PHOENIX TO GET THEIR MAN DEAD OR ALIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00337R000300060020-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2000
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: February 22, 1970
• Content Type: NSPR

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Approved For Release 2001/08/674 EU-10072-00337R000300060020-8
F` oenix:
To Get
Them Mali
Dead or
Alive
bush of a Vietcong district head.; Its very "existence was classi-
quarters staff as it Is moving fled as "secret" and Phoenix was
from one hamlet to another ---'; staffed by tough close-mouthed
hit and run.
Dirty Job
hind unmarked doors in provin=
,vial and district headquarters,
raced about the countryside in
It is a dirty and dangerous ScoutI station-wagons and, incqn-
occupation. Squads that do their ''gruously, carried attache cases.
work conscientiously take many f saw one of the cases opened
casualties. Entire units have once; it contained a' stubby
been wiped out in counter-am- Beretta submachine gun and
bushes, carefully prepared with; packs and packs of Vietnamese
false information. The men who ! 500-plaster notes.
volunteer for such assignments By
t hard
late 1967 it wasn'
often have unsavory pasts. The to find knowledgeable sources
lure is usually money. The pay
scale for Provincial Reconnais-? , who would admit that Phoenix
sance Units is four times as high; wasn't accounting for many
as that of the Vietnamese mili- i" Vietcong leaders and that the
tary. Bonuses are given for spec- P?R.U.'s. who were also recruited
tacular successes. P.R.U. men by the C.I.A. were quicker to
tend to have more. gold teeth go o their money, get drunk and
than the average Vietnamese, go off on their own extortion
and robbery operations than
bigger motorbikes and sharper, they were to sweep out into
clothes. The Kit Carson Scouts
and the Armed Propaganda E the dangerous boondocks. Iie-
are composed : of Ades, many Vietnamese province
and district officials were, un-
Vietcong defectors and captives,; willin as thy e still seem to be
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee may have been con- fused by last week's testimony on Operation Phoenix. The corn-
mince had a report from the American military command in Saigon that seemed to give Phoenix the credit for hunting down and killing 6,187 Vietcong political cadres last year. Thenit heard William E. Colby, the
pacification chief in Vietnam,
, emphatically deny that Phoenix?
was an "assassination" program.
The problem is one of defini-
tion, according to knowledgeable
sources. Phoenix, which operates
at the district and province
level, gathers, evaluates and dis-
seminates intelligence on the
identity and movements of mem-
bers of the Vietcong infrastruc-
ture. These are the nonmilitary
figures who govern the parts of
Vietnam still controlled by their
movement and who slip in and
out of Government-controlled
and contested areas.
Shadowy Organizations
The information that may lead
to the "neutralization" of these
men -- the official figures state
and there are many of these' in
the Seal teams, which are run
by the United States Navy. For
them, poor performance can
mean a return to harsh confine-
ment. Any hint of treachery can,
bring summary execution.
The apparent disquiet with
which various Senators have
viewed Phoenix operations --
there is apparently a suspicion'
that they have been occasionally
directed against anyone who op-
poses the Government of Presi-
dent Nguyen Van Thleu -- has.
A th S - an
t
h
P
to upset live-and-let-live arrange-
ments with the Vietcong that
might put their own lives in
jeopardy. ,
Tet Setback
The Tet offensive of 1968 'set
back Phoenix operations for
many months. Later,'a Washing-
ton decision to reduce the C.I.A.s'
operational role in, Vietnam led
,to the replacement of agency
men by young military intelli-
,gence officers, often straight out
'of school. Last.July the military
en
led t
e
agon an a asg command took nominal charge
command to do something un- of the program, although the
usual. Correspondents have been planning is still done by the
told that the program hasp t' Office of the Special Assistant
been working well and that its to Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker,
tally sheet for 1969 is probably the somewhat motheaten cover
ns In
d
t
h
.away ,,..
ea
qua
e
8,505 were captured and 4,382, ? American participation --- intelli fo ? 'a.aa.
i
Ph
h
is then passed on to Vietnamese
,officials who can call any one
of several shadowy specialist
organizations: for actions
These include Proviiial Re-
connaissance Units, Armed
Propaganda Teams, ' Kit, Carton
Scouts and Seal commando
teams. Operating in small units,
generally of six to 12 men, they
quietly penetrate into contested
or Vietcong-controlled territory
to carry out their missions. And
despite whatever denials that
are being made now in Washing-
ton and Saigon, their mission is
to get their man, dead or alive.
In such operations, a prisoner,
who can sometimes be made to
yield information under torture,
oenix
as
on
gence officers, are assigned as ' That, Operat
advisers and paymasters in each' not been able to eliminate the
district ' and province head- ` Vietcong political structure can
quarters --- is being gradually hardly be regarded as surprising.
reduced with the objective of: After 30 years of covert opera-
eventual Vieti}amization. tions against Japanese, Chinese,
Operation Phoenix was estab- French, American and South
lisped in July;` 1967, by Robert Vietnamese security forces, Viet-
. Komer, Mr. Colby's' predecessor cong officials have become mas-
as pacification chief, and, like: ters of survival, never sleeping
him, a senior official of the Cen- more than one night in the same.
tral ? Intelligence' Agency before place, masking their identity be
taking that post. It was "Mr. " hind dozens of aliases, seldom
Komer's view that a military vie= letting their guard 'down. More
tory, which was still an objective important, after ' all ' this time,
in those days, would be mean-. they. can still' find Vietnamese
Ingless, even" if attainable, unless who will shelter rather than
the Vietcong's political) structure betray theme
could be destroyed. Mr. Komei TOM BUCKLEY.
also hoped to hit back at the
Vietcong assassination squads
is more valuable than a corpse;; which for years had been carry.
but there are occasions that I ing out the judgments in absentia
Vietnam,?- for exar b? / .tc ~, - i8~to~l +s~V: U1A-KUF 1Z-UUJJ1K000JUUUbUULU-tf