CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3 MARCH 1970; WASHINGTON POST ARTICLES 3 AND 10 MARCH 1970: CIA ACTIVITIES IN LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010018-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 2, 2002
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: March 10, 1970
• Content Type: NSPR

WASHINGT ON POST DATE VYI AMC. 10 PAGE
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AID Mission in Lao
Used as CIA Cover
By Jack Foisie
Los Angeles Times
VIENTIANE, March 9-The
U.S. civilian aid mission in
Laos is being used as a cover
for CIA agents engaged in
clandestine operations against
the Communist enemy.
Agents posing as members
of the U.S. Agency for Inter-
national Development mis-
sion's rural development divi-
sion are recruiting and train-
ing progovernment guerrillas
to fight Communists, detect
enemy movements and act as
ground controllers for air-
craft.
The Americans involved in
these military activities are
members of the AID mission's
Rural Development Annex to
distinguish them from other
'rural development workers
engaged in normal functions-
assistance to civilians in re-
mote areas.
Based on talks with people
throughout Laos the past
several weeks, the number of
agents posing as civilian? AID
workers totals several hun-
dred.
In one area there areal-
most 50 Americans and about
half of them are listed as
members of. the Rural Devel-
opment Annex. In military :W6
gion 2 in Northeast Laos.
where much of the fighting
has occurred, annex members
are very numerous.
In the northeast, both regt
lar and guerrilla forces are un
der the command of the Me(
tribal general, Vang Pao. Foi
years the CIA has been .active
in supporting Vang Pau',
mountain people..
See CIA, A12, Col $'
CIA, From Al
Originally the activity was
under the code name of White
Star. It now appears that Ru-
ral Development Annex is the
successor to White Star.
Although nominally under
control of the AID mission di-
rector, Charles Mann, annex
people answer only to the CIA
chief in Laos.
There is another secret or-
ganization hidden within the
AID Mission compound. It is
called the Special Require-
ments Office. Its personnel
provide the supplies for the
clandestine units.
Even AID workers who are
in remote areas to help vil-
lagers dig wells, build schools
and teach sanitation are some-
times called upon to act as
forward air controllers, it was
learned.
Discontent in Mission
Within the AID mission
there is some discontent over.
the. military role that is being
forced upon them.
"It breeds distrust of the
people we are trying to help,"
one field worker said. "I won't
say that we perform humani-
tarian work free of political
implications. But now some
people think we're an adjunct
of the military."
It is particularly embarrass-
Ing for field supervisors when
ey ask for more money or
more staff and the request is
questioned by an unknowing
bureaucrat in Washington.
"How can you ask for more
men when you've already got
15. supervising well-digging?"
is the query.
He doesn't know that 10 of
the well-digging experts are
really CIA agents. '
Peace Corps Predecessor
The only strong opposition
to the AID mission's change l
of its original peaceful role,:
however, comes from a youth-
ful group of overseas work-
ers, ,members of the Intea-na-
tional Volunteer Service. Pri-
vately chartered, IVS pre-
ceded the Peace Corps.
There are 49 IVS members
in Laos, and they serve under
an AID mission contract. Al-
though they have made no
formal protest, there is deep
discontent and some are con-
sidering voicing their dis-
pleasure.
Many members of the annex
are former American , ervice-
men who fought in Vietnam.
Often they come from the Spe-
cial forces and their job in
Laos is about the same-with-
out the green beret.
The men for the annex are
recruited as their discharge
date from service comes due.
Many have a desire for fur-
ther adventure overseas and
like the high pay, triple or.
more what they earned when i
There is the possibility that
some men have gained tem
porary leave from the armed
forces and can return to the
military after their contract
expires.
In the past several years the
membership in the annex has
remained constant, it was
learned. Only the American
air support to the Royal Lao'
government forces seems to
have, escalated.
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 March 3, Y970Approved Fotg t?SWAJ22jiR8iR 7; 3 ?000300010018-6
ORDER OF BUSINESS
The PRESIDING OFFICER. In ac-
cordance with the previous order, the
Senator from South Dakota (Mr. Mc-111Q6 A GovERN) is recO ized for not less than param I ary opera Ions or arms aid in
20 minutes. acoss....
shad a discussion with a distinguished
member of the press this morning who
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY told me the
was nothing in the Geneva
AND THE HIDDEN POLICIES OF
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, only
10 days ago the Congress received the
President's message on U.S. foreign
policy for the 1970's. Described by the
President as the "first annual report on
U.S. foreign policy," It espoused a new
"Nixon doctrine." Mr. Nixon described
the report as "the most comprehensive
statement on U.S. foreign policy ever
made in this century."
With regard to Asia and the Pacific,
the'major theme of the message was that
future U.S. policy would be shaped in
accordance with the Guam doctrine, first
described by the President on July 2'5,
1969, and later restated in his Novem-
ber 3 Vietnam address.
bummarizing the key elements of his
Guam approach, the President made
these three points:
.First. The United States will keep all
its treaty commitments.
Second. We shall provide a shield if a
nuclear power threatens the freedom of
a .,nation allied with us, or of a nation
whose survival we consider vita7`to our
security and the security of the rekior
as a whole.
Third. In cases involving other types
of aggression we shall furnish military
and economic assistance when requested
and as appropriate. But we shall look to
the nation directly threatened to assume
the primary responsibility of providing
the manpower for its defense.
The President said:
This approach requires our commitment
to helping our partners develop their own
strength. In doing so, we must strike a care-
ful balance. If we do too little to help
them-and erode their belief in our com-
mitments-they may lose the necessary will
to conduct their own self-defense or become
disheartened about prospects of develop-
ment. Yet, if we do too much, and American
forces do what local forces can and should
be doing, we promote dependence rather
than independence.
erne is no
majority leader said here yesterday. It
includes the training and direction of lo-
cal forces and an aerial bombardment
running at an estimated rate of 500 sor-
ties daily, although there seems to be
some dispute as to the exact level.
We are doing all of this in violati
f e Gene` Accords or 1962, we
ternational commitments? What has
happened to the pledge that we s gn
agreement that foreclosed the possibility
of us granting military aid or partici-
pating in military operations if it were
so requested by the Government of Laos.
I checked very carefully on the Geneva
accords which we signed in 1962 and I
find that that member of the press is
mistaken.
Article IV of the agreement spec ficall
Omoits-InTuTary or par
.
ante by any ou id pow r in he s
ArW&
of LaD&
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed at the conclusion
of my prepared remarks the text of the
Geneva settlement of July 23, 1962.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I call
special attention to article IV to which
I find no exception whatsoever in the
remaining portion of this document.
How does the roughly $300 million in
annual military and supporting military
aid we are pouring into this tiny little
kingdom square with the President's
warning that "if we do too much, and
American forces do what local forces
can and should be doing, we promote
dependence rather than independence?"
An even more serious question is
raised by the secretive character of our
hidden war in Laos. In his televised
foreign policy speech of last Novem-
ber 3, the President said:
I believe that one of the reasons for the
deep division about Vietnam Is that many
Americans have lost confidence in what their
government has told them about our policy.
The American people cannot and should not
be asked to support a policy which Involves
the overriding issues of war and peace unless
they know the truth about that policy.
We not only do not know the truth
about our heavy involvement in Laos
but also we are increasingly in the dark
about what is really going on in Vietnam.
The senior Senator from Missouri
(Mr. SYMINGTON), who is in the Cham-
ber, has been chairing a special commit-
tee looking into these matters. He prob-
ably knows more about them thaii any
other Member of Congress. He has dis-
charged that obligation with great care
and wisdom, as he always does. But other
Members of'Congress are increasingly in
the dark about what is really going on
in Laos, Vietnam, and Southeast Asia..,
Indeed, the entire Southeast Asia in-
volvement is more and more riddled with
confusion and contradiction.
I am grateful for the reduction in our
forces in Vietnam which the President
made. I credit him for his steps of a de-
escalatory nature. But I challenge any-
about this in the press over past months,
but it is also fair to say that Remb
yAgc-J!Prfs,inl t, this MemhF-r
Congress;;- s fully what our op-
erations are In Laos.
How does this square with the Presi-
dent's pledge that we shall keep our in-
one to explain what our present policy
really is that distinguishes it strongly
S 2803
policy will lead to the disengagement of
American forces from Southeast Asia in
the next decade.
Three years ago I described our South-
east Asian policy as one of "madness."
It is nothing less than that, and it is
getting more intolerable. It was bad'
enough to make the initial blunders that
drew us into the Southeast Asian tan-
gle. To continue these blunders under a
new public relations umbrella and a pol-
icy of secrecy is to mislead the Ameri-
can people.
It has been said that we should for-
go further discussion of the issue of Viet-
nam and Southeast Asia and move on to
other issues. But Southeast Asia is a can-
cer in the American body politic that
must be removed before we can satisfac-
torily confront the serious areas of neg-
lect in our own society and around the
world.
It is all well and good to talk about
saving our environlr, ent-I am all for
that-or rebuilding our cities; or ending
poverty, poor health care and bad hous-
ing; but none of those things will be
adequately addressed. as long as we are
pouring our money, energy, and blood
into the caldron of Southeast Asia.
There is a special note of irony in the
current environmental commotion, in
that while we are talking about the cru-
cial issues of ecology and pollution, we
are polluting the water and soil of South
Vietnam with chemical defoliants. No
one can read the scholarly analysis of
this biological and Chemical campaign
in Vietnam, described in depth by Thom-
as Whiteside in the February 7, 1970,
issue of the New Yorker magazine, with-
out deploring the folly that passes for
policy in Southeast Asia.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent
that the article which I have referred to
may be printed in the RECORD at the
conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 2.)
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, if we
do not end our military and political
machinations in that area soon, I tremble
for the future of our society and our
place in the world. What we are now
doing to the people of Southeast Asia
and what we are doing to ourselves is an
affront to every principle of decency and
commonsense.
I indict our policy in Southeast Asia,
first, because we are backing a corrupt,
repressive regime in Saigon that does not
merit the sacrifice of one American or
Vietnamese life. That regime has neither
the support nor the respect of its own
people. It probably has less integrity, less
intelligence, less commonsense, and less
reason to exist than the coalition of
Vietnamese forces which challenge it.
Two elected members of the South
Vietnamese Assembly, Tran Ngoc Chau
and Hoang Ho, have recently been sen-
tenced by a drumhead military court for
advocating what I advocate-a broad-
ened coalition government in the south
capable of negotiating a settlement of
the war.
from the course we have followed in Deputy Tran Ngoc Chau is a retired
Vietnam for the past decade. I ask if [,colonel with the South Vietnamese Army
anyone really believes that our present and a former province chief and mayor
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 3, 1970
of Danang. He wears South Vietnam's
most exalted decoration for valor and
patriotism. He was elected to the South
Vietnamese Assembly by his own peo-
ple. He has been s 1 in valuable ma,-
ter' I to the Arnt-171CRY e , ecause
cal independence, they convened a fire-
man military trial, and after 35 minute
o:f "deliberation," condemned him to 20
years in .jail, A second deputy, Hoang Ho,,
was sentenced to death on a similar
charge, but he avoided capture by fleeing
the country and some 20,000 people of
the best political skill in South Vietnam
have done the same thing.
The runrierup presidential candidate
in the 1967 election, Truong Dinh Dzu,
has been in fail ever since the election---
and will stay there for another 3 years--
for the same crime of advocating a,
broader political, base in South Vietnam.
and a negotiated end of the war.
The Thien-Ky regime, which we claim
to be backing in the interest of self-
determination, actually stays in power
only because we hold it in power. It jail:;
or exiles its critics, bans its newspaper
opponents, and rejects any suggestion of
broadening its own political base.
There are an estimated 30,000 politi-
cal prisoners in Vietnam-mostly non-
Communists-with views toward ending
the war approximately like the congres-?
sional critics in our own country. An.
equal number have fled Vietnam. A much
larger number doubtless belong to South
Vietnam's silent but sullen majority.
Indeed, most of the indigenous, corn-
petent leadership of South Vietnam is
either in these dissenting, jailed, or
exiled groups-or with the National Lib-
eration Front.
Many thoughtful non-Communist peo-
ple have turned in despair to the Na-
tional Liberation Front because they
found no other viable alternative, not
because they wanted to endorse the Corn.-
munist ideology.
The constituency of the Thieu-Ky re-
gime are the opportunists, the military
adventurers, the black marketeers, pimps
and prostitutes, and others who profit
from this regime-plus the enormous
American military and economic
presence that subsidizes and supports
that regime at the expense of the Ameri-
can people.
Let me say flatly: There will be no
peace in Vietnam and no end to our
involvement until we loosen our em-
brace of the Thieu-Ky regime. That
regime will never be accepted by the
people of Vietnam, and as long as we
insist on keeping it in power, we will
have to stay there to hold it in power.
We say we must stay in Vietnam to pre-
serve self-determination; but we are
really there for precisely the opposite
reason: to prevent self-determination.
Such a policy is not in our national
interest. Our interest is in encouraging
the emergence of a broadly representa-
tive coalition in Saigon that is capable
of negotiating a settlement of the war
with the National Liberation Front and
Hanoi. That process could begin over-
night, if we would relax our grip on
General Thieu and let indigenous politi-
cal forces Degir.+ to form in South Viet-
nam.
My second indictment of our policy in,
Southeast Asia is that we are Waging a
secret war in Laos which is repugnant
to the principles and security of a free
society. It is absolutely incredible that
a great nation such as ours could be
conducting a major. military operation
in a foreign country without the knowl-
edge of either its citizens or its Con-
gress. But that is the fact. In spite of the
painful lessons of Vietnam, we are going
down the same road in Laos, and we are
doing it in secret.
Laos is a kingdom of less than 3 mil-
lion persons and about the size of Ore-
go a. Its people are 95 percent rural.
They are an easygoing, congenial people
who want little more of life than a"
chance to grow some rice, catch a few
,fish, tend their huts, and rear their
families. But for many years we have
been trying to convert them into a pow-
erful, modernized military bastion to
turn, back some kind of great imaginary
Communist combine involving Russia,
China, Hanoi, and the Pathet Lao. This
enormously costly and foolish effort,
which we have financed and directed,
has been enough to have killed, wound-
ed, or made homeless a third of the 3
million population.
Having done much to build up one
group of Laotians to fight the others,
we have discovered that "our" Laotians
do not very much relish the fight. The
Am" Ewer
iln ra ayes. of this has been
regarded 1T-delicate stuff that it
was not proper to tell either the Con-
gress or the American people about it.
Our Government and the Laotian Gov-
ernment have a deliberate policy de-
signed to prevent either the press or the
Congress from learning the nature and
extent of American i.nvolvement in Laos.
Reporters are carefully prevented from
reaching northeastern military region
II where most of the American military
activities are occurring. The planes
which could take Americans there belong
to Air Am rica or Continental Airways-
rivate companies antes chartered e TT A
arx requires c earance IrOm tile
tinerica Embassy in Saigon for re-
porters to board these planes, and that
clearance is not given.
Writing in the March 1, 1970, Wash-
ington Star, Tammy Arbuckle reports
that Central Intelligence Agency and
American military are warned a if a
correspondent does show up in their area,
they are to disappear. "You should have
seen this place empty when they heard
the press was coming," an American said
while relating one such incident.
"li; is' er the Amer-
lC:an +may No. i brink even
at 1eri ia11B-.f~i~ porter erhl
It is both ironic and highly disturbing
that while American newsmen are being
blocked from reporting the news in Laos,
the Vice President and other administra-
tion spokesmen have sought to intimi-
date critical press reports and commen-
ts ry in our own country.
But in spite of` efforts by the adminis-
tration, the military, and, the CIA-and
this is not a partisan judgment; these
things have been going on in previous ad-
ministrations---to wage a secret war in
Laos, certain alarming facts are now be-
ginning to emerge.
It appears that we zi.re carrying on
B-52 and tactical bombing raids in Laos
that are comparable to or greater than
the raids over North Vietnam at their
heaviest---raids in clear violation of the
Geneva accords of 1962 brought about
to a great extent through the able di-
plomacy of Averell Harriman. There is
no way that that accord or document
can be interpreted as a legal cover for
this aerial bombardment
To say that North Vietnam is also
guilty of international violations is to
say that we will set American policy
according to the illegal. standards of
others. Furthermore, as Senator MANS-
FrFLD has reminded us:
There are other signatos?iasa of the accord.
Have the others Immersed themselves in the
war? Has the Soviet Union? The United King-
dom? France? Indeed, has China?
It seems clear that,wc' invited the re-
cent Communist offensive in the Plaine
des Jarres by encouraging an American
trained, equipped, and directed Laotian
army to seize this area last September,
thus upsetting a more o'- less stable mil-
itary line that had exacted for several
years. There is growing evidence t
e CIA and mel can null y person-
nel- a i-~ %n are
directing Zao ran military opera 5.
