LIMITATIONS ON AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN CAMBODIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00337R000300020001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 21, 1970
• Content Type: OPEN

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December 21, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 20961
standardize these programs, raise pay-
ment levels in the States with lowest
payments, give the States the option of
turning over program administration to
a Federal agency, and place a ceiling on
State expenditures which guarantees
each State future reductions in welfare
costs.
A third principle embodied in the pro-
posal 1 that as many poor people who
can work should do so and should be as-
sisted in becoming economically inde-
pendent. The Ribicoff-Bennett proposal
would require certain family assistance
recipients to register for work or train-
ing, and they would be referred for
whatever services can benefit them. The
necessary manpower and day care serv-
ices would be improved, both in quantity
and quality, over what is available to-
day under programs for welfare fam-
ilies.
Some specific points were raised about
this legislation last week that I would
like to comment on. It was alleged that
the family assistance plan would do
nothing to retard the current incentives
for family breakup mentioned earlier,
and that the plan would somehow re-
ward couples for having illegitimate
children. These statements are mislead-
ing if not inaccurate, and I submit the
following chart to illustrate the point.
As the chart shows, an intact family of
four in Phoenix, Ariz., earning $2,000
receives no aid under AFDC. If the fa-
ther leaves the family, the mother and
Children receive $1,836 from AFDC, rais-
ing total income to $3,836. However, un-
der family assistance, the family would
receive $960 in benefits if they stay to-
gether. Thus, the incentive for the fam-
ily to break up is reduced by more than
half.
As for the suggestion that family as-
sistance would reward illegitimacy, the
fact is just the contrary. Current law
rewards illegitimacy, because a working-
man and his family cannot get assist-
ance, but an unwed mother can. Under
family assistance, the legally married
couple with children could be helped if
their income made them eligible for the
program.
In summary, I feel that the Ribicoff-
Bennett amendment to H.R. 17550 rep-
resents a greatly needed step forward
in the reform of welfare and I urge its
prompt enactment.
INCENTIVES FOR FAMILY BREAKUP UNDER AFDC AND UNDER FAMILY ASSISTANCE
. [Data assume a father, mother and 2 children living in Phoenix, Ariz.; father earns $2,000 annuallYI
Income under AFDC
Income under Family Assistance
Earnings AFDC
Total Earnings FAP Total
Family lives together
$2, 000
$2, 000
$2, 000
$960
$2,960
Father leaves family
2,000
$1,836
3, 836
2, 000
1, 836
3, 836
Incentive to break up
1,836
876
L TATIONS ON AMERICAN
INVOLVEMENT IN CAMI3ODIA
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, over the
weekend, I received a letter from Secre-
tary of State William P. Rogers stating
that the administration has no objection
to the legislative restrictions on our mili-
tary and economic aid to Cambodia, as
provided in HR. 11991, the supplemental
foreign assistance authorization for 1970.
These restrictions, originally offered by
the distinguished Senator from Kentucky
(Mr. COOPER) and me, and contained in
section 6 of the bill, prohibit the use of
any funds to introduce U.S. ground com-
bat troops into Cambodia or other U.S.
personnel as advisers or instructors. The
language, to which the executive branch
takes no exception, reads as follows:
In line with the expressed intention of the
President of the United States, none of the
funds authorized or appropriated pursuant
to this or any other Act may be used to fi-
nance the introduction of United States
ground combat troops into Cambodia, or to
provide United States advisors to or for Cam-
bodian military forces in Cambodia.
The Secretary of State's letter, which
I am told was approved at the "highest
level" of the Government, should appre-
ciably clear the air as to the Nixon ad-
ministration's intentions in Cambodia.
Dated December 19, 1970, the letter
reads:
DEAR SENATOR CHURCH: Confirming Assist-
ant Secretary Abshire's conversation with
you, I should like to reaffirm that the Ad-
ministration's programs, and policies and in-
tentions in Cambodia in no way conflict with
Section 6 of H.R. 11991, or with the concerns
expressed in the colloquy on the floor of the
Senate on December 15, 1970.
Sincerely,
WILLIAM P. ROGERS.
The colloquy Secretary Rogers was re-
ferring to took place between the distin-
guished Senator from Mississippi (Mr.
STENNIS) , the Senior Senator from Ala-
bama (Mr. SPARKMAN) , the ranking Re-
publican member of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, the Senator from Ver-
mont (Mr. AIKEN), and myself. I ask
unanimous consent that the pertinent
pages from the RECORD covering the col-
loquy be printed in the RECORD at this
point.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
SPECIAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1971
The Senate continued with the consider-
ation of the bill (H.R. 19911), to amend the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
Mr. GRAVEL. I call up my amendment and
ask that it be stated.
The PRESIDING OrrreEs. The amendment
will be stated.
The legislative clerk read the amendment
as follows:
"On page 4 strike out lines 18 through 20
and renumber the subsections accordingly."
The language proposed to be stricken reads
as follows:
"(1) 885,000,000 for additional military as-
sistance and 870,000,000 for special economic
assistance for Cambodia:"
Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I yield to the
Senator from Mississippi without losing my
right to the floor.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator from
Alaska.
The PRESIDING Oviricea. The Senator from
Mississippi is recognized.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I do not think
I shall take more than a few minutes. I wish
to address a question to the Senator from
Alabama. I direct the attention of Senators
to this question because it is a matter of
some importance.
- I wish to direct the attention of the Sen-
ator from Alabama to page 7 of the bill as
now printed, and that part that provides,
beginning with line 1: "none of the funds
authorized or appropriated pursuant to this
or any other Act may be used to finance the
introduction of United States ground com-
bat troops into Cambodia.'"
My question to the distinguished Senator
from Alabama is as to his interpretation
of this limitation on the President about
financing the introduction of U,S. ground
combat troops into Cambodia.
Is that language intended to be a prohibi-
tion on the President's going into Cambodia
with U.S. combat troops to meet a situation
like the sanctuary battle that we had last
June and July, which proved to be directly
connected with the arsenal, the armory, and
everything else that goes to make war on
our men in South Vietnam, and which proved
to be beneficial? Would the Senator from
Alabama speak to that point?
Mr. SPARKMAN. AS I recall, when the Presi-
dent announced that we were going into
Cambodia, he gave us the reason that it was
to protect American troops?American
people, American citizens--who are in South
Vietnam. It was for that purpose. The sanc-
tuaries imperiled those citizens and that was
his purpose for going in there.
I may say that in the committee discussion
I raised the question as to whether or not
this language would permit the use of Amer-
ican forces to protect American lives in South
Vietnam, as was done before. I shall be very
glad to check on this, but, as I recall, the
answer was that that would be a presidential
power, that he would be exercising his own
powers, and that this language did not pro-
hibit that.
The distinguished Senator from Idaho
(Mr. CHURCH), a few minutes ago, said some-
thing about the constitutional powers ques-
tion still being unresolved. We all admit that.
I would be very glad if the Senator from
Idaho would say somethi:ng on this.
Mr. CHURCH. I thank the Senator.
Mr. President, the question of the dis-
tinguished chairman of the Committee on
Armed Services goes to the heart of the
debate that took place this spring and sum-
mer on the Cooper-Church amendment.
Since we had much time-7 weeks?to ex-
plore the question, we discused it at consid-
erable length.
In the course of the debate, it was recalled
that in times past the President had invoked
his constitutional authority as Commander
in Chief to order rescue operations, to take
precautionary action to protect American
troops in the field threatened with an im-
minent enemy buildup that posed a serious
danger to them, and that, within the frame-
work of past precedent, there is an area of
discretionary action open to the President
as Commander in Chief.
The exact definition ref that power has
never been attempted in the past. Congress
has never undertaken to define it with pre-
cision. The best answer must rest upon the
_precedents.
However, I would not want it to be thought
that writing this language into the bill has
little or no effect. Far to the contrary. No one
has contended, based on the precedents, that
the President can make general war or deploy
an army in a foreign country on his author-
ity as Commander in Chief.
