NEGOTIATIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00337R000300060015-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
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• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2000
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: March 5, 1970
• Content Type: OPEN

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March 5, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
It is well known that Dr. Moynihan is
not a Republican. But it is especially
proper for Republicans to salute Dr.
Moynihan for the way he acts in the
spirit of Abraham Lincoln.
He does this in two ways.
First, he is devoting much of his life
to helping realize the great American
dream-the dream of a harmonious mul-
tiracial republic.
Second, in working for that goal, Dr.
Moynihan is faithful to the words of
Lincoln, who said:
The dogmas of the quiet past are inade-
quate to the stormy, stormy present. The
occasion is piled high with difficulty and we
much rise to the occasion. As our case is
new, so we must think and act anew. We
must disenthrall ourselves.
All Dr. Moynihan is asking is that we
disenthrall ourselves from the dogmas
of the past. As Dr. Moynihan under-
stands, our future will be less stormy if
our thinking is less dogmatic.
I ' ask unanimous consent to have
printed in the RECORD, Dr. Moynihan's
memorandum and an editorial on the
subject.
There being no objection the items
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the New York Times, Mar. 1, 1970]
TEXT OF THE M~e,OY eIHAN MEMORANDUM ON THE
STATUS OF NEGROES
As the new year begins, it occurs to me
that you might find useful a general assess-
ment of the position of Negroes at the end
of the first year of your Administration, and
of the decade in which their position has
been-the central domestic political issue.
In quantitative terms, which are reliable,
the American Negro is making extraordinary
progress. In political terms, somewhat less
reliable, this would also appear to be true.
In each case, however, there would seem to
be countercurrents that pose a serious threat
to the welfare of the blacks and the,stability
of the society, white and black.
1. EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME
The nineteen-sixties saw the great break-
through for blacks. A third (32 per cent) of
all families of Negro and other races earned
$8,000 or more in 1968 compared, in constant
dollars, with 15 per cent in 1960.
The South is still a problem. Slightly more
than half (52 per cent) of the Negro popula-
tion lived in the South in 1969. There, only
19 per cent of families of Negro and other
races earned over $8,000.
Young Negro families are achieving income
parity with young white families. Outside the
South, young husband-wife Negro families
have 99 per cent of the income of whites!
For families headed by a male age 25 to 34,
the proportion was 87 per cent. Thus,. it may
be this ancient gap is finally closing.
Income reflects employment, and this
changed dramatically in the nineteen-sixties.
Blacks continued to have twice the unem-
ployment rates of whites, but these were
down for both groups. In 1969, the rate for
married men of Negro and other races was
Drily 2.5 per cent. Teen-agers, on the other
hand, continued their appalling rates: 24.4
per cent in 1969.
Black occupations improved dramatically.
The number of professional and technical
employes doubled in the period 1960-68. This
was two and a half times the increase for
whites. In 1969, Negro and other races pro-
vided 10 per cent of the other-than-college
teachers. This is roughly their proportion of
the population (11 per cent),
2. EDUCATION
In 1968, 19 per cent of Negro children 3
and 4 years old were enrolled in school, com-
pared to 15 per cent of white children. Forty-
five per cent of Negroes 18 and 19 years old
were in school, almost the equal of the white
proportion of 51 per cent. Negro college en-
rollment rose 85 per cent between 1964 and
1968, by which time there were 434,000 Ne-
gro college students. (The total full-time
university population of Great Britain is
200,000.)
Educational achievement should not be
exaggerated. Only 16 per cent of Negro high
school seniors have verbal test scores at or
above grade level. But blacks are staying in
school.
3. FEMALE-HEADED FAMILIES
This problem does not get better, it gets
worse. In 1969, the proportion of husband-
wife families of Negro and other races de-
clined once agai a to 68.7 per cent.
The illegiti g ratio rose once again, this
time to .4 per cent of all ve births. (The
white 7do rose more sharpy, but was still
only .9 4per cent.)
Iyfcreasingly, the problem of Negro poverty
is the problem of the female-headed family.
I 1968, 56 per cent of Negro families with
1 ome under $3,000 were female-headed. In
19 , for the first time, the number of poor
Ne children in female-headed families
(2,241, was greater than the number in
male-hea Yamilies (1,947,000).
4. PATHOLOGY
The incidence o ti-social behavior
among young black male ntinues to be
extraordinarily high. Apart fro hate racial
attitudes, this is the biggest prob black
Americans face, and in part it helps e
jure one another. Because blacks live in de
facto segregated neighborhoods and go to de
facto segregated schools, the socially stable
elements of the black population cannot es-
cape the socially pathological ones. Rou-
tinely, their children get caught up In the
antisocial patterns of the others.
You are Tamiliar with the problems of
crime. Let me draw your attention to another
phenomenon, exactly parallel, and originat-
ing in exactly the same social circumstances:
Fire. Unless I mistake the trends, we are
heading for a genuinely serious fire problem
in American cities. In New York, for example,
between 1956 and 1969 the over-all fire alarm
rate more than tripled, from 69,000 alarms
to 240,000. These alarms are concentrated in
slum neighborhoods, primarily black. In
square mile 13 times that of the city
whole. In another, the number of alar as,
on an average, increased 44 per ce er year
Many of these fires are_fiesult of popu-
lation density. But a great many are more or
less deliberately set. (Thus, on Monday, wel-
fare protectors set two fires in the New York,
State Capitol.) Fires are in fact a "leading
indicator" of social pathology for a neighbor-
hood. They come first. Crime, and the rest,
follows. The psychiatric interpretation of
fire-setting is complex, but it relates to the
types oY personalities which slums produce.
(A point of possible interest: Fires in the
black slums peak in July and August. The
urban riots of 1964-1968 could be thought of
as epidemic conditions of an endemnic situ-
ation.)
5. SOCIAL ALIENATION
With no real evidence, I would nonetheless
suggest that a great deal of the crime, the
fire-setting, the rampant school violence
and other such phenomenon in the black
community have become quasi-politicized.
Hatred-revenge-against whites is now an
acceptable excuse for doing what might have
been done anyway. This is bad news for
any society, especially when it takes forms
which the Black Panthers seem to have
adopted.
This social alienation among the black
lower classes is matched and probably en-
S 3071
hanced, by a virulent form of anti-white
feeling among portions of the large and
prosperous black middle class. It would be
difficult to overestimate the degree to which
young, well-educated blacks detest white
America.
6. THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION
As you have candidly acknowledged, the
relation of the Administration to the black
population is a problem. I think it ought
also to be acknowledged that we are a long
way from solving it. During the past year,
intense efforts have been made by the Ad-
ministration to develop programs that will
be of help to the blacks. I dare say, as much
or more time and attention goes into this
effort in this Administration than any in
history. But little has come of it. There has
been a great deal of political ineptness in
some departments, and you have been the
loser.
I don't know what you can do about this.
Perhaps nothing. But I do have four sugges-
tions.
First. Sometime early in the year, I would
gather together the Administration officials
who are most involved with these matters
and talk out the subject a bit. There really
is a need for a more coherent Administration
approach to a number of issues. (Which I
can list for you, if you like.)
Second. The time may have come when
the issue of race could benefit from a period
of "benign neglect." The subject has been
too much talked about. The forum has been
too much taken over to hysterics, paranoids
and boodlers on all sides. We may need a
period in which Negro progress continues
clo attention to such progress-as we are
doing while seeking to avoid situations in
which tremists of either race are given op-
portunit s for martyrdom, heroics, histrion-
ics or wh tever. Greater attention to Indians,
Mexican - mericans and Puerto Ricans
would be seful.
A tend ncy to ignore provocations from
groups s ch as the Black Panthers might
also be useful. (The Panthers were appar-
ently a ost defunct until the Chicago po-
lice ded one of their headquarters and
trans rmed them into culture heroes for
the hite-and black-middle class. You
p aps did not note on the society page of
stein gave a cocktail party on Wednesday to
raise money for the Panthers. Mrs. W. Vin-
cent Astor was among the guests. Mrs. Peter
Duchin, "the rich blonde wife of the orches-
tra leader," was thrilled "I've never met a
Panther," she said. "This is a first for me.")
Third. We really ought to be getting on
with research on crime. We just don't know
enough. It is a year now since the Adminis-
tration came to office. committed to doing
something about crime in the streets. But
frankly, in that year I don't see that we
have advanced either our understanding of
the problem, or that of the public at large.
(This of course may only reveal my ignorance
of what is going on.)
At the risk of indiscretion, may I put it
that lawyers are not professionally well
equipped to do much to prevent crime. Law-
yers are not managers, and they are not re-
seachers: The logistics, the ecology, the strat-
egy and tactics of reducing the incidence of
certain types of behavior in large urban
populations simply are not things lawyers
think about often.
We are never going to "learn" about crime
in a laboratory sense. But we almost certain-
ly could profit from limited, carefully done
studies. I don't think these will be done
unless you express a personal interest.
