CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE, 30 APRIL 1970

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040006-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 61
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 11, 2002
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: April 30, 1970
• Content Type: OPEN

AprilSO, 19'70 Approved Fott3fstwEsNIMpA2Ika5ift9PIRLINIA317E000300040006-6
capital equipment, power and a handful of
similar inputs.
Today he well may include social costs?
the cost of cleaning water and air polluted
in producing the product.
Now that society realizes the necessity of
maintaining environmental .quality and the
enormous cleanup cost Involved, it also real-
izes that the price of many products has
been unrealistic.
Realism dictates that the cost of cleaning
up after the product be included in its price.
The question, then, is how to tie cleanup
coats to products.
Economists have been debating two meth-
ods. One is to dangle a carrot before in-
dustry by offering direct financial incentives,
such as tax credits, for installing control
devices.
This seems to be losing out to the "big
stick" approach?forcing companies to clean
up.
The argument is that cleanup cost
would be merely another of many costs for
a manager to overcome to make and market
a successful prOduct. This would bring to
bear the Managerial skill of US Industry,
resulting in the most economical approach
to the problem.
PRO2OKIRE rnoPosED PEE
Last December Sen. William Proxmire (D-
Wis.) and nine colleagues introduced a bill
to do just this in the field of water pollu-
tion.
The bill calls for a federal "efficiency fee"
of 10 cents a pound for industrial wastes
dumped into the nation's water.
EP:nem/re estimated that such a fee would
produce about $2 billion a year, much of
which could be used to construct and operate
municipal sewage plants.
Another way to view this "tax" is as an
incentive -to industry to overcome It and to
recycle waste.
Knees? tad The Journal that the ideal
situation would be to couple the fee program
with a regional approach to water pollution
control to achieve economtos.
This would mean serving large numbers of
industrial municipal and individual pollu-
ters with the same piece of highly sophisti-
cated equipment used at a large treatment
plant.
It is precisely this approach that the South-
eastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Com-
mission (SEWRPC) has proposed for the Fox
River Valley. It advised abandoning sewage
treatment facilities?industrial and munici-
pal?an Pewaukee, Brookfield, Poplar Creek,
Sussex and Waukesha and treating this sew-
age in a new plant down stream from Wau-
kesha.
AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL'S
REPORT ON THE SALT TALKS
Mr. THURMOND. IVA., President, last-
week I had the honor of placing in the
RECORD a short article by the assistant
editor of the Charleston News &
Courier, Mr. Anthony Harrigan, point-
ing out some of the dangers to be had in
dealing with the Russians at the SALT
talks.
As I stated at that time, Mr. Harrigan
Is a distinguished international writer
on military tactics and strategy and
covered the Helsinki talks first hand as
a journalist. Mr. Harrigan has now ex-
panded his opinions in ttle current
Washington Report of the American
Security Council. The American Secu-
rity Council is one of the leading or-
ganizations dedicated to our national
security and has produced many in-
formed studies on the international
strategic balance and on the need for
our ABM.
In the report Mr. Harrigan once more
places great importance upon the sud-
den announcement of the Soviet Cosmos
248, which has the capacity for knock-
ing down U.S. intelligence satellites.
Thus the argument that we can de-
pend upon electronic detection equip-
ment to monitor Soviet activities no
longer holds water.
Mr. President I ask unanimous con-
sent that the Washington Report en-
titled "America's Stake At Vienna: The
SALT Talks, MIRV and the ABM" be
printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
AMERICA'S STAKE AT VIENNA: THE SALT
TALKS, MIRV AND THE ABM
In Vienna on April 16 the United States
and the Soviet Union began the second
round of the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks. The opening of these talks?a follow-
up to discussions commenced at Helsinki
last fall?is a fateful moment in the his-
tory of the free world's long effort to safe-
guard its freedom against Soviet aggres-
sion.
The instructions given to the U.S. dele-
gates are secret, and properly so. But Pres-
ident Nixon is on record in his "United
States Foreign Policy for the 1970's" as
saying that American negotiators will deal
with specific positions at Vienna, whereas
the Helsinki round of -talks were concerned
with procedural matters and general issues.
Thus it is timely for the American people
to consider what is at stake in the SALT
talks. And while the talks may result in
new opportunities for peace, grave dangers
are involved and should be clearly under-
stood. If the U.S. delegates?and authori-
ties at home?lack the toughness, hard-
headed realism and endurance that the
negotiations require, the United States
could find itself cruelly exposed to Soviet
nuclear blackmail or worse by the mid-
1970's.
UNITED STATES AT DISADVANTAGE
The first thing the American people need
to understand is that they are at a marked
disadvantage in. the Vienna negotiations and
in dealing generally with the Soviet Union.
Aggressors states such as the Soviet Union
have a built-in advantage in that they know
precisely what they want and resolutely pro-
ceed towards their goal of domination with
no consideration for truth or International
morality, The Soviets, for example, have a
history of making "peace" pacts that they
have no intention of honoring. The United
States, on the other hand, scrupulously hon-
ors its international agreements. Realistic
Americans know, therefore, that their coun-
try cannot put any stock in the word of the
Soviet Union and cannot assume good faith
on the part of the USSR. An agreement with
the Soviets is no better than the means of
verifying the degree of the Soviets' adher-
ence to their own pledges.
The fundamental immorality of the So-
viet Union poses extreme difficulty for U.S.
negotiators. It also introduces great danger
into the question of concessions. Yet there
are many, influential figures in U.S. public
life who speak as though the U.S. and USSR
were equal in terms of seriousness and hon-
esty of intention and who urge concessions
as evidence of American good faith in box-
gaining. Thus McGeorge Bundy, former
White House adviser in the Kennedy and
Johnson administrations, stresses what he
calls the need for "balanced concessions" as
a necessary part of the thinking of both the
U.S. and Soviet delegations. Mr. Bundrs po-
sition ia the opposite of realism, for he re-
fers to American "strategic overstrength"
and "superfluous nuclear, weapons" at a time
S 6409
when Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird re-
ports that the Soviets have more and bigger
intercontinental rockets.
UNITED STATES AND SOVIET INTENTIONS
It is terribly important that responsible
U.S. officials not engage in balancing of U.S.
and Soviet intentions at Vienna. The Soviets
undoubtedly were "serious and businesslike"
in the Helsinki talks, as President Nixon said.
But when haven't the Soviets been serious
and businesslike in their efforts to gain dom-
ination over the Western countries? At all
cost, the United States government, espe-
cially the negotiating team at Vienna, must
avoid naivet?n viewing Soviet proposals and
promises.
Insofar as Soviet intentions are concerned,
the U.S. SALT delegates can view a record' of
duplicity regarding new weapons. Though
they had an understanding with the United
States not to develop weapons for space war-
fare, the Soviets secretly developed and tested
(as is their custom with all new weaponry)
a satellite destroyer known as Cosmos 248.
Word of this did not reach the U.S. public
until after the Helsinki talks, though the
space weapon was launched more than a year
prior to the opening of negotiations.
cissmos 245
- .
The military potential of Cosmos 248 is
enormous, for it has the capability of knock-
ing down U.S. satellites essential for com-
munications and intelligence. The danger is
that the USSR may be able to blind America's
electronic eyes whenever they choose. The
U.S. Air Force envisioned a similar space
weapon years ago, but the concept was
shelved during the Kennedy administration.
Cosmos 218 should hold an important place
in the thinking of America's SALT negotia-
tors from the standpoint of 'Soviet intentions
and capabilities. Moreover, the successful
secret testing of Cosmos 248 should be an
object lesson to the U.S. delegates, namely
that no amount of American electronic de-
tection equipment can alert this country to
secret testing of a new Soviet weapon. In
other words, the Soviets could sign an agree-
ment banning further development of MIRV
(multiple warhead missiles) and still con-
duct tests. They could do so in the way they
secretly tested Cosmos 248, by holding the
tests at a time when U.S. radars and other
detection devices were focused on American
and Soviet space shots. Coordination of secret
military weapons tests with announced space
flights is a convenient and effective way for
the USSR to mask tests it wants to hide from
United States.
EFFORTS TO HALT MIRV
The anti-preparedness bloc in the United
States has concentrated on halting develop-
ment and testing of multiple warhead weap-
ons and on thwarting expansion of the Safe-
guard anti-ballistic missile system. Members
of this bloc hope that the SALT talks will
cause the UB. to halt MIRV and ABM de-
velopments. For several months, there has
been a barrage of articles and speeches by
anti-preparedness figures, saying that a MIRV
test ban should precede the Vienna meeting.
The Soviet MIRV tests in the Pacific in late
March underscored the incredible folly of the
argument for a pre-Vienna unilateral test
halt by the United States.
The anti-MIRV lobby bases its case on the
statement that the United States, using elec-
tronic means, could verify Soviet compliance
with a ban on testing of multiple warhead
missiles. This position is shattered by dis-
closure that the Soviets were able to mask
their Cosmos 248 feSts. If they could do that,
they also could mask ivratv tests.
Fortunately, the U.S. Senate has realists
who know the score. One of these, Sen. Henry
M. Jackson (D-Wash.), is firmly committed
to the position that the United States should
complete testing of both MIRV and ABM
systems. He said in late February that the
U.S. must make sure that in case of a nuclear
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S 6410
arras agreement with the Soviet Union at
Vienna "we remain within lead-time reach
af corrective measures," should the agree-
ment be "abrogated." In other words, the
U.S. must have its technology up to date in
the event the Soviets cheat. This would only
be elementary prudence, of course.
ABU AND THE SALT TALUS
Insofar as the Safeguard ABM system is
concerned, the SALT talks must not be used
as an excuse to abort this embryonic pro-
gram. The Soviets are far ahead in this
vital area of armaments. It would be unwise
of Americana to dismiss as mere bragging
the claim of Soviet Marshal Andrei Grec:hko
that his nation possesses "weapons capable of
reliably hitting enemy aircraft and missiles
irrespective of height or speed of flight, at
great distances from the defended targets."
While members of the Senate Disarmament
Subcommittee and Others have sought to
cancel America's limited ABM program, the
Soviets have forged ahead in anti-missile
defense, thereby increasing their overall mil-
itary capabilities and buttressing their peer-
ehological assurance.
The Nixon administration's proposal for ex-
pension of the Safeguard ABM system is ex-
tremely modest. All the administration rec-
ommends is constructiOn of one additional
Safeguard site to defend the Minuteman
complex at Whiteman Air Force Base in
Missouri, plus preliminary work on five other
sites. No request is being made to activate
the entire 12-station complex, which repre-
sents the real security need. Secretary of
Defense Laird has said that the administra-
tion proposal is "the minimum we can and
must do . . to fulfill the President's na-
tional security objectives." Yet even this
minimum effort is bitterly resisted. If this
resistance is successful, the position of the
U.S. delegates at the SALT talks will be seri-
ously weakened. The stronger the U.S. is
militarily the better chance the United
States delegation stands in its discussions
with the Soviets.
TEE NEED POR EXPANSION
The need for expansion of the Safeguard
ABM also is illustrated by the build-up of
Communist China's nuclear power. Robert D.
Heinl Jr.,. internationally-recognized mili-
tary analyst, recently reported on the con-
struction of missile-launching facilities hi
Northweet China, saying: "Today, accord-
ing th intelligence-satellite photographs, the
Chinese are speeding work on these missile
sites which seem to be configured for very
large weapons."
The entire free world should be concerned
about this Red Chinese build-up and wel-
come American's efforts to create an ABM
defense. But this is not the case. Invincible
ignorance of the need for ABM defense is
the situation in some quarters. Thus Presi-
dent Pierre Elliott Trudeau of Canada made
the astounding statement February 2 that
the Canadian government is "rather Un-
happy" that the U.S. is facing China with
anti-ballistic missiles rather than with an
offer of diploma-tic recognition. As though
diplomatic recognition would halt Red
China's drive for nuclear arms or provide a
protective shield against ballistic missiles"
The Canadian position no doubt arises out
of wishful thinking about the nature of the
world. Thus some Europeans actually give
serious consideration to the Warsaw Pact
statetnerut that it wants to discuss "renurnaa-
titm of the use of threats of force in rela-
tion to European countries." The recent un-
happy experience of the Czech people should
be sufficient to show that such a Warsaw
Pact statement is the ultimate in deceit. Yet
some people on both skies of the Atlantic
are so determined to believe in a Soviet
change of heart that they will accept the
most self-serving statements of the com-
munist powers.
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April 30 1970
THE NEED TOR REALISM
Complete realism is rare in Official cireles
anywhere irs the Wese these days. The Nixon
administration, for ell its sound emphasis
on strengthened ABM defense, is not without
some confusion on basic points. The presi-
dential report, entitled "U.S. Foreign Policy
For the 1970's", while it includes many sound
observations on the Soviet milliary threat, is
disturbingly ambiguous on strategic pro-
grams. On the one hand, the report acknowl-
edges that "sharp cutbacks" in U.S. strategic
programs "would not permit us to satisfy our
sufficiency and might provoke the opposite
reaction." On the other hand, this statement
Is followed-up by the comment that "sharp
Increases might not have any significant po-
litical or 'unitary benefits." The report also
asserts that sharp increases might cause So-
viet political positions to "harden" so that
"tensions would increase" and "the prospect
for reaching agreements to limit strategic
arms might be irreparably damaged."
This is the position taken by former Seere-
leery Of Defense Robert S. McNamara. Ad-
herence to it is what caused America's loss of
nuclear superiority. Indeed reluctance to
peen for "sharp increases" in strategic pro-
grams can only contribute to a widening
margin of Soviet nuclear superiority. It is to
be hoped that notions of this sort do not
color the instate-alone given the U.S. delega-
tion to the SALT talks. Unless America's
negotiators believe in the political advantage
of U.S. military strength, the Republic se-
curity interests may be compromised at
Vienna.
..???????1011111.V
SENATORS :R,ANDOLPH AND MOSS
URGE COMMEMORATIVE STAMP
IN RECOGNITION OF OUR MIN-
ERAL HERITAGE?AWARENESS
NEEDED FOR THIS NONRENEW-
ABLE RESOURCE AND FOR ITS
CONSERVATION
Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, I have
for several years expressed an interest
in the issuance of a commemorative
stamp in recognition of our vast mineral
heritage.
Gem materials, for example, must have
three principal qualities--beauty, dura-
bility, and rarity. Splendor in a gem de-
Pends on transparency, brilliance, lus-
ter, and color. Luster is a function of
the transparency, refractivity, and crys-
tal structure of a mineral; durability is
determined by hardness and toughness;
and rarity is a major factor in deter-
mining the value of a gem. Of the 1,500
mineral species, only about 100 have all
the attributes required in gems.
It is interesting that at least one va-
riety of gem stone occurs in each State,
a symbol of -which is the First Ladies'
broach on display at the Smithsonian
Institution and which contains gem
.stones from each State of the Union.-
Mr. and Mrs. Milton Turner of. Silver
Spring, Md., recently brought a sample
of beautiful quartz crystals and other
gem and mineral collections to my of-
fice for viewing by Post Office Depart-
ment officials. Mrs. Turner is chairman
of "Our Mineral Heritage Stamp Com-
mittee." Following the meeting, I met
with George King, acting director, Di-
vision of Philately; Paul Carlin, execu-
tive assistant to the Postmaster Gen-
eral; and Ray Stewart, congressional
liaison officer, to discuss the issuance of a
commemorative stamp. Other Members
of the Senate and House are interested
in the proposal; including Representative
RECHLER, of West Virginia.
Mr. President, on April 20 of this year,
I wrote the Postmaster General, request-
ing that he give consid?ration to the is-
suing of such a stamp. The Senator from
Utah (Mr. Moss) joined in the appeal.
It is our feeling that if the stamp were
to be issued, it would provide an in-
ducement to travel within the United
States. I would hope that it would also
help to create an awareness of conser-
vation and beautification.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have the letter minted in the
RECORD at the conclusion of my re-
marks,
There being no objection, the letter
was ordered to be printed in the REc-
ORD, as follows:
APRIL 20,1970.
Hon. WINTON M. BLOUNT.
Postmaster General,
Post Office Department.
Was hinpton, D.C.
DEAR MR. POSTMASTER GENERAL: Several
years ago I expressed my interest in the is-
suance of a commemorative stamp in recog-
nition of our mineral heritage. I again bring
this subject to the attention of the Citizens'
Stamp Advisory Committee, which will meet
this week to consider future stamp subjects.
I can think of no better symbol of our
mineral wealth than the First Ladies' broach
on display at the Smithsonian Inetitution,
which contains gem stone-s from each State
of our Union. A photograph of this unusual
pin is enclosed.
Stamps have been issued stressing the con-
servation of wildlife, water and forests, and
it is appropriate to provide one recognizing
resources that are not renewable?our min-
erals?so important in West Virginia and in
all States.
The release of a stamp calling attention
to our mineral deposits would focus atten-
tion on widely diversified segments of our
population which have become involved in
our mineral heritage.
At present the National Geographic So-
ciety is engaged in a vital program to ac-
quaint the youth of our Nation With our vast
mineral wealth. Schools are using min-
eralogical exhibits for a wider area of teach-
ing and a more interesting manner of pres-
entation of the subject. I understand there
Is much excitement in this method, even
among some young people who tend toward
delinquency and, thus, by this subject may
be able to channel their thoughts toward
constructive exploration of rocks which are
alt about them. They have little or no con-
cept of their content and revelations.
Our senior citizens, as well as our young
people, are finding it increasingly interesting
to pursue hobbies that lead to exploration of
rock formations and the collection of gem
stones. It has promoted the "family together-
ness" theme since it can become a hobby in
which family members +et all ages can par-
ticipate and, indeed, large numbers do now
engage in this thrilling adventure.
Seardhing for the tui usual -formations is
also an exciting type of physical recreation
that brings individuals, families, and orga-
nizations into the great outdoors to enjoy a
better understanding of the appeal and the
beauty of nature. Such interest, in turn, can
lead to studies or educational pursuits that
develop into occupatiolis for the future.
Through many groups interested in a min-
eral heritage commemorative stamp, the
. publicity gained from it would be an induce-
ment to travel and "See America First." We
need to create an awaretessis of conservation
and beautification.
Such a stamp should te released in con-
nection with a Mineral Heritage Week
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April 23, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE S 6163
The following tables show in detail the
public imageof a "conservative" and of a
"liberal," with the percentages based on
all persons in the sample:
Image of a conservative
FAVORABLE
Percent
Saves, doesn't throw things away 16
Cautious ( careful ) 10
General remarks (favorable) 5
Total 31
NELTTRAL
Mentions Nixon, current administration_ 6
Mentions specific person other than
Nixon 5
Mentions political position or party 3
Total 14
UNFAVORABLE
Does not want to change, does not take
a chance 12
Close-minded, intolerant, self-centered_ 9
Total 21
Miscellaneous 3
No opinion 35
Total* 104
Image of a "liberal"
FAVORABLE
Percent
Open-minded, fair ? 12
Generous, good-hearted 6
Wants change, active in bringing about
needed reforms 5
General remarks (favorable) 2
25
NEUTRAL
Mentions specific person 7
Mentions political position or party 7
Mentions a specific problem (civil rights,
etc.) 3
17
UNFAVORABLE
Gives things away, spends too freely__ 8
Negative descriptions (Communists,
hippies, drug addicts, etc.) 5
Gets carried away, wild, too far out 4
Permissive, indifferent 4
General remarks (unfavorable) 4
26
Miscellaneous 2
No opinion 37
==.
Total* 106
*Total adds to more than 100 per cent
because some persons gave more than one
response.
THE ABM: IS IT A DOOMSDAY
MACHINE?
Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, the time
is fast approaching when we shall once
again be asked to vote authorization of
an expanded anti-ballistic-missile sys-
tem?ABM. Its proponents have long
since begun to beat the drums in an effort
to alarm the American people into ac-
cepting this shockingly expensive, appal-
lingly dangerous weapon.
What, they ask, if we do not have the
ABM and an enemy attack appears to be
underway? The more terrifying and ap-
propriate question is, however: What if
we do have such a system and use it?
The answer, it now appears, is the extinc-
tion of mankind through strontium 90
poisoning.
The question was posed an answered
last fall by Dr. Ernest J. Sternglass, pro-
fessor of radiation physics at the Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh. His chillingly en-
titled essay, "The Death of All Children,"
received far less attention than it de-
served. In order that it be available for
consideration by the Senate during this
year's debate, I ask unanimous consent
that it be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
THE DEATH OF ALL CHILDREN?A FOOTNOTE
TO THE A.B.M. CONTROVERSY
(By Ernest J. Sternglass)
Hopefully it is not too late to ask the mem-
bers of Congress in their deliberations over
the Administration's proposed Anti-Ballistic
Missile system to pause and reflect on the
nature and urgency of the matter they have
been debating
In view of new evidence on the totally un-
expected action of strontium 90 on human
reproductive cells, it is apparent that Con-
gress has not yet considered what may well
be the most important factor affecting its
decision to proceed or not to proceed with
the first steps toward the A.B.M. shield. The
fact is this: a full-scale-A.B.M. system, pro-
tecting the United States against a Soviet
first strike, could, if successful, cause the
extinction of the human race. (Indeed, the
scientific evidence indicates that already at
least one of three children, who died before
their first birthdays in America in the 1960's,
may have died as a result of peacetime nu-
clear testing.) Such is the conclusion indi-
cated by new information on the unan-
ticipated genetic effect of strontium 90, pre-
sented at a recent meeting of the Health
Physics Society.
Proponents of the A.B.M. system argue
that it is necessary to prevent the destruc-
tion of our deterrent forces by a massive
first strike of Russian SS-9 missiles carry-
ing thousands of multiple warheads. nut the
threat of such an attack loses all credibility
against our present knowledge that the vast
amounts of long-lived strontium 90 neces-
sarily released into the world's rapidly cir-
culating atmosphere could lead to the death
of all Russian infants born in the next gen-
eration, thus ending the existence of the
Russian people, together with that of all
mankind.
The unanticipated genetic effect of stron-
tium 90 has become evident from an increase
in the incidence of infant mortality along
the path of the fallout cloud from the first
atomic test in New Mexico in 1945, and froni
a detailed correlation of state-by-state infant
mortality excesses with yearly ob,anges of
strontium 90 levels in milk.
The computer-calculated change in infant
mortality was found to have reached close to
one excess death in the U.S. per one hundred
live births due to the release of only 200
megatons of fission energy by 1963. This indi-
cates that a release of some 20,000 megatons
anywhere in the world, needed in offensive
warheads for an effective first strike or in the
thousands of defensive A.B.M. warheads re-
quired to insure interception, could lead to
essentially no infants surviving to produce
another generation.
The specter of fallout has of course loomed
before in the national anxiety over nuclear
explosions. But the restlt of these studies
comprises the first documented, long-range
analysis showing direct quantitative correla-
tions between strontium 90 and infant mor-
tality. (They will be published later this year
as recorded in the Proceedings of the 9th
annual Hanford Biology Symposium.)
The physicists who exploded the first
atomic bomb at Alamogordo had expected
radioactive materials of some kind and as-
sumed that they would fall to earth down-
wind as far as fifty -miles away. Accordingly,
the test site had been located in an isolated
area of southern New Mexico. When a sub-
sequent series of tests was held in 1951, six
years later, the scientists moved to the isola-
tion of desert country in southern Nevada.
By now, however, and without the knowledge
of the scientific community, the death rate
of children in states downwind from Alamo-
gordo had begun to rise.
The infant mortality rates in the United
States have been carefully collected for many
years. From 1935 to 1950, the rate shows a
steady decline, and mathematical models
allow the rate to be exte:nded to show, on
the basis of previous experience, what the
infant mortality rate for any time, consistent
with the immediate past, ought to be. But
while elsewhere (with one exception) in the
U.S. the rate continued downward as ex-
pected; in the states downwind of Alamogor-
do it did not. There was no change in the
infant death rate in 1946?the year .after
the Trinity test?but by 1950 the rate in
Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Ala-
bama, Georgia, and both Carolinas deviated
upward from the normal. expectancy. In-
creases in excess infant mortality of some
twenty to thirty percent occurred some
thousand to fifteen hundred miles away in
Arkansas, Louisiana, and Alabama, where
mortality rates were between 3 and 4.5 per
hundred live births. Thus, as observed by
our research group at the University of Pitts-
burgh, the Alamogordo blast appears to have
been followed by the death, before reaching
age one, of roughly one of one hundred chil-
dren in the area downwind. No detectable in-
crease in mortality rates relative to the com-
puter-determined 1940-45 base line was ob-
served in Florida, south of the path of the
fallout cloud, or in the states to the north;
and the mortality excesses became progres-
sively less severe with increasing distance
eastward, in a manner now understood to
be characteristic of the activity along the
path of a fallout cloud. Though the increase
in infant mortality in these states was taking
place during the years 1946-1950, it does not
appear to have been associated with the
Alamogordo fallout before our studies be-
ginning in October, 1968.
Meanwhile, the study of radiation effects
proceeded elsewhere in the scientific com-
munity. It became known lin the early 1950's
that radioactive strontium was concen-
trated in cow's milk and transmitted, along
with the calcium to which it bears a close
chemical resemblance, to the rapidly grow-
ing bones of the fetus and the subsequent
infant. Still, the radiation from strontium
90, though long-lasting, was relatively small
In degree: and It was a matter of record,
from studies of young women employed in
painting luminous watch dials, that very
large amounts of radiation over long periods
of time are required to produce bone cancer
or leukemia in adults. Besides, the survivors
of Hiroshima and - Nagasaki and their off-
spring were carefully observed without dis-
covering any very serious long-term effects
of radiation. A small number of leukemia
cases turned up, and a very few detectable
abnormalities among their children, but
compared with the rest of Japan the dif-
ference was slight. The measurable effects of
fallout, at the time, did not seem so ominous
after all. So atmospheric nuclear weapons
testing proceeded in Nevada until 1968, and
continued in the Pacific until 1963 under the
pressure of the Cold War. No obvious or clear-
cut incidents of serious harm to anyone were
reported outside the immediate area of test-
ing.
Still, there was concern among radio-
biologists and geneticists over the possibility
of radiation effects on the highly sensitive
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S 6164 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE Apr11 23, 1970
human reproductive cells, rapidly dividing
and developing to form the human embryo
during the first few weeks and months of
gestation. .Evidence from animal experi-
ments, as well as from the observation of
pregnant women who had been exposed to
X-rays, suggested that ova and embryo
might be from twenty to fifty times more
sensitive to the development of leukemia
than the mature adult. If so, the potential
danger of even relatively small amounts of
radiation would be greatly magnified.
The evidence implicating X-rays in child-
hood leukemia had been discovered?quite
unexpectedly?by Dr. Alice Stewart of Ox-
ford University, in the course of a Hervey
designed to uncover the causes of a disturb-
ing rite in childhood leukemia among the
children of England and Wales during the
1950's. Her study, published in 1958, showed
that mothers who had received a series of
three to five abdominal X-rays in the course
of a pelvic examination gave birth to children
who were almost twice as likely to die of
leukemia or other cancers than the children
of mothers who had not been X-rayed dur-
ing pregnancy. Subsequent studies showed
that only about six percent of all childhood
leukemia is related to X-rays, but Dr. Stew-
art's research remains significant, since be-
fore then no serious effects of ordinary diag-
nostic X-rays had ever been demonstrated,
especially since a single abdominal X-ray
gives the fetus a radiation dose not much
larger than what each of us receives in the
course of some three to five years from
cosmic rays and the natural radiation in the
rocks around us.
It is true that leukemia and childhood
cancer are relatively rare. Only about one
child in one thousand is affected. Neverthe-
less, since leukemia and other cancers are
the second greatest cause of death among
children between five and fourteen (ranking
only after accidents), Dr. Stewart's findings
were regarded by physicians as startling, and
efforts were made to check them. Perhaps
the moat definitive such examination was
done by Dr. Brian MaelVta.hon at the Har-
vard School of Public Health. Using a study
population of close to 800,000 children born
in large New England hospitals, where care-
ful records of X-rays given to mothers were
available, Dr. MacMahon confirmed Dr.
Stewart's findings. He observed only about
a forty percent increase in the cancer rate
among exposed children, probably because
of impovements in X-ray technology that
allowed lower exposures.
Meanwhile, in April, 1953, e sizable amount
of nuclear debris from a teat explosion in
Nevada was wafted downwind some two
thousand miles to the east and, thirty-six
hours later, deposited by a rainstorm over
the Albany-Troy region of New York State.
Dr. Ralph Lapp, one of the first scientists
to be concerned with the hazarde of peace-
time nucelar testing, drew attention to this
heavy local fallout. Subsequent examination
of the childhood leukemia pattern in this
area showed that leukemia doubled over a
period of some eight years af _at' the fallout--
and then decreased. Here, for the first time,
was a documented case in which fallcut ap-
peared to produce serious effects at a rate
consistent with what was expected from the
study of children exposed to prenatal X-rays.
Further examination of the leukemia rate
for the entire State of New York revealed a
pattern of increase and decrease following
the sequence of individual test series in
Nevada between 1951 and 1958, with a char-
acteristic time delay of about five years after
each detonation. The rise and fall were par-
ticularly marked in the age group from five
to fourteen years, the group most indicative
of radiation-produced cases.
More disturbing yet, the evidence showed
that the arrival of the fallout was followed
by a halt in the normal decline of the rate
of stillbirths. For the previous fifteen years,
from 1935 to 1950, the stillbirth rate had
shown a regular and progressive decline.
Within a year after testing began in Nevada
in 1951, the rate began to deviate upward.
Between 1957 and 1963 the fetal death rate,
instead of steadily declining as it had from
1935 to 1950, leveled off completely at around
twenty-three per thousand live births. In
1964, the fetal death rate rose to 27.3 per
thousand, the first such leap since records
had been kept in New York State. In 1965
and 1966, it declined slightly, as a gradual
reduction of fallout in milk and food took
place throughout the U.S. In contrast to-
New York, the fetal death rate for Cali-
fornia?upwind of the Nevada test site, and
therefore not affected by it?continued its
steady decline, in line with the 1935-1950 fig-
ures from which New York so sharply devi-
ated. Still, the rate of decrease began to slow
down in California also?two to three years
after the onset of hydrogen bomb tests in the
Pacific in 1954.
The implications of the fetal death rate
could be considered much more serious for
society than the incidence of childhood leu-
kemia, since there are more than ten times
as many fetal deaths reported than cases of
childhood leukemia. Moreover, for every fetal
death reported, an estimated five or six are
not reported, yielding perhaps fifty or sixty
fetal deaths for each case of leukemia. Con-
sequently. the search for further evidence
continued. More fallout seemed to be fol-
lowed by mere fetal deaths, but no precise
statistical correlation had been drawn. Since
the amount of strontium 90 deposited in the
soil is easily measurable, the cumulative de-
posit of strontium 90 was plotted against the
excess of fetal mortality over what the mor-
tality should have been if the 1935-1950 de-
cline had persisted. The finding: except for
the first few years of testing in Nevada, when
short-lived isotopes rather than. the long-
lived strontium 90 were dominant, the fetal
death rate in New York followed the same
general pattern, as the accumulated stron-
tium 90 on the ground. Both curves showed
the same decrease in rate of climb coincident
with the temporary halt of nuclear testing
from 1958 to 1961; both show a sharp rise
beginning with the large Soviet test series in
1961. Two years after the test ban in 1963,
both the fetal death rate and the radioac-
tivity hi the environment once again began
to decline.
A similar pattern in the fetal death rate
exists in the data for the United States as a
whole for all periods of gestation up to nine
months. Again, there is a steady rate of de-
cline until the Fifties, a leveling off in 1951-
52, and an actual rise in 1954, corresponding
to the onset of the Pacific H-bomb tests;
and a second rise in 1961, corresponding to
the Soviet test series.
But perhaps the most disturbing evidence
of all indicates that the rates of the infant
mortality in the _United States and all over
the world seem to have been affected by nu-
clear testing. The infant mortality rate is far
more accurately known than the fetal death
rate, since the death of a baby, unlike a mis-
carriage or an abortion, rarely escapes notice
in the advanced countries. Like fetal deaths,
infant mortality had shown a steady decline
in the period 1935-1950; but beginning with
the Nevada tests In 1951 and continuing un-
til just after the test ban in 1963, the rate
suddenly leveled off in the U.S. This leveling
off did not occur in such other advanced
countries as Sweden Holland and Norway, or
in Southern Hemisphere countries like Chile
and New Zealand, until late in the 1950's
when hydrosien-bomb tests in the South Pa-
cific and Siberia began to produce world-
wide fallout on a much increased scale. Only
after the major portion of the most violently
radioactive material from the 1961-62 tests
had disappeared did U.S. infant mortality
begin to decline again in 1965, at a rate close
to the previous 1935-1950 decline.
The most serious effects appeared In the
age group from one month to one year. Here.
the rate of deaths per one thousand live
births should have been, according to the
1935-1950 figures, about 2.7. Instead, the ob-
served number was 5.4 per thousand, twice
what it should have been and twice what it
actually was in Sweden, where the rate had
steadily declined to 2.6 per thousand.
Not only was there a drastic change in
overall infant mortality for the U.S. as com-
pared to the rest of the advanced countries.
but there were also disturbing patterns of
change within the U.S. For example, the in-
fant mortality rate started to level off, sharply
in the Eastern, Midwestern and Southern
states within two years after the onset or
atomic testing in Nevada in 1951, while it
continued steadily downward in the dry
Western states. But this is exactly the known
pattern of accumulated radioactive stron-
tium on the ground and in the diet, since
strontium is most heavily deposited in states
of high annual rainfall, especially in those to
the east of Nevada.
Serious difficulties remained, however, in
establishing a casual connection between nu-
clear testing and these drastic changes in
fetal and infant mortality. First, why should
fallout, and in particular strontium 90, cause
fetal and infant deaths, since it goes to the
bones and should therefore cause, if any-
thing.. bone cancer and leukemia many years
later? Second, there was no observed direct
quantitative relation between different levels
of strontium 90 in the body and mortality
rates at any given age. Therefore it was
difficult to see how the very small amounts
of radiation resulting fix= peacetime testing
could possibly have been the cause of the
deviations in fetal death and infant mor-
tality, especially since no significant genetic
effects had been observed among the chil-
dren of the Hiroshima and Nagaski survivors.
The causation puzzle now appears to be
solved. In 1963, K. G. Luning and his co-
workers in Sweden published their discovery
that small amounts of strontium 90, in-
jecteel into male mice three or four weeks
prior to mating, produced an increase in fetal
deaths among their offspring. No such in-
crease appeared when corresponding amounts
of chemically different radioactive cesium
137 were injected. Mere recently, evidence
presented at an International Symposium on
the Radiation Biology of the Fetal and Juve-
nile Mammal in May, 1969, has demonstrated
severe chromosome damage, fetal deaths and
congenital malformations in the offspring of
female mice injected with strontium 90 be-
fore and during pregnancy. Similar effects
have new been observed for very small quan-
tities of tritium, produced by both A-bombs
and relatively "clean" hydrogen weapons.
In the light of these studies, the absence
of genetic effects in Hiroshima is under-
standable. In Hiroshima and Nagaski, the
bombs were detonated, not on the ground as
in New Mexico, but at such an altitude that
there was essentially no fallout in these two
cities proper. The radiation exposure there
resulted almost- exclusively from the brief
flash of X-rays, neutrons and gamma rays
at the instant of explosion. Consequently no
special effects related to strontium 90 ap-
peared in the children of the survivors; but
the rate of cancer deaths among children up
to fourteen years in Japan as a whole jumped
by more than two hundred percent between
1949 and 1951, four to six years after the
bombs, when the fallout had had a chance
to produce its effects throughout the south-
ern parts of Japan?exactly the same delay
observed after the fallout from Nevada ar-
rived in Albany-Troy.
But the problem remains of demonstrating
a direct connection between the levels of
strontium 90 in human fetuses and infants,
on the one hand, and observed changes in
fetal and infant mortality, on the other.
Such a direct connection seems to emerge
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from, the so-called "baby-tooth survey" car-
ried out by the Dental School of Washing-
ton University in St. Louis, supported by the
U.S. Public Health Service and directed by
Dr. H. L. Rosenthal. Using the data from
tooth-buds and mandibular bones of aborted
fetuses and from baby teeth collected in the
greater St. Louis area, Dr. Rosenthal's study
showed that the concentration of strontium
90 in the teeth followed closely the meas- ?
ured concenrations in bone and milk. Meas-
urement of the strontium 90 content of
milk anywhere in the world permits a calcu-
lation of the concentration in the bones of
infants and fetuses developing in the same
areas. We have found a direct correlation
between the yearly changes of strontium 90
contained in the teeth (and therefore the
bones and bodies) of the developing human
fetus and infant, and the changing excess
mortality rates, going up and down together
as atmospheric tests began in 1951 and
stopped in 1963.
From our examinations of the infant mor-
tality changes from a computer-fitted base
line for 1935-1950, for various states in which
the Public Health Service reported monthly
values of the strontium 90 concentrations in
the milk since 1957, there emerges a close
correspondence between average strontium
90 levels and infant mortality changes. Wher-
ever the strontium 90 rose to high values over
a four-year period, as in Georgia, a large,
parallel, year-by-year rise in infant mortality
also took place; while in areas where there
was little stontium 90 in the milk, as in Texas,
the infant mortality remained at a corre-
spondingly lower value. Other states such as
Illinois, Missouri, New York and Utah also
show a rise, peaking in the same 1962-1965
period at levels between these extreme cases,
each according to their local annual rainfall
and strontium 90 concentrations in their
milk.
For the United States as a whole, we found
a detailed correspondence between and
among: 1) the excess infant Mortality rela-
tive to the 1935-1950 base line; 2) the to-
tal strontium 90 produced by nuclear weap-
ons; 3) the strontium 90 thus produced ac-
tually reaching the ground; and 4) the four-
year average concentration in U.S. milk from
1955, the year after the first large II-bomb
test; and 1965, the year when strontium 90
concentrations began to level off and started
to decline once again.
At the peak of this excess infant mortality,
it was the District of Columbia that showed
the largest excess in 1966-157 percent, com-
pared with an average excess of 72 percent
for the U.S. as a whole. The low value was
found in dry New Mexico, minus-eleven per-
cent?actually below the 1935-50 base line.
To appreciate the magnitude of these ef-
fects, it must be recognized that in the 1950's
about 2.5 to 3.2 infants out of every hun-
dred born in the U.S. died before reaching
the age of one year. The average excess in-
fant mortality, therefore, represents close
to one child out of one hundred born, or
one of every 2.5 to 3.0 that died during the
first year of life.
Since about four million children were
born annually during this period, close to
40,000 infants one year old or less died in ex-
cess of normal expectations each year, to-
taling some 375,000 by the mid-Sixties and
continuing at about 34,000 per year since
the end of atmospheric testing by the U.S.
and the U.S.S,R.
It is no wonder, then, that infant mortal-
ity has been a major concern of our Pub-
?
lic Health Service since this trend was first
pointed out in 1960 by Dr. M. Moriyama of
the National Center for Health Statistics.
However, as Dr. Moriyama and his asso-
ciates observed during an international Con-
ference devoted entirely to infant mortal-
ity in 1965, none of the factors so far con-
sidered?medical care, population movement,
new drugs, pesticides, smoking or epidemics
of infectious disease?suffices to explain the
observed facts.
That the recent excesses in infant mor-
tality cannot readily be explained by medi-
cal and socioeconomic factors normally in-
fluencing mortality trends may be seen from
an examination of the death rate in the vari-
ous states following the Alamogordo blast.
At the University of Pittsburgh, we have
plotted the percentile infant mortality ex-
cesses or decrements relative to the com-
puter-determined 1940-1945 base line for the
first and fifth years after Alamogordo. In
1946, one year after the detonation, there was
no sign of any excess infant mortality in the
states downwind from New Mexico; but by
1950 a clear change toward excess infant
mortality appeared in the states over which
the fallout cloud had drifted, and only in
those states. Furthermore, the excess mor-
talities are seen to be distributed in such a
pattern as might be expected from nuclear
fallout originating in New Mexico, since the
effects are lowest in the dry area of western
Texas, and largest in the areas of heavy rain-
fall first encountered by the cloud, namely
Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi and Ala-
bama, declining steadily thereafter toward
the Atlantic.
The only other area that showed a clear
excess infant mortality greater than ten per-
cent as compared to the 1940-1945 period was
found to be North Dakota. There, subsequent
measurements of stronthun 90 in the milk,
carried out by the Health and Safety Labora-
tories of the Atomic Energy Commission, re-
vealed the highest concentrations anywhere
in the U.S. for which data is available prior
to 1960. The causes of this "hot spot" are not
yet fully understood, but they are quite pos-
sibly connected with known accidental dis-
charges of radioactivity from the Hanford
plant of the Manhattan Project, directly to
the west, in the early years of its operation,
where the fissionable plutonium for most of
the nuclear weapons was produced beginning
in 1944.
Since no excess infant mortality was regis-
tered along the path of the New Mexico fall-
out cloud in the first year after the detona-
tion, the deaths occurring downwind in later
years could not have resulted from the direct
effects of external radiation from fallout on
the developing embryo. It becomes clear
then that we are dealing with an effect on
the reproductive cells of the parents, or a so-
called genetic effect.
The evidence available so far therefore
suggests that radioactive strontium appears
to be a far more serious hazard to man
through its long-lasting action on the ge-
netic material of the mammalian cell than
had been expected on the basis of its well-
known tendency to be incorporated into
bone. The resultant effect appears to express
itself most noticeably in excess fetal and
infant mortality rates among the children
born two or more years after a nuclear ex-
plosion. Presumably such factors as lowered
birth weight and reduced ability to resist
ordinary infectious diseases are involved, ac-
counting for the greatest increase in infant
mortality in the U.S. as compared to the
advanced countries of Western Europe since
the early 1950's. Children who receive ade-
quate medical care are more likely to survive
these factors than those who do not.
What does all this imply for the debate
over the deployment of new nuclear weapons
systems, such as the A.B.M. or the M.I.R.V.
(Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle),
carrying many nuclear warheads in a single
missile? To appreciate the probable genetic
effects of a large nuclear war, we can con-
sider first the effect of small tactical-size
nuclear weapons comparable to the 20 kilo-
ton bombs detonated over Hiroshima, Naga-
saki, and in the desert of Alamogordo Since
increases of some 20 to 30 percent excess in-
fant mortality were observed from a thou-
S6165
sand to fifteen hundred miles downwind in
Arkansas, Alabama and Louisiana, where
mortality rates were between 3 and 4.5 per-
hundred live births, the detonation of a
single, small tactical-size npclear weapon
on the ground in the Western United States
appears to have led to One out of one hun-
dred children born subsequently dying be-
fore reaching the age of one year. Therefore,
the detonation of a hundred or so weapons
of this size, amounting to the equivalent of
only two megatons in the form of small war-
heads, would be expected to lead to essen-
tially no children surviving to maturity in
the states directly downwind.
But according to a former Defense Sec-
retary Clark Clifford, speaking at a N.A.T.O.
conference in the Fall of 1968, we have close
to eight thousand tactical nuclear weapons
in the kiloton range ready to be released in
order to protect our European allies from a
ground attack by Russia. Thus, we would
probably achieve the protection of Western
Europe at the cost of the biological end of
these nations through the death of the chil-
dren of the survivors, together with the likely
death of most children subsequently born to
the people of Eastern Europe, Russia and
China as the radioactive clouds drift east-
ward around the world until they reach the
United States. Thus, the use of the biologi-
cally most destructive small nuclear weapons
in tactical warfare now appears to be at least
as self-defeating as the release of large quan-
tities of nerve gas, killing indiscriminately
soldiers and civilians, friends and enemies
alike.
But, what about the use of large megaton
warheads in a massive first strike or in A.B.M.
missiles detonated high up in the strato-
sphere or outer space, as proposed for the
Spartan missile that is to provide us with
an impenetrable shield against a first strike
attack by large Chinese or Russian missiles
in the 1970's?
According to the figures on infant mor-
tality in the United States, based on the
testing of large hydrogen weapons in the
Pacific and Siberia, both in the atmosphere
and outer space, close to one out of every
one hundred children born are likely to have
died as the result of only about 200 megatons
worth of fission products into the world's
atmosphere, under conditions which were es-
pecially designed to minimize the possible
effects on health.
According to the testimony of Defense
Secretary Melvin Laird in. the Spring of 1969,
the U.S.S.R: will have the capability of
launching some 500 SS-9 missiles, each capa-
ble of carrying 25 megatons worth of bombs
in the form of many multiple warheads, or a
total of some 1500 to 2500 warheads. Together
with comparable numbers launched by smal-
ler missiles, the total rnegatonnage would
therefore be of the order of 10 to 20,000
megatons needed in a first strike that at-
tempts to destroy most of our thousands of
missiles and bombers at the same [me.
Thus, the threat of a first strike by Russia
loses all credibility since, in order to have
any chance at all of preventing devastating
retaliation, it would necessarily have to re-
lease so much radioactvity into the circulat-
ing atmosphere that it would lead to the
death of most Russian infants born in the
next generation, ending the existence of the
Russian people together with that of all
mankind.
Since it takes at least three to five Anti-
Ballistic Missiles launched to insure a high
probability of interception, the U.S. must be
prepared to launch some 5000 to 15000
A.B.M.'s in order to provide a meaningful
"shield" against such a massive attack.
We know that each Spartan missile must
cOntain a warhead of at least 2 megatons to
produce a sufficiently intense X-ray pulse to
achieve interception, so that the use of this
system to protect our own missiles and cities
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S 6166 'CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE April 23, 1970
would require the detonation of some 10,000
to 30,000 megatons into the stratosphere, not
counting any radioactivity from the Faustian
warheads, from our own couriterstrike, or
from the Russian A.B.M. missiles.
Thus, even if anti-missile systems were to
work with ideal perfection on both aides,
preserving every home, every school, and
every factory from destruction, the release
of long-lived radioactive materials would
produce more than a hundred times as mach
radioactive poison as during all the years of
peacetime testing. Based on the excess mor-
tality observed during the period of testing,
this would most likely be sufficient to insure
that few if any children anywhere in the
world would grow to maturity to give rise to
another generation.
Nor will it make much difference hew
high above the atmosphere the bombs are
detonated, because the strontium 90 takes
twenty-eight years to decay to half of its
initial activity, long enough for most of it
to return to earth well before another gener-
ation of children is born. And even if a
perfectly "clean" weapon containing no fis-
sionable material at all could ever be de-
veloped, the carbon 14 it produces would
get into the genetic material controlling the
life processes of all living cells, and it takes
5770 years before half of its radioactivity
is exhausted.
The implications of the warning mankind
has received from the death of its infants
during nuclear testing are therefore clear:
Nuclear war, with or without anti-missiles
or elaborate shelters, is no longer "think-
able" due to a fatal flaw in the assumptions
of all our military war-garners, namely the
unexpectedly severe biological sensitivity of
the mammalian reproductive system to ge-
netically important by-products of nuclear
weapons, which must now be regarded not
merely as vastly destructive explosive and
incendiary devices, but as the most power-
ful biological poison weapons that man has
yet invented.
THE U.S. NATIONAL ARBORETUM
Mr. PERCY. 'Mr. President, on April
22, many of the people of the Nation took
time out to stop and think about our
earth and its struggle for survival. One
aspect of this day was that we seemed
to see more clearly both the beauty of
nature and the destructiveness of man.
There were many speeches made about
what ought to be done, and I hope that
it was not just rhetoric.
If we want to look for something to do
that will stop a part of man's destruc-
tion of nature, we have to look no fur-
ther than the Nation's Capital. The U.S.
National Arboretum is one of the most
beautiful spots in the Washington, D.C.,
area. It is a magnificent spot in which
we can withdraw from the noise and
smells of our highly industrialized so-
ciety where we can get away from the
fumes and sight and sound of cars and
trucks and buses and enjoy the serenity
of nature.
Now, however, an East Leg Parkway
has been proposed that would run along
the arboretum side of the Anacostia
River, using precious aboretum land.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that an article written by Mr. Tom
Stevenson and published in the Wash-
ington Post of April 19 be printed in the
RECORD. The article eloquently describes
l.-th the arboretum and the threat to it.
If we are serious about saving our
environment, it is with small but Impor-
tant issues like this that we must deal
and deal decisively.
There being' no Objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
NATURALISTS FEAR ROM OP ARBORETUM
(By Tom Stevenson)
The U.S. National Arboretum Is considered
one of the great arboretums of the world
and one of the big attractions of the District
of Columbia. Yet, an effort is being made
to take a lot of Arboretum acreage and use
it for a roadway. The decision rests with
Congress.
Robert F. Lederer, executive vice president,
American Association of Nurserymen, and
Mrs. Glenn B. Eastburn, executive director,
American Horticultural Society, have warned
their members that a. proposed East Leg
Parkway along the Arboretum side of the
Anacostia, River would require the use of
land now occupied by the Arboretum.
Richard P. White, chairman of the National
Arboretum Advisory Council, says that the
proposal, if adopted, would cripple the Ar-
boretum.
"In jeopardy," said Dr. White, "Is a col-
lection of plants worth millions of dollars,
really priceless, since they could not be moved
to a new location without heavy losses, and
some of which, due to their worldwide na-
ture, could never be replaced; and a corps
of trained scientists in horticultural re-
scarab, highly efficient, that might move else-
where and that would be hard to replace,
once lost."
One of the outstanding attractions at the
Arboretum is the Gotelli collection of dwarf
conifers. Ovee a period of 15 years, William
T. Gotelli, of South Orange, N.J., assembled
more than 1,500 plants from all parte of
the world. In 1963 he gave the collection to
the Arboretum. He said it was too fine for
one person to possess, and he wanted it
at the Arboretum where all could enjoy it.
Here the conifers of normal growth contrast
pleasingly with their dwarf counterparts, in
an arrangement of rocks and stone-mulched
beds set among velvet green grass walkways.
In late .April and early May, 70,000 azaleas
on the slopes of Mount Hamilton, in the
Arboretum, are in bloom beneath a canopy
of tulip, oak and dogwood trees.
Along the A:aacostia River are hundreds
of magnificent camellias, both sasanquas and
Japonicas. Last fall the Camellia Society of
the Potomac Valley in a test program, pro-
duced thousands of blooms on the japonicas
by regulating their growth through a process
called gibbing. MOTO than 100 varieties of
sasanqua are planted along trails and among
stately Japanese temple trees.
Nearby, a central alley bordered by speci-
men plants of flowering dogwood is set among
hemlocks and informal plantings of .other
dogwoods. In the collection are about 65
kinds of dogwood, including the weeping
form, the bunchberry and the Chinese dog-
wood.
The collection of more than 600 crabapples
represents one of the largest test plantings
in this country. Thought the trees are still
young, crabapple blossoms are beginning to
add considerably to the flower display of
raid-April, the effect being heightened by
underplantings of daffodils. Ornamental
crabapples are considered the most depend-
able of all small flowering trees for cold
climates. At the Arboretum there are var-
ieties suitable for every region that experi-
ences temperatures below zero in the United
States. The Arboretum's collection is also be-
ginning to provide information on the best
varieties for the middle and upper South.
There is a fine collection of hollies, Ameri-
can, English, Chinese, Japanese and miscel-
laneous evergreen types. The plants are la-
beled to help 'visitors identify them. The
holly plantings also suggest possible land-
scape use of these plants. In addition to the
hollies on display, the Arboretum has re-
search collections which are being used in
breeding programs to develop superior forms,
particularly for sections of the country where
hollies are not now climatically adapted.
The holly trail leads to a unique six-sided
teakwood bench from which one can view
plantings of 25-foot tall hybrid magnolias,
deciduous hollies and crabapples.
Fern valley is a naturalistic planting of
ferns and other plants native to Eastera
North America. Of special interest is a wall
for lime-loving ferns, made from limestone
rocks said to have been originally used in
a rocky parapet constructed by Braddock's
army.
A start toward a complete collection of
flowering cherries at the Arboretum was
made through a gift by National Capita
Optimists. The collection is being added to
each year, and will serve for research and
possibly hybridizing.
Many of the plantings at the Arboretum
in addition to the flowering cherries, have
been contributed by the general public in-
dividuals nurserymen and garden clubs.
In addition to being a beauty spot, the
Arboretum is an educational institution--
an outdoor museum in which one can study
many kinds of trees, shrubs and other plants.
It is a research institution, using its plants
for cultural observation and in breeding and
testing programs. In cooperation with the
New Crops Research Branch of USDA, it dis-
tributes new plants and seed to other botanic
gardens of this country.
..-...??????=0.1.11?????orea
LIMITING FARM PAYMENTS To
$10,000 PER CROP OF COTTON,
WHEAT, AND FEED GRAINS
Mr. GOODELL. Mr. President, con-
sidering the inflationary pressures in our
economy and the budget constraints
which are applied to so many vitally
needed programs, it seems unbelievable
to me that we should still continue waste-
ful programs of large farm subsidy pay-
ments to a small handful of wealthy
producers.
When the Agriculture Appropriations
Act was considered in the Senate last
year, I offered an amendment to the bill
which would have limited the payments
to individual producers of cotton, wheat,
and feed grains to $10,000 per crop. Be-
cause I had to offer my amendment to
the appropriation bill, this limitation
would have applied only to the 1970 crops.
Basic farm legislation, expires this year.
We now have an unparalleled opportu-
nity to enact long-range changes in the
farm program which would have the ef-
fect of placing permanent limitations on
these programs. I intend to offer my
amendment again this year and I will be
working with Senator BIRCH BAYII in a
bipartisan effort to bring this about. We
are planning to introduce our amend-
ment next week. If our proposal is en-
acted, a potential saving of $250 million
annually could result.
Last year I placed in the RECORD a list,
by State, of producers receiving $10,000
or more from these three programs in
1968. Figures are now available for 1969,
and they show an alarming increase in
just 1 year. The number of payees re-
ceiving $10,000 or more increased by
1,877 in the cotton program, by 2,836 in
the feed grains program, and by 1,806 in
the wheat program.
Mr. President, for the benefit of Sena-
tors who will be considering a limitation
on farm subsidies this year, I ask unani-
mous consent to have printed in the
RECORD a table provided by the Depart-
ment of Agriculture which lists by State
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il 23, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 6153
helped factory workers to get through "vaca-
tion without pay" periods.
A commonly expressed view was tliat the
money gave families a small measure of
security in case of illness or job difficulties.
This was best expressed by the family that
said:
"We aren't using_ the money to pay the
electric bill or things like that. We put a
little aside and just having it gives you
peace of mind in case anything should hap-
pen."
Several families were negative in their re-
sponses, saying the money wasn't sufficient
to help them ..r'- .uately for their
families by President Nixon. The bill is sched-
uled for a vote on the House floor next
month,.
Until now; the preliminary results of that
$4.5 million government-financed experiment
have been put forth in general terms or in
cold statistics.
But last week, Mathematica, a research
group based.' here, released verbatim quota-
tions from infervieWwilh 10 per cent of the
more than 7,000 families who receive the cash
guarantees_in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.
Although a few families expressed some
reservations or misconceptions about the
program, more typical responses included
. such Statements as it is "four to five times
better than welfare" or "it seems simple and
Uncomplicated compared to most govern-
ment programs."
Unlike welfare, the families do not have
to fill out complicated forms, do not have to
account for how they spend their money, do
not have to forfeit assets, and are not super-
vised by case workers and investigators.
. In faCt, the experiment's workers go out of
their way not to advise families. If families
need help, such as finding housing, they re
' ceive a list of agencies to contact so that the
can learn to help themselves. The cash pay
ments are strictly divorced from any services.
To be eligible for the payments, a family
Submits to a quarterly interview and reports
Its income and family composition each
month. The income report form, as one fam-
ily said, "couldn't be simpler. You'd have to
be pretty stupid" not to understand it.
The one-page form, covering a four-week
period, asks the family to list any changes in
household members (because grants are
based on family size) and to list earnings be-
fore taxes and other income such as Social
Security benefits.
Families include their paycheck stubs with
the report. If they don't have stubs, they can
submit signed statements from employers.
Their benefits are recalculated every four
weeks, but are based on average earnings over
the last three-month period.
Because the eXperiment is aimed simply
at determining how income guarantees af-
fect work patterns of those who receive
them, the families are under no obligation to
account for how they spend the extra cash.
But the families have shown a strong de-
sire to prove they are worthy of the pay-
ments. Many have voluntarily attached paid
bills to their income declaration forms to
Show how they have spent the money.
That the money is being used in a variety
of meaningful ways was also shown by the
Interviews that Mathematica conducted last
month in Trenton, N.J., where the first proj-
ect families were selected in 1968, and in
Paterson. Passaic and Jersey City, N.J., and
Scranton, Pa.
Two Scranton families are using the
money, spread over ,a three-year period, to
renovate their homes.
"This way we are increasing the value of
our home and will have something to show
for the money," one family said.
That family-has renovated one room and
named it the "Council of Grants to Families"
room. The Council is the subsidiary which
issues the payments to the families.
Another family, noting that the payments
were enabling it to move from a "dump" to
a nicer apartme:nt, said:
"We are trying to Plan ahead. In three
years, I might be making good money, and by
then the kids will be older and my wife could
possibly work. It sure has raised our stand-
ard of living."
A 60-year-old mother, living with her
son's family, said the payments would make
it possible for her to delay in applying for
Social Security benefits until she was eligible
for the maximum amount.
The income guarantee is helping one rail-
road worker to, sit out a layoff, and has
families.
A few fa
checks
sprees.
0
ful
Cr'.
lies looked upon their bimonthly
windfalls to be used for spending
young father has been quite success-
n using his guarantee to extend his
It rating so that he could lavishly fur-
h his public housing apartment?com-
lete with bar. He also tried to con the ex-
periment's workers out of giving him his
payments in one lump sum so that he could
have a "stake."
Among those interviewed, there was al-
most universal contempt for the existing de-
pendent children's welfare program, which
egan in the 1930's and would be replaced
the Nixon administration's Family Assist-
anc Ian of income guarantees.
One mily said that "on welfare you can't
go any p or raise your cultural level." An-
other said are "kills people," and a third
said welfare " es liars and cheats" out of
people.
Only a few of th income experiment's
families did not endo the concept of a
national income guarantee an.
"I don't think it will wo " one father
said. "It's like putting the le country
on welfare."
But the overwhelming view was pressed
by families that said the program as a
"good idea," that "all the people in th cel-
lars and in the slums need it," that ' on
need a program for those not rich."
"Professionals can always find a job i
their field," one Jersey City father said. "Bu
there is no such thing as a guaranteed fac-
tory job."
Similarly, a Scranton father said:
"It's giving those who are already trying
a chance to get ahead. Everyone can't count
on steady work . . . Take Scranton. Six years
ago if you wanted a job as a dishwasher you
had to fight at least 10 other guys to get
it. Think how much this program would
have meant then."
Most of the families showed a clear un-
derstanding that the income guarantee
which average less than $100 a Month,
down as earnings go up.
"You work more, you get less," said one
father.
Another said he took a job knowing that
the guarantee would go down, because he
wanted to better himself. And one enrollee,
who now only receives $20 a month, said that
small incentive has made him "work harder
in the last months putting in overtime when-
ever I can."
Under eight different combinations of tax
rates and guaranteed income levels, the
guarantees are entirely eliminated when
earnings go above a certain level. To date,
10 per cent of the families in Trenton, Pater-
son and Passaic have increased their earn-
ings so that they no longer are eligible for
the guarantees.
One father correctly figured the point
where he no longer would be eligible for
benefits and said, "I'd be happy to go above
it"?indicating, as many of the answers did,
that the cash payments do not slow down
work effort.
Typical comments were "I'd rather work
than sit," and "it's all I ever knew all my
life." Another family head said work was
necessary so a guaranteed income plan would
be "more an insurance policy than a hand-
out."
The experiment is being financed by the
Office of Economic Opportunity under con-
tracts with the Institute for Research on
Poverty at the University of Wisconsin, and
Mathematica.
Although developed under the Johnson
administration, the experiment is proving
to be a unique testing ground for President
Nixon's revolutionary welfare reforms, which
appear assured of Congressional passage this
year.
The reforms are mammoth in that they
establish the first uniform federal income
guarantee ($1,600 for a family of four) and
include working poor families, as well as
the non working poor, for the first time.
Critics have said the program might lead
to widespread loafing. But the Mathematica
interviews suggest the program, in the words
of one father, will give the "guy who tries
the feeling that it is worth it."
[From the New York Times, Feb. 28, 1970]
INVENTORY OFFERS TO SUPPORT TEST OF
WELFARE GRANTS AND WAGES
(By Jack Rosenthal)
WASHINGTON, February 27.?A computer
scientist from White Plains, N.Y., thinks that
the Government is approaching welfare re-
form in the wrong way and is willing to put
$500,000 of his own money to prove it.
"The present system is terrible, and even
the President's welfare reform plan would, in
effect, put poor people in the same 50 to 67
per cent tax brackets as industrialists," says
Leonard M. Greene, a 51-year-old inventor
and producer of on-board computers for com-
mercial aircraft.
He regards even a current Federal income-
grant experiment as unsatisfactory and this
week wired an offer to tbe Office of Economic
Opportunity.
He would, his telegram said, personally
support a broadening of the experiment to
cover 100 poor families if they could receive
income grants and also be allowed to keep
all outside earnings.
The present experiment, conducted in New
Jersey, seeks to determine what 1,359 low-
ncome families do with income grants if
hey are permitted to keep some but not
11 outside income.
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS
The O.E.O. issued a preliminary report last
week indicating that families with grants are
more likely to work than non-recipients. The
experiment has two years to run.
An O.E.O. spokesman said today that the
agency was not prohibited from accepting
private grants. Mr. Greene's proposal, he
said, "is an interesting offer" but the agency
will have to learn more about it before act-
ing.
Mr. Greene hopes to broaden the experi-
ment to find out what happens to work in-
centives when poor people can keep all they
earn plus the grants.
Mr. Greene, a one-time test pilot and air
taxi operator, says the offer could cost him
$500,000 over two years. He admits with a
shrug that he is not sure the contribution
would be tax-deductible.
In a slightly "mod" suit and wide tie, he
does not look at all like a zealot, but like
the wealthy businessman he has become as
the result of his computer inventions.
"I don't consider myself a nut," he says,
"or even as all that altruistic. I'm successful,
but so what? Unless our society can solve this
(poverty) problem, I'm a success on a sink-
ing ship."
Mr. Greene came to Washington this week
seeking support in Congress for his own wel-
fare reform proposal; keyed to the same idea
as his offer to 0.E.0.?that the poor should
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S 6154 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE April 23, 1970
get income grants and be able to keep all
outside Income besides.
Under his "fair /glare" plan, all citizens,
poor or not, WOuld receive income allow-
ances. Those received by the poor would be
untaxed or taxed at low rates. The amount
of tax on the allowance would increase grad-
ually, like the income tax, so that non-needy
families would keep nothing of the allow-
ance.
Mr. Greene believes that the Nixon Admin-
istration's proposed family assistance pro-
gram, to reform the present welfare system,
suffers from the same fault as the 0.5.0.
experiments.
Under the proposed program, pending in
Congress, a poor family would be guaranteed
$1,600 in annual Federal grants. It could
earn an additional $720 without penalty. But
It could keep only half of any earnings above
that.
REBUFFED BY TRAINEE
"And that's tantamount to a 50 per cent
tax," Mr. Greene says, "67 per cent if you add
what the states might add."
Mr. Greene first came to devise a welfare
reform system three years ago when his Safe
Flight Instrument Company offered a good
salary to a black youth to become a com-
puter technician-trainee.
"And yet the boy had to turn us down,"
recalls Mr. Greene, eight of whose own 12
children are now in college. "The additional
income would have disqualified his family
from its place on the waiting list for public
housing. What kind of society is it that com-
pels a young man to barter his whole future
for a place on an apartment waiting list?"
He believes that present law encourages
people "to become ivegetablizedi and live
on the dole. The only work they can seek is
in hidden, cash jobs like driving cabs, caddy-
ing--and crime. These cash jobs are precisely
those with no future."
"We should be encouraging people to work
and to get ahead," he says, "not penalizing
them for it."
ENDING THE WAR
Mr. SCHWEIKER. Mr. President, I
commend President Nixon for the work
he is doing to end the tragic Vietnam
war and for his excellent speech to the
Nation on this work on Monday night.
In my view, the President accom-
plished two significant things by this
speech:
First. Despite reported pressures from
various military sources to curtail Ameri-
can troop withdrawals, he announced a
continuation of the present rate of troop
withdrawal without any break in the
monthly average.
Second. We preserved a flexibility in
the daily handling of our disengagement
from Vietnam which he should main-
tain as Commander in Chief of our
Armed Forces.
All Americans should be heartened by
his pledge of Withdrawal of an additional
150,000 troops in the next year. The Pres-
ident, by this dramatic step, has shown
his good-faith intention to end the war,
but without moving so precipitously as
to endanger the lives of American troops
not included in present withdrawal plans.
have often told the people of Penn-
sylvania in the last year-and-a-half that
President Nixon has taken steps which
no previous President has done by actu-
ally removing troops, by actually scal-
ing down the intensity of the combat,
and by actually reducing the level of
American fatalities.
I share his regret that negotiations in
Paris have not borne fruit up to this
point, but I urge continued efforts in
Paris in the hope that there still may be
encouragement from this quarter.
President Nixon showed Monday night
that he is ori the right track, and he
has my full support.
THE WARSAW GHETTO UPRISING:
A COMPELLING REASON FOR SEN-
ATE RATIFICATION OF THE GEN-
OCIDE CONVENTION
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, this
week marks the 27th anniversary of the
Warsaw ghetto uprising. It is particu-
larly fitting and proper that we should
pay tribute to the inhabitants of the
Warsaw ghetto who gave their lives in an
attempt to preserve the rights of their
comrades.
