NIXON POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA HON. JEFFERY COHELAN OF CALIFORNIA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WEDNESDAY, JUNE 24, 1970

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• Publication Date: June 24, 1970
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Approved For Release 2003/12/02,: CIA-RDP.72-00337,R000300060006-4 E 5905
June 24, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL Itk.C.ORD ? txtenszons icemarRs
that will provide for the construction of
an advanced recycling plant near Wil-
mington. The State and the many sup-
porters of this proposal are to be
commended.
Two recent newspaper articles ap-
peared on this, subject that I would like
to bring to t e attention of my col-
leagues. One a ipeared in the Wilmington
Morning New yesterday, and describes
in some detail e background of the pro-
posed Wilming n plant. The same day,
the Wall Street ournal carried an arti-
cle that details si e of the problems fac-
ing another rec ling operation. I ask
unanimous consen that these articles be
printed, with my co ments, as a part of
the Extensions ofarks.
There being no obi ction, the articles
were ordered to be pr ted in the REC-
ORD, as follows:
? [From the Wilmington Del.) Morning
News June 23, 1701
HERCULES GETS STATE BID: W TE RECYCLING
PLANT PLAN ACCEP
(By John D. Gates and Bo Dolan)
DovErt.?A Hercules, Inc., prop al for the
design, construction and operatio of a solid
waste recycling plant in New Cas e County
was accepted yesterday by Gov. ssell W.
Peterson.
Peterson announced he had acceP ed the
Hercules plan on the recommendation of his
Committee on Solid Waste as he s ned
House Bill 822, appropriating $1 milli? for
design and engineering work on the plan
The plant, billed as the first in the wo
to reclaim all waste materials fed into i
would handle 500 tons of domestic and in-
dustrial waste and 70 tons of wet sewage
sludge a day, or nearly half the solid waste
generated in New Castle County.
The next step will be contract negotiations
between Hercules and the state to iron out
details concerning what exactly the State
wants from Hercules in the way Of design
work. A Hercules official said these negotia-
tions would probably be completed in from
three to aix weeks.
Construction and operation of the plant
would require more negotiations?as well as
more money. These negotiations would in-
volve New Castle County government and,
If hoped-for federal funds are available, the
federal government.
Cost of the plant from initial design to
start of operations would be about $10 mil-
lion, According to John N. Sherman, direc-
tor of advanced programs for Hercules
chemical propulsion division, which su
mitted the proposal.
Design of the plant allows for event
doubling of capacity through expansi
After an initial shakedown phase, mo
realized from the sale of recycled waste p od-
ucts would pay the operating expens# of
the plant, according to the Hercules pro-
.
Members of the Governor's Commit fee on
Solid Waste said that similar plants rfLay be
built in the Dover and Georgetown a eas at
a later date.
A bill to provide federal aid for piht waste
recycling projects is new being pre red by
the U.S. Senate Committee on Publhj Works,
of which Sen. J. Caleb Boggs, R-De ., is the
ranking minority member.
The committee hopes to have the bill on
the Senate floor for action next month. Dela-
ware hopes to get some of that money to
help finance the plant.
State Rep. Robert J. Berndt, R-Hillcrest,
who sponsored the bill to fund design work
and chaired the governor's committee, said
a site for the plant must be chosen soon
because Hercules designs will depend on the
nature of the site.
The Hercules proposal included a comple-
tion schedule for the plant of 22 months
from the date of site selection, barring un-
foreseen obstacles and assuming full financ-
ing of the project.
Committee members present when Peter-
son signed H.B. 822 were Berndt, George
Dutcher, New Castle County public works
director; Richard Weldon of Bear; Arthur
W. Dobberstein of Dover; State Sen. J. Don-
ald Isaacs, R-Townsend; and Rep. R. Glen
Mears Sr., ID-Seal Ord.
Berndt said the selection narrowed to Her-
cules from nine firms which filed proposals.
Some withdrew their plans, he said.
Berndt said Hercules was chosen because
"They have the talent to do it; they're way
out in front of everybody else." He said the
firm also has markets for the byproducts.
The proposed plant, designed to be oper-
ated by about 50 employes, is to have three
major elements.
The first is a digester system for convert-
ing organic waste materials to a high qual-
ity humus product free from disease pro
ing organisms. A similar plant in San ivafl,
Puerto Rico, is currently processing 0 tons
a day.
The second is the application pyrolysis
techniques?subjecting organic aterials to
high temperatures?for the trolled de-
composition of organic soli astes such as
rubber and plastics.
The third is a residue s ? aration system for
the inorganic residue se rated from the di-
gester discharge. The eparation of metals,
glass and grits will b accomplished through
a series of screener gravity tables and other
equipment.
Hercules ada d the systems design
knowledge of i chemical propulsion divi-
sion to come p with its plan. Parts of the
system desig by Hercules were the result
I Hercules esearch, while other parts are
tented p ? ducts of other companies.
IF
EEC
WA
PRO
Si
wh
pr
to
m t Wall Street Journal, June 23, 19701
NO REFUSE: EFFORTS TO SAVE, REUSE
PRODUCTS SLOWED BY .YARIETY OF
MS
yea
he
table
build pro
ng and me
s basic corn
d other refu
recovered mate
used again.
That way he
from both the c
died and the co
separated trash. A
forming a valuable
bage would be kept
landfills, and reso
through the reuse of t
Today Mr. Brown is
tan Waste Conversion C
plant that processes 25
bage. He charges Houston
dle the garbage, which
paper, metals and a combi
glass, yard refuse and food
compost.
(By David Gumpert)
s ago Victor Brown came up with
hought was a progressive?and
dea. He would form a company
essing plants capable of shred-
anically separating trash into
onents of paper, metals, glass'
e, and then he would sell the
ials back to industry to be
would be making money
y whose garbage he han-
panies that bought the
d he would also be per-
ervice because the gar-
out of incinerators and
ces would be saved
e materials.
esident of Metropoli-
p,, which operates a
of Houston's gar-
4.11 a ton to han-
separated ? into
tion of crushed
te for garden
AHEAD OF HIS TIM
But Mr. Brown is frustrated and disap-
pointed, and he is beginning to el he may
be slightly ahead of his time. Th reason:
He's losing about $2 on each ton of arbage
he handles because he can't sell most of the
materials he salvages.
Of the 2,000 tons of garbage Mr. Brown
handles each week, for instance, 1,200 tons
consists of paper. But he can sell only 200
tons. "It's good solid paper?paper that's only
been used once," says Mr. Brown. "It rep-
resents trees and a lot of other resources,
and we're throwing it away and burning it.'
Mr. Brown's business is known as "recy-
cling." In recent months, with the surge of
public concern over environmental issues,
More and more governirrent officials, business
leaders and conservationists have pointed to
recycling as a fundamental step toward alle-
viating such problems as pollution and the
depletion of resources.
But, as Mr. Brown's experience indicates,
several hurdles must be overcome before re-
cycling is likely to become a routine, widely
accepted process. At the moment, any broad
move to recycling seems to be blocked by a
complex set of factors, including unfavorable
economics, technological shortcomings and
restrictive government regulations.
NOT A NEW IDEA
Recycling is far from a new idea. Many
metals and large quantities of textiles and
rubber once were routinely collected by scrap
dealers and reprocessed. But in recent years
rising costs of collecting and processing used
materials have discouraged their use.
About half the copper, lead and iron used
in the U.S. is still recycled, but only about
30% of aluminum and 20% of zinc are re-
used. Less than 10% of textiles, rubber and
glass is reprocessed nowadays. Of paper, the
largest component of municipal waste, only
about 20% winds up being used again.
The effects of recycling on conserving
natural resources are particularly evident in
the case of paper. The Association of Sec-
ondary Material Industries, a trade group,
estimates it takes 17 trees on the average to
produce a ton of paper. Of the 58.5 million
tons of paper used in the U.S. last year, 11.5
million tons were recycled?meaning that
200 million trees did not have to be cut. But
if 50% of the paper had been recycled, the
association figures, the cutting of another
300 million trees could have been avoided.
GLASS FOR PAVING
A number of projects and experiments
have been launched recently to investigate
possibilities for recycling. At the University
of Missouri scientists are testing the feasi-
bility of extracting glass from garbage and
crushing it for use as an aggregate in asphalt
paving. In San Francisco and in Madison,
Wis., the public has been asked to separate
its newspapers from other trash so that the
papers can easily be collected and recycled.
Officials in both cities say the public's co-
operation has been greater than expected.
But advocates of recycling say far more
work will have to be done before recycling
begins to have any significant effect on en-
vironmental problems. I think the approach
up till now has been totally unimaginative,"
says Merril Eisenbetd, professor of environ-
mental medicine at New York University and
former head of New York City's Environmen-
tal Resources Protection Administration. He
advocates government subsidies to encourage
industry to become more involved in re-
cycling.
The Federal Government would become
heavily involved in recycling activities if
legislation now pending in the House and
Senate gains approval. Bills in both houses
provide for spending some $500 million in
the next few years to support research and
the building of recycling facilities by local
and regional governments.
Recycling advocates aren't sure if the
pending legislation is the real answer, how-
ever, since it places most of its emphasis on
technology and tends to ignore economic fac-
tors. A closer look at Victor Brown's opera-
tion in Houston shows how technological and
economic problems are intertwined.
In planning his Houston plant, which was
? built more than three years ago. Mr. Brv-ri
figured most of his recycling income would
be from the sale of scrap paper to paper com-
panies. But so far he has been unable to sell
any of his paper to paper companies; the 200
tons he sells each week go entirely to the
' construction industry to make building ma-
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E 5906 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD Extensions of Remarks June 24, 1970
tennis. 'We have to fight just to maintain
that Small market," Mr. Brawn says.
Mr. Brown contends the paper industry has
rejected lids paper because paper companies
have suele a heavy investment in woodlands
and in pulp-making equipmairt that they
simple aren't interested in recycling--an
assessment that at least one paper industry
executive concedes is partly true.
&rum REASONS As WELL
"A lot Of the companies are oriented to
the trees," says John Schmidt, assistant
managet of Manufacturing for St. Regis
Paper C. 'If you have a lot of land with
trees, you aren't inclined to abandon that."
But Mr. Schmidt says there are also other
reasons for the difficulties Mr. Brown has bad
in selling his paper. St. Regis has considered
buying Wastepaper from Mr. ?Brown but so
far has rejected it, arguing that the paper
is mixed in quality, contaminated by other
garbage Rzlici too expensive to transport from
Houston to the company's recycling paper
mills in the Midwest and North.
St. Regis officials argue that technology isn't
yet sophisticated enough either to separate
paper according to quality nor to remove the
odor of garbage completely. "When we get
to that point, Victor Brown might have a
product," says Mr. Schmidt.
Mr. Bf?own's difficulties extend beyond
paper. He says he's capable of turning out
60,000 tons or more of compost a year, but
right aose he can sell only 5,000 tons an-
nually to agricultural markets. His only suc-
cess has been in the sale of metals, mostly
cans, to the copper industry, which uses
them as Catalysts in the production process.
As a result of his losses, Which he says hate
amounted to about $2 million over the past
three years, Mr. Brown is cutting back on his
research and development in an attempt to
reduce costs.
REGULATORY PROBLEDAL
Besides the economic and technological
problems such as those plaguing Mr. Brown,
there is the problem of regulatory restric-
tions. M. J. Mighdoll, executive vice presi-
dent of the National Association of Secon-
dary Material Industries, argues that many
scrap metal, paper and textile dealers have
been forced out of municipal centers to less-
convenient locations on city outskirts be-
cause their businesses are considered "un-
sightly."
Mr. Mighdoll also contends that export
limitations on materials such as copper and
nickel, considered vital to national needs,
have restricted markets and thus discour-
aged recycling efforts. He also cites a 10%
depletion allowance that provides a tax
break to growers of timber as a deterrent
to the recycling of paper.
Recycling advocates maintain that many
of these factors will have to change before
industry Will take more interest in recycling.
Richard Vaughan, director of the Federal
Bureau of Solid Waste Management, urges
that the Government "provide the same
kind of incentives for recycling" as have been
provided for the exploitation of raw ma-
terials. He observes, for instance, that
freight rates for iron ore and pulpwood cur-
rently are lower than those for scrap metal
and scrap paper, a situation he argues could
be changed by Government regulation.
ASSESSING 51NALTIES
Recycling might also be encouraged by
adding extra charges on disposable coa.
sumer products, making reusable products
more attractive and by somehow penalIzs
tog manufacturers who shun recycled raw
materials when they're available. Such pen-
alties might be imposed through special
taxes, thoegh conservationists haven't come
up with any specific proposals yet. "These
penalties would force the producer and con-
sumer to look for alternatives," says
Michael Brewer, vice president of Resources,
ure Inc., a nonprofit Washington-
based research organization.
Many of these active in recycling argue that
once the economic problems are overcome,
the technological obstacles will easily fall.
All of the exciting things ase in technology
and all the weavers are in ecormeasese, says
Harold Gershowitz, executive director of the
National Solid Wastes Management Asso-
ciation in Washingtore a trade group that
represents private handlers of solid waste.
Mr. Gershowitz argues, "You cannot sepa-
rate the need for technology from the need
for markets." He suggests that the Govern-
ment begin creating markets for recycled
products by confining its own purchases to
recycled goods. 'rhe same argument is echoed
by conservationists. "If the Government
would say it Would le
PaP
recycling paper plants would spring up all
over the country," maintained Jerome Gold-
stein, executive vice president of Rodale
Press Inc. in Emmaus, Pa., which publishes
several conservation magazines. Mr. Goldstein
ear that he hat; asked his paper suppliers to
seek out only recycled paper for use in Rod le
publications.
alL/
NIXON POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
HON. JEFFERY COHELAN
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF hEPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, June 24, 1970
Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Speaker, the
Nixon policy in Southeast Asia is replete
with contradiction. There is, however,
one basic fact that runs through all the
scenerios of Vietnamization?the pres-
ence of 200,000 U.S. troops for an indefi-
nite period of time. Whether we call
these U.S. troops "support" or "com-
bat" is really meaningless. The unalter-
able fact remains--the current Nixon
plan for Southeast Asia requires a large
U.S. manpower and material commit-
ment in that area well into the foresee-
able future.
This is the wrong course, as I have
pointed out on numerous occasions. Any
impartial study of the sociopolitical
problems of Vietnam or of the entire
Southeast Asian area, for that matter,
and the heavy -U.S. commitment, point
inexorably to a single conclusion: The
Thieu-Xy regime Will not be forced into
active negotiations while they have
a massive U.S. presence. In addition,
Cambodian-type operations conducted
by U.S. personnel or U.S.-sponsored
"volunteers" have done little to forward
a negotiated settlement.
Two former Defense Department offi-
cials from the Johnson administration,
Townsend Hoopes and Paul Warnke,
have carefully delineated the problems
faced by the Nixon administration. This
is a thoughtful and provocative essay and
I recommend it to my colleagues:
Newer Reeler JUST DIGGING IN
(By Townsend Hoopes and Paul C. Warnke
President Nixon's speech of June 3 has
now made undisguisably clear the aim of his
Vietnam policy. It is not a total withdrawal
of U.S. forces in the next 12 or 18 months,
or even in the foreseeable future; nor does
it involve a willingness to accept the conse-
quences of the ,free play of political forces
in Indochina. Mr. Nixon's Vietnam policy in-
volves three basic elements:
Endeavoring tc reduce U.S. forces to that
level which, in his judgment, will be politt
cally acceptable to Americarepublic opinion.
Striving to strengthen ARVN (the South
Vietnamese army) to a point where, in col-
laboration with remaining U.S. forces, an
unassailable military posture can be per-
manently assured.
Hoping to force Hanoi to recognize the en-
dcluuretiongg nHatuorie toof nthegaottitotsetuares,ettthleermeebisitt into-
Paris on present U.S. teries.
Behind a smokescreen of ambiguity, there
is now the clear shape of the Nixon policy.
It is confirmed by the surfacing of U.S.-sub-
sidized Thai "volunteers" for Cambodia and
by the lack of administration resistance to
indications that ARVN will continue its Cam-
bodian operations indefinitely.
It has been supposed that of the three
major considerations said to have produced
the April 30 Cambodia detaion, what counted
most was the concern that continued Ameris
can force withdrawals depended on "clean..
Ing out the sanctuaries." liven in that con-
text, the Cambodian border crossings were
pre-emptive strikes desigited not to meet an
immediate threat but to reduce enemy capa-
bilities in the area for four to six months,
thereby buying time for the "further
strengthening" of ARVN.
No doubt that was the thrust of Gen.
Creighton Abrams' view (welch suggests how
unreliable and unpromising ARVN is really
regarded by the U.S. command, beneath all
the chamber of commerce ebullience about,
Vietnamization). The President on June 3
made this view his own official explanation
for the decision to strike Cambodia.
However, this explanation looks like an
after-the-fact rationalization invented by
Defense Secretary Melvin Laird. For as Stew-
art Alsops look at the Prestdents yellow pad
(Newsweek. June 1) made quite clear, Mr.
Nixon is still tilting with "International com-
munism" in Southeast Asia and his chief
concern on April 30 was that Cambodia
might go Communist.
The most revealing point on the yellow
pad was the Nixon concern that, if neither
side moved, an "ambiguous situation" might
arise in Cambodia which would make it very
difficult for the United States to hit the
sanctuaries?Le., we would be charged by
international opinion with attacking a rieu-
tral. convention and the degree of disarray
special scrutiny.
Specifically his conclusion on June 3 that
activities in the Cambodien sanctuaries be-
tween April 20 and April ISO "posed an unac-
ceptable threat to our remaining forces in
South Vietnam" is belied by Laird's state-
ment to newsmen that the attacks repre-
sented "an opportunity" because the North
Vietamese in Cambodia. unsettled by the
Lon Nol coup, were at that time facing west.
More generally, his concern to act precipitate-
ly would seem to reflect a failure to under-
stand that in limited war, there are
sanctuaries by definition.
Why attack Cambodia tether than Laos
or across the DMZ? Why refuse to acknowl-
edge that a certain mutual respect for sanc-
tuaries is what has kept U.S. bases ha Thai-
land essentially free from sapper attacks?
There is a further point. One would have
supposed that a President who had publicly
eschewed the prospect or military victory
and who was conducting a strategic with-
drawal had long since made the judgment
that the particular coloration of petty non-
governments in Southeast Asia did not af-
fect the serious interests of tee United States.
A statesman who had in fact decided that
a genuine U.S. extrication tram the area was
necessary would indeed be at pains to foster
"ambiguous situations.- He would go out
of his way to avoid a clear-cut Comments ts
anti-Communist polarization.
THAT "JUST PEACE"
Mr. Nixon's quite opposite concerns and
actions tell us something very important.
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CiuN A
With respect to Vietnamization, Secretary tiated settlement and also works against a tion and immediate liquidation. Can anyone
of State William P. Rogers and Laird have tacit understanding with the other side with believe a wise decision could be made in such
consistently run ahead of the President with regard to lowering the level of violence. circumstances? Given the divisiveness, the
their clear implication that the program is l.n this mushy situation, the war is con- frayed nerves and the general distemper that
primarily a vehicle for total U.S. extrication siderably enlarged, and with it, American now define our national mood, does anyone
(even though the war might continue after responsibility for the Cambodian govern- have confidence that our political system
our forces were gone). Mr. Nixon, however, meat. The setting in motion of imponderable would not be grievously shaken by the con-
has always insisted that Vietnamization will new political forces (in Phnom Penh, Vien- sequences of either choice?
lead to "a just peace" and an end to the tiane, Bangkok, Saigon, Hanoi, Peking, MOS- THREE MAJOR POINTS
war.cow and Washington) indicates that the
It is now obvious that Mr. Nixon missed a
' On June 3, he said categorically: "I have struggle in Cambodia will be protracted, will
pledged to end this war. I shall keep that probably spread, will reopen old tribal golden opportunity, during the honeymoon
pledge." These have been puzzling assertions, hatreds and will continue to involve us in period of early 1969, to lead the country firmly
since all signs indicate that even successful situations which the American presence can away from a decade of self-deception by be-
Vietnamization (i.e., a transfer of the en- aggravate but can do nothing to resolve. ginning to uncoil the contradictions and re-
store the national balance. He could have
tire military burden to ARVN) , could produce Meanwhile, American force withdrawals
taken definitive steps toward liquidating
nothing better than interminable war. The continue, impelled by domestic pressures. As
the war and binding up the national wounds.
speech of June 3 and the revelation of the they do, the truth is borne in upon the ad-
He could have done this without political
yellow pad - now makes these assertions a ministration that the gradual and unnegoti-
risk to himself and indeed with positive
good deal less puzzling. ated character of the reductions cannot, be-
benefit for his party and the cause of na-
They show that what Mr. Nixon means low certain levels, assure the safety of the
by a "just peace" is Hanoi's recognition of remaining forces. tional unity. Though time is running out, itis still not too late for someone?preferably,
a permanent position of U.S.-ARVN military This unfolding denouement requires
of course, the President--to take up this
strength in South Vietnam. Since even the that the American people wake up to the
White House has in tarious ways revealed self-deception and bankruptcy of the Nixon vital task. Three points need to be explained
to the American people with absolute clarity.
that it has no illusions about ARVN's abil- policy in Vietnam, for it is now a matter of 1. That after five years of major combat,
lty to go it alone, it is a fair inference from the utmost urgency to bring policy into ac-
a series of official statements that a "just - cord with realities both in Indochina and at we have done about as much as any outsidepower could do to shore up the government
peace" will require the indefinite retention home. Our transcendent need at this junc- of South Vietnam;
of something in the neighborhood of 200,- ture is for leadership in the White House? 2. That the tangled political issues which
000 U.S. troops as well as indefinite sup- and if that is not possible, then in Congress? divide Vietnam, growing as they do out of
port for the Thieu regime. with the scale of mind and the inner firmness long colonial repression and the ensuing
Row Mr. Nixon plans to make these re- to explain the real choices facing the
quirements politically palatable at home is country.
net yet clear. Until recently he has kept The task is to lead public opinion toward
both his aims and his formulations artfully an understanding that a Vietnam policy
vague, but now the fig leaf has fallen away. based upon these realities is consistent with
The difficulty with this vision of the future our national interest, can be carried forward
is that it is a gossamer dream on at least two without a traumatic loss of self-confidence
Counts: (1) On all the evidence, the Amer- and need not cause a lapse into mindless
lean people are not prepared to sustain a isolation?above all, that such action is
sizable military commitment in Vietnam for infinitely preferable to continued self-
an indefinite. period, especially under condi- deception.
tions that requires our forces to go on win- PERSISTENT RHETORIC
fling victory after meaningless victory in the We are not getting that leadership. Presi-
pattern of the past five years; and (2) there dent Nixon seems somewhere between be-
is absolutely nothing in the history of the 1 [eying in the essential rightness of the war
Vietnam war (or in the present or prospective and understanding that the American in-
power balance there) to indicate that Hanoi terest requires its liquidation. He has evolved
will come to terms with the Thieu regime. 8, policy of substantially reducing, but not
If Mr. Nixon and his advisers really believe ending, the American role.
that they can force a settlement in Paris on At the same time, he has been unwilling to
present U.S. terms, then they remain deluded abandon the rhetoric that supported our in-
about the most fundamental political-mill- tervention in the first place. One must con-
tary realities in Vietnam; they also fail to dude that either he genuinely believes the
grasp how very narrow are the margins of rhetoric or is afraid to risk, through candor,
domestic tolerance for their conduct of the even a transient loss of national prestige for
old war, not to mention the new and wider the sake of a healthy adjustment to the
war they have now arranged. facts.
Negotiations in Paris have failed chiefly be- Viewed in the light of the political situa-
cause our political aims exceed our bargain- tion in the United States and the military
ing power. Hanoi is not prepared to accept situation in Indochina, the Nixon policy is
arrangements for elections worked out un- a grab bag of contradictions, illusions and
der the auspices of the Thieu government expedient actions. It seeks objectives that
and in which the winner would take all; and are unattainable while warning that accept-
the U.13.-ARVN military position, even at the once of anything less would mean "humil-
. point of ite maximum strength, was not sufil- i.ation and defeat for the United States."
" dent to compel Hanoi to bargain on our .the increasingly visible gulf between this
terms. The departure of 110,000 U.S. troops martial bravado and the known facts is pro-
and the promised withdrawal of another 150,- ,dueing a form of official schizophrenia; if un-
000 hardly strengthen our military position. .checked, it could lead to a national nervous
A VITI.N.ERABLE PROCESS breakdown.
Thus strapped to a negotiating position Worse still, if the President really does be- Nevertheless, it does not seem impossible
that cannot succeed, Mr. Nixon is thrown lieve his own rhetoric, there is the predictable that steady, candid, clearheaded leadership,
back upon Vietnamization. But owing to the danger that he will feel compelled to take based squarely upon the three points set
very uncertain qualities of ARVN and to the action more drastic than the Cambodian down above, could steer the American Levis-
President's unstated (but now undisguisa- strikes in certain foreseeable situations?e.g., than through the dangerous transition with-
ble) insistence that our proxy regime must after U.S. forces have been further reduced out running the ship aground or producing
be permanently secured, the process of Amer- but there has been no corresponding im- general hysteria. For one thing, there is
loan withdrawal is necessarily slow and am- provement of ARVN and no corresponding really no choice about leaving Vietnam; for
biguous. deterioration of North Vietnamese capabil- another, there are enormous advantages
Its lingering nature makes it vulnerable to ity. Indeed, the looming probability, of just ahead if we can by skill and steady nerves
Unanticipated intervening events, like the such a crunch is what makes it imperative make a safe and sane passage.
Lon Nol coup, which knock it off balance and for the country to face the realities now while To change the metaphor, Mr. Nixon's
create new pressures for compensatory mill- there is still time for dignified, rational, "pitiful giant" of April 30 is pitiful chiefly
tary action?pressures which Mr. Nixon deliberate choice, because his leg is in quicksand up to the
promptly translates in "opportunities" in the If we continue down Mr. Nixon's path, we midthigh and because he is unresolved about
permanent holy war against communism. Its could easily reach a situation which seriously its extrication. But the military, economic
Conditional nature?the unspoken determi- threatened the safety of our remaining and psychological advantages of removing
nation to hang in there until we have ended forces. At that point, we would face a con- the leg are demonstrable.
the war in a "just peace"?precludes a nego- striated choice between immediate escala- With two feet on solid ground again, the
struggle to define a national identity, can
only be settled among the Vietnamese them-
selves;
3. That, contrary to the erroneous assump-
tion on which US. military intervention was
based, the particular constitutional form
and the particular ideological orientation of
Vietnamese (and Indochinese) politics do
not affect the vital interest of the United
States.
Adoption of such a posture would lead di-
rectly (a) to a policy of deliberate, orderly,
unswerving and total withdrawal of U.S.
forces to be completed not later than the end
of 1971; and (b) thus to circumstances that
could bring about a serious negotiation based
on our declared intention to depart.
This kind of negotiation would not be un-
conditional. We would require the return of
our prisoners and the safe withdrawal of all
our forces; we would seek at the same time
to provide, with Russian and other outside
assistance, for the restoration of neutrality
at least in Cambodia and Laos, and hopefully
in Vietnam as well. This approach is fully
consistent with plans put forward at differ-
ent times by Averell Harriman and Clark
Clifford.
It must be faced, however, that the Nixon
decision to strike Cambodia has moved us
further away from the chances of political
settlement. For that act has surely deepened
Hanoi's suspicion that WO do not intend to
leave while it has reinforced Saigon's natural
resistance to compromise. In addition, of
course, it has put into our laps the problem
of working out the political future of yet
another country.
GIANTS IN QTMCKSAND
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E 5908 Approved Fo
AL REL:01110 ?Extensions of Remarks June 24, 1970
country would regain its global poise. Our
influence and power would not evaporate.
We iTtrould, not be rendered incapable of de-
fining and defending our legitimate interests.
On the contrary, our ability to reassure our
NATO and Japan treaty partners, arid our
capacity to exert a steadying influence on the
smoldering situation in the Midate East,
could only be enhanced. Our industrial,
technical and cultural achievements would
continue to astound and attract the world.
At home, we desperately need a breathing
space in which to redefine our vital interests,
our military strategy, our basic relationships
with the rest of the World. We are still oper-
ating essentially within the frame of a for-
eign policy worked out in the late 1940s.
The main tenets of that policy were strong
and valid for their time, but they are now
badly in need of revision; among other
things, they fail to reflect the fragmentation
of the "Communist bloc," the recovery of
Europe and the deep divisions in our own
Society that call for drastic realignment of
national priorities. We cannot gala the
breathing space, we cannot reconcile the
younger generation, we cannot conduct a
reasoned self-appraisal until the Indochina
enterprise is liquidated.
It is important that the American people
Understand what is going on so that they
Cats effectively assert their right to a policy
tonsietent with their interests.
SUPPORT FOR ACTION 3N
CAMBODIA
HON. STROM THURMOND
OT Bonen CAROLINA
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
Wednesday, June 24, 1970
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, it is
inspiring to receive letters from our com-
bat men in Cambodia who fully agreed
with President Nixon's decision to attack
the privileged sanctuaries in Cambodia.
One of the most impressive letters 1 have
received was from 1st Lt. William J.
Price, First Cavalry Division, whose
home Is in Spartanburg, S.C. Lieutenant
Price also sent me a copy of his let-
ter supporting the President which he
wrote to the editor of the Spartanburg
Herald-Journal.
Price's letters presented clear, logical,
and practical evidence of why President
Nixon's decision was the right decision.
The success of the operation, as experi-
enced by Lieutenant Price and many
others, shows beyond any doubt that
President Nixon's bold action was a
master stroke of tactical surprise at the
right time, at the right place, and under
the right circumstances. Lieutenant
Price states that?
One reason that the American morale is so
high is that we are finally being able to take
the offensive instead of the passive role we
have been taking in which our hands were
tied.
Mr. President, I commend Lieutenant
Price for his loyalty, dedication, patrio-
tism, and wisdom. It would behoove all
Americans to support our fighting men
and our President in order to hasten an
honorable and just end to the war.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that Lieutenant Price's letter to me
and his letter to the editor of the Spar-
tanburg Herald-Journal be printed in the
Extensions of Remarks.
There being no objection, the letters
were ordered to be printed In the RECORD,
as follows:
FIRST CAVALRY DivisiOsr (AM),
May 12, 1970.
Senator STROM Tienemown,
COlumbia,
DEAR Sre: I am writing to let you know that
I'm glad you are supporting President Nix-
on's move of U.S. troops hitt? Cambodia. I
feel that he made the right decision and I
admire him of his convictions. I sent the en-
closed letter to the Editor of the Spartan-
burg Herald-Journal today and I thought you
might be interested in reading it.
My Father is Dr. George W. Price of Spar-
tanburg, S.C. and if you will recall, we played
tennis with you at the Spartanburg Country
Club tennis courts about two years ago. I cer-
tainly enjoyed meeting you and playing ten-
nis that afternoon. I wrote Governor McNair
on 3 Feb. 70 concerning servicemen in Viet-
nam paying state income tax and I also
asked him for a South Carolina state flag to
display over here but I have never heard from
him. If it is not too much trouble, I would
surely appreciate a state flag for it would
mean a lot to me over here. I did learn about
the income tax from my Father.
I am looking forward to leaving Vietnam
and the Army this September. That will be a
a happy day returning to my wife and fam-
ily in Spartanburg. I certainly have been
proud of what you have been doing in the
Senate and I'm glad I will be home in Novem-
ber to vote. My wife and I voted absentee for
Nixon when I was stationed at Fort Sam
Houston, Texas in November 1968.
I hope you and your wife are fine. Shanks
so much for your time.
Sincerely,
First Lt. WILLIAM J. PRICE.
QUAN LOI, RVN,
May 12, 1970.
EDITOR,
The Spartanburg Herald-Journal.
DEAR SIR: I have been a resident of Spar- -
tanburg for the pest 23 years and graduated
from Wofford College in 1968. Since Septem-
ber 1969, I have been serving with the 1st
Cavalry Division (Ahmobile) in the Republic
of Vietnam.
I have been concerned with the reaction
of the American public and especially the
college and university students who have
been rioting since American troops entered
Cambodia the first of May. I had mixed emo-
tions at first concerning our American troops
entering Cambodia for I didn't want this
war escalated but I know that President
Nixon made the right decision now. I admire
him for making that decision as it may cost
his a second term in office but I hope not.
My battalion, the 2/5 Ca,v, built the first
American fire support base inside Cambodia
and I was with the battalion when we made
this move. It was quite an experience and
most of the troops had mixed emotions at
first but now their morale has never been
higher for the troops out in the field. We are
finding large caches of supplies to include
weapons, ammunition, rice, and numerous
other things needed by the NVA to continue
this war. By entering Cambodia and finding
all of these supplies, many American lives
will be saved and it will also give the South
Vietnamese Army a longer time to build up
their army. It will also be quite awhile before
the NVA can build up their supplies again to
mount a strong offensive.
One reason that the American morale is
so high is that we are finally being able to
take the offensive instead of the passive role
we have been taking in which our hands
were tied. The men feel that they are finally
accomplishing something and that they are
really hitting the enemy where it hurts and
possibly this war can come to an end soon.
The GI's over here would like nothing better
than to end this war and go home so other
Americans won't have to come over here,
I can't understand why there Is so much
violence and trouble on the campuses of
America. I doubt that many of the protesters
have been over here and I don't think they
really know what it is like here. I didn't ask
to come over here and I don't enjoy being
away from my wife and family for a year, but
since we are so deeply involved in Vietnam
I feel that the American public should sup-
port our troops over here for this isn't an
impersonal war. This war is affecting the lives
of families in every city in the United States.
Being in Vietnam for a year is no fun but.
one does learn to appreciate all the things
we have in America that everyone takes for
granted. I feel that I will be a better Ameri-
can after being over here for I will appreciate
all the freedoms ami conveniences that I
took for granted before I came over here
America would be a better place if everyone
woke up and tried to work together instead
of fighting among themselves and if they
didn't take everything for granted.
All we ask is for your support so this con-
flict in Vietnam can come to an end so the
American troops can come home. Our inter-
vention into Cambodia is really paying off
for we are really hurting the enemy and this
should help speed up the end of the war.
Everyone over here surely prays and hopes so.
If the college students want to protest the
war in Vietnam, they should have protested
the way it was being fought before we entered
Cambodia for now we are winning and fight-
ing the war in a way that is really hurting
the enemy and his supplies, not just waiting
for him to attack us like we were doing
before. President Nixon and the American
troops in Vietnam need your support so this
war can come to an end.
First Lt. WILLIAM 'JAMES PR/CE,
First Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Re-
public of Vietnam.
BROADCAST NEWS AND THE
GOVERNMENT
HON. F. EDWARD HEBERT
OF LOUISIANA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, June 24, 1970
Mr. HEBERT, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Al-
bert Allen, editor and publisher of Tele-
vision Digest, spoke before the National
Institute for Religious Communications
at Loyola University in New Orleans on
June 15, 1970.
Because his topic is a matter of dis-
cussion today, I was requested to in-
clude his speech in the CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD.
Mr. Warren is an experienced jour-
nalist who has been with Television
Digest since 1945 and its editor since
1961. During his years in Washington
journalism circles, he has covered the
Federal Communications Commission,
Congress, courts, trade associations, and
others.
I insert his speech in the RECORD at
this point:
BROADCAST NEWS AND THE GOVERNMENT
(Remarks by Albert Warren)
It has been ray privilege and good luck to
serve as a reporter in Washington for the
last 25 years. In addition, I've been writing
In a print medium, addressing readers who
manage the electronic media, while covering
the government officials who regulate these
media.
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June 23, 1970 - CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 9571
national body, a composite of many regional
agencies, or all of them?is so overwhelm-
ing that an immediate, urgent and concerted
action by all countries seems imperative.
THE V ? LAR?NO END IN
SIGHT
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President 3 years
ago this month the Saigon correspondent
of the Washington Post, Mr. Ward Just,
wrote a final dispatch before leaving
South Vietnam after 18 months of re-
porting. In good Journalistic fashion, Mr.
Just began his last report?on June 4,
1967?by coming directly to the point.
He wrote:
This war is not being won, and by any rea-
sonable estimate, it is not going to be won
in the foreseeable futnre. It may be unwin-
nable. Frustrated at the resiliency and re-
sources of the enemy, the administration
revises its rules of engagement and widens
the war. South Vietnam, unattainable at
best, threatens to become unmoored
altogether.
Now, 3 years later, what has really
changed, Mr. President? We are still, as
Mr. Just wrote, "chasing straws in the
wind." Recent articles by Washington
Post correspondents Robert kaiser and
Laurence Stern provide the latest docu-
mentation that this war is "recycling it-
self?returning full circle to a low-level,
guerrilla-type war, based upon attrition
and the political isolation of rural areas
by the Vietcong.
Today, after years of war, we are re-
turning to the point where we came in
and we call it progress?although po-
litical "pacification" remains as illtisive
as it has always been. Mr. Stern writes:
The unglamorous war in Vietnam is still
Waiting to be fought; while it has not been
lost by any means, it is still?as ever?far
from won,
Mr. President on how many tomb-
stones must that epitaph appear?"yet
to be won"--before we change our pri-
orities and take negotiations seriously?
I ask unanimous consent that the re-
cent articles written by Messrs. Kaiser
and Stern and published in the Wash-
ington Post be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the articles
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Washington Post, May 31, 19701
THE VIEW FROM SAIGON: No END IN SIGHT
(By Robert G. Kaiser)
"0 mouse, do you know the way out of this
pool? I am very tired of swimming about
here, 0 mouser?Alice in Wonderland.
Ssisois.?If the mouse knows, he isn't say-
ing. After a month of foraging in Communist
sanctuaries in Cambodia, after a year of Viet-
namization and 16 months after Richard
Nixon took office promising to end the war,
the United States is still swimming about in
Indochina. The end may be in sight in presi-
dential speeches, but it isn't in sight from
here.
The Cambodian adventure has reopened
the breach between the image of the war one
gets by looking at it in Vietnam, and the
image conveyed by the speeches of high offi-
cials in Waahington. While President Nixon
and Secretary of Defense Laird imply that
the Cambodian incursions will accelerate the
American withdrawal and ensure the success
of Vietnamization, the men meet directly
responsible for conducting the war in Viet-
nam refuse adamantly to make any such
predictions.
Many American officials here are still shak-
ing their heads at the terms of President
Nixon's April 80 speech announcing the
Cambodian offensive. "A move that was taken
for small tactical reasons got swept up in the
big strategic picture," as one senior official
put it in a somewhat helpless tone of voice.
To an outsider with no claim to expertise
beyond 14 months experience chasing his
sense of curiosity around Vietnam and Cam-
bodia, the qualms of these officials seem thor-
oughly justified. Neither the situation be-
fore April 30 nor the situation since then
much resembles the descriptions coming
from Washington.