Fourth. There is a silent black majority as
well as a white one. It Is Illostly working
class, as against lower middle class. It is po-
litically moderate (on issues other than
racial equality) and shares most of the con-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 5, 1970
cern5 of its white counterpart, This group
has been generally ignored, by the Gover-
ment and the media. The more recognition
we can give to it, the better off we shall all
be. (I would take it, for example, that Am-
bicssador [Jerome H.] Holland is a natural
leader of this segment of the black commu-
nity. There are others like him.)
I From the Evening Star, Mar. 3, 19701
THE MOYNIHAN MEMORANDUM
It, is not exactly clear how the private
communication between Daniel P. Moynihan
and President Nixon on the status of Negroes
in American society wound up in the public
domain. Somehow it came into the possession
of a newspaper, which decided that the
document constituted news fit to print---
and that was that.
It can, however, be deduced that, whoever
was responsible, it wasn't Moynihan. At a
press conference following publication, Moy-
nihan was obviously steaming. Had he
known, he said, that the document was go-
ing to be "stolen or borrowed or leaked" he
would have taken the trouble to explain that
terra "benign neglect" in its historical con-
text.
Moynihan's anger is understandable. No
one likes to think that his private corre-
spondence-even a note to the President-is
;subject to national distribution. Besides, it
:is probable that had Moynihan been writing
for publication, the prose would have been
somewhat more polished. The document was
only about 100 percent above the average lit-
erary quality of governmental prose, instead
of the 200 or 300 percent one has come to
expect of Moynihan.
But there is nothing in the substance of
,the memorandum to distress anyone. includ-
iing the author. The term "benign neglect"--
4M or out of its historical context-is pe:r-
haps not outstandingly felicitous. The prob-
lems of race should not truly be neglected by
any administration, benignly or otherwise.
The memo made that fact clear by its statts-
tical catalogue of continuing Negro prob-
:ems. But the thrust of Moynihan's argu-
ment-that this society might benefit from
a relaxation of its fixation on the problems
of race-is a suitable topic for intra-govern-
mental discussion.
There is considerable food for thought in
Moynihan's contention that the total so-
ciety would benefit from a studied disregard
of the more paranoid elements of the black
activist movement and the fanatic white
supremacists. And it Is hard to fault his
thesis that progress toward full equality for
all races would be accelerated if those who
yell the loudest about race would shut up.
Perhaps the outstanding characteristic
of the memo was its typical Moynihan.ian die-
daiii of euphemism. It is a trait that has
ruffled feathers on a number of previous oc-
casions. But whether or not one agrees with
all of Moynihan's conclisions, it is good to
know that the President has men about him
who call the shots as they see them, and
.that he encourages them to pass their emcos-
:metized opinions directly to him.
V ,Ali
NEGOTIATIONS AND PROSPECTS
FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the
Philadelphia Bulletin of February 22
contains an interesting article by for-
mer Assistant Secretary of State Roger
Hilsman concerning North Vietnam's
and the NLF's negotiating position and
the prospects for peace in Vietnam.
According to Mr. Hillman, recent sig-
lals seem to add up to the following
offer:
No election, but an old-fashioned politi-
factions, Communist and non-Communist;
Although their propaganda still calls for
immediate total withdrawal of American
troops, privately they have indicated the
withdrawal could be phased over two or
three years;
Postponement of the reunification of
North and South Vietnam for a period of be-
tween five and ten years.
International guarantees of the territorial
integrity of Laos and Cambodia,
This analysis bears out recent similar
reports from other sources and, if cor-
rect, presents the administration with
an opportunity and a challenge to initiate
serious negotiations in Paris. There have
been all too many chances for peace ig-
nored or rejected during the history of
this tragic war.
Mr. Hilsman concludes the article with
this warning:
And if the professional Communist-
watchers are right in believing that the Com-
munists are offering an acceptable deal, his
(President Nixon's) rejection of their pro-
posal may be as tragic as the decision to
make Vietnam an American war in the first
place. I
Mr. Hilsman's analysis of North Viet-
nam's and the :Nl s current posture is
similar to that put forward in early Feb-
ruary by Dr. Leslie Gelb, a former high
official ofthe Defense Department, pres-
entll* with the Brookings Institution.
In a letter to the editor appearing in
the New York Times on February 1, Dr.
Gelb also expressed the belief that Ha-
noi and the NLF had. put forward a new
negotiating position. After analyzing the
new position, Dr. Gelb went on to sug-
gest how it might provide an opening for
a comprehensive new American proposal
dealing with troop withdrawals, direct
political talks between Saigon, Hanoi,
and the NLF, and the return of Ameri-
can prisoners of-war.
I)r. Gelb pointed out that his proposal
was consistent with the President's past
positiQns on Vietnam. He concluded his
letter with this observation, in which
concur:
We should not consider the Paris peace
talks a forgotten chapter of the war. Presi-
dent Nixon's objective of free self-determi-
nation and Hanoi's objective of full U.S.
withdrawal are not mutually exclusive.
If there is any possibility that some-
thing might come of an exploration of
the viewpoints suggested by Mr. Hilsman
and Dr. Gelb, such art effort is well worth
making. If Hanoi and the NLF do not
respond favorably we will have lost noth-
ing. On the other hand, there could be
no greater tragedy than passing up an
opportunity to end the war.
I ask unanimous consent that Mr.
Hilsman's article, Dr. Gelb's letter and
an accompanying New York Times edi-
torial be placed in the RECORD at this
point.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Philadelphia (Pa.) Bulletin Feb.
22, 1970]
Nixon APPEARs To BE REBUFFING RED OFFER
OF PEACE IN VIETNAM
(By Roger Hilsman)
(NOTE.-The author of this article is a
former Assistant Secretary of State for Far
New York-President Nixon is rebuffing a
Communist offer of a more-or-less immediate
Vietnam peace on terms that many Ameri-
cans might find perfectly acceptable.
This is the puzzling, and unhappy, con-
clusion I have reached after private contacts
with North Vietnamese diplomats and after
studying both public and private signals
which the Communists have been sending
out in recent months.
Other Communist watchers, including W.
Averell Harriman, the former American peace
negotiator in Paris, have came to the same
conclusion.
WITHDRAWALS SCIEDULED
Meanwhile, there is increasing evidence
that "Vietnamization" of the war is going
forward at a much slower .pace than is gen-
erally expected and believed.
The best information In Washington is that
President Nixon plans to reduce American
forces In Vietnam very gradually In 1970 to
about 280,000 to 300,000 men, Then, in 1971,
he plans only a relatively small further re-
duction to about 250,000 men.
In 1972, the election ye,:r, he will bring
home another 50,000 to 75,000 men, and just
before the election he can announce a deci-
sion to withdraw another 50,000 to 75,000.
SHREWD POLITICS
This is shrewd politics, but the conse-
quences are great. The monetary cost of the
war under Nixon program will be high-
something between $50 and $100 billion.
Much more important, however, is the fore-
seeable cost of the program in American
lives.
Although the President's plan will mean
a reduction in casualties, we can expect
another 5,000 to 10,000 Americans to be killed
in the three-year period. And it might be
many more than that.
For the fact is that the Nixon plan Is a
decision to continue the war in Vietnam, not
to end it. When all the reductions he is re-
portedly planning have been made, there
will still be between 100.000 and 150,000
American troops in Vietnam.
NOT THE ONLY WAY
And this means that, although It may not
come for a year or even two, eventually the
North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong will be
forced into launching a major offensive
aimed directly at the Americans.
This snail's-pace Vietnamization is not
the only course available to Mr. Nixon. For
snore than a year, the Communist side has
been sending what the Communist-watchers
call signals. Sometimes these signals are
direct and straightforward, but private-put
out, for example, not officially, but in one of
the "tea-break" conversations of the Paris
negotiations. Others are ccnntained in sub-
tleties of language that laymen find con-
fusing, but which are meaningful to profes-
sional Communist-type watchers.
An example is the letter from the late No
Chi Minh to President Nixon written just
before Ha's death last September In the
past, Communist practice had been to de-
scribe the so-called "ten points" of the NFL
peace proposal as the only possible solution.
SHIFT NO ACCIDENT
But, in his letter, Ho refers to them as "a
logical and reasonable basis for the settle-
ment of the Vietnamese problem." If past
experience with the Communists is any
guide, the shift from "the" to "a" and from
words like "only possible solution" to "basis
for a settlement," is not accidental.
In the opinion of a number of profes-
sional Communist-watcher:;, what these sig-
nals add up to is the following offer:
-No election, but an old-fashioned po-
litical deal setting up a coalition government
including representatives of all political
factions, Communist and non-Communist;
cal deal setting up a coalition government Eastern Affairs, and is presently professor of immediate total withdrawal of American
:including represen tiv s of i of er t xp U have indicated the 4 ipproved 1F8r 1 ~'e ~ $ I/B~Fd'~i. A- ?2'-003371 43 3 ivy
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March 5, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
withdrawal could be phased over two or
three years; -
CAMBODIA'S INTEGRITY
-Postponement of the reunification of
North and South Vietnam for a period of
between five and ten years;
-International guarantees of the terri-
torial integrity of Laos and Cambodia.
"One interesting point is that the Com-
munist side told Harriman, when he was
chief negotiator in Paris, that after the war
was over, they would like to exchange am-
bassadors with Western nations, including
the United States.