Imiellse oreary air has said that
the President will not send American
combat troops to Laos without asking for
permission from Congress. I suppose we
should give thanks for small favors. But
it is a measure of how far we have per-
mitted' the constitutional responsibility
of the Congress to deteriorate when we
accept such a condescending assurance
as satisfactory. It is not satisfactory at
all ; it is an outrage,
The Constitution places in Congress
the power to declare war. This is not
something the President should regard as
a courtesy to be extended at his discre-
tion. Furthermore, why does anyone sup-
pose that conducting massive air raids
over Laos at a rate of several hundred
sorties a day is not war? Sending Ameri-
cai planes and pilots to bomb a foreign
country is as serious an act of war as an
attack with forces on the ground. It may,
not be as unpopular in domestic Ameri-
can politics, but it is definitely an act of
war.
If Congress is to recover its constitu-
tional responsibility aricl regain public
confidence, we had better assert without
delay our control over the unofficial and
unknown was now raging in Laos and
the undeclared, seemingly endless war in
Vietnam. Both of these wars should be,
ended now. At the very least, we should
take the time and make the oar o
wia the
wanted to ask for a closed session of the.
Senate to discuss this matter and our
overall involvement in Southeast Asia. I
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-was persuaded not to make that request
at that time, on the grounds that this is
a matter that ought to be discussed
openly. But we are told that this is classi-
fled information. The Senator from Mis-
souri (Mr. SYMINGTON) has had great dif-
ficulty'in getting clearance from the ex-
ecutive branch to release the information
that he has.
With that thought in mind, I would
like to suggest something that I believe
has been on the minds of other Sen-
ators.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator's time has expired.
Mr. McGOVERN. I ask unanimous
consent to proceed for 1 additional
minute.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
ea session OR TT
"THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF LAOS,
"Being resolved to follow the path of peace
and neutrality in conformity with the in-
terests and aspirations of the Laotian peo-
ple, as well as the principles of the Joint
Communique of Zurich dated June 22, 1961,
and of the Geneva Agreements of 1964 in
order to build a peaceful, neutral, independ-
ent, democratic, unified and prosperous Laos,
Solemnly declares that:
"(1) it will resolutely apply the five prin-
ciples of peaceful co-existence in foreign re-
lations, and will develop friendly relations
and establish diplomatic relations with all
countries, the neighboring countries first and
foremost, on the basis of equality and of
respect for the independence and sovereignty
of Laos;
"(2) It is the will of the Laotian people
to protect and ensure respect for the sover-
eignty, independence, neutrality, unity, and
territorial integrity of Laos;
11(3) It will not resort to the use or threat
of force in any way which might impair
the peace of other countries, and will not
interfere in the internal affairs of other
countries;
"(4) 'It will not enter into any military
alliance or into any agreement, whether mili-
tary or otherwise, which is inconsistent with
the neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos; it
will not allow the establishment of any for-
eign military base an Laotian territory, nor
allow any country to use Laotian territory
for military purposes or for the purposes
of interference in the internal affairs of
other countries, nor recognise the protection
of any alliance or military coalition, includ-
ing SEATO.
11(5) it will not allow any foreign inter-
ference in the internal affairs of the King-
dom of Laos in any form whatsoever;
"(6) Subject to the provisions of Article
5 of the Protocol, it will require the with-
drawal from Laos of all foreign troops and
military personnel, and will not allow any
foreign troops or military personnel to be
introduced into Laos;
"(7) It will accept direct and uncondi-
tional aid from all countries that with to
help the Kingdom of Laos build up an in-
dependent and autonomous national eoon-
omy on the basis of respect for the sov-
ereignty of Laos;
"(8) It will respect the treaties and agree-
ments signed in conformity with the in-
terests of the Laotian people and of the policy
of peace and neutrality of the Kingdom, in
particular the Geneva Agreements of 1962,
and will abrogate all treaties and agreements
which are contrary to those principles.
"This statement of neutrality by the Royal
Government of Laos shall be promulgated
by the administration or through the
Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by
Senator FULBRIGHT, and the special sub-
committee chaired by Senator SYMING-
TON. The Senate should then discuss
whether the policy is in our national in-
terest, and in any event should fully in-
form the American people as to the na-
ture and operation of that policy. Any
policy which cannot stand the light of
day and the judgment of the American
people is a policy we should not be pur-
suing.
Whether you agree with our involve-
ment or not, at least we ought to know
where it is, where we are heading, and
what is involved.
The truth is not always easy or reas-
suring, but it is the essential foundation
of a freeftociety.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to insert in the RECORD several other
articles relating to our involvement in
Laos.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 3.)
EXHIBIT 1 DECLARATION ON THE NEUTRALITY OF LAOS, JULY 23, 1962 The Governments of the Union of Burma, the Kingdom of Cambodia, Canada, the Peo-
of Viet-Nam, the Republic of France,
p le's Republic of China, the Democratic Re- the Republic of India, the Polish People'sRepublic, the Republic of Viet-Nam, the of Thailand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, whose representa-
tives took part in the International Confer-
ence on the Settlement of the Laotian Ques-
tion, 1961-62; the presentation of the state-
ment of neutrality by the Royal Government of Laos of July 9, 1962, and taking note of this statement, which is, with the concur-
rence of the Royal Government of Laos, in- in the present Declaration as an
integral part thereof, and the text of which
is as follows:
constitutionally and shall have the force of
law.
"The Kingdom of Laos appeals to all the
States participating in the International
Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian
Question, and to all other States, to reCag-
nine the sovereignty, independence, neutral-
, unity and territorial integrity of Laos,
ity,
to
conform to those principles in all re-
, and to refrain from any action in-
spects
."
consistent therewith."
the principles of respect for
Confirming
the sovereignty, , independence, unity and
territorial integrity
eats of 1954;
Emphasising of the Kingdom of Laos;
that the above-mentioned prin-
Agreeing
ciples constitute
of the Laotian question:
Profoundly convinced that the independ-
ence and neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos
will assist the peaceful democratic
develop- Treaties and Other International Acts ment of the Kingdom of Laos and the
S 2805
that country, as well as the strengthening of
peace and security in South-East Asia;
1. Solemnly declare, in accordance with
the will of the Government and people of the
Kingdom of Laos, as expressed in the state-
ment of neutrality by the Royal Government
of Laos of July 9, 1962, that they recognise
and will respect and observe in every way
the sovereignty, independence, neutrality,
unity and territorial integrity of the King-
dom of Laos.
2. Undertake, in particular, -that-
(a) they will not commit or participate in
any way in any act which might directly or
indirectly impair the sovereignty, independ-
ence, neutrality, unity or territorial integrity
of the Kingdom of Laos;
(b) they will not resort to the use or
threat of force or any other measure which
might impair the peace of the Kingdom of
Laos;
(c) they will refrain from all direct or in-
direct interference in the internal affairs of
the Kingdom of Laos;
(d) they will not attach conditions of a
political nature to any assistance which they
may off or or which the :Kingdom of Laos may
seek;
(e) they will not bring the Kingdom of
Laos in any way into any military alliance
or any other agreement, whether military or
otherwise, which is inconsistent with her
neutrality, nor invite or encourage her to
enter into any such alliance or to conclude
any such agreement;
(f) they will respect the wish of the King-
dom of Laos not to recognise the protection
of any alliance or military coalition, includ-
ing SEATO;
(g) they will not introduce into the King-
dom of Laos foreign troops or military per-
sonnel in any form whatsoever, nor will they
in any way facilitate or connive at the in-
troduction of any foreign troops or military
personnel;
(h) they will not establish nor will they
in any way facilitate or connive at the es-.
tablishment in the Kingdom of Laos of any
foreign military base, foreign strong point
or other foreign military installation of any
kind;
(i) they will not use the territory of the
Kingdom of Laos for interference in the in-
ternal affairs of other countries;
(j) they will not use the territory of any
country, including their own for interfer-
ence in the internal affairs of the Kingdom
.of Laos.
3. Appeal to all other States to recognise,
respect and observe in every way the sover-
eignty, independence and neutrality, and
also the unity and territorial integrity, of the
Kingdom of Laos and to refrain from any
action inconsistent with these principles or
with other provisions of the present Decla-
ration.
4. Undertake, in the event of a violation
or threat of violation of the sovereignty, in-
dependence, neutrality, unity or territorial
integrity of the Kingdom of Laos, to con-
sult jointly with the Royal Government of
Lacs and among themselves in order to con-
sider measures which might prove to be nec-
essary to ensure the observance of these
principles and the other provisions of the
present Declaration.
5. The present Declaration shall enter into
force= on signature and together with the
statement of neutrality by the Royal Gov-
ernment of Laos of July 9, 1962, shall be
regarded as constituting an international
agreement. The present Declaration shall be
deposited in the archives of the Governments
of the United Kingdom and the Union Of
Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall fur-
nish certified copies thereof to the other
signatory States and to all the other States
of the world.
In witness whereof, the undersigned Pleni-
potentiaries have signed the present Decla-
ration.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE March 3, 1970
Done in two copies in Geneva this twenty-
third day a July one thousand nine hundred
and sixty -twc in the English, Chinese, French,
Laotian and Russian languages, each text
being equally authoritative.
PROTOCOL TO TEE DECLARATION ON THE
SiEUT*S5.ITT OF LAOS
The Governments of the Union of Burma,
the Kingdom of Cambodia, Canada, the Peo-
pie's Republic of China, the Democratic Re-
public of diet-Nam, the Republic of France,
the Repu)ilio of India, the Kingdom of Laos,
the Polish People's Republic, the Republic
of Viet-Nam, the Kingdom of Thailand, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland and the United States of America;
Having regard to the Declaration on the
Neutrality of Laos of July 23, 1962;
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
For the purposes of this Protocol-
(a) the term "foreign military personnel"
shall include members of foreign military
missions, foreign military advisers, experts,
instructors, consultants, technicians, observ-
ers and any other foreign military persons,
including those serving in any armed forces
in Laos, and foreign civilians connected with
the supply, maintenance, storing and utili-
zation of war materials;
(b) the term "the Commission" shall mean
the International Commission for Supervi-
sion and Control in Laos set up by virtue of
the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and coan?-
posed of the representatives of Canada, India
and Poland, with the representative of India
as Chairman;
(e) the term "the Co-Chairmen" shall
mean the Go-Chairmen of the International
Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian
Question, 1961-1962, and their successors in
the offices of Her Britannic Majesty's Prin-
clpat Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics respectively;
(d) the term "the members of the Con-
ference" 'hall mean the Governments of
countries which took part in the Interna-
tional Conference for the Settlement of the
Laotian Question, 1961-1962.
Article 2
All foreign regular and irregular troops,
foreign para-military formations and foreign
miliary personnel shall be withdrawn from
Laos in the shortest time possible and in any
case the withdrawal shall be completed not
later than thirty days after the Commission
has notified the Royal Government of Laos
that in accordance with Articles 3 and 10 of
this Protocol its inspection teams are pres..
ent at all points of withdrawal from Laos.
These points shall be determined by the
Royal Government of Laos in accordance
with Article 3 within thirty days after the
entry into force of this Protocol. The inspec-
tion teams shall be present at those points
and the Commission shall notify the Royal
Government of Laos thereof within fifteen
days after the points have been determined.
Article 3
The withdrawal of foreign regular and ir-
regular troops, foreign pars-military forina..
Lions and foreign military personnel shall
take place only along such routes and
through such points as shall be determined
by the Royal Government of Laos in consul.,
taation with the Commission. The Commission
shall be notified in advance of the point and
time of all such withdrawals.
Article 4
The introduction of foreign regular and
irregular troops, foreign para-military for-
mations and foreign military personnel into
Laos is prohibited.
Article 5
Note is taken that the French and Lao-
tian Governments will conclude as soon as
possible an arrangement to transfer the
Frsuch military installations in Laos to the
Royal Government of Laos.
f the Laotian Government considers it
necesary, the French Government may as an
exception leave In Lace for a limited period
of time a precise'..y lien:'ited number of French
military instructors for the purpose of train-
ing the armed forces of Laos.
The French and Laotian Governments shall
inform the members of the Conference,
through the Co-Chairmen, of their agree-
ment on the question of the transfer of the
French military installations in Laos and of
the employment of French military instr.rc-
tors by the Laotian Government.
Article 6
The introduction into Laos of armaments,
munitions and war material generally, ex-
cept such quantities of conventional arma-
ments as the Royal Government of Laos may
consider necessary for the national defence
of Laos.
Article 7
All foreign military persons and civilians
captured or interned during the course of
hostilities in Laos shall be released within
thirty days after the entry into force of this
Protocol and handed over by the Royal Gov-
ernment of Laos to the representatives of
the Governments of the countries of which
they are national In order that they may pro-
cerd to the destination of their choice.
Article 8
The Co-Chairmen shall periodically re-
ceive reports from the Commission. In addi-
tion the Commission shall immediately re-
port to the Co-Chairmen any violations or
threats of violations of this Protocol, all :sig-
nificant steps Watch it takes in pursuance
of this Protocol, and al ,.o any other impor-
tant information. which may assist the Co-
Chairmen in carrying out their functions.
The Commission may at any time seek help
from the Co-Chairmen in the performance
of its duties, and the Co-Chairmen may at
any time make recommendations to the
Commission exercising general guidance.
The Co-Chairmen shall circulate the re-
ports and any other important information
from the Commission 'to the members of the
Co of erence,
The Go-Chairmen shall exercise supervi-
sion over the observance of this Protocol and
the Declaration of the Neutrality of Laos.
The Co-Chairmen will keep the members
of the Conference constantly informed and
when appropriate will consult with them.
Article 9
" he Commission shall, with the concur-
rerece of the Royal Government of Laos, su-
pervise and comarol the cease-fire in Laos.
The Commission shall exercise these func-
tions in full co-operation with the Royal
Government of Laos and within the frame-
work of the Cease-Fire Agreement or cease-
fire arrangements made by the three pol,ti-
cal forces in Laos, or the Royal Government
of Laos. It is rlnderstcoa that responsibility
for the execution of the cease-fire shall rest
with the three parties concerned and with
the Royal Government of Laos after its for-
mation.
Article 10
The Commission shall supervise and con-
trol the withdrawal of foreign regular and
irregular troops, foreign pars-military for-
mations and foreign Military personnel. Tn-
spection teams sent by the Commission for
these purposes shall be present for the pe-
riod of the withdrawal at all points of
withdrawal from Laois determined by the
Royal Government of Laos in consultation
with the Commission in accordance with
Article 3 of this Protocol.
Artic4e 11
The Commission shall investigate cases
where there are reasonable grounds for con-
sidering that a violation of the provisions of
Article 4 of this Protocol has occurred.
It is understood that in. the exercise of
this function the Commission is acting with
the concurrence of the Royal Government of
Laos. It shall carry out it. investigations in
full co-operation with the Royal Government
of Laos and shall immediately inform the
Co-Chairmen of any violations or threats of
violations of Article 4, and also of all sig-
nificant steps which it to-ak:es in pursuance
of this Article in accordance with Article 8.
Article 1.
The Commission shall assist the Roval
Government of Laos in cases where the
Royal Government of Laos considers that a
violation of Article 6 of this Protocol may
have taken place. This assistance will be
rendered at the request of the Royal Gov-
ernment of Laos and in full co-operation
with it.
Article 1
The Commission shall exercise its func-
tions under this Protocol in close co-opera-
tion with the Royal. Government of Laos. It
is understood that the Royal Government of
Laos at all levels will render the Commis-,
Sion all possible assistance in the perform-
ance by the Commission of these functions
and also will take all necessary measures to
ensurethe security of the Commission and
its inspection teams during their activities
in Laos.
Article 14
The Conunission functions as a single
organ of the International Conference for the
Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961-
1962. The members of the Conrnrission will
work harmoniously and in cooperation with
each other with the aim of solving all ques-
tions within the terms of reference of the
Commission.
Decisions of the Commission on questions
relating to violations of Articles 2, 3, 4 and
6 of this Protocol or of the cease-fire re-
ferred to in Article 9, conclusions on major
questions sent to the Co-Chairmen and all
recommendations by the Commission shall
be adopted unanimously. Co. other questions,
including procedural questions, and also
questions relating to the initiation and
carrying out of investigations (Article 15),
decisions of the Commission shall be adopted
by majority vote.
Article 1
In the exercise of its specific functions
which are laid down in the relevant articles
of this Protocol the Commission shall con-
duct investigations (directly or by sending
inspection teams), when there are reasonable
grounds for considering that a violation has
occurred. These investigations shall be car-
ried out at the request of the Royal Govern-
ment of Laos or on the initiative of the
Commission, which is acting with the con-
currence of the Royal Government of Laos.
In the latter case decisions on initiating
and carrying out such investigations shall
be taken in the Commission by majority vote
The Commission shall submit agreed re-
ports on investigations in which differences
which may emerge between members of the
Commission on particular questions may be
expressed.
