CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE EXTENSION OF REMARKS 21 JANUARY 1970

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January 21, 1970
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00000010032-0 E 15] January 21, 197~ppr~cJ1~TLIZEG(3K'-ClxtRensions~o3R ear s ENSIONS OF . REM DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APf'RO- Smith, Ill. Talmadge Yarborough 1'RIATIOIVS, 1970 Sparkman Thurmond Young, N. Dak. HON. MIKE % Stevens Williams, Del. l/ il:OiFACi 1~+4+ Mr. KENNEDY. I announce that the IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATE-5 Senator from New Mexico (Mr. ANDER- soN) , the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Wednesday, January 21, 1970 UsS LL),, the Senator from Missouri Mr. M'cCLEI,L,AN., Mr. Presidex>,t, on r. SYMINGTON)-, and the Senator from behalf of the-, distinguished majority Maryland (Mr. TYDINGS) are necessarily leader, I ask unanimous consent to have absent. printed in the Extensions of Remarl s ti I also announce that the Senator from expurgated transcript of the proceedings West Virginia (Mr. RANDOLPH) is absent December. 15, 1969, which has been pre- 1. Iurtner announce that the Senator paled under the direction. of the,. Sen- from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) is ab- ator from Louisiana, (Nil'., EL~s pER); sent because of a death in his family. and that subsequently it be published at Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the the appropriate place in the body of the Senator from Iowa (Mr. MILLER) is nec- permanent RECORD of December 15, 1969. essarily absent. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without The Senator from South Dakota (Mr. objection, it is so ordered. MUNDT) is absent because of illness. The Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) is absent because of illness in CLOSED SESSIO'T his family. Mr.11)fANSFIELD. Mr. President, Under, The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum rule XXXV, I move t4lat the doors of the is present. Chamber be closed and that the Preside Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, ing Officer' direct that the galleries be amwouldes of the those Presiding officials who Officer read the lcleared. Mr. ' President, I do so only to nho will will be he bring this matter to a head, lowed under rule XXXVI to be in the Mr. F'I7I,B1 IGHT. I second the ingtion Chamber. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. PAY> The PRESIDING OFFICER. Perhaps it would in the chair). The motion having ,been m be appropriate for 2 of the o nresif made and seconded that the Senate go, g Officer to read from section into closed session, the Chair, pursuant rule XXXVI which governs the question to rule XXXV, now directs the Sergeant- raised d by by the distinguished majority at-Arms to clear the galleries, close the leader. doors of the Chambers and exclu..e Section 2 of rule =VI reads: all 1 When acting upon confidential on Execu- offtcials of the Senate + not Sw4?p to Live business, unless the same shall be con secrecy. sidereci an. open Executive Session, the Sea- (At 1 o'clock and 9 minutes p.m. the ate Chamber shall be cleared of all persons doors of the Chamber were closed.) except the Secretary, the Chief Clerk, the paiaClpal Legislative Clerk, the Executive Clerk, the Minute and Journal Clerk, the CALL OF THE ROLL, Sergeant-at-Arms, the Assistant Doorkeeper, a.ad such other ofAcers as the Presiding Of- Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. president, I sug- fiver shall think necessary, and all such of- gest the absence of a quorum. flyers shall be sworn to secrecy. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, are will call the roll. . the majority and minority secretaries The assistant legislative clerk called included? the roll, and the following Senators ans- The PRESIDING OFFICER. In the wered to their names. past, the orders have been interpreted Aiken Allen Allott Baker. Bayh Bellmon Bennett Bible Gravel Boggs Griffin Brooke Gurney Burdick Hansen Byrd, Va. Harris Byrd, W. Va. Hart Cannon Hartke Lase Hat$eld Church Holland Cook Hollings Cotton Hruslm Cranston Hughes Curtis Inouye .Metcalf. .The PRESIDING OFFICER. They are Mondale covered by the previous order. Montoya Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in Murphy . addition to that, the joint leadership has M?skie asked the Parliamentarian for a memo- Nelson randum on the question of the official Pas ? Reporters. On the basis of previous ses- Pearson ore Pearson siDns, I ask unanimous consent that the Dodd Javits Proxmire Dole) Jordan, N.C. Ribicoff. . Dominick Jordan, Idaho Saxbe 1lagleton Kennedy Schweiker Eastland Long Scott Ellerxder Magnuson Smith, Maine [No. 231 Leg.) and ,expanded to include the majority Ervin Mansfield and minority secretaries, The Senator Fannin Mathias is correct. Fong McCarthy Fuibright McClellan Mr. MANSFIELD. And the Parliamen- Goldwater McGee . tarian and the Assistant Parliamentari- Goodell McQovep Gore McIntyre an. F,lc~cllu W?l,n.zs.e 1Luues. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and -it is so ordered. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I further ask, unanimous consent that, at the conclusion of the closed session, the transcript of the remarks of each Sen- ator who participatel in the proceedings be delivered to the Chief of Official Re- porters; that the Senator shall have the right to revise his own remarks; that such Senator shall deliver his revised re- marks to the Chief Reporter, who shall then deliver the transcript to the dis- tinguished Senator from Louisiana (Mr. ELLENDER), as acting chairman oT the Subcommittee on Defense Appropria- tions; that the expurgated version of these proceedings be prepared under the direction of the Senator from Louisiana, and that there be deleted from the tran- script anything which might be classi- fied; that such record of proceedings be made public by being printed in the permanent CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of the date on which they occurred; and that the Chief Reporter turn. the shorthand notes of the Official Reporters over to the Secretary of the Senate to be kept in secret and not to be disclosed with- 'Out leave of the Senate. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, in ad- dition to the persons authorized to be in the Chamber, I ask unanimous con- sent that the counsel to the Committee on Appropriations, Mr. William Wood- ruff, and the staff consultant to the Com- mittee on Foreign Relations, Mr. Walter Pincus, be permitted to be present. Mr. TOWER. Reserving the right to object, Mr. President, It would be proper to inquire as to the security clearance of the two staff members.. Mr. MANSFIELD. They have been cleared. Mr. TOWER. They have been cleared? Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, without ques- tion. Mr. ELLENDER. Without question. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, it is my understanding that one of the pur- poses of this closed session is for me to provide answers to the questions that were propounded by the distinguished Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FTLBRIGHT) in his letter to the chairman of the Com- mittee on Appropriations. I am prepared to proceed with this information. I ask the indulgence of Senators to listen to the. questions and the answers as I shall read them. Question No. 1: What treaties, agree- ments, or declarations provide the basis for our defense commitment and military assist- ance to the Royal Lao Government? The answer is unclassified. It reads as follows : The basic US policy towards Laos is that of support for its independence and neu- trality. We have no written or oral defense commitment to Laos. In 1962, the US and other parties to the Declaration of Neutrality of Laos, agreed to respect and observe the neutrality of Laos. Under Article IV, the parties undertake in Approved For Release 2002/01/22 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0 Approved For Release 2002/01/22 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0 E 152 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -. Extensions of Remarks January 21, the event of a violation or a threat of viola- tion Of Lao sovereignity, Independence. neu- trality oor territorial integrity, to consult jointly with the RLG and among them- selves "in order to consider means which might prove to be necessary to ensure the observance of these principles."-Pasi; Royal Lao Government efforts to obtain consulta- tion among all the parties have been unsuccessful. After North Vietnam failed to respect the Geneva Agreements, by not withdrawing about 6,000 of their troops after signing the Geneva Agreements in 1962, the RLG In September 1962 requested the US to provide supplies and repair parts for US furnished equipment, training ammunition, and con- sumable supplies for national defense of Laos. This assistance is permitted under Ar- ticle VI of the Protocol of the Declaration of Neutrality which states; "The introduc- tion into Laos of armaments, munitions and war material generally, except such quan- tities of conventional armament as the RLG may-consider necessary for national defense of Laos, is prohibited." In 1984, when NVN significantly In- creased its military support of the Pathet Lao and use of Lao territory to infiltrate men and material into South Vietnam, the RLG requested additional US assistance against this threat to its neutrality and territory. The RLG was fully within its rights to do so. In response to this request and to assist Laos in meeting this Increased threat to Its national defense created by communist ag- gression, we increased assistance to Laos. This increase in assistance was in a spirit of a response proportionate to the threat. In sum, we complied with the Geneva Agreements. The North Vietnamese violated these agreements by (1) attacks against the Royal Lao Government (2) use of Lao terri- tory to carry out aggression in South Viet- nam. Our assistance to Laos has been limited and in response to North Vietnamese viola- tion of the Agreements. This assistance has been to preserve the independence of Laos, under the general pre- cepts of international law-which allow a na- tion to seek assistance in Its own self-defense. This is classified: [Deleted.) Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a brief interruption? Mr. ELLENDER. I yield. Mr. GRIFFIN. In response to several inquiries from Members; I wish to ask the Chair to state what the pending busi- ness is. The pending amendment has not been printed and is not available on the desk of each Senator. Therefore :[ think it would be helpful if the pending amend- ment could be read again. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will read the pending amendment. The legislative clerk read as follows: On page 46, between lines 8 and 9, insert a new section as follows: "Sac. 643. None of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used for the support oa local forces in Laos or Thailand except tc provide supplies, materiel, equipment, and facilities, including maintenance thereof, or to provide training for such local forces." Mr. GRIFFIN. I thank the Senator. The PRESIDING` OFFICER. The amendment has been offered by the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) and the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD). Mr. ELLENDER. I shall reread the classified portion of the answer to. ques- tion No. [deleted]. Question No. 2: Mr. FULBRIGHT. Will the Senator yield for eiarification, before he goes to the next question? Mr. ELLENDEfR. I yield. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Do I correctly un- derstand from the Senator's statement that no treaty of any kind has been en- tered into and that no agreement, of any kind has been submitted to the Senate authorizing these activities in Laos? Mr. ELLENDER. I am just reading from the statement. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Is that not clear? There is no treaty. Do they contend there is any agreement or treaty? Mr. ELLEND:ER. It is in accord with the Geneva agreement. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point? Mr. ELLENDER. I yield. Mr. MANSFIT`LD. Under the protocol of the Southeast Asian Treaty, Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam were brought under its umbrella. The proviso was that we would come to their assist- ance if they were attacked by Commu- nist forces from, outside. But it also said that any such move would be subject to due constitutional process. Mr. FULBRI(HT. Did not Laos itself remove itself from under that umbrella? Mr. MANSFIELD. I do not believe so. I think Cambodia did but not Laos. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think Laos did. They were trying after 1962 to establish a neutrality; so it would not be brought into this. Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator may be right. Mr.. ELLENDER. If the Senator has evidence to that, effect, let him present it. Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield. I was just trying to clarify the situation. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DOLE in the chair). The Senator from Louisi- ana has the floor. Mr. ELLENDER. I yield so that the Senator from Idaho may propound a question. Mr. CHURCH. If I correctly under- stood the statement the Senator read, the only formed obligation the United States assumed with respect to Laos-- Mr. GURNES_'. Mr. President, will the Senator speak :louder? We cannot hear him. Mr. CHURCH. If I correctly under- stood the written statement which has just been read by the Senator from Lou- isiana the nature of the formal obliga- tion assumed by the United States is to consult with other signatories to the Geneva Accord on Laos in the event of aggression. That is the only formal commitment. The present activities in the nature of aerial sorties over Laos are in violation of the Accord. [Deleted.] Mr. PASTOR:E. Mr. President, will the Senator yield on that point? Mr. CHURCH. I yield. Mr. PASTORS. Did not the Senator read that all attempts at consultation were futile? Mr. ELLENDER. Yes. Mr. PASTORRE. That, we did try to consult and that this was all rejected? Mr. ELLEND 11. Yes, but I may state this also. There is no question but that [deletedl these sorties were [deleted I for the purpose interdicting men and sup- plies coming down the Ho Chi Minh trails into South Vietnam. [Deleted.] However, the Senator from Arkansas had extensive hearings on all this mat- ter. If he has anything different from the answers I am reading it might be well if it were stated for the Senate. (Subsequently, on December 17, Mr. MANSFIELD made the following state- merit, which by unanimous consent is printed in the RECORD at this point:) Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President,' on Monday, there was an exchange between the distinguished Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT) and me relative to whether the kingdom of Laos had re- noutlced its adherence to the Southeast- ern Asia Treaty' Organization, otherwise known as SEATO. I indicated that I thought only Cam- bodia had stated it would not be under the SEATO umbrella and that Laos was still in that category. Under the corollary to the SEATO agreement at Manila in 1953, I find that I was wrong. and that the distinguished chairman of the Fo: eign Relations Com- mittee was right and that in the Neutral- ity Agreement Laos did declare its in- tention to not recognize the protection of any alliance or military coalition in- cluding SEATO. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that the Declaration on the Neu- trality of Laos be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the docu- merit was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: DECLARATION ON THE NEUTBALrrY OF LAOS The Governments of the "Union of Burma, the Kingdom of (2'umbodia, Canada, the People's Republic of China, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, the Republic of France, the Republic of India, the -Polish People's Republic, the Republic of Viet-Nam, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Union of So- viet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, whose repre- sentatives took part in the International Conference on the S'.': Clement of the Laotian Question, 1961-62; Welcoming the presentation of the state- ment of neutrality by the Royal Government of Laos of July 9, 1962, and taking note of this statement, which is, with the concur- rence of the Royal Government of Laos, in- corporated in the present Declaration as an integral part thereof, and the text of which is as follows: "The Royal Govern.rient of Laos, "Being resolved to i'ellow the path of peace and neutrality in conformity with the Inter- ests and aspirations of the Laotian people, as well as the principles of the Joint Commu- nique of Zurich dated June 22, 1961, and of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 in order to build a peaceful, neutral, Independent. democratic, unified and proseprous Laos, "Solemnly declares that: "(1) It will resolutely apply the five prin- ciples of peaceful re-existence in foreign relations, and will develop friendly relations and establish diplomatic relations with all countries, the neighboring countries first and foremost, on the basis of equality and of re- spect, for the independence and sovereignty of Laos; "(2) It is. the will of the Laotian people to protect and ensure respect for the sover- eignty, independence. neutrality, unity, and territorial integrity of Laos; Approved For Release 2002/01/22 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0 gpprQ xxeQ~~(~ lI~a~g$@,2 CI -RDR72-003 000300010032-0 ianuary 1, 1970 1.6JJGF VRX 7ZFW :- Extensions of Kemarks (3) It will not resort to the use or Threat political nature to any assistance which they shall include members of 'foreign military of force in any way which might impair the may offer or which the Kingdom of Laos missions, foreign military advisers, experts, peace of other countries, and will not inter- may seek; instructors, consultants, technicians, ob- fere) i the internal affairs of other countries; (e) they will not bring the Kingdom of servers and any other foreign military per- 4) It will not enter into any mfl1tary Laos in any way into any military alliance sons, including those serving in any armed alliance or into any agre . eiiient, whether mill- or any other agreement, whether military forces in Laos, and foreign civilians eon- foxy or otherwise, wh ch is inconsistent with or otherwise, which is inconsistent with her, netted with the supply, maintenance, stor- ii the neturality of the Kingdom of Laos; It will neutrality, nor invite or encourage her to Ing and utilization of war materials; not allow the establis)iment of any foreign enter into any such alliance or to conclude (b) the term "the Commission" shall mean military base, on Laotian territory, nor allots any such agreement; the International Commission for, Supervi- any country to lase Lao-flan territory, for (f) they will respect the wish of the King- sion and Control in Laos set up by virtue of military purposes or for the purposes of dom of Laos not to recognise the protection the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and com- Interference in , the, internal affairs of other of any alliance or military coalition, includ- posed of the representatives of Canada, India countries, nor recognize "'he protection of tug SEATO;, and Poland,. with the representative of India any alliance or inilltary coalition, including (g) they will not introduce into the King- as Chairman; SEATO. dom,of Laos foreign troops or military per- (c) the term "the Co.?Chairnren" shall "(5) It will not allow any foreign interfer- sonnel in any form whatsoever, nor will they mean the Co-Chairmen of the International ence in. the Internal affairs of the Kingdorn in any way facilitate or connive at the in- Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian of Laos in any form whatsoever; troduction of any foreign troops or'military Question, 1961-1962, and their successors in "(6) Subject to the provisions of Article b personnel; the.offices,of Her Britannic Majesty'sPrin- of the Protocol, it will require the withdrawal (h) they will not establish nor will they cipal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from Laos of all foreign troops and military in. any way facilitate or connive at the es- and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union personnel, and will not allow any foreign tablishment in the Kingdom of Laos of any of Soviet Socialist Republics respectively; troopsor military personnel to be introduced foreign military base, foreign strong point (a) the term "the members of the Con- into Laos; or other foreign military installation of any ference" shall mean the Governments of "(7) It will accept direct and uncondi- kind; countries which took part in the Inter- t1tomal aid from all, countries that wish to (I) they will not use the territory of the national Conference for the Settlement of help the Kingdom of Lacs build up an Inde Kingdom of Laos for interference in the in- the Laotian Question, 1961-1962. Laos; country, including their own for interfer- All foreign regular and irregular troops, "(6) It will respect the treaties brat agree;- ence in the internal affairs Of the Kingdom foreign para-military formations and foreign relents signed in conformity with the inter= of Laos? military personnel shall bet withdrawn from errs oY the Laotian people and of the policy 3. Appeal to all other States to recognise, Laos in the shortest time possible and in any of .peace and neutrality of the Kingdom, in respect and observe in every way the rover- case the withdrawal shall be completed not parttculas the Geneva Agreements of 1962, eignty,independence and neutrality, and also later than thirty days after the Commission and will abrogate all treaties and agreements the unity and territorial integrity, of the has notified the Royal Government of Laos which to contrary to those principles. Kingdom of Laos and to refrain from any that in accordance with Articles 3 and 10 of "This statement pf neutrality b7 the Royal action inconsistent with these principles or this Protocol its inspection teams are present Government of Laos shall beprorriugated with other provisions of the present Dec- at all points of withdrawal from Laos. These oonstittvtior ally and shall have the force of laration. points shall be determined by the Royal law. 4. Undertake, in the event of a violation or Government of Laos in accordance with Ar- "he Kingdom of Laos appeals to all the threat of violation of the sovereignty, inde- ticle a within thirty days after the entry into States participating in the International pendence, neutrality, unity or territorial in- force of this Protocol. The inspection teams Conference on tl)e Settlement of e Lryotiai tegrity of the Kingdom of Laos, to consult shall be present at these points and the Question, and to all other Sates, tO recognise jointly with the Royal Government of Laos Commission shall notify the Royal Govern- the sovereignty, indepein'Ae e, neutraland among themselves in order to consider ment of Laos thereof within fifteen days unity said territorial integrity of Laos, to measures which might prove to be necessary after the points have been determined. ooa#rnin to these principles in all respects, to ensure the observance of these principles Article 3 and to refrain from any action inconsistent therewith," and the other provisions of the present Dec- _ The withdrawal of foreign regular and laration. irregular troops, I p Oonfi ?ming the principles of respect for foreign ~ar the sovereignty, independence, unity and 6 The present Declaration shall enter into motions and foreign military personnel shall hall territorial Integrity of the lain Om of Laos force on signature and together with the take place only along such routes and etsi.Ynmoni? ~f rn?Fna li+~. he. Fh'.. D..,..,1 l3,.,,_ .- _ _ _ __ _ _ which are embodied in the Geneva;4gree- merit, of 1954; Empiiasizing the principle of ' respecat for the neutrality of the Kingdom 'ott Laos; Agreeing that the above-mentioned;grin= triples constitute a basis for the peaceful settlement of the Laotian question: Profoundly convinced that the independ ence and neutrality of the Eli gdom`of .Laos will assist the peaceful democratic develop mentOf tAae Kingdom of.Laos?will assist,the e in two y one h und" i y - that country, as well as the strengthening of peace and security In South-East Asia; , third day of July one thousand nine ne hundred 1. Solemnly declare, in accordance with and sixty-two in the English, Chinese, the will of the Government and people of French, Laotian and Russian languages, each the Kingdom of Laos, as expressed in the text being equally authoritative, statement of neutrality by the Royal Gov- PRiTOCOL TO THE DECLARATION ON THE ernment of Laos of July 9, 1952 that they NEUTRALITY OF LAOS an gx9eption leave in Laos for _a limited recognise and ,will respect and observe in ' The Governments of the Union of Burma, period of time a precisely limited number of every way the sovereignty, independence, the Kingdom of Cambodia, Canada, the Peo- French military instructors for the purpose neutrality, unity and territorial integrity OT pie's Republic of China, the Democratic Re- of training the armed forces of Laos. the Kingdom of Laos. public .of Viet-Nam, the Republic of France, The French and Laotian Governments shall 2. Undertake, in pairticular, that tie Republic of India, the Kingdom of Laos, inform the members of the Conference, (a) they will not commit or_participate In the Polish People's Republic, the Republic of through the Co-Chairmen, of their agree- any way ` h any act which might directly or Viet-Nam, the Kingdom of Thailand, the ment on the question of the transfer of the indirectly impair the sovereignty, independ- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the French military installations in Laos and ence, neutrality, unity or territorial integ United Kingdom of Great Britain and North- of the employment of French military in- rity of the Kingdom of Laos; ein J,reland and the Upited.States of Amer- structors by the Laotian Government. (b) they will not resort to the use or threat Ica; Article 6 of force or any other }treasure` which might Having regard to the Declaration on the The introduction into Laos of armaments, impair t'he peace of the Kingdom of Laos Neutrality of Laos of July 23, 1962; munitions and war material generally, ex- they will refrain from all direct or Have agreed as follows: cept such quantities of conventional arma- indirect. Bute e> yggipy,t irate np4, Srs Article.1 ,meats as the Royal Government of Laos may of the dom of Laos; g . ,. , ? For the purposes of this Protocol consider necessary for the national defense (d)` they will not attach conditions of a .(a). the term "foreign military personnel" of Laos, is prohibited. Approved For Release 2002/01/22 : CIA=RDP72-0,0337R000300010032-0 ernment of Laos of July 9, 1962, shall be re- by the Royal Government of Laos in con- garded as constituting an International sultation with the Commission. The Com- agreement. The present Declaration shall be mission shall be notified in advance of the deposited in the archives of the Governments ??i?} -A i ~~ -11 --1 ...,~,,a,..,-,..- .- i~cj, u,.si LlN?, n1111:11 ?11W11 141- nish certified copies thereof to the other sig- natory States and to all the other States of the world. - In -witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present D claration. , The Introduction of foreign regular and Irregular troops, foreign para-military for- mations and foreign military personnel into Laos is prohibited. Article 5 Note is taken that the French and Laotian Governments will conclude as soon as possi- ble and arrangement to transfer the French military installations in Laos to the Royal Government of Laos. if -,; Qt.ipn_ Q2veriAie l cgnsiders it. necessary the Frencia Government may as E14 Approved For Release 2002/01/22 : CIA-RDP72-00337R00030001.0032-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -Extensions of Remarks Ja' i.uali 21, 1970 Artfole 7 All foreign military persons and civilians captured or inteted during the course of hostilities in Laos shall be released within thrity days after the entry. into force of this Protocol and handed over by the Royal Gov- ernment of Laos to the representatives of the Governments of the countries of which they are nationals in order that .they may proceed to the destination of their choice. Article 8 The Co-Chairmen shall periodically receive reports from the Commission. in addition the Commission shall immediately report to the do-Chairmen any violations or threats of violations of. this Protocgi, all signlticant steps which It takes in pursuance of this Protocol, and also any other important in- formation which may assist the Co-Chairmen in carrying out their functions. The Com- mission may at any time seek help from the Co-Chairmen in the performance of As du- ties, and the Co-Chairmen may at any time make recommendations to the Commission exercising general guidance. The Co-Chairnen shall circulate the re- ports and any other important information from the Commission to the members of the Conference. The Co-Chairmen shall exercise supervi- sion over the observance of this Protocol and pervise and control the cease-fire in Laos. The Co-Chairmen will keep the members of the Conference constantly informed and when appropriate will consult with them. Article 9 The Commission shall, with the concur- rence of the Royal Government of Laos, su- pervise and control the cease-fire in laos. The Commission shall exercise these func- tions in full co-operation with the Royal Government of Laos and within the frame- work of the Cease-Fire Agreement or cease- fire arrangements made by the three politi- cal forces in Laos, or the Royal Government of Laos. It is understood that responsibility for the execution of the cease-fire shall rest with the three parties concerned and' with the Royal Government of Laos after its for- mation. Article 10 The Commission shall supervise and con- trol the withdrawal of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign pars-military for- mIttions and foreign military personnel. In- spection teams sent by the Commission for these purposes shall be present for the period of the withdrawal' at all points of withdrawal from Laos determined by the Royal Govern- ment of Lace In consultation with the Com- mission in accordance with Article 3 of this Prptoool Article 11 The Commission shall investigate cases where there are reasonable grounds for con- sidering that a violation of the provisions of Article 4 of this Protocol has occurred. It is understood that in the exercise of this function the Commission is acting with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos. It shall carry out its investigations in full co-operation with the Royal Government of Laos and shall immediately inform the Co-Ciiairrnan of any 'atolattons or threats of violations of Article 4, and also of all signifl- cant steps which it takes in pursuance of this Article it,. accordance with Article 8. Article 12 The,, Commission shall assist the Royal Government of Laos in cases where the Royal Government of ;Laos considers that a viola- tion of Article 8 of this Protocol may have taken place. This assistance will be rendered at the request of the Royal, Government of Lads and in full co-operation with it. Article 13 The Commissions shall exercise its func- tions 'Under this 2 otocal. Ill' close co- tion With the Royal Government of Laos. It Is understood that the Royal Government of Laos at all`levets will render the Commis- sion all possible assistance in the perform- ance by the Commission of these functions and also will take all necessary measures to ensure the securiit'y of the Commission and its inspection teams during their activities in Laos. Article 14 The Commissicn functions as a single organ of the International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961-1962. The members of the Commission will work harmoniously and in co-operation with each other with the aim of solving all questions within the terms of reference of the Commission. Decisions of the Commission on questions relating to violations of Articles 2, 3, 4 and 8 of this Protocol or of the cease-fire referred to in Article 9, conclusions on major ques- tions sent to the Co-Chairmen and all rec- ommendations by the Commission shall be adopted unanimously. On other questions, including procedural questions, and also questions relating to the Initiation and car- rying out of Investigations (Article 15). deci- sions of the Commission shall be adopted by majority vote. Article 15 In the exercise of its specific functions .which are laid down in the relevant articles of this Protocol the Commission shall con- duct investigations (directly or by sending Inspection teams), when there are reasona- ble grounds for considering that a violation has occurred. These investigations shall be carried out at the request of the Royal Gov- ernment of Laos or on the initiative of the Commission, which Is acting with the con- currence of the Royal Government of Laos. In the latter case decisions on Initiating and carrying out such Investigations shall be taken in the Commission by majority vote. The Commission shall submit agreed re- ports on investigations in which differences which may emerge between members of the Commission on particular questions may be expressed. The conclusions and recommendations of the Commission resulting from investiga- tions shall be adopted unanimously. Article 16 For the exercise of its functions the Com- mission shall.,-as necessary, set up inspection teams, on which the three member-States of the Commission shall be equally represented, Each member-State of the Commission shall ensure the presence of its own representatives both on the Commission and on the inspec- tion teams, and shall promptly replace them in the event of their being unable to per- form their duties. It is understood that the dispatch of in- spection teams to carry out various specific tasks takes place with the concurrence of the Royal Oovern:nent of :Laos. The points to which the Commission and its inspection teams go for the purposes of investigation and their length of stay at those points shall be determined In relation to the require- ments of the particular investigation. Article 17 The Commission shall have at its disposal the means of communication and transport required for the performance of its duties. These as a ride will be provided to the Cent- mission'by the Royal Government of Laos for payment on mutually acceptable terms, and those which :Ghe Royal Government of Laos cannot provide will be acquired by the Commission from other sources. It is understood that the means of communica- tion and transport will be under the admin- istrative control of the Commission, Article 18 The costs of. the operations of the Corn- mission shall be borne by the members of the Conference in accordance with the provisions of this Article. (a) The Governmiiu:ts of Canada, India and Poland shall pay the personal salaries and allowances of th=sir nationals who are members of their delegations to the Com- mission and its subsicl.ary organs. (b) The primary responsibility for the provision of accommodation for the Com- mission and its subsid:tary organs shall rest with the Royal Government of Laos, which shall also provide such other local services as may be appropriate. The Commission shall charge to the Fund referred to in sub- paragraph (c) below any local expenses not borne by the Royal Government of Laos. (c) All other capital or running expenses incurred by the Commission in the exercise of its functions shall 13e met from a Fund to which all the members of the Conference shall contribute In the following propor- tions The Government of the People's Republic of China. France, the- Union of Soviet So- cialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America shall contrib- ute 17.8 per cent each. The Governments of Burma, Cambodia, and the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, Laos, the Republic of Viet Nam and Thai- land shall contribute 1.3 per cent each. The Governments .f Canada, India and Poland as members of the Commission shall contribute 1 per cent e,3eh. Article 19 The. Co-Chairmen shall at any time, if the Royal Government of Laos so requests, and In any case not later than three years after the entry into force of this Protocol, pre- sent a report with appropriate recommenda- tions on the question of the termination of the Commission to the members of the Con- ference for their consideration. Before mak- ing such a report te Co-Chairman shall hold consultations with the Royal Govern- ment of Laos and the Commission. Artii.Tei 20 This Protocol shall enter into force on signature. It shall be deposited in the archives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Which shall furnish certified copies thereof to the other signatory takes and to all other States of the world. In witness whereof, the undersigned Pleni- potentiaries have signed this -Protocol Done In two copies hi Geneva this twenty- third day of July one thousand and nine hundred and sixty-two in the English, Chi- nese, French, Laotian and Russian lan- guages, each text beln3 equally authorita- tive. Mr. FULBRIGIIT. [Deleted.) I am not at this time saying we should not be doing this. I am saying it is being done without the knowledge of the Sen- ate and it is being done without any au- thorization by the Congress. If it can be done in Laos there is no reason why it 'Could not be done in Surma, Malaysia, Singapore, or anything else. It is the same general principle involved as was involved in the arguluent about the com- mitment resolution. That is, has this [Government now got to the point where the executive branch is considered to be within its rights to undertake this kind of major operation without consulting Congress, without, any specific treaty or other authorization. Actually what we 'are doing is against the agreement of 1962. If the amendment offered by the ma- jority leader and the Senator from Ken- tucky (Mr. dooPEa) is adopted, and if it means anything si?;nifieant, it means Approved For Release 2002/01/22 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0 onr 2- ? CIA-RDP,772-00 3 00300010032-0 = January 21, 1970 C0NGRESS1O1NARELUK x en z s 7 e a E 155 that these air strikes cannot be con- Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am not making an nothing new. I do not approve of it. We tinued. Some may think it .has 'little argument that we should retire. I say have got to make the best of it and live meaning. I think it has. If it means any- that we should know what actually is with it. thing of substance, it "means that the taking place. Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator may strikes by our Air Force, working out of Mr. MANSFIELD. All right. That is know the situation but I did not know Thailand, must be stopped. If it'cfoes' not different. the situation on these bombings in the mean anything at all and is an idle.ges- Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is what I am north. [Deleted.] I did not know it. I did What t. ''trying to reveal^-what is going on in not know apparently what the Senator ture ho be i is important is that this ques- Laos. If our interest in Laos is so great, knows about this operation. But I do not tion is not idle It strikes me that .if we why do we not just follow the usual see, if this is in the national interest, expect to preserve' our system' of`-gov- constitutional procedures called for by why it is not open and public knowledge ernment, which every Senator is sworn- such circumstances? and we declare it to be in our interest to to support, then wve,have'to know, and we Mr. MANSFIELD. I understood the wage it in the usual manner. This is ought to know, what we are voting for Senator to indicate that we should cut what I do not understand about this when we vote vast sums. down on our support- whole operation, and what the majority leader and others have said they regret. The acting chairman specified the Mr. F=RIGHT. T did not make any amount of money, $90 million,' for the such indication at all. I ,am trying to Nearly everyone that has spoken out Royal Laotian Army [deleted]. , . ' have revealed what we are doing and recently has said that they think it was Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. President, will why. a mistake to become involved in Vietnam the Senator yield`s Mr. MAI' SFIELD.' It is not secret. or, in this instance, in Laos. [Deleted.] Mr. E LBl `IIHT. I yield. Everyone knows. This is escalating into a major operation. Mr. ELDER, X yield. Mr. ELLENDER. Of course, all that [Deleted.] Mr. MANSFIELD, First, the Meo has been said is tied in with the South Mr. ELLENDER. [Deleted.] group, under General Vane are, I'believe, 'Vietnamese war, Mr. FULBRIGHT. [Deleted.] considered a ?part of the Royal Laotian Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. Mr. ELLENDER. [Deleted.] Army, if my memory serves me correctly. President the Senator from Montana Mr. FULBRIGHT. [Deleted.] Second, both the Ana or from Arkan made my point much better than I Mr. ELLENDER. [Deleted.] sas and the senate as,a~ whole a e fully could myself with referenbe to the step- Mr. FULBRIGHT. [Deleted.] awake f my very deep personal feelings up in the bombing of Laos and especially' Mr. ELLENDER. [Deleted.] about our involvement in Vietnam arid of north Laos the stepup` corresponds Mr. FULBRIGHT. [Deleted.] Southeast Asia. 13ut I would point out with the increase of the' nuiipbeir of the I think we should know how much we that what we have seen is "more than North Vietnamese troops in Laos. It was, are spending for this operation which an eightfold increase, since 1962, of the to our interest to bomb those troops: It is beginning to be a major war. To North Vietnamese backbone 'the Pathet also is much more preferable to bomb stretch the concept of the SEATO treaty Lao, from 6,000 to' 50a00i1, or" perha s them, than to send our men in there. ? into this area is a major expansion of 55,000, North Vietnamese. Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, I it. I say, I see no reason why the ad- On, the other side of the; comp hi ac- thought the `statement of the Senator ministration could not apply this con- cordance with t1ie,S eneva Accorejs. of ' from 'Arkansas _Just a moment ago was cept to anything it wanted to do in 1962, we withdrew. our military forces' that if we agreed to this amendment` 'Burma or in Malaysia, or any other completely except for` an advisory ?group it would then be illegal to do any more place, if they follow this style of op- representing the, various services. Sen- of the bombing and we would be out of eration. I think this is strictly against ators may recall also that in 1963,' again business. That is the point at question- the constitutional system which Mem- if my memos serves,me correctly, ' Pres here. bers of this body are supposed to sup- ident John V. Kennedy then considered Mr. ELLENDER. We do not agree to port. 'Senators are supposed to know seriously the dispatch of a number of that, but that is his interpretation, what they are voting for. [Deleted.] Maripe units up to the Mekong because Mr. FULBRIGHT: I said if it ine`ant Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the of 4' 1 possible mflltration intq the anything at all, it means the -bombings Senator yield? area around *Vientiane to, overthrow the` in the north should stop. Mr. ELLENDER. I yield. Laotian Government and the' further Mr. GURNEY. It is a question of Mr. STENNIS. I did not get to attend possibility of an overspill Into Z"hailaiidy whether we' should be doing it in the all of the Appropriation Subcommittee which would then involve an all of outs, open, but the amendment would pre- hearings this year. However, I want to an ally under the Southeast Asia Treaty vent it. refer to a point we had up when the Organization. Mr`. FULBRIGHT, It is riot my amend- authorization bill was before the Senate To, look at it particularly, without any ment. It is the amendment of the Sen- because it contained an item for $2.5 personal feelings, insofar as I can if we ator from Kentucky` (Mr. COOPER) and billion, which was the sum finally agreed were, to take away this air support from "the majority leader. I did not offer the upon, for all of Southeast Asia, for spe- the".Royal "Laotian Army and the Ro `a1 amendment. cial military aid. 3,aotian Government which is ' leii}g Mr. MANSFIELD. The amendment We have been carrying on military aid furnished . at the request of the Lao would not prevent it. In many forms since World War H. A Government, it is quite possible that the Mr. FULBRIGHT. 'If the amendment very small sum of military aid is involved 50,000 to 55,000 North Vietnamese wfio would not prevent the bombing, then directly here. That goes to the Royal are in Laos, contrary- to the Geneva it has. no significant effect. Laotian Army. That money was in the accords-I think they were a signatory Mr. MANSFIELD. If the Senator bill we authorized. It is not involved In to those accords-wgpld then,finn A would yield further, the important thing the bombing. to sweep down Into the Mekong to tae: Is to make sure that no combat troops I was asked in that debate if we had over ; thegapitals of Luang Prabacig and get Involved in Laos, and I mean com- any military forces in Laos by the Sen- Vientiane, What, would be o}lr Qftionsii` 'bat troops on the ground. That is the ator from California (Mr. CRANSTON). His they got that far and they did not stogy danger?That is the great danger. That question was: Did we have any armed at the Mekong? is what I though the Senator from Ar- ground forces? I said no. We did not go So, we are up against a delicate ques- kaiisas was interested in. into the bombing, [deleted]. tion. If we want this Government to? Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not see how Back to the money, in my best judg- survit}e aid w.-were. ,signato y to. tie military bombing is not combat. When ment, about $94 million of this money is Gengva a cords-d4 we, do al tettin YOU say "combat" I assume the Senator authorized in the authorization bill, the Patliet Lag take over in f t Anne . means infantry? where we had the Cooper amendment. I ing-letting the North Vietnamese .take Mr. MANSFIELD. That is right, argued then that the Cooper amendment over, with their Pathet nLa ets, in Mr. FULBRIGHT. Ground troops. did not touch the money we spent on our effect making it a part of Nort Vietnam? ]MANSFIELD. Ground. troops. But on troops, whether it was in Laos or Mr. FUI,BRIGIIlI am not mal pq pn the use of the Air _ Force has been, in elsewhere. That is still my opinion. argument that we shguid get to tedthe N Vietnamese on A word on the merits of the bombing; Mr. MANSIi'7EL alri, just pointing the [e] and Chi 1Vlinh Icra~il thisis one of die most effec?ive'tlilrigs del out the possibility and elsewhere in Laos: That is 'really- *0 ` have been able to do concerning the T I? Approved For Release, 2062/01/2.2 :.CIA-RDP72-00337R00030001 b032-0 - LUiN(:iR.ESSIONAL RECQ - Extenasioi s of Remarks January 21, watinn Spu ' Asia. It grew just like the ,weir in grew a little at a time, We all- kwwhat the Ho Chi Mph Trail means` and what it has meant. There is no way to estimate where we would have been in that war if we had not been able to do this bcmb- ing and inflict the punishment it caused, always at-the request of the Laotian Government, As I have always under- stood it. I do not think we could consider limit- ing the amount we have to spend on bombing there any more than we could limit it in South Vietnam, as long as we are at war. I. think this amendment would be very unfortunate. It reads: None' or the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used for the support of local forces in Laos or Thailand exoept to provide supplies, materiel, equipment That raises a question: Could we give them battle support with our own Air Poree? If anything is to be adopted, it ought to be made clear that we are limiting the amendment to money support, not bombing support. So far as I know, we do tot have any ground troops over there, and never have had. [Deleted.l I mean fighting ground troops. - My additional point here is on the word "support." [Deleted.] Mr. ELLENDER.. Mr. President, I wish to further state, as I said a while ago, that we have had an interpretation of this amendment, and I am informed that the adoption of it would not prevent this bombing. That Is why I suggested, in open session a while ago, let, us adopt the amendment and let the conferees meet and get such information as they desire and look into the amendment further to darify it so that, if nedessaay, these bombings can be continued. Mr. OURNICY. Mr. President will the .senator yield?. Mr. ELLENDER. I yield. Mr. GURNEY. I am confused. I just heard the- chairman of the Armed Serv- ices Committee say that, in his opinion, the adoption of the `amendment would prevent the bombing. W. BLLENDER. I received that In!or- mation from [deletedl, and the author of the amendment, Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator let me proceed to explain what I meant? i said unless we use the word "suppor;t," limit it to direct financial sup- port, it would but out the bombing, be- clause "support" can be interpreted as bombing. Mr. DOM1NICS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. ELL ENDER. I yield. Mr. WMINK`K. I remember being at the 'White House in 1967-amt I think the distinguished Senator from Arkansas was there at the time- , Mr. RNUS09 Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for an announce- ment, without' losing his might to the floor, for, about Ulf a minute? Mr. D! rM~t .Surely. ` Mr. ffi'AGNt q. Mr. P esident.we had "called a gtsf the full Appro- priations Committee for 2:30 p.m., to consider the i EW,appropriation bill, but in view of the executive session, I think It would be wise for us to wait until we got through the ?eXeci tive session, and then we will meet downstairs. I thank the. Senator for yielding. Mr. VS.LEidDElR . Mr. President, I will yield to the Senator from Colorado in a moment. I would prefer that I, be permit- ted to give these ,answers. That was the purpose of the executive session. Mr. DOMI]NIICK. Let me make a couple of comments here.which are of interest. When we were a'& the White House in 1967, and President Johnson called us down in equia thirds on Monday, Tues- day, and Wednesday in 1967, I think the Senator from Arkansas was there. At that time a map was shown of South- east Asia by Secretary McNamara? on which he had dots in Laos. Someone asked what those dots were. He said, "Those are the areas [deleted] we are engaged in bombing." [Deleted.] This was at the White -louse in 1967. 1 was there. We knew and I knew what was going on in Laos, for a considerable pe- riod of time.. I am surprised that: the Senator from Arkansas apparently did not know but here is what bothers me about this knendinent, and I wonder if I can address this to the Senator from Louisiana. If we have no combat troops there-and as far as I know, we do not have-and if we are not spending any money there for support of ground troops-and as for as I know, we are not-then it seems to me if we put in the bill a prohibition on the use of fonds for troops when we do not have any there, all we are doing Is raising a cues- tion in the mind - of the enemy as to whether we are doing that and giving them one more propaganda weapon. That is the problem--not whether this affects the bombtag, because I do not think it hits the bombing, but whether or not we are going to give the enemy one more item so they can take the ball, run with it, confuse our allies, and mis- inform some of our friends. Mr. ELLENDER, I think the amend- ment is slnect'le as to how the money is to be used It states "except to provide supplies, materiel, equipment, and facili- ties, including maintenance thereof, or to provide training for such local forces." I think it is specific enough to indicate that this money will be used for supplies, material, equipment, and training; of local forces. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. ELLENDER. I yield. Mr. TOWER. I think Senators must understand that all, of Laos must be con- sidered in context. They cannot separate southern Laos, from northern Laos. The fact is that the Futhet Lao could not hold all of the sizable area they have if it were not for the 50,000 North Viet- namese troops. If the North Vietnamese did not have possession of north Laos, there would be no Ito Chi Mimi trail. We must do anything we can to weaken the North Vietnamese efrorts in Laos with reference to our own efforts. We roust interdict what thiiy use as a line of communication. T am concerned. that. this measure 1970 might Indeed prevent our being able to airlift paramilitary forces around Thai- land to help them deal with insurgent activity there. I would point out that. most of the Thai Communist infrastructure is not ethnic That, it is rather ethnic Chinese and ethnic North Vietnamese. Thailand is the target for the next so -called war of na- tional liberation, and Laos is now being used as a staging ar,~a for Communist activity in Thailand. I might further note that the Chinese are now building a road In northern Laos to aid in the establishment 'of a line of communication to niake war against Thailand more feasible and possible. I think this is a very mischievous amend- ment indeed, and I would like the opinion of the Senator as to whether its enact- ment would preclude our support of paramilitary forces in Thailand. Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I have just read the purpose of the amendment, and in order to obviate this executive ses- sion we are now havr;.:g, my suggestion was that we accept the amendment and let the conferees deal with it. The con- ferees will be able to get all the informa- tion possible, and the advice of the De- fense Department. We are here trying to give the answers to questions that we have been asked by the S nator from Arkansas, and I was in hopes that we could go along with that. 1: hesitate to read tomorrow's newspapers and find out what is going to be in the newspapers about this session. It may be nothing new, but it will be sensational. Mr., MANSFIELD. dir. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. ELLENDER. I yield. Mr. MANSFIELD. Just to go along with what the Senator- from Texas was saying about the building of that road from Meng-La in Yunnan to Muong Soul, that construction. has been going on for months and yeiu's, as a matter of fact. The Thai Government has said there are two divisions of Chinese troops along that road, and the road is being built toward northern Thailand. As a matter of fact, the road is not be- ing extended except a mile or so out of Muong Soul toward Thailand, but it is being built in the other direction toward the direction of Dienb;ienph.u-in North Vietnam. There are no Chinese divi- sions there, accordirl, to Souvanna Phourna. Iin the last day or two, he stated there are five Chinese battalions, some labor and some antiaircraft bat- talions. As I said earlier, last August when I visited the area there were ru- mors that there were anywhere from three to 10 Chinese battalions. The best evidence is that. tht re were four or five at the time. Mr. TOWER. If the Senator will yield, I accept the Senator's statement that there vuere some antiaircraft and labor battalions there, rather than maneuver battalions but the fact of the matter is that not only is that road traversing across northern Thailand, but there is a spur that goes down toward the Mekong River under construction. Mr. MANSFIELD. Tl.e Senator may be right, but I do not be .lieve. it is under construction. They stopped the construc- tion going south and west toward the Approved For Release 2002/01/22 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0 January 21, 197 pp' t ' o I n r ool rose-o t157 the area going east toward the road to combat troops; not our combat troops? There are none there now. Dienbbic hu: T'fiat noes riot mean that Mr: - MANSFIELD:- 'Well "including Mr. ALLOTT. Since we do not include they are not pfanning on going ahead maintenance thereof"; I would not be them, the term "local forces" does not and doing at, but they are not doing it able to define that. I would think that include U.S. Government troops, and ' navfrient to the Laos soldiers to the par- they are eliminated from this amend- now.. - Mr. "POWER. That does not mean they cannot do it. Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct'. Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. lELL1NDER. I yield. Mr. JAVITS. So that we` will 'know, when the Senator answers ' questions, what we are trying to legislate here, it is thought that the conference may deal with it, but if we agree to the amendment, we ought to know what we are `doing. Therefore,. I should like to address-a question to the author of the amendment, or the Senator proposing it, as follows- . First, is this amendment intended to deal in any way with U.S. forces in combat? ' Mr. MANSF!IELD.' It is intended to keep ground troops out of combat in Thailand and. Laos. Mr. DAVITS, Will the Senator' point .out the words in this amendmentwhich would effect that result? Mr. MANSFIELD. The words them- selves, I think, are self-explanatory. It ~ays~ None of the funds ,appropriated lay, this act shall be used for_ the support of local forces in Lads or Thiland, except to pro- vide supplies, materiel, equipment, and fa- cilities, including the maintenance' thereof, or to ptovide training for such local forces. Mr r A VIT$ Are the local forces ra- , 1?i+"` W, S v-y' There is nothing in this language that Mr. MANSFIELD: They ey are indigenous will prevent American combat troops forces, both Thai and Laotian. from being used; and the way the Sena- Mr.. am endm JAVITS. that deals i with h word id tor defines. It, there is something in here is this ent that prevents combat troops which are ic an forces at all? Indigenous from being paid; and I think Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct. all the rest of these interpretations. defy this: Mr. We e understand IMy second question is the words of the amendment as sub- to what we are to give them.-supplies, materiel' equi matted p- ment, facilities, maintenance'and-traln- One.function we ought to perform ing. Now, what are we not going to give is to find out what the majority of the them by this amendment? Senate wants to do, and then be sure Mx. ' MANSFIELD. Ground combat that the amendment we pass does it. troops., For myself, I would say if what you Mr:. 3AVITS, American combat troops want to do is continue the present situ- are rued aut; they are not provided for. ation, you ought to have the words broad But we are nQt going to give them money enough to continue it. Now that we un- to engage in combat with or pay salaries derstand what it is, that you want to of soldiers who fight? "keep American involvement out, then we Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, we are; and ought to say at least something like that that would be continued, because if we In the amendment, which I submit it did, not subsidize the Laatialis,"'they does not say now. would not last 'for, a fortnight. Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is en- Mr.. JAVITS, Oat is exactly what Y ''titled to his opinion. I have stated what am hoping we can reveal to the Senate, .I think the distinguished Senator from to the meaning of the amendment. Kentucky meant and what I think the Mr. MANSFIELD, That 'is common amendment means, and we will have to knowledge. If the Senator read the New ` let the Senate decide. York Times, from his own State, just Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, will the lac: an Laos, This is not secre ; this is public information. Mr. JAVITS, The Senator does not quite follow me. If we did pass this amendment, it would result in affirmative act on, atwould utQ wh>ttever R'eare. paying, f we pay combat troops directly or indirectly; that is true, is it `not, it to our leader? I think the Senator from New' York -has performed a very valid task here. '15o I' understand, I ask the Senator 'from Montana, that the term "local forces" as used here eliminates all t1.S: ground troops? Mr. MA1vSF'IELD.It does not elimi- Mr. ELLENDER. I yield. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I think that this brings about an interpretation of the word "support." The Senator from Mississippi took the position that he would want it spelled out as financial support. I think that would distort the meaning of the amendment. Why would it not be all right to say combat troops in front of support? Mr. MANSFIELD. I would prefer to leave it as it is. If there were to be any changes, I would prefer that the Sena- tor from Kentucky be responsible for them.- Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, the rea- son I raise the point is because what we are talking about, as the Senator from New York indicated, is what we mean by support. Do we mean American com- bat forces? That is the support we are talking about. And yet, the word "sup- port" is all-encompassing and could mean anything at any time to anybody. The is the problem. What is meant by support? Does it mean American com- bat forces? Does it mean American money? -What does it mean? I think we have to clarify it. Mr. MANSFIELD. I have tried to clar ify it. It means what is going on at the present time. Mr. PASTORE. That is only part of the history, but not part of the amend- ment, ,Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator and I look at it in different ways. Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. ELLENDER. I yield. Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I 'For 'Release 2002/d1/22 CIA-RDP72-003378000300010032-0 be allowed to continue. Mr. MANSFIELD. '-Chat is correct. Mr. DAVITS. We would provide the They are to be given no consideration at supplies, material, equipment, facilities, all, except to stay out. and the maintenance thereof. Mr. ALLOTT. Then we are talking Mr. MANSFIELD. That is true. about maintaining the status quo. In Mr, JAVITS. That is very different line 4, the amendment says "including froi} line troops; those are transporta-` maintenance thereof," and that could tion forces, their equipment, et cetera. include the payment of salaries and sup- Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator had port to indigenous troops? better go to Laos and see what kind of Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct. troops they have. They have not cut Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, with all them. down- in divisions and outfits like due deference, I say to my beloved col- we-have; they are all combat troops, 'league that the way the amendment is whereas about, a fifth of ours are com- written it says, "shall be used for the bat troops, and the others are support support of local forces in Laos or Thai- troops. land, except to provide supplies, materiel, Mr. JAVITS. If the Senator will bear equipment, and facilities, including the with me, what t am trying to get before maintenance thereof." "Including the the Senate is, if we vote for the amend- maintenance thereof" means the sup- ment, is what we are doing affirmative or plies, materiel, equipment, and facilities. negative? And unless he writes an undisputed legis- Mr. MANSFIELD. You would be voting lative record that this does include the for what is going on now, by reiterating, payment of salaries, the amendment in once again, as the National Commit- my opinion cannot mean anything. mexlts Resolution says, that under no cir-? Mr? MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the cumstances except through due consti- Senator from Colorado, like the Sena- tutional processes will there be combat tor from New York, is entitled to his ground troops of this country used in opinion. I have given the Senate what I think is intended by the Senator from Laos or Thailand. Mr. DAVITS. May I say to'my beloved Kentucky and me. The Senate will have to decide. colleague, if that is in his amendment- Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the then he is putting it in by the interpre- Senator yield? r~ ? ' L U NLTXt,)S1QNAL Rk;t? U3wll --Extensions of Remarks Jait car? T 970 should, l*e t9aska d questtpon. Undoubt- di eu; n to the elanfusion and that the is not going to be denied the right to edly it has mid answered t crrituaitrn over the inter ret%tton would supply aid to these I cople doing all of I3o i 1"' td abet earlier, run r=partat 3,_let alone around these things there now to help us. Would the amendment prohibit the the wtrzld _I,.agree_an.kee ing 1 e zLOUn ore __. use of tactical aitcralt at' any place in Mr ELL P 't. Mr. President, I reit- out. I do not think they should have Thailand or Laos? erateei *hat I sale awhile ago. The only gone into South Vietnam. But they did. Mr. MANSFIELD. Unfortunately, no. Teaso:x .I.siis;gested that the Senate go If we are ever threatened again in that Mr. GOLDWATER. It will not, pre- acing with the aamendment was to ob- part of the world, p,rrticularly in an vent the use of tac?%cal air support in viate what is takijgg place now. Because, area with the type of geography in Northwestern, Thailand? as far. a I am concerned, I suggest that northwestern Thailand and Central Mr. MANS:FIEL D. No. when the time comes, we vote it into the Laos, our troops are not equipped to fight Mr. GOLDWATER. Or in the south- bill or out. there. And we cannot :help sunless we do ern provinces where it might be needed? Mr. JAVITS. Air. President, will the so with tactical air, or possibly with Mr. MANSFIELD. No. Senator yield? .,_ .,. strategic-air. However, not at this point. Mr. GOLDWATER. Or, .as they say, Mr. T NDEE,. Mr-President, I yield If we are going to vote on the amend- up in Central Laos, around the Plaine first to the eenatcu f Michigan. meat, I accept the wcrd of the majority des Jarres? - The PRESIDING OFFICER. The leader at any time. Inasmuch as there is Mr. MANSFIELD. No. What the Sen- $eunatar-from.,Michigan is recognized. a dispute between the majority and mi- ator ought to keep in mind is that the Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, the dis- nority leaders as to whether it applies to Point being made by the Senator from tinguiahed inajori v leader responded to air, I think we should make it :clear. Arkansas, if I understand it correctly, is a que. tuan by the Senator from Arizona Otherwise, we are going to pull the rug that there has been a tremendous step- and indicated Ids interpretation as. out from under some wonderful help in up 10 the amount of activity tdeleted]. spons>rof the amendment that the Ian- Thailand and Laos, [Dele ted?] gunge was not intended to preclude cer- Mr. ELLENDER. It is not a matter of Mr. GOLDWAT'ER. That is largely tafn t ombing activities-by ourAir Force, disagreement between rae and the major- where the support is. Mr. MaNSPrwr;D. I said, unfortunate- ity leader. He gave his interpretation Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct, al- ly, no I deleted ] . most entirely. Mr. GRIFFIN. But I think in view of Mr. GOLDWATER. The [deleted] Mr. GOLDWATER. None of our troops the fret that the Senator from Arizona agrees that support does not include are engaged in- active combat. carne into the Chamber only recently, he technical or strategic or reconnaissance Mr. MANSFIELD. Not on the ground. should, be aware of the fact that there is or supply by air? Mr. GOLDWATER. Is the Senator some dispute about the meanng of the Mr. ELLENDER. I said to the distin- convinced that the language does not wards .in the amendment, guished Senator from Montana--wheth- prevent the use of aircraft for tactical As L xecal;l. the distinguished chair- er or not his amendment was in keeping air support for reconnaissance flights man cf the Foreign Relations Committee with section 638 (a) in the appropriations and for rescue flights? earlier indicated his understanding that bill, appearing on page 43-and the an- MT. MANSFIELD. It would not pre- line effect of the language would be to swer was "Yes." vent that, in my opinion. preclude ]such bombing. And as I under- Mr. MONTOYA. Mr.President, will the Mr. GOLDWAT R. I hope the Sena- stood the chainnan of the Armed . Senator yield? for is right, Because I just returned from services Committee, he said it could pre- Mr. ELLENDER. As I have said, I there this morning, And contrary to elude such bombing. should like to continue answering the what we have been thinking, the ]nil- Cex,airily, .the remarks of the distin- questions and then have a vote on wheth- tration has stepped up tremendously, guishe d Senator from Wyoming (Mr. er it is desired to have this amendment Friday night 600 trucks started in McGE m) - were very appropriate. in the rill. from the border of North Vietnam. It is very obvious that there is con- Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the I am very frank to say, and I shall fusion-as to the meaning of the lan- Senator yield? address myself to the subject later this guage. Accordingly. It would be ill- Mr, ELLENDER. I yield to theSenator week, that if we do not' resume the advlseI to agree to such an. amendment. from Idaho. He has boen on,his feet for bombing of North Vietnam, I see no way Therefore with to associate myself some time now. to come out on this,' with .he remarks -of `the Senator from Mr, CHURCH. Mr. President, it seems Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, will the Arizor a (Mr. GOLDWATER). to me that we are all agreed pretty much Senator yield? Mr. MANSFIELD. The war in Viet- on, what our objective,is..The Senator from Montana has repe_ Mr. MENDER. I yield. nam i; very confusing and tragic in and repeatedly mentioned Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I think the of itse f. It; the Senator from Aril sna has empha- dialog here in executive session makes To :mt down to the nub of what our sized it. I.think we are agreed that what the point that ought to guide us in what asnencment purports to say-and I say we want to prevent is the introduction we do on the pending proposal. it is, this without-fearof equivocation inso- of American combat troops into Laos and that we should be reluctant to adopt far as the Senator from Kentucky is con- Thailand-ground troops. That is our the amendment because its meaning or cernee there shall be the use of no purpose. We certainlyy should be able to intent Is subject to too many interpre- . U.S. troops in "Thailand or Laos- write the language to put our purpose tations. While the matter that concerns laeriod=_totL1 Bn Itraiigle all you want into effect. the Senator from Arkansas is a very about maintenance of supplies. That Is Mr. GOLDWATER. Why do we not understandable one, the pending resolu- what is ie ns. spell it out? tion could not possibly clatify it. - Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I Mr. CHURCH. Of co.=rse. Does it mean we are going ~into Burma agree with my friend the Senator from Let me make this suggestion. There is or Malaysia without it? Hardly. We have Michigan. The word "support" taken in no reason why this language cannot be made it clear downtown. And the Senate a milit manner does -mean help. It made to conform to our objective. It is?a has made it clear before on how it re- means everything. simple objective. We have been through lates to our present status, in Vietnam. I ce^tainly abide by the word of the two wars-one in Korea and one in Viet- I think it has made it so clear that I majority leader.