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S 20962 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE December 21, 1970
This language would clearly prevent the
deployment, for an extended period of time,
of a substantial number of American troops
in Cambodia. If the President intended to
do that, the money is not made available for
that purpose, and it would be necessary for
him to return to Congress and ask our con-
sent. But it is true that, as Conunander IL
Chief, within a limited area, the President
has power to initiate action designed to pro-
tect American troops in the field.
Mr. Sransas. If I may ask the Senator Usk
question, with reference to the battle of tile
sanctuary, the areas that the President in-
vaded this summer, to destroy ammunition.
and so forth, would the Senator think that
his language prohibits a repetition of that
if the facts are similar and conditions are
spressing?
Mr. Cnuncii. If there were a particular
concentration just over the border which
constituted a serious, imminent threat, that
could be suddenly struck and destroyed, that
might fall within the President's powers as
Commander in Chief. However, I could not
say to the Senator that undertaking an ex-
tended invasion of Cambodia with a large
American expeditionary force for six or eight
weeks falls within the scope of his power
under the Constitution as Commander in
Chief.
This whole question was fully explored in
the course of the earlier debate.
Prom a conversation I had with the Presi-
dent last evening, it is my understanding
now that he no longer takes exception to the
limiting language. He feels it conforms with
his own policy in Cambodia. He says he has
no intention of sending back troops. He no
longer persists in objecting to language of
this kind. I could not say, however, that this
prohibition in the bill would not preclude
an invasion of Cambodia on the scale that
took place and for the length of time that
occurred Iasi, summer. I feel it would.
Mr. STENNIS. On that point right there, the
the Senator understands that no President,
no Commander in Chief, no Army field com-
mander, can tell how long it would take to
carry out an objective. They go into the un-
known. Also it takes time to prepare for such
an attack on a sanctuary. So the President
and his advisers might have to have 3 or 4
weeks, or even longer, to prepare. It is a de-
liberate act. It is not an extreme, rash act.
So the Senator would not preclude, then.
a bona fide effort, the planning of an attack,
an invasion, technically, of the country to
clear out and Clean out a sanctuary that was
an imminent threat to our men in South
Vietnam?
Mr. CHURCH. I would say, in reply to the
Senator that, in the first place, there would
be nothing to preclude whatever any plan-
ning on any military mission. Yet, on the
basis of precedents, the President's power as
Commander in Chief to undertake military
action is strictly limited to actions restricted
both in scope and time, and which are di-
rectly related to the need to protect Ameri-
can troops in the field.
Mr, STENNIS. While I am on that, the
Senator does recognize that it takes time,
and cannot always be foretold exactly?
Mr. CHURCH. Yes, I appreciate that there
is no way to fortell precisely the length of
an intervention.
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator
yield?
Mr. GRAVEL. I yield to the Senator from
Vermont for an observation.
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I do not think
:he Committee on Foreign Relations now
takes a position much different than it took
last spring, H an incursion is necessary for
the safety of our men, there would be no ob-
jection, but an invasion, which, as stated by
the Senator from Mississippi, would require
a long time in preparation and probably a
tong time to carry out, would have to be
reported back to the Senate before it was
undertaken. The committee did make a sharp
distinction between an incursion and an in-
vasion,
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
Mr. GRAVEL. I yield to the Senator from
Alabama.
Mr. SPARICMAN, May I say that I did not
understand that the Senator from Missis-
sippi was speaking of an invasion. The term
"Incursion" was used, I think, in referring to
it. But I think it is the objective that is
controlling---in ether words, the protection
of American lives.
Mr. &martyrs. The Senator is correct, and
my question was based on the incursion or
the thrust, :rather than a large scale invasion.
Mr. SPARIZMAN. To protect American lives.
Mr. STENNIS. Primarily to protect the lives
of our soldiers, our military men. I did make
the point that sometimes it took weeks even
to plan an incursion and get ready for it.
Mr. SPAREMAN. / wish to say that there is
nothing in here that intends to limit the
President's conststutional powers to act in
an emergency in order to protect American
lives.
Mr. STENNIS. I appreciate the Senator's
answer; and, if I may respond quite briefly
to the Senator from Idaho, Mr. President, I
do not think it in definitely known, accord-
ing to the precedents of ?history or according
to this debate, just what the extent of the
President's powers as Commander in Chief
is. I think it depends greatly on the circum-
stances. I do not want any hard law here that
would create any cloud or any doubt in any
President's mind as to what his responsibil-
ities are. I want to leave him with the re-
sponsibilities as well as the powers. If we do
not leave the powers and the responsibilities
with him, then it Is not his fault or he is not
to blame, and we have no head of State to
that extent.
Mr. SPARKMAN. There is no effort here to
limit the President's emergency powers or his
constitutional powers.
Mr. STENNIS. Yes. That Is why / am SO 00n-.
cerned about this. The point first came up, as
far as written law is concerned, In the mili-
tary procurement bill. The battle of the
sanctuaries was an then, and we put lan-
guage in there that was approved by this
body, that he would not be restricted as long
as it was tied to our men and their safety in
the draw-down. The battle over that lan-
guage is going on now in appropriation bills
and elsewhere, as well as here.
It seems to me that the colloquy has made
it clear that this language does not take any
of the responsibility nor the power away
from the President of the United States to
do what he thinks is reasonably necessary,
within reasonable limitations of time, in de-
stroying arsenals, armories, armies, or any-
thing else that is in close proximity to our
borders, which we have designated by the
general term "sanctuaries," as in the past.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, may I make
one observation? Will the Senator yield for
that purpose?
Mr. Srsairas. I yield.
Mr. CHURCH. It is perfectly true that it
does not lie within the power of this body,
even if we were to harbor an intention to do
so, to curtail the constitutional powers of the
President as Commander in Chief.
What we seek to do here is assert con-
gressional powers over the spending of the
public money. That is within our authority.
It is clear, as far as my evidence indicates,
that the President is now willing to acqui-
esce in a limitation of this kind imposed
upon the funds made available in this bill
and in other bills, vis-a-vis Cambodia.
It follows that if the President were later
to decide that it 113 in the national interest
to repeat an extended, full scale military
invasion of Cambodia, he would come back
to Congress and ask: our consent.
We are exercising our power. I recognize
that it is not within our reach to undermine
such constitutional powers as vest in the
presidency in the role of Commander in
Chief.
Mr. CHURCH. In view of the fact that
the administration has accepted the per-
tinent language in the Senate version of
the supplemental foreign assistance au-
thorization bill, including the Cooper-
Church amendment, and, the fact that
the House and Senate conferees, repre-
senting the two legislative committees
concerned, have concurred in that lan-
guage, I hope it will now prove possible
to eliminate from the appropriations
conference reports those .,Drovi,sions that,
contradict and undercut these provisions
in the authorizing legislation. If such an
accommodation could be reached, we
could then complete our legislative work
on all the unfinished defense and foreign
aid appropriation measures.
UNSNARLING THE CAMBODIA AID
TANGLE
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I do
not think that the editorial in this morn-
ing's Washington Post, entitled "Un-
snarling the Cambodia Aid Tangle,"
should stand without com:ment.
The editorial complains that the "po-
tentialities for a misreading" of the words
and deeds of American legislators
"should be apparent to anyone who casts
even a casual glance at the Senate's de-
bate on whether its voting of $255 mil-
lion in aid to Cambodia constitutes a
'commitment' or not."
It is obvious to me, from reading the
editorial, that the writer has cast only a
casual glance?and nothing more?at
the Senate debate.
The editorial expresses respect for Sen-
ator FCLBRIGHT'S concept "that the Sen-
ate must assert its constitutional duty to
approve foreign commitments." But it
then goes on to say that the chairman of
the Foreign Relations Committee failed
to assert that duty because, the editorial
continues, he should have been emphasiz-
ing that approval of the money was not
equivalent to a treaty, and attempting "to
nail down the administration tightly to
that other interpretation," instead of
charging, as he did and as others did,
that "approval of this money is equiva-
lent to a treaty."