Pointing to the fact that they have friend-
ly relations with the French in spite of their
long struggle for independence, they said
that they would like to do the same with
the United States.
What is particularly unusual is how far
the Communist side has gone in their public
signals, making concessions that for reasons
of negotiating tactics they would normally
reserve for later use.
The most startling of all was the public
statement by the Paris representative of the
NLF, Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, on November 14.
The NLF has refused to do business with
the Thieu-Ky government, and everyone in
Washington supposed they v.rould'deal only
with some pliable pro-Communist.
But Mrs. Binh stated that if General "Big"
Minh became the head of a peace cabinet in
Saigon, "we are ready to begin conversations
with him." Although "Big" Minh has hinted
that he is willing to negotiate with the Com-
munists, he is certainly neither pro-Com-
munist nor a dove. On the contrary, he is the
most senior and popular general in the South
Vietnamese army, and the leader of the 1963
coup against the hated Diem regime.
WILLINGNESS TO DEAL
A willingness to deal with Minh is an ex-
traordinary concession, since he could form
a non-Communist government far more
representative and popular than the present
Thfeu-Ky government, and hence one that
would carry much more weight in negotia-
tions and in any coalition government that
followed.
Although there is some difference of opin-
ion about the exact nature of the coalition
government the Communists are proposing,
there is no doubt that they are offering a
deal.
Harriman, the most prestigious Commu-
nist-watcher of them all, is convinced that
if President Johnson had accepted the ad-
vice given him in the summer of 1968, a peace
settlement could have been achieved as early
as September, 1968. And he thinks Mr. Nixon
has the same sort of opportunity.
INTERESTING POINT
The interesting point is why the Com-
munist side is offering such a deal.
It is very doubtful that Hanoi and the
NLF have decided they won't win. Although
they may be poorly informed on some
aspects of American politics and excessively
suspicious, there is reason to believe that
they can read the political signs in the United
States well enough to know that President
Nixon will find it impossible to return to a
policy of escalation in Vietnam and that
even keeping American air and artillery forces
there may become politically difficult for him.
In the second place, there is no reason to
believe either that the Communist side
doubts that they will prevail over the Saigon
government once the United States departs
or that they are wrong in that judgment.
WASHINGTON OPTIMISM
Currently there is an upsurge of optimism
in Washington about the ability of the Viet-
namese to fend for themselves because the
statistical indicators are favorable. The
trouble is that the gains highlighted by the
statistical indicators are very fragile, and
most of them have been possible only because
the North Vietnamese forces have pulled back
for the political purposes of signalling a will-
ingness to negotiate and in response to Mr.
Nixon's reduction of American troops.
The North Vietnamese can dramatically
reverse all these indicators by a decision to
launch an offensive, or less dramatically by
a decision to attack the pacification effort
itself.
So why are Hanoi and the NLF so interested
in a settlement based on a coalition govern-
ment, if things will eventually go their way
no matter what? Why don't they simply
settle down themselves to a long-haul, low-
cost war? I think it is because of Communist
China.
THEY'RE DETERMINED
Hanoi has so far maintained its independ-
ence of China, even to the extent of going to
Paris for the negotiations against Chinese
advice and in the face of some very concrete.
measures of a punitive nature that China
took against them. And it seems perfectly
clear that the North Vietnamese are fiercely
determined to continue to maintain their
independence.
If the motive for their signals is related to
their fear of China, this would explain a
number of things.
In the first place, a negotiated settlement,
formally signed by 13 or 14 signatories (de-
pending on whether China does or does not
sign) would act as a potent political deter-
rent to China whether or not its provisions
include teeth in the form of international
police forces or the like.
The Chinese have other goals than Viet-
nam, and they are political enough to under-
stand the consequences for those other goals
of a blatant violation of an agreement signed
by so many of the world's powers, both Com-
munist and non-Communist.
A WESTERN STAKE
Second, If North Vietnam maintained
friendly relations with Western powers it
would provide a Western stake in Vietnam
and a Western presence there that would
also act as a deterrent to China. A phased
withdrawal of American troops would make
the point even more dramatically, and a post-
poned reunification would be both a conces-
sion and a way of providing time for healing
wounds and thus eventually presenting both
China and the world with a Vietnam that is
more truly united.
And if the motive is China, there are also
several implications that are important to
the United States. It means, for example, that
there is little basis for Mr. Nixon's fear of a
blood bath following the installation of a
coalition government-a fear that was the
foundation stone of the Vietnamization pol-
icy laid down in'his November 3 speech.
If the Communist side does in the end be-
come dominant in a coalition government,
some individuals will undoubtedly be tried as
war criminals-such as the secret police chief
who shot a suspect in front of an American
camera.
SETTLE OLD SCORES
Also, in some villages, where conditions are
chaotic, there will undoubtedly be individu-
als, both Communist and non-Communist,
who will take the opportunity to settle old
scores.
But if the Communists want to maintain
their independence of China, they will not
want a blood bath but a reconciliation. For
if China is a problem, they will need to de-
velop support among non-Communist ele-
ments of the population as well as Commu-
nist.
For the same reason, the Vietnamese Com-
munists have a stake in maintaining the
sympathies of the outside world, non-Com-
munist as well as Communist, which any
sort of blood bath would jeopardize-and
certainly so if Western ambassadors were
present in the country. For all these reasons
S 3073
it seems likely that the official policy will be
one of no reprisals.
WHAT PROFESSORS SAID
The expectations of Vietnamese who would
be prime targets of any reprisal are instruc-
tive. Last year I asked 12 different non-Com-
munist or anti-Communist Vietnamese pro-
fessors and university officials what they
would do if the Paris negotiations resulted in
a coalition government and sessions of self-
* * * communist-dominated-would they go
to Paris? To the United States? Each one an-
swered that he expected not only to remain
in Vietnam but to continue in his university
post.
"But what about reprisals?" I would ask
in some amazement.
"Oh," the reply went, "there will be some
harassment and sessions of self-criticism.
But I expect to go on teaching, and to draw
my salary."
What all this suggests Is that although one
may not be inclined to gust what the Com-
munists are saying, there seems to be solid
political pressure on them on which one can
rely. It is these pressures which lead them
to want a settlement rather than simply to
wait for Vietnam to fall in their laps.
NUMBER OF MISGIVINGS
As for the Nixon policy of Vietnamization,
experienced observers have a number of mis-
givings. The most important is doubt that
it will work. It hardly seems realistic to be-
lieve that Saigon can prevail against the
combined strength of the Viet Cong and the
North Vietnamese alone.
WE SHOULD ASK
Admittedly, It might turn out that in
spite of their signals, what the Communist
side has in mind for a coalition government
is unacceptable.
If so, the Nixon policy may be a better
policy than the other possibilities. But the
paint is that we will never know if we don't
take at least the first step-that of asking
the Communist side in Paris to be specific.
It is this that Mr. Nixon refuses to do.
And if the professional Communist-watchers
are right in believing that the Communists
are offering an acceptable deal, his rejection
of their proposal may be as tragic as the deci-
sion to make Vietnam an American war in
the first place.
[From the New York Times, Feb. 1, 19701
HANOI'S TERMS AT PARIS PEACE TALKS
To the EDITOR:
Since last May, two "legitimate demands"
have constituted the core of Hanoi's terms
for settling the war: (1) The "total and un-
conditional" withdrawal of all U.S. and al-
lied forces, and (2) the formation of a pro-
visional coalition government made possible,
in effect, by U.S.-North Vietnamese negotia-
tions at Paris. In sum, we were supposed both
to make a commitment to get out and to
dump the Thfeu-Ky regime.
In September, Hanoi hinted at a shift.
Their negotiators stated in Paris that accel-
eration of U.S. withdrawals would be "taken
into account," and when quizzed about the
reduced level of military activity in South
Vietnam, they said that "it speaks for itself."
At about this same time, U.S. officials ob-
served that North Vietnamese infiltration
declined, resulting in a reduction of forces
approximately equal to U.S. withdrawals.
On Dec. 18, Ha Van Lau said:
"If the United States declares the total and
unconditional withdrawal from South Viet-
nam of its troops and those of the other for-
eign countries in the U.S. camp within a six-
month period, the parties will discuss the
timetable of the withdrawal of these troops
and the question of insuring the safety for
such troop withdrawal."
In this same statement, he said that once
the above requirement is fulfilled, the various
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March
forces for peace in Vietnam "will enter into
talks to set up a provisional coalition gov-
ernment...." Seemingly Hanoi expects the
latter to happen; it does not have to be ne-
gotiated at Paris.
What might all this mean?
1. For the first time Hanoi has told us :how
to meet the "total and unconditional with-
drawal" requirement--by announcing it
publicly.
2. The key to the announcement is the
certainty that by a specified date all of our
troops will be withdrawn.
3. While Hanoi says six months, this could
be read as a bargaining gambit. Xuan Thuy
said that the U.S. "must accept the principle
of withdrawal, then put it into practice," and
that some U.S. forces could remain in South
Vietnam even as late as the elections to be
conducted by the provisional coalition gov-
ernment.