The conclusions and recommendations of
the Commission resulting from investiga-
tions shall be adopted sinsnimously_
Article It
For the exercise of its functions the Com-
mission shall, as necessary, set up inspection
teams, on which the three member-States
of the Commission shall be equally repre-
sented. Each member-State of the Commis-
sion shall ensure the presence of its own
representatives both on the Commission and
on the inspection teams, and shall promptly
replace them in the event of their being un-
able to perform their duties.
It is understood that the dispatch of in-
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spection teams to carry out various specific
tasks takes place with the concurrence of
the Royal Government of Laos. The points
to which the Commission and its inspection
teams go for the purposes of investigation
and their length of stay at those points shall
be determined in relation to the require-
ments of the particular investigation.
Article 17
The Commission shall have at its disposal
the means of communication and transport
required for the performance of its duties.
These as a rule will be provided to the Com-
mission by the Royal Government of Laos
for payment on. mutually acceptable terms,
and those which the Royal Government of
Laos cannot provide will be acquired by the
Commission from other sources. It is under-
stood that the means of communication and
transport will be under the administrative
control of the Commission.
Article 18
The costs of the operations of the Commis-
sion shall be borne by the members of the
Conference in accordance with the provisions
of this Article.
(a) The Governments of Canada, India
and Poland shall pay the personal salaries
and allowances of their nationals who are
members of their delegations to the Commis-
sion and its subsidiary organs.
(b) The primary responsibility for the
provision of accommodation for the Com-
mission and its subsidiary organs shall rest
with the Royal Government of Laos, which
shall also provide such other local services
as may be appropriate. The Commission shall
charge to the Fund referred to in sub-para-
graph (c) below any local expenses not borne
by the Royal Government of Laos.
(c) All other capital or running expenses
incurred by the Commission in the exercise
of its functions shall be met from a Fund
to which all the members of the Conference
shall contribute in the following proportions:
The Government of the People's Republic
of China, France, the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics, the United Kingdom and
the United States of America shall contribute
17.6 per cent each.
The Governments of Burma, Cambodia,
and the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam,
Laos, the Republic of Viet Nam and Thai-
land shall contribute 1.5 per cent each.
The Governments of Canada, India and
Poland as members of the Commission shall
contribute 1 per cent each.
Article 19
The Co-Chairmen shall at any time, if the
Royal Government of Laos so requests, and in
any case not later than three years after the
entry into force of this Protocol, present a
report with appropriate recommendations on
the question of the termination of the Com-
mission to the members of the Conference
for their consideration. Before making such
a report the Co-Chairmen shall hold con-
sultations with the Royal Government of
Laos and the Commission.
Article 20
This Protocol shall enter into force on
signature.
It shall be deposited in the archives of the
Governments of the United Kingdom and the
Union of Soviet Republics, which shall fur-
nish certified copies thereof to the other sig-
natory States and to all other States and
to all other States of the world.
In witness whereof, the undersigned
Plenipotentiaries have signed this Protocol.
Done in two copies in Geneva this twenty-
third day of July one thousand and nine
hundred And sixty-two in the English,
Chinese, French, Laotian and Russian lan-
guages, each text being equally authoritative.
[From the New Yorker, Feb. 7, 19701
EXHIBIT 2
A REPORTER AT LARGE: DEFOLIATION
(By Thomas Whiteside)
Late in 1961, the United States Military
Advisory Group in Vietnam began, as a
minor test operation, the defoliation, by
aerial spraying, of trees along the sides of
roads and canals east of Saigon. The purpose
of the operation was to increase visibility
and thus safeguard against ambushes of
allied troops and make more vulnerable any
Vietcong who might be concealed under cover
of the dense foliage. The number of acres
sprayed does not appear to have been publicly
recorded, but the test was adjudged a suc-
cess militarily. In January, 1962 following a
formal announcement by South Vietnamese
and American officials that a program of such
spraying was to be put into effect, and that
it was intended "to improve the country's
economy by permitting freer communication.
as well as to facilitate the Veitnamese Army's
task of keeping these avenues free of Viet-
cong harassments," military defoliation oper-
ations really got under way. According to an
article that month in the New York Times, "a
high South Vietnamese official" announced
that a seventy-mile stretch of road between
Saigon and the coast was sprayed "to remove
foliage hiding Communist guerrillas." The
South Vietnamese spokesman also announced
that defoliant chemicals would be sprayed
on Vietcong plantations of manioc and
sweet potatoes in the Highlands. The pro-
gram was gathering momentum. It was do.
ing so in spite of certain private misgivings
among American officials, particularly in the
State Department, who feared, first, that the
operations might open the United States to
charges of engaging in chemical and bio-
logical warfare, and, second, that they were
not all that militarily effective. Roger Hils-
man, now a professor of government at
Columbia University, and then Director of
Intelligence and Research for the State De-
partment, reported, after a trip to Vietnam,
that defoliation operations "had political
disadvantages" and, furthermore, that they
were of questionable military value, par-
ticularly in accomplishing their supposed
purpose of reducing cover for ambushes. Hils-
man later recalled in his book, "To Move a
Nation," his visit to Vietnam, in March, 1962:
"I had flown down a stretch of road that
had been used for a test and found that
the results were not very impressive. .. .
Later, the senior Australian military repre-
sentative in Saigon, Colonel Serong, also
pointed out that defoliation actually aided
the ambushers-if the vegetation was close
to the road those who were ambushed could
take cover quickly; when it was removed the
guerrillas had a better field of fire." Accord-
ing to Hilsman, "The National Security
Council spent tense sessions debating the
matter."
Nonetheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
their Chairman, General Maxwell Taylor,
agreed that chemical defoliation was a use-
ful military weapon. In 1962, the American
military "treated" 4,940 acres of the Viet-
namese countryside with herbicides. In 1963,
the area sprayed increased five-fold to a
total of 24,700 acres. In 1964, the defoliated
area was more than tripled. In 1965, the 1961
figure was doubled, increasing to 155,610
acres. In 1966, the sprayed area was again
increased fivefold, to 741,247 acres, and in
1967 it was doubled once again over the
previous year, to 1,486,446 acres. Thus, the
areas defoliated in Vietnam had increased
approximately three hundredfold in five
years, but now adverse opinion among sci-
entists and other people who were concerned
about the effects of defoliation on the Viet-
namese ecology at last began to have a brak-
ing effect on the program. In 1968, 1,267,110
S 2807
acres were sprayed, and in 1969 perhaps a
million acres. Since 1962, the defoliation op-
erations have covered almost five million
acres, an area'equivalent to about twelve per
cent of the entire territory of South Vietnam,
and about the size of the state of Massa-
chusetts. Between 1962 and 1967, the delib-
erate destruction of plots of rice, manioc,
beans, and other foodstuffs through herbi-
cidal spraying-the word "deliberate" is used
here to exclude the many reported instances
of accidental spraying of Vietnamese plots-
increased three hundredfold, from an esti-
mated 741 acres to 221,312 acres, and by the
end of 1969 the Vietnamese cropgrowing area
that since 1962 had been sprayed with herbi-
cides totalled at least half a million acres.
By then, In many areas the original pur-
pose of the defoliation had been all but
forgotten. The military had discovered that
a more effective way of keeping roadsides
clear was to bulldoze them. But by the time
of that discovery defoliation had settled in
as a general policy and taken on a life of
its own-mainly justified on the ground that
it made enemy infiltration from the North
much more difficult by removing vegetation
that concealed jungle roads and trails.
During all the time since the Program
began in 1961, no American military or civil-
ian official has ever publicly characterized
it as an operation of either chemical or bio-
logical warfare, although there can be no
doubt that it is an operation of chemical
warfare in that it involves the aerial spray-
ing of chemical substances with the aim
of gaining a military advantage, and that
it is an operation of biological warfare in
that it is aimed at a deliberate disruption
of the biological conditions prevailing in a
given area. Such distinctions simply do not
appear in official United States statements
or documents; they were long ago shrouded
under heavy verbal cover. Thus, a State De-
partment report, made public in March, 1966,
saying that about twenty thousand acres of
crops in South Vietnam had been destroyed
by defoliation to deny food to guerrillas,
described the areas involved as "remote and
thinly populated," and gave a firm assurance
that the materials sprayed on the crops
were of a mild and transient potency: "The
herbicides used are nontoxic and not dan-
gerous to man or animal life, The land is
not affected for future use."
However comforting the statements issued
by our government during seven years of
herbicidal operations in Vietnam, the fact is
that the major development of defoliant
chemicals (whose existence had been known
in the thirties) and other herbicidal agents
came about in military programs for bio-
logical warfare. The direction of this work
was set during the Second World War, when
Professor E. J. Kraus, who then headed the
Botany Department of the University of Chi-
cago, brought certain scientific possibilities
to the attention of a committee that had been
set up by Henry L. Stiinson, the Secretary of
War, under the National Research Council,
to provide the military with advice on various
aspects of biological warfare. Kraus, referring
to the existence of hormone-like substances
that experimentation had shown would kill
certain plants or disrupt their growth, sug-
gested to the committee in 1941 that it might
be interested in "the toxic properties of
growth-regulating substances for the de-
struction of crops or the limitation of crop
production." Military research on herbicides
thereupon got under way, principally at
Camp (later Fort) Detrick, Maryland, the
Army center for biological-warfare research.
According to George Merck, a chemist, who
headed Stimson's biological-warfare advis-
ory committee, "Only the rapid ending of the
war prevented field trials in an active theatre
of synthetic agents that would, without in-
jury to human or animal life, affect the grow-
ing crops and make them useless."
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CONGRESSIONAL :RECORD - SENATE March 3, 1970
After the war, many of the herbicidal
materials that had been developed and tested
for biological-warfare use were marketed for
civilian purposes and used by farmers and
homeowners for killing weeds and controlling
brush. The most powerful of the herbicides
were the two chemicals 2,4-dichlorophenoxy-
acetic acid, generally known as 2,4-D, and
2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid, known as
2,4,5-T. The direct toxicity levels of these
chemicals as they affected experimental ani-
mals, and, by scientific estimates, men, ap-
peared then to be low (although these esti-
mates have later been challenged), and the
United States Department of Agriculture, the
Food and Drug Administration, and the Malt
and Wildlife Service all sanctioned the wide-
spread sale and use of both. The chemicals
were also reported to be shortlived in soil
after their application. 2,4-D was the bigger
seller of the two, partly because it was cheap-
er, and suburbanites comonly used mixtures
containing 2,4-D on their lawns to control
dandelions and other weeds. Commercially,
2.4-D and 2,4,5-T were used to clear railroad
rights-of-way and power-line routes, and, in
cattle country, to get rid of woody brush,
2,4,5-T being favored for the last, because it
was considered to have a more effective herbs-
c,,dal action on woody plants. Very often,
however, the two chemicals were used in
combination. Between 1945 and 1963, the
production of herbicides jumped from nine
hundred and seventeen thousand pounds to
about a hundred and fify million pounds in
this country; since 1963, their use has risen
two hundred and seventy-one percent-more
than double the rate of increase i the use
of pesticides, though pesticides are still far
more extensively used. By 1960, an area equiv.,
alent to more than three per cent of the
entire United States was being sprayed each,
year with herbicides.
Considering the rapidly growing civilian
use of these products, it is perhaps not sur-
prising that the defoliation operations in
Vietnam escaped any significant comment in
the press, and that the American public re-
mained unaware of the extent to which these
uses had their origin in planning for chern-
teal and biological warfare. Nevertheless, be-
tween 1941 and the present, testing and ex-
perimentation in the use of 2,4-D, 2,4,5-T:,
and other herbicides as military weapons
were going forward very actively at Fort Det-
rick. While homeowners were using herbici-
day mixtures to keep their lawns free of
weeds, the military were screening some
twelve hundred compounds for their useful-
ness in biological-warfare operations. The
most promising of these compounds were
test-sprayed on tropical vegetation in Puerto
Rico and Thailand, and by the time full-
scale defoliation operations got under way in
Vietnam the U.S. military had settled on the
use of four herbicidal spray materials there.
These went under the names Agent Orange,
Agent Purple, Agent White, and Agent
Blue-designations derived from color-coded
stripes girdling the shipping drums of each
type of material. Of these materials, Agent
Orange, the most widely used as a general de-
loliantconsists of a fifty-fifty mixture of n
butyl esters and of 2,4-13 and 2,4,5-T. Agent
Purple, which is interchangeable with Agent
Orange, consists of the same substances with
slight molecular variations. Agent White,
which is used mostly for forest defoliation, is
a combination of 2,4-D and Picloram, pro-
duced by the Dow Chemical Company. Uri-
like 2,4-1) or 2,4,5-T, which, after application,
is said to be decomposable by mirco-organ-
:isms in soil over a period of weeks or months
(one field test of 2,4,6-T in this country
showed that significant quantities persisted
in soil for ninety-three days after applica-
tion), Picloram-whose use the Department
of Agriculture has not authorized in the
cultivation of any American crop-is one of
the most persistent herbicides known. Dr.
Arthur W. Galston, professor of biology at
Yale, has described Picloram as "a herbici-
dal analog of DI)T," and an article in a Dow
Chemical Company publication called "Down
to Earth" reported that in field trials of
Pi,.loram In various California soils between
eighty and ninety-six and a half per cent of
the substance remained in the soils four
hundred said sixty-seven days after applica-
tion. (The rate at which Picloram decom-
poses in tropical soils may, however, be high-
er ) Agent Blue consists of a solution of
cacodylic acid, a substance that contains
fifty-four per cent arsenic, and it is used in
Vietnam to destroy rice crops. According to
the authoritative "Merck Index," a. source
book on chemicals, this material is "poison-
ous." It can be used on agricultural crops in
this country only unc'.er certain restrictions
imposed by the Department of Agriculture. It
is being used herbicidnily on Vietnamese rice
fields at seven and a half times the concen-
trotion permitted for weed-killing purposes
in this country, and so far in Vietnam some-
thing like five thousand tons is estimated to
have been sprayed on paddies and vegetable
fields.
Defoliation operations in Vietnam are car-
ried out by a special flight of the 12th Air
Commando Squadron of the United States
Air Force, from a base at Bien Hoa, just out-
side Saigon, with, spelially equipped C-123
cargo planes. Each of these aircraft has been
fitted out with tanks capable of holding a
thousand gallons. On defoliation missions,
the herbicide carried in. these tanks is sprayed
from an altitude of around a hundred and
fifty feet, under pressure, from thirty-six
nozzles on the wings and tail of the plane,
and usually sever spray planes work in for-
mation, laying down broad blankets of spray.
The normal crew of a military herbicidal-
spray plane consists of a pilot, a co-pilot, and
a technician, who sits in the tail area and
operates a console regulating the spray. The
equipment is calibrated to spray a thousand
gallons of herbicidal mixture at a rate that
works out, when all goes well, to about three
gallons per acre. Spraying a thousand-gallon
tan.kload takes live minutes. In an emer-
gercy, the tank can be emptied in thirty
seconds-a fact that has particular signifi-
cance because of what has recently been
learned about the nature of at least one of
the herbicidal substances.
The official code name for the program is
Operation Hades, but a more friendly code
name, Operation Ranch Hand, is commonly
used. In similar :fashion, military public-re-
lations men refer to the herbicidal spraying
of crops supposedly grown for Vietcong use
in Vietnam, when they refer to it at all as a
"food-denial program " By contrast, an
American biologist who is less than enthu-
sfa::tic about the effort has called it, in its
current phase, "escalation to a program of
starvation of the population in the affected
area." Dr. Jean Mayer, the Harvard professor
who now Is President Nixon's special adviser
on nutrition, contended in an article in Sci-
ence and Citizen in 1567 that the ultimate
target of herbicidal operations against rice
and. other crops in Vietnam was "the weakest
element of the civilian population"-that is,
women, children, and the elderly--because In
the sprayed area "Vietcong soldiers may ,
be expected to get the fighter's share of what-
ever food there is." He. pointed out that mal-
nutrition is endemic in many parts of South-
east Asia but that in wartime South Viet-
nam, where diseases associated with malnu-
trition, such as berl-berf, anemia, kwashior-
kor (the disease that has decimated the Bi-
af ran population), and tuberculosis, are par-
ticularly widespread, "there can be no doubt
that if the (crop-destruction) program is
continued, (the) problems will grow."