In September 1939, the Nazis invaded
Poland, and by October had completely
taken over the country with its Jewish
population of over 3 million. The oc-
cupation was immediately followed by a
series of restrictive laws, designed to
subject the Jews to starvation and dis-
ease. In Warsaw, this was accompanied
by the institution of the "ghetto," an
area of 100 city blocks, into which 450,-
000 Jews were confined.
In the face of many hardships imposed
on them by the Germans, an organiza-
tion called the Jewish Fighter Organize-
tion?ZOB?Was formed. The militancy
of this group grew when it was learned
that the thousands of Jews who were de-
ported daily faced certain death in the
gas phambers. However, due to the scar-
city of firearms and the limited coopera-
tion of the non-Jewish resistance, it was
not until April 19, 1943, that the ZOB
presented an organized attempt to drive
the Germans from the ghetto.
Initially, they were successful, inflict-
ing heavy German casualties, and rout-
ing their tormentors. Nevertheless, the
Nazis responded with soldiers, tanks, and
bombs. By May 16, they had leveled the
ghetto and but for a few exceptions, had
liquidated its entire Jewish population.
In 1948, the United States, along with
47 other countries, signed the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. The de-
signers of this declaration among other
things sought to define and to prevent
the crime of genocide as it was practiced
by the Germans against the Jews in
World War II.
This week hearings open on the Geno-
cide Convention. The United States was
instrumental in drafting this convention,
as it has been in the drafting of many
other human rights conventions. How-
ever, we have not yet ratified this or any
treaty which would demonstrate our
strong opposition to the crime of geno-
cide. It would indeed be a tribute to the
brave people of Warsaw if the United
States took speedy action in the ratifica-
tion of the Genocide Convention.
EASTERN AIRLINES NEWARK TO
WASHINGTON SHUTTLE
Mr. CASE. Mr. President, as one vrho
joined with our entire congressional dele-
gation in the effort to keep the Newark to
Washington shuttle in operation, I am,
naturally, pleased that Eastern Airlines
now has decided to continue the service.
I believe that the expansion and im-
provement of this service, as opposed to
its more continuance, would be in the in-
terest of Eastern as wen tt:s.iessthe public
interest.
CHINA AND U.S. POLICY A TIME OF
TRANSITION
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, Mr.
A. Doak Barnett, senior fellow, the
Brookings Institution, delivered a most
interesting speech before the Women's
National Democratic Club on March 2
which was entitled "China and U.S. Pol-
icy: A Time of Transition." Mr. Barnett
summarizes briefly the present situation
in China and the major factors that have
impelled Peking to reexamine its -policy.
He also examines the transition in the
American attitude toward China and
Suggests some actions that the United
States might take to improve our rela-
tions with the most populous nation in
the world.
I ask unanimous conomt that the text
of Mr. Barnett's speech be printed in
the RECORD at the conclusion of my re-
marks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I call
attention to a few sentences toward the
end of Mr. Barnett's speech. Mr. Barnett
observes that "the key immediate issue is
whether we should build an anti-Chinese
ABM." Mr. Barnett comments that "on
this the Nixon administration, in my
judgment?despite the rightness of the
direction of its general China policy?is
quite wrong. The arguments against an
anti-Chinese ABM, on political and other
grounds, wholly apart from technical
grounds, are overwhelming in my view."
Mr. 13arnett testified before the Sub-
Committee on Arms Control, Interna-
tional Law, and Organization on April 9
on the specific question of the ABM and
its effect on U.S. relations with China.
At that time, he made an extensive state-
ment on the undesirability of going
ahead with an anti-Chinese ABM sys-
tem. I ask unanimous consent that Mr.
Barnett's statement to the subcommittee
on April 9 also be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the items
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
TESTIMONY BY DOAK BA RNETT BEFORE THE
SUB-COMMTITEE ON ARMS CONTROL, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION, SENATE
FoREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, APRIL 9,
1970
Mr. Chairman and members of the Sub-
committee, let me begin by saying that I am
very grateful for this opportunity to meet
and discuss with you a number of questions
relating to arms control?questions focusing
on the ABM and the SALT talks and their
relevance to the broad problem of U.S.-
China relations.
I would like to make two preliminary com-
ments about my statement: First, the views
I will express today are purely my own, and
do not in any way represent views of The
Brookings Institution, Which does not itself
take any stands on policy issues. Secondly,
since I have very recently written an article
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April 23, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE
pa1
(appearing in the current issue of Foreign
Affairs) which summarizes many of my views
on questions we are considering today, I am
taking the liberty of drawing material from
that article for the purposes of the state-
ment I am now presenting to you.
We are now, in my view, at a rather criti-
cal juncture in the &elution both of our
policy toward China and our policy regard-
ing arms control.
For the first time in several years, there
now appears to be at least a? limited basis
for hope that movement can take place in
our relations with mainland China, move-
ment which may reduce tensions and -in-
crease contacts between us. The current War-
saw talks will help to determine whether
some progress is possible, or whether the
freeze of the last two decades will continue.
At the same time, I believe that the arms
control negotiations which we and the Rus-
sians have initiated are clearly the most im-
portant ones in the postwar period. We are
about to meet again in Vienna at a time
when both sides are poised to deploy new
Weapons systems?in our case, ABMs and
MIRVs?if no agreements to forego such
systems can be reached. Decisions made in
the period immediately ahead by Washing-
ton and Moscow Individually, and by both
at the SALT talks, will determine, therefore,
whether the U.S.-Soviet arms race will ac-
celerate or slow down in the years immedi-
ately ahead. These decisions will also?and
this is one of the major points I wish to
make today?have a very significant impact
on the prospects for iniproved U.S.-China re-
lations. The evolving triangular relationship
among the U.S., Soviet Union, and China is
now such that any action by one or two
of the three inevitably affects the others.
Since my assignment today is to focus at-
tention on matters relevant to U.S.-China
relations, and specifically to consider how
we should view the ABM issue and SALT
talks in relation to the "China problem," I
will not comment on other fundamental
questions, such as whether effective ABM
systems are technically feasible or how they
might affect the stability of the U.S.-Soviet
balance. / asume that others will discuss
these questions with you.
Let me proceed with my assignment and
start by saying that I believe the Nixon Ad-
ministration is to be commended for the
new general approach it has adopted in our
overall China policy. In his February 18 re-
port to Congress on foreign policy, the Presi-
dent stated that we do not now wish to "iso-
late" mainland China but rather hope that
in time it "will be ready to re-enter the in-
ternational community," that we look for-
ward to a "more normal and constructive re-
lationship" with the Peking regime, that
"the principles underlying our relations with
China are similar to those governing our
policies towards the U.S.S.R.," and that we
will "take what steps we can toward im-
proved practical relations with Peking." This
Is a very sound and very encouraging ap-
proach, in my opinion. Moreover, the limited
steps we have taken recently to implement
this approach?namely the liberalizing of
passport and travel regulations and the re-
duction of trade restrictions, are highly de-
sirable and deserve strong support. The Ad-
ministration should now be urged to con-
tinue making further and more substantial
steps along these same lines?for example,
by removing all restrictions on nonstrategic
trade with mainland China.
However, having said this, I must im-
mediately go on to say that in my view, the
deployment of an anti-Chinese ABM area
defense would be extremely undesirable and
would, in fact, run directly counter to, and
tend to undercut, the basic objectives that
underlie our new overall China policy.
Deployment of an anti-Chinese ABM
would be both unwise and unsound, I be-
lieve, for a number of reasons. Let me sum-
marize these briefly now, and then proceed
to elaborate on some of them at greater
length.
(1) The ABM is not necessary for the de-
fense of the U.S. against any foreseeable
"Chinese threat." For the indefinite future,
the 'U.S. will continue to have overwhelm-
ing nuclear superiority in relation to China;
and there is every reason to believe that our
superiority will operate effectively to deter
the Chinese from any offensive nuclear ac-
tions or threats. It is not necessary, there-
fore, to try to achieve a total damage denial
capability by building ABMs.
(2) If the U.S. insists on building an anti-
Chinese ABM system, Peking will probably
interpret this to mean (whatever Washing-
ton says to try to convince it otherwise) that
we are determined to maintain an unre-
stricted capability of making "first strike"
threats against China, and that we insist on
denying China the ability to acquire even a
limited, defensive, "second strike" capability.
There is every reason to believe that this
would tend to reinforce Peking's worst in-
stincts in interpreting our motives and would
work against the possibility of improving our
relations.
(3) China's present opposition to all inter-
national arms control agreements is rooted,
in part at least, in its basic sense of vulner-
ability and nuclear weakness. Peking obvi-
ously has been, and still is, fearful of threats
by the superpowers and of U.S.-Soviet "col-
lusion" directed against China. Until China
achieves a minimal defensive deterrent it-
self, this situation is likely to continue. How-
ever, once the Chinese do acquire a limited
"second strike" capability, it is at least con-
ceivable that leaders in Peking may at that
point be more inclined than at present to
consider the advantages of arms control
agreements in terms of their own interests.
If so, the chances of inducing China to par-
ticipate in arms control may increase at
that point. An anti-Chinese ABM will prob-
ably work to postpone that day.
(4) For these and other reasons, the US.
should itself forego building an anti-Chinese
ABM area defense system, and in addition
should attempt, at the SALT talks, to reach
agreement with the Soviet Union that nei-
ther we nor they will build such systems. If,
in the absence of such agreement, either or
both proceed to deploy anti-Chinese systems,
this will tend to reinforce Peking's fear of
anti-Chinese collusion between Washington
and Moscow, which at least would complicate,
and could well seriously set back, the pro-
spects for improving U.S. relations with
China.
Let me now elaborate on some of these
points, starting with a few comments on
Chinese motivations, nuclear capabilities,
and foreign policy behavior, and how one
should view the "Chinese threat."
There is no doubt, I believe, that ever since
1949 the Chinese Communist regime, in its
relations with the superpowers, has felt very
vulnerable to external pressures and possible
attack by one or both of the major nuclear
powers. Particularly since the late 1950's?
following the Sino-Soviet split and the start
of U.S.-Soviet collaboration in the arms con-
trol field?Peking has felt itself to be, in a
sense, "encircled" by the two superpowers. It
is still, in a fundamental sense, weak and
knows it; its basic posture in big power rela-
tions is, therefore, of necessity defensive.
One of China's basic aims has been, and
still is, to acquire at least a minimal nuclear
deterrent to improve its ability to deal with
the U.S. and Soviet Union. Its hope is to
achieve a position less unequal than in the
past, and to strengthen its bargaining posi-
tion and leverage in relations with the big
powers. Above all, its aim is to deter attack
against China and reduce China's vulner-
ability to external pressures. This is the basic
military-strategic motivation behind its nu-
clear program.
S 6155
Without attempting to summarize in de-
tail the progress of China's nuclear program,
let me say that while its technological pro-
gress has been impressive in many respects,
its actual nuclear capabilities are very lim-
ited and will remain so for a long time to
come?because of the relative weakness of
China's resource base.
By the middle or latter 1970's China will,
-at best, have accumulated perhaps 15 to 40
operational ICBMs plus 100 to 200 MRBMs
and a limited number of other bombs deliv-
erable by aircraft. (The most recent De-
fense Department estimates suggest that by
1975 China may have 10 to 25 ICBMs and
80 to 100 MRBMs.)
To provide a crude basis of comparison,
today, the U.S. and the Soviet Union each
has over 1,000 ICBMs, plus many thousands
of other nuclear weapons deliverable by a
variety of sophisticated systems including
missiles, airplanes, and submarines.
Projections of China's nuclear capabilities
through the 1970's make several things clear.
There is no possibility that in the foreseeable
future Peking can aspire to parity with the
U.S. and the Soviet Union in the nuclear
field. The Chinese cannot come close to
achieving a "first strike" capability against
either of the superpowers. Under any con-
ceivable circumstances, in the event of a
Chinese attack, Washington or Moscow could
retaliate massively. The question is wheth-
er?and if so, when, and with what con-
sequences?China may be able to acquire a
limited, defensive, o'second strike" capabil-
ity which will serve as a minimal deterrent
for China?that is, a capacity; if subjected to
U.S. or Soviet nuclear attack, to retaliate and
hit at least some targets in the attacking
country or, in the U.S. case, possibly Ameri-
can forces in the Pacific or bases in allied
countries. To date, it has yet to achieve this.
If the U.S., and Soviet Union, forego build-
ing anti-Chinese ABlVI systems, they will, in
effect, be accepting the l'act that by the lat-
ter 1970's, China will have acquired a small
defensive, "second strike" capability.
What risks or costs would this involve?
It would require acceptance of the fact that
the U.S., and the Soviet Union, cannot with
impunity consider or threaten nuclear "first
strikes" against China. One can question,
however, whether this would involve high
costs. The arguments and inhibitions against
considering nuclear "first strikes" in most
conceivable situations are already very great.
(Conceivably, this may be less true for the
Soviet Union, than for the U.S., as the vague
hints about a possible preemptive strike in
1969 suggest, but even Moscow must feel
strong inhibitions about initiating a nu-
clear "first strike.") Moreover, in most lim-
ited conflicts in Asia, nuclear weapons are
likely to be almost irrelevant.
The possibility that key non-nuclear pow-
ers such as Japan, India, and Australia might
feel more vulnerable and threatened cannot
be ignored. If this impelled them to embark
on independent nuclear programs, the cost
in relation to U.S. aims (including the de-
sire to prevent proliferation) would be sub-
stantial. Yet, as long as such countries have
confidence in the U.S. commitment to defend
them against nuclear threats, and as long as
it is clear that American nuclear superiority
in relation to China is such that any offensive
nuclear threats by Peking would not really
be credible, there is no reason why China's
acquisition of a minimal deterrent should
basically alter the position or the views of
such countries.
It is sometimes argued that if the U.S.
maintains a "first strike" capability against
China and builds invulnerable defenses, pre-
sumably by development ABMs, the Japanese
are likely to have greater confidence in our
defense pledges. I believe that it is much
more likely, however, -that if the U.S. focuses
on such a defense strategy, rather than rely-
ing on the continued applicability of mutual
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S 6156 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
deterrence, the Japanese may conclude that
the, US, in a crisis condition might concern
itself only With Its own defense and abandon
Interest in allies not protected by such de-
Lenses.
The fact is that not only have the Chinese
to date resisted whatever temptation they
may have felt to engage in "bomb rattling,"
it is difficult to see how, from their position
of nuclear inferiority, they will have any sig-
nificant capacity for credible "nuclear black-
mail" in the foreseeable future. Peking's
cautious emphasis, to date, on defense as its
sole aim in developing nuclear weapons sag-
goats that Chinese leaders may already realise
this.
Same might fear that once the Chinese
believe they have acquired a credible deter-
rent, they might tend to become more ag-
gressive in areas such as Southeast Asia, feel-
ing that they could take more risks in non-
nuclear or subnuelear situations, involving
conventional weapons, because they would be
less vulnerable to nuclear counter-thre.ats.
Whether one considers this to he a significant
risk depends very much on. one's general
assessment of China's foreign policy goals,
strategy, and behavior.
If one views China es a power committed
to broad territorial aggression and expan-
sionism by military means, willing to take
large risks, and prone to irrational action
(i.e., inclined to commit aggression without
regard for possible consequences), there
would be cause for major _concern. However,
among specialists on Chinese affairs, boils in
and out of the U.S. government, there ap-
pears to be a fairly broad consensus that
analysis of China's behavior and doctrine
over the past two, decades doea not support
this view. In general, this consensus, winch
I believe hi sound, maintains that:
Although China encourages revolutionaries
abroad, it is not committed, to broad terri-
torial expansionism. Among its national goals
Is the recovery of certain areas that it con-
siders to be lost territories, but even in re-
gard to these territories its inclination is to
pursue long-term, low-risk policies, riot broad
military expansionism.
It appears to bepre-disposed to keep Chi-
nese military forces within China's bound-
aries, and It seems likely to continue doing
so, except in cases where it feels Chinese
security?or that of a Communist buffer
state on its periphery?is seriously threatened
(az it did in Korea).
Its primary stress, both in the structure of
is conventional military forces and the dm-
trifle governing their use, is on defense rather
than offense.
It cannot and does not ignore the pos-
sible risks and costs of large-scale conven-
tional war, even when nuclear weapons are
not involved, and it places a high priority
on the desirability of avoiding large-scale
war of any sort with the major powers.
It is strongly pre-disposed, in general, to
low-cost, low-risk policies. While it clearly
encourages and supports revolutionary strug-
gles in other countries, such support does note
Include Chinese manpower on any signed-
cant scale. Even Maoist doctrine insists that
all revolutionaries must be "self-reliant,"
and should depend primarily on indigenous
resources; it opposes the use of Chinese
forces to fight other revolutionaries' battles
Lot them.
China has used pressures and probes
against its neighbors for a variety of pur-
poses, but in doing so its use of force has
generally been carefully calculated, limited,
and controlled.
In crisis situations, it has tended to act
with considerable prudence and caution, and
'repeatedly it has moved to check escalation
when there has appeared to be a serious risk
or major conflict.
There is, of course, no absolute guarantee
that these patterns of behavior, which seem
to have characterized Chinese actions over
the past two decades, will persist in the
future. Nevertheless, there is a remarkably
broad consensus among China specialists
that they are likely to continue. In fact,
there is a fairly widely-held view?a view
that I share?that post-Mao leaders are
likely to be more pragmatic and realistic
than Mao, and subject to even greater in-
ternal as well as external constraints.
As a result of the internal disruptions
caused by the Cultural Revolution in China
during the past four years, the Peking re-
gime has clearly been weakened in some re-
spects. Consequently, there are now new
constraints, in fact if not in theory, on Chi-
nese policy, which will certainly affect its
strategies abroad.
Moreover, as a result' of the steady deteri-
oration of Sino-Soviet relations in the 1960's,
the "Russian threat" appears to have re-
placed the "U S. threat" as Peking's major
foreign policy preoccupation, and this seems
to have impelled the Chinese leadership to
consider new options and strategies, to re-
duce China's present isolation and vulner-
ability and explore new opportunities for
maneuver and flexibility.
It is 'at least plausible to believe, there-
fore, that future Chinese leaders may down-
grade the importance of revolutionary aims
(not ending, but possibly deemphasizing,
Chinese activity in this field) and upgrade
the importance of state-to-state relation-
snips and more conventional political and
economic instruments of policy. There is re-
markably little support among China spe-
cialists for the idea that China is now, or
is likely to be in the future, prone to act in
an irrational or highly reckless manner,
which it would certainly be doing if it were
to ignore the continuing fact of its nuclear
inferiority, and its vulnerability to both con-
ventional and nuclear retaliation, even if,
and when, it acquires a minimal deterrent.
If these judgments are correct, there are
strong reasons to assume that once China
achieves a nuclear deterrent it can be ex-
pected. lb a basic sense, to act much as the
other nuclear powers have, and to be con-
strained, as they are, by the realities of nu-
clear deterrence. There is little basis for argu-
ing that the U.S., or Soviet Union, can feel
secure vis-?is China orily if they have a
total damage denial capability and an un-
questionable ability to threaten China with
a "first strike". To argue this is to argue, in
effect, that the U.S. and the Soviet Union can
only feel secure under conditions that guar-
antee that the Chinese will continue to feel
highly insecure.
As I stated earlier, if the U.S. operates on
other assumptions and proceeds to build an
anti-Chinese ARM, this will not only tend
to strengthen Chinese suspicions that we are
determined to maintain a potentially threat-
ening "first strike" capability against China
and to, deny China even a minimal defensive
"second strike" capability, it will also tend
to postpone the day when China may be will-
ing to consider participating in international
arms control agreements.
Fundamental change in China's posture on
strategic and nuclear arms control issues will
not be easy for Peking to make, under any
circumstances, because of China's basic weak-
ness relative to the two superpowers. How-
ever, if one asks when and under what con-
ditions a more flexible and pragmatic leader-
ship in China might be inclined to change
its posture on areas control, and even begin
to see arms control measures as in the inter-
est of China as well as of the other powers,
the answer would seem to be the following:
When China is convinced that its own nu-
clear development has reached a stage where
If has at least a minimal credible nuclear
deterrent?that is, some kind of defensive
"second strike" retaliatory capacity?soethat
it will be able to deal with the U.S. and Soviet
Union on terms less unequal than at present.
?ipril 23, 1970
It is not easy to denne when this point
will be reached. But it will doubtless be
reached eventually, whether or not we build
an anti-Chinese ABM. It is almost certain
that in time the Chinese will have acquired
a sufficient nuclear capability so that no one
could be sure whether, if China were sub-
jected to a "-first strike-, it could not mount
a significant retaliatory ;strike, at least against
allies or forces in the Pacific if not against
the U.S. itself.
Whenever the Chinese, and we, are con-
vinced that China has acquired some sort of
limited "second strike" capability, the possi-
bility that Peking may reconsider its present
blanket opposition to areas control may in-
crease, for a variety of reasons. The' realiza-
tion that pursuit of parity is a will-o-the-
wisp is likely to begin to sink in, in China.
Moreover, once China has acquired any sort
of credible deterrent, scene Chinese leaders
may conclude that it is more feasible to try
to reduce the gap between China and the
euperpowers through agreements limiting (or
reducing) U.S. and Soviet capabilities than
by trying to catch up in a hopeless race. And,
as the cost of deterrence goes up (it inevi-
tably must, as Cnina gets involved in more
sophisticated hardware), and as the com-
petition foe resources in china increases (be-
tween those stressing economic development
and those emphasizing defense), there may
be greater pressures within China, an eco-
nomic grounds, to limit investment in stra-
tegic arms development.
The construction of anti-Chinese ABM
systems would be likely, therefore, to post-
pone the day when there may be some realis-
tic hope of including China in international
arms control, It would tend to raise the level
of nuclear development which Peking's lead-
ers will consider essential, as a minimum
goal. Anti in general it will tend to make
more remote the possibility of establishing
a "more normal and constructive relation-
ship" with China and the possibility of in-
ducing Peking to "re-enter the international
community"?which are now our stated, and
in my opinion eminently sensible, goals.
What does all of this suggest rewarding the
decisions we should make and the policies
vie should pursue regarding an anti-Chinese
ABM system?both in our own consideration
of the problem and in diecussions with the
Russians at Vienna?
I strongly believe we should clearly decide
that, in terms of our broad national interests
and aims, we should not build an anti-
Chinese Al3M system, because it conflicts with
the main thrust of ouor new China policy and
is unnecessary for our defense?wholly apart
from other possible reasons. The cost of such
a system would certainly lie in its disfavor,
too, but clearly the costs would be tolerable
if it were essential in terms of our defense
arid foreign policy goals. The point is that
it is not only unessential, but would tend to
be damaging in terms of our overall objec-
tives.
We should not only make this decision
ourselves; we should also in the SALT talks
attempt to reach agreement with the Soviets
on this issue, so that both we and they will
forego traveling this road This would he
desirable in relation both to our aims re-
garding China and our desire te check the
U.S.-Soviet arms race.
Both the U.S. and the Soviet- Union must
concern themselves, more than they have.
in the past, not only with the problem of
strategic stability in their bilateral relations
but also with the task of inducing China,
over time, to improve relations in general
marl, eventually, to participate in erms con-
trol efforts and accommodate more fully
than it has to date to the requirements of
the nuclear age. Neither need fear that the
Chinese will be able to achieve a "first strike"
capability, or approach nuclear parity, in the
foreseeable future. Nor should they consider
China's eventual acquisition of a minimal
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April 23, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 6157
deterrent to be a special danger. While it is
true that China's acquisition of a credible
deterrent will improve Peking's defensive
capabilities, it will not significantly alter
the overall nuclear balance. Moreover, China
can be expected to act much as other nuclear
powers have, and to be constrained, as others
are, by the realities of mutual deterrence.
Equally important, when China achieves a
credible deterrent, Peking's leaders may be
more inclined than at piesent to reassess
their strategic polices and consider the value
of arms control.
The hope should be that Moscow as well
as Washington will see the importance of
this. But even if Moscow does not, the U.S.
in shaping its own strategic and arms con-
trol policies, should take the "China prob-
lem," as well as the problem of 'U.S.-Soviet
bilateral relations, fully into account.
CHINA AND U.S. POLICY: A TIME OF
TRANSITION
(A.. Doak Barnett's speech at the Women's
National Democratic Club on Mar. 2, 1970)
I'm delighted to be with you and to talk
with you briefly today about trends in China,
as I see them, and in U.S.-Chinese relations.
For the first time in quite a long time, there
is something to talk about. For a good many
years, this has been a rather gloomy subject
to discuss?and r have discussed it for a
good many years?not because relations be-
tween the two countries have been so bad,
but also because there has been So little
seeming prospect of any change or improve-
ment. ?
During the past few months, this has
begun to change, and although there is
certainly no basis yet for great optimism or
enthusiasm about the prospects, there are
at least some rays of hope and small signs
of a possible thaw, and this makes the sub-
ject of U.S.-China relations much more in-
teresting, and snore timely and encouraging,
than it has been for some years.
I think it is clear, in fact, that we are now
in a transition period: and although no one,
certainly not I, can really predict or foresee
the future, the future definitely seems more
open-ended than it has been for a very long
time.
China itself is in the midst of an extremely
important transition period. Its situation
both at home and abroad is basically differ-
ent in many respects than what it has been
in the past. But the U.S., too, is in the midst
of a transition in its policy towards Asia as
a whole and in its policy and attitude toward
China specifically, so that China's changing
situation and our changing attitude and
policy have introduced, it seems to me, new
elements of flexibility and change into a
situation that has been frozen for so many
years.
, Now let me begin with a few comments
on changes that have been taking place or
are now underway in China itself, because
they are an extremely important ingredient
in the situation. I obviously cannot, in a very
fewminutes, do justice to the extremely com-
plicated and even traumatic events that have
taken place in China in the five years since
the so-called Cultural Revolution began in
'65.
The Cultural Revolution has been a re-
markable, and in some respects a unique,
historical phenomenon. In essence, it has
been a struggle in which an aging and ex-
traordinary utopian revolutionary leader lost
faith in, and actually lost control over, for
a while, the revolutionary regime which he
had created; and then set about organizing
what , in effect has been a second revolution.
Mao in the early '60s no longer had day-
to-day control over the Communist Party
which ran China, so he turned to the Army,
or at least part of the Army under Lin Piao
who was Defense Minister, and to the youth
of the country, particularly youth in the
schools and colleges and mobilized both to
attack the majority of his old revolutionary
colleagues and the entire Party and Govern-
ment bureaucracy which had dominated the
country for fifteen years.
In a basic sense Mao had real cause to be
disturbed by trends in China in the early
1960s. There was in China, in the aftermath
the great leap forward and the economic
depression which followed it a definite de-
cline in ideological fervor and morale; a real
growth of deadening, ossifying bureaucratic
behavior: an emergence of vested interests
and parochial interests; a growing and very
serious generation gap; and increasing frus-
tration and disillusionment among the
youth.
In response to these trends and to the real
economic crisis which China experienced in
that period, the leaders in charge of day-to-
day affairs in China did appear to become
leas and less revolutionary; more and more
pragmatic, if you will?in Mao's terms re-
visionist?more and more like leaders in the
Soviet Union.
And it was in this context, I think, that
Mao decided that he was going to make one
final, apocalyptic attempt to try to halt the
decline and deterioraation of the revolution,
as he saw it, in China and try somehow to
revitalize the revolutionary process, to try,
in short, to ensure that the particular brand
of values that he believes in would persist
after he died.
In some respects this was a rather grand
idea, a heroic revolutionary effort. The fact
is, however, in my view at least, that Mao was
a romantic, a Utopian, in thinking that he
could do this, that he could impose his views
on the country, and completely unrealistic in
believing that he could achieve his aim, that
he could perpetuate his values, by tearing
down the bureaucratic structure of the re-
gime that had been built up in the previous
fifteen years; by setting loose chaotic forces
for change and conflict.
He did set loose these forces. He was able
to tear down, in a large degree, the bureau-
cratic structore treat had grown up in the
previous fifteen years. He was able to purge
most of those who disagreed with him at the
top in China. But he was not able?he has
not been able to date, and will not be able?
suddenly to replace all this and create a new
order based on his particular values.
Consequently, after this long and very
chaotic period in China, China is now in the
process, slowly and painfully, of trying to
rebuild its political system, trying to define
a whole new set of policies. In this situation,
the Chinese leadership is very different from
What it was in the decade before 1965, cer-
tainly very different from what it was in the
50s. Even though Mao's brooding presence is
still there and he is able to inject himself
into the situation when he wants to, he does
not have real control over the situation in
China; and the leadership, I would say, is
basically a coalitional type of leadership in
which people representing interests of very
conflicting sorts are somehow trying to get
along, somehow trying to run the country,
somehow trying to evolve new policies.
As a consequence, the regime has had a
very difficult time defining clear policies. As
a matter of fact, it seems to me, if one looks
back to the Party Congress last spring, the
most notable thing about it was the failure
to announce any real strategies and policies,
and in my opinion this lack of policy has
continued throughout the past year (it is
now almost a year since the Party Congress).
In a sense, the atmosphere in China is al-
most like that of an interregnum already,
even though Mao is still there. Clearly the
Maoist era is approaching its end, but the
post-Mao era has not yet started. And in a
basic sense, one gets the sense of a country
waiting for its old revolutionary leader to
pass from the scene. Mao and his closest fol-
lowers still do press for revolutionary policies
of a variety of sorts, but they are not really
able to carry them out throughout the coun-
try effectively. Others resist, drag their feet,
sometimes push in other directions. And yet,
until Mao does pass from the scene, those
who might favor quite different policies, less
Utopian policies, are inhibited from really
pressing for what they believe in, because
Mao's prestige is such that they cannot.
As a result of what has happened, the
power structure in the country has changed
to a very great extent. For one thing, power
in a de facto sense has been decentralized
very substantially. Peking just does not have
the capability now to try to manage and di-
rect everything from the center as it did ten
years ago. Instead it is local leaders, military
and other leaders in the provinces and at
lower levels, who are running China in many,
many respects.
Furthermore, it is not the party?and this
is unparalleled in any Communist country?
it is not the party which is running the
country really now; it is the Army. Into the
vacuum that was created by -the Cultural
Revolution, the Army had to step in. It was
the only really centralized instrument of
power left in the country, and it has stepped
in; from the center right down to the local
level the Army and military people are per-
forming functions the party used to perform.
The party and government are now in the
process of being reconstructed after the
events of '67 and '68, but it is very slow, very
painful, and there are many kinds of local
conflicts, as the people involved try to decide
what kind of a party it will be and who will
be members of it.
When Mao dies, there will clearly be an-
other period of uncertainty, some confusion
and perhaps a power struggle. My own guess,
though, is that somehow a coalitional type
of leadership will be put together, a collec-
tive type of leadership. 1-5 will hold the coun-
try together. It is likely, in my view, to move
in some new directions. As a matter of fact,
I think it is highly probable that post-Mao
leadership will move almost precisely in the
directions that Mao has feared: it will move
away from the idea of great. Utopian, apoc-
alyptic, grand strategies; away from the radi-
cal revolutionary policies that Mao has tried
to promote the last few years. Of necessity,
I think it will move toward a somewhat more
realistic, pragmatic policy designed simply
-to cope with the immediate and very pressing
problems that the country faces and will
face. There will be concern about the need
to restore a larger degree of order, a larger
degree of unity, a larger degree of purpose,
to get the country back on the course of ra-
tional development. I believe China will
move in these directions over time.
China's international position has also un-
dergone some very great changes in the same
period. The Chinese encountered a series of
rather dramatic set-backs in their foreign
policy in 1965, just on the eve of the Cultural
Revolution: the coup in Indonesia?the
Chinese had put a great deal of stock in
their relations with Indonesia and the pos-
sibility of a revolution there--the failure of
the attempt to hold a second Bandung Con-
ference at Algiers that year?in which the
Chinese invested a great deal of political
prestige?and others. Then came the Cul-
tural Revolution.
Although the Chinese adopted, and con-
tinued to exhibit a very militant, verbal pos-
ture, favoring revolutions all over the world,
in practice they became so preoccupied with
their internal problems that they, virtually
abandoned normal foreign policy activities
abroad. For a couple of years, I think it is
fair to say, China had no real foreign pol-
icy?it turned inward, and cut many of its
external ties.
One indicator of this is the fact that at
the height of the Cultural Revolution, in
forty-odd embassies abroad China only had
one ambassador. The rest had all been called
home in connection with the Cultural Revo-
lution. This situation started to change as
the Cultural Revolution itself began to grind
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S 6158 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE April 23, 1970
towards a halt in late "68 and early '69.
Peking then begun to look cautiously out-
ward again; it began to renew its foreign
policy activities abroad.
Last spring it sent back the first group of
seventeen or so ambassadors: Possibly two
or three may have gone subsequently, All of
these, incidentally, have been professional
diplomats, not Maoist idealegues. Subse-
quently, it has promoted trade in a very
systematic and non-idealogical way, and it
has entered into negotiations with a num-
ber of countries about the possibility of
establishing relations ?Canadians and Ital-
ians. It has also entered into negotiations
with the Russians over border problems, and
most recently has agreed to renew negotia-
tions with us.
Looking at what has happened to China's
foreign relations through this period, I think
the most important and most dramatic
change has been in China's relationship with
the Soviet Union, as a result of the Sam-
Soviet conflict. This conflict, as I am sure
you know, has been developing for years,
from the late '50s on and has escalated step
by step over the years.
The Soviet military build-up around China
has been steadily increasing since about 1965.
certainly since 1967. And finally, last year
as you know, there were some very important
and dangerous border clashes between the
Russians and the Chinese in Manchuria and
in Sinkiang, on the Chinese-laussian border
there. I think It is clear that by last year
the Chinese genuinely feared the possiiblity
of a major war with the Soviet Union, gen-
uinely feared Soviet attack, and were forced
to the conference table by some subtle and
not-so-subtle Soviet threats. They have been
talking in Peking since last fall, but there
Is little sign?in fact, no sign?that the ne-
gotiations have accomplished anything to
date and I suspect that progress will, at best,
be very slow.
The sequence of events, I think, clearly
has led the Chinese to regard the Soviet
Union as a more immediate and more real
threat to Chinese security today than the
U.S., and this is a very fundamental change.
The danger of a Sino-Soviet war is now
Peking's single most important preoccupa-
tion ih foreign policy, in my view, and with-
in China there is a wide range of programs
going on right now that are said to be, and
to an extent doubtless are, preparations for
the possibility of war. This threat hanging
over China has been a subtle factor influ-
encing its foreign relations with almost
everyone else, including ourselves.
So there are number of major factors that
have been impelling Peking to reexamine its
policy: the situation at home, one of uncer-
tainty and considerable fluidity; the need to
rebuild a foreign policy, after a period in
which they had almost no foreign policy and
were very Isolated, during the Cultural
Revolution; the pressure of professionals
concerned with foreign affairs, and certain
other leaders in Peking, to have a degree of
flexibility in rebuilding China's foreign pol-
icy; a new sense of threat from- the Soviet
Union, which I would say is probably the
most important factor; and a feeling, which
I think is valid and is shared by most of the
powers concerned with Asia, that the situa-
tion in Asia is changing, that it is developing
toward a much more multi-polar situation
than in the past, a situation in which there
will be more opportunities for maneuver and
flexibility, and more necessary for it.
So this is the context in which China has
begun to show some signs of increased flexi-
bility. It is still groping. It certainly has' not
yet defined any clear new foreign policy or
foreign policy strategy, but it le groping for
new policies, as we oh our side are doing.
These are, in very crude and simple terms,
some of the facts that have been influeneing
the other side. The U.S. has also, I think,
been undergoing an extremely significant
transition in our attitude towards China.
This has happened fairly gradually and in
sante respects undramatically?so much so
that many Americana don't realize how much
change has taken place.
Throughout the 1950s, U.S. attitudes and
policies toevarde China were extremely hostile
and fearful. We were committed not only to
contain China, but also to isolate it, to keep
is out of the international community, and
to exert as much pressure on China as pos-
sible, in the hope that somehow the regime
would change. I believe change in our at-
titudes began in the U.S. government as early
as the Kennedy administration, but Kennedy
was not able, or did not in any case take
teps to change our policies.
During the Johnson administration there
were some important steps, more important
than many people maize, to redefine our
broad posture toward China. At one point, in
one very important speech, for example.
Johnson actually called for "reconciliation"
between the U.S. and. China, a very different
stance from that we had been committed to
in the '50.s. But during the Johnson admin-
istration there were few concrete steps taken
to translate this change of posture Mtn
change of actual poliey toward China.
The process of making real policy changes
began last summer under the Nixon Repub-
lican administration.
Several factors help to explain this process
of change, / thrak. One is just a gradual cool-
ing, that time has brought about, in the emo-
tions of the 1950s?which reached a peak in
the mid '50s as a result of the Cold War, in
general, and the Korean War, in particular.
A second factor has been a revised view
of China and its potential threat. This is in
part -because oa the Sino-Soviet split. It is
obviously not true that China and the Soviet
Union are today a cohesive, monolithic unit
working against us They are competing
against each other as well as competing
against us.
There are other factors too. Observation
of Chinese foreign policy behavior over
twenty years has indicated to people in and
out of the U. S. government, who have stud-
ied Chinese affairs, that the Chinese have
not been adventurous and irrational. They
have, in fact, been prudent and very cautious
In situations where there has been crisis and
danger.
As a consequence, I think, in 1970 the
"China threat" seems quite different from
what it was in the '50s; and validly so, I
would say. Today there is simply not the
sense of China posing a great, overriding
threat to us, or to the rest of Asia, that
many Americans tended to feel in an earlier
period.
For these and, other reasons, Nixon decided
fairly early in his administration that he was
going to take?or approve?acme small con-
crete policy changes, and he started last sum-
mer. You are all aware of them, I think, but
to remind you, in the middle of last summer
we liberalized travel restrictions as far as
China was concerned, and opened the first
crack in the twenty-year total embargo that
we had imposed on China trade?first by
allowing tourists to buy Chinese goods in
Hong Kong; then last December we took what
was still a small, largely symbolic step but
it is nevertheless significant?we decided to
allow American subsidiaries abroad to trade
with. Communist China, Significantly, there
has been almost no criticism in Congress; or
by the public of these steps; that is a sign,
I think, of the basic change that has oc-
curred in public attitudes.
I have no doubt, myself, that these are
just the first steps in a new direction, and
are not the end of it. I would expect, in the
relatively near future, some further steps,
probably in the trade field?perhaps steps to
open up some direct trade between the
U. S. and China.
Then early this year, we and the Chinese
finally agreed to sit down at Warsaw and
reopen the talks that had lapsed for almost
two years, and we have now had two ses-
sions in rapid succession. I do not know what
took place at either of these meetings. I am
quite impressed, in fact, by how well the
people in the State Department as well as
the Chinese are observing their agreement
not to leak what is going on. I find this
encouraging; it suggests both sides are look-
ing at these talks as serious negotiations
and are not just viewing them as propa-
ganda gambits.
But there are hints, I think, that the U. S.
Government is encouraged by the meetings,
and personally I think it is very possible
that .they will produce some results.
Having said that, let me say that in my
opinion one should not have unrealistic
hopes about large changes in our China rela-
tions rapidly developing out of these talks or
other trends. The legacy of twenty years of
almost no contact, and of intense hostility,
certainly is not going to disappear over night.
At best, steps towards normalization of rela-
tions are going to be slow, and take time.
But I nevertheless think that it is ex-
tremely encouraging that the U. S. has adopt-
ed the stand that it has, and that the
Chinese are showing at least a hint of flexi-
bility. The present administration has said
that we will work towards a normalization
of relations with China; that we will deal
with China on the basis of the same prin-
ciples that underlie our dealings with the
Soviet Union--this is a big change from our
approach in the past?and that we will
focus first of all on small steps that will
improve practical relations. I think this is
an entirely sound, desirable posture and a
desirable general direction for us to move.
There are, of course, some very large ob-
stacles down the road, if we find it possible
to move down this road, before we get to the
point of any real normalization of relations.
Probably the crucial one, and the most dif-
ficult one, is Taiwan. We are committed to
the defense of Taiwan against any military
attack. It is clear that we will, and should,
maintain this commitment. The Chinese
Communists are committed to the ultimate
liberation, recovery, and incorporation of
Taiwan into China. It is clear that they will
maintain this as an objective. So it is a ma-
jor problem. Conceivably, though both sides
might show some tactical flexibility about it.
It is clear that neither can change its basic
position in the years immediately ahead.
The question that we will face as we go down
the road of some mutual compromise is
whether the Taiwan issue can, for a while,
be finessed, can in effect be put aside while
we and the Chinese Communists deal with
other problems and hope that we can make
some progress on them,
In the 1950s, Peking was willing to do this,
and looking back it is clear that it was rigid-
ity and inflexibility on our side that pre-
vented some mutual accommodation in the'
latter 1950s. For the past decade, however,
Peking has had a very rigid and inflexible
view. The question is whether the Chinese
will now be slightly flexible; I think we are
now encouragingly flexible. I am hopeful that
perhaps both sides will be. On the U.S. side,
though, I think it is terribly important that
we not stop with the two or three impor-
tant, but essentially symbolic and no very
large, steps we have taken in adjusting our
policy, but continue taking a number of
other steps.
On some matters, we may well find it pos-
sible to reach agreement with the Chinese at
Warsaw; on others, though, I think we ought
to be prepared to continue taking unilateral
steps on our side, on the assumption, and
in the hope, that over time this will influence
Peking, and will stimulate Peking to take
responsive action, even perhaps parallel ac-
tion.
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...i o?
April 23, 197(. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE S 6159
There are many things that I think we For the indefinite future we will have . how we reform our political institutions.
still need to do. We should not stop, and absolute, unquestioned, overwhelming nu- The Constitution implies and it has been
be pleased with ourselves, because of the clear superiority over China?on the basis of traditionally accepted, that elector qual-
small progress we have made. We should any projection of what the Chinese may be ifieations are within the provinces of the
continue exploring every possible avenue able to do. There is no reason not to proceed
for increased contacts. On this, incidently, on the assumption that our present deter-
several States. Four States have already
thp most practical approach Would be: in- rent against China will be wholly effective in set the voting age below 21.
stead of putting primary stress on trying preventing China from even considering any I am a cosponsor of Senate Joint Res-
to get Americans into China, we should take offensive use of nuclear weapons against Glutton 147, which would lower the voting
every opportunity to invite Chinese to come ' either us or our allies, age by constitutional amendment. This
to meetings and conferences in this coun- Actually, there Is every reason to believe approach provides for review, in the
try. This is going on; the U.S. government is that China's main strategic motive in de- ratification process, by the States with-
f or it. We ought to keep doing it until the veloping nuclear weapons is to try to ac- out affecting, one way or the other, a
Chinese begin to send a few people; then I quire a limited defensive second-strike cepa-
think they will reciprocate and let some bility. That is all they can hope for. They State's right to lower the voting age if
Americans visit China, hope to deter us from considering nuclear that is the desire of its citizens. The Sen-
In trade, I think it is clear?I run con- first-strikes against China. If we insist on ate's action ignores and preempts the
vinced most people in the U.S. Government building an anti-Chinese ABM, in effect rights of the States to determine the age
believe this now?we should move to remove what we will be saying to the Chinese is that at which its citizens shall vote.
all restrictions on nonstrategic trade with we insist on having a total, continuing, one- Another aspect of a lower voting age
China and put China trade on precisely the sided superiority; that we insist on having which has been ignored by the Senate's
same basis as trade with the Soviet Union a total damage-denial capability against action is the whole question of the rights
and Eastern European countries. There is China; that we insist on having a credible
every reason to do this; and no real reason first-strike capability against China; and that and responsibilities of full citizenship.
not to do it. we insist on having the option of threatening Citizenship for an adult American af-
Before very long we =St also readjust our China, without any fear of any kind of a fects more areas than the responsibility
policy on the China seat in the U.N. This is retaliation, for the indefinite future, of casting a ballot.
a terribly complicated subject, and I cannot This is hardly likely, I think, to be re- In most States a minor cannot sign a
deal with it adequately now. My own prefer- assuring to the Chinese about our inten- binding contract, but must have an adult
ence, considering the various alternatives, is tions. I would argue that it runs directly cosigner to an apartment lease or to fl-
for us actively to explore some formula for counter to the main thrust of our new nance an automobile.
"dual representation"; even though Peking China policy, and that is, morever, not neoes-
and Taipei both disapprove of this. I am not sary from any security point of view. We The age at which a num or woman
convinced that it is not possible to work out need, therefore, to make our strategic policy may marry without parental consent dif-
some formula which ultimately they might be and our China policy more consistent than fers from State to State and is frequently
willing to accept. they now are, different for men and women within the
We must also show greater sensitivity than I would argue, therefore, that on this same State.
we have in the past to China's military and issue, at Vienna, when we meet with the A guardian or trustee must be named
strategic fears, and avoid all unnecessary mil- Russians in the SALT talks, our aim should in many States for any person under 21
itary pressures and provocations. To cite one not be to get Sciviet and U.S. agreement to
example, we obviou.sly do not send airplanes build ABMs. We should get U.S. and Soviet who inherits property.
on reconnaissance missions over the Soviet' agreement that neither of us will build anti- The lists of prospective jurors are
Union any more; we rely on satellites. But, China ABMs. drawn from the voter rolls. By extend-
out of Taiwan, there are still such flights over Let me make just one final comment about ing the franchise, we may be automati-
mainland China all the time. It seems to me the overall Asian context of our China policy cally extending the privilege and re-
that, we should rely on satellites for intent- in the '70s. On many respects there is going sponsibility of jury duty from age 21 to
gence about China, as we de about the Soviet to be a new ball-game in the '70s; we are
age 18.
Union and avoid this kind of very provoca- beginning to realize this but have not fully
I do not intend to suggest that any of
-Give action., adjusted to it. Instead of bi-polar confron- these additional rights and responsibili-
EVen in regard to Taiwan, while maintain- tation between two ideologically motivated
ing our defense commitment regarding Tai- sides?a theoretically monolithic Sino-Soviet ties of full, adult citizenship should not
wan?which we can and must?I think we block versus a U.S. with a subordinate, cora- be extended below the age of 21. I do,
can and should make some adjustments in pliant Japan?instead of this, there is going however, suggest that these equally
our policy. We have already made one, inci- to be an increasingly complicated four-power important rights and responsibilities
dentally, which has practically escaped no- relationship and four-power balance, should be considered by the States when
tice. We have virtually abandoned active All four of the major powers involved in they act to lower the voting age or when
patrolling in. the Taiwan Strait. We do not the region?the U.S., Soviet Union, China they consider ratification of a constitu-
need the patrol in the Taiwan Strait. What and Japan?are going to play significant
we need is the Seventh Fleet and our Polaris roles, influential roles. All of them, including tional amendment to lower the voting
Fleet in Asia; we do not need to have ships Japan, I would say, are going to play fairly age.
touringup and down the China coast. We independent and autonomous roles. These corollary rights and responsi-
have virtually stopped doing this, and I think Of the six hi-lateral relationships involved bilities of adult citizenship should not be
this is both significant and desirable, in this four-power balance, it is clear that ignored when considering the voting
However, we should also commit ourselves the one today that is least developed, and yet age, any more than the rights and re-
to remove the limited American military may have the greatest potentialities for at sponsibilities of the States to establish
presence on Taiwan, after Vietnam if not be- least some change in the years immediately the voting age should be ignored as the
fore?but preferably before, if we can. We do ahead, is the U.S.-Ohin.a relationship. If we Senate has done by its action on the
not have a large presence there. It is mainly are wise, we will take the opportunity that we Voting Rights Act.
connected with one air base which serves have now to press ahead as much as we can to
as a refueling station for U.S. planes going see what extent we are able, as the Nixon ad- The Chicago Tribune and the Illinois
to Vietnam. But this is something that cer- ministration has proposed to move toward State Journal have published excellent
tainly is of concern to the Chinese Commu- a normalization of relations with China? editorials on the question of lowering
nists, and something we could do without without any unrealistic wishful thinking the voting age by the means the Senate
reducing our capacity to fulfill our commit- or overoptimistic expectations, but with some
has elected to use. I ask unanimous con-
ment to Taiwan?and something I think basis for the first time in twenty years for
would be desirable, believing that some change may be possible. sent they be printed in the RECORD.
More broadly?and this is very important= , , There being no objection, the edi-
we should take the problem of China policy torials were ordered to be printed in the
fully into account in our general strategic LOWERING OF VOTING AGE RECORD, as follows:
and arms control, policy; this, I would say, we
have not done. The 'key immediate issue is Mr. SMITH of Illinois. Mr. President, [From the Springfield (I11.) State Journal,
Mar. 18, 1970]
whether we should build an anti-Chinese the Senate has taken what is, to my
ABM?a nationwide light area defense. On mind, unduly hasty action in moving to SOUR LEGISLATION: LOWERING OF VOTING
AGE
this the Nixon administration, in my judg- lower the voting age to 18 in all elections
At the moment the United States Senate
Ment?despite the rightness of the direction by mere congressional fiat,
of its general China policy?is quite wrong. appears to be content with its 64-to-17 vote
I hasten to assure Senators that I am passage of the Voting Rights Bill, amended
The arguments against an anti-Chinese ABM,
on political and other grounds, wholly apart not opposed to extending the franchise to to permit 18-year-Old AMOTICRIIS to partic-
from technical grounds, are overwhelming in American citizens below the age of 21. I ipate in elections.
my view, am, however, seriously concerned about- The passage of time might give those who
S
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S 6160 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
voted for the meaeliee some sobering second
thoughts. Senators, even more than the lay
Public, should be well aware that the vot-
ing rights extension it approved simply is
sour legislation.
There are two ti Oubleseine aspects.
As the United States of America pursues
its fight to guarantee all citizens equality of
opportunity, it should not itself project the
image of discriminating against its citi-
zens or states.
Yet the Votng Rights Act does discrim-
inate by singling out a handful of states for
the focus of federal efforts when the prob-
lem is acknowledged to exist in all of them.
It supports its actions on data that in some
instances are six years old. The danger is
that the measure can divide instead of unite
Americans.
Secondly, and perhaps of more immediate
concern, was the Senate's willingness to
tamper with the heart of the mechanisms
that make our republic what it is?con-
stitutional authority that relates to the sep-
aration of powers.
A constitutional method was available to
the Senate to lower the franchise age
through the regular procederes for amend-
ing our basic law.
Instead of using it, the Senate chose.
against the advice of the attorney general
and its own constitutional students--to at-
tempt to interpret the Constitetion en its
own.
There is a disturbing thought that the
leadership of the Senate and a majority of
its members bow to highly emotional pres-
sures of the moment.
That would, of course be too strong a
conclusion to draw from an isolated, ex-
ample. As important as it is, Unfortunately,
there is considerable other evidence.
The leading example is the effort o the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in re-
cent years to establtsh our foreign policy.
Another is the Senate's willingness to ad-
vise at great length in respect to the poli-
tical philosophy that the administration's
nominee for the Supreme Court should
have, but decline consent on the basis of
judicial qualifications.
Or consider for a moment the proposal
by Sen. J. William Fulbright that the Sen-
ate should declare any United States mili-
tary activity in Laos "unconstitutional."
The constitution does not contemplate that
Congress also should double as the judicial
branch of government.
One of the great values of our constitu-
tional process is that it deliberately dis-
courages haste and whimsy, opting instead
for the slower approach that benefits from
national debate and due process of law.
[From the Chicago (Ill.) Tribune
Mar. 16, 19701
THE VOTING AGE IS A STATE MATTES
The United States Senate, by a vote of 64
to 17, has approved an aniendment to the
voting rights bill which would lower the
voting age to 18 in all elections, federal,
state, and local.
Even the author of this proposal, Sen.
Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), the majority
leader, implicitly acknowledged that its con-
stitutionality is doubtful. He said he favored
continued work by is Senate subcommittee
on a proposed constitutional amendment to
lower the voting age. This alternative will be
available if the House refuses to accept the
Senate amendment or if it is enacted and
later held unconstitutional by the courte.
A number of senators challenged the Mans-
field amendment on constitutional grounds,
but the majority apparently was more con-
cerned about the possibility of offending 13
million potential new voters than about the
violence it might do the Constitution or what
is left of the federal principle in our syetem
orgovernment. ?
We favor reduction of the minimum voting
age to 18, but we believe this is a matter
for State action. Kentucky and Georgia al-
ready have lowered the minimum to 18;
Alaska has lowered it to 19, and Hawaii has
lowered it to 20. No federal action is required,
but if it is desired a constitutional amend-
ment is the procedure prescribed by the Con-
stitution itself.
The 15th amendment was adopted to give
Negroes the vote, the 19th to give women
the vote, and the 24th to abolish poll taxes.
Altho conatitutlonal amendments were
deemed necessary in all these cases, the
United States Senate now proposes to ignore
the Constitution in respect to federal legisla-
tion to lower the voting age.
The Constitution is explicit, It provides
that electors of senators and members of
the House of Representatives from each
state "shall have the qualifications requisite
for electors ,of the most numerous branch of
the state legislature." For the election of the
President and Vice President, the Constitu-
tion provides that "each state shall appoint,
in such manner as the legislature thereof
may direct," as meseyeereEttere,,as it has sena-
tors and represgettatives in Congress.
Clearly the the etates, and not Congress,
are empovpIed by the Ctinstitution to pre-
scribe qiiiScations for voting. Supporters
of the ansfleld amendment relied upon the
specio s argument that the 14th amendment
guar tees, among other things, "the equal
pr ectfon of the laws" for all citizens, and
atfhorlzes Congress to enforce its provisions
b "appropriate legislation." Under this au-
ority, Congress, in the voting rights act of
965, denied states the right to require liter-
y tests in English for persons who have
ompleted the sixth grade in another Ian-
uage. The Supreme court, in aKtzenbach
ersus Morgan, upheld this section of the act
s applied to a New York statute which ex-
uded Puerto Ricans, illiterate in English,
m the franchise,
his law, however, was a determination by
ress that English literacy tests deny "the
protection of the laws" to citizens who
rate in another language. It does not
h
om te Supreme court's decision
Ste la,w classifying citizens by age
rposes is discriminatory. If that
an qualification whatsoever
iaatory, for some could vote
of.
Co
equ
are li
follow,
that a s
for voting
were the ca
would be disc
and others coul
A dissenting onion by Justice John M.
Harlan, who was )pined by Justice Potter
Stewart, upheld New' ork's literacy test law.
It said the act of Col ess could not be sus-
tained "except at the sh?flce of fundamen-
tals in the American con tktutional system?
the separation between ikie legislative and
judicial function and th boundaries be-
tween federal and state pol ical authority."
An attempt by Congress to surp the right
of the states to determine the minimum age
for voting would do far great r violence to
the constitutional system.
OVERPOPULATION A D
POLLUTION
Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Preside t, as we
move into the last third of the 20th
century, it has become drama cally clear
that the danger we .fkce fy6m the de-
struction of the habitat ?d life support
systems of man by overpopulation and
pollution of all kinds is as great as that
from nuclear holocaust.
The danger involved in the technology
of progress and abundance was evident
in the development of DDT and other
long-lasting pesticides which proved ex-
tremely effective for lighting crop pests
and diseases, but also proved to nave
other unwanted and deadly impact on
4,?
April 23, 1970
other parts of the environment by
spreading through the soil and waters
and into the air to the farthest reaches
of the world.
Polluted air and waters damage the
quality of the present and destroy the
promise of the future. We face the pm-
sibility of being inundated with the bot-
tles, cans, jars, and other packaging cast-
offs of a consumer society.
But recognition of the problem has
begun to grow. Yesterday, April 22, was
Earth Day, and its celebrations and ob-
servances did much to build greater
awareness of the need to carve out new
priorities dedicated to humanity, liv-
ability and quality, rather than just more
progress, bigness and abundance.
Kenneth E. Boulding, professor of
economics and director of social and eco-
nomic research for the Institute of Be-
havioral Science at the University of
Colorado, in the April 1970 issue of the
Progressive magazine which is devoted
entirely to environmental articles, calls
for a nonpolitical systems approach to
the problems of the environment. He
says:
We need a new image of the total dynamics
of the social system more realistic than those
provided by ideologies either of the right or
of the left.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that this fine article, entitled "No
Second Chance for Man," which outlines
the framework within which efforts to
improve the environment must take
place, be printed in the RECORD.
No SECOND CH ANCE POE MAN
(By Kenneth E. Boulding)
One of the agreeable things about the
young of any generation is that they tend
to think that they invented the world, and it
is this indeed that keeps the world fresh. It is
likewise a strong sign of being over sixty
that one points out, niech to the distress of
the young, that a greai deal of what is hap-
pening has happened before. The current
excitement about the environment in par-
ticular is at least the third peak of interest
in this particular issue in this century.
Excitement about the environment seems
to have a generation cycle of some thirty
years. The first major peak in this country
was at the turn of the century, associated -
particularly with Governor Gifford Pinchot,
America's first professional forester, Theodore
Roosevelt, and the first conservation move-
ment, which gave us the Bureau of Recla-
mation and expanded the National Park send
Forest. System. The second peak was in the
1930s, with the dust bowl and the great dust
storm of 1934, in which noticeable portions
of the Great Plains landed on the steps of
the Capitol in Washington, and this pro-
duced the Soil Conservation Act, contour
plowing, and all that.
It is not wholly surprising, therefore, that
another generation has discovered that the
world is not wholly indestructible. Now it is
perhaps air rather than soil, and cities rather
than forests, which have created the anxiety,
but the anxiety is of course quite legitimate.
There it; nothing in the proposition that
something has happened before to argue
against its happening now. It is possible,
however, to get a certain perspective on what
is happening now, and perhaps also to avoid
certain mistakes, if we see it as part of the
much larger process.
We probably know more about the eco-
nomics of the environment, surprisingly
enough, than about its biology and physics.
One of the real problems of the present crisis
is that we know so little about the earth as
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1 23, 1970' CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 6145
providing publicity and special programs
to focus attention on the role of the sec-
retary. Today, as Secretaries Week draws
to a close, I call upon the Congress to join
me in recognition of the vital part played
by secretaries in government, business,
education, and the professions.
The year 1970 marks the 19th annual
observance of Secretaries Week, which
was initiated in 1952 by the National
Secretaries Association, in cooperation
with the U.S. Department of Commerce.
This year, extra emphasis was placed on
the responsibilities of secretaries to their
employers and their profession. To this
end, many have taken part in secretarial
seminars, providing a forum for consid-
eration of these matters. I extend my
warmest congratulations to the National
Secretaries Association for the successful
completion of this week of celebration
and discussion, and to the secretaries
themselves for their continued commit-
ment to the betterment of our society.
SENATOR SPONG STRESSES NEED
FOR ONGOING ENVIRONMENTAL
CONCERN IN EARTH DAY
SPEECHES
Mr, SPONG. Mr. President, it has been
my privilege to speak at four Virginia
institutions of higher learning this week
in connection with programs marking
the observance of Earth Day.
I have discussed the need to improve
the quality of our environment in talks
at the University of Virginia, at Char-
lottesville; Mary Baldwin College, at
Staunton; Christopher Newport College,
at Newport News, and Old Dominion
University, at Norfolk.
The response of the audience was grat-
ifying. The younger generation is aware
of the extent of pollution problems. I
hope, however, that the present zeal for
Improving the quality of our environ-
ment is not a passing fad. In my talks
to Virginia college students, I stressed
that pollution abatement and control
must be an ongoing mission. It has taken
generations to befoul our environment.
It cannot be cleaned up with a wave of
a wand.
Our knowledge about some aspects of
pollution is still primitive. Additional re-
search is necessary -if we are to develop
the factual information necessary to
achieve progress.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that my remarks at a public seminar
at Old Dominion University be printed
In the RECORD.
There being no objection, the remarks
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
a4 follows:
REMARKS BY U.S. SENATOR WILLIAM B.
SPONG, JR.
Our contemporary culture, primed by pop-
ulation growth and driven by technology,
has created problems of environmental deg-
radation that directly affects all of our
senses. One doesn't need to be a scientist
to realize that. He need only to use his eyes,
ears and nose.
Henry Thoreau foresaw the trend more
than 125' years ago. In writing about ma-
chines, he said: "They insult nature. Every
machine or particular application, seems- a
slight outrage against universal laws. How
many fine inventions are there which do not
clutter the ground."
Even before the days of Thoreau man was
misusing the environment to assimilate his
waste products. And until relatively a few
years ago, there was no evidence of any
adverse effects. In the process of trans-
forming matter into energy through com-
bustion, and of synthesizing new products
through chemistry, man has used the air
and water as dumping grounds for his wastes.
In achieving technological progress and sci-
entific breakthroughs, man has modified his
environment. At first, the changes were in-
significant because there were no major con-
centrations of population, and untamed
frontiers were abundant. No one was par-
onal fish
od stream was only
smoke from a factory
e, it wasn't too difficult
eaner area nearby.
an until very recently has ac-
ion as the price of technological
is laissez faire policy was ques-
when the scientific community
ning that man was pouring wastes
nvironment at a rate faster than
ticularly concerned over
kill because another
a few miles away
became bothers
to escape to a
In short?
cepted poll
progress. T
tioned on
began wa
into the
nature c. uld reprocess them. The evidence
that man was exceeding nature's assimilative
capacity s owed up in the form of polluted
rivers; alg. -covered lakes and smog-laden
atmosphere.
In the Uni d States we are pouring carbon
monoxide, sul r oxides and other potenti-
ally dangerous .ollutants into the atmos-
phere at a rate o 142 million tons per year.
Our garbage gr. h exceeds our popula-
tion growth. It has 'een estimated that an
average of 5.3 pound of solid waste is col-
lected per person per d That is more than
190 tons per year. By 19 some 235 million
people are expected to be enerating eight
pounds per person per day. hat would be
310 million tons per year. Thee gures cover
only those wastes that are han. ed by col-
lection agencies. Overall, the nati.. is gen-
erating about 10 pounds per person .er day
oT household, commercial and in trial
wastes. In addition, about seven m ion
motor vehicles are junked annually in e
United States. More than three-fourths
them may be salvaged in varying degrees, bu
the excess contributes to an accumulation of
abandoned vehicles that has been estimated
at from nine million to 161/2 million.
Even the oceans, our last frontier, have
not been spared. Back in about 1675, the
Governor of New York, Edmund Andros, is-
sued a decree prohibiting the dumping of
dirt or refuse "or anything to fill up ye
harbor or among ye neighbors or neighboring
shores under penalty of forty shillings."
Nearly 300 years later we are still having
problems with the disposal of the same type
of wastes, and we have essentially the same
type of control measures.
Unfortunately, the problems have been
compounded by the extensive population
growth extending from Boston to Norfolk.
Because the land is covered with people,
spaee has largely been exhausted for landfill
operations. Incineration causes air pollution
difficulties, so the wastes of this urban mega,'
lopolis is being dumped on the continental
shelf.
The total amount of solid wastes being
dumped into the ocean from the New York
Metropolitan region alone, spread uniformly
over Manhattan Island, would form a layer
six inches thick each year. Viewed in another
way, the discharge amounts to about one ton
per person per year.
But New York csn't the only area that has
restorted to sea disposal. The Corps of Engi-
neers recently reported that 22 sites were
used for waste disposal in the ocean between
Boston and the mouth of Chesapeake Bay.
A research oceanographer who testified
before the Subcommittee on Air and Water
Pollution only last month said "knowledge
of the effects of these waste disposal opera-
tions on the ocean is at best sketchy and
completely absent for many areas and types
of wastes."
It has been assumed that materials dredged
from New York Harbor and hauled to the
ocean for dumping consists primarily of
clean sands, and that sewage sludges gen-
erated at waste treatment plants is just an-
other form of manure. But the oceanog-
rapher said data he has collected indicate
that this is far from the case for many wastes.
For example, he said dredged materials in
many parts of the harbor contains large
amounts of sewage solids and are soaked with
chemicals, including petroleum and petro-
chemicals. Sludges contain high concentra-
tions of metals known to be toxic to marine
organisms.
Wastes introduced into coastal waters may
travel for long distances. The expanse of
water between southern Massachusetts and
Cape Hatteras is essentially a single unit, and
currents generally move from the north to
the south.
A little-known provision of the recently-
enacted Water Quality Improvement Act will
remedy the situation insofar as dumping is
concerned for the first three miles offshore.
The statute requires federal permittees and
licensees to obtain from state water pollution
control agencies a certificate of reasonable
assurance that they will not violate appli-
cable water quality standards. It would seem
desirable to me to consider international
agreements limiting the dumping of wastes,
or an extension of our sovereignty further
out to sea.
Oil spills present equally serious problems.
In just 30 years, seaborne oil commerce has
increased ten-fold. Moreover, the size of tank-
ers is increasing at a dramatic rate. The
Torrey Canyon was one of the ten largest
tankers in the world three years ago when
it went aground with 118,000 tons of crude
oil. Its size soon will be run-of-the-mill.
Nearly 200 tankers of more than 200,000 tons
have been ordered by shipping companies in
recent years, and ships of 500,000 tons capac-
ity are being designed.
The pollution potential from collisions and
accidental groundings are enormous. More-
over, the largest number of accidents occur
close to shore or in ports?areas that Ire-
uently are of greatest economic, nutritional
d aesthetic importance to mankind.
ollution from shipping is only part of the
p blem. Offshore drilling rigs also pose a
th at, as was dramatized by the Santa Bar-
bar episode. The number of wells drilled
arm ally off the continental United States
has ore than doubled in the past decade.
Expl. ration is underway or planned in waters
off 5 countries of the world.
It as been estimated that a minimum of
a mi ion tons of oil a year is spilled, flushed
or 1 ked in oil operations. Half the sea-
food of the world comes from one-tenth of
one per cent of the area of the sea, pri-
ma ly the coastal areas which are most sub-
je to pollution.
hese are the results of a society that
as become a virtual slave to technology.