What more would the writer have
had Senator FULBRIGHT and other Sena-
tors who agreed with him do if they be-
lieved that approving the President's sup-
plemental aid request constituted sena-
torial endorsement of a commitment
which was, in fact, as much of a commit-
ment as a treaty would have been.
The committee did include an amend-
ment to the bill which made it clear that
the giving of aid should not be construed
as a commitment to come to the defense
of Cambodia. But some lumbers of the
Senate feel that approval of the funds
does constitute a cominitment neverthe-
less?if a quarter of a billion dollars a
year to a nation of 6 million does not
involve a commitment; what does?
In fact, the staff report prepared for
the committee, a portion of which the
Post reprints on its editorial page, states
clearly that the Cambodians have cer-
tainly inferred that the military assis-
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CPYRGHT
E
THE WASHINGTON POST DATE 0 PAG 22
CPYRGHT
Sunday, Dec. 20, 1970 THE WASHINGTON POST
. . .
American Outposts in Laos
Threatened by N. Vietnam
By Mark Frankland
London Observer
PAKSE, Laos, Dec. 19?
From the back seat of an
ancient Laotian air force
fighter-bomber, Pakse Site
twenty-two does not look
much of a place to fight
over: a dirt landing strip, the
outlines of defensive posi-
tiOns, some huts covered
with yellow-brown dust. Yet
it is around PS-22 that one
of the most important battles
of the Indochina war is
likely to be fought.
For several years Ameri-
cans have used Site 22 and
other places like it on the
edge of the Bolovens Plateau
News Analysis
to spy on and sabotage the
North Vietnamese trail sys-
tem in the mountains that
start a few miles to the east.
This U.S. operation has been
a nuisance to Hanoi, but
more or less a tolerable one.
The situation today, how-
ever, is quite different The
overthrow of Cambodian
Head of State Prince Noro-
dom Sihanouk in March and
the loss of the port of Sihan-
eukville (renamed Kompong
Som) for North Vietnamese
supplies has at least doubled
the importance of the Ho
Chi Minh trail to Hanoi.
The North Vietnamese are
expanding the trail system
to the west, but cannot do so
easily as long as American
led guerrillas remain on the
Bolovens Plateau.
A few hundred yards east
of Site 22, the plateau ends
in an abrupt fall of about
Approvti Fur Rb dbU 200-1
3,000 feet to the Mekong
River. The fast flowing and
treacherous river curves
around the plateau's edge
and into Communist-con-
trolled Northern Cambodia.
But Americans have mined
the river, greatly hampering
North Vietnamese attempts
to develop the upper reaches
of the Mekong into a new
supply route.
The American sites also
limit the extent to which the
Communists can infiltrate
south across the Bolovens
Plateau itself. It is doubtful
that the two government-
controlled towns on the
plateau could hold out if the
sites were destroyed.
A few months ago the
Communists created panic
in Pak Song, larger of the
two, just by sending in mes-
sagers to announce that an
attack was imminent.
Two weeks ago the North
Vietnamese tried and failed
to take Site 22, which is also
a supply and training center
for other outposts. It is as-
sumed they will try again
and? that next time they
might succeed.
This puts. the Americans
in something of a spot, be-
cause guerrilla sites on Bolo-
yens Plateau belong to
Washington's half-b illion
dollar a year secret war in
Laos. Special guerrilla units
on Bolovens Plateau and
elsewhere are trained and
led by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency.
Accountants from the CIA
arrive regularly at the sites
in helicopters to pay the
Laotian guerrillas three
times as intich as ordinary
Lao soldiers get.
The armee clandestine, as
the American-led guerrilla
force is known here, is
scarcely clandestine any
more. It has been written
about by reporters and in-
vestigated by senators.
There are even people who
claim to have seen some of
its football teams wearing
shirts with the initials AC.
But since the CIA is, by
American standards, any-
how, a secret organization
and its agents have under
the Geneva agreements no
more right to be in Laos
than the North Vietnamese,
the battle for Bolovens is
hidden in clouds of official
discretion.
It-is only since the North
Vietnamese threat to Bolo-
yens developed that the
regular Laotian army has
had anything to do with the
guerrilla sites.
But the Lao army is being
pushed into the Bolovens
battle by Hanoi's increased
pressure and American vul-
nerability: special guerrilla
units were never meant for
defensive warfare. It was a
regular Lao infantry bat-
talion which helped to save
Site 22 two weeks ago and
had a very rough time of it.
The Lao army is getting
near the end of its human
resources. Its recruits in-
clude teen-agers.
The effort the Lao army is
being asked to make on
Bolovens is widely thought
to be hopeless. Almost
everyone says, "the North
Vietnamese can take the
Bolovens sites if they're
ready to pay the price"?and
it is assumed they are.
3
CPYRGHT
CPYRGI-?T STM
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Ron
n
1.1 c cs flh fts:_,E)G.,:z.)
, By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Special to The Star
VitAitat
ese forces have launched heav
attacks in southern Laos in
major effort to protect the Ho
Chi Minh Trial, their main rein
forcement and resupply systen
to South Vietnam and Can
'podia, from American-led guer
rums.
Military Sources today said al
estimated three North Vietnam
cse battalions captured Roya
Mountain and two other air
strips on the southeast edge o
the Bolovens Plateau in heavy
fighting yesterday.
merican
? / ? El
r-
[? Ili La
accountants rutt.
eric-ati
411,-,,y, ?
ill ltArk13 and "mo can gveys
o ier _p aces, one source
-
said.
Run by CIA
...4ChaLapention is rum- 'by the
N and -isenot part of the U.S.
,,pinitary ?
Lao military sources, though
deeply worried by the North Vi-
etnamese push on the Bolovens
Plateau, say preseriee of the spe-
cial units will be maintained-,de-
spite the attacks.
--Thrteair strip,s,Jeenetai-
.
At one strip, North Vietnam-
ese sappers blew up an ainmuni-
tion dump with satchel charges.
? Teak - buildings with corrugat-
ed roofing sheets containing mor-
tars and other supplies under
control of the U.S. were burned
down.
,. -- Boat Traffic Hit
Alja thIse_positons were held by
special guerrilla units led anct
? 1 b the Central In-
telli&ence Agency.; T use units
specialize in slipping down the
side of the Bolevens Plateau, hit-
ting Communist boat traffic on
the Sekhong River?part of the
trail complex?and penetrating
that part of the trail on the Kas-
song Plateau. _. .
Sources said these guerrilla
units long have been a thorn in
the Communist .side and they
believe the Reds now want con-
trol of the eastern half of the
Bolovens' Plateau to eliminate
them. TileaN saecial Iini'c
said t9 be better .thariezegWar
I ,no ..P tenty__,Lreo9s-1,10-ay
ki,u11:a....j2ladeepedieggeetr i me
oya o ?
fierce fighting earlier this year
when the North Vietnamese hold
it for four .months against
strikes by U.S. air and guerrilla
units. . ?
Pram Royal Mountain a i r -
strips the streets of Attopeu,
the Communist-held province
capital, can be seen in detail on
a clear day.
. The Red -offensive is seen as
an attempt t build a suth Laos
sanctuary for the ?fighting in
Vietnam and Cambodia.
"Hanoi can no longer rule out
South Vietnamese' or American
ground strikes against these
areas and they are worried,"
sources said.
With Cambodia closed off to
:Communist supplies, . Hanoi- is
more than ever deponent on
:south Laos for logistics to con-
tinue the Indochina fighting.
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'1 5 NOV 1970 .
PYRGHT itziec re ?
e By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Special to The Stat
ficial
concealment of American ac-
tivities in , Laos is designed to
hide the small U.S. ground
combat involvement from crit-
ics a administration policy,
sources here say.