Whether a particular mission involves
defoliation or crop destruction, American
military spokesmen insist that a mission
never takes place without careful considera-
tion of all the factors involved, including the
welfare of friendly inhabitants and the safety
of American personnel. (There can be little
doubt that defoliation missions are extremely
hazardous to the members of the planes'
crews, for the planes are required to fly very
low and only slightly above stalling speed,
and they are often targets of automatic-
weapons lire from the ground.) The process
of setting up targets and approving specific
herbicidal operations is theoretically subject
to elaborate review through two parallel
chains of command; one chain consisting of
South Vietnamese district and province
chiefs-who can themselves initiate such
missions--and South Vietnamese Army com-
manders at variosu levels; the other a United
States chain, consisting of it district adviser,
a sector adviser, a divisionoil senior adviser, a
corps senior adviser, the United States
Military Assistance Command in South Viet-
nam, and. the American Embassy in Saigon,
ending up with the American ambassador
himself. Positive justification of the military
advantage likely to be gained from each op-
eration is theoretically required, and applica-
tions with such positive justification are
theoretically disapproved. However, according
to one of a series of articles by Elizabeth Pond
that appeared toward the end of 1967 in the
Christian Science Monitor:
"In practice, [American! corps advisers
find it very difficult to turn down defoliation
requests from province level because they
simply do not have sufficieuut specific knowl-
edge to call a proposed operation into ques-
tion. And with the momentum of six years'
use of defoliants, the practice, in the words of
one source, has long since been "set in
cement."
"The real burden of proof has long since
shifted from the positive one of justfying an
operation by its [military] gains to the
negative one of denying an operation because
of [specific] drawbacks. There is thus a great
deal of pressure, especially above province
level, to approve recommendations sent up
from below as a matter of course."
Miss Pond reported that American military
sources in Saigon were "enthusiastic" about
the defotlation program, and that American
commanders and spotter-plane pilots were
"clamoring for more of the same." She was
given firm assurances as to the mild nature
of the chemicals used in the spray opera-
tions:
"The defoliants used, according to the mil-
itary spokesman contacted, are the same her-
bicides ... as those used commercially over
some four million acres in the United States.
In the strengths used in Vietnam they are
not at all harmful to humans or animals,
the spokesman pointed out, and in illustra-
tion of this he dabbed onto his tongue a bit
of liquid from one of . .. three bottles sit-
ting on his desk."
As the apparently inexorable advance of
defoliation operations in South Vietnam
continued, a number of scientists in the
United States began to protest the military
use of herbicides, contending that Vietnam
was being used, in effect, as a proving ground
for chemical and biological warfare. Early
in 1966, a. group of twenty-nine scientists,
under the leadership of D-. John Edsall, a
professor of biochemistry at Harvard, ap-
pealed to President Johnson to prohibit the
use of defoliants and crop-destroying herbi-
cides, and called the use of these substances
I. Vietnam "barbarous because they are in-
discriminate." In the late summer of 1966,
this protest was followed by a letter of peti-
tion to President Johnson from twenty-two
scientists, including seven Nobel laureates.
The petition pointed out that the "large-
scale use of anticrop and 'nonlethal' anti-
personnel chemical weapons in Vietnam"
constituted "dangerous precedent" in chem-
ical and biological warfare, and It asked the
President to order it stopped. Before the end
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 March 3, 1970Approved Fore
of that year, Dr. Edsall and Dr. Matthew S.
Meselson, a Harvard professor of biology, ob-
tained the signatures of five thousand sci-
entists to co-sponsor the petition. Despite
these protests, the area covered by defolia-
tion operations in Vietnam in 1967 was dou-
ble that covered in 1966, and the acreage of
crops destroyed was nearly doubled.
These figures relate only to areas that were
sprayed intentionally. There is no known way
of spraying an area with herbicides from the
air in a really accurate manner, because the
material used is so highly volatile, especially
under tropical conditions, that even light
wind drift can cause extensive damage to
foliage and crops outside the deliberately
sprayed area. Crops are so sensitive to the
herbicidal spray that it can cause damage to
fields and gardens as much as fifteen miles
away from the target zone. Particularly
severe accidental damage is reported, from
time to time, to so-called "friendly" crops in
the III Corps area, which all but surrounds
Saigon and extends in a rough square from
the coastline to the Cambodian border. Most
of the spraying in III Corps is now done in
War Zones C and D, which are classified as
free fire zones, where, as one American official
has put it, "everything that moves in Zones
C and D is considered Charlie." A press dis-
patch from Saigon in 1967 quoted another
American official as saying that every Viet-
namese farmer in that corps area knew of
the defoliation program and disapproved of
it. Dr. Galston, the Yale biologist, who is one
of the most persistent critics of American
policy concerning herbicidal operations in
Vietnam, recently said in an interview, "We
know that most of the truck crops grown
along roads, canals, and trails and formerly
brought into Saigon have been essentially
abandoned because of the deliberate or in-
advertent falling of these defoliant sprays;
many crops in the Saigon area. are simply not
being harvested." He also cited reports that
in some instances in which the inhabitants
of Vietnamese villages have been suspected
of being Vietcong sympathizers the destruc-
tion of food crops has brought about com-
plete abandonment of the villages. In 1966,
herbicidal operations caused extensive inad-
vertent damage, through wind drift, to a very
large rubber plantation northwest of Saigon
owned by the Michelin rubber interests. As
the result of claims made for this damage,
the South Vietnamese authorities paid the
corporate owners, through the American
military, nearly a million dollars. The ex-
tent of the known inadvertent damage to
crops in Vietnam can be inferred from the
South Vietnamese budget-in reality, the
American military budget-for settling such
claims. In 1967, the budget for this com-
pensation was three milllon six hundred
thousand dollars. This sum, however, prob-
ably reflects only the barest emergency claims
of the people affected.
According to Representative Richard D.
McCarthy, a Democrat from upstate New
York who has been a strong critic of the
program, the policy of allowing applications
for defoliation operations to flow, usually
without question, from the level of the South
Vietnamese provincial or district chiefs has
meant that these local functionaries would
order repeated sprayings of areas that they
had not visited in mornths, or even years. The
thought that a Vietnamese district chief can
initiate such wholesale spraying, in effect
without much likelihood of serious hindrance
by American military advisers, is a'disqufet-
ing one to a number of biologists. Something
that disquiets many of them even more is
what they believe the long-range effects of
nine years of defoliation operations will be
on the ecology of South Vietnam. Dr. Gal-
Stan, testifying recently before a congres-
sional subcommittee on chemical and bio-
logical warfare, made these observations:
"It has already been well documented that
some kinds of plant associations subject to
?RM~2Rk$P72Sig4T000300010018-6
spray, especially by Agent Orange, contain-
ing 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T, have been irreversibly
damaged. I refer specifically to the mangrove
associations that line the estuaries, especially
around the Saigon River. Up to a hundred
thousand acres of these mangroves have been
sprayed.... Some (mangrove areas) had been
sprayed as early as 1961 and have shown no
substantial signs of recovery.... Ecologists
have known for a long time that the man-
groves lining estuaries furnish one of the
most important ecological niches for the
completion of the life cycle of certain shell-
fish and migratory fish. If these plant com-
munities are not in a healthy state, second-
ary effects on the whole interlocked web of
organisms are bound to occur. . In the _
years ahead the Vietnamese, who do not have
overabundant sources of proteins anyhow,
are probably going to suffer dietiarily because
of the deprivation of food in the form of
fish and shellfish.
"Damage to the soil is another possible
consequence of extensive defoliation.-... We
know that the soil is not a dead, inert mass
but, rather, that it is a vibrant, living com-
munity.. .. If you knock the leaves off of
trees once, twice, or three times . you
change the quality of the soil.... Certain
tropical soils-.and it has been estimated
that in Vietnam up to fifty per cent of all
the soils fall into this category-are lateri-
zable; that is, they may be irreversibly con-
verted to rock as a result of the deprivation
of organic matter.... If ... you deprive trees
of leaves and photosynthesis stops, organic
matter in the soil declines and laterization,
the making of brick, may occur on a very
extensive scale, I would emphasize that this
brick is irreversibly hardened; it can't be
made back into soil....
"Another ecological consequence is the
invasion of an area by undesirable plants.
One of the main plants that invade an area
that has been defoliated is bamboo. Bamboo
is one of the most difficult of all plants to
destroy once it becomes established where
you don't want it. It is not amenable to kill-
ing by herbicides. Frequently it has to be
burned over, and this causes tremendous
dislocations to agriculture."
Dr. Fred H. Tschirley, assistant chief of
the Crops Protection Research Branch of the
Department of Agriculture, who made a
month's visit to Vietnam in the spring of
1968 in behalf of the State Department to
report on the ecological effects of herbicidal
operations there, does not agree with Dr.
Galston's view that laterization of the soil is
a serious probability. However, he reported
to the State Department that in the Rung
Sat area, southeast of Saigon, where about
a hundred thousand acres of mangrove trees
had been sprayed with defoliant, each single
application of Agent Orange had killed ninety
to a hundred, per cent of the mangroves
touched by the spray, and he estimated that
the regeneration of the mangroves in this
area would take another twenty years, at
least. Dr. Tschirley agrees with Dr. Galston
that a biological danger attending the de-
foliation of mangroves is an invasion of
virtually ineradicable bamboo.
A fairly well-documented example not only
of the ecological consequences of defolia-
tion operations but also of their disruptive
effects on human life was provided last year
by a rubber-plantation area in Kompong
Chaco Province, Cambodia, which lies just
across the border from Vietnam's Tay Ninh
Province. On June 2, 1969, the Cambodian
government, in an angry diplomatic note to
the United States government, charged the
United States with major defoliation dam-
age to rubber plantations, and also to farm
and garden crops in the province, through
herbicidal operations deliberately conducted
on Cambodian soil. It demanded compen-
sation of eight and a half million dollars
for destruction or serious damage to twenty-
four thousand acres of trees and crops. After
S 2809
some delay, the State :Department conceded
that the alleged damage might be connected
with "accidental drift" of spray over the
border from herbicidal operations in Tay
Ninh Province. The Defense Department
flatly denied that the Cambodian areas had
been deliberately sprayed. Late in June, the
State Department sent.a team of four Ameri-
can scientists to Cambodia, and they con-
firmed the extent of the area of damage that
the Cambodians had claimed. They found
that although some evidence of spray drift
across the Vietnamese border existed, the
extent and severity of damage in the area
worst affected were such that "it is highly
unlikely that this quantity could have
drifted over the border from the Tay Ninh
defoliation operations." Their report added,
"The evidence we have seen, though cir-
cumstantial, suggests strongly that dam-
age was caused by direct overflight." A sec-
ond report on herbicidal damage to the area
was made after an unofficial party of Ameri-
can biologists, including Professor E. W.
Pfeiffer, of the University of Montana, and
Professor Arthur H. Westing, of Windham
College, Vermont, visited Cambodia last De-
cember at the invitation of the Cambodian
government. They found that about a third
of all the rubber trees currently in produc-
tion in Cambodia had been damaged, and
this had happened in an-area that normally
had the highest latex yield per acre of any in
the world. A high proportion of two varieties
of rubber trees in the area had died as a
result of the damage, and Dr. Westing esti-
mated that the damage to the latex-produc-
ing capacity of some varieties might per-
sist for twenty years. Between May and
November of last year, latex production in
the affected plantations fell off by an aver-
age of between thirty-five and forty per
cent. According to a report by the two scien-
tists, "A large variety of garden crops were
devastated in the seemingly endless num-
ber of small villages scattered throughout
the affected area. Virtually all of the .
local inhabitants ... depend for their well-
being upon their own local produce. These
people saw their crops . literally wither
before their eyes." The Cambodian claim
is still pending.
Until the end of last year, the criticism
by biologists of the dangers involved in the
use of herbicides centered on their use in
what were increasingly construed as biolog-
ical-warfare operations, and on the disrup-
tive effects of these chemicals upon civilian
populations and upon the ecology of the
regions in which they were used. Last year,
however, certain biologists began to raise
serious questions on another score-possible
direct hazards to life from 2,4,5-T. On Octo-
ber 29th, as a result of these questions, a
statement was publicly issued by Dr. Lee
DuBridge, President Nixon's science adviser.
In summary, the statement said that because
a laboratory study of mice and rats that had
been given relatively high oral doses of
2,4,5-T in early stages of pregnancy "showed
a higher than expected number of deformi-
ties" in the offspring, the government would,
as a precautionary measure, undertake a
series of coordinated actions to restrict the
use of 2,4,5-T in both domestic civilian ap-
lications and military herbicidal operations.
The DuBridge statement identified the lab-
oratory study as having been made by an
organization called the Bionetics Research
Laboratories, in Bethesda, Maryland, but gave
no details of either the findings or the data
on which they were based. This absence of
specific information turned out to be char-
acteristic of what has been made available
to the public concerning this particular re-
search project. From the beginning, it seems,
there was an extraordinary reluctance to dis-
cuss details of the purported ill effects of
2,4,5-T on animals. Six weeks after the pub-
lication of the DuBridge statement, a jour-
nalist who was attempting to obtain a copy
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 S2810
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March ,-) , 1910
of the full report made by Bionetics and to
discuss its details with some of the govern-
ment officials concerned encountered hard
going. At the Bionetics Laboratories, an offl-
cial said that he couldn't talk about the
study, because "we're under wraps to the
National Institutes of Health"-the govern-
ment agency that commissioned the study.
"Chen, haviIsg been asked what the specific
doses of 2,4,6-T were that were said to have
:Increased birth defects in the fetuses of
experimental animals, the Bionetics official
cut off discussion by saying, "You're asking
sophisticated quesions that as a layman you
don't have the equipment to understand the
answers to." At the National Institutes of
Health, an official who was asked for details
of or a copy of the study on 2,4,5-T replied,
`The position I'm in is that I have been
requested not to distribute this information."
Ile did say, however, that a continuing evalu-
ation of the study was under way at the
National Institute of Environmental Health
Sciences, at Research Triangle Park, North
Carolina. A telephone call to an officer of this
organization brought a response whose tone
varied from wariness to downright hostility
and made it clear that the official had no
intention of discussing details or results of
the study with the press.
The Bionetics study on 2,4,5-T was part of
a series carried out under contract to the Na-
tional Cancer Institute, which is an arm of
the National Institutes of Health, to in-
vestigate more than two hundred com-
pounds, most of them pesticides, in order to
determine whether they induced cancer-
causing changes, fetus-deforming changes, or
mutation-causing changes in experimental
animals. The contract was a lareg one, in-
volving more than two and a half million
dollars' worth of research, and its primary
purpose was to screen out suspicious-looking
substances for further study. The first vis-
ible fruits of the Bionetics research were
presented in March of last year before a con-
vention of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, in the form of a
study of possible carcinogenic properties of
the fifty-three compounds; the findings on
2,4,5-T were that it did not appear to cause
carcinogenic changes In the animals studied.
By the time the report on the carcinogenic
properties of the substances was presented,
tlae results of another part of the Bionetics;
studies, concerning the teratogenic. or fetus..
deforming, properties of the substances, were
being compiled, but these results were not
immediately made available to biologists
outside the government. The data re-
mained-somewhat frustratingly, in the
view of some scientists who had been most
curious about the effects of herbicides-out
of sight, and a number of attempts by bi-
ologists who had heard about the teratologi?-
csl study of 2,4,5-T to get at its findings ap?
pear to have been thwarted by the authori-.
tie? involved. Upon being asked to account
for the apparent delay In making this in..
formation available to biologists, an official
of the National Institute of Environmental
Health Sciences (another branch of the Na-.
tiona.l Institutes of Health) has declared,
with some heat, that the results of the
study itself and of a statistical summary of
the findings prepared by the Institute were
in :act passed on as they were completed to
the Commission on Pesticides and ''heir Re
lationship to Environmental Health, a scien-
tide group appointed by Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare Robert Finch and.
known-after its chairman, Dr. E. M. Mrak,
of the University of California-as the'Mrak
Commission, Dr. Samuel S. Epstein, chief of
the Laboratories of Environmental Toxicol-
ogy and Carcinogenesis at the Children's.
Cancer Research Foundation in Boston, who
was co-chairman of the Mrak Commission
panel considering the teratogenic potential
of pesticides, tells a different story on the
availability of the Bionetics study. He says
thaT he first heard about it in February, At
a meeting of his ;panel in August, he asked
for a copy of the report. Ten days later, the
panel was told that the National Institute
of Environmental Health Sciences would be
willing to provide a statistical summary
but that the group could not have access
to the full report; on which the summary
was based. Dr. Epstein says that the panel
eventually got the full report on September
24th "by pulling teeth."
Actually, as far back as February, officials
at the National Cancer Institute had known,
on the basis of a preliminary written outline
from Bionetics, the findings of the Bio-
netics scientists on the fetus-deforming role
of 2,4,5-T. Dr. Richard Bates, the officer of
the National Institutes of Health who was
in charge of coordinating the Bionetics proj-
ect, has said that during the same month
this information was put into the hands of
officials of the Food and Drug Administration,
the Department of Agriculture, and the De-
partment of Defense. "We had a meeting
with a couple of scientists from Fort Detrick,
and we informed them of what we had
learned," Dr. Bates said recently. "I don't
know whether they were the right people for
us to see. We didn't hear from them again
until after the DuBridge announcement at
the White House. Then they called up and
asked for a copy of the Iionetics report."
At the Department of Agriculture, which
Dr. Bates said had. been informed in Febru-
ary of the preliminary Bionetics findings, Dr.