4. Hanoi's "total and unconditional" phrase
'remains, raising the question as to what we
might get in return for our withdrawal an-
nouncement. Hanoi backed away from this
some phrase in October, 1968. When we
stopped the bombing, Hanoi accepted the
condition that the Government of South
Vietnam be seated in Paris along with the
National Liberation Front as part of a your-
side-our-side arrangement.. We also assumed
and had reason to believe that Hanoi under-
stood that it should "not take advantage" of
our bombing cessation by shelling major
cities and by abusing the DMZ. To a degree,
Hanoi has lived up to our assumption of "no
advantage."
This past experience is suggestive of what
we could ask from Hanoi now. Politically, we
might extract the condition that Hanoi and
the N.L.F. agree to talk with the Govern-
ment of Vietnam about political settlement.
Militarily, we could give Hanoi to understand
that we expect its forces in the South to be
reduced accordingly, the level of military
activity to decline, and require the return of
all American POW's.
This proposal is not inconsistent with
President Nixon's speech of May: "Peace on
paper is not as important as peace in fact."
We should not consider the Paris peace
talks a forgotten chapter of the war. Presi-
dent Nixon's objective of free self-determi-
nation and Hanoi's objective of full U.S.
withdrawal are not mutually exclusive.
LESLIE H. GELD.
ALEXANDRIA, VA., January 22, 1970.
(NoTE.--The writer, former Acting Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy
Planning and Arms Control, worked on the
Paris negotiations.)
IFrom the New York Times, Feb. 1, 19701
PARIS PEACE OPENING
A high Pentagon official of the Johnson
and early Nixon Administrations, who worked
on the secret Paris negotiations on Viet-
nam, believes the North Vietnamese may now
be trying to tell the United States how to
break the deadlock in the peace talks.
The shift in Hanoi's position described in
today's letter to the editor from Leslie H.
Gelb, former Acting Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense for Policy Planning and Arms
Control, seems to provide an opportunity for
the United States to employ again a device
similar to that used in 1968 to get the ne-
gotiations going in the first place. Mr. Gelb's
suggestion is that the United States inform
Hanoi and Moscow privately that it will pub-
licly announce a terminal date for with-
drawal of all its troops if it can also an-
nounce that it assumes and has reason to
believe the other side will comply with two
conditions. These are: first that Hanoi and
the National Liberation Front will promptly
enter into negotiations with the Saigon Gov-
ernment for a political settlement and sec-
end, that North Vietnam will withdraw its
forces from the South at the same rate as
the U.S., further reduce the level of military
activity and return all American POW's.
President Nixon last May said: "If North
Vietnam wands to insist that it has no
forces in South Vietnam, we will no longer
debate the point-provided that its forces
cease to be there, and that we have reliable
assurance that they will not return."
But, while asking questions about some
of Hanoi's shifts of position, the Nixon Ad-
ministration has refused to make any new
proposals. It Insists that it has already made
so many concessions that the next offer
must come from the other side.
If Mr. Gelb is right, North Vietnam has
now conceded several points. The return
of Politburo member Le Due The to Paris
from Hanoi Friday makes this a strategic
moment to attempt to revitalize the nego-
tiations. Hanoi's reaction to the Gelb pro-
posal, if It were now advanced in Paris,
would quickly reveal whether this can be
done.
'I HE INVOLVEMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES IN LAOS
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, the time for
candor about the deepening involvement
of the United: States in Laos has ob-
viously arrived. The American people
have a right to a public accounting from
the administration. They have a right to
an official explanation of what we are
doing there and why. They have a right
to know what the intentions of the ad-
ministration are. They have a right to
know what the actual military situation
in Laos is.
Certainly there have been some alarm-
ing reports in the press. We are told that
hundreds of American warplanes are
providing direct air support to a guer-
rilla army raised and financed by the
CIA.. This is all taking place in and
around the Plain of Jars, scores of miles
from the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail
where our bombing raids are said to be
necessary to hinder North Vietnamese
infiltration in South Vietnam.
I need not remind the Senate that our
present tragic and seemingly endless in-
volvement in South Vietnam began with
intervention on a somewhat smaller scale
than now seems to be the case in Laos.
One clear lesson we should have drawn
from Vietnam is that an increase in our
own involvement leads inevitably to a
similar increase by the other side. What
will we do then?
We must ask ourselves just how vital
are our interests in Laos and how much
in lives and money we are willing to pay
to preserve them. But we cannot answer
these questions so long as the pertinent
facts are kept behind a shield of official
secrecy.
In short, Mr. President, the public and
the Senate badly need a public statement
of administration policy.
ROLE OF AGRICULTURE IN IMPROV-
ING THE ENVIRONMENT
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, Secretary
of Agriculture Clifford M. Hardin, ad-
dressing the National Farm Institute
in Des Moines on February 13, described
the important role Of agriculture in im-
proving our environment.
The Secretary's significant address
w..a particularly timely in that it fol-
lowed by only 2 days the far-reaching
message of President Nixon on the en-
tire subject of the environment. Secre-
tary Hardin's response to the President's
challenge to all of us to summon "our
energy, our ingenuity, and our con-
science in a cause as fundamental as life
itself" was directly to the point.
Both the American farmer and the
U.S. Department of Agriculture have
been engaged for decades in practices
which enrich and protect our environ-
ment.
Since the dust bowl days of the 1930's,
Secretary Hardin pointed out, more than
two million individual farmers, ranch-
ers, communities, and other land users
have voluntarily signed cooperative
agreements to put conservation plans
into effect-plans that involve three-
quarters of a billion acres of land.
Yet, as the Secretary correctly ob-
served, new technology has presented
new problems affecting, environmental
quality. He cited the Department's de-
termination to help solve these problems
and outlined the policy objectives it is
following to reach early solutions.
I believe the Secretary's speech merits
the attention of all who are concerned
with the agricultural aspects of envi-
ronmental quality and l: ask unanimous
consent that it be placed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the state-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD? as follows:
ADDR.Ess BY S5CB.ErART OF AGRICU LTURa
CLIFFORD M. IL9,RDne
It may be concidence that we are meeting
on Abraham Lincoln's birthday--but it is
altogether fitting and proper. The Admin-
istration of our sixteenth President left sig-
ni scant marks on agriculture-for it was
during those years that three lasting pieces
of legislation came into being-the Morrill
Act providing for the Land-Grant Colleges
and Universities, the Act creating the United
States Department of Agriculture, and the
Homestead Act. Together they set the pat-
tern for American agriculture. The Home-
stead Act resulted in the settling of half a
continent and placed the management of our
basic soil and water resources in the hands
of independent free-hold farmers,
The 19th century brought progress and it
brought exploitation. The century began with
a patent for the first cast iron plow; it ended.
with the invention of the gasoline engine
and the automobile.
Today we are very much aware that our
technological advances which have done so
much for us and for the. world also are ser-
iously offending and polluting our environ-
ment. The alarms has been sounded, and just
the day before yesterday, President Nixon
sent to the Congress a comprehensive 37-
point program, embracing 23 major legisla-
tive proposals and 14 new measures being
taken by administrative action or Executive
Order.
In view of the rising public concern and
against the backdrop of the President's new
initiatives, it is imperative that those of us
with agricultural responsibilities re-think
and re-assess the special role of agriculture.
As the President said in his message, "The
fight against pollution, however, is not a
search for villains. For the most part, the
damage done to our environment has not
been the work of evil men, nor has it been
the inevitable by-product either of advanc-
ing technology or of growing population. It
results not so much from choices made, as
from choices neglected; not from malign in-
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position. These EKG's demonstrated a lag
in the pulse rise of about 6 to 10 seconds
after becoming erect. A sinus tachycardia
then ensued with rates, as described as
above. In general,, the rate at the end of
the 60-second erect-position period was
higher by 5 to 10 than the initial phase of
the tachycardia. Upon reclining, there was
again a lag of 3 to 6 seconds then abrupt
slowing occurred with the rate changing
from 120 to 130 to 50 to 60 in the space
of 5 to 10 seconds. In one case, there was a
complete inhibition of the S-A node with
a pair of nodal escape beats (this man had
50 Ag/kg). This phenomenon did not repeat.
In addition, there was generally inversion
of the T-wave in lead II during the tachy-
cardia phase. This is probably of little sig-
nificance and may be attributed to heart
rate and decrease in blood pressure rather
than a direct effect of the agent.