From here, the fall of Prince Norodom Si-
hanouk in Cambodia seems to have changed
the Indochina situation radically. Though
SpOkesmen for the administration aren't
saying so, the United States' ability to con-
trol events on this peninsula?which has
never been great--seems less now than ever
before.
On April 30, the President said attacks
against the sanctuaries were necessary "to
guarantee the continued success of our with-
drawal and Vietnamization programs." He
added that the enemy is "concentrating his
main forces in these sanctuaries . . . where
they are building up to launch massive at-
tacks on our forces and those of South
Vietnam."
As it has turned out, that concentration of
enemy troops in the sanctuaries did not exist.
Thus U.S. and South Vietnamese troops met
almost no opposition when they entered them
early this month.
- This is one of those small errors of fact
that have recurred throughout the war in
Vietnam, disturbing but not crucial. Much
more important was the President's basic
contention that the sanctuaries had to be
attacked to allow withdrawal and Vietnam-
ization to continue successfully.
On that question, like all the big ques-
tions in the history of the Vietnam war, there
can be no certain answer. There is only one
way to try to predict events in Vietnam: One
assembles a portion of the information avail-
able (there is too much ever to consider it
all) , judges it on the basis of experience and
intuition and ends up with a guess, more or
less educated. For most who have tried it, this
system has proven woefully imperfect. But it
is all that exists, so we continue to use it.
A NEW DEPARTURE
President Nixon's prognostication came as
a surprise in Vietnam. What he said, in ef-
fect, was that all the boasts about Vietnami-
zation in the past were hollow: the program
couldn't work because of the enemy's sanc-
uaries in Cambodia. Those sanctuaries ex-
isted before Sihanouk was deposed March 18.
Nothing that happened after March 18 made
them any more dangerous, according to Mr.
Nixon's own commanders in Vietnam.
It is difficult to begrudge Mr. Nixon his
siecisiost to change his mind about the al-
legedly rosy future of Vietnamizatiori. The
theory that a relatively constant number of
Vietnamese soldiers could grow in stature?
but not in numbers?to replace half a mil-
lion Americans has always been question-
able Many of the President's critics had
accused him of dreaming on this score, or
of deliberately misleading the public.
And yet in Vietnam, Vietnamization has
looked like a reasonable bet?not a sure
thing, not even a clear favorite, but by Viet-
namese standards, a wager with a fair chance
of success.
To be sure, it was a risky idea, not least
because the North Vietnamese did have large
forces in the Cambodia sanctuaries. But one
could travel all around this country asking
Americans and Vietnamese and outsiders,
too, if they thought it would work, and the
answer has been a conditional but wide-
spread "yes" for many months.
The question had to be posed carefully:
Could the United States withdraw its forces
without the last men having to shoot theis
way to their airplanes? Could the South
Vietnamese army and government hold up
the tent until the Americans got out from
under it? As the geopoliticians sometimes
put it, could the Americans withdraw and
leave behind a decent interval before fate
took its course in South Vietnam?
The question had to be put in those terms
because any broader assertion could not be
justified. The long-term future of South"
Vietnam depends on so many variables, so
few of them dependent on the outcome of
the current shooting war, that any grander
prediction would be foolhardy. Americans
and Vietnamese here tend to agree about
that.
When you asked those who answered a
cautious "yes" if they could think of another
way to get the United States out of Viet-
nam in an orderly fashion, you heard two
answers. The first, and much the more pop-
ular, was "no"; the other was that America
might negotiate a settlement with the North
Vietnamese that would allow a complete
and quick withdrawal.
This idea, so popular among war critics
in Washington, is not very popular here.
Among Vietnamese and Americans in Viet-
nam, there is widespread doubt that the
North Vietnamese will negotiate a settlement
unless they can be sure it is to their advan-
tage. From here, where the Communists ap-
pear to be weak on the ground, negotiation
does not look like an appealing alternative
for Hanoi. A negotiated settlement that ac-
curately reflected the current balance of pow-
er in South Vietnam would, in effect, force
Hanoi to give up most of its stated objec-
tives And it is hard to imagine the South
Vietnamese or the United States agreeing to
a settlement that did not accurately reflect
the current balance of power.
BASIS FOR OPTIMISM
The limited optimism that has existed here
was due to a few apparent facts about the
state of the war that have gained wide ac-
ceptance in the last year OT so. Briefly stated,
these are the principal ones:
The government has established a domi-
nant physical presence in all of the urban
areas and in most of the countryside, includ-
ing the crucial Mekong Delta, the area
around Saigon and heavily populated coastal
regions in the north. U.S., ARVN and local
militia forces have obliterated most of the
old Vietcong army, pushing its remnants out
of the populated areas. The Communists now
must rely on North Vietnamese to do most
of their fighting.
Most of the remaining enemy force units,
primarily northern, have been forced to stay
close to their sanctuaries.
Without its local military forces, the Viet-
cong's political organization has been weak-
ened, at least ostensibly. People in the coun-
tryside are therefore less conscious of the
Vietcong's presence while more active gov-
ernment programs have made them more
conscious of the Saigon regime.
Apparent rural prosperity has also helped
the goverrunent Economists say the prosper-
ity is false, based entirely on props provided
by American dollars, but it is real to the
farmer who can buy a radio, a motorbike or a
tractor.
And President Thieu, with the army, has
established an unprecedented degree of po-
litical stability in wartime Vietnam. The
chaos of the 1963-6 period has been super-
seded by a remarkable calm, relatively
speaking.
If those generally optimistic assertions
were widely accepted here, so were a number
of doubts and questions that put any opti-
mistic conclusions in jeopardy. The funda-
mental reservation Must be that none ,ef
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S 9572 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE June 23, 1970
these factors can be counted on in the lcng
term. The Vietoang have demonstrated an
ability to revive their organization, and all
the Saigon government's apparent strengths
seem to be based on slender reeds. All could
be reversed in one Way or another.
The future of Vietnamization has long
seemed to depend on the answers to these
questions: Could the lamentable ARVN offi-
cer corps become effective? Could the local
militia, now extremely erratic, assure local
security without U.S. and ARVN assistance?
Could the army survive without the Amer-
Lean props that now support them at every
level?
Could official Corruption in Vietnam be
controlled or regularized? Could the woefully
weak civil administration be improved?
Could economic collapse and chaos in South
Vietnam be avoided? Could the non-Corn-
mullets ever compete with the political or-
ganizing skill of the Vietcong? And finally,
could South Vietnam ever cope with enemy
forces in the northern half of the country,
where the Communists have much more
secure sanetuaries and a much better tacti eel
position than in the south?
These were the long-term problems. De-
spite them, it seemed possible that over a
short term of, say, five years, the South Viet-
namese might be able to hold their own--
not because of their strengths so much as
because of the Ccaninuniets' grave, if
temporary weaknesses.
The offensive into Cambodia seems un-
likely to help provide any satisfactory answer
to the questions about the long-term pros-
pects for Vietnaraization. But by further
weakening the Communists' tactical position,
the new offensive should make the situation
on the ground in South Vietnam even more
hopeful.
In sum, if the Nixon's administration was
pursuing a short-term strategy of getting
out of Vietnam as quickly as possible without
the tent collapsing in the process, the Cam-
bodian operation might have been very help-
ful. Might have been, had others remained
equal. But of course they have not. For rea-
sons over which the Nixon administration
had only slight control, the entire Indochina
situation' changed dramatically during the
past several months.
TEM HOPES FAIMD
Before this change, the United States bad
what seemed a fair chance of escaping more
or lest honorably from Indochina if it could
cope with the situation in South Vietnam.
The war in Laos seemed stalemated, albeit
precariously. Cambodia's neutrality under
Sihanouk, though benevolent to the Viet-
namese Communists, seemed to assure stabil-
ity in that country for the foreseeable future
(In this part of the world, no more than a
few years). So In thase good old days, the
United States just might have escaped trona
the region, leaving Indochina intact, at least
for a reasonable period of nine.
The good old days are gone. The situation
in Laos looks more precarious than ever. The
Communists are in a stronger position, es-
pecially after their recent offensive 111 south-
ern Laos. Souvanna Phouinat neutralist gov-
ernment faces a gloomy future.
More important, the pretense of Cam-
bodian stability is gene. Cambodia has be-
come an active battlefield of the war, a third
1 ront for the North Vietnamese. In the first
days after the March 18 coup, there might
have been a chance for Lou Nol to negotiate
a modus vivendi with the North Vietnamese.
But instead, he threw down the gauntlet, and
the North Vietnamese responded in kind.
The new government in Cambodia is weak,
uncertain and apparently ineffectual. The
same adjectives wiatild flatter the Cambodian
army. The Cambodian economy is in sham-
bles, and will almost certainly get very much
worse. The rubber industry, which provides
almost all of Cambodia's exports, has already
been severely disrupted by the new war.
U.S. intelligence now expects the Lon Nol
regime to be challenged by a Cambodian lib-
eration movement, led at least in name by
Prince Sihanouk, whose personal popularity
is said to remain high in the Cambodian
countryside. The new regime's ability to cope
with this challenge is, at the very beat, prob-
lematical. If any prediction in Indochina is
justifiable, title that Cambodia will be in tar-
ml (or in Communist hands) for a long time
to come.
Despite these baleful prospects, the United
States seems to be tied to the new Cambodian
regime almost willy-nilly. President Nixon
said it was necessary to attack the Cam-
bodian sanctuaries to assure the success of
U.S. policy in Vietnam. If Sihanouk returns
to power, all of Cambodia will probably be-
come a sanctuary for the Communists. Must
the whole country then be invaded?
Moreover, regardless of presidential rhet-
or e, it seems impossible not to interpret the
offensive into Cambodia as a signal to Hanoi
that the United States would not allow Cam-
bodia to fall. Such a signal must have seemed
unavoidable in Washington, if 50,000 dead in
Vietnam were not to be written off as a bad
go.
If one defends the Vietnam war for its
stated purpose?to assure self-determination
in South Vietnam?or for its cold war pur-
pose?to stop the advance of communism
in Asia?the reaction to events in Cambodia
must be the same: Cambodia must be saved.
But in the long run, barring a re-creation of
the American presence in Vietnam, there
appears to be no way Americans can prevent
Communists (or pro-Communists under Si-
hanouk) from taking over Cambodia.
As a result of the coup against Sihanouk
and events since, Indochina is now a mael-
strom of conflicting vital interests: The
North and South Vietnamese, the Laotians,
the Cambodians and now even the Thais all
see their vital interests in jeopardy.
President Nixon apparently sees America's
vital interests at stake here too. But these
vital interests are not compatible?in sev-
eral combinations, they are mutually
exclusive.
And there is no foreseeable way that the
maelstrom can be calmed, unless North Viet-
nam abandons its Indochina campaign.
That, of course, has always been the dream
of American officials, in both the Johnson
and Nixon administrations. Someday, the
United States always believed or hoped, the
men in Hanoi would have to cry uncle. One
can hear that talk again: They've overex-
tended themselves, according to the new
version of the old line; they can't fight on
three fronts in the rainy season atter losing
their supplies, with hostile forces on all
sides.
Perhaps this time it is true, but the small
bits of evidence available suggest the con-
trary. Skeptical Westerners very recently in
Hanoi were impressed by the apparent high
morale and resiliency of the leadership. Ac-
cording to one of these recent travelers, the
morale of the masses has apparently risen
lately, because the government has cut prices
and ended: rationing of many consumer
goods.
LONG FIG ter AHEAD
In the field, the Communists show every
sign of having the patience to carry on the
war. In Cambodia, according to 11.8. intelli-
gence and captured documents, they are be-
ginning the long difficult task of building
an fiedigenous revolutionary movement from
the hamlets up.
Surely the North Vietnamese have grave
supply problems, but they have already se-
cured a new infiltration route via the Se-
kong and Mekong rivers into southeast
Cambodia, which conceivably could be ex-
tended to their forces in southern South
Vietnam.
And if it is true, as Presidents Johnson
and Nixon have both said, that North Viet-
IIRM is counting on the American opponents
of the war to win their victories, then the
men in Hanoi must now be dancing the
North Vietnamese version of a jig. Perhaps
something resembling the gloomy picture,
that now seems- to face the United States
was inevitable even before Sihanouk's fall,
Some old Indochina hands have long criti-
cized American policy as shortsighted and
self-deluding, because it *tilled to face up to
the entire Indochina problem.
The United States, hes devoted its atten-
tion to South Vietnam, these critics have
said, hoping that the Communists would do
the same, thus localizing the problem. The
criticism is harsh but cleric:nit to dispute, if
one assumes the United States has had long-
term objectives in this region. Almost cer-
tainly there would have been serious insta-
bility in Indochina's future even if Vietnam-
ization in the old context had been a smash-
ing success.
Even in the new context, Vietnamization
seems certain to continue In Vietnam it is
assumed that the end of the Cambodian
operation on June 30 will be quickly followed
by a substantial further withdrawal of 17.S.
troops. These withdrawals should be possible
without serious repercussions in South Viet-
nam. Three months ago, that alone would
have been very good news. It is still, on bal-
ance, good news; but now one must wonder
if the orderly withdrawal of Americans from
South Vietnam will be seen, a year or two
from now, as a very significant achievement,
From the Washington Post, June 19, 19701
REDS MOUNT GUERRILLA DRIVE:,
DISRUPTING PACIFICATION
(By Laurence Stern)
DANANG, SOUTH VIETNAM, June 18.?While
Cambodia has preempted the world headlines.
the Communists in South Vietnam have
mounted a fierce and determined guerrilla-
style military campaign_
The reversion to guerrilla war tactics by
the North Vietnamese and Vietcong cadres,
has been foreshadowed for nearly a year in
Communist military proclamations and di-
rectives, starting with a much-publicized
Vietcong resolution (COSVN nine).
American and Vietnamese military com-
manders call the new strategy a policy of
"desperation" that is being waged by an
adversary who knows he is "'losing."
Whatever the motive, the current Com-
munist offensive has sent pacification scores--
the elaborate accounting system used here
for measuring government security?tumb-
ling in numerous South Vietnamese pro-
vinces since the onset of spring.
It has also exposed gaping weaknesses in
the ability of South Vietnamese territorial
forces to defend civilian populations in the
So-called pacified areas from. Communist
attack.
In II corps, the central highland region
which contains half of South Vietnam's land
mass, the number of 'D" and "E" hamlets
(lowest on the pacification scoreboard) has
doubled from 10 to 20 per cent since Febru-
ary. American military observers expect the
trend to continue, partially in response to
the Cambodians operations.
Northward in I corps. 'which extends from
the highlands to the Demilitarized Zone,
small Communist unite, have attacked gov-
ernment-controlled villages, government
military dependents quarters and American
firebases with growing boldness and intensity
in recent months.
SCENT ATTAMS
During a four-day tour of the central and
northern provinces I visited the dependents
quarters of Vietnamese ranger units at
Pleiku where- 31 had been killed and 83
wounded--nearly all the vi Ives and children
of rangers?in three successive Communist
attacks. The lain was on June 3.
This narrow neck of South Vietnam lying
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June 23 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE
just below the DMZ has been the scene of
the fiercest fighting in both Indochina wars,
the French and the American.
In both I and n corps there is every evi-
dence that the Communists?following a
meticulously formulated game plan?have
broken down many elements of their main
forces into small assault units whose mission
is to strike at American military targets as
well as civilian population centers (the Com-
munists still call them "strategic hamlets")
then fade back into the forests and jungle.
The objective is not to hold territory
against the massive retaliatory firepower of
the' Americans and South Vietnamese so
much as to demonstrate the ability of the
Communist guerrillas to strike at will and to
terrorize civilian populations living within
the military occupation zones of the Amer-
icans and the Saigon government.
To the unknowing the word "pacification"
may be misleading since there are few areas
in Vietnam, no matter how pacified, with-
out guns, sandbags and soldiers.
The Communist strategy is based on pa-
tience and attrition, the two staple elements
of revolutionary war as it has been practiced
in Vietnam over the past two decades. Now,
in a climate of American withdrawal, such
tactics could have all the more telling effect
on the allegiance of Vietnamese villagers and
peasants?especially in this hardcore region
called the cradle of the Vietminh movement.
Some South Vietnamese commanders, who
will inherit greater and greater responsibility
as the Americans leave, are frank to voice
their anxieties.
The victims can take little comfort in the
statistics recited with utter conviction by
American officials here, showing that I Corps
regional and popular forces have outper-
formed all the rest in South Vietnam.
Small Communist units have also waged
Intense attacks at the string of special forces
camps manned by Vietnamese civilian irreg-
ular defense groups, who operations are
masked in heavy security. The camps, 12 to
15 run along the Laotian border from the tri-
border area with Cambodia at Kontum to
Quangduc.
NOT WON OR LOST
All this is not to say that the war is being
lost in the two northern corps which have
always borne the brunt of the bitterest fight-
ing in South Vietnam. It does mean, how-
ever, that despite all the widely heralded suc-
cesses of "pacification," the Communists are
still able to wage what the late Bernard Fall
called "revolutionary war" across a wide
expanse of South Vietnamese terrain.
It means that despite the extra terri-
torial allure of battle in neighboring Cam-
bodia, the unglamourous war in Vietnam is
still waiting to be fought. While it has not
been lost by any means, it is still?as ever?
far from won. The Communist objective, at
the moment, is to keep things that way, or
so It appears.
TANXEE comn RAM
"Is there anything I can do for your an
American general recently asked the Viet-
namese chief of an important province in
II corps. "Yes," the Vietnamese official re-
plied. "Please bring back the Fourth (U.S.
infantry) Division."
Since the American unit had left, security
in the province, Pleiku, had dropped sharply.
Several lereeIrs ago, Communist sappers staged
a daring ground offensive into the provincial
capital of Pleiku, coming within 200 yards
of the headquarters in which the American
pacification staff was housed.
"Pacification," sighed an American official
in that headquarters, "is like a balloon."
The upsurge in small force, hit-and-run
Communist attacks is a reflection, only in
part, of the spring-fall offensive Pattern that.
governs the cycles of the war. American mil-
itary observers familiar with that pattern.
are almost unanimous in their judgment
that soniething new is afoot.
The successes of the new tactics in the
central Highlands have already cast the
chiefs Of two important provinces?Tuyen-
due and ,Phuyen?their jobs.
The chief of Tuyenduc doubled as mayor
of Dalat, the resort city that Is absentee-
owned by Saigon's elite. It was effortlessly
invaded last month by a smell Vietcong
fierce which escaped unscathed. "They let
the little bastards get out," fumed one Amer-
ican adviser, "and I want to find out why.''
CAMPAIGN SUCCESS
. In Phuyen, the Communists had been
highly successful in a campaign of kid-
napings and assassination directed mainly
at village and district officials. In February,
the number of abductions reached 300.
The most spectacular act of terrorism in I
Corps recently was the strike by North Viet-
HOMEBUILDING IN THE SEVENTIES:
PREDICTIONS BY MR. J. WILLIAM
I3ROSIUS
Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, an in-
creasingly important segment of the
American housing industry is the vaca-
tion home and second-home market. Al-
though this market is still relatively
small, it is growing rapidly, in spite of
S 9573
double in number in the next decade?a
recent survey shows 1.'1 million Americans
own second homes, accounting for three per
cent of the total 59 million homes in this
country.
In the Seventies, second homes could easily
number one-fifth of the 200,000 to 250,000
new homes expected to be constructed each
year.
These new second homes will reflect a
strong interest in design and function ac-
cording to a family's activities. They will be
built in areas focusing on such recreation
facilities as lakes, the ocean, or forests.
Environmental design will be of paramount
importance. There will be a renewed aware-
ness of the natural setting of the home, and
definite attempts to fit the home to the
landscape, rather than to level trees and
terrain to accommodate the house.
Recognizing this, better builders will take
added pains to minimize any effects their
communities might have on the ecological
balance. Some builders are already consult-
ing with ecologists and water, beach and
forestry experts before designing their
communities.
Based on past performance, the Washing-
ton region should be in for the biggest share
of the second home building boom. The num-
ber of vacation homes built in the Northeast
has doubled since 1950, and now represents
38 per cent of vacation homes in the country.
(The North Central area accounts for an-
other 30 per cent, the South for 17 per cent
and the West, Hawaii and Alaska share the
remaining 15 per cent.)
Cottages account for three-fifths of these,
houses for one-third and cabins for the
remainder.
Last year alone, 150,000 vacation homes
were built. By contrast, 55,000 were built in
the early and mid-Sixties; 20,000 during the,,
Forties. We're closing out 1969 with spendS
lag for second homes up 67 per cent over
the tragic national shortage of basic 1965.
family housing today. It may not be vain In that same time period, vacation land
to hope that within a generation, the and lots spending came up 86 per cent. In-
second home may be the kind of goal for dustry experts anticipate a record $1.5 mil-
American families that the second car is lion second home market for this past year.
today. The character of the market buyers has
Recently the prospects for vacation changed. too. No longer are upper and upper
homes and second homes in this decade
middle level income families the only ones
buying: a number of people with incomes
were surveyed by Mr. J. William Brosius, ranging between $10,000 and $18,000 per year
president of the Linganor Corp. Mr. Bro- are buying. And more people are shopping.
sius is well qualified to review this in- A University of Michigan survey earlier this
dustry's future, for he is a director of year found that one of 10 U.S. families are
the National Association of Home Build- saving for a second home, and that 50 per
ers and past chairman of the Associa- cent of all American families want a vaca-
tion's Institute of Environmental Design. tioTnhhe ageome. level of second home owners is
Currently he is developing the Lake dropping, too, and will continue to lower
Linganor at Eaglehead Community, a in the Seventies. By the end of the Sixties,
recreational project encompassing about eight per cent of all second home owners
3,200 acres of woodland in Frederick were under 35, some 71 per cent were 35-64
County, Md. years of age, and 21 per cent were 65 or
Mr. Brosius' report is interesting and older. These figures should gradually change
informative on a little noticed but rapidly over the next decade, with the under 35's
expanding aspect of the construction in- forging way ahead in the percentage.
As the age level falls, there is less resist-
dUStrY. I ask unanimous consent that ance to longer drives between the first and
it be printed in the RECORD. second homes. Three-fifths of all vacation
There being no objection, the report homes today are within 100 miles of the pri-
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, mary home. A full 80 per cent are within
as follows: 200 miles.
Increased air transportation service, new
HOMESTJILDING /N THE SEVENTIES roads, and even the shorter work week will
(By 3. William Brosius) help to push the range even farther from
(The Linganore Corporation is currently the metropolitan areas.
Another new phase ol the second home
market that is just beginning to blossom is
rental programs. A number of recreational
area developers and vacation home builders
offer the prospective buyer rental service,
enabling him to rent during periods he isn't
using the house.
In New England, for instance, a person
buying a home for summer sports can rent
from December to April for winter sports
and bring in from $1,500 to $2,000 in rent.
naniese Sapper Battalion 89 against the developing Lake Linganore at Eaglehead, a
village of Phuthanh south of Danang. The 3,200 acre recreational community near Fred-
Sappers killed about 100 civilians and crick. Mr. Brosius is a director of the Na-
wounded about 170. tional Association of Home Builders and past
Not a single member of the local tern- chairman of its Institute of Environmental
tonal force impeded the invading force. Design.)
Today's Quangnarn provincial hospital In The one to watch in home building in the
Danang is still crammed with the burned and Seventies is the vacation and second home
disfigured survivors of the attack aimed w11,h market.
deadly precision at the families of the re- Secondary homes within a one or two hour
gionaI and popular force members. drive from the primary home could easily
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S 9574 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
An estimated one-half of all second homes
today are used only 30 to 90 days a year.
When a second home is available for rent
most of the year it qualifies fcr income tax
deduction of business expenses (repairs,
maintenance, management; fees and depre-
ciation) '
Variations abound, of course. Some de-
velopere are finding vacation condominiums
an excellent sales packet. Average sales cur-
rently run from $15,000 to $50,000, taking in
one room studios to four bedroom villas.
Renting is especially attractive to con-
dominium owners. Rates can go as high as
$5,000 or $6,000 per year, giving rise to excel-
lent investment opportunities.
The only cloud threatening on the horizon
is mortgage rates. But even here the picture
in the Washington area is somewhat encour-
aging. Locally, buyers of second homes
and/or vacation land average down pay-
ments of $8,000 for a $30,000 purchase with
a 10-year payment period. Nationally, the
average downpayment is only 25 per cent.
A SON'S AND A FATHER'S LETTERS
ON THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, a fel-
low Member of Congress recently showed
me an astonishing letter he had received
from his son, a 23-year-old officer in the
Marine Corps. Though the young man
had volunteered for military service and
has asked to be assigned to duty in Viet-
nam, he warns eloquently and chillingly
of the terrible things he believes the In-
dochina war is doing to our country.
His letter, along with his father's reply,
dramatically point up the conflicting
emotions this war has aroused in the
so-called younger and older generations.
The young, who are troubled by a sense
of duty as well as a social conscience, are
beginning to despair that the answers to
today's problems can be found within the
present system; the old, who have a trou-
bled conscience as well as a long-stand-
ing sense of duty, are still confident '.hat
the answers can be found within the
democratic process.
But we who believe in democracy have
a lot of work to do and little time left
:in which to do it if we are going to save
democracy. The first, indispensable step
is to stop this awful war that sends our
boys to die in defense of dictatorships
abroad while freedom and diversity are
threatened at home and our country is
being torn apart.
Mr. President, acting with the per-
mission of my fellow Member of Con-
gress and respecting his request for
anonymity, I ask unanimous consent
that the young Marine's letter and his
father's reply be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the letters
were ordered to be printed in the REC-
ORD, as follows:
DEAR DAD: It may seem trite to speak out
on what's happening here in the USA and
what. I say Won't be new to you, I'm not
trying to be original, just sincere.
Being in the Marines, I feel I have a
strange perspective on the confusion here
In the country, I'm going to have to risk
my life in Southeast Asia within the next
year . . Risking my life in a war that
hasn't been declared. Can't be nought and
Can't be won. What's more, a war that is
contrary to everything I've been taught to
believe about America. Sure, I'm not unique.
Thousands have already gone with their
minds doubting the purpose of it all. More
than 50,000 have died. It's not that I'm
reluctant to go. I'm actually intrigued by the
thought of having tO do something exciting
and dangerous. The problem is that in the
past year I've come to the realization that
our country has fallen so very short of its
ideals?not necessarily through unfortunate,
naive blundering, but because of a conscious
effort by a largo number of stubborn, un-
compromising traditionalists who fear any
interference with their project mission for
the United States. These xenophobes seek
to maintain a level of suspicion within our
country in order to continue the economic
and political status quo not only here but
abroad. You know as well as I the old
theory of "you're with us or you're against"
no longer holds any water in a world of
emerging independent nations who seek no
formal binding ties or allegiances to the
powers that be in either the "Communist"
or "Free World." Yet we continue to po-
litically, economically, and militarily intim-
idate countries who don't toe the line; we
encourage and finance counter-insurgency
programs in countries whose present gov-
ernments are farther away from democracy
than any liberalizations in these nations that
would enhance the local populations at the
expense of American interests,
Well, you say, these observations and criti-
cisms are all fairly true?but what do I
plan to do about it all, what's my solution?
The fact that I can offer no solutions that
would satisfy all concerned interests is not
Important. For the last decade Americans
have been electing men who said they had
the solutions. You were one of those men.
Going through the campaign you and many
others promised to go to Washington and
see that the war was ended in as long as
it would take to get the troops out. President
Nixon pledged to put an end to the insanity
and the war, fight inflation, promote con-
tinued social reform and bring us together.
Promises have been compromised, the war
has been expanded as it was in 1964 and 1968.
the economy has gone to hell, racism has
been ignored, and the Government has made
a strong effort to polarize the country into
two hostile camps with no middle ground.
The people who have seen the enormity of
the problem and have taken to the streets
to protest the duplicity of the Administra-
tion's words and actions have been ignored
by the man in the White House while his
"internal security forces" have been un-
leashed to beat, maim and kill those who
dissent. The people who are demanding the
peace they were promised for 10 years are
being portrayed as traitors in order to alien-
ate them from the "silent majority." Nixon
seems to be employing the same tactic in
the United States as he is continuing
abroad?strengthening the police and se-
curity forces of the Nation rather than di-
verting funds necessary to- alleviate the
causes of the ills that beset us.
The old generation gap concept is no joke
anymore. The Indochina war is a war your
generation started and continued to preserve
your generation's concepts of world order
and America's role. My generation is being
used to fight that war. Old soldiers never die,
just the young ones. A large number of peo-
ple are directing all their energies at resist-
ing the war they regard as unjust and un-
necessary. The Nixon administration labels
them cowards and traitors. It sends out
troops to repress them and even kill them.
There's much talk about the irresponsible
revolutionaries. Well, I don't think you'll
deny that the National Guard and the police
have had much more luck and opportunity
to beat, shoot, and kill. I used to think that
all the talk of revolution was just roman-
tic speculation on the part of my genera-
tion?but no more. I've Watched close
friends discard the banner of peaceful dis-
sent for the bricks of defense and resistance.
Jane ;23, 1970
If the war doesn't eel' soon, I See ZIT)
underground development that would seek
to disrupt the country with arson, sabotage,
and assassination. The development is diffi-
cult to imagine, but just stop to listen to
the words of songs played on current radio
programs. No more singing about peace and
flowers, but about "tearing down the walls"
and killing cops. It's Very much for real.
If it comes to a civil war it would, of course,
be a slaughter, but the movement is being
pushed and radicalized to the point of no.
return. What else can. you expect the youth
to do when the alternatives are to go it
Vietnam and get blown eway or stay here
and get blown away. "Breather" and "sister"
are becoming part of the new language--
I'm sure much like "comrade" was some-
where else another time. I'm 23 and my
brothers and sisters are my future. I am
greatly disturbed by the number of people
who come to me for instruction in street
warfare and similar actions.
Hopefully, people like you, Dad, will pre-
vail and get the U.S.A. beck on the right
track. People like you can save America but
you'd better get busy, because I think the
Administration is rapidly destroying the
relative harmony that the schools teach kids
always existed in the U.S.A. I love you and
Mom very much and hope you can under-
stand what I've tried to say.
Love.
You Sots .
JUNE 11, 1970.
DEAR Son Your well composed letter cer-
tainly organized the current ease against
Congress and the Administration. I recog-
nize that this letter was lot a casual ex-
pression but represented deep conviction.
I assure you that many in the Senate share
your concern and I further assure you that
we are determined to do the many things
that are on the national agenda. The Ad-
ministration is slow to respond. The urgency
just isn't there but today for the first time a
majority of the Senate stuck together for
the cause of peace and rationality, however
obscured it was in the Cooper-Church
amendment fight. If we can but hold this
small edge perhaps we can proceed In a man-
ner that will demonstrate to the dismayed
and discouraged that our elected officials
are responsive and that democracy can and
will work toward solving our many prob-
lems.
As you perhaps know I have been making
Commencement Addresses and have been
straining to bring words of assurance. There
are still many who believe the system is the
best possible arrangement for people to gov-
ern themselves. I would hope that your seri-
ous examination will, further convince you
that this is true. But frustration is not suf-
ficient ground for even thinking of violence.
Our system is the most open and available to
change of any in the world. The safeguards,
the machinery for dissent is there and avail-
able. We have long stressed and admired the
fact that we govern by consent of the gov-
erned. This means by consent of the ma-
jority. Disgruntled minorities always have the
opportunity to become victorious majorities.
Our 'House of Representatives is elected en
into every two years. One third of the Senate
on each biennial election. Congress can as-
sume and exercise its policymaking function.
Its members can and perhaps should be
changed; just remember that the opportu-
nity is there and available. But if the dis-
gruntled take to the barricades and aban-
don their legal aind constitutional role they
will assure the election of those they feel
unresponsive and perhaps pull the whole
structure down on their heads whir dis-
astrous results to the whole of mankind.
Violence breeds violence end once un-
leashed cannot be recaptured or controlled.
The real danger is not the fake over by
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June 18, 1970 GRESSIONAL KEWKO ? HOUSE
Ali
overwhelming. Such illnesses are proving in-
creasingly painful to middle-class families,
who are neither eligible for Government As-
sistance nor financially able to meet the
soaring cost of medical care on their own.
No one knows how many fa,milles face
medical bills of this magnitude. But the
Health Insurance Institute in New York
notes that while 85% of all Americans under
65 have some medical insurance, fewer than
half this number are protected by major
medical policies covering prolonged illness.
Furthermore, many families are covered by
major medical policies that were written sev-
eral years ago and carry maximum benefits
of only $5,000 to $10,000?sums wholly in-
adequate to meet today's hospital costs,
which reach $100 a day in many metropoli-
tan areas.
To be sure, most Blue Cross plans and
Commercial insurance companies are up-
grading their coverage whenever new poli-
cies are written. But they admit that, their
efforts haven't closed the gap. One reason is
that most people are covered under group
policies negotiated by unions and manage-
ment. At contract time there generally is
more pressure to provide broader coverage?
for such things as semiprivate rooms, visits
to a doctor's office or dental care?that would
affect the many than to increase payments
for catastrophic illnesses affecting the few.
"It never crossed my mind that I wasn't
adequately insured," says John Baines, a
craggy-faced, self-made man of 42. But as a
vice president of Southern Materials Co., a
large building materials concern, he con-
fesses he faces a dilemma. "Now I know how
much an illness like this can cost, but as
part of management I also know we're limited
In what we can pay for group insurance."
As a result, he and other Southern Materials
employes still are covered by a policy with a
maximum of only $10,000.
PINCHING PENNIES
The Baineses found that most of their in-
surance was used up during the first year of
Karen's illness. Their savings have long since
been replaced by mounting debt, and even
with John's salary of nearly $30,000 a year,
the family has had to cut out many things
to make ends meet.
"I never used to pinch pennies, and I'd
loek down my nose at those who did," says
Betty Baines, a trim, dark-haired mother of
three other children. "Lately, however, I
think I'm the biggest penny-pincher in
town."
Grocery bills have been pared by $50 a
month, and Betty's Easter shoes this year
cost $16, not the $40 or more she used to.
pay. The Baineses have withdrawn their three
sons from private school, canceled member-
ships in four golf, beach and country clubs,
and cut their entertaining expenses and
charitable contributions. John, an antique
car buff, sold his 1922 Model T Ford for $1,100
and applied the money against Karen's bills.
He also has borrowed against his stock,
cashed in his life insurance and no longer
is the first to reach for the check when
lunching with friends,
Their losses constitute a significant change
in the Baineses' style of living. For instance,
a neighbor and close friend who used to
socialize and vacation with the Baineses says
she no longer extends invitations to the
couple. "It would just hurt their feelings to
ask," she explains, noting that John and
Betty would feel obligated to reciprocate.
Similarly, John finds his new austerity
embarrassing While working with other busi-
nessmen on a committee to seek new indus-
try for Virginia Beach or while serving as a
vestryman at his Episcopal Church. He has
also had to pass up a promotion that would
have involved a move to Texas and a change
of doctors for Karen.
THE BRIGHTER SIDE
The picture isn't entirely black, however.
With a large house in one of the most
fashionable areas of town, the Baineses
readily admit they still live better than most
families. Also, they're thankful for the care
their daughter is receiving. "I also think
we've grown closer together as a family,"
Betty adds.
In addition, they've been extremely lucky.
John has wangled more money from his in-
surance company than he previously thought
possible. The president of his company has
helped him arrange loans at favorable rates.
Friends and foundations have picked up
some drug costs, The specialist who has
worked most closely with Karen's case has
never submitted a bill and recently Johns
Hopkins Hospital unexpectedly wrote off a
substantial portion of the family's hospital
charges.
It doesn't always work out that way, of
course. The wife of a Philadelphia merchant,
for example, had to transfer to a charity
ward in the city hospital after her insurance
'benefits expired and a private hospital re-
fused to continue her treatment. On the
other hand, as hospital authorities point
out, many families overwhelmed by medical
bills simply refuse to pay at all. But for
those families that do make the effort, a
close look at the Baineses case shows the
ordeal of balancing medical costs against the
needs of the rest of the family.
When Karen was first admitted to the
hospital in Jacksonville, Fla., where the
family was then living, there was little to
Indicate that her stay would become a pro-
tracted one. Under terms of their insurance,
the Baineses agreed to pay the first $10 of
Karens hospital bill and 20% of anything
above that. However, after six weeks of mas-
sive transfusions to replace the protein that
' was being lost through Karens damaged kid-
ney, it became apparent that more extensive
treatment was needed. Karen was transferred
to the University of Florida hospital in
Gainesville. After another six weeks of treat-
ment her condition still remained poor, and
her parents were beginning to realize that
recovery would be an agonizingly slow, ex-
pensive firoC'ess. (Their out-of-pocket costs
to Florida doctors and hospitals alone totaled
about $4,800.
Through friends, the Baineses were intro-
duced to Dr. Harriet Guild, a pediatrician at
Johns Hopkins in Baltimore, who has devoted
her life to the treatment of nephrosis. Karen
was referred to Dr. Guild and Johns Hop-
kins. Like most patients referred to a major
medical center, Karen entered the Baltimore
hospital with what was by then recognized
as a major illness, and with her insurance
benefits, and her parents' resources, already
seriously depleted.
Karen's first visit to Johns Hopkins lasted
11 months, six of them spent in isolation
( not even her parents were permitted to
see her). Then shortly after her release in
September 1967, it was discovered that she
was suffering side effects from the heavy
doses of cortisone she was taking. She de-
veloped a diabetic condition and an al-
lergy; cataracts formed in both eyes, caus-
ing total blindness.
Since then, Karen has been back to Johns
Hopkins seven more times for stays of three
to six weeks. Operations in the spring and
fall of 1968 fremoved the cataracts, and with
the aid of bifocals she has regained her sight.
S:he is scheduled to return again later this
month.
Financial recordi on her case at Johns
Hopkins weigh five pounds and list charges
totaling $29,814. Of this amount, insurance
has paid $13,082. (The insurance company
treated Karen's eye surgery as a separate ail-
5837
ment and then, after the $10,000 limit on the
kidney ailment was reached, it allowed the
Baineses to reinsure their daughter and col-
lect another $1,000 a year).
The Baineses have paid another $6,056 to
Johns Hopkins out of their pocket. This has
been in the form of monthly installments to
the hospital of $75 a month since 1967 as
well as additional payments of $1,000 or so
each year from income tax refunds or bor-
rowings. On top of this they have paid out
$3,500 to doctors in Baltimore and Virginia
Beach and have been shelling out up to
$130 a month for the 32 prescriptions Karen
needs to control her illnesses or to counter-
act the drugs that do. (The Kidney Founda-
tion, a national group that supplies some
drugs to kidney patients without charge, and
a friendly druggist who sells other prescrip-
tions at wholesale combined recently to cut
the Baineses' monthly drug bill in half).
There have been other less obvious costs.