This combat involvement
consists of a few hundred
Americans in three
groups?military attaches ad-
vising in combat, former milia
tary personnel working for the
Central Intelligence Agency
who lead commando teams,
and Special Forces units
which shift through the Ho Chi
Minh trail areas.
The American combat role
is directed primarily by the
CIA, rather than the U.S. mill.-
' tary, and continue $ despite de-
' nials and evasions. Reporters
have seen military attaches
?
INTERPRETIVE REPORT
Peel iaintao
giving advice in combat to Lao a mi
forces and accompanying Lao been reported in Senate hear-
troops in field operations. lags, including the armed
American planes, rescue heli-
has
Si
The secrecy continues n
many cases because of the
failure of the U.S. Embassy to
revise its policies after March
Jr6 when President Nixon admit-
rted U.S. activities in Laos.
ce::"Only a small percentage of
the secrecy involves U.S. na-
tional security," sources said,
while admitting that the major
reason was simply conceal-
ment from the American pub-
lic.
An incident last weekend 35
miles north of here at Long
Chien, headquarters for Gen.
yang Pao, leader of the Amer-
ican-supplied guerrilla forces
near the Plain of Jars, illus-
trates the situation.
U.S. officials evicted an
American from Long Chien
even though the American Was
there at the personal invitation
of yang Pao.. U.S. officials
also warned another American
visitor to remain in yang
.Pao's own compound.
Asians Enter Area
e Asian guests, though they
lack any security clearance,
are not harrassecl.
? Americans report, in fact,
that Asians of all walks of life,
'including merchants, are free
to visit Long Chien without a
security check,
"Only Westerners, especial-
ly newsmen, are personna non
grata up there," a source said.
This security system indi-
cates the .U.S. Embassy is
more concerned with what is
reported to the American peo-
ple than it is with what Cum-,
munist spies might see and
report.
Yet much of what a reporter
would see already has been
CO
chanics w io
bombers, the U.S.' Air Force
reconnaisance planes, the U.S.
logistics officers, the civilian
American pilots and the troops
from Thailand and elsewhere.
. _ .
Jy
Secrecy Farce
Nix o n ' s admission that
American Military and civil-
ian personnel were engaged in
military advisory roles ceuld
even cover the armed Ameri-
cans hired by the Central In-
telligence Agency, who lounge
around Long Chien in camou-
flaged fatigue uniform.
Yet the secrecy farce contin-
ues, particularly around Long
Chien and Laos Military Re-
gion II where U.S. involve-
ment seems the greatest. .
,Americans run away when a
newsman appears, stopping-
tion of the Lao military.
their work, to the consterna-
? U.S. officials in the field ap-
pear quite uninformed about
what has been said about
American activities in Laos by
Nixon as well as by State De-
partment and Pentagon aides
in Washington.
MC-
?
it
In Laos tie re
van .
necessary for two reasons: to
continue support for Premier
Souvanna Pheruna's - position
' modes
id is '
therwi
the Corernimiste aed,tdIvold
breaking the eoiter CL'
ployes or to POblicize,teliahr
details of the,egeney's.Opeee-
tions.
Unfortunately Solivanna.'e
neutralist status is word thin'.
Under North Vietnamese mili-
tary attack his neutralist '
army dwirdled away and he is
forced to rely on rightist gen-
erals and their wellies, the
U.S. Air Force, the CIA and
Thai troops for support.
A Western diplomat who de-
scribed Souvanna as "de-
vious," said Souvanna's credi-
bility would be improved if he
did not need to make denials
of U.S. involvement that :no-
body believes.
Some CIA operations partic-
ularly intelligence gathering,
do deserve secrecy. But this is
possible without closing off
whole regiees of Laos to re-
porters when the U.S. govern-
ment is spending some $2 bil-
lion annually on the Laos war
and Aniericans are being
killed. ?
Approved For Release 2001/03/02: CIA-RDP72-00337R000300020001-3
NEW YORK TIMES
Approved For Release 2001/0320i .1elk-7JilDP72-00337R000300020001-3
A CAMBODIAN BID
IN LAOS REPORTED
Troops Would Get U.S.-Arms
There for Operations
" By HENRY KAMM
t,perialt Th P 'New York TimPs
CPYRGHT
SAIGON, South Vietnam,
Nev. 8?According to informed
sources, Cambodian officers are
discussing with members of the
entourage of Prince Boun Gum,
the feudal chief of southern
Laos, the possibility of sending
sizable numbers of Cambodian
itroo-Jps to La03 to be equipped,
with United States arms.
These arms, it is said, would
be in addition to the limited
program of American military
aid now granted to Cambodia.
At this stage, the sources
said, the United States has not
been brought- inte'. the discus-
sions, which were. initiated by
the Cainbodians'. However, the
ImpetuS for the talks arose
from the fact that-about 1,500
Cambodian soldiers are being
trained under the auspices of
the United States Central Intel-
ligence Agency in southern
Laos.
The Cambodian idea is sim-
ply that Cambodia has more
troops than arms, and Laos
needs soldiers but has found
it easy to get weapons and
equipment from the United
States.
Prince Operates Independently
The Cambodians evidently
see no need to raise the issue,
with the Government of Pre-
mier Souvanna Phouma, of hav-
ing their troops equipped,
trained and operating in the
panhandle of Laos.
Not only. is Prince Boun
Oum's authority in southern
Laos almost independent of the
Central Government, but also,
perhaps of more importance, his
dealings with the Central Intel-
ligence Agency on military op-
erations- run by the agency
in the Ho Chi Minh Trail re-
gion are direct and. do. not
pass through Vientiane.
The C.I.A. supplies- a mer-
cenary army in Laos through
funding that apparently has
escaped strict Congressional
control,- while American aid to
Cambodia is a limited program!
with a spending ceiling for the
present fiscal year. of $40-mil-
lion.
Although an additional ap-
propriation is expected by early
next year, it would still be
easier to escape budgetary re-
strictions by supplying Cam-
bodian troops through funds for
Laos.
5 Battalions Considered
No specific proposals have
been made, but Cambodian offi-
cers are thinking in terms of
five battalions, each of about
600 men. They feel that such a
force would be of equal value
to Laos and Cambodia and
could operate in either coun-
try.
At the moment, the Viet-
namese Communists control
roughly the eastern half of the
Laotian panhandle as well as
the adjoining Cambodian prov-
inces of Ratanakiri and Stung-
treng to the south.
The Laotian Government is
worried about Communist at-
tempts to widen the Ho Chi
Minh Trail network westward
to supply their forces in Cam-
bodia.
Cambodian authorities con-
sider it imperative to introduce
at least small military
units into the occupied
provinces to give the civilian
population a -rallying point and
to counter Communist political
influence In the regions they
have held since April.
Greater Containment Needed
Intelligence reports of a
growing Communist build-up in
southern Laos have added ur-
gency to the need for troops
to contain the Communists,
keep their flow of men and
supplies under surveillance and
call in American air strikes.
Most of American bombing is
tow concentrated on southern
Laos.
According to informed
sources, the Communist build-
up has already caused an in-
crease in raids across the bor-
der into Laos by South Viet-
namese irregulars led by
American Special Forces
troops. It has also led to Th,-;.!,
troop reinforcement of Laotian
Government forces in Champas-
sak Province, between the Thai
border and the Mekong River.
CPYRGHT
Approved For Raleasa 90n1 /n3m2 ? nui_DIDP72-00337R000300020001-3
kit s
Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-5R1721043f000300020001-3 "
NEW YO.itiK TIMES
CPYRGHT
A CAMBODIAN BID
IN LAOS REPORTED
Troops Would Get U.S. Arms
There for Operations
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
By HENRY KAMM
Stew:eel be The teTew York Thus
SAIGON, South Vietnam,
Nov. 8?According to informed
sources, Cambodian officers are
discussing with members of the
entourage of Prince Boun Own,
the feudal chief of southern
Laos, the possibility of sending
sizable numbers of Cambodian
troops to Laos to be equipped
with United States arms.