Liver-function tests (bile, alkaline phos-
phatase, SCOT, SGPT, TT) and BUN's,
drawn at control, at 8 hours and at 24
hours showed no consistent alterations. Oth-
er observations included a decrease in tem-
perature, as measured orally. This drop in
temperature occurred at 3 to 10 hours. The
magnitude varied from 0.5? to 1?F at lower
doses and 2?F at higher doses. The time of
onset of symptoms varied from person to
person; however, changes in pulse and in
blood pressure were observed at 2 hours, with
the peak effects on pulse and blood pressure
occurring at 6 to 10 hours and even later
in some cases. With the larger doses, the peak
effect seemed to occur later than with the
smaller doses. The major effect of. the agent
on the cardiovascular system was gone
24 hours. There were drops in pr(
and pulse rises, howeve
for several days, alth
perfectly well and Ld no symptoms '
soever. There w injection and hype
of the conjunc vae in all cases; this iE
er reports. of human ad
sistent with of
abis.
istration of Ca
It should be oted that the somn(
induced by this a nt had its peak afti
at I
cardiovascular effect ad reached their
The two men who rece 4OAg/kg he
longest lethargic period a slept all
control subject
Dose, --
Hg/kg
Systolic
Diastolic
Jan. 17, 1963________ Echols---------
10
-3
+10
I an. 15,1963________ Eget___--______
10
+10
+5
Do------------- Butts----------
20
-9
+1
Jan. 17, 1963_____-__ Hallau______--_
20
+11
-1-11
Jan. 22, 1963Hardin_________
20
-10
V23
Jan. 24, 1963________ Fox------------
30
-10
-5
Do ------------- Premus________
30
-10
+15
Jan.29,1963________ Echols_________
40
-11
-1
Do------------- Eget----------
40
-20
-5
Jan.31,.1963-------- Van Ness-------
50
-28
-1-6
Do ------------- Watrous________
50
+8
+16
Feb. 5,1963 -------- Warec----------
60
-34
+1
Do ------------- McDonald-----.
60
+1
+20
,5 30,3
and the day following exposures. At this
time, there were changes in pulse and blood
pressure, but less marked than previously
and symptoms attributed to these changes,
if any had occurred, had disappeared.
Objective physiological data with signif-
icant drug-induced changes are to be found
in table 6.
Psychophysical decrement of drug-induced
origin was assessed by numerical facility and
speed of closure (Texas Battery Test), Pur-
due Pegboard Test, and the Stromberg Man-
tered to a subjects at regularly scheduled
intervals t ughout the course of the ex-
min-
experimental subject experimental subject after
- dose,
Systolic Diastolic Systolic Diastolic hour
-20 +5 -45 -30 5
-10 +8 -40 +5 5
-24 -17 -40 -24
-40 0 -62 -8
-17 +16 -44 +1
-27 -7 -50 -20
-30 0 -60 -10
-22 -10 -44 -10
-32 -7 -52 -14
-42 -10 -66 -26
-29 -13 -64 -32
-32 -10 -60 -20
-27 -11 -50 -34
In table 7, the mean of the three highest
performance scores is compared with the
mean of the three lowest scores for each
of the tests used. This numerical relationship
of dose to psychophysical performance is ex-
pressed graphically in the following figure.
2. Human Estimates for EA 1476, EA 2233,
and Isomers.
The oral ID50, for both EA 1476 or EA
2233, is 4 mg/70-kg man.
Beats per minute Time at maximum experimental subject
rate
experi- Beats ---------- -
mental per Maximum
subject Hour minute Mean decrease
95 5 100 98.0 1.0
89 5 100 98.1 0.8
124 7 127 97.7 1. 8
133 5% 160 99.2 2.4
100 18 120 98.5 1.9
105 7;J 92 98.2 1.2
100 2Y, 118 98.1 1.7
96 5% 91 97.7 2.1
119 11 108 98.3 3.3
103 7hh 105 98.2 2.3
131 53 160 98.4 3.4
106 1% 107 98.0 2.0
104 81/3 120 98.6 1.9
Dose
A of three
highest
A of three
- lowest
scores
s/kg?
scores
(percent)
Texas battery test:
Echols________________
112
95
Eget------------------
103
89
Hardin________________
113
101
Hallau________________
107
91
Butts___________-_--
113
107
Premus_____________
106
92
Fox-------------------
106
84
Egetr-----------------
96
80
Echols l_______________
110
81
Watrous_______________
122
93
Van Ness______________
123
88
McDonald_____________
109
63
Wa rec----------------
115
87
Purdue pegboard test:
Echols_______________
102
86
Egat------------------
101
95
Hardin________________
97
87
Hallau______________
102
95
Butts-- --------------
103
91
Premus---------------
96
78
Fox ------------------
98
86
A difference
at each
Difference dose level
Eget.!"--------------
Hardin________________
Hailau_-_-__________
Butts-----------.---
Premus_--_--______
Fox------------------
Eget'---------------
Echols r______________
Watrous_______________
Van Ness______________
McDonald-------------
Warec-----------------
A of three
A of three lowest A difference
Dose highest scores at each
,Jkg. scores (percent) Difference dose level
40 102 82 20 22
40 103 80 23 ____________
50 101 75 26 25
50 108 84 24 ------------
60 100 77 23 21
60 100 81 19 ------------
10 97 90 7 10
10 102 89 13 ------------
20 93 89 4 7
20 99 91 8 ------------
20 101 93 8 ____________
30 98 84 14 13
30 98 86 12 ------------
40 99 80 19 18
40 97 80 17 ------------
50 110 80 30 26
50 100 79 21 -----------
60 101 79 22 22
60 109 86 23 ------------
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE March 5, 1970
3. Source of Data.
See Table 8 (not printed In the RECORD)
preceding Human Data section.
4. Derivation of the Estimates.
If it is assumed that mydriasis does not
represent incapacitation, but ptosis in the
monkey is a reflection of some central In-
capacitating effect, the lowest in capacitat-
ing, intravenous dose of EA 1476 in any ani-
nail is not less than 30 sg/kg. This assump-
tion, referring to ptosis, is probably invalid,
since the VDT, effective doses are between
i to and 316 pg;'kg. Also, effective doses In
the CAR test on dogs are from 50 to 100
pg. kg, and in the SPE test, effective doses
are from 175 to 250 /,g/kg.
Earlier studies (Fourteenth Tripartite Con-
ference) showed that no volunteer, given an
oral does of more than 2.5 mg/man (ca. 35
p.g, kg), was capable of performing his reg-
ular duties. More recent studies with EA
2233, the acetate of EA 1476,D indicate that
oral doses of 60 ag;'kg (4.3 nig,170-kg man)
did not cause severe incapacitation. Thus, it
is indicated that a dose of 2,5 mg/man or
more is required to cause incapacitation In
man by oral administration. Doses of 2.5 and
4.2 mg/man are equivalent to the respective
ICt5O's of 500 and 840-nag min/cu m, assum-
iug a body weight of 70 kg, a minute volume
of 10 1/min, and an aerosol respiratory re-
tention of 50%. This also assumes that a
respiratory effective dose is the same as an
oral effective dose. It must be borne in mind
that the inhalation route may be more or
less effective than the oral Route; however,
the human oral doses are in general agree-
ment with the animal data, which indicate
an intravenous effective dose of 30 ^.g/kg or
more. Animal experimentation indicates that
EA 2233 and EA 1476 are of similar effective-
ness.
5. Limitation of the Estimate.
EA 1476, EA 2233, or the isomers have not
been studied in man by the inhalation Foote.
The human estimate is based on intiaven-
ous doses in animals and oral doses in nian.
It is not possible to project an aerosol hu-
man estimate from present data.
PART IX--CONCLVsION
The actions of EA 1476 and EA 2233 are
generally similar to many other psychotropic
compounds of military interest; i.e., they
yield varying degrees of incapacitation, both
physical and mental, Both compounds, how-
ever, are unique in eliciting an unequivocal
orthostatic hypotension at dose level; far
below those required to produce mild mental
inoapacitation.
No huniali studies have yet been made on
isomers 2 and 4. Primate data do indicate,
however, that these specific steroisomers
possess a degree of pharmacologic potency,
at least equivalent to that of the raac:emic
mixtures studied in human subjects. Sec-
ondly, no human or animal data are avail-
able on the effects of the aerosolized agents.
It is believed that data should yet be ob-
tained from the following studies:
1. Exposure of animal and human subjects
to the aerosolized racemate,
2, Exposure of human subjects to oral doses
of stereoisomers 2 and 4.
I ask unanimous consent that the ad-
dress be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection the address
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
THE VIETNAM DEBATE
(By Senator EDMUND S. MusnxE)
Since the election of President Nixon in
November, 1968, and especially since the
President's speech of November 3, 1969,
United States policy toward Vietnam has
been transformed in the public mind from
the most critical issue of the times to just
another policy problem.
It was understandable that the American
people wanted to give. a new President a
chance to study the problem on his own and
come up with a solution. It was understand-
able that we were pleased with the with-
drawal of some U.S. troops and the prospect
of further withdrawals. But now we must face
the fact that we have stopped debating Viet-
nam policy, but in the year since President
Nixon took office we have recorded the deaths
of over 10,000 American servicemen, the
wounding of 40,000 more, and the expendi-
ture of another $20 billion.
With ambiguous promises, with thinly
veiled threats to freedom of the press, and
with carefully spacial withdrawal announce-
ments, the Nixon Administration succeeded
in virtually blotting out domestic criticism
of the war and erasing Vietnam from public
consciousness.
Many Americans flow believe or seem to
want to believe that the Vietnam, problem
has gone away. Many Americans who know
that there is much to debate have been
reluctant to voice their doubts and reserva-
tions. They look at present policy as an im-
provement on past policy, and they hope for
the best.
