AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION, INC.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00337R000500280003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 24, 1971
• Content Type: OPEN

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE June 24, 1911
President rejected setting a deadline or date
certain for the total withdrawal of our forces,
saving the North Vietnamese have only prom-
ised to "discuss" the POW question if we did
so. In his words:
"We need action. on their part and a com-
mitment on their part with regard to the
prisoners. Consequently, as far as any action
on our part of ending American involvement
is concerned-and that means a total with-
drawal-that will have to be delayed until
we get not just the promise to discuss the
release of our prisoners, but a commitment
to release our prisoners, because a discussion
promise means nothing where the North
Vietnamese are concerned."
And finally, in his press conference of
June 1, 1971, the President was asked the
question: "What is there to lose by setting a
date contingent upon release of all prison-
ers' " The President responded:
"According to Ambassador Bruce, the posi-
tion taken by the North Vietnamese has been,
'If we end our involvement in Vietnam and
set a date, they will agree to discuss prison-
ers, not release them .' Now, as far as
we're concerned, we at this time are not go-
ing to make any kind of agreement with re-
gard to prisoners that is not going to be fol-
lowed by action or concurrent action; and
from the standpoint of the North Vietnamese,
we have yet no indication whatever that they
would be willing to release prisoners in the
event we took certain steps,"
I have drawn upon these Presidential.
statements because I think they do point
to all evolving American policy vis-a-vis the
iiecotiationa and conditions for the total
withdrawal of American forces. As our force
levels decrease, our bargaining 'stroke' at
Paris is reduced so far as an Indochina set-
tlement is concerned, and eventually, the
only point to be negotiated between us and
the North Vietnamese will be the prisoner
of war Issue and the date of our final
withdrawal. I do not mean to Imply here that
the President has taken the position that the
only condition for our final withdrawal is the
release of our prisoners, though there are
indications from the statements I have
quoted that we are moving in that direction.
The fact is that the President has stated an-
other condition for the final withdrawal of
American forces, and that is "the ability of
the South Vietnamese to develop the capacity
to defend themselves against a communist
takeover," in other words, the completion of
the Vietnamization program.
My resolution, on the other hand, goes
back to the President's statement on April
'7th of this year to the effect that our goal
Is a total withdrawal through the Vietnam-
ization program if necessary, "but we would
Infinitely prefer to reach it even sooner-
through negotiations"; and the President's
statement on April 26th of this year to the
effect that as our force levels diminish, the
only point left to be negotiated between us
and Ilanol is the prisoner of war question.
Under the policy suggested by my resolution,
?we would express to the North Vietnamese
our willingness to accelerate our withdrawals
and complete them by a date certain if they
in turn agree to release all American pris-
oners being held in Indochina 60 days prior
to that date, and guarantee the safe and
orderly withdrawal of our remaining forces.
My resolution does not specify a date, leav-
ing this a matter to be negotiated concur-
rently with the prisoner of war question.
But obviously, it would have to be within
a reasonable time frame to have any appeal
at the bargaining table. It seems to me that
the value of this approach is that rather than
having each side waiting for the other to
make it move on either the matter of setting
a date or the matter of releasing prisoners,
both would have to agree to discuss these
issues simultaneously, and the resolution of
one would be contingent upon the other.
While suggesting a specific date in such a
resolution is appealing from a political
standpoint, or from the standpoint of reas-
suring the American public, I think from a
practical negotiating standpoint this is some-
thing best left to Abe worked out in the secret
sessions at Paris and not publicly announced
until an agreement has been reached.
To get back to the question of what effect
an accelerated withdrawal and date certain
for its completion would have on the Viet-
namization program, let me say that while
an earlier withdrawal date would reduce the
amount of final preparation we could give the
South Vietnamese to defend themselves, it
would not he fair to suggest that we haven't
already given them a reasonable capability
for survival. You will recall that on April
7th of this year, shortly after the Laotian
operations, the President announced that,
"Vietnamization has succeeded."
A report released by the Department of
Defense last week points out that ground
combat responsibility will be completely
turned over to the South Vietnamese by this
summer, thus completing phase one of the
Vietnamization program; and phase two-
developing South Vietnamese air, naval, artil-
lery, logistics and other support capabilities-
has been proceeding concurrently with phase
one, though it will take a little longer.