Tschirley, one of the officials most intimately
concerned with the permissible uses of herb-
icidal compounds, says that he first heard
about the report on 2,4,5-T through the Du- ,
Bridge announcement. At the Food and Drug
Administration, where appropriate officials
had been informed in February of the terato-
genic potential of 2,4,5-r, no new action was
taken to safeguard the public against 2,4,5-T
in foodstuffs. In fact, it appears that no ac:-
tiorr at all was taken by the Food and Drug
Administration on the matter during the
whole of last year. The explanation that
F.D.A. officials have offered for this inaction
is that they were tinder Instructions to leave
the whole question alone at least until
December, because the matter was under
definitive study by the Mrak Commission--
the very group whose members, as it turns
out, had such extraordinary difficulty in ob-
taining the Bionetics data. The Food Toxicol-
ogy Branch of the F.D.A. did not have access
to the full Bionetics report on 2,4,5-T until
after Dr. DuBridge issued his statement, at
the and of October.
Thus, after the first word went to various
agencies about the fetus-deforming poten-
tial of 2,4,5-T, and warning lights could have
flashed on in every branch of the government
and in the headquarters of every company
manufacturing or handling it, literally al-
cnos? nothing was done by the officials
charged with protecting the public from
exposure to dangerous or potentially danger-
ous materials--by the officials in the P,D.A-,
in the Department of Agriculture, and in the
Department of Defense. It is conceivable
that the Bionetics; findings might still be
hidden from the public if they had not been
pried loose in midsummer through the ac-
tivities of a group of young law students.
The students were members of a team put
together by the consumer-protection activist
Ralph Nader--and often referred to as Nad-
er's Raiders-to explore the labyrinthine
workings of the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration, In the course of their investigations,
one of the law students, a young woman
named Anita Johnson, happened to see a
copy of the preliminary report on the Bione-
tics findings that had been passed on to the
F.D.A. In February, and its observations
seemed quite disturbing to her. Miss John-
son wrote a report to Nader, and in Septem-
ber she showed a copy of the report to a
friend who was a biology student at Harvard.
In early October, Miss Johnson's friend, in a
conversation with Professor Matthew Mesel-
son, mentioned Miss Johnson's report on the
preliminary Bionetics findings. This was the
first that Dr. Meselson had heard of the ex-
istence of the Bionetics study. A few days
previously, he had received a call from a sci-
entist friend of his asking whether Dr. Me-
selson had heard of certain stories, originat-
ing with South Vietnamese journalists and
other South Vietnamese, of an unusual in-
cidence of birth defects in South Vietnam,
which were alleged to be connected with de-
foliation operations there.
A few days later, after his :friend sent him
further information, Mr. Meselson decided
to obtain a, copy of the Bionetics report, and
he called up an acquaintance in a govern-
ment agency and asked for it. He was told
that the report was "confidential and classi-
fied," and inaccessible to outsiders. Actually,
in addition to the preliminary report there
were now in existence the full Bionetics re-
port and a statistical summary prepared by
the National Institute of Environmental
Health Sciences, and, by nagging various
Washington friends, Dr. Meselson obtained
bootlegged copies of the two latest reports.
What he read seemed to him to have such
serious implications that he got in touch with
acquaintances in the White House and also
with someone in the Army to alert them to
the problems of 2,4,5-T, in the hope that
some new restriction would be placed on its
use. According to Dr. Meselson. the White
House people apparently didn't know until
that moment that the reports. on the adverse
effects of 2,4,5-T even existed. (Around that
time, according to a member of Nader's Raid-
ers, "a tremendous lid was putt on this thing"
within government agencies, and on the sub-
ject of the Bionetics work and 2,4,5-T "peo-
ple in government whom we'd been talking
to freely for years just shut up and wouldn't
say a word.") While Dr. Meselson awaited
word on the matter, a colleague of his in-
formed the press about the findings of the
Bionetics report. Very shortly thereafter, Dr.
DuBridge made his public announcement of
the proposed restrictions on the use of
2,4,5-T.
In certain respects, the DuBridge an-
nouncement is a curious document. In its
approach to the facts about 2,45-T that
were set forth in the Bionetics report, It
reflects considerable sensitivity to the politi-
cal and international issues that lie behind
the widespread use of this powerful herbi-
cide for civilian and military purposes, and
the words in which it describes the reasons
for restricting its use appear to have been
very carefully chosen:
"The actions to control the use of the
chemical were taken as a result of findings
from a laboratory study conducted by Bi-
onetics Research Laboratories which indi-
cated that offspring of mice and rats given
relatively large oral doses of the herbicide
during early stages of pregnancy showed a
higher than expected number of deformi-
ties.
"Although it seems improbable that any
person could receive harmful amounts of this
chemical from any of the existing uses of
2,4,5-T, and while the relationships of these
effects in laboratory animals to effects in
man are not entirely clear at this time, the
actions taken will assure safety of the pub-
lic while further evidence is being sought."
These actions, according tc, the statement,
included decisions that the Department of
Agriculture would cancel manufacturers'
registrations of 2,4,5-T for use on food crops,
effective at the beginning of 19711, "unless by
that time the Food and Drug Administra-
tion has found a basis for establishing a
safe legal tolerance in and on foods," and
that the Departments of Agriculture and
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 March 3, 197(f pproved For ?jK2V,@ I2 VM00300010018-6
the Interior, in their own programs, would
stop the use of 2,4,5-T in populated areas
and in all other areas where residues of the
substance could reach man. As for military
uses of 2,4,5-T, the statement said, "The
chemical is effective in defoliating trees and
shrubs and its use in South Vietnam has
resulted in reducing greatly the number
of ambushes, thus saving lives." However,
the statement continued, "the Department
of Defense will [henceforth] restrict the use
of 2,4,5-T to areas remote from the popula-
tion."
All this sounds eminently fair and sensible,
but whether it represents a candid exposi-
tion of the facts about 2,4,5-T and the Bi-
onetics report is debatable. The White House
statement that the Bionetics findings "in-
dicated that offspring of mice and rats given
relatively large ora', doses of the herbicide
during early stages of pregnancy showed a
higher than expected number of deformities"
is, in the words of one eminent biologist who
has studied the Bionetics data, "an under-
statement." He went on to say that "if the
effects on experimental animals are appli-
cable to people it's a very sad and serious
situation." The actual Bionetics report de-
scribed 2,4,5-T as producing "sufficiently
prominent effects of seriously hazardous na-
ture" in controlled experiments with preg-
nant mice to lead the authors "to categorize
[it] as probably dangerous." The report also
found 2,4-D "potentially dangerous but need-
ing further study." As for 2,4,5-T, the report
noted that, with the exception of very small
subcutaneous dosages, "all dosages, routes,
and strains resulted in increased incidence
of abnormal fetuses" after its administra-?
tion. The abnormalities in the fetuses in-
cluded lack of eyes, faulty eyes, cystic kid-
neys, cleft palates, and enlarged livers. The
Bionetics report went on to report on fur-
ther experimental applications of 2,4,5-T to
another species:
"Because of the potential importance of
the findings in mice, an additional study
was carried out in rats of the Sprague-Daw-
ley strain. Using dosages of 21.5 and 46.4
mg/kg [that is, dosages scaled to represent
21,5 and 46.4 milligrams of 2,4,5-T per kilo-
gram of the experimental animal's body
weight] suspended in 50 per cent honey and
given by the oral route on the 6th through
15th days of gestation, we observed excessive
fetal mortality almost 80 per cent) and a
high incidence of abnormalities in the sur-
vivors. When the beginning of administra-
tion was delayed until the 10th day, fetal
mortality was somewhat less but still quite
high even when dosage was reduced to 4.6
mg/kg. The incidence of abnormal fetuses
was threefold that in controls even with the
smallest dosage and shortest period used....
It seems inescapable the 2,4,5-T is tera-
togenic in this strain of rats when given
orally at the dosage schedules used here."
Considering the fetus-deforming effects
of the lowest oral dosage of 2,4,5-T used in
Bionetics work on rats-to say nothing of
the excessive fetal mortality-the White
House statement that "relatively large oral
doses of the herbicide ... showed a higher
than expected number of deformities" is
hardly an accurate, description of the results
of the study. In fact, the statistical tables
presented as part of the Bionetics report
showed that at the lowest oral dosage of
2,4,5-T given to pregnant rats between the
tenth and fifteenth days of gestation thirty-
nine per cent of the fetuses produced were
abnormal, or three times the figure for
control animals. At what could without
much question be described as "relatively
large oral doses" of the herbicide-dosages of
21.5 and 46.4 milligrams per kilogram of
.body weight of rats, for example-the per-
centage of abnormal fetuses was ninety and
a hundred per cent, respectively, or a good
bit higher than one would be likely to de-
duce from the phrase "a higher than-ex-
pected number of deformities." The asser-
tion that "it seems improbable that any per-
son could receive harmful amounts of this
chemical from any of the existing uses of
2,4,5-T" also appears to be worth examining
for this is precisely what many biologists are
most worried about in relation to 2,4,5-T
and allied substances.
It seems fair, before- going further, to
quote a cautionary note in the DuBridge
statement: "The study involved relatively
small numbers' of laboratory rats and mice.
More extensive studies are needed and will
be undertaken. At best it is difficult to ex-
trapolate results obtained with laboratory
animals to man-sensitivity to a given com-
pound may be different in man than in
animal species.. ." It would be difficult to
get a biologist to disagree with these seem-
ingly sound generalities. However, the first
part of the statement does imply, at least
to a layman, that the number of experi-
mental animals used in the Bionetics study
had been considerably smaller than the num-
bers used to test commercial compounds
other than 2,4,5-T before they are approved
by agencies such as the Food and Drug
Administration and the Department of Ag=
riculture. In this connection, the curious lay-
man could reasonably begin with the rec-
ommendations, in 1963, of the President's
Science Advisory Committee on the use of
pesticides, which proposed that companies
putting out pesticides should be required
from then on to demonstrate the safety of
their products by means of toxicity studies
on two generations of at least two warm-
blooded mammalian species. Subsequently,
the F.D.A. set up new testing requirements,
based on these recommendations, for com-
panies producing pesticides. However, ac-
cording to Dr. Joseph McLaughlin, of the
Food Toxicology Branch of the F.D.A., the
organization actually requires applicants for
permission to sell pesticides to present the
results of tests on only one species (usually,
in practice, the rat). According to Dr. Mc-
Laughlin, the average number of experi-
mental animals used in studies of pesticides
is between eighty and a hundred and sixty,
including animals used as controls but ex-
cluding litters produced. The Bionetics
studies of 2,4,5-T used both mice and rats,
and their total number was, in fact, greater,
not less, than this average. Including con-
trols but excluding litters, the total number
of animals used in the 2,4,5-T studies was
two hundred and twenty-five. Analysis of
the results by the National Institute of En-
vironmental Health Sciences found them
statistically "significant," and this, is the
real purpose of such a study: it is meant
to act as a coarse screen to shake out of
the data the larger lumps of bed news.
Such a study is usually incapable of shak-
ing out anything smaller; another kind of
study is needed to do that.
Thus, the DuBridge statement seems to
give rise to this question: If the Bionetics
study, based on the effects of 2,4,5-T on
two hundred and twenty-five experimental
animals of two species, appears to be less
than conclusive, on the ground that "the
study involved relatively small numbers of
laboratory rats and mice," what is one to
think of the adequacy of the tests that the
manufacturers of pesticides make? If, as the
DuBridge statement says, "at best it is diffi-
cult to extrapolate results obtained with lab-
oratory animals to man," what is one to say of
the protection that the government affords
the consumer when the results of tests of
pesticidal substances on perhaps a hundred
and twenty rats are officially extrapolated to
justify the use of the substances by a popu-
lation of two hundred million people-not
to mention one to two million unborn babies
being carried in their mothers' wombs?
The very coarseness of the screen used in
S 2811
all these tests-that is, the relatively small
number of animals involved-means that
the bad news that shows up in the data has
to be taken with particular seriousness, be-
cause lesser effects tend not to be demonstra-
ble at all. The inadequacy of the scale on
which animal tests with, for instance, pesti-
cides are currently being made in this coun-
try to gain F.D.A. approval is further indi-
cated by the fact that a fetus-deforming
effect that might show up if a thousand test
animals were used is almost never picked up,
since the studies are not conducted on that
scale; yet if the material being tested turned
out to have the same effect. quantitatively, on
human beings, this would mean that it
would cause between three and four thou-
sand malformed babies to be produced each
year. The teratogenic effects of 2,4,5-T on
experimental animals used by the Bionetics
people, however, were not on the order of
one in a thousand. Even in the case of the
lowest oral dose given rats, they were on
the order of one in three.
Again, it is fair to say that what is appli-
cable to rats in such tests may not be ap-
plicable to human beings. But it is also fair
to say that studies involving rats are con-
ducted not for the welfare of the rat kingdom
but for the ultimate: protection of human
beings. In the opinion of Dr. Epstein, the
fact that the 2,4,5-T used in the Bionetics
study produced teratogenic effects in both
mice and rats underlines the seriousness of
the study's implications. In the opinion of
Dr. McLaughlin, this is even further under-
lined by another circumstance-that the rat,
as a test animal, tends to be relatively re-
sistant to teratogenic effects of chemicals.
For example, in the late nineteen-fifties,
when thalidomide, that disastrously terato-
genic compound, was being tested on rats in
oral dosages ranging from low to very high,
no discernible fetus-deforming effects were
produced. And Dr. McLaughlin says that as
far as thalidomide tests on rabbits were con-
cerned, "You could give thalidomide to rab-
bits in oral doses at between fifty and two
hundred times the comparable human level
to show any comparable teratogenic effects."
In babies born to women who took thalido-
mide, whether in small or large dosages and
whether in single or multiple dosages, be-
tween the sixth and seventh weeks of preg-
nancy, the rate of deformation was estimated
to be one in ten.
Because of the relatively coarse testing
screen through which compounds like pesti-
cides-and food additives as well-are sifted
before they are approved for general or spe-
cialized use in this country, the Food and
Drug Administration theoretically maintains
a policy of stipulating, as a safety factor, that
the maximum amount of such a substance
allowable in the human diet range from one
two-thousandth to one one-hundredth of
the highest dosage level of the substance that
produces no harmful effects in experimental
animals. (In the case of pesticides, the World
Health Organization takes a more conserva-
tive view, considering one two-thousandth
of the "no-effect" level in animal studies to
be a reasonable safety level for human ex-
posure.) According to the standards of safety
established by F.D.A. policy, then, no human
being anywhere should ever have been ex-
posed to 2,4,5-T, because in the Bionetics
study of rats every dosage level produced
deformed fetuses. A "no-effect" level was
never achieved.
To make a reasonable guess about the gen-
eral safety of 2,4,5-T for human beings, as
the material has been used up to now, the
most appropriate population area to observe
is probably not the relatively healthy and
well-fed United States, where human beings
are perhaps better equipped to withstand
the assault of toxic substances, but South
Vietnam, where great numbers qI civilians
are half-starved, ravaged by disease, and
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0
racked by the Innumerable horrors of war.
In considering any potentially harmful ef-
fects of 2,4,5--T on human beings in Viet-
na.m, some attempt has to be made to esti-
mate the amount of 2,4,5--T to which people,
and particularly pregnant women, may have
been exposed as a result of the repeated de-
foliation operations. To do so, a comparison
of known rates of application of 2,4,5-T In
the United States and in Vietnam is in order.
in this country, according to Dr. Tschirley,
the average recommended application of
2,4,5-T in aerial spraying for woody-plant
control is between three-quarters of a pound
and a pound per acre. There are about five
m inufacturers of 2,4,5-T in this country, of
which the Dow Chemical Company is one of
the biggest. One of Dow Chemical's best-sell-
ers In the 2,4,5-T line is F,steron 245 Concen-
trate, and the cautionary notes that a drum
of Esteron bears on its label are hardly re-
assuring to oneone lulled by prior allega-
tions that 2,4,5-T is a substance of low
'toxicity :
"Caution--may cause skin irriation, avoid
contact with eyes, skin, and clothing keep
out of the reach of children."
Under the word "warning" are a number
of instructions concerning safe use of the
material, and these include, presumably for
good reason, the following admonition:
"Do not contaminate irrigation ditches or
water used for domestic purposes."
Then comer a "notice":
"Seller makes no warranty of any kind, ex-
press or implied, concerning the use of this
product. Buyer assumes all risk of use or
handling, whether in accordance with direc-
tions or not."
The concentration of Esteron recommend-
ed-subject to all these warnings, cautions,
and disclaimers- -for aerial spraying in the
'United States varies with the type of vegeta-
tion to be sprayed, but probably a fair aver-
age would be three-quarters to one pound
acid equivalent of the raw 2,4,5-T per acre.