Fortunately, an increasingly large segment
of the American public has come to realize
that instead of devoting ourselves exclu-
sively to the development of new things
which. are assumed to be better becauee
they are bigger or operate faster, we must
consider whether something new is worth-
while in terms of the total context of the
environment.
This will necessitate a change in values
by consumers as well as the obvious sources
of pollution. After all, productivity is gov-
erned by demand. Many environmental acti-
vists want the "good life," but they also
want bigger and better color Tir sets, more
powerful automobiles, and throw-away pack
aging that isn't readily degradable.
Industry, on the other hand, must act re-
sponsibly. It must find ways of producing
without polluting. Industry must act re-
gardless of whether It costs more and re-
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S 6146 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE A
gardless of how the increased cost IA ab-
sorbed. In the Words of one corporate exe-
cutive, "Industry will adapt voluntarily to
the imperatives of environmental conserva-
tion, or ultimately it will be forced to do
so."
The eountry's population growth and the
pattern of its distribution will require
ebangeS in present-day attitudes. In George
Washington's day the population of the
country was less than four million. We
passed the 100 milion mark ill 1915, the 200
million mark in 1968, and by the year 2000
we will reach 300 million. But to see the
situation in its true perspective one must
examine where the growth has occurred. In
the early days of the country there were only
about 320,000 persons living in what we
know as cities. Today, mere than 140 mil-
lion Americans-70 per cent of our betel
population?are crowded on two per cent of
the land. If the present trend continua; for
another 25 years, 100 million additional peo-
ple will be stacked on top of the 140 million
already living in our cities and suburbs
In considering the nation's population
growth We must recognize that quality of
life is related to quantity. Man obviously
is highly adaptable. We have survived many
environmental changes. But until we learn
more about ourselves and can use our krmwl-
edge to ensure lives of happiness and ful-
fillment for all our citizens, corstrol of popu-
lation must be a high-priority national goal.
We also must exercise better management
of our resources of land, air and water. This
necessarily will involtPe more anti-pollution
research, more controls and more money.
Congress has been seeking solutions for sev-
eral years to the problems involved in re-
claiming the environment. Admittedly, most
of our progress has been achieved in the past
live or six years. The 'mile tools for control
of air arid water pollution are already on
the statute books. They no doubt will be
strengthened.
For example, there is need for better con-
trols over the use of pesticides, particularly
the persistent chlorinated hydrocarbons. The
present federal administrative machinery to
abate pollution is fragmented and should be
modernized. Federal authority to control
emissions from-motor vehicles ehould be ex-
panded to include other modes of transpor-
tation.
Each of the areas r have discussed today
presents separate problems. They are not
simple by any meane. Several include highly
complex economic inlEsues which?if we are
to act responsibly?must be telniges into ac-
count.
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LAIRD
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, an editorial
In the April 22 Washington Post, entitled
"Secretary Laird on Strategic Arms,"
characterizes Secretary of Defense
Laird's address on Monday, April 20, as
"disjointed and indifferently argued." It
then brings up specific points from this
speech which appear out of tune with the
writer's views?but ends up with the con-
clusion "Secretary Laird has somehow
given a persuasive aims control speech."
It is surprising how a "disjointed, indif-
ferently argued" speech can be described
as "persuasive" unless, perhaps, there
was more to the speech than the Post
editorial chooses to discuss.
From the phrases "perhaps with Less
design" and "he did not think it imPled
what we did," it is intimated that this
speech was not meant to be pertinent to
arms control, but just turned out that
way. Rather, the Post seems to assume
that the Secretary's speech was lust a
rationale for current U.S. weapons pro-
grams. For example, the Post says Laird's
address-- .
focused on the gains the Soviets have made
In strategic nuclear weapcinry in the past
five years and concluding from this the ne-
cessity for our presieeding With. . . MIRV
and SAFEGUARD.
-
Is that really the message which Sec-
retary Laird was - delivering? I submit
that a much more pertinent conclusion
could be taken from the following section
of his speech: .;
The Soviets have a momentum going both
in strategic._ weal/eels deployments and in
steategic weapons developments. If their
etrategic posture meld be expected to stay
at the operationally deployed posture which
exists today, I believe we would have a toler-
able situation. What must concern us, how-
ever, is the momentum the Soviets have es-
sablished both in deployments and develop-
ments and where that momentum may carry
While the editorial does use the middle
sentence to point out that our posture
today . appears adequate, it completely
ignores the other two, which are dis-
cussed at length in the Secretary's
speech. From reading the full speech, it
appears obvious that this issue of mo-
rnentum--not past actions by the So-
viets?was the major reason for the
Secretary's conclusion that MIRV and
Safeguard should proceed. This con-
clusion is supported, by other sections of
the Secretary's spdech, such as "in the
mid-to-late 1970's -we would no longer be
able to rely" and "pending a successful
outcome in the Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Talks, therefore, prudence dictates
that we Must continue our approved pro-
gram te MIRV current forces" and "this
is why we must also, at the very least,
preserve an option to defend a portion of
our land-based retaliatory forces."
- Although we could accept a misinter-
pretation of the rationale put forward by
Secretary Laird and perhaps ascribe It to
a careless reading of his remarks, an-
other section of the editorial is much
more bothersome. One wonders what the
Post suggests when it says:
And the more horrendous one makes the
Soviet potential appear in both technologies.
the more feeble one's own argument becomes
for development of the U.S. counterweapon?
especially when one is, like Secretary Laird,
endeavoring to stress the magnitude of So-
viet threat and the relative modesty of our
own response.
This sentence conveys a clear message
to me?which is that we should roll over
and do nothing in the face of this Soviet
momentum. I suggest that this is one of
the reasons, perhaps the major reason,
why Secretary Laird is voicing his con-
cern?that is, for the past 5 years we
have been, in his words, virtually in neu-
tral gear. Apparently, we should do even
less, now that the Soviets are in high
gear. I for one cannot accept this rea-
soning as a proper or acceptable philos-
ophy for the United States.
It appears to me that Secretary Laird
has made a rather cogent case for the
current U.S. position, and that rather
than being disjointed, his address is a
valid explanation of the situation we
face. From my reading of the speech.
this position appears as follows:
First. We are concerned about the
7 23, 1970
momentum behind the Soviet strategic
baldup, and where that momentum will
place them vis-a-vis the United States
in the future unless we take offsetting
actions or get a meaningful early agree-
ment in SALT.
Second. The current strategic situa-
tion is not intolerable but could become
so unless the United States takes steps to
offset this Soviet momentum. These steps
are geared to what can happen, rather
than what has happened.
Third. The steps we have planned are
negotiable at SALT and that is the Place
to resolve these issues.
Fourth. Pending success at SALT, we
should not abandon these plans because
we have no indication that the Soviet
Union intends to slow down this momen-
tum.
Fifth. We are serious in our approach
to, and hopeful for success in, SALT.
Thus, I agree that "Secretary Laird
has somehow given a persuasive arms
control speech," but not, as the Post
would have us believe, by accident. I be-
lieve he pointed out with excellent rea-
soning our approach to SALT, our con-
cern about Soviet programs, and our
desire--which I share?to resolve these
issues at the conference table with the
Soviets, rather than ignoring the other
side of the strategic equation.
I ask unanimous consent that the Post
editorial and the text of Secretary
Laird's speech be printed in the lascoma
There being no objection, the items
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD.
as follows:
SECRETARY LAIRD ON STRATEGIC ARMS
In San Francisco, in 1967, Secretary Mc-
Namara announced the Johnson administra-
tion's decision to go ahead with the Sentinel
anti-ballistic missile system at the end of
a long speech which had consisted mainly
of arguments for not doing so: the facts he
adduced simply pointed in a different direc-
tion from the conclusion he was to reach.
Something similar happened?perhaps with
less design--at a luncheon of the Associated
Press on Monday, when Secretary Laird de-
livered an 18-page address focused on the
gains the Soviets have made in strategic nu-
clear weaponry over the past five years and
concluding from this the necessity for our
proceeding with both the scheduled deploy-
ment of MIRVs in June and the (limited)
Phase IS deployment of the Safeguard ABM.
It was a disjointed, indifferently argued
speech and presumably il, was meant to put
pressure on the Soviets in Vienna and the
congressional critics at borne. But a clone
reading yields up another, unexpected result.
For even those of us who did not oppose the
President's ABM program last year sindiwho
are willing to acknowledge that summary,
across-the-board arms agreements have their
dangers and impracticalities must concede
that Secretary Laird's Monday rationale for
going ahead with MIRV and the ABM con-
stitutes----despite itself? one of the most
cogent arguments we have yet heard for a
nuclear weapons deployment freeze. His own
solutions, on the other hand, have only the
most tangential relationseip to the problem
he describes.
The point is not facetious and it does not
rest on either a disbelief as the Soviet prog-
ress Secretary Laird has cited or a senti-
mental hope that our conflict with the So-
viets can be called off by joint communique.
Rather, what the secretary's speech revealed
with a special clarity was the built-in illogic
of the position which must argue simultane-
ously the case for MIRY (which is designed
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April 23, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SEN ATE
to penetrate an ABM) and for an ABM (which
is designed to defend against a force which
has been MIRVed). And the more horren-
dous one makes the Soviet potential ap-
pear in both technologies, the more feeble
one's own argument becomes for develop-
ment of the U.S. counter-weapon--especially
when one is, like Secretary Laird, endeavor-
ing to stress the magnitude of Soviet threat
and the relative modesty of our own re-
sponse. In this connection the point might
also be made that it is not quite accurate to
describe the Soviets' effort as having been in
"high gear" as compared with our own hav-
ing been in "neutral" 'since 1965 "in both
deployment and development of strategic
nuclear weapons." While it is true that we
have diminished our megatonnage, reduced
the size of our bomber force and held to
fixed numbers of land-based ICBMs arid sea-
based ballistic missiles, the development of -
MIRV?as the secretary himself observes?
points to a massive multiplication of the nu-
clear warheads we will have available.
But we are not of a mind to argue with the
secretary so much as we are to ponder the
implications of much of what he said?even
though he did not think it implied what we
did. Secretary Laird, in his posture statement
a While back acknowledged that the Soviet
ICBM buildup, if it continued at the present
rate, could make the planned Safeguard ABM
obsolete in short order. In this address, while
he argues the urgency of our proceeding
with sea-based MIRVs as a hedge against a
pre-emptive strike that would do in our
bomber and land-based missile force,--he also
warns against the danger of depending solely
on submarine-based missilry. He does not
make a persuasive case that either the pro-
gress of the Soviet ABM or the progress of
the Soviet MIRV requires the deployment
of our own MIRVs in two months, any' ihore
than he indicates that the Safeguard system
will be adequate to the threat that may
materialize. And as to the figures he provides
on the Soviet ICBM development in the past
five years, what the secretary characterizes
as a Soviet attempt to "change the balance
of power" turns out by his own account to
be more like a Soviet attempt to create one:
"The United States then, unlike the situa-
tion today, clearly occupied a superior posi-
tion." We still do, of course, despite the
gigantic efforts of the Soviets over the past
five years. But the figures laid out by Mr.
Laird suggest that the point may have been
reached now when the much talked of nu-
clear w'eapons deployment freeze would in
fact be in our common interest. As he him-
self put it while warning of the dangers
ahead, "If their strategic posture could be
expected to stay at the operationally de-
ployed posture which exists today, I believe
We would' have a tolerable situation."
Whether or not some kind of freeze is in
order is up to Mr. Nixon's negotiators to ex-
plore. Meanwhile, Secretary Laird's speech,
as part of a tactical approach to the Soviets
may Or may not be of practical value. Else-
where In his text the secretary observes that
arms, as such, are not the cause of an arms
race: "The fundamental driving force in
an arms race is what one country perceives as
possible objectives of another country's ac-
tions." That, like much of the rest of what
Mr. Laird told the A. P. luncheon, is classical
arms Control dogma?only his perspective
on its was a bit one-sided. What makes
addresses like Seenetary Laird 's a bit chancy
just now and the deployments he has in
mind questionable is precisely that?how our
objectives will be perceived?apart from
whatever they actually are. As we said, Secre-
tary Laird has somehow given a persuasive
arms control speech, better in fact that those
we have listened to in recent days and weeks
by acknowledged opponents of what he is
supporting.
ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE MELVIN R. LAIRD,
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
I was particularly pleased when your
President, Paul Miller of Gannett News-
papers, called me on a Saturday morning
several months ago to invite me to speak to
the Annual Luncheon of the Associated
Press on the subject of the strategic bal-
ance. I told him that I regarded this forum
as particularly appropriate to express my
views on the need to make available to the
American people additional information re-
garding national security.
When I assumed office 15 months ago, I im-
mediately established as a top priority goal
the restoration of credibility in the Depart-
ment of Defense. Since then we have at-
tempted to follow President Nixon's stated
desire to make more information available to
the American people.
The editors of the Associated Press and
all members of the communications media
in this country have a deep interest in this
subject. I pledge to you that we shall con-
tinue to -devote maximum attention to re-
ducing and hopefully eliminating overclas-
sification in the Department of Defense. And,
we will provide all the information we can
within the limits of national security, con-
sistent with the safety and legal rights of
our Citizens.
This open news policy has brought about
significant progress in at least five major
areas where information was previously with-
held from the American people.
1. Previous policy was to restrict public
discussion of Prisoner of War matters. Pres-
ent policy is to foster public discussion
and to focus worldwide attention on the
plight of our prisoners of war in order to
gain humane treatment for them and to ob-
tain their release.
2. Previous policy was to withhold from
the 'public information on chemical warfare
and biological research matters. Present pol-
icy is to keep the public informed about
our new policies in these two areas, the rea-
sons for these new policies, and the steps
being taken to implement them.
3. Previous practices on reporting the costs
Of major weapons systems led to a major
credibility problem in the Department of
Defense. Our new policy of full disclosure on
major weapons costs will help to restore the
Department's credibility and will assist us
in gaining better control of costs and in
developing better management practices.
4. For several years, the American people
were denied knowledge about our activities
in Laos. Today, the American people are be-
ing informed about what we are doing and
what we are not doing in Laos.
5. In the past, overuse of classification de-
nied to the American people pertinent in-
formation on the nature and scope of the
strategic nuclear threat. In my view, there
is still too much classification, but we have
tried and will continue to make more and
more information available on this subject
which is so crucial for the future security of
our country.
In my remarks today I will attempt to
shed more light on the crucial subject of the
strategic threat. In particular, I want to dis-
cuss with you editors the nature and scope
of the growing Soviet threat, recognizing full
well that, in Vietnam, our negotiators have
just begun round two of the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks, commonly called SALT.
I hope for success at SALT. I want to em-
phasize that point. I also want to emphasize
that our top military leadership hopes for
success at SALT. Where the security of the
United States is involved, it is this objec-
tive?insuring national security?which is
most important. A lower-cost means to
achieve that objective, lower compared to
what otherwise may be required,?if it can
be achieved within tolerable risks?is ob-
S 6147
viously most desirable to all Americans, civil-
ian and military.
The budget we have recommended to Con-
gress for the next fiscal year demonstrates
how deeply the Nixon Administration is com-
mitted to progress at SALT. We have called
this year's defense budget a traditional
budget. It is transitional because in terms
of military capability, it is basically a status
quo, stand-pat budget. We have postponed
basic national security decisions in the
strategic field in order to give maximum op-
portunity for SALT to be successful, and to
foster a meaningful beginning for the era of
negotiation President Nixon and the Ameri-
can people seek.
The objective of the Nixon Administration
is to restore and maintain peace. With re-
gard to SALT, the President's actions and
words document this Administration's accent
on negotiation rather than confrontation.
In my Defense Report to Congress in Feb-
rurary, I expressed concern that the United
States, by the mid-1970's, could find itself in
a second-rate strategic position with regard
to the future security of the Free World.
Today, in keeping with our policy of maxi-
mum information, I intend to present addi-
tional reasons for this concern.
It is important to discuss the growing
strategic threat because it is essential for the
American people to understand the complex
issues involved, if we are to insure our na-
tional security interests through the decade
of the 1970's. The American people need to
understand the reasons President Nixon is
pursuing the course he has recommended in
this year's transitional budget.
As Secretary of Defense, I must face the
fact that we are taking a risk by postponing
hard decisions which the increasing Soviet
threat poses for us. I recognize that in the
interests of lasting peace, some risks must be
taken. But, it is my judgment that as the
American people are provided additional in-
formation, such as we are discussing here to-
day, they will agree that we are literally at
the edge of prudent risk. And the inescapable
conclusion will be that if the Soviet strategic
offensive buildup continues, the risk to our
nation will become too great to sustain
without major offsetting actions.
Therefore, what I particularly want to
focus on today is the basic asymmetry be-
tween what the United States has been do-
ing and what the Soviet Union has been do-
ing in the field of strategic nuclear weapons
in recent years.
In a word, for the past five years, the
United States has virtually been in neutral
gear in the deployment of strategic offensive
forces, while the Soviet Union has moved
into high gear in both deployment and de-
velopment of strategic nuclear weapons. In
the 1965-67 time period, the United States
decided on a level of strategic nuclear forces,
including Multiple Independently Targeted
Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), which was
deemed adequate to preserve our deterrent
posture for the threat of the 1970's which
was projected then. No basic change has
been made in the force level decisions estab-
lished in the mid-1960's.
The Soviet Union, by contrast, has en-
gaged in a major effort since 1965 to change
the balance of power. The United States
then, unlike the situation today, clearly oc-
cupied a superior position.
Except for the minimum "hedge" that
SAFEGUARD will provide, we have not re-
sponded to the Soviet strategic offensive
buildup with new deployment programs. We
did not respond in past years because the
United States deliberately chose to assume
that the Soviet buildup at most was aimed
at achieving a deterrent posture comparable
to that of the United States. We have not
responded this year because, as I have said,
we fervently hope that SALT can render
such a response unnecessary.
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S 6148 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
As much as we might wish it otherwise,
however, we must concentrate our attention
on what the Soviet Union is actually doing.
In the current situation of a diminishing
U.S. deterrent and Soviet momentum, we
simply cannot ba M our plans and programs
on what we hope the Soviet Union may do
either unilaterally or In SALT. The Soviets
have a momentum going both in strategic
weapons deployments and in strategic weap-
ons developments. If their strategic posture
could be expected to stay at the operation-
ally deployed posture which exists today, I
believe we would have a tolerable situation.
What must concern us, however, is the ma-
mentem the Soviets have established both
in deployments and developments and where
that momentum may carry them.
Let me explain in more detail the basic
problem.
The most crucial aspect of national se-
curity Is the strategic balance IsetWeen
tions that have competing interests in the
world. The strategic balance has a direct
effect on relations between the superpowers.
It has an indirect effect on other nations both
In terms of their own relations with each
other and in terms Of their relations with
the superpowers. As one example, a situation
of clear superiority on the part of the Soviet
Union would have profound implications for
any future political or military confronta-
tion between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
In fact, a clear strategic superiority on the
part of the Soviet Union would affect our
interests and our obligations throughout the
world.
In our continuing debate on defense mat-
ters, it has been said many times ths,t the
driving force behind the so-called strategic
arms race is the "action-reaction" phenom-
enon. The recent ABM-MIttV discussions
in this country illustrate this. The argu-
ment is made, for instance, that the deploy-
ment of defensive missiles by one side tends
to generate increased offensive deployments
by the other side.
I certainly agree that one side's actions
definitely can influence what the other side
does. But just as Weapons in themselves are
not the cause of wars, neither are a coun-
try's actions in weapons deployment- in
themselves?the driving force in a so-called
arms race. The fundamental driving force in
an arms race Is what one country perceives
as possible objectives of another country's
actions.
Let me explain it this way. Our goal is a
stable peace. Our strategic policy to achieve
that goal is deterrence. As publicly stated,
the basic .rationale for United States weap-
ons deployment in the strategic field has
been Mel remains deterrence. Our actions of
the past several years underscore the fact
that deterrence is our funceamental police
and that we seek no more than a posture
of effeetive deterrence..
Because we in the United States seek a
posture Of deterrence to protect our interests
and those of Our allies, we obviously could
recognize as legitimate a Soviet desire for
a comparable deterrent to protect its in-
terests.
I knave that the actions of the Soviet
Union in recent years have raised questions
in the minds of some of you editors and
others about the true objectives they are
pursuiag.
As I have said many times, I do not believe
that it is appropriate for me, as Secretary of
Defense, to attempt to assess the strategic
intentions of another country. However,
under my responsibilities, I must be con-
cerned about present and potential strategic
capabilities.
You representatives of a free press under-
stand fully the national security price an
open society must pay when competing with
adversaries who cloak their plans in secrecy
and attempt to hide both their objectives
and their hardware behind the mantle of a
closed society. The whole world knows what
we in the United States have and what we
plan in the national security field. Mean-
ingful essentials :are laid bare in an open
forum?in official statements, in Congres-
sional,hearings, in the give and take of Con-
gressional hearings, in the give and take of
Congressional and public debate and in the
reports of a, free and competitive press. e
Would not have it any other way.
Let me emphasize again my conviction
that the American people have a right to
know even more than has been available in
the past about matters which affect their
safety and security. There has been too
much classification in this country. In par-
ticular, too match has been withheld in the
past about what has been going on in the
closed societies of the Soviet Union and
Comniunist China.
As we all pray for success in Vienna, let
me point out that, in my view, the Ameri-
can people will support an arms limitation
agreement only if they are confident they
have the relevant facts about the strategic
balance.
The facts I am about to present are not
taken from external Soviet discussions of
their strategic forces. They do not come
from press conferences in Moscow, from
testimony In the Kremlin, from news stories
in Pravda, or from published annual De-
fense Reports by Marshal Grechko.
Rather, the information I am presenting
to you is based on our own observations of
what the Soviets are doing?and on our
belief that this information and, these facts
should not be witInaeld from the American
people and should be made available to
others in the world.
Let us examine whet has happened in the
past five years to shift the relationship be-
tween U.S. and Soviet strategic forces and to
provide an accelerated momentum to the
Soviets in the strategic field:
In 1965, the Soviet Union had about 220
launchers for the relatively old-fashioned
missiles?SS-43's, SS-7's and 85-B's? some-
what similar to our TITAN. We had 54
TITANs in the inventory at that time.
Today, these two forces remain essentially
the same. So in this category of old-fashioned
multimegeton weapons the Soviets had and
still maintain a better than 4-1 advantage.
In 1965, the Soviet Union had no relative'y
small ICBM launchers comparable to our
MINUTEMAN, By 1965, we had 880 MINUTE-
MAN missiles aperaltional and had established
that the total force level for MINUTEMAN
would be 1,000 launchers. In the 1965-67 time
period, the United States finalized plans eo
convert a portion of the established MINUTE-
MAN force to a 1VGRV MINUTEMAN III con-
figuration.
Today, the Soviet Union has over 800 such
launchers operatiorial, and a projected force
that could exceed 1,000 launchers within the
next two years. These launchers include both
the SS-11 and 55-13 missiles. Concurrently,
flight testing of an improved 8S-11 missile
continues. Thus, at present construction
rates, the Soviets will achieve parity in
MINUTEMAN-type :launchers within the next
two years or to and could move into a sub-
stantial lead in this category by the mid-
1970's if they continue to deploy these mis-
siles. The previously scheduled U.S. program
to MIRV a substaneial part of MINUTEMAN
continues in progress.
In 1965, there were no operational launch-
ers for the large Soviet 88-9 missile which, in
its single warhead version, can carry up to
25 megatons.
Today, I can report to you that there are
some 220 SS-9's operational with at least 60
more under construction. Testing of an 8e-9
multiple reentry tehicle?the triplet ver-
sion?continues. The U.S. has no oounterpart
to this program involving large missiles. So,
1 23, 1970
in this area, the Soviet.: have and will main-
tain a monopoly.
In 1965, neither a depressed trajectory
ICBM nor a Fractional Orbital Bombardment
System existed in either the Soviet or U.S.
inventory.
Today, the Soviets have tested both con-
figurations an could ]'save an operational
version already deployed. The United Steles
has developed nothing comparable to these
systems.
In 1965, the Soviet Union had about 25
launchers for SubmarinesLaunched Ballistic!
Missiles (SLBMs) on nuclear submarines.
and about 80 more on diesel submarines.
Most were designed for surface launch only.
The U.S. had 464 SLUM launchers opera-
tional on 29 submarines in 1965 and Con-
gress had authorized the last of the 41 nu-
clear-powered submarines in our POLARIS
Force in the previous fiscal year.
Today, the Soviets have over 200 opera-
tional launchers on nuclear submarines for
submerged launch SLI3Ms and about 70 op-
erational launchers on diesel submarines. In
the next two years, the Soviets are ex-
pected to have some 400-500 operational
launchers on POLARIS-type submarines, and
at present construction rates-6-8 subma-
rines a year?could match or exceed the num-
ber in the U.S. force by 1974-75. United
States POLARIS submarines still number
41 and no increase is projected in current
plans. Conversion of 31 of our POLARIS
submarines to the MIRVed POSEIDON mis-
sile is planned, and eight conversions have
already been authorized by Congress.
In 1965, there was no development under-
way of a so-called Undersea Long-Range
Missile System (ITLMS) ill the United States
and there appeared to be none in the Soviet
Union.
Today, the United States is spending rela-
tively small sums in tee research and de-
velopment area on preliminary investigations
of such a system. I can also report to you
today that the Soviet Union, on the other
hand, already is testing a new, long-range
missile for possible Naval use.
In 1965, the Soviet heavy bomber force
consisted of slightly over 200 aircraft, about
50 of which were configured as tankers. The
U.S. heavy bomber force strength was about
780 in 1965.
Today. the Soviet heavy bomber force is
slightly under 200, with about 50 still con-
figured as tankers. U.S. heavy bomber
strength has declined to about 550 today.
In 1965, we estimated that the Soviet
Union had a complex of ABM launchers being
constructed around Moscow as well as a
number of radars under construction which
could provide early warning acquisition anti
tracking functions for ABM use.
Today, we believe that 64 Moscow AI3M
launchers are operational together with so-
phisticated early warning _radars and track-
ing capabilities. ABM testing for new and/or
improved systems continues. Today, the first
two SAFEGUARD sites have been author-
ized, but will not be operational before
1974-75. This modified deployment sched-
ule is considerably behind the schedule Con-
gress had approved in 1967 for the planned
SENTINEL area defense, which called for
initial capability in 1972, and nation-wide
coverage in 1975.
Thus, in the space of five years?from 1965
to 1970?the Soviet lemon has more than
tripled its inventory of strategic offensive nu-
clear weapons launchers from about 500 to
about 1700?which includes some 200 heavy
bombers in both totals --and continues the
momentum of a vigorous construction pro-
gram. In that same period, the Soviet Union
has virtually quadrupled the total megaton-
nage in its strategic offensive force. The
United States, on the other hand, in the
same time period, made no increase in its
established level of 1710 strategic nuclear
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April 23, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE
missile launchers and reduced its heavy
bomber strength of 780 by over 200. In that
same period the United States also reduced
its megatonnage by more than 40%.
To repeat: The United States has taken
no action to increase the total of approved
strategic offensive delivery Vehicles in the
past five years in response to the rapid
growth in Soviet strategic delivery vehicles.
We have, of course, maintained certain op-
tions and other steps have been taken to
preserve our deterrent in the face of this
increase.
Two programs that have been the subject
of intense public discussion are, of course,
our MIRV and SAFEGUARD systems.
Let me emphasize that MIRV is needed to
preserve our deterrent. Many people do not
fully understand why it is necessary for us
to continue the previously planned, Con-
gressionally-approved and funded deploy-
ment of MIRV systems. The' point is made
that the current number of strategic nu-
clear weapons on alert in our force is suffi-
cient for immediate retaliatory use in a
oriels. Because MIRVing would more than
double the number of deliverable weapons,
the conclusion is drawn that this is unneces-
sary.
This conclusion could be valid, if we as-
sumed that the POLARIS, MINUTEMAN, and
Bomber forces all would survive a surprise
attack and that the Soviet Union would not
deploy an extensive ABM system. However,
as was pointed out in my Defense Report in
February, the rapidly-growing Soviet stra-
tegic offensive forces could seriously threaten
both the U.S. MINUTEMAN and strategic
bomber forces by the mid-1970's.
Assuming we do not take additional ac-
tions to offset the expanding threat?and
this apparently is what some people urge?
I must, as Secretary of Defense, face the dis-
quieting possibility that in the mid-to-late
1970's we would no longer be able to rely
on either the Bomber or MINUTEMAN force
to survive a surprise attack. In such a situa-
tion, we would be left with only the PO-
LARIS/POSEIDON deterrent force in our
strategic arsenal for high confidence retalia-
tory purposes. This would pose intolerable
risks for American security.
s Thus, the critical choice in the face of
that situation is this:
1. Do we rely on the fraction of the 858
current weapons that will be at sea on our
POLARIS force if we do not convert to
POSEIDON and do not defend our land-
based strategic forces?
2. Or, do we continue the previously estab-
lished program to convert 31 POLARIS sub-
marines to the long-approved POSEIDON
MIRV program?wifich would provide
ap-
proximately the same number of sea-based
retaliatory weapons on alert that we cur-
rently have today in the sea-based and land-
based retaliatory forces combined but with
inach reduced megatonnage?
Pending a successful outcome in the Stra.
tegic Arms Limitation Talks, therefore, pru-
dence dictates that we must continue our
approved program to MIRV current forces.
Moreover, as the experience of the past five
years demonstrates, it would be dangerous
and imprudent to place unquestioned reli-
ance on the invulnerability of any single
strategic system for more than five to seven
years into the future.
This is why we must also, at the very least,
preserve an option to defend a portion of
our land-based retaliatory forces. That is a
major part of what the proposed minimal
addition to the SAFEGUARD Defensive pro-
gram is designed to do. I will come back
to that. ? ?
Because we want to give the Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks every chance of sue-
ceeding, we are deliberately accepting certain
risks by postponing hard choices related to
strategic offensive weapons. These risks are
aceeptable only in the context of proceeding
with the way deployments that have been
programmed and approved for several years
and the SAFEGUARD increment we are rec-
ommending this year.
A second and equally important reason for
MIRV is that it helps preserve our deterrent
by increasing confidence in our ability to
penetrate Soviet strategic defensive forces
which, by the mid-to-late 1970's also could
be quite formidable. In addition to the ex-
tensive air defense capabilities they already
possess, the Soviets are pursuing a vigorous
anti-ballistic missile research and develop-
ment program designed to improve the pres-
ent operational system or to develop substan-
tially better second-generation ABM com-
ponents.
We now have evidence that the Soviet
Union is testing an improved long-range
ABM missile. They are also expanding their
radar surveillance coverage .' We cannot rule
out the possibility that they have or will give
the extensively deployed SA-5 surface-to-air
missile system an ABM role. We believe such
a role is technically feasible for this system.
With regard to SAFEGUARD, which I men-
tioned previously, let me say this. In addition
to other objectives, the reoriented SAFE-
GUARD program, initiated last year, is de-
signed to provide protection for our land-
based deterrent forces, the MINUTEMAN and
Bombers. As you know, the President directed
that each phase of the SAFEGUARD deploy-
ment is to be reviewed each year to ensure
that we are doing as much as necessary but
not more than that required by the threat.
The increments of SAFEGUARD proposed so
far will provide protection for a portion of
our land-based deterrent, and permit flexi-
bility with regard to our future course of
action.
Without approval by Congress of the Mod-
ified Phase II SAFEGUARD protection pro-
posed by the President, we would be forced
to recommend going forward this year with
Other strategic nuclear offensive force pro-
grams.
All of my comments so far have, of course,
been focused on the more immediate and
troublesome threat posed by the Soviet stra-
tegic force buildup. The nuclear weapons
program of Communist China also concerns
us and directly relates to the need for pre-
serving timely SAFEGUARD options as we
move toward the mid-1970's. Time does .not
permit a discussion of this issue and the in-
terrelationship of maintaining adequate stra-
tegic offensive and defensive forces to meet
both the Soviet and Communist Chinese
threats.
Where does all this leave us, and what is
President Nixon attempting to do with the
decisions he has incorporated in his Fiscal
Year 1971 transitional defense budget?
Clearly, this Administration has not ac-
celerated the previously planned deployment
of offensive systems during our 15 months in
office. On the contrary, we have slowed it
down. The only major change we have made
has been modification of the previously ap-
proved SENTINEL ABM deployment; and
that, change was a slowdown, not a speedup.
We slowed the original deployment plan Con-
gress approved, keyed it to the emerging
threat on an annual review basis, and re-
oriented it to provide more timely protection
needed for our land-based deterrent forces.
If the programmed forces established by
the lest Administration some years ago and
approved by Congress were deemed appropri-
ate and necessary for the-security of the
United States in the 1970's against the then
projected threat, I am at a loss to under-
stand how critics can claim that the Nixon
Administration has escalated the arms race.
The xecord clearly shows that we have not
done so. We have chosen instead to defer
major new weapons decisions as long as pos-
sible pending developments in the Stra-
tegic Arms Limitations Talks. In continuing
the MIRV and ABM programs, we are simply
going ahead with programs on which our
deterrent policy was formulated by previous
Administrations, even before the current mo-
mentum of Soviet strategic programs became
clear.
With regard to the important talks which
have just resumed in Vienna, the President
has stated that every U.S. system is negoti-
able. To those who argue that the U.S. should
take specific, and perhaps unilateral, action
at the start of these negotiations, I would
reply that the place to resolve these issues
is at the conference table with the Soviets.
Let us try to find out at the conference table
the meaning of the Soviet Union's increased
weapons deployments and let us conduct
these important negotiations with full rec-
ognition of these continuing Soviet deploy-
ments.
My appraisal today has covered some of the
available evidence of the Soviet military
buildup. I am not unmindful, however, of
possible other directions of Soviet policy that
could be relevant to our security. There have
been reports that Soviet economic problems
may place pressure upon their leadership to
devote major attention to internal matters,
thus reducing the recent emphasis on a con-
tinued military buildup.
As Secretary of Defense, I will continue to
hope that the shift in national priorities we
have instituted in America will be dupli-
cated in the Soviet Union. But until evidence
of that shift is discernible in weapons de-
ployment activities, I have :a6 alternative but
to base my actions and recommendations on
the evidence available, much of Which I have
shared with you editors today and, through
you, with the American people.
BLAME FOR RISING FOOD PRICES
Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, all too
often the American farmer is blamed for
the rising food prices. However, statistics
which have recently been made available
indicate that while food prices have been
rising, the price the farmer has been re-
ceiving has been declining. For example,
recently when the price of bread in-
creased from 22 to 23 cents, the price the
farmer received for wheat, milk, and
shortening decreased from 3.6 to 3.3
cents.
We now know tjaat the farmer, like the
wage earner, small businessman, and the
homebuyer and builder, has suffered
greatly from the inflation we have been
experiencing. With a return of only 3
percent on his investment as opposed to
a 10-percent return by major industrial
_ corporations and mime of the large
farms, the average farmer finds it in-
creasingly difficult to continue operating
when his prices are falling and the coun-
try is experiencing a 6-percent rate of
inflation.
I think it is important that we recog-
nize the fact that the average farmer
has been greatly hurt by inflation and
that he is not responsible for the in-
crease in food prices.
EARTH DAY COMMENTARY
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, pol-
lution and environmental problems have
become the subject of massive attention
In recent months?magazine articles,
television programs, statements by the
President, and many public officials,
and a number of bills introduced in
Congress.
On April 22, Earth Day, we had a na-
tional environmental teach-in, with var-
ious special activities to focus on the
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S 6150 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE April 23, 1970
environmental crisis being planned
across the country. Although I 'under-
stand that Senator NELSON played a
leading part in formulating this idea,
it was developed, organized, and ener-
gized by many young people.
I welcome and commend all this ac-
tivity and I am hopeful that it will lead
to some truly significant accomplish-
ments in combatting the critical en-
vironmental problems. At the outset,
however, I feel compelled to offer a woial
of caution, There is a tendency among
Americans, and all humans I suppose, to
feel that if we talk about a problem long
enough, if we express enough indigna-
tion and concern, that it will somehow go
away. Witness the example of 'the Viet-
nam war. Many Americans seem to have
convinced themselves that after all the
tumult in this country in the months
prior to March 31, 1968, Vietnam ceased
to be a problem.
Many people have tried, and some have
apparently succeeded in phasing the war
out of their minds, despite the fact that
the death and destruction continues
daily.
Just as we cannot afford to lessen our
concern about Vietnam until we have
brought the war to an end, we must not
deceive ourselves into believing that by
voluminous talking and writing we have
resolved the environmental crisis.
The crisis is of such proportions that
it is going to take a concerted and large-
scale, longterrn effort to effectively deal
with it. One encouraging aspect of all
the concern about the environment and
ecology is that there are signs that this
is an issue that could unite rather than
divide Americans. All of us are affected
by these problems and all of us need to
work together in solving them.
Several significant measures have been
passed by Congress as we have belatedly
moved to confront these problems. Of
course, as in the case of many other do-
mestic needs, environmental quality ac-
tivities are severely limited due to the
lack of available funds. As I have often
stressed, it is a matter of priorities, and
as long as we have such a massive in-
volvement in Vietnam and are spending
billions for more and more armaments,
these crucial domestic programs will be
short changed.
This is even more tragic because rea-
sonable expenditures now may save some
enormous costs later. We need to act Im-
mediately to prevent the further de-
spoiling of our air, water, and soil, rather
than to wait until matters are com-
pletely out of control.
As an example of our current priori-
ties, the $1.5 billion the administration
plans to spend on the ABM this year is
considerably more than allocated for
control of air and water pollution. The
fiscal 1971 budget provides $275 million
for the Supersonic Transport?SST.?
aircraft as opposed to $106 million for
air pollution control.
The total cost for the SST is estimated
at $2.5 billion or more. We have been
told that the SST can be used only for
transoceanic flights because of the
clamorous sonic booms. 11 they are flown
over land they would add further to our
considerable "noise pollution" problem.
Anyone who lives or works near a major
airport probably feels that this prob-
lem?plus the grimy exhaust-laden air?
could not get much worse. All too typical
of the times is the fact that the U.S.
Army Band may have to move its tra-
ditional Washington outdoor summer
concerts from Watergate. Because of the
aircraft flying into or out of National
Airport, trying to play or hear music is a
losing proposition.
The folly of the SST should be evi-
dent. The jumbo jets already in serv-
ice can carry more passengers over a
longer range at lower fares than the
SST, And if we are really worried about
transportation, should note the problems
of the millions 1? n our urban areas
take precede over the desires of a few
who may b,i eager to get from the New
York tra c jam to the London traffic
jam a little faster?
The oney could be well spent on de-
veloping and expanding urban rapid
tra ft rail systems, which would help
alleviate the squeeze and pollution in our
str ets. Or the funds could be applied to
d eloping and improving high-speed
service between our major cities,
us reducing the mayhem on our high-
ys.
echnology has brought some benefits
ankind, but no longer can we afford
nore the human and environmental
uences of technological develop-
to
to
con
ment.
We
creasing
which heig
ties. Our de
St also keep in mind the in-
ulation pressures in world,
m environmental difficul-
, 'orating transportation
situation, our p lem with waste dis-
posal, our noisy, bitty, crime-plagued
cities make the problerns of urbanization
all too clear.
The need to raise more food for the
evereincreasing world population can
wreak additional damage by upsetting
the balance of nature. We increase the
threat to survival by heavy use of pesti-
cides and certain chemicals which pol-
lute streams, linger in living tissues, and
threaten wildlife species. The pollutants
we pour into the air not only harm man's
health directly, but also may change at-
mospheric conditions dangerously.
I have in the past and will continue
to support programs to, provide assist-
ance for population control programs in
developing countries, as well as volun-
tary family planning in our own country,
and I believe such programs are of great
importance.
A very visible component of our en-
vironmental blight is the ugliness, clut-
ter, and litter that we see not only in,
our urban areas, but in the countryside
as well. This is why it is important to
act to preserve some of our more beauti-
ful natural scenery. An example of this
is the bill to make the Buffalo River in
Arkansas a national river, a part of our
national park system. This bill would
enable the preservation, in its free-flow-
ing, natural state, of an important seg-
ment of this beautiful river in an area
which contains unique scientific fea-
tures. This bill was passed by the Senate
Iii September. and we are hopeful of
favorable action in the House.
In many sections of the country water
supplies are, contaminated, and marine
life is imperiled. Between 15 and 20 mil-
lion fish are being killed each year by
water pollution. Some of our rivers have
even become fire hazards. However, the
budget request for water pollution con-
trol is less than the program authorized
by Congress in 1966.
Solid waste disposal is a problem that
grows by the hour and is plaguing more
and more cities. We are burying our-
selves under 7 million scrapped cars, 30
million tons of waste paper, 48 billion
discarded cans, and 28 billion bottles and
jars a year. Newspapers in two Arkansas
cities, Fort Smith and Pine Bluff, have
recently reported on the increasing prob-
lem there. On an average, every Arkan-
san living in ari urban area throws away
4 pounds of solid waste every day of the
week. A State official points out that
most Arkansas cities are still operating
open dumps where garbage is burned.
This contributes considerably to air pol-
lution and is against the law. A Fort
Smith reporter, Taylor Joyce, recently
wrote in the Southwest Times Record:
For as long as some local residents can
remember there has be.m an open dump
down along the Arkansas River on Fort
Smith's northwest side. There has been al-
most perpetual burning there, creating nox-
ious odors and blanketing the city with
billows of smoke.
The dump has attracted insects and ver-
min and has been a breeding ground for
flies, mosquitoes and rats.
The City Health Department wants to elim-
inate the dump because of the health haz-
ards it creates.
But perhaps most important of all, the
Arkansas Pollution Control Commission says
the dump has to go because it poses an air
and water pollution threat.
In Arkansas we have had the oppor-
tunity to avoid some of the problems and
mistakes which have occurred in the old-
er, industrialized States. The opportunity
is rapidly slipping away from us. Not
many months ago, speaking of the Ark-
ansas River development project, I stated
that by preserving the beauty of the
river, the purity of the water and air, and
retaining favorable living conditions for
those who work in the area, it could truly
be a model development. Now, it is most
disconcerting to read of a statement by
a State Health Department official who
says that the Arkansas River could not
be made pollution free because of in-
creasing industrialization of the river
valley and pollution caused by out-of-
State sources. In an editorial on the sub-
ject, the Arkansas Gazette pointed out:
A$ it happens- so frequently in the environ-
mental field, the problem is interstate In
nattire and it presents a challenge for the
federal anti-pollution effort that President
Nixon promises his administration is ready
to undertake. Already the federal govern-
ment has spent over a billion dollars to
create the inland waterway, and that ought
to be enough to give it a vested interest in
the quality of the water that flows down the
costly river channel.
The problems are vast and numerous.
We are, literally, surrounded by them.
I hope that Earth Day will have marked
the beginning not of conflict and con-
frontation, but of resolute and united
action on many fronts to improve the
quality of life and living conditions.
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April 23, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE S 6069
A WORLD VIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENT
(Remarks of Senator WARREN G. Ifacig-asox
before the second annual International
Geoscience Electronics Symposium, Wash-
ington, D.C., April 16, 1970)
I am deeply honored by your welcoming
me to this International Symposium, and I
in turn would like to re-extend the welcome
of the United States to those of you who have
came here from foreign lands. I know your
Symposium will be a success; for you have
assembled here a vast amount of:talent, ex-
perience, and achievement from many na-
tions.
Problems of the environment are an apprb-
priate focal point for this Symposium, not
only because the United States is experienc-
ing a period of intense environmental aware-
ness but also?as our visitors can tell us?
because the United States has no monopoly
on environmental problems or environmental
concern. Pew, if any, environmental ills are
unique to a particular country. With the ex-
ception of isolated species of wildlife whose
existence is threatened, most environmental
problems?like pollution?are common to all
industrialized nations, regardless of their
size or form of government.
We are all familiar, for example, with the
problems of the United States and other
Western nations; but it is interesting to note
that the SOviet Union is undergoing environ-
mental difficulties similar to our own. Pol-
luants from pulp mills are quicky destroying
beautifu Lake Baikal, and a recent accident
in a chemical plant is known to have killed
millions of fish in an important Soviet river.
And while we ti,the Rutted States are still
in the "talking stage With respect to noise
pollution, the Soviets have already taken ac-
tion: cars and trucks are no longer permitted
to drive through Moscow during the hours
when most Muscovites are asleep. Perhaps
these developments fortell a new contest to
replace the arms race and the space race: an
"environment race" between the East and
the Westto see who will have the cleanest
air and Water and the quietest streets. This
would be a healthy and welcome fOTM of
competition indeed.
Yet the problems of environmental quality
are global in scope and extend far beyond the
industrialized nations of the Fast and West.
Rapid population growth and economic de-
velopment efforts make the environment a
problem for the Modernizing nations of the
world as well--regardless of 'their political
systems or their foreign policy. The Ganges
River in India is more polluted than the
Rhine; DDT is spread far more thickly in the
tropics than in North America. Any nation
that hopes to increase its Gross National
Product, its per capita consumption, or other
indices of economic growth is faced with an
ineseapable dilemma about the impact of
Such development on its environment.
With this realization in mind?that en-
vironmental problems are rooted in the
growth of population and technology, not
in ideology7?I want to share with you to-
night a special hope, a hope that I be-
lieve is more than just a dream. It is a hope
born of concern for the dozens of moderniz-
ing nations for whom environmental quality
is a necessarily low priority today but for
whom the experience of the industrialized
nations could provide valuable assistance
in making economic growth and environ-
mental quality compatible. These nations
have seen, and desire, the glamorous fruits
of industrialization; and most of them have
not yet paused to consider cinestions of
ecology that we ignored ourselves fongenera-
tions. A cooperative international effort
could clarify the choices these nations face
and could help, them avoid the costly mis-
takes that we made in similar stages of our
own development.
But my hope is born of other, more omi-
nous concerns about the international as-
peots of environmental quality; concern
about DDT being found in the fat of Ant-
arctic penguins; concern about the oil glob-
ules that now dot the surface of the oceans;
concern about the steady build-up of carbon
dioxide in the Earth's atmosphere. These
findings indicate that international coopera-
tion on environmental problems would be
more than helpful?it may hold that key to
survival for all of mankind.
I know that It isn't fashionable today to
raise the issue of survival when speaking
of the environment. We are told not to be
alarmists, not to jeopardize public support
for environmental programs by raising un-
justified fears. But the rate at which the
nations of the world are pumping poisons
into the air, the water, and the soil makes
survival a very real issue in the long run. No
portion of the complex chain-of-life on this
planet can die without threatenin
forms of life; the "death" e oceans,
for example, might seal t ate of mankind.
The issue that this r s is stark: no na-
tion can survive wh other nations perish;
no country ban pr er while other countries
pollute the ocea and the atmosphere. Ul-
timately, for ? n to continue his existence
on this plan , international cooperation
and underst ding will have to prevail. A
pragmatic c cern for survival will force
us to achiev what an idealistic concern for
peace and fr endship never could: the realiz-
ation that e are all brothers, destined to
perish or p ?sper together as a species.
Adlai Stev nson. an American who was
really a citize of the world, summed up this
realization Ion ago. He wrote that:
"We all trave together, passengers on a
little spaceship, de ndent on its vulnerable
reserves of air and ; all committed for
our safety to its secu and peace; pre-
served from annihilation nly by the care,
the work, and the love we ye our fragile
craft."
Ir9nically, we had to launch s' 'ceships of
our own before we saw what Stev on had
seen: Earth is a spaceship herself, o which
every member of the human race t vels
together through the solar system and he
Infinite universe. An Apollo astronaut on t
lunar surface can block out the vision o
our distant planet simply by lifting his
thumb. When he looks at Earth, he can see
no national boundaries, no capitals, no place
names, no armies. All he can see is a tiny,
shining ball suspended in the black void of
outer space.
Most Of us will never stand on the moon.
That makes our task even more difficult than
the astronauts'. We must learn to see Earth
as the astronauts have seen it, yet we must
do so without ever leaving the ground. If we
can achieve this vision?and we must achieve
It?we will concentrate less on the issues that
divide mankind and more on those matters
that emphasize our common problems and
our inter-dependence. We will realize that
pollution of the Yangtze, the Ghanges, the
Rhine, or the Dnieper is no less important to
our continued existence than pollution of
the Missouri and the Potomac. We will learn
that DDT is no less hazardous to us all if it
Is sprayed on the Indian subcontinent instead
of on the United States. And we will see that
all wastes and poisons from around the world
mingle together in our COMMOD environ-
ment?the air, the water, and the soil?to
form a blanket of danger that envelops the
guilty and innocent alike.
When we achieve this understanding, we
have only two alternatives available: action
or despair. To despair is to forget mankind's
greatest virtues: his ability to cooperate, his
ability to pass knowledge between peoples
and between generations, his ability to estab-
lish goals for himself and to work until those
goals have been met. Even with the aid of
these abilities, however, action will not be
easy. We will have to overcome centuries of
mistrust, generations of conflicting ideolo-
,.
gies, and years of suspicion and fear. But we
Will never be alone: no nation, no govern-
ment can ignore the issue of survival.
Fortunately, there are many international
organizations working today to bring about
controls on pollution and harmful sub-
stances?the United Nations, NATO, and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, to name only a few. These
groups are attempting to establish interna-
tional treaties, inspection procedures, and
environmental police powers. Their success?
and the success of many similar organiza-
tions?is essential to all men.
But these organizations, important as they
are, cannot provide one vital function that
must be performed: the gathering and dis-
semination of environmental information to
all nations of the world. Since each of us has
a stake in the environmental quality of other
nations, we cannot afford to work only
through existing international organizations
that include some nations and exclude oth-
ers. NATO by definition involves only 'one
community of nations; the United Nations
excludes the largest country in the world.
In addition, each of the existing organiza-
tions on the world environmental front is
political in nature and is involved in disputes
between different nations and blocks of na-
tions. Even though politics will play an im-
portant part in environmental treaties and
arbitrations, politics must not be allowed to
interfere with the free flow of information
and knowledge between all nations and all
people. The world pool of knowledge and
talent is a resource that belongs, like the air
and water, to all mankind. No nation should
be denied access to this pool because of po-
litical disputes with other nations. In fact,
the solution to international environmental
disputes may hinge on the sharing of knowl-
edge and technology by all nations alike.
This knowledge includes more than conven-
tional environmental techniques?the tech-
nology of mass transportation, housing de-
velopment, and automobile safety are clearly
related.
So tonight, I am proposing for the first
time that a new international organization
be created. This organization, which might
be called the World Environmental Institute,
would serve as a central information center
or all nations of the world. Every nation?
gardless of its form of government or its in-
t national and domestic policies?could
co cult the Institute for expert advice on all
for of environmental problems. The Insti-
tute would serve both as a research center
and the repository of that worldwide pool
of kn 'wledge and talent. Through the use
of co puters, any country could obtain a
thorou h guide to the scientists and scientific
studie around the world that relate to a par-
ticular environmental problem.
Und r the auspices of the Institute, a con-
tinua exchange of scientists and techno-
logic information between the countries of
the orld would be possible on a non-politi-
cal basis?not simply on the unilateral scale
of today but on a multilateral level never
dreamed of before. Task forces could be set
up?consultants who would work as a team
and on request visit the distant parts of the
globe to undertake special projects. A con-
stant flow of specialists between the Insti-
tute and other public and private research
centers throughout the world would insure
a balance in the Institute's personnel and
purpose.
The Institute would be an intwnational
organization similar in spirit and purpose to
the Olympic Games; but like the Games, it
would not heal the political divisions of the
world, even with respect to environmental
problems. International environmental dis-
putes would continue to rage, with British
soot falling on Swedish forests and with an
Egyptian dam upsetting the ecology of the
Mediterranean. The Institute would not at-
tempt to arbitrate such disputes?that is the
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S 6070 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
function -of organizations like the United
Nations. But the Institute would attempt to
provide as much and as accurate informa-
tion as possible to all those concerned and
to the international organization within
which such conflicts will be resolved, The In-
stitute, let me emphasize again, would have
110 police powers?it would be like a refer-
ence book available to any and all nations
with en eiromnental difficulties.
It is not my intention to supplant the
work of those hundreds of research institu-
tions where scientists are now at work on
complex ecological problems. On the con-
trary, the World Environmental Institule
would serve as an ifidei to these men and
their work--helping to speed the flow of
knowledge between those few who discover
and those millions who need. The Institute
wilt be an exchange, a reference center, a
"clearing house" on environmental informa-
tion?not a monolithic super-bureaucracy.
it will be founded on a simple ideal: that the
stock of knowledge about environment prob-
lems ought to be held in common by all men
and that all men should have access to such
knowledge whenever they desire it.
Surely the time has come for the United
States to take the lead and to propose crea-
tion of the Institute to the nations of the
world. The time has come for us to reatiee
that world leadership and world prestige are
based on the power of ideas, not on the power
of weapons. And the time has come for
knowledge?that most precious of man's
many resources-to be liberated from the
prisons ef nationalism and the shackles of
she Cold War.
In the next few days, I will introduce a
Senate Resolution designed to accomplish
these aims. The Resolntion will express the
sense of the Senate that the United States
should begin now to explore, both formally
and informally, the attitudes of leaders
around the world with respect to the crea-
tion of the World Environmental Institute,.
The Resolution will further urge that the
Institute proposal be placed on the agenda
of the World Environment Conference sched-
uled by the United Nations for Stockholm in
1972 and that nations who are not members
'of the U.N.--like Red Chins-be extended
specific invitations to participate in that
Conference. In addition, I personally stand
ready to meet with foreign leaders and scien-
tists in this country and abroad to promote
the creation of the Institute.
Perhaps the plan I have laid before yOu is
only a dream; perhaps, despite my hopes,
the centuries of nationalism cannot be
washed away by all the polluted waters of
the world. Perhaps mankind cannot muster
the will and the energy to ineure his own
survival. But as a Nobel Prize-winning
novelist once wrote, man is not yet a finished
creation: he is a challenge of the spirit.
Response to that challenge of the spirit is
the measure of man.
Survival is a challenge. Cooperation is a
challenge. Peace is a challenge. A world view
of the environment is a challenge. We may
not meet these challenges, but we must try.
For our response to these challenges will de-
termine not only how we are remembered
by future generations?it will determine
whether or not there will be future gen-
erations to remember us at all.
Mr. 10ENNEnY subsequently said: Mr.
President, yesterday, as America ob-
served Earth Day, many proposals were
put forth in many parts of the country
to help solve the evils that pollution has
done to our environment. I think yes-
terday's observance will 'bring many
Americans to a greater realization that
we must act to preserve and improve
the environment of this Nation.
And, at this time, as we study the
effects of Earth Day. I would also like
to call to the attention of the Senate
a proposal put forth by the senior Sen-
ator from Washington, Senator MAG-
xusoN. In an address on April 16 be-
fore the second annual International
Geoscience Electronics Symposium, Sen-
ator MAG NUSON made some very con-
structive proposals on the larger ques-
tion of international cooperation to pre-
vent pollution. His address deserves the
careful consideration of all of us.
I understand that the majority leader,
Senator MANSFIELD, has introduced this
address into the RECORD. I would like to
ask as well that the RECORD include a
copy of an editorial from the Boston
Globe of April 20 which examines and
commends Senator MAGNUSON's pro-
posal.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows-:
COURAGE ON POLLUTION
Sen. Warren 0, Magnuson (D.-Wash.) pro-
poses that the United States take the lead
in the establishment of a "World Environ-
mental Institute" to conduct research and
store knowledge on a problem that knows no
national boundaries.
It is our obligation to support the proposal,
which should not, for the mast compelling
of politica), and moral reasons, be dismissed
as merely another idealistic, do-gooder
scheme.
For the United States, because of its not-
altogether-blessed status as the world's most
prosperous nation, is, in fact, the world's
biggest polluter.
It is to a measurable degree the demand
for the consumer luxury of air-conditioning
that produces New York's Summer brown-
outs. They -take their name more from -the
color of the sky than, from the dimming of
the lights in August.
The power plants (Mayor Lindsay is try-
ingeto do something about this, as are eta-
thbrities in Boston) belch sulfurous fumes
into the sky in order to manufacture the
current to run the machines that clean the
air. This cycle is increasingly futile.
Fly over the Bronx-Westchester line some
inuebird-April day and look south, where you
might expect to see the world's most male-
ificent city. You can't even see Central Park.
The ocean is dying where New York barges
Its sludge. Lake Erie is dead, and Michigan
salmon are declared inedible. It is, largely.
American DDT that is found in the too-
fragile shells of osprey eggs that do not hatch
and in the livers of polar bears and penguins.
Most tragically, it is petroleum to run the
automobiles and the power plants of the
United States that threatens the beaches and
rocky foreshores of the world.
In his address that announced his pro-
posal to the second International Geoecience
Electronics Symposium, Sen. Magnuson
stressed the internatiOnal aspect.
"The world pool of knowledge on environ-
mental problems," he said, "is a resource
that belongs, like the air and the water, to
all mankind.
"No nation should be denied access to this
pool because of political disputes with other
nations. Pollution a the Yangtze, the
Ganges, the Rhine or the Dnieper is no less
important to our continued existence than
pollution of the Missouri or the Potomac.
"No nation can eUrvive while other na-
tions perish; no country can prosper while
other countries pollute the ocean and the
atmosphere. We are all brothers, destined to
perish or prosper together as a species."
The senator wants the institute open to
all nations, regardless of foreign or domes-
tic policies, and he insists that the institute
would be totally non-political.
April 2.6, 1970
Pollution, however, is p:ready a political
issue because the economic realities of the
American consumer society render it politi-
cal. This country has been accused, and can
expect to be accused with increasing fre-
quency 'and uncomfortable accuracy, of
spoiling the earth in its attempt to subdue
it and meet the insatiate demands of its
'citizens' rising economic expectations.
There is no indication that these demands
and the technological caps city to meet them.
are going to disappear in the immediate fu-
ture. Troreau's bean patch simply does not
turn Reuther's auto workers' wives on.
In this sense, the United, States and all
the industrial societies have a greet deal of
rethinking to do about the meaning of prog-
ress and the purpose of life and the courses
they choose to pursue happiness.
In time, the rethinking will be done.
Meanwhile, the world needs to know that
this country is responsibly aware of the
situation it largely has created and is ac-
tively in pursuit of means by which the
blessings and the consequences of' techno-
logical advance can be reconciled.
Sen. Magnuson has proposed a way. That
it will, inevitably, be subject to politicking,
much of it designed tie embarrass this coun-
try, should not deter conservationists. Ecol-
ogy is more than an issue to distract people
from imrnediate concerns.
Just as it took courage to admit, as most
people now do, that the war in Vietnam was
damaging our interests, it will take courage
to confess our share in nee despoliation of
the world. Our sin is apparent from Pitcairn
to Portland.
SAFEGUARD--1970
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President. an
excellent paper on the gresent range of
arguments concerning the Safeguard
ABM system has been prepared by
George W. Rathpens, Ph. D., and Her-.
bert F. York, Ph. D., Drs. Rathjens and
York have long experience within the
Government as well as in private life in
defense armaments and technology. I be-
lieve it IN the most succinct synopsis and
analysis of the current arguments seek-.
ing to justify deployment of the Safe-
guard ABM.
I ask unanimous consent that the
paper be printed in the RECORD at this
point.
There being no objection the paper
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows: .
COMMENTS ON SAel.,:oAxo-1970
(By George W. Rathjens and Herbert F. York,
April 5, 1910)
SUMMAR
The Administration's case for Safeguard as
a defense for Minuteman is far weaker than
it was a year ago. The actual technical situ-
ation has not changed materially but it is
now conceded that if Soviet missile forces
grow ai projected in inteligence estimates,
even the full Phase II of Safeguard would be
inadequate to defend our Minuteman force
against a pre-emptive attack. The defense
would be effective only if the Soviet Union
were to tailor its threat. to match Safe-
guard's limited capabilltlies. Safeguard as a
defense of Minuteman now looks so bad on
cost tffectiveness grounds, even to the Ad-
ministration, that it can not be defended
on its, own merits. It is now being ration-
alized on the grounds that since we need an
anti-Chinese defense anyway, the defense of
Minuteman can be justified as an addition.
There is no need to go ahead with Minute-
man defense at this time. We could safety
wait a year to see how the 'threat" is develop.'
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April 23; 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE
tog, and then make decisions, if necessary, to
buttress our retaliatory strength. Options
other than Safeguard would be less costly,
more effective, and, even with a year's delay,
available on a shorter time Scale than Safe-
guard. Cancelling Safeguard (and deferral for
a year or so of decisions to go ahead with ad-
ditional offensive forces as well) would be
highly desirable both because of dollar sav-
ings and because the prospects for 4 success-
ful SALT outcome would be enhanced.
The arguments that Safeguard is needed
to cope with a possible Chinese attack and
that it could do SQ infallibly are both wrong.
We can and should rely on deterrence vis-a-
vis China (while at the same time trying to
bring China, Into the world community) ?
Safeguard is unlikely to be available by the
time the Chinese have their first ICBM's.
When it is available, the Chinese are likely
to have capabilities for penetrating it. Cer-
tainly it would be foolhardy for the United
States, in a belief in Safeguard's infallibility,
to take actions some years hence that might
lead to a Chinese attack.
Any attempt to maintain even a moder-
ately effective defense in the face of an
evolving Chinese "threat" is to commit our-
selves to a program that will require con-
tinuous improvement and massive expan-
sion. The money being asked for this year
should be recognized as but the ante in a
program that will involve the expenditure
of billions each year with no end in sight
and no increase in our security.
Not only should there be no expansion
of Safeguard, the program should be can-
celled forthwith. With Safeguard having
been approved last year by a single vote
It is clear that the collective view of the
Senate was that the case for even Phase
I was very marginal. Those Senators who
had doubts about the proposal last year,
but who voted for it, will find many of their
doubts resolved this year in favor of can-
cellation. The Administration has now gone
most of the way in conceding the validity
of the opposition's arguments of a year ago.
Ttlls is apparent from a careful reading of
Defense Department statements of this year.
It will become more apparent with ques-
tioning of Administration witnesses.
(i) DEFENSE OF MINUTEMAN
The Administration now recognizes that
the radars are the Achilles' heel of the Safe-
guard defense of Minuteman.
There are two problems with the radars:
they are relatively soft targets (perhaps able
to withstand VA the blast overpressure
that Minuteman missile sites can with-
stand); and they are very expensive (of the
order of 6200 million each).
Because they are so soft, weapons with
relatively poor yield-accuracy combinations
will be able to destroy them. This means
that the Soviet 55-11 missiles, of which
there are very large numbers, would suffice.
Also, if the Soviet Union should develop
a MIRV capability for its SS-9 missile, that
missile could carry large numbers of war-
heads of yield adequate to destroy the Safe-
guard radars. The defense ca,nnot function
at all if the Missile Site Radars (MkVs) are
destroyed. Therefore, a large fraction of the
defensive interceptors must be deployed so
they can protect the MSR's. Because the
range of the Sprint interceptor missiles is
only about 25 miles, interceptors that are
deployed so that they can defend the MSR's
will be unable to defend many of the Min-
utemen in any given complex (the complex
at Great Falls is about 200 miles aerosa)?
Interceptors deployed to defend the more
remote Minutemen would be unable to pro-
tect the MSR's. In addition, controlling the
interceptors remote from the radar could
be something of a problem.1
These problems could be very largely al-
leviated if it were feasible to employ a num-
ber of redundant radars at each Minuteman
base. However, the very high cost of the
radars makes this unattractive. Opposition
witnesses suggested that the system might
be greatly improved by developing and util-
izing a radar specifically engineered for
hard-point defense. However, the Adminis-
tration brushed aside such suggestions. Thus,
Dr. Foster, the Director of Defense Research
and Engineering said:
"Each year we have looked for a cheap radar
that could defend hard sites, and each year
we have tried to think of a way of having a
lot of radars that could do the Job. And then
we have come down on the decision that
you really have to have a radar that can
cope with all of the kinds of things that
the enemy might throw at those hard points
that you are trying to defend, and that is
not a cheap radar. It is a rather expensive
radar.
"This radar, from Raytheon, costs about
$40 million.2 Now you could get a radar for
$10 million, but it would not do the kind of
things that we think the radar has to do if
it is to accomplish this mission." (ref. 3, p.
194)
and Secretary Packard:
''There has been talk about the possibility
of using smaller harder radars for the de-
fense of Minuteman. There are some areas
where smaller and harder radars might be
utilized, but this question has in fact been
investigated. It is our conclusion, after look-
ing at all aspects of the matter, that we
need the kind of capability that the Missile
Site Radar we are, recommending here has,
and we need the size in order to achieve that
capability." (ref. 3, p. 1681-1682)
The Administration is now actively facing
up to the fact that an effective defense
against a heavy threat cannot be based on
the MSR.
Thus this year we have Dr. Foster saying:
1 The problems of the defense of remote
Minutemen were not well developed in last
year's debate. In March Secretary Laird
claimed with reference to Safeguard Phase
I, "A heavy cover would be provided to
roughly one-third of our Minutemen mis-
sile force" (ref. 1, p. 180). The use of the
figure 1/3 implied that virtually all of the
Minutemen at Grand Forks and Malstrom
would be defended. Opposition witnesses
pointed out that if the remote missiles were
defended the same interceptors could not
be used to defend the 1VISR's. There is an
additional problem in that the MSR would
be unable to "see" the remote Sprint missiles
until they were well above the ground (for
those as far as 89 miles away the altitude
would be several miles above the horizon).
This problem arise because of the earth's
curvature and because radars do not work
well against targets that are only a degree
or two above the horizon.