Because cortisone has left Karen highly sus-
ceptible to disease, the Baineses have spent
$5,000 to install an electronic air filtering
system, a humidifier and zoned heating and
air-conditioning in their house. Before the
illness they had a part-ti isle maid; now they
need a fulltime one (at $230 a month) to
lift Karen and help her exercise. Long periods
in bed and heavy drug use have weakened
Karen's legs and left her overweight. Al-
though now six years old, she is just learning
to walk with the use of parallel bars and re-
quires frequent physical therapy sessions.
She also is getting special tutoring and
will need more in the future.
A few montha ago the Baines were des-
perate. Betty, for instance, fretted over how
they were going to afford college educations
for their three sons, who are now aged 16, 14
and 9.
SOME LUCKY BREAKS
Then, without the Baines' knowledge, the
Kidney Foundation wrote Johns Hopkins and
solicited help from the hospital. By tapping a
restricted endowment fund, Johns Hopkins
promptly wrote off $8,850 of the Baines bill,
leaving a remaining balance of only $1,826.
Thomas Barnes, Johns Hopkins treasurer,
explains that an excessively large bill like the
Baineses, which would have taken them more
than 10 years to pay off even if Karen had
needed no further treatment, is so discour-
aging that it often prompts families to quit
paying altogether. So, whenever possible, the
hospital uses its endowment funds to reduce
bills to the point that the "guy can see some
light at the end of the tunnel."
Mr. Barnes also was impressed by the way
the Baineses had kept up their payments over
the years without complaining about the size
of Karen's bill. "Obviously we weren't dealing
with some guy who was taking an irresponsi-
ble attitude toward his obligation," he says.
The write-off may not result in a loss for
Johns Hopkins in the long run. Vows John
Baines: "One of these days when all this is
behind us, we hope we'll be in a position to
help Johns Hopkins as they have helped us."
The Baineses already are moving to repay
their obligation to the Kidney Foundation by
heading a drive to organize a local chapter
in their area of Virginia.
Perhaps the Baineses' most generous bene-
factor, however, has been Dr. Guild, the spe-
cialist who has been Karen's principal doctor
and who has never sent a bill. "If I got a bill
from her for $20,000 tomorrow, I wouldn't say
a word," John confesses. But Dr. Guild says
she has made it her practice to charge her
patients only that amount that she can col-
lect from their insurance. And so she has
marked the Baines account as paid although
in four years of intensive care she has col-
lected only $763.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? -HOUSE June 18, 1970
GOVERNMENT AGENCY?CIVIL highest dollar. The Chin Aeronautics Board
AERONAUTICS BOARD?PRO- approved a proposal by air carriers to make
TECTS INDUSTRY rr WAS OR- this upward adjustment, averaging 43 cents,
GANIZED TO MONITOR or 0:9% more a ticket. The rounding-upward
process will start the same day that. the
The SPEAKER pm tempore. Under a ticket tax goes up to 8% from 5% Under the
previous order of the House, the gentle- recently enacted Airport and Airways Im-
man from Michigan (Mr. McDonatn) is provement Act.
The board specified that the roundine-off
recognized for 10 minutes. increase would last for 60 days, through Aug.
Mr. McDONALD of Michigan. Mr. 31. The time limit was specified because the
Speaker, another Government agency change is being allowed to take effect on
has reared its inconsiderate head and unusually short notice. The airlines can file
taken steps to protect the industry it was later for the right to carry on the rounding-
organized to monitor. I am speaking of
upward process on a permanent basis, with
longer notice given to permit comment by
the public.
In all cases, rounding off will mean a boost;
.1 the calculated fare comes out to $16.01,
the passenger will pay $47.
The board voted three-to-two to approve
the fare-rounding proposal. Chairman Secor
D. Browne and members Whitney Gilliland
and John G. Adams backed it, with mem-
bers Robert T. Murphy and 0. Joseph 141Inet-
ti dissenting.
The proposal, submitted by American Air-
lines, was backed by other trunk line and
local-service carriers. They argued that the
additional revenue was needed to offset a new
ba4c annual aircraft registration tax nf $25
plus an added charge of 3.5 cents a pound
for jets and two cents a pound for piston
aircraft, applying to planes over 2,500
pounds. These charges were part of the new
airport-airways package.
A CAB spokesman estimated that I he
0.9% fare rise would add slightly less than
$50 milhon to annual airline revenue, based
on 1969 traffic.
the Civil Aeronautics Board, and its re-
cent, so-called temporary action which
permits air carriers to round out our air
ticket costs to the highest dollar. A re-
cent Wall Street Journal article, in re-
porting on this action, used words to the
effect that air travelers would not have
to fuss any longer with odd dollars and
cents. Well, Mr. Speaker, those odd dol-
lars and cents amount to on additional
$50 million annually from the pockets of
those who use the airines a: a means of
transportation.
This irresponsible action c n the part of
the CAB will be effective July 1, 9 months
following a 6.35 faro increase in October
and 16 months following a 3.8 fare in-
crease in February 1969. On top of those
increases, July 1 will see a 3-percent
ticket tax increase go into effect.
I have several questions E bout this re-
cent action. First, vihatever happened to
the board established to protect the
rights of the public? And second, what
sort of action is this which delibecately
flaunts the policy of wage and pricere-
straint requested Wednesday by our
President?
I do not recall the President asking
everyone to show restraint except the air-
line industry. Nor do I recall the CAB be-
ing constituted to act on the behalf of the
airline idustry.
If the CAB is to provide ways and
means for the airlines industry to in-
crease its revenuer, perhaps the airlines
industry should reciprocate by taking
over some of the burdensome cast of
running this Federal agency.
The CAB's promise to limit the so-
called rounding up increase to 60 days is
not very convincing to me. Mr. Speaker,
I feel very strongly that the CAl3 has
acted capriciously and without any kind
of objective inveetigation against the
public interest.
For the benefit of my colleagues who
may not have yet read a report of this
act, I am including a copy of the Wall
Street Journal account for printing in
the RECORD.
I have no further remarks at this time,
Mr. Speaker. Perhaps the next time we
discuss the CAB and its cavalier attitude
it will be during that agency's appro-
priation bill.
The item follows:
CAB VOTES TO RAISE ODD-St NI Am FE,REE TO
NEXT EVEN DOLLAR the following subjects:
WASHINGTON.?Air travelers won't have to First. The state of training and k''"E' equip-
dollarsd cents figures like $3842
ass any longer with paying fares with 'they s odd ,rsi.,,n,
cf South Vietnamese forces to ul-
a.n. But 's
will have to pay a little bit extra to avoid timately displace the combat role of
worrying about the odd change. U.S. forces.
starting July 1, airlines will round the Second. The future prospects of the
price, including tax, upward to the next pacification program to assure stability
Separately, the CAB is conducting a broad
investigation of air fare structure to deter-
mine whether different levels and different
approaches are in order. The board granted a
3.8% general fare increase in February 1969
and another averaging 6.35% last Oci eT,er.
The investigation grew out of that latest
boast, spurred by court action brought by
a group of Congressmen protesting
crease.
,OUR NEED FOR
INFC)RMATION
ASIA
SOME CONCRETE
ON SOUTHEAST
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a
previous order of the House, the gentle-
man from Ohio (Mr. llamas's) is rec-
ognized for 10 minutes.
Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, the as-
signed mission of the Select Committee
on U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia
is a most challenging one, and I wish
the Members every possible success in
their search for the information to lend
some understanding of the problems at
hand.
Central to all questions on Southeast
Asia today is the situation in Vietnam.
We have bean involved there in the long-
est military conflict of our history. Con-
troversy has surrounded this subject for
years, and we need some clarification re-
garding the direction in which we are
heading. This select committee in its fact
finding will accomplish much in closing
the present information gap on Vietnam
if it can come up with some answers on
in the villages, hamlets, and general ru-
ral areas to avoid or prevent subversion
by the "Vietcong cadre.
Third. Future prospects of the South
Vietnam Army to successfully protect
the sovereignty of a free South Vietnam
Government.
An evaluation of other prospects in
Vietnam, such as: First, the ability of
a coalition government in Saigon to
withstand political pressures, internal or
external military pressures, subversion,
and/or economic duress; second, the
consequences, if any, of an immediate
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam
without endangering their security, or
our role in Asia.
Some say that with cur growing prob-
lems at home, there is increasing doubt
that we can police the Whole world,
therefore, I believe we are in great need
of some statement defining the strategic
importance of Southeast Asia. This may
clarify the basis for our being there, or
not being there. Heretofore, many have
been led to believe that our strategic
interests in that lame Le area have been
expressed only in terms of the geographic
arc extending from Alaska, through the
Aleutians, Japan, South Korea, Okinawa,
Taiwan, the Philippines, and the Mari-
anas to include Gauen. This has been
known as cur Western Pacific strategic
frontier. Do we now add all of South-
east Aerla to this concept, or is Southeast
Asia a strategic factor relating to an
obligation under the Southeast Asia
Treat y Organization?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
previous order of the House, the gentle-
man from Texas (Mr. GONZALEZ) is rec-
ognized for 10 minutes.
[Mr. GONZALEZ addressed the House.
His remarks will appear hereafter in the
Extensions of Remarks.]
-~?????110111=1101010111=111
ON THE EVENTS AT LORTON COR-
RECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS ON
MAY 22, 23, AND 24, 1970
(Mr. ADAMS asked and was given per-
mission to extend his remarks at this
point in the RECORD. and to include ex-
traneous material.)
Mr. ADAMS. Mr. Speaker, during the
weekend of May 22-24, there were a
number of disturbances at the Youth
Center and the Corns ctianal Complex at
Lorton, Va. Much of the reason for the
disruption at the Correctional Complex
was due to 'a power failure which blacked
out lighting, resultir g in some escapes,
destruction of property and fires.
Seen in perspective, the handling of
these incidents was admirable. District
of Columbia and local fire fighting and
law enforcement personnel executed
their responsibilities with a great deal of
control. There was no excessive use of
force and thus no dancer of escalation
of the disturbances. The staff and ad-
ministrators of the Department of Cor-
rections performed their duties in a cool,
disciplined, and efficient fashion. Most
inmates visibly resisted a minority el
troublemakers by remaining noninvolved
and peaceful.
Prosecutions or other disciplinary ac-
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June 16, 1970 S 9145
5. Who said this? "In my judgment the
war in Vietnam is a tragic national mis-
take . . a collosal one. In any other context
of life, when a mistake has been made?
whether by a person, by a company, or by a
nation?there is only one thing to do: face
up to it. No amount of cover-up--rational-
izing, alibiing, or ducking the facts?will
avoid the inevitable day of reckoning: it
only compounds the cost . . . In my judg-
ment, it is time the people begin to call for
an ehd to the squandering of American
blood, morale and resources on what is in
essence an Asian war of nationalism."
A. Dr. Spook,
B. Bobby Seale, Black Panther Leader.
C. A. W. Clausen, President, Bank of
America.
The answer to each one is "C".
These statements were made, in order, by
the Chairman of the Board of IBM, by the
President of the United Auto Workers Union,
by the Board Chairman of the Allied Chemi-
cal Corporation, by the President of the In-
ternational Chemical Workers Union and by
the President of the Bank of America, the
largest bank in this country. Each was made
in the last six weeks.
These statements were made by God-fear-
ing, freedom-loving Americans?heads of
major American businesses and unions?who
oppose the continuation of an expanding and
endless war which is detrimental to tile land
they love.
A VOICE FROM THE WEST AOAINST
THE WAR
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, the Los
Angeles Times, whose growing dismay.
over American policies in Southeast Asia
over the years has now resulted in a
forceful editorial this week which, with-
out fudging, states in the opening sen-
tence:
The time has come for the United States
to leave Vietnam, to leave it swiftly, wholly,
nd without aquivocation.
The editorial acknowledges that the
threat of the Soviet Union is real, but
that we are militarily engaged in the
wrong place:
? All questions of American foreign policy
are subordinate to the central one, which is
to prevent nuclear war between the two
super-powers. We shall be engaged against
the Communist world one way or another all
our lives; but in Southeast Asia we are en-
gaged on the periphery of that world in a
battle obscured by the elements of civil war
and Vietnamese nationalism,
I ask unanimous consent that the edi-
torial be printed in the RECORD at this
point in my remarks.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
- GET OUT OF VIETNAM Now
The time has come for the United States
to leave Vietnam, to leave it swiftly, wholly,
and without equivocation.
The President still has in his hands the
opportunity to effect such an exit. He should
seize the chance now as it presents itself, for
it may not come so readily again.
That the ?war must be ended, all are
agreed. That, as the President said last week,
"peace is the goal that unites us," all are
also agreed.
Long ago, when we began to help the anti-
Communist Vietnamese against the Com-
munist Vietnamese, it seemed a worthwhile
thing to do. It seemed cheap, first in dollars,
then in men. No need now to trade the mel-
ancholy history of how, bit by bit, decision
by decision, it became extravagantly expen-
iVe Of money, of human lives, of the tran-
q?ility this country, of our reputation
abroad.
The President said recently he would not
have this nation become a "pitiful helpless
giant" in the eyes of the world. We are not
entirely pitiful, and not yet helpless. But
we are like a giant lunging about with one
foot in a 'Crap, a spectacle that is discon-
certing to our friends and comforting to our
enemies.
NOT THE CENTER RING
Our great adversary is now, and will re-
main, the Soviet Union.
All questions of American foreign policy
are subordinate to the central one, which
is to prevent nuclear war between the two
super-powers. We shall be engaged against
the Communist world one way or another
all our lives; but in Southeast Asia we are
engaged on the periphery of that world in
a battle obscured by the elements of civil
war and Vietnamese nationalism.
Our response ought to be commensurate
with the challenge: as it was over Berlin,
in the Cuban missile crisis, as it may yet
have to be in the Middle East. But we have
SC1 overresponded in Indochina that it may
be harder for us to respond as we ought
should a gileater and more direct challenge
arise.
No need now either to delineate at length
the consequences in our own country of the
Indochina war:
The war is not the sole cause of strife be-
tween parents and children, yet it has in-
flamed that strife.
The war is not the cause of conflict be-
twee.' the races, but it has made that con-
flict More bitter.
The war is not the only reason for our
present economic distress, but it has ren-
dered that distress harder to treat.
The war alone did not create the illness
afflicting our public and private institutions,
but it has brought that illness to the crisis
paint.
Like a small wound the war has festered
until its infection has appeared in every
organ of this Republic. Its ache is felt in
every limb; its pain clouds the national
judgment. The country is losing heart.
"Peace," therefore, "is the goal that
unites us."
As the President said, our national debate
is not about the goal of peace, but about
"the best means" to achieve it.
JOB CAN DE BETTER DONE
The President has better means at hand
than he is using.
, He has promised a withdrawal of Ameri-
can combat troops?a.nother 150,000 by next
May 1?but the withdrawal in these sum-
mer months has been reduced and after tile
150,000 leave there will still be 284,000 troops
left in Vietnam. If Mr. Nixon has a private
schedule for their withdrawal he has hat
revealed it.
He has declared that his goal is the total
withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam,
but by making open-ended threats of coun-
ter-action should the enemy attack, he has
Made it necessary to make good on those
threats. Thus he has given to the enemy a
large measure of decision over our own rate
of withdrawal.
By the President's move into Cambodia,
arid by his encouragement of the Vietnamese
and Thai operations there after we leave, he
has entwined American prestige with the
fate of that unhappy but unimportant little
country.
In declaring that the credibility of Amer-
ican promises elsewhere in the world hangs
on our achieving "a just peace" in Vietnam,
he is making it harder for us to make with.
credibility those compromises which every-
one, including the Administration, believes
will eventually have to be made.
The President, in sum, is pursuing, for
reasons which of course he deems excellent,
an ambiguous and contradictory policy?a
policy of which the stated purpose is to
leave Indochina, but in which it is implied
that it may be necessary to stay in Indo-
. china.
The Times believes the United States has
discharged all the responsibilities it has in
Vietnam. The Times believes this nation
has?bravely and honorably?done every-
thing, and more, that could reasonably have
been expected of it.
American men prevented Communist
forces from precipitantly seizing South Viet-
nam. American men, at an enormous cost in
lives, have secured for the South Vietnamese
a reasonable length of time for improve-
ment of their army and consolidation of
their country and government. Short of
permanent occupation, there is no more
America can reasonably be expected to do
for Vietnam.
The President said last week that the
Cambodian venture "eliminated an imme-
diate danger to the security of the remain-
ing American troops" and "won precious
time" for the South Vietnamese army.
This, then, is the opportunity for the
President to accelerate the withdrawal.
THE TIME IS NOW
Let him now publicly set a deadline for
removing not only the remaining combat
troops but all American forces, combat and
support, according to a swift and orderly
schedule. Let him begin to hasten the re-
moval of combat troops this summer. It
ought to be possible to bring about a total
and orderly withdrawal in the next year and
a half at the longect.
Such a program of withdrawal would of
course be hazardous. But it would be much
less hazardous than the policy the President
is presently pursuing.
The South Vietnamese would be firmly
, on notice that their future is where it
belongs?in their hands. The United States
could continue to support them with arms
and money, should they choose to keep on
seeking a military solution; more likely they
would feel impelled to put their own politi-
cal house in order pending that day when
they will come to the political compromise
that is the inevitable outcome in Indochina.
American troops would be in some danger,
but they are certainly In some danger now,
and the faster they leave, the sooner they
will be in no danger at all.
imakineuaz DEPARTURE
We shall not argue, as some do, that rapid
American withdrawal would induce the
North Vietnamese to negotiate; but It is
certain they are not inclined to negotiate
now. On the contrary, the longer we stay
in Vietnam the more inclined the North Viet-
namese will be not to negotiate, and the
readier they may be to mount attacks on
our forces in hope of pushing us out.
Let the President, therefore, remove all
foreign and domestic doubts about our in-
tentions by announcing a speedy departure
from Vietnam.
? The President said list week he was de-
termined to end the wax in a way that would
"promote peace rather than conflict through-
out the world . . . and bring an era of re-
conciliation to our people?and not a period
of furious recrimination."
The Times believes that the program of
withdrawal we suggest would bring about
the kind of peace Mr. Nixon spoke about the
the kind of peace Mr. Nixon spoke of. The
policy suggested here would hasten the end
of one war and put the United States on a
better footing to preve.nt other more dan-
gerous conflicts.
. The policy suggested here would certainly
be met with recrimination from some in
this country. But we firmly believe that this
policy would be thankfully approved by
the great majority of our people as an hon-
orable conclusion to this terrible long war.
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S 9146 CONGRESSIONAt RECCM June 16, 1970
LAST WEEK'S SENATE ACTION
LAUDED
Mr, CHURCH. Mr. President, editorials
called to my attention have uniformly
praised the vote of the Senate last week
in refusing to accept the original Byrd
amendment to the Cooper-Church
amendment to the Foreign Military Sales
Act. Editorials interpreted the action as
a reassertion of the constitutional pow-
ers of the Senate in respect to war-
making. I agree.
One typical comment was that of the
Baltimore Sun which said:
What the Senate in majority was saying . _ .
was that it opposes open-end authority for
a President to commit the country to large
armed actions without the consent of Con-
gress.
I ask unanimous consent that four
editorials be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorials
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Baltimore Sun, June 14, 19701
SENSE OF THE SENATE
The present effect of last week's vote on
an amendment to the Cooper-Church pro-
posal (which seeks to cut off funds for Amer-
ican. military operations in Cambodia past
July 1) is, or should be, to warn President
Nixon against any new impulsive adventure
into that country. What the Senate in ma-
jority was saying more broadly was that it
opposes open-end authority for a President
to coramit the country to large armed actions
without the consent of Congress.
The question was presented as a constitu-
tional one, and so it is. On the one hand
is the power of a President as commander-
in-chief. On the other is the right and duty
of Congress to have a voice in major national
decisions, including decisions of war. One dif-
ficulty today is of course that the Indochina
waris unlike any other we have ever waged.
As Senator Church said, "This being the
first limited war in which the United States
has engaged, it is altogether appropriate
that the Congress share with the President
the responsibility for defining the limits; of
our involvement." With that the majority of
the Senate obviously agrees.
It also holds, as evidenced by its approval
of another amendment offered by Senator
Mansfield after the vote which in effect re-
buffed the administration, that nothing ln
the Cooper-Church proposal "shall be
deemed to impugn the constitutional power
of the President as commander-in-chief."
In any ease, Congress could not actually
prevent a new move into Cambodia should
the President decide on such a move. :But
the burden of proof of necessity would be
on him in a way much more severe than was
the ease at the end of April.
If it is said that last week's vote was,
praatically, only an expression of the sense
of the Senate, the expression was still a
forceful one, and the administration would
make a grave mistake in any failure to rec-
ognize its importance.
[From the New York Post, June 12, 19701
THEY REMENIDERED TONKIN
'Resolved by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of
Anierica in Congress assembled.
"That the Congress approves and supports
the determination of the Presidenteas Com-
mander in Chief, to take all necessary meas-
ures tie repel any armed attack against the
forces of the United States and to prevent
further aggression." (From the Tonkin Gulf
Resolution, August 7, 1964.)
Nearly six years, thousands of casualties
and countless bitter regrets later, the Sen-
ate has decisively rejected another deceptive
declaration of war in Indochina; in doing
sO, it has issued its own declaration for
peace.
The issue in question yesterday was the
"Byrd amendment," sponsored by the sen-
ior Virginia Senator and eagerly embraced
by the Nixon Administration; the section,
to be added to the foreign military sales
act, would have authorized the President to
take whatever action he deemed necessary
to protect 'U.S. forces in Vietnam.
The President has already taken such ac-
tion without authority?from either Con-
gress or the Constitution?by invading Cam-
bodia; the Byrd amendment was intended
to emasculate the pending Cooper-Church
amendment, holding the President to his
promise to pull all U.S. forces from Cam-
bodia by June 30 and forbidding their re-
entry.
The Administration might have established
confidence in its candor by asserting?as
it did late last year in somewhat similar
circumstances when Congress sought to pro-
hibit deployment of U.S. combat troops in
Laos or Thailand?that the Cooper-Church
amendment was consistent with its policy.
Instead, it mobilized massively for a show-
down.
In that campaign, it deployed not only its
regular lobbyists but a contingent of "fact-
finders" hastily dispatched to the wax zone.
In the late stages of debate yesterday, the
nation became even more feverish as Sen.
Byrd bid for votes with vague amend-
ments to his own amendment.
But in the end, he was voted down by a
firm 62 votes to 47 and the way is now
clear for a conclusive test on Cooper-Church,
and later on the comprehensive McGovern-
Hatfield amendment specifying that funds
for all military operations in Southeast Asia
be cut off by the end of the year, with total
troop withdrawal by mid-1971. The 1964
resolution has not been directly repealed?
although that may still be a possibility. But
it seems clear that the Senate is resolved
to prevent expansion of a war that has car-
ried the U.S. from the Gulf of Tonkin across
to the Gulf of Siam.
---
(Prom the Philadelphia Inquirer, June 13,
19701
No BLANK CHECK
With their well remembered experience
with the Tonkin Resolution, most senators
were not about to be burned again by a
blank-check authorization for Presidential
military action in Cambodia.
The 52 to 47 vote against Senator Robert
C. Byrd's amendment was thus both a rebuff
to President Nixon and a reassertion of the
Senate's constitutional powers.
The Senate has before it the Church-
Cooper amendment forbidding the President,
in the absence of congressional approval, to
spend any funds after July 1 for retaining
U.S. forces in Cambodia, for providing mili-
tary advisers or combat air support for the
Cambodians, or for financing the pay of
forces from third countries going to the aid
of the Cambodians.
This amendment on its face would seem
merely to back up President Nixon's own
commitment to U.S. troop withdrawal from
Cambodia by the end of June.
Nevertheless, it was not satisfactory to the
Administration; Senator Byrd acted as Nixon
field general in pressing hie amendment
which declared that the President could re-
tain troops in Cambodia whenever he con-
sidered such action necessary to protect the
safety of American forces in Vietnam.
Opponents of the amendment argued that
it would permit Nixon to do anything he
wanted in Cambodia on the grounds that he
was protecting U.S. forces.
The principle they were upholding was
that of the constitutional role of Congress.
"We stand up now," Senator Frank Church
told the Senate, "or we roll over and play
dead."
As the House is unlikely to accept the
Church-Cooper amendment even if it gets
past the Senate?rand a Nixon veto is yet
another prospective obstacle?the Senate
majority action may turn out to be largely
symbolic. Even so, it is symbolic of some-
thing immensely important; the Senate's
rejection of the blank-cheek theory of Presi-
dential military authority.
[From the Philadelphia Bulletin,
June 14, 19701
THE PRESIDENT ON NOTICE
The Senate has rejected what it inter-
preted as an attempt to give President Nixon
black check legislative authority to send
American forces back into Cambodia after
July 1, if he thought it necessary to pro-
tect U.S. forces in South Vietnam.
By its action, the Senate has actually done
two things:
It has asserted most strongly its feeling
that the war-making authority of Congress
must be reestablished.
It has served notice on the President that
its patience with U.S. military involvement
in Southeast Asia is just about exhausted.
American disengagement in South Viet-
nam is Mr. Nixon's aim, too. He has already
withdrawn many U.S. troops and has set a
deadline for the withdrawal of another con-
tingent of U.S. troops.
But the steady pace of American with-
drawee which had been so reassuring to the
U.S. public, and which had reduced the fever
of dissension over the war, was interrupted
by U.S. military operations in Cambodia.
Vagueness as to continued involvement of
American Asian allies in Cambodia fighting--
which means U.S. involvement by proxy,
with uncertain consequences as to the sup-
port that might be called, for?contributes
to unease.
The long debate in the Senate over the
Church-Ooopee amendment is not over, to be
Sure. The Senate has not yet approved its
provisions, which deny the President au-
thority to spend money after July 1, with-
out congressional approval, to keep U.S.
troops in Cambodia, to supply advisers or air
support to Cambodian troops, or to finance
other countries aiding Cambodia.
If the legislative fate of the Oooper-Church
amendment is uncertain in the Senate, and
even more so should it reach the House, it
Is also uncertain as to its impact if passed.
Its own sponsors are at pains to put on
record that they do not intend to interfere
with the President's constitutional powers
as Commander-in-Chief. 'they point to emer-
gency circumstances under which the Presi-
dent could still take military action in Cam-
bodia.
But already, in rejecting language that
even possibly could be interpreted as ap-
proval of future free-wheeling Presidential
military action across the Cambodian border,
the senators have written large on the wall
their message to the Administration.
The complexities of the debate and the
argument over constitutional powers aside, it
seems clear that the only satisfactory answer
to this bitter controversy is for the President
to move more swiftly and certainly to elimin-
ate its source.
That is by speeding the rate of American
Military withdrawal from South Vietnam.
DARK VIEW FROM AN ASIAN
OUTLOOK
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, Stanley
Karnow of the Washington Post is a
veteran, respected Asian watcher. His
dispatches over the years have been in-
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June 12, 1970 CONGRESSI A E
They would have been prepared for it. theory and he is arriving at the accom-
The element of surprise would have been plishments which are desired by all.
denied us. These are the things that I believe
The first two moves into the southern should concern us at this time. That is
sanctuaries could possibly have failed. why, Mr. President, I hope that many of
As it was, one of the defectors told us my colleagues will express their feelings
they had 20 hours notice. That is not with regard to these restraints and re-
very much notice. strictions.
The Senators will be glad to know that I know that some of the opponents
they did not have time to booby trap the have said, "We will only do what the
bunkers. When we left, there had been President said he would do."
only two cases of booby traps. And they However, I get the feeling that they
were quickly contrived. They simply were want to lock him in. They say, "He said
hand grenades with the pins pulled and this. So, to make certain, we will put it
placed under boxes so that if one raised into law."
a box, it would detonate and explode. It would almost appear to some that
They moved a let of supplies. There is there was a matter of distrust there. I
no doubt about that. We heard it said do not think that should exist.
that we did net capture the headquarters. I do not think that is based on the
We never really expected to, because they evidence. I do not think it is healthy or
are very mobile. They never put their helpful at this particular time. Let us
roots down firmly in any one place. How- not lose the advantage that has been
ever, we captured enough of their corn- gained after such a long struggle, after
munications and supplies to destroy their such a costly experiene. Let us keep that
efforts and break them up so that they advantage and let us see if we cannot im-
are and will be ineffective, prove on it so that at long last we can
We do not know what may be neces- bring about the honorable, lasting, and
decent peace that all of us so earnestly
desire.
Mr. President, I hope that the people,
and the young people particularly, who
were here yesterday and who were so
enthusiastically interested in the out-
come of the vote that took place in this
Chamber, will take the trouble to read
what I have said here today; that they
take the trouble to get an understanding
of the entire situation.
This is net a matter of who wins or
who loses a vote on the floor of the Sen-
ate. That is incidental. That is gone as
the sun goes down. The matters that con-
cern us are matters of permanent policy
that will affect the future of this great
Nation for years and years to come, and
that is why these matters should be ap-
proached with careful and mature judg-
ment. Enthusiasm is wonderful; it is
great; but it never should burn so bright-
ly it overcomes the fires of wisdom, good
sense, and reason.
So, Mr. President I can only wish in
closing that these galleries had been as
filled this morning as they were yester-
think themselves and be cautious and day. We hear quite often now that the
careful. We cannot afford any more un- older generation?and I am certainly a
fortunate mistakes, part of that older generation, having
Mr. President, I have concluded that lived in this great country for over 60
the advantage in this unfortunate war years?does not communicate with the
has changed, that the third President younger generation.
is on the right track. And I would sug- I made a promise to some of the
gest and recommend most highly that students in my State that I am going to
we join solidly behind him and give him communicate and I am going to be avail-
our support. And as long as he is going able to them in the universities, not to
in the right direction, we should give those who are concerned with a con-
him all the help we can and urge him on frontation, but I will be available to
so that not only in the negotiations in those who are interested in sitting down
Paris but also in the negotiations in the and having a free, honest, and open-
S 89ir
than they were. They are net, however,
completely satisfactory yet.
Vietnamization is working. It is ahead
of schedule.
Cfur troops will be coming home.
That brings me to the current business
new before the Senate. We have con-
cerned ourselves here with writing new
laws which would, somehow or other, re-
strain and restrict this new President,
the third President to inherit this preb-
' lem, the one who is meeting with success.
? Some said immediately when the Cam-
bodian decision was announced that it
was broadening the war. That is not true.
It deescalated the war.
We are fighting in a different area, but
there is a lot less fighting. I just told the
Senate about the 13 million bullets that
will not be used by the enemy to kill
American boys.
The casualties are down. The effort is
moving in the right direction. And we
are meeting here to debate and discuss
new laws that will restrain and restrict
the powers of this third President.
Mr. President, I have said, and I repeat,
that I think it is proper that we debate
and eventually delineate exactly the
powers of the President of the United
States as Commander in Chief with re-
gard to declarations and actions that
may bring involvement in war. I think i?
is to be desired. But I do not think that
this is the time for it. I do not think that
this is a well chosen date for this dis-
cussion and debate.
I can see nothing productive, nothing
that would help solve the problems of the
United States that could come from such
discussion at this time.
I think this debate should be held at a
time when we are at peace, held with
calmness and with complete, cool rea-
soning.
We can make this delineation then and
spell it out se that it will be clearly drawn
for all, future time. But let us see what
happens as we do it in these days, with
these problems fazing us, with this on-
going situation.
I can see immediately that certain ele-
ments of the unfriendly, foreign press
will say that the American people have
lost confidence in their President. Thai;
is not true. That is a falsehood. The polls
show this:
Regardless of the fact that some of
our highly publicized editorial writers
indicate this, it is just not true. It adds
to the confusion. And they should rectify
this because in time of war this Nation
must be solidified and there must be full
understanding.
It is difficult to write restrictions, be-
cause we de net know the conditions. We
only know our side of the story. What
will the enemy do? What would have
sary. We do net know what action, what
quick, sudden decision may be necessary
for the safety of our men, for the success
and final victory and for a solution to
this awful dilemma.
That is why I say that this is not the
time and that these are not the days for
this type of discussion.
I have the greatest confidence that
my colleagues, the proponents of such
restraints and restrictions, feel that
what they are doing will bring about an
end to this awful dilemma. They want
to see it finished. But I assure them,
Mr. President, that no one wants to see
it finished more than the President of the
United States. No one wants to see it
brought to an end sooner than the Sena-
tor from California. But it is a matter of
judgment. It is a matter of certainty
that it must be carefully considered.
We have made too many mistakes in
the past. And some of those who have
advised us in the past and must share
Partially the responsibility of this awful
experience, continue to raise their voices
in this debate. I think they should be-
happened in the Cambodian incursion, SALT sT'1icfisarmament talks and minded discusison. I hope I learn a great
had there been a debate in this Chamber the confrontations which must take place deal from them, and possibly, with
ahead of the incursion and at long last with regard to the problems in the Mid- good luck, they may learn something
the President had been given permission east, the world will know that we have from me and my experience. Out of the
to do what should have been done so confidence in this third President and interchange may cOme some ideas that
many years ago? that we, the great majority of the people, will be of advantage to the future of this
I will tell the Senate what would have believe that his judgment has been good, great Nation. I hope that these same
happened. It would have cost the lives his decisions have been well taken, cou- young people will take the time to read
of thousands of Atherican boys, because rageous, daring, and have been based on the RECORD as I have attempted to make
the enemy would have known about it. facts and reality, not on fiction and it this morning.
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50 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENA Jwiie 12, 1970
? THE MIDDLE EAST
Mr. /MURPHY. I have talked for sev
eral years and at great length about th
problem in the Middle East. I have take
a &in public position on the importune
and the necessity of the healthy, stron
viability of the new country of Israel.
In the Washington Post this morning
there was published a most interestin
article by Mr. Joseph Alsop entitle
"Mideast Crisis Provokes Only Slime
From the Left," and I ask unaninion
consent that it be printed in the Rectum
There being no objection, the andel
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD
as follows:
MIDEAST CRIS/S PROVOKES ONLY SILENCE FROM
THE LEFT
(By Joseph Alsop)
The most bewildering feature of th
Middle Pastern crisis is the strange silenc
on the left. Here is the most dangerous situa
tion that the United States has had to frac
since the Second World War. Here is the
Nixon administration pursuing, at lease t?
date, a policy so limp that it actually in-
creases the danger to Israel.
Here are the liberal Democrats in Con-
gress, with their highly articulate allies, the
liberal arid leftwing intellectuals, in a per-
fect fever of rage about Cambodia, which
promises to be a brilliantly successful U.S.
operation. Yet they have not given the Nixon
administration as much as a tap on the wrist
where it is most vulnerable, in its manage-
ment of the Middle Eastern crisis to date.
The contest is so extraordinary that it
cries out for explanation. The only available
explanation is not exactly creditable, how-
ever, to the liberal and leftwing intellectuals
and their heroes in active politics,
With ludicrously premature sighs of re-
lief, this entire, highly influential American
group firmly decided, some years ago, that
an problems of the Cold War had ceased to
existe--if indeed they had not been imaginary
problems in the first instance. The tragic lees
of President Kennedy, who never went in for
self-delusion, secrets to have been the signal
for the begining of this enormous exercise
in self-delusion by so many who had ad-
mired him.
Thus a new world view began to tie pro-
mulgated; as unchallengeable doctrine. The
view was that all the dangers- of late tory in
the latter half of the 20th century could be
largely blamed OTL the United States. The
whole American effort to maintain a reason-
ably safe balance of power in the world was
seen the exclusive source of all risks and
troubles.
This world view leaves no room at all, of
course, for an increasingly militarized Soviet
Union, bent upon crushing Israel, and by
crushing Israel, aiming to gain control of the
entire Middle East. The choice has been,
therefore, between continuing to peddle the
world view above-defined, or publicly swal-
lowing it whole, as a grossly erroneous view,
end thereupon facing the terrible new facts.
Vanity, Ignorance and arrogance have all
combined to prevent the admission of error
that is now in order by the liberal and left-
wing intellectuals and the liberal Democrats;
in Congress. So Israel's deadly peril has been
all but ignored. Or if not ignored, it has been
treated as really no more than Israel deserves.
And the Indian war dance about Cambodia
has continued, with a rising decibel count.
For the short run, this is quite bad enough,
The Nixon administration badly needs to
be hammered on its Middle Peet-ern policy,
Otherwise, none of the right things are likely
10 be done. For the long run, too, the cone
tinning liberal and left-wing exercise in self-
delusion is bound to end in disaster for the
self-deluders, among others.
The Middle Eastern facts. alone are enough
be show the threat to the self-deluders.
- The unprecedented Soviet injection of Rus-
e elan troops into the Middle Eastern war quite
n directly menaces Israel's very existence. The
e design, furthermore, is not just to crush
? .fsrael. The decign Is. to exclude any form of
lower except Soviet power from the Middle
Jireast.
Suppose that the Israelis are beaten to
g .their knees or actually destroyed. Suppose
d shat we also experience the immense upset
e ,n the entire world balance of power that
e will result if the Kremlin's Middle Eastern
design is successfully carried out. We shale
ellen be doubly haunted, by the ghost of Is-
rael, and by the obvious danger of a third
World War caused by the upset in the bal-
ance of power.
Can anyone suppose that the self-deluders
will not then be rent asunder, in the storm
of fury, recrimination, fear and scapegoat-
e hunting that will follow in this country?
? The answer is obvioue. Yet this is only part
of the story, for the Middle Eastern crisis is
? only part of the danger.
Except for Japan after the rise of the
a militarists, the Soviet Union today stands
alone among major nations in this century.
With the exception noted, it is in fact the
only major nation that has allowed the uni-
formed leaderteof the armed services to name
taeir own boss, the defense minister.
That grim fact is clearly linked to other
facts?the Soviet pilots in Egypt; the lava-
eon of Czechoslovakia; the rising pressure
on Romania; the increasing number of di-
visions deployed along-the Sino-Soviet border.
The Nixon administration's defense policy,
which amounts to shambling disarmament
pisaiitcyerefore as vulnerable as its defense
But on this front, too, the administration
is never attacked, except for not disarming
fast enough. The truth is that the geese that
should sound the alarm on the Capitol have
all been taking mind-blowing drugs.
Mr. MURpHY, Mr. President, I sug-
gest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unani-
mous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
TRANSACTION OF FURTHER ROU-
TINE MORNING BUQINESS
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unani-
mous consent that there be a period for
the transaction of further morning busi-
ness, with statements limited to 3 min-
utes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered,
COMMUNIST TERROR AGAINST
SOUTH yja.....IgiaM
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, the basic ob-
jective of the Vietnamization program s
initiated by President Nixon is to realize 1
an orderly withdrawal of American forces
from the war zone and, at the same time, a
secure the safety of the people of South 1
Vienam against possible acts of terrorism
which might be perpetrated by the forces -
of North Vietnam and the Vietcong.