Without information and without alterna-
tives, it is no wonder that a majority of
American people are now silent.
I do not believe the silence will continue,
and I believe the longer the debate is bottled
up, the more serious will be the ultimate
confrontation over Vietnam.
Therefore, l: came to the National Press
Club today to talk about the need for a
constructive debate on Vietnam and to urge
changes in our Vietnam policy.
I believe the following points need to be
made:
First, those of us in public office and the
news media have not been effectively focus-
ing public attention on the policy issues in
Vietnam. Because of this, the American peo-
ple have not been made aware of the mean-
ing of the President's policy and of the al-
ternatives to that policy.
Second, I believe that what the President
calls his "silent majority" is silent only be-
cause it has not been made to realize that
although some U.S. troops will be coming
home, we are not really getting out of Vet-
Dam.
Third, I believe that the President's Viet-
namization policy can be only a formula for
the perpetuation of the war. Because it is
basically a strategy for continuing the fight-
ing, it cannot bring peace to Vietnam and
it cannot get us out of Vietnam.
VIETNAM-ADDRESS BY SENATOR Fourth, I believe that an end to the wax
--_?~ MUSx,IE and an end to our involvement in the war
can be brought about only through a nego-
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Presiders;;, at tiated settlement. There are peace proposals
the National Press Club today, the Sena- that the President has not tried. By his
tar from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE) gave a preoccupation with net b the
the President has turned his his back on e n war Paris.
most thoughtful and timely address en- By letting almost four months go by without
titled "The Vietnam. Debate.." As arrays, sending a senior personal representative to
the tenor is of the highest level, the Paris, he has downgraded negotiations.
thoughts presented are carefully Tea- Fifth, for all these reasons, our nation
toned, and the proposals fully construe- must have a new national debate on Viet-
nam policy. There can be no debate for the
people unless public figures are prepared to
I commend this address to the entire speak Out and unless the news media are
Senate. prepared to listen, :report, and comment,
THE ROLE OF THE NEWS MEDIA
Over the last eight years, the news media
have proven to be the most consistently re-
liable guide to facts and to understanding
the war. No matter how honest the purposes
of any Administration, it does-have a vested
interest in making the facts fit its policies.
And no matter how hard it tries to ferret
out divergent opinions and additional facts,
a government is bound up with, its own re-
porting system.
People in the government lave learned
the necessity of supplementing "official re-
porting." President Nixon has cited his need
for "out-house" sources of Information. What
the President feels as a need, the public
must have as an absolute requirsment.
In Vietnam, newsmen dug up facts we did
not hear from any other source. They probed
beyond the facts to judgments about the
meaning of events and programs-, and sought
out varied points of view. We learned from
all this the human price of the war and how
little progress was really being made. In
short, these efforts provided a basis for public
evaluation.
In Washington, and around our country,
we were made aware of imprecisions, ambi-
guities, and contradictions about U.S.
policies. The news media kept alternatives
to the President's policy very much before
the public mind. Time and space were pro-
vided for the public to digest these alterna-
tives. In short, these efforts gave a basis for
public comparison.
But today we are get ling much less than
we require for informed public opinion on
Vietnam.
It is net difficult to reconstruct how this
happened. Vice President Agnew's attempts
at intimidation set the stage. Hints about
license renewal problems appeared here and
there. Statements were made by "high Ad-
ministration officials" from time to time that
every possible solution has been tried. Im-
plications were left that Nixon's policy will
deliver more tomorrow. The President
launched a campaign to convince the Ameri-
can people that the onlyy alternative to his
policy is "precipitate withdrawal."
The result has been less news coverage
and less coverage in depth.
The recent hearings on Vietnam resolu-
tions conducted by the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee seems to me a typical ex-
ample. In past hearings by this committee,
the TV networks gave full live coverage or
news specials. This time, the public saw
Only a few minutes at most. In :fact, Vice
President Agnew's wisecracks about the
hearings received almost as much attention
on TV and in the papers as did the hearings
themselves.
And whatever happened to the immediate
in depth analysis that used to follow every
Vietnam statement by President Johnson?
Has the Vice President's attack against "in-
stant analysis" produced non-analysis?
What the President keeps referring to as
his "silent majority" may well be the product
of too silent a press.
While public opinion polls ted us that a
majority of Americans think the President is
handling Vietnam policy adequately, these
polls also tell us that Americans have dif-
ferent views of what they are supporting.
Many of the silent supporters believe that
the President intends to get all U.S. forces
out of Vietnam-and soon. This is not the
case, but this knowledge has not been ade-
quately conveyed to the American people.
The press has contributed to misapprehen-
sions about our Vietnam policies by reduc-
ing reasoned alternatives to a few pat news
phrases.
The facts and alternatives of Vietnam pol-
icy are exceedingly complex. The President
can command all the air time and all the
newspaper space he wants to explain his
views. Those who disagree with him can be
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March 5, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - S 3095
heard by the American public only if the in keeping Thieu and Ky in power. I do not hope that their supporters in South Viet-
news media provides the opportunity. believe the American people share this ob- nam can be safe in their lives or could gen-
I am not trying to drum up press criti- jective. uinely participate in the political life of
cism for its own sake. For the sake of the WHAT CAN WE EXPECT FROM VIETNAMIZATION? their country. Mr. Nixon merely threatens
public's right to know, I am asking for more Can it work in Vietnam? Will it bring us them with more force, and a continuing
probing, for more facts, for more coverage closer to peace in Paris? American military veto.
whatever the results may be. The North Vietnamese and the Vietcong To Saigon, we Wive promised much in the
I am not trying to make a party issue out have been hurt by the years of war, but they way of continuing g military and political sup-
of Vietnam. It cannot be done and it should show no signs of being near a breaking point. port, but we have conveyed little warning
that American be done. Both Democrats and Republi- They have bfighting for 25 years to throw merican military support will not con-
cans were involved in getting us into Viet- western have been ee military influence out of Vietnam, time forever and that reasonable political
Viet-
nam, and both Democrats and Republicans concessions on their part are necessary if
interested in getting out. Can we realistically expect them to give up there is to be an end to the war. Given the
are I want to encourage a constructive na- this goal? And on the battlefield, they can prospect of our indefinite stay in Vietnam,
tional debate on United States policy on still control the level of combat, and noth- Saigon has no incentive either to improve
Vietnam. President Nixon equates national Ing in Mr. Nixon's plan takes this away from militarily or to bargain away its own power
it-
debate at the peace table. In order to maintain it-
U.S. disunity. the at The South Vietnamese forces have tin- self in power, the Thieu-Ky regime has every
U.S. can with be defeated el only by > disunity sn
home. I grant that the absence of national proved over the years, but this improvement incentive to help make our stay indefinite.
debate may make it temporarily more com- also serves to point up how far they have In my judgment, nothing the President
fortable for Mr. Nixon, but I do not believe to go. They still avoid night patrolling. Their threatens to do in Vietnam and nothing he
it can advance the cause of peace in Viet- officer corps is still widely regarded as in- has done in Paris is likely to result in suc-
nam. In the end, absence of debate can lead competent. Promotions to officer rank are cessful negotiations. Serious -bargaining is
only to increased divisions and ugly con- still based on social status. Desertions still precluded so long as both Saigon and Hanoi
irantations, run as high as 10,000 per month. This figure believe that our real aim is to stay in Viet-
incidentally is just an educated estimate. nam indefinitely and preserve the Thieu-Ky
WHAT IS THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN? And behind all this still lies a political regime.
The full implications of the President's regime which neither deserves nor receives In disregarding the Paris negotiations, the
plan for Vietnamizing the war remain a mys- much popular support. With ail the claims President is making his most fundamental
tery. Backgrounders and statements by high we make that 90 percent of the population mistake.
officials in the Nixon Administration have of the hamlets are "pacified," roughly half
continued to offer hope to many that the the hamlets are still classified as subject to THE PARIS NEGOTIATIONS-TOWARD A
SETTLEMENT
plan was to get all of our men out of Viet- significant Vietcong Influence. Even at this
nam in accordance with our own interest. stage of the war, the Saigon Government The only way to end a war which Is in-
However, the President at his January 30 has no meaningful control of half of its trinsically a political struggle is through
press conference made clear that this was not own country. Neutralists and anyone else negotiations. In order to bring Paris back
the case. who speaks out against the present Saigon into the picture and improve the chances
"We had implemented a plan in which the regime are still being jailed and hounded, for a peaceful settlement, the President must
United States would withdraw all of its com- while we stand silently aside. The recent take two steps he has not taken.
bat forces as Vietnamese forces were trained incident involving Deputy Chart is only the First, he must replace Ambassador Lodge
and able to take over the fighting. latest example of the failure of the Thieu with another senior personal representative
"That policy of Vietnamization is irrevers- regime to observe democratic processes. and close the symbolic but important pro-
ible. We should also note the continued senti- tocol gap.