Presumably in recognition of these prob-
lems Mr. Laird changed his position re-
garding the coverage for Minuteman that
could be provided by Safeguard. Thus he
said in May "We would have heavier pro-
tection for at least 10 to 20% of our Min-
uteman force". (ref. 2, p. 46)
There is no admission in the record that
with this reduction in the number of mis-
siles defended by Sprints there would be
a reduction in Safeguard effectiveness.
2 The cost of an MSR installed with the
associated data processing equipment is now
estimated at $150-200 million.
S 6071
"If the Soviet threat to Minuteman should
Increase beyond levels that could be handled
by the Phase II Safeguard multi-purpose
defense, we might wish to augment the sys-
tem by deploying several terminal defense
radars in each Minuteman field. For this
reason we have budgeted for development
of a new radar, smaller and less expensive
than the MSR. The new radar, although less
capable than the MSR, could be deployed
in greater numbers to improve defense survi-
vability." (ref. 4, p. 2)
The Administration now concedes that
Safeguard, including the full Phase II de-
ployment, will be quite inadequate if Soviet
forces grow as protected.
Secretary Laird now says:
"We are now faced with the following
possibilities concerning Minuteman:
"(a) That the Soviets do not increase the
deployment of the 55-9 and the SS-11, do
not develop a MIRV for the SS-9, and do not
improve ICBM accuracy. Under these cir-
cumstances there is no need for a defense
of the ,Minuteman force.
"(b) That the Soviets stop building ICBM's
beyond those now operational or started;
they do not develop a MIRV for the SS-9;
but they do improve the accuracy of their
entire ICBM force. Under these circum-
stances, the force could constitute a threat
to the Minuteman force and Safeguard would
be quite effective against that threat.
"(c) That the Soviets deploy a MIRV
on the SS-9, improve their ICBM accuracy,
and do not stop building ICBM's at this
time, but continue building them at their
present rate. We would then be faced in the
mid-70's with 4i threat which is much too
large to be handled by the level of defense
envisioned in the Safeguard system without
substantial improvement arid modification.
(ref. 5, p. 48)
"To be perfectly candid, Mr. Chairman,
It must be recognized that the threat could
actually turn out to be considerably larger
than the Safeguard defense is designed to
handle. That is one reason we have decided
to pursue several courses which should lead
to less expensive options for the solution to
this problem than expanding Safeguard to
meet the highest threat level." (ref. 5, p. 49)
The contingency suggested in paragraph b
of the quotation above Implies a less active
Soviet program than even the "Low-Force-
Low Technology" estimate of the intelli-
gence community. That estimate, according
to Secretary Laird, credits the Soviet Union
with possibly "hard target multiple RV's as
early as mid-1972", and with a "hard target
kill capability [that] would be consider-
able" (ref. 5, p. 104). It is not much of an
exaggeration to say that the only circum-
stance, by the Administration's own admis-
sion, under which Safeguard would be ef-
fective would be one where the Soviet Union
could be induced to tailor its strategic force
to match the meager capabilities of Safe-
guard! Such a Soviet force posture might
result if the SALT negotiations were suc-
cessful, but otherwise seems exceedingly un-
likely. Contrast this situation to that of a
year ago when the Administration was claim-
ing that Safeguard was needed in case the
SALT negotiations failed. Secretary Packard:
"It provides a hedge against failure of
arms control. If the Soviets refuse a work-
able agreement, then this country will be
able to move to a protection of its second-
strike force, if the Soviets continue to in-
stall more effective weapons." (ref. 1, p. 263)
Also contrast this with the Administra-
tion contention that Safeguard would be ef-
fective against a Soviet missile threat in-
cluding one that involved not only increased
accuracy but also MIRV's and increased num-
bers of SS-9's, Secretary Laird lastyear:
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S 6072 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE Apil 23, 1970
The relative effectiveness of Safeguard
option 2A in defending our Minuteman
force can be measured in terms of the threat
I mentioned earlier; namely, the large Soviet
SS--9 type missile equipped with three inde-
pendently targetable 5-megaton warheads
with an accuracy of one-quarter of a mile.
With a force of 420 of these missiles on
taunchers and an assumed failure rate of
20 percent, the Soviets could place over the
Minuteman fields about 1,000 warheads.
Without any ABM defense, it is possible that
only about 50 Minutemen would survive. (A
mixed force made up of fewer large missiles
but including a number of highly accurate
small missiles could produce similar results.)
With Safeguard Phase I, perhaps two or three
times as many Minutemen would survive sod
with Safeguard option 2A perhaps live or six
times as many." (ref. 2, p. 27-28)
and Dr. John Foster:
'We think on the basis of those kinds of
calculations that we can on an economic and
practical basis, defend the Mintiteman field
against anything the Soviets will throw at
use (ref. 3, p. 225)
Because Safeguard is patently an un-
economic approach to defense of Minute-
man, the Administration is now rationaliz-
ing its deployment as a desirable add-on to a
nationwide defense that should be deployed
against China anyway.
Secretary Laird:
"We have further decided to continue de-
ployment cd Safeguard because he addition-
al coat needed to defend a portion of Min-
uteman is small if the full area defense is
bought." (ref. 5, p. 49)
Secretary Packard has estimated the costa
for Safeguard Phase I to be $4.5 billion and
for the modified Phase II (i.e. adding more
interceptors and the defeeise at Whiteman
Air Force Base) to be $5.9 billion (ref. 5, p.
16). From Secretary Laird's statement 'that
with Phase I at least 10-20% of the Minute-
men would have a heavy defense (ref. 2, p.
46) one might reasonably infer that at most
150 to 225 would be defended by Sprints in
the cue of Phase I. These figuree are obvious-
ly an upper limit on the number that could
be saved no matter what the weight of at-
tack (provided it is of a quality such that it
can penetrate the Spartan defenses). Thus,
the minimum cost per Minuteman saved
will be $20-30 million with the Phase I de-
ployment. Perhaps 50% more Minutemen
could be saved as an upper limit with the ex-
pansion to inolude Whiteman. In that case
the minimum costs would run about 520-25
million per Minuteman. Compare these costs
with those for buying additional Minutemen
(6 or 7 million each for super-hard silos [ref.
2, p. 48] plus perhaps 2 million for mis-
sile), or with the cost of additional Polaris
boats. (The whole Polaris force cost only
about twice the cost of Safeguard Phase I.)
Looked at another way the Soviet problem
of overwhelming Safeguard would be simple
Indeed, particularly if they have
The SS-9 should be able to miry a dozen or
so warheads of yield adequate, even without
accuracy improvement, to destroy the MIR.
A few month's production of SS-9's would
suffice to exhaust the Phase I defenses and
probably less than a year's production 'would
exhaust the modified Phase It defenses.
This rationalization is fantastic par-
ticularly considering that there is not now a
commitment to the full 12 site program, and
there may never be. As will be apparent sub-
sequently, the rationalization for a naeloo-
wide Safeguard, i.e. full Phase IT, is about as
weak as that for defense of Minuteman. If
one truly regarded the Chinese ratiorale
at: primary, the order of implementation of
the Safeguard program would be far different
3 Just how practical and economic the
presently proposed defense is likely to be can
be illustrated by some simple calculations,
than the Administration plans: The first two
sites deployed will provide coverage over only
about 7% of the population and Will be the
least effective of the twelve in defending U.S.
population. Two Wee deployed for optimum
defense of population would provide cover-
age over an area containing ten times as
many people. Grand Forks and Malstrom
would be the last sites deployed if we were
primarily interested in population defense
against China. Considering that, and the Net
that there is considerable likelihood that we
will never go through with a full Phase II
deployment, virtually the full cost of the
first two sites, and Whiteman as well, must be
charged to defense of Minuteman.
Secretary Laird now concedes that we could-
have much greater confidence in the deter-
rent capability of the Polaris-Poseidon fleet
alone than he vas prepared to admit a year
ago.
In the Administration's first rationalization
of Safeguard they ,'were scarcely willing to
admit the deterrent role of Polaris. With
criticism and under questioning, they event-
ually did so. Even then, however, they sug-
gested that Polaris might be vulnerable to
Soviet ASW effort to a degree inconsistent
with reasonable technical judgment. Follow-
ing further criticism they now take a more
realistic view. The technical situation re-
mains essentially as it was a year ago, but
there is considerable difference in Adminis-
tration statements as the following examples
illustrate. Note particularly in 1969 Secretary
Laird indicated serious concern after 1972--
73, but that this year he suggests some in-
crease in Polaris vulnerability after the mid--
1070's. March 30, 1969 Secretary Laird:
"The next question: Is there any reason
63 believe that our Poseidon force will be
vulnerable to preemptive attack during the
early 1970's?
"If this particular question is limited to
the period through 1972-73, I would say I
believe that our force will remain very free
from attack. If you go beyond that time
period, I would have to question that serious-
ly . . . ." (ref. 3, p. 1.92)
February 20, 1970 Secretary Laird:
"According to our best current estimates,
we believe that our Polaris and Poseidon sub-
marines at sea can be considered virtually
invulnerable today. With a highly concen-
trated effort, the Soviet Navy today might be
able to localize and destroy at sea one or
two Polaris submarines. But the massive and
expensive undertaking that would be re-
quired to extend suck a capability using any
currently known ASW techniques would take
time and would certainly be evident.
"However, a combination of technological
developments and the decision by the Soviets
to undertake a worldwide ASW effort might
result in some increased degree of Polaris/
Poseidon vulnerability beyond the mid-I970's.
I would hope that Polaris would remain
invulnerable at least through the 1970's.
But, as a defense planner, I would never
guarantee the invulnerability of any stra-
tegic system beyond the reasonably foresee-
able future, say 5-7 years." (ref. 5, p. 40)
The Administration suggests that the al-
ternative to expanding the Safeguard de-
ployment is to decide now to build new of-
fensive systems thereby exacerbating the
arms race. The argument is inconsistent with
?earl time realities.
We need not make decisions at this time
to deploy any new offensive systems if Safe-
guard is held to Phase II or cancelled. The
defense at Whiteman Air Force Base will
not be operational until 1975 at the ear-
liest (and the other sites probably won't be
either). Additional Minutemen could be de-
ployed in considerably less time. This, Secre-
tary Packard concedes:
"We think it (deployment of additional
Minutemen) would take three or four years.
including all of the administrative lead
time) ." (ref. 3, p. 1741)
The deployment of additional Minutemen
at a time when they may be obsolescent be-
cause of MIRV development is hardly very
attractive, but neither is spending billions
on an ineffective defense of those we have.
However, if one insists on increasing the
number of Minutemen that would survive a
Soviet first strike in the second half of the
decade, clearly deploying more is an option
that is preferable to defense. It would be
considerably cheaper. It would be consider-
ably more effective in increasing the number
of surviving Minuteman we would have in
the event of an attack against the force. This
would be particularly so if they could be
superhardened as may well be possible. And,
what is most important, no decision would
have to be made now. We could wait at least
a year, and more likely two, while we tried
to negotiate an end to the arms race If at
that time the construction of more Minute-
men was indicated, we could begin and they
would be operational as soon as Safeguard
would be.
Realistically, we could also wait a year or
so and then build more Poseidon submarines
If It appeared necessary. They too would be
more cast-effective, and they could probably
also be operational by toe time Safeguard
would be.
Thus, Secretary Laird is being disengenu-
ous when he says:
"In summary, our decision now to proceed
with further deployment of Safeguard gives
us another year in which to pursue SALT
without ourselves exacerbating the arms con-
trol environment through actions on offen-
sive systems." (ref. 5, ei. 50)
(2) DEFENSE AGAINST CHINA
Safeguard is unlikely le be operational by
the time a "Chinese Threat- develops.
According to Secretary Ceeird the Chinese
may have an initial operational capability
(10C) with ICBM's by early 1973 though
more likely in 1975 or 11176 (ref. 5, p. 109).
The last of the twelve Sefeguard sites could
be installed by the late 1e70's (ref. 6, p. 17).'
Obviously as a defense against China Safe-
guard won't be much good until completed
since if a few large cities are undefended
they could be attacked even if the remainder
of the defense were operational. If present
plans are implemented there would be at
least several years during which the Chinese
would have an operationel ICBM force when
the large cities of Calitornia and those of
the south would be undefended. The Pres-
ident's statement that Safeguard could pro-
vide a "virtually infallible" defense against
China (ref. 7) is technically unrealistic and
dangerous.
A single Chinese weapon of the yield they
have already tested, 3 megatons, and which
is suitable for their ICBM's (ref. 4, p. 4)
could inflict well over a million fatalities
if delivered on a large American city and a
force of 25, even if only 40% reliable could
inflict 11-12 million fate:Ales (ref. 5, pi. 43).
A defense might well reduce the number of
Chinese weapons that could be delivered but
it is totally unrealistic to expect none to
get through, and it is quite likely that sev-
eral will. There are a number of reasons for
this: the radars might es blacked out, the
Chinese might concentrate their attack
against one or two areas, they might use
penetration aids that would be highly
effective, and the defenie might just fall
catastrophically.
The President's statement is a dangerous
one in four respects:
(1) It was claimed that the anti-Chinese
defense was needed so that we could credibly
deter China from aggressive behavior vis-a-
*Last. year Secretary Laird suggested that
the full Safeguard deployment could. be
completed by mid-1976 (ref. 2, p. 28, 85).
Secretary Packard more eautiously suggested
1977 (ref. 1, p.295).
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23, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE
via its nieghbors. The clear implication is
that with Safeguard in place the United
States might take actions that it could not
prudently take in the 'alibence of defense.
This suggests that millions of American
lives might be lost if a future president, in
an unwarranted belief in Safeguard's "in-
fallibility', should take actions which might
trigger a Chinese nuclear attack against us.
(2) The statement suggests ah aggressive
approach to dealing with China; not con-
sistent with the Adininistration'g Otherwise
constructive moves in this 'area. "
(3) The statement, like the whole' Safe-
guard prop: nal, will cause a reduction in con-
fidence of the,Arnerican public and the'wortd
in the v.s. Government as the incredibility of
the argument becomes apparent.
(4) The statement suggests that the Presi-
dent is being dangerously. iselated from re-
sponsible technical opinion on questions that
seriously affect the security of the nation.
The Administration's attempt to buttress
its case for an anti-Chinese defense by argu-
ing that deterrence may not work vis-a-vis
China is unconvincing.
Secretary Laird has argued (ref. 5, p. 43-45)
that deterring China may not be feasible be-
cause such a large fraction of Chinese popu-
lation is rural and because we must have
enough weapons after war with China to
deter the Soviet Union,
It is true that only a small percentage of
Chinese population is in large cities but most
of the industry and the technical and politi-
cal leadership is concentrated there. A modest
'number of weapons delivered against the
large cities would, therefore, probably destroy
the government if not a large percentage of
the people. But even aside from that, rural
China is very vulnerable and this the Secre-
tary has not recognized. Some % of China's
population is concentrated in only about ye
of its area. Considering that, China would
be very vulnerable to a fall-out attack. This
will be especially so since outside the cities
fall-out shelter potentialities are likely to be
poor and stOckpiles of food and medical sup-
plies inadequate. A few hundred 11-52's if
loaded with high yield, surface burst weapons
could probably destroy both China's urban
and rural population. Thus, we can deter
China without compromising in any way our
missile capabilities. Moreover, considering
China's poor air defenses virtually all our
bombers would probably survive a single at-
tack or even several round trips against
China. Thus, our bomber capabilities vis-a-
vis the USSR would be reduced only slightly
should we ever execute a strike against China
designed to destroy her totally.
The Administration's claim that the Chi-
nese are unlikely to develop effective pene-
tration aids by the time Safeguard is fully
deployed or soon thereafter (ref. 6, p. 9) is
unrealistic.
.
Secretary Packard argues that the Chinese
'lack complex range instrumentation and
skilled technical people that would he re-
quired to design and test penetration aids in
which they could have confidence (op, cit.).
In making the argument lie totally misses
the point that it is we who must have con-
fidence that Chinese penetration aid's will
not work if we are to behave as if onr de-
fenses were "infallible"?not China, that
must have confidence that they will work.
The Chinese could not attack the United
States whether they had effective penetration
aids or not without inviti4 the tail de-
struction of China. Thus, the only r4ional
purpose that a Chinese ICBM capability can
serve vis-a-vis the U.S. is as a deterrent to
us. For that purpose it is our view of Chinese
penetration aid effectiveness that will be
relevant. We cannot be sure they will not
work.
In denigrating Chinese penetration aid po-
tentialities Secretary Packard 15 probably
Wrong on technical grounds as well. He cites
the fact that it has taken us ten years to
develop high-confidence penetration aids,
and uses this to buttress his argument that
"Safeguard Phase II is expected to have a
capability more than adequate to cope with
the Chinese threat in the late 1970's" (ref.
5, p. 9). In so arguing, he completely mis-
reads the history of technological emula-
tion, and that is that once a new device or
technology has been developed somewhere in
the world others can repeat the develop-
ment at much less cost and in a much shorter
time than the original pioneers. There are
countless examples of this but perhaps few
that are ?as releifant and dramatic as the
development of thermonuclear weapons. The
Intervals between a first nuclear explosion
and ?a first thermo-nuclear explosion were
7.3 and 2.7 years for the United States and
China respectively. Belief that the Chinese
cannot develop high quality penetration aids
in a much shorter time than it has taken us
is wishful thinking. If they test their first
ICBlVf in, say, 1974, we must expect them, by
the time Safeguard is fully deployed, to have
penetration aids as effective as those we now
have; and against such penetration aids the
Safeguard area defense would be ineffective.
While the weapons enthusiasts may have
schemes in mind for upgrading Safeguard so
that it woufd. be effective against an evolv-
ing Chinese capability, there is no realistic
basis for Secretary Packard's contention that
we could do so without a general thickening
of the system (ref. 6, p. 10). The best hope
of providing a reasonably effective defense
against a late 1970 Chinese capability, and
it would not be "infallible" would be to begin
building now a defense very much like the
kinds we have considered for defense of pop-
ulation and industry against the Soviet
Union, i.e. terminal type defenses for all
large American cities, and a nationwide fall-
out shelter program. A realistic anti-Chinese
defense implies an unending Program re-
quiring the expenditure of probably five to
ten times the amounts projected for Safe-
guard and it implies a defense to which the
Soviet Union would probably react by fur-
ther expanding its strategic offensive forces.
(s) DEFENSE OF BOMBERS
With the erosion of its Minuteman and
anti-Chinese rationales for Safeguard, the
Administration is likely to play up the de-
fense of bombers, but it has yet to explain
why such a defense is necessary.
Leaving aside entirely the extreme unlike-
lihood of the Soviet Union being able to de-
stroy the Polaris force simultaneously with
an attack against our ICBM's and bombers,
the Administration still has not explained
how the Soviet Union could confidently at-
tack the latter two forces. If an attack were
designed so that Soviet missiles would impact
simtiltaneously on both our missile and
bomber bases, we would have 15 to 80 min-
utes warning of the launch of Soviet ICBM's
before impact. If the bombers are in a rea-
sonable alert status a very large fraction
should be air borne before the arrival of
either Soviet ICBM's or SLBM's over the
bomber bases. On the other hand, the Soviet
Union could hardly defer launching its
ICBM's against our Minuteman bases in an
attempt to deliver a surprise SLBM attack
against the bombers. Were they to do so, they
would have to expect that the bulk of the
Minuteman force would be launched between
the time they destroyed our bombers and
the time their ICBM's would arrive over our
Minuteman bases.
Even if fully implemented Safeguard
Phase II will provide very little defense for
bombers against a Soviet SLUM attack.
While there has been little if any discus-
sion of a possible MIRV program for Soviet
SLBM's, it would be surprising if such a pro-
gram did not develop if other MIRV pro-
grams continue. If the Soviet SLBM's use
either MIRV's or high quality penetration
aids, the Safeguard area defenses may be
quite inadequate. Those air bases not de-
fended by Sprints will have very little pro-
S 6073
tection. The Administration has indeed pro-
posed terminal defenses at the bomber bases
(ref. 2, p. 78). Yet, MSR's and Sprints will be
located near at most 14 of the main operat-
ing bomber bases (ref. 3, p. 1749) that are
near enough to our coasts to make a surprise
SLBM attack feasible. To provide even a mod-
erately effective defense for bombers would
require increasing greatly the planned num-
bers of MRS's and Sprints.
( 4 ) DEFENSE AGAINST ACCIDENTS
The Administration still argues that Safe-
guard would be useful in coping with the ar-
rival over the U.S. of one or a few acciden-
tally launched missiles. Yet, it does not ex-
plain how the command and control prob-
lem would be solved. -
If Safeguard is to be effective in dealing
with accidents, it must be usable at all times.
This almost certainly implies delegation to
launch down to very low command echelons
including possibly even to the computers.
Administration spokesmen continue to be
obscure about this point, presumably either
because they do not want to upset the public
or because they have not yet decided on the
command and control philosophy that will
prevail.
(5) COSTS AND SCHEDULES
Not surprisingly Safeguard costs have
escalated and the deployment schedules have
slipped during the last year.
Last year it was claimed that the full
Safeguard Phase It (including RDT & E but
excluding AEC costs and annual operating
costs) would be $9.1 billion (ref. 2, p. 29).
Ten months later the corresponding figure is
$10.7 billion (ref. 6, p. 17), an increase of
over 17%. And the program has slipped
somewhere between 6 :months and 10 months
during the last year. (Secretary Laird ad-
mits to six or seven months slippage [ref. 8,
.p. 8] but Secretary Packard admits to 8 to 10
months [ref. 6, p. 61.)
The latter's explanations regarding slip-
page and increases in costs are interesting.
He attributes 3 months' slippage to delay in
getting Congressional approval for the Safe-
guard last year, but asserts that the remain-
der is "deliberate, to allow a more economical
and less compressed construction schedule
(5 to 7 months)" (ref. 6, p. 6). Curiously,
later on Secretary Packard attributes 6% of
the 17% increase in costs to the stretch-out
of deployment (ref. 6, p. 18). (Of the remain-
ing 11%, 4% he claims is due to inflation
and 7% to design changes and more detailed
estimates.)
We stretch out programs so that they will
be more economical, but they cost more be-
cause we stretch them out!
(6) SAFEGUARD?SOVIET REACTIONS AND SALT
Now that expansion beyond Phase I is con-
templated, the Administration's contention
that Safeguard is unlikely to lead to an ex-
pansion in Soviet Strategic capabilities is
even less convincing this year than it was
last year.
If we are to have a defense that will be sig-
nificantly effective in coping with an evolv-
ing Chinese ICBM force, the defense too
must evolve. Unless that is contemplated
there would be no sense whatever in starting
on an anti-Chinese defense program. Yet, if
we do try to build a defense that will be
effective a decade hence, it will almost neces-
sarily have to be a "thick" one, and deploy-
ment of large numbers of MSR or similar
type radars will have to begin soon. With
such moves, the Soviet Union is likely to fur-
ther expand its offenses to offset its extra-
polations of what that deployment may por-
tend in the way of a large-scale nationwide
ABM system. That would certainly be the
If costs continue to rise at this rate we
will be at the $25-$40 billion level by the
time the full Phase II deployment could be
implemented.
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S6074 CONGRESSIONAL
American reaction were we to see a similar
deployment in the Soviet Union.
A similar reaction is likely to follow a
serious effort to defend bomber bases. A num-
ber are near enough to larger cities so that
MSR's used for defense of the base could.
also be used to defend a city, and in some
cases the baste and cities are so close to each
other that the same Spirit interceptors could.
be used to defend both. If we don't put in
al,SR's and Sprints near the Lewes we won't
have much of a defense. If we do, the Soviet
Union is likely to perceive a need to expand
its offenses to offset the implied city defense
capability.
Defense of Washington will almost cer-
tainly lead to whatever Soviet targeting they
feel is required, and if need be to increases
in overall force levels, Just as the Soviet de-
fenses of Moscow have resulted in heavier
American targetting of that city.
The Administration hes argued that a full-
scale Safeguard will be less likely to stimulate
a Soviet response than Sentinel would have
been because the radars will be more remote
from large cities. However, if the map pre-
pared by the Administration is even approxi-
mately correct MSR's will be deployed within
50 or 100 miles of a number of large American
cities: Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles,
Dallas, Kansas City, Detroit, Washington,
Baltimore, and Boston. Sprints 50 miles from
such cities could not defend them. However,
the Sprints can be added relatively quickly
11 the radars are available and close enough
eo control them. Again, a Soviet reaction is
likely. We may believe we have deployed the
radars too far from cities to be useful for
terminal defense, but will they? Would we
discount MBE's 50 or 100 miles from large
Soviet cities? Not likely.
The argument tnat we need Safeguard so
that we will have a strong hand in the SALT
negotiations is far weaker this year than last.
It Is now admitted that Safeguard cannot
cope with the kind of Soviet threat that is to
be expected if the SALT Wks fall, and it
is rationalized on economic grounds as an
add-on to a nationwide anti-Chinese de-
fense. Under the circirmstances, neither the
anti-Chinese part of Safeguard nor the Min-
uteman defense is a very impressive card in
the SALT negotiations. The former is hardly
negotiable with the Russians; and the latter
Is so ineffective that it is hardly likely to
Impress the Soviet Union as something which
they should pay a price to have us forego.
REFERENCES
( 1 ) Strategic and Foreign Policy Implica-
tions of ABM Systems, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on International Organize,
lion and Disarmament Affairs of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, United States
Senate, Ninety-first Congress, First Session,
March 6, 11, 13, 21, 16, and 28, 1969.
(2) Safeguard Antiballistic Missile System,
Hearings before Subcommittees of the Com-
mittee on Appropriatione. House of Repre-
sentatives, Ninety-first Congress, First Sea-
sin, May 22, 1969.
? (3) Authorization for Military Procure-
ment, Research and Development, Fiscal
Year 1970, and Reserve Strength. Hearings
before the Committee on Armed Services,
United States Senate, Ninety-first Congress,
First Session, March 19, 20, 25, 26, 27; April
1, 2, 3, 15, 16, 17, 22, 23, 29, 30; May 13, 14,
15; June 3,4, 1969.
(e) StateMent by Dr. John Foster, Direc-
tor, Defense Research and Engineering, on
? 71 Modified Phase II Safeguard Program,
24 February 1970.
(5) Statement of Secretary of Defense
Melvin R. Laird before a joint Session of the
Senate Armed Services Committee and the
Senate Subcommittee on Department of De-
fense Appropriations on the Flecal Year 1971
Defense Program and Budget, February 20,
1970.
(6) Statement Of Deputy Secretary of De-
fense David Packard to Committee on Armed
RECORD? SENATE
Services, United States house of Represents-
three. March 9, 1970.
7) President Nixon's News Conference of
January 30, 1970.
(3) Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird's
News Conference of February 24, 1970,
EXECUTIVE SESSION
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senate go
into executive session to consider nomi-
nations for the U.S. circuit court, the
U.S. district court, U.S. attorneys, and
U.S. marshals. I do so with the under-
standing that they were reported unani-
mously by the committee earlier today,
and they have been cleared on both sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
SPONG). Without objection, it is so or-
dered.
U.S. CIRCUIT COURT
The assistant legislative clerk read the
nomination of Wilbur F. Pell, Jr., of
Indiana, to be a U.S. circuit judge,
seventh circuit.
The PRESIDING Di.viCER. Without
objection, the nomination is considered
and confirmed.
.1101IMMIN?11111.0????????????..
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to read sundry nominations to the
U.S. district court.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the nominations
be considered en bloc.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, the nominations are considered
and confirmed en bloc.
U.S. ATT()RNEYS
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to read sundry nominations of
U.S. attorneys.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the nominations
be considered en bloc.
The PRESIDING OteriCER. Without
objection, the nominations are considered
and confirmed en bloc.
U.S. MARSHALS
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceed'ed to read sundry nominations of
U.S. marshals.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unaniraous consent that the nominations
be considered en bloc.
The PRESIDING 01.1.1er-rt. Without
objection, the nominations are considered
and confirmed en bloc.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the President be
immediately notified of the confirmation
of these norninations.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
LEGISLATIVE SESSION
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, T
move that the Senate resume the con-
sideration of legislative business.
The motion yeas agreed to: and the
April 23, 1970
Senate resumed the consideration of
legislative business.
NAMING OF FEDERAL OFFICE
BUILDING AND U.S. COURTHOUSE
IN CHICAGO, ILL.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President. I ask
the Cha:ir to lay before the Senate a
message from the House of Representa-
tives on S. 3253.
The PRESIDING CA. ICEit, (Mr.
Srobro) laid before the Senate the
amendments of the House of Represent-
atives to the bill (S.3253) to provide that
the Federal Office Building and U.S.
Courthouse in Chicago, Ill., shall be
named the "Everett McKinley Dirksen
Building East" and that the Federal of-
fice building to be constructed in Chi-
cago, Ill., shall be named the "Everett
McKinley Dirksen Building West" in
memory of the late Everett McKinley
Dirksen, a Member of Congress of the
United States from the State of Illinois
from 1933 to 1969, which were- to strike
out all after the enacting clause and
insert:
That the Federal Office Building and
United States Courthouse e'. 219 South Dear-
born Street in Chicago, Uncials, shall be re-
named the "Everett McKinley Dirksen Build-
ing" in memory of the late everett McKinley
Dirksen, a distinguished Member of the
United States House of Repeftentatives from
the State of Illinois from 1933 to 1949 and
of the United States Senate from 1950 to
1969. Any reference to the Federal Office
Building and United States Courthouse at
219 South Dearborn Street in Chicago, Illi-
nois, in any law, regulation, document, rec-
ord, map, or other paper at he United States
shall be deemed a reference to such building
as the "Everett McKinley Dirksen Building".
And amend the title so as to read: "An
act to provide that the Federal Office
Building and U.S. Courthouse in Chicago,
Ill., shall be named the 'Everett McKinley
Dirksen Building'."
Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr.
President, I move that the Senate concur
in the amendments of the House with an
amendment which I send to the desk on
behalf of myself and Seaators HRUSKA,
MANSFIELD, SCOTT, MUNDT', BURDICK, and
CURTIS.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
SPONG). The amendment will be stated.
The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK read
as follows:
SEC. 2. Upon a determination that a local
educational agency lacks tie fiscal capacity
to provide an adequate free public education
for children of persons who Live and work on
Federal property, and if suiih children con-
stitute not less than 25 pereent of the total
enrollment, the Secretary tff Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare shall from sums already
available make emergency payments for the
current school year to such local educational
agency as may be necessary to provide a free
public education for such children: Provided,
That the total of such patments shall not
exceed $2,500,000 and shall not exceed the
average per-pupil cost to such agency for all
children eligible to receive a free public edu-
cation from such agency, less Federal and
State payments to such agei toy for free pub-
lic education.
Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr.
President? this amendment has been
cleared by the leadersho, the distin-
guished Senator from Montana (Mr.,
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Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr.
President, I suggest the absence of a
quorum.
The PRESIDING OrriCER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceed-
ed to call the roll.
Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
NINETY-EIGHTH ANNUAL ARBOR
DAY
Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, in the
tremendous outpouring of public re-
sponse and cooperation on Earth Day
yesterday, another venerable observance
of equal importance may have been over-
looked by some who are interested
conserving the Nation's great natur
heritage.
The observance of which I speak i
the 98th annual Arbor Day. While Arbo
Day is observed in every State in the
Union and in many foreign countries, it
Is a most important celebration to Ne-
braska because Nebraska is the State in
which it originated.
Nebraska statute has established Arbor
Day on April 22 and decreed it a legal
holiday. It is celebrated no less vigor-
ously in Florida and West Virginia, which
have two Arbor Days each year, and in
Utah.
Whether Arbor Day is officially ob-
served on April 22, or on other dates as
it may be in other States, I think it is
Important to remind this body that mil-
lions of people do observe this occasion
-every year.
It is also important to point out that
in an age when we are increasingly con-
cerned about the dissipation of our nat-
ural resources, we would do well as a
Nation to reemphasize the basic values
which motivated J. Sterling Morton to
establish the first Arbor Day in 1872 in
Nebraska.
Mr. Morton, newspaper publisher, hor-
ticulturist, and public servant, conceived
the idea of Arbor Day in Nebraska City,
Nebr., where he had moved from Michi-
gan. Disturbed by Nebraska's miles of
treeless plains, he inspired fellow Ne-
braskans to aelTote &le -day each spring
to mass tree-planting.
Within 16 years after his mass tree-
planting day had become an official State
observance, more than 600 million trees
had been planted and 100,000 acres of
forest had been created on the once-
barren Nebraska prairies.
The idea of Arbor Day spread quickly
and within a few years, more than 35
States conducted their own observance.
Today, every State observes the holiday,
and in addition it is commemorated in
England, Canada, Australia, British
West Indies, South Africa, New Zealand,
France, Mexico, Norway, Russia, Japan,
and China.
J. Sterling Morton went on to serve his
State as secretary of the Nebraska Ter-
ritory and president of the State board
of agriculture, and his Nation as Secre-
tary of Agriculture under President
Grover Cleveland. But, with all his excel-
lent contributions to his State and Na-
tion, he is best remembered for the con-
servation instincts which he instilled
into a Nation of abundance in its early
years.
Nebraska City, Nebr., the home of
Arbor Day, is planning a massive cele-
bration May 1-3 for this year's observ-
ance. Among the many events scheduled
will be a tree planting by the National
Guard in memory of the late Ray Thur-
man, a former Guard company com-
mander. A similar pla
Home will hono veteran kille
a war.
It will my honor to attend the Ne-
brask ity celebration, along with many
0th- State officials and dignitaries from
a ver the State.
I am pleased to report, Mr. President,
that the Senate Judiciary Committee
today has reported to the floor House
Joint Resolution 251, which authorizes
the President to proclaim the last Friday
of April each year as National Arbor Day.
I urge the Senate to approve this resolu-
tion, enabling the President to elevate
his important Arbor Day function to the
tional status which it so well deserves.
e, in Nebraska, are proud of Arbor
Day nd we observe it vigorously. Several
other tates follow suit. But, too, often,
the ob vances have fallen into a status
of a for ? ality which cannot be ignored
but is not ctively observed.
We are n w in a period in this Nation
when we ar more and more concerned
that our resou ces will be drained off and
lost to future g ? erations. I commend to
those who are so oncerned, the example
of J. Sterling Mo f?n. If more of us would
take his positive a ? 'roach to solving our
resource problems, e might soon dis-
cover that we were i deed beginning to
solve them.
Two fine newspaper The New York
Times and the Linco Nebr., Sunday
Journal & Star, last we kend took note
of the importance of bor Day. I ask
unanimous consent to ye the articles
printed in the RECORD.
There being no obj ? ion, the articles
were ordered to be p d in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Lincoln (Near.) Journal and Star,
Apr. 1', 1970]
J. STERLING MOST. 'S IDEA AN ECOLOGICAL
STEP?ARBOR D ROOTS DEEP IN STATE
(BY 'Opal Y. Palmer)
Arbor Day is observed around the world by
millions each year.
To many J. Sterling Morton's Arbor Lodge
Is synonymous with the concept. Today the
lodge is a state park with its awn arboretum,
the family stables, a formal garden and a
2,000-tree pine grove planted by Morton in
1892.
This park contains a three-room cabin
grown into a 52-room mansion on the site
of his original squatter's claim.
. .. When the noted agriculturaist brought
his bride, Caroline Joy, from Michigan to
Nebraska in 1855 their destination was a 160-
acre claim in the Nebraska Territory near the
brawling river bluffs town of Nebraska City.
Morton's land was fertile but practically
treeless although many trees grew on the
river bluffs. After building an L-shaped
house, he began planting trees. His site was
probably the first in any prairie state to be
landscaped. He set shade trees, planted an
orchard and later landscaped with vines,
shrubs and flower beds.
J. Sterling Morton emphasized tree plant-
ing through oratory, journalism and politics.
He spoke on the subject at the First Terri-
torial Fair in 1859 and at the dedication of
the University of Nebraska in 1871. He used
his pen in a tree campaign in the Nebraska
City News.
After Nebraska statehood in 1867, Morton
encouraged farmers?through publications
and personal contact?to plant orchards. He
employed political influence to get trees
planted in honor of notables visiting the
state.
At the 1872 annual meeting of the Ne-
braska Board of Agriculture of which he was
a member, Morton presented a resolution
that April 10 be set aside for tree planting
and that it be called Arbor Day.
The resolution was adopted. But in 1885
the state legislature made Arbor Day a legal
holiday and set the official date on April 22,
J. Sterling Morton's birthday.
Other states followed Nebraska's example.
It was almost as though an old Indian legend
were in operation, where one tree whispered
the message to another. For today, every
state except Alaska observes a tree-planting
day.
Nebraska's act inspired Illinois to proclaim
an Arbor Day in 1888.
When the white man arrived, half of the
area which is now Illinois was wooded. Early
settlers permitted forests to burn unchecked
and ravaged trees for industry. Conservation-
ists seized on Morton's Arbor Day idea in an
attempt to repair the damage with syste-
matic planting.
C. A. Hammond, secretary of the Illinois
State Horticultural Society, encouraged citi-
zens in a public statement to plant "one or
more specimens of all our native trees" in
a public park for every town and village. He
recommended special trees for Arbor Day
planting "for school and church yards, along
roadsides, and in cemeteries,"
As is true with many good causes, there
was' some dissension. Citizens objected to
roadside plantings on the grounds that the
shade would prevent the rapid drying up of
mud after rains.
Jabez Webster of Centralia, Illinois, wel-
comed Arbor Day because: "In our great
country, in the scramble for the almighty
dollar, we have almost lost sight of the beau-
tiful in nature."
The 1,200-acre Morton Arboretum is situ-
ated at Lisle, rn., west of Chicago. The abore-
turn, which contains about 4,800 species and
varieties of plants and trees, is open to the
public year round.
MORTON AG SECRETARY
Other countries have adopted the Arbor
Day practice. By 1961, a tree-planting day
had been set aside in England, Canada, Aus-
tralia, British West Indies, South Africa, New
Zealand, France, Mexico, Norway, Russia,
Japan and China.
Morton was defeated for governor three
times. However he served his state in many
official capacities and was secretary of agri-
culture under president Grover Cleveland
beginning in 1893.
Joy Morton, J. Sterling Morton's son,
deeded sixty-five of the original acres to the
state in 1923 as a memorial.
Thousands of nature lovers stop each year
at Arbor Lodge to delight in the blossoms
and pattern gardens, the heritage of a pio-
neer generation.
[From the New York Times, Apr. 19, 19701
WHAT BECAME OF ARBOR DAY?
(By Richard Reinhardt)
Two great holidays of American origin
outshine all others in their freedom from
chauvinism, sectarianism and commercial
exploitation.
One is Thanksgiving, a feast of brother-
hood and gratitude based upon a long and
honorable historic tradition. The other is a
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE April 23, 1970
neglected, ridiculed, almost forgotten festival
called Arbor Day, which celebrates human
kinship with the living earth. Of all our
major anniversaries, Arbor Day is the least
known and least respected, although it prob-
ably is the most significant of all holidays in
an era of destructive technology, irretriev-
able waste and the dark stain of poisons in
ills. air and water.
Unlike the general run of civic and re-
agious celebrations, Arbor Day was the de-
iiberate creation of one man, a Nebraska
newspaper publisher named Julius Sterling
Morton. It was Morton's happy notion, In-
t/aired by _ancient European and Middle East-
ern folkways, to devote a day each spring to
mass treeplanting. During his long career as
a horticulturist, editorial writer and politi-
cian, he succeeded in spreading this idea to
several dozen states and a handful of foreign
countries.
Morton first gave' evidence of his zeal for
forestry in 1854, when he moved from his
boyhood home in Michigan to the treeless
prairies of Nebraska. Taking squatter's rights
on 160 acres of naked loam on the west bank
of the Missouri River, he built a four-room
house for his young wife and almost im-
mediately began planting slips and seeds.
Within a few years he had surrounded the
cottage with a jungle of shade trees, shrub-
bery and vines and was using the columns of
his Nebraska City News to urge his neighbors
to get busy with their own landscaping
projects.
With his friend, Robert W. Furnas, who
bad started a large orchard in nearby Brown-
ville, Morton toured eastern Nebraska to en-
courage farmers to plant fruit trees. It was
lonely to the credit of these two men that
the area became an important fruit-growing
region.
But Morton's enthusiasm for vegetation
went far beyond uses of commercial agricul-
ture. He saw by treeplanting as a communal
function with social and educational values.
He hounded churches, schools and clubs to
undertake planting projects, and he came
up with the suggestion that Nebraska towns
should set out young trees to commemorate)
such notable events as the visit of a distin-
guished guest, the dedication of a public
building, or the anniversary of a respected
leader.
For four years-1858 to 1861?as secretary
at the Nebraska Territory, and later as presi-
dent of the State Board of Agriculture, Mor-
ton had frequent occasion to promulgate
both his simple, Jeffersonian faith in the no-
bility of small farmers and his love of trees.
He seldom passed up an opportunity to state
the case:
"If every farmer in Nebraska will plant out
and cultivate an orchard and a Rower gar-
den, together with a few forest trees, this
will become mentally and morally the beat
agricultural state in the Union."
This message with its calm faith in the
ultimate virtue of hugging close to the earth
was balm to the homesteaders of that raw
territory, where nature was harsh, tillage
was difficult and failure was common. When
Morton published a resolution in 1872, call-
ing on this courageous fellowship of farm-
ers to conduct a state-wide day of tree-
planting in early April, the Nebraskans re-
sponded by 'planting something over a m1:1-
lion trees.
Two years later Morton's friend, Robert
Pumas, who had been elected Governor of
the state, proclaimed April 8 the official Arbor
Day. With this authoritative blessing, the
holiday blossomed into Nebraska's favorite
public event. Over the next 16 years, the
people of the state planted more than 600
million trees and created 100,000 acres cif
forest on the once-open plains. The Nebraska
legislature in 1885 made Arbor Day a legal
holiday, setting it on the date of Sterling
Morton's birthday, April 22.
Arbor Day spread with marvelous speed.
Kansas, Tennessee, Minnesota and Ohio
quickly adopted the Idea. By 1890, 35 states
had established some kind of Arbor Day
each one picking a date that was appropriate
to the local climate.
Few states kept Arbor Day with as much
enthusiasm as did Nebraska, but few dared
to ignore the occasion, Then as now, the
word "conservation" was a shibboleth. The
United States rapidly was changing from a
rural nation of small farmers into an urban
nation of factory workers, and this senti-
mental rural, earth-centered ceremony
seemed to provide a link with the past and
a promise for the future. Cynical legislators
saw this harmless holiday as a sop for the
worriers who were already complaining about
disappearing forests and lost wilderness. Ar-
bor Day? Why not? How much easier it would
be to plant a few new trees once a year than
to forbid the wanton cutting of virgin tim-
ber.
What has happened to Arbor Day? On
paper it is flourishing. Every state in the
union gives it some form of official sanction.
two states (Nebraska and Utah) make it a
legal holiday, and two other states (Florida
and West Virginia) celebrate it twice a year.
Elementary school classes everywhere set out
arborvitae trees along the parking strip.
Ladies clubs adorn the facades of telephone
exchanges and state and Federal tree nurs-
eries ship out millions of seedlings to be
planted in windbreaks, woodlots and erosion
barriers.
But these demonstrations of amateur agri-
culture do not add up to a great national
sentiment for the stewardship of the earth.
They are only ludicrous parodies of a pio-
neer ritual that was intended to seal a yearly
covenant with nature and to inculcate in
young and old a reverence for the earth
and a sense of personal responsibility for its
perpetual renewal.
The spirit is gone dormant. Arbor Day is
a sham. It goes on, year after year, but it
no longer seems important.
Part of the trouble is that Arbor Day be-
gan in a struggling, frontier society that
has disappeared. Once the buffalo grass had
been plowed under and "village adornment
societies" had done their work of planting
cotton woods and elms on the residential
streets of the Great American Desert, Arbor
Day lost its compelling urgency.
Then, too, America has become an urban
nation. Our tastes are more sophisticated.
Family picnics at the country fairgrounds no
longer amuse us. On holidays we drive 300
to 400 miles to go watersking. Arbor Day
smacks of the rural past. It reminds us of
lukewarm lemonade, speeches on the court-
house steps, Main Street, outhouses, dia-
lect jokes and other crudities we have out-
grown.
The saddest reason for the decline of Ar-
bor Day is that many Americans have lost
their easy confidence in the positivist prin-
ciples that guided Sterling Morton and thou-
sands of tree-planting committees since his
time. Recent history has given ample evi-
dence that the good, the true and the beau-
tiful do not inevitably triumph. The faith
of a Nebraska editor in the ultimate progress
of civilization through the promulgation of
shade trees and flower gardens now seems
blissfully naive. We have learned that trees
grow in slums and in concentration camps
and on battlefields. Haw can we pretend
that planting trees will guarantee a general
Improvement in the moral quality of man-
kind?
The questions is why do we bother to keep
Arbor Day on the calendar? In its present
form, it is a mockery of the very principles
it espouses. It would be worth keeping only
if it could be revived and reestablished as a
national day of homage to the earth. If that
should happen, Arbor Day could become the
most important holiday in the year.
There are reasons to think this observ-
ance would be welcomed byanost Americans.
The harshness of frontier life has, in a sense,
returned to this richly favored continent. In
the midst of luxuriant technological devel-
opment, we find ourselves looking forward
into a wasteland as dark and dry as any that
confronted a starving immigrant on the
Great Plains, Once again, we are confronted
by the frailty and finite limits of the natural
environment.
It would do us spiritual and practical good
to have a day in which to demonstrate that
we are not helpless to save ourselves from
this crisis, to show that, as a nation, we are
capable of owing as well as reaping, of heal-
ing as well as hurting, of creating as well as
destroying. Arbor Day would be a pledge to
our children that we will not let the world
go to waste: that there will, indeed, be blue
skies, greenery and clear water, and that trees
will endure.
To serve this object, Arbor Day must be-
come a legal, national holiday. Past efforts
to accomplish this have fenced, but it is time
to make the effort again. Even if it is impos-
sible to find a date to suit all climates, a date
could be chosen that will satisfy a majority
of states. April 22, Morton's birthday, might
well be as suitable as any.
When a date has been chosen, Arbor Day
could be called each year by Presidential
proclamation, as is Thanksgiving. The Presi-
dent could appoint a national committee to
advise him on programs of environmental
concern that can be undertaken as Arbor Day
projects. The committee could coordinate
state and local projects so that the impact
of Arbor Day would be immediate, conspicu-
ous and exemplary.
Above all, the pattern of Arbor Day activi-
ties must change to suit the mood and man-
ners of today. This holiday is too important
to be laid out and embalmed in a 19th-cen-
tury costume. Arbor Day needs a fresh array
of ceremonial symbols, an infusion of new
ideas.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, I sug-
gest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
YOUNG of Ohio). The clerk will call the
roll.
The assistant legislative clerk- pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
?5,41
PRESIDENT NIXON MAKES MAJOR
CONTRIBUTION TO STRATEGIC
RESTRAINT
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, the be-
ginning of the strategic arms limitation
talks is an event of utmost importance.
The success of these vital negotiations
will depend on the willingness of both
the Soviet Union and the United States
to accept certain mutual restraints in
the interest of their common security.
It is important for both Americans and
Soviets to develop greater appreciation
of each other's purposes, And in our
quest for joint limitations on strategic
arms, we need to couple a heightened
sense of urgency with a sober under-
standing that there is still time to ward
off a new spiral in the nuclear com-
petition.
The Soviet Union, speaking through
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S 6079
April 23, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?
an historic Pravda article of March 7, not lose sight of this important shift in particular program to which General Ryan
referred did not receive Department of De-
struck precisely this balance. the program. fense approval for funding in the forthcom-
ing the difficulties? Of still greater significance has been Defense budget.
an unpublicized change in the plans for
Wrote Pravada? the U.S. MIRV program. Those of us I cannot exaggerate the importance of
it is obvious that there is still time and who have worked for many months to the President's decision to abandon the
there are still possibilities for reaching an
support a mutual ban on MIRV testing proposed program to perfect a hard-
derstanclng which all states await and
by which they will gain . . . If both sides and deployment have stressed the hazard target MIRV capability. The scope of this
intend to hold honest talks without striv- that such systems pose for mutual deter- commitment to avoid destabilizing tech-
tag to obtain any unilateral military ad-. rence. We have stressed that such weap- nology is underscored by the parallel de-
vantages and if the negotiations proceed ons could ultimately destablize the bal- CiSiori not to press forward with a pro-
from the need to insure equal security for ance of power by posing an intolerable gram to improve the guidance and
both sides . . '. , then one can count on threat to hardened missile sites. At the accuracy of the Poseidon missile system.
achieving agreed solutions, same time, however, it has been stressed Mr. President, certainly these meas-
Much the same tone was sounded by that the first generation U.S. MIRV sys- ures of restraint do not mean that we
the Soviet Party leader, Mr. Brezhnev, tems are too inaccurate and too low yield should proceed with the planned deploy-
on the eve of the Vienna talks: to pose a threat to hard targets. ment of less accurate MIRV systems in
If the u.S. government really wants a To perfect highly precise MIRV sys- the coming years. In my opinion, such
strategic arms limitation treaty, . . . pros- tems with adequate yield to destroy weapons are not yet required and will
peets for the negotiations may be viewed hardened missile silos would require a not be until there is a substantial expan-
positively. The Soviet Union in any case, concentrated development program over sion of Soviet ABM capabilities. Much to
will do all within its power to see that a period of several years and costing tens be preferred would be a joint arrange-
these talks prove useful, of millions of dollars. Unfortunately, ment in SALT by which both countries
These observations are a constructive from the very beginning, discussions of refrain from proliferating ABM systems
prelude to the substantive discussions the U.S. MIRV program have been am- and introducing multiple-target capa-
now getting underway. biguous. While primary attention has bilities into their offensive missile forces.
All of us know the deep suspicion with been given to the function of ABM pene- We must continue to seek a ban on MIRV
which each country has come to view tration for retaliatory purposes, there testing and deployment.
the other. Just as Americans have been have been frequent allusions to possible But I believe it is of critical importance
apprehensive about the Soviet Union's applications of MIRV against hard tar- that the United States is exercising re-
true purposes, so the Soviet Union has gets. Preliminary studies of such appli- straint on advanced development of even
been prone to doubt America's genuine cations were in fact begun some years more dangerous MIRV weapons. It i- an-
interest in arms control. ago, before President Nixon explicitly other indication of Mr. Nixon's earnest
It is essential that Moscow understand defined American strategic policy as one desire to find a mutually acceptable basis
that the United States is indeed dedicated of mutual deterrence. for stabilizing the strategic balance and
to agreed and verifiable arms limitations These studies account for much of the for enhancing the security of both our
which will serve the interests of both our anxiety over MIRV deployment. For ex- nations.
peoples. By now I hope the Soviet nego- ample, on January 16, 1968, the Depart- My purpose in making these comments
tiators in Vienna are already reporting ment of Defense publicly indicated today is to highlight a hopeful and for-
to their Governrnent the obvious fact that that? ward-looking action by the American
the United States has prepared for these Each new mritv missile warhead will be far Government. In the initial days of the
negotiations in the most comprehensive more accurate than any previous or existing SALT discussions in Vienna, this signal
and serious manner. The intensive work warheads. They will be far better suited for
contribution to mutual security should
destruction of hardened enemy missiles than
and evident good will of the American
any existing warhead. be reassuring to the Soviet Union. The
delegation will, I trust, have impressed Soviet leaders can be confident that their
Itself upon Deputy Foreign Minister As recently as last October 7, the Air forces are not in imminent danger from
Semenov and his colleagues. Force Chief of . Staff, Gen. John Ryan, the relatively crude American MIRV sys-
In this connection the United States alluded to such advanced MIRV systems tems which are being developed. They
has undertaken a major act of strategic in testimony before the House Appropri- should also find assurance in the knowl-
restraint which should be emphasized. It ations Committee: edge that any specific development pro-
is an act grounded on President Nixon's We hate a program we are pushing to in- gram to produce a true hard-target capa-
admirable and decisive commitment to crease the yield of our warheads said decrease bility in the U.S. rvi-mv systems would
mutual deterrence as the fundamental the circular error probable so that we have
what we call a hard target killer which we take years and would be highly visible
rationale for American strategic forces.through the elaborate test programs re-
tdiomneot have in the inventory at the present
Over a year ago, the President set forth quired, not to mention the congressional
his awareness that, in today's world, and public reviews which such a pro-
Mutual security depends on mutual de- It is wholly understandable that such posal would arouse. I do not believe that,
terrence. He made clear that neither the statements would alarm those responsi- on present evidence, the Congress would
Soviet Union nor the United States could ble for the protection of Soviet strategic authorize such a dangerous and unwar-
safely attempt to deny the other the forces. It is also quite clear that such ranted development.
capacity to retaliate. Any such effort programs would be incompatible with the By the same token, this act of restraint
would be futile, since both countries will judicious strategic policy adopted by
is an invitation to the Soviet Union. The
take whatever action is required to President Nixon. It is for that reason
maintain a confident second-strike capa- essential to make absolutely clear a far-
United States is profoundly concerned
bility. Thus, programs which seem to reaching commitment which the Presi-
about potential hard-target applications
of the Soviet SS-9 missiles, which al-
jeopardize either side's retaliatory forces dent has now undertaken.
ready are deployed in substantial num-
In the course of numerous exchanges
are guaranteed to stimulate compensat- which the President and I have had on bers. It would be most conducive to prog-
ing changes or increases in those forces.
the dangerous implications of Dimly ress in the SALT negotiations if the So-
On this central insight President Nixonviets were equally prepared to provide
technology, Mr. Nixon has indicated his
has based his search for mutual armscredible assurances that the SS-9 and
specific decision not to pursue the pro-
control. It required the reorientation of gram to which General Ryan referred. other Soviet weapons were not being re-
America's planned ABM program toward In a letter of December 29, 1969, the fined for possible use against U.S. missile
a principal focus on defense of the U.S. President reiterated his basic commit- sites. I remain convinced that the most
deterrent forces, recognizing that no de- merit to maintain our deterrent, but not promising approach to such 'mutual
.fense of American cities was feasible to engage in programs which threaten guarantees would be an end to MIRV
against the size and character of nuclear any nation with a first strike. The Presi- testing and a prompt suspension of fur-
attack which the Soviet Union can dent indicated: ther deployments of offensive and de-
mount. Whatever our views of the pro- There is no current U.S, program to develop fens-ive missiles on both sides, as the
posed Safeguard deployment, we should a so-called hard-target MIRV capability. The Senate recommended in its overwhelm-
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S 6080 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE April 23, 1970
hg approval of Senate Resolution 211
2 weeks ago.
Surely the Soviet Union must share our
perception that security can Only suffer
from a continued arms race. And surely
a comparable Soviet willingness to un-
dertake concrete acts of restraint would
be the most hopeful augury for rapid
progress in Vienna.
c;.0MMUNICATIONS FROM EXECU-
TIVE DEPARTMENTS, ETC.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore (Mr. HOLLAND) laid before the Sen-
ate the following letters, which were
referred as indicated:
PROPOSED LEGISLATION To PROVIDE FOR REIM-
BURSEMENT OF THE TREASURE BY THE
PANAMA CAINAL COMPANY
A letter from the President, Panama Canal
Company, transmitting a draft of proposed
legislation to provide for reimbursement of
the Treasury by the Panama Canal Company
for the annuity paid to the Republic of
Panama (with an accompanying paper); to
The Committee on Armed Services.
Ps ?POSED LEGISLATION To REVISE THE PROMO-
TION SYSTEM FOR CERTAIN OFFICERS OF THE
RESERVE COMPONENTS OF THE ARIVIY
A letter from the Secretary of the Army,
transmitting a draft of proposed legislation
to amend titles 10 and 32. United States Code,
to revise the promotion system for certain
officers of the Reserve components of the
Army (with accompanying papers); to the
CeminIttee on Armed Services,
REPORT ON PROPOSED FACILITIES PROJECTS FOR
AIR NATIONAL GUARD AND AIR FORCE RESERVE
letter from the Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense (Installations and Housing) ,
transmitting, pursuant to law, a report o:n
tim location, nature, and estimated cost cif
certain facilities projects proposed to be
undertaken ler the Air National Guard and
Air Force Reserve subsequent to 30 June 1970
(oith an acCompanying report); to the Corn-
ttee on Armed Services,
REPORT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
A letter from the Secretary of Defense,
transmitting, pursuant to law, a secret report
relating to funds obligated in the chemical
warfare and biological research program
I with an accompanying report); to the Com-
mittee on Armed Services.
PR )POSED LEGISLATION To AMEND THE MILI-
TARY SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT or 1967
A letter from the Director, National Head-
quarters, Selective Service System, trans-
mitting a draft of proposed legislation to
13,irend the Military Selective Service Act of
1967 to provide authority for the President
to phase out undergraduate student defer-
ments, and to modify the method of allocat-
ing quotas and calls (with an accompanying
paper); to the Committee on Armed Services..
PROPOSED LEGISLATION To P'URTHEE THE RE-
DUCTION or DRAFT Cams me THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES
A letter from the Secretary of Defense,
transmitting a draft of proposed legislation
to amend title 37, United States (lode, to
fin ther the reduction of draft calls in' the
armed forces of the United States by in-
creasing the pay rates of certain enlisted
members* of the uniformed services (with an
accompanying paper); to the Committee on
Armed Services.
BED'ORT OF FEDERAL CONTRIBUTIONS PROGRAM
EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES
A letter from the Director of Civil Defense,
u asinitting, pursuant to law, the report of
Pee end contributions program equipment
aa,c,_ facilities for the quarter ended March
31, 1970 (with an accompanying report); to
the Committee on Armed Services.
REPORT OF DEPARTMENT OF ARMY CONTRACTS
FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AWARDED
WITHOUT FORMAL ADVERTISEMENT
A letter from the Secretary of the Army,
transmitting, pursuant; to law, a report of
Department of Army contracts for military
construction awarded without formal adver-
tisement for the period July 1 through De-
cember 31, 1969 (with an accompanying re-
port); to the Committee on Armed Services.
REPORT OF U.S. SOLDIERS` HOME
A letter from the Secretary of the Army,
transmitting, pursuant to law, the annual
report of the U.S, Soldiers' Home for fiscal
year 1969 (with an accompanying report);
to the Committee on Armed Services.
PROPOSED LEGISLATION AUTHORIZING DIRECT
LOANS TO VETERANS FOR SPECIALLY ADAPTED
HOUSING
A letter from the Administrator, Veterans'
Administration, transmitting a draft of pro-
posed legislation to amend section 1811 of
title 38, United States Code, to authorize the
Veterans' Administration to make direct
loans to any veteran who is determined to
be eligible for assistance in acquiring spe-
cially adapted housing under chapter 21 of
title 38, united states Code (with an ac-
companying paper); to the Committee on
Banking and Currency.
PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO INCREASE TAX ON
MOTOR VEHICLE FUELS SOLD IN THE DIS-
TRICT OF COLUMBIA
A letter from the assistant to the Com-
intesioner, Executive office, Government of
tho District of Columbia, transmitting a
dreft of proposed legislation to amend the
act entitled "An (Let to provide for a tax on
motor vehicle fuels sold within the District
of Columbia, and for other purposes" (with
an accompanying paper); to the Committee
on the District of Columbia,
PROPOSED SMALL laosiwass TAXATION ACT OF
1970
A letter from the Acting Secretary of the
Treasury, transmitting a draft of proposed
legislation to amend the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 to ease the tax burdens of small
businesses, and for other purposes (with
accompanying papers): to the Committee on
Finance.
REPORTS OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
A letter from the Comptroller General of
the United States, transmitting, pursuant to
law, a report on the need to improve mili-
tary supply systems in the Far East. De-
partment of Defense, dated April 21, 1970
(with an accompanying report); to the Com-
mittee on Government Operations.
A letter from the Comptroller General of
the United States, transmitting, pursuant to
law, a report on further improvement needed
In the management of magnetic tapes by
Goddard Space Flight Center, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration,
dated April 22, 1970 (with an accompanying
report); to the Committee on Government
Operations.
PROPOSED LEGISLATION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
PUBLIC LANDS FROM FIRES
A letter from the Assistant Secretary of the
Interior, transmitting a draft of proposed
legislation to authorize the Secretary of the
Interior to enter into contracts for the pro-
tection of public lands from fires, in advance
of appropriations therefor, and to twice re-
new such contracts (with an accompanying
paper); to the Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs.
ADMISSION INTO THE UNITED STATES OF CER-
TAIN .ALEENS--WITHDRAWAL OF NAME
A letter from the Commissioner, Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, Depart-
ment of Justice, withdrawing the name of
Mr. Howe Peek Tang from a report relat-
ing to aliens whose deportation has been
suspended, transmitted to the Senate on Sep-
tember 1, 1969; to the Committee on the
Judiciary.
WILLIAM B. RICHARDSON V. DAVID M. KENNEDY
A letter from the Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Department of Justice. transmitting, for
the information of the Senate, the fact that
a citizen taxpayer has instituted an action
in the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania, challenging the
constitutionality of Public Law 90-208, under
which the rate of payment of compensation
to Members of Congress has been deter-
mined; to the Committee on Post Office and
Civil Service.
PROSPECTUS To Alumni CERTAIN PUBLIC
BUILDING PROJECTS
A letter from the Administrator, General
Services Administration, transmitting, pur-
suant to law, a prospectut which contains
proposed amendments to 15 authorized pub-
lic buildings projects (with accompanying
papers); to the Committee on Public Works.
REPORT ON REVISED ESTIMATE OF COST OF
COMPLETING THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF' IN-
TERSTATE AND DEFENSE HIGHWAYS
A letter from the Secretary of Transpor-
tation, transmitting, pursuant to law, a re-
port on a revised estimate of the cost of
completing the National System of Inter-
state and Defense Highways prepared for the
purpose of apportioning Interstate System
funds authorized for the faecal years ending
June 30, 1972, June 30, 1973, and June 30;
1971 (with an accompanying report ) ; to the
Committee on Public Works.
PROPOSED DISASTER ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1970
A letter from the Director, Office of Emer-
gency Preparedness, Executive Office of the
President, transmitting a draft of proposed
legislation to amend existing Federal disas-
ter assistance legislation, and for other pur-
poses (with accompanying papers); to the
Committee on Public Works,
PETITIONti
Petitions were laid before the Senate
and referred as indicated.
By the ACTING PRESIDE :NT pro tempore
(Mr. HOLLAND):
A concurrent resolution of the Legislature
of the State of Oklahoma: to the Committee
on Agriculture and Forestry:
"H. CON. Rss. 1057
"A concurrent resolution memorializing the
Congress of the United atates to provide
that Federal statutory and other regula-
tions over small meat slaughterers shall
not be such as would preclude their con-
tinuing in the operation of their busi-
ness; and directing distribution
"Whereas, recent federal legislation has
threatened the continued existence of many
small meat slaughtering businesses across
the State of Oklahoma; and
"Whereas, such legislaticm by exempting
from antemortem and postmortem examina-
tions for eaoh animal only those custom
slaughtering businesses which do riot sell or
buy carcasses or meat food products places
an undue burden on such businesses; and
"Whereas, many custom slaughtering busi-
nesses must, in order to stay in business,
operate the logical auxiliary business, that of
a meat market: and
"Whereas, such legislation could be inter-
preted to require such additional facilities or
modification of existing facilities of the small
slaughtering businesses as would not be
economically feasible for sack businesses;
and
"Whereas, the small slaughtering busi-
nesses of this state perform a vital and im-
portant service to many of the citizens of
this state; and
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20,1970 ApprovedcFANtggyMOA2eneeal-ERPERAW37R000300040006-6 s 5975
The budget squeeze came as oceanogra- limitation talks that began yesterday in
phers were on the verge of unprecedented Vienna.
opportunities to develop and use new un- This document, very much in line with
dersea technology, to replace ships of World Senate Resolution 211, which the Senate
War II vintage, and to launch ambitious
new research efforts. "In developing tech-
passed recently by a vote of 72 to 6, calls
nology, we are now?by comparison?rough- on the President of the United States to
ly where the development of the airplane propose "on a reciprocal basis an imme-
was in 1910 or 1915," said H. Crane Miller, diate interim halt in the deployment of
counsel for Hollings' subcommittee and a strategic offensive and defensive weap-
former Stratton Commission staff member. ons of the tests of multiple warheads."
The funding of ocean programs increased Additionally, this group of especially
dramatically in the middle 1960's, but the well-informed fellow citizens asked the
level of support has virtually frozen. For ex- President to defer for 6 months the im-
ample, the annual growth rate of academic
marine science programs funded by the Na- pending deployment of American multi-
tional Science Foundation and the Office of ple warheads or MIRV's.
Their reason was that uniquely favor-
able strategic and political conditions
exist at the present for such a move.
They feared that unless the United States
and, of course, the Soviet Union, seized
this opportunity, the success of the SALT
talks could be jeopardized. And I would
add my own view that the failure of the
arms limitation talks would be a serious
setback in our search for a more stable
world.
The American Assembly, as many of
us will recall, was established by Dwight
Eisenhower at Columbia University in
1950. It is a nonpartisan organization
dedicated to providing information, stim-
ulating discussion, and evoking inde-
pendent conclusions on matters of vital
public interest.
I ask unanimous consent that this
thoughtful effort be printed in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the report
was ordered to be printed in the REcoxn,
Naval Research was 7.3 percent from 1963 to
1966 but declined to 2.2 percent from 1966
to 1968, not even covering rising costs.
The Navy, with a marine science budget of
some $239 million this year, continues to
dominate U.S. oceanography. But even the
Navy's funds are down by $24 million from
haat year, requiring deactivation of some re-
search ships and postponement of new proj-
ects. "We have had our share of the cuts, but
only our fair share," said Rear Admiral 0. D.
Waters, Jr., the Oceanographer of the Navy.