Over the last year, according to the DOD
report, American air sorties have decreased
46% while South Vietnamese attack sorties
have increased 65%. The pacification pro-
gram has likewise been proceeding with
marked success. Regional Forces have In-
creased 48% since June of 1968 and have thus
relieved the ARVN for combat duties, while
Popular Forces have increased 51 % since
June of 1969, and over 95% of the Popular
Force platoons are now fully trained and
equipped with modern radios and armed
with M-16 rifles.
And so, Mr. Chairman, I hardly think an
accelerated withdrawal, contingent upon the
prior release of our prisoners, could in any
way be considered precipitious in terms of
the Vietnamization program since the South
Vietnamese have developed an impressive
capacity to shoulder the burden themselves,
all the way down to the hamlet level.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to briefly
address myself to Section 3 of my resolution
which states as a further matter of national
policy our intention to provide continued
military and economic assistance to the na-
tions of Indochina, in amounts approved
by Congress, and consistent with the objet-
nam and in preventing future Vietnam-type
involvements. If this is to happen it must
begin right here in this committee. I com-
mend this committee on its war powers hear-
ings and its Indochina hearings, and I urge
you to follow through in such s way that
the full House will have an opportunity to
express itself on these issues of crucial Im-
portance to our country and our Constitu-
tional form of government.
H. CON. RES. 347
Whereas, the President of the United States
Is pursuing a policy designed to bring an
honorable end to the war in Vietnam through
the withdrawal of American Armed Forces
from that country, through a reduction in
the level of hostilities, and through negotia-
tions; and
Whereas, the President has withdrawn over
half of the American Armed Forces from Viet-
nam since taking office, and has further an-
nounced that two-thirds of all such forces
will have been withdrawn by December 1,
1971; and
Whereas, the President has announced
that, "Our goal is a total American with-
drawal from Vietnam"; Now, therefore be it
Resolved by the House of Representoti.rrs
(the Senate concurring), That the Congress
hereby declares that it is the national policy
to continue the safe and orderly withdrawal
of American Armed Forces from South Viet-
nam on an irreversible basis, with the objec-
tive of the total withdrawal of all such forces
at the earliest practicable date.
SEC. 2. It is the national policy to acceler-
ate and. complete such withdrawal by a date
certain provided that there is a negotiated
agreement to: (a) release and repatriate all
American prisoners of war being held in Indo-
china by a date 60 days prior to such date
certain, under the supervision of the Inter-
national Red Cross or other such organiza-
tion; and (b) guarantee the safe and order-
ly withdrawal of all remaining American
Armed Forces from South Vietnam by such
date certain.
SEC. 3. It is the national policy to: (a) pro-
vide assistance to the nations of Indochina,
in amounts approved by the Congress, con-
sistent with the objectives of the Guam Doc-
trine of July, 1969; and (b) arrange asylum
or other means of protection for South Viet-
namese, Cambodians, and Laotians who
might be physically endangered by the with-
drawal of American Armed Forces.
tives of the Guam Doctrine; and to arrange I AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR PRIVATE
asylum for those who might be endangered INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICA-
by our withdrawal. TIONS, INC.
As the members of this subcommittee are
well aware, the United States cannot legally
or morally turn its back on Southeast Asia
after the last troop has been withdrawn from
South Vietnam. We will continue to be a
Pacific power and we will continue to have
certain obligations and responsibilities to
the people of that part of the world. In July
of 1969, the President Issued the Guam Doc-
trine which said in effect that the United
States will honor its treaty commitments,
extend Its shield to any nation allied with
us which is threatened by a nuclear power,
and, in cases involving other types of ag-
gression, we will furnish military and eco-
nomic assistance but look to the nation di-
rectly threatened to assume the primary re-
sponsibility of providing manpower for its
defense. I think the Congress should offi-
cially endorse this policy of encouraging
self-sufficiency on the part of our allies, and
at the same time help formulate specific
programs for its implementation.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, I am inter-
ested in seeing that the Congress reassumes
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a
previous order of the House, the gentle-
man from Connecticut (Mr. STEELE) is
recognized for 10 minutes.
Mr. STEELE. Mr. Speaker, on June 22,
1971, a bill H.R. 9330 was introduced in
the House by Mr. REID of New York to
provide for creation of an American
Council for Private International Coin-
munications, Inc. The primary purpose
of the council would be to receive con-
gressional appropriations and make
grants to Radio Liberty for broadcasts to
the Soviet Union and to Radio Free Eu-
rope for broadcasts to Eastern Europe.
