REVIEW OF PROJECT TAGBOARD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72R00410R000200090004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 12, 1963
• Content Type: MF

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066661D
i Z JUN 1963 INNL)
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MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Review of Project TAGBOARD
1. The attached paper discusses in detail the background for Project
TAGBOARD and the various steps leading up to the directive issued by D/NRO
on 4 June 1963 removing CIA from the management and technical monitoring
role which had been delegated to it by the previous D/NRO on 17 October 1962.
2. Also stated are some of our reasons for earnestly suggesting that
the Director attempt to reverse Dr. McMillan's decision of 4 June, perhaps
as a part of his immediate concern over the future of CIA in the clandestine
reconnaissance field and his present attention to the entire NRO/USAF/CIA
interface on U. S. reconnaissance policy. Little or no technical information
has been included in this report, since it was felt that the basic problem was
one of management rather than aerodynamics and technical operation.
3. In spite of the 4 June directive from D/NRO, and until resolution
of the broader questions involved, the DD/R will continue to function in the
management and technical monitoring role forecast in Dr. Charyk's paper of
17 October 1962.
Signed Herbert Scoville? Jr.
NRO
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Signature Rerommpndt r1.
i n:
1, 2 - DDCI 9 - CD . OSA
3.14 - DD/R 10 - SS/OSA
5 - AD / OSA 11 - PS / OSA
6 - DAD / OSA 12 - SD / OSA
7 - D/TECH 13 - RB/OSA
HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.
Deputy Director
(Research)
NRO
25:
E- D/FA/OSA14 - DAD (Chro
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Copy of 14
1 2 JUNE
MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Review of Development and Status of Project TAGBOARD
REFERENCE : a. Memo from D/NRO to DD/NRO; D/NRO Staff;
D/Program D, Dated 4 June 1963; No Subject
NRO 25X1
b. Memo from DD/R to D/NRO, Dated 6 u 3;
Subject: "Project TAGBOARD' INRO
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1. This memorandum is for the information of the Director of Central
Intelligence and is not, therefore, an action paper.
2. Project TAGBOARD, the supersonic reconnaissance drone version
of the A-12 OXCART aircraft, had its origin early in 1962 with a conversation
between Dr. Eugene Fubini of the Office of Research and Engineering, Depart-
ment of Defense, and Mr. C. L. Johnson, Vice President of Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation and designer of the OXCART vehicle. Dr. Fubini asked Mr.
Johnson if it would be possible to develop a small-scale version of the A-12
aircraft, which could be droned carrying a responsible reconnaissance payload
with performance characteristics similar to that anticipated for the A-12.
Dr. Fubini felt that such a drone version, if feasible and susceptible of develop-
ment on the same time scale as the OXCART Program, would affordthe President
a choice between reconnaissance of critical denied areas with manned or unmanned
aircraft. Dr. Fubini's concern was grounded in the U-2 incident of 1 May 1960
and the international repercussions of that act centering around the existence of
a live pilot whose story proved certainly more politically damaging than the same
mission would have provoked had the U-2 been operated at that time as a drone
aircraft.
3. Mr.. Johnson's response to Dr. Fubini was that he felt it would be
feasible to develop a scaled-down version of the A-12, which could be launched'
from the basic OXCART vehicle on a time scale which would be compatible with
the development of the larger aircraft. On 26 September 1962 the then Director 25X1
of the National Reconnaissance Office, Dr. Joseph B. Charyk, in a memor
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to the Secretary of Defense stated that the projected drone now known as
25X1 Project TAGBOARD "appears to offer an alternate means to the A-12 and
satellite sstems for the purpose of overflight photography 25X1
From the tone of his memorandum, it appears that
Dr. Charyk was not completely sold on the political advantages inherent in
an AQ-12 as opposed to the manned version of the same aircraft. He said,
"It seems to me that the drone would provide no better overflight capability
than the A-12 will provide and, from my assessment, the political considera-
tions in sending a drone on this type of mission are not significantly different
from the political considerations in manned overflight. " Dr. Charyk did state
that he felt that the scaled-down version of the A-12 would result in a radar
cross-section of equally reduced magnitude, making tracking of the drone more
difficult than tracking the A-12. The principal attraction of the AQ-12 version
to Dr. Charyk appears to be contained in his statement from the same memoran-
dum of 26 September; "It (AQ-12) may . . . . possess unique capabilities which
le
th
o
e1. s J~ems, \
11 t no time was t e sugges ion
made that the A Q-12 should be considered as an offensive weapons system with
a bomb carrying capability, although later utterances of the D/NRO have
included statements to this effect.