"We have had to slow down, but nothing
vital has been dropped." The Administra-
tion's request for fiscal 1971, however, Would
cut the Navy programs by another $19 mil-
lion and increase the civilian, oceanography
budget by $40 million.
The Navy cooperates extensively with civil-
ian ocean agencies, especially through the
Instrumentation Center. For example, Navy
data on water temperature is fed to the Bu-
reau of Commercial Fisheries to guide fishing
vessels to favorable waters. But, as Admiral
Waters points out, "it is only happenstance,
really, when our programs benefit the civilian
sector.... Our purpose is always military."
On the NOAA proposal, the Navy has taken
no formal position except to request that,
whatever is done, the Coast Guard retain its
sernimilitary role. It is known, however, that
many Navy oceanographers are unenthusias-
tic about a NOAA., viewing it as a potentially
serious competitor for money and programs.
If effectively promoted, civilian oceanogra- timely reference to the Strategic Arms Ural- than one missile site with a single attacking
' phy could indeed win formidable support iri
tation Talks, scheduled to resume in Vienna, missile. The obverse of this frightening coin
Congress. There are, after all 30 coastal and
April 16. Reference was also made to the is that each side may fear that, unless it
Great Lakes states with a direct interest, and
broader problem of slowing down the arms strikes first, the MIRVed missiles of the other
the nation is increasingly resource-conscious,
race and to the effect of military expendi- side may be able substantially to eliminate
In hopes of tapping this potential support,
tures an national resources. its own land-based ICBM force, with the
oceanography lobbying groups and newslet- The meeting was held under the auspicea other side still having substantial ICBM
tees are proliferating. For example, the Wash-
of The American Assembly of Columbia Uni- force left in reserve.
ington-based National Oceanography Asso-
ersity, which regularly convenes for the New and worrisome uncertainties would
elation added 700 new corporate and indi- purpose of focusing attention on issues of enter the strategic calculations. For example.
vidual members in 1969, for a total of 2100.
public importance. The recommendations of Secretary Laird has testified that 420 Soviet
(In a poll, the membership heavily favored
this Assembly were adopted in the plenary SS-9s with three warheads of five megatons
creation of a NOAA.) Sea-related industries
session of April 2, after two previous days of each and an accuracy of one quarter of a
are badly in need of new federal initiatives in
, discussions as a committee of the whole, mile could eliminate all but 50 of our Min-
developing technology. (Because of the urgency of the topic, stand- utemen. Similar calculations by the Soviet
Should civilian oceanography develop its ant American Assembly procedures were Union would show that if the U.S. were to
own effective lobby, the marine science pro- modified somewhat for the occasion, and the MIRV its Minutemen with three warheads,
grams might be more than able to hold their number of participants was reduced accord- with yields approximating a quarter of a
own in a new Department of Environmental ingly. Many had taken part in earlier Amen- megaton each and having an accuracy of one-
Affairs. Even NOAA champions such as Len- can Assembly programs on arms: Arms Con- tenth of a mile, it could by using 580 Min-
n= and Hollings concede that such a depart- trol, 1969, and Nuclear Weapons,1966.) utemen, eliminate all but 70 or so of the So-
ment makes sense. But they contend that a ?
Adrian S. Fisher, dean of the Georgetown viet missile force.
single ocean agency is needed first, to rem- Law School and former deputy director of the
ganlze existing programs, establish goals, and U.S. Control and Disarmament Agency, pre- Whatever their validity such caletilations
make it clear that both sides would feel more
attract the necessary public and congres- pared a background paper as the basis of
discussion. secure if neither one had a MIRV. The U.S.
plan to deploy MIRVed Minuteman III in
As a non-partisan educational institution
June of this year, within two months after
The American Assembly takes no official
the beginning of the talks may well close
Limitation-197o reviewed as a group the
following statement. Although it represents
general agreement, no one was asked to sign
it, and it should not be assumed that every
participant necessarily subscribes to every
recommendation.)
We call upon the President of the United
States to propose to the Soviet Union, on a
reciprocal basis, an immediate interim halt
in the deployment of strategic offensive and
defensive weapons and of tests of multiple
warheads. To give this proposal a chance of
success, we ask the President to defer for six
months the impending deployment of-Multi-
ple Independently Targetable Re-Entry
Vehicles (MIRVs) .
The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are
resuming in Vienna at a time when mankind
has a unique opportunity to end the nuclear
arms race. At present there exists a roughly
equal and relatively stable nuclear balance
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. A rare coin-
cidence of favorable political and strategic
conditions provides a real but fleeting op-
portunity for agreement between the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R. to halt the arms race in both
quantity and quality of weapons, and then
to diminish the threat to mankind posed by
existing weapons. Whether agreement can be
reached we do not know, but wisdom and
oommon sense require every plausible effort
to exploit the present promise.
This opportunity will be put in jeopardy
If the U.S. soon deploys Multiple Independ-
ently Targetable Re-Entry Vehicles (MIRVs) ,
or proceeds with plans for a modified Phase II
Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM), or if
the Soviet Union extensively tests large
ICBMs (SS-9) with multiple warheads
(which may not themselves be independently
targetable but may well be steps in the devel-
opment of a Soviet multiple independently
targetable delivery system).
The introduction of MIR,Vs into the pres-
as follows: ent nuclear relationship would have the
initial effect of substantially increasing the
THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY ON ARMS LIMITATION number of deliverable nuclear warheads
These pages contain the views of a group available to each side. MIRV program will
of Americans who met March 31-April 2, take on new dimensions as missile accuracy
1970, at Arden House, Harriman, New York, increases. When this occurs, it becomes pos-
to consider the outlook for arms limitation sible for one side if it strikes first with mis-
The meeting was held with immediate and siles armed with MIRVs to take out more
sional support. 4s.00941
AMERICAN ASSEMBLY ON ARMS stand on the opinions herein, which belong
the door on this possibility. Although the
LIMITATION to the participants in their private capacities. generation of MIRVs which would be de-
They represented themselves and not neces-
Mr. CASE. Mr. President, early this sadly the institutions or persons with whom ployed would not be capable of a first strike,
month a group of Americans meeting they are associated. (Clifford C. Nelson, Pres- this step would cast serious doubts on ourseriousness in pursuing SALT. This would
under the aegis of the American Assem- ident, The American Assembly) present the U.S.S.R. with a fait accompli.
bly in New York State produced a gen- FINAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY ON One of the most important things that the
erally agreed document of great interest ARMS L/MITATION-1970 SALT talks could accomplish is to prevent
to the debate about American strategic (At the close of their discussions the par- the deployment of MIRVii. This opportunity
weapons policy and the strategic arms ticipante in The American Assembly on Arms should not be lost.
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S 5976 C NGRESSIONAL RECOE-
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We in
the American. Assembly therefor
call on the President to postpone tens de
plOyMent for six Months. Such deploys:nen
iet this time would not contribute to ou
security; Par from improving our bargaining
strength at SALT proceeding with that de-
ployment would make negotiations more dif-
ficult, and would invite the Soviet Union in
turn to present us with faits accomplis. No
harm can result to our strategic posture by
such delay, which will involve only a hand-
ful of land-based missiles in a MIRV pro-
gram that is already being widely questioned
as unnecessary, wasteful, and certainly pre-
mature, since the large Soviet ABM program
it was designed to penetrate does not exist.
We also suggest that current U.S. and So-
viet
g o multiple warheads compli-
cates the political and strategic climate on
which these negotiations depend. We urge
mutual restraint In this regard.
We also urge postponement in implement-
ing the proposed, modified Phase II of the
Safeguard System. The argument that going
ahead with this program would strengthen
our bargaining position at Vienna Is not
persuasive; authorizing armaments so that
they can be included in a disarmament pro-
gram soon reaches the point of diminishing
returns. If both sides play this game, SALT
will result in an increase in the arms race.
Going ahead with modified Phase It Safe-
guards so soon after Phase I had been made
a separate program would belle the promise
and deliberate consideration upon which
that separation. was in part based. It would
more likely give the Soviets the impression
that the U.S. was determined to push the
complete Safeguaticis program to a finish,
come what may, This would make SUCCeS3 in
SALT less rather than more likely.
These measures of restraint will give our
negotiators a chance. But the negotiations of
a treaty at the SALT talks will be difficult
and complex and may take years. To keep the
present opportunity from eroding during this
period, an interim halt is necessary. to pre-
vent any substantial changes in the rough
strategic balance which now makes such an
agreement possible.
We therefore urge the President of the
Soviet Union, on a reciprocal basis, an im-
mediate two-year suspension Of the deploy-
ment of strategic offensive and defensive
weapons and of the tests of multiple war-
heads. Specifically we propose that during
this two-year period interim halt there would
be:
I. No testing of any multiple warheads,
whether MRV or MIRV;
2. No deployment of multiple warheads;
3. No new deployment of land-based inter-
continental ballistic missiles;
4. No construction of Anti-Ballistic Mis-
sile radars or deployment of anti-ballistic
missile interceptors;
5. No new "starts" on constructing sub-
marines for launching ballistic missiles.
In such an interim agreement we see no
necessity for limits on air defenses or on
new bomber construction because develop-
ments in these areas do not carry an im-
mediate potential for upsetting the present
strategic balance.
The short term of the agreement and its
comprehensive quality would simplify the re-
quirement for inspection. From the stand-
point of the U.S. security, compliance with
these provisions can be adequately deter-
mined by national means of vertification. In
particular, the halt in Soviet buildup of
ICBMs and SLBMs, including the 58-9, could
be verified. With regard to the restrictions
on multiple warhead testing, however, to
enhance confidence during the interim halt,
an understanding that missile tests will be
preannounced and restricted to designated
areas may be desirable.
The restraints that we propose and an g
agreed interim halt would create an environ-
e ment of stability and mutual confidence, Zr
- such an improved climate more lasting agree
t ments, taking account of new technologica
r and political developments, could be
achieved.
We have not attempted to blueprint the
details of a more permanent agreement;
planning fox it should take account of what
Is learned during the interim halt. Some of
the major issues which would need to be
taken into account during the negotiations
of a treaty are:
1. ABM levels. A key question appears to
be whether some level of ABMs is necessary
for the U.S. In. light of the developing Chi-
nese nuclear capability. We believe that an
area ABM is not vital to protectingII in-
terests in Asia and that we should be pre-
pared to accept a mutually agreed zero ABM
level if it improves the prospects for obtain-
ing an effective agreement with the Soviet
Union. Without an ABM, deterrence is as ef-
fective against China as against others; and
a Safeguard system designed for area defense
against the Chinese may, in the eyes of Soviet
planners, pose a threat to their deterrent.
2. Control on Missile Testing. A ban on
MIRVs would require a prohibition on all
multiple warhead tests and limits on a num-
ber and location of all missile tests. We be-
lieve that such controls would be feasible
and desirable
3. Reduction. We believe that the U.S.
should seek agreement on reduction in num-
bers of strategic systems. In particular the
U.S. should consider proposing the phasing
out of fixed land-based missiles which will
become increasingly vulnerable even if
MIRVs are teamed.
Depending on how these and related is-
sues are resolved, a whole range of agree-
ments is possible. One type of agreement
Which most of us would favor would seek to
freeze the existing situation by banning
MIRVs and ABMs. A second type would con-
centrate on banning ABMs and phasing out
fixed land-based misiles if it does not prove
possible to ban MIRVs. A third type would
focus on freezing numbers of offensive mis-
siles and limiting ABMs if It is not possible
to ban MIRVs and if the judgment is reached
that an area ABM against China is needed.
On our current understanding of the issues
most of us favored the first type of agree-
ment.
April 20, '1970
may look to the Soviets so much like a first-
strike posture that they will be inclined to
1 increase their own forces, thereby continu-
ing the arms race and increasing the danger
of nuclear war. In fact, the proper test for
the adequacy of U.S. nuclear retaliatory
power is not the U.S. worst estimate of its
effectiveness, but the Soviet estimate of the
damage it would suffer in a nuclear exchange.
That estimate will not be based on assump-
tions that take the Soviet performance at
its best possible level and the U.S. perform-
ance at its worst. If we arm against a "parade
of imaginary horribles" on the part of an
adversary, the adversary will do the same,
and we will have devised'a sure prescription
for a dangerous and wasteful arms race.
We have made this mistake in the past,
from a misdirected sense of caution. In the
Interests of our own security we must not
make this mistake again. We must end the
nuclear arms race.
PARTICIPANTS IN TNE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY ON
ARMS LIMITATION?I970
Adrian S. Fisher, Dean, Georgetown Uni-
versity Law School (Discussion Leader and
Director of Drafting). -
Alexander, Archibald S., Bernardsville, New
Jersey.
Bader, William B., New York,
Bloomfield, Lincoln P., Center for Interna-
tional Studies, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
Brawn, Courtney C., Editor, Columbia
Journal of World Business.
. Daniloff, Nicholas, United Press Interna-
tional, Washington, D.C.
Dudman, Richard, St. Louis Post Dispatch,
Washington, D.C.
Finkelstein, Lawrence S., Center for In-
ternational Affairs, Harvard University.
Fischer, Benjamin B., Harriinan Scholar,
Columbia University.
Fitzgerald, Ernest, Besinessmen's Educa-
tional Fund, Washington, D.C.
Gulick, Lewis, The Associated Press, Wash-
ington, D.C.
Halperin, Morton H., The Brookings Insti-
tution, Washington, D.C.
Henkin, Louis, Hamilton Fish Professor of
International Law & Diplomacy, Columbia
University.
Herzfeld, Charles M., Technical Director,
Defense-Space Group, ITT, Nutley, New Jer-
sey.
Knorr, Klaus, Center for International
Studies, Princeton University. -
Manton, Thomas B., United Church of
Christ, New York,
McDermott, Rev. Patrick P., S.J., Assistant
Director, Division of World Justice es Peace,
United States Catholic Conference, Washing-
ton, D.C.
Paffrath, Leslie, President, The Johnson
Foundation, Racine.
Palfrey, John G., Professor of Law, Colum-
bia University.
Parrent, Rev. Allan, Department of Inter-
national Affairs, National Council of
Churches, Washington, D.C.
Persinger, Mrs. Richard, Chairman, Com-
mittee on Public Affairs, National Board of
the Y.W.C.A., New York.
Posvar, Wesley W., Chancellor, University
of Pittsburgh.
Rathjens, Geerge W., Professor of Political
Science, Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology.
Scoville, Herbert, Jr., Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, Washington, D.C.
Shulman, Marshall D., Director, The Rus-
sian Institute, Columbia University.
Stone, Jeremy J., International Affairs Fel-
ow, Council on Foreign Relations, New York.
Stuhler, Barbara, Associate Director, Min-
iesota World Affairs Council, Minneapolis.
Yarmolinsky, Adam, Professor of Law, liar-
etre! University.
We believe that the initiatives and agree-
ments we propose will enhance U.S. security
by improving the prospects for peaee. These
efforts can also lead to the wise and prudent
use of our national resources. The expendi-
-tures thus avoided would amount to at least
several billion dollars a year in the short
run and much more in the long run if the
U.S. and U.S.S.R. enter into a new and cost-
lier phase of the arms race. The SALT talks,
and the clearer assessment of our real se-
curity requirements which may result from
those talks, may prevent these expenditures.
More of our resources can then be devoted
to human needs, both at home and abroad.
This is an important aspect of our national
security. Unless urgent social needs are met,
our national security may be progressively
undermined, not by external threats but by
failure to meet internal and justifiable social
needs.
The negotiation of a treaty to end the arms
race will involve many complex technical
details. But the overriding considerations are
not technical; they are deeply political. They
require a fresh and clear reassessment of the
fundamentals of U.S. security.
We must recognize that it is at least as
dangerous to focus on "worst cases" as it is ,
to overlook significant threats to our de-
terrent. If one proceeds from the most pessi-
mistic view of U.S. capabilities, and the most
onerous view of the Soviet capabilities, one
arrives at a U.S. second-strike posture that
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April 20, 1970 PAT:gaiiiiikA3MC.(811P-015RT-6a7R000300040006-6
S5977
\ iivE STATEMENTS ON At first, the designers of our offensive mis- But that's not the whole story. The Rus-
ARMS CONTROL sues did not take missile defense very seri- sians have proceeded with a multiple war-
ously. By 1960, however, technical progress in head development of their own. Their pro.
Mr. CASE. Mr. President, i also draw our own Nike Zeus program, plus accumu- gram apparently is a number of years behind
the Senate's attention to five remark- lating evidence of a major Soviet effort in ours. It was probably stimulated by our pro-
able statements made before the Sub- the ABM field, forced the ,developers of our gram, and their technologists probably used
committee on Arms Control, Interne- ICBM's and Polaris missiles to take this the same justifications for it that ours did.
tional Law and Organization of the For-
possibility into account. These weapons de- The device they are currently testing is the
eign Relations Committee, which has
signers accepted the challenge, and they in- payload package for the large 88-9 missile.
itiated a number of programs to exploit the It is said to contain three separate war-
been holding hearings on America's stra- possibilities enumerated above. Thus began heads of five megatons each. The present
tegic weapons policy in relation to the the technological contest between missile de- device may not be a true MIRV, but there is
strategic arms limitation talks and our fense and missile offense which continues to no doubt they could develop one soon.
national security, the present and which was discussed before After making a number of estimates and
These sthtements seem to me to be un- this committee in considerable detail last projections concerning the accuracy, the
reability, and the current deployment and
usualin their clarity, rigorous logic, and year.
--
insight into one of the greatest issues of For our purposes here today, the most urn- rate of build-up of such EI6-9 missiles, our
our time; the maintenance of American
portant result of this contest was the emerg- defense officials concluded last year that the
ence of the multiple warhead idea as the threat posed by this Soviet MIRV required us
security through arms control. I believe most promising of all the various "penetra- to deploy the Safeguard ABM system to de-
they deserve our most thoughtful atten- tion aid" concepts. At first, the idea involved fend our Minute Man force. We thus see that
tion. a shotgun technique in which a group of the whole process has made one full turn
Of course, the views that these gentle- warheads plus some lightweight decoys were around the spiral: Soviet ABM led to U.S.
men hold are not the only ones the sub- to be launched along several different paths MIRV; U.S. MIRV led to Soviet MIRV; Soviet
committee intends to hear. The case for all leading to a common target area. But MERV leads to U.S. ABM.
shortly after, methods for aiming each of the fytehare, some of those who spoke in
the expansion of the Safeguard ABMfavor t uopanideSnytsatsembedinegsceribeeodiathfley
and the deployment of multiple war-for separatet h SovietoMIRV development individualinvented. warheadsereasons atextension
heads also deserves close study. We hope the original idea were: 1) it provided addi- dangerous and foreboding because it seemed
that the bashfulness of the Defense De- tional flexibility for the offense, 2) it made to them that its only rational purpose was
partment will not- interfere with our the defense problem still harder, and 3) it to destroy our Minute Men before they could
hearing that side of the issue. was more complicated and expensive, and be launched. They further speculated that if
I ask unanimous consent that the thus provided the weapons engineers and sci-
this were so, the Soviet MIRV indicated prep- _
statements of Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Dr. entists with a still better means of dis-
aration for a possible preemptive strike
against us. These same people argued, by Herbert F. York Dr. W. K. H. Panofsky, playing their technological virtuosity. This con-
extension of the original idea is, of course, trast, that our own MIRV development was
clearly benign, since its main purpose was
to maintain the credibility of our deterrent
in the face of a hypothetical extensive Soviet
ABM, and that, in any event, our MIRV was
clearly not a "missile killer."
The main argument in support of this
supposed different between the purposes of
the U.S. and Soviet MIRV's involves the
large difference in their explosive power. The
Soviet 58-9 MIRV is said to have an esti-
mated yield of 5 megatons. This yield is
twenty-five times the yield usually quoted
for one of the individual warheads in the
U.S. Minute Man MIRV; it is one-hundred
times as large as the common estimate of a
single Poseidon MIRV warhead. These large
differences in yield are doubtless real, and
they are important, but they are not by any
means the whole story. The killing power of
a warhead against a hard target, such as a
missile silo, depends much more critically
on accuracy than on yield. In fact, a factor
of 3 in accuracy makes up for a factor of 25
in yield, and a factor of 4.6 in accuracy makes
up for a factor of 100 in yield. To be more
specific, a Minute Man MIRV warhead hav-
ing a yield of 200 KT and an accuracy (or
CEP) or about 1/8 of a nautical mile has a
95% chance of destroying a so-called "300
psi" target (which is a typical estimate of
the strength of hardness of a missile silo).
Similarly, a Poseidon MIRV warhead having
a yield of 50 kilotons and an accuracy of
about -ilg of a mile has the same probability
of destroying a missile silo. And what are the
prospects for attaining such accuracies? The
accuracy of real operational missiles is clas-
sified, but in last year's debates, a figure of
about 1/4 of a mile for U.S. accuracies was
commonly used. That is quite different from
1/8 or -1 of a mile, but what is the record
of progress in improving accuracy? In 1944,
the German V-2 missile, which used a primi-
tive version of the same kind of guidance
system as the present day Minute Man snd
Poseidon, achieved an accuracy of about 4
miles in a range of about 200 miles. Ten
years later, when the decision to build the
U.S. ICBM was made, an accuracy of five
miles in a range of 5,000 miles was estimated
as both possible and sufficient. That was an
improvement of twentyfold in the ratio of
accuracy to range. Now we talk about 1/4 mile
at the same range, so in an additional 15
years, we have achieved another factor of 20.
Dr. A. Doak Barnett, and Dr. Herbert
Scoville, Jr., be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the state-
ments were ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
STATEMENT BY HERBERT F. YORK BEFORE TUE
StracosturrrEr ON ARMS CONTROL, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW' ANS ORGANIZATION Or THE
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTKE,
APRIL 8, 1970
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Com-
mittee: I appreciate very much having the
privilege of appearing before your commit-
tee at this particular crucial moment. I plan
to discuss the ABM and the MIRV and their
relationship to each other and to the anus
race as a whole, I should like to begin by
the new well-known MIRV, an acronym
standing for Multiple Independently-target-
e.bel Reentry Vehicles. It is, I think, most im-
portant to note that these early developments
of MIRV and ABM were not primarily the re-
sult of any careful operations analysis of the
problem or anything which might be de-
scribed as a "provocation" by the other side.
Rather, they were largely the result of a con-
tinuously reciprocating process consisting of
a technological challenge put out by the de-
signers of our own defense and accepted by
the designers of our own offense, then fol-
lowed by a similar challenge/response se-
quence in the reverse direction. In this fash-
ion, our ABM development program made
very substantial progress during the early
sixties.
first describing how We got where we are. Concurrent with this internal contest, the
and then speculating a bit on where we're Soviets were making progress on their own.
going to be is the current attempts to halt As early as 1962, Premier Khrushchev and
the arms race fail. I will also present m9 Defense Minister Malinovsky boasted about
views on how the current ABM and MIRV how they had solo.-ed the missile defense
developments and deployments affect the problem. By 1965, Soviet progress in develop-
prospects for a successful outcome -to the ment and deployment of an ABM had pro-
SALT talks. ceeded to the point where we felt compelled
In 1956, about a year after the United to react. As a result, we decided to deploy
States started development of its first Inter- MIRV as the one certain means of assuring
Continental Ballistic Missile, the Army asked penetration of Soviet defenses and thus
the Bell Telephone Laboratories to make a maintaining the credibility of our deterrent.
study of the feasibility of an Anti-Ballistic What was the result of this cycle of action
Missile. The problem was then thought of and reaction? Last year, in the course of the
as being simply how to hit a "bullet with a national ABM debate, it was said that the So-
bullet," or more accurately, how too inter- viets had deployed a total of about 70 ABM
cept large simple incoming warheads one interceptors, all of them around Moscow. This
at a time. The Bell Laboratories concluded year, it was announced that the U.S. was go-
that the technological state of the art in ing ahead with its plans to deploy MIRV's
radar, electronic computing, nuclear explo- on our Minute Men and on our sub-launched
elves and rocketry had reached a point such Poseidon missiles. Using figures generated by
that it was indeed feasible to build an ABM this committee last year, we /see that the re-
with that simple objective. As a result, the sult of this U.S. reaction will be a net in-
Nike Zeus project was started late in 1956. crease of around 5,000 in the number of war-
Very soon after, it was' recognized that the heads aimed at Russia. If every one of those
clefense problem might well be complicated Soviet interceptors was successful in the
by various hypothetical "penetration aids" event of an attack (and I have substantial
available to the offense. The Office of the doubt that they would be) , they could cope
Secretary of Defense set up a committee to with just 70 of those additional 5,000 war-
review the matter. In early 1958, this corn- heads. The deployment of -the Moscow ABM
mittee pointed out the feasibility of greatly must rank as one of history's most counter-
complicating the missile defense problem productive moves. It also shows more closely
by using decoys, chaff, tank fragnients, re- than any speculative analysis how, despite its
duced radar reflectivity, nuclear blackout and defensive nature, the ABM can be a power.
last, but by no means least, multiple war- fully accelerating element in the nuclear
heads. arms race.
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S 5978 Approved For ReleraWMARION.AelaROOR:1)003fffiQP9/00040006-6 A pr,11, 20, _1970
Altogether, that snakes an inaproveMent of If launching our missiles on electronic of responsible U.S. military and civilian au-
400-hold in only 25 years. Any conservative warning does not seem so bad, then con- thorities. It is the inevitable consequence
Russian planner considering these f.gures Bider the situation, the other way around, of the arms race and the systematic exploita-
would have to conclude that in a relatively Our current technical developments, ape- tion of the fruits of modern science and
short time U.S. technology could improve cifically greater accuracy and reliability of technology by the USA and the USSR. Our
missile accuracy by another 'factor of two or missiles, MIRV and ABM are pushing the attempts to deploy bomber defenses during
four and thus convert not only the Minute Russians in the same direction. Further, in the fifties and sixties did not substantially
Man MIRV but even the Poseidon MIRV into their case a far larger. fraction of the deter- modify this picture, and ABM deployment
a missile-silo-destroyer, rent Ls provided by fixed land-based forces will, I believe, have an even smaller direct
We have seen that the SS-9 MIRV is caus- than in ours, and so they have an even impact on the number of castfalties we
lug our Defense Department to fear ear the greater need to find a truly reliable means might suffer in a future attack.
viability of out deterrent and to react of protecting their deterrent from a pre- Nearly everyone now recognizes the futility
strongly to it for that reason. In the present emptive attack by us. If we continue with of the arms race, and nearly everyone now
international elentext, and in the absence our MIRV developments, and thus force the realizes that still more of the same baroque
of any real progress in arms control, the Soviets to go to a Launch on Warning Sys- military technology is not going to provide
Soldets must be expected to react to our tern, can we rely on them to invent and a solution to the dilemma of the steady
MIRV in some similarly fear-inspired way. institute adequate controls? Do they have decrease in our national security that has
ABM and MIRV are thus inseparable; each the necessary level of sophistication to solve accompanied the increase in our military
the contradiction inherent in the need for power. The SALT talks are one hopeful result
parately or in combination they create un- '
one requires and inspires tlie other. S'e-
1 "hair trigger" (so that their system will of the widening recognition of the absolute
,
certainty in each of the nuclear powers about respond in time) and a ''stiff trigger" (so necessity of finding some other approach to
the capability and even the intentions of the they won't fire accidentally) ? How good are the problem, and finding it soon.
So, how do ABM (and MIRV) affect these
other. These uncertainties eventually lead their computers at recognizing false alarms?
talks? We must consider both of these ele-
How good is the command and control sys-
in turn to fear, overreaction, and further :n-
en for the Polaris-type submarine fleet they ments of the arms race since they are really
creases in the number and types of all kinds
inseparable. ABM automatically leads to
are now rapidly, if belatedly, building? Will
of 'weapons, defensive as well as offensive.
What about the future? In the absence of
it be "fail-safe?"
MIRV, and vice versa. There are at least two
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that melee effects.
International arms control agreements, what
unfavorable answers to these questions
First of all. ABM has both a multiplying
can we expect? Predictions sze, of course,
about their capability will mean diminished
and a rachet effect on the arms race: its
very uncertain, but one can single out some
likely possibilities, national security for us. Yet there is no way
deployment produces a stepwise, irreversible
for us to assure favorable answers to them.
Increase in the number of offensive missiles
The ABM Is a low confidence system. The The only way we can avoid the danger to required. It does not matter whether it Is
expressions of confidence In the system made The only
our security inherentti in i tteh ese que ask est osns is Chinese-oriented or Soviet-orien
Consist-
by those Who supported it last year are by eliminating the
a. Chinese-oriented ABM. People who
bound to give way to a more realistic ap-
tegic Weapons systems on both sidmes. must
st -
propose such imagine the Chinese bl k-
ua
praieal by the time the system is deployed.
mailing ICBM's
When designed so that no premium is put on a us with just a few (50-100) IC's
When that happens, the defense preemptiveestablish-
attack, and so that neither side by threatening to destroy some small but
meet will turn in accordance with the pre- mi forcd to adopt the kind of "hair trigger"
cepts of "worst plausible case" analysis to eepitomized in the "launch on warning" vital part of the U.S. Since the defensive
e Minute Man. Of the various possibilities,
other methods of insuring the surviviai concept. t pared to the dimensions of the U.S., since
of ' '''' coverage of an ABM interceptor is small corn-
Fortunately for us, the Soviets have also Hawaii and Alaska must also be defended,
the surest, quickest and the cheapest, is
simply to adopt the Launch on Warning expressed concern about this problem. In and since the offense in this special and
Doctrine. This doctrine involves, first: detect-
words very similar to those used before this peculiar case could concentrate all of its
,
ing that a launch of enemy missiles has committee last Spring, Foreign Minister missiles ort just one small area of the U.S?
s
occurred; second: analyzing the information Gromyko last Summer said, "(There) is an-
we would need many times as many ABM'
in order to determine whether the launch other matter that cannot be ignored. . as the Chinese have missiles. If they have . . It
endangers our missile forces; and, third: if is linked to a considerable extent to the tact no penetration aids, we might get by with
it does, lanuching our missiles toward their that the command and control systems for only 21 times as many interceptors as they
targets before the incoming warheads can arms are becoming increasingly autonomous, have missiles; however, if they do have good
catch thein in their silos and destroy them. . . from the people who create them. . . . decoys or multiple warheads, a cautious 'U.S.
This Metheel of coping with the problem has The human brain is no longer capable of defense planner would call for a great many
been in people's minds since the beginning assessing at sufficient speed the results of the more. Thus, a really serious Chinese-oriented
A siyhatteermeeprettesrusiremse many w
of the missile program, multitude of instruments. The decisions AB BmM
made by man depend in the last analysis on
rev erseouthisdsanodf US.
In the early fifties, we anticipated that the
what the Russians would have to do in the
the conclusions provided by computers. tiov-
early warning systems then foreseen would
face of such a supposedly Chtnese-oriented
ernments must do everything possible to be
Provide about fifteen minutes' notice before
U.S. ABM deployment. In their case we do
enemy warheads tended. Far that reason, the able to determine the development of events
not imagine them as merely blackmailing
and not to find themselves in the role of
original Atlas was designed to be launched
us by threatening to destroy a few cities.
within less than fifteen minutes after receipt captive of events."
Rather, we imagine them as trying to deter
The nuclear arms race has led to a sinus.-
of orders to do so. One of the major reasons
tion that is at once absurd and poses a di-
us, as we try to deter them.
in the early sixties for switching to the Titan lemma. Ever since the end of World War II,
Minute Man with its solid propellants, was been steadily Increasing,
with its storable propellants, and the the military power of the United States hasas According to the current fashion in stra-
ing, while at the same tegic analysis, in order to achieve deterrence
that the 'tame from the "go signal" to the time our national security has been rapidly it is necessary to have an offensive farce
Which, after weathering a surprise attack
actual launch could be made still shorter. and inexorably decreasing. The same thing
against it, can still retaliate and destroy a
Many of the people who have proposed this
solution to the problem are thoughtful and is happening to the Soviet Union.
large fraction of the enemy population and
moderate, but even so, I find this resolution At the end of World War II, the United industrial base, and as much of his offensive
of the dilemman to be completely unsatis- States was still invulnerable to a direct forces as may still remain in silos and on
factory. The time in which the decision to attack by a foreign power. In 1949, the de- bases. Di order for the Soviets to be able to
launch must be made varies from Just it veiopment of the Atomic Bomb by the Soviet do that, they must be able to penetrate al/
few minutes up to perhaps 20 minutes, de- Union ended that ideal state of affairs, per- parts of our ABM shield with whatever force
pending on the nature of the attack, and haps forever,
they might have left after a first attack by
the details of our warning system, comenuni- By the early 1050's, the USSR, on the basis us, And to guarantee that outcome, a con-
cation system, and our command and con- of its own unilateral decsion to accept the servative Soviet planner would have to call
trol system. This time is so short that the inevitable retaliation, could have launched for many more total Soviet offensive war-
decision to launch our missiles must he an attack on the U.S. with bombers carrying heads than there were total 'U.S. interceptors.
made either by a computer, by a pre-pro- fission bombs. Most of these bombers would Thus, an ABM designed to cope with black-
gramme President, or by some pre-program- have penetrated our defense and the Amen, mail by 50-100 Chinese missiles, can pro-
flied delegate of the President. There will lee can casualties could have numbered in the duce a multiplying and a rachet effect re-
no time to stop and think about what the tens of millions. quiring a total Soviet warhead inventory
signals mean or to check to see whether they During the late fifties and early sixities much larger than the more than 1.000 they
might somehow be false alarms. The deci- filet thermonuclear bombs arid then inter- even now possess. Clearly, in such an event
stoutwill have to be made on the basis of con Ltinental missiles became part of the we cannot hope to achieve any meaningful
electronic signals electronically analyzed, in equation. As a result, by 1970, the USSR, strategic arms limitation,
accordance with a plan worked out long again on the heals of Its own unilateral de- A second way in which ABM and MIRV
before by a political analysis in an antiseptic claion to accept the inevitable retaliation, affect the possibility of a successful out-
and unreal atmosphere. In effect, not even could launch an attack that could produce come of the SALT talks is through the un-
the President, let alone the Congress, would 100-million or more American casualties. certainties they introduce into she strategic
really be a party to the ultimate decision This steady decrease in national security equation. The main uncertainty connected
to end civilization,
does not result from inaction on the part with ABM is the one that has been so per-
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sistently raised here: how well will it work?
The. main uncertainty connected with MIRV
has'tti- do Aritli the impoSSibility of knowing
how many warheads were actually poised for
launch. As is well-known, we are fairly con-
fident about our ability to know how many
missiles they have, but as others have point-.
ed out, it is quite another matter to know
how many MIRV warheads each missile car-
ries.
At present, then, each of us. is fairly con-
fident in his predictions about the results of
a hypothetical nuclear exchange, and each
is confident that he has an adequate force
to deter the other. With Al3M and MIRV,
this confidence will be greatly weakened, and
neither of us will be sure of what we cotild
do to the other, and what they could do to
us. Unfortunately, experience ? has clearly
shown that such gross uncertainties pro-
duce an atmosphere in which arms control
agreements are practically impossible. For
example, for more than a decade, similar un-
certainties about detecting underground ex-
plosions combined with wild speculations
about the kinds of developments which
might flow from a secret series of under-
ground tests have inhibited any progress to-
ward eliminating such tests and thus achiev-
ing a complete nuclear test ban. In the same
way, the uncertainties inevitably associated
with Al3M and MIRV will lead us into a
similar morass, and no progress will be pos-
sible in the extremely vital area of strategic
arms
In summary: The steady progress of the
arms race has led to an 'equally steady and
seemingly inexorable decrease in our national
security and safety. Today, the strategic bal-
ance is such that Strategic Arms Limitation
agreements, which could bring an end to the
nuclear arms race, seem possible. ABM and
MIRV threaten to upset this balance in a
Way which will make such agreements im-
possible, or at least extremely difficult. ABM
and army are inseparable; each inspires and
requires the other. They must be stopped be-
fore it is too late if we are to avoid another
increase in the magnitude of the nuclear
holocaust we all face.
? We must do everything possible to ensure
a positive outcome to the SALT talks. The
interim freeze on the deployment of offen-
sive and defensive strategic weapons, riow
being considered by the Senate, is one such
move.
STATEMENT OF MCGEORGE BUNDY SIIBCONI/T-
TEE ON ARMS CONTROL, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND ORGANIZATION, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, APRIL 8, 1970
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Sub-
Committee: I am happy to accept your in-
vitation to testify on the arms race, and I am
particularly happy to appear in company
with Dr. York. I would like to associate my-
self strongly with his basic argument.
My broad view of the arms race was stated
last October in an article in FOREIGN AF-
FAIRS, and to save the time of the Com-
mittee I would like, with your permission, to
offer that article for the record instead of
repeating it. Its principal conclusion was
simply that the strategic arms race between
the United States and the Soviet Union has
gone too far, threatens to go further, and
should be stopped by an early agreement be-
tween these two great powers. Since then
SALT has begun in a businesslike way, and
our Government is now considering what its
position will be as the talks resume in Vienna
next week.
My own strong belief is that the best next
step for the United States in this field is to
followthe course proposed in Senate Resolu-
tion 211. That Resolution first states the
sense of the Senate that prompt negotiations
be urgently pursued between the two great
powers, and on this point I think there
is little or no disagreement among Ameri-
cans. The second part of the Resolution ex-
presses the sense of the Senate that we
should now propose an immediate suspension
by both sides "of further deployment of all
offensive and defensive nuclear strategic
weapons systems." An excellent basic argu-
ment in favor of this Resolution is developed
in the report submitted by Senator Ful-
bright, and I will not waste your time by
repeating it. Let me rather offer ten brief
comments on the significance of your Com-
niittee's position.
1. I assume that in passing Senate Reso-
lution 211, the Senate will be urging the
President to propose to the Soviet Union
the mutual suspension of these deployments
for some reasonable term during which fur-
ther progress could be made toward a defi-
nite agreement. There are some who suppose
that the word "moratorium" implies a form
of permanent self-entanglement, but as I
understand it no such self-entanglement is
either necessary or intended.
2. I strongly support the statement in the
Committee Report that an agreed suspension
of deployment of strategic systems will nec-
essarily imply a suspension also of tests--
as well as deployment?of such emerging
systems as MIRV. The Committee Report
makes the correct connection between the
Soviet SS-9 and the American MIRV. This
connection goes both ways. Just as the So-
viets must limit 55-9 if they wish to stop
MIRV, so I believe that if we are to get any
early limit on 55-9 deployment, we ourselves
must place MIRV on the bargaining table.
3. I believe that there will not be much
progress in SALT until the United States
Government is prepared to make a specific
proposal. I think the odds are heavy that
it will prove wise and right for us to move
first. The Committee has heard the sensitive
and perceptive testimony of Professor Mar-
shall Shulman on Soviet attitudes towards
arms negotiation. I share his view that So-
viet wariness is at least equal to our own.
Our experience, understanding and present
strength make it right for us to take the
4. Specifically, I believe that as a part of
any proposal for an agreed moratorium the
United States should take a first step by
announcing a suspension of its own deploy-
ment of ABM and MIRY for a limited time.
Such a time could and should be relatively
brief, and its extension could and should
depend upon the promptness and seriousness
of Soviet response. There might be some
marginal inconvenience for our defense or-
ganization in such a suspension, and our
already overwhelming strategic war plans
might need marginal revision if specific
planned deployments are delayed?but there
is no real or present danger in such a limited
suspension, and if we want results in SALT,
we should try it. How long such a trial should
be, and precisely what it should include, are
matters I do not attempt to cover, since it
would be unwise for a private citizen to try
to define the exact length and direction of
any first step. My point is simply that we
should begin by an action as well as a pro-
posal.
5. This belief rests not on any sentimental
notion that we must be more virtuous than
the Russians, but rather upon the deep con-
viction that effective limitation and reduc-
tion of the strategic arms race is an Objective
deeply in our own national interest as well as
the interest of all mankind. It is wholly false
to suppose that the national security is al-
ways served by adding strategic weapons and
never by their Limitation. In the world of the
1970s the truth is more nearly the opposite.
We have more than enough strategic weapons
today. The addition of new systems which
will inevitably produce further Soviet sys-
tems is not the road to safety for anyone
in any country.
6. In particular we should be on guard
against the notion that it is useful to press
th d lo me or d loyment of any given
HTR000300040006-6
S 5979
weapons systems because of its value as a
bargaining-counter for SALT. It is quite true
that if we get nowhere in SALT and if Soviet
strategic expansion continues, we shall have
to take careful stock of our own needs. But
there is no evidence at all that pressing the
deployment of systems we do not yet, need
is likely to have a constructive effect on
Soviet behavior in SALT. There are times and
topics for toughness with Moscow, but SALT
in April is not one of them, and many of
those who urge this tactic are men who do
not want SALT to succeed. It will be very
hard to get a good agreement even if we do
only what we have to do. It will probably
be impossible if we provide unnecessary am-
munition to Soviet weapon-lovers by press-
ing our own deployments relentlessly
throughout the talks.
7. In moving toward effective Limitation
of the arms race, we shell need to be alert
and skeptical against distractions and diver-
sions from those whose special interests may
be threatened. This history of arms negotia-
tion includes many examples of efforts by
the partisans Of particular weapons systems
to prevent any agreement at all. During the
negotiations before the Limited Test Ban
Treaty, for example, it was suggested that
the Soviets might obtain some decisive ad-
vantage by secret nuclear tests conducted
behind the sun or by the construction of
underground holes so big that the very exist-
ence of a test could not be detected. These
arguments now rest properly in the dustbin
of dead fantasy. But now new dangers are
depicted in the effort to justify a refusal to
limit or delay our own new weapons systems.
Such arguments should be subjected to most
meticulous and skeptical analysis, and in
such study the role of the Congress is of
high importance.
8. There is a particular danger in the un-
critical acceptance of doctrines of strategic
superiority?or even sufficiency?which may
be used by zealous men in support of their
own preferred weapons. This is as true of
the Eisenhower Administration's belief in
"prevailing" in a general war as it is of later
doctrines of "assured destruction" and
"damage limitation." Art of these forms of
words can be used to justify excessive ex-
penditure on unnecessary strategic systems.
At present there are four new criteria of
strategic sufficiency, but the Administration
has not told us what they are. According to
press reports, these criteria include "assured
destruction," "hostage equality," "crisis sta-
bility" and "third country protection." If the
Administration and the Congress are not
alert and watchful, criteria like these can
be protective umbrellas for unchecked strat-
egic expansionism. They can also be road-
blocks in the way of arms limitation. They
deserve public discussion. My own convic-
tion is that the realities of strategic nuclear
weapons are not subject to ?antral by such
erbal formulae. In the language of Justice
Holrhes, I believe that criterialike these tend
to be spiders' webs inadequate to control the
dominant facts.
9. The main proposition which we need to
understand in order to limit the dangers of
the nuclear age is that enough is enough.
The Soviet Union and the United States have
long since reached and passed that point.
Each is now able to do totally unacceptable
damage to the other, no matter how a nu-
clear catastrophe begins. Sane political
leaders on both sides know this reality for
what it is. It is of course possible that some
still unknown technological development
might genuinely disrupt this fundamental
parity, but there is no evidence whatever
that any such development is likely in the
present decade. So we have enough, and more
than enough, and we are on the edge of a
most unstabilizing and dangerous escalation.
Now is the time to stop.
10. The Committee Report recognizes what
I would like to emphasize in closing: that
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S 5980 Approved For Re(i9
while citizens can corarnent and the Senate
can advise, only the, President can decide.
It win like negotiation to reach agreement,
and the ciecial position of the Government
of the nnited States can be stated to the
Soviet Union only by our President and his
authorized agents. The President must choose
the timing and the shape of any initiative
e takes; in the end his leadership is what
will decide. As he considers the possible
choices and deliberates on decisions which
have not yet been made, the President is en-
titled to the thoughtful advice of the Senate,
and in this field, where the weight of bureau-.
cratic influence has historically been heavily
on the side of arms as against arms controi,
such advice can be of particular value to him.
The easy course is always to avoid decisions;
politically the argument for weapons is easy,
and the argument for acts of restraint is
hard. A President who wants to take the lead
needs all the help he can get. The Senate
can give such help, and in this situation it
Is obviously the duty of citizens to respond
to the Senate's request for their honest views,
have stated mine, and I will be glad to try
to answer your questions.
TESTIMONY OF A. DOAK BARNETT, SENIOR FEL-
LOW, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, BEFORE
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION, SEN-
ATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, APRIL
9, 1970
Mn Chairman and members of the Sub-
committee, let me begin by saying that I am
very grateful for this opportunity to meet
and discuss with you a number of questions
relating to arms control?questions focusing
on the AIM and the SALT talks and their
relevance, to the broad problem of U.S.-
China relations.
I would like to make two preliminary
comments about my statement. First, the
views I will express today are purely my own,
and do not in any way represent views of
The Brookings Institution, which does not
itself take any stands on policy issues. Sec-
ondly, since I have very recently written an
article (appearing in the current issue of
toreign Affairs) which summarizes many of
my views oh questions we are considering to-
day, I am taking the liberty of drawing mate-
nal frem that article for the purposes of the
statement I am now presenting to you.
We are now, in my view, at a rather criti-
cal juncture in the evolution both of our
policy toward China and our policy regard-
ing arms control.
For the first time in several years, there
now appears to be at least a limited basis
for hope that movement can take place in
our relations with mainland China, move-
ment which may reduce tensions and in-
crease contacts between us. The current War-
saw talks will help to determine whether
some progress is possible, or whether the
freeze of the last two decades will continue.
At the same time, I believe that the arms
control negotiations which we and the By
have initiated are clearly the most
important ones in the postwar period. We
are about to meet again in Vienna at a
time when both sides are poised to deploy
new weapons systems?,in our case, ABMa
and MIRlis?if no agreements to forego such
systems can be reached. Decisions made in
the period immediately ahead by Washing-
ton and Moscow individually, and by both
at the SALT talks, will determine, therefore,
whether the U.S.-Soviet arms race will
accelerate or slow down in the years ira-
re ediately ahead. These decisions will
also?and this is one of the major points I
Wish to make today?have a very significant
impact on, the prospects for improved U.S.-
China relations. The evolving triangular re-
lationship among the U.S., Soviet Union, and
China is now such that any action by one
or two of the three inevitably affects the
others.
NIGRIEISWOMOiLCHERORT2-00563/fROPI)300040006-6 A prit,,f 0 1.4.9 70
Since my assignment today is to locus
attention on Matters ,relevant to U.S.-China
relations, and specinetally to con.sioler how we
should view the ABM issue and SALT talks
Iii relation to the "China problem," I will not
comment on other fundamental questions,
such as whether effective ABM systems are
technically feasible or how they might affect
the stability of the U.S.-Soviet balance. I
assume that others will discuss these ques-
tions with you.
Let me proceed with my assignment aral
start by saying that I believe the Nixon Ad-
ministration is so be commended for the new
general approach it has adopted in our
overall China policy. In his February 18 re-
port to Congress on foreign policy, the Presi-
dent steted that we do not now wish to
"isolate" mainland China but rather hope
Lhat in time It "will be ready to re-enter the
international cemmunity," that we look for-
ward to a "more normal and constructive re-
lationship" with the Peking regime, that "the
principles underlying our relations with
China are similar to those governing our
policies towards the U.S.S.R.," and that we
will "take what steps we can toward improved
practical relations with Peking." This is a
very sound and very encouraging approach,
in my opinion. Moreover, the limited steps
we have taken recently to implement this
approach--namely the liberalizing of pass-
port and travel regulations and the reduction
of trade restrietions, are highly desirable
and deserve strong support. The Adinistra-
Lion should now be urged to continue mak-
ing further and more substantial steps along
these same lines?for example, by removing
all restrictions on nonstrategic trade with
mainland China,
However, having said this. I must immedi-
ately go on to say that in my view, the de-
ployment of an anti-Chinese ABM area de-
fense would be extremely undesirable and
would, in fact, run directly counter to, and
tend to undercut, the basic objectives that
underlie our new overall China ptelicy,
Deployment of an anti-Chinese ABM would
be both unwise and unsound. I believe, for
a number' of reasons. Let me summarize
there briefly now, and then proceed to elab-
orate on some of' them at greater length.
(1) The ABM is not necessary for the de-
fense of the U.S. against any foreseeable "Chi-
nese threat." For the indefinite future, the
U.S. will continue to have overwhelming nu-
clear superiority in relation to China, and
there is every reason to believe that our su-
periority will operate effectively to deter the
Chinese from any offensive nuclear actions
or threats. It is not necessary, therefore, to
try to achieve a total damage denial capa-
bility by building ABMs;
(2) If the U.S. insists on building an anti-
Chinese ABM system, Peking will probably
interpret this to mean (whatever Washing-
ton says to try to convince it otherwise) that
we are determined to maintain an unre-
stricted capability of making "first strike"
threats against China, and that we insist on
denying China the ability to acquire even a
limited, defensive, "second strike" capability.
There is every season to believe that this
would tend to reinforce neking's worst in- _
stincts in interpreting our motives and would
work against the possibility of improving our
relations.
(3) China's present opposition to all in-
ternational arms control agreements is
rooted, in part at least, in its basic sense of
vulnerability and nuclear weakness. Peking
obviously has been, and still is, fearful of
threats by the superpowers of the U.S.-Soviet
"collusion" directed against China. Until
China achieves s. minimal defensive deter-
rent itself, this situation is likely to con-
tinue. However, once the Chinese do acquire
a limited "second strike" capability, it is at
least conceivable that leaders in Peking may
at that point be more Inclined than at pres-
ent to consider the advantages of arms con-
trol agreements in terms of their own in If so, the chances of inducing China
to participate in arms control may increase
at that point. An anti-Chinese ABM will
probably work to postpone that day.
(4) For these and other reasons the U.S.
should itself forgo building an anti-Chinese
ABM area defense system, and in addition
should attempt, at the SALT talks, to reach
agreement with the Soviet Union that
neither we nor they win builci such sys-
tems. If, in the absence of such agreement,
either or both proceed to deploy anti-Chi-
nese systems, this will tend to reinforce
Peking's fear of anti-Chinese collusion be-
tween Washington and Moscow, which at the
least would complicate, and could well seri-
ously set back, the prospects for improving
U.S. relations with China.
Let me now elaborate on some of these
points, starting with a few comments on
Chinese motivations, nuclear capabilities,
and foreign policy behavior, and how one
should view the "Chinese threat."
There is no doubt. I believe, that ever since
1949 the Chinese Communist regime, in its
relations with the superpowers, has felt very
vulnerable to external pressures and possi-
ble attack by one or both of the major nu-
clear powers. Particularly since the late
1950's--following the Sino-Soviet split and
the start of U.S.-Soviet collaboration in the
arms control field?Peking has felt itself to
be, in a sense, "encircled- by the two super-
powers. It is still, in a fundamental sense,
weak and knows it; its basic posture in big
power relations is, therefore, of necessity
defensive.
One of China's basic aims has been, and
still is, to acquire at least a minimal nu-
clear deterrent to improve its ability to deal
with the U.S. and Soviet Union, Its hope is
to achieve a position less unequal than in
the past, and to strengthen its bargaining
position and leverage in relations with the
big powers. Above all, its atm is to deter at-
tack against China and reduce China's
vulnerability to external pressures. This is
the basic military-strategic motivation be-
hind its nuclear program.
Without attempting to summarize in de-
tail the progress of China's nuclear program,
let me say that while its technological prog-
ress has been impressive in many respects,
its actual nuclear capabilities are very
limited and will remain so for a long time
to come?because of the relative weakness
of China's resource base.
By the middle or latter 1.970's China will,
at best, have accumulated perhaps 15 to 40
operational ICBMs plus toe to 200 MRBMs
and a limited number of other bombs de-
liverable by aircraft. (The most recent De-
fense Department estimates suggest that by
1975 China may have 10 to 25 ICBMs and
80 to 100 MRBMs.)
To provide a crude basis of comparison,
today, the U.S. and the Soviet Union each
has over 1,000 ICBMs, plus many thousands
of other nuclear weapons deliverable by a
variety of sophisticated systems including
missiles, airplanes, and submarines.
Projections of China's nuclear capabilities
through the 1970's make several things
clear. There is no possibility that in the
foreseeable future Peking can aspire to parity
with the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the
nuclear field. The Chinese cannot come close
to achieving a "first strike" capability against
either of the superpowers. Under any con-
ceivable circumstances, in the event of a
Chinese attack, Washington or Moscow could
retaliate massively.
The question is whether?and if so when
and with what consequences?China may be
able to acquire a limited, defensive. "second
strike" capability which will serve as a mini-
mal deterrent for China?that is, a capacity,
if subjected to U.S. or Soviet nuclear attack,
to retaliate and hit at least some targets
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in the attacking country or, in the U.S. case,
possibly American forces in the Pacific or
bases in allied countries. To date, it has yet
to achieve this.
If the U.S., and Soviet Union, forego build-
ing anti-Chinese ABM systems, they will, in
effect, be accepting thefact that by the latter
1970's, Chins, will have acquired a small de-
fensive, "second strike" capability.
What risks or costs would this involve? It
would require acceptance of the fact that the
U.S., and the Soviet Union, cannot with im-
punity consider or threaten nuclear "first
strikes" against China. One can question,
however, whether this would involve, high
Costs. The arguments and inhibitions against
considering nuclear "first strikes" in most
conceivable situations are already very great.
(Conceivably, this may be less true for the
Soviet Union, than for the U.S., as the vague
hints about e possible preemptive strike in
1969 suggest, but even Moscow must feel
strong inhibitions about initiating a nuclear
"first strike.") Moreover, in most limited
conflicts in Asia, nuclear weapons are likely
to be almost irrelevant.
The possibility that key non-nuclear pow-
ers such as Japan, India, and Australia might
feel more vulnerable and threatened cannot
be ignored. If this impelled them to embark
on independent nuclear programs, the cost
in relation to U.S. aims (including the desire
to prevent proliferation) would be substan-
tial. Yet, as long as such countries have con-
fidence in the U.S. commitment to defend
them against nuclear threats, and, as long as
It is clear that American nuclear superiority
In relation to China is such that any offen-
sive nuclear threats by Peking would not
.really be credible, there is no reason why
China's acquisition of a minimal deterrent
should basically alter the position or the
views of such countries.
It is sometimes argued that if the U.S.
maintains a "first strike" capability against
China and builds invulnerable defenses, pre-
sumably by developing ABMs, the Japanese
are likely to have greater confidence in our
defense pledges. I believe that it is much
more likely, however, that if the U.S. focuses
on such a defense strategy, rather than rely-
ing on the continued applicability of mutual
deterrence, the Japanese may conclude that
the U.S. In a crisis situation Might concern
Itself only with its own defense and abandon
interest in allies not protected by such de-
fenses.
' The fact is that not only have the Chinese
to date resisted whatever temptation they
may have felt to engage in "bomb rattling,"
it is ClifIlcult to see how, from their position
of nuclear inferiority, they will have any
significant capacity for credible "nuclear
blackmail" ixt the foreseeable future. Peking's
cautious emphasis, to date, on defense as its
sole aim in developing nuclear weapons sug-
gests that Chinese leaders may already real-
ize this.
Some might fear that once the Chinese be-
lieve they have acquired a credible deterrent,
they might tend to become more aggressive
in areas such as Southeast Asia feeling that
they could take more risks- in non-nuclear
or sub-nuclear situations, involving conven-
tional weapons, because they would be less
vulnerable to nuclear counter-threats.
Whether one considers this to be a significant
risk' depends very much on one's general
assessinent of Chine's foreign policy goals,
strategy, and behavior.
' If one views China as a power committed
to broad territorial aggression and expan-
sionism by military means, willing to take
large risks, and prone to irrational action
(i.e., inclined to commit aggression without
regard for possible consequences), there
would be cause for major concern. However,
among specialists on Chinese affairs, both in
and out of the U.S. government, there ap-
pears to be a fairly broad consensus that
analysis of China's behavior and doctrine
over the past two decades does not support
this view. In general, this consensus, which
I believe is sound, maintains that:
Although China encourages revolution-
aries abroad, it is not committed to broad
territorial expansionism. Among its national
goals Is the recovery of certain areas that
it considers to be lost territories, but even
in regard to these territories its inclination
is to pursue long-term, low-risk policies, not
broad military expansionism.
It appears to be pre-disposed to keep Chi-
nese military forces within China's bound-
aries, and it seems likely to continue doing
so, except in cases where it feels Chinese
security?or that of a Communist buffer
state on its periphery?is seriously threat-
ened (as it did in Korea).
Its primary stress, both in the structure
Of its conventional military farces and the
doctrine governing their use, is on defense
rather than offense.
It cannot and does not ignore the possible
risks and costs of large-scale conventional
war, even when nuclear weapons are not in-
volved, and it places a high priority on the
desirability of avoiding large-scale war of any
sort with the major powers.
It is strongly pre-disposed, in general, to
low-cost, low-risk policies. While it clearly
encourages and supports revolutionary
struggles in other countries, such support
does not include Chinese manpower on any
significant scale. Even Maoist doctrine in-
sists that all revolutionaries must be "self-
reliant," and should depend primarily on
indigenous resources; it opposes the use of
Chinese forces to fight other revolutionaries'
battles for them.
Chinas has used pressures and probes
against its neighbors for a variety of purposes,
but in doing so its use of force has generally
been carefully calculated, limited, and
controlled.
In crisis situations, it has tended to act
with considerable prudence and caution, and
repeatedly it has moved to check escalation
when there has appeared to be a serious risk
of major conflict.
There is, of course, no absolute guarantee
that these patterns of behavior, which seem
to have characterized Chinese actions over
the past two decades, will persist in the
future. Nevertheless, there is a remarkably
broad consensus among China specialists
that they are likely to continue. In fact,
there is a fairly widely-held view?a view
that I share?that post-Mao leaders are
likely to be more pragmatic and realistic
than Mao, and subject to even greater in-
ternal as well as external constraints.
As a result 'of the internal disruptions
Caused by the Cultural Revolution in China
during the past four years, the Peking re-
gime has clearly been weakened in some
'respects. Consequently, there' are now new
'constraints, in fact if not in theory, on
Chinese policy, which will certainly affect
its strategies abroad.
Moreover, as a result of the steady deteri-
oration of Sino-Soviet relations in the 1960's,
the "Russian threat" appears to have re-
placed the "U,S. threat" as Peking's major
foreign policy preoccupation, and this seems
to have impelled the Chinese leadership to
consider new options and strategies, to re-
duce China's present isolation and vulner-
ability and explore new opportunities for
maneuver and flexibility.
It is at least plausible to believe, therefore,
that future Chinese leaders may downgrade
the importance of revolutionary aims (not
ending, but possibly deemphasizing, Chinese
activity in this field) and upgrade the im-
portance of state-to-state relationships and
more conventional political and economic
instruments of policy. There is remarkably
little support among China specialists for
the idea that China is now, or is likely to
be in the future, prone to act in an irra-
tional or highly -reckless manner, which it
S 5981
would certainly be doing if it were to ignore
the continuing fact of its nuclear inferiority,
and its vulnerability to both conventional
and nuclear retaliation, even if, and when,
It acquires a minimal deterrent.
If these judgments are correct, there are
strong reasons to assume that once China
achieves a nuclear deterrent it can be ex-
pected, in a basic sense, to act much as the
other nuclear powers have, and to be con-
strained, as they are, by the realities of nu-
clear deterrence. There is little basis for
arguing that the U.S., or Soviet Union, can
feel secure vis-a-vis China only if they have
a total damage denial capability and an
unquestionable ability to threaten China
with a "first strike", To argue this is to
argue, in effect, that the U.S. and the Soviet
Union can only feel secure under condi-
tions that guarantee that the Chinese will
continue to feel highly insecure.
As I stated earlier, if the U.S. operates on
other assumptions and proceeds to build an
anti-Chinese ABM, this will not only tend to
strengthen Chinese suspicions that we are
detremined to maintain a potentially threat-
ening "first strike" capability against China
and to deny China even a minimal defensive
"second strike" capability. it will also tend
to postpone the day when China may be will-
ing to consider participating in international
arms control agreements.
Fundamental change in China's posture on
strategic and nuclear arms control issues will
not be easy for Peking to make, under any
circumstances, because of China's basic
weakness relative to the two superpowers.
However, if one asks when and under what
conditions a more flexible and pragmatic
leadership in China might be inclined to
change its posture on arms control, and even
begin to see arms control measures as in the
interest of China as well as of the other pow-
ers, the answer would seem to be the follow-
ing: When China is convinced that its own
nuclear development has reached a stage
Where it has at least a minimal credible nu-
clear deterrent?that is, some kind of defen-
sive "second strike" retaliatory capacity?so
that it will be able to deal with the U.S. and
Soviet Union on terms less unequal than at
present.
It is not easy to define when this point
will be reached. But it will doubtless be
reached eventually, whether or not we build
an anti-Chinese ABM. It is amost certain
that in time the Chinese will have acquired
a sufficient nuclear capability Co that no
one could be sure whether, if China were
subjected to a "first strike", it could not
mount a significant retaliatory strike, at
least against allies or forces in the Pacific
if not against the U.S. itself.
Whenever the Chinese, and we, are con-
vinced that China has acquired some sort
of limited "second strike" capability, the pos-
sibility that Peking may reconsider its pres-
ent blanket opposition to arms control may
increase, for a variety of reasons. The real-
ization that pursuit of parity is a will-o-the-
wisp is likely to begin to sink in, in China.
Moreover, once China has acquired any sort
of credible deterrent, some Chinese leaders
may conclude that it is more feasible to try
to reduce the gap between China and the
superpowers through agreements limiting
(or reducing) U.S. and Soviet capabilities
than by trying to catch up in a hopeless
race. And, as the cost of deterrence goes up
(it inevitably must, as China gets involved
in more sophisticated hardware), and as the
oompetition for resources in China increases
(between those stressing economic develop-
ment and those emphasizing defense) there
may be greater pressures within China, on
economic grounds, to limit investment in
strategic arms development.
The construction of anti-Chinese ABM sys-
tems would be likely, therefore, to postpone
the day when there may be some realistic
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hope of including Chine in international
arms control, It would tend to raise the levet
of nuclear development which Peking's lead-
ers will consider essential as a minimum goal.
And in general it will tend to make more
remote the possibility of establishing a "more
normal and constructive relationship" with
China and the possibility of inducing Peking
In -re-enter the international community"?
which are now our stated, and in my opinion
eminently sensible, goals.
What does all of this suggest regarding
the decisions we should make and the poli-
cies we should pursue regarding an anti-
Chinese ABM system?both in our own COn-
sideration of the problem and in di;cussions
with. the Russians at Vienna?
I strongly believe we should clearly decide
that, in terms of our broad national intes-
tate and aims, we should not build an anti-
Chinese ABM system, because is conflicts
with the main thrust of our new China pol-
icy andt is unnecessary for our defense--
wholly apart from other possible reasons.
The cost of Bach a system would certainly
be in its disfavor, too, but clearly the costs
would be tolerable if it were eesential in
terms of our defense and Foreign policy goals.
The point is that it is not only unessential,
but would tend to be damaging in terms of
our overall objectives.
We should not only make this decision
ourselves; we should also in the SALT talks
attempt to reach agreement with the Soviets
on this Issue, so that. both we and they will
forego traveling this road. This would be de-
sirable in relation both to our aims regard-
ing China and our desire to check the U.S.-
Soviet arms race.
Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union must
concern themselves, more than they have in
the past, not only with tee problem of stns.
tegic stability in their bilateral relations but
also with the task of inducing China, over
time, to improve relations in general and,
eventually, to participate in arms control ef-
forts and accommodate more fully than it
has to date to the requirements of the nu-
clear age. Neither need fear that the Chi-
nese will be able to achieve a "first strike"
capability, or approach nuclear parity, in the
foreseeable future. Nor should they COE-
sider China's eventual acqukition of a mini-
mal deterrent to be a special danger. While
it is true that China's acquisition of a credi-
ble deterrent will improve Peking's defensive
capabilities, It will not significantly alter
the overall nuclear balance. Moreover, China
can be expected to act much as other nu-
clear powers have, and to be constrained, as
others are, by the realities of mutual deter-
rence. Equally important, when China
achieves a credible deter sent, Peking's lead-
ers may be more inclined than at present to
reassess their strategic policies and consider
the value of arms control,
The hope should be that Moscow as well
as Washington will see the importance of
this. But even if Moscow does not, the U.S.
In shaping its own strategic and arms con-
trol policies, should take the "China prob-
lem," as well as the problem of U.S.-Soviet
bilateral relations, fully into account.
SAFEGUARD, ABM, AND SALT
(By W. K. H. Panorsky)
Testimony before the Disarmament Sub-
committee of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, U.S. Senate, April IS, 1970)
Last year I had the opportunity of discuss-
ing the Phase I ABC deployment decision
before this committee; I very much appre-
ciate the privilege of appearing before you
again this year. Again, to avoid any mis-
understanding, let me say that I ain :testify-
ing as an individual scientist who has been
involved in defense matters in general, and
ABM in particular, for a long period of time.
My first, official contact with the subject was
:955 when I served on the Scientific Advi-
sory Board to the Air Force, which recom-
mended the establishment of the Ballistic
Miesile Early Warning (BMEWS) System. I
have been participating in various advisory
roles on these and 'related subjects to the
government since that time.
X. OUTLINE OF TESTIMONY
hast year, during his press conference of
March 14, 1969, the President gave three rea-
sons for wishing to go forward with Phase
of the Safeguard System. These were:
A. Protection of the land-based deterrent
(Minuteman and SAC en: fields).
B. Protection against an accidentally
leunched missile.
C. A thin area defense against small nu-
clear powers, in particular Mainland China.