Some of my distinguished colleagues in b.
the Senate have questioned -the likeli- 1v1
hood that such atrocities as mass civilian
execution and lengthy incarceration
would result if the United States left the
South Vietnamese without adequate
means for defense. Yet, as President
Nixon pointed out in Ida April 30 speech
to the American people, we cannot ex
pose 18 million South Vietnamese "who
have put their trust in us to the slaughter
and savagery which the leaders of North
Vietnam inflicted On hundreds of thou-
sands of North Vietnamese who choose
frwdorn when the Communists took over
North Vietnam in 1954." I believe time
President is correct in this position.
In order to determine whether the
North Vietnamese and Vietcong have
changed their method of assuring obedi.-
ence and loyalty we must inquire about
the expressed intentions and actions of
Communist forces.
The record is not encouraging. In fact,
Reuters News Service reported this morn-
ing that at least 70 South Vietnamese
civilians were killed and another 70
wounded in a 2-hour bloodbath when
Communist forces attacked a village near
Danang. The Associated Press said that
civilian deaths in the incident might be
as high as 115.
News reports also quote a South Viet?-
namese military spokesman as saying it
was the worst toll of civilians since the
Tet offensive of 1968.
Mr. President I ask unanimois
sent that the Associated Press account of
the tragedy printed in the Washington
Post this morning be inserted in the
RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
KILLING' OP 115 C/VIL/ANS CIIARGED AGAINST'
VrErcoNn
SAIGON, June 11.?About 115 South Viet-
namese civilians were killed and another 70
wounded in a two-hour bloodbath today
When Vietcong troops overran a village south
of Danang, reliable sources said.
The U.S. Command said 70 civilians were
known to have been killed and 70 Wounded
in the assault on Baren, e hamlet of about
2,000 residents 17 miles southeast of Danang,
[Reuters reported that a South Vietnamese
military spokesman said it was the worst toll
of civilians since the Tet offensive in Febru-
ary, 1963. In the city of Hue alone, during
that offensive, several thousand civilians
were massacred by the Vietcong. In the vil-
lage of Mylal, 'U.S. forces neve been formally
charged with the deaths of 109 civilians.]
The assault followed a withering mortar
barrage which set fire to much of the river-
side village.
One U.S. officer, who flew over the smolder-
ng remains of the hamlet, said it was about
90 per cent destroyed or demaged.
Survivors said Vietcong ran through the
streets of Baren "shooting ,tnyone they saw"
and hurling grenades into homes and civilian
bunkers, he said.
The U.S. Command in Saigon reported a
harp drop in American battlefield deaths
ant week. (Story on Page A16.)
The attack on Baren came less than a week
I ter a Vietcong assault against another vii-
age two miles south of the same bridge,
when 22 villagers were killed and 13
ounded,
Today's attack occurred es other Vietcong
troops hit an outpost at the end of the
ridge just north of /been, manned by U.S.
arines.
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, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE S8951
The attack was the heaviest of seven re
ported Thursday against civilian populatio
centers ranging from deep in the Mekon
Delta to Dalat in the central highlands.
The cDminancier of the Niarines ,at Bare
Lt. T. S. Miller, 27, New Kensington, Pa., w
quoted by the command as saying the Viet
cong's "main objective was to destroy thi
village."
"They kept my Marines pinned down whil
they infiltrated the village, and then the
started their massacre," said Miller. He esti
mated that more than 200 mortar shells hi
" the village.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, some critic
of President Nixon's Vietnamization
program have argued that reports o
Communist terrorism are exaggerated
They contend that no "bloodbath" would
ensue should we make a hasty with-
drawal since the situation of mass ter-
rorism In the north in the 1950's is not
analagous to the present.
- day, I am more convinced than ever that participants with the requisite years of
unless these basic reforms are under- service may still not qualify for vested
g taken, the American worker will lose his rights if they have not attained an age
n, confidence in the value of these plans. specified by the plan.
as The harsh facts are that despite close The currently unacceptable level of
- to $126.2 billion being accumulated in vesting protection is further magnified by
s these pension plans, and despite indica- the continued spectacular rise in the
tions that they will grow to over $200 bil- growth of private pension fund assets.
e lion by 1980, only a relatively small num- For example, the latest SEC survey?de-
ber of employees in many of these plans scribed in SEC press release No. 2437,
will ever receive a single dollar in retire- April 20, 1970?shows that noninsured
ment benefits, pension fund assets increased by $7 bil-
The underlying reason for this alarm- lion during 1969 while insured pension
S ing state of affairs is that the private reserves increased by $4 billion. The cur-
pension system has failed to respond to rent book value of assets in all private
new realities generated by technical, bus- noninsured pension funds is over $87
? Mess, and social change. This failure is billion while in insured pension reserves
most noticeable with respect to the so- it is at $39 billion. Ten years ago, the
called "forfeiture" problem. It seems to total assets in both insured and non-
be a recurring theme, for example, that: insured pension funds were at $52 bil-
First. Employees with relatively long lion. I question whether the enormous
periods of service are laid off due to tech- wealth being built up iii these funds could
The evidence to support this position
is hardly convincing, especially in light
of today's reports of atrocities.
I submit that the enemy's intentions
and actions are to similar today to risk
the further preparation of such atroci-
ties against the people of South Viet-
nam.
All available Communist propaganda
points to a continuation of the strategy
of terror and savagery by the north. On
September 18 of last year a high official
In the North Vietnatnese Communist
Party said: ?
It is absolutely essential to use violence
against the counter-revolutionaries and ex-
ploiters who refuse to submit to reform.
He continued:
We must pay continuous attention to con-
solidating the repressive apparatus of the
people's democratic state.
For those who "stubbornly oppose the
revolution" a decree issued by the Pres-
ident of North Vietnam provides for se-
vere punishment, ranging from 2 years
to life imprisonment and capital punish-
ment. Edicts such as these are hardly
unusUal coming from the Communists.
The distinguished Senator from Colo-
rado (Mr. ALtorT) has pointed out re-
peated statements by North Vietnamese
leaders demanding what are called
"blood debts" of their opponents in South
Vietnam. His address to the Senate of
May 21 as printed in the RECORD includes
some of the statements of the Com-
munists which hardly seem to indicate
a change in policy from the massacres of
the early 1950's,
Mr. President, this most recent report
of Communist terrorism should not be
hastily forgotten, especially considering
past behavior and expressed intentions
of the Vietnamese Communists.
?
LATEST ELS AND SEC STUDIES
SHOW NEED FOR PENSION RE-
FORM
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, for sev-
eral years I have sponsored legislation
intended to secure certain reforms of the
Private pension system. Last year, I again
Introduced this legislation as S. 2167. To-
nological or business reasons without
having acquired pension rights.
Second. Employees who voluntarily
quit to accept more advantageous em-
ployment often forfeit benefits they had
expected to receive in retirement.
Third. Many employees cannot even
hope to qualify for a private pension be-
cause the characteristics of their occu-
pations as well as the nature of their
job opportunities demand such mobil-
ity that they cannot earn a pension ben-
efit even under the more progressive
plans.
What makes these circumstances pro-
foundly disturbing is that in all these
cases contributions on behalf of these
employees have been made into a pension
fund. These contributions, which are tax
deductible, are supposed to provide em-
ployees with retirement benefits, but re-
strictive requirements in many of these
plans virtually insure that these con-
tributions will not, for the most part,
achieve this purpose. In the technical
language of the pension specialist, the
right to obtain some type of retirement
benefit when leaving employment prior
to retirement is known as a "vested
right." When an employee leaves em-
ployment without obtaining such a
vested right he is said to have "forfeited"
all moneys credited to him for retire-
ment benefits based upon his service with
the employer.
The shocking extent of the risk of for-
feitures of private pension benefits in
this country is fully revealed by the latest
Bureau of Labor Statistics' study. This
study is summarized in press release No.
11-024 issued this year by, BLS. Very
briefly, the BLS study of vesting cover-
age in private pension plans shows that
despite the fact that the proportion of
plan participants belonging to plans with
vesting provisions increased by 29 per-
cent in 1969, only one out of every three
plan participants will receive a vested
pension right if he leaves employment
with 10 years of service under the plan,
and only one out of every two partici-
pants will receive a vested pension right
If he leaves employment after 15 years
of service. Moreover, even this estimate
may be too rosy since many terminating
not support a more equitable system of
vesting than is presently the case, and,
indeed, whether one of the factors bear-
ing on this phenomenal growth in assets
is an unwarranted level of forfeitures.
These statistics speak for themselves.
I believe these releases, as well as earlier
reports in this connection, fully justify
the steps which I have continually urged
as a necessary corrective to a significant
Inequity in the private pension system.
While it is gratifying to learn that volun-
tary progress has been made in this re-
gard, it is quite evident that the rate of
progress is hardly adequate.
Lack of adequate vesting is, of course,
only one of a number of problems pre-
sented by the present operation of the
private pension system. For example,
there is a widening concern, which I
share, that the vast resources concen-
trated in these funds are not being suffi-
ciently utilized in connection with the
resolution of pressing domestic social
problems. Also, recent business reverses
in certain industries, notably aerospace,
has once more turned the spotlight on
the general problem of employers who
terminate their business operations with
the result that their employees are not
only out of jobs but find that their pen-
sion rights have been severely reduced
and, in some instances, virtually de-
destroyed.
Solutions to these persistent problems
cannot be deferred much longer. Pur-
suant to Senate Resolution 360, the Sen-
ate Labor Subcommittee is in the process
of conducting an indepth exploration of
the private pension system to ascertain
the facts surrounding many of these
matters. I am hopeful that the subcom-
mittee will hold hearings in the summer
on this subject and that 'backed by the
findings of its investigation, serious at-
tention will be given to appropriate re-
form measures.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that there be printed at this point
In the RECORD the charts and tables con-
tained in the BLS and SEC release.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
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S 8952 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 12, 1970
TABLE I.-ASSETS OF PRIVATE NONINSURED PENSION FUNDS
[Book value in millions of dollars; figures may not add to totals due to rounding. Includes funds of corporations, nonprofit organizations and multiemployer and union plans.)
Annual 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1
Cash and deposits 550 660 110 770 890 940 900 1,320 1,640 1,190
us. Government securities 2 680 2,728 2,320 3, 050 3,070 3,100 2,610 2,170 2,540 2, SO
Corporate and other bonds 15 700 10, 880 18, 100 19, 560 21, 210 22, 700 24, 580 25, 500 26,160 26, 640
Preferred stock780 760 750 710 650 750 790 980 1320 1, 740
Common stock_ 10, 730 13, 340 15, 730 18,120 20, 840 24, 450 28, 340 33, 830 40, 260 45, 960
Mortages.. N 1,300 1, 560 1, 880 2,220 2, 750 , 320 3, 810 3, 940 3, 910 4, 010
Other assets 1,400 . 1,590 1,000 2,120 2,510 820 3,430 4,110 4, 450
4, 740
Total assets 33, 140 37, 510 41090 46, 550 51, 910 58 090 64, 470 71, 840 80 280
87, 240 .
Ns 1967 1968 1969
Quarterly \ 3c1 quarter 4th quarter Ist quarter 2e1 quarter 3d quarter 4th uarter 1st quarter 2d quarter 3c1 quarter 4th quarter
Cash and deposits
_ \ 1,050 3,320 1120 1,290 1.500 1,640 1,241) 1,640 1,4911 1,5911
U.S. Government securities __. \ 2,380 2,170 2.400 2,390 2.330 2,540 2,600 2,400 2,600 2,591)
s
Corporate and other bonds 25, 420 25, 500 25 830 25, 900 26, 140 26,160 26,1110 26, 080 26, 530 26,64))
Preferred stock 940 980 1020 1,150 1,210 1 1,320 1,460 1,570 1,110 1,74))
Common stock_ 2, 460 33, 830 35, 210 36, 810 38, 640 40, 260 41, 760 43,350 44,140 45, 960
Mortgages 930 3, 940 3,950 3,910 3,92 3, 910 3,940 3,910 3,070 4,
Other assets__ 80 4,110 4,190 4,270 4,3 4,450 4,360 4,530 4,570 4,74))
Total assets_
l Preliminary.
69,2
71,840 73,720
75,710 , 78
0
- I -
80, 280 81, 380 83, 560 135, 010 87, 240
TABLE 2.-ASS S OF ALL PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PE ION FUNDS
[Book Value, in billion dollars; figures may not add to tot rine to rounding]
1960 1962 1963 1964 .1965 1966 1967 1968 19691
Private: 52.0 57.8 63.5 69.9 77,2 85,4 93.9 ' 103.9 115.3 126.2
_
Insured pension reserves. 38.8 20.2 21.6 23. 25.2 21.3 . 29.4 32.0 35.0 239.0
Noninsured pension funds 7
33. 1 37. 5 51. 9
_ 58. 1 _ .
64. 5 71. 8 80. 3 87(3
(Separate accounts, included above% 3 ,t . 3 .6 1.2 2.2
56.4 59.3 61 69.5 72.8 80. 4 90, 3 98.4
--111. 3
19.6 22. 0 24. 5 26.9 29.2 33. 1 37. 1 '41,1 46. 0 52.))
Public:
State and local
Federal old-age and survivors insurance_ ..._ __ _ . 20.3 19.7 18.3 18.5 19.1 18.2 20.6 24.2 25.7 30.1
Federal: .
Federal disability insuranco 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.6 1,7 2.0 3.0 4.3
Civil service retirement and disability program 7.... 10.4 11.4 12.5 3.5 14,7 15.9 17.0 18.3 19.4 20. 8
Railroad retirement 3.1 3.7 3.7 8 3.0 3.9 4.1 4.2 4.2-4. 3
. __
Total private and public----------. 1904. 111.1 124.9 146,6 158.2 174. 4 194. 2 213, 6 237.6
Preirnallary
2 Estimated.
a Separate accounts of life insurance comeanies. set Ur, for specific per plans, allow greater
investment latitude than is permissible under State laws for general life insurance assets.
BUREAU OF
TABLE I --NUMBER OF PRIVATE PENSION PLANS, AN) HUMBLE( OF COVERED WORKERS
ISMS, 1
. -
Characteristic
Less than $5 000,000.
Not available.
'Includes funds f nonprofit organizations and multiemployer plans
7 Includes Foreig Service retirement and disability trust fund
BOR STATISTICS
121 PERCENT OF WORKERS I NsF%:LANS WITH VESTING PROVISIONS BY SELECTED PLAN CHARACTER-
, 1967 AND 1962-63
1969 1967 -63 Characteristic 1969 1967 1962 63
Number of plans
17, 403 17, 091
16,038
Number of active covered workers (thousands) ,... 19, 511 17,485 15, 787
Single err ployer plans 13 869 12, 555 f. 11,002
Multiemployer plans_ 5,150 4,920 3,985
Noticontrrbutory plans.. 15, 15, 368 13,351/11,784 Contributory plans
Contributory plans_ _ 4, 051 4,1 4,003
'Data relate only to those private pension plans covering more than 25 p licipants for which years earlier than the study's' reference te. The totals presenter] here for 1969 include r529
the plan administrator filed a report with the Departmeat of Labor's Labor- anagement Services plans covering 92,33? workers, for which co plete information was lot available in the Depart-
Administration. Plans providing noncomptdable retirement benefits (such profit sharing plans) ment's files at the time the study was rand ted; all subsequent data for 1969 exclude these
were excluded from all studies. The active worker court in each study i or a period of about 2 plans.
TABLE 2.--PREVALENCE OF STING AND EARLY RETIREMENT PROVISIONS IN PRIVATE PENSION PLA S, 1969
Percent of active cover ed worke
Plans with vesting provisions 76 63 59
Single employer plans ___ 87 77 71
51 26 23
Multiemployer plans
51
Noncontributory plans 74 57
89 80 78
ype of provision
All plans number.(warkers in thousands)
Total
Plans Workers
Type of employer unit
Single employer
Plans
Workers
Methou of financing,
Multiemployer Noncon .butory Contributory
Plans Workers Plans orkeis Plans Workers
16, 874 19, 49 15, 230 13, 869 1, 644 5, 550 12, 482
Plans with either vesting or early retirement provisions.. 14,902
Vesting and early retirement 12, 309
Vesting only 632
Early retirement only1, 961
Plans with neither vesting nor early retirenrent provisions 1,972
0468
N
17, 6:r9 13, 515 13, 315 1,337 4, 306 10, 535 13, 73 4, 367 3806
14, 241 11, 631 11, 641 678 2,601 8, 526 II, 003 3, 783 3, 230
610 478 418 154 223 523 284 109 356
2,738 1,496 1, 256 555 1.482 1,496 2,446 475 292
1,799 1,765 555 257 1,244 1, 947 1,634 25 165
4,392 4,051
-----------
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,,IEW YORK TIMES LJA.T.E I .frr`.1
Many U.S. Civilian Roles
In Asia May Go to Military
By TAD SZULC
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, June 9?The Nixon Administration is(
drawing' up plans for the shift of numerous American!
economic and social programs id, South Vietnam_a.nd Laos
? from civilian to MiAtary con-
- .
trot
ler, je plans, the United
St se rt4:14iirthient
riV94.1.4?gpduaily take over,
'wholly or in part, the financing
and operation of such programs
as the balancing of the South
Vietnamese defense budget,
pacification of rural areas, pub-
lic health, the training of the
police dila the care of refagees.
Those programs are financed
and administered alone or in
cooperation with the Defense
Department by the Agency for
International Development. In
s many instances the Central In-
telligence Agency and the
United States Information
Agency also participate.
During the fiscal year ending
on June_ 30, the aid agency, it
is estimated, will have spent
$365-million in Vietnam. ,
The Administration plans to
incorporate some of the changes
in its revision of the foreign-aid
program, which is expected,
soon. Part of the program will
require Congressional approval.
The plans are expected to
generate considerable contro-
versy in and out of Congress
because they deal with the sub.
ject of civilian vs. military con.
trol of policy. The contemplatec
shift could transfer the respon-
sibility of Senate review from
the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, which has generally been
critical of American operation,
in Southeast Asia, to the Arme . nate the support assistance
Services Committee, which ha4 urger the reorganization blue-
generally been sympathetic. print, does not have "enough
clout," funds or experienced
Civilian officials have beer clout,
personnel to run the programs.
citing private remarks by high
ranking officers involved in Larger C.I.A. Role Foreseen
policy planning for Vietnam, ?
officials also - f oresaw
to the effect that civilian lead-r. ke
that the C.I.A. would seek to
ership is failing and that well- increase its role in the support
trained Army men should be programs. They noted that in a
ztri radio interview last Sunday Dr.
Appro
elligenceRTeettd/VIVA
using A.I.D. A.I.D. as a cover for its
? activities in Laos since 1962.
increasItgly assigned to posi-
tions of responsibility in the
administration of wartime and
postwar programs.
A major argument among
Administration officials favor-
ing an increase in the military
role in Asian and other support-
assistance programs is said to
be that the Defense Department
Is expected to have an easier
time getting funds from Con-
gress, where opposition to for-
eign-aid appropriation has been
growing in recent years.
Indications are that the new
approach has support in the
White House staff as well as
among many though not all
civilian and military officials in
the Defense Department. Top
officials in the aid agency are
described as resigned to the
change, partly because A.I.D. as
an entity would disappear under
the projected reorganization of
the foreign-aid program.
Secretary of State William P.
Rogers has participated in the
discussions only to a limited ex-
tend. The whole question is ex-
pected to be reviewed by the
National Security Council.
Dr. John A. Hannah, the aid
administrator, discussed the
problem with President Nixon
at the White House May 25 in
one of their rare meetings.
In recent public statements
Dr. Hannah has made it clear
that the "support assistance"
programs would be divested
from the agency that would be
set up to handle overseas eco-
nomic development under the
reorganization, expected to
take effect in about a year. He
has recognized that some of
the support functions would be
turned over to the Defense
Department.
Other aid officials foresaw a
tug-of-war between the Penta-
gon and civilian agencies over
the extent to which the mili-
tary establishment would as-
same responsibility for the ac-
tivities now performed by the
aid agency.
They said that the State De-
parment, which is to coordi-
_
In Vietnam, the C.I.A. is an
active partner in the pacifica-
tion program, which it created
eight years ago, and is engaged
in many other operations.
While there is resistance
among civilian officials to what
is viewed as military encroach-
ment, A.I.D. recognizes its in-,
ability to obtain . sufficient
funds and personnel to finance
and operate some programs in
Vietnam.
Early this year, for example,
the United States Ambassador
to South Vietnam, Ellsworth
Bunker, turned down insistent
proposals from the United
States Military Assistance Com-
mand in Saigon that he accept
135 Army officers as advisers
to the aid agency's public-
safety program, which seeks to
build up the South Vietnamese
civilian police.
The Defense Department
plans to finance several proj-
ects that have been adminis-
tered and funded by the aid
agency, among, them the sup-
ply of high-protein food to the
South Vietnamese Army. Ten-
tative estimates are that in
fiscal 1971 the Defense Depart-
ment will finance up to $50
million in programs that pre-
viously were paid for from aid
funds.
In many recent situations,
officials said, A.I.D. had to
turn to the military for admin-
istrator's and physicians to run
refugee and public-health proj-
ects because of a shortage of
civilians willing to serve in
Vietnam.
Rapidly Growing Ability
Such developments indicate
the rapidly growing capability
of the military, especially the
Army, to administer typically
civilian programs.
This month the newly reor-
ganized John F. Kennedy Cen-
ter for Military Assistance at
Fort Bragg, N. C.?originally
established by the Army to
teach antiguerrilla warfare?
will graduate the first class of
Army officers trained in the
political, social, economic, cul-
tural and linguistic aspects of
overseas military activities.
Commenting on the trend, a
civilian official said that "the
realities of the situation"
would increasingly force the
Administration to turn to the
military ? for the financing and
management of certain pro-
grams because of the inability
of civilian agencies to muster
adequate funds and personnel.
The major institutional
changes are expected to come
in the message that President
higypnf send to Congress
30111rfertni;-rmonth.
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Deriving from the report of
the task force on international
development headed by Rudolph
A. Peterson, retired president
of the Bank of America, the
Presidential message is ex-
pected to recommend a clear
separation of international
economic - development assist-
ance from military and support
aid. It is the latter that, in situ-
ations like Vietnam, has been
administered by A.LD. while
the Pentagon has ,handed mili-
tary sales and grants.
The Peterson report call for
a law covering both military as-
sistance and support assistance,
and for an agency on inter-
national security cooperation in
the State Department that
would supersede the present
aid agency. The law would vest
in the State Department the
direction and coordination of
the security-assistance program.
While the Defense Depart-
ment would control military as-
sistance, the State Department,
under the Peterson recommen-
dations, Would be responsible
for support-assistance and pub-
lic-safety programs.
Senior Administration officals
said that it appeared inevitable
that considerable responsibility
for the support programs would
be shifted to the Pentagon even
If, in theory, the State Depart-
ment retained over-all policy
direction.
Officials discussing the situa-
tion are convinced that the
Pentagon financing will be fol-
lowed by insistence that pro-
jects be increasingly adminis-
tered by the military.
Civilian officials have been
cliting private remarks by high-
ranking officers involved in
policy planning for Vietnam,
to the effect that civilian lead-
er?ship :is failing and that well-
trained Army men should be
iricreasingly assigned to posi-
ti ons of responsibility in the
iministration of wartime and
astwar programs.
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June 10, 1970
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE
tions, etc. The organization relies heavily on
volunteer attorneys who either handle cases
directly or write and prepare briefs. There is
no specific amount of time which a volun-
teer must contribute.
I. New York Lawyers' Committee For Civil
Rights Under Law
This organization, co-chaired by Vincent
L. Johnson and Russell D. Niles, is the op-
erating arm in New York of the National
Lawyers' Committee For Civil Rights Under
Law. It has been active in providing work-
shops and training programs to assist law-
yers and others in understanding the Com-
munity School District System Act. Other
projects include urban areas programs, anti-
poverty programs, challenges to various ad-
ministrative decisions. Board of Elections
cases, civil rights cases and class actions in
unfair labor practices cases. There is a con-
tinual backlog of work and cases in all of
these areas and volunteer attorneys are
needed.
SECTION V
The following organizations are involved
in general projects related to the poverty
area or the administration of justice in the
poverty area.
A. The Vera Institute of Justice
Vera operates entirely within New York
City and its work is limited to criminal law
reform. It provides no litigation services, but
works closely with other agencies in the
criminal justice system and is concerned
with the quality of justice afforded the poor.
Vera is currently engaged in a variety of
activities, including consultant to the
Mayor's Criminal Justice Coordinating
Council, operating a project in the Manhat-
tan Criminal Court designed to provide
counseling, job training and employment for
'selected defendants as an alternative to
criminal prosecution, an experiment in the
Bronx Criminal Court with an advance ad-
lournment program, and an experiment with
the use of short form pre-sentence investiga-
tion in misdemeanor cases. Other programs
under way include a study of the prosecu-
tion in juvenile delinquency cases, a cora-
3rehensive study of bail jumping, a study of
the feasibility of a centralized prearraign-
ment facility and an experiment of monitor-
ing of police interrogation. Volunteer law-
yers will be employed in the research and
writing of studies and reports concerned with
these matters. No block of time need be
made available.
B. VISTA
VISTA (Volunteers in Service to America)
recruits volunteer lawyers (among others)
to work in economically depressed urban
and rural areas. Law graduates, selected for
the Legal Services programs on a national
basis, live among the people whom they
serve. The regular term of service is one year
after six weeks of training in the area of
urban and poverty law. VISTA attorneys
serve as advisers and house counsel to local
community organizations on matter of strat-
egy, legal requirements and appropriate
types of action. They are also engaged in the
area of statutory reform, working with the
Office of Economic Opportunity's Neighbor-
hood Legal Services Agencies. VISTA attor-
neys are working on problems relative to
consumer fraud; housing violations; co-
operatives; credit unions; community plan-
ning; welfare rights; health issues; economic
development; Federal and local funding; and
preparation of individual and group cases
for court actions.
C. The Council of New York Law Associates
The Council of New York Law Associates
was formed this past November for the pur-
pose of increasing the flow of information
among young associates with the expecta-
tion of thereby increasing the degree of par-
ticipation of such attorneys in the public
service area. In its first few months some
600 lawyers have become members. This
membership is spread among 76 firms and
offices.
The Council expects to make a significant
contribution to a great many sectors of the
public service simultaneously without estab-
lishing any program of action or priority of
interests. It will promote any and every po-
tentially valuable project that may be of
interest to any appreciable segment of its
membership. The bulk of the Council's work,
then, consists of maintaining relationships
with a broad range of organizations already
engaged in public service projects, assisting
those organizations to make efficient use of
the resources that the Council attracts. The
supplying of legal assistance to the under-
privileged is'one of the areas of public service
in which the Council engages. Legal assist-
ance organizations with "which and projects
on which the Council and its members al-
ready are involved include: Trying civil
liberties cases; working on Family Court
matters; lecturing to high school and com-
munity groups on housing, consumer law,
criminal law, etc.; helping the state defend
against habeas corpus petitions; counseling
small nonprofit organizations and commu-
nity groups working with ghetto businesses
on tax, corporate, labor and real estate mat-
ters.
Respectfully submitted.
GEORGE J. WADE, Jr.,
itairman, Young Lawyers Committee.
(4EIREAT TO BLAME PRESIDENT IF
COMMUNISTS CONTROL SOUTH
VIETNAM
Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, a few
days ago one of Washington's more criti-
cal newspaper columnists, Miss Mary
McGrory, who writes as if she is con-
vinced that the world will come to an
end because Richard Nixon is President,
wrote one of her typically hypercritical
columns.
Toward the end she said of the Presi-
dent:
He is incapable of believing that the Demo-
crats would not, someday, accuse him of
"losing Indochina," even though 'some of
them are committing their futures to the
proposition that it might be the best thing
that ever happened to this fractured and
anguished country.
Mr. President, the former Democratic
National Chairman, my colleague from
Oklahoma (Mr. HARRIS) , said some
things that might make it difficult for
anyone including the President to believe
that the Democrats do not mean to have
their cake and eat it, too, so far as Indo-
china is concerned.
Ever since the President took office, the
former democratic chairman Senator
HARRIS, and his successor, Lawrence
O'Brien, have demanded that the Presi-
dent surrender now and get all Ameri-
cans out of Vietnam. They, more than
any other two persons, have sought to
turn Vietnam into a political issue.
Yet, in an off-guard moment, Senator
HARRIS told some members of the press
that the Democrats will blame Presi-
dent Nixon if the Communists take con-
trol of South Vietnam.
Columnists Roscoe and Geoffrey
Drummond quote Senator HARRIS as say-
ing
We will hold Nixon responsible if he turns
South Vietnam over to the communists.
That Is a very interesting threat, one
that Miss McGrory apparently was not
aware of.
'The Drummonds go on to say:
S 8733
But simultaneously, Senator HARRIS and
Democratic Senators like EDWARD KENNEDY,
GEORGE MCGOVERN, EITGENZ MCCARTHY, and
J. W. FULBRIGHT are continuing to demand
such a rapid pullout of 17.S. troops that the
end result would be to give the Communists
control of South Vietnam.
So there you have it. Former chair-
man HARRIS and his successor demand
that we pull out of South Vietnam,
whether or not it means the Commu-
nists will take over.
But at the same time they are prepared
to blame the President if the Commu-
nists do, and attempt to reap as much
political gain as possible.
Miss McGrory is obviously capable of
believing that Senator HARRIS did not
mean what he said. So far as I know,
he has not changed his mind. Inciden-
tally, I should like to make reference to
one other of Senator HARRIS' statements
regarding the war in Vietnam. He is
quoted in an Associated Press story of
last October 8 as saying in January,
1969:
Arguments of critics of Pr esident Johnson's
policy in Vietnam have little validity. The
biggest factor "?and I emphasize this
point?" the biggest factor in prolonging the
war is division at home. I'm sure the gov-
ernment will continue in Vietnam its pres-
ent course and that we will not abandon
the countries of Southeast Asia.
It is helpful to know, that at one time,
Senator HARRIS' views, those who are
fracturing our country are the biggest
factor in prolonging the war. Those are
my views, also.
Mr. President, in the interest of world
peace now and in the future and to pre-
vent needless killing in Indochina, those
who are tempted to try to gain partisan
or philosophical advantage by criticiz-
ing the President could do a great serv-
ice to the country and probably to them-
selves by controlling this impulse. Par-
tisanship may no longer stop at the wa-
ter's edge, but certainly it has little merit
in the rice paddies and jungles of Indo-
china.
I ask unanimous consent that Miss
McGrory's column and two other articles
on the same subject be printed in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the articles
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
DICK NIXON WEARS A HARD HAT
(My Mary McGrory)
The Senate was extremely polite, almost
apologetic, as it wound the first delicate
threads around the hands of a President
bent on some unknowable venture in Indo-
china.
Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, one of its
least partisan members and co-sponsor of
the Cooper-Church amendment, explained
that "no disrespect was intended" by this
tentative, preliminary attempt at preventive
detention of the war-making executive.
"We are strengthening the President's
hand," said Church, "helping him overcome
the evasions and foot-dragging by bureau-
crats and foreign allies."
The language of the preamable of the
amendment, which merely holds the Presi-
dent to his promise to bring all American
troops "home" to Vietnam by July 1, was so
softened that even Chairman John Stennis of
the Armed Services Committee, a fierce and
unwavering hawk, said it was "meaning-
less."
The Senate is extremely nervous on its
first expedition into composite dissent, which
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S 8734 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE June 10 1970
probably will come to a vote this week. Since
Z967, individual members like Sens. J. W.
Fulbright and Eugene McCarthy have
formed and Ted resistance, but the Senate
as a whole has been content to let the COM-
mander-in-chief, who is the proprietor of
the flag, the definer of "patriotism" and the
protector of "our boys," make all the deci-
sions.
The Senate is not built for speed or de-
finance. Nor had it seen itself in the role of
savior of the country, which it has now As-
sumed in the eyes of millions of troubled
and despairing Americans.
Since Cambodia, it has been swamped by
mall and besieged by lobbyists?not the old
comfortable kind who bought them lunch,
but lean and hungry hordes of students,
housewives, doctors, lawyers and clergymen
demanding justice and threatening retribu-
tion at the polls. The senators are told that
if they could reject Carswell, they can reject
the war.
The President is free of such pressures.
HO is surrounded' by servants and courtiers
in. bin splendid mansion. He is told by his
staff that the men who oppose him never
did or would vote for him, and merit his
contempt.
While George W. Ball, former undersec-
retary of state, the celebrated, tame dove of
the Johnson years, was telling the House
Iaoreign Affairs Committee that "eongres-
atonal consultations," not congressional
curbs, were the answer, the President was
receiving the construction workers, the most
vocal and violent supporters of his Cambo-
dian deeision, in the Oval Room. The day
before, he had seen the head of the far-
right Young Americans for Freedom.
"Flu only a senator," moaned Warren G.
Magnuson, D-Wash., when importuned by
the Yale Law School student lobby to stand
up to the President.
It is, to be sure, an unequal contest. The
resident has symbolic and actual superi-
ority. He did not even tell the Senate he
was sending troops into Cambodia. Eight
thousand were over the border when the
Senate, with the rest of the country, learned
about this new expansion to shorten the war.
When the howls of outrage went up, the
White Housevirtuously claimed "fear of se-
curity risks on Capitol Hill."
Jaen. George D. Aiken of Vermont, dean of
Republicans and ranking member of the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee, sputtered,
'T have never betrayed a president's confi-
dence. He didn't tell us because he knew
we would not approve."
The President reckons, apparently, that
disunity and fear will strike the anti-war
forces in the Senate, who, after they deal
-with Cooper-Church, must face the radical
McGovern-Hatfield fund eut-off. His marks-
men have no convenient personal target, the
Sponsorship is bipartisan. No stars have yet
been born during the struggle and, to date,
no deep divisions. His spokesmen are in-
voking the prisoner-of-war issue to delay
the vote.
It seems unlikely the Senate will part him
from his money. For many of them, it would
smack of regicide, and the presidency has
become, partly dile to the Senate's compli-
ance, something of a monarchy.
What is needed more is an effort to sepa-
rate the President from his memories and
suspicions. He came of age in the 1950s,
came into prominence as a Red-hunter and
cold warrior. He was a leader in the hue
and cry against the Democrats that they "lost
China," never mind that we never had it.
He is incapable of believing that the beme-
erats would not some day, accuse him of
"losing Indochina," even though some of
them are committing their futures to the
proposition that it might be the best thing
that ever happened to this fraaturea and
anguished country. The President has, in
short, put on his hard-hat, and the Senate
is, going to have a nasty, awkward time g.et-
ting him to take it off.
OU, 0S17 WAR PROTEST MEETINGS BOOK
HARRIS
OKLAHOMA Crrr.-s-U.S. Sen. Fred R. Harris
will speak at the University of Oklahoma
and Oklahoma State University next Wed-
nesday for the war protest meetings, but
Gov. Dewey laartlett declined an invitation
to appear.
Harris said he expects to discuss the Viet-
nam War situation in all his speeches, but
added, "I regret that some people have tried-
to put a partisan label on. the strong feel-
ings I have concerning the war."
The Democratic national chairman said
he "didn't change my mind on this war dur-
ing this administration. I spoke out against
it during the last administration."
During the final year Of President John-
son's Administration, Sen. Harris spoke out
in support of the President's policies in Viet-
nam, newspaper files show.
In a January 1968 interview with Lawton
newspaper reporters, Sen. Harris said:
"Arguments of critics of President John-
son's policy in Vietnam have little validity.
"The biggest factor in prolonging the war
is division at kome. I'm sure the government
will continue in Vietnam its present course,
and that we? will not abandon the countries
of Southeast Asia."
He said he had visited Korea, Australia,
Thailand, New Zealand, Malaysia and others.
"To a man, the leaders of those nations
say, `If you leave us here and pull out with-
out a successful conclusion in Vietnam, you
will have weakened our positions almost
overwhelmingly.'"
DEMOCRATIC LEADERS ARE PLAYING WITH
DYNAMITE ON VIETNAM
The leaders of the Democratic Party are
playing with political dynamite in trying to
`force President Nixon to withdraw U.S. troops
from Vietnam so rapidly as to throw away all
prospect of negotiating a peace.
The United States of America would be
hurt?grievously hurt?by this shortsighted,
reckless, perilous undermining of what the
President is doing to end the war by seeking
a fair peace.
No one is suggesting that those who want
peace at any price, those who want to with-
draw all American forces immediately, re-
gardless of the consequences, should still
their protests. All the President and others
who are earnestly seeking disengagement
and a decent peace are asking is that for a
reasonable period Congressional critics
should stop telling Hanoi that it doesn't
need to negotiate, that all it has to do is to
wait and they?the Congressional critics?
will see that the U.S. government accepts a
no-peace policy.
The Vietnamese war has never been a
partisan issue, and attempting to bring it to
an end with a fair peace is not a partisan
issue. But leaders of the Democratic Party
are now trying to make it so. Sen. Fred H.
Harris of Oklahoma, chairman of the Demo-
cratic National Committee; disclosed this
strategy in a candid remark to the press last
week. ,
"We will," he said, "hold Nixon responsible
if he turns South Vietnam over to the Com-
munists."
But simultaneously, Senator Harris and
Democratic Senators like Edward Kennedy,
George McGovern, Eugene ? McCarthy, and
J. W. Fulbright, are continuing to demand
such a rapid pull-out of U.S. troops that the
end result would be to give the Communists
control of South Vietnam.
Thus, the national chairman of the Demo-
cratic Party is not only acting to make Viet-
nam a pay-dirt partisan issue but is also
seeking to put President Nixon in such a box
? that no matter what he does he's bound to
lose. . . .
In other words, Senator Harris' neat for-
mula is to make Mr. Nixon punishable by the
out quick and also if evil consequences come
from yielding to such pressures.
Senators and congressmen know- that the
President has the constitutional duty to con-
duct foreign policy and that negotiating
peace is the most difficult and delicate act of
foreign policy. Heckling and harassing the
President is delaying the peace?not hasten-
ing it.
Have the Democrats forgotten so soon that
Richard Nixon is acting to end a war which
he inherited from his Democratic predeces-
sor and which they helped to authorize?
FOREIGN BANK SECRECY?COM-
MENTS ON S. 3678 AND H.R. 15073
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, a problem
which is of great concern to me and to
all Americans is the apparent increase
in tax and criminal activities which have
been aided and concealed by the use of
foreign bank accounts, especially in those
countries that offer a maximum degree of
bank secrecy.
The Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency is now holding hearings on two
similar bills which attempt to curb this
increase: S. 3678, introduced by the dis-
tinguished Senator from Wisconsin (Mr.
PROXMIRE) , and H.R. 15073, which was
passed by the House on May 25, 1970.
There is widespread agreement on the
need for legislation to curb the illegal
use of foreign bank accounts. H.R. 15073
was passed unanimously. At the hearings
held by the House Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency. on this subject, all ad-
ministrative agencies that testified sup-
ported the implementation of legislation
to curb the illegal use of these accounts.
The American banking community has
also supported the need for corrective
measures in this area.