In Vietnam, however, the concentration of
2,4,5-T for each acre sprayed has been far
higher. In Agent Orange, the concentrations
of 2,4,5-T have averaged thirteen times the
recommended concentrations used in the
United States. The principal route through
which quantities of 2,4,5-T might be expected
to enter the human system in Vietnam is
through drinking water, and in the areas
sprayed most drinking water comes either
from rainwater cisterns fed from house roofs
or from very shallow wells. It has been
calculated that, taking into account the av-
erage amount of 2,4,5-T in Agent Orange
sprayed per acre in Vietnam by the military,
and assuming a one-inch rainfall (which is
quite common in South. Vietnam) after a
spraying, a forty-kilo (about eighty-eight-
pound) Vietnamese woman drinking two
litres (about 1.8 quarts) of contaminated
water a day could very well be absorbing
into her system a hundred and twenty milli-
grains, or about one two-hundred-and-fifti-
eth of an ounce, of 2,4,5-T a day; that is, a
daily oral dosage of three milligrams of.
2,4,h-T per kilo of body weight. Thus, if a
Vietnamese woman who was exposed to
Agent Orange was pregnant, she might very
well be absorbing into her system a per-
cen~age of 2,4,5-T only slightly less than the
percentage that deformed one out of every
three fetuses of the pregnant experimental
rats. To pursue further the question of ex-
posure of Vietnamese to 2,4,5-T concentra-
tions in relation to concentrations officially
considered safe for Americans, an advisory
subcommittee to the Secretary of the In-
te;'ior, in setting up guide-lines for maxi-
main We contamination of surface water by
pesticides and allied substances some time
ago, recommended a concentration of one-
tenth of a milligram of 2,4,5-T in one litre
of drinking water as the maximum safe con-
centration. Thus, a pregnant Vietnamese
woman who ingested a hundred and twenty
milligrams of 2,4,5-T in two litres of water
a day would be exposed to 2,4,5-T at six hun-
dred times the concentration officially con-
sidered safe for Alnericains.
Moreover, the level of exposure of Viet-
ii.'imese people in sprayed areas is not, neces-
sarily limited to the concentrations shown
in Dr. Ivleselson's calculations. Sometimes
the level may be far higher. Dr. Pfeiffer, the
University of Montan'a, biologist, says that
when difficulties arise with the spray plants
or the spray appatratus, or when other acci-
dents occur, an entire thousand-gallon load
of herbicidal agent containing 2,4,5-T may be
dumped in one area by means of the thirty-
second emergency-dumping procedure. Dr.
Pfeiffer has recalled going along as an ob-
server on a United States defoliation mission
last March, over the Plain of Reeds area of
Vietnam, near the Cambodian border, during
which the technician at the spray controls
was unable to get the apparatus to work, and
thereupon dumped his whole load. "This
rained down a dose of 2,4,5-T that must have
been fantastically concentrated," Dr. Pfeif-
fer has said. "It was released on a very
watery spot that looked like headwaters
draining into the Mekong River, which hun-
dreds of thousands of people use? In another
instance, he has recalled, a pilot going over
the area of the supposedly "friendly" Catho-
lic refugee village of Ho Nal, near Bien Harz,
had serious engine troable and dumped his
whole spray load of herbicide on or near the
village. In such instances, the concentration
of 2,4,5-T dumped upon an inhabited area
in Vietnam probably averaged about a hun-
dred and thirty times the concentration rec-
ommended by 2,45-T manufacturers as both
effective and safe for use in the United
States.
Theoretically, the dangers inherent in the
use of 2,4,5-T should have been removed by
means of the steps promised in the White
House announcement last October. A quick
reading of the statement by Dr. DuBridge
(who is also the executive secretary of the
President's Environmental Quality Council)
certainly seemed to convey the impression
that from that day onward there would be
a change in Department of Defense policy
on the use of 2,4,5-T in Vietnam, just as
there would be a. change in the policies of
the Departments of Agriculture and the In-
terior on the domestic use of 2,4,5-T. But
did the White House mean what it certainly
seemed to be saying about the future mile-
tary use of 2,4,5-T in Vietnam? The White
House statement was issued on October 29th.
On October 30th;. the Pentagon announced
that no change would be made in the policy
governing the military use of 2,4,5-T in South
Vietnam, because-so the Washington Post
reported on October 31st-"the Defense De-
partment feels Its present policy conforms
to the new Presidential directive." The Post
article went on:
"A Pentagon spokesman's explanation of
the policy, read at a morning press briefing,
differed markedly from the written version
given reporters later.
"When the written statement was distri-
buted, reporters were told not to use the
spokesman's [previous comment that the
defoliant . . . is used against enemy 'train-
Ing and regroupment centers.'
"The statement; was expunged after a re-
porter asked how use against such centers
conformed to the Defense Department's
stated policy of prohibiting its use in 'popu-
lated areas."'
But the statement wasn't so easily ex-
punged. A short time later, it was made
again, In essence, by Rear Admiral William
E. Lemos, of the Policy Plans and National
Security Council Affairs Office of the Depart-
ment of Defense, in testimony before a sub-
committee of the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee, the only difference being that the
phrase "training and regroupment centers"
became "enemy base camps." And in testify.
ing that the military was mounting herbici-
dal operations on alleged enemy base camps
Rear Admiral Lemos said:
"We know .. that the enemy will move
from areas that have been sprayed. There-
fore, enemy base camps Or unit headquar-
ters are sprayed in order tv make him move
to avoid exposing himself to aerial obser-
vation,"
If one adds to the words "enemy base
camps" the expunged woe Is "training and
regroupment centers"--centers that are un-
likely to operate without an accompanying
civilian population-what the Defense De-
partment seems actually to be indicating is
that the "areas remote front the population"
against which the United :states is conduct-
ing military herbicidal operations are "re-
mote from the population" at least in part
because of these operations.
As for the Bionetics findings on the terato-
genic effects of 2,4,5-T on experimental ani-
mals, the Department of Defense indicated
that it put little stock in the dangers sug-
gested by the report. A reporter for the Yale
Daily News who telephoned the Pentagon
during the first week in December to inquire
about the Defense Departn ent's attitude to-
ward its use of 2,4,5-T in the light of the
Bionetics report was assured that "there is
no cause for alarm about defoliants." A week
or so later, he received a letter from the Di-
rectorate for Defense Information at the
Pentagon which described the Bionetics re-
sults as based on "evidence that 2,4,5-T,
when fed in large amounts to highly imbred
and susceptible mice and rats, gave a higher
incidence of birth defects than was normal
for these animals." After reading this letter,
the Yale Daily News reporter again tele-
phoned the Pentagon, and asked, "Does [the
Department of Defense] think defoliants
could be affecting embryo growth in any
way in Vietnam?" The Pentagon spokesman
said, "No." And that was that. The experi-
mental animals were highly susceptible; the
civilian Vietnamese population, which even
under "normal" circumstances is the victim
of a statistically incalculab;e but clearly very
high abortion and infant-mortality rate, was
not.
Nearly a month after Dr. DuBridge's
statement, another was issued, tais one by
the President himself, on United States
policy on chemical and biological warfare.
The President, noting that "biological
weapons have massive, unpredictable, and
potentially uncontrollablc:> consequences"
that might "impair the health of future
generations," announced it as has decision
that thenceforward "the United States shall
renounce the use of lethal biological agents
and weapons, and all other methods of bio-
logical warfare." Later, a White House spokes-
man, in answer to questions by reporters
whether this included the use of herbicidal,
defoliant, or crop-killing chemicals in Viet-
nam, made it clear that the new policy did
not encompass herbicides.
Since the President's statement did specif-
ically renounce "all other methods of bio-
logical warfare," the reasonable assumption
is that the United States government does
not consider herbicidal, defoliant, and crop-
killing operations against military and ci-
vilian populations to be part of biological
warfare. The question therefore remains:
What does the United States government
consider biological warfare to consist of?
The best place to look for an authoritative
definition is a work known as the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Dictionary, an official pub-
lication that governs proper word usage
within the miltary establishment. In the
current edition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Dictionary, "biological warfare" is defined
as She "employment of living organisms,
toxic biological products, and plant-growth
regulators to produce death or casualties in
man, animals, or plants or defense against
such action." But the term "plant-growth
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regulators" is. nowhere defined in the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Dictionary, and since a cer-
tain technical distinction might be made (by
weed-control scientists, for example) be-
tween plant-growth regulators and defoli-
ants, the question of whether the Joint
Chiefs consider military defoliation opera-
tions part of biological warfare is left un-
clear. As for "defoliant agents," the Diction-
ary defines such an agent only as "a chemical
which causes trees, shrubs, and the other
plants to shed their leaves prematurely." All
this is hardly a surprise to anyone familiar
with the fast semantic legerdemain involved
in all official statements on biological war-
fare, in which defoliation has the baffingly
evanescent half-existence of a pea under
a shell.
To find that pea in the official literature
is not easy. But it is reasonable to assume
that if the Department of Defense were to
concede officially that "defoliant agents"
were in the some category as "plant-growth
regulators" that "produce death . . . in
plants," it would thereby also be conceding
that it is in fact engaging in the biological
warfare that President Nixon has renounced.
And such a concession seems to have been
run to earth in the current edition of a De-
partment of the Army publication entitled
"Manual on Use of Herbicides for Military
Purposes," in which "antiplant agents" are
defined as "chemical agents which possess a
high offensive potential for destroying or
seriously limiting the production of food
and "defoliating vegetation," and goes on
"These compounds include herbicides that
kill or inhibit the growth of plants; plant-
growth regulators that either regulate or
inhibit plant growth, sometimes causing
plant death. " The admission that the
Department of Defense is indeed engaging,
through its defoliation and herbicidal op-
erations in Vietnam, in biological warfare,
as this is defined by the Joint Chiefs and as
it has been formally renounced by the Presi-
dent, seems inescapable.
Since the DuBridge statement, allegations,
apparently originating in part with the Dow
Chemical Company, have been made to the
effect that the' 2,4,5-T used in the Bionetics
study was unrepresentative of the 2,4,5-T
generally produced in this country, in that
it contained comparatively large amounts of
a certain contaminant, which, according to
the Dow people, is ordinarily present in 2,4,5-
T only in trace quantities. Accordingly, it
has been suggested that the real cause of
the teratogenic effects of the 2,4,5-T used
in the Bionetics study may not have been
the 2,4,5-T itself but, rather, the contami-
nant in the sample used. The chemical name
of the contaminant thus suspected by the
Dow people is 2,3,6,7-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-
dioxin, often referred to simply as dioxin. The
2,4,5-T used by Bionetics was obtained in
1965 from the Diamond Alkali Company, now
known as the Diamond-Shamrock Company
and no longer in the business of manufactur-
ing 2,4,5-T. It appears that the presence of
a dioxin contaminant in the process of man-
ufacturing 2,4,5-T is a constant problem
among all manufacturers. Three years ago,
Dow was obliged to close down its 2,4,5-T
plant in Midland, Michigan, for several
months and partly rebuild it because of what
Dow people variously described as "a prob-
lem" and "an accident." The problem-or
accident-was that workers exposed to the
dioxin contaminant during the process of
manufacture came down with an acute skin
irritation known as chlor-acne, The DOW
people, who speak with considerable pride of
their toxicological work ("We established our
toxicology lab the year Ralph Nader was
born," a Dow public-relations man said
recently, showing, at any rate, that Dow is
keenly aware of Nader and his career), say
that the chlor-acne problem has long since
been cleared up, and that the current level
of the dioxin contaminant in Dow's 2,4,5-T
is less than one part per million, as opposed
to the dioxin level in the 2,4,5-T used in
the Bionetics study, which is alleged to have
been between fifteen and thirty parts per
million. A scientist at the DuBridge office,
which has become a coordinating agency for
information having to do with the 2,4,5-T
question, says that the 2,4,5-T used by Bio-
netics was "probably representative" of 2,4,
5-T being used in this country-and presum-
ably in Vietnam-at the time it was obtained
but that considerably less of the contaminant
is present in the 2,4,5-T now being produced.
Evidently, the degree of dioxin contamination
present in 2,4,5-T varies from manufacturer
to manufacturer. What degree of contami-
nation high or low, was present in the quan-
tities of 2,4,5-T shipped to South Vietnam
at various times this spokesman didn't seem
to know.
The point about the dioxin contamination
of 2,4,5-T is an extremely important one,
because if the suspicions of the Dow people
are correct and the cause of the fetus de-
formities cited in the Bionetics study is not
the 2,4,5-T but the dioxin contaminant, then
this contaminant may be among the most
teratogenically powerful agents ever known.
Dr. McLaughlin has calculated that if the di-
oxin present in the Bionetics 2,4,5-T was
indeed responsible for the teratogenic effects
on the experimental animals, it looks as
though the contaminant would have to be at
least ten thousand times more teratogenical-
ly active in rats than thalidomide was found
to be in rabbits. Furthermore, it raises alarm-
ing questions about the prevalence of the
dioxin material in our environment. It ap-
pears that under high heat the dioxin ma-
terial can be produced in a whole class of
chemical substances known as trichlorophe-
nols and pentachlorophenols. These sub-
stances include components of certain fatty
acids used in detergents and in animal feed.
As a consequence of studies that have been
made of the deaths of millions of young
chicks in this country after the chicks*had
eaten certain kinds of chicken feed, govern-
ment scientists are now seriously speculating
on the possibility that the deaths were at the
end of a chain that began with the spraying
of corn crops with 2,4,5-T. The hypothesis
is that residues of dioxin present in the
2,4,5-T remained in the harvested corn and
were concentrated into certain byproducts
that were then sold to manufacturers of
chicken feed, and that the dioxin became ab-
sorbed into the system of the young chicks.
One particularly disquieting sign of the po-
tential of the dioxin material is the fact that
bio-assays made on chick embryos in another
study revealed that all the embryos were
killed by one twenty-millionth of a gram of
dioxin per egg.
Perhaps an even more disquieting specu-
lation about the dioxin is that 2,4,5-T may
not be the only material in which it appears.
Among the compounds that several experi-
enced biologists and toxicologists suspect
might contain or produce dioxin are the tri-
chlorophenols and pentachlorophenols, which
are rather widely present in the environment
in various forms. For example, a number of
the trichlorophenols and pentachlorophenols
are used as slime-killing agents in paper-pulp
manufacture, and pare present in a wide range
of consumer products, including adhesives,
water-based and oil-based paints, varnishes
and lacquers, and paper and paper coatings.
They are used to prevent slime in pasteurizers
and fungus on vats in breweries and are also
used in hair shampoo. Along with the 2,4,5-T
used in the Bionetics study, one trichloro-
phenol and one pentachlorophenol were
tested without teratogenic results. But Dr.
McLaughlin points out that since there are
many such compounds put out by various
companies, these particular samples might
turn out to be-by the reasoning of the
allegation that the 2,4,5-T used by Bionetics
was unusually dirty-unusually clean.
S 2813
Dr. McLaughlin tends to consider signifi-
cant, in view of the now known extreme
toxicity and possible extreme teratogenicity
of dioxin, the existence of even very small
amounts of the trichlorophenols and penta-
chlorophenols in food wrappings and other
consumers products. Since the production of
dioxin apears to be associated with high-
temperature conditions, a question arises
whether these thermal condtiions are met
at any stage of production or subsequent use
or disposal of such materials, even in minute
amounts. One of the ;problems here seems to
be, as Dr. Epstein has put it, "The moment
you introduce something into the environ-
ment it's likely to be burned sooner or later-
that's the way we get rid of nearly every-
thing." And most of these consumer products
may wind up in municipal incinerators, and
when they are burned, the thermal and other
conditions for creating dioxin materials may
quite possibly be met. If so, this could mean
a release of dioxin material itno the entire
environment through the atmosphere.
Yet so far the dioxin material now sus-
pected of causing the fetus-deforming effects
in experimental animals has never been put
through any formal teratological tests by any
company or any government agency. If the
speculation over the connection between
dioxin in 2,4,5-T and the deaths of millions
of baby chicks is borne out, it might mean
that, quite contrary to the assumptions made
up to now that 2,4,5-T is rapidly decom-
posable in soil, the dioxin material may be
extremely persistent as well as extremely
deadly.
So far, nobody knows-and it is probable
that nobody will know for some time-
whether the fetus deformities in the Bio-
netics study were caused by the 2,4,5-T itself,
by the dioxin contaminant, or by some other
substance or substances present in the 2,4,5-
T, or whether human fetuses react to 2,4,5-T
in the same way as the fetuses of the experi-
mental animals in the Bionetics study. How-
ever,. the experience so far with the em-
ployment of 2,4,5-T and substances chemi-
cally allied to it ought to be instructive. The
history of 2,4,5-T is related to preparations
for biological warfare, although nobody in
the United States government seems to want
to admit this, and it has wound up being
used for purposes of biological warfare, al-
though nobody in the United States govern-
ment seems to want to admit this, either.
Since 2,4,5-T was developed, the United States
government has allowed it to be used on a
very large scale on our own fields and coun-
tryside without adequate tests of its effects.