Because of my own interest in Soviet
affairs, I wish to speak today about R.n-
dio Liberty. It appeal's that unless Con-
gress acts on H.R. 9330, Radio Liberty
will have no other source of support and
will have to end its broadcasts to the So-
its Constitutional role In matters of war and i viet Union. Indeed, I am informed that
peace. I think we can and should play a role Radio Liberty's present funding does not
in extricating the United States from Viet- extend beyond the end of this month,
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June 24, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL RECUIS.D - klu Li 6.L,
and that unless an interim arrangement
can be made pending passage of H.R.
9330, the station will have to go off the
air very shortly.
I urge the Congress to take action to
prevent this emergency, which would ser-
iously damage the foreign-policy inter-
ests of the American people and the
cause of international understanding.
In more than 18 years of continuous
broadcasting, Radio Liberty has built up
a specialized following of concerned So-
viet citizens. Unlike other radios beamed
to the Soviet Union from outside, Radio
Liberty speaks as the voice of former
Soviet citizens and focuses primarily
on the country's internal political, eco-
nomic, and social life. The station has
approached Soviet problems construc-
tively, in terms of moderate and nonvio-
lent solutions. It issues no appeals to ac-
tion, but concentrates on dissemination
of news and diverse opinions.
Ever since 1960, when I visited the So-
viet Union with one of the first groups
of American students to go there, I have
been keenly aware of the role of infor-
mation in the development of Soviet so-
ciety. It is ironic that today, as the Soviet
Union rises to the challenge of the
space and nuclear age and the number
of citizens with professional train-
ing at the university level is grow-
ing by leaps and bounds, the dead
hand of the censor lies ever more heavily
on Soviet life. This contradiction between
progress and backwardness has given rise
to a dissent movement which, although
small in visible size, cuts deeply into the
fabric of its society.
Radio Liberty's audience includes im-
portant segments of the Soviet cultural
and scientific elites, those pressing hard-
est for positive change in their society.
If the Soviet system yields to pressures
for modernization, decentralization and
liberalization, as someday it can hardly
fail to do, these people will be in the fore-
front of the country's leadership. From
our standpoint as Americans, they will
be more important in our relations with
their country than the aging bureaucrats
at the top level with whom we now must
deal.
Resistance to censorship among think-
ing members of Soviet society has given
rise in recent years to a movement un-
precedented in the Soviet period. I re-
fer to so-called samizdat, an abbrevia-
tion of two Russian words meaning "self"
and "publishing." Samizdat consists of
literally hundreds of unpublished
works-fiction, criticism, political essays,
protest documents, appeals for human
rights-now circulating throughout the
Soviet Union in manuscript form. In a
country where even the use of mimeo-
graph machines is controlled by the re-
gime, samizdat manuscripts must be
painstakingly copied on typewriters, a
few carbons at a time.
Samizdat has been a major source for
Radio Liberty. More than one-sixth of
the station's Russian-language program-
ing in the first half of this year has con-
sisted of broadcasts of samizdat items
which have filtered out of the Soviet
Union. Thus, Radio Liberty is able to
provide its audience with their own un-
censored medium of mass information, a
unique forum for the exchange of ideas.
The meaning of this to Soviet intellectu-
als chafing under censorship is expressed
in a recent comment by one of them:
If I want to say something to the people,
to the country, then the only way I can say
it is through Western radio.
A major samizdat item now being
readied for broadcast by Radio Liberty
is the new novel "August 1914" by the No-
bel Prize-winning Russian writer Alex-
ander Solzhenitsyn, whose work has been
suppressed in his own country. A Wash-
ington Post reviewer, the newspaper's
former Moscow correspondent Anatole
Shub, has written of "August 1914":
Millions of Soviet citizens, spiritually de-
meaned by the official mendacity and pap,
would surely queue up instantly, as a bread-
line in a siege, to read even a few pages of
a book of such shining merits.
Radio Liberty has also acquainted its
audience with the inconoclastic writing
of the Russian physicist Andrei Sakha-
rov, called the "father" of his country's
hydrogen bomb, who has warned:
The division of mankind faces it with de-
struction ... In the face of these perils, any
action increasing the division of mankind,
any preaching of the incompatibility of world
ideologies and nations is madness and a
crime.