While there has been uniform support
for legislative action to control secret
foreign bank accounts, there has been
some disagreement over the specific
means to be employed toward this end.
The Treasury Department speaking on
behalf of the administration strongly
opposed several elements of H.R. 15073
and urged the enactment of several other
provisions. Moreover, S. 3678 introduced
by Senator PROXMIRE includes an addi-
tional provision not found in the bill
passed by the House. This provision
would prevent U.S. securities brokers
from transacting business on behalf of
a foreign entity unless that entity dis-
closed the person for whom it is acting
or certified that it is not acting for a
U.S. citizen or resident. It is a new and
different concept which should be studied
thoroughly. I believe that these differ-
ences will be thoroughly discussed and
examined by the Senate Banking and
Currency Committee, and that all Mem-
bers of the Senate will give careful con-
sideration to the proposed legislation be-
fore us.
I would also note that new legislation
is just one element of the program neces-
sary to effectively curb the illegal use of
foreign secret bank accounts, and that
I am pleased with efforts being made
presently in connection with these other
elements. In addition to any legislation
to strengthen our own legal framework
to combat this problem, the United States
must seek increased assistance from for-
eign nations, especially those in which
voters if he doesn't yield to pressures to get secret accounts are maintained for ii-
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June 8, 1970
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will please call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
GET OUT OF VIETNAM Ns OW
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, the
Los Angeles Times, one of the great
newspapers of our country, announced
an important new editorial position Sun-
day when, for the first time, it called
upon President Nixon to reveal his pri-
vate schedule for American military
withdrawal from Southeast Asia, and to
publicly set a deadline for removing not
only the remaining combat troops, but
all American forces, combat and support,
according to a swift and orderly sched-
ule.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the June 7, 1970, editorial of
the Los Angeles Times entitled "Get Out
of Vietnam Now," be printed at this place
in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
Grr OUT OF VIETNAM Now
The time has come for the United States
to leave Vietnam, to leave it swiftly, wholly,
and without equivocation.
The President still has in his hands the
opportunity to effect such an exit. He should
seize the chance now as it presents itself,
for it may not come so readily again.
That the war must be ended, all are agreed.
That, as the President said last week, "peace
Is the goal that unites us," all are also agreed.
Long ago, when we began to help the anti-
Communist Vietnamese against the Commu-
nist Vietnamese, it seemed a worthwhile
thing to do. It seemed cheap, first in dollars,
then in men. No need now to trace the
melancholy history of how, bit by bit, deci-
sion by decision, it became extravagantly ex-
pensive of money, of human lives, of the
tranquillity of this country, of our reputa-
tion abroad.
The President said recently he would not
have this nation become a "pitiful helpless
giant" in the eyes of the world. We are not
entirely pitiful, and not yet helpless. But
we are like a giant lunging about with one
foot in a trap, a spectacle that is discon-
certing to our friends and comforting to our
enemies.
NOT THE CENTER RING
Our great adversary is now, and will re-
main, the Soviet Union.
All questions of American foreign policy
are subordinate to the central one, which
is to prevent nuclear war between the two
super-powers. We shall be engaged against
the Communist world one way or another
all our lives; but in Southeast Asia we are
engaged on the periphery of that world in
a battle obscured by the elements of civil
war and Vietnamese nationalism.
Our response ought to be commensurate
with the challenge: as it was over Berlin, in
the Cuban missile crisis, as it may yet have
to be in the Middle East. But we have so
overresponded in Indochina that it may be
harder for us to respond as we ought should
a greater and more direct challenge arise.
No need now either to delineate at length
the consequences in our own country of the
Indochina war:
The. war is not the sole cause of strife be-
tween parents and children, yet it has in-
flamed that strife.
The war is not the cause of conflict be-
tWeen the races, but it has made that con-
flict more bitter.
The war is not the only reason for our
present economic distress, but it has rendered
that distress harder to treat.
The war alone did not 'create the illness
afflicting our public and private institutions,
but it has brought that illness to the crisis
point.
Like a small wound the war has festered
until its infection has appeared in every
organ of this Republic. Its ache is felt in
every limb; its pain clouds the national judg-
ment. The country is losing heart.
"Peace," therefore, "is the goal that unites
us."
As the President said, our national debate
is not about the goal of peace, but about
"the best means" to achieve it.
JOB CAN BE BETTER DONE
The President has better means at hand
than he is using.
He has promised a withdrawal of American
combat troops?another 150,000 by next
May 1?but the withdrawal in these sum-
mer months has been reduced and after the
150,000 leave there will still be 184,000 troops
left in Vietnam. If Mr. Nixon has a private
schedule for their withdrawal he has not
revealed it.
He has declared that his goal is the total
withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam,
but by making open-ended threats of coun-
ter-action should the enemy attack, he has
made it necessary to make good on those
threats. Thus he has given to the enemy
a large measure of decision over our own
rate of withdrawal.
By the President's move into Cambodia,
and by his encouragement of the Vietnamese
and Thai operations there after we leave,
he has entwined American prestige with the
fate of that unhappy but unimportant little
country.
In declaring that the credibility of Amer-
ican promises elsewhere in the world hangs
on our achieving "a just peace" in Vietnam,
he is making it harder for us to make with
credibility those compromises which every-
one, including the Administration, believes
will eventually have to be made.
The President, in sum, is pursuing, for
reasons which of course he deems excellent,
an ambiguous and contradictory policy?a
policy of which the stated purpose is to leave
Indochina, but in which it is implied that
it may be necessary to stay in Indochina.
The Times believes the United States has
discharged all the responsibilities it has in
Vietnam. The Times believes this nation
has?bravely and honorably?done every-
thing, and more, that could reasonably have
been expected of it.
American men prevented Communist
forces from precipitantly seizing South Viet-
nam. American men, at an enormous cost in
lives, have secured for the South Vietnamese
a reasonable length of time for improve-
ment of their army and consolidation of
their country and government. Short of per-
manent occupation, there is no more Amer-
ica can reasonably be expected to do for
Vietnam.
The President said last week that the Cam-
bodian venture "eliminated an immediate
danger to the security of the remaining
American troops" and "won precious time"
for the South Vietnamese army.
This, then, is the opportuntiy for the
President to accelerate the withdrawal.
THE TIME IS NOW
Let him now publicly set a deadline for
removing not only the remaining combat
troops but all American forces, combat and
support, according to a swift and orderly
schedule. Let him begin to hasten the re-
moval of combat troops this summer. It
ought to be possible to bring about a total
and orderly withdrawal in the next year and
a half at the longest.
S 8541
Such a program of withdrawal would of
course be hazardous. But it would be much
less hazardous than the policy the President
is presently pursuing.
The South Vietnamese would be firmly on
notice that their future is where it belongs?
in their hands. The United States could con-
tinue to support them with arms and money,
should they choose to keep on seeking a
military solution; more likely they would feel
impelled to put their own political house in
order pending that day when they will come
to the political compromise that is the in-
evitable outcome in Indochina.
American troops would be in some danger,
but they are certainly in some danger now,
and the faster they leave, the sooner they
will be in no danger at all.
IMMEDIATE DEPARTURE
We shall not argue, as some do, that rapid
American withdrawal would induce the
North Vietnamese to negotiate; but it is
certain they are not inclined to negotiate
now. On the contrary, the longer we stay in
Vietnam the more inclined the North Viet-
namese will be not to negotiate, and the
readier they may be to mount attacks on our
forces in hope of pushing us out.
Let the President, therefore, remove all
foreign and domestic doubts about our in-
tentions by announcing a speedy departure
from Vietnam.
The President said last week he was deter-
mined to end the war in a way that would
"promote peace rather than conflict through-
out the world . . . and bring an era of re-
conciliation to our people?and not a period
of furious recrimination."
The Times believes that the program of
withdrawal we suggest would bring about
the kind of peace Mr. Nixon spoke of. The
policy suggested here would hasten the end
of one war and put the United States on a
better footing to prevent other more danger-
ous conflicts.
The policy suggested here would certainly
be met with recrimination from some in this
country. But we firmly believe that this
policy would be thankfully approved by the
majority of our people as an honorable con-
clusion to this tnrri le long war.
NEED OR BLICLY ANNOUNCED
FIXED TIMETABLE FOR WITH-
DRAWAL OF ALL AMERICAN
TROOPS FROM SOUTH VIETNAM
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, for
months I, along with other Members of
the Congress, have urged the President
to announce publicly a fixed timetable
for the withdrawal of all American
troops from South Vietnam.
We have urged that it be a timetable
determined solely by the safety of our
men and subject neither to the inflex-
ibility of Hanoi nor the convenience of
Saigon. The South Vietnamese govern-
ment, in its own self-interest, clearly
has no desire to speed an American de-
parture that would leave it to do all the
fighting itself.
The President has never declared
openly that he has a timetable for
withdrawing all of our men?ground,
air, and naval. But he frequently hints
at the existence of an overall adminis-
tration timetable and has talked of a
timetable for removing some of our
ground forces, specifically, those he calls
"ground combat" troops.
Neither the Congress nor the country
knows what the President's timetable is;
it is a private timetable that he has never
made public. But even while he refuses to
reveal his timetable, the President from
time to time suggests that he is meeting
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S 8542 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE Ji,f,ne 8, 1970
it, and is even a bit ahead of schedule.
This strange state of affairs is like a
railroad refusing to publish a timetable,
and then announcing that all its trains
are running on time.
Critics, and they include the Presi-
dent, have claimed it would be disas-
trous to announce a withdrawal timeta-
ble publicly. They say it would remove
any incentive for the enemy to negoti-
ate, that it would tip our military hand
and endanger our war aims and our
men.
But an odd thing has happened in
recent weeks: the President has him-
self taken to publicly announcing time-
tables, though in a circumscribed way.
First he announced on April 20 that
he would would withdraw 150,000 addi-
tional men from South Vietnam within
a year. Then, following his decision to
invade Cambodia, he announced he
would have all men out of there by June
30.
The pending business in the Senate is
the Cooper-Church amendment, which
relates to that timetable announced for
Cambodia. It relates also to the feeling
of many in this body, and in the other
body of Congress, that responsibility for
ending wars as well as beginning them,
responsibility for determining timetables
for orderly termination of wars in which
in which we become involved, and re-
sponsibility for the power of the purse in
connection with our Armed Forces, can,
and indeed must be exercised by this
body to fulfill its constitutional duties.
If the President now finds it proper
to announce a fixed timetable for Cara-
bodia, how can he any longer justify not
announcing one for Vietnam? And if he
can announce a limited timetable for
some of our men in Vietnam, how can he
any longer justify not announcing a total
timetablq for all? -
Just such a fixed, total timetable is set
by the Amendment to End the War,
which I have cosponsored with Senators
MeGoveaN, HATFIELD, GOODELL, and
HUGHES, just such a fixed timetable,
which the President himself set, is the
subject of the pending matter?the
Cooper-Church amendment dealing with
the American incursion in Cambodia.
The Amendment to End the War would
bring about the withdrawal of all our
men from Indochina by June 30, 1971,
safely and systematically, as the Cooper-
Church amendment wated withdraw all
American troops from Cambodia, in ac-
cordance with the President's schedule,
by July 1 of this year.
Passage of the amendment would prove
to the North Vietnamese that we are in
earnest about withdrawing from the war,
completely and soon?not piecemeal and
over an indefinite and dangerous period
of time, as is our present policy. Such
unequivocal assurance would, I believe,
do much toward getting the Paris talcs
back on more productive tracks.
'The amendment would also put the
Thieu-Ky government on notice that we
do not intend to go on fighting and dying
in their cause forever, that they have a
definite deadline by which they either
must work to bring about a negotiated
peace or, If they want to keep on fighting,
shape up and fight without us.
If the President does indeed have a
timetable for total military withdrawal
from Southeast Asia, let him make it
public. If his timetable agrees with ours,
fine. If it differs, then there can be full
and healthy public debate over the differ-
ence and Lull and healthy congressional
participation in, and shared responsibil-
itylor, the final decision.
If the President continues to refuse
to make public his timetable, he leaves
open the inference that he really does
not have one. By his own acts, he has
conceded that national security cannot
be used as an excuse for secrecy in the
matter of a timetable.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence
of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant. legislative clerk proceed-
ed to call the roll.
Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded. '
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
PRESIDENTIAL USE OF THE MILI-
TARY FORCE
Mr. ALLorr. Mr. President, I con-
tinue to receive munerous significant
communications from scholars concerned
about the current debate over the Presi-
dent's powers as Commander in Chief. I
arn anxious to share these communica-
tions with all concerned Senators.
Today it gives me special pleasure to
call to the Senate's attention an illumi-
nating letter I have received from Prof.
Joseph E. Kaltenbach of the University
of Michigan.
Professor Kallenb.ach is a member of
the department of political science at
that university, and is a widely respected
authority on the Presidency. He has
published numerous articles in scholarly
journals. His books include "The Ameri-
can Chief Executive"?Harper & Row,
1966.
I would especially call attention to
two pertinent sections of that distin-
guished book. The first deals with "Presi-
dential Use of Military Force" and is in
the chapter covering pages 512-518. The
second section is on "The President, Con-
gress and the 'War Power? and is in
the chapter covering pages 533-540.
In his letter to me, Professor Kellen-
bach gives useful insight into the back-
ground of the Founding Fathers' under-
standing of the war power. He says:
The current debate in the Senate on the
SC)- called Church-Cooper Amendment, which
would invoke the fiscal powers of Congress,
in effect, to order the withdrawal of Ameri-
can troops from Cambodia by June 30 and
prohibit their redeployment there without
the specific approval of Congress, raises a
question of utmost concern to the people of
this nation as well as to American military
personnel engaged in combat in Southeast
Asia. Legislation of this character, if passed,
would amount to an undisguised vote of lack
of confidence in the President's personal in-
tegrity, good faith and judgment in the dis-
charge of his constitutional duties as Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief. More
than that, if enacted into law in its un-
diluted original form it would constitute
in a most fundamental sense a challenge to
the soundness of our consieutional arrange-
ments regarding the proper division of func-
tions between the President and Congress
with respect to control over military opera-
tions in a sone of combat.
These arrangements have stood the nation
in good stead for nearly two centuries. To un-
balance them with a legislative demarche of
the sort proposed would, in my opinion, be
setting a precedent of gravest consequence.
It is not only the security of the American
forces now in process of being disengaged
from combat in the Southeastern Asia area
but the future security of the nation itself
that is threatened.
With the experience of ihe Revolutionary
Wax behind them, the Fre niers of the Con-
stitution were fully aware of the dangers and
frustrations involved in divided authority in
the direction of military operations, once the
stage of combat conditions has been reached.
For this reason they reached the conclusion,
with a complete absence of dissent, that the
Commander-in-chief role seould be assigned
to the President, by constitutional mandate.
With this clause they placed in his hands
the ultimate responsibility for direction and
deploying American troops in the field. This
provision was characterized by Hamilton in
the Federalist Paper (No. 74.) as one "the pro-
priety of (which] is so evident in itself" that
he felt "little need be said to explain or en-
force it:'
The assignment to Coneress of authority
through the Constitution to raise and sup-
port armies, to provide for and maintain a
navy, to declare war, and to appropriate
funds in pursuance of these purposes reserves
to it powers of a very fundamental nature
also, so far as the national military establish-
ment is concerned. These are powers which,
in conjunction with the giant of authority,
in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution to
pass laws necessary and proper to implement
these and other powers vested in Congress or
in other branches of the national govern-
ment, equip the Congress with a vast reser-
voir of constitutional authority to legislate in
the area of national security where military
concerns are involved. But surely the Com-
mander-in-Chief clause must stand in some
degree as a constraint upon Congressional
power in this connection where field opera-
tions of American military forces are con-
cerned.
Professor Kallenbach is especially per-
suasive in applying his understanding of
the Presidency to the realities of the cur-
rent policy of disengagement in Viet-
nam.
The constitutional issue of where the line
should be drawn between the authority of
Congress to shape American military defense
policy, on the one hand, end of the Presi-
dent to direct military operations in an
actual theatre of military operations on the
other, is not one that can or should be re-
solved by creating a constitutional crisis, in
the fatuous expectation that the issue can
be eventually passed upon in a definitive way
by the courts through some sort of "test"
case. The nation cannot afford the luxury of
that method of resolvine a difference of
opinion between the legislative and execu-
tive over the appropriate 'limner of effectu-
ating American military iiisengagement in
South Vietnam.
The President has committed himself and
his administration, so far is words and ac-
tions can do so, to a policy of step-by-step
disengagement of American combat forces in
this area. The sorties by South Vietnamese
and American forces into Cambodia have as
their clearly stated military tactical purpose
the furtherance of that policy. For Congress
to seek to write into law a tactical blue-
print and time-table for carrying out this,
or any other aspect of the widely advertised
and nationally accepted overall strategy of
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June 8, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?Extensions of Remarks
tending that the violent left and right are
e enemies of all the rest of us.
hat, then?and finally, now?can, or
sho d, Congress, and this particular Con-
gress n, attempt to do?
Well, gain without expecting to enjoy
your ful upport for my answer, I believe
Congress d this Congressman?must do
what we ca at this late date, to broaden
the base of ? blic discussion and under-
standing of our ? ainful few alternatives in
Indochina.
In such an, effo you, of course, have a
part to play and, i u have not yet written
me to give me the eneflt of your views
about Vietnam, and ow Cambodia and
Laos?though, looking a y backlog of Mail,
I tend to think I have b now heard from
every person in this 33rd ngressional Dis-
trict!?you are still invited ? do so. Partici-
patory democracy, as we ha e known it,
demands no less of you in any vent, for it
Is now undergoing in this Nation ts severest
test ever.
And I shall listen to you as, all da
day?as a member of a six-man,
committee I -helped form in the Hou
such purpose?I listened to student r
sentatives from some 25 of our college c
puses; this continuing effort having be
designed by us to encourage persons in th
age group to believe that they can, an
must, work within and through our system
of government?and only through it?to
bring about, if they can by the forces of
reason and logic, the changes in policy they
demand.
But, you may well ask, what at this time
is the purpose of all this?
What good will it do for you?or for some
student?to give me or any Congressman, orhe
even t President, the benefit of your views?
Won't the President?with or without the
concurrence of Congress?still do what he
wants, or what he thinks best, anyway?
And, to tell the truth, some of you?for
you have written me along such lines?seem
to feel that the President, whoever he is,
ought to be left alone to do what he wants;
a sort of "father-knows-best" attitude based
apparently, on the theory that only the Pres-
ident has all the "facts."
Well, when it comes to the straight-out
defense of these United States, that's about
the way it has to be?given the realities of
the nuclear age in which we live; and I see
no way around those realities
However, when it comes, to nn-declared
wars or "Presidential" wars?or "political"
wars, if you will, like the one in Vietnam,
Where the defense of this Nation in the way
the framers of our Constitution evident
thought about it is involved in only t
most-obscure way?I don't think any s h
open-ended grant of authority to any
? dent is Wise. Ilesides which, one of the w ht-
ler lessons we should have learned fro let-
nam Is that no President can, for lo carry
the people with him in pursuit of e pur-
poses of such a war without event ally em-
periling the future of representat e govern-
ment, itself.
I therefore believe?as I trust ou believe?
that some way must be foun ? for restoring
-the war-making power for uch purposes
under our Constitution to he representa-
tives of the people; mean g the Congress
? of the United States.
The Central problem in rying to do so now
Is complicated by the f'. the we are already
up to our ears in such a war; a war?need
we be reminded?that r. Nixon inherited,
but one we have had very reason to believe
Mr. Nixon wants to' see ended just as soon
as possible and, generally, for about the same
reasons I have already stated in my own
regard. .
Now, I want?by my votes and such influ-
ence as I may have?to keep him moving in
the direction of withdrawal. I cannot sup-
port?nor do I think a majority of the Amer-
ican people would support?any widening of
Thurs-
d-hoc
for
re-
the war, or any lasting escalation of our par-
ticipation in the conflict.
This is why I have expressed my reserva-
tions about the incursion into Cambodia--
the public reaction to which the President
seems to have misjudged. This is also why I
have already voted?week before last in the
House?for language to be added by way of
amendment to a defense-procurement bill
which, though not the best vehicle for such
purpose, 'would have expressed the sense of
Congress that the President should have, as
he has promised, all of our troops out of
Cambodia before July 1st, as well as a sug-
gestion to Mr. Nixon that, before repeating
any such move, he should first seek Congres-
sional concurrence.
That vote?which I would repeat again to-
day?has been applauded by some and vigor-
ously condemned by others as, somehow,
showing my "disloyalty" to the President. As
one who has strongly supported the Presi-
dent in other ways, I don't see it at all in that
latter light. I don't doubt the President's
sincerity or his motives?but I do doubt
even as I did in Lyndon Johnson's case, t
wisdom of some of the military advice t
has been offered and apparently accepte ? by
him. Though I hope and pray, like yo , for
the full success of this new effort?s. much
so that, after it is over, it may en' le the
President to announce a speed- in the
withdrawal of the 150,000 men to e brought
ome this year?I have tended, to now, to
w this effort as just one m. e (and this
o a massive one) "searc. and-destroy"
nth., on of the type we trie at such great
cost nd such little, lastin success for far
too 1 g in years past in ietnam.
At t s point, I don't ow whether Con-
gress w yet adopt an such precautionary
limitatio ? on the Pres ent's powers as Com-
mander-in hief or 'ot. Perhaps it doesn't
matter, for t is pr ? able that the force of
public opini ?b itself?would from now
on prevent hi om repeating such an ex-
ercise without, least, first obtaining Con-
gressional con
But what o er tions may Congress also
be called up n to co sider along comparable
lines?
There e numerous ossibilities, ranking
from an nlikely vote an actual declara-
tion of ar on North Vie am (which a Sen-
atoria aspirant in this te Is pushing to
mak Congress "face up to he issue"), con-
sid ation of which I thin would be mad-
n s under the existing circu stances, to an
en-unlikelier vote on a res ution to im-
each both the President and e President
for having committed (as stated the Con-
stitution) "Treason . . (and) ? her high
Crimes and Misdemeanors." Despite he fact
that I have recently received from arpur
College students and faculty a petitio bear-
ing a purported 2,372 signatures dema ? ing
my support for such a move, this, I ? ust
. say, is utter nonsense. At worst, the P
dent?with the Vice President as o
looker?has been guilty of bad judgmen
which is yet to be proved; at best, he deserves
in this difficult time all our understanding
and support, as well as our guidance insofar
as God gives any of us wisdom to guide him.
To all of which one might add that, should
such a move somehow succeed, the Nation,
would for now be left with Speaker John
McCormack, of Massachusetts, as its Presi-
dent?an event I am confident even Mr.
Nixon's most-violent critics do not really
wish to promote.
However, what I undoubtedly shall have
to consider?and this in the near future?is
language by way of amendment to be added
to the forthcoming Defense Appropriation
Bill for Federal fiscal year 1971 (beginning on
July 1st), which would require the President
to have all our forces out of Vietnam, and
the Indochina area, before July 1st of 1971.
This is the so-called "McGovern-Hatfield-
Goodell-Hughes" proposal in the Senate?
its companion piece in the House being H.
E 5343
Res. 1000, which some local groups are vig-
orously supporting.
Though Congress has never, in its 181
years, so used its ultimate "power-over-the-
purse" to end a shooting war, there is no
doubt of the Congressional right to do so.
However, I have grave reservations about
the wisdom of doing so.
I am for withdrawal, paced to "Vietnam-
ization"?and I woud like to see us make,
now, a new effort at negotiations again?but
setting an inflexible deadline for withdrawal,
in a "hang-the- 'nsequences" mood, would
seem to final end whatever slim chance
there still is or obtaining a political settle-
ment; unl , of course?and this needs to be
said in ness?such a deadline might move
the Sa on government to do some needed
negot ting on its own, at least with the
larg non-Communist groups within South
Vb nam, itself. We have made only pain-
f ly slow progress?even as with promoting
d-reform?in getting Thieu-and-Ky to
broaden the base of their government, but
until they try the latter as they now are
the former there is little chance of our leav-
ing behind a government in Saigon that can
survive.
Be all this as it may?and I have taken
far too much of your time?I do not think
this Congress will mandate a "forced" with-
drawal on the President. But it ought al-
ternatively consider, I suggest, action some-
what along the lines offered in a Concurrent
Resolution I have submitted with, now, some
thirty House colleagues. This resolution calls
firmly for a national policy of withdrawal
from Vietnam?of all our forces?but leaves
the mechanics of doing so free of any dead-
line and flexible enough so that our remain-
ing forces face a minimum of danger, and
no military or political vacuum is created
overnight.
This resolution also states that it is in
our national interest to work to achieve a
political settlement and, in the meantime, to
avoid enlarging the present conflict, and
finally declares that Congress?as it should?
from now on ". . . expects to exercise its
Constitutional responsibility of consultation
with the President on all matters, now and
henceforth, affecting grave national deci-
sions of war and peace."
The precise language of all this could ob-
viously be improved, but I see it as at least
a proper beginning, as well as an effort to
unite Congress?and, behind them, the peo-
ple?with the President in the all-important
task of extricating this Nation from
Indochina.
Perhaps what I have offered you is no
answer. Surely some of you have already
rejected it as such. But, as these are not
easy days, so is it also true that there are
no "easy" answers?and equally true that
silence of the sort that, on the part of too
many of us these past seven years, led us
down the wrong pathway, would be the worst
sin of all.
So, I hay tried tonight to tell you "like it
is"?so far as I am concerned?over Viet-
nam; urging you, at the same time, to share
he burden of decision with me for, in the
d, after those decisions are made, it is
the people" who must live with them, as
we as with ourselves, our children and our
fell human beings, throughout this so
fragi world.
ROBISO SUPPORTS PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION
TO IN STIGATE TRAGEDIES AT KENT STATE
AND JAC SON STATE
Rep. Ho rd W. Robison has announced
that he has onsored a Resolution in the
House of Re esentatives expressing- the
sense of Congre that the President should
establish a co ssion to examine the re-
cent events at K t State, Jackson State,
and other college c ? puses. A similar reso-
lution has been co- ponsored by well over
forty other members of the House. In sub.
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E 5344 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks June 8, 1970
mitting this resolution, the Congressman
made the following statement:
"Anyone Who watches television or reads
a newspaper knows that oUr campuses have
become battlegrounds for the conflicting
factions in our increasingly polarized soci-
ety. The situation is becoming ever mere
serious and tense. We are not now dealing
with a mere handful c:f students throwing
rocks, but with large crowds of youth?end
with policemen and National Guard troops
with bayonets and live ammunition. The
armed confrontation resulted in the sense-
less deaths earlier this month of four stu-
dents at Kent State and of two students at
Jackson State. It is justified to ask, where
wilt it all end if we do not develop better
ways of dealing with the dissatisfaction and
frustrations of our people?
"I am as disturbed as anyone else about
the small minority of college youth who
practice violence on our c:atnpuses?wkio, in
the process, seriously impair the freedom and
rights of their fellow student:. But it is
equally disturbing that authorities have
found it necessary to respond to random
rock throwing with random rifts fire. There
is no logic in either eat; only horror and
irrationality,
"The value of a Presidential commission
at this point is that it could study the
events at Kent State, Jackson State, and
other campuses and present to the American
people an objective analysis of the shoot-
ings. Hopefully, it would also make specific
recommendations and set forth reasonable
guidelines for the handling of future cam-
pus disturbances.
"It should be obvious that stringent guide-
lines are long overdue. Even if one accepts
the explanation offered by both the National
Guard at Kent State and, the police at Jack-
son State that a sniper's fire precipitated
the outbreak of shooting, there is little
justification for the bloody response.
"Are we really to believe that the best
way to deal with a rooftop sniper is to fire
into an unarmed crowd on. the ground? That
is what the official explanation at Kent State
seems to imply. Are we ready to accept the
fact that the way to react to an unseen
sniper at night is to pump over a hundred
rounds into a women's dormitory occupied
by hundreds of students? The police in Jack-
son, Mississippi, seem to be suggesting that.
"I do not accept that, and I believe that
the vast majority of the American people?
after proper reflection?will not accept that
either, I hope, therefore, that we will have a
good deal of public support for establishing
the commission I have recommended. The
commission could perform a valuable public
service by carefully evaluating the events on
our campuses over the past few weeks; and
also by suggesting viable regulations to in-
sure that such tragedies do hot re-occur."
SAIGON REGIME TORTURES THOSE
WHO SEEK PEACE
HON. DONALD M. FRASER
OF MINNESOTA
IN THE HOUSE OF PEPRESMNTATIVES
Monday, June 8, 1970
Mr. FRASER. Mr. Speaker, on May 30,
the New York Times noted the occupa-
tion of the Veteran's Ministry in Saigon
by 200 disabled South Vietnamese vet-
erans. On the same day: thousands of
students and Buddhist monks demon-
strated at the state funeral for Phan
Khac Suu, former South Vietnamese
Chief of State. The Thieu-Ky govern-
ment responded to the veteran's sit-in
and the student demonstration with tear
gas and clubs.
It has been brought to my attention,
Mr. Speaker, that students, disabled war
veterans, Buddhist monks and laymen
have been holding demonstrations in
Saigon almost every day since mid-April.
In addition to tear gas and clubs, many
demonstrators have also been subjected
to torture and imprisonment.
These demonstrations against the
Thieu-Ky government and the continu-
ation of the Indochina war have not
been adequately reported in the Ameri-
can press.
The following statement from the Fel-
lowship of Reconciliation and an article
by Don Luce, former head of Interna-
tional Voluntary Services in Vietnam and
coauthor of '`Vietnam: The Unheard
Voices," describe the brutal and repres-
sive response of the South Vietnamese
Government to these sincere demands
for reform and peace.
I believe every Member of Congress
should be aware of the repressive nature
of the Thieu-Ky regime which claims to
be our ally in the search for peace.
The staterne:nt and article follow:
STUDENT PROTESTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
While the attention of the American pub-
lic has been riveted on the protests and
demonstrations of American students and
other anti-war forces, a sequence of equally
significant and far more hazardous actions in
South Vietnam has gone almost entirely un-
reported and unnoticed.
For more than two months, protests
against the war and the government of Gen-
erals 'Men, Ky and Khiem have occurred
almost daily under the leadership of students,
disabled war veterans, Buddhist monks and
laymen, and Catholic priests, and have led
to the beating, imprisonment and torture of
hundreds, perhaps thousands, of their par-
ticipants.
The Thieu governnient is facing a crisis
comparable to that preceding the fall of Pres-
ident Ngo Dinh in 1961, and has reacted with
predictably ferocious repression. Yet the
demonstrations continue. When police sur-
rounded the Cambodian embassy in Saigon
that had been 'occupied by 400 students in
protest against the Cambodian adventures,
and refused to allow other students to j)ass
through to bring them food, members of the
House of Representatives carried the food to
the students.
Important Saigon newspapers. including
tin, sang, Dong nai and Dune Nita Nam have
challenged the omnipresent censorship by
carrying stories of these actions, with photo-
graphs, on their front pages. It is reported
that, as a consequence, 40 of the last 48 is-
sues of tin sang alone have been confiscated
by the police.
All universities and high schools have been
closed; arrests have multiplied, and the most
brutal forms of torture inflicted on the pro-
testing students. Repression has been char-
acteristic of the Thieu government since its
formation, but according to eyewitnesses, is
worse now than ever.
Yet almost none of this has been reported
in the American press. The U.S. embassy in
Saigon refused even to see a delegation of
American relief workers protesting American
collusion in the repression.
We align ourselves with these students, and
will seek every way possible to identify with
them more directly. We call on the peace
movement in the United States, and particu-
larly the students, to and means to publicize
and reinforce these actions by their Viet-
namese counterparts.
We remonstrate with the American press
for its failure to report and interpret these
events to their American readers. Nothing so
clearly reveals the nature of this war as the
fact that the Thieu government is so strenu-
ously opposed by these non-NLF, non-Com-
munist people in their own country.
We plead with the officials of our own gov-
ernment, at every level, to withdraw support
from this tyrannical puppet we have created,
and take the burden of the war off the backs
of the Vietnamese people.
TORTURE IN SA/GoN
(By Don Luse)
It is now known beyond any doubt that
the Saigon police are subjecting Vietnamese
students to brutal torture in an Twiempt to
stifle student dissent against the war and the
government. On April 21, ten of these young
people were released. Their condition was
pitiable but not nearly as grave as that of
some whom they left behind in prison.
Do Huu But lies in semi-shock in a labora-
tory at the College of Agriculture which has
been converted into a dispensary for the ten
released prisoners. His fingernails are black-
ened from having pins pushed underneath.
He is nearly deaf from having had soapy
water forced into his ears., after which they
were beaten. Miss Que Huong, a philosophy
teacher at Doan Thi Diem high school in Can
Tho, forces a small Smile tthen visitors come.
Her knees are swollen three times their nor-
mal size, and black and blue welts cover her
thin arms. She was completely undressed in
front of several policemen who watched and
drank whisky while she was beaten. Her
fiance, Nguyen Ngoc Phong, was brought into
the room to watch in an attempt to get him
to sign confession 'papers.
After five weeks in jail. Emu Hoang Theo,
denuty chairman of the Van Hanh University
student association, is one of the few stu-
dents in good enough physical condition to
give an extended interview:
"For the first three days, the police beat
me continuously," he said "They didn't ask
me any questions or to sign anything. They
just beat my knee caps and neck with billy
clubs, then hit me with chair legs until I
was unconscious. When I regained conscious-
ness, they beat me again. Really, after three
days, they asked me to star a paper that they
had already written. I wouldn't sign it, so
they beat me some more." Than said he
doesn't know why he was arrested or why
he was released. Some observers believe that
the government released the tortured stu-
dents to frighten other students who have
been demonstrating against government re-
pression in large numbers in recent weeks. In
any event, the torture of Lull Hoang Thao
continued day after day, increasing in feroc-
ity and variety. The details of what they did
to aim are sickening.
"Finally," he said, "they injected medicine
into me and took my hand and signed a paper.
It said that I had had liaison with the
Commun is ?s."
Dr. Nguyen Dinh Mai. who is attending the
ten students, said he did not yet know the
full extent of their injuries.
"When they regain their strength, we will
take them to one of the large hospitals for
x-rays and thorough medical examinations,"
he said.
But the students are concerned about the
many others who are still in jail. The condi-
tion of three of them, who were reported
"too ill" to appear with other students for
trial in Saigon April 20, was described by the
newspaper Tin Sang (Morning News) on
April 11. One lay near death from torture slif-
fared for refusing to sign a statement that
police had found weapons and explosives in
his house. Two others were in grave condi-
tion with paralyzed legs in both eases and
other serious injuries. While refusing to com-
ment on its accuracy; a government spokes-
man, Nguyen Ngoc Huyen called the article
"objectionable" and had the paper confis-
cated?for the ninth time in less than a
month.
Article 7 of the Constitution of South Viet-
nam specifically prohibits the use of torture
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if necessary, penalties for industries who
or of confessions obtained by torture, threat
, or force, Yet signed statements obtained in
June 8, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Kemar/es E 5345
NEW COUNCIL
For example, your new Council on En-
vironmental Quality could be put to work
looking over the operations of the Federal
government. The Council might start by ask-
ing the Corps of Engineers to justify their
'depredations of the landscape; the Trans-
Department, to establish a better al-
lotment of funds between their lavish high-
way construction grants and their less than
adequate aid to public transport; the Ag-
riculture Department, to cut back subsidies
that encourage farmers to misuse land and
to keep on using harmful pesticides.
Another point of investigation should be
Robert Finch and his Department of Health,
Education and Welfare. HEW is, or will
shortly become, the custodian of $45 million
in public funds to be spent on cleaning the
air we breathe.
I have serious doubts about how effectively
and efficiently the money is being used. I
have made a rather extensive study of how
the funds have been allotted to various
projects and after considering them, I think
you might also be convinced that they merit
some looking into.
_HEW AND ENGINES
HEW has stated that it doubts the inter-
nal combustion engine can be "cleaned up"
enough to meet their standards and claims
"there is a lack of motivation within the
(automotive) industry for it to mount a sig-
nificant effort to develop serious competition
to the ICE." politan areas. The land should then be leased
On that basis, HEW has cancelled their to others for the sole purpose of creating
meeting with the automotive industries rep- recreational areas. Even if you don't agree
resentatives, which might have proved very this is the way to stop urban sprawl, people
informative. The industry itself is well aware need large green belts to furnish sufficient
of the need to eliminate pollutants and Sc- oxygen in order to breathe and recreational
cording to one representative of The Big areas to free themselves from the confining
Three it will be done to everyone's satisfac- city.
tion "within five years," with a minimum of AIR POLLUTION
GOSt to the car buyer and the taxpayer. When you, Mr. President, think the econ-
It is unfortunate, however, that HEW only can afford it, I would encourage Federal
cannot accept Detroit's plan and would spending first in the area of air pollution. In
rather have their own "Big Project." California, one million trees are dying and
oses ""--'-'--a $21 7 million on $200 million worth of crops were lost last year
contribute to the destruction of our coun-
' this way are used extensively in the trials of try's resources. The government should en-
political prisoners. In the case of the stu- courage large-scale service companies to
dents, the government denies that it has switch from gasoline to natural gas as a fuel
tortured or manhandled them but will not for their fleets of trucks, as PG&E did this
comment on their obvious disfigurement last month without government pressure.
when they appear in court. PG&E reports that this switch eliminated
The gravity of the situation has led sev- as much as 90 percent of the pollutants con-
ofleading Vietnamese to come to the aid tamed in their regular truck emissions
of the students. Father Nguyen Huy Lich, a PG&E also stated that natural gas itself is
respected Dominican priest, has investigated safer than regular fuels and in the long run
reports of torture and obtained substantia- it should be cheaper also.
tion from nurses and doctors who have the With some encouragement, business could
job of treating prisoners during the day in make pollution elimination a profitable en-
preparation for another night of torture. On terprise. "How to make America smoother,
March 31, Father Lich and seven other priests cleaner, quieter longer?" I'm sure with some
called upon the Saigon government to pro- strong prodding, the packing industries could
vide humane treatment of its prisoners. come up with "bio-degradable" packing,
Others, like former Minister Vu Van Man, meaning containers which would rot away
Vietnam's foremost legal authority, have naturally, to replace the mountains of in-
joined *file struggle against torture in the destructable no-deposit, no-return trash
prisons. which is staring us in the face.
On April 21, Leo Dorsey, a volunteer social GREEN BELTS
rnittee in Vietnam, went to the U.S. Embassy Another type of land pollution is the re-
worker with the Unitarian Universalist Com-
to request a private interview with Ambas- sult of exploitation of the land for the sake
sador Ellsworth Bunker for himself and a of progress. Farmlands are being eaten up
small group of American volunteers con- with taxes, housing and freeways. According
cerned with the fact that U.S. equipment is to Irwin Luckman, the only way to prevent
supporting the Saigon government's re- this urban sprawl is to maintain green belts
sion of its people. The tear gas grenades the between large urban areas.
police use, for example, are made by Federal To implement this plan, when the nation's
Laboratories Inc. in Saltsburg, Pa., and are inflationary status goes down, the govern-
part of the U.S. assistance program to Viet- t should buy land between great metro-
nam. Mr. Dorsey's group was unable to meet
with the ambassador or his deputy.