In South Vietnam-a nation we are attempt-
ing to save-for seven full years the American
military has sprayed or dumped this biolog-
ical-warfare material on the countryside, on
villages, and on South Vietnamese men and
women in staggering amounts. In that time,
the military has sprayed or dumped on Viet-
nam fifty thousand tons of heribicide, of
which twenty thousand tons have apparently
been straight 2,4,5-T. In addition, the Amer-
ican military has apparently made incursions
into a neutral country, Cambodia, and rained
down on an area inhabited by thirty thou-
sand civilians a vast quantity of 2,4,5-T. Yet
in the quarter of a century since the De-
partment of Defense first developed the bio-
logical-warfare uses of this material it has
not completed a single series of formal tera-
tological tests on pregnant animals to de-
termine whether it has an effect on their
unborn offspring.
Similarly, officials of the Dow Chemical
Company, one of the largest producers of
2,4,5-T, although they refuse to divulge how
much 2,4,5-T they are and have been pro-
ducing, admit that in all the years that
they had produced the chemical before the
DuBridge statement they had never made
formal teratological tests on their 2,4,5-T,
which they are now doing. The Monsanto
Chemical Company, another big producer,
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ha.cl, as far as is known, never made such
tests, either, nor, according to an of$cial in
the White .House, had any other manufac-
turer. The'Department of Agriculture has
never required any such tests from manu-
facturers, The Food and Drug Administra-
tion has never required any such tests from
manufacturers. The first tests to determine
the teratogenic efforts of 2,4,5-T were not
u ade until the National Institutes of Health
contracted for them with Bionetics Labora-
tories. And even then, when the adverse re-
suits of the tests became apparent, it was,
as, Dr. Epstein said, like "pulling teeth" to
got the data out of the in!Aitution:a involved.
And when the data were obtained and the
White Mouse was obliged, partly by outside
pressure and publicity, to act, the Presi-
dent's science adviser publicly presented the
facts in a less than candid manner, while
the Department of Defense, for all practical
purposes, ignored the whole business and
announced its intention of going on doing
what it had been doing all along.
There have been a number of reports from
Vietnam both of animal abortions and of
malformed human babies that are thought
to have resulted from spraying operations
in which 2,4,5-T was used. But such scattered
reports, however well founded, cannot really
shed much more light on the situation. The
fact is that even In this country, the best-
fed, richest, and certainly most statistics-
rninded of all countries on earth, the stand-
ards fortesting materials that are put into
the environment, into drugs, and into the
;human diet are grossly inadequate. The
screening system is so coarse that, as a
teratology panel of the bIrak Commission
warned recently, in connection with thalido-
mide, "the teratogenicity of thalidomide
might have been missed bad it not, produced
malformations rarely encountered." In other
words, had It not been for the fact that very
'unusual and particularly terrible malforma-
tions appeared in an obvious pattern-for
example, similarly malformed babies in the
same hospital at about the same time-preg-
nant women might still be using thalidomide,
and lesser deformations would, so to speak,
disappear into the general statistical back-
ground. As for more subtle effects, such as
brain damage and damage to the central-
nervous system, they would probably never
show up as such at all. If such risks existed
under orderly, normal medical conditions
in a highly developed country, how is one
ever to measure the harm that might be
clone to unborn children in rural`Vietnam, In
the midst of the malnutrition, the disease,
the trauma, the poverty, and the general
shambles of war?
ExHlsrr 3
Laos 1: NEW Roumen IN A Pocics.T WAR
(By Henry Kamm)
VIENTIANE, LAOS.--Last September the Gov-
ernment forces in this divided country scored
an unexpected spectacular military success:
They drove the North Vietnamese invaders
and their feeble local client, the Pathet Lao,
from the Plaine des Jarres, a strategic region
in the mountainous north that had been held
by the Communists since 1964.
The mood in Vientiane then was one of
elation, the more so since the surprise victory
followed a Communist dry-season offensive
that had moved the Communists further
westward than they had been in previous
campaigns. The war In Laos has followed a
pattern of North Vienamese advances during
the dry season, to be abandoned when the
summer rains make supply and support of
the troops impossible.
But even in their elation, Laotian officials
end the Americans, Whose aerial bombing
and logistic support and tactical counsel are
the sine qua non of resistance to the inva-
sion, said that no doubt the territorial gains
c,f the summer would be erased when the
Communists returned to the offensive early
in 1970.
This is what happened in the last two
weeks. The Government forces, following
Amerfean'counsel not to put up a great strug-
gle, withdrew from the plain as the Com-
munist offensive got rolling. They withdrew
with minimal losses.and.in reasonable order.
Thus, the situation in Laos last week was
back to where it was last summer, with the
Communists in command of the plain that
controls the country's major roadways.
The Communist forces were said to be con-
solidating their gains. They have retaken
positions they held last June, and they have
two or three more months of favorable
weather for what ever military action they
may decide to take.
But they have also to contend with the
fact that in their hasty retreat from the
Plaice des Jarres last September they left
behind great stocks of supplies spread In
caches throughout the plain that sustained
their operations. These supplies were lost,
and the plain has to be restocked under
heavy American bombardment of their main
route of supply.
Reports, not denied by the United States,
have circulated of the use of the big B-52
bombers on two occasions. The American
bomber, which has been used to pound the
He Chi Minh trail in eastern Laos bordering
South Vietnam, had not previously been
committed in northern Laos,
NOT carrlCAL
The situation, in the view of Laotian and
American military sources as well as unin-
volved experts, is difficult, as it is every
year at this time, but not critical. And yet,
the United States and other countries of the
West show signs of alarm, and speak of the
likelihood of American escalation and the
possibility of the commitment of American
ground troops. Reporters from all over the
world flock here to discuss around the swim-
ming pool of the Lane x:ang Hotel the some-
times conflicting briefing of meager military
action by Laotian and American officials-
Meanwhile, the Laotian Chief of Staff went
to a royal wedding in Nepal this weekend and
the people of Vientiane yawn and complain
that. the hot season seems to be early this
year.
Viewed from Vientiane, the excitement
seems overblown and the result of a long
and angry debate focused on a false issue.
No serious observer here believes that the
North Vietnamese will go far enough to
raise the issue of e, commitment of American
ground forces-or that America could do in
Laos what she is being pressed to undo In
Vietnam.
HEAVY BOU13ING
Tie United States is countering the North
Vietnamese Invasion of Laos, a violation of
the Geneva Accords of 1962, with heavy
bombing and a dominant position in equip-
ping and counseling the Government forces,
regular and clandestine---equally in viola-
tion of the 1962 agreement. The United States
feels that since North Vietnam does not
adroit its invasion, it would give Hanoi a ne-
gotiating advantage in conceding the Ameri-
can riposte.
The controversy engendered in the Ameri-
can Congress and press by this policy of
secrecy is regarded! by independent observers
here as stemming from two causes: concern
over so obvious a departure from the Ameri-
can tradition of Informing the public on
what the Government is doing, and fear that
the secrecy cloaks developments which may
be drawing the United States into another
Vietnam. This fear, however, In the opin-
ion of knowledgeable sources here, is based
on an exaggerated. view of North Vietnam's
objectives in Laos.
The North Vietnamese, as these analysts
see the situation, have shown no indication
that their aim in Laos, as distinct from
South Vietnam, is to take over a country.
Their aim is thought to be twofold:
It southern Laos, Hanoi's abjec:ive is to
control the region of the He Chi Mins trail,
the vital lifeline from North Vietnam to its
forces and the Vietcong in c:outh Vietnam.
The, Government of Premier Souvanna
Phouma recognizes this goal and has said it
will not interfere with this aspect of the war
in Vietnam.
PLAN IN NORTr
In northern Laos, Hanoi seeks to maintain
sufficient pressure in support of the Pethet
Loa to prevent the power vacutira of this
feeble and uncohesive country from being
filled by an anti-Communist government In
conversation with friendly diplomats, North
Vietnamese officials have emphasized that
they will never accept a Laotian government
they cannot trust.
How far Hanoi's aims will eventually reach,
no one professes to know. But serious observ-
ers are convinced that while North. Vietnam
remains at war with America and the South,
it will not challenge the world with open
take-over of a neighbor that offers it no ad-
vantages and is difficult to occupy. The be-
lief here is that the North Vietnamese offen-
sive will end with limited gains and will lead
to no significant escalation by either side.
The pity of the argument centering on the
chance of escalation, in the eyes of observers
whose principal concern is the people of
Laos, is that it beclouds the tragic fact that
the present level of hostilities is enough to
have killed, maimed or made into constantly
shuffling homeless as much as a third of a
population estimated at three million.
I. From the Columbus Citizen-Journal,
Feb.27,19701
THE HIDDEN WAR IN LAOS
(By James Reston)
WASHINGTON.--In his definitive foreign
policy speech of last Nov. 3. President Nixon
said: "I believe that one of the reasons for
the deep division about Vietnam is that
many Americans have lost confidence in
what their Government has told them about
our policy. The American people cannot and
should not be asked to support a policy
which involves the overriding issues of war
and peace unless they know the truth about
that policy."
Well, you can say that again about Nixon
and his policy in Laos. He has withheld the
truth about important United States mili-
tary operations in that country. As he is
deescalating the war in Vietnam and claim-
ing a lot of credit for it, he is escalating the
war in Laos and refusing to release the facts
about it.
The result is that the President, and the
United States Senate, are now arguing about
U.S. military actions well known to the
enemy in Laos, but officially withheld from
the American people. In fact, State and De-
fense Department officials have testified in
executive session about what our "advisers',
and airmen are doing there, but they have
claimed executive privilege on this testi-
mony. and have refused to release it to the
public.
All the Nixon Administration has con-
ceded publicly is that it ha:: certa.n "advis-
ers" in Laos and has authorized high-level
bombing of part of the enemy's supply trail
that runs from North Vietnam through
Laos Into South Vietnam.
In addition to these high-level bombing
raids, however, U.S. airmen have beery flying
fighter support missions for the Laotian
army in the Plaine des Jarres and even closer
to the North Vietnamese and Chinese bor-
ders, training the Meo mountain tribes-
men to fight the North Vietnamese and the
Laotian Communists, and according to some
senators, concealing the identity of the
American military assistance by transfer-
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,ring regular armed services personnel to the
Central Intelligence Agency, and assigning
military supply missions to nonmilitary U.S.
private airline carriers.
It should be noted that a great deal of
information about U.S. military action there
has been printed. The main issue is not so
much about the facts, but about the right
of the Administration to try to conceal the
facts, and to suppress the facts even after its
own officials have confirmed them in private
congressional committee hearings.
Here, for example, is an exchange between
Sen. Barry Goldwater of Arizona and Sen.
Stuart Symington of Missouri in the Senate
on Feb. 25:
"GOLDWATER. Does the senator mean that
the United States has troops in combat in
Laos?
"SYMINGTON. It depends on a definition.
"GOLDWATER. I mean Americans engaged in
fighting on the ground.
"SYMINGTON. I am not in a position to
answer any questions ... In open session
at this time . . because the transcript
has not been released as yet on any mean-
ingful bab`sis,
"GOLDWATER. The reason I ask Is that it
has not been any secret that we have been
flying fighter support missions in support
of the Laotian army up on the Plaine des
Jarree. The senator, I know, has known about
that for a long time. If the information is
classified, I will not press the point."
The point of this exchange is that the In-
formation about U.S. fighter support was in
fact put on a "secret" basis so *far as the Ad-
ministration was concerned. Symington, of
course, knew it was a fact but was not free
to discuss it until Goldwater blurted out
the truth.
There was another sharp debate in the ex-
ecutive meeting of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee Thursday over this Same
issue of what information senators have the
right to request and what information the
executive branch has the right to withhold,
During a private interrogation of William J.
Porter, who has been nominated as Nixon's
ambassador in Korea, Chairman J. William
Fulbright asked about the implications of
deploying U.S. nuclear weapons in that part
of the world.
Porter replied that he had been instructed
not to discuss this question even with mem-
bers of the Foreign Relations Committee in
secret session. Fuibright observed that in 25
years he had never had such a reply during
a confirmation hearing and demanded to
know who had so instructed the ambas-
sador. All Porter would say was that he had
been Instructed "on higher authority." This
was something new, the chairman observed:
"Was the ambassador taking the Fifth
Amendment?"
What is happening, in short, is precisely
what Nixon himself warned against in his
Nov. 3 speech. Members of the senate are
losing confidence in what the Government
Is telling them about Laos, members of the
press on the scene are being condemned for
reporting what they see, and the President
and the Foreign Relations Committee are
getting into a nasty confrontation over the
constitutional question of what information
can be withheld, released, or suppressed.
"The American people cannot and should
not be asked to support a policy which in-
volves the over-riding issues of war and
peace," the President said, "unless they know
the truth about that policy." Maybe they
should not, but they are in Laos, and the
President knows it.
[From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star,
Feb. 25, 1970]
Two VIET DEPUTIES "GUILTY"; ONE APPEALS
To NIxoN
(By Donald Kirk)
SAYGON.-A military court today officially
ended the case of two National Assembly
deputies accused of aiding the Communists
by sentencing one to death and the other to
20 years in prison.
It was clear immediately after the five-man
court passed the sentence, however, that the
politically combustible case was far from
over.
One of the deputies, Tran Ngoc Chau, ap-
pealed to President Nixon to intercede and
promptly began what turned out to be a
day-long press conference in his office in the
assembly building. He challenged police to
"come and get me."
U.S. CASUALTIES CITED
Chau was sentenced to 20 years in prison,
for secret contacts with his brother, now
serving a life sentence for his activities as a
Communist intelligence officer.
Chau said police would have to "capture me
with bayonets and other weapons and beat
me until I'm unconscious" before he would
leave the assembly building.
(Chau, 46, said he sent a plea by cable
to President Nixon to intercede in behalf of
himself and other Vietnamese politicians,
in jail, the Associated Press reported.)
("For these liberties you take for granted,
40,000 of your sons and over 200,000 of our
sons have died," he told Nixon. "Let not
their sacrifices be in vain.")
Only a single guard watched outside the
assembly, an old French-built opera house in
the center of Saigon, while Chau, dressed in
a blue short-sleevd shirt and black tie, talked
to reporters in the office of the deputy
speaker.
Police were forbidden by law from arrest-
ing him inside the building without an order
from the speaker of the House.
Although police eventually might capture
Chau, it appeared unlikely the government
would ever be able to carry out its sentence
against the other deputy, Hunyh Van Tu,
generally known by the alias of Hoang Ho,
who was sentenced to death.
Ho's wife explained her husband had left
a note in his house saying he was "going
abroad to a free country." Ho was convicted
of treason on charges of having given classi-
fied information to a senior Communist lead-
er and having formed the "Association of
Patriotic Newspapermen," a Communist
front.
The entire case amounted to a test of
power for the government of President Ngu-
yen Van Thieu, who insisted on prosecuting
the charges against the wishes of the Ameri-
can Embassy and opposition politicians,
many of them afraid to voice their feelings.
OBJECTIONS IN PRIVATE
The reason American officials objected-in
private, never publicly-was that Chau had
provided information to American agents
while serving several years ago as chief of
the Upper Delta province of Kien Hoa, still
heavily influenced by local Viet Cong guer-
'rillas despite gains in the past year in the
allied pacification program.
The indictment said that Chau had in-
formed American agents-probably repre-
sentatives of the Central Intelligence
Agency-of meetings with his brother, Capt.
Tran Ngoc Hien, but had never told his South
Vietnamese superiors.
In interviews with reporters in his home
here, Chau has charged both U.S. officials
and Thieu "betrayed" him by not blocking
the government's case. "I am no Communist,
I am a genuine nationalist fighting for the
cause," Chau reiterated today after the 20-
minute trial.
Besides reflecting on American-Vietnamese
relations, the case symbolized the question
of the power of the executive branch of the
government here as opposed to the National
Assembly. The accused deputies were im-
munte from prosecution under the Consti-
tution until 102 deputies signed a petition
waiving that immunity.
Chan claimed some of the deputies were
"bribed," said he would appeal to such or-
ganizations as the International Parliamen-
tary Union, the International Human Rights
Commission and the International Associa-
tion of Lawyers.
At the bottom of the government's dis??
taste for Chau and Hoang Ho is that both of
them appear sympathetic with moves for
compromise to end the war. Thieu has re-
peatedly indicated his government will re-
sist a coalition and fight to the end.
Chau made clear today his views had not
changed. He urged Thieu to "cooperate with
opposition leaders, reconcile with Buddhists,
build a genuine nationalist force capable of
extricating South Vietnam from the clutches
of the Communists and heavy dependence on
foreign countries."
VIEWED AS NEUTRALISM
This statement might not appear pro-
Communist in itself but government officials
view it as an appeal fo:r a "neutral" foreign
policy. They believe neutrality would play
into the hands of the Communists, who also
call for a "neutral" position.
The case of Chau follows a series of widely
publicized government efforts at stifling neu-
tralist opposition and preventing contacts
with the enemy.