These arms, it is said, would
be in additien to the limited
program of American military
aid now granted to Cambodia.
At this stage, the sources
said, the, United States has not
been brought into the discus-
ions, which were initiated by
the Cambodians. However, the
impetus for the talks ara-le
-from-the fact that about 1,566
Cambodian soldiers are being
trained under the auspices of
the United States Central Intel-
ligence Agency in southern
Laos.
The Cambodian idea is sim-
ply that Cambodia baa more
troops than arms, and Laos
needs soldiers but has found
it easy to get weapons and
equipment from the United
States.
Prince Operates Independently
The Cambodians evidently
see no need to raise the issue,
with the Government of Pre-
mier Souvanna Phouma, of hav-
ing their troops equipped,
trained and operating in the
panhandle of Laos.
Not only is Prince Boun
Oum's authority in southern
Laos almost independent of the
central Government, but also,
perhaps of more importance, his
dealings with the Central Intel-
ligence Agency on military op-
erations run by the agency
in the Ho Chi Minh Trail re-
gion are direct and do not
pass through Vientiane.
me to.i.A. supplies cl 1LL6i
icenary army in Laos through
funding that apparently has
escaped strict Congressional
}control, while American aid to
Cambodia is a limited program
with a spending ceiling for the
present fiscal year of- $40-mil-
lion.
Although an additional ap-
propriation is expected by early
next year, it would still be
.1,-. 1,., cacapc budgetary ro
strictions by supplying Cam-
knel inn trrtnro2 through funds for
Laos.
5 Battalions Considered
No specific proposals have
been made, but Cambodian offi-
cers are thinking in terms of
five battalions, each of about
600 men. They feel that such a
force would be of equal value
to Laos and Cambodia and
could operate in either coun-
try.
At the moment, the Viet-
namese Communists control
roughly the eastern half of the
Laotian panhandle as well as
the adjoining Cambodian prov-
inces of Ratanakiri and Stung-
treng to the south.
The Laotian Government is
worried about Communist at-
tempts to widen the Ho Chi
Minh Trail network westward
to supply their forces in Cam-
bodia.
Cambodian authorities con-
sider it imperative to introduce
at least small military
units into the occupied
provinces to give the civilian
population a rallying point and
to counter Communist political
Influence in the regions they
have held since April.
Greater Containment Needed
Intelligence reports of a
growing Communist build-up in
southern Laos have added ur-
gency to the need for troops
to contain the Communists.
keep their flow of men and
supplies under surveillance and
call in American air strikes.
Most of American bombing is
tow concentrated on southern
caos.
According to informed
sources, the Communist build-
up has already caused an in-
crease in raids across the bor-
der into Laos by South Viet-
namese irregulars led by
American Special Forces
troops. It has also led to Tha.,,
troop reinforcement of Laotian
Government forces in Charnpa,,-
sak Province, between the Thai
border and the Mekong River.
Approved For Release 2001/03/02: CIA-RDP72-00337R000300020001-3
/IAII ONAL GUARDIAN
cpyR8Ntr0ved For Release 2001/02/ON tilk-RDP72-
n_ -? ? )9,
67, al-1 Fiis-
1[177.1[1 011
By Ricfiara t. Ward
. Representatives of the Lao Patriotic Front and the Vientiane
regime last week agreed on a formula for talks. But a continuing
U.S. escalation in Laos makes it apparent that Washington is
. determined to destroy any possibilities for a negotiated settle-
ment of the conflict in Laos at this time. _
Behind last week's development is three years of serious and
irreversible .military setbacks for the U.S.-cdritrolled military
forces of, the Vientiane regime, despite massive U.S. bombing and
the use oftThahand Saigon mercenaries.
The U.S.-led military forces in Laos, including the CIA's
?!`clandestine army" of mercenary troops, are no longer effective
instruments for waging offensive operations. This was demon-
strated by the complete failure of the traditional rainy season
'offensive" this summer and autumn.
The wet season gives a marked advantage to the U.S.-Vientiane
troops because they have the-use of air transport while the Pathet
Lao forces, which travel only by foot or surface vehicle, are?
hindered by .the rains that wash out bridges and turn roads into
mud bogs.'
11,7)
PIL
;
CPYRGHT
00337R000300020001
-3
mercenaries and 10 U.S. Special Forces troopers" were Sent into
Laos in Marine CI-1763 froop-carrying helicopters of which two
were downed.
Opaation Obfuscation
Washington goes to elaborate lengths to conceal its operations
in Laos. In an article entitled, "Laos: The Men Who Aren't
There," published in the Sept. 19 Far Eastern Economic Review,
a Hong Kong business weekly, Nancy Duncan exposes the official
pretense that there are only 21 Americans in the Laotian royal
capital of Luang Prabang, where there is a base for the CIA's Air
America and other aircraft sent on raids over Pathet Lao territory
only a few miles distant.
Duncan reports observing first-hand many uncounted Ameri-
cans in Luang Prabang. She states that the U.S. sends its
personnel to Laos on "temporary duty," while recording them as
:being stationed in Thailand, the Philippines and even the U.S.
CIA personnel, Air A/merica employes and "retired" military men
are among the Americans "who aren't there."
Further revelations about the CIA's activities in Laos were
. published in September in a staff report of the Senat
Subcommittee_on Refugees; headed by Sen. Edward Kennedy.
Staff counsel Dale S. De Haan and sur576-1"
M. Tinker, who visited Indochina this past summer, write:
"From the outset, the USAID refugee program in Laos has
been inextricably tied to and part of, the U.S. paramilitary effort
in northern Laos. In fact, from conversations with USAID
officials in Vientiane and other sources, it is clear that until
relatively recent times the USAID refugee program was simply a
,euphemism. to cover American assistance to persons, mostly hill
tribesmen, who agreed to . take up arms and support efforts
By last spring, Vang Pao's troops, estimated at 17,000 during 2Trainst the Pathet Lac,"
the summer of 1969, were down to 6000, as a result of casualties U.S. bomb victinis
and desertions among the Meo mercenaries. Subsequently; Vang . De. Haan and Tinker's report, entitled "Refugee and Civilian
Pao is said to have recruited new troops, mainly untrained youth, War Casualty Problems in Indochina," elucidates other aspects of
and possibly even some Thais. U.S. policy and its failures in Laos. The authors show that there
During his ."offensive" this year Vang Pao could do no more has been a massive increase in the number of "refugees," who
than "take" a couple of towns of no strategic significance near actually are persons displaced by U.S. bombing and "strateg:e
the plain of Jars. The towns had previously been left deserted by movement of people." They state:
the Pathet Lao,, which held all its important gains made during "Population control and the strategic movement of people in
the first half of this year, including the Plain of Jars and the Laos has been justified on two grounds: First, it denies the Paehet
towns of Attopeu and Saravane in southern Labs. The liberation j Lao the resources of the local population and second, it secures
of these towns and the holding of the surrounding region have 4 more of the population under government control. Or, as one
strategic significance because they block the U.S. aim of observer has said, 'if you can't take the government to the
establishing a corridor in southern Laos between Thailand and people, then you bring the people to the government,'
South Vietnam. "Evidence suggests that this approach has been used extensiv-
Washington has not abandoned this strategy for isolating the ely in Laos, with perhaps as much as a third of the total refugee
NLF forces in South Vietnam. During most of October, the U.S. movement being created through government sponsored, and
command admitted that its entire complement of B-52s based in sometimes government coerced, village evacuations. This has been
Thailand have been bombing in southern Laos, ostensibly particularly true of recent refugee movements from the Plain of
attacking the "Ho Chi Minh trail." Since this summer, U.S. ! Jars."