THE ENVIRONMENT?HERE IS
WHAT TO DO
,
HON. JEROME R. WALDIE
OF CALIFORNIA
IN TI-12 HOUSE OF REPRUSENTATIVES
Monday, June 8, 1970 .
Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, high school the development of "Rankine-cycle" engines, because of a lack of clean air.
of what able if they consulted Bill Lear, who already Industries should be encouraged by Fed-
asked to write their suggestions
students of San Francisco were recently over a five-year period. It might. prove profit-
- eral subsidies to create more byproducts from
best advice could be given the President has spent $4.5 million on steam and con
their waste products and, if possible, a sys-
as to how best protect our environment eluded that "the most can be said about the
ile engine is that it is rank." tem could be achieved where numerous en-
and preserve our natural resources. Rankine-cyc g terprises could pool their wastes and jointly
As high school and college students make use of a nuclear reactor which would
across the Nation have deep concern for
the protection of the enivronrnent, the
response to this contest conducted by
the San Francisco Electrical Industry
Trust was heavy.
The winner was Miss Diane Lynn Cal-
den of Presentation High School.
Miss Calden's suggestions and com-
ments are exellent and I think my col-
leagues in the Congress would benefit
by what she Says:
Now, HERE'S WHAT TO DO . . ?
Mr. President, as you yourself stated in
your State of the Union address, our goal in
the '70s should be "restoring nature to its
natural state." This takes money. It has.
been estimated that it will take 4 percent
of the GNP, nearly $40 billion annually, for
the United States to even hold its own
against pollution.
The existence of a suitable environment
is necessary for our very existence and while
you agree with this you are still holding
hack money that Congress appropriated last
year to fight pollution. According to you,
fighting inflation has more urgent priority
for the moment.
Since you are cif this mind, my first sug-
gestion to you is that the least you could do
is get started on environmental remedies
which don't require heavy Federal spend-
ing.
EXOTIC BATTERIES
Another $12.2 million will be fed into the
development of electric propulsion systems;
not for the development of a decent fuel
cell as you might expect, but on exotic bat-
teries. Even if they do develop then, what
are they going to do with them?
New York has already had one massive
power failure. What would happen if every-
one plugged in their cars for recharging at
night? Even by eliminating the pollution
produced by cars with the electric car, you
would increase the pollution caused by the
electric power generating plants. Little is ac-
complished when you move the sonfte of
pollution from lots of cars to a couple of
power plants.
Only $7 million was proposed for the gas
turbine investigation, but of course there erations such as this could also be use
are a lot of people around who already know help farmers in places like California's Im-
about building efficient gas turbines. HEW penal Valley, where millions of dollars in
even plans to pay someone a few million crops were lost last year because the salt
F.',. the development of things like flywheel content of the irrigation water is too high.
roduce at
eliminate the waste material and p
the same time, enough power to operate all
of the plants involved.
The other large areas of pollution, water,
also requires substantial federal aid to be
overcome. The prime source of water pollu-
tion is industry and this is where my sugges-
tion of standards and penalties would come
in. What would be far more effective than
penalties, however, would be giving indus-
try something to do with their liquid wastes.
My suggestion is to help communities,
especially highly industrialized ones, to build
sewage treatment plants like the one at In-
dian Creek Reservoir in California. This op-
eration produces reclaimed water which is
above the U.S. drinking water standards. Op-
buses which the Swiss have already been AND NOISE
using and I'm sure that they would impart
A third area of pollution which requires
their acquired knowledge for a lot less than Federal aid before any notable progress can
a million dollars. be made is noise pollution. In the downtown
NATURAL GAS areas of large cities the noise is trapped by
- Strangely enough, HEW has tossed in only tall city buildings and amplified to the point
$700,000 for the Sterling engine, the most that it can cause damage to the human ear.
probable replacement of the present auto- Sail Francisco's new buses operate at about
mobile engine. 105 decibels; that is 10 decibels above the
Another non-inflationary measure would safety level.
be for Washington to set up standards and. Quiet mass transit seems to be the only
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E 5346 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?Extensions of Remarks June 8, 1970
solution. Constant exposure to noises at the
levels which now exist in IXIOSt modern cities
result in physical and psychological harm
to the human body. The Transportation De-
partrnent has. made an excellent first step
in trying to help cities such as San Fran-
cisco find a solution to their noise prob-
terns.
Many people seem to think that "no-
growth" is the solution to all of our en-
vironmental problems. This theory ik faulty
by the very fact that It will take even more
technology and wealth to undo what our
-technology and wealth have done to the
envirenment,
But More important than numerous proj-
ects is that a new awareness must he born
which realizes that it is not a right of
affluency to squander and spoil our resources_
but it is a threat to it. "a country which
has Deng taken pride in 'conquering nature
is now learning to live with it."
TWO COMMENCEMENT ADDRESSES
HON. BILL NICHOLS
OF Aroiroase,
IN THE HOUSE Oe' REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, June 8, 1970
Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Speaker, one of the
most enjoyable duties that I have as a
Congressman is to deliver the com-
mencement addresses at several high
schools in my district each year. It is a
pleasure to see our young people ending
their high school education and going
either on to college or into the business
world:
This year, I was invited to speak at the
Pell City High School's commencement
exercises. I was particularly impressed by
the valedictory and salutatory addresses
delivered by members of the graduating
class. Because of the timeliness of these
address and the views expressed by these
young people, I would like to insert them
in the RECORD at this point:
GET INVOLVED
When Nathan Hale said, "I regret teat I
have but one life to give for my country,'" lie
became involved. When George Washingtm
consented to serve as President of a new-
born nation, he became involved. When
Franklin D. Roosevelt began to jerk the
American economy out of a severe depres-
sion, he became involved. When Ralph Nader
acted as self-appointed overseer of consumer
interests, he became involved. When Richard
Nixon decided to send United States troops
into Cambodia to stamp out the kindling
fires of Communist takeover there, he became
involved. Can we, as United States citizens,
do any less?
It is so easy to become uninvolved. :ft is
possible to lie on one's living room couch,
exclaim over the horrors of war as reflected
on the newsreels, push a button on the auto-
matic channel changer, and watch reruns of
the "I Love Lucy" show. Or, one could listen
to reports of highay fatalities on the radio,
and then research for another station that
is playing the latest "Three Dog Night" ;rec-
ord. Or, perhaps upon scanning the front
page on one's newspaper and reading of a
violent demonstration, one quickly flips
through to find the funnies. And, upon arriv-
ing at one's favorite swimming spot at a lake
or stream and finding the stench of pollution
unbearable, it is possible to merely begin
swimming at a public pool. But, these end
other problems confront people every day,
and I contend that it le not right to assume
a passive attitude toward them. In order for
these or any other problems to be solved,
someone must be intereeted in solving them.
Someone must be involved.
To be involved does not necessarily mean
to picket the city hall daily or to take part
in a demonstration at the local university,
but it does mean to be concerned with things
which happen in one's own community and
in the world also. We, who are almost high
school graduates, have a responsitility . to
learn what we can. about world, national,
state, and local affairs because in approxi-
mately three years, we will have a voice in
them. A citizen who does not bother to care
about the problems surrounding him is not
a very effective voice in choosing the right
officials and in making the right decisions.
An informed citizenry is the key to an effec-
tive government, and an informed citizenry
Is one which is concerned, knowledgeable,
and, above all, involved.
I've mentioned the word "involved.' many
times, but perhaps some are asking the ques-
tion "What is she talking about? How can I
become involved in anything?" I submit to
you that "involved" covers a wide range of
meaning. For the past twelve years, all of us
have been involved in the take o'f obtaining
a high school education. But, after this night,
the paths of our lives will divert in many dif-
ferent directons, and we will no lorger be
known as a senior class but as 138 separate
individuals. Some of us are going to college
or trade school; others are beginning to pave
their own way in life by holding a job; still
others have chosen to be married. But, no
matter what path we choose, each of es has
the responsibility of recognizing problems
which are around 'us and doing our hest to
correct them. However, before deciding
whether or not to be involved in a certain
problem, it is imperative that one think
about every aspect of that problem, weigh
the pros and cons in one's mind, and act
upon his decision only when he feels very
deeply in his heart that his decision is right.
After deciding to become involved, his ac-
tions must be constructive; the actions of
the men fighting in southeastern Asia is con-
structive; lying down in the streets is not.
Forking out a few extra tax dollars to fight
the pollution of our environment is con-
structive; protest rallies are not.
In conclusion, I would like to say that
each of us has a responsibility to ourselves,
our community, and our country. This re-
sponsibility is to be aware of the problems
around us, to be concerned enough to search
for a solution to these problems, and to be
involved enough to be willing to work to-
ward the correction Of these problems. In
other words, Get Involved!
---
SALUTATORY ADDRESS BY CHARLES DENNIS
ASSOTT
Faculty and friends, I wish to extend to
each of you the warmest of welcomes and to
express our appreciation for the support and
assistance that you have given us for so
many years. Through our years of public
education you have guided us with patience
mingled with hope. Now, as we await the final
steps of graduation, there are no words capa-
ble of expressing our gratitude.
We are venturing into a new world--a
frightening world?a world we have had no
part in creating. But we possess one great
advantage over any human being in our
country. That advantage is being an Ameri-
can citizen. We will journey along life's path
with the same basic rights granted to each
and every individual. How we use these
rights determines our destiny.
With each right, however, there is a respon-
sibility; and it is this burden that weighs
heavily upon our shoulders?responsibility
which some of us have never known. 'The
very word frightens us. After tonight, how-
ever, we must meet the challenge, we unset
grow up, we must face responsibilities, and
we must make our. own decisions.
We will make our own decisions and we
will live with the results of our choices for
the rest of our lives. But we, at least, have
the right to make the decisions. We are
American citizens living in a free society un-
der a democratic government?a government
which cannot exist without rights, respon-
sibilities, and decisions. Human sense is still
the lifeline of this great, country even though
we do live in an age of mechanized brains and
computers. Indeed, this country is run on
"the will of man."
And in the same sense our society thrives
on "the will of man." Our country can only
be as great as we want it to be. Our rights and
responsibilities can be fulfilled only if we
want to fulfill them. And, more importantly.
our future lives can only be as good as we
wish them to be. We, as Americans, possess
the rights and abilities, and it is our-duty to
our country and to our personal lives to use
them.
Through our basic training in high school
we have learned to forgive, to share, and to
posseas. But most importantly, we have
learned to become involved?involved in pep
rallies, sports events, school elections, and
many other extra-curricular activities. This
involvement has helped us to realize the
democratic way of life: this life of "better to
give of yourself than receive." This admoni-
tion of being an American with rights and
responsibilities, this thought of being a part
of a country, a state, a city, and even a
school. We are ready to meet the challenge,
and rthink we will succeed. And so it is to-
night that I, as do the oilier Seniors, welcome
you "on the first day of the rest of our Dees."
Thank you.
NATURAL GAS SHORTAGES
HON. JOHN R. RAR1CK
OF LOUISIANA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, June 8, 1970
Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, the short-
age in natural gas remains unsolved?
it _approaches crisis,
Unless we exert some leadership to en-
courage the FPC bureaucracy to act I
fear we can expect a mounting wave of
dissatisfaction from our people at home
when services, homes, and a lot of jobs
start being interrupted because of a lack
of natural gas.
Nor will the people at home be satis-
fied to learn that we are awaiting inter-
national agreements to obtain even
emergency supplies from foreign coun-
triAes. most interesting and timely article
by Mrs. Shirley Scheibla appeared in
Barron's magazine for June 1, 1970, en-
titled "Simmering Crisis," I include her
article, as follows:
SIMMERING CRISIS: THE FPC HAS PRODUCED
NO SOLTJTION TE THE SHORTAGE OF NATURAL
GAS
(By Shirley Scheibla)
"When I talked with you three years ago,
I said our pricing of natural gas was a big
fat mess. Now it has become a big fat crisis."
(Carl E. Bagge, FPC Commissioner.)
WASHINGTON.?Members of any regulatory
body, notably the Federal Power Commission,
tend to avoid being quoted by name regard-
ing their views on matters pending before
them. However. FPC Commissioner Carl E.
Bagge feels that "someone has to stick his
neck out to make the public aware of the
Impending very serious national shortage of
natural gas due to the Commission's control
of producer prices."
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
Mark Twain said: "Soap and education are
not as sudden as a massacre, but they are
more deadly in the long run."
I speak today on that deadly subject of
education.
If you put yourself in the position of Mark
Twain's audie ce, his words become not just
funny but poig ntly so. He was a mid-west-
erner, addressing id-westerners at the end
of the Nineteenth Century. Many of them
had heard about th great Indian massacres
from their parents. oh sudden death was
still close enough to ca se a shudder.
The old farmer readink Twain by his kero-
sene lamp on Saturday ftght had some in-
stantaneous reactions to e words "soap"
and "education": they wer luxuries to him.
He was still struggling to survive in the
terrible harshness of the ce ral plains. All
day long he had sweated in t fields. If lie
had the time for a bath (and t water, and
a tub to squeeze into) he vrou still have
doubts about the soap?canal ly store-
boughtn step. First, it was expen lye, and
second, it might smell nice. He Lea d that
nice smell for himself and for his andy.
They might get used to such refin ents
and come to despise sweat which was e
essence of their survival.
As to education: he was doubtful abo
that, too. He had had little schooling him-
self, because his parents had needed him on
the farm, just as he probably still needed his
own children to help in the desperate busi-
ness Of staying alive. He was skeptical about
allowing their minds to be lathered up with
perfumed ideas that seemed to have little
to do with plowing and planting and har-
vesting.
But like all parents he also hungered for
a richer life for his children, and he knew
in his heart that education was the only
door that led to it. That's why he could
laugh at Mark Twain, and at himself. The
statement Was both true and ridiculous at
the same time.
Since Mark 'rwain's time, American higher
education has performed a miracle in pro-
viding a place for virtually every student
who wishes to go to college and has the
brains to get in, whether or not his family
can pay the cost. It has also provided a
place for a good many without the brains.
The pressure on the educational system that
brought this about has been enormous, and
a lot of it arises from the peculiar and often
artificial prestige attached to a college de-
gree. In performing this miracle of num-
bers, the colleges have often lost sight of
quality. The production line has always been
more interesting to Americans than the
quality of the product. Many colleges have
tended to produce not educated men and
women who think independently, under-
stand their world broadly, and possess genu-
ine mental muscle, but merely trained grad-
natea who possess a specific, useful skill; or
knowledgeable graduates, whose heads are
stuffed like a mattress ticking with unco-
ordinated facts.
While engaged in this energetic enter-
prise, those who run such colleges have bat-
ted around the term "Excellence" like a bal-
loon. Like inost balloons it is pretty but,
empty, except for a little hot air. They seem'
to believe that a scholarly faculty, a flint,
campus, and students selected merely
their brains add up to excellence in
fields of education.
Far from excellence, I think this cons -
'butes failure.
Part of the failure stems from a spec Sc
and glorious achievement of the American
education system: the ability to sort out stu-
dents according to their scholastic aptitude.
Those of you who are educators know the
extraordinary degree of accuracy of those
tests, when combined with the student's rec-
ord in high school. The intellectual capacity
of an entering freshman may be measured
to a nicety. In the whole murky fog of pre-
dieting human behavior, these tests provide
a single brilliant light--in fact, not just bill-
Dant, but blinding.
And college administrators have often been
blinded by putting too much emphasis on
scholastic aptitude while ignoring other es-
sential qualities of students. The most im-
portant other quality is motivation?mad-
deningly difficult to measure, frustrating to
encourage and impossible to change once its
direction is set. Motivation lies at the core of
an individual's personality, like the nuclear
reactions that boil in the center of the sun.
The outpouring of energy is visible on the
surface, and the warmth and light of extraor-
dinary accomplishments may be admired, but
until psychology is a more mature science
the sources may only be guessed at.
Further, the sources of motivation keep
changing. At one time America was a hard
land, and in the mid-west this was not so
long ago. Some of you remember when thee
northern plains were not the rich a
friendly area we now enjoy. The land
the environment were hostile, and the
pleat needs needs of human life?food, shelt and
a little warm clothing?had to be ea ed by
bitter work. At an earlier time the s busters
who opened up this land did so w a plow
pulled by oxen or horses throu soil that
had never been turned since the orld began.
Month after month they swan' and sweated
rid struggled and suffered to I, plant, her-
and start all over again, hese men were
f to face with the m terrible reality
of 1S-either keep going or ie. They changed
the 'nd, but the experie ce changed them.
They ere tough beyon comprehension.
Not ong after the dustrial revolution
finally ?ished thes marvelous men with
the tree , ccanbin and other tools they
needed f an easier ire, the Great Depres-
sion tits= them own with hardship of
another The p ins became economically
hostile. The m ivation was tested once
more in a ter way; and if their motiva-
tion was lacki disaster was their reward,
As though this eren't enough, the tribula-
tions of the Du owl days were visited upon
them, when t wi d literally lifted the top-
soil off their arms d carried it away into
the black sk ,
The Grea Depressio and the Dust Bowl
are not for otten. All o ? erica has become
a gardenaffluence and ducational oppor-
tunity. B t with these b sings has come
fiabbin in the moral fiber. The desperation
and so of the challenge is one. Everyone
in this udience detects it, the tudents most
clearlyiof all, They are suspicio about what
has happened in recent years to is country.
They do not respect the phony s ndards in
America which value national p ?e above
humanism, and property above lives
This year students are disturbed a ut two
big issues: Southeast Asia, and the po ution
of our environment. They have aut - .rity
of history to back them up. Rome dee ed
and finally died in part for these two fact re.
Foreign military adventures bled the Emp e
economically and fractured it politically. An
lead poisoning from the use of lead pipes
the water supply of Rome caused infertility
among the most able Romans and their
birthrate fell drastically,
We have overcome physical hardship and to
a great degree economic hardship, but we
haven't replaced these motivating forces with
anything else.
I have no formulas to propose. I, am as
bewildered as the next person about what
might be done, but I sense that motivation
must now be aroused by focussing on the
responses of individuals, rather than by
focussing on broad social incentives.
Physicea and economic hardships as broad
Social incentives were strong, but is we could,
we would not wish to bring them back. The
price is too high. To be sure economic moti-
vation of a sort still exists: people still work
for dollars, but the dollars most of them work
S 8457
for now are marginal dollars that will buy a
second car or a color T.V. set. At one time
they worked for the minimum food to stay
alive and the coat that kept the cold out
of their homes. Money and goods as incen-
tives are no longer as important as they once
were.
What else makes people stretch themselves?
A hundred things, and in thousands of dif-
ferent combinations. Some men are driven
by sheer red blood, the desire to use them-
selves against existing challenges. Hillary
said he climbed Mount Everest simply be-
cause it was there.
A desire to improve the world?pure al-
truism?is not to be underrated as a human
force. We are social animals, and whether we
admit it or not, all of us care to a greater or
leer degree about the welfare of -our fellow
Van. "Never send to know for whom the
/bell tolls: it tolls for thee." We all believe
It, and some of you are driven by it.
A hunger for power cannot be ignored, and
It is not necessarily destructive. Many of our
finest politicians and our builders of business
empires are driven by the taste for power.
They live to control things, and they must
earn their power by producing what society
needs.
Pride and a sense of obligation to one's
family or one's own expectations are deep
incentives. The student who knows keenly
the sacrifices made by his family for his edu-
cation may well earn grades far beyond his
normal achievements., The businessman
whose pride would be shattered by failure
Is more apt to succeed.
Curiosity has been the principal motivat-
ing force in the lives of history's greatest
scientists. Madame Curie could not antici-
pate the benefit her discoveries would have
for mankind; she was simply and very purely
fascinated by nature's mysteries.
The hunger for creative satisfaction drove
Thomas Edison and most of the artists who
have graced our planet. Picasso, when asked
What he would do if imprisoned and denied
all brushes and paints, said he would draw
with the head of a burnt match or his own
finger dipped in mud. Such men are intoxi-
cated by the satisfactions of their own work.
There are dozens of other motivations that
are still valid, most of them positive and
relating to the temperament of the indi-
vidual rather than negative and arising from
broad social events like the Depression. Per-
haps this is a measure of civilization: that
men will be increasingly driven by positive
impulses rather than by hunger and fear
and deprivation.
Motivation varies enormously among chil-
dren. None are born without it. Some seem
to lose it at an early age?and even on occa-
sion to regain it. Teachers know the happy
phenomenon of the "late bloomer". He didn't
develop a better mind, but something hap-
pened to his motivation.
Every teacher is aware of the motivational
facts of life, and delights in the responsive
student; but the colleges have too often
filled his classroom with bright students
with lead in their intellectual pants.
American private colleges face other prob-
ems besides trying to educate students some
I whom are unmotivated, and those prob-
1 s are practical, urgent and far from eso-
t c.
st, the private colleges face competition
fro the state universities that are huge and
gett g bigger in response to public demand.
They ,perform a necessary public function,
and they are encouraged by the high pro-
tein diet of feeding at the public _trough. In
the end they will have trouble maintaining
their quality because they must concentrate
so much on quantity. They will also have
trouble with their independence, because the
legislatures which feed them will wish to
some extent to control them. What has hap-
pened to universities owned by the govern-
ment in socialist countries could happen
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S 8458 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
here, and it is sad. In the long run, the very
independence oi private colleges may be their
Most important asset.
The second practical and very urgent prob-
lem is money, and it is heartbreaking. Just
-when the cost of running colleges has leaped
beyond their means, the government iaas
seen fit to discourage private philanthropy
to a significant degree with the Tax Reform
Ac of 1969.
vale colleges, including Jamestown, are
stifle g and will continue to suffer for a
while rom this competition and this pov-
erty. T y have no choice but to tighten
their bel , re-examine their functions and
make sure that the education they sell is
something s iety needs to buy.
Before Jam town college can as-examine
Its function a set a new course, it must
take stock of iLi, assets. Some of them are
not evident to tl casual eye: its location,
the character of it students, its alumni, its
lack of graduate ogranis, its faculty, Its
history, and its man ers.
rt sits in the nitdd3 of a vast and rather
empty plain from tha static of cities arid
far from many of th?roups who would
try to push it around f it were within
reach. It is geographicaThr disengaged, anti
this enables it to do its ork serenely and
thoughtfully. One of tads, most corrosive
contaminants of ou:r atmostre is noise ?
actual noise and cultural note. Jamestown
has been spared.
Your students are a balanced oup, a little
closer perhaps to the basic reali es of this
world than some students in mo \e densely
populated parts of the country wh Inevita-
bly are more susseptible to fancy \or fad-
dish or extreme notions. Your studea4s, fol-
lowing the leadership of the sen1o4 class
this term, have demonstrated their belief
that reason can be more effective than\ raw
emotion, and constructive action than 'Vio-
lence.
There are a hundred colleges that wi?li
they had students such as you in their class'
rooms.
Your alumni are the preachers of James-
town's gospel in the world at large, the fi-
nancial supporters of its programs, the en-
couragement of its efforts and in a sense
the justification of its existence. Perhaps no
one listens to the alumni while the stu-
dents get all the attention, but what is a
student except ark embryo alumnus? Grad-
uation is just a big hatching process.
On occasion this college may have wished
it had a range of graduate programs. They
are conceived to be the academic big time.
For small colleges they are largely disastrous,
Their expense is uncontrollable and the coal-
petition they face for money, faculty nd
students is intense. Jamestown is I min-
istratively compact and acaderni y ef-
ficient.
The faculty is tailored to function.
With all those poisonous jokes bout North
Dakota being passed around l,Xe educational
world, no teacher comes hep unles,s he has
the sense of purpose to pupue his high call-
ing with dedication.
One of the greatest s engths of this school
has been its hard hiptory. Like the women
of Berlin after World War It, Jamestown
might well adopt /he motto "what doesn't
kill me, strengthe s me." The college has de-
veloped sinews ,6ut of its adversity. Those
who run thi$ liege talk no nonsense, as a
reflection of e fact that the college has
never been a position to afford nonsense.
One of t.l1ase no-nonsense people is John L.
Wilson, tlje chairman of your board, who
has modestly devoted to this college more
courage, generosity, educational wisdom and
Just plain horse sense than many of you may
know about. One of his most significant acts
of horse sense was to select, with the help
of his fellow trustees, Hay Joe Stuckey as
president. Jamestown College is In good
hands.
Those are some of the assets What can
Jamestown make of them, without risking its
solid achievements, or incurring expenses
that will ultimately cripple it?
Here I speak with real diffidence. I am not
a professional educator. I am a lawyer, and
the law is said to sharpen a man's mind by
narrowing it. What's more, as a guest on this
campus I'm well advised to mind my manners
and not try to tell my academic host what
to serve for dinner.
My ideas are only suggestions. After you
think about them, you may reject them?but
In. the process you may also develop ideas of
your own.
For what it's worth I suggest that James-
town College quietly but deliberately start
to focus its main attention on the highly
motivated student. Those with brains and the
incentive to use them are certain to be the
movers of this world, There is no reason why
Jamestown should not be highly selective
about whom it chooses to educate. It is al-
ready. I merely suggest it select its students
indreasingly for motivation.
How could this be accomplished, when
therm are no tests or other sure guides to
measure that quality?
Awareness of the goal is the first step. Em-
bracing the policy will carry the intention
part of the distance.
Admissions would have to be held down as
far as economically possible. This is a tricky
financial problem and calls for careful judg-
ment, but obviously under a supply and de-
mand theory, the smaller the supply for
given demand the greater the chance to
selective.
In weighing applicants, the college ust
balance motivation against scholasit apti-
tude. Most colleges settle for t better
brains (which are measurable) ther than
take a chance on the average tudent who
conceals a jet engine in his ta' feathers. That
Jet engine may carry his erage ability to
extraordinary heights. A.?iemically he's a
good bargain.
Further, your facuJ and admissions offi-
cers may be able tevise admissions proce-
dures to test a at ent's hunger for a college
ucation. Buc tests might well be rather
ificial?ju as the procedures for screen-
lawyer for the bar in some states are
al oat ri culously artificial. If the machin-
er seet a eccentric, never mind, so long as
t s ates the nuggets from the mud.
Is highly nuitivated bird can be caught,
? en do you care for him and feed him
r n the four years he stays in the aca-
demic c ge?
In ge ral, he must learn tight intellectual
disciplin in an atmosphere that will main-
tain his &ale at the highest level.
You mu expose him to a faculty selected
more for I ; teaching ability than of its
scholarly q alifications. I deeply respect
scholars, but hey pursue a different course
than those w ose first love is to deal with
students. Our olleges have often failed to
distinguish th two functions clearly, and
the ambiguity led to unhappiness:.
A teacher who can inspire?or drive?stu-
dents of high na ye motivation will inevita-
bly stretch their'ads. One helpful academic
device is to requir a good deal of individual
work, particularly work involving careful
writing. Nothing is ? demanding of a stu-
dent, nothing is sos e to stretch him, noth-
ing is so sure to expo to his eye weaknesses
of his own thought han having to write
lucidly. 'The pain of 1 aiming may be great,
but no skill is more t be cherished by an
educated man.
Sensitive individual ounselling of stu-
dents would be an ease tial part of such a
program, to help to unco er the mainsprings
of the student's incentive and act :on them
with the carrot and with the stick. James-
town, with imagination, has already under-
taken a strong counselling program. To be
effective, such a program must not be con.-
June 5? 1970
tent to hold the student's hand but mast
require him to use his own intellectual mus-
cles, to exert himself till he is sore with the
effort.
Further, much could be accomplished
merely by reminding students and faculty at
every turn of their function: not merely to
learn and teach, but to expand the capacities
of the student's mind. During World War II,
a marine recruiting poster demanded of
everyone who read it: "Are you man enough
to be a marine?'' This college might well
challenge each student in the same Way: "Are
you man enough to be an educated person ?"
This little sketch doesn't b ''n to com-
plete the picture. Every mem r of the fac-
ulty, every administrator ap every trustee
could add a dozen differ t elements. And
certainly the students, anyone bothers to
ask them, can seed inor ideas on this subject
than the rest of you n harvest. Their own
future is at stake, ci they also happen to
be the only ones ho know for sure what
turns them on,
What I propo calls for no major revisions
of the curri lum, no major changes In
faculty exc t, a change of emphasis, no
need for n plant new administrators, or
new expe es of any significant amount that
would t normally be incurred. Such a
policy ontains little drama or glamor, but
it w Id be founded on the great assets thia
co e already possesses, and the great need
our country.
In effect I suggest a program of academic
stress combined with high morale that would
demand from strongly motivated students,
an enlargement of their abilities and a stif-
fening of their intellects. r suggest an
academic program lo accomplish for the
minds and hearts of students what the un-
plowed sod of these plains did for their great-
grandfathers: It called forth the best they
were capable of giving, because it was so
difficult.
That old farmer is a man to contemplate.
Be drove his plowshare through the stub-
born soil while the rain tried to wash him
away and while the son tried to broil him. Be
must have loved nature because he was so
directly dependent on her, and he must also
have hated her for the droughts that killed
his grain, the grasshoppers that ate it, the
hail, the blizzards and all the other miseries
that she gratuitously gave him. After a 'time
even his own feelings, all that love and all
that hate, must have been submerged
beneath the overwhelming will to be strong
enough and smart enough and enduring
enough to conquer his environment.
In the end that old, sodbuster became
larger than life-size, and he did conquer his
environment. As a man, he had stretched
himself in a way that few of us can fully
comprehend. Be had bade himself bigger,
and he accomplished more than can reason-
ably be expected of a man.
He's dead now, but we need people just
like him worse than ever,
Perhaps this college can devise a way to
reinvent him for the good of the country.
THE VIETCONG TERROR AGAINST
THE FREE TRADE UNION MOVE-
MENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, critics of
the South Vietnamese Government are
prone to seize on every aberration from
utopian democracy as a proof that this
Government is dictatorial and unworthy
of support. More than one of them has
argued that there is really nothing to
choose between the dictatorship in the
south and the dictatorship in the north.
I am not among those who are pre-
pared to give blanket endorsement to
every single action of, the South Vietnam-
ese Government. I believe that that
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Government has been guilty of certain
Mistakes and certain excesses. In par-
ticular, I deplore the recent imprison-
ment of Tran Ngoc Chau, an official who
has been given the highest rating by all
Americans who have worked with him.
But if the critics want to be fair, they
must also be prepared to give credit where
credit is dtie,
Under the present Government, a con-
stituent assembly was elected, in elec-
tions that were given high marks for
fairness by virtually all observers and
correspondents; a democratic constitu-
tion was hammered out after months of
vigorous debate; free elections were held
for the National Assembly and for the
Senate and for the provincial assemblies;
? village self-government, which was sus-
pended by President Diem, was restored,
and over the past 3 years some 2,100 vil-
lages have elected their own governing
councils, in harmony with the centuries-
old Vietnamese pattern of village de-
mocracy. An ambitious land reform pro-
gram has been introduced, under which
the land will be turned over to those
who till it, very much along the lines
of the enormosusly effective land reform
program in Taiwan.
For all of these things the Thieu gov-
ernment must be given credit?and all
the more credit because this progress has
been achieved in the midst of a bloody
and bitterly fought conflict.
Apart from ignoring the truly re-
Markable progress that has been
achieved in many fields, I have the im-
pression that some of the critics who
equate the Saigon government with the
Hanoi regime simply do not know the
meaning of totalitarian dictatorship.
? How false their equation is should be
apparent to anyone who is willing to take
the time to look at a few basic facts.
Hanoi has one political party, the
Communist Party. Saigon has several
score political parties, competing with
each other frantically for cuts of the po-
litical pie at various levels.
Hanoi has one newspaper, which
faithfully reflects the Communist Party
line and only the Communist Party line.
Saigon has 25 Vietnamese newspapers,
10 Chinese newspapers, two English and
one French. And while there is censor-
ship, there is also much vigorous criti-
cism of the Government in the Saigon
press.
But perhaps the most impressive evi-
dence that there is far more democracy
In South Vietnam than there is dictator-
ship is provided by the existence of a
free trade union movement.
In the North, of course, there is no
free trade union movement. As in every
other Communist country, there are gov-
ernment controlled unions, in which
membership is compulsory and whose of-
ficials are selected by the Communist
Party. Strikes of any kind are not tol-
erated by these unions, because in Com-
munist countries unions are instru-
ments for government control over the
workers, rather than instruments
through which the workers may seek to
improve their lot.
In South Vietnam, in contradistinc-
tion, there is a free trade union move-
ment?the Vietnamese Confederation of
Labor, or CVT-500,000 strong. The of-
ficials of the affiliated unions and of the
confederation are elected by the work-
ers themselves. The unions engage in
strikes and fight militantly on many
fronts to improve the lot of their mem-
bers.
The tenant farmers' union, for exam-
ple, played an extremely active role in
lobbying for the land reform legislation
approved earlier this year by the Na-
tional Assembly. And recently, the CVT
announced that it planned to organize a
farmer-labor party of its own, on a pro-
gram approximating the political pro-
grams of the European social democratic
parties, and compete in its own name in
the political arena.
The CVT is headed by Mr. Tran Quoc
Buu, a veteran of more than 20 years'
trade union activity, whose courage and
independence is respected even by his
enemies and who served a term in prison
under President Diem. A measure of the
esteem in which Buu is held, not merely
in Vietnam but throughout the western
Pacific, is the fact that he has for some
time now served as president of the major
S 8459
regional trade union organization, the
Brotherhood of Asian Trade Unions?
BATU.
Sometimes the CVT has had to oper-
ate against government opposition. But
on other occasions it has received wel-
come support from the Thieu-Ky gov-
ernment. In 1868, for example, the pro-
vincial police sought to suppress the tex-
tile workers strike in Gia Dinh by arrest-
ing the woman organizer and ordering a
blockade of food supplies to starve out
sympathy strikers. At that point, Nguyen
Cao Ky, who was then prime minister,
intervened to release the union organizer
and end the blockade and suspend the
overzealous police chief.
Despite their many political differ-
ences with the Government, the leaders
of the CVT unions have been bitterly and
militantly anti-Vietcong because they
know only too well what has happened to
the free trade union movement and to
free trade union leaders under the Com-
munist regime in the north. Because of
this, the free trade union officials of
South Vietnam have been favorite tar-
gets of the Vietcong terrorists.
Mr. President, for the purpose of illus-
trating the kind of terror that can be ex-
pected if the Vietcong takes over, I ask
unanimous consent to have prihted in the
RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks
a tabulation I have received from the
CVT, listing over 60 officials of their un-
ion movement who have been assas-
sinated by the Communists over the past
10 years.
I also ask unanimous consent to have
printed in the RECORD the statement is-
sued by the Vietnamese Confederation of
Labor on February 7, 1968, condemning
the Communists for the treacherous at-
tacks they made on so many Vietnamese
cities in their so-called Tet offensive.
Finally, I ask unanimous consent to
have printed in the RECORD a statement
adopted by the AFL-CIO executive coun-
cil in March of 1969, reiterating its sup-
port for the Vietnamese Confederation
of Labor.
There being no objection, the items
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
LIST Of CVT CADRES' WHO HAVE LOST THEIR LIVES IN SOUTH VIETNAM FOR THE FREE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT
Name
Age Union local
Union position
Profession
How, where, when assassinated by VC,
Giao Can
Doan Kiem
Nguyen Luong
Nguyen Buong
Tran Minh Chanh
Nguyen Van Do
Nguyen Van Nua
Bao Van Thanh
Nguyen Van Hai
Nguyen Ngoc Anh
Nguyen Van Nghia
Le Cong Tale
Phan Van ieu
Le Hoang Vinh
Nguyen Van Cho
to Van Huong
Tran Van How_
Iran Van Dol
Pham Trung Ciao
' Le Van Mieng
Him Choc.
54 Farmers local Diep an district_ Local representative
35 Farmers province union of Quang Nam_ District secretary
55 Farmers local of Quang Nam province Provincial representative
54 Hang Con local Treasurer
45 Plantation workers' local Thanh An district Local representative
53 Plantation workers Phu-My Hung local Treasurer
52 do Local representative
40 Lambretta drivers Union, Binh Duong province President
58 Trade Unions Council Vinh Long province Secretary General
56 Farmers union Treasurer
60 do Vice President
56 do Secretary of My Loc local
38 do Local Representative of Piton,
Hatt village.
60 do Local propagandist-organizer
48 Farmers Union of Binh Thuan province President
43 Farmers Local of Bac Lieu province Representative
Farmers local of Phong Thanhvillage, Baclieu Local secretary
province.
55 Farmers localFm
63 _....__do Treasurer
Committee member
45 _do Vice president
63 .do Committee
Farmer
do
do
do
Worker
Driver
Worker
Farmer.
do
do
do
do
do
do
do
arer
do
_do
......
Assassinated while carrying on union activities on
Mar. 15 1965.
Assassinated while carrying on union activities on
Mar. 15, 1968.
Assassinated while carrying on union activities on
Apr. 20, 1968.
Assassinated while carrying on union activities in
1968.
Assassinated while carrying on union activities on
? Apr. 9, 1964, at Than An.
Kidnaped in July 1961 and presumed killed.
Assassinated by VC on Dec. 23, 1960 at Phu My
Hung,
Assassinated by VC on Dec.23,1960 at Binh Duong.
Kidnaped and presumed killed by VC.
Assassinated by VC in 1962.
Assassinated by VC in 1965.
Assassinated by VC in 1960.
Assassinated by VC in 1964.
Assassinated by VC in 1964.
Killed by VC at VC Offensive of Mau-Than New
Year holidays (1968).
Assassinated by VC in 1965
Assassinated by VC in 1962.
Died from torture in 1959.
Assassinated by VC at Thanh My in 1969.
Died from torture in 1965.
Assassinated by VC at On Loc village, Vinh Binh
province, on Aug. 22, 1969.
?..--
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$ 8460 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE June 5, 1970
LIST OF CVT CADRES WHO HAVE LOST THEIR LIVES IN SOUTH VIETNAM FOR THE FREE TRADE UNION MOVE
ENT?Continued
Name
Age Uniorkloral
Union position Profession
How, where, when assassinated by VC
Nguyen loan 42 Farmers local of Quang Ngai province Secretary of To Nguyen local Farmer
Nguyen Sau 39 do_ Secretary of Tu-Luong local do
Le an Thorn 41 do Vice president of Tu-Luong locaL do
Nguyen Hue Nghia 40 do Secretary of Nghia Loc local
Trail Cao Nghiep 45 Farmers union of Qualg Ngai province President of Nghia Loc local
Assassinated by VC at Tu-Nguyen in 1964.
Assassinated by VC at Is twang in 1963.