A military court late last year sentenced
four former government officials, among
others, for having masterminded a Com-
munist spy ring.
Chau's brother also :figured in the arrest
and conviction last year of Nguyen. Lau,
editor of the Saigon Daily News, an English
language newspaper shut down by the gov-
ernment.
Lau was accused of providing Chau's
brother with press credentials and introduc-
ing him to contacts in Saigon from whom
he hoped to obtain intelligence secrets.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator's time has expired. Under the pre-
vious order, the Senate will now proceed
to the transaction of routine morning
business, in which statements of Sena-
tors will be limited to 3 minutes.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, be-
fore the morning hour, starts, I ask unani-
mous consent that the time of the Sena-
tor from South Dakota be extended for
a minute or two, so that I may make a
comment.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, re-
serving the right to object, I ask unani-
mous consent that the time be extended
5 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none. The
Senator from South Dakota is recognized
for 5 additional minutes, in continuation
of his previous order.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Senator has said.
With particular reference to the ques-
tion of the information which the Senate
has and the participation of the Senate
in decisions for proceeding in Laos, of
course, I have a very special interest, as
I know the Senator from Missouri has.
The Senator from Missouri is on the
floor and, of course, will speak for him-
self about the difficulties his subcom-
mittee has had in obtaining the release
of the hearings which have been held
about Laos.
I only wish to say to the Senator that
I think he has made a great contribu-
tion, and as far as I am concerned, I
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 3, 1970
am very anxious to follow on with this,
with the information from the subcom-
mittee of the Senator from Missouri, and
also additional information, I would
hope, and additional advice, from the
administration itself. I s ll re uest t is
week, or as soon as can, a e a+re
a a _=u1iblVI1 ti
;* to
I'ation prepara
;~
We acj.444
Tus material is made avaTable, I0
session, because It is of such importance
that It ought to be discussed.
Mr. McGOVERN. I think the Senator
has considered that matter for some
time. He mentioned it to me the other
day.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I have. I have the
feeling that we are at one of those periods
not unlike the period in August of 1964,
and later the follow-on period in Febru-
ary of 1965, in which we got involved in
Vietnam. At that time the maneuvering
of the administration was such that, be-
cause of my lack of foresight and that of
others-because no one foresaw it-we
did not have a proper discussion of what,
was involved.
I shall do everything: I can, in coopera-
tion with the Senator from South Da-
kota, the Senator from Missouri, and
others, and the leadership of the Senate,
to see that this time, whatever the result
may be, it will be discussed by the Senate,
and that the Senate, and I would hope
the country, is Informed of what is in-
volved. If, then, they make a decision to
go down that road, that is their privi-
lege, but we should never again permit a,
decision of that kind to be made without
knowing what is involved, under a mis-
apprehension or false information as to
what is involved.
I commend the Senator from South
Dakota on a very significant speech.
Mr. MCGOVERN. I thank the Senator.
I think he and the Senator from Mis-
souri(Mr. SYMINGTON) know more about
this problem than the rest of us do, and
that they, in consultation with other
Senators, are the ones who should make
the judgment as to whether it would be
useful to request a secret session.
I do not feel that I am in as good a po-
sition to make that judgment as the
Senator from Arkansas and the Senator
from Missouri, but I know some of the
things that must be on their minds, and
I would hope, if we cannot obtain release
of the material that Senator SYMING-
ToN's subcommittee has complied, that
at least the other Members of the Sen-?
ate will have the opportunity to discuss
it in a closed session, and then make
some judgment about what other steps
should be taken.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. One last word. The
Senator from Missouri has done an out-
standing job in the conduct of the hear-
ings of the subcommittee. He has an ex-
cellent staff, and has given countless
hours to the hearings on that matter. It
would be a great tragedy if those hear-
ings are not made public and the Sena-
tor from Missouri is not given the op-
portunity, in the Senate, and I would
hope in a_public session of the Senate, to
go into this matter.
Mr. McGOVERN. I could not agree
more. I think what the Senator from
Missouri has been doing may turn out
to be one of the most important investi-
gations ever conducted in the history of
the Senate.
Mr. SYMINGTON, Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MCGOVER,N. I yield.
Mr. SYMINGTON. First, I thank both
the distinguished Senator from South
Dakota and the able chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Relations for their
kind remarks.
Let me at this time commend the ma-
jority leader for- his talk on Laos yester-
day, which I did not have the privilege
of hearing but read in the RECORD this
morning, and I. also. commend the dis-
tinguished Senator ;?rom South Dakota
for his outstanding presentation today of
this Laotian problem.
Our subcommittee effort started largely
as the result of Senators on the other
side of the aisle bringing up the impor-
tance of tailoring our military establish-
ment, justifying its size, to our commit-
ments.
As a result, 1. went to the able chair-
nman, the Senator from Arkansas, pre-
sented the problem, and he agreed an
investigation of foreign commitments
would make sense. So for over a year
we have been trying to find out what
are our commitments, what is the truth,
the importance of which the Senator
from South Dakota pointed out so well
this afternoon.
Must ad in all sir; ,rites that we
have had exce ent support from the De-
parently does not want to bother with
the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee. I have come to this conclusion after
serving on many other Senate commit-
tees, and think it not only a denigration
of the Committee of Foreign Relations
and all its members, but also of the Sen-
ate itself. I have never seen anything
like this before in all my years in Gov-
ernment.
Inasmuch as the Committee on For-
eign Relations is one of the great com-
mittees of the Senate, it obviously shows
some form of contempt for the Senate.
We do not get answers to our letters for
many weeks. We completed these Laos
hearings over 4 monhs ago; and to date
have gotten nowhere from the stand-
point of a meaningful release of their
contents. I have an article here, which
I ask unanimous consent to have printed
in the RECORD at the end of my remarks.
It is entitled "Laos: What United States
Is Doing," written by George Sherman,
and published in the Washington Sun-
day Star of March 1, 1970.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
of the Senator from South Dakota has
again expired.
Mr. SYMINGTOI'. I ask unanimous
consent to proceed for 5 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER,. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SYMINGTON. This article by Mr.
Sherman has in it much information
that in our hearings has been tightly
classified by the Department of State.
It was obviously given to this reporter by
someone in the executive branch. In ad-
dition, considering that 4 long months
have gone by, it has events in it which
we were not told in executive session,
no doubt because they had not hap-
pened at the time we had our hearings.
I have been to Laos many times. Some
of the things I was told we were told
later in the hearings; but other activi-
ties we were told about in. the :hearings I
was not told about out there, even
though I am a member of both the
Armed Services Committee and the For-
eign Relations Committee, and went into
Laos on that basis. It was information
kept from me in Laos, just as it is being
kept from the American people today.
This matter has nothing to do with
politics. It is simply a question as to
whether or not the Senate of the United
States, under the "advice and, consent"
clause, does or does not have anything
to do with foreign policy.
If it does, then the way the State De-
partment has operated has been effective
in blocking the truth from other Mem-
bers of the Senate and the American peo-
pie; information by the people in just
about all the other countries of the
world. I am sure that the distinguished
Senator from Arkansas will agree to
that, because we constantly get accurate
information from newspapers in Hong
Kong, in Paris, in London, in Bangkok,
and so forth. One can only wonder why
the Government of the United States has
refused over a period of years to give us
the truth with respect to Laos.
I am surprised that apparently the
new administration not only does not
want to renounce the obvious Laotian er-
rors that were made in the past, but now
seems to want to embrace them and
carry them on.
I might add that this. is not a ques-
tion of what the subcommittee can or
cannot release. It is being released in
bits and pieces by the executive branch;
at the same time they deny us the right
to release it through the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee.
One final point: the Senator brought
up in his talk the importance of the
Geneva accords. There is only one possi-
ble reason we can continue to violate
those accords. It is not a violation of
security to say that the reason given us
in committee is that we violated the
Geneva accords because the North Viet-
namese first violated those accords.
if that is the reason why we are in
Laos, then why is it so important to
keep it all so secret? It is the only rea-
son we can justify killing the enemy
up there, and also some of the civilian
population, through bombing, way up in
North Laos, closer to the Chinese border
than the Ho Chi Minh Trails. It.is the
only way we can justify to the American
people why we think it is necessary, in
the interest of the security of the United
States, to have their sons killed in action
in Laos.
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Mr. McGOVERN. As a practical mat-
ter, does not the Senator think it is im-
portant for us to remember that coun-
tries other than North Vietnam and the
United States signed the Geneva Ac-
cords, and that the rest of the countries
are generally abiding by it? Is there any
evidence that Britain or-France or Po-
land or even Russia or China are heavily
involved in Laos?
Mr. SYMINGTON. No, I do not think
there is any such evidence.
Mr. McGOVERN. So that we have
some responsibility to the other coun-
tries. It is not just a matter, Is it, of
trying to gear our conduct according to
what the North Vietnamese do? We are
a member of the family of nations and
presumably ought to be concerned about
how our word is evaluated in other
countries, especially those with which
we jointly signed the Geneva settlement
of 1962.
'Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
close by again commending the distin-
guished Senator from South Dakota for,
as he has done before, urging that the
American people now be cut in on this
war we are waging in Laos. The people
have the right to know.
Mr. McGOVERN, I thank the Senator
for his kind words.
EXHIBIT 1
[From the Washington Sunday Star,
Mar. 1, 19701
LAOS: WHAT THE UNITED STATES IS DOIN9
(By George Sherman)
Washington sources revealed yesterday
more details on the United States' involve-
ment in the secret war in Laos andjts direct
tie to the war in Vietnam.
According to these sources, upwards of 200
combat sorties a day are being flown by U.S.-
marked planes .against North Vietnamese
armed forces which have overrun the.Plain of
Jars and threaten the military and political
balance in Laos.
Mpre than 200 other air missions are flown
against the Ho Chi Minh infiltration trail
farther south through the 125-mile jungle
panhandle of Laos from North to South
Vietnam. In all, there are from 400 to 500
sorties of U.S. Air Force planes over Laos
every day.
According to these sources, U.S. B52s flew
missions for two. successive days over the
Plain of Jars, "around" Feb. 17 and 18. The
raids, which have provoked charges in the
Senate of escalating U.S. involvement in
Laos, were approved directly by President
Nixon, the sources say.
They also say that the attacks did not
accomplish their purpose-stopping the drive
of parts of two North Vietnamese divisions
of nearly 16,000 men-across the Plain of
Jars. The claim is that the political decision
to use the strategic bombers ,was delayed too
long In Washington, despite advance warn-
ing of North Vietnamese moves.
Also, the sources say, by the time the U.S.
commander in Vietnam, Gen. Creighton W.
Abrams, ordered the B52 raids, the North
Vietnamese forces "grouped" in the rolling
Plain of Jars had vacated their sites. Abrams
is said to give priority to B52 raids against
enemy concentrations in South Vietnam and
truck convoys along the Ho Chi Minh trail,
since they are more directly related to Amer-
ican ground fighting-and lives-in the
South.
According to the sources, the U.S. ambassa-
dor in Laos, G. Murtrie Godley, asked for as
many sorties as possible-not just B52
raids-when It was clear early this month
that the North Vietnamese were massing for
a major offensive. The request went to
Abrams, who relayed it to -Hawaii to Adm.
John S. McCain, commander of U.S. Forces
in the Pacific, and from there to Secretary
of Defense Melvin S. Laird and the President.
Under the presidential decision, the B52
raids were limited in scope and time. There
was not the saturation bombing many ob-
servers predicted when U.S. aircraft, working
with the Laotian government, evacuated
18,000 persons from the Plain of Jars early
in February.
Also in the present scheme B52 raids in
the Plain of Jars-which have never been
officially announced-must be ordered di-
rectly by Washington. Decisions on raids
along the Ho Chi Minh trail against highly
selected targets, and in South Vietnam, are
left to Abrams.
TRIBESMEN FLY
The present rate of 200 sorties a day around
the Plain of Jars represents a jump from
30 a day at the beginning of the enemy of-
fensive, the sources say. The raids are usually
conducted with a Meo tribesman riding be-,
hind the pilot to point out enemy caves.
According to the sources, there is the real
danger that the surge of air sorties in North
Laos is hurting the attacks on the Ho Chi
Minh trail.
Sources here say the plan is to work out a
more flexible plan for rationing the use of
air power-the strategic B52s and tactical
planes-between Laos and South Vietnam.
The matter of priorities and coordination
is believed to have been high on the agenda
of a series of top-secret conferences in Saigon
Thursday and Friday.
II'he top military men and diplomats deal-
ing math Southeast Asia-U.S. ambassador
to South Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker, U.S.
ambassador to Thailand Leonard Unger, as
well as McCain, Abrams and, Godley-were
there.
Sources here and reports of the meetings
from Saigon confirm the tight link the Nixon
administration sees between the two wars,
in Laos and South Vietnam. Experts say
Hanoi is using the offensive in northern Laos
to try to end the highly effective American
air interdiction of the Ho Chi Minh trail
farther south.
MOVE TO SOUTH
The North Vietnamese ploy, in this view, is
to either blackmail or force out of office
altogether Laotian Premier Souvanna
Phouma. Their immediate aim, after taking
the Plain of Jars and the important road
junction at Muong Soui, is to move south-
west against the two key bases of Meo tribal
units-the chief fighting force of the Laotian
government.
There is little doubt in Informed circles
here that the North Vietnamese can overrun
these two bases at Sam Thong and Long
Chien, less than 100 miles north of Vientiane,
Souvanna Phouma's capital. Once in control
of the bases, and having wiped out pro-
government "neutralist" forces and occu-
pied their territory, Hanoi could threaten to
wipe out Souvanna Phouma and his capital
if he refuses to stop American bombing of
the Ho Chi Minh trail.
The sources here claim that such an order
would be catastrophic to the American war
effort in South Vietnam. They contend it
would destroy all hope of turning the war
over to the South Vietnamese and withdraw-
ing American ground forces, since Hanoi
would be free to infiltrate as many men and
massive supplies as needed to take over South
Vietnam.
EFFORT DOUBLED
At the moment, these sources say Hanoi is
already mounting a massive new supply ef-
fort along the Ho Ohi Minh trail-even with
heavy U.S. air raids. It is double what it was
last year at this time, the sources said, and
may be preliminary to another big enemy
offensive.
The amount of supplies being moved south
has gone straight up since the dry season
began in October and is expected to continue
to climb until the May rains come.
According to these sources, the North
Vietnamese put into the trail, at the north-
ern entrance in the Mu Gia Pass, an average
of 700 trucks a week during the first three
weeks of February. An average of 350 a
week-each carrying 4 tons of supplies-
was able to reach the southern terminal in
the Ashau Valley. In the week ending Feb.
17 American planes are reported to have
taken out 495 trucks-90 percent of them at
night. But 442 trucks still got through that
same week.
The North Vietnamese maintain special
logistic and antiaircraft forces along the
trail-in addition to the estimated 65,000
combined fighting and supply forces con-
ducting the campaign :in the north. They
have tried to establish some Soviet-made
ground-to-air missiles, but the jungle ter-
rain makes these SAM weapons difficult to
operate.
Nevertheless, Officials Say, American plane
losses over the Ho Chi Minh trail reached
the point in mid-February where sorties had
to be turned away from. truck convoys and
against antiaircraft installations for three
days one week. In November, American plane
losses were 18, in December 16, in January
15 and in February 14.
The American bombing has been so suc-
cessful, it is claimed, that Soviet trucks have
become a leading import for the war effort
into Hanoi.
According to -these sources, the Soviet
Union is sending 160,000 tons-about 30 ship-
loads-of supplies and equipment a month
into Haiphong harbor.
They say that 75 percent of all North Viet-
namese military imports-including those
from China and the Soviet Union-come by
sea, 25 percent by land over the railroad
from China, but that no major Soviet items
are sent by land because of Chinese pilferage
in transit.
The major problem facing the Nixon ad-
ministration is how to counter this coordi-
nated drive in Laos and South Vietnam with-
out becoming "over involved."
Sources note that the limited use of air
power in Laos on the Ho Chi Minh Trail--
admitted by the President-is the first test
of the "Nixon doctrine" for lessening Ameri-
can involvement in Asian wars.
Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird re-
peated on Thursday the President's claim
that no American ground forces are in Laos
He insisted that there had been no change
of policy, that all efforts in Laos still were
to protect the American position in Vietnam.
But his definition was broad enough, ob-
servers noted, to allow for use of American
,air power in other places than the Ho Chi
Minh Trail. The sources have now provided
details of operations farther north.
The planes all carry U.S. Air Force mark-
ings, the sources say, since they have been
requested officially by the Laotian govern-
ment.
FIVE UNITS USED
The sorties around the Plain of Jars are
flown mainly by T28 jet fighter-trainers, F4
Phantom supersonic jet fghter-bombers and
F105 Thunderchief jet fighter-bombers based
at five sites in neighborhood Thailand-
Udorn, Takhli, Nakhon Phantom