In connection With announcing his deploy-
ment decision the President emphasized sev-
eral additional points laet year. Among these
a n :
A. He did not wish: the ABM deployment
to threaten the Soviet deterrent against U.S.
attack. For this reason he specifically ruled
ow; deployment of ABM in the role of defense
of U.S. cities against Soviet attack; in con-
trast a defense dedicated solely to defending
Minuteman silos does not threaten the So-
v tet deterrent.
The deployment decision should not
endanger the chance of success of the forth-
coming SALT talks.
As I testified last year, I welcomed the
President's statement that he did not wish
to endanger SALT and that he did nest wish
to escalate the arms race further by endan-
gering the Soviet deterrent, thus forcing the
Soviet Union towards further increases of
offensive weapons. However, I aan oppeeed
the Phase I deployment as actually carried
out by the Department of Defense and to the
proposed Safeguard expansion; these steps
do not meet the President's objectives in
many essential respects, as summarized here:
A. The Safeguard system does vary little, if
anything, to protect the Minuteman force?
better protection could be achieved at a
lower cost on a comparable or shorter time
scale.
B. The President stated in his press con-
ference of January 31, 1970, that he had
been assured that the system would provide
a "virtually infallible" defense against ICBM
attack from Chines. Safeguard does not fit
this description, nor does technology permit
construction of a dependable ABM shield
Over the entire country.
C. A National Policy requiring a highly ef-
fective ABM defense against Mainland China
implies an ever-growing deployment of city
defense ABM's which would threaten the
Soviet deterrent in contrast to the Presi-
dent's stated objectives.
D. An expanded ABM deployment, as now
proposed, in particular considering its
stated objective as being an anti-China de-
fense, seriously interferes with the flexibility
the President will have in negotiating an
acceptable ABM level with the Soviet Union
at the SALT talks
The President promised that this program
will be reviewed annually from the point of
view of:
A. Technical development.
B. The threat.
C. The diplomatic context, including any
talks on arms limitation.
Where, then, is the new experience on
which the decision to expand ABM deploy-
ment now was to be based? There has been
no construction activity on the sites au-
thorized last year; the contract to develop
the first site for future technical use was
awarded by the Army just two weeks ago.
The date at which equipment can be re-
ceived at the sites has slipped by almost one
year. None of the technical results in the
ongoing development work have made Safe-
guard look better. On the contrary, several
factors exist 'which tend to degrade the ex-
pected performance of Safeguard: The abil-
ity of the PAR to function in the presence
of nuclear explosions is highly dubious, and
the computer severely limi is: the perform-
ance of the system in handling large at-
tacks; also, oosts have risen substantially.
Where is the new threat justifying ABM
expansion? The Soviet threat against Minute-
man has indeed been growing/ but it is just
in defending Minuteman Against growing
threats that Safeguard Is no admitted to be
uneconomical and ineffective, As a "hedge"
to counter the Soviet threat we can develop
a system specifically designed to protect Min-
uteman on a time scale at lent as fast as that
of Safeguard, and at much lower cost. Esti-
mates of a Chinese ICBM nireat have been
slipping farther into the future, yet we are
now re-emphasizing the area-China mission
of the Safeguard.
What is the diplomatic c:mtext to justify
expansion of Safeguard now? The agreed
level of ABM deployment Witch might arise
from the SALT talks will control more than
any other single factor the total level of
strategic armament at *Wined we might be
able to freeze the weaponry of the world as
a result of SALT. Authorization to expand
Safeguard with emphasis on anti-China
mission would thus endanger the success of
SALT, since the negotiability with the So-
viets to reduce ABM levels is limited by such
a decision. The argument for an expensive
but technically ineffective expansion of Safe-
guard in order to "negotiate from a position
of strength has little merit: Although the
Soviets have greater total explosive power in
their nuclear arsenal, we have numerical su-
periority of three to one in nuclear warheads,
and U.S. MIRV's are ready for deployment.
The sequence of events between last year's
Safeguard decision and this year's request for
expansion gives little confidence that we are
embarking on an "orderly, phased" deploy-
ment, carefully tailored to' changing cir-
cumstances. This is the time to push toward
a halt in the nuclear arms spiral?a race
which has cast a shadow over the history of
our time.
II. THE VALUE OF SAFEGUARD rar PROTECTING
MINUTEMAN
During the past year the Soviet threat
against the Minuteman force, due to growth
of the numbers of Soviet 3S-9 missiles of
high explosive power, and owing to the recog-
nized technical possibility of improved ac-
curacy de Soviet missiles, has increased at
approximately the rate forecast by Secretary
Laird last year. However, e threat against
Minuteman is not synonymous with a first
strike capability against the U.S., let alone
a first strike intent. In last year's testimony
it was conclusively demonstrated that a first
strike threat against the United States would
have to envisage a simultaneous attack
against the American Minuteman force, the
SAC bomber fleet, and the Polaris-Poseidon
fleet on a time scale which is technically im-
possible because of existing earnly warn-
ing capabilities. I note the) under current
policies each of these U.S. farces is designed
to be able to inflict enormons damage on the
Soviet Union and Mainland China; even after
absorbing a first strike the level of damage
the U.S. could inflict would be such that the
society of the attacker wend be unlikely to
survive.
Nevertheless, in view of the reality of the
emerging threat against Minirtenian it might
be prudent to consider a number of alterna-
tives to improve the U.S. deterrent, such as:
A. ABM defense of the Minuteman force
against missile attack.
B. Phase-out of the lane-based deterrent
force and relying for deters ence entirely on
an airborne bomber force end an improved
or amplified submarine foree.
C. Increase in the hardness; of the Minute-
man force or improvement of its ohance for
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survival under attack through increased
mobility.
D. Increase in the number of Minuteman
silos at a rate sufficient to stay ahead of the
Soviet threat.
'1 E. Limitation of the threat by "freezing"
the number of Soviet missiles as a result of
the SALT talks, possibly Preceded by an
agreed temporary moratorium during the
talks.
Naturally, the last alternative is the most
attractive one from the point of view of the
peace of the world; thus nothing should be
done to endanger`the success of SALT.
Secretary Laird has testified that he con-
siders this year's request for military au-
thorization (which includes expansibn of
the Safeguard system at a coat of $1.450
billion of new obligational authority) to be
a "holding" operation in order to avoid the
difficult decisions this year among the al-
ternate options listed. He maintained that
defense of the Minuteman silos is a non-
threatening "hedge" to lengthen the period
of time over which Minuteman might be
expected to survive. With this conclusion I
agree, as / also agreed with the President's
stated objective to protect Minuteman. How-
ever, during last year's hearings, many wit-
nesses (and I among them)" introduced
severe technical- criticisms which have never
been answered satisfactorily by the Defense
Department Oh the role of Safeguard in
Minuteman defense. The dominant points of
these criticisms were: The Safeguard system
provides only a single, very expensive (about
$200 million) radar for each Minuteman
complex and only a very small still classi-
fied, number of Sprint missiles to protect the
Minuteman silos and the radar. If, therefore,
the radar were to malfunction, or be de-
stroyed by enemy attack, then the whole
system collapses. Attack on the radar is an
attractive enemy tactic, since the missile
site radar is much "softer", that is, vulner-
able, than the missile silos it defends.
Defense of an entire Minuteman ceniplex
by a single MSR radar contradicts the fun-
damental philosophy of the Minuteman sys-
tem: The value of Minuteman as a deterrent
is based on the -survival of each silo; inde-
pendent of any other silo which might be
-destroyed. The single radar on which the
entire defense depends is thus the "Achilles'
Heel" of the entire system and a substantial
part of the defense has to be dedicated to
protecting this radar, i.e., to "defending the
defense."
\This criticism is aggravated by a second
objection never answered by the Defense
Department: The Soviet SS-11 missiles
(which now exist in much larger quantities
than the SS-9's) are at present of sufficient
accuracy and explosive power to destroy the
missile site radar, although they do not en-
danger the Minuteman silos. Thus in effect
a Safeguard defense to protect Minuteman
against the 68-9 could be totally negated by
the Soviets even if the system were deployed
today.
During the last year it has become clear
beyond a reasonable doubt that if the de-
fense of Minuteman were the only, Or even
the principal, function of Safeguard, its de-
ployment clearly could not be justified. Hot
only is the number of Minuteman silos saved
by -the Safeguard deployment neglible, but
it is also clear that if the attempt were made
to increase the protection Offered by Safe-
guard by increasing the nuniberi of missiles
and radars using the Safeguard' technology,
then such an undertaking would be enor-
mously expensive. Specifically, the cost per
silo defended would be many times the cost
of each Minuteman saved and the defense
cost would also exceed the cost of the en-
emy missiles which could be intercepted
with confidence. -
These criticisms have now been tacitly
agreed to this year by the Defense Depart-
ment. Secretary Laird in his statement on
February 20, 1970, before the Joint Session
of the Armed Services and Appropriations
Committees of the Senate, proposed:
"If, in the future, the defense of Min-
uteman has to , be expanded, new and
smaller additional radars placed in Min-
uteman fields would be less costly than the
Safeguard Missile Site Radar (MSR) be-
cause they would not have to cover such
large areas. For this reason we will pursue
a program to determine the optimum radar
for such a defense and begin the develop-
ment of this radar and associated com-
ponents in FY 1971 ..."
Similarly, the Secretary of the Air Force
stated before the Senate Armed Services
Committee in March 1970:
"If the Soviets continue to increase the
threat (against Minutemen) it may prove
most cost effective to rely on a broader list
of defensive measures . . . close hard point
defense, hardening and multi-basing as ex-
amples ..."
The Deputy Secretary of Defense recently
testified to the House Committee on Armed
Services:
"For example, we have under considera-
tion a new, smaller, less-expensive radar and
data processor aimed specifically at close-in
defense of Minuteman . . ."
? In. contrast the Secretary testified last year
on April 16, 1969, that he saw:
"no feasible substitute for Safeguard . . ."
The Secretary of Defense has now proposed
an additional appropriation of $158 million
for these new development programs, in-
tended to protect Minutemen by techniques
better than Safeguard. This is an admission
of the validity of the tuhnical criticisms
voiced last year: Those witnesses opposing
Safeguard deployment maintained that a
more effective and less expensive way to de-
fend Minuteman would clearly? be a system
which employed smaller radars rather than
a large, vulnerable one. The Defense Depart-
ment now recognizes belatedly that any hope
of a reasonably effective defense of Minute-
Man would require the development and de-
ployment of a system of defense of hardened
Minuteman silos, rather than being a gen-
eral purpose development such as the Safe-
guard adaptation of the former Sentinel and
Nike-X systems, which Were primarily de-
signed as city defense ABM systems.
A frequent "criticism of the critics" voiced
last year was, "Assuming you are right, that
Safeguard is technically very poorly suited
to defending Minuteman, but considering the
evolving threat, can we afford to wait tO de-
velop a better system specifically designed
for defending Minuteman?" The answer to
that is "les, we can." the total schedule for
deploying the Safeguard Phase I defense is
not controlled by providing the hardware,
that is, the missile and radars, but is paced
by the unprecedented complexity of the com-
puter and the associated programming Which
is required to control the system.
Last year Secretary Packard testified that
the data processing job was a large one and
this year DOD witnesses testified that prog-
ress was "satisfactory." What they did not
state was that the programming task not only
control the level of threat which can be
handled, but also paces the entire deploy-
ment schedule. Therefore, "doing the job
right' will not delay the time at which Min-
uteman could be defended, and may in fact
shorten it.
Last year critics expressed concern that
the performance of the PAR radar would be
impaired by the proximity of nuclear explo-
sions. This year Dr. Poster testified on Feb-
ruary 24, 1970: "We have encountered no ser-
ious problems in engineering the PAR." What
he did Ttot state is that the concern of the
critics is more than justified: Nuclear bursts
degrade the expected performance of the
PAR to such an extent that there is great
doubt that he PAR can contribute to the
defense of Minuteman at all and that fur-
S 5983
thermore its role in area coverage is seriously
impaired. I consider this a "serious engineer-
ing problem."
The totality of all these technical facts
amounts to one thing: Even if Safeguard
functions perfectly it offers significant pro-
tection to Minuteman only over a very nar-
row band of threats; if the threat continues
to grow as rapidly as it is at present, Safe-
guard is obsolete before deployed; if the
threat levels off, Safeguard is not needed. If
one combines this fact with the likelihood
of catastrophic failure of the single radar
and computer controlling the system, and
the fact that a less failure-prone and more
effective system to defend Minuteman can
be produced on the same time scale for less
money, Safeguard looks like a very poor use
of the shrinking defense dollar indeed.
III. THE DEFENSE AGAINST CHINESE ICBM'S
There is now, general agreement that the
mission of defending Minuteman alone can-
not justify Safeguard Phase I deployment,
let alone deployment of an amplified Safe-
guard system. Therefore, the principal mo-
tive for wishing to go forward has again be-
come the role of the system in defense of
cities; it was this role which was de-em-
phasized in the testimony of Department of
Defense witnesses last year, e.g., the Deputy
Secretary of Defense testified before this
Committee on March 26, 1969:
"I must say that I am very pleased to know
that you and I have come to the same con-
clusion on this matter?that an ABM de-
fense of our cities makes no sense and that
it is the kind of thing that does lead to es-
calation of the arms race. That is one of
the first conclusions I came to after getting
into the study of this matter. That is why
I have recommended a different course?the
course of protecting our retaliatory capabil-
ity rather than protecting our cities."
However, the President put city defense
again into primary focus as an anti-Chinese
defense during his press conference of Jan-
uary 31 of this year. This shifting role of
Safeguard was described by Senator Gore
last year by the words "a defense looking
for mission;" we now find that such a mul-
tiple role system is very poorly suited for
the defense of Minuteman and-is also of lit-
tle value in offering total protection against
a possible Chinese threat.
Although there has been progress in the
development of Chinese nuclear devices our
projections of a Chinese ICBM capability
have continuously slipped in time. We ex-
pected that the Chinese would undertake an
experimental launch of an ICBM in 1987 (as
was recently mentioned by Secretary Laird),
but now the expectation of such an event
has slipped to 1970, a shift of 3 years. What
is the new urgency for an anti-ICBM defense
against China?
The President, in his press conference of
January 31, 1970, indicated that he had been
assured that Safeguard would provide a "vir-
tually infallible" defense to provide a "cred-
ible foreign policy in the Pacific areas." Pre-
sumably under such an umbrella the 'U.S.
can use its nuclear power in response to Com-
munist moves without exposing its popula-
tion.
I will not enter into the controversial
question whether the threat by the 'U.S. of
a nuclear "massive retaliation" against un-
acceptable Communist moves is a wise or
moral policy in Asia; I only would like to
-point out that for this role Safeguard is
subject to many valid technical objections.
The thin area defense proposed is very fal-
lible indeed for many reasons. Among these
are:
A. Any system as complex as an ABM
and which can never be tested is subject to
Many sources of failure?human or technical.
B. Since the PAR radar is required for
complete area coverage the nuclear environ-
ment produced both by explosions of the
defensive Spartan missile and the incoming
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S 5984 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE April 20, 1970
missile can interfere with proper functioning
ir many ways,
C. Since each Interceptor will never have
perfect reliability there is always a good
ehanee of the enemy's attack "leaking
ia irough.-
D. The area defense against China is of
no value at all until one has completed the
full deployment of all planned sites, since
otherwise it can be bypassed by ICBM attack
against' uncovered areas. Hawaii and Alaska
e not covered.
E. Many mechanical devices - designed to
penetrate ABM defenses and which can be
added to ICBM's with relative ease are well
known. Theee could be adopted by the
Chinese at their option to confuse and thus
defeat the radar.
F. Should the Chinese really plan or
threaten a suicidal attack against the U.S.
they would have means other than an ICBM
to deliver a nuclear explosion to the Uae.
homeland, for instance by smuggling in a
bomb.
Secretary Packard, in his testimony to the
Committee on Armed Services of the U.S.
House of Representatives, agreed that "Rela-
tively simple devices like tank fragments
have a limited ability to deceive a sophisti-
cated defense system like Safeguard." I would
go beyond this by stating that the Safeguard
area defense can definitely be defeated by
tactics as simple as tank fragmentation (the
'U.S. did this in its ATLAS Program in the
mid-fifties!), as well as other simple pene-
tration devices such as balloons. It is well
known from more than a decade of experi-
ence that defeating the defense by present-
ing many confusing objects outside the at-
mosphere Is no longer a technological chal-
lenge.
In his testimony Secretary Packard tried
to minimize the threat of such Chinese moves
by pointing out that the Chinese would have
to construct range instrumentation to mon-
itor whether the tank had actually exploded
and would have to possess detailed knowt-
edge of the characteristics of Safeguard. Since
the President was Proposing protection in
"perhaps ten years from new" it is clear
that the Chinese are fully capable of pre-
viding such simple radar instrumentation
once they have succesifully mastered the
technology of ICBM development itself.
Considering this combination Of facts it
iv clear that an area defense system such as
Safeguard can never be expected to achieve
total protection. Defeating Safeguard, if de-
sired by the Chinese, would, of course, re-
quire additional effort, but it is an effoit
which they are clearly capable of undertak-
ing. The only hope would be that the Chinese
would not choose to adopt measures to de-
feat Safeguard, or would fail to remedy some
essential defect of their ICBM's.
I am impressed how tortured the argu-
ment of the DOD witnesses has become: In
order to justify Safeguard as a defense
against Soviet missiles and to Justify im-
mediate deployment of MIRV against sus-
pected clandestine Soviet ABM defenses, we
are giving the Soviets credit for a degree of
performance and reliability of their military
systems which we could not dream oaachiev-
Mg ourselves; when talking about an "infal-
lible" defense against China we are assum-
ing that even a decade from now the Chinese
could not achieve results we accomplished
fifteen years ago!
The serious inadequacy of the area defense
against China will, of course, become ap-
parent as time goes on. As a result pressure
nil mount to add progressively to the "thin'
sieeense to make it more and more effective
iteninst the conjectured threat from Main-
lend China. This means that once the U.S.
hal adopted the policy that it needs a corn-
p?ete shield against China the stage is set
/or an ever-expanding but never fully effec-
tive ABM system at enormous cost.
It is this last conclusion, namely that'
adoption of an anti-Chinese ABM policy
leads us to a technological arms race with
China, which gives rise to the most serious
concern: Pressures will rise to have each area
of the country covered by a thicker defense
so that each center of population can be pia-
tected against the total Chinese ICBM force.
But die very existence of a growing U.S. city
ABM system, however dubious its perform-
ance, would lead the conservative Soviet
planners to conclude that their deterrence
against U.S. firs': strike nuclear attack is
threatened: Therefore the Soviets will press
for expansion of their offensive weapons.
Conversely, the U.S. conservative planners,
being well aware of the technical deficien-
cies of Safeguard, are ignoring the protection
it may offer in their strategic force planning.
It was for this rsason that last year Presi-
dent Nixon in hie March 14, 1969, press con-
ference ruled out a substantial city defense
ABM; he agreed that such a move would be
escalatory and hence undesirable. This year
this position appears reversed through the
emphasis on defense against China, although
in the intervening year no developments have
created a new urgency to deploy an anti-
Chi nese ABM.
Iv. RELATION OF ABM TO SALT
In the previous sections I have demon-
strated that Safeguard is ineffective in de-
fending Minuteman, and Is incapable of pro-
riding a tight umbrella over the U.S. to de-
fend reliably against ICBM attacks which
Mainland China might be able to launch late
this decade. Despite the clear technical lim-
itations of Safeguard as an anti-Chinese
defense the very fact that ',lie President has
stated such a defense to be a U.S. policy ob-
jective creates a danger le the success of
SALT. Fortunately the President has empha-
sized, in particular in his more recent state-
ments, that he considers al3M levels fully
negotiable in the forthcoming SALT talks. I'
hope that he can justify to the American
people giving away in negotiation with the
Soviets a system whichahe is now persuading
the American people is a defense we need
against Communist China.
While emphasizing the negotiability of
ABM deployment the President and DOD
witnesses urge an expanded Safeguard sys-
tem now, in spite of the obvious technical
Inadequacies, in order to be in a position of
"negotialang from the strength" at SALT.
The expressed fear is that since the Soviet
strategic forces are grovemg in numbers,
While the seven billion dollar U.S. strategic
budget is only buying qualitative improve-
ments, the Soviets will not feel under suffi-
cient military pressure to negotiate a limita-
tion of istrategic arms under terms accepta-
ble to the U.S. But are we really negotiating
from weakness? Quite apart from MIRV de-
ployment, the status of U.S vs. Soviet inter-
continental strategic defensive forces (as
presented on February 20, 1970, by Secretary
Laird) is given in the following table:
UNITED STATES VERSUS SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES
United States
Sept 1, 1968
Soviet
United States
Sept. 1, 1969
Soviet
1, 060
110
ICMB launchers
SUVA launchers.
Total launchers
I n tercontinenta I bombers
Total force loadings weapons_
1,054
656
900
45
1,054
656
1,710
646
945
150
1,710
581
1,710
140-145
4,200
1,100
4,200
1,350
This belies the fact that the U.S. is in an
inferior position. At present the U.S. is clearly
ahead by a large factor in the total number
of deliverable nuclear warheads while the
Soviets are ahead in terms of the total explo-
sive power of their weapons. Under current
circumstances neither side could deliver a
fine. strike against the other without expos-
ing itself to a retaliatory blow of such enor-
mous magnitude as to endanger the very
tillIvival of the society of the attacker. How-
ever, the Soviets appear to be racing ahead
to achieve a nuclear "war fighting" capabil-
ity and the U.S. has already acquired nuclear
strategic armaments greatly in excess of those
required for deterrent purposes only. What
better time could there be for both sides to
attempt to freeze strategic armaments near
current levels rather than escalating the arms
race further by trying to negotiate "from a
position of strength?"
Once the Congress approves an expanded
Safeguard under the announced policy to
give full protectien against Chinese ICBM'A
it will be difficult for the U.S. negotiators to
propose ABM levels below those authorized
at home. In turn the Soviets will find it im-
possible to agree to ABM levels on their own
below those proposed by the U.S. I note that
current Soviet ABM deployment levels consist
of only the few interceptors and associated
radars deployed around Moscow. The expand-
ed Safeguard system now before the Congress
involves more interceptor missiles than those
deployed around Moscow and is technically
much more advanced. An ABM freeze agreed
at SALT at'a level no lower than that of the
expanded Safeguard system would thus per-
mit and in fact encourage the Soviets to
further expand and improve their ABM Bp-
'ems
If the agreed ABM level; are high then
both sides will insist on higher levels, both
qualitatively and quantitatively, of offensive
arms in order to retain their deterrent against
the other country. Thus the level of ABM de-
fenses which may be agreed an at SALT ulti-
mately will control the limit which one has
any hope of imposing on both the offensive
and defensive strategic wee eons of the two
nations.
The level of ABM deployment which will
be agreed on at SALT is even more critical
than the question of prohibition on MIRV
testing and deployment and the associated
questions of verification of each a MIRV ban.
A highly accurate MIRV, if deployed, can only
threaten the fixed land-based deterrent of the
other side; for example, the multiple nuclear
warheads of the 55-9's may endanger our
Minuteman, and Soviet fear that upgrading
and accuracy of the U.S. Poseidon and Min-
uteman HI MIRV's may endanger the Soviet
land-based missile silos are well justified. In
contrast, ABMs threaten to intercept ballistic
missiles from wherever they are launched?
land or sea? and therefore will raise doubts
ma the effectiveness of the entire deterrent
missile force of each country.
The terms of a SALT trete 3, setting a level
of ABM at agreed number., of interceptors
or radars other than at "zero" would be diffi-
cult to po'lice: It is much easier to assure
compliance with provisions which prohibit
a weapons system entirely than with a spe-
cific limit on the number of weapons. Once
both sides have agreed to ABM levels as high
as those of the advanced phases of Safeguard,
then the fears of clandestine upgrading of
the Soviet ABM system into an even larger
system sufficient to endanger the U.S. deter-
rent will gain in substance Once radars as
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A 1 26,71970
sophisticated as the Safeguard MSR are ex- Peace for whom I am now working part-
tensively deployed around the Soviet Union, time. Furthermore, I would like to make it
and once other components of a "legal" ABM clear that I have not had access to classified
system are widely deployed, then clandestine Government documents or positions on
upgrading using some of the existing parts SALT, and so what I say should not in any
of the air defense system is much harder to way be construed as describing its views.
prevent. I therefore foresee a real danger that I have been asked and am particularly
if the agreed levels of ABM deployment at pleased to be able to present to you my
SALT turn out to be no lower than that of thoughts on the subject of verification since
the expanded Safeguard, then in turn we this has been and is a key problem in achiev-
will be unable to accept a freeze on the quan- Ing arms control. Any limitations on strategic
tity of our offensive missiles or a ban on arms, whether they be by formal agreement
MIRV deployment and testing. or occur as a result of mutual understanding,
Specifically, the objections to a moratorium must be able to be verified to provide confi-
on MIRV deployment, or a prohibition of dance that violations which would endanger
MIRV under SALT voiced by DOD witnesses security are not occurring. Unless this conti-
in the past, have been based on the assertion dance exists, any agreement will be danger-
that MIRV's are required to penetrate Soviet ous, unstable, and probably not endure for
ABM. While I conclude that such statements very long.
have no technical validity at present. they Verification has been the stumbling block
may become valid if increases of ABM in the in negotiating almost all arms control agree-
ts since World War II. The closed society
-0H7R000300040006-6 S 5985
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CONORESSIONAL RECuttu? S.LiNt1
been negotiated have relied primarily on na-
tional means of verification. The limited test
ban treaty is monitored by BUCh national
systems, and all countries have a high de-
gree of confidence that significant violations
are not occurring. The same Is true of the
undertaking in the outer space treaty not to
place nuclear weapons in orbit around the
earth. General Wheeler in testifying in sup-
port of that obligation said that he favored
reliance on national means since he did not
believe that the Soviet Union could, without
U.S. knowledge, violate this provision so as
to obtain a significant military advantage.
In this connection, it is interesting to con-
sider briefly the history of the linnted test
ban treaty. This treaty is verified by highly
sophisticated scientific national techniques,
and I believe that all countries have a high
confidence that any significant violation of
this treaty could be detected. Nevertheless
on several occasions since the treaty came
couraged at SALT. It is this chain of events in the Soviet Union has always fed fears in into effect radioactive material from under-
Soviet Union are permitted or in ac
which leads to the conclusion that the deci- this country that the Soviets might us p an ground tests has been detected outside the
lot a U.S. boundaries of the country in which the
arms control agreement to restr
tests were held This could well be considered
sion to expand Safeguard now is a c ear
danger to the entire success of the SALT
talks, both in regard to limiting strategic
offensive and defensive missiles.
V. CONCLUSION
There can no longer be any question that
AB1V1 has escalated and will continue to
escalate the nuclear arms race; let me review
some recent history: Suspected deployment
of ABM by the Soviets has given the incentive
for U.S. development of the MIRV, deploy-
ment of multiple warheads by the Soviets has
given last year's justification for the U.S.
deployment decision on Safeguard, the pos-
sible expanding role of Safeguard in protect-
ing our cities will give rise to Soviet fears
of being able to maintain their deterrent
against us, the possibility of improving the
accuracy of American MIRV's with which we
are trying to counter Soviet ABM's appears
to threaten Soviet missile silos, etc. In short,
starting from the concern about ABM deploy-
ment, the world is embarking on the next
large step of the arms race. Yet the world
has now strategic nuclear armament suf-
ficient to destroy life as we know it on both
the European and North American conti-
nents and in fact to endanger survival of
the entire human race. The various argu-
ments in which contrived situations are
created to lustily even further expansion of
this enormous arsenal in the name of "secu-
rity" must be weighed against the resulting
eter-increasing danger of accident and in-
advertent escalation into nuclear war.
SALT extends the hope to freeze nuclear
strategic arms at their present levels which
are already vastly in excess of those required
to maintain a strategic balance between the
two super powers; SALT may even extend
hope for reduction from these levels. I have
presented technical evidence that the actual
Safeguard deployment contrasts sharply with
the justification stated by the President, that
weapons program while allowing
sians to continue their program clandestinely a technical violation since the treaty bans
to the point of achieving a military advan- tests which cause radioactive debris to be
tage. A classic and perhaps over-emphasized present outside the territorial limits of the
example of this problem has been in the state under whose control the explosion is
negotiation of a comprehensive test ban conducted. While these ,accassions have re-
treaty. The U.S. has always feared that the suited in exchanges of notes and requests for
Soviets could derive significant military gains explanation, both the U.S. and the Soviet
by underground tests which could not be die- governments have recognized that the events
tinguished from earthquakes and sought in- did not threaten either nation's security nor
spections to clarify the nature of the seismic did they significantly increase the health
events. The Soviet Union resisted this desire hazards throughout the world. As a conse-
as a threat to their society, andas a conse- quence neither nation has made a major
quence no agreement on banning under- international incident oat of these possible
ground nuclear tests has yet been achieved, technical infractions. However it is an ex-
In evaluating the adequacy of any verifi- ample, of where the wording of the treaty
cation procedures, it is important to empha- was sufficiently ambiguous as to permit a
size that it is not necessary to be able to difference of views as to whether violation
detect every possible violation but only to had occurred even though the verification
have the ability to detect violations which procedures were quite satisfactory. Such am-
could significantly affect U.S. security. If a biguities in treaty language should be avoided
nation believes that there is a risk of the to the maximum extent possible, without
violation being discovered, it is unlikely that at the same time incorporating so many
it would take that risk unless the violation technical details that the treaty could be-
provided a significant gain. Cheating on an come inoperable as a result of unforeseen
ICBM launcher freeze by secretly building a scientific developments.
dozen or even a hundred missile silos makes Verification is not limited to arms control
no sense when both nations already have agreements but is also an important factor
more than a thousand missiles, in our everyday unilateral national security
Any arms limitation together with its planning. Decisions that are made on ICBM
means of verification should also be designed force levels, on whether to deploy an ABM,
to avoid continual alarms that violations or on whether to develop MIRVs or other
were occurring, since if these occurred fre- penetration aids to overcome a Soviet ABM
quently the value of the agreement could be are all based on the best information nation-
greatly reduced. Fears of minor infractions ally available on Soviet armament programs.
of the agreement should not be allowed to In this day-to-day unilateral planning it is
become a source of major international inci- not enough to just know that a missile has
dents. This can be avoided as much by proper been deployed. One must also know the char-
phrasing of the agreement as by the me- acteristles of that missile and have some
chanics of verification itself, basis for estimating the quantity and the
In general, arm limitation verification pro- timing of the total deployment program.
cedures are divided into two categories. The Thus, the informa;tion required for unilateral
first are known as "national" or "unilateral" planning is much more difficult to obtain
verification techniques which do not require than that required to monitor an arms limi-
t ti agreement where information that a
the anti-Chinese rationale for Safeguard
any agreements for inspection w
impedes the negotiability of ABM levels at
boundaries of another nation. The second single missile launcher had been added to
SALT, and that any level of ABM other than
category are termed "onsite inspections" in the force would be all that might be required
a very minimal one will endanger seriously
which a nation would agree to allow na- in order to verify that the arms control agree-
arms limitation. I urge that the Congress tionals of another country to inspect within ment was not being abided by.
the success of SALT in achieving meaningful
its territories to determine whether a vio- A good example of where it would be much
, express its intent to bring the arms race
lation had occurred. Intermediate to these easier to verify satisfactorily an arms con-
under control through successful SALT nego-
categories would be those situations in which trol agreement than the size of the force for
tiations by rejecting any expansion of the
both sides agreed to conduct their operations unilateral planning would be in the area of
Safeguard ABM system at this critical time,
so as to facilitate verification by national mobile ICBMs. If, as a result of SALT, it were
agreed that mobile ICBMs would be totally
banned, then the ability to detect the deploy-
ment of even a single such missile would be
sufficient to verify whether the agreement
was being abided by. It would not be neces-
sary to count precisely the number of mobile
missiles deployed, which might be very diffi-
cult unless one had instantaneous observa-
- means.
OPENING STATEMENT BY D. HERBERT Only in the case of the Antarctic Treaty
Scovxmr, Sri., APRIL 13, 1970 has the Soviet Union allowed the use of on-
Mr. Chairman, it is a great pleasure to site inspections to verify compliance with the
come before your Committee again, this time treaty. At one time Chairman Khrushchev
as a private citizen after having met with agreed in principle to three onsite inspec-
ur Committee for many yearS as a member tions per year within the Soviet Union to
of the Government. In this connection. I monitor a comprehensive test ban
should like to emphasize that any statements but at that time the 'U.S. did not believe three tion of the entire Soviet Union, since the
I may make here today are my own personal a sufficiently large number. Since then the missiles could otherwise be moved from one
views and do not necessarily reflect those of Soviet Union has withdrawn that offer. All place to another between observations. On
the Carnegie Endowment for International others arms control agreements which have the other hand in order to determine for our
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s 5986 Approved For Relea,,1
(en/
unilateral force planning whether a Bove
mobile ICBM force, which had not. been e
stnicted by an agreement, posed a threat, oi
would need to know the size of such a force
This might be very difficult to accornplie
with suitable reliability.
This example raises another point wide
should be kept in mind in evaluating th
adequacy of verification capabilities for an
arms control agreement. First one must el
ways evaluate the relative rise from a pm>
sible violation against the risk which mige
exist if no arms control agreement ever
achieved. For example, the rick of an no
detected Soviet violation of a ban on mobil
ICBMs which the U.S. has no plans to deple
would be far less than the risk of no agree
ment which allowed the Soviets to build ti
a force of undeterminable size and churn:
teristics. Further when programs are pro
feeding without any restrictions, Mit:seam
tion on the nature of new developments and
deployments can often be confusing and late
leading and consequently produce less alien
optimal unilateral U.S. weapons decisions.
e 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R00030004000
6-6
NGRES SIGNAL RECORD ? SENATE prit 20,-":970
et designed to emphasize those phases abich 'This censtruction rem -ire, many months,
C- are at the same time easy to monitor and and therefore ample ane is available to
le critical to security, permit its detection. In presenting his FY 71
. Research and development, while still in Defense Program, Secrirsary Laird has re-
11 the /aboratory, could rarely be reliably cle- ported with great prod i .ion the numbers of
teasel by either any tepe of national obeerve- such armlet launchers, :ioth operational and
h tion system or any exceptable onsite inipec- their rate of construct n, each year since
e tion scheme. Thus it is only when the de- 1966. While in theory tt might be possible
y VelOpraent reaches the testing phase that to build clandestinely rie great cost in time
- strategic weapons programs become obeerv- and money a few additianel launchers using
- able and provide opportunities to verily no. elaborate camouflage tef eniques, such a vita-
e .strictione on development of new systems. lation would have no eft ect on U.S. security
a Before most offensive missile systems can be since they would be an insignificant addl-
.. reliably deployed, they require extensive Wets tion to the already exieting large forces of
e
at long range so that they can be observed more than a thousand ineelMs on both sides.
y myond the borders of ehe testing nation The Therefore, a limitation ci numbers of ICBM
U.S. has been able to observe Soviet ICBM launchers could be acienuately verified by
p eats consistently since their program began national means withou I. the need for any
in 1957. Not only have successive Secretaries supplementary proceduree.
_ of Defense reported on the number of missile Mobile land-based miseiles would be more
iirings but in many cases on the character-
istics of the weapona being developed. While difficult to monitor, but even these require
_ defensive interceptor missiles do not travel logistic support which would be difficalt to
euch long distances, the high-powered redare conceal, This would be aarticularly true in
the Soviet Union, where the road system
which track the incoming warhead and guide
the interceptors emle radio waves Which can Is limited and the rail eystem well known.
eaten be discernible at remote looations. 'T.ef large numbers were already deployed, it
might be hard to obtain a reliable count of
,Sinee much testing is relatively easily vend- the number of such missiles since the rnis-
able, it is frequently a good point in the sees might be moved beaween observation,.
weapons cycle to start applying limitations. If deployment were nonexistent or small at
Finally, adequate vertification of limita-
tions on strategic arms is greatly simplified
at this time by the fact that both sides now
have such large forces of survivable strategic
weapons that any clandestine program in
violation of a treaty would have to be very
great before it could threaten our national
security. Not only are the numbers large but.
there are also several different types of sys-
tems available in our assured destruceion
force, he., submarine launched missiles,
hardened land-based missiles, and intercon-
tinental bombers, so that a sudden unex-
pected threat to one system will not jeopar-
dize the entire second strike force. Deterrence
can be maintained by both sides despite
large changes, either qualitative or quanti-
tative, in the force structure of either side.
For example, although the Soviets have
trebled their missile force in the last five
years they are still a long way from being
able to prevent the U.S. from inflicting wide-
spread and unacceptable devastation on the
Soviet Union in retaliatory attack. Even if
in the highly unlikely event that the So-
viets succeeded in secretly developing a
3VIIRV missile force which could destroy all
U.S. land-based missiles, the U.S. would still
have a force of 41 Polaris submarines each
with 16 missiles, only a small fraction of
which would be required to devastate the
Soviet Union.
This was, however, not the case in 1960
when the deterrent force relied almost en-
tirely on vulnerable bombers and had only
e few or no ICBMs. Then, even a smite Mere-
ment to these missile forces would have bad
eery significant military consequences. Like-
wise we are much better off technically to
erify by national means the size and char-
acteristics of the opposing strategic forces
than in the 50'e. While it is not appropriate
for me to discuss our technical capabilities
in an open hearing, I am sure it is no secret
that our capabilities have improved mark-
ally in the last ten years. Had they not so
The production of strategic weapons is
again more difficult to observe. Many COM-
ponents can be produced in small buildings
and even a complete missile could be assem-
bled in structures which might not be easily
identifiable. National means of verification
might locate many suspicious structures, and
frequent onsite inspections might be required
to provide sufficient confidence that viola-
tions of a ban on peoduction were not oc-
curring. For ABM systems it would be even
more difficult since the missiles are smaller
and the electronic components for the radars
would be indistinguishable from those re-
quired for other purposes until they were
finally assembled in the deployed radar. The
one exception would be the production of
missile launching submarines which employ
for their construction large and relatively
easily identifiable shipyard facilities.
Finally, looking at the last stage in the
weapons cycle?deployment. It is relatively
easy to observe deployment and determine
changes in the size of operationally deployed
systems. To simplify the verification it is
usually best to have a complete ban or to
freeze the number at existing levels rather
than agreeing on a fixed number of items.
After a freeze has been achieved, then the
levels can be reduced by agreed numbers_
Et is often not so may to determine the
cbaraoteristies off the systems deployed, since
many of these are Is dependent of the ex-
ternal configuration of the hardware. Once
missiles with certain capabilities were dem-
onstrated and proven ea testing and particu-
larly if troop tnainiiag were observed, one
must assume that they could be deployed, hut
it will frequently be impossible to know how
many have been incorporated in the force
and what will be their real operational can t-
atty. It would, for example, be difficult to
edify with high confidence Whether a new
pe of missile was being substituted for an
letting one or Whether improvements were
eing made to existing systems. Therefore,
rnetations on deployment should emphasize
umbers of weapons rather than weapon
aracteristic.s.
In order to evaluate the ability to verify
eployment limitations, it is necessary to
tek at each individual strategic weapons
stem. For the purpose of discussion today
have concentrated on those systems which
aild be most critical in a freeze on strait-
c offensive and defensive weapons.
LAND-BASED mina's
Sexed land-based IC13Ms require extensive
mach site construction in order to provide
e necessary hardening to make them re.
rant to blast from a nuclear explosion,
improved, it would not have been possible 7
for Secretaries McNamara, Clifford and Laird TY
to report year after year with high cone- ex
donee on the size of the Soviet ICBM force, b
submarine force, and AT1Ms. Ii
Any nation which attempts to violate any lele
arms limitation agreement on a scale suf- `e"
ficient to obtain a significant military ad-
vantage will run some risk of being de-
Mated. Defection by disillusioned personnel 'D
er disclosure of the violation by an agent
can never be ruled out for even the most t
secret program. However, such sources of in- lev,
formation are unreliable and cannot be
counted on by the U.S. when its vital secur-
ite interests are at stake. Therefore since
verification capabilities vary greatly for die- la
ferent phases of the weapons developmeat th
cycle, arms limitation agreements should be sis
e agreement was reached, then
a large new deployment would become ap-
parent. Therefore, a total ban on deployment
of such systems would be preferable, since
the detection of even one would constitute
a violation. This country has not developed
or deployed any mobile ICBMs and there are
no reliable reports of aoviet deployment
of either mobile ICBMs Cr IRBMs, although
the Russians have displayed missiles in the
Moscow parades which they claim to be
mobile IC13Ms. It is highly unlikely that the
Soviets could secretly deploy the many hun-
dreds of mobile ICBMs which would be re-
quired to affect the present strategic bal-
ance, but the sooner a ben took effect the
easier the verification.
SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES
(SL1HVLS)
Submarines which have large numbers of
long range missiles and which can operate
for protracted periods at len distances from
their home ports require large and distinctive
facilities for their construction. Secretary
Laird has reported in his F'Y71 Defense Pro-
gram that the Soviets can accommodate 12
complete hulls at two titiferent shipyards,
After they are launched I hey require many
months for fitting out, during all of which
they are subject to observation. To have a
reliable operational capability they must be
shaken down and cruise lit the open oceans.
Secretary Laird, like his predecessors, has on
several occasions reported with confidence
the numbers of existing Soviet submarine
launched missiles. Again, for the Soviets to
increase their present relatively small but
rapidly growing SLBM force without U.S.
knowledge to a point where it could signifi-
cantly affect U.S. security would not seem
possible, 'Therefore a ban on construction of
new ballistic missile submarines could be
verified by national means.
MIS VS
So far I have addressed only the numbers
of missiles or their launchieg platforms; the
number of nuclear suarheate within a given
missile is another thing. Same a single large
warhead can be replaced, without changing
the external configuration of the missiles,
by several smaller warheaos either with or
without a capability to be individually tar-
getted (MIRVs or MRVs), it is hard to visual-
ize how the U.S. could verify by national
means whether a deployed le issue has or has
not multiple warheads. In fact even onsite
inspection to make this determination would
be difficult. It would require the right to in-
spect any deployed missile including those
on submarines, on sufficieelly short notice
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26: 7970 Approved For Release
to prevent substitution of the reentry ve-
hicle. The inspection would require access
into the interior of the reentry vehicle or
at the very least, the use at close range of
some scientific technique, such as X-rays, to
determine the number of warheads present.
Such inspection would almost certainly not
be acceptable to the USSR. If the Soviets
required similar inspection to verify that the
U.S. was not secretly deploying MIRVs, it is
doubtful that the "U.S. could accept it.
Therefore, if MIRVs are to be controlled,
every effort should be made to limit testing
as well as deployment. At the present time,
neither the U.S. nor the USSR have fully
developed and tested a MIRV system with
sufficient accuracy and reliability to provide
a first strike capability. The Soviets began
testing MRVs on the 559 in August 1968,
and President Nixon in the summer of 1969
stated that the "footprint" of the Russian
MRV indicates that they may happen to fall
in a pattern comparable to the area covered
by a complex of three Minuteman sites.
However, Dr. John Foster, DDR&E, has stated
on February 24, 1970 that the Soviets "have
not demonstrated to us the flexibility neces-
sary to target each warhead at a different
Minuteman silo." All Minuteman sites do not
have the same spacing so that the Soviets
would require the ability to vary the foot-
print reliably and accurately if they were to
have a capability to wipe out the entire
Minuteman force.
The U.S. started a two-year program to
test first generation MIRVs for the Poseidon
and Minuteman III missiles also in August
1968, and DOD officials have announced that
the Minuteman III will begin to be fielded in
June 1970 and the Poseidon become opera-
tional in January 1971. While U.S. officials
have emphasized that the accuracy-yield
combination of these first MIRVs will not
be sufficient to provide a first strike coun-
terforce capability, the Soviets may be con-
cerned that the first U.S. systems might have
such a capability. Fortunately the Soviets
should be able to satisfy themselves that the
U.S. was not deploying MIRVs in violation
of a ban, since it is hard to conceive how the
U.S., with its open society, could place MIRVs
in a large part of its force without detection.
Certainly we should not prejudge the decision
for the Soviets and conclude that controls
on MIRVs are unverifiable because the U.S.
program has proceeded too far. There is still
time, but maybe only a little, to prevent de-
ployment of MIRVs if a ban on testing and
deployment can be achieved soon.
What are the opportunities for the U.S.
to verify a ban on MIRV and MRV testing?
(MRV testing would probably also have to be
banned to be confident that these were not
confused with MIRVs). Since the type of
MIRV which could threaten the fixed land-
based missile force is one which has a re-
liable capability for destroying hardened
ICBM sites, i.e., a MIRV with high accuracy
and high yield, I believe verification is possi-
ble. In order to achieve such a capability it
will be necessary to test at full range and at
as near operational conditions as possible.
Such tests can be monitored to determine
the number of reentry vehicles.. No nation
would replace existing reliable missiles and
consider initiating a nuclear war with a
missile which had only been partially tested.
Planners would demand high confidence on
the reliability and accuracy of the full sys-
tem before risking national suicide by carry-
ing out a first strike.
Tests in which only one of the multiple
warheads was allowed to separate would be
useful for development but not satisfactory
for proving out the complete system. Such
tests would in any case probably raise sus-
picions. Likewise, simulated tests in space or,
as has been suggested in analogy to the pro-
posal for evading the Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty, "tests behind the moon" would be
equally unsatisfactory. Elaborate schemes for
Clandestine testing will undoubtedly be put
forward as they were in the case of nuclear
weapons testing, but even with much simpler
systems than MIRVs, military planners like
to see full operational testing before under-
taking deployment. For example, even more
than five years after development testing
has been completed on the Polaris AS MRV
system, the military are claiming that addi-
tional firings of the complete system are
essential to maintain confidence in the op-
erational capability of the system. Based on
past experience Soviet military are even more
stringent in their requirements for full op-
erational testing than the U.S. It is most
unlikely that the Soviets could without U.S.
knowledge violate a MIRV?MRV test ban
to the extent that they would be in a posi-
tion to deploy a MIRV system which would
be sufficiently reliable and accurate to
threaten to destroy the entire Minuteman
force.
LONG-RANGE BOMBERS
The Soviets have no known present pro-
gram for deploying a new truly intercon-
tinental bomber. If they were to undertake
such a deployment in violation of a ban
it is almost certain that the force would be
detected before it had reached a significant
size. Bombers are not easy to conceal, and
U.S. authorities have known with confidence
and publicly reported the size of the Soviet
bomber force since the mid-fifties. Sugges-
tions have been made that they would mas-
querade such a force under the guise of a
supersonic transport which could be rapidly
converted to a bomber. Both Generals LeMay
and Power have frequently emphasized that
a bomber force which does not train and
carry out realistic simulated operations is
of almost no value. It is inconceivable that
the Soviets could create secretly an opera-
tionally capable bomber force which could
provide any serious additional threat to U.S.
security.
ASSES
Finally, going to strategic defensive sys-
tems. I shall concentrate on ABMs, since they
pose the most serious potential threat to
our confidence in our strategic deterrent
forces and since they are the system of most
interest in any strategic arm limitation
agreement. In 1966 Secretary McNamara pub-
licly announced that we had clear evidence
that the Soviets were building an ABM sys-
tem around Moscow, and the progress of this
system has been reported on since at regu-
lar intervals. Secretary Laird has recently
reported that a number of the complexes in
this system were only brought to opera-
tional status this past year. Furthermore both
Secretaries Clifford and Laird were even able
to report that the deployment had been
reduced in scope from that originally plan-
ned but that the Soviets are continuing to
press forward with R & D on a more ad-
vanced system. Secretary Laird also referred
to large Soviet phased array radars for track-
ing and warning. I am confident, and these
statements are a public substantiation, that
we are now capable of verifying a freeze
on the deployment of ABM systems and that
any violation could be detected well in ad-
vance of their becoming operational.
ABMs to cope with the sophisticated type
threat of which the U.S. is capable are com-
plicated and large systems. They require
large radars which have a high visibility,
have a long lead time for construction and
which, furthermore, must radiate energy
continuously if they are to be of any value.
In addition, an ABM system requires large
numbers of high performance defensive mis-
siles if it is not to be saturated. Extensive
training exercises must be carried out to
develop operational competence. All these
factors greatly facilitate the verification of
a freeze on ABMs.
The greatest problem in this area could be
the confusion between systems designed for
S 5987
defense against aircraft with those for de-
fense against ballistic missiles of the former
were not controlled. For example, during the
early construction period there was some
doubt as to whether the so-called Tallinn air
defense system was for ABM purposes or not.
However, as deployment proceeded, it became
more and more clear that it was for defense
against aircraft.
Nevertheless, fears still exist that the
Tallinn or other air defense systems might
be upgraded to provide an ABM capability
without our knowledge. In evaluating this
risk it is important to realize that any air
defense system may have some limited capa-
bility to shoot down an Incoming missile. To
be a threat to a retaliatory attack of which
the U.S. is capable and thereby erode the de-
terrent it must, however, have an extremely
high capability. Its radars must be able to
handle rapidly large numbers of incoming
targets and must also be defended. The mis-
siles must have a high acceleration to avoid
the necessity of committing the defense be-
fore the radar has determined the nature of
the incoming objects. President Nixon has
stated when the Safeguard decision was first
made that the heaviest defense system con-
sidered, an ABM system designed to protect
cities from a Soviet type threat, could not
prevent a catastrophic level of U.S. fatalities.
Clearly a Soviet system to cope with the even
larger U.S. threat cannot be built by clan-
destinely upgrading existing air defense sys-
tems. New or large numbers of greatly im-
proved radars, new missiles, ne'w command
and control systems and new radar defense
systems would be required if the Soviet anti-
aircraft systems were to be turned into even
a partially effective ABM. Extensive troop
training would be needed to develop opera-
tional effectiveness. Suth a program would
undoubtedly be detected with plenty of lead
time to incorporate counter-measures to per-
mit penetration of suoh a system. The U.S.
already has developed and tested MIRVs ca-
pable of penetrating an ABM system, and
these could be deployed in an emergency
much more rapidly than a Soviet ABM.
Thus it Would appear that the limitations
on ABMs to low or zero levels can be ad-
equately verified by national means. While
some fears might arise about the upgrading
of Soviet defense systems, it is believed that
the risk to our security from such a secret
program would be less than if there were no
limitations on ABMs. It would be preferable
to ban ABMs or restrict them ..to very low
levels, since in these instances, radar de-
ployments could be limited and thus facili-
tate verification.
In summary: Quantitative limitations on
the deployment of the key strategic weapons
systems can be adequately verified by na-
tional means.
Limitations on the testing of all multiple
reentry vehicles can be adequately verified
by national means and should be sought im-
mediately together with a ban on MIRV de-
ployment if MIRVs are to be controlled. It
is not yet too late to achieve such limitations
since MIRV systems which are sufficiently
reliable and accurate to threaten hardened
ICBM sites are not yet fully tested and de-
ployable and since the U.S. could not secretly
deploy MIRVs.
ABM deployment limitations at zero or
low levels can also be verified. Any upgrad-
ing of existing air defense systems which
could escape detection would not provide an
ABM capability which could seriously de-
grade the U.S. deterrent.
In light of existing national verification
capabilities, the large numbers of weapons
on each side, and the insensitivity of each
side's deterrent to relatively large force
changes, I am confident that an agreement
can be designed which would significantly
limit strategic armaments and in fact in-
crease real security.
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S 598o CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE Ap'ii20, 9 70
REFUGEES AND CIVILIAN WAR,
CASUALTIES IN LAOS
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, one of
the more distressing aspects of the war in
Laos is the plight of the Laotian people,
who, like their neighbors elsewhere in
Indochina, are paying a heavy toll not
only from insurgent attack, but also from
the nature of our own military activi-
ties. As chairman of the Judiciary Sub-
committee on Refugees, there is little
doubt in my mind that the escalation of
these military activities is following the
familiar pattern of Vietnam in the de-
struction of the countryside, the genera-
tion of refugees, and the occurrence of
civilian war casualties. The subcommit-
tee is pursuing this significant aspect of
our involvement in Laos, and, as I sug-
gested last week, will, it is hoped, hold
hearings within the very near future.
Some recent press articles detail 1;he
eurrent situation among the people in
Laos. Because of the broad congressional
and public interest in this matter, I ask
unanimous consent that Articles from
the March 14 issues of the Christian Sci-
ence Monitor and the Manchester
Guardian weekly, from the New York
Times of March 15, from the Washing-
ton Post of March 26, from the Washing-
ton Evening Star of March 27, from Life
magazine of April 3, and from the
Washington Sunday Star of April 19, be
printed in the REcosa.
There being no objection, the items
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
irrom the Christian Science Monitor, Mar.
14, 1970]
WHAT U.S. BOMBING FEELS LIRE TO LAOTI4NS
(By Daniel Southeriaed)
Beau Nor XAY, Leos.--The old woman said,
she had been through several wars but that
this was the most destructive and terrtfy-
log?because of the bombing.
"In tile other wars, I didn't have to leave
my home," she said.
"When the soldiers cantiS on the ground io
fight, I wasn't so afraid," she said. "But when
they came in airplanes, it was 'terrible,"
The 70-year-old Lao woman was one of
some 14,000 refugees evacuated from the
Plain of Jars prior to the Feb. 21 recovery of
that area by North Vietnamese forces and the
Lao rebels, the Pathet Lao.
Few civilian inhabitants, if any, were left
in the Plain of Jars following the evacuation
of the refugees.
In 1960, the plateau itself and its eur-
rounding ridges and valleys had supported
an estimated 150,000 people. But a decade of
war has taken its toll.
The old woman and eteme 750 other persons
from her native village were moved by plane
and then by truck last months to this reft gee
camp as th its bamboo-and-straw hues, about
40 miles, east of Vientialie.
AIR POWER REDIRECTED
The correspondent visited four refugee
camps and talked with refugees from eix
different locations in and around the Rain
of Jars,
After questioning a large number of them,
it was possible to get a picture of the deva-
station unleashed by American lighter-
bombers in northeastern Laos over the past
two years, and it is not a pretty one.
After the United States halted its bomb-
ing of North Vietnam on Nov. 1, 1968, it
stepped up as much as 10-fold its bombing
raids?support which started on a minor
scale in mid-1961?against Pallet Lao-occu-
pied ntertherstern Laos. The number of
bombing sorties by United States Air Force
and Navy jets kose to as many as 300 a day.
This bombing campaign, code-named Bar-
rel Roll, is separate from the other, More-
publicized campaign. The latter, code-named
Steel Tiger, is directed against the Ho Chi
Minh Trail in struthera Leos. '
The refugees said about 9 out of 10 of the
bombing strikes flown over the past two
years in the Plain of Jars area were carried
out by American jets and the rest by pro-
peller-driven Royal Lao Air Force T-28s.
In most areas of the plain, the bombing
forced the people to move out of their homes
and into trenches, caves, and bunkers where
they lived for the most part for two years.
HIDDEN BY DAY
They threw corrugated iron over the
trenches and covered it with dirt, topped
with branches for camouflage. Many said they
ventured out to farm only at night because
of the bombing.
By all accounts, the situation has been
somewhat similar for the estimated 192,000
people living in Hotta Han, or Sam Neuit
Province to the northeast of the Plain of
Jars, although information is more difficult
to come by on that area.
One Western diplomat reported, however.
that in some areas of that province "whole
communities are living underground."
It has been a similar story also for vil-
lagers living in the vicinity of the Ho Chi
Minh Trail in southeastern Laos, where
refugees and North Vietnamese prisoners and
defectors say rnay villages have been de-
stroyed.
In all of these places, the bombing stepped
up greatly after the cessation of the attacks
against North Vietnam.
In the Plain of Jars area, the bombing
destroyed the main towns of Xien Khouang,
Khang Khay, and Pmongsavan. The refugees
said the bombs flattened many villages in
and around the plain and heavily damaged
others. They, said no 'village; they knew of
seeped the bombing.
The refugees said they were sometimes
forced to leave their villages and bunkers
to do porterage?carrying rice and ammu-
nition?for. the Pathet Lao and North Viet-
namese. But they added that in many bomb-
ing raids there were no Pathet Lao or North
Vietnamese troops near their villages.
RAIDS DAILY OR OFTENER
As the bombing increased, they said, the
troops moved farther away from the popu-
lated areae.
In 1969, they said they saw the bombers
every day when the weather was clear, some-
times so often they could not count the
number of raids. The planes tended to fire
as anything that moved, they said,
For the most past, however, the attackers
apparently spared their buffaloes and cows,
although some refugees felt that even these
were sometime; targets.
One man said he narrowly escaped being
blasted to pieces on six separate occasions
when bombs fell near his hole, several times
knocking him unconscious. But while he es-
caped death, there was one thing he could
not escape?fear. It stalked him day in and
day out.
crvIerear TERRORS DESCRIBED
Some refugee; said they moved four or live
times, each time farther away from their
villages, to escape the bombing. But the
bombs always followed them. Even at night
the bombers came, and finally, even the rice
fields were bombed.
"There wasn't a night when we went to
sleep that we thought we'd live to see the
morning," said, one refugee. "And there
wasn't a morning when we got up and
thought we'd live to see the night."
"It was terrible living in those holes in the
ground," said another. "We never saw the
sun. Our hair was falling out."
My wife and three chtearen were killed."
said a man in his thirtie 'There were no
troops IPathet Lao or north Vietnamese]
anywhere near our 'village"
All this raises some baser questions about
the bombing . in northeastern Laos. What
has been its purpose?
It is impossible to get the United States
Government side of the picture in any de-
tall because American officials refuse to dis-
cuss except in the vaguest gerterinities the ac-
tivity In Lac.s.
amoes PLEDGED TO SECRECY
The pilots who fly the ride front air bases
in Thailand and South Vietnam and from
carriers in the Gulf of Titakin are under in-
structions not to discuss the details of their
missions.,
For years, the United etates maintained
the fiction that it was only flying "armed
reconnaissance"s. missions over northern
ia
The most candid official acknowledgment
that something other than "reconnaissance"
was going on came in President Nixon's
March 6 statement when he said for the first
time that the United Stares had been flying
"combat support missions' northern Laos
when requested to do so by the Royal Lao
Government.
"The level of our air operations has in--
creased only as the number of North Viet-
namese in Laos and the level of their ag-
gression has been increased," the President
said.
BUILDUP ADRirrTED
On this point, there le no question that
there has been a continuing North Vietnam-
ese buildup in northeastern Laos. This build-
up has been in direct violation of the 1962
Geneva accords and has felowed the Pathet
Lao, heavily supported be the North Viet-
namese, to solidify their control there.
But has the bombing born a justifiable or
effective response? A number of well-quaila
fled military sources feel the bombing's ef-
fectiveness in cutting enemy supply lines and
slowing down the North Vietnamese has been
In general greatly exaggerated, just as it se
often had been in both North and South
Vietnam.
BOOMERANG EXPECT?
According to the refugees from the Plain
of Jars, the bombing may even have had a
boomerang effect in some areas.
One refugee said that as the bombing in-
created, the Pathet Lao forces in his dis-
trict started getting more volunteers, whose
attitude was "better to die a soldier than
to stay at home waiting for the the airplanes
to kill you?'
He also said the bonbing tended to
heighten the fighting spirit of the Pathet
Lao?no mean achievement given the Lao
propensity for avoiding battae.
Whatever the effects of the bombing on
enemy military forces in Laos?still a sub-
ject for much debate?there is no doubt as
to its effectiveness in completely disrupting
civilian life.
TRANSPORTATION HALTED
Wheretis the North Vietnamese and the
Pathet Lao soldiers are eapabie of moving
Into the protection of the forests and living
off supplies shipped in from neighboring
North Vietnam, the civilians are tied to their
rice fields, their livestock, and the rest of
their belongings and are thus exposed more
constantly to the bombing than the soldiers.
A refugee from Phongsavan said the
bombing put a halt to an civilian motorized
transportation in his district and caused
markets to open only in the predawn dark-
ness and to close before sunrise. Schools
were destroyed, and there was a general
shortage of everything from clothing to bi-
cycle parts.
Sometimes it took some prodding and a
Lot of patience to get the refugees to talk
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April 20, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? HOUSE 11 3297
made and the intense desire of Dick
Daley to serve the people of Chicago.
In addition to being mayor of our
city, he is also the county chairman of
the Democratic Party. He has often said
"good government is good politics," and
more of us should be concerned about
good goverment and good politics, be-
cause America cannot progress without
more and more political participation,
especially participation in a constructive
and sound manner on behalf of the peo-
ple of America.
At this point in the CoscaEssroNar.
RECORD, I want to insert an article writ-
ten by Harry Golden, Jr., which appear-
ed in the Midwest magazine section of
the Sunday, April 19, 1970, Chicago Sun-
Times. The article follows:
A SURE HAND, A RAE', HAT: 15 YEAEs
MAYon DALET
(By Harry Golden Jr.)
Richard J. Daley, head of Chicago govern-
ment for precisely 15 years on Monday, is a
hard-hat mayor?a chief executive who has
helped create a Chicago where the sound of
construction never ceases.
He presides over a dynamic city of archi-
tecturally distinguished new buildings, a re-
vitalized public transit system, new express-
ways, of vaulting bridges and massive public
projects above and below ground.
No sooner is a project like O'Hare Airport
a reality than, the mayor is planning its ex-
pansion, and ultimate replacement.
Few men in their lifetimes have been able
to look upon so complete a change that they
themselves have wrought in their physical
environment.
Daley has combined a dedication to renewal
and a mastery of finance to bring about the
metamorphosis of his home town. But he says
he's far prouder of his administration's social
welfare record than in physical renewal.
It will remain for historians to judge
whether Daley's role as the builder has been
superseded by his work as an administrator
and behind-the-scenes architect of such in-
novative programs as the federal war on
poverty ($50 million a year in Chicago), the
Model Cities programs ($38 million) and his
own Office of Inquiry and Information, first
city agency in the nation to offer direct com-
munication between the administration and
the public.
But the city will offer physical evidence
of Daley for the next three quarters of a cen-
tury in such monuments to his administra-
tion as the Civic Center, graced?some think
Ironically?with the inscrutable work of
Picasso. Critics say that, in his zest for public
works and business development, Daley has
negleced the cultural.
But Daley showed how to use urban re-
newal to create the University of Illinois at
Chicago Circle?a brand-new university for
20,000 students. "They talked about that for
35 years before we got it built," says the
Mayor.
And he prodded the board of the Chicago
Public Library to proceed with planning for
a $25 million new central building that will
preserve the most artistic features of the
present building on Michigan Av.
Even when Daley gives the plans impetus,
years must pass between the idea and the
realization.
As Daley completes his 15th year as mayor
Monday, the gigantic projects he has an-
nounced but not yet seen through doubtless
will figure in his reflections on whether to
run for a fifth four-year term.
Since early 1969, Daley has been fending
off reporters' questions about his political
plans.
"Ask me about it early in 1971," he would
Say.
Any doubt that he intends to run again
seemed to be dispelled for political observers
recently.
On the day of the last City Council session
April 8, the mayor disclosed his intention in
a governmental triple play. Within an eight-
hour span, he mediated the dispute between
contract home buyers and owners, urged a
tougher anti-pollution code to reduce further
the sulphur content of coal used in the city
and led the City Council in ordering an un-
precedented emergency outlay of $500,000 to
cope with hunger.
Two days earlier, he took another step
which some observers regarded as a clue to
his fourth-term plans. He ordered his
department heads to reduce spend He
told the bosses of 52 city agencies e wants
a corporate budget surplus of 6 per/ cent this
year, rather than the normally Otpected 4
per cent. That would mean a year-end sur-
plus of $25.3 million to apply to the 1971
budget.
Though Daley must be taken at his word
that he ordered th.e economies because of the
unpredictability of the present: business cli-
mate, it should not be forgot-fa that mayors
like surpluses to offset tax inc eases in elec-
tion years.
As Daley starts his lath year ? office, he
has a number of projects with wh to kick
off that auspicious occasion.
For instance, although a $400 milli? ex-
pansion is under way at O'Hare, he is c
vinced the city needs a third major airport.
He has asked (and will shortly get) the air-
lines to make greater use of Midway. But
though he recently said that a third airport
may not be needed for another decade, he
wants planning to go forward, and thus far
he is persuaded that the best place to put the
$500 million facility is in Lake Michigan
somewhere off the South Side.
Then there's a $650 million sewer-tunnel
system that he proposed last Nov. 7 to clean
up Chicago waterways and relieve flooding in
the metropolitan area.
Still another major project?even closer to
realization?is a $600 million replacement of
the Loop L with a subway transit under
Franklin, Randolph, Van Buren and Wabash
and extension of lines north, south and west.
An elaborate financing arrangement to raise
funds for this project would include a special
tax, matching state funds and a federal
grant. Work could very well start early in the
1970s.
Mayor Daley already holds seniority among
all big-city American mayors. He was first
elected April 5, 1955, succeeding Martin J.
Kennelly, and he took the oath of office
the City Council chamber 15 days later. -
On April 23, 1969, Daley eclipsed the pre-
vious record of mayoral service in Chicago
established by the late Edward J. Kelly, who
served in office from April 13, 1933, until
April 15, 1947.
To be sure, Mayor Daley could count on
the momentum of a flourishing economy to
help rebuild the city.
But the statistics that emerge from his
public works and from administration poli-
cies that have encouraged development are
nonetheless striking in any inter-city com-
parison, even after allowance is made for the
effect of inflation.
He instigated at least 30 urban renewal
projects involving a total of $250 million.
He prodded into existence virtually the en-
tire Chicago expressway system and provided
it with the revolutionary median-strip
transit line. Late this year or early in 1971,
he will give the green light to construction
of the $800 million crosstown expressway
from the Kennedy-Edens Expressway inter-
change an the north to the Dan Ryan at a
point south of its intersection with the Chi-
cago-Skyway.