-'I'fowever, when he says namutIve were really cornmeiaced by believe we would be well advised not to support troops in the military, that is executive decision. We are in a situation proceed along the lilies envisoned in the exactly what itmeedas, In Laos in which it took extraordinary to rts on the-part onc cerni iningTes ntare amendment at this time, particularly in if w,, deny suppc t, then we deny tac- g a public way. tical a r bombing and supply and recon- oeat t information n cng the e n et we are I think it would only tend to confuse naisanee and Lthings. we supply them of our involvement t our there. prerogative-which going to reassert or hobble our Government in its efforts there now. i think we all want to do-as a part of to seek a meaningful and responsible If there is any question about this, I the constitutional. process in determin- way to disengage itself from Vietnam. think it'ought to lmmade perfectl r clear ing questions of war and peace and the I -think we have contributed In this in the :unendnaeiit that the United States nature of the foreign policy of the United Approved For Release 2002/01/22 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0 rf ` Approved For Release 2002/01/22: CIA-7RDP72-00337R000300010032 O January 21, 19 70 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks States, we ought to ,draw some lines with respect to'Laos and 'T'hai'land. All we would have to? d4 to accomplish that would be ,"to revise the proposed amendment in the following manner: BEc. 643. None of the funds- appropriated by this Act shall be used to finance the in- troduction of American combat troops in Laos or Thailand. I think that would accoinplisi, our ob- jective. Mr. FULBRIGHT. "Ground." Mr. CHURCH. We could put "ground" in. That would. accomplish our purpose, and it would reassert our right to deter- mine how public money should be used In foreign countries, particularly in so sensitive an area as Laos and Thailand. I should like to offer this as an amend- ment to the amendment offered by the Senator from Montana and the Senator from Kentucky. T.he PRESIDING OFIIICER. Will the Senator send his amendment to the desk, please? Mr. MONTOYA. Mr. President, I should like to ask The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the f en a,tor from Louisiana indicate whether he has yielded for the purpose of an amendment being offered to the amend- ment? Mr. ELLENDER. First, I will yield to the distinguished Senator from New Mexico, and then I. will continue with the answers to the questions submitted by the Senator from Arkansas. If Sen- ators desire to take action immediately on this amendment, we can do so shortly. Mr. MONTOYA. I think there is una- nimity here, in that there is confusion about what this amendment means. I was going to ask the majority lead- er, in view of his interpretation, if he would consent to the following lapguaae in his amendment, so that it would read as follows: None of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used to provide combat troops for the support of local forces in Laos or Thailand, except to provide supplies, ma- teriel, equipment, and facilitie$, including maintenance thereof, or to provide training for.,such local forces. The .. words added to the amendment would be after the word "used," and the new words would be "to provide combat troops," Mr. ELLENDER. "Ground." Mr. MURPHY. "Ground troops." Mr. MONTOYA, "`Ground combat troops" could be, used, or "combat troops." "Combat troops" is a more ge- neric term, Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, if we took 5 minutes for .a quorum call, I am sure we could work out language satis- factory. to all concerned. Mr. ELLENb i,. Mr, President,,we are In executive session now, at the request of the distinguished Senator from Mon- tana and the distinguished Senator from Arkansas, and I will not yield further until ,I have finished with _ the answers to .the. questions of the Senator of Ar- k&nsas, Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a brief question Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President. I have a brief question. Now that so many Mem- bers of the Senate have decided that the majority leader does not know what he means with his proposed amendment, will the Senator from Louisiana proceed with his explanation, as he started to do? That is my question, exists between the United States or Its agencies and the present Royal Laotian Government or its Prime Minister, Sou- vanna Phouma?" This question was answered in my re- ply to question No. 1. Question No. 3: "What military as- sistance, including manpower, material, and training, Is the United States pro- viding through this bill?" As I stated previously, this bill in- cludes approximately $90 million for the support of the Royal Laotian Army pur- suant to specific authority included in the Department of Defense Procurement and Research and Development Author- iation Act. The arms and ammunition the United States provides are within the framework of the 1962 Geneva Agree- ments. Article VI of the Protocol to. the Agreements permits the introduction In Laos of armaments, munitions and war materials necessary for Lao national defense. [Deleted.] I have here a list of what this money is to be used for. If Senators desire, I can go into every item named here. Other- wise, it is available to Senators to look at. Mr. FULBRIQHT, Mr. President, will the Senator yield, for clarification? Mr. ELLENDER. I yield. Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator said it is approximately $90 million for the Royal Lao Army, Mr. ELLENDER. That is correct. Mr. FULBRIGHT. [Deleted.] Mr. ELLENDER. That is in another matter. As I said to the Senator from Arkansas earlier, this is an item that cannot be identified, Mr. FULBRIGHT. I want to reiterate, since more Senators have entered the Chamber, that I do not at this time raise a question as to the wisdom of these-ac- tivities. I raise the question only that Senators ought to know what they are voting on. Mr. President, it seems, to me that every Senator is entitled to know, if he is voting for this bill, that he is not only voting $90 million for the Royal Lao Army [deleted]. The Senator from Arizona, a moment ago, made a point which led me to be- lieve he would be in favor of authorizing these activities. If they are in the interest of this country why must they all be kept secret? The only reason in the world I brought up this matter was not to argue with the Senator that we should not be bombing in the north [deleted] but so that Senators would know, among other things [deleted]. These [deleted] are as much as the entire budget of the country of Laos. It is approximately the same as the budget of the Laotian Government, After Senators know all these things, Approved for Release E 159 in the interest of the United States to continue this 'escalation of a conflict in Laos, which could well lead to another Vietnam. A few Senators have said it is a great tragedy. We have gotten bogged down in Vietnam. It is simply that we should know what is involved in this matter. I do not understand, in view of what was said by the, Senator from Arizona, why it is not also proper to say, "Yes, this is what we are engaged in, and it should be authorized." Mr. ELLENDER. The Senate now knows it, since the Senator announced it. Do Senators desire me to read how many rifles are involved? SEVERAL SENATORS. No, no, no ! Mr. FULBRIGHT. Summarize it. What is the material? Mr. ELLENDER. What is the money for? It is going ?to be used to purchase carbines, rifles, machine guns, artillery, and engineering equipment. It states the amount to be spent in each category. Approximately one-third of the total is for ammunition. Question 4: As of today, what is the total number of U.S. military personnel in Laos and describe the manner in which they operate? Answer: There are [deleted] U.S. military personnel stationed in Laos. These are either part of or attached to the attache staff. [Deleted. f With regard to personnel stationed in Laos, the U.S. Ambassador has jurisdic- tion over all U.S. personnel and U.S. activities in Laos, including the military I just mentioned. Question 5: Describe in detail activities over Laos of U.S. Air Force, including both those activities, if any, based in Laos, and those, if any, based in Thailand. (a) What, if any, is the current monthly sortie rate over northern Laos for U.S. Air Force aircraft? (b) How does that rate, if any, compare to one year ago and two years ago? (c) The contemplated sortie rate, if any, over northern Laos in the coming 12 months? (d) How do these sortie rates, if any, com- pare to U.S. Air Force sorties directed toward the Ho Chi Minh Trail? Answer: The U.S. conducts photo and re- con missions over Laos, and as the Presi- dent said, interdiction of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. (Deleted). Question 6: What, if any, have been the total number of, U.S. military personnel killed, wounded, and missing in North Laos since 1962? Answer: (Deleted). Casualties in Laos are included as part of the total casualties in Southeast Asia. They are not broken out separately. Question 7: How does this compare to per- sonnel lost in operations solely against the Ho Chi Minh Trail? This was covered in my reply to question number six. Now, Question 8: What is the amount of the personnel, operating and maintenance and military assistance which is included in this bill for Laos and Laos related activi- ties? Answer: Approximately $90 million is in- cluded in fiscal year 1970 Appropriations Bill for support of the boyal Laotian Army. (Deleted). That is all the. questions. Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I think 2002/0:1 /22 CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0' E160 Approved For Release 2002/01/22 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0 CONGRESSIONAL I CORD Extensic, ors of The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from. Louisiana yield to the Sen- ator from Wyoming? Mr. ELLENDER. I Yield. Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I think that our discussions here have reiterated the` point which I make again; namely. that there is great uncertainty as to what we ran put into words. The meaning of those words will vary widely, and it seems to me, in reflecting upon them, that all it can do is to complicate the problems of then President, as he seeks to pursue disengagement. ,It could even give the wog` impression to the other side at a critical moment like this. Therefore, to try to protect as much as we can, I would move to table-- Several Senators addressed the Chair. Mr. MANSFIELD. No, no-- -just a mo meat-Mr. President, if we are going to vote, we should vote in open session. I intend to be heard on it. There will be no tabling motion, or any other kind of motion, in secret session. . Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, a parlia- mentary inquiry. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator from Wyoming will state it. Mr. McGEE. Is a tabling motion in order? The `PRESIDING OFFICER. A tabling motion is in order if the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. ELLENDER) yields the floor or yields for that purpose. Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I yielded to the Senator from Wyoming for a question, However, I have nothing further to state, unless there are other questions to be asked, Mr. ANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Louisiana yield ,to me? Mr. ELLENDER. I yield. Mr. MANSFIELD. I think that we should have our votes on this matter in public, that we should nst evade the issue, that we should face up to it. Sen- ators will recall during the last execu- tives session that this matter carne up and we decided to vote in public. Let me refer to what the, distinguished Senator from Kentucky said when he in- troduced practically this same amend- ment in September of this year, an amendment which was agreed to by the distinguished Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) the chairman of the com- mittee, and the Senate as a whole, Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield at that point? Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. Mr. 3TENNIS. On the basis that it did not apply to the funds in the bill then being considered. Mr. MANSFIELD. That ibb correct. But let me-read what the Senator from Ken- tucky said in his latter to all Senators on September 15: I will Introduce the enclosed amendment, or one, substantially similar on September 17 and-will ask that it be made the pending business at the first opportunity. The amendment would not affect clause (l), or restrict the support of Vietnamese or other Free world forces fighting In Vietnam. It would prohibit the use of funds for the en- gagement of the armed forces of the-U'nited States in combat in Laos and Thailand in support of local forces of Laos and Thailand. Its purpose Is to prevent, if possible, the United States from becoming involved In a domestic war in Laos and Thailand, without the authority of the Congress. And then he enclosed a copy of his proposed amendmnent, which is almost similar to the amendment now before this body. At that time, in explaining his amend- ment, he said : My amendment is designed to prohibit the use of our Armed Forces in combat sup- port--in combat support of local forces in Laos or Thailand and to keep them out of situations in which they might become engaged in combat which could lead into war in Thailand or. Laos as it did in Viet- nam. The language means our forces can- not be used in combat in support o- local forces unless an emergency arose where the President's constitutional authority would come Into play except by joint au- thority of the Executive and Congress. Thus, I think, despite the fact that there is a certain: amount of confusion, the Cooper amendment speaks for it- self. I do not think it needs any change. The intent is clear, not only at, this time but during debate on the author- ization bill, and I would hope it would be accepted so that this Congress could go on record once again as backing up the national commitments resolution which it passed same months ago. Several Senators addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER.'The Sen- ator front New York (Mr. JAVIrs) is recognized. Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator from New York yield? Mr. JAVITS. I yield to the Sc irator from Vermont. .Mr. AIKEN. Mr, President, I think the distinguished Senator from Montana knows exactly what the amendment means. It means that we will permit our Government to continue doing in Laos what it is doing n.ow, but would prohibit the start of another Vietnam war in that area. I believe, further, that the vote on this amendment will be interpreted by the country as it dee;usion that we are sup- porting President Nixon's efforts to with- draw honorably from Vietnam and de- escalate out forces, as he is doing al- ready. Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I should like to have a word--and I shall be happy to yield to the chairman. The words of the amendment are confusing. The words will not do what the majority leader says he wishes them to do. But the words can be changed. I would propose, if we have the oppor- tunity to propose, how the Senate can work its will if it wants to do what the Senator from Montana says the amend- ment does, It, does not do it. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President. will the Senator from New York yield? Mr. JAVITS. I yield. Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator from New York was on the floor of the Senate when the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) offered this amendment in Sep- tember. The Senator from New York did not raise an .argument then. The amend- ment was spelled out then; it is spelled out now. It is practically the same amend- ment which we are considering at, this time. Mr. JAVITS. I do not know whether Reinarks Jun ua'r?y 21, 1970 I was on the floor o1 the Senate or not. I hope the Senator will not be upset with me. I am trying to help the Senator to accomplish what he desires, in a way in Which the Senate can legislate with dignity. I am not trying to cross him at all; I am trying to be helpful. This must be done here; it cannot be done in public. [Deleted.] He merely wishes to inhibit two things, as I understand: first, the use of Amer- ican combat troops; second, the support of local troops other than in respect to logistics and trainingg That can be ac- complished with word:,, retraining intact the right to bomb from Thailand and from South Vietnam, and to inhibit the use of American combat troops in Laos. But I respectfully submit that these words-whether I was on the floor of the Senate then or was awake or asleep-do not do that. They do not have anything to do with combat troops, but deal only with the use of these funds for the sup- port of local forces and how they shall be managed. Second, this is a real constitutional test. This is the first time we are trying to match the power of the Senate with the power of the executive. We have got to make both work, because we will not retain our power unless we make them work. The commitments resolution says that we may act either by a declaration of war or by a concurrent resolution. As to Southeast Asia, we have acted by a joint resolution-the Ci'ulf of Tonkin res- olution. That resolution is ample enough in its words to quality under the com- mitments resolution. It lets us do every- thing we want to do :in Laos and Thai- land as well as in South Vietnam. Now what we are tryirol to do is to limit that resolution to some extent, which I think, as I understand, is right and important to do in an appropriation bill, unless we want to repeal the Gulf of Tonkin resolution altogether. Therefore, if the opportunity presents itself--and I hope very much that the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. McGEE) will not press his motion to table-I shall seek to modify, with all respect to the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANS- FIELD) and the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. CoopER), so that the Senate may know what we are doing. I shall move to amend the proposal to read as follows: None of the funds ,. prop:riated by this act shall be used for ground forces in Laos or Thailand except to i,.?ovide supplies, ma- teriel, equipment, and facilities, including maintenance thereof, for the support of local forces or to provide training for such local forces. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator Yield? Mr. JAVITS. I yield. Mr. PASTORE. The thing that fright- ens me about this amendment is this: Are we not inducing and encouraging North Vietnam to intensify its infiltra- tion in Laos to the disadvantage of our plan to withdraw troops from South Vietnam? On second reflection, after reading the amendment of the Senator from Montana very carefully and listening to his explanation, I think we should Approved For Release 2002/01/22 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0 Approved For Release 2002/01/22 CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0 January 21, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -Extensions of Remarks either accept his amendment or do without his amendment, because if we become too clear, I am afraid that all we are going to do Is to hint to our en- emy to the extent that he will intensify his infiltration in Laos, and thereby dis- rupt the President's plans to withdraw troops from South Vietnam. We all know that Is what we mean. The Defense Department knows what we mean. We have 'been assured time and time again that the do not intend tb use combat forces. We recognize the fact that they are not using combat forces In Laos, Therefore, why do we not let that stand there and rely on one an- other's iriterity, rather than put` our selves in the position of encouraging the enemy to intensify the infiltration be cause they know what we are going to do7 .:: Mr. ,fAVITS, We have already in the sense used by the Senator encouraged the enemy by what we have done, all they need to be encouraged, by everything we are doing, including with our own forces reductions in Vietnam, We are not go- ing to give them any more signals that we do not intend to intensify the war. Now we are looking into our own situ- ation. We? do hot want to get into an- other situation where, without our 1hiow ing-and Senator Fulbright is ' right-a lot of things get done, and then they are faits acc?mpli, whether we like it`or not. it npt going to go into, the details ka of how, the Gulf of Tonkin' Resolution was recommended and discussed' and how it was used, and the toll in lives as `a result. I will say this to the Senator from Montana: I will gil'er no amendment un- less he wants it, but T am telling .him that the words he, has proposed do not do anything like he has in mind to do but If he wants it that way, I will leave it that way. Mr., MANSFIELD. I disagree. Mr. F L IMRIGH' ', Mr. Preside,'t the purpose of my submitting the questions I did to the chairman of the'Appropria- Lions, Committee, was simply, as I wl state once. more, to have this matter disused so Members of theena>fe know what they are doing: In effect, we are spending,` if I understood the- figures in an wer to my question [deletedl. About [deleted] we are spending in `a different war, going on within Laos be- tween, the R oval Laotian Army, the Pathet Lao,, and whatever troops the North Vietnapiese have iniiltrated;thei, which are estimated to be about $0,000. [Deleted.] I do not see any reason why this should not be authorized if it is jr oar interest. I do not believe it is, If I under- E 161 part in that, and I am not proud of hav- this body had a right to know what it is ing been taken in by the then adminis- voting on. This is an appropriation bill. tration and, in my view, deceived. In not We are appropriating at least $400 mil- having asked the kind of questions we lion, which I do not really believe is au- are asking here today, it is possible that thorized, because It is very far removed that experience has made me more sensi- from the activities in 'Vietnam, and I tiveto being .deceved by any adminis- believe that as to Laos, we are violating tration than I otherwise would have been. the 1962 convention. I do not believe that I think it is important that Members it is acceptable; I do not believe it is, in of this body who have to explain this to international law, that if someone else their constitutents at least know what violates the laws, you are also entitled they are voing for. It might be embar- to do it. You are in a case of genuine rassing to any Senator if he is not aware self-defense. If this was a threat to the of the war in Laos to have someone say security of this country, of course, we to him, "I have a friend whose son was would be entitled to defend ourselves, It killed In a bombing raid over North is quite a different international question, Laos." As a matter of fact, I had, in my to maintain that we are entitled to [de- prepared statement, excerpts of letters leted] against an enemy in northern from members of families where sons had Laos, when the situation in Laos has very been flying over North Laos. One of much the aspect of a civil war. them is from a wife of a soldier who has The war in Vietnam began, before we not returned. These are letters that came ever had any combat troops there, as a to me as a Member of the Senate. They civil war. Once we entered it with com- are not classified. I was intending to read bat troops in the Kennedy administra- them in open session, but we went into tion, then it became an international Executive Session before I could. I will war. But I believe most people would put them in the RECORD after we are agree it was a civil war until we did back in open session. send combat troops into South Vietnam. We ought to know about this, the size In Laos, we do not yet have ground of it, and also whether it is in the na- combat troops, I would Certainly support tional interest. I think it is a question and do support the objective of the we have to raise. amendment of the Senator from Ken- But that is not the question I was try- tucky and the Senator from Montana lug to solve in Executive Session. I was that we do not want to put in ground simply trying to make every Senator combat troops. I do not want to continue aware of-the kind of actions we are per- the activities of bombing without our suing, and then we can draw our own knowledge or authorization. If we wish conclusions as to whether or not, in con- to authorize it, that is another matter. tinuing to escalate this activity as we I would close with this thought: It is have since the beginning of the year, we not' only the secrecy in Laos. We run are running the risk of another Viet- - into the same thing in the Philippines nam, of going far beyond the intentions, and Thailand. [Deleted.] I believe, of the present administration. I do not see that that is a good excuse. We are led to believe-and I believe- Recently, in the Philippines, we found the ' figuresabout the . deescalation in they do not wish to make public the Vietnam, but I have seen very little pub agreements that have been made, by Iished on this matter in Laos. Some per- which you use your constituents' money sons say this 'has all been in the papers. , and the prestige of this country in an I have never seen much of it in any news-' agreement with the Philippines as to paper. what we pay for their troops. In some of the testimony, when we It has been said here that it is much asked this question of our Ambassador _ better to hire troops than to send our [deleted], own boys. Well, it may be, especially if the war is not in your national interest This practice as between the legisla- and not in defense of your own country. ture-the Senate-and the Executive, Whether or not it is a proper policy to with respect to our Ambassador [deleted] hire troops to go fight anywhere around an unaccetpable practice. I have been the world where your true interests are An this body 25 years, and 2 years in the not involved, and you make a mistake- other body, and I have never before which Vietnam has generally been heard an Ambassador. tell the com-, agreed by many Senators to be-is quite mitt], that he cannot talk about C he another matter from defending your letedl, under instructions. He said he own homes. had, been instructed [deleted], But in any case, in conformity with I have never heard before any am- .the hearings conducted by the Senator bassador take such a position. from Missouri-and I am very sorry he Recently, the fifth amendment wass is not here, but he has to be away because taken by Army officers, but that is also , his wife has been very ill-the only rea- stood correctly from the remarks of the. less unprecedented. Here we had Ede- son I brought this up, and I think he Senator from Arizona, he may not agree leted]. would have if he had been here, is to wit] that' I do not want to put, words gn This again indicates a certain attitudemake the point that we run into this at- hfs n]cliztll, 1?tt~t he believes this is of such on the paid of the executive branch- titude on the part of the Executive that a nature that we ouglit'to 'do it. and I dp not day it is test this Executive, these matters are not the affair of the This As not anything new. The origin 'but the previous administration, too. As Senate,, that we are not entitled to know of the war is not attributable to this a matter.oj fact, Mr, Katzenbach went what is' -going on and :where vast sums 'admi'nistration., phis is no; partisan ef- further than anybody had ever gone be- of money are being._spent, that it is a for(,t4 pin anything on this administra- fore in denigrating the role of the Sen- secret matter, so secret they cannot even tibn. It is a question of the role the .Sergi- ate In the whole matter ?of foreign rela- tell the Senate, ate plays .1 n matters of this kind tions, especially the war power. That is the e s iftial reason, why I I ~haii not eitexate what liappened on Iattiought it was my duty to raise this. thought this discussion was in the na- the, GttIf o onkfn, xesoiu era I question. The central question is whetlieia tional interest Approved .Far Release 2002/01/22 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0 Approved For Release 2002/01/22 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0 E162 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks January 21, 1970 Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to the for a question? Mr. I'ULBRIGHT. I yield, Mr. CHURCH. I think we are all agreed that the Senate ought to exer- cise. ith constitutional responsibility as intended by the commitmeits resolution. The Senator remembers the Gulf of Tonkin affair, as well as anyone in this Chamber. Is it not true that, at the time, we acted in the context of a situation in which, we were told that American de- stroyers had been attacked on the high Seas, and that certain retaliatory strikes had been made by our Navy in response? Thereupon, we hurriedly passed a reso- lution authorizing the President to take whatever action was necessary in South- east Asia to protect the interests of the United States. We did not draft that resolution with sufficient precision, and afterward we learned that the resolution was beirg used by the President as justification for sending half a million American troops into agigantic ground war in Vietnam. Now we face the first opportunity, to- clay, to reassert the, constitutional re- sponsibility of the Senate in compliance with a resolution we passed earlier in the session, and the question is, Are we go- ing to assert our authority to protect this country from involvement in another Vietnam, in Laos or Thailand, without the consent of Congress? The language with which we are pre- sented is just as imprecise, if not more so, and much more ambiguous, than the language we used in the Gulf of Tonkin resolutloli. I think if we are to assert our respons- ibility we should do so in clear and .pre- cise language. That is the lesson of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution; and, in the face of, that lesson, we certainly ought not to le content with language as vague and ambiguous as that contained in the amendment offered by the distinguished majority leader. I -would implore him to considei some revision of that language which would make, it perfectly clear that we are undertaking to restrict the use of the money in this bill to bar the fi- nancing of American ground troops in Laos and Thailand. I think the language can easily be made perfectly clear, and if we are going to speak at all we should not speak in an ambiguous way, but in a way that makes it clear, not only to us, but to the President and everyone concerned, just what we mean. On this basis, I ask the majority leader to reconsider the language in the amend- ment he proposes. I want to support it, but Ido think it does not carry out the intent he wishes. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield to the Sen?- ar,or, Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, there was nothing ambiguous about the lan- cage in the Gulf of Tokin resolution, nothing ambiguous at all, and maybe Were is a point to be made In not being too clear in what you write down, but in following out the intent as expressed at the time. The distinguished Senator from Ken- ucky knew what he was doing, and he studied this language. He made its intent of ground forces there, we might, as clear during the time that the authori- stated by the Senator from Rhode Is- zation bill was before us for considera- land, be simply inviting ground infiltra- tion; and I have tried to make. it as tion of larger numbers of ground forces clear as he did last September, from North Vietnam and perhaps even I would point out that you can make from Red China. language so clear that, in becoming clear, So it seems to me, reluctant as I am you become involi,ed in places like Laos ever to vote for the laying on the table and Cambodia on a ground combat basis. of a well-intended amendment-and There is no question as to what the particularly when it comes from the ma- intent of this "armbiguous language" is. jority leader-it seems to me that is I do not think I could change it. I am about the only thing we can do. certain the Senator from Kentucky would I might say if we agree to the amend- not. I think this is a good amendment, ment as it is now, when it certainly re- is in accord with .the national commit- lates and can be held to relate to the ments resolution, and is certainly far Air Force as well as to the other forces, more effective, I think, from a senatorial because it says, "none of the funds ap- point of view, than the Tonkin Gulf res- propriated by this act, shall be used for olution was. We got taken in by that, but the support of local forces in Laos or we will notget taken in by this, Thailand" that it does not limit itself Several Senators addressed the Chair. to ground support. Mr. FULBRIGHT, I shall yield further It does include, by possible, and by res- in a minute. sonabic interpretation, the, Air Force. It is true that the language of the Gulf And if we should agree to an amendment of Tonkin Resolution was not ambiguous. in those words and the Exewutive would What was ambiguous about that pro- continue to use the Mir Force as it is posal was, first, that the representation now used, I think it would be interpreted about what actuary had happened in the by many editorialists and fine citizens Gulf of Tonk:?n actually was not true, and from one end of the country to the other second, that the President stated clearly as meaning that the President was that the purpose was not to widen the violating the decision of Cohgress as war, not to bring in North Vietnam. He written into the act. was of the view, and all of the adminis- It seems to me that we are caught in iration spokesmen were, that if we would a situation under which we can do little show unity, and dcs it quickly, the resolu- else except lay on the table the lion was designed to prevent any widen- amendment. ;ng of the war, or any further belligerent i fully agree with he Senator from activities on the part of North Vietnam. I Montana that the action shall be taken' would say that the committee and, in a public meeting. I have no feeling hrough the committee, the Senate, was that that should not be done. deceived. Mr. MANSFIELD. It will be. Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I cer- Mr. HOLLAND. Hoye ever, my feeling is '.,ainly agree with the motives of the dis- that that is the only thing we can do, tinguished majority leader. I think he unless we are permitted to :Limit this to has made those motives clear. He wants the prohibition of the use of ground to prevent our involvement, or Senate forces in Laos. And there seems to be approval of our involvement, In any substantial reason why we cannot so limit ,!,round war in Laos. this amendment. However, I agree completely with the I regret that we are in this position. Senator from New York that the wording i regret that the Senator from Kentucky of the amendment,, which I understand cannot be here. I appreciate the loyalty is really the wording of the Senator from of the Senator from Montana in trying to Kentucky, does not limit itself to that stand by the amendment of the Senator purpose or that motive. from Kentucky. However, I do not be- I noticed, and I hope the majority lieve the amendment is limited to what leader will follow me, that when he read the distinguished Senator from Montana the two excerpts from the statements of would like to limit it. the Senator from Kentucky in Septem- And being in a much more general her, when we were debating the authori- condition, I do not think we should zation legislation, that neither of those adopt it at this time. I feel that it should statements applied only to the Armed be laid on the table. Forces which are used on the ground. Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I They might be interpreted just as clear- should like to address a question to either iv as referring to the Air Force. The Seri- my distinguished colleague, the chair- ator from Arizona has already made it man of the Committee on Foreign Re- entirely clear that we are using the Air latlons, or to the leadership, whichever 'Force over Laos [deleted], and that we one might be willing to answer it. are continuing to :i0 use them and will I am concerned, and have been all continue to so use them. along, about all of the actions we take Mr. President, I was hoping that; we that put us in an apologetic position in could find words here to make the world opinion and esteem with respect to amendment apply only to any use in the the war in Vietnam. fsuture, or at any ti,nie, of ground forces It seems to me that for a long time there without the concurrence of Con- about all we have been doing Is giving gress. encouragement to the enemy. I say that Mr. President, I find, however, that in all deference. those on the committee, several of them, If we are going to pull out uncondi- feel that if we used, those limiting words tionally, then let us pull out and get it and made it clear that we were talking over with. I am persuaded that what we hilly about the use of ground forces and are doing is slowly and maybe pain- were preventing or- prohibiting the use fully-maybe that is what we intended Approved For Release 2002/01/22 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0 January 21, Approved For Release 2002/01122 CIA-RDP72-00337R00.0300010032-0 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-Extensions of Remarks E 163 to do and will do >Iltin tely urnIng over outhe ist siEL tq whocver ants to gl?ab it tip --and `t sink we know who will grab 'and sulvertit Aside from that ..I point out before t ptb`ui'id the question; that I think-we should have li, ,rrnetl gi~r Ies?on ,;I seIc orn iia}k about thin iss Ze H .ever, nk we- shouldh Ye learned from ouraexpgri enge"iii South Vietnam and it Sapthi Kt rest that we shouldnever go into an- ather war, with ground troops or other- wise; except that we go in to win. I think that has been our tragic mis--- take and 'that if entering the the-Vietnam. war vas a InUtake then our not fighting" to win has oinpounded that mistake. We have telegraphed from our Gov- erhn ent to the ether side the'rnessage we do not warn towin a victory rather that we are just begging the other side to quit., That strategy has 'not worked. It will not work, in my judgment. If we are to give another signal . with this resolution, it will avail us? nothing. suss now written, this proposed amend-_ -inept can be interpreted as one chooses. As has been indicated in the debate, the leader can Interpret it as,l~e wants to.. 1 , ban put a different interpretation upon. it. . And? so can anyone else., It , is very ambiguous. However, the ,..best way, to approach this, if that is what we want to d'i-and I am perfectly willing, because 1-do not think the President should com- mit ground forces there without the consent of Congress-would be for this body to have an understanding with the President that he will not do it, That,, it seems to me, would be suilicient. If,hp gives us his pledge that he will not do it '~Vitlout 'codling to, Congress, I will take his word for it. He is the President of the United States, and there, is no reason for ally? of us to doubt his good faith and - assurances. It We do .that, we ill not need the pending amendment in- the form,ili which it is offered. I cannot vote for it _in the form m which it is offered. If there are celtain ni,qdflcations xpade,a,xid the ma?t-. ter comes to a vote, I will vote for it. But I doubt the. wisdom of this pro- cedure. 1fany things we have -'clone publicly have not been a credit to, or in tb, inter- est of our country. I do not blame tlie- other side for not negotiating. Why should they? They appear to be.getting_ what they want without mal[ipg any edncesslons. If we keep going as we have been, unless it is possible to so effectively Vletnamize the war that the. South Viet naniese can take it over and win, the Communists will soon take. over South Vietnam. I for one, would like to know that Congress will be conslted ktefore;ground troops are committed,uand I do riot lzlow. of,;anyone that does not want.tp know. Perhaps I am mistaken, but I think that is a sentiment of the Senate, Why, not do it by taking the word of the President and relying upon it? -t:We can always take action if We need, to d$ so. KoweYer,, r would rather do It, that way than to? signal again. to the other side. that, our p.giWtry is divided and. wilt become further divided; that is to the distinguished Senator from Louisiana. While 'I have the TCoor, let ine saythat I have been "listening with interest to the arguments''agafnst the language in the Cooper mendment. "Ambiguous" does not get to the point. We ought to be more definite we ought to be more clear. May I.point out that one amendment to the amendment offered is as follows: None of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used for ground forces in Laos or Thailand except to provide supplies, ma- teriel, equipment, and facilities, including maintenance thereof, for the support of local forces or to provide training for such local forces. The effect of that would be to put U.S. combat troops in-Laos. . So I think there is something to be said for ambiguous language, and there is a great deal more to be said for the intent of the Senate. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Mr. McGEE. I yield. Mr. TOWER. T suggest thatthe Senate resolve itself back into open session. I think that way we will bring this matter to a conclusion a little earlier. Mr. MANSFIELD. We will. Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Sen- ator yield? Mr. McGEE. r yield. Mr. CASE. I wish to express agree- ment with the conclusion just stated by- the majority leader. The language is am- biguous.'Our beloved colleague, the Sen- ator from Kentucky, has a very subtle mind, and so does our majority leader. Mr. MANSFIELD. Not I. Mr. CASE. The Senator from Montana has. This is said very kindly. That lan- guage could be interpreted to exclude, as the Senator -from Kentucky said in the statement the Senator from Montana read about it, it seems to me, air sup- port. I 'do not think there is doubt about that. The Senator from Florida made that point. If by "combat troops" is going to be meant just ground combat I am going to support the ambiguity, because I think any public statement we snake is likely to. get us into much worse trouble in the world than just repeating what we have said before. I think we can all agree on one thing: We are not going to have American foot soldiers go in -there. Beyond that, I am note sure what this amendment would do, and I do not think it matters too much. But, on the basis that there is a great deal of ambiguity here as to exactly what may be permitted, sc long as that one basic thing is excluded, that is the medicine we had better take today. . Mr, THURMOND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. McGEE. I am glad to yield. Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I feel very strongly about the words uttered by the distinguished Senator from Florida and the distinguished Senator from Ar- kansas about what constitutes the proper course for us to follow. 1 have been to Vietnam. I have firm convictions about the matter. I am of the opinion that we could have won the war long ago, and should)iave done it, and we are fighting we continue'to fight among ourselves and that some want to give the enemy their' way about ` everything. And they are getting their way more, and more as`we continue to make concessions ' without any comparable action whatsoever from the other side. I `would rather to dolt with an agree- ment with the President. And I think we can accomplish more by that approach and better protect our country than we can by adopting this proposed ambiguous amendment. Mr. McGEE. Mr. President-- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming is recognized. Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Arizona without losing my right to the floor. ' The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized. Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, if the majority leader's decision holds that the vote will be outside the executive session, I suggest to the majority leader that lie declassify the executive hearing. I think it would appear rather foolish to the American public to have the result of a vote without being able to read what we were voting on and all'of the argu- m ent and debate. I say this with all due ' respect. Frankly', outside of [deleted] there is nothing that could not be declassified. I suggest to the majority leader that in the interest of the country, if we have a public vote, the record should be made public. 'If it has to be sanitized, let it be sanitized. I think that too many things have been said today that have long needed saying. I think the American public would be encouraged and strengthened if it could read some of the remarks that have been made, even if we have to delete some of the numbers and make some declassifica- tion, and I would hope that the majority leader would take the proper steps to see that the record, as we have listened to It today, will be made available to the public. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. McGEE. I yield. Mr. MANSFIELD. We will follow the usual procedure agreed, to by the Senate on all previous occasions in which we have been in executive session, by means of which it will be up to the chairman of the committee in charge of the bill- to wit, in this instance, the distinguished senior Senator from .: Louisiana (Mr. ELLENIER)-to approve, to sanitize and to clear the final version, just as it was up to the distinguished Senator from Mississippi (Mr., STENNrs) when a similar occurrence arose during the considera- tion of the defense authorization bill. So far as I am concerned, I believe that the Senator from Louisiana will not be picayunish, that he will be pretty broad in allowing what can get through. Frankly, I have heard nothing in this executive session which I think should be kept secret, but I think the precedents of the Senate should be and must be upheld, and we will leave the final de- termination. as to what the. sanitizatiopi Approved For Release 2002/01/22 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0 ~' - E 164 CONGRESSIONAL RECOR;P---Extensions of Remarks Jamu i'y 21, 1970 the war! in Vietaa now, because we did not will in Korea. if we do not win this war, we will fight again. The Senator is just as right as he can be when he says we should not go into a war until we have to; that once we get into a war, we ought to win it. But that is beside the point at this time. The question now, before the American people is,,what course can we, the Senate of the United States, follow to help to bring t4e war in Vietnam to a close as soon as rossible? I am convinced that any words we ut- ter or any actiofi we take indicating di- vision in this country will tend to extend the war. I am convinced that the mora- torium march in Washington opposing the Vietnam war helped to ex-tend the war, because it showed a division in this country. Other similar demonstrations will do the same. I am firmly of the opinion that we should table this motion, as the Senator from Wyoming indicated he would like to do, and leave this matter with the President, Let the leaders. of the Commit- tee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Foreign Relations confer with the Presi- dent. If they cannot work something out, then the Senate can consider any other action. I should think that the best thing to do today would be to stand behind our President and show unity. I hope the Senate will follow that course. Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. McGEE. I yield to the Senator from California. Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I have sat quietly in the background, and I have listened attentively. With all due respect to the majority leader, I think the mere fact of the amount of time we have been discussing, the meaning of the amend- ment is, evidence enough that there is a misunderstanding. I do not- think there is any great divi- sion of opinion as to what happened in the Gulf of Tonkin. I do not think there is any great division-I do not see how there can be---among those who have read the record, that the entire involve- ment in Vietnam has been a series of mis- takes. The involvement in Korea began with a mistake, and then we went on from-one mistake to another. I think the distinguished Senator from Arkansas made a-: very wise statement when he said that we ought to try to find-our way out of this morass. I do not think we accomplish anything by per- mitting any thought or feeling or word to come out of the Senate which would further confuse or further divide the American people. I do not think anyone in this Chamber does not know and understand that con- trived confusion, division, and polariza- tion has been the most important tactic of the enemy for at,least the Past 2 years. So I would say that two things occur: First, we are talking about. a condition that I am not sure really needs, our at- tention at this time.. The President of the United States, who has done: more to get us out, who, I think we all agree, is trying sincerely to bring it to an end, has said that there will bero more Vietnams. I think we can trust:bim. Until we find out to the ontrary, I believe we should trust him. SoI do not think it needs any em- bellishment on our part. As the Senator from Arkansas = Mr. MCCLLLLAiN) has suggested, I think that perhaps there should be a policy, an arrhgement, an agreement, whereby, before tins ever happens again, the legis- lative and the executive branches would sit down together. I can envision cir- cumstances in which, if the debate vent on as long as this debate has gone on, as to possible action needed, the action might be lost before our decision was made. This is perhaps one of the reasons why, at the outset, the Chief Executive was charged with these matters. I would suggest that we be very cau- tious. First of all, we should find out ex- actly what we want to accomplish and make sure we are doing it. I must say that, after listening attentively to all the explanations and to all the divisions of opinion, 'I am not certain what might result. I do not wEmt any more Ameri- can troops to go ar..yvwhere to fight. But I also do not want to signal to the enemy, who are watching carefully, who.are listening carefully, who are very sensitive, and in these matters of at- tempting to divide, our citizens, adept. They are experts. They have played the propaganda game successfully for 35- years. I know something about it; I have studied it. They are wondering what we are say- ing here and how to use it to their ad- vantage. Senators know as well as I know that there is not anything they do that is not motivated from political considera- tions, including their military activities. It is always planned for political effect and it always has been. If we are going to vote on this matter in public, I assume we will have s, discussion and an oppor- tunity to be heard in public; and that we will have an opportunity to vote on a resolution under which there will be no question as to what is the exact meaning. Before we vote in public I hope we all take into full consideration what we would be accomplishing with regard to the gen- eral welfare, future, and safety of our country, to make certain we will never again by hoodwinked by something like the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. I think we have talked a long time, and I think everybody understands the niat- ter quite well. I would be perfectly happy if we could get on to other matters. Mr. AIKEN. Mr, President, will the Senator yield? Mr. McGEEI,. I yield to the Senator from Vermont. Mr. All EN. Mr. President, however, I want to say the Senator from Montana knows exactly what he intends with his resolution. It is perfectly plain to anyone who wants to understand it. We have, of course, Many different types of people and many different schools of thought in this country, We have those who want to get out of Vietnam precipitately, regardless of the cost; we have those who want to go on expanding the war until victory is achieved, regardless of the cost in lives and dollars; sold, then, we have those who believe that pescE.~ can be restored in Southeast Asia, if we approach the subject in a sensible manner with a grad- ual withdrawal, such as President Nixon is now attempting to do. I just want to say if there are any misunderstandings about the Senator from Montana or the Senator?from Ken- tucky, they can be applied equally against the President, of the United States who is trying to bring about peace over there and to do away with the excessive expense }:nd who, I judge, is opposed to war for the sake of war. Mr. MCCLELLAN. Mr. President, I posed the question in r I previous re- marks, Can anyone an>wer it, primarily the leadership on either side and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations that has jurisdiction over these matters. I would like to know whether the President has been. consulted with respect to any plan to put any ground troops into Laos? Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. McCLELLAN. I coine back to the question: Why cannot ;Eris matter be re- solved simply by an ut derstrmnding with the President that - it will not be done except that he comes to the Congress for approval? Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. NIcCLELLAN. It seems to me if that has not been done, to take this ac- tion precipitately is somewhat an affront to the President. I trust the President. I agree with the distinguished Senator from Vermont that he is doing everytil:ing he can to get us out of the Vietnam situation. I think he is acting in good faith. I hate to vote for something here that I think would cast an aspersion or reflection that the Senate doubts the President's good faith. It has not been done; I'now of no threat to put ground troops in there. Why then should we take this proposed action? It seems 'to me a simple conference, a simple communication between the lead- ership of this body and the President, and his response thereto would be suf- ffcient to allay this whole issue. We can put our confidence in that ap- proach and that is the way we should operate. If we must heve a vote on this resolution, I cannot .support it in its pres- ent form. The President said that we are not going to have any more Vietnams. I trust him, but if we have any doubt, why not contact him and get an assurance we could all accept and rely on. Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Montana. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, no Senator raised any question about mis- trust of the President, nor 3hould any Senator do so. What we are tr, in; to do in this amendment is support the President, who has said that he will not send ground combat troops into Laos. His words have been backed up by his Secretary of State, who said, in,response to a question con- cerning the possibility of being involved 1n Laos on a ground combat basis: The President won't let it happen. Approved For Release 2002/01/22 CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0 MIj_tJI VVCW rVl RCICQ,7C LVVLiV IILZ , VIM-rcF7r 1L-VV I RVVVJVVV I VVJL-V January 21, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions o Remarks E 165 Continuing, Secretary of State Rogers' made me believe was his policy. I do not it seems to me, that itun derscores and re-, said believe the 'h'ounding Fathers intended iriforces the constitutional role of this mean we have learn d one lessoji,`aiid our system to mean the Senate should body in that the projection of-foreign policy I think the dues= is we are not goin p& ilt any major ask the President what he means about intents and directions wars in the, mainland o Asia again and we something and take his word for it. tion that remains is whether the message are not going to send American troops there, We should not have this complicated has been delivered and I can see no and we certainly aren't going to do it` unless system unless the three branches play reason to doubt that the message has we have the American public and. the Con- greys behind us, their respective roles. There is nothing come through loud and clear, and no I applaud the Secretary of State and wrong with our understanding of the doubt has been heard downtown for some words in the amendment of the Senator time, the President of the United States for from Montana. I; shall support it, It is I fail to see what more in the form their statements, sentiments, and intent. intended to be a limitation of the present of a public resolution it could achieve But remind Senaors t h a t w ire, apart program. that the President. has not already heard of this Government, too, and that we I wish to refer to the point, made by on that question. share a part of the blame, a good part, my senior colleague on,going all out in Therefore, Mr. President, in that con- for getting n" i eolvw ed vin 'Vietnam. , the war. I agree with him. I do not be- text, I am resuming my motion to table oulif get behind this.. lieve that we should get into a war when the pending resolution. resolution which means something ,and is it is not sufficiently clear that the na- Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask meant to be helpful to the President so tional interest is involved, and there is for the yeas and nays. that we can put into effect what we dg no question that we will go all out to The yeas and nays .were ordered, cided to do in our national commitments win it. It would. be a terrible mistake_ to Mr, ALLOTT. Mr. President, will the resolution., get into a war in which one is ambivalent Senator yield? ~ Mr. MoGEE. Mr. President, I yield to in his attitude toward going all out in_ Mr. MANSFIELD.- Mr. President, I the Senator. from Arkansas. a war. move that the Senate return to- 10 FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, first, Why did not President Johnson go all The PRESIDING OFFICER. The I wish to make the record clear so that the out? I can guarantee that I was not one motion is not debatable. record is not confused In the" rejnar"ks. of his advisers, during the period when Mr. ALLOTT.._ Mr. President, I was ofethe Senator from South Caroljn , and, he was refusing to go all out. He did not going to-ask if the. Senator from Wyo I believe one other SezlatQr, I do not be- consult me from about September 1965 ming would withhld his motion for a lieve he said, "distinguished senior Sen- until December a year ago. It was not moment. ator from Arkansas" but be should have. done on my advice. Why did he not go.. Mr. McGEE. How much time does the Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will all out? I think one of the reasons was Senator from Colorado need? th i ld t e Sen ? e or y ? that he was doubtful about the validity. Mr. FBR>'GHT. I yield. of the war he had ufide;taken. I 'do not Mr. TIuITJ,t2,ZUlONA.I meantsenipr Sep}- know why he did not go all out. In World ator from Arkansas. War II, we went all out for unconditional Mr. 'ULDRIGHT. I just wanted to surrender, We won that war, make clear that he was referring to the It is of course true that the previous senior Senator. administration over a fpll 3 or 4 years.." With respect to the matter of trusting refused to go all out, which is. the tradi- the President, certainly I.did not, wish to_ tional way. There must have been some raise that question. The Penator_ from, reason fpr it, Not only was it a, disaster Montana 1~ut. it on g proper basis. This for the country, but it also, discredited is a constitiitigna question and, the Sex - the President himself, Clearly he was not ate has a rolp to play. I say once more out to discredit himself. He of course did the purpose o my actions here ,today was not wish to bring about a situation in to inform the Senate so that We, could, which he Gould n,, pt run for election again. play that, role -with full inforrpation. That is unprecedented in our history. But about what we are doing in this area. _ , it does raise the question that maybe the. ?3owever, 3t does not seem,,to ,me, this war was ill founded and maybe it was question of tri}sting the President Should. not justified in the first place. In_ the be brought up in this fashipn, I supported present circumstances we face. I believe very strongly the previous President, that we support the President's objective. President Johnson, Hg,rarion,a platform The only difference that I know of in in "1964 "of .no wider war. The .Senator most people's minds is not the President's froze. .Arizona will, recall. the nature of objective, but whether the means he has that perhaps a little better than I,,ISup- adopted to achieve the objective are cal- ported President Jollz~ on, One of the, culated to, do" so, this is an instance in issues, and I believe the Senator from which we can have honest differences of Arisoona will agree, was "no wider, war," opinion. I certainly do not disagree with President Johnson said throughout the the announced objective of the President, summer a41d early fall, of 1964 that be but I do not 'think it disloyal or un was against a wider war. American to suggest that the policy he I believe the -Senator, , from Arizona is following is not likely to achieve his did advocate some. of the things that objective. It is purely a matter of judg were later done by President Johnson, ment. Mr.,GOLPWATER. Mr. President, will' I should like to do anything I can to the Senator, yield? help him achieve his-announced objec- Mr. G.,gI 2W4i.TEA his heart he. ment, the amendment of the Senator Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, this knew I was -right, from Kentucky and the Senator from, is the only way I can get hold of the Mr. FULBRIGHT, As I look back upon Montana, would certainly strengthen his members of my committee to say that I It, I believe you were, too. Anyway, I and to resist if pressure is put upon him was not going to have a meeting if this is did, not support the Senator, frorl?., Ari t . _wfden the war and to make it more going to continue much longer. I am zona, I supported the Deu}ocratic,nomi-, difficult for him not to withdraw and ton 'hopeful that we can continue the HEW nee, tie 1Qw w t i%pened, conclude, I would say, the tragic war, in appropriations meeting when we get Via. fox as theoxnili .lJkizig a corn- South Vietnam. through with the vote.. I am sure that mltmentthat he is going to follow a .par-, Mr, McGEE, Mr. President, the de- we can at least clean up or at least finish titular "policy in a ward I do not believe- .liberattons of this, body this afternoon was not going to have a meeting if this is Presiddent Johnson fnllnxx-1 nrlla++ ie bairn b ?f l suc een Approved; Fqr Release 2002/01/22 CIA=RDP72-0,0337R00030001OQ32-0 Mr. ALLOTT. One minute. Mr. McGEE. I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Colorado. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator from Wyoming would have to ask unanimous consent- Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. McGEE) may yield to the Senator from Colorado (Mr. AL- LoTT) for"1 minute. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Montana? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. The Senator from Colorado is recog- nized for 1 minute.' 'Mr, ALLOTT. Mr. President, all I wanted to say was that; I believe we are in basic accord. I was going to suggest to the majority leader that we might be able to come out with a positive res- olution affirming the decision of the President not to use U.S. combat troops in Vietnam. In this way we would solidi- fy the country and solidify the sense of the Senate not to denigrate our own position in our joint responsibility, and also not feed the fuel of Communist propaganda aroufld the world. Mr. McGEE. Mr: President, I ask unan- imous consent' that :1 may yield 15 seconds to the Senator from Washing- ton (Mr.'MAGNUSdN) in order to make an announcement. E 166 Approved For Release 2002101/22 CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECD I) - Extensions ? of Remarks Jag2 ry Mr. I ANSFIII . M. President, I ask for the rands. ; The PRWIDING O 'XCF .. The yeas and nays have already been ordered. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. 'resident, I move that the Senate return to legis- lative, open session. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Ques- tion is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Montana. The motion was agreed to and, there - upon ,at 4:27 o'clock p.m. the doors of the Chamber were opened, and the open session of the Senate was re?umed. FANNIN NOTES INDL=STR t PROBLEM HON. SAM STEIGER OF ARIZONA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES , Wednesday, January 21, 1970 Mr. STEIGER of Arizona. Sr. Speaker, in the midst of an extremely difffcult inflationary situation it is ironic that we are also facing an international trade problem of such purgeoning prpp'ortions that it may threaten our domestic econ- omy. In last Sunday's Arizona Republic, business and financal'editor'Don Camp- bell printed an interview with Arizona's Sonator PAUL FANNIN outlining the scope of this problem and some of the actions which must be taken if a trade crisis is to be avoided. Senator FANNn notes some of the com- plexities which have gotten;usinto our current international logjarl and puts forth some interesting and innovative ideas on how the problem may be at- tacked. Mr. Speaker, I include the article to which I have referred, whidh appeared an the Arizona. Republic on Sunday, January' 18, in the RECORD at this point: INDUSTRY AT THE CROSSROADS?---IMPLACABLY PINCERS OF SOARINC. COSTS, Low TARIS's''S STRANGLING MANUFACTURERS IN TILE MAR- KETPLACE (By Don G. Campbell) With the possible exception of performing brain surgery In the back of a truck camper while 1 negotiating the Coronado 1h-ail, few i;bings corn quite so close to :;seer impos- .;ibility as that of understanding our tariff laws. And yet, ironically, few International ar- 'angements strike so decisively, at the-man- n-the-street's pocketbook and arouse, so _nuch emotionalism as this complex network of duties that each country erects to protect As domestic commodities and products from .mports. Ideally, of course, all coulitrtes should be to constituted that tariffs wouldn't be neces- ;ary and there would be, literally, "free trade" with everyone competing-no strings at- tached-With everyone else. But life is one t.hing,, art Is another, and free trade is an art ;hat Is as elusive 'today as it was when inter- riatiorsal commerce began. The fact that the United States Is, day by day, getting into an increasingly critical po- Iitio'n In its foreign trade is no particular Beret, belt' very con4plexity of how we got into our current jam helps to obscure the seriousness Of it. As our productions costs oar, the fewer goods we sell overseas: The fewer goods we sell overseas, the more jobs are lost domestically. And, at the same time, the more foreign markets we lose, the ? more American manu- facturers axe tempted to move some of their operations abroad to compete more evenly. The result; the loss of even more jobs here in the United States. One of )rte more vocal advocates of taking action in thin area before the damage is lx- reversible is Arizona's senior U.S. Senator, Paul J. Fannin, whose concern is underscored by the fact that Arizona's role as a foreign exporter IS growing by leaps and bounds--up to $98.2 million in 1966 (the latest year avail- able), exclusive of agricultural items, from $63 million just six years earlier. It was in 1366 that Arizona finally nosed Colorado out of the No,, l sport in escorts among the Moun- tains Mates. The key to the crisis, Sen. Fannin said this past week in an interview, is the infla- tionary cycle in the United States and, in particular, the soaring cost of labor-which, since 1965, has risen at twice the rate of out- put per man hour. As a case in point, Sen. Fannin cite- the disparity between labor costs among the ma- jor auto producing countries. In the United States, according to Fannin's figures, labor costs in the industry amount to about $5,31 an hour asngaiost: Argentina, $1.19; Australia, $1.52; Brazil, $0.96; Germany, $2.20; Italy, $1.99; Japan, $1.40; Mexico, $2.04; South Africa, $1.05; United Kingdoms, $117. Undoubtedly, too, laanrcin feels, labor con- siderations are also the prime factor in the explosive growth at imports currently crippling the domestc shoe industry. As re- e5tntly as 1959, for instance, shoe imports equaled only 3.5 per cent of U.S. shoe pro- duction but, last year, they equaled 37.5 per cent of it, and the industry estimates that by 1975 one out of every two pairs of shoes sold in the United States will -be foreign made. File industry, Fannin said, also reckons that for every 10 million shoes imported (and there were 200 million of them in lti69), there are roughly 3,000 job opportunities lost for domestic shoe workers, Hurt even more, of course, Is the consumer electronic industry, Of the total market of 12.5 million television sets labt year, for in- stance, a full 4.;, million of them, 33 per cent, caitlie from abroad. 'the industry estimates that the Import share of this will rise to 43 percent of the arket in the current year. In the case of tape Instruments, the battle already has been decisively lost-a full 10.3 million of the 11.9 million tape machines sold last year, 90 per cent-were imported. This year, the Industry expects the import share of the market to rise to 92 per cent. But, while "Cheap foreign labor" is the traditional rallying cry of the protectionists, Fannin said, the whole problem is a bit more complex than that, The disparity in labor costs, is further complicated by unfavorable tariff struetureS cosni;l.g out of the "Kennedy Round- of tariff negotiations--a drastic re- duction in the tariffs on about 100,000 prod- ucts Involved in world trade and a move that was decidely dverdue. The negotiations were the result of eon- greasibnal action in 1963 giving the late President , the authority to slash import duties up to 50 per cent across the board. The knotty details of the authorization, how- everkept all 46 nations involved in the matter bu$y clear up until it was flnallly signed into law on Nov. 13, 1967. "The trouble is," Sen. Fannin said, ""hat the tariffs worked out were supposed to even up the productive capacities of the countries involved. Countries like Mexico, with a much lower productive capacity than the United States, were protected from a flood of imports with relatively high tariffs." The trouble Is, the Arizona senator said, the situ tion changed quickly and, by the time the nonstop negotiations on the Ken- nedy Round had been completed, the pro- 21, 1970 ductivitl' capacity of such Countries as Japan and Germany had drastically changed--they no longer needed the "p -otectinn" that the high tariff still gave theri. Meanwhile, of course, inflation in the United States had Continued at a dizzy pace alai-- Between soaring caste and disadvan- tageous tariff barriers---A>aterioaa goods were rapidly being priced out of the market. (In France, for instance, tariffs are based on "1sorsepoker units" which :makes the duty on a Volkswagen only $16 while on a Chevy II, with only twice the "horupowel' units,'" the duty is $130). In order to sell abroad, ,it all, then, Anieri- can manufacturers have heels fleeing to such free-port assembly zones as Mexican border, Taiwan a nd Singapore-- n: rt merely to pick up lower priced labor, but to execubs an end -run around the tariff barriers, too. The result: plants that should be built In the United States, (`.'You can train ass .American Indian," Sen. Fannin said,"to asse-noble apart just-as easily as you can teach a Korean.") are being built abroad and staffed by foreigners. By the end of 1970, the electronic industry est'ima-ten, all hut two of the mayor American manufacturers will be Lnporting complete TV sets, or substantiali r finished chassis, from their own foreign plats for sales in the United States. No one, Fannin said, wants to try to counter this by launch' ng a drive for a return to the isolationistic high tariffs also- cited with the disastrous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1931 which would simply result in retaliatory tariffs around the world, shut- ting us completely out of all nuerkets. The solution, Arizona's senior senator be- lieves, has to be a return to realism on the part of organized labor in the United States, plus legislation that would give American industries the same inceritives for building plants in the United Staten, as they now have for building them abroad. "I don't see how labor (',in take much sat- isfaction in getting worcers a $5-an-hour scale," Fannin said, "if there aren't any jobs to be filled-and that's the direction we're going." Currently under study by the Treasury Department, he added, is I-roposed legislation that he has drafted that would domesticate some-of the incentives-;;uch as tax defer- ments on funds reinveal n'd in plants--that American manufacturers now enjoy in set- ting up foreign subsidiaries. But the time is short, rand the squeeze is rapidly becoming a string ohold. HON. MASTON O'N:EAL OF GYORG It IN THE HOUSE OF RErPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, Janue.ry 21, 1970 Mr. O'NEAL of Georg; i a. Mr. Speaker, the Albany Herald, a distinguished news- paper in my :district, on January 5, 1970, paid a most deserved tribute to one of America's most dedicated and respected public servants, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Di- rector of the Federal Bireau of Investi- gation. A little over 5 years ago this body unanimously adopted :1 rescSution ex- pressing the hope that Air. Hoover would "continue in his presen'. office for many years to Come.' I would like to reiterate that hope now. Mr. Speaker, I inc.lu6e; In the RECORD the editorial entitled ".5. Edgar Hoover, Patriot" : Approved For Release 2002/0,1/22 : CIA-RDP72-00337R0'00300010032-0