"Now, as far as the timing of the plan is ment for a peaceful settlement among the This seems like a small step, but the North
concerned, how many and at what time they several groups in South Vietnam. In the Vietnamese are not unique in their concern
come out, that, of course, will depend on 1967 elections which brought Thieu to power, for diplomatic niceties, and they are not in
the criteria that I also set forth in that 60 percent of those who did vote cast their different to matters of general international
speech-the criteria of the level of enemy ballots for some form of accommodation for courtesy. Le Duo Tho, Xuan Thuy and Ma-
dame Binh from North Vietnam and the
activity, the progress in the Paris peace talks, peace.
and, of course, the other matters, the prob- The Nixon Administration looks at this Provisional Revolutionary Government re-
lems particularly with regard to the rate of and says it is "cautiously optimistic." It has spectively outrank Ambassador Phillip Habib
training of the Vietnamese forces." its statistics about open roads, and rice pro- and any member of the South Vietnamese
What does this now tell us about the plan? duction, and pacification and so on. I am delegation by several levels. As a negotiator,
First, the plan has two parts-the removal not talking about the success of an Amer- Mr. Habib's obvious ability cannot compen-
of combat forces from Vietnam and the ican occupation, but the underlying and con- sate for his obvious unacceptability.
maintaining in Vietnam of "support for the trolling elements of the war. These have The protocol gap has crucial practical con-
South Vietnamese logistically, and until they not changed, and they do not make me "cau- sequences. Our delegation to negotiations
are ready to take over .. tiously optimistic." must have recognized authority to probe the
other side's position, to command the atten-
Second, the plan appears to relate primer- If we look at Laos today and magnify that tion of the President, and to propose needed
fly to ground combate forces. We still do not situation many times, we can get a pretty and sensible compromises. We should also
know what this means in numbers of men good picture of what Vietnamization will insist that Saigon upgrade its team in Paris.
and timing. Conjecture seems to put the fig- look like in five or ten years-if everything A new senior man in Paris is the necessary
ure at about 300,000 which would mean at goes perfectly. Without a political settlement first step in recreating a serious atmosphere
least 200,000 Americans left in Vietnam by in Vietnam and Southeast Asia the fight- for diplomacy.
the end of 1971 if all goes well. ing will persist in Laos, and we will be al- Second, the President must develop a pro-
Third, this is an optimistic conjecture, ways on the verge of crisis, and American posal that Is negotiable, a proposal which
since the timing of both parts of the plan participation always will be necessary and will create the necessary climate for a settle-
is not based on our own interests, but on the irreplaceable. ment of those differences. Specifically, I have
actions of Saigon and Hanoi. Leaving aside The cruel irony of Victnamization of the in mind our trying to negotiate a U.S. with-
the Paris negotiations for the moment, this war is that even if it succeeds as a mili- drawal timetable, and coupling this with an
means that if Hanoi maintains or steps up tary strategy it succeeds only in perpetuat- informal arrangement regarding the with-
the pressure and Saigon cannot hold its own, ing the killing of Vietnamese by Vietnamese. drawal of North Vietnam forces and a reduc-
even our combat forces will remain indef- And by so doing; it perpetuates American tion in the level of violence.
lnitely, involvement in the war, American deaths, There is some reason to believe that Hanoi
Why hasn't all this been made clear to and the diversion of needed American re- would be receptive to such an approach. But
the American people? sources. the Administration has been reluctant to
The silent majority would be silent no The President's plan cannot bring peace probe possible changes in Hanoi's position.
longer if this fact and this fact alone were because it is essentially a military strategy Such probing, we are told, would be regarded
brought to their attention. Silent Ameri- intended to win what is primarily a political by Hanoi as a sign of American weakness.
cans are assuming that Mr. Nixon is really struggle. This is simply another illustration of how
getting us out of Vietnam. The truth of the High Nixon Administration officials some- Vietnamization has become a roadblock not
matter is that he is pinning us down in- times say that these long-run political prob- a path to peace.
definitely. We have been told that Mr. Nix- lems will not have to be faced because Viet- This brings us to the issue of an announced
on's plan has been cleared with President namization will lead to successful negotia- withdrawal timetable.
Thieu, and President Thieu appears to be tions in Paris. They say that our policy is President Nixon says that he has a with-
well aware of our indefinite commitment. to appear tough and demonstrate our stay- drawal plan, and that Saigon knows and
On January 9, Thieu warned. that "many ing power, thereby putting pressure on Hanoi agrees with it. However, he refuses to make
years" will be required to remve U.S. com- to negotiate seriously in Paris. In my judg- it known to the American public. If Saigon
bat troops. ment, however, the strategy of threatening knows, then Hanoi is also informed. Only
President Nixon seems to believe that the a prolonged U.S. presence is self-defeating. the American people remain unfamiliar with
U.S. has a vital national security interest As directed at Hanoi, it promises little the details.
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S 3096 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 5, 1970
He says if he announces a timetable, Hanoi
will wait until we are vulnerable and then
attack us. But Hanoi can wait and do this
at a time and place of its own choosing,
whether or not Mr. Nixon announces a time-
table.
He says that an announced timetable
would take away Hanoi's incentive to cote.
promise. We have been in Paris for over a
dear and a half, and it is obvious that Hanoi
finds no incentives for compromise in our
present policy.
All this leads me to conclude that we are
=sill following the endless path to an un.-
teachable military victory, and that the Paris
peace negotiations have become the forgot-
ten chapter of the war in Vietnam.
In conclusion, I think we come to three
paints.
First, because American and Vietnamese
lives continue to be lost and because billions
of American dollars continue to be spent,
tc-w national debate is in order.
Second, because I believe the President's
Vietnamization policy can lead only to the
prolongation of the war and because I believe
a real end to the war can come only through
negotiations, a new national debate is a
necessity.
And, finally, because the issues demand the
i,+.ndersbanding attention of the American
]n:blic, the role of the press in faithfully
reporting this national debate is indispensa-
CONCLUSION OF MORNING
BUSINESS
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. AL-
LEN in the chair). Is there further morn-
ina business? If not, morning business
is concluded.
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT--
APPROVAL OF JOINT RESOLUTION
A message in writing from the Presi-
dent of the United States was communi-
cated to the Senate by Mr. Leonard, one
of his secretaries, and he announced
that on March 4, 1970, the President had
approved and signed the joint resolu-
tion (S.J. Res; 180) to provide fora tem-
porary prohibition of strikes or lockouts
with respect to the current railway
labor-management dispute.
VOTING RIGHTS ACT
AMENDMENT OF 1969
The PRESIDING OFFICER. At this
time the Chair lays before the Senate
the unfinished business which the clerk:
will report.
The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A
bi l (H.R. 4249) to extend the Voting.
Rights Act of 1965 with respect to the
discriminatory use of tests and devices.
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill.
s:Oor-HART AMENDMENT SHOULD Be ADOPTED
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President,
the' right to vote is the most central and
precious right in our system of govern-
ment. Every President and every Con-
gress in our Nation's history has at-
tes';ed to the fact that the free and se-
cret ballot is the foundation of America.
The ballot box has always been our
means of settling disputes. The vote has
been the primary weapon :In the arsenal
of the American citizen. We have used
the ballot both to support national poll-
eles and to demand change and reform.
Sadly, almost 200 years after the birth sure adequate representation of all cit-
of our Republic and a. full 100 years after izens. Charles Evers of Fayette, Miss.,
the ratification of the 15th amendment has distinguished himself as one of the
to the Constitution, a significant pro- South's most concerned and progressive
portion of our adult population Is de- mayors. Julian Bond of Georgia is one
nied the opportunity to vote. Black of the Nation's best known and most
Americans have been systematically kept promising of the younger generation of
off the voting rolls in some sections of the South manifesting interest in public
the country-sometimes through undis-
guised legislation, but more often
through devious devices. There can be
no excuse for this in a democracy.
In a message to Congress in 1963,
President Kennedy said:
The right to vote in a free American elec-
tion is the most powerful and precious right
in ,he world-and it must not be denied on
the grounds of race or color. It is a potent
key to achieving other rights of citizenship.
President Johnson told Congress in
Marche 1965:
Many of the issues of civil rights are coin-
plea and difficult. But about this there can
be no argument. Every American citizen
must have an equal right to vote. There is
no duty which weighs more heavily on us
than the duty to insure that right.
The passage Of the 1965 Voting Rights
,Act by Congress was a tribute to the per-
sistent efforts of President Johnson and
to the high ideals and endless zeal of
our beloved President Kennedy. The Vot-
ing Rights Act was the first frontal as-
sau.'.t on a longstanding and pervasive
evil, which had been perpetrated in some
parts of the country for more than 100
years by constant and Ingenious defi-
ance of the Constitution. Three earlier
enactments in 1957, 1960, and 1964 had
failed to ease blatant discrimination in
the electoral processes in certain areas,
primarily in the South. These laws gave
the U.S. Attorney General the power to
institute lawsuits to protect the right
to vote.
This case-by-case approach was met
by massive State and local resistance.
The result was only the most meager
gains in Negro voter registration. In Mis-
sissippi, for example, registration in-
creased from 4.4 percent in 1954 to but
6.7 percent by 1964; in contrast, 70 per-
cent. of the State's white population was
registered.