4. As a follow-up to Dr. Charyk's memorandum of 26 September to the
Secretary of Defense, and after a meeting between Mr. McNamara and the DCI
on 5 October, it was agreed to proceed with initial stages of the development of
the AQ-12 program. In view of technical uncertainties of the system, it was
agreed that the program would be carefully reviewed after an initial study and
feasibility phase had been completed. Following the meeting between the
Secretary of Defense and the DCI on 5 October, Dr. Charyk agreed with Dr.
Scoville that management responsibility for Project TAGBOARD should be in
CIA in much the same way as the OXCART Project
He also
d
h
.
agree
t
at DOD
should assign an individual to CIA knowledgeable on drones and enthusiastic for NRO
25X1 the AQ-12 program. On 11 October 1962 the Assistant Director, Office of
Special Activities, requested the NRO Comptroller 25.
to cover the feasibility study project which r. Johnson of
Lockheed proposed in writing to AD/OSA on 9 October 1962. A terminal date
of 2 January 1963 was set for completion of this part of the TAGBOARD Project.
5. On 17 October 1962 Dr. Charyk, in a memorandum to the DD/R,
stated in part; "NRO management responsibility for this development is assigned
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to the Director, Program B (AD/ OSA). " In the same memorandum Dr. Charyk
stated that he was prepared to assign Lt. Colonel Henry Howard from the NRO
Staff to the Dirdctor, 'Program B, "for this important task". On 26 October
1962, the DD/R responded to Dr. Charyk's memorandum of 17 October, stating
that "Colonel Jack C. Ledford, USAF, Director, Program B, has assumed
managerial responsibility for the AQ-12 drone project". My memorandum
of this date also expressed appreciation for the nomination of Lt. Colonel
Howard and further asked that communications be established between
Colonel Ledford and Lt. Colonel Howard in order to determine when the latter
would assume his new position. Nothing further was heard from the NRO
Staff on Colonel Howard's nomination to this Agency.
6. In the interim between 26 October 1962 and the completion of
Lockheed's feasibility study for Project TAGBOARD on 11 January 1963, OSA
solicited camera proposals for the AQ-12 reconnaissance system for interested
manufacturers, and on 3 December 1962, firm proposals were received from
Eastman-Kodak, Perkin-Elmer Corporation, ITEK Corporation and HYCON
Manufacturing Company. The TAGBOARD feasibility study was optimistic,
and following a meeting between the Secretary of Defense and the DCI, approval
to proceed with the program on the basis of recommendations from the D/NRO
and the DD/R-CIA was given. On 28 February 1963, Lockheed was given a go-
ahead for the procurement of twenty drones and modification of two A-12 into
drone launch aircraft configurations. Lockheed at that time forecast that the
first AQ-12 drone would be ready for flight test within approximately fifteen
months. Delivery of cameras was deemed compatible with this schedule.
7. Subsequent to Dr. Charyk's 17 October 1962 memorandum assigning
management responsibilities for TAGBOARD to CIA, there was no formal
exchange with the D/NRO on this subject up to the time of his departure from
the Department of Defense. However, rumors began reaching the Office of
Special Activities after Dr. Charyk's departure to the effect that the question of
management and technical responsibility had in fact not been clearly settled. These
rumors were definitely directed toward establishing the proposition that the
USAF should be responsible for technical operation and later operational missions
in view of their historical experience in the operation of drone aircraft. In the
meantime OSA continued to exercise its management responsibility in the fields
of contracts, security and technical monitoring as provided for in the 17 October
1962 paper from Dr. Charyk. During the early tenure of Dr. McMillan, the
question of TAGBOARD responsibility was raised, and he indicated that he had
been advised that this more appropriately belonged in the AF than in CIA.
I demurred and pointed out that in view of the close association with the A-12
and the strong requirement for covertness for this project, I did not feel this
appropriate. On 25 April Dr. McMillan forwarded me a draft memorandum
assigning TAGBOARD to Director, Program D and asked for my concurrence.
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I demurred even more strongly and asked for the logic which would justify
such a decision. Dr. McMillan then stated that one of the strong requirements
for this development was for military activities such as bomb delivery in
wartime, and he also repeated his previous arguments that CIA had not been
enthusiastic about the usefulness of the project and therefore was not
appropriate as manager. I stated that the idea of the drone as a bomb carrier
had never been seriously proposed and could not be a serious consideration
in this connection. I further pointed out that CIA's record in pressing for the
feasibility study and pushing for improved capabilities in face of Dr. Charyk's
opposition belied the statement that CIA would not pursue the program
vigorously.