Especially since the post-Khrushchev
leadership came to power, a relatively
small but important number of Soviet
citizens, prominent in various profes-
sions, have managed to seek asylum in
the West. Many of these are now con-
tributing to Radio Liberty programs:
Writers, journalists, social scientists,
natural scientists, and others. On several
occasions Svetlana Alliluyeva has gone to
Radio Liberty studios to read from her
own writings on the air. Such broadcasts
are virtually the only link through which
such former citizens, who have given up
their citizenship in order to work for re-
form from abroad, can communicate
with the public in their homeland.
In addition to its Russian broadcasts,
Radio Liberty speaks to Ukrainians, Uz-
beks, and other Central Asian and Si-
berian Moslems, to Belorussians, and to
the peoples of the Caucasus, using a total
of 16 languages of Soviet non-Russian
nationalities. A proposal to add Lithu-
ania, Latvian and Estonian is now pend-
ing. The non-Russian nationalities,
which the recent census shows are on
their way to outnumbering the Russians
themselves, remain for the most part
linguistically and culturally distinct and
buoyed by a soaring rate of elite forma-
tion. In thinking of the future of our re-
lations with the Soviet Union, we Ameri-
cans must consider our links with these
peoples as well as with the Russians.
An important component of Radio
Liberty's Russian broadcasts has been
programs in behalf of Soviet Jews. This
has included scores of separate appeals
by individual Soviet Jews and groups of
Jews protesting discriminatory practices
and demanding in many cases the right
to emigrate to Israel. I understand that
the station also tries in other ways to
keep alive for its Jewish listeners an
awareness of their ethnic and cultural
identity in the face of regime efforts to
efface traditional values. Jewish high
holidays have been celebrated in Radio
Liberty broadcasts with Hebrew prayers
and songs. A regular feature of Russian
broadcasts has been material dealing
with condemnations of anti-Semitism
and other forms of intolerance by re-
vered Russian humanists of the past, and
by persons abroad whose names are re-
spected in the U.S.S.R. A recent im-
migrant to Israel, the physicist Boris
Tsukerman who was associated with
Academician Sakharov, Alexander Solz-
henitsyn, and others in creating an un-
official "Committee on Human Rights"
in the Soviet Union, commented after
leaving the country:
Special hopes have been placed, of course,
on a radio station which has paid special
heed to the requirements of various cate-
gories of Soviet radio listeners and has had
the mission of satisfying these requirements.
Radio Liberty's value as a world asset
is recognized internationally. In the past
few months, as word has reached the
press of the station's difficulties, public
statements of support have been issued
by leading Soviet specialists at centers
of learning like Oxford, Cambridge, Lon-
don University, and the Sorbonne. Such
influential newspapers as the London
Daily Telegraph, the Paris Figaro, and
the Neue Zuercher Zeitung of Switzer-
land have written favorable articles.
In the United States, Radio Liberty's
support is bipartisan. The station has
friends among liberals and conservatives,
among hawks and doves. Some of its most
vigorous support comes from academic
specialists. I understand that in recent
weeks those sending messages to Mem-
bers of Congress in behalf of Radio
Liberty have included such distinguished
scholars as Philip Mosely and Zbigniew
Brzezinski of Columbia, Hans Morgen-
thau of the University of Chicago, Fre-
derick Barghoorn of Yale, Richard Pipes
of the Russian Research Center at Har-
vard, Robert V. Daniels of the University
of Vermont, and Foy Kohler of the Uni-
versity of Miami-a former Ambassador
to the Soviet Union. I might add that
hundreds of specialists in the United
States and abroad rely on Radio Liberty's
research analyses of Soviet affairs.
Radio Liberty is less well-known to the
United States public at large. It has never
conducted mass public-relations or ad-
vertising campaigns, largely because it
has not solicited donations from the gen-
eral public.
What would be our loss if Radio Liberty
ceased broadcasting?
Radio Liberty performs a function that
is not feasible for official radios like the
Voice of America. If its unique role were
to end, the United States and its friends
abroad would relinquish an important
medium of international understanding.
They would rebuff an audience which
has been built up over the years through
investment of time, money and dedica-
tion.
If once dispersed, Radio Liberty's hu-
man resources including many persons
with rare linquistic skills and cultural
backgrounds would be lost beyond re-
covery. The station's technical facilities,
once dismantled, would require years to
replace. Its frequencies would be yielded
permanently to other broadcasters in the
crowded shortwave spectrum. Above all,
notice would be served on important,
friendly segments of Soviet society that
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WAU1(Y:SS1OiNAL lit L1 ]till- hUU.fiv June , If, 1:/, 1
they have been downgraded by the people
of the United States
.