The 1965 Voting Rights Act, the en-
actment into law of which Presidents
Kennedy and Johnson exerted wise lead-
ership, is different from the voting leg-
islation that preceded It and was an im-
provement. This law has been.the most
effective civil rights legislation ever en-
acted by the Congress. The 1965 act pro-
vides for immediate and automatic ap-
plication instead of lengthy and repeat-
ed litigation.
Automatic application works. Black
men and women who had earlier been
systematically denied the right to vote
in many Southern States registered and
voted in record numbers following 1965.
In Mississippi, the nonwhite popula-
tion registration to vote increased from
6.7 pereent in 1964 to 59.9 percent in
1968; in Alabama, from 19 to 57 per-
cent; in Georgia, from 27 to 56 percent;
in Louisiana, from 32 to 59 percent; and
in South Carolina, from 37 to 51 percent.
In addition, many 'Mack citizens are
now candidates for State and local of-
fices in Southern States. This helps as-
ever, there is much more to be accom-
plished. Negro registration is still well
below that of white men and women in.
every Southern State. In many counties
Negro registration is less than half that
of white men and women. Resistance to
equal voting rights is still rampant in
some Southern States.
This is not the time to discard the only
voting rights law that has really worked.
That law should be extended and ex-
panded, not weakened.
Never has there been a more impor-
tant time to assure voting rights for all
Americans. The past few years has seen
an alarming increase in crime, mount-
ing disruptions on college campuses, and
extensive violence in the major cities of
the country, in the North and also In the
South. To deny to one group of people
the precious right to vote is to deny that
group a stake in the democratic process.
To deny the ballot as a means of -settling
disputes is to invite settlement of those
disputes in the streets. If the weapon
of the vote is not available, some other
weapons will be.
Mr. President, I know that President
Kennedy, who fought so hard for human
rights and human dignity, and President
Johnson, who most regrettably is ill to-
day In a San Antonio hospital, would
urge us to extend and strengthen the
1965 Voting Rights Act.
President Nixon on December 10, 1969,
wrote a letter to the distinguished mi-
nority leader of the House of Represent-
atives. In that letter, which has been
printed in the RECORD, the President
stated, "Justice is diminished for any
citizen who does not have the right to
vote for those who govern him. There is
no way for the disenfranchised to con-
sider themselves equal partners in our
society." If the President believes those
words, and I assume he does, he will sup-
port an extension of the 1965 act. If
he is truly concerned about the millions
who remain disenfranchised he should,
it seems to be, announce Ins support for
the substitute offered by the distin-
guished senior Senators from Pennsyl-
vania and Michigan and eight other
Senators who are members of the Sen-
ate Committee on the Judiciary.
The Scott-Hart amendment provides
for full extension of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965. In addition, it makes uni-
form throughout the Nation the ban on
discriminatory literacy tests and elimi-
nates restrictive residency requirements.
This is an important and carefully con-
sidered piece of legislation. I enthusias-
tically support the Scott-Hart amend-
ment and urge its adoption.
Mr. EASTLAND obtained the floor.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield without losing his right
to the floor?
Mr. EASTLAND. I yield.
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March 6, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
terials, entrained or contained, are buried
at this site, the particulates in the form of
unfixed or loose contamination would be the
only potential source. The operational pro-
cedures require that all material received for
disposal is placed in trenches, compacted,
and covered with three feet of foil. These
procedures provide adequate assurance that
aerial dispersion of any particulates will not
occur.
From a public health and safety stand-
point, the waste burial site must provide a
protective barrier so that radioactivity will
be confined to the waste burial pits. The
control mechanism which limits any move-
ment of radioactivity from the site is de-
pendent upon such factors as solubility, per-
meability of the soil, ion exchange capacity,
availability of water, and distance to the
source of potable water. The geology, hydrol-
ogy, and the permeability of the soils in the
vicinity of NRTS have been reported by the
U.S. Geological Surveys ?. Substantial thick-
nesses of continuous layers of alluvial soils
beneath the burial ground would be expected
to provide a barrier to migrating radionu-
clides through ion-exchange. However, there
is a lack of data on geology and lithology be-
neath the burial site. The closest drill holes
which have been logged are several miles
away 81. It must, therefore, be considered
conceivable that continuous cracked and/or
channeled basalt formations could extend
from the bottom of the burial pits and
trenches to the aquifer. Until more informa-
tion on subsurface geology at the burial
ground becomes available, the separation
distance to the aquifer cannot be considered
as a protective barrier. It is therefore rec-
ommended that a minimum of two feet of
alluvial soil be required beneath all buried
wastes. Unless several feet of soil separate
buried wastes and basaltic rock formations,
no credit can be allowed for removal of ra-
dioactivity by the ion-exchange mechanism.
In discussions with NRTS personnel, it was
stated that snow melts have occurred in re-
cent years which caused the flooding of
trenches for periods as long as 30 days. There-
fore, despite the low average precipitation,
water is available during certain periods of
time as a leaching and transport agent to the
aquifer. Even if measures to provide alluvial
soil cover under buried wastes are employed,
the presence and residency of leaching water
In the trench is highly undesirable. Flood
control measures for the burial should, there-
fore, be taken to prevent any accumulation of
water in the trenches and pits. These control
measures include covering and mounding
each trench and pit with a minimum of
three feet of soil above the ground level, dig-
ging a drainage ditch around each pit and
trench, and removing snow. During the visit
to the burial site, it was noted that flood
control measures have been initiated to pro-
vide for drainage of water from the area.
On the basis of the eval aste
disposal burial op s and the exam na-
tion of enviro tal surveillance data, there
is no evide which indicates that any ra-
dioactiv aterial has migrated from the
burial ound. However, as an added safety
me re, the on-site monitoring should be
In nsified to provide confirmation that no
Volume - Volume
Contain- (cubic Activity Contain- (cubic
ers feet) (curies) ers feet)
1968
Category I:
(A) Onsite:
High level ------- 21 88 626,266 42 718
Intermediate----- 208 3,392 316,074 169 4,020
Low level -------- 4,543 64,375 22,476 4,202 68,689
872,600
147,231
3, 025
S 3145
and its location above a highly productive
acquifier, a great degree of conservatism has
been exercised in examining the precautions
which have been employed in the solid waste
disposal operations. Because of the long-term
considerations that apply to the burial of
plutonium and americium, additional protec-
tice measures should be adopted by the AEC
in management of the waste burial ground.
Thus, It Is recommended that (1), the op-
erational procedures for burial of long half-
life radioactive materials be modified so that
the plutonium and americium waste is seg-
regated in the burial pits, (2) monitoring be
intensified to provide a positive indication
that radioactive material has not migrated
from the waste burial pits, and (3) plu-
tonium and americium waste be accessible
for removal from the burial pit, should it be
detected in .the monitoring holes.
Additional information of the geological
formations beneath the burial site is needed
to fully evaluate the possibility of waste sol-
utions seeping down to the water table and to
determine the rate of the lateral movement
from the site. Therefore, it is recommended
that test holes be drilled in the vicinity of the
burial site to provide detailed information in
the lithology and character of the alluvial de-
posits and underlying basalt.
In summary, the present operational pro-
cedures and land burial methods meet the'
radiation safety criteria and will not result in
a health and safety problem in the off-site
area. The additional safety measures recom-
mended in this study will provide further
assurance that long half-life radioactive ma-
terials are confined to the waste disposal
grounds.
January through June July through December
Volume Volume
Contain- (cubic Activity Contain- (cubic Activity
ers feet) (curies) ers feet) (curies)
High levt----- --------------- -----
-------- ------------
Intermediat_-_ 1 10 122 ---------------------------------
Low level-__ 13, 821 159,400 4, 641 11,185 186, 057 4,641
Volume Volume Volume
(cubic Activity (cubic Activity (cubic Activity
Year meters) (curies) meters) (curies) meters) (curies)
1956-------- -. 2,754 ------------ 1,066 ------------ 3,820 10,000
1957 ---------- 3,269 ------------ 1,701 ------------ 4,970 15,000
1958 ---------- 5,909 ------------ 971 ------------ 6,909 10,500
1959--------- - 2,813 ------------ 1,667 ------------ 4,480 23,600
1960--------- _ 3,462 ------------ 1,948 ------------ 5,410 9,200
1961__________ 3,022 134,038 4,662 21,737 7,684 155,775
Volume j Activity Volume
(cubic /J Activity (cubic Activity (cubic Activity
Year meters) (curies) meters) (curies) meters) (curies)
1962 _ 4, 4 112, 369 3,703 5, 808 8,171 118,177
19638 239,518 5,477 14,047 8,755 253,565
1964__________ 133 143,194 3,752 2,291 6,885 145,485
1965__________ - 4,095 1,446,686 3,434 10,032 7,529 1,456,718
1966 ---------- 4, 568 3, 303, 410 4, 858 17, 276 9, 516 3,320,686
1967__________ 3,843 4,059,299 5,843 11,458 9,686 4,070,757
1968 ---------- 3,998 1,987,674 9,777 9,404 13,774 1,997,078
Origin of waste U-235 U-238 Pu-239 l'u-240 Am-241 Co-60
N RTS (1960 through 1967)___ 1.40