8. In order to force this issue into the open, a message was sent on
4 June 1963 to Lockheed and HYCON, with an information copy to the Director
of Program D, NRO, convening the first of a series of periodic TAGBOARD
status reviews and co-ordination meetings. The call for these meetings went
out in the name of CIA, with the further suggestion that Lockheed obtain
representation from the Ramj et engine manufacturer and guidance systems'
contractor. The afternoon of the same day, 4 June, Dr. McMillan, Director,
National Reconnaissance Office, signed a memorandum to DD/R, the Director
NRO Staff, and the Director of Program D, assigning Project TAGBOARD to
Colonel Leo P. Geary, USAF, Director of Program D and calling out the con-
ditions which were to be in effect. (See Reference a. ) It is interesting to
observe that the D/NRO in the first of the conditions set forth lays upon the
Director of Program D the responsibility for conducting Project TAGBOARD as
a "completely black activity". In a brief note accompanying the referenced
memorandum, Dr. McMillan said that the overriding consideration in assigning
TAGBOARD to USAF in his opinion "is that this program is of vital interest to
the military and ... will have a direct application to systems under direct
military control". On 6 June 1963 I said that I felt this matter should be
referred upward to the Secretary of Defense and DCI for a policy decision
and asked that the D/NRO not implement his directive of 4 June until such a
policy decision was in hand. In the meantime Lockheed has agreed to an
initial one-day technical review of TAGBOARD to be held in Burbank on
.19 June 1963.
9. It is obvious from the detailed chronicle above that the various
responsibilities for Project TAGBOARD have suffered from a certain amount of
fuzzy interpretation. Attempts, by the DD/R and members of the Office of
Special Activities to force a restatement of responsibilities from the NRO Staff
were met with coolness from the beginning, and especially after the departure
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of Dr. Charyk from the job of D/NRO. We feel that the assignment of TAGBOARD
to Air Force is fundamentally incorrect for a variety of reasons, some of which
are set forth hereafter, though not necessarily in order of importance.
a. There is a basic problem of dual responsibility for the
ultimate operation of TAGBOARD if the Project gravitates to USAF.
The Agency maintains operational control of Project OXCART,
whose vehicles will be used to launch the TAGBOARD drone. To
superimpose another level of operations control on OXCART from
the same base is detrimental to the efficiency.
b. It is our view that security on TAGBOARD would be
impaired by the close relationship of that Project to the R-12
(Project EARNING), with both aircraft being produced in the same
physical facility and technically monitored by personnel from
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio. It is our view
under these circumstances that a truly covert program cannot
exist, and ultimately 'TAGBOARD would become simply another
part of a much broader USAF program in a KEDLOCK 25X1
c. Project TAGBOARD, under USAF technical management,
would superimpose another layer of technical management on
Lockheed and would further dilute Mr. Johnson's efforts to bring
Project OXCART to operational readiness.
d. Should a decision be made to surface the long range
interceptor version of the A-12, Project TAGBOARD might well
turn out to be the most covert asset of the whole OXCART Program.
It is our view that for the reasons noted above, Project TAGBOARD
cannot remain covert for very long if subjected to normal USAF
management and operational techniques.
e. As for a reported bomb-carrying military mission for
the AQ-12 suggested orally by D/NRO to DD/R as one reason for
retaining TAGBOARD control in Air Force, it should be noted that
the bomb-carrying capability of the AQ-12 would be drastically
limited to no more than 250 pounds. It is our view that such a
limitation prevents serious consideration for this aircraft as an
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offensive weapons system, since it offers little in this configuration
not available to the military at the end of World War II in the German
V-2 rocket.
10. Obviously a solution to the present muddle over responsibility for
Project TAGBOARD is only one part of the larger problem of CIA's role in
the clandestine reconnaissance business. It is, however, illustrative of the
divergence of opinion existing as a hard cold fact between certain elements of
the Air Force and those parts of CIA charged with the responsibility his-
torically for the conduct of these clandestine reconnaissance operations.
Signed Herbert SCOVi11eo, Jr.
Sianati rp Recommended:
HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.
'Deputy Director
(Research)
NRO
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istribution:
1, 2 - DCI, w/refs
3, 4 - DD / R
5 - AD/OSA
6 - DAD / OSA
7 - D/TECH/OSA
8 - D/FA/OSA
9 - CD/OSA
10 - SS/OSA
11 - PS / OSA
12 - SD / OSA
13 - RB/OSA
14 - DAD Chrono
DAD/ OSA: JA Cunningham, Jr.n(10 June 63)
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NRO
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