Mr. Speaker, Radio Liberty is not an
outmoded instrument of the "cold war."
It is ail institution involved in the vital
work of establishing links with those in
the Soviet Union working for peace and
a better life. In terms of money, its total
annual operating budget is little more
than the price of a single F-111 jet
fighter. At that cost, it must be preserved.
drew from all territories occupied in June
1967, the Arabs would not make peace.
Soviet-built Sukhoi jets have resumed
flights over the Suez Canal to spy on
Israeli positions. They have been driven
off by antiaircraft fire on a number of
very recent occasions. The cease-fire is
in danger.
With possible collaboration by the So-
viet Union, the leftist Arab regime in
Yemen permitted extremist Arab ele-
of H.R. 9330. 1 from Suez as a base for a sneak attack
11_ J by sea on an oil tanker bound for an
Israeli sea rt Th t k 1
o
an e
TAKE PRIDE IN AMERICA
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a
previous order of the House, the gentle-
man from Ohio (Mr. MILLER) is recog-
nized for 5 minutes.
Mr. MILLER of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, to-
day we should take note of America's
great accomplishments and in so doing
renew our faith and confidence in our-
selves as individuals and as a Nation.
The United States is the location for
the largest medical center in the world.
The District Medical Center in Chicago
covers 478 acres and includes five hos-
pitals, with a total of 5,600 beds and
eight professional schools with more than
3,000 students.
NEED FOR AMERICAN-ISRAEL
TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a
previous order of the House, the gentle-
man from New York (Mr. HALPERN) is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Speaker, I am to-
day reintroducing a House resolution
urging the negotiation of an American-
Israeli treaty of friendship as a timely
move to stabilize the Middle Eastern sit-
uation and prevent further deterioration
of the tenuous cease-fire. It is cospon-
sored by, Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG, Hon.
JOHN DUNCAN, Hon. JOSEPH ADDABBO,
Hon. SAM STRATTON, Hon. ROBERT MC-
CLORY, Hon. ROBERT DRINAN, Hon.
GEORGE COLLINS, Hon. JOHN. Dow,
Hon. GUS YATRON, Hon. JAMES SCHE-
UER, and Hon. BENJAMIN ROSENTHAL.
My proposal is prompted by the re-
cent grave events in the Middle East.
These events took place at a time when
our attention was preoccupied by Viet-
nam and the disclosure of sensational in-
formation related to our involvement
there. Our preoccupation with Vietnam
was cynically exploited by the Soviet
Union to sabotage American efforts to
promote peace between Egypt and Israel.
Moscow entered into a 15-year friend-
ship treaty with Egypt that advanced
Soviet military involvement in Egypt
and transformed that country into a vir-
tual Russian satellite. The Soviet Presi-
dent, Nikolai V. Podgorny, expressed
Moscow's belligerent new views on the
Middle East on May 27 after signing the
new treaty of friendship and cooperation
with Egypt. He condemned "the imper-
ialists in the United States" and de-
nounced American efforts to mediate the
conflict.
President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt
subsequently denounced the United
States and said that even if Israel with-
p
. e
r narrow y es-
caped destruction. Credit for the attack
was claimed by the Marxist Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine,
the group that last year hijacked and
destroyed American aircraft.
My resolution envisages a 15-year
American-Israeli friendship pact that
would serve as an effective answer to the
mounting crisis created by the new 15-
year Soviet-Egypltian friendship treaty
and the resulting escalation of tensions.
The threat to world peace has been in-
creased. Massive new Soviet arms ship-
ments are arriving in Egypt. Soviet air
and naval bases in that country are being
expanded. Soviet officials have just vis-
ited new Russian naval units concentrat-
ing in the Mediterranean in a bid to
neutralize the U.S. 6th Fleet. The Soviet
Navy is now manning submarines and
missile ships as well as jet bombers dis-
played the insignia and colors of Egypt.
It is my conviction that we have not
taken the Soviet-Egyptian pact seriously
enough. My resolution would serve the
national security interests of the United
States by providing a dramatic notice to
potential aggressors. We would indicate
that our country will not be moved from
its commitments to Israel. We would
show the futility of efforts to drive a
wedge between our Nation and the state
of Israel.