The current five-year program of public
works planned by all public agencies in the
period ending in 1973 totals $3.5 billion. It
must be remembered that Daley hasan over-
riding say In the building policies of most
public agencies other than the city itself.
He appoints all members of the Chicago
Board of Education, the boards that run the
library and park systems, and half of the
members of the board that runs McCormick
Place. And his political organization domi-
nates the elective board of the Sanitary Dis-
trict and the government of Cook County.
His influence is everywhere. Nowhere is it
so evident as in guiding projects through the
Public Building Commission of Chicago, an
agency that he got the General Assembly to
create the year he became mayor.
PBC undertakes construction of projects
needed by other public agencies. PBC then
issues bonds for the work. The bonds are re-
tired with "rents" paid by the other public
agencies. PBC obviously was created partly
to circumvent what the Daley Administra-
tion regards as archaic state constitutional
limitations on borrowing without a vote of
the people.
The first project of P130 was the $87 mil-
lion Civic Center. About a year ago, PBC
undertook 20 new school projects that will
cost $200 million.
On March 31, PBC voted to build a $10
million underground parking garage because
the McCormick Place governing board found
it couldn't complete the reconstruction of
the hall itself, let alone the garage, much un-
der the approximately $100 million available
rom other sources.
t the same meeting, PBC undertook a $65
mil package of public works including po-
lice, and health installations proposed
by Mayo Daley to the City Council last Jan,
27. In bot aVers, the P:BC vote was affirma-
tive and u animous. Mayor Daley presided
as chairman f the PBC.
Beyond the ? ublic projects, however, Daley
has been in umental in encouraging the
construction a each new skyscraper.
The City Bui ? ing Department is under or-
ders to "bend ? er backwards" to assist any
private construe ion. Officials of that depart-
ment routinely go to architects' offices to
point out the east expensive way a new
project can m the building code require-
ments.
Through the ity Council, which he domi-
nates. Daley rsues zoning policies which
some anti--a inistration aldermen condemn
as too per issive but which unquestionably'
prompt new construction.
Pr ? ities for water and sewer extensions
roften rearranged on order of the mayor so
at a street, water or sewer line can be built
in time to lure a new factory to the city.
Here is an example of how Daley brings the
prestige of his office to bear on an important
occasion: a few years ago Sears Roebuck &
Co. had tentatively decided to build one of the
nation's largest office buildings in suburban
Chicago. Daley personally appealed to Sears
officers to locate the huge, $100 million build-
ing, with three million square feet of floor
space, in Chicago.
The city sold Sears a one-block section of
Quincy St. to let the project go forward
this year immediately west of the Loop in
Wacker.
Ald. Leon M. Despres (5th), the most ar-
ticulate critic of the mayor, asserted: "You
have to say that a cardinal point of his pol-
icy, perhaps the cardinal point, has been the
subsidy and encouragement of the central
area?the Loop and the Near North Side.
They have been nourished, caressed, asaisted,
encouraged and dealt with in every way to
produce the maximum development. And the
administration has encouraged as many pub-
lic works as possible because they are showy
and profitable?profitable to the contractors
and to the insiders and the friends of in-
siders.
"But these projects," Despres complains,
"are not part of a coherent plan. They ignore
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3298 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE April 20, 1970
grayeiareas of our city and its decaying
neighborhoods and they gc:i forward without
regard to the needs of light, air, traffic and
11 vability,"
The mayor shrugs off such critichm.
Lewis W. 11111, Daley's commissioner of
development and planning, said the Despres
merges are easy to refute.
"Any review of the capital improvements
epigrams of the last 15 years," Hill said, "will
show that the preponderant expenditures
have been in the neighborhoods--In street
and alley lighting, local street improvements,
police, fire, health and sanitation facilities,
The current five year program calls for
cil..y investments totaling $23 billion, of
which only $140 million is for the area from
Chicago to Roosevelt and from the Chicago
River to Lake Michigan.
"Even if we add the non-city McCormick
Place at $100 million, the total for the central
area would still be only $240 million, or about
10 per cent of the whole."
Hill went on, "Probably the clearest ex-
pression of this dedication to the improve.
ment of the urban environment can be seen
in urban renewal. In contrast to other cities
Chicago has not even one downtown central
business district urban renewal project."
Hill noted facetiously, "As to favors
granted to encourage developments, perhaps
Aid. Despees is referring to the recent modi-
fication of the zoning requirements approved
by the city to permit construction of Wood -
lawn Gardens, by the nob-for-profit organiza-
tion formed by the Woodlawn Organization
and the Nate Maremont Foundation to pro-
vide moderate income housing at 80th and
Cottage Grove in his ward."
Mayor Daley's appointments for a weeks
groundbreakings and dedications look some-
thing like this:
Monday morning, for instance, he used the
silver-plated shovel on the site of a new
school.
On Tuesday, he attended steel I upping-out
ceremonies at McCormick Place.
On Thursday, he broke grotesd for a $38
million O'Hare Airport parking garage--
biggest in the world.
Records of the City Building Department
show that new construction, public and
private, In Daley's 15 years as mayor has
totaled 55,669,701,974-- or about $378 million
a year.
In the five years previous to his administra-
tion, also boom years, new construction was
valued at 0,064,817,183?or about $213 mil-
lion a year.
Dick Daley the doer and builder?
"Construction is what brings jobs," said
Paul N. Zirnmerer, executive director of the
Mayor's Committee for Economic and Cul-
tural Development. "That's what brings
money and activity and the base for taxes."
But, underlying all, said Zimmerer, is
Mayor Daley's love for the City of Chicago.
"If you love something," he said, "you
want to see it grow."
Again, on behalf of the Chicago dele-
gation, we want to extend beet wishes to
Mayor Richard J. Daley for abundant
good health and for continued service to
the people of our city and the people of
America.
(Mr. ANNUNZIO asked and was given
Permission to extend his remarks at this
point in the Recoan, and to include ex-
traneous matter.)
[Mr. ANNUNZIO addressed the House.
His remarks will appear hereafter in the
Extensions of Remarks.1
SALUTE TO SECRETARIES
(Mr. PRICE of Illinois asked and was
given permission to extend his remarks
at this point in the RECORD and to include
extraneous matter.)
Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I
am indeed proud to pay tribute to our
secretaries during National Secretaries
Week.
For the 19th consecutive year, the last
full week in April has been designated as
Secretaries Week, with business, indus-
try, education, government, and the pro-
fessions joining in its observance. In
1970, Secretaries Week is April 19-25,
with Wednesday, April 22, set aside as
Secretaries Day. Under the sponsorship
of the National feecretaries Association--
International?the world's leading secre-
tarial organization, the theme will again
be "Better Secretaries Mean Better Busi-
ness."
The week is acknowledged by Federal,
State, and municipal governments and is
observed with special NSA sponsored ac-
tivities. In the District of Columbia,
Mayor Washington signed a proclama-
tion on April 17, urging recognition for
all secretaries for the vital role they play.
Washington's Capital Chapter and Dis-
trict of Columbia Chapter will join to-
gether in the activities of the week, be-
ginning with a church service on Sunday,
April 19, at the Christ Church. And a
morning walking tour of Old Alexandria
on Saturday, April 25.
The highlight of the week will be Sec-
retaries Day, April 22, with a reception
and banquet being held in Blackie's
House of Beef. The speaker will be Hon.
William L. Gifford, Special Assistant for
Legislative Affairs to the Secretary of
Labor, and entertainment will be by Bo
Kinnel and his cordovox.
I am familiar with this organization as
Margaret Morrison, a member of my
staff, is an active member and a former
officer.
I commend our secretaries and I am
glad to have this opportunity to partici-
pate in National Secretaries Week with
the National Secretaries Association?
International. qv--
ADDRESS BY SECRETARY OF DE-
FENSE MELVIN R. LAIRD
(Mr. GERALD R. FORD asked and
was given permission to extend his re-
marks at this point in the Remit]) and
to include an address by the Secretary
of Defense, Melvin R. Laird.)
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker,
the Secretary of Defense, our former
colleague from Wisconsin, Mr. Laird,
made a most important address today
In New York City. Addressing the animal
Associated Press luncheon he warned of
the increasing strategic capability of the
Soviet Union and of some of the hard
choices which we are going to have to
face up to in the area of national secu-
rity. In order that all Members might
have an opportunity to read the Secre-
tary's speech in full I include it in the
RECORD with these remarks.
ADDRESS BY TIIE HONORABLE IVIELVIN R LAIRD
I was particularly pleased when your Presi-
dent, Paul Miller of Gannett Newspapers,
called roe on a Saturday morning several
months ago to invite me to speak to the
Annual Luncheon of the Associated Press
on the subject of the strategic balance. I
told him that I regarded this forum as par-
ticularly appropriate to express my views on
the need to make availabe te the American
people additional information regarding na-
tional security.
When I assumed office 15 months ago, /
immediately established as a top priority
goal the restoration of credibility in the
Department of Defense. Since then we have
attempted to follow President Nixon's stated
desire to make more information available to
the American people.
The editors of the Associated Press and
all members of the communications media
in this country have a deep interest in this
subject. I pledge to you that we shall continue
to devote maximum attention to reducing
and hopefully eliminating overclassification
in the Department of Defense. And, we will
provide all the information we can within
the limits of national security, consistent
with the safety and legal rights of our
citizens.
This open news policy has brought about
significant progress in at least five major
areas where information was previously
withheld from the American people.
1. Previous policy Was to restrict public
discussion of Prisoner of War matters.
Present policy is to foster public discus-
sion and to focus worldwide attention on the
plight of our prisoners of war in order to
gain humane treatment Mr them and to
obtain their release.
2. Previous policy was to withhold from
the public information os chemical war-
fare and biological research matters. Present
policy is to keep the public informed about
our new policies in these two areas, the rea-
sons for these new policies, and the steps
being taken to implement them.
3. Previous practices on reporting the
costs of major weapons systems led to a
major creditibility problem in the Depart-
ment of Defense. Our new policy of full dis-
closure on major weapons costs will help
to restore the Department's credibility and
will assist us in gaining better control of
costs and in developing better management
practices.
4. For several years, the American people
were denied knowledge about our activities
in Laos. Today, the American people are
being informed about what we are doing end
what we are not doing in Laos.
5. In the past, overuse of classification
denied to the American people pertinent
information on the nature and scope of
the strategic nuclear threat. In my view,
there is still too much classification, but we
have tried and will continue to make more
and more information available on this
subject which is so crucial for the future
security of our country.
,In my remarks today I will attempt to
shed more light on the crucial subject of
the strategic threat. In particular, I want to
discuss with you editors the nature and
scope of the growing Soviet threat, recog-
nizing full well that, in Vienna, our negoti-
ators have just begun round two of the
Strategic. Arms Limitation Talks, commonly
called SALT.
I hope for success at SALT. I want to em-
phasize that point. I also want to emphasize
that our top military leadership hopes for
success at SALT. Where the security of the
United States is involved, it is this objec-
tive?insuring national security?which is
most important. A lower-cost means to
achieve that objective, lower compared to
what otherwise may be required?if it can
be achieved within tolerable risks?is ob-
viously most desirable to all Americans,
civilian and military.
The budget we have recommended to Con-
gress for the next fiscal year demonstrates
how deeply the Nixon Administration is corn-
rciitted to progress at SALT. We have called
this year's defense budget a transitional
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budget.ransitional because in terms of
nallitaanability, it is basically a status
quo, stand-pat budget, We have postponed
basic national security decisions in,the stra-
tegic field in order to give maximum oppor-
tunity for SALT to be successful, and to fos-
ter a meaningful beginning for the era of
negotiation President Nixon and the Anaeri-
can people seek.
The objective of the Nixon Administration
Is to restore and maintain, peace. With re-
gard to SALT, the President's actions and
words document this IldiniMistratiOn's accent
on negotiation rather :than . Confrontation.
In my Defense Report to Congress in Feb-
ruary, I expressed concern that the United
States, by the mid-1970's, could find itself
In a second-rate strategic position with re-
gard to the future security of the Free World.
Today, in keeping with our policy of maxi-
mum information, I intend to present addi-
tional reasons for this concern.
It is important to discuss the growing
strategic threat because It is essential for
the American people to understand the com-
plex issues involved, if we are to insure our
national security interests through the dec-
ade of the 1970's. The American people need
to understand the reasons President Nixon
Is pursuing the course he has recommended
in this year's transitional budget.
As Secretary of Defense, I must face the
fact that we are taking a risk by postponing
hard decisions which the increasing Soviet
threat poses for us. I recognize that in the
interests of lasting peace, some risks must
be taken. But, it is my judgment that as the
American people are provided additional in-
formation, such as we are discussing here
today, they will agree that we are literally
at the edge of prudent risk. And the in-
escapable conclusion win be that if the So-
viet strategic offensive buildup continues,
the risk to our nation will become too great
to sustain without major offsetting actions.
Therefore, what I particularly want to
focus on today is the basic asymmetry be-
tween what the United States has been doing
and what the Soviet Union has been doing
in the field of strategic nuclear weapons in
recent years.
In a word, for the past five years, the
United States has virtually been in neutral
gear in the deployment of strategic ofiensive
forces, while the Saviet Union has moved
into high gear in both deployment and de-
velopment of strategic nuclear weapons. In
the 1965-67 time period, the United States
decided on a level of strategic nuclear forces,
including Multiple Independently Targeted
Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), which was deemed
adequate to preserve our deterrent posture
for the threat of the 1970's which was pro-
jected then. No basic change has been made
in the force level decisions established in
the mid-1960's.
The Soviet Union, by contrast, has en-
gaged in a major effort since 1965 to change
the balance of power. The United States
then, unlike the situation today, clearly oc-
cupied a superior position.
Except for the minimum "hedge" that
Safeguard will provide, we have not re-
sponded to the Soviet strategic offensive
buildup with new deployment programs. We
did not respond in past years because the
United States deliberately chose to assume
that the Soviet buildup at most was aimed
at achieving a deterrent posture- comparable
to that of the United States, We have not
responded this year because, aS I have said,
we fervently hope that SALT can render such
a response unnecessary,
As much as we might wish it otherwise, f
however, we must concentrate our attention
on what the Soviet Union is actually doing.-
In the current situation of a diminishing
U.S. deterrent and Soviet ?rnomentia.m, we r
simply cannot base our plans and programs
on what we hope the Soviet Union may do
either unilaterally or in SALT. The Soviets t
tilsgEggiwigato RakAppimagFo00300040006-6
have a momentum going both in strategic know even more than has been available in
weapons deployments and in strategic weep- the past about matters which affect their
ons developments. If their strategic posture safety and security. There has been too much
could be expected to stay at the operationally classification in this country. In particular,
deployed posture which exists today, I be- too much has been withheld in the past
lieve we would have a tolerable situation, about what has been going on in the closed
What must concern us, however, is the mo- societies of the Soviet Union and Communist
mentum the Soviets have established both in China.
deployments and developments and where As we all pray for success in Vienna, let
that momentum may carry them.
Let me explain in more detail the basic
problem.
The most crucial aspect of national secu-
rity is the strategic balance between nations
that have competing interests in the world.
The strategic balance has a direct effect on
relations between the superpowers. It has an
indirect effect on other nations both in terms
of their own relations with each other and in
terms of their relations with the superpowers.
As one example, a situation of clear superior-
ity on the part of the Soviet Union would
have profound implications for any future
political or military confrontation between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In fact, a clear
strategic superiority on the part of the So-
viet Union would affect our interests and our
obligations throughout the world.
In our continuing debate on defense mat-
ters, it has been said many times that the
driving farce behind the so-called strategic
arms race is the "action-reaction" phenome-
non. The recent ABM-MIRV discussions in
this country illustrate this. The argument is
made, for instance, that the deployment of
defensive missiles by one side tends to gen-
erate increased offensive deployments by the
other side.
I certainly agree that one side's actions
definitely can influence what the other side
does. But just as weapons in themselves are
not the cause of wars, neither are a country's
actions in weapons deployment?in them-
selves?the driving force in a so-called arms
race. The fundamental driving force in an
arms race is what one country perceives as
possible objectives of another country's ac-
tions.
Let me explain it this way. Our goal is a
stable peace. Our strategic policy to achieve
that goal is deterrence. As publicly stated,
the basic rationale for United States weapons
deployment in the strategic field has been
and remains deterrence. Our actions of the
past several years undertcore the fact that
deterrence is our fundamental policy and
that we seek no more than a posture of ef-
fective deterrence.
Because we in the United States seek a
posture of deterrence to protect our interests
11 3299
me point out that, in my view, the American
people will support an arms limitation agree-
ment only if they are confident they have the
relevant facts about the strategic balance.
The facts I am about to present are not
taken from external Soviet discussions of
their strategic forces. They do not come from
press conferences in Moscow, from testimony
in the Kremlin, from news stories in Pravda,
or from published annual Defense Reports
by Marshal Grechko.
Rather, the information I am presenting
to you is based on our own observations of
what the Soviets are doing?and on our belief
that this information and these facts should
not be withheld from the American people
and should be made available to others in the
world.
Let us examine what has happened in the
past five years to shift the relationship be-
tween U.S. and Soviet strategic forces and
to provide an accelerated momentum to the
Soviets in the strategic reld:
In 1965, the Soviet Union had about 220
launchers for the relatively old-fashioned
missiles?SS-6's, SS-7's and SS-8's?some-
what similar to our Titan. We had 54 Ti-
tans in the inventory at that time.
Today, these two forces remain essen-
tially the same. So in this category of old-
fashioned multimegation weapons the So-
viets had and still maintain a better than
4-1 advantage.
In 1965, the Soviet Union had no relatively
small ICBM launchers comparable to our
Minuteman. By 1965, we had 880 Minuteman
missiles operational arid had established
that the total force level for Minuteman
would be 1,000 launchers. In the 1965-67 time
period, the United States finalized plans to
convert a portion of the established Minute-
man force to a MIRV Minuteman III con-
figuration.
Today, the Soviet Union has over 800
such launchers operational, and a projected
force that could exceed 1,000 launchers with-
in the next two years. These launchers in-
clude both the SS-11 and SS-1C, missiles.
Concurrently, flight testing of an improved
55-11 missile continues. Thus, at present
construction rates, the Soviets will achieve
an those of our allies, we obviously could parity in Minuteman-type launchers within
recognize as legitimate a Soviet desire for a
comparable deterrent to protect its interests. the next two years or so and could move into
a substantial lead in this category by the
I know that the actions of the Soviet Union mid-1970's if they continue to deploy these
in recent years have raised questions in the missiles. The previously scheduled U.S. pro-
minds of some of you editors and others gram to MIRV a substantial part of Min-
about the true objectives they are pursuing. uteman continues in progress.
As I have said many times, I do not be- In 1965, there were no operational launch-
lieve that it is appropriate for me, as Secre-
tary of Defense, to attempt to assess the stra- era for the large Soviet SS-9 missile which,
in its single warhead version, can carry up
tegic intentions of another country. However,
under my responsibilities, I must be con-
cerned about present and potential strategic Today, I can report to you that there are
capabilities. some 220 SS-9's operational with at least
'You representatives of a free press under- 60 more under construction. Testing of an
stand fully the national security price an SS-9 multiple reentry vehicle?the triplet
open society must pay when competing with version?continues. The U.S. has no counter-
adversaries who cloak their plan in secrecy part to this program involving large missiles,
and attempt to hide both their objectives So, in this area, the Soviets have and will
and their hardware behind the mantle of a maintain a monopoly.
closed society. The whole world knows what In 1965, neither a depressed trajectory
we in the United States have and what we ICBM nor a Fractional Orbital Bombard-
plan in the national security field. Meaning- ment System existed in either the Soviet or
ul essentials are laid bare in an open U.S. inventory.
forum?in official statements, in Congres- Today, the Soviets have tested both con-
sional hearings, in the give and take of figurations and could have an operational
Congressional arid public debate and in the version already deproyed. The United States
eports of a free and competitive press. I has developed nothing comparable to these
would not have it any other way. systems.
Let me emphasize again my conviction In 1965, the Soviet Union had about 25
hat the ,American people have a right to launchers for Submarine Launched Ballistic
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Missiles (SLBIVI.$) on nuclear submarines, and
about 80 mere on diesel submarines. Most
were designed for surface launch only. The
U.S. had 464 SLBM launchers operational en
20 subrriarines in 1965 and Congress had au-
thorized the last of the 41 nuclear-powered
submarines in our Polaris Force in the pre-
vious fiscal year.
Today, the Soviets have over 200 opera-
tional launchers on nuclear submarines for
submerged launch SLBMs and about 70 op-
erational launchers on diesel submarines. In
the next two years, the Soviets are expected
to have some 400-500 operational launchers
on Polaris-type submarines, and at present
construction rates-6-8 submarines a year--
could Match or exceed the number in the
U.S. force by 1974-75. United States Polaris
submarines still number 41 and no increase
Is projected in current plans. Conversion of
31 of our Polaris submarines to the MIRVed
Poseidon missile is planned, and eight con-
versions have already been authorized by
Congress
In 1965, there was no development under-
way of a so-called Undersea Long-Range
Missile System (TYL1VIS) in the United States
and there appeared to be none in the Soviet
Union.
Today, the United States is spending rela-
tively small sums in the research and de-
Nelopment area on preliminary investigations
of such a system. I can also report to you
today that the Soviet Union, on the other
hand, already is testing a new, long-range
missile for possible Naval use.
In 1965, the Soviet heavy bomber fame
consisted of slightly Over 200 aircraft, about
50 of which were configured as tankers. The
U.S. heavy bomber force strength was about
'780 in 1965.
Today, the Soviet heavy bomber force is
slightly under 200, with about 50 still con-
figured as tankers. U.S. heavy bomber
strength has declined to about 550 today.
In 4965, we estimated that the Soviet
Union had a complex of ABM launchers be-
ing constructed around Moscow as well as a
number of radars under construction which
could provide early warning acquisition and
tracking functions for ABM use.
Today, we believe that 64 Moscow ABM
launchers are operational together with so-
phisticated early warning radars and track-
ing capabilities. ABM testing for ncw and,/
or improved systems continues. Today, the
first two Safeguard sites have been author-
ized, but will not be operational before 1974-
75. This modified deployment schedule! Is
considerably behind the schedule Congress
has approved in 1967 for the planned Sentinel
area defense, which called for initial capa-
bility in 1972, and nation-wide col crags in
1975.
Thus, in the space of five years -from i.965
to 1970?the Soviet Union has more than
tripled its inventory of strategic offensive
nuclear weapon launchers from about 500
to about 1700?which includes some 200
heavy bombers in both totals?and continues
the momentum of a vigorous construction
program. In that same period, the Scrviet
Union has virtually quadrupled the 'total
megatonnage in its strategic offensive force.
The United States, on the other hand, in
the same time period made no increase in
its established level of 1710 strategic nuclear
missile launchers and reduced its heavy
bomber strength of 780 by over 200. In that
same period the United States also reduced
its megatonnage by more than 40' .
To repeat: The United Stales has taken
no action to increase the total of approved
strabegle offensive delivery vehicle's in the
past Ave years in response to the rapid growth
in Soviet strategic delivery vehicles. W
have, of course, maintained certain option
and other steps have been taken-to preset's,
our deterrent in the face of this increase.
Two programs that have been the subject
of Intense public discussion are, of course,
our MIRV and Safeguard systems.
Let me emphasize that MIRY is needed to
preserve our deterrent. Many people do not
fully understand why it is necessary for us
to continue the previously planned. Con-
gressionally-approved and funded deploy-
ment of MIRV systems. The point is made
that the current number of strategic nuclear
weapons on alert in our force is sufficient fig
immediate retaliatory use in a crisis. Because
MIRVing would more than double the num-
ber of deliverable weapons, the conclusion
Is drawn that this is unnecessary.
This conclusion could be valid, if we as-
sumed that the Polaris, minuteman, and
Bomber forces all would survive a surprise
attack and that she Soviet Union would not
deploy an extensive ABM system. However,
as was pointed out in my Defense Report in
February, the rapidly-growing Soviet stra-
tegic offensive forces could seriously threaten
both the U.S. Minuteman and strategic
bomber forces by the mid-1970's.
assuming we do not take additional actions
to offset the expanding threat--and this ap-
parently is what some people urge?I must,
as Secretary of Defense, face the disquieting
possibility that in the mid-to-late 1970's we
would no longer be able to rely on either the
Bomber or Minuteman force to survive a sur-
prise attack. In such a situation, we would
be left with only the Polaris/Poseidon deter-
rent force in our strategic arsenal for high
confidence retaliatory purposes. This would
pose intolerable risks for American security.
Thus, the critical choice in the face of that
situation is this:
I. Do we rely on the fraction of the 656
current weapons that will be at sea on our
Polaris force if we do not convert to Poseidon
and do not defend our land-based strategic
forces?
2. Or, do we continue the previously es-
tablished program to convert 31 Polaris sub-
marines to the long-approved Poseidon MIRV
program?Which would provide approxi-
mately the same number of sea-based re-
taliatory weapons on alert that we currently
have today in the sea-based and land-based
retaliatory forces combined, but with much
reduced megatonnage?
Pending a successful outcome in the Stra-
tegic Arms Limitation Talks, therefore, pins-
dance dictates that We must continue our
approved program to MIRV current forces.
Moreover, as the experience of the past
five years demonstrates, it would be danger-
ous and imprudent to place unquestioned
reliance on the invulnerability of any single
strategic system for more than five to seven
years into the future.
This is why we most also, at the very
least, preserve an option to defend a portion
of our land-based retaliatory forces. That is
a major part of what the proposed minimal
addititon to the Safeguard Defensive pro-
gram is designed to do. I will come back to
that.
Because we want to give the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks eveey chance of succeeding,
we are deliberately aecepting certain risks by
postponing hard choices related to strategic
offensive weapons. These-risks are acceptable
only in the context of proceeding with the
MIRV deployments that have been pro-
grammed and approved for several years and
the Safeguard increment we are recommend-
ing this year.
A second and equally important reason for
MIRV is that it helps preserve our deterrent
by increasing confidence in our ability to
penetrate Soviet strategic defensive forces
which, by the mid-to-late 1970's, also could
be quite formida.ble. In addition to the exten-
e sive air defense Capabilities they already prise
s seas, the Soviets are nurseling a vigorous anti-
e ballistic missile research and development
program designed to improve the present
operational system or to develan, substan-
tially better second-generation '"ABM
components.
We now have evidence that the Soviet
Union is testing an improved long-range ABM
missile. They are also expaildhig their radar
surveillance coverage. We cannot rule out
the possibility that they have or will give
the extensively deployed SA-5 surface-to-air
missile system an ABM role. We believe such
a role is technically feasible for this system.
With regard to Safeguael, which I men-
tioned previously, let me say this. In addition
to other objectives, the receiented Safeguard
program, initiated last year, is designed to
provide protection for our land-based deter-
rent forces, the Minuteman and Bombers. As
you know, the President directed that each
phase of the Safeguard deployment is to be
reviewed each year to ensure that we are
doing as much as necessary but not more
than that required by the threat. The incre-
ments of Safeguard proposed so far will pro-
vide protection for a portion of our land-
based deterrent, and permit flexibility with
regard to our future Coll2A.: of action.
Without approval by Congress of sire Modi-
fied Phase II Safeguard pretection proposed
by the President, we would be forced to rec-
ommend going forward this year with other
strategic nuclear offensive force programs.
All of my comments so Mr have, of course,
been focused on the snore immediate and
troublesome threat posed Op the Soviet stra-
tegic force buildup. The nuclear weapons
program of Communist China also concerns
us and directly relates to the need for pre-
serving timely Safeguard options as we move
toward the mid-1870's. Time does not permit
a discussion of this issue and the interrela-
tionship of maintaining adequate strategic
offensive and defensive forces to meet both
the Soviet and Communist Chinese threats.
Where does all this leave us, and what is
President Nixon attempting to do with the
decisions he has incorporated in his Fiscal
Year 1971 transitional de cuss budget?
Clearly, this Administration has not ac-
celerated the previously planned deployment
of offsensive systems during our 15 months
in office. On the contrary, we have slowed
it down. The only major change we have
made has been modification of the previously
approved Sentinel ABM deployment; and
that change was a sloweiewn, not a speed-
up. We slowed the original deployment plan
Congress approved, keyed it to the emerging
threat on an annual review basis, and re-
oriented it to provide more timely protec-
tion needed for our land-based deterrent
forces.
If the programmed forces established by
the,. last Administration some years ago and
approved by Congress were deemed appro-
priate and necessary for the security of the
United States in the 1970'3 against the then
projected threat, I am at a loss to understand
how critics can claim that the Nixon Admin-
istration has escalated site arms race. The
record clearly shows that we have not done
so. We have chosen instead to defer major
new weapons decisions ,is long as possible
pending developments in ,he Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks. In continuing the MIRV
and ABM programs, we arc simply going
ahead with programs on which our deterrent
policy was formulated by previous Adminis-
trations, even before the current momentum
of Soviet strategic progrions became clear.
With regard to the imeortant talks which
have just reaumed in Vienna, the President
has stated that every U.S. system is negotia-
ble. To those who argue ',Oat the U.S. should
take specific. and perhaps unilateral, action
at the start of these negotiations, I would
reply that the place to resolve these issues is
at the conference table with the Soviets. Let
us try to find out at the conference table the
meaning of the Soviet Union's increased wea-
pons deployments and let us conduct these
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Important ne otiations with full recognition
of thew hung Soviet deployments.
My appraisal today has covered some of
the available evidence of the Soviet military
buildup. I am not unmindful, however, of
possible other directions of Soviet policy that
could be relevant to our security. There
have been reports that Soviet economic
problems may place pressure upon their
leadership to devote major attention to in-
ternal matters, thus reducing the recent
emphasis on a continued Military buildup.
As Secretary of Defense, I will continue to
hope that the shift in national priorities we
have Instituted in America will be dupli-
cated in the Soviet Union. But until evidence
of that shift Is discernible in weapons de-
ployment activities, I have no alternative but
to base my actions and recommendations on
the evidence available, much of which I have
shared with you editors today and, through
you, with the American people.
THE LATE BILL HENRY
(Mr. GERALD R. FORD asked and
was given permission to extend his re-
marks at this point in the RECORD and to
include extraneous matter.)
Mr. GERALD R. FORD, Mr. Speaker,
only a few months ago, on the occasion
of the 30th anniversary of Mrs. Bill
Henry's column in the Lops Angeles Times,
the distinguished majority leader, the
chairman of the California delegation
(Mr. /10LIFIELD) and our late beloved
colleague Mr. Lipscomb, joined in
tributes from this floor to a veteran
Washington newsman and a warm
friend. ?
Now, we are saddened to learn of Bills'
death, just a few days before he was to
have received from President Nixon the
highest civilian honer of our country, the
Medal of Freedom. In expressing the
condolences of all of us to his wonderful
wife, Corinne, and to their daughters
and grandchildren, may I share with
Bill's many friends in the House the
tribute paid him last week by the Presi-
dent.
[From the Los Angeles Times, April 14, 19701
TEXT OF A NOTE FROM PRESIDENT NIXON TO ?
Mas. Btu. HENRY
Pat and I were deeply saddened to learn
of Bill's death and we join in. sending our
heartfelt sympathy to you. Bill was a man
deeply dedicated to his profession and he
set high goals for himself. His intense loyalty
to our nation, his passion for freedom and
justice were the only challenges he needed
in life. Bill loved people. He believed in them
and he worked for them.
Re wrote a fine chapter in the world of
newspaper reporting. And all of us who had
the privilege to know him personally will
miss our warm and generous' friend who
sparkled with zest for life.
- We know how proud Bill was of you.
And we pray that the memory of your happy
years together and of his great achievements
In life will bring you comfort in this very
difficult time.
THE UNHERALDED WHO SUPPORT
THE PUBLIC TRUST
(Mr. HALL asked and was given per-
mission to extend his remarks at this
point in the RECORD and to include per-
tinent material.)
Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, the U.S. Gov-
ernment maintains a civilian staff of
over 2.7 million personnel. In so large and
complex an organization, it often hap-
pens that the key element, the individual
employee who has devoted many years of
service to his job, may have his efforts
go largely unnoticed. I am very pleased,
therefore, when employees who have
continuously demonstrated a high de-
gree of proficiency are properly honored
for their abilities.
Such a case recently occurred in St.
Louis, where Mrs. Pearline Golliday of
the National Personnel Records Center
was presented with the Federal Em-
ployee of the Year award in the Admin-
istrative Services category. Currently an
employee of GSA, Mrs. Golliday has
been a dedicated public servant for 27
Years. During her tenure with the Fed-
eral Government, she has received sev-
eral aWard,a for her administrative
abilities, including the outstanding per-
formance rating and several Sustained.
Superior Performance awards. Mrs. Gol-
liday was selected out of the 38,000 Fed-
eral employees in the area by a group
of both Federal executives and distin-
guished members of the non-Federal
community.
The award was presented by General
Services Administrator Robert L. Kun-
zig, who was the featured speaker at the
event. In his remarks, Mr. Kunzig aptly
recognized the high value of the career
civil servant, indicating that it was the
Federal Career Service which has pro-
vided the continuity of administration at
the National level that is the envy of
many countries. Kunzig noted the Na-
tion's pride in career service personnel,
and challenged them to progressive
thinking during the next decade. He
cited President Nixon's recent message
to Congress, which pointed out the need
for a reduction, termination, or restruc-
turing of those programs which are ob-
solete, of low priority, or in need of basic
reform, and called on each Federal em-
ployee to actively pursue the President's
goals. He said that understanding, flexi-
bility, and responsiveness were essential
leadership traits in the career Federal
employee, and congratulated Mrs. Golli-
day, as well as Miss Joyce Allen, and Mr.
John Johnson, who were also honored.at
the ceremony, for demonstrating those
qualities.
At this point, I would like to have in-
serted into the RECORD an article from
the St. Louis Post-Dispatch of March 14,
1920, regarding the event:
THREE HONORED AS TOP FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
HERE
Three employees of federal agencies were
honored last night with awards naming each
as a Greater St Louis Federal Employee of
the Year. They were selected from among 37
candidates competing in categories of ad-
ministrative services, managerial and tech-
nical, and professional and scientific.
Honored were Mrs. Pearline Golliday, Na-
tional Personnel Records Center; Miss Joyce
Allen, Army Aviation Systems Command, and
John I. Johnson, Air Force Aeronautical
Chart and Information Center. The awards
were presented at a banquet at Stouffer's
Riverfront Inn. Winners were selected for ex-
ceptional performance and devotion to fed-
eral service, participation in corrummity ac-
tivities, and self-education improving the
value of the indiivdual to his agency.
Robert L. Kunzig, administrator of the
General Serviced Administration, was guest
113301
Speaker. More than 1000 federal employees
attended the event.
LAOS AND CAMBC)DIA LOOM AS
NEWEST BATTLEGROUNDS
(Mr. BOLAND asked and was given
permission to extend his remarks at this
point in the RECORD.)
Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Speaker, Laos and
Cambodia loom before us as the newest
battlegrounds in Southeast Asia. The
startling testimony made public yester-
day by Senator STUART SYMINGTON'S Sub-
committee on Foreign Relations reveals
this country's role In what is aptly
termed a "secret war." The transcript
of testimony--as chilling and chasten-
ing a document as we are likely to read
in a long time?shows that tens of thou-
sands of Americans have been taking
part in the Laotian war over the past
several years. The grim toll: nearly 200
dead, hundreds more wounded, and bil-
lions of dollars wasted in a war that vir-
tually any military strategist would con-
sider futile. The role of the U.S. Ambas-
sador to Laos is roughly akin to that of
commander in chief of all military oper-
ations. He coordinates air, ground, and
intelligence missions with the kind of
feudal sovereignity that even the Lao-
tian Government itself miff lit envy. The
United States is paying half the cost?.
quite literally, half the cost?of running
that government. Indeed the United
States is even paying two-thirds the cost
of operating Laotian embassies abroad.
Is this the "limited involvement" Pres-
ident _Nixon cited in his guarded press
release a few weeks ago?
The answer is obvious?indeed, con-
spicuous. The Nixon administration?
and the Johnson administration before
It?have concealed the extent of Ameri-
can military activities in the countries
bordering Vietnam. Stonily aloof to the
American people and its representatives
in the Congress, two administrations have
been pursuing a war without our consent.
The military situation in Cambodia
threatens to become as forbidding as the
one in neighboring Laos Cambodia's new
regime, energetically pressing the war
against Communist insurgents, has ap-
pealed to the world for military aid. And
the United States, it is said, is seriously
contemplating shipments of arms. It is a
familiar situation, to anyone even cur-
sorily aware of Southeast Asia's recent
history. First, arms. Then, "advisers" to
train Asian troops in the use of such
arms. Then?perhaps inevitably?Amer-
ican troops to guide the war effort.
The lessons of this country's harrowing
decade in Vietnam has schooled few ad-
ministration officials in the futility of
Asian civil wars. After 40,000 American
deaths, after 10 years of devastating war,
we appear no closer to a meaningful
peace settlement than 'we were in the
early 1960's. Now the war is spreading
Into Laos and Cambodia, threatening to
engulf the entire area conventionally re-
ferred to as Indochina. Are we prepared
for such a war? Are we prepared to con-
tinue sacrificing American lives and
wasting American dollars in a kind of
Messianic campaign to thwart anything
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? HOUSE April 20, 1970
even tenuously comparable to commu-
nism in Southeast Asia? I think not.
Several weeks ago I idle odured a resol-
utiori calling on the administration to
reveal the extent of military operations
in Laos and demanding that such opera-
tions not be increased withotit the con-
sent of Co, !ress.
Today I am introducing a new resolu-
tion.
It maintains that this country's mili-
tary activities in the countries bordering
Vietnam should be Witted to only those
missions necessary to shield American
troops in South Vietnam against enemy
infiltration, and that troop withdrawals
from Vietnam should be accelerated so
that no American combat forces remain
there 1 Year from today.
We have spilled enough of our blood
and dissipated enough of our resources
in Southeast Asia.
The time to stop is now.
LEAVE OF ABSENCE
By unanimous request (at the request
of Mr. ALBERT) leave at absence was
granted to:
Mr. PATTEN, for today and tomorrow,
on account of official business.
Mr. PATMAN, for today, on account of
official business.
Mr. Lioneon, for today and rest of week,
on amount of official business.
Mr. EILBERG, for Monday and Tuesday
of this- week, on account of religious
reason.
Me. PEPPER, for today, on account of
official business.
Mr. GETTYS (at the request of' Mr.
Boaes) ef or today, on account of official
business.
Mr. GRIFFIN (at the request of Mr.
Boees), for today, on account of illness
in family.
Mr. HAGAN (at the request of Mr.
GRAY) , for today, on account of official
business.
Mr. FALLON (at the request of Mr.
Geinaerie), for today, on account of of-
ficial business.
SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED
By unanimous consent, permission to
address the House, following the legisla-
tive program and any special orders
heretofore entered, was granted to:
(The following Members at the re-
quest of Mr. DELLENBACK) to revise and
extend their remarks and include ex-
traneous material:)
Mr. HALPERN, for 5 minutes, today.
Mr. CONTE, for 10 minutes, today.
Mr. MILLER of Ohio, for 5 min ates,
today.
Mr. HOGAN, for 5 minutes, today.
Mr. McCeosicxx, for 60 minutes,
April 21.
(The following Members (at the re-
quest of Mr. Monte of Virginia) to re-
vise and extend their remarks and in-
clude extraneous material:)
Mr. FARBSTEIN, for 20 minutes, today.
Mr. GONZALEZ, for 10 minutes, today.
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
By unanimous consent, permission to
revise and extend remarks was granted
to:
Mr. Jcanos of Alabama.
Mr. WYATT prior to the vote On H.R.
780 and to include extraneous matter.
Mr. DEVINE (at the request of Mr. Kyle
to extend his remarks on Senate Joint
Resolution 106() and S. 1968.
(The following Members (at the re-
quest of Mr. DELLENBACK) and to include
extraneous material : )
Mr. Qtree in two instances.
Mr. FINDLEY in two instanees._
Mr. STEIGEE Of WiSeCillSin in -three
instances.
Mr. Drewresite in two instances.
Mr. ASHBROOK in two instances.
Mr. McCeoay.
Mr. Coeres.
Mr. DOKCAN.
Mr. cRALD R. Foxe in two instances.
Mr. NAS.
MI-.4WYMAN in two instances.
MIcesa
. ANDERSON of Illinois in two
inst
Mr BURTON of Utah in five instances.
Mr. Gessere
Mr. CHERL1.
Mr. lyras.
Mr. J NSON of Pennsylvania.
Mr. Ter PSON of Georgia.
Mr. Bea
Mr. HAST .
Mrs. MAY.
Mr. WATSON.
Mr. REID of few York in three
instances.
(The following Memb (at the re-
quest of Mr. Dunes of Virg 'a) and to
include extraneous material:)
Mr. Dines of Tennessee in th
tances.
Mr. ALBERT.
Mr. CULVER.
Mr. HUNGATE.
Mr. ROONEY of New York,
Mr. MARSH in two instances.
Mr. CAREY in two instances.
Mrs. HANSEN of Washington in two
instances.
Mr. Menne in two instances.
Mr. How= in two instances.
Mr. Jecoss in two instances.
Mr. Rearm in three instances.
Mr. COHELAN in six instances.
Mr. GONZALEZ.
Mr. GARMATZ.
Mr. ANDERSON of California.
Mr. MIKVA in six instances.
Mr. SYMINGTON
Mr. STOKES in three instances.
Mr. COLMER in two instances.
Mr. FOUNTAIN in two instances.
Mx. Rome; of Florida in five instances.
Mr. Rms.
Mr. GALLAGHER ill two instances.
Mr. RODIN? in two instances.
Mrs. SULLIVAN in three instances.
SENATE BlI,L REFERRED
A bill of the Senate of the following
title was taken from the Speaker's table
and, under the rule, referred as follows:
S. 3885 ?An act to Inertia:eta abiav ail-
ability of mortgage credit for the financing
of urgently needed housing, and for the
other purposes; to the Corimittee on Bank-
ing and Currency.
ADJOURNMENT
Mr. DANIEL of Virgie!a. Mr. Speaker,
I move that the House do now adjourn.
The motion was agreed to; accord-
ingly (at 3 o'clock and 43 minutes p.m.),
the House adjourned until tomorrow,
Tuesday, April 21, 1970, at 12 o'clock
noon.
"RxECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS,
ETC.
Under clause 2 of rule 2KXIV, executive
communications were taken from the
Speaker's table and referred as follows:
1939. A letter from the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare, transmitting the
fifth annual report of the Advisory Council
on State Departments of F. Mention, pursuant
to title V of Public Law 89-10; to the Corn-
mittee on Education and Labor.
1940. A letter from the Chairman, Water
Resources Council, transmitting a report and
comprehensive plan fox the Pascagoula
River Basin, Ala. and Miss , pursuant to the
Water Resources Planning Act (Public Law
39-80); to the Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs.
1941. A letter from the Chairman, Vetter
Resources Council, tranitnitting a report
and comprehensive plan for the Sabine River
Basin, La., and Tex., purFetant to the Water
Resources Planning Act (Public Law 89-40);
to the Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs.
1942. A let;er from the Chairman, Water
Resources Council, transm tting a report and
comprehensive plan for the White River
Basin, Ark., and Mo., pur niant to the Water
Resources Planning Act !Public Law 89-80);
to the Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs.
1943. A letter from the Commissioner, Im-
migration and Naturalization Service, U.S.
\Department of Justice transmitting reports
honcerning visa petitions pproved according
c tain beneficiaries thltd and sixth peel-
e ce classification, pursuant to the provi-
sion of section 204(d) (e! the Immigration
and Tationality Act, as amended; to the
Corn ttee on the Judiniary.
1944, A letter from the Secretary of the
Interi transmitting the third report on
the nata nal requirements and cost of wa-
ter poll don control, pursuant to section
18(a) of jthe Federal Weer Pollution Con-
trol Act, jas amended: to the Committee on
Public Works.
REPORTS OF COMMTTTEES ON PUB-
IC BILIS AND RESOLUTIONS
.'Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of
committees were delivErecl to the Clerk
for printing and reference to the proper
calendar, as follows:
Mr. STAGGERS: Committee of conference.
Conference report on HR. 10105 (Rept. No.
91-1008). Ordered to be printed.
Mr. O'NEILL of' Massachusetts: Committee
on Rules. House resolution 938. Resolution
for consideraibon of H.R. 4599, a bill to extend
for 2 years the period for which payments in
lieu of taxes may be made with respect to
certain real property tratieferred by the Re-
construction. Finance Corporation and its
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April 2i97O CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks E 3411
too true. In their Week in Review sec-
tion in yesterday's edition, under the
heading "Revolution in Welfare From an
Unlikely Source," they express surprise
that "Congress has endorsed the star-
tling notion" of a guaranteed income
plan,
Who would have ever thought that
the party which has historically turned
a deaf ear to the socialistic Pied Pipers
would suddenly exhibit a lemming in-
stinct and provide the votes necessary
to pass this radical plan? The Times cor-
rectly terms proiSosal and passage of the
administration's welfare bill "an aston-
ishing development" and then adds:
The principle of a guaranteed annual in-
come for all Americans, about as pure a piece
of socialism as Washington had seen since
the 1930's, had been put forward by?of all
people?President Nixon and then ratified
in that citadel of conservatism, the House,
by a resounding 243-155 vote.
As we have said all along, it is ,the
principle that counts the most, and the
writer of the article agrees:
Most significantly, if the Senate concurs,
the principle will have been established. Suc-
ceeding Congresses, as Opponents of the legis-
lation loudly warned, will be able, probably
even anxious in election years, to raise the
minimum guaranteed income figure . .
In other words, once we have initiated
the program, all the blanks can be filled
In later at taxpayers' expense.
In view of the far-reaching conse-
quences of this ill-advised legislation,
I strongly commend the following article
to the attention of my colleagues, but in
particular to those who thought they
were supporting a conservative's solution
to the welfare problem:
[From the New York Times, Apr. 19, 19701
REVOLUTION IN WELFARE FROIVI AN UNLIKELY
SOURCE
(By Warren Weaver, Jr.)
WASHINGTON.?On the wall of the Capitol
meeting room of the House Rules Commit-
tee, a group rarely given to whimsy or charm,
there hangs the following legend in old Eng-
lish characters: "Due to the lack of experi-
enced trumpeters, the end of the world is
postponed for three weeks." Despite this
warning, it was with something of a flourish
that the end of an era in American Govern-
ment, the days of the welfare dole, was pro-
claimed last week in the cavernous and res-
onant chamber of the House of Representa-
tives.
For the House, scarcely more venturesome
in the past than its own Rules Committee,
subscribed dicisively to a doctrine that was
radical, even revolutionary.' Its members
adopted the theory that the Federal Govern-
ment would not allow the income of any
American family to sink below a minimum
tolerable figure, no matter what its adult
members ,Were doing.
Taken altogether, it could only be called
an astonishing development. The principle of
a guaranteed annual income for all Amer-
icans, about as pure a piece of socialism as
Washington had seen since the 1930's, had
been put forward by?of all people?Presi-
dent Nixon and then ratified in that citadel
of conservatism, the House, by a resounding
243-155 vote.
ransithium GUARANTEED
True, it was a very modest beginning in
terms Of impact on an individual poor fam-
ily. The family assistance plan, the core of
;the Administration welfare reform bill that
moved halfway through Congress, only guar-
antees a couple with two children an annual
income of $1,600, or barely $30 a week. It does
not extend this protection to individual
adults or childless couples; there must be a
family of at least one parent and one child.
It does not provide an outright flat grant;
the Federal benefits will only be large enough
to guarantee that the family income reaches
this minimum standard, which is only about
half the acknowledged poverty level.
But, for the first time in its history, Con-
gress has endorsed the startling notion that
there should be some sort of floor under hu-
man misery and that it is up to the Federal
Government to lay down that floor and fi-
nance its coast-to-coast construction. And,
also for the first time, it was recognized that
the public Obligation to maintain a mini-
mum income for all American families should
not be restricted to those with no income
at all but should cover the so-called work-
ing poor, marginal wage-earners who have
been traditionally barred from the welfare
rolls.
Most significantly, if the Senate concurs,
the principle will have been established. Suc-
ceeding Congresses, as opponents of the leg-
islation loudly warned, he will be able, prob-
ably even anxious in election years, to raise
the minimum guaranteed income figure to
something more nearly resembling the cost of
keeping alive in the United States.
The impact on the Federal budget, even
initially, is substantial. In its first year of
operation, the Administration bill will ap-
proximately double Federal welfare expendi-
tures, to about $8.4-billion. The cost will
continue to rise for a time?crtics said to
$15-billion a year?before accompanying
training and employment programs begin re-
ducing the caseload.
How was the timorous House of Represen-
tatives ever persuaded to buy such a pack-
age? It took broad and powerful combination
of forces. Primarily, 103 Republicans became
convinced that (A) the present welfare sys-
tem is so disastrous that any bold revision
has got to be an improvement, and (B) on
a major political issue, party loyalty de-
manded support of President Nixon, who
could hardly be suspected of radical tend-
encies.
For the 140 Democrats who voted for the
welfare bill, it was much easier. They had
to swallow their reluctance to help the Re-
publican Administration win a major Con-
gressional victory, but many of them had
long been supporters of the income main-
tenance principle and could scarcely turn
their backs on it because it came to the floor
under the aegis of Richard Nixon.
Perhaps most important, waverers of both
parties could listed to the homespun Arkan-
sas rhetoric of Representative Wilbur Mills,
the Ways and Means Committee Chairman,
whose outspoken advocacy of the welfare bill
demonstrated the enthusiasm of the recent
convert, The House really could not accept
that something he backed could be socialism.
The problems the welfare program faces
in the Senate are of a different character.
No one doubts that the votes are there for
the family assistance plan; the question is
whether liberal Senators can be dissuaded
from increasing the benefit level?and the
resulting cost?to such an extent that Presi-
dent Nixon will feel compelled to turn baek
his own program with a veto.
SALT TALKS RESUME
?????????????,
HON. JOHN B. ANDERSON
OF ILLINOIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, April 20, 1970
Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr.
Speaker, I want to commend the ad-
ministration on its announced intention
to seek a comprehensive strategic arms
limitation agreement with the Soviet
Union at the talks which resumed in
Vienna last Thursday. In his state of the
world message President Nixon termed
the SALT talks, "The most important
arms control negotiations this country
has ever entered." And he went on to
explain why this was so. In his words:
Both the Soviet Union and the United
States have acquired the ability to inflict
unacceptable damage on the other, no mat-
ter which strikes first. There can be no gain
and certainly no victory for the power that
provokes a thermonuclear exchange. Thus.
both sides have recognized the vital mu-
tual interest in halting the dangerous mo-
mentum of the nuclear arms race.
I have long been concerned about the
"mad momentum" of the arms race and
where it has been taking us. I agree with
the President that it is senseless to con-
tinue this dangerous and costly race
since we and the Soviet Union already
have an assured destruction capability.
And I would further agree with the
President that both we and the Soviet
Union have a "vital mutual interest" in
stopping the arms spiral. This is our pri-
mary aim at the SALT talks.
Congressional concern about the arms
race has been running high for some
time. There has been widespread sup-
port in both bodies of Congress for a
mutual moratorium on the further test-
ing and deployment of multiple-war-
head missiles, and I am proud to be one
of the principal sponsors of that resolu-
tion in the House. Two weeks ago, the
other body, by a 72 to 6 vote, passed a
resolution in support of the SALT talks
and the goal of a comprehensive limita-
tion agreement on both offensive and
defensive weapons. It further called for
an immediate and mutual moratorium
on the further deployment of these sys-
tems.
An essentially identical resolution was
introduced in this body last week by my
good friend and colleague from Delaware
(Mr. Rom), and today I am proud to
add my name to the list of cosponsors of
that resolution. I do want to emphasize
our sincere desire that we not only seek
a comprehensive limitation agreement on
offensive and defensive strategic weap-
ons, but that we also seek with the So-
viets an immediate and mutual morato-
rium on the further deployment of these
systems. The SALT talks may be rather
long and drawn out and it will be some
time before a formal agreement is ar-
rived at and officially ratified. In the in-
terim, in the absence of a deployment
moratorium, the temptation may be great
for both sides to arm to the hilt, thereby
setting off the arms spiral the agree-
ment would be designed to prevent. It
would be somewhat analogous to the two
drunks trying to buy as many drinks as
possible before the bar closes down.
Needless to say, the results could be of
staggering proportions, and we could well
walk away from those talks more drunk
and dizzy with power than ever before.
The balance of terror could be seriously
jeopardized by the destabilizing effects of
new offensive and defensive weapons sys-
tems. That is why it is so crucial, it seems
to me, for both sides to postpone further
deployments while these talks are in
progress, "subject to national verification
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E 3412 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD Extensions of Remarks April 20, 1970
or such other measures of observation
and inspection as may be appropriate,"
in the words of the resolution.
At this point in the RECORD, Mr. Speak-
er. I include a copy of tip resolution in-
troduced by the gentleman from Dela-
ware (Mr. ,ROTH) arid- whicn I am co-
sponsoring. I also include an article from
Lie April 17 Washington Post, and two
articles from the Sunday New York
Times of April 19. The items follow:
RESOLUTION
xpressing the support of the House of Rep-
resentatives with respect to the Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks, and for other pur-
poses
Whereas the preparations for t'ae Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks have involved the
most intensive study of strategic arms prob-
lems ever made by the Government of the
United States of America or any other gov-
ernment:
Whereas the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics open
talks on April 16, 1970, which could result
in agreement to limit arms and other mat-
ters: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That the House of Representa-
tives hereby expresses its unreserved support
for the talks which begin April 16, 1970, on
the limitations of strategic arms between
the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Be it further resolved, That it is the sense
of the House of Representatives that?
II) prompt negotiations between the Gov-
ernments of the United States of America
and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics to seek agreed limitations of both offen-
sive and defensive strategic weapons shoold
be urgently pursued; and
(2) the President should in such negotia-
tions propose to the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics anIm-
mediate sutipension by the United States and
by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of
the further deployment of all offensive road
defensive nuelear strategic weapons systems.
subject to national verification or such other
measures of observation and inspection as
may be appropriate.
[From the Washington Post, A. 17, 19701
SALT TALKS REOPEN WITH RUSSIAN SOLEMN
(By Chalmers M. Roberts)
VIENNA, April 16.---The strategic arms limi-
talon talks resumed here today on a note
more of caution than Of optimism.
There were fewer smiles from Vladimir S.
Semyonov, the chief Soviet delegate, than
there had been when the preliminary phase
began last November in Helsinki, and what
he had to say sounded harsher than his Hel-
sinki words.
Semyonov once again mentioned Lenin
and the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence
But this time he added a phrase saying that
intensification of the arras race, in contrast
to its curtailment, "serves the interests Of
aggressive imperialist circles." No names Or
nations were mentioned, but such phrases
have been applied recently to American Dee
tense Secretary Melvin R. Laird.
At Helsinki the Soviet delegate had spoker.
bath of limitation and the subsequent reduce
don of nuclear arms. Today he spoke only of
-curbing" the arms race and he added that
-the items on our program of work in Vienna
are not simple."
The chief American delegate, Gerard C.
Smith, as at Helsinki, read a message from
President Nixon before saying on his own
that "we both have nothing to gain front
failure. We have and the whole world has
much to gain from success. We look forward
so its early achievement"
The Nixon message reaffirmed what he bad
said at Helsinki: hope for an agreement on
limitation and eventual reduction of era-
Mille arsenals, "with proper recognition of
the legitimate security interests of the
United States and the Soviet Union and of
third countries."
Then the President added that Smith's in-
structions "will enable you to move from gen-
end explorations," the Helsinki pattern, "to
a discussion of more specific proposals toward
these ends." Mr. Nixon also told Smith that
"you have authority to approach the issues in
the most comprehensive manner."
A comprehensive agreement would curb
the deployment of rind multiple nuclear
warheads mi missile sysi ems as well as curb
anti-missile defense systems. Mr. Nixon's use
of the word "approach in reference to a pos-
sible comprehensive" agreement reflected
the known administration -caution on this
en tical issue,
The President also expressed the hope that
the Soviet delegation had come, to Vienna
wish "the same d.eternehiation" as the Amer-
icans "to bring about a mutually acceptable
agreement."
There is considerable discussion within the
American delegation as to what is going on
in the Kremlin and whether the widely ex-
pected changes in the Politburo about which
there is no hard information, would have an
effect on the SALT talks, as these discussions
now are being called by the Soviets as well as
by the Americans.
The dominant view appears to be that any
Kremlin changes are more likely to stiffen
the Soviet position than to liberalize it.
eleznyonov gave no clue, but it was noted
that he quoted Soviet Communist Party
leader Brezhnev's Tuesday speech in Khar-
bow to the effect that Moscow would welcome
"a reasonable accomraodation" and would
"do its bent for these negotiations to be
useful." At least in quoting Brezhnev, whose
position seems the most secure in the Krem-
lin, Semyonov was on safe ground.
The first opportunity for an exchange be-
hind closed doors will come when the two
delegations have their first business session
at 4 p.m. Friday at the Soviet embassy. A
second meeting is scheduled for next Mon-
day morning at the American embassy.
At these initial sessions, Smith and Sem-
yonov are expected to read each other formal
statements, as was the practice at Helsinki.
The question now is at what point in this
procedure one side or the other will indicate
what kind of proposal it would like.
Today's 30-minute television opening care-
mcny was held at the Belvedere, an in-city
palace, where the Austrian State Treaty was
signed almost 15 years ago, the treaty 'which
evacuated the Red Army from Austria and
set this small nation on its current neutral
course in international relations.
Austrian Foreign Minister Kurt Waldheim
sounded very moch as his Finnish counter-
part had sounded last November when the
Helsinki talks opened. Waldheim hoped for
"a turning point in the history of disarma-
ment" (a word both big powers avoid here)
and "a new phase" in Zest-West relations.
[Prom the New York Times, Apr. 19, 19701
CHAMPAGNE HERALDS SPRING AND SUMMER OF
SALT
(By Bernard Weinraiub)
VIENNA.?At two minutes to noon last
Thursday, a black limousine glided to a halt
at the massive Belvedere Palace and Soviet
Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir S. Semyo-
noe climbed out and walked quickly up the
marble steps.
By noon, a similar limousine with Gerard
C. Smith, the director of the United States
Arms Control and. Disarmament Agency, had
stopped at the palace doors. Within moments
thc American diplomat?tall, bespectacled
craggy-faced--stood beside the Russian min-
ister--short, plump, resembling Otto Prime
inger?in a glittering red and white marble
hall that blended stucco, gilt, mirrors and
ceiling frescoes with an at egorical depiction
of victory.
"The palace is, you know, a building of
war," said an Austrian Mlle ell early last week.
"It was constructed by Prince Eugene of
Savoy who plundered and conquered the
Turks. It is, perhaps, trona: that the palace
could be a building of peace."
It is, perhaps, ironic but also somewhat
foreboding and even bizarre, that within the
baroque splendor of a faded empire--within
a palace built between 1714 and 1716 on vine-
covered hills facing Vienne?the two super-
powers sit down and seek td discuss the nitty
gritty of thwarting a nuclear holocaust.
The resumption of the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT) on Thursday was
marked by a curious mod of unease and
boredom and a hint?just a hint?of hope.
Dutifully, Mr. Semyonov rose and spoke of
the arms race "which' serves the interests of
aggressive imperialist circi es." Just as duti-
fully, Mr. Smith read a message from Presi-
dent Nixon that called tor -reduction of
strategic arsenals with peeper recognition
of the legitimate security interests of the
United States and the Soviet Union and of
third countries.-
Dutifully, both men sipped champagne
and grinned for photograpeers and then or-
dered the paneled doors shut to start the
secret talks that may last into the summer.
"It may be deal vu?we 's seen and heard
so much of this before that some people
may be numb by now to these talks," said a
junior American official. "Is may be the lan-
guage that confuses people, an this talk of
MIRV and ABM and ICBM ',nett makes it cold
and technical.
"What people don't seem to realize is that
these talks are a hope? possibly an only
hope?for peace."
THE RIVALS Y
Another American official, sipping coffee
in the Hotel Bristol, slowly discussed the
rivalry in nuclear weetpone. "We started re-
search in the MIRY (multiple independently
targetable re-entry vehicle:, when we first
learned of their deployment of the ABM
(anti-ballistic missile)," hr said. "Then they
started the MIRV."
The official, who has been working for years
on disarmament, paused. "The real ques-
tion is when do you step. You've got all -this
overkill anyway. You've got to stop, some-
time. There's an economic factor. There's a
moral factor too. You've got to stop."
With the talks enveloped in a mood of
somberness and secrecy, the 60 members
of both delegations, the security men, the
secretaries, the advisers, the families and the
hundreds of journalists in Vienna, began the
uneasy?and difficult?task of watching the
negotiattions without knowing too confi-
dently what Was going on 'in the Belvedere
Palace where .15-year-old Marie Antoinette
married the Dauphin who was later Louis
XVI of France.
The Soviet delegation itself has carefully
sought virtual total isolation?renting the
93-room Park Hotel in nearby Baden replete
with spa, suana and rejuvenating water cure.
By the weekend, the Russians were digging
in: Trucks moved into Baden and unloaded
crates of sturgeon and bottles of vodka for
the spring and summer of SALT.
NIXON CALLS FOR BROAD I'ALKS ON ARMS
(By John W. Finney)
WASHINGTON?For Weeks a debate has
been going on within the Administration
over whether the United States should seek
a comprehensive strategic arms control
agreement or propose pleoemeal steps to
curb the nuclear arms race. Last week, to
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks E 3413
the surprise and delight of many In Con-
gress, President Nixon came out in favor of
the comprehensive approach.
In his still secret instructions, the Presi-
dent authorized the American delegation to
the strategic arms limitation talks in Vienna
to propose to the Soviet Union a compre-
hensive limitation on deployment of both
offensive and defensive strategic weapons.
The general goal of the Administration is an
agreement that would place quantitative
limitations on the number of offensive and
defensive weapons possessed by each side.
Thus, for example, each side might be per-
mitted to have modest antiballistic missile
(ABM) systems, while numerical ceilings
would be placed on the number of offensive
weapons, such as intercontinental missiles
or bombers, they could possess,
Basically this proposal corresponds to the
negotiating position developed in the John-
son Administration for the SALT talks. But
with its cautious attitude toward these talks,
there had been no certainty that the Nixon
Administration would come out in favor of
a comprehensive limitation on strategic
weapons.
What the Soviet reaction will be to
a comprehensive proposal remains unclear,
particularly in light of the apparent power
reshuffle within the Kremlin. Admittedly it
r-3 more complex than a weapons-by-weapons
approach, which was generally advocated by
the Pentagon. But a comprehensive limita-
tion has the advantage that it deals with all
the interrelated elements, of the arms race
in a manner that presumably would not give
an advantage to one side or the other.
If disarmament critics had one objection
to the Administration approach, it was that
it does not contemplate a stop in the Amer-
lean deployment of an ABM system and
MIRV multiple warheads for missiles. That
may prove to be a controversial and perhaps
crucial omission, for if the United States
proceeds with MIRV warheads and the Safe-
guard ABM System and the Soviet Union
With deployment of its large SS-9 intercon-
tinental missiles, then it may prove doubly
difficult to reach agreement on any limita-
tion on strategic weapons.
BETTER SECRETARIES
HON. PAUL FINDLEY
OF ILLINOIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESNTATIVES
Monday, April 20, 1970
Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, the theme
of the 19th consecutive annual Secre-
taries Week April 19-25 is "Better Sec-
retaries Mean Better Business," spon-
sored by the National Secretaries Asso-
ciation?International?the world's lead-
ing secretarial association, the week will
be highlighted on Wednesday, April 22,
which is set aside as Secretaries Day.
Many Governors and mayors through-
out the United States will officially pro-
claim "Secretaries Week," while their
counterparts in Canada do the same. For
the seventh straight year, the Outdoor
Advertising Association has undertaken
Secretaries Week as a .public service
project.
Miss Bertha J. Stronach, CPS, NSA's
international president, who is secretary
and senior staff assistant to L. M, Col-
lins, manager of Educational Marketing
Programs, IBM, New York, said that as
the leader and authoritative spokesman
for the secretarial profession, NSA would
be devoting some soul searching to the
present and futuxe respect from superi-
ors, colleagues, and subordinates that
secretaries can only command through
performance.
Miss Stronach said:
Admittedly, secretaries are in a sellers'
market. With the ever-adjusting law of sup-
ply and demand in the labor market, we
have to be on guard against the erosion of
the secretarial "image" that will ultimately
come from any compromise of the standards
we are committed to elevate. When and if
the pendulum swings to a buyers' market,
we don't want to be remembered from the
difficult days of the so-called secretarial
shortage.
On every side, management bewails the
fact that secretaries are in short supply and
that they are having to settle for minimal
job fulfillment at maximal salary levels. Yet.
some of the same management attempts to
recruit from weakness rather than strength
and so offer lures that can only be termed
frivolous when applied to a business en-
vironment. Naturally, we favor appropriate
fringe benefits in the form of adequate paid
vacations, hospital ancrretirement insurance
plans, and profit-sharing programs. But non-
job-related inducements such as a day at
the races, a night at the theater or unearned
vacations are not what makes a professional
secretary job-happy instead of job-hopping.
Our own NSA research consistently re-
veals that the one major incentive to a sec-
retary is job satisfaction. One recent re-
search conclusion is that it does not neces-
sarily follow, ipso facto, that a successful
secretary is satisfied with her job, or that a
secretary who is satisfied with her job is
succesful.
