelligible).
Naval commanders over there have our ships lined up like sitting
ducks, everybody was enjoying themselves. Wouldn't you have
thought they would have taken some sort of precaution.
KIRKPATRICK: Well the answer is they were taking a
great number of precautions. It's quite true in retrospect,
when we look at it, it seems rather unfortunate that they had
the eight battleships lined up off the island there. But I
think when you study all of the things that were being done,
you'll find they were taking precautions. But again this is
what I tried to explain in some 90 ,ages of this particular
book.
UNKNOWN: Doesn't that slap our intelligence, our management
when they sent the message, as you say they did, of course a
lot of that came out on the hill in the hearings, you know,
in a mighty different story. And they never did find out where
General Marshall was that morning, it sounds to me .........
KIRKPATRICK: 00 they knew where General Marshall was.
He was horse back riding.
UNKNOWN: Yes, that's what I say, Horse back riding
and a bicycle was taking the intelligence across the ocean,
1 think that's interesting.
KIRKPATRICK: Well, I think what you have to do, in
fact I've read all of the forty volumes of the Pearl Harbor
 Approved For Release 200 /12/03 : CIA-RDP72R0041OR000200240001-0
hearings , which were the accumulated hearings of the Coi;gress
the Army, and the Navy. There were seven hearings on it ..ital.
And what I tried to do was to distill this down and to tell
the hi ghpoi nts of why it happened and I hope I've told it
way it is.
UNKNOWN: I thank y U.
KIRKPATRICK: Your welcome.
GALE: Hello commen
UNKNO.4N: Sir. I was wondering if it is possible for
me to get a comment on the i etnam war. I knot,; that this is ,
you asked man talking about the Pearl harbor, World War Twc,
attac::.
GALE: b le can talk
to talk about Vietnam, wait
a call back or something, a
GALE: Right. Not
to go for a long, unless yo
it into perspective. I aue
Indo China took place and J
the United States drive the
somehow from left field thr
KIRKPATRICK: Shoul
GALE: We can fit i
GALE: Hello common
UNKNOr.N: Hello. I
the activities of CIA. Do
of it?
GALE: He's a forme
s a i d i s tAMrQqqOdF(trfRc O set2Qq
bout Vietnam later. If you want
about`a half an hour and give me
right?
ecessarily related unless you want
want to go around about and bring
s it is since theyre fighting in
pan was there and Ho Chi Minh hrlped
Japanese out, we can bring it in
ugh that.
we drag it in?
in there somewhere.
like to talk to your guest about
executive di rcctor, which as he
ki 219gri GIB-x.72
0419j .000200240001-0
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UNK 0N: Okay. Fin e. I find your comment
from your former position.
of the CIA in the student o
don't seem to consider that
And you don't mention the b
the CIA or the voice of, no
radio activities, the forei
they say is a backer up and
funds from the public.
CPYRGH
T
I find your view on the activities
rganizations rather humorous. Yoe
interfering with internal affairs.
ogus book publishing activities of
its not the Voice of America, the
an radio activities of CIA which
constantly on the air begging for
GALE: Are you talking about Radio Free Europe?
UNKNOWN: Yes. Tha
recently.
KIRKPATRICK: Are
statement?
UNKIN OW N: I'm makir
that you neglect to mention
activities of CIA in inter
When Fred asked you wdhethe
affairs you didn't answer
i;I RKPATRI CK: I thi
than I used. I said inter
UNKNOWN: Alright,
the question you quoted th-
KIRKPATRICK: Every
outside of the U.S., hasn't
UNKNOWN: Certainl
States is not outside the
KIRKPATRICK: I bel
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is been exposed as a CIA front rather
ou asking a question, or making a
g a statement, I find it rather interesting
these things with regard to the
al affairs of the United States.
the CIA was involved in the internal
he question, you stated the law.
nr: you're using a different word
al security not internal affairs.
internal security, you didn't answer
law.
thing you've mentioned has been directed
it?
not, when (unintelligible) United
nited States.
ieve that I made the statement that
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V
what they did in this country was based to operations outside
of the United States.
UNKNOWN: Right, in other words you have a very loose
interpretation of the law. In fact so loose that it has no
meaning by your interpretation, as far as I'm concerned.
1CI RKPATRICK: Which law are you talking about.
UNKNO!411: The law that supposedly controls the CIA,
which of course it doesn't pay any attention to.
KIRKPATRICK: Well I tiink you're probably covering
a great deal in your broad statement, because the law has to
be enforced and the President is the ........
UNKNOWN: Who enforces that law? Nobody even knows
how much money the CIA has, or their activities?
KIRKPATRICK: The congress does.
Ur KNOWN: It's idiotic to talk about enforcing that
KIRKPATRICK: The congress knows how much the CIA has.
The Presi dent knows how much it has.
UNKNOWN: A good number of congressmen will tell you
they you that they haven't the slia:';test idea.
KIRKPATRICK: Have they asked?
U;N;K11011 N: Yes, I'm sure they've asked.
KIRKPATRICK: Who have they asked?
U4,11 KN OWN : They asked the CIA. What kind of answer are
they going to get from -them.
KIRKPATRICK: Well they proba.;;y haven't asked the right
congressrm?en.
GP, !Jell anyway sir we are out of time. I hate to
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UNKNOWN: Right, thank you.
GALE: I hate to cut you off" but we're out of tine.
9r. i(i rkpatri ck thank you very rmmuc, for coming by, apprec i at.:
it. The hoof; is called CAPTAINS ?IIT!!{'UT EYES .,tid it' . -11 about
iiitellinencc failures in World '.!ar Two and most i,,teresting
too. As you will find it so. We ?,cst touched on basically
one chapter, talked a little about Hitler and his involvement
in intelligence in Germany. But it goes into five specifics
and a great deal more.
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