helicopters have been ferrying Saigon troops and American U.S. bombing of -Laos was stepped up markedly following the
"advisors" on secret operations, also in southern Laos. bombing halt over North Vietnam, according to De Haan and
For several months the U.S. command in Saigon has reported :Tinker, who write: "Refugees say, according to one source, that
weekly losses of helicopters in Laos while saying nothing about during some of this bombing phase, jets have come daily?drop-
casualties among U.S. personnel. But AP correspondent George ping napalm, phosphorous, and anti-personnel bombs: 'They say
Esper, in an Oct. 25 dispatch from Saigon, reveals: "U.S. Special the jets bombed both villages and forests, that they spent most of
Forces troops leading clandestine operations in Laos have their time in holes or caves, and that they suffered numerous
suffered scores of casualties that never have been made . civilian casualties. They say that everything was fired on,
public... . American 'helicopters from bases in Laos are partici- buffaloes, cows, ricefields, schools, temples, tiny shelters outside
pating in ground operations in Laos." the village, in addition to, of course? all people.' "
?Esper notes the ritualistic-denial by the U.S. that "there are no . The subcommittee investigators also reveal the falsity of the
U.S. grounii combat trc/on.a in Lhgo4," an asanr4,19 tks.,i711-4000r,.cArj.g4csoi-rois the bombing in
MAW) OA-041ft
or 44,r6H.144/ Pc-Rity, "as critics have
writer ? obA iff,r0Yea AZOrtaKePikaSfte4
troops leading reconnaissance patrols." In one of the largest of long argued, 'free fire' zones are not uncommon in Laos and the
these operations in September, according. to Esper, "about 150
Last year, the CIA's main force in Laos under Gen. Vann, Pao,
. .
Occupied the Plain of Jars; Although proclaimed is a great victory
in U.S. communiques, it aPparently was a desperate last measure.'
, Actually, there, had been relatively little fighting until the Pathet.
Lao regrouped for a counterattack which culminated in a decisive
victory in February of this year. Vang Pao's forces were trounced
while the U.S. launched the heaviest air attacks in the history of
the Laotian conflict. U.S. air power could not make up for the
deficiencies already evident in Yang Pao's army,
Big loss for Vang Pao
?
CPYRGHT
militaryA. leiblirtasiedaityocifinprmew.*6r9noaryn3762g.?rfi 0:0132;171R0001300a2000tE3lie frontier, with the
the AmericFir ambassador, or; or matter, ffie royar Lao total of the American forces. How can we fight on the
government." .
The purpose: support Saigon
De Haan and Tinker believe that the main purpose of U.S.
intervention in Laos, at least from 1965, has been to support U.S.
operations in Vietnam. They recall that the U.S. operated "a
secret radar station at Pha Ti in northern Laos, just 17 miles from
North Vietnam's border" until it was overrun by the Pathet Lao
in March 1968. The purpose of the U.S. base at Pha Ti, they
write, "was to help guide American bombing raids over North
Vietnam, a function which could understandably be viewed by
North Vietnam as an 'aggressive' act."
Finally, the subcommittee report notes the fate of the Meo
people in Laos; "Nearly the entire Meo population are
refugees?either as civilians fleeing from battle, or as paramilitary
forces taking refuge from defeat. Of an estimated Meo population
of 400,000 in 1960, at least 40% to 50% of the men have been
killed and 25% of the women .and children, have fallen as?
casualties of the war."
The signIficance of these Meo casualties lies in the fact that
U.S. mercenary forces are drawn mainly from the Meo. De Haan
and Tinker note that "some observers feel that many Meo would
probably prefer the risks of accornmodation with the Pathet Lao
and North Vietnamese, .to the continued loss of life and limb arid
land in a conflict which, for them, is endless."
Further details of., the crisis confronting U.S.-spcmsored
Laotian forces are reported by Laurence Stern from Vientiane in
the Oct. 18 Washington Post. Stern writes:
"From the American standpoint any hope; of making new
headway in the war would clearly require a greater U.S. military
investment, such as the massive bombing of the Plain of Jars in
late 1969, but a look at the results is not encouraging. -
"For taking its size into account, Laos has been the. most
heavily bombed country in the history of the World, authoritative
military officials here acknowledge.... In addition, Laos has.
served as a laboratory for counter-insurgency tactics.
"Despite all this support, the royal Lao government is in worse
shape militarily and territorially now than it was eight years ago.
at time of Geneva.
"Pro-government cadre are being killed at the rate of 10 to 15
a day, according to military sources here.... This would be the
equivalent of a 1000 to 1500 daily death toll in a country the size
of the United States."
Stern concludes that it would be in the interest of prince
Souvanna Phouma, Premier of the Vientiane regime, "to stop the
hostilities before things get worse?a question of cutting losses."
Premier may change course
Whether Souvanna Phouma will agree to* a negotiated
settlement remains to be seen.. Although he has been closely
cooperating with the U.S. in recent years, conceivably he might
show more Concern for. the fate of his people than rightist
.elements who are completely subservient to the U.S.
It is reported that Washington wants to negotiate a halt in the
bombings over Pathet Lao territory in Northern Laos and halt
ground operations there while maintaining a free hand for U.S.
operations in southern Laos along the "Ho Chi Minh trail."
? In other words, the U.S. would halt its bombings that have
proved totally ineffective and stop ground operations for which
troops are lacking. Then the U.S. would concentrate its efforts in
a smaller region, maintaining the bombing in southern ,Laos and
possibly augmenting ground operations there by Saigon troops.
Already plans exist for large-scale use of Saigon troops in Laos,
reports Jean-Claude Pomonti in Le Monde Oct. 21. But Pomonti
notes that with U.S. withdrawals, Saigon troops could not
maintain such operations for long. Le Monde's correspondent
quotes Saigon Gen. Duong Van Minh's observations: "If we go to
Laos, it will be difficult to hold on there. It was already
Ho Chi Minh trail, far from our bases and without American.
troops?"
If that actually happens, it wouldn't be the first time that the
U.S. has launched Saigon on a disastrous operation.
Pomonti continues by quoting a North Vietnamese sources
.who stated recently that if Saigon and American forces "launched
an operation against the alleged 'Ho Chi Minh trail,' the Pathet
Lao might then do. something in turn, against Luang Prabang, for
example." _
If Souvanna Phouma gives complete support to further U.S.
escalation, Vientiane may well he faced with not only the loss of
further territory, but also, as some observers report, the
establishment of a provisional government by the Lao Patriotic
Front and the patriotic neutralist forces.
CPYRGHT
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Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP72-0033irprepp20001-3 /(0
THE EVENING STAR DATE - - PAGE
6 YtAKS IN LUMbAl CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT By TAMMY ARBUCK.LE
?%1Otp. Thy nh P. Not One Trail One officer, a colonel, was re-
Chi M: nil i3 not nional adviser to the 5th Military
VIENTIANE ? U.S. advisers one trai , but a mass of small Region. The other, a major, was
have been on the ground work- trails, aths and rivers with armed with an M16 rifle.
ing in combat situations in Laos truck basses all interlocking!: U.S. military men played the
part of ground controllers during
North Vietnamese attacks on
Long Chien this year. At Senate
hearings, it was admitted that
"validated" U.S. Army person-
nel may take part as forward air
guides.This is extremely danger-
ous duty involving approaching
U.S. Advisers Role inttags? Reported
since 1964, Lao military sources The whole thing is split into sec-
say. tions to which North Vietnamese
Lao military sources, corn- units are permanently assigned.
menting on stories Monday that Trucks shuttle back and forth on
U.S. troops have been leading each section and never cross
ground strikes in the Ho Chi into other sections.
Minh Trail area in South Laos To monitor and attack this
said "yes, sometimes there are naze local mountaittribesmen
Americans and South Vietnam-
ese in attacks there. The North enemy units and infiltrating past
Vietnamese have taken over led by American operatives, I
that part of Laos. We have no
control over it now. Souvanna
Phouma has said the trails are
part of the Vietnamese war.