A satisfied secretary is one who is given a
challenge and can make a vital contribu-
tion to an integral part of the over-all busi-
ness at hand. When such challenge is offered
along with room for advancement, there is
a qualified secretary who will be attracted
to and remain happy in the position. The key
points of what a secretary expects to meas-
ure up to are found in NSA's own definition
of a secretary, and management's attentio?
Is particularly called to the phrases I have
underlined:
"A secretary shall be defined as an execu-
tive assistant who possesses a mastery of of-
fice skills, who demonstrates the ability to
assume responsibility Without supervision,
who exercises initiative and Judgment, and
who makes decisions within the scope of
assigned authority."
One of the prinIary things management
can do toward eliminating the secretarial
shortage is to put priority on defining the
scope of the secretary's authority on more
liberal terms. Then, together, we can work
out of the stigmatic, unbalanced atmosphere
of the current sellers' market for secretaries.
?
Miss Stronach also brings to manage-
ment's attention, as well as that of their
employment agents, the continuing need
for support and endorsement of the cer-
tified professional secretary rating. She
states:
Thanks to the support we have already
enjoyed, we will have 5,000 CPSs who have
passed the examination at the completion of
the annual two-day, six-part examination
which will be administered May 1 and 2.
As further evidence of the National
Secretaries Association's relentless pur-
suit of seeing that qualified secretaries
are trained for the future, Miss Stronach
also singles out the goals of the NSA Re-
search and Educational Foundation in
defining by in-depth research exactly
what secretarial requirements in future
years will be.
The Future Secretaries Association.
one of NSA's fastest growing endeavors,
helps management through FSA's work
in assisting business educators to provide
realistic training for high school and col-
lege students who have chosen to work
toward a career in secretaryship.
The observance of Secretaries Week is
especially worthy of note on Capitol Hill,
where more than 5,000 secretaries pro-
vide indispensable skills in handling the
steadily rising volume of personal corre-
spondence and official statements which
flow from the offices of Representatives
and Senators.
NATIONAL LAND REFORM
PROGRAM
HON. OGDEN R. REID
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, April 20, 1970
Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Speaker,
I am introducing today with the gen-
tleman from California (Mr. Moss) a
bill to authorize an additional $200 mil-
lion in supporting assistance funds for
the Government of Vietnam, which
money shall be earmarked to support
rapid implementation of the national
land reform program enacted March 26,
1970, by the GVN.
Under the so-called "Land to the
Tiller" program, land is to be given free to
the tenants who have been cultivating it.
The present landowners will be permit-
ted to retain only that land which they
themselves actually cultivate, and no
landlord will be allowed to keep more
than 37 acres. If the program is effec-
tively administered, it will be one of the
most ambitious and progressive land re-
distribution programs ever promul-
gated?the government is to buy up
more than 2 million acres of land and
distribute it free to the 1 million families
who have been working it as tenant
farmers for absentee landlords.
The action of the South Vietnamese
Government and the legislature on land
reform is long and tragically overdue.
It may well be too late. Nonetheless, the
test now is whether the enacted program
will be implemented for all farmers in
the next few months. Any real adminis-
trative delay could doom government in
South Vietnam and make a mockery of
promised reform.
There will obviously be many oppor-
tunities for corruption and inefficiency
In so ambitious a program as the one
which has been undertaken by the Gov-
ernment of Vietnam. For that reason,
our bill makes the use of these new sup-
porting assistance funds for land re-
form "contingent upon the attainment
of mutually agreed goals of accomplish-
..ments stressing economy, efficiency, and
advanced implementation of the pro-
gram by July 1, 1972." Payments for
land reform assistance shall be made at
quarterly intervals, based upon satis-
factory achievement toward the 1972
target goal.
The Vietnamese land reform program,
if successful, conld help hasten the end
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E 3414 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD Extensiolla
of the war, Certainly it is a vital step
toward the economic and social reform
which the gentleman from California
Moss) and I have so long advo-
cated. By making a $200 million con-
tribution toward the cost of land re-
form?which is expected to cost the
Vietnamese Government a total of $400
million?the U.S. Government will sira-
pis be acknowledging the fact that we,
too, have an interest in bringing about
social reform in Vietnam and an early
end to the war.
The $200 million authorized by this
bill is less than the cost?one-half of 1
eek of war. It seems a small enough
price to pay for a program which could
help bring an end to that war, and enable
us once again to focus on the urgent
problems here at home.
CONCENTRATION ON INTEGRATION
IS DOING LITTLE FOR EDUCATION
HON. ROMAN C. PUCINSKI
OF ILIANOIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monclay, April 20, 1970
Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, recently,
the very highly respected columnist, Mr.
William Raspberry, wrote his column for
the Washington Post which included
such foresight and depth of understand-
ing of the whole question of integration
that I believe every Member of the House
ought to read it.
As chairman of the House Subcommit-
tee on General Education, I am placing
Mr. Raspberry's excellent article in the
RECORD today:
The article follows:
1From the Washington Post, Feb. 20. 19701
CONCENTRATION ON INTEGRATION IS DOING
L/TTLE FOR ED-mimosa'
(By William Raspberry)
Racial segregation in public schools is both
foolish and wrong, which has led a lot of us
to suppose that school integration must,
therefore, be wise and just.
Is ain't necessarily so. It may be that one
reason why the schools, particularly in Wash-
ington, are doing such a poor job of educat-
ing black children is that we have spent too
much effort on integrating the schools and
too little on improving them.
The preoccupation with racial integration
follows in part from a misreading of what the
suit that led to the 1954 desegregation deci-
sion was all about.
The suit was based (tacitly, at least) on
what might be called the hostage theory. It
was clear that black students were suffering
under the dual school systems that were the
rule in the South. It was also clear that only
the -separate" part of the separate-but-equal
doctrine was being enforced.
Civil rights leaders finally became Con-
-,dmed that the only way to ensure that their
children would have equal education with
white children was to make sure that they
received the same education, in the Same
sea: srooriss.
Nor would she education be merely equal,
the theory went: It would be good. White
people who after all run things, are going
to see to it that their children get a proper
education. If ours are in the same classrooms,
ehey'll get a proper education by osmosis.
That, at bottom, was the reasoning be-
hind the suit, no matter that the legal argu-
of Remarks '1j; 'i1 20, 1970
silents were largely sociological, among them,
that segregated education is inherently
unequal.
(Why it shouid be inherently more un-
equal for blacks than for whites wasn't made
clear.)
In any case, the aim of the suit was not
so much integrated education but better ed-
ucation. Integration was simply a means to
an end.
Much of the confusion today stems from
the fact that the means has now become en
end in itself. Suits are being brought for
integration, -boundaries are being redrawn,
busing, is being instituted?not to improve
eductaion but to integrate classrooms --
1 he restates can sometimes be etic.
In Washington, blacks send eir children
(or have them sent) across ock Creek Park
in pursuit of the dream, good education.
But as the blades cor, the whites leave,
and increasingly tee id rid ourselves busing
children from all-yfack neighborhoods all
the way across toyfi to schools that are rap-
idly becoming black.
The Tri-Seh. setup In Southwest Wash-
ington is a e in point. Of the three ele-
mentary sch Is in the area, only one was
considered good school: Amidon, where
the childr of She black and white well-
to-do at ded. Bowen and Syphax, popu-
lated al exclusively by poor kids from
the proj ts, were rated lousy schools.
Then he hostage theory was applied. A
plan w worked out whereby all first- and
second- raders in the area would attend one
school, 11 third- and fourth-graders a sec-
ond, a d all fifth- and sixth-graders the
third.
The ell-to-do parents would see to it that
their c ildren got a good education. All the
poor p eats had to Co was see to it that
their ldren were in the same classrooms.
That as the theory. What happened, of
course, I. that instead of sprinkling their
children mind three schools, the luxury
high-rise vvellere, black and white, packed
their youn ters off to private school. Now
instead of ? e good s.nd two bad schools,
Southwest hington has three bad ones.
After 16 y we should have learned
that the ho .ge theory doesn't work.
This is not suggest that integration
is bad but that must become a secondary
consideration.
Busing makes AO e sense (as a temporary
measure) when its urpose is to transport
children from neig borhoods with over-
crowed classrooms to hools where there is
space to spare.
It works to a limited degree when it in-
volves children whose rents want them
bused across town for s lbc reasons.
But it has accomplIshe nothing useful
when it has meant transpo leg large num-
bers of reluctant youngsters schools they'd
rather not attend.
The notion will win me the mbarrassing
support of segregationist bigo but isn't
it about time we started conce 'trating on
educating children where they Sr
?
e?
?
AMERICAN COUNCIL ON E
TION?COUNCIL ON FOREIG
LATIONS ON THE COLLFGE F
HON. JOHN R. RARICK
UCA-
RE-
oNT
Ca? LOVFSIANA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIV
Monday, April 20, 1970
Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, rece
we have heard a loud and anguis
scream from the left?over the corn
tensed invasion Of privacy. It seems t
the U.S. Army, having been give
ly
ed
u-
at
a
counterinsurgency mission, was in the
process of collecting the necessary in-
telligence to perform ha assigned task.
It was busy identifying the potential in-
surgents, determining ti Leh) capabilities,
and presumably making its estimate of
the situation.
I call to the attention of the House the
computer games of the left?not the
counterinsurgency preparations of the
Government which is ) equired by he
Constitution to assure le each State in
the Union a republican lorrn of govern-
-went.
I call to the attenti en if the Douse an
intelligence operation?recognized by in-
telligence experts to be jast that?which
has developed information so dangerous
that it is "safeguarded" by storage in an
unidentified foreign nation.
Many Members are aware of the Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations --the CER. This
introduces its little brother. the Council
on Education?the ACE, also spawned
in the aftermath of World War I. and like
the CFR a silent partner and often a
backstage manipulate of the fashioning
of our world during the past half century.
A former intelligence officer in nne dis-
trict was kind enough to annish me with
a bylined story relating .o college fresh-
men and a questionnaire. His comment
was to the effect that V pe possession of
such information was an intelligence
officer's dream?or a counterintelligence
officer's nightmare. I cert itinly agree with
him, and I am sure that other Members
of the House will have the same reaction.
The careful research of Publisher
Frank Capell, of the Herald of Freedom.
fills in the background on the council and
its past interests and activities. In view
of the council's past use?either of or
by?Communists and Soviet agents, its
possession of such vital intelligence in-
formation, stored "for security reasons"
in a foreign country, is worthy of our
careful attention.
I include in my remarks the two ar-
ticles mentioned and excerpts from the
questionnaire answered by a quarter of
a million college freslinain last fall as
published in ACE reseaech reports un-
der the title of "National Norms for En-
tering College Freshmen- -"Fall 1969."
[From the Baton Rouge (La.) Morning
Advocate, Jan. le 1970)
COLLEGE FROSH SPILLING SoME FAMILY
SECRETS
Ey Patricia McCiareack)
NEW Yoeas-aMore than a quarter of a mil-
lion college freshmen spilled some family
secrets when they filled out a super-snooper
form last fall. Mom and Dad's education
level. Family income.
And they told a lot about their innermost
thoughts on controversial topics?abortion,
marijuana, the Army.
They also designated their race, religion,
attitudes toward political aianings.
Information put on the four-page farm
from the American Council on Education is
for those involved in edited done) guidance,
counseling, administra,ion, research and
manpower studies.
Since so-me of the informition is of a per-
sonal nature, the question arises: What steps
are taken to guarantee eentidentiality of
responses?
The answer: Very eleeceitte ones?for if
there are no precautions, some of the re-
sponses may haunt the student later, even
stunting career development.
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April 16, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE
evident in Saigon and the failure of the
Thieu-Ky militarist regime to provide
any land reform for the people of South
Vietnam and to relieve them from the
corruption of absentee landlords who
have been favored all along while
wounded war veterans have been ne-
glected.
Conummist regimes the world over
govern by decree. Fascists likewise. qerne
40 years ago Adolf Hitler gave sirnilar
reasons when he assumed dictatorial
Power and created the infamous Third
Reich. Incidentally, not long ago Ky
stated he regarded Adolf as a great hero.
Mr. President, when I was in Vietnam,
interviewing the flamboyant Ky, he was
very proud of the decoration he dis-
played, which the French had given him
for fighting against his own people.
At present a fully disabled South Viet-
nam war veteran with a wife and six
children receives the paltry sum of $15
a month in compensation for his crip-
pling war wounds and permanent disa-
bility. In contrast to these Vietnamese
veterans who with their families slowly
starve on their meager monthly allot-
ments, Vice President Ky and many gen-
erals and officials of the Thieu-Ky
regime, live the rich life stashing away
in unlisted Swiss and Hong Kong bank
accounts huge sums of money they cor-
ruptly acquired. Madam Thieu recently
Purchased a beautiful and expensive
villa in Switzerland, apparently in prep-
aration for the day when the Vietnamese
people oust her husband from oface.
The people of South Vietnam have
courageously demonstrated their opposi-
tion to the corrupt policies of the Saigon
militarist regime. It is evident that it
lacks support of all except a small minor-
ity of the people of South Vietnam. Re-
cently, a crowd of crippled former sol-
diers protested outside the Presidential
Palace and the National Assembly build-
ing demanding better treatment from
the Government. Thieu responded by
calling out the police, the key instru-
ment of repression of his regime, who
then launched a tear gas attack to dis-
perse the crippled veterans.
The veterans' demonstrations also ex-
posed the Thieu regime's repression of
Saigon's fledging news media. Three aai-
gon newspapers dared to support the
disabled veterans' campaign for more
benefits and criticized the police for over-
reacting to the demonstrations. Police,
under government orders, then proceed-
ed to seize all copies of the three papers.
The Thieu government justified this un-
der "the national press law," an oppres-
sive edict which allows the Thieu regime
to suppress any "subversive and inflain-
=tory" articles appearing in the South
Vietnamese press.
Last fall Thieu decided that austerity
taxes were urgently needed but doubted
they would be passed by the National
Assembly so he simply imposed them by
decree. Bven though a few courageous
legislators dared to oppose the will of this
bush-league Hitler, the President's tax
decree was enacted.
1)11r. President it is a tragic irony that
more than 50,000 of our men have laid
down their lives and more than 270,000
have been wounded in an immoral, unde-
clared wax, to maintain in power that
corrupt Thieu-Ky regime.
Vietnam is of no importance whatever
to the defense of the United States, yet
last week 141 of our finest young men
were killed over there, and the casualties
continue on a huge scale in the escala-
tion of our fighting in Vietnam and now
In Cambodia and Laos.
Thieu's plan to rule by decree strips
away any pretensions of legitimacy which
he has attempted to create. He has re-
vealed himself for what he really is a
parasitic dictator totally dependent on
continued American support to sustain
his precarious position. Historians will
record our continued support of the
Thieu regime as one of the saddest and
most shameful chapters in the history
of our Republic.
ARMS CONTROL
CONTROL
Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, the ques-
tion of arms control is being considered
on two fronts today. The Senate is de-
bating the budget request for the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency.
In Vienna, representatives of the
United States and the Soviet Union are
continuing arms control discussions.
The Soviet Union has shown itself
responsive in a time of crisis for the
astronauts on the Apollo 13 mission, by
offering assistance. While not bearing on
the crucial question of arms control, it
Is a hopeful sign on a level important to
the people of this country today. We ap-
preciate it and I would like them to
know it.
Columnist Joseph Kraft, with whom
I am not often in agreement, has an
interesting column on the general out-
lines of the American proposal to be
made in Vienna.
I ask unanimous consent to have
printed in the RECORD at this point the
article by Joseph Kraft to which I have
referred, entitled "United States in
Vienna: Nonpassive," published in the
Baltimore Sun of April 16, 1970.
?There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
UNITED STATES IN VIENNA: NONPASSIVE
(By Joseph Kraft)
WASHINGTON.?AS an offset to the disap-
pointment of Apollo 13 there comes nicely
to hand the opening of the Big Two arms-
control talks in what could be a meeting
as historic as the other Congress of Vienna.
For contrary to what has been widely
reported, the United States is ready to
serve up a comprehensive and outgoing
proposition for the Vienna talks. And with-
out even knowing the Russian position, the
feeling in Washington is that an agreement
to moderate the arms race may at last be
in the works.
The American position for the outset of
the talks was generally figured to be a
stance dependent upon a lead from the
Russians. But those of us who made that
assessment based it on a misreading of the
bureaucratic In-fighting that preceded the
formulation of the final terms.
It is true that Gerard C. Smith?the head
of the arms-control agency and chief of the
delegation in Vienna?wanted to offer a
S 5829
proposal for mutual suspension of new de-
velopments in defensive and offensive stra-
tegic weapons. That would in effect, have
meant a cutoff on the ABM, or anti-ballistic
missile, in the defense field, and the MIRV,
or multiple independently targetable re-
entry vehicle, in the matter of offensive
weapons.
It is also true that these proposals were
vigorously opposed by the military. The
armed services came out strongly for con-
tinuing MIRV development on -the grounds
that it was needed as a penetration device
against Soviet Defenses which might be sud-
denly improved through clandestine up-
grading of antiaircraft weapons into anti-
missile weapons. They also argued ABM de-
ployment was necessary to defend land-
based missiles against a knockout first strike
by Russia's blockbuster?the 55-9.
These military views were not modified by
the Defense Secretary, Melvin Laird, nor
seriously opposed by the State Department.
Neither were they overruled by the White
House?which explains why so many of us
concluded any American proposal in the
Vienna talks would have to wait on a lead
from the Soviet Union.
But at the very end of the long internal
bicker in Washington, there happened some-
thing unexpected. The White House, while
not sustaining the arms-control agency
against the Pentagon, did develop a way
around the confrontation.
The details of the proposal that emerged
are still closely held.
But the guiding principle is not in doubt.
The guiding principle is to move toward a
phasing out of land-based missiles in favor
of missiles fired from submarines. Agreed
limits would be placed on the number of
submarines, and then the problems posed by
ABM and minx would tend to wither away.
The ABM has been pushed in this country
Chiefly as a defense of the land-based mis-
siles. o as these missiles were phased out,
ABM development would be leveled off. In
effect, there would be a trade of limited ABM
development by this country against limited
ABM development by Russia.
As to MIRV, development would go for-
ward. But it would not present the over-
whelming problem of giving each side un-
told numbers of missiles the other side
could not count. For submarines can be
tracked. Each side's pearls, so to speak,
would be in a limited number of oysters.
And each side would know exactly how many
oysters Were available to the other side.
Before presenting the practical details of
their proposal, the American negotiators will
want to have some sense of how the Rus-
sians are thinking so there will certainly be
some preliminary sparring at the Vienna
talks.
But there is no doubt that the Nixon ad-
ministration is now prepared to make an
offer. The White House no longer acts as
though the strategic-arms talks were Just
something handed on by the Johnson ad-
ministration.
How the Russians will react to the more
positive American attitude remains in doubt
here. The latest remarks of Leonid Brezhnev
are regarded favorably?if only because they
imply that Russia, like this country, has
numerous internal problems that could use-
fully absorb resources spent on armaments.
But Washington does fear that the arms-
control talks might become a political foot-
ball in the leadership struggle now felt to
be going on in the Kremlin.
Still, even there the implication is posi-
tive. For the implication is that the prospects
are now so good that it will take some un-
toward disturbance from the outside to get
in the way of agreement:.
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S 5830
NIXON ADMINETRATION TACKLES
POLLUTION PROI3LEIIS REALIS-
TICALLY
Mr. GURNEY. Mt. President. with
Earth Day being .commemorated next
week, a great deal of attentfon is being
focused on what is wrong with the way
we are trying to live with our environ-
ment. The whole gamut of problems deal-
ing with air and water pollution, waste
disposal and the proper use of our nat-
ural resources has attracted and is hold-
ing national interest to a far greater de-
gree than ever before in our history.
In this light, I would like to call the
attention O my colleagues to several very
important developments in this field un-
dertaken by the Nixon administration.
The President yesterday asked Con-
gress for authority for the Government
to clean up the Great Lakes and prevent
their further pollution.
The President has ordered a compre-
hensive study of the problems and pas-
sible solutions to them involved in ocean
pollution.
The Department of Agriculture has Or-
dered an end to the use of 2,4,5-T---a
weed killer.
Mr. President. all three of these actions
are likely to stir up opposition from Pea-
Pie who will be affected by them. That
is understandable since Uwe changes
will mean econonhl ade= for each
of the greliDs-
Irstdie past the Government has been
loathe to' undertake such actions simply
because of the amount of opposition they
were likely to create. It is significant that
the Nixon administration is moving this
swiftly and this courageously into an
area where, before,. the Government te -
fesed to act.
The President is asking for stranger
legislaticia to clean ma the Great Lakes.
His request places the burden of respon-
sibility now squarely on the Congress. It
will be up to us to provide him with the
kind of tools needed to undo the damage
done by years of ignorance 'and neglect.
The President is tO be commended for
these actions.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE April IC, 1970
with wholesale slaughter. Tlaa Japanese cling
tenaciously to their racial separateness to
the point of- ostracizing the illegitimate oc-
cupation-children of both alack and white
American soldiers.
Even Sweden. which has- gained a repu-
tation for racial tolerance largely through
unremitting criticism of thi American scene,
is not without blemish. ante local press in
sprinkled with slighting illusions to the
swarthy southern Europeal s imported into
r-short market.
Black deserters from the U.S. Army quickly
discover a wall of Aryan croasciousness just
beyond the official welcome mat. A reporter
for a Stockholm paper intently decided to
test the racial climate. Disguised as a Negro,
he tried repeatedly?and u About success--
to obtain a hotel room in the city.
Confronted , by widespre ad evidence of
prejudice, a reporter finds t hard to accept
the popular notion that ratesm is a uniquely
American phenomenon. To the contrary, he
is led to the conclusion that the evil has deep,
tenacious and universal rocts in the human
psyche, and that the U.S. is. remarkable, less
for its inadequacies than fie being the only
society to attempt a just resolution of the
problem.
A close look at the taw enforcement prac-
tices in other countries pre duces a different
perspective on charges of pence brutality in
the U.S.
Recently a mildly heatee political debate
among students spilled out into the sidewalk
In front of a cafe on the Left Bank.
Soon a squad of gendarmes, without so
much as a warning to disperse, proceeded to
beat the students over the heads with rubber
truncheons. The youths were then packed
into a police van and driver off, undoubtedly
to be locked up for the weekend without
charge, without lawyer and without legal
recourse.
Under France's Napoleonic Code and a
stern set of taws laid down at the time of
the riots in 1968, the police here have ex-
traordinaryn
freedom. Excei in Britain and
Scandinavia, that is true U1naughout Western
Europe. In Spain, police enstrols are con-
siderably more rigorous, and in Eastern Eu-
rope they are so severe that any public
display of dissent is unthin gable.
11.8. SYSTEM "BEST SO FAR"
"American institutions which (in the
U.S.) are taken for gran ed like oxygen,"
commented Leopold Tyruand, the expa-
triate Polish essayist, "are the subject of our
wildest dreams in Eastern Europe. I have
a certain pity for the Americans because they
do not know how to chernh what they have
and what others know they have."
On a recent tour of Eastern Europe, I
found the intellectuals to utter despair of
Marxist economics and cairn polities and
astonished they should be die vogue in cer-
tain sectors of the U.S. protest movement.
"Utopian programs." a c zech professor re-
marked, "do not take account of the cor-
ruptibility in all of us. Revolutionary ideal-
lam quickly gives way t'. power, lust and
greed. But when all the countervailing insti-
tutions, have been destine ed?private prop-
erty, the church, parhamentary democracy,
a free press?there is no way to challenge
the corrupted idealists_ s ere is no second
ohance for protest."
Late last month as 1 sat in a bus edging
Its way through a checkpoint in the Berlin
Wall, I recalled Winston g;hurchill's remark
that democracy is the worst form of govern-
ment except for every other that has been
tried.
Perhaps. I reflected, I would feel differ-
ently when I had been bark in the States for
a while. But at that moment, emerging from
the gloom of Eastern Europe. I could not
help thinking that the American society was
better than the others that had been tried
and that It deserved more than violent words
or deeds.
FOREIGN CORRESPONDENT WRITES
THAT EUROPEANS ASKS, "WHY
ARE AMER/CANS PROTESTING?
THEY DON'T KNOW HOW LUCKY
THEY ARE"
Mr.. GURNEY. Mr. President. my at-
tention has been called to an excellent
article in the Thnes-Picaynne, New Or-
leans, by Foreign Correspondent Thomas
B. Ross.
Mr. Ross writes from Paris that his--
Enduring impression of a year's reporting
In Western and Eastern Europe is how much
more there is to protest about here and
how much less protesting is done.
He added:
on a recent tour of Eastern Europe. I
found the intellectuals in utter despair of
Marxist economics and elitist politics and
astonished they should be the vogue in cer-
tain seettmat of the U.S. protest movement.
Mr. Ross quotes Leopold Tyrmand, a
Polish intellectual now living in London:
Amerlean institutions, which (in the U.S.)
are taken for granted like oxygen, are the
subject of our wildest dreams in Eastern
Europe. I have a certain. pity for the Ameri-
cana became alley do not know how to
cherish what they have and what others
'know they have.
Mr. President,. I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD at
this point the article to which I have
referred, entitled "Unrest in United
States Astonishes Foreigners Much
Worse Off," written by Thomas Vget.i.er---118464144
and published in the New Orleans ? es-
Picayune of April 11. 1970.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
"UNREST IN U.S. Amon nliES FOREIGNERS
MUCH WORSE OFF
(By Tine/nes B. Ross)
PARIS.?The enduring impression of a
year's reporting: in Western and Eastern
Europe is how iuoh ra re there is to protest
how hiuch less protesting
about here
Is done.
By official nited States definition, half
the-people o Western Europe and more than
three-fourt of those in Eastern Europe
are "poor" and "hungry." (Elsewhere., of
course, vi ually everyone falls in that
category.)
The Ame n Negro, one of the most dis,-
privileged hers of U.S. society, has a
higher income than the citizen of
o the most economically privi-
leged menna of the human community.
Despite the ? scrimination the black has
suffered and c'tissues to suffer in the U,S.,
he would have t d even worse here. Europe
operates under th unspoken segregationist
anumption that To who are different,
by language; nettle . religion and color,
cannot live amicably her.
"If Paris were hall ?" a French
journalist remarked in as nishment after
a sour of U.S. cities, "there ould be blood
in the streets every day."
OLD WORLD RECORD PO
France had the beat racial reco ? of any
of the colonial powers, but cond ons at
heme leave much to be desired. The erten
arid African sSuras of Paris are trrispea ble,
march worse than the black U.S. ghetto
fie Britain, the question of "color" ay
become the critical issue in the forthcoantng
parliamentary election, even though
than 3 per cent of the population is f
Angrier' or Asian extraction.
The German perform mice on race hardly
needs to be cited. And even after the newt
holocaust of World War II, anti_Semitismi
remains a potent political force in Eastern
Europe. The Soviet Union requires Jews tot
carry special identity cards and refuses to
allow them to emigrate to 'fermi.
In Poland, atter the Arab-Israen- war of
1987, the Communist regime sought to con-
trive an entire political policy out of anti
Zionism, even though the Jewish popuIati
already had declined from a prewar 1e 'l
of 3 million to fewer than 25,000.
In the Middle East, a variant of r dal
antagonism Iles at the root of the c ict
over Israel, even though Jew and A b are
of the same Semitic stork.
The Moslem world, contrary to e senti-
mental notions of some U.S. acks, also
harbors a strong prejudice ainst blacks.
Though it is not consider? politic subject
fur public conversation ack American rad-
icals in Algeria le privately and bit-
terly about-pre/ dice there.
Africa, too, has its version of the problem
in the tribal hatred that produced the blood-
bath in Biafra.'
In Asia, the Chinese hold themselves ra-
cially superior to occidentals as well as to
their neighbors.. The feeling is sometimes
reciprocated, as in Indonesia and Malaysia.
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M1 16, 19p
proved For
A7
-
Within this background and for this
limited purpose, I support the Secretary's
adoption of the pill test. Again, I under-
line that this pill test Is only acceptable
as an interim procedure to an acceptable
test for flammability. How long it will
take the Department of Commerce and
Industry to develop this appropriate test
for flammability remains to be seen. Cer-
tainly, this is a legitimate subject for in-
quiry at the hearings to be conducted in
the near future by my Subcommittee on
Consumer Affairs which will be conduct-
ing ?versa() hearings on the Flammable
Fabrics Act.
I ask unanimous consent to have print-
ed in the RECORD the text of my letter to
the Secretary of Commerce and his re-
sponse to Me.
There being no objection, the letters
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
FEBRUARY 16, 1870.
Hon. MAIIRICE H. STAN'S,
Secretary of Commerce
Washington, D.C.
DEAR. MR, SECRETARY: I am enclosing a copy
Of my opening statement delivered as we
began our hearings on questions arising out
Of the January 9, Ohio Nursing Home fire
which to date has taken 32 lives. I have two
vital questions:
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ONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
1. Why hasn't the 1967 Flammable Fabrics
Act been implemented? ,
2. When will the new standard for flam-
mability of carpets and rugs be announced
to replace the ineffective "pill test" and will
the new test take Into consideration smoke
emission?
Significantly, it is nowhere indicated in
your December 14, 1969 press release that
the announced standard for flammability of
carpets and rugs (pill test) is of an interim
or first generation nature. On the contrary,
your release bears the stamp of finality with
the singular exception of the word "pro-
posed". Certainly the carpet industry, inde-
pendent laboratories and Dan River, spe-
cifically, viewed the Department's proffered
pill test as the test for ,carpets and rugs.
What is Daos t important at this time is
that we have implementation of the Flam-
naable Fabrics Act immediately, and the re-
placement Of the pill test with something
like the ASTM-E84. tunnel test to measure
the flammability and smoke emission of car-
pets and rugs. I would hope you could act
on these objectives at once. The safety of
all Americans la our homes and schools, and
especially, those who suffer the compound
burdens of ill health and advanced age de-
serve your immediate attention to reduce the
risks of injury by fire. In view of the im-
portance of this matter, I would appreciate
hearing from you as soon as possible.
Best wishes.
Sincerely,
FRANK E. Moss,
Chairman, Subcommittee for the Con-
sumer.
TEM SECRETARY OF COMMERCE,
Washington, D.C., April 7, 1970.
lion. FRANK E. Moss,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Long-Term
Care, Senate Special Subcommittee on
Aging, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR SEzi =cat Moss: This letter is in
reply to your recent letter requesting infer-
Matioh on the FiernmabIe Fa.brice .At.
In 'response to your first question as to
WhY the Flanamable Fabrics Act amendments
have not been implemented, the following
information is submitted. When I was ap-
pointed Secretary of Commerce, I immedi-
ately asked for a review of this program as
I considered it to be bne of the Department's
most important responsibilities. This re-
view disclosed that under the previous Ad-
ministration there had been only minimal
progress in implementation of the Act. Dur-
ing that Administration two findings of pos-
sible need for a flammability standard were
made. In October 1968, there was a finding
that there might be a need to revise or
amend the general wearing apparel standard
on flammability (CS 191-53). In December
1968, there was a finding that there might
be a need for a flammability standard for
carpets and rugs.
After examining the results of t view,
I took the following actions:
1. The Department r ested increased
funds for fiscal years 1 and 1972 for use
in implementation the Act;
2. The staff the National Bureau of
Standards wo ng on this program was re-
organized, ? nging more qualified people
into the p gram and increasing the number
of perso el working on the program;
3. Ac on was initiated to increase the flow
:of (la concerning deaths, injuries and eco-
no c losses resulting from the accidental
bu ing of products, fabries'or related ma-
ials from the Department of Health, Edu-
tion and Welfare that was envisoned by
ection 14(a) of the Act.
4. Research contracts were let by the Na-
tional Bureau of Standards to supplement
the research work being performed "in-
house" on flammable fabrics.
B. The entire program of this Department
has been reorganized to provide a systematic
approach to the identification, evaluation,
? nd testing of common problems of flam-
able fabrics. Examples of these problems
e by-products of combustion, heat 3i-was-
-a ments from burning fabrics, investigation
of e operation of _flame retardants, and
heat ransfer from burning garments. Such
resear will provide for the first time
method and techniques to determine the
flammabi ty characteristics of fabrics and
interior f ishings.
In additio to the reorganization of the
flammable fab cs program, the Department
has also propose a carpet and rug standard
and issued a fin g of possible need for a
flammability stand d for certain items of
children's wearing ap rel. The more difficult
area of wearing appar in general will re-
quire etxensive research ? resolve the many
problems presented befo any meaningful
revision can be made in tha standard.
As to your second questi regarding the
proposed carpet and rug sta 'ard, the De-
partment views this proposed tandard and
any standard that may issue fr m this pro-
posal as a "first generation" s ndard for
carpets and rugs. The purpose ? the pro-
posed standard is to guard agains the haz-
ard of a small ignition source sue as a cig-
arette, ash, cinder or spark that mi ht come
in contact with a carpet or rug. II e more
complex problems of carpet and ru under-
layment, smoke and toxic fumes fro carpets
and rugs, and carpets' and rugs' c ntribu-
tion to a general conflagration wil be ad-
dressed as soon as either data or esearch
provide us with the tools to adequa ly iden-
tify, assess, characterize and test t hazards
in these areas.
We have been preparing facilit s to make
possible the development of tea ethods for
carpets and rugs that simula actual room
conditions. We have develop the capability
to measure both smoke inte ity and the con-
centration of -toxic gases order to evaluate
those hazards, and to stablish appropriate
test methods for f re standards. It is our
intention to proceed with the development
of test methods and with such other research
as will make possible a determination of the
need for second generation standards.
You inquired specifically about the AST1VI-
E84 tunnel test for carpets and rugs. It is
our view that this test, which exposes the
product fixed to the ceiling of the tunnel
S 5849
to a high intensity flame source, is not rep-
resentative of service conditions for carpets
and rugs. Specifically we feel that a test
method Must, as nearly as practicable, sim-
ulate service conditions. This will be our
aim as we continue the technical develop-
ment of test methods and standards.
Please be assured of my continued in-
terest in this vital program. We are doing
everything possible within the limits of
the Act and the existing personnel and
budgetary limitations to accelerate the work
program.
-I hope that this information will be of
assistance to you.
Sincerely,
latution H. STANS,
Secretary of Commerce.
THE TRUTH OF THE REJECTIONS OF
JUDGE HAYNS WORTH AND JUDGE
CARS WELL
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, although
the President's critics are vehemently
denying it, the truth of the rejections
of both Judge HaynSI,Vorth and Judge
Carswell is being recognized by astute
observers throughout the Nation.
Recently an editorial published in the
Indianapolis News pointed up the real
issues, and the ambiguity and hypocrisy
seen in the reasons alleged for their
rejections. One cannot help wondering
what excuses will be found with a non-
southerner, but as the editorial asserts,
"anti-Haynsworth and anti-Carswell
Senators will be put to the acid test of
whether they will indeed support a strict
constructionist."
I ask unanimous consent that the edi-
torial be printed in the RECORD and com-
mend it to the attention of all Senators.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
From the Indianapolis News, Apr. 14, 1970]
KEEP IT UP
Both President Nixon's rejected Supreme
Court nominees Judge Clement F. Hayns-
worth and Judge O. Harrold Carswell?were
weighed and a.ssertecily found wanting by
the Senate according to standards which
have never been applied in the past.
In the case of liaynswoa-th, critics said
that even a mere "appearance of impro-
priety" disqualifies a man from service on
the Supreme Court, eve:n though at least one
justice on the court at present is at least
equally culpable.
In the case of Carswell, a veteran jurist
with long judicial experience, critics said
that "mediocrity" was the issue, even though
during the Kennedy and Johnson adminis-
trations the Senate confirmed nominees who
had no previous experience on the bench
whatsoever.
Inasmuch as both Judge Haynsworth and
Judge Carswell were relatively conservative
in judicial philosophy, and the Kennedy
and Johnson nominees were not, the suspi-
cion dawns that this was the real reason for
their rejection.
Carswell's critics denied this was the case,
claiming the issue was not Carswell's judi-
cial philosophy but his intellectual capacity.
Some of them, in fact acknowledged the
President's right to appoint strict construc-
tionists to the court.
The time is appropriate, therefore, for
President Nixon to challenge his opposition
on this point by naming to the court a true
strict constructionist who, insofar as possi-
ble, is not susceptible to such manufactured
allegations.
President Nixon has made a notable start
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S 5850
in this direction by indicating that, his next their SS-9's, and we deploy our MIR,V's
Supreme court nominee will not come from and expand the ABM system--we will be
the South. It is regrettable but true that off to the races again.
regional division and an aosities still iflu.ence our politics in irrational ways, and With both sides striving for a margin
s inn-
no doubt the Southern backgrounds of of security, both must necessarily feel
Haynsworth and Carswell contributed to more insecure. This is what escalation
their defeat. is all about. What is needed now is a
On the next court nomination, the issue psychological breakthrough where pure-
raouid be clearly drawn. If President'Nixon ly military and strategic considerations
names a non-Southern conservative of 1115 yield to sober attempts to inject greater
pescable credentials, anti-HaynsWorth, anti- sanity into the discussions of what kind
Carswell senators will be put to the acid test
ef whether they will indeed support a strict of future mankind will have.
constructionist. In light of their various de- By inseparably linking arms control to
mars and disavowals in Intriguing spectacle-- the achievement of a general detente
particularly with the fall elections Just with the Soviet Union, we are pursing
ahead. unreality. It is more likely that success
in Vienna will help to bring about ac-
THE OPENING OF THE SALT TALKS wara.?. conamodation in Southeast Asia, Europe,
and the Middle East, than vice versa.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, the Despite the poor beginning, there is
second phase of the crucial SALT talks still some chance of salvaging, the SALT
are beginning this week in Vienna under talks. But the administration must first
a cloud. Much of the blame for the poor make a fundamental committment to
climate lies with the administration's deescalation of the arms race and let
contradictory statements. the other side know about it?both by
Last week the Senate overwhelmingly word and deed.
passed an eminently sensible resolution Why must the Unitec' States and the
calling for our Government to propose to Soviet Union continue to spar like two
the Soviet Union a freeze on the further scorpions in a bottle" It is time that both
development of both offensive and defen- nations sought a common way out of the
sive nuclear strategic weapons systems. I narrow confines we have constructed
fail to see what possible harm could have for ourselves.
flowed from the implementation of this ?
worst, we would have given tangible eel- THERE IS STILL HUNGER IN STORE 26 BLOCI: 6' AWAY
straight-forward proposal. At the very
dence of a genuine desire for a halt to CHICAGO
voucher for $13.25, good only at a super-
The next day Mrs. White did get a food
the insane spiral of the nuclear arms Mr. PERCY, Mr. President, on April market 26 blocks from her home. She was
race. At best, it would have been an im- 13, 1969, hunger was discovered in Chi- promised another check in the mail in a,few
, pressive opening move which the Soviets cago. For the first time, many people days but it didn't come for a week. In the
would have been hard pressed to reject. learned that 200,000 children, 150,000 meantime she ran out of lood again. She also
Instead, the talks are beginning in the senior citizens, and nearly 300,000 other had to borrow from neighbors for items that
classic cold war atmosphere of mutual adults were living in poverty, unable to f,otolvosutcohkeeres dmon'thobtutsye-iisi
?:,rciei'pers and
distrust, recrimination, and suspicion. afford food. For the first time, the city At
'things
wesiterny district office, supervisor
The public disclosure last month by was confronted with a problem they re- Geraldine Harris gave no reason for the delay
our Secretary of the Air Force of plans fused to admit existed. in aiding the White family. "It shouldn't
to deploy MIRV-tipped Minuteman III One of the people who forced Chicago have taken that long," she said.
missiles this June was termed a "slip" to notice its hungry was Mrs. Linda A spokesman for the main office said that
by the administration. It was more of a Hockey, of the Sun Times. Through her apparently there was a misunderstanding
disaster. As could be expected, this in- series of articles entitled "Hunger in Chi- over where to proecss Mrs. White's request.
The incident l not an isolated one, but in
discretion was matched by appropriate cago" she elucidated the numbers and a
a way the Whites were lucky---it was only a
saber rattling by the other side. There- problems of the hungry and malnour-
temporary crisis. Hunger remains an ongoing
fore, I was not surprised to read authori- ished in the city, problem for the city's poet?the elderly, dis-
tative reports that our delegation has On Menday, April 20, the Select COM- abled, dependent children and families whose
been sent to Vienna with instructions raittee on Nutrition and Human Needs is heads work at poverty wages.
to carefully probe the Soviet position going to Chicago to investigate further ADMIT HUNGIIL EXLSTS
rather than take any initiatives, its hunger problem. Unfortunately, only city officials no longer deny that hunger
Mr. President, this is not the time for a little progress has been made in find- exists as then Health Conn% Morgan J. O'Con-
our country to be playing a waiting nag solutions since Mrs. Hockey's articles nell did last year in The Sun-Times series.
game. We have lived in the shadow of first appeared. On Sunday, Linda Hockey But the extent remains impossible to meas-
nuclear extermination too long?and we summarized this progress in an article ure accurately.
have had to pay a terrible price. The dry published in the Sun Times. I ask unani- The Board of Health study O'Connell
rot which is afflicting our institutions, raou.s consent that the article be printed promised last ,spring "10 determine if we
have a problem' never took place.
our cities, and the very fabric of our ,n : the tio S,
seEsURD. The committee appointed April 30 by the
society is directly linked to the allocation There being no objection, the article Illinois Legislature to study the extent of
of our resources for weapons systems we was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, hunger in the state had one meeting and
really do not need. Failure of the SALT as follows: failed to report back by June 2. The chair-
talks could well mean another decade of Ursine's Primness, THERE'S STILL HUNGER IN man, Rep. Robert S. Juciiett IR-Park Ridge) ,
spending billions in the name of secu- CHICAGO turned down an invitation to attend a hear-
rity?while we actually became more in- (By Linda Rockey) ing this Sunday on hunger in the suburbs:
"The basic existence of hunger remains
secure here at home. One year age this week, a Sun-Times series unchanged," says state Rep. Robert E. Mann
By playing our cards too close to the documented the presence of widespread hun- (n-Chicago), sponsor of the 1969 free lunch
vest in Vienna, we will be raising the ger in Chicago. bill. But he added: "The willingness of eo-
stakes to a point where neither side will But despite all the protests and promises' ple in power to acknowledge its existence
risk a bid for peace. April 1970 is a pro- one fact remains painfully clear: is an important step forwards"
pitious moment?there is now a rough There is still hunger in Chicago. year i Chicago.
strategic
past ye has seen several develop-
It i-
It is too ear,y to tell what the impact will meats in the war on hunger in Chic
strategic parity between ourselves and be . ofte. Amm 'ann emergency outlay ordered but none has attacked the problem on a.
the Soviet Union. Even if there is doubt ?? --
Wednesday by the City Council, But it is too broad scale.
over each others' intentions lthere Is ate to help James White' 4442 W Monroe, Most significant has been the expansion
agreement as to capabilities. Once the whose family went without food for several of the free school lunch program. Under a
Russians complete deployMent of III of days last month. $5,200,000 state act to supplement federal
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE Apni 16, 1970
White was working as an assembler for
Hotpoint last fall when things started to go
wrong. He didn't make a lot of money, but it
was enough to support his young wife and
two baby girls.
OFF WORM FOR A 7.10ISTH
Then, in September, on the way home from
the grocery, he was shot In the back by a
robber. He was out of work for a month with-
out pay. His wife applied for public assist-
ance, but was told she wasn't eligible. They
borrowed money from relatives and friends
and somehow managed until he went back
to work.
But the medical bills and debts piled up,
and White couldn't afford to miss more work
when he suffered a relapse in February.
There was more surgery and three weeks
without pay. He ran out of money and people
to borrow from.
His wife went to the Cook County Depart-
ment of Public Aid. It took six visits and a
call from The Sun-Times before she received
money for food.
On the afternoon of her fifth visit, the
family hadn't eaten since the night before
when they borrowed beans, neckbones and
cornbread from a neighbor.
"The caseworker gave me money for bus-
f are and told me to come hack the next day
about food money," she recalls. "I asked her
why I couldn't go to the office on 21st St.
(where emergency food aid is available on
evenings and weekends). She said that the
program there was for people who'd been
burned out. What's worse than being com-
pletely out of food?"
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April 16, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
this inventory under way. In nineteen sixty
five, following indications of industry's wil-
lingness to cooperate, the Subcommittee
again urged that industrial wastes be inven-
toried. In nineteen sixty seven. the Interior
Department, which had new responsibilities
for pollution abatement, asked the Budget
Bureau to approve an inventory question-
naire. The Budget Bureau, responsive to its
industry advisers, again balked.
The Bureau, in an amazing letter sent to
Subcommittee Chairman Jones, on four An-
gust nineteen sixty seven, said that it wanted
to delay getting information until it had
more information. The Budget Burettu-indus-
try was stalling, waiting for "economic in-
centives to protect the environment." The
Budget Bureau met again in nineteen sixty
eight, with a panel of industry representa-
tives, and again stymied the questionnaire.
Mr. Chairman, I want to advise your Sub-
committee on the status, as of yesterday, of
this seven-year effort to obtain basic infor-
mation from industry on pollution. The
Budget Bureau advised my office yesterday
that the new Administrator of the Water
Pollution -Control Administration had aced
to look at the proposed questionnaire:He de-
cided this was not a proper Federal concern.
He wants to see if the states can provide the
information.
That attitude by a Federal administrator,
starkly illustrates the fact that this Admin-
istration does not believe in law enforcenient
against corporations. It is of a piece with the
failure to enforce laws and regulations vio-
lated by oil nompanies which pollute our
coastal waters. It is of a piece with the tragic
Presidential veto, a decade ago, which said
that pollution is a uniquely local blight.
And the Budget Bureau?I was advised
yesterday?has withdrawn consideration of
the proposed inventory.
If ever there was a time for the legislative
branch to assert itself, the time is now.
Yet these industry groups try to maintain
the fiction that they do not operate in the
policy area.
I would add, Mr. Chairman, as an aside,
that these same industriea ,now spend many
thousands of dollars advertising haw they
protect the environment and their custom-
ers.
Through use of these industry advisory
committees, the teeth are removed from the
laws we pass. The public and the regulators
are denied basic information to which they
are entitled, answers to such fundamental
questions as: Who owns the companies? Who
works for them? Where does their money
go? The answers to such questions are fun-
damental to meaningful regulation and also
to application of anti-trust statutes.
"Nader's Raiders reported this week to the
Senate Subcommittee ou Surface Transporta-
tion that the Interstate Commerce Comrnia-
sion does not have "a single consumer or con-
sumer representative on its numerous ad-
viaory groups. I found the same to be true
regarding the Budget Bureau advisory com-
mittees. Indeed, the utility advisory commit-
tees?there are three of them?are so selec-
tive that they do not include a single repre-
sentative_of a municipally-owned or cooper-
atively-owned power system.
For several years ,peflodically suggested
to the Budget Bureau that it broaden -the,
membership of its advisory committees. The
Bureau declined to do so. So last year In-
troduced legislation requiring consumer,
small business and labor representation on
Budget Bureau advisory committees.
Introduction of this legislation?S. 3067?
perturbed the Budget Bureau and its ad-
visory committees, to the extent that the
Bureau now suggests, in its report on the
bill, that it will find somebody in Mrs.
Knauer's office, and maybe some small ,bUsi-
nessMen, to sit in on those meetings. ,
They don't say a word about letting our
former colleague, Andy Biemiller, into the
inner sanctum.
The few public representatives who have
had the temerity to sit in on meetings, since
my bill was introduced have been treated
like second class citizens.
Obviously, legislation IS needed. I am not
sure that my bill is the remedy. It would be
better to abolish the advisory committees
altogether than to? simply adorn them with
window-dressing Congressman Moss has the
companion.bill over here before your pres-
ent committee?HR. 15101. I am sure that
the record you are developing in this hear-
ing will be helpful in deciding what legisla-
ton should finally be reported.
My remarks when I introduced S. 3067 in-
clude the membership of these advisory com-
mittees, as of last September, along with
examples of their actions. I shall submit
them for the hearing record, along with the
Budget Bureau's adverse report on the bill.
I have three suggestions for your subcom-
mittee to consider.
First, I believe it would be useful to re-
view the minutes of the Budget Bureau ad-
visory committees through the years, to
determine the fate of various proposals that
have been put before them.
Secondly, I think it would be useful to
try to determine the extent to which the
Administration and industries are holding
closed sessions now that a slight bit of
attention is being given to the advisory
cemmittees. For example, I have just learned
that the Federal Power Commission has
agreed to a request by Edison Electric Insti-
tute, the trade association of the power
companies, to have a very private meeting
next Monday with some members of the
FPC staff,
,The purpose of that meeting will be to
discuss proposed collection of data on air
and water pollution controls. The Budget
Bureau discussed these matters with one
of the utility advisory committees last No-
vember. However, that meeting was attended
by five observers who were not members of
the committee. These five observers repre-
sented the Consumers Federation of America,
the National Rural Electric Cooperative As-
sociation, the American Public Power As-
sociation, the National Consumer Law Center
and the National Wildlife Federation.
That was too much public observation for
the utilities. They like to settle matters very
privately.
,If this Subcommittee wants to send a
representative to that meeting Monday I will
be glad to try to find out where the meeting
will be held, but can't guarantee that he'll
get in.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to sub-
mit a few questions that have been put to
me by the 'Center for Advanced Study in the
Behavorial Sciences, at Stanford. These ques-
tions relate to current policies and pro-
cedures of the Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare regarding selection of
scientific advisory committees. You may
have the answers to these quegtions already.
If you have?or if you get them?I hope you
will share them with me. I am directing these
questions to the Secretary of HEW. As I re-
ceive answers. I shall share them with you.
IsTsw FNMA GENERAL, ADVISORY COMMITTEE
MEETS APRIL 14
The Federal National Mortgage Associa-
tion's General Advisory Committee will hold
its first meeting of this year on April 14th
at the offices of the corporation in Washing-
ton, D.C.
The purpose of the Committee, as ex-
plained by FNMA President Oakley Hunter,
is to advise the management of the corpora-
tion in all matters respecting its activities in
the field of housing and home finance.
"The General Advisory Committee," Presi-
dent Hunter stated, "is composed of leading
S 5889
business executives from throughout the na-
tion who serve without compensation. Their
extensive knowledge and experience is inval-
uable to FNMA, and we are deeply appre-
ciative of their generous contribution."
FNMA is a government-sponsored private
corporation that provides support for the
secondary mortgage market. By purchasing
government-insured or guaranteed residen-
tial mortgages from lending institutions,
FNMA helps insure a steady flow of funds
for mortgage loans. In addition to home
mortgages, the corporation purchases mort-
gages on FHA-insured nursing homes, hos-
pitals, mobile home courts, land develop-
ment groups, medical practice facilities and
apartment projects, including special pro-
grams for low- and moderate-income families
and for older persons.
During 1970 FNMA estimates it will pur-
chase approximately $6 billion of mortgages
and will issue purchase-commitments total-
ling approximately $8 billion. FNMA pur-
chases mortgages with private capital bor-
rowed primarily on the open market.
The Committee was organized in 1969. All
of the original members of the committee,
with the exception of Charles Wellman, who
is deceased, will continue to serve. They are
W. P. Bridges, President, Bridges Loan and
Investment Company, Inc., Jackson, Missis-
sippi; Franklin Briese, Chairman and Presi-
dent, The Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance
Company, Saint Paul, Minnesota; C. C. Cam-
eron, Chairman and President, First Union
National Bancorp, Inc., Charlotte, North
Carolina; M. D. Crawford, Jr., Chairman,
Bowery Savings Bank, New York, N.Y.; Don
E. Dixon, President, Lincoln Securities Com-
pany, Lincoln, Nebraska; Hans Gehrke, Jr.,
Chairman, First Federal Savings and Loan
Association, Detroit, Michigan; Robert Gra-
ham, Senior Vice President, First National
City Bank; New York, N.Y.; Max H. Karl,
President, Mortgage Guaranty Insurance
Corporation, Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Sidney
Kaye, Executive Vice President, Advance
Mortgage Corporation, Detroit, Michigan;
David L. Krooth, Krooth and Altman, Wash-
ington, D.C.; Raymond T. O'Keefe, Executive
Vice President, Chase Manhattan Bank, New
York, N.Y.; Samuel Revits, Senior Vice Presi-
dent, Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and
Smith, Inc., New York, N.Y.; William E.
Simon, Salomon Brothers and Hutzler, New
York,- N.Y.; Douglas C. Welton, President,
Dry Dock Savings Bank, New York, N.Y.;
John H. Wheeler, President, Mechanics and
Farmers Bank, Durham, North Carolina; and
Julian Zimmerman, President, Lumbermen's
Investment Corporation.
Three additional members have been ap-
pointed by President Hunter. They are Albert
M. Cole, Attorney, McKenna and Fitting,
Washington, D.C.; Eugene F. Ford, President,
Mid-City Developers, Inc., Washington, D.C.;
and John E. Home, President, Investors
Mortgage Insurance Company Boston, Mas-
sachusetts.
ARMS CONTROL
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, dur-
ing Senate debate on Senate Resolution
211, proposing an opening posture for
the United States at the strategic arms
limitation talks, I raised a number of
reasons why we should, instead of seek-
ing to preserve the Minuteman force with
expensive improvements and question-
able defensive systems, allow its phase-
out in favor of more reliable methods of
deterrence.
Although I think his estimates are
much too generous, the Secretary of De-
fense has asserted that the Russian SS-9
can degrade our land-bused missiles. In
his posture statement this year he tells
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S 5890 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --- SENATE Apiii 16, 1970
us that even the Safeguard ABM defense
cannot counter a threat which includes
SS-9's with improved accuracy and mul-
tiple independently targetable warheads.
I am convinced, therefore, that we
should at,a minimum eliminate the funds
requested this year for deployment of
Minuteman III and for further upgrad-
ing of the land-based force. If the threat
does not develop as envisioned by the
Secretary then these improvements will
be unnecessary. If it does they will be
incorporated into a system which cannot
be relied upon to perform effectively. In
either case the expenditures requested
this year would be wasted. In addition,
since they embark on deployment of a
new and provocative weapons system,
the multiple independently targetable re-
entry vehicle, or MIRV, they stand in
direct contradiction to Secretory Laird's
characterization of the 1971 defense pro-
gram as transitional.
On last Monday the Long Island Daily
Newsday editorialized on this subject in
a manner which I believe deserves the
attention of the Senate. The editors point
out that Senate Resolution 211 consti-
tutes good advice to the President but
that it has in a sense already been re-
jected. They state further that in order
to prevent MIRV's dangerously unset-
tling effects upon SALT "what the Sen-
ate should do is not just pass advisory
resolutions but instead a pass a law pre-
venting the Pentagon from deploying
MIRV. For as long as the weapon is not
actually atop missiles, there is still some
breathing space before the MIRV fail-
safe line is irrevocably crossed."
Because it presents the MIRV issue so
concisely and because it presents an ex-
tremely important reason ,for deleting
Minuteman III?MIRV deployment
funds'froM the fiscal 1971 budget, I ask
unanimous consent that the editorial be
printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECoan,
as follows:
TOWARD A WRIT WORLD
It is the pride of the Anierican techno-
logical elite and the triumph of the gen-
erals; it improves at once and by a quantum
leap the already awesome power of the Amer-
ican missile arsenal. But, for those who wish
to bring an end to the nuclear arms race,
this new offensive weapon is a potential
danger of thermonuclear proportions: its
deployment will set back permsmently man-
kind's efforts to avoid nuclear war. The prod-
uct of America's drive for total security, the
weapon promiaes only to exchange the
slender margins of safety from doomsday
that the nation now enjoys for the final
radioactive solution. It is, all at once, the
multiple, independently targeted reentry ve-
hicle?for short, the MIRV.
The MIRV is an educated nose cone that
will replace existing cones atop about half
of the 1,050 land-based U.S. Minuteman
missiles and on some 540 missiles launched
by Polaris Submarines. Each nose cone will
contain not one but several nuclear weap-
ons ?from three to 14 depending, among
other things, on the size of each bomb. Once
propelled into the exoatmosphere, the MI:EtV
changes speeds and directions according to
instructions from the tiny onboard COED-
puter, and releases, one at a time, individual
bombs on individual targets. In a sense, the
MIRV becomes a kind of unmanned bomber,
traveling at missile-rate speeds, and flying
at far higher altitudes than manned bomb-
ere are capable of. No wonder the techno-
logical and military minds are so excited by
MIRV: for the approximately 1,500 U.S. of-
fensive missiles now become capable of drop-
ping up to 10,000 bombs on the enemy, each
one of which can be targeted on a different
enemy city, missile site, or industrial area.
Clearly, the MIRV is the biggest bang for
a few million bucks to come out of the
Pentagon in a long time.
A MEC'FIANIC AL DECISION
The MIRV has the singular characteristic,
however, that once deployed it fairly cries
out to be used. The MIRV is not like the
ABM system, which must await the firing of
enemy missiles to go into action. On the
contrary, the MIRV doesn't do its thing un-
til it has been fired, until the computer
begins releasing the warheads, until, in
short, the decision-makers have Opted for
nuclear war. When must that millennial de-
cision be made? Should we wait until the
enemy has fired its MIR.Vs, until the enemy's
force becomes transformed by MIRV into a
threat 10 times RS great as it is on the
ground, until it has so many warheads in
the air that our ABM missiles cannot pos-
sibly intercept all of them? Shouldn't we
fire first, getting our birds into the air be-
fore theirs, catching many of their folded-up
MIRV's on the ground, and hoping that our
ABM missiles will intercept in the air what
our MIRVs don't destroy on the ground?
Clearly, to be caught with one's MIRV's down.
while the enemy's are in the air proliferat-
ing like bunnies, is a nightmare possibility
that would weigh heavily on the minds of
Washington and MOSCOW decision-makers. It
is in this way that the very mechanics of
MIRV's operation cut heavily into man's
ability to control the weapon's use.
Thus, the prospect created by MIRV de-
ployment is a world made nuclear trigger-
happy by the very technological exigencies
of this weapon. The Pentagon plans to begin
outfitting U.S. missiles with MIRV this
summer, and the Kremlin is not too far
behind. Once both sides have MIRVed, the
U.S. and USSR negotiators might as well
strike MIRV from the agenda of the strategic
arms limitation talks (SALT) due to resume
in Vienna this week. By the time the negoti-
ators are able to deal with MIRV as part of
an overall arms limitation package deal, the
new weapon will already be deployed. And
once deployed, Pandora's box is forever open.
For the only agreements likely to come out
of SALT are arms limitations that can be
verified by satellite reconnaissance. Since
super-high power camera lenses in the satel-
lites can do just about everything these days
except peer inside a missile nose cone,
neither the United States nor the Soviet
Union will have any way of knowing for
sure just how many missiles each side has
MIRVed and just how many bombs are in-
side each nose cone. Since neither side would
agree to the kind of extensive on-site in-
spection needed to verify a MIRV reduction
once the weapon is deployed, it is probable
that both the Kremlin and the Nixon. ad-
ministration may already have decided,
among themselves, to MIRV and to forget
about including MIRV in a SALT package.
BREATHING SPACE
However, the Senate has passed a well-
intentioned resolution sponsored by Sen. Ed-
ward Brooke and some 40 other senators. It
cane for a mutual Soviet-American freeze
or, the deployment of all offensive and de-
fensive strategic weapons pending the out-
come of SALT. During the subcommittee's
hearings on the eesolution, McGeorge Bundy,
president of the Ford Foundation, went a
step further in recommending that the ad-
ministration take the initiative by uni-
laterally deferring both MIRV and ABM de-
ployments for a limited time. Unfortunately,
both the Brooke resolution and Bunny's pro-
posal add up to nothing more than good
advice the administration has already re-
jected (holding up all further weapons de-
ployments because of SALT). What the Sen-
ate should do is not just pass advisory rei-
olutions but instead pass a law preventing
the Pentagon from deploying MIRV. For as
long as the weapon is not actually atop mis-
siles, there is still some breathing space be-
fore the MIRV fail-safe line is Irrevocably
crossed. For, quite simply, the case against
MIRV de:ployment is the case against nu-
clear war.
THE CIGARETTE: HABIT
Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I found very
interesting an article in the Washington
Post this morning which indicates that
the cigarette habit is based upon both a
physical and a psychological-need which
nicotine nurtures and builds up. This
need is what makes it so difficult for a
heavy smoker to stop smoking, even
though he recognizes and accepts the
health hazards of continuing his habit.
This new information on nicotine
makes even more important the cigarette
legislation passed by the Congress re-
cently. The removal of cigarette adver-
tising from TV takes away the most
appealing medium for reaching to new
and young smokers, who ale more easily
induced to take up smoking because of
the "glamour" of the TV presentation,
and then get hooked on the need for
nicotine--a need some people cannot
overcome.
I ask unanimous consent that the Post
article be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
SMOKING SEEN INDUCING ITS NEED
ATLANTIC Crane N.J., April 15.?A scientist
came up today with what he believes to be
the physical basis for the cigarette habit.
It may explain why so many people keep
right on smoking despite heavy health pres-
sures.
This physical basis is what nicotine does
with norepinephrine (Nit), Dr. Budh D.
Bhagat of St. Louis University told the an-
nual meeting of the Federation of American
Societies for Experimental Biology.
NE is a regulatory hormone of the brain
and other nervous system I issue. Nicotine in-
creases both its production and its utiliza-
tion, Bhagat said. As the result, the smoker's
brain is kept in a state of abnormal ex-
citement.
"Once the body becomes accustomed to
this increase in the production and use of
NE, any withdrawal of nicotine results in
depression," he said.
"Thus, the body begins to depend on nico-
tine. Therefore the smoker must smoke to
'dose' himself with nicotine to keep the pro-
duction of NE at elevated levels."
Bhagat and his St. Louis associates came
to this conclusion after three years of experi-
menting with rats and by reasoning from
other scientific findings,. Forsix weeks their
rats got through injection as Much nicotine
as they would have gotten from smoking
three packs of cigarettes a day.
Aside from greater activity and aggressive-
ness, they behaved like other rats. But their
blood pressure was higher and an analysis of
their brains revealed a much higher produc-
tion and utilization of NE than is normal in
rats.
Then came this reasoning:
Some tranquilizing drugs reduce NE in
people and calm their behavior. Some anti-
depression drugs increase NE production and
energize behavior.
Approved For Release 2002/03/20 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300040006-6
Approved For ReleaseitiffinaMmigkek/W72-00337R000300040006-6
15 APR 1970
Arms Treaty Violation Held,
, ?
'Deteble \
of MIRV deployment. He said a NY ? ? .
postponement of further de-
cta
velopment of the Safeguard
anti-ballistic-missile system
also would be desirable.
By Spencer Rich
Washinitton Post titet I Writer
Russian violations of Lej...?a;
e ic arms Jimjiatien treat
could be detected by
United States without on-site
Inspections, a former high
CIA and disarmament agency
official told a Senate subcom-
mittee yesterday.
Dr. Herbert Scoville Jr.,
, now with the Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace,
said, "Any nation which at-
tempts to violate any arms
limitation agreement on a
scale sufficient to obtain a sig-
nificant military advantage
will run some risk of being de-
tected."
, For this reason, Scoville in-
? dicated, it would be feasible
and desirable for the U.S and
? Russia to conclude arms limi-
tations agreements in talks be-
ginning in Vienna Thrusday.
' Another witness, Adrian S.
Fisher of the Georgetown Uni-
versity Law School, said the
strategic arms talks would be
severely endangered if the
U.S. went ahead with its pre-
viously announced plan to
begin installing MIRVs (multi-
ple independently targetable
nuclear warheads) on Minute-
men III ICBMs in June. ,
Even though the MIRVs
have not been fully tested and
? are not a s dependable as they
would be after full testing,
? Fisher said, Soviet fear of
their ability to penetrate So-
viet fear of their ability to
penetrate Soviet defenses
might make it impossible to,
conclude a successful arms
agreement once they were de-
ployed.
Fisher, who served as Dep-
uty Director of The U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament
Agency, said the President, as
a move toward making the
arms talks successful, should
announce a six-month deferral
e
Approve
Scoville, a former CIA As-
sistant Deputy Director for
Science, Technology and Re-
search and an Assistant Direc-
tor for Science and Tech-
nology, said it was still techni-
cally possible to detect arms
control violations without on-
site inspections becaue MIRV
and other strategic systems
had not been fully tested and
deployed.
He indicated that sophisti-1
cated U.S. inspection devices,
which already permit officials
to estimate Soviet missiles
with a high degree of accu-
racy, would be able to spot at- ,
tempts to test or deploy weap-
ons covered by an arms limit ,
treaty if one emerges from the
Vienna talks.
Running down the list of
strategic weapons systems, he
gave this analysis:
Installation of fixed land-
based ICBMs requires exten-
sive launch-site construction,
over many months and such
installation in violation of
ban would be extremely diffi-
cult to conceal. The same
would be true of mobile, land-
based ICBMs, though installa-
tion of these would be some-
what easier to conceal.
? Enlargement of facilities,
to launch submarine-based
missiles would also be diffi-
cult to conceal because of the
use of shipyhrd facilities, the
requirement of "many months
for fitting out, during all of
which they are subject to ob-
servation."
? Installation of MIRVs on
existing missiles would be
hard to detect by aerial or sat-
ellite observation, but MIRV
was not yet a fully tested sys-
tem. Tests adequate to assure
MIRV dependability would re-
quire full range and simula-
tion of operational conditions
, and could be detected. There-
fore, a MIRV test-ban, under-
taken now before MIRV has
been tested, could be ade-
quately policed without on-site
Inspection.
? Installation of ABM sys-
Items, requiring large radars of
'high visibility and considera-
ble other facilities could be,
ikefiddeigmse-200?/03/20 cIA-RDP72-00337R000300040006-6
detected without on-sitel