Assassinated by VC in 1966 at Tu Luong.
do Assassinated by VC in 1967 atNghia Loc.
do Assassinated by VC when carrying en union ac-
tivities at Hghia Inc in 1967.
Driver Assassinated by VC in 1964.
do Assassinated by VC when carrying out union ac-
tivities.on July 14, 1969..
do Do.
Superintendent_ Assassinated by VC on Dec. 6, 1968.
Farmer Assassinated by VC in 1955.
do_ Assassinated by VC when carrying out union activi-
ties on Oct 1, 1969, at Tan Hoe Thanh, Dinh
Tuong province.
Fischernian Kidnaped by VC and assassinated by VC in 1961.
do Assassinated by VC at his horns in 1965.
Kidnaped and assassinated by VC in 1961.
Assassinated by VC at his home in 1954:
Assassinated by VC at his home in 1953.
Killed by warfare in 1965.
Killed by warfare in 1967.
Killed by warfare in 1966.
Assassinated by VC in 1961.
Assassinated by VC in 1963.
Assassinated by VC at his home in 1956.
Assassinated by VC in 1962.
Assassinated by VC at Cail-Khoi on July 8, 1965.
Abducted on Oct. 13, 1962, and presumed dead.
Kidnaped on Dec. 2, 1965, and presumed dead.
Kidnaped on Dec. 6, 1962, and presumed deed.
Kidnaped at Long Khanh in July 1962.
Do.
Do.
do Kidnaped at Long Khanh in May 1963,
Kidnaped at Long Khanh ir October 1962.
Carpenter _ Kidnaped at Long Khanh on Nov. 6,1363.
Tapper Kidnapped by VC at Long Khanh and presumed
deaden Nov. 6, 1963.
do Do.
Superintendent. On.
Tapper On.
Do.
Kidnapped by VC at Binh Duong in 1956 and pre-
sumed dead.
Kidnaped by VC and presumed dead.
Presumed dead after 8 years jail.
Fisherman Kidnaped by VC and presumed dead.
Do.
Fisherman_____ Kidnaped by VC and presumed dead.
Fanner. Do.
.do Do.
Ton Ngoc Trang. 45 Horse-vehicles workers union of QuangNgai Member
Li! Van Hong 30 Lambretta drivers unian of Quang Ngai Local vice president
Huynh Van Trang 35 do_ Secretary
Phan Them 37 MIC tames? workers anion Treasurer
Le van Hong_ Farmers local of Ba Xryen province Local representative
Nguyen Van Nhiem o3 Farmers union of Dint Thong province President
Nguyen Du
Le Khanh
Deng Duc Tan__
Dinh Thanh
Nguyen Luan
Ho Van Ants
Deng Oat.
Iran Quang Phuc
Nguyen Doi
56 Fischerman's union of Quang Tin province Vice president
10 Fischenmen's local of Ky-Ants Local president
40 Farmers local of Ky-Ly. . Local vice president _ Farmer
46 Farmers local of Ky-Nghia_ . Local president do
45 Farmers local of Ky-Phu Local secretary do
53 Farmers local of Ky-Nghia do do
50 Farmers local of Binh Quy_ . Local vice president._ do
43 Farmers local of Ky Sanh do do
GO Farmers local of Ky-Nghia . Local treasurer do
Luong Van Quang 47 Farmers local of Ky-Senh. Local committee member do
Vo-Thong 50 Farmers local of Binh.Quy dc, .do
Vu-Van-Nhang_ 57 Lambretta drivers Union of Saigon-Giadmh Social committee driver member Driver
Le Van Ven 'Plantatioil workers Union of Tay Niel' President Foreman
Dao Ngoc Tam__. 55 Plantation workers' Courtenay local Financial officer . Sapper
Lai Bao Ngoc 34 Plantation workers union of Long Khanh___ _. ______ , _ Secretary
Dang Van Tich 37 do_ President,.
Nguyen Van Him 39 Plantation Hang Con local . Representative
Nguyen [Mlle.__ 50 do_ Committee member
Nguyen Bleu Member__
Vic Qaan Quy........ 35 do. Secretary
Nguyen Van Truy_ 95 Planatation workers' Courtenay local Member
Le van Lang 45 Plantation workers' union "Tran Van Phone" Representative
Iran Van Thai___.. 43 Plantatiori workers local "Iran Van Phone Financial officer
Plan Van Tot 32 do i Committee member
Le Van Mee 57 do Controller
In Van Nuoc 29 do Committee member
Le Thai Tuy a0 _ ___ _do_ __ - ____ - - - M - _ Foreman
Huynh Thi Hwy_ Trade Unions Council of Binh Duong Secretary general N u rse_
Pnan Thanh Gino 40 Goldsmiths' Union of Ash Long President Goldsmith
Bach Le. 47 Farmers Union of Queen Neat Secretary general Farmer
Tray Chanh Hai_. 42 Fischermen's Union or Quang Tie President
Le Thang 34 Fischermen's local of Ky-Xuan. Local president
Trait Van Co 42 Fishermen's local of Einh Dao - do
Bui Thuoc 57 Farmers' local of Ky Santa. Committee member
On Phien 57 Farmers' local of Ky A nh.. do
Lo mai Nguyen___ . 70 dodci
Le Tai Nguyen__. , 70 Farmers' union of An Track Gia Rai district_ Farmers' union cadre in village
Le Trung Quoi __ 42 Farmers' Federation Federation's cadre in charge of
management of a village of
implantation of refugees
(An-Luong).
Nguyen Van Chi.... _ . Federatimi Plantation workers of Phone Toy Secretary of Binh-Ba local
Nam Cong Dan Federation Plantation workers of Phi= Long
Nguyen Nang Tien . Plantation workers' union of Phone Long
Huynh Van Tu Plantation workers' Federation in Phuoc lay -------Cadre Worker
Technician
Sapper
do
_do
Kidnaped by VC on Dec. 35, 1964, and presumed
killed.
Worker Kidnaped at Phone Toy '11 1957, and presumed
killed.
President of union Superintendent.. Kidnaped by VC at Bu Doe on July 19, 1966.
Treasurer of Thuan-Loi's local_ Teacher Kidnaped by VC at Than Loi in June 1965 and
presumed killed.
Kidnaped by VC-on July 74, 1961, at Plnioc Toy_
FREE VIETNAM LABOR DENOTTNCES VIETCONG
ATTACKS
President Tran Quoc Bun of the Vietnam-
ese Confederation of Labor (CVT on Febru-
ary 7 sent the following cable to the
AFL?CIO:
"We at the CVT are safe and sound. We
appeal urgently to free world union organi-
zations to aid the workers and other Viet-
namese who were savagely attacked by the
Communists during the truce of 'Pet, the
traditional sacred feast of Vietnam."
President Tran Quoc BLIU and Clene:al
Secretary Trani Huu Quyen of the Vietnamese
Confederation of Labor (CVT) issued the
following statement on February 2:
"Concidering that the armed forces of the
V ietncong have invaded the capital area of
Sa.gon, Cholon, Gia-Dinh and in chief towns
during the new lunar year's truce; consider-
ing that the people's quarters generally and
tbe working class quarters especially were
treacherously used by the Vietcong for con-
cealment and as a battleground to combat
the army of the Republic of Vietnam; con-
sidering that the workers and their families
have become as a matter of fact the miserable
victims of street fighting inside the cities:
considering that the permanent position of
CVT is anti-war and for realization of peace
by constructive social action, based on
brotherhood, in order to protect the sacred
freedom of man within the framework of
social communities;
"The Bureau of CVT, in its extraordinary
meeting on February 2, 1968 in Saigon issued
the following communique:
" 'We condemn the Criminal actions of the
Communists causing war in the days of truce.
"'We earnestly appeal to all brothers and
sisters, cadres and merabers over the country
to be calm and to tighten their ranks in these
troubled and perilous days. We earnestly re-
quest the government to apply suitable meas-
ures to protect the lives and property of the
people and to restore quickly the general
security and the public order.' "
Thames CVT
(Statement by the AFL?CIO Evecutive
Council)
The Executive Council notes the visit of
President Buu of the CVT. After hearing his
report about the activAies of the Confedera-
tion of Vietnamese Workers and his being
encouraged by the cooperative attitude mani-
fested by the head of state, President Nguyen
Van Thieu, we reaffirm our policy of cooper-
ting with the CVT for the advancement of
free trade unioniam, democracy, social justice
and a just and enduring peace.
In this connection, we note with satisfac-
tion the recently announced readiness of AID
to contribute substantially towards a $100
million undertaking for helping the govern-
ment of South Vietnam speed a massive pro-
gram of land reform and redistribution.
We emphasize that the success of this pro-
gram and its being safeguarded against the
sabotage by Communist in Eltrators and un-
dermining by corrupt forces can be best
assured through organizations like the CVT
participating actively in its execution so as
to assure that the full benelits of the agrarian
reform be enjoyed by the tillers of the soil.
BIASED NEWS MEDIA
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, a story pub-.
lished in Variety for May 27 is of interest
to some of us who think that the news
media could do a little more objective
job in some cases.
The story, interestingly enough, is not
exactly free of bias, either, but even so
the reporter could not get around the
fact that officials. of the affiliated tele-
vision stations of the National Broad-
casting Co. think its network news cov--
erage of the war is biased.
The reporter gratuitously blames this
attitude by the officials on a lack of pro-
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Malnutrition in the U.S. is not confined
to low-income groups, but extends to the
affluent as well.
Private industry should take immediate
steps to provide foods with a higher nutri-
tional content for consumers
Food ompanies should begin by improving
the nutri 'onal qualities of those foods which
people en and are accustomed to eating.
Changing ating patterns of the American
public shoul also be recognized. Snacks and
sweet goods a forming a large part of the
cereal portion o the diet of many consumers,
particularly youn people and the poor.
KROGER IN EN HMENT SINCE 1941
Kroger has produc enriched white bread
and rolls since 1941 en current standards
of enrichment were for ulated, Mr. Reusser
stated. At that time, whi bread was chosen
as the vehicle for enrich ent because it is
a basic food and was consid ed probably the
most universally consumed od throughout
the country.
The use of enriched flour a bread has
been credited with virtual eli nation of
such deficiency diseases as pelle a, which
was prevalent in the united State as late
as the 1930's.
RECIPE AND MENU PROGRAM PLAN
The recipe and menu program, which ill
be made available throughout Kroger's
state area, has been planned to emphasiz
meals that are well-balanced and nutritional
and make them more attractive to home-
makers.
Menus and recipes were planned around
the Department of Agriculture "Smart
Shepper" releases (based on plentiful foods)
and the "Low Cost Cookery" series developed
by Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. (using TJ.S.D.A.
recommendations).
TENTH LARGEST BAKER IN U.S.
Kroger, which produces in excess of 300,-
000,000 lbs. of baked goods a year, ranks itself
as the 10th largest baker in the United
States. The company has operated bakeries
since before the turn of the century. B. H.
Kroger, who founded the company in Cin-
cinnati in 1883, is recognized as the first
grocer to operate his own bakeries.
ECONOMIC DISPOSAL OF JUNKED
AUTOMOBILES
Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, at a
time when there appears to be an over-
abundance of rhetoric in response to a
national concern over environmental
problems, it is refreshing and encourag-
ing to find real progress in this area. As
most of us are aware, technological solu-
tions to many environmental problems
exist, but cannot be placed into practice
because of the associated economic im-
pact. Engineers in the Bureau of Mines
have apparently contributed substantial-
ly toward one of the Nation's ,inaj or en-
vironmental problems, the ecOnomic dis-
posal of junked automobiles.
Mr. President, I ask un imous con-
sent that the article be irinted in the
RECORD.
There being no obje ion, the article
was ordered to be prin d in the RECORD,
as follows:
From Mineral Information, Service,
May 1, 19701
NEW INCINERATOR PROVIDES SMOKELESS
BURNING OF JUNKED CARS
A low-cost way to avoid the air pollution
caused by open-air burning of junked auto-
mobiles has been developed through research
now being pushed to completion by the U.S.
Bureau of Mines.
Bureau engineers have developed a rela-
tively inexpensive smokeless incinerator that
can efficiently process all the junked cars
from a metropolitan area with a population
of 300,000. Preliminary tests of the incinera-
tor have been successfully completed. Fur-
ther testing is underway to get more precise
Information on performance and operating
costs.
Principal attraction of the new incinerator
Is its construction cost, quoted by the Bu-
reau a about 822,000. This is roughly one-
tenth the cost of smokeless models now
commercially available and should stimulate
interest among scrap processors whose open-
air burning practices are being increasingly
restricted by new regulations aimed at curb-
ing air pollution.
Burning is considered the cheapest way
rid junk cars of combustible material. T e
cost of using hand labor to remove ?p-
holstery, plastic parts and similar subst ces
could make the recovery of metals eco-
nomic.
Because smokeless incineration been
so expensive, the burning has us lly been
done in the open where it gene es dense
clouds of black smoke. With gro ing public
concern over air pollution, m y cities al
ready have outlawed open bur ng and many
others are moving to do so. A a result, some
auto scrapping operations y be forced to
close down, and car hulks 11 be either used
In ways that leave their ? -tals unreclaimed
or will be left to rust in v ant lots or on city
rests.
he Bureau's smokele s incinerator was de-
vel ed at its Metallur y Research Center in
Salt ake City, Utah, s part of a varied pro-
gram facilitate re very of millions of tons
of valu ble metals ow discarded annually
as waste. Other f cets of the program are
aimed at cover of minerals from muni-
cipal incine tor residues, more effective use
of fly ash acc ? lated at power plants burn-
ing pulverized oal, and conversion of gar-
bage and ot r city refuse into an energy
source.
Capable of prom Ing 50 junked cars every
eight hour , the ne ncinerator is simple in
operation Burning t cars at a time, the
incinerator heats comb sion gases to tem-
peratu s of more than 1,50o F in an after-
burner chamber. At such emperatures, the
carbon particles which nor ? ally constitute
smoke are oxidized and are ? awn upwards
to 'the atmosphere with othe combustion
gases through a 54-foot stack.
Once incinerated, the junked auto can
be dismantled in the usual mann for its
metal values and the scrap sorte baled,
or bundled for sale and re-use.
REGIONAL POLLS SHOW SUPPO T
OF PRESIDENT'S VIETNAM PO
CIES
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, independ-
ently taken, regional polls continue to
show strong support by the people for
President Nixon's policies in Southeast
Asia.
The Wichita Eagle, in my State of
Kansas, reports a poll taken by my col-
league, Representative GARNER E. SHRIV-
ER, which shows that about 75 percent
of the people in his district, the Fourth
Congressional District, support the Presi-
ent.
Another poll, taken for the Indiana-
polis News by a professional polling or-
ganization,_showed that 64 percent of all
Indianians approve of the way the Presi-
dent is handling his job, and 53 percent
approve of his move into Cambodia.
Mr. President, I believe the continued
solid support of the President and his
300060006-4
S 8463
leadership by Americans all across the
Nation deserve the careful consideration
of the Senate.
I ask unanimous consent that these
two articles be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the articles
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Indianapolis (Ind.) News,
May 26, 19701
NEWS' POLL SHOWS STATE FOR NIXON
independent poll conducted for The
N s by a professional polling organization
ows a majority of Indiana's citizen's sup-
ort President Nixon and his controversial
decision to send American troops into Cam-
bodia.
The poll was conducted May 15-17 in 36
Indiana cities. Experts questioned 500 people
at 74 sites in the Hoosier cities.
The President received 64 per cent endorse-
ment of the Way he has handled the presi-
dency, the poll showed. The breakdown by
political parties showed:
[In percent]
Approve
Disapprove
Don't know. _
Democrat Republican Independent
43 89
42 2
15 9
60
28
12
The over-all percentage of those who dis-
approved of the way President Nixon is han-
dling his office was 24 per cent, with 12 per
cent saying they had no opinion.
Sixty-eight per cent of the Republicans,
40 per cent of the Democrats and 50 per cent
of the Independents said they agree with the
President's decision to send U.S. troops to
fight in Cambodia.
The breakdown, again by party affiliations,
showed:
[In percent]
Democrat Republican Independent
Yes 40 68
No 50 18
Undecided 10 14
50
39
11
The over-all figures showed 53 per cent of
those polled endorsed the President's action;
35 per cent opposed it, and 12 per cent were
undecided.
[From the Wichita (Kans.) Eagle, May 30,
1970]
POLL BY SHRIVER SHOWS KANSANS SUPPORT
NIXON
WASHINGTON.?Solid support for President
Richard Nixon's southeast Asia policies is
revealed in early returns of his opinion poll,
Rep. Garner E. Shriver, R-Kan., said Friday.
Shriver released a sbmple tabulation rep-
r senting 10 per cent of the first ballots
re eived from his constituents in the Kansas
4th congressional district
Hi office mailed out about 110,000 ballots.
Shr er's sample tabulation showed 75
per ce support for the President's decision
to cond t a military operation in Cambodia,
19 per ce t opposition and 6 per cent "no
opinion".
68 per c t said America should follow
the Nixon p icy of gradually phasing out
U.S. troops an replacing them with South
Vietnamese; 20 per cent indicated they favor
immediate withdrawal from Vietnam.
The returns also showed that in the fight
against inflation, 62 per cent favored wage
and price controls, with 32 per cent opposed
and 6 per cent with no opinion.
On other issues, 62 per cent were against
lowering the voting age, 37 per cent favored it
and 1 per cent were undecided.
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S 8464 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE June 5, 1970
bers of Congress in have committed their full energies and re-
51 per cent favored higher taxes to pay
Mr an all-out anti-pollution fight; 42 per
cent were opposed and 7 per cent undecided;
54 per cent wanted an all-volunteer army,
:38 per cent were opposed and 8 per cent
undecided.
Shriver emphasized that tabulations are
c estinuing and results will be announgt:
aster final tabulations.
REPORT OF STEEP G COMMIT-
TEE OF CONGRESSIONAL COM-
MITTEE FOR A VOTE ON THE WAR
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, on be-
half of Members on both sides of the aisle
in both Houses of Congress, I am pleased
to present to the Senate the report of
the steering committee of the Congres-
sional Committee for a Vote on the War.
The report is a significant document
because it is a serious effort by Senators
and Representatives to explain to the
American public what must be done to
end the war in Indochina.
The Congressional Committee for a
Vote on the War was formed in early
as a bipartisan endeavor to seek a1
They are among noesn.
numbers growing apace with the multiplies- sources to that end.
tion of public dissatisfaction over the Viet-
nam War, whose attempts to persuade the
Presidency to a different course have been
constantly frustrated, and who perceive a
Congressional duty to participate more fully
in decisions on war arid peace.
There seems to be little doubt that if the
or the Congress were blessed with
President
a new opportunity to decide whether Ameri-
can lives and treasure should be invested in
Vietnam, with the benefit of the knowledge
gained over seven years of expanding conflict
but without the burden of having to justify
its costs, the declaration would be firmly
against. While the United States may have
preference as to the political character of
Vietnam's rulers it has no paramount Inter-
et even nearly equating the heavy toll de-
manded by an effort to establish and pre-
serve palatable leadership in Saigon. More-
over, decisionmakers with an ability to per-
ceive the future would have probably been
convinced that the mission could not be ac-
e.omialished anyway without taking risks far
more profound than any possible advantage.
Yet we continue in a war we do not want,
cannot win, but will not end. An accumula-
tion of seven years of dissent, a collection of
costs so obvious that accounting is super-
4510.3ternatives to a policy that has promised duous, the election of two presidents pledged
peace but has bought only a widened war to peace over opposition identified with war,
and more American lives lost, all have failed to work a decisive change in
However, the amendment to end the basic national policy.
war is more than another policy alter-
Meanwhile the passage of time erodes the
of
President's ability to escape the fe raistakes
native. It is a fundamental effort to end his predecessors. knell sacrifice under his
American military involvement in South- oommand makes him feel a greaetr share of
east Asia through a reassertion of Con- the total responsibility for the ultimate out-
gress constitutional power to declare war come of a war he did not start, wedding hire
and fund armies. We are asking the tighter to an approach whose lack of promise
President to share with Congress the bur- fairly glows in the eyes of more detached ob.-
dens and responsibilities of ending the servers. Critical analysis only prompts more
war, ordering a safe arid systematic with-
expansive descriptions of America's stake in
the war and more excited portrayals of the
drawal of American forces, and making
the peace.
The report of the steering committee
endeavors to explain the purpose of the
amendment and the effects it will have in
America and abroad as it comes nearly
two decades after we became involved in
the extremely complex political situation
in Indochina.
The report makes it very clear that the
amendment to end the war should not
be regarded as a symbolic effort to
change the course of events in Southeast
Asia. The millions of people who have
written Members of Congress in its sup-
port do not consider it as a mere symbol
or pious hope for peace. Neither do the
amendment's 24 cosponsors in the Sen-
ate who are determined to see that the
representatives of the American people
have the chance to vote "yea" or "nay"
on whether more American lives should
be lost in Indochina pursuing a military
THE AMENDMENT TO END THE WAR
The Amendment to End the War would
require adherence to an orderly plan for U.S.
disengagement from Cambodia, Laos and In-
dochina. Its authors are convinced that only
such a committed procedure for eliding mili-
tary involvement can succeed in extricating
the United States from protracted Indo-
chinese conflict.
Specifically, the Amendment provides that
none of the monies authorized by the bill
to which it is offered, or by another law,
shall be spent for any military operation or
assistance in Cambodia from 30 days after
enactment; for military operations in Laos
after December 31, 1870; or in Vietnam? for
purposes other than the process of with-
drawal and other carefully defined activi-
ties?after the same date.
It would permit all necessaty expenditures
after December 31, 1970, for the "safe and
systematic" withdrawal of U.S. armed forces,
for terminating U.S. military operations in
Vietnam, for prisoner exchanges, and for
arranging asylum for South Vietnamese who
might be physically endangered as a conse-
quence of the withdrawal. Ftuther funds
would remain available or a continuing basis
for any military and civilian assistance to
South Vietnam, in the amounts authorized
by the Congress and approved by the Presi-
dent.
Finally, the Amendment provides that U.S.
armed forces would be totally withdrawn
from Vietnam no later than June 30, 1971,
unless Congress?by joint resolution?were
to approve a determination by the President
that additional time is required and author-
ized an extension.
Similar plans to achieve a vote on a binding
Indochina withdrawal program are underway
In the House of Representatives. Since pro-
cedures in that body are more complex, initial
activities center upon achieving broad co-
consequences of failure. sponsorship of a House resolution in support
Against this background the Committee
rejected more speeches and resolutions as of the same basic objectives as the Amend-
clearly ineffectual. Little hope was seen in ment to End the War.
any gesture, no matter how dramatic, Which SAFEGUARD NATIONAL INIERESTS AND HUMAN
would be aimed at the same objective which LIVES
had eluded all past efforts?to convince the Any major initiative affecting American
White House in favor of a sharp change in posture in Indochina must be carefully and
policy, critically examined.
Rather It turned to an option always avail- The American people are united in wanting
able but never employed. Instead of offering the war to end. They are also united in
more advice to the President on how he wanting to know how any actjustment in
should exercise the authority granted to him policy, regardless of its source, will weigh on
by the Constitution, the Committee deter- such overriding concerns as the safety of
mined to focus on the powers held by its American forces now in Vietnam, the pros-
members themselves in concert with their pacts for return of prisoners of war, the
colleagues in the Congress.
security of Vietnamese citizens, the negotia-
The Committee's vehicle for reasserting tions in Paris, and the future position of the
Congressional authority over the Vietnam United States in world affairs.
conflict is the "Amendment to End the War." The Amendment to End the War obviously
The Committee's premise is that Congress deserves such scrutiny. There is, of course,
l
can do directly what its indirect efforts have little dispute over the premise that it would
failed to accomplish, through its undisputed end the involvement of American combat
control over the resources without which the personnel and reduce the costs liokfelcyotnorlibcte
more quickly than the program
war cannot be prosecuted.
tarsued in its absence. It sets forth a
solution to a political problem. The amendment offers to each member of definite, unambiguous process for return-
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent Congress an effective, temperate and respon- '
ing United States forces, and will thus fulfill
that the report of the steering Committee sible alternative to the President's policy. most effectively that primary objective upon
of the congressional committee for a Vote To the white House it is an offer to share which all can agree.
on the war be printed in the RECOlto, the burden of decisions over which the Con- But what otother major interests?
stitution assigns at least equal responsibility
There being no objection, the report to the Congress, and to assume a proper share Protection of American lives
Was ordered to be printed in the B,ECORD, of any blame or any credit ensuing from a If the protection of American troops is a
as follows: plan to bring American involvement to an primary concern it can best be accomplished
THE AMENDMENT To END TILE WAR orderly end, by bringing them home?so long as that step
(Report of the Steering ComMittee of the Before Americans of all ages and all sta- does not dismantle more pressing national
Congressional Committee for a Vote on the tions who are distressed by the war it places interest. The Amendment will save lives that
War) a vehicle for peaceful, lawful political action, would otherwise be lost.
It says that the "system" can work. If the return of U.S. forces is wise policy,
The Senators and Representatives who as the Amendment contends, then their
formed the Committee for a Vote on the War safety during disengagement and withdrawal
and who have since swelled its ranks have is the focal point at concern, and for this
no regard for the amendment as a symbolic the Amendment makes thoroughgoing pro-
act. They mean to see it approved, and they vision.
INTRODUCTION
The Committee for a Vote on the War was
created early in May by a bipartisan group
of Senators and Representatives who share a
deep feeling of the need to find a new method
of affecting national policy in Southeast Asia.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE
There is no question of taking ammunition
from combat troops while they are facing or
engaged in combat with the enemy. The
Amendment lays down a withdrawal plan
With very wide latitude for such tactical
options as are no assary to protect U.S. life
and limb.
Offensive combat activities are to be
brought to an end in six months and with-
draWal is to be completed in twelve, allow-
ing ample time for safe and deliberate re--
deployment. If the time is insufficient Con-
gress can extend the deadline
tion.
Throughout this period appropriated funds
may be spent in whatever ways are deemed
necessary by the Commander in Chief to in-
sure that maximum safety is achieved. This
would include all forms of defense against
attack. The most prudent course might be to
Withdraw combat troops last, but in any case
the entire range of protective options would
be available to commanders. These are pre-
rogatives with which the Amendment does
not, and with which the Congress certainly
Should not, interfere.
Just as relevant is the likely reaction of
enemy forces, the source of whatever dangers
exist. It is, of course, impossible to predict
how the North Vietnamese and Vietcong
Will respond to the short run. But it is diffi-
cult indeed to calculate a motive for them to
attack troops which are in the process of
being removed from battle. On the contrary,
the Amendment puts them on explicit no-
tice?with its provision for extension of the
deadline?that anything they do to endanger
U.S. forces may result in a longer American
presence than would otherwise be the case.
Something approaching an informal cease-
fire during the withdrawal period is quite
plausible, with a reduction in the overall
level of violence.
Prisoners of war
Whatever Vietnam policy is pursued by
the United States cannot alter the fact that
the North Vietnamese have life and death
control over Americans shot down and cap-
tured over years of conflict. Surely this truth
accounts in some measures for the depth of
concern for their safety which has been so
broadly exhibited; concern heightened by a
sense of helplessness and frustration.
The same truth renders impossible a guar-
antee by advocates of any policy that the
course they recommend?be it escalation,
Vietnamization, or withdrawal?will result in
the certain return of American prisoners.
Again, as in the case of the safety of HS.
forces in combat, predictions can only be
based on estimates of intentions and motives
of the adversary.
The Amendment to End the War will, how-
ever, hold out hope not available under the
alternative of continued conflict. The latter,
coupled with sharp protestations and invo-
cations of international law from Americans
of virtually every shade of political phi-
losophy, has accomplished nothing and prob-
ably never will. So long as everything the
United States does militarily is guided by
goals unreated to the prisoner issue?pri-
marily the preservation of the Thieu-Ky gov-
ernment?and perhaps so long as we are
deeply involved in Vietnam, our options for
action on that single matter will be severely
limited.
If, on the other hand, it is true that the
prisoners are being held as hostages in order
to influence American policy, then the
Amendment to End the War will eliminate
naneh of the .reason for their continued in-
? Caresistion. ktereover, by enhancing the out-
look for meaningful negotiations on all war-
related issues, it will advance the resolution
of the issue, which is essential to any ac-
ceptable settlement. The amendment does,
of course, continue authority for spending on t
arrangements for exchanges of prisoners as
required.
The negotiations
In the January, 1969, issue of Foreign Af-
fairs, Presidential Adviser Henry Kissinger
supplied an apt description of the military
realities which assure that if and when the
war in Vietnam does end, it will be through
political rather than military process. "The
guerilla wins," he wrote, "if he does not lose.
- The conventional army loses if it does not
win." The combined armies of the United
States and South Vietnam, as assumed by
the stated policies of the current President
as well as by those adopted in the last year
of his predecessor's term, cannot achieve a
military victory, while the other side does
not need one. The war will be Interminable
without political arbitration of the deep
antipathies in Indochina.
Meanwhile the Paris negotiations are
clearly failing. They are stalemated, and
there is no evidence that the stalemate Will
be broken without the introduction of some
new factors. The United States, although
agreeable to free elections, insists that the
Thieu-Ky government as now composed must
remain in power until and unless a successor
is chosen.
It holds that coalition with the Commu-
nists is unacceptable. The Thieu-Ky govern-
ment is, if anything, even more adamant on
this point, for obvious reasons.
North Vietnam and the National Libera-
tion Front, on the other hand, believe that
the outcome\ of such elections depends di-
rectly on the identity of the organizers and
administrators of the electoral process, and
they refuse to accept such control by those
now in power. In turn this also makes the
U.S. proposal for "mutual withdrawal" un-
acceptable, since it would leave the Saigon
administration?while still unable- to win?
still in exclusive command of all governmen-
tal machinery in South Vietnam.
The United States has essentially two op-
tions in these circumstances. One?the appli-
cation of military pressure and the threat of
even more damaging applications, both seek-
ing bargaining advantage by force on the
battlefield?has been tried without success.
In a sense it was the touchstone of American
policy throughout all the years of military
escalation even before the talks started in
Paris. It differs little from a strategy of mili-
tary victory.
The other option is to seek a true recon-
ciliation of the differences between the nego-
tiating parties.
Present American policy, as evidenced by
the "decisive" military moves of recent weeks,
appears to tend more toward the first option.
Although it is carried out in the context of a
gradual withdrawal program, the withdraw-
als made contingent upon moderated
enemy activity. The threat of military re-
sponse is explicit.
One strong element in the stalemate ap-
pears to be the ambiguity as to ultimate U.S.
intentions. Successful bargaining usually be-
gins when the parties perceive that their ad-
versaries' positions are predictable, sys-
tematic and clear-cut. The United States
position in Vietnam has been anything but
that, partly because of inconsistent rhetoric
and partly due to rapid swings in military
poliey.
The Amendment to End the War would
meet this problem directly by laying down
our plans with precision and clarity in a
program espoused not by the Executive
alone, whose capacity for shifts of strategy
must be painfully evident, but by a bi-
partisan, broadly representative Congress. It
would inject a new element of order and
reliability to the U.S. position.
But the Paris stalemate has a more com-
plex genesis, and that is the refusal of both
North Vietnam and South Vietnam to work
oward a breakthrough in negotiations. It is
here that the Amendment would have its 1
most salient effect.
S 8465
Initially it would provide a strong induce-
ment to Hanoi and the Vietcong to bargain
while the United States is stilt a party to the
negotiations and before U.S. withdrawal is
complete. The present government of South
Vietnam is notoriously less flexible than the
United States. Hence, it is to the advantage
of the adversary to bargain while the United
States has a negotiating presence coupled
with a direct battlefield interest. That pres-
ence will constitute a leavening influence
toward accommodation.
In addition, without an unacceptable loss
in negotiating strength and with momentous
benefit in terms of conditions in South Viet-
nam, the Amendment would set a definite
date for U.S. withdrawal which could be ex-
tended only by Congressional action. Such a
commitment would dispose of one of the
most serious impediments to meaningful
talks.
By the same token, the Amendment would
give the Saigon government incentives to
seek political accommodations as well, by
meeting what is perhaps the central dilemma
facing American policy. The Thieu-Ky Ad-
ministration has been vocally and embar-
rassingly unwilling to make any of the con-
cessions and commitments necessary to break
the deadlock. Its intransigence?and even on
occasion Saigon's willingness to pull the rug
out from under the U.S. position?derives in
large measure from our blank-check com-
mitment to its preservation. No regime, born
as this one in the heat of war, would be
likely to hazard its fortunes in peacetime
politics as long as it would enjoy the under-
writing of the most powerful military nation
in the world.
Our commitment, in effect, gives Saigon
almost dictatorial power over the direction
of U.S. policy. Paradoxically, it is a power
best exercised by political and military short-
comings. Palpably the Thieu-Ky govern-
ment's interests lie in continuing the con-
flict which keeps it in power; in retaining
the hazards of war and avoiding the hazards
of politics. To further this interest Saigon
can prevent agreement indefinitely unless the
United States sets precise, unquestioned
limits upon the extent and duration of its
commitment--as the Amendment to End the
War would do.
If this route is followed it is not difficult
to imagine the terms of an agreement which,
while perhaps not reflecting the preferences
of Saigon, would square fully with U.S.
advocacy of self-determination for the Viet-
namese people.
South Vietnam after withdrawal
The Amendment's effect on Saigon's at-
titude toward negotiations in Paris would
have a parallel influence on its manner of
facing military and political challenges back
in South Vietnam. Again the result would
coincide with the goal of U.S. policy.
It is appropriate to first address the dismal
predictions of terror and bloodshed which
have come to attend nearly all discussions of
fixed disengagement from Vientam. The
Amendment includes provisions for dealing
with such eventualities by suggesting and
funding arrangements for asylum for Viet-
namese who might be physically endangered
by the withdrawal of U.S. forces. But it
neither abandons allies nor invites their
destruction.
The Amendment would by no means force
Saigon to capitulate. Although it is diffi-
cult to make exact estimates, it would leave
South Vietnam with roughly one million
men under arms in the regular forces, plus
perhaps another quarter-million in national
police, all arrayed in combat against enemy
forces only one-fourth to one-fifth as large.
This numerical superiority would hold even
if North Vietnamese troops held back thus-
far were committed to battle. The ARVN is,
n comparison to North Vietnamese and Viet-
cong forces, elaborately equipped and metic-
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S 8466 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENA -""
ulously trained. And the Amendment pre- industrial and economic powers?than in the government and regulation of the land
serves continued aid, both civilian and mill- propping up a sagging military dictatorship and naval forces," to provide for the calling
tory, in amounts to be determined by the in Cambodia by force of our arms. out of the militia to execue the laws, suppress
Congress. On a global basis, the war has been weak- Insurrection and repel invasions, and to "pro-
Suggestions that South Vietnam would be ening, not strengthening, our influence and vide for organizing, arming, and disci-
overrun and its people slaughtered after power. By tying clown our resources, our plining the Militia, and for governing such
withdrawal do not, therefore, reflect the military capacities, our energies and our at- Part of them as may be employed in the
realities of existing power?unless the Saigon tention to a futile and endless war in one Service of the United States." Appropriations
government is unable to marshal the sup- corner of the world, tt has drained our capac- for the army, though not for the navy, were
port of its people?so that no amount of ity to influence developments in Europe, in limited to a term of two years, the only such
American help can preserve it. A conclusion the Middle East and elsewhere, and damaged limitation prescribed in the Constitution on
to that effect clearly destroys the premise our credibility and prestige in the view of the duration of funding for a particular pur-
that Vietnamizatlon can ever be more than our allies, pose.
a faint hope. Above all, the war has weakened us in the An elected President replaced the King as
The 'Amendment does not abandon the eyes of the world by dividing us internally. "Commander in Chief" of such forces as the
Saigon government nor demand its removal American power and resources were never in Congress might determine to put into the
from power. Rather it 'would confront its doubt?but our ability to utilize these cape.c- field. Article II, Section 2, established him
leaders with a series of choices, based upon [ties for global objectives have been placed in that office, thus assuring civilian control
realistic assessments of their own strength . in serious question by our profound internal and leadership even down to the most mi-
without the artificial inflation of an Amer- split over Vietnam. nuts tactical detail.
Man guarantee. As noted, they might as- And if it is our moral leadership with which The point of division of war powers be-
sums a more amenable posture in Paris- we are concerned, this can only be enhanced tween the President and the Congress has
They might implement the kind of eco- by ending a war that the rest of the world not been precisely defined. It has long been
nomic and political reforms long recognized largely regards as an immoral and futile effort recognized, for example, that the President
by American advisers as essential to the to rescue a corrupt dictatorship. can use the forces available to him to repeal
achievement of broad indigenous support. It Those who argue that disengagement would invasions without a declaration of war, a
might adopt less ambitious military strait- make us seem, in the President's words, a conclusion which finds support in the legis-
egies aimed at defense of critical areas in- -pitiful helpless giant" have forgotten their lative history of the Constitution itself. In
stead of seeking to control the entire omit- recent history. The Russians themselves were an early draft Congress was given power to
"make war", but the words "declare war"
tryside anti parts of other countries as well.
The President made it clear in his Guam
statement that Asian nations must chart
their own destiny without relying Upon
open-ended commitments of American help,
This can be no less true for Vietnam than
for other nations of the region. The Saigon
government must learn to walk by itself.
The Amendment to End the War would
leave it with this choice. Without just such
an explicit decision it 13 probable that the
choice will never be made.
Effect on U.S. global posture
An argument in favor of our continued
military presence in Vietnam has been that
disengagement there would somehow do ir-
reparable injury to our entire global pos-
ture.
The Committee is convinced, however, that
the opposite is true?that disengagement
would enhance the return of global stand-
ing and influence.
The war does not improve the U.S. posi-
tion in Asia; it weakens it.
The Vietnam experience has clearly shown
that the United States cannot establish a
bridgehead in an Asian nation in defiance
of indigenous forces of nationalism. A reason
for our lack of success in Vietnam is that we
permitted ourselves to become identified as
the foreign occupier and the successor of the
French colonist in a country in which anti-
colonialist and nationalist sentiments far
surpass the appeal of any other political ide-
ology or system.