The sources admitted they
knew of occasions when U.S. ad-
visers were present during fight-
ing in other parts of Laos.
3 Types of Advisor
U.S. ground advisers in Laos
break down into three catego-
ries.
Group is composed cf advisers
belonging to the studies and ob-
servation group of the Special
Forces. These men, apart from
certain special operations, oper-
ate against the Ho Chi Minh
Trail in the Laos panhandle.
Their missions include leading
troops of various Asian national-
ities in what the Lao military
call "2 commando destruction"
operations against parts of the
trail.
When Americans are killed,
they are included in the Vietnam
causalty list. In 1967, one such
group operated in South Viet-
nam, near Ke San village south
of the Demilitarized Zone. They
entered Laos often by helicopter.
The see3i_gmlt.p_uf_aduisers
in Laos consists of ex-milqary
men employerne operations
ERR?a OI_Ine_centr_al_balli;
gence Agency.
These men, in South Laos'I
work the wit flank _of the_trajj
and supplement the activities of
Special Forces groups working
out of Vietnam.
In North Laos they supervise
paramilitary groups in combat
against North Vietnamese.
Approved For Relea
are used.
In August 1965 I walked into
the western flank of the Ho Chil
Minh Trail east of the town of
Saravane where I met one agen-
cy's paramilitary American op-
eratives.
That morning he had been
chased away from a ridge over-
looking the trail by Communist
troops and escaped after a fire-
fight. He was dressed in a one
piece green fatigues. He led trib-
al troops back into the area.
Two such operatives usually
are present in 10-man surveil-
lance and harassment teams
working North Vietnamese lines
of communication in northern
Laos, U.S. sources say.
The third group of men are
U.S. Army officers and non-
commissioned officers assigned
to Laos units, usually on tempo-
rary duty.
'65 Incident Recalled
These men give advice to Laos,
commanders under fire. In No-
vember 1965, I saw a U.S. Army
captain, while under fire from a
North Vietnamese unit, give ad-
vice to Col. Thao Ly, then com-
manding paratroop group mo-
bile 21 of the Royal Lao army.
The captain advised the colonel
to bring up a howitzer to fire
down a cave mouth where North
Vietnamese troops had taken
shelter.
The captain had two U.S.
Army sergeants who handled
communications further back.,
Americans continue to carry
out those duties.
At Paksane earlier this year,
correspondents saw Oro U.S.
Army officers who asked their
nanigs not be divulged accompa-
S*Qaarla3i02B:a101A-Ft
what Lao officers said was the
start of a military operation.
their patrols to pinpoint Red po-
sitions for air strikes
'The U.S. military in Vientiane
in testimony before a Senate
committee, said U.S. advisers in
LCUMjire 11U1 CUILLbdi calvibei b.
The U.S. press is restricted in
traveling to Laos battlefields to
prevent them seeing Americans
in action.
The American troops, who
number fewer than 300, are
working with Lao and tribal
guerrillas against thousands of
Hanoi troops.
P72-00337R000300020001-3
ttt),
Approved For R
NEW YORK TimCPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
U. S. CASUALTIES
IN LAOS REPORTED
IN SECRET ACTIONS
Special Forces Said to Have
Suffered Losses That
Were Never Disclosed
PYRGHT
By The Associated Press
SAIGON, South Vietnam,
Oct. 25?Highly placed sources
said today that United States
Special Forces troops leading
clandestine operations in Laos
had suffered casualties in re-
cent months that never had
been made public.
The informants also said
that American helicopters from
bases in South Vietnam were
participating in ground oper-
ations in Laos. The United
States command said that an
Army UH-1 helicopter was
shot down in the lower pan-
handle of Laos yesterday but
declined to disclose the air-
craft's mission. The command
said that there had been no
casualties in the crash.
It was learned that about
150 mercenaries and 10 United
States Special Ferces troopers
were used in an operation in
southern Laos last month to
force out two enemy battalions
for American bombers. Infor-
mants said a North Vietnamese
force estimated at more than
500 men had been destroyed.
A dozen mercenaries were re-
ported killed and 40 to 50
mercenaries and two Americans
were wounded in the oper-
ation, they added.
The military command in
Saigon and the United States
Embassy in Laos, under orders
from Washington, said in March
that they would make public all
DATE IA-RDP,7?-1093317R000300020991A
asualty figures from Laos.
[In Washington, the De-
fense Department denied that
United States Special Forces
troops had suffered easual-
ties in Laos in recent months
that had not been reported.
"All casualties for all of
Southeast Asia have been re-
ported on a regular basis,"
a Pentagon spokesman said.]
The United States Embassy in
vientiane,?the Laotian capital
has responsibility to release al
information on American mili
?tary personnel stationed in
Laos who become casualties
The United States command in
Casualties Reported, U. S. Says
specie to The Net,/ Yen 'Times
WASHINGTON, Oct. 25?The
Defense Department denied to-
day that United States Special
Forces troops had suffered cas-
ualties in Laos in recent months
that had not been reported.
"All casualties for all of
Southeast Asia have been re-
ported on a regular basis," a
' Pentagon spokesman declared.
The spokesman said that cas-
ualties connected with aircraft
losses had all been reported. In
response to questions about
ground combat operations, of-
ficials at both the State Depart-
Defense Depart-
ment referred to
Nixon.s si.aleisteut lit March tin*
there were no United States
combat troops in Laos, only
training and logistical support
troops.
Defense Department sources
that Special Forces personnel
were included in these two cate-
gories, and it has been reported
that the Central Intelligence
tiAgncy employs former Special
Forces men as advisers to pri-
vately operated armies made up
of Asian personnel.
Defense sources said that
American casualties Incurred by
units operating from South
Vietnam would be included as
part of the weekly casualty re-
ports for the South Vietnam
theater of operations. However,
they expressed doubt that more
than a handful of Americans
had died in these missions and
characterized the report that
'many casualties had gone unre-
Jaorted as "erroneous."
Approved For
closina casualties suffered by
American forces operating in
Laos from bases in South Viet-
nam.
But command casualty sum-
maries dating from March 10
have listed no ground combat
casualties for Laos, although a
highly placed source said:
"American Special Forces
troopers operating out of South
Vietnam are losing one or two
killed in Laos every month and
anywhere from three to 10
wounded."
The source said that the cas-
ualties in Laos were being incor-
porated into weekly casualty
summaries under a broad head-
ing of "cumulative figures for
Southeast Asia," which includes
mostly casualties in South Viet-
nam and those in Cambodia,
during the United States incur-
sions there last May and June
Troops' Presence Denied
Asked about this, a spokes-
man for the command said.
"There are no United States
ground combat troops in Laos."
This statement is repeated often
by the command, but it does
not take into account Special
Forces troops leading reconnais-
sance patrols.
Informants said that the 160-
man operation into Laos last
month was one of the biggest
across-the-border actions of the
war and was supported by
United States Marine CH-53
troop4carrying helicopters. Two
helicopters were said to have
been shot down.
"It was a company-sized op-
eration," said one info ' ant,
"with the mission of inte diet-
ing a road and forcing out a
couple of enemy battalion."
The sources also said that
squad-sized patrols cons sting
of a dozen mercenaries 1 d by
United States Special F rces
men were now operating in
Ofriit
R.
capture enemy soldiers for intel-
ligence purposes.
CPYRGHT
IA-RDP72-00337R0003000 0001-3
10-C1
Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300020M-2
DAT E
NEW YORK TID,a,E,S
U-' Y RGHT
CAMBODIAN FORCE
TRAINING IN LAOS
C.I.A. Runs Effort to Build
Group for Possible Use in
Ho Chi Minh Trail 1$rea
PYMRY KAMM
C Ire New York Timm
PNOMPENH, Cambodia, Oct.