My resolution would give ' added
strength to the existing understandings
between the United States and Israel. It
would serve notice to the Russians that
they do not have an "open sesame" to the
Middle East.
My resolution provides that "the Presi-
dent should give favorable consideration
to the negotiation by the Department of
State of a 15-year American-Israel
Treaty of Friendship." Enactment would
give added prestige and strength to the
existing relations linking the two coun-
tries. It would provide, in the words of
the resolution, "a formal basis for the
existing close relations between the two
nations relating to economic cooperation
and the supply of military and defense
material."
It appears to me that the United States
has taken the new pact between Russia
and Egypt too lightly. There is already
evidence that the treaty is calculated
to prevent a just peace settlement and
to cover the shipment of additional arms
to Egypt.
The new treaty made Egypt almost
completely subservient to the Soviet
Union and made Cairo regime a virtual
satellite of Moscow. The most effective
American answer, serving the national
security interest of the United States, is
to stabilize the now unbalanced situa-
tion by a treaty formalizing American-
Israel friendship.
The Soviet Union entered an arms
accord with Egypt in 1955 with tacit
undertakings that led to the war of 1956.
Soviet-Egyptian accomodations were
further expanded in 1967, leading to the
outbreak of war in that year.
There have been some reports that the
United States is withholding new con-
tracts for arms to Israel although Egypt
has become more bellicose following her
new pact with Russia. The United States
is pressured by Egypt and the Soviet
Union to withhold arms required by
Israel.
A new Soviet strategy has emerged to
keep tensions broiling in the Middle East
over Israel which is not protected by
NATO. The Russian aim is to isolate the
United States from its allies, to under-
mine the credibility of our defensive
capacities, and to test our resolve. Rus-
sia is consolidating air and naval bases in
Egypt to dominate the Mediterranean.
As a member of the Near East Sub-
committee of the Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee, I recently visited Israel and Leb-
anon to study the developing situation
The Soviet-Egyptian pact has not been
taken seriously enough by our own Gov-
ernment; not only did it forge a tie be-
tween Russia and Egypt as states but
also links the two peoples and their only
legal political parties.
The Communist bloc provided the only
parallel in existence for a pact of this
sort. Egypt can be considered from now
as virtually a Russian satellite in the
Middle East.
The imbalance of arms between Egypt
and Israel is reaching dangerous propor-
tions as the United States defers new
Phantom Jet contracts. Russia, mean-
while ships MIG-23's and its finest ultra-
modern firepower into Egypt in a shock-
ing escalation of weapons systems. Amer-
ican preoccupation with peace and with-
drawal from military commitments is
being cynically exploited by the Russians
in the Middle East.
The danger of the new pact linking
Moscow with Cairo lies in the prospect of
new fighting. To deter such a possibility,
the United States must act now to clarify
its relationship to Israel and determina-
tion to keep faith with an outpost of
freedom.
The United States-Israeli treaty would
not obligate the United States to auto-
matically go to war in defense of Israel
or vice-versa. It would nevertheless
dramatize to potential aggressors that
we are willing to formalize the existing
commitments and contractural arrange-
ments, including the provision of arms,
linking the United States with Israel.
Our relations with all concerned govern-
ments-Israeli, Egyptian, and Russian-
would be strengthened. Our policies
would be made clear to friend and foe
alike.
My resolution, if adopted, would serve
as an insurance policy for peace.
STANDARDS FOR OPERATION OF
NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a
previous order of the House, the gentle-
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iLt u USE UIJLY L~
SUBJECT: (Optional)
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
FROM:
EXTENSION
NO.
DATE
Acting Legislative Counsel
25 June 1971
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'
S
cmment to show fom whom
O COMMENTS
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RECEIVED
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1.
Attached is an excerpt from
Acting Director
the Congressional Record of
2. Executive Director-
Thursday, 24 June 1971, contain-
Comptroller
ing remarks by Representative
t
hi
3
s suppor
Bob Steele expressing
of Radio Liberty. He also sets
OPPB
forth the urgency for an arrange-
--
4.
ment for interim funding of the
Radios pending passage of
Mr. Cord Meyer
Representative Reid's (Case's)
5.
bile..
8.
signed
ry
9.
Acting Legislative Counsel
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
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Approved For Release 2005/08/22 CIA-RDP72-00337R000500280003-1