Nationalism is oleo the great catalyst in
the rest of Southeast Asia?and for that rea-
son our continued involvement in what is
widely regarded as a colonial war has and
will seriously undermine our credibility in
compelleddlsengag
Cuba in 1962?a move that certainly had the were substituted with the intent, according
appearance of a setback, if not a defeat. Yet to the authors of the motion. of "leaving to
no one?least of all the architects of Viet- the' Executive the power to repel sudden
itemization within the Administration?ever attacks."
discounted Russian power. The reverse in Beyond that, .the scope of the President's
Cuba did not undermine that power because asserted authority as Commander in Chief
as
like our own, it w 'based upon overwhelm- has been much debated, both in general
lin and incontestable economic and military and with specific reference to Vietnam. Rea-
resources. Similarly, the French termination sonable men differ as to whether we are at
of the colonial war in Algeria proved a pre- war in the constitutional sense in Indochina,
lude of a sudden resurgence of French pree- and whether Congress should have declared
'lige and influence. The name holds true of that war; whether the Gulf of Tonkin Rem-
us, were we to terminate the war in Vietnam, lution was an adequate substitute for such
No rational observer in the Kremlin or else- a formal declaration; and whether the Presi-
where would regard our nation?with its dent is otherwise acting within his coneti-
armies and rockets and missiles and technol- tutional prerogatives in directing military
ogy and riches, and with a sense of renewal operations in South Vietnem, Cambodia and
born of the ending Of a divisive and hopeless Laos.war?as anything but a force to be reckoned It must be recognized, however, that the
Amendment to End the War does not de-
with very seriously. mend resolution of those issues. The ques-
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS tion whether the war is legal or illegal is not
Quite apart from its value in setting a relevant to a determination whether Con-
snore promising direction in Indochina, the gress may, based upon its evaluation of pm-
Amendment to to End the War will establish a dent uses of American military power and of
precedent of major consequence: By their the benefits and costs attending a given
simple exercise it will give vitality and mean- military action, choose to stop a war no
ing to Congressional powers which?although matter how begun. The Amendment does not
among the most critical vested in the Legis- seek to declare the Vietnam policies and
lative Branch--have suffered from disuse. measures of four presidents unlawful. It
The constitutional arrangement of shared does not adjudicate the past; rather it creates
power was devised against the background of a procedure for the present and the future,
two centuries of vigorous contest between If there as a constitutional issue it is
King and Parliament in England, centering whether the Congress may do that much
on the location of the power to make war. In without infringing upon the President's pow-
many respects it was seen as an exclusive era as Commander in Chief. The Constitu-
prerogative of
the monarch, but Parliament tion itself and a century and a half of mew-
had set out long before the American Revo- tice answer firmly in the affirmative.
lution to exert a negative influence through The view of Alexander Hamilton, a parti-
its control of the purse. Thus, for example, san of a strong executive, is in point in
f the office "Corn-
the region. the Supply Act of 1678 was passed for the construing
The war has been advertised as a deterrent express and sole purpose of financing and Mender in Chief." He pointed out that the
to Communist expansion in Asia, but thus disbanding the Charles Army in Flanders. President's power "amounted to nothing
far has succeeded chiefly in being a magnet The Founding Fathers were vividly aware more than the supreme command and di-
for it. Our stand in Vietnam appears to have of the history of this struggle and were de- rection of the military forces, as first Gen-
precipitated, rather than prevented, the termined not to repeat it. Their inclination eral and Admiral of the Confederacy. . , .
spread of the war into the rest of Indochina. in nearly all areas, but particularly in issues The duplication is that the President is em-
Our new involvement in the internal affairs of war and peace, was toward a broadened powered to determine how forces can be best
of Cambodia has, for the first time, drawn legislative scope and function. managed in pursuit of agreed objectives. An
the Communist Chinese into unequivocal The first power and duty of the Congress attempt by the Congress to substitute one
support of a "war of national liberation" in under the Constitution was: "To lay and col- particular combat tactic for another would
that country. leCt Taxes, Duties, Impost and Excises, to pay be seen as an improper interference with
The way to influence in Asia does not lie the Debts and provide for the common De- presidential discretion,
in continuation of the war and the propping fense and general Welfare of the United But the military resources available to the
up of unpopular regime's in the face of the States." For the purpose of providing for the President remain the exclusive domain of
rising forces of nationalism. It lies, rather, in common defense, Congress was empowered in Congress, along with its decisive share of
ending the war and forging strong economic Article I, Section 8, to "declare war, grant the power to choose which objectives shall
and political inks with independent and in- letters of marque and reprisal, and make be pursued and which shall not. It is these
ternally strong nations. We have much more rules concerning captures on land and water." prerogatives which the Amendment to End
to gain, for example, from improving our ties It Was to "raise and support armies," to "pro- the War would exercise.
with Japan?now one of the world's leading vide and maintain a navy," to "make rules for Congress has, of course, consistently qual-
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5, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
ified its appropriations and authorizations in
all areas The use of funds it appropriates is
- lithiteci by riders and amendments In many
cases each year, as witness programs re-
quiring Satisfactory desegregation plans as
a condition of Federal school aid.
Military appropriations, moreover, are of
a 'speaial character, as established by the
unique constitutional requirement that they
may never be made for a period exceeding
two years. They represent?and were de-
signed by the Founding Fathers to force?
a continuing, affirmative re-esamination of
the record of the Executive Department in
the military arena.
S -uch examinations and limitations are by
no means unusual. One of the most detailed
directives to be found was !minded in the
1909 Naval Appropriations bill, through
Which the Congress required that the Ma-
rine Corps should serve alongside Naval
personnel on battleships and cruisers, in
Contradiction of an order of President
Roosevelt. Upon request of the Secretary of
the Navy, Attorney General George Wicker-
Sham ruled that the act, which conditioned
the appropriation upon compliance with the
Congressional mandate, was constitutional
and that the President was obliged to follow
It. He said:
"Inasmuch as Congress has the power to
Create or not create, as it shall deem expedi-
ent, a marine corps, it has the power to create
a marine corps, make appropriations for its
pay, but provide that such appropriations
shall not be available unless the marine corps
be employed in some designated way. . . ."
More recently, and in more direct parallel
to the Amendment to End the War, the De-
fense Appropriations Act of 1970 provides
that:
". . none of the funds appropriated by
This Act shall be used to finance the intro-
duction of American ground combat troops
into Laos or Thailand."
The proviso is an obvious limitation on
the kinds of actions and the locations in
Which the President may command the mili-
tary forces made available to him. Its pro-
priety under the Constitution is beyond
question.
The Amendment under consideration here
leaves the President with full discretion as
Commander in Chief, to manage the removal
of United States forces from Indochina. It
does no more than exercise a power clearly
held by the Congress to determine that mili-
tary forces shall not be available for a par-
ticular purpose, and thus comports exactly
With the constitutional arrangement.
If Congress does have the power to decide
upon military appropriations, it follows that
such appropriations can properly be con-
strued as a Congressional mark of approval
for the military programs they fund.
President Johnson made this clear with
explicit reference to Vietnam on May 4, 1965,
When he said in requesting a further $700
million for the war:
"This is not a routine appropriation. For
each member of Congress who supports this
request is also voting to persist in our effort
to halt Communist aggression in South Viet-
nam. Each is saying that the an
the President stand united before the world
in joint determination that the independence
of South Vietnam shall be preserved and the
Communist attack will not succeed."
- Congress has, therefore, as much responsi-
bility as the Executive for the continued
conflict in Vietnam. It cannot turn aside
that conclusion by claiming that the Presi-
dent is Commander in Chief and, in that role,
desires the appropriation. Nor can Its re-
sponsibility be avoided by noting that Viet-
nam funds have in each instance been in-
cluded in large authorization and appropria- t
tions bills, for the Opportunity to amend or
limit _hag; always been available. Congress i
does not acquiesce in appropriations; it t
makes them.
The one procedural difference between the
Amendment to End the War and prior votes
on the conflict in Indochina Is that the
Amendment singles out the issue and calls
for a direct decision. In this sense it fulfills
much more completely than has previously
been the case the constitutional mandate for
scrupulous review of military activities.
It will, moreover, make war once again a
shared decision and, by an act of respectful
and solemn law-making, reassert the respon-
sibility of the Congress in the most momen-
tous area of national policy. The practice
of recent years?the President bearing alone
the grave burdens of deciding to send U.S.
troops to battle and death; the Congress re-
treating from its own role?is unstable, un-
dignified and unwise. By engendering a re-
newed understanding of and willingness to
assert Congressional obligatims, it can make
a positive contriBution to the process of U.S.
foreign policy far beyond Vietnam and share
the burden of responsibility for declarations
of war and peace, as intended by the Con-
stitution.
THE ORIGINS OF INVOLVEMENT
The United States first moved into Viet-
nam in the closing days of World War II,
when it appeared that neither England nor
France would be able to recover the domi-
nance they had achieved prior to World War
As World War It drew to a close, the Viet-
namese resistance movement, led by Ho Chi
Minh and his military commander, Nyugen
Giap, established control over much of Viet-
nam and, on September 2, 1945, proclaimed
the establishment of the Democratic Repub-
lic of Vietnam. The same month General
Philip D. Gallagher arrived to head a U.S.
military mission; and an office of the OSS
was set up. This first U.S. presence supported
Vietnamese independence under Ho Chi
Minh. However, the British, who had liber-
ated the southern part of Vietnam, permitted
the French to return. The French proceeded
to sign an agreement recognizing the Demo-
cratic Republic of Vietnam as "a free state
with its own government, army, and finances,
forming a part of the Indo-Chinese Federa-
tion and the French Union." In exchange for
this recognition of autonomy, Ho Chi Minh
agreed to the return of 15,000 French troops.
In subsequent months, the French position
on Vietnamese independence hardened, and
by November the war for Indo-China had
begun, with a deadly French artillery barrage
on the city of Haiphong. The French alsO
began the process of setting up a rival gov-
ernment in Saigon under Bao Dai, who had
served as emperor under the Japanese. This
set the pattern for later, anti-communist
governments in Saigon.
The United States first began to take a
serious interest in Indo-China in the summer
of 1949, after the final victory of the Com-
munists in China. Secretary of State Dean
Acheson directed an assessment of U.S. policy
In Asia with the premise that "it is a funda-
mental decision of American policy that the
United States does not intend to permit fur-
ther extension of communist domination
upon the continent of Asia or in the South-
east Asia area." Early in 1950 the government
cif Bao Dai was granted independence by the
French, and the United State immediately
recognized this regime as the government of
Vietnam. Several months later we agreed, for
the first time, to provide direct military and
economic aid to the French, who were con-
tinuing the war against the Vietminh based
In Hanoi. Before the French pulled out in
1954 we were to give more than $1.5 billion
In. aid for this struggle.
In spite of this massive assistance, the
French effort went downhill, culminating in
he decisive battle of Dien Bien Phu. Some
advisors strongly advocated U.S. Intervention
Zi the form of a large-scale air strike, but
he British would not support us and there
was intense congressional resistance to t
S 8467
American intervention on the land mass of
Asia. President Eisenhower refrained.
Without 'direct American intervention, the
French were unable to carry on the struggle.
The State Department, in . assessing the
causes of the French defeat, observed that
"failure of important elements of the local
population to give a full measure of support
to the war effort remained one of the chief
negative factors." The French agreed to meet
In Geneva to settle the war.
The United States refused to join in the
resulting accords, fearing that they would
lead to the surrender of all of Indo-China to
communist domination. Geneva represented
a genuine compromise which satisfied neither
side. Although he had achieved the clear mili-
tary advantage, Ho Chi Minh somehow was
persuaded?apparently by a joint Sino-Soviet
effort?to settle for half the country. Ho
knew that his regime was popular throughout
Vietnam?President Eisenhower later Ob-
served that "80% of the population would
have voted for the communist Ho Chi
Minh"?and he agreed to a nationwide elec-
tion as the means of ending foreign control
of Vietnam. Eisenhower, of course, provided
for a provisional zone of demarcation along
the 17th parallel pending "the general elec-
tion which will bring about the unification of
Vietnam." The Geneva Accords stated that
."the military demarcation line is provisional
and should not in any way be interpreted
constituting a political or territorial bound-
ary."
In spite of these provisions, the United
States was determined to establish a non-
communist regime in the southern part of
Vietnam. Three days after the Geneva Ac-
cords were signed, the Wall Street Journal
observed that "the U.S. is in no hurry for
elections to unite Vietnam; we fear Red
leader Ho Chi Minh would win. Secretary
Dulles plans first to make the southern half
a showpiece?with American aid." A coali-
tion of American military officers, professors,
bureaucrats, and publicists joined forces to
convert the provisional government south of
the 17th parallel into a "viable" non-com-
munist state. Ngo Dinh Diem was imported
from the Maryknoll Seminary in New Jer-
sey to serve as premier of the new regime;
the U.S. began the process of "nation-build-
ing". The U.S. supported Diem in his refusal
to permit the national elections provided for
in the Geneva Accords, and provided his re-
gime with $3 billion in economic and mili-
tary aid between. 1955 and 1959. Experts in
land reform, currency control, police ad-
ministration, and, eventually, counterinsur-
gency, sought to buttress the fledgling
regime.
The land reform program was hindered by
opposition from the landlords. Diem's ruth-
less suppression of opposition led, by 1957, to
a beginning guerrilla warfare within South
Vietnam. These efforts were initially led by
the anti-communist National Salvation
Movement and the Dai Viet; Hanoi initially
stacked the insurgents for losing patience in
the Geneva settlement and advocating a
prematurely radical program. Eventually,
Hanoi gave its support to the guerrillas in
South Vietnam. During those early years
there were many reports of dissension be-
tween guerrilla forces in the south and the
communist government in Hanoi. At one
meeting of the National Liberation Front,
the anti-Diem coalition set up in South
Vietnam, agents from Hanoi were greeted
with scorn: "What are you waiting for to
help us? If you don't do anything, you com-
munists, we will rise up against you, too?"
With the aid of Hanoi, the guerrillas grew
in strength and, by the time the Kennedy
Administration took office, the Diem regime
was near collapse. In May, 1961, the U.S.-
ambassador in Saigon thought "it would be
a miracle if South Vietnam lasted three
months longer." The Kennedy Administra-
tion decided to send in large doses of mill-
ary assistance, including thousands of "ad-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SEN NI t June 5 1970
visors", backed by helicopters and massive
amounts of supplies. By the summer of 1964 r
there were 25,000 American soldiers in Viet- t
nem, but the government was more unstable
than eves'. The Diem regime had been over-
thrown and six successive military juntas
had attempted unsuccessfully to govern.
The rilias posing a succession of 4.
weak and unpopular regimes in Saigon and
expressing Nationalist opposition to the in-
fluence of the Americans, continued to grow
in strength. Even in late 1964, when the
Johnson Administration was planning large-
scale intervention and the bombing of the
North, there was still very little direct inter-
vention from the North, Pentagon figures
show that there were only 400 North Viet-
namese soldiers south of the 17th parallel
at that time. Nevertheless, the Johnson Ad-
ministration saw, in Secretary McNamara's
words, that the Viet Cong were "approaching
possible victory" and they moved, in Feb-
ruary 1965, to strengthen the fragile regime
in the South by carrying the war to the
North. The result was bombing on a scale
exceeding even that carried on during World
War II and the introduction of more than
500,000 American soldiers. But with even
this level of support (with U.S. expenditures
exceeding $150 billion ) and with the loss of
more than 45,000 American lives, and the
devastation of much of the country. the
guerrillas, with assistance from North Viet-
nam, are still carrying on the fight, and the
regime in Saigon must resort to political
repression and American force of arms to
maintain itself in power.
THE ALTERNATIVE?VIETNAM
Any resolution of the Vietnam conflict
short of an impossible military victory will
be distasteful to many Americans, and the
Amendment to End the War cannot avoid
such consequences.
But the Amendment cannot be considered
In a vacuum. A truly satisfactory solution is
not available under either alternative?the
Amendment or the program announCed by
the Administration. What, then, will be the
consequences of a Congressional refusal to
act?
Prospects in that event depend in large
part on the Thieu-Ky government, which
has been maintained in power for years al-
most solely by the American military
presence.
Its political base continues to rest mainly
on a small group of army officers and North
emigres. It has steadfastly refused to permit
any participation by perhaps the mont im-
portant non-communist elite in Vietnam?
the Buddhist leadership. Despite pretentions
at legitimacy, its constitution and electoral
system are carefully structured to support
present war policies and deny effective par-
ticipation by dissident political elements.
It has systematically branded as "neutralists"
and "traitors" noncommunists who have ex-
pressed interest in any negotiated settlement.
The imprisonment of Tran Ngoc Chau and
the closing of more than two dozen news-
papers by government censors are dramatic
examples of such political repression.
If such a regime were able to survive at
all after the dparture of American forces,
it could only do so by undertaking drastic
reforms and by permitting the participation
In the country's political life of elements
that are now completely -excluded. The simple
truth is that the Saigon government pres-
ently has no intention of going forward with
this painful process--painful because it
would require the regime to share its power
with others?since it can cling to the hope
of an almost indefinite presence of at least
a residual force of American troops.
The overriding interest of a clear majority
of the South Vietnamese people is peace?to
stop the killing, to stop the destruction of
the cities, villages and farms of Vietnam.
The overriding interest of the military major strategic centers. The U.S. intervention
egitne of South Vietnam is war?for it is also invites the North Vietnamese to extend
he war that is the basis of the regime's their operations anywhere within Gam-
power. bodia--including the area around Phnom
We have long ago made the choice of Penh and districts opposite the Thai fron-
givernment for the South Vietnamese peo- tier. This, in turn, would threaten the se-
)le. We have done so by supporting with curity of Thailand, whose open southeastern
iur armies and with enormous sums of flank Was previously protected by the exist-
ence of a neutralist Cambodia.
The loss of Cambodian neutrality thus
presents a striking illustration of the fra-
gility of a policy which relies upon military
pressure in a widening war with shrinking
numbers of men. Encouragement of an alli-
ance between Saigon and Phnoth Penh will
weaken rather than strengthen the U.S. po-
sition. It brings into the fray a dismally
weak new military force on the allied side
while extending the battlefront over thou-
sands more square miles of Dangle. It offers
both political and military advantage to the
enemy, by identifying American interests
with a new narrow dictatorship and in op-
position to a deposed leader enjoying broad
respect and support among the Populace.
Vietnamization has emerged in recent
months as a formula for an indefinite U.S.
presence in Vietnam. Coupled with a strat-
egy of decisive, military response?a pro-
cedure for making the war bigger quicker?
it gravely endangers the life of each service-
man who is obligated to remain in Viet-
nam with shrinking support. Nearly any
alternative would be more in keeping with
U.S. interests.
money a military regime which is totally
dependent on that support, and which sup-
presses all political opposition. As long as
such a narroatly based government remains
in power, there can be no real "self-deter-
mination" for the South Vietnamese people.
Vietnamizatinn is nothing new?it is as
old as the Indochina war. It was attempted
,3y the French, by the Kennedy Adminlistra-
eon, and by the Johnson Administration in
its first year. In each case this strategy?
of arming, training and directing the South
Vietnamese armies laas not worked, and has
proven the prelude to further military in-
volvement.
Vietnamization is tiot, therefore, a true
policy of disengagement. It is not a delayed
version of the complete withdrawal policy
proposed by the Amendment. It is, at best,
a troop reduction strategy?a plan aimed
at reducing the American presence to a level
that would sustain the Saigon government
and army and at the same time seem "accept-
able" to American public opinion.
So far only about one-fifth of American
troop strength has been withdrawn from
Vietnam. If the President's announced with-
drawal schedule were followed, there will
be nearly 300,000 American troops in Viet-
nam well into the third year of the Nixon
Administration's term in office. That is about
the same as American force level in Viet-
nam in mid-1966.
By all indications, the Administration is
contemplating the retention of a "residual
force" in Vietnam for an unspecified and
possibly indefinite period. Even a relatively
"low" residual force figure represents a per-
manent troop commitment of the same or-
der of magnitude as that which existed in
early 1965, when we initiated bombing of
the North.
The price of so large an American commit-
ment will be from 5,000 to 10,000 or more
American dead by the end of 1972. It will be
from 25,000 to 50,000 or more American
wounded by that time. And the cost will be
$30 to $50 billion or more--a cost that must
be measured in the opportunities forgone to
respond to urgent domestic needs.
No U.S. interest in Vietnam justifies such
sacrifice in this seemingly interminable war.
This is the staggering price if Vietnamiza-
tion works as planned. And recent develop-
ments in Cambodia show that Vietnamiza-
tion is plainly unlikely to work.
The South Vietnamese army, whose ca-
pacity to defend even South Vietnam is still
critically dependent upon American military
upon ea, its
THE ALTERNATI V1H)?AMERICA
The most damaging, irretrievable cost of
any war to any society, and particularly to
one that respects individual life and liberty,
is measured in blood spilled. Now some 50,000
young Americans have made the greatest
sacrifice any government can exact; dead,
lost to their families and to the country,
because of the war. Hundreds of thousands
more have been injured.
Perhaps some would have the war con-
tinue precisely because of those tragic costs:
to seek justification for lives already ended
and bodies already torn. But surely most of
us must recognize as cruel and intolerable
a premise that further sacrifice in a futile
cause can give meaning to sacrifice already
made. The great national contribution of
Vietnam war dead can be found instead in
the wisdom and maturity the Vietnam ex-
perience can bring to the American char-
acter, traits that can avoid more loss of life
both in the immediate and more distant fu-
ture. Instead of the casualties we can expect
from further conflict, their memory can be
best honored by the preservation of life.
For America the basic alternative to the
Amendment to End the War is to continue
these losses and to postpone these lessons.
Surely the burden of persuasion must lie
with those who choose that course.
The war and the economic crisis
forces, now seems intent spr ding
resources ever more thinly in long-term If some bear the burdens of war most
ground operations over half of Cambodia. It heavily, no one in America can escape its
Is clear that the number of Vietnamese sol- pervasive, pernicious Influence. The eco-
diers available to relieve American manpower nomic crisis engendered by the war touches
in Vietnam le now drastically reduced. To ex- each of us.
tend assignment of Saigon's forces to wide During the 1960's the United States ex-
areas of Cambodia makes a travesty of what periences one of the longest periods of sus-
ever prospects for success Vietnarnization tained economic growth ever recorded. In
might have enjoyed, had the role of Saigon's the first half of the decade the purchasing
troops been confined to Vietnam. Since Viet- power of the dollar held firm. Every new dol-
namization means substitution of Vietnam- lar that contributed to growth was worth a
ese soldiers for Americans, it is clear that full dollar.
the process set in motion by the Cambodian Since the mid-1960's, however, the United
invasion works directly against prospects for States has seen the dollar's value eroded to
achievement of that policy and bringing the point that any apparent growth in the
American soldiers home. national economy has in fact been offset by
Moreover, the invasion threatens the Amer- a decline in real worth. This economic stag-
loan position in areas of Southeast Asia not nation, in tandem with an endless round of
previously Contested in earnest. North Viet- rising prices and rising wages, is the result of
naanese forces have already responded by ex- marked, uncontrolled inflation.
pending their political in Southern Laos-- ? The country actually faces two kinds of
seizing Attopeu and menacing Saravene, both economic maladies. Inflation is a crisis in
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itself and its causes and effects merit pri-
ority attention. But the second set of prob-
lems?the economic impact of measures de-
signed to halt inflation?should cause equal
concern. They create serious obstacles to
meeting the nation's pressing needs, and
they have meanwhile brought us to the
brink of recession?while still not ending
the price spiral.
Inflation is a self-propelled movement. As
prices rise, labor legitimately asks for higher
wages. Wage increases in turn push prices
higher, and the process continues as long as
the basic causes are not countered. Today
they have not been, and selected economic
indicators record the bleak reality:
Gross National Product, the dollar value
of all the goods and services produced in the
economy, has ceased to grew as the decline
in the value of the dollar more tnan eats up
any gains made in production.
The Consumer Price Index, which shows
the cost of the average market basket for
Individuals, rose 28% in tte 1960's, but
three-quarters of this increase came after
1965.
Corporate profits grew by more than 50%
in the first part of decade, but the growth
rate dropped to less than 17% between 1966
and 1969 as industry shifted to war pro-
duction.
The nation's debt ceiling has had to be
lifted repeatedly. It is now about $100 billion.
The effect of war spending on the United
States balance of payments has been esti-
mated to be about $4 billion a year, a figure
that the Defense Department has accepted.
The ;United States is "losing" this much each
year on international transactions, and the
outflow has increased the pressure on the dol-
lar and has contributed to the massive loss of
American gold.
But the average person is more concerned
with more concrete indicators:
Telephone service is declining due to a lack
of men, material and adequate research and
development.
Food prices are going up 5% every year.
In some areas, the price of a house has
gone up 25% in two years.
Steel prices are raised several times a
month, making everything from refrigerators
to cars more expensive. New auto price in-
creases are planned for the fall models.
Property taxes have climbed as much as
10% in one year and Federal taxes have
gone up thanks to the surcharge.
The cost of going out to the movies or to
dinner has doubled in the big cities in the
last five years.
Indochina war spending?estimated by Pro-
fessor James Clayton in his book The Eco-
nomic Impact of the War at about $350 bil-
lion?is the central cause of inflation. Dr.
Roy L. Reierson, Senior Vice President and
Chief Economist at Bankers Trust, sums up
the grim outlook and its origins this way:
"The enhanced involvement In friilitary
operations in Asia in mid-1965 resulted in
sharp boosts in defense orders, production
and spending, and these had their normal in-
flationary impact. These war-engendered in-
flationary forces were strengthened by a seri-
ous mismanagement of fiscal policy, includ-
ing greatly underestimated defense spending
and its impact on the economy, lack of re-
straint on non-defense spending at a time
when defense spending was rising rapidly,
and delay in taking action to raise taxes. This
Culminated in a massive $25 billion deficit
in fiscal 1968 in the face of an overheated
economy and acute labor shortages."
The answer to inflation is to end the war.
Until that is done it is probable that every
American will be doubly-taxed, by regular
taxes and by the cruel tax of inflation, bear-
ing most heavily on those least able to pay.
Early in 1969, Arthur Burns, then counsellor
to the President and now Chairman of the
Federal Reserve System, said that inflation
could be reduced to a 3 percent rate by the
end of the year. April, 1970, estimates set the
rate at 7 percent. The economic prognosis is
more trouble, more distortion of a delicate
economy, so long as the war goes on.
Lost opportunities
The Indochina War has a direct effect on
the allocation of resources in the American
economy. The high cost of the war simply
means that the government has less money
for other programs. In addition, the measures
that the Administration has adopted to stop
inflation, without halting the war, determine
in large part "who gets what" from national
wealth and productivity.
In 1969, Senator Ralph Yarborough de-
scribed the kind of economic choice implicit
in the continuation of the American military
effort in Indochina: "There are an estimated
240,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong
now in South Vietnam," he said. "If we take
that 240,000 and divide it into the $5.2 bil-
lion they (the Defense Department) want for
ammunition alone, that is $21,666.67 for am-
munition to shoot at each Viet Cong and
North Vietnamese soldier, whether they hit
him or not. But they (the Administration)
ask only $3.2 billion for elementary and sec-
ondary education for 72 million school chil-
dren, which is $44 for each child."
Every hour the United States spends $2
million on the Indochina War. These are
some of the programs that are not receiving
necessary funds because of the war effort and
all of which could be financed out of war
expenditures in a two-year period:
Provisions of public libraries for 12 million
Americans who have no access to libraries.
Four years of training for 125,000 nurses
and 50,000 doctors.
Construction of 296,000 new elementary
classrooms.
Provision and equipment of 600,000 hos-
pital beds.
Capital spending program for mass trans-
portation systems amounting to $10 billion
over 10 years.
Federal grants for urban renewal of $14
billion over 10 years.
Provision of the Federal government con-
tribution of $13 billion to end air and water
pollution. Sewage plants cannot be built at
present, because there is little Federal money
available to match local bond issues.
There is no assurance today that the money
made available from an end to the war would
be made available for these or similar pro-
grams. The decisions on how the money
should be spent is in the hands of the Ad-
ministration and the Congress and, ulti-
mately, of the people. But it is absolutely
certain today that money will not be avail-
able for these or similar programs unless the
war is ended.
In order to stem inflation while continu-
ing the Indochina War, the Administration
has adopted a stringent economic policy. It
is aimed at cooling off the economy by reduc-
ing at the same time industrial production
and consumer purchasing. The key elements
in this policy is raising interest rates, which
makes it more difficult to raise money for in-
dustry. Theoretically this policy is also de-
signed to encourage saving by individuals
who could expect to get high interest instead
of spending all their income. In fact, however,
the rising interest rates charged for all pur-
chases?from a washing machine to a home?
have eaten up the money that individuals
might have been expected to save,
The effects of reduced consumer demand
and higher costs for producers have led to a
recession. Industry must lay off workers. Un-
employment across the country has risen to
4.8%, the higest in five years. In some areas
this means an unemployment rate of 8%
and for some less-skilled groups a rate of
15%. For each percentage point on a national
basis, almost one million wage earners are
thrown out of work. They are called "soldiers"
in the war against Inflation; in fact, because
inflation is caused by the Indochina War,
they are making a major and involuntary
contribution to the pursuit of that conflict.
Industrial production is declining steadily
as manufacturers And that fewer consumers
are able to purchase their goods. In the
nine months ending on April 30, 1970, it fell
2.5%. American industry is now operating at
only 80% of capacity.
Reduced production means reduced profits.
As was mentioned earlier, corporate profits
rose more than 50% from 1962 to 1965, but
increased only about 17% from 1966 to
1969.
Falling profits have undermined investor's
confidence in American industry. In May,
1970, prices on the New York Stock Exchange
hit a seven year low in two days in succes-
sion. In April 1970, in the face of a falling
? Stock Market, President Nixon said: "Frank-
ly, if I had any money, I'd be buying stocks
right now." Apparently, like many other
Americans, he did not have any money. But
if he had bought stocks that day, he would
have lost money in the next 30 days, when
the Dow Jones index plunged from 735 to
665.
Slower economic activity has also resulted
in decreased revenues from taxes paid to the
Federal government. Thus, at the same time
as the Administration is increasing expendi-
tures related to the Indochina War, its in-
come has fallen below expectations. A deficit
in the Federal budget is expected through
mid-1972, according to the White House. The
only method proposed to close this gap is
the imposition of a new tax on leaded gaso-
line. And if the Administration succeeds in
"getting the lead out" through this measure,
the fiscal benefits will be slight and the
deficit will remain. This deficit becomes a
part of the national debt and must be re-
paid later with interest.
In sum, the war has upended national
priorities. It has shrunken the supply of re-
sources needed to meet domestic goals, pub-
lic and private, both by its direct consump-
tion of those resources and by consequential
deterioration in their worth.
Again each American, regardless of his view
toward America's involvement in Indochina,
must account its costs in terms of lost op-
portunities at home. Our contributions for
the preservation of one government in one
country 10,000 miles away have been great
indeed.
Spiritual Decline
The costs of inflation resulting from the
Indochina War and of the measures employed
to combat it can be calculated objectively.
There is little room for debate about the
economic impact of inflation and recession.
But beyond these costs are those which are
less easy to calculate, though they may be
far higher. These are stresses placed on the
roots of American society by the continua-
tion of the War.
Whether an American's concept of his pa-
triotic duty leads him to support fully the
President's policy in Southeast Asia or to
oppose it and support an early withdrawal
of American forces, he will undoubtedly rec-
ognize that the prolonged debate over the
War is having harmful effects on the cohe-
sion of his country.
The United States was conceived by its
Founding Fathers as a nation in which di-
vergent views could exist in an atmopshere
of freedom made possible by common accept-
ance of a democratic form of government.
Now this common will is in danger of being
torn asunder.
Violence as a form of political expression
either in favor of or against the war is in-
creasing. Tolerance of unorthodox forms of
dress and speech, of the right to hold a dif-
ferent opinion, of the right to speak out for
or against government policies, is fading fast.
Invective and name calling have become the
order of the day.
The political system seems to many to have
become unresponsive to their viewpoint. Sue-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE June 5, 1970
cessive administrations have made a point of
demonstrating that they will not be affected
by opposing opinions a,nd that they would
prefer it if these opinions were not evert ex-
pressed. This attitude has led to a growing
sense of frustration. Frustration has in turn
led to growing dissatisfaction with the po-
litical system itself.
The strength of the American political sys-
tem is that it has continually evolved since
the Articles of Confederation and then the
Constitution were adopted. The unyielding
policy on Vietnam, which has clearly be-
come the national issue of parruncamt impor-
tance, marks a step back from this tradi-
tion. Those who have sensed this change
have reacted vigorously, occasionally violent-
ly, to it. Their acts have provoked counter-
violence and sometimes repression.
The major question before the American
people is whether the pursuit of the Indo-
china War, a war which will not be won on
the battlefield in any case, is worth the real
chance of permanent damage to the Ameri-
can political system.
Not only does the debate over the War en-
danger 'society through its menace to the
underlying consensus that has enabled Amer-
ica to become a great nation, but it prevents
energies from being devoted to the great is-
sue of American history?the construction of
a society in which men of all races, religions
and national origins can live together.
The Amendment To End the War seeks to
preserve the American political system by
using it. Its ultimate success depends on the
willingness and the ability of those who sup-
port its objectives to work and to persevere
within that system, so that the system itself
will survive to cope with problems and chal-
lenges that lie ahead.
CONCLUSON OF MORNING
BUSINESS
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, is there further morning business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
further morning business? If not, morn-
ing business is closed.
AMENDMENT OF THE FOREI:ON
MILITARY SALES ACT
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, I ask unanimous consent that the
Senate proceed to the consideration of
the unfinished business.
' The PRESIDING 0101010ER. The bill
will be stated by title.
The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A
bill (H.R. 15628) to amend the Foreign
Military Sales Act.
The PRESIDING OreaCER. Is there
objection to the request of the Senator
from West Virginia?
There being no objection, the Senate
resumed the consideration of the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to amendment No.
667, as modified.
The Chair recognizes the Senator from
Wyoming (Mr. HANSEN).
Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, it has be-
come the fashion today for the vocal
minority to undertake a game of second
guessing the President of the United
States. It is increasingly apparent to all
of us that this minority, which takes
pride in using clear hindsight, will ques-
tion the President on every move he
makes.
When the President announced he was
going into Cambodia, there was an in-
stant cry by many that this was a mis-
take. Many jumped on the President's
decision as a vehiele to express displeas-
ure with the President?regardless of
the reason. For many, I would guess that
the decision on Cambodia served as the
vehicle for purely political displeasures.
Nevertheless, Mr. President, it is evi-
dent to me that the President's decision
was the right and correct decision to
make. In order to continue the plan for
Vietnamization, I believe the President
had no other choice but to destroy the
Cambodian border strongholds. The
President's decision was justified and
necessary. What it means is that fewer
American lives are going to be lost, and
we can bring our fighting men home at
an earlier date.
When I heard that the President had
made his decision to knock out sanctu-
aries over the Cambodian border, I ex-
pressed my complete support for his de-
cision.
In fact, I had been concerned for some
period of time with the fact that the en-
emy had been able to walk across an
imaginary line in the night, strike and
kill Americans and Vietnamese under
the shadow of darkness, and then re-
treat back over this same imaginary line
before sunrise.
Be that as it may, there were signifi-
cant events leading up to the President's
decision. Let me summarize some of those
events:
Prior to the overthrow of Prince Si-
hanouk on March 18, Cambodia had in
large part avoided the fighting in Viet-
nam. This was the case despite the fact
that North Vietnam had established
bases for an estimated 55,000 to 70,000
of its troops on the Cambodian side of
the South Vietnamese border. It is true
that from 1965 until March 18, 1970, the
Cambodian Government did little to in-
terfere with these bases.
The Vietnamese Communists have
made use of its territory for tactical
sanctuary, for base areas, for infiltra-
tion of personnel, and for shipment of
supplies. They have also procured arms,
food and other supplies from Cambodian
sources.
The utility of Cambodia to Hanoi be-
came crucial in 1969, when the North
Vietnamese decided after the defeat of
their Tet offensive and two subsequent
offensives in 1968, that they would shift
to a strategy of "protracted struggle."
This strategy, as outlined in detail in a
document issued August 1969 by COSVN,
the "Central Office for South Vietnam,"
which is Hanoi's main headquarters in
the southern part of South Viet Nam,
called for the withdrawal of the bulk of
the Communist main forces into the
Cambodian base areas, from which they
would wait out the U.S. troop withdraw-
als under Vietnamization, stage occa-
sional forays, or "high points," to main-
tain military pressure on the allies, and
support the Communist infrastructure
and local forces left behind in South
Vietnam. Here the Communist forces
enjoyed sanctuary, a particularly impor-
tant feature for the forces operating ad-
jacent to the relatively open, densely-
populated, and heavily-garrisoned areas
of IV Corps and southern III Corps--
the Delta and the Saigon region. (Safe
haven in Cambodia is less important
farther north where the rugged, densely-
forested and lightly held South Vietnam-
ese highlands provide more elbow room
for Communist forces on the move or at
rest.)
These base areas have now been turned
by the NVA/VC elements into compre-
hensive military installations where
troops and new recruits are received,
supplied, and trained; military and po-
litical staffs maintain their headquar-
ters; and fighting forces receive refuge
and medical treatment. Some base areas
contain sizable ordnance depots, weap-
ons and ammunition factories, petroleum
storage facilities, truck parks, and POW
camps. Clearly, the ease areas provide
the foundation upon which rest Com-
munist expectations of maintaining an
effective military-political apparatus in
southern South Vietnam while the U.S.
withdrawal proceeds.
The more northerly base areas, op-
posite II Corps and northern III Corps,
serve as safe havens for Communist
troops operating into these areas, and
also facilitate the southward movement
of North Vietnamese troops and supplies
toward COSVN and eastward into the
highlands of South Vietnam. They con-
stitute, in effect, an extension of the
Laos corridor?but a sector in which the
NVA has enjoyed virtual immunity from
Allied attack. To the extent that the
Communists were denied free use of
these areas, their forces in the highlands
of South Vietnam could suffer a loss in
combat effectiveness and increased
casualties,
The southernly base areas, opposite the
delta and the Saigon region, have grown
rapidly in size and importance since Au-
gust 1969 as Hanoi has sought to lim-
it exposure of its main force units and
reduce casualties while attempting to
halt the erosion of As political-military
base in this populous and decisive thea-
ter. The bases are sit netted in well popu-
lated areas, many in villages and planta-
tions inhabited by ethnic Vietnamese and
and controlled by Communists since the
days of the Viet Minh.
The Cambodian sanctuaries play a key
role in Hanoi's response to the Vietnam-
ization and pacification programs. Be-
cause of their existence, especially the
sanctuaries in southern Cambodia along
the III and IV Corps frontiers, Hanoi can
always mass large hostile forces in close
proximity to major South Vietnamese
population concentrations. This ability
enables Hanoi to pose a continuing threat
to South Vietnam's internal security that
progress in pacification or Vietnamiza-
ton cannot eradicate.
The Cambodian base structure, as not-
ed above, supports infiltration of NVA
personnel into South Vietnam, and the
shift of units from one portion of South
Vietnam to another, as in the case of the
movement of NVA regiments into the
delta last year. The infiltration system
through Cambodia handled nearly 55,000
to 70,000 NVA personnel in 1969, an esti-
mated 60 percent of total NVA infiltra-
tion into South Vietnam last year. About
45,000 to 55,000 of these enemy troops
moved as far as the southerly base area
subordinate to COSVN. The foot trails
used lie very close to the border and oc-
casionally cross into South Vietnamese
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