22?Reliable sources have re-
. ported that three Cambodian
) battalions---about 1,500 men?
are at an American Special
Forces camp in southern Laos
for commando training and
possible use in the Laotian-
Cambodian border region.
The camp?at Paksong, at
the northern run of the Boloven
Plateau in the Laotian pan-
handle?is a principal base for
surveillance of the Ho Chi Minh
Train to the and for raids on it.
Those operations, as well as
the training of Laotian and now
Cambodian troops to participate
in them, are carried out under
the direction of the Central In-
telligence Agency.
The first Cambodians were
reported to have arrived in late
spring. About 600 of them are
I said to have been recruited
among refugees who drifted
Inorthward to the Mekong River
island of Khong, on the Laotian
side of the border, as North
Vietnamese troops were seiz-f
ing control of the Cambodian
border province of Stung Treng.
Indications are that the de-
ployment of the Cambodian
soldiers in neutral Laos was in-
itiated by the intelligence
agency in cooperation with
some quarters in the Cambodi-
an and Laotian military. There
are also indications that none
of the Governments involved;
not even the United States Em-
bassies here and in the Laotian
capital of Vientiane, have been
informed.
American officials declined
comment on the report, the La-
otian Embassy here denied it
and the chief of Cambodian
military inteknErrthvg.HCF*1 r
Kim Eng Kinirotideffi,?gard hr?
could not discuss it.
With the hold of the Vien-
tiane Government over the
south almost negligible, in-
formed sources presume that
the introduction of the Cam-
bodian troops was arranged
with representatives of Prince
Boun Gum of Champassak, the
effective ruler of the portions
of southern Laos not controlled
by the Vietnamese Communists.
In this connection it was
noted that Prince Sissouk of
Champassak, who enjoys the
esteem of the United States
and is a ne ? hew of Prince Boun
imen in Laos in support, or ef-
fective domination, of the Com-
munist Pathet Lao rebellion.
They cooperate with about
6,000 Chinese Communist
troops building and guarding a
road toward the Thai frontier
that the Laotian Government
did not ask them to build.
The United States has
a
large s aff olfrtflftary attachds
as advisers to the regular Lao-
tian Army and, through the
Central Intelligence Agency,
lies, advises
481,. 3taging A.'" 1
Laotian strength in the south
showed signs of great attrition
earlier this year, when the Gov-
ernment abandoned two ml-
portant towns, Saravane and
I Attopeu, with little resistance.
Although both had long been
accessible only by air, they
served as important centers of
American-directed guerrilla'
units in their surveillance and
occasional spoiling operations
along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
Th4 two provincial capitals
fell as Cotrtmunist forces
mounted pressure on southern
this year. Furthermore, Maj.
Gen. Phassouk Somly, who is
close to Prince Biotin Gum and
commands the southernmost
military region, has had direct
dealings with the intelligence
agency for many years.
In Government's Interest
The sources said it would
be in the interest of Prince
Souvanna Phouma's Govern-
ment to remain at least offici-
ally unaware of the presence of
the Cambodian troops because
the Geneva accord of 1962 on
the neutrality and independ-
ence of Laos, which the Pre-
mier is striving to make effec-
tive, forbids the presence of
foreign troops.
Nonetheless, the accords
were violated by five powers
before Cambodia did so.
North Vietnam . has an army
estimated at upward of 50,00e
DEMILITARIZED
ZONE
ottlA ,
CIZieza
ch.
KNONG
Sturistra 9
CAMBODIA m.bian?
Komflanysom
frliES
ETS1.1.41
DIA
The New York Times Oct. 23, 1970
entry army
That is in addition to exten-
sive air attacks throughout the
country, with particular con-
centration on the Ho Chi Minh
Trail, on which North Vietnam
moves men and supplies to
South Vietnam in circumven-
tion of the Geneva accords of
1954, which ended the Indo-
china war, and of the demili-
tarized zone on the border be-
tween North and South Viet.'
nam.
Thailand frequently sends
troops across the border for
brief, operations and has re-
cently begun to station units
in Sayaboury Province in the
north and in Champassak Prov-
ince in the south, in the areas
between the Mekong River and
the border.
South Vietnamese units also
frequently cross the border in
hot pursuit, but Prince Souvan-
na Phounia ts- believed to have
resisted more long-term oper-
fit
ations by ?afgoli. That is in line
with widespread expectations
among Laotians that they will
have a difficult time under the
best of circumstances in per-
suading their foreign friends
and foes to return their coun-
try to them if peace comes to
Indochina.
Diplomatic considerations
aside, informed sources believe
that the use of Cambodian
troops in Laotian border area
serves the interests of both
countries.
break of fighting in Cambodia.
With the extension of Vietna-
mese Communist operations
throughout Cambodia and the
loss of the border sanctuaries
and the supply route from the
Cambodian port of Kompong
Som, southern Laos became the
main depot and staging area.
During the current lull in
fighting throughout Indochina,
allied 'intelligence is especially
concerned over a reported
build-up of the Communists'
strength in the southern pan-
handle. It is believed that to
supply their forces in Cambodia
they will be obliged to widen
the Ho Chi Minh network of
trails toward the west end
south.
To resist that, as well as to
minimize the flow d sup-
plies southward, greater allied
strength is said to be needed
in southern Laos. But Laos,
whose population does not ex-
ceed three million and where
child soldiers have become a
componplace, is running out of
men. Cambodia, on the other
hand, has more volunteers than
arms,
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'NOT ON POST
DATE (40010 PAGE :3
'AID Goods for Laos
Vanished, GAO Says
C YRGHT
By Ronald Koven
Investigators for the Gen-
eral Accounting Office found
serious losses of U.S. relief!
goods intended for refugees inj
Laos, according to a report re-
leased yesterday.
1
In two weeks of spoteheck-
in t, GAO, investigators found!
that $109,000 worth of goods
shipped from Thailand to Laos
had inexplicably disappeared,
according to a summary of the
report released by Sen. Ed
ward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.)
chairman of the Judiciary Sub
committee on Refugees.
The GAO, an investigatin
arm of Congress, conducte
i t s investigation of U. S
Agency for International De
velopment programs at th
Kennedy Subcommittee's re
quest.
Kennedy. alleged that "slop-
py management, weak account-
ability procedures, and a
serious loss or diversion of
commodities characterized
some AID programs in Laos"
and that this raises "serious
doubts about the efficiency
and effectiveness of all U.S.
aid programs to Vientiane,"
the capital of Laos.
All) spokesmen in Wash-
ington said they would have
no comment until they had
studied the GAO report. They
said many of the loose prac-
tices the GAO had reported
to AID personnel on the spot'
, had since been tightened up.
After the GAO's field in-
vestigation, conducted in July
and August, AID told the
GAO it had found documents
accounting for most of the
missing $109,000 worth of
f nails
Nat?
But the GAO said it could
only conclude that there is
still a need for AID to review
its procedures and to improve
them.
Daniel De IIaar, the coun-
sel for the Subcommittee, said
a number of obstacles had
been placed on the GAO in-
vestigation by the Central In-
telligence Agency.
He said that an attempt had
been made to prevent the
GAO investigators from go-
ing to Laos on the grounds
that no travel funds were
available for them and that
the CIA had attempted to in-
voke executive privilege to
prevent the investigators from
seeing the records for the
refugee aid program.
Examples of mismanage-
ment the GAO found included:
? Transportation bills sub-
mitted by a military-controlled
Thai government agency, Ex-
press Transportation Organi-
zation, were paid without
proof that goods shipped from
Thailand had been received
in Laos.
? A Thai private company,
Ear Peng Chiang, was paid for
delivering a shipment of steel
bars and axes which was not
received in Laos.
? "USAID was not process-
ing most claims against car-
riers for shortages or dam-
ages incurred in transit."
U.S. aid to Laos runs about
$50 million yearly, a third of
which is designated for refuge-
es. The GAO investigators
spotchecked programs worth
.t.,:.talojr,1$14.1 million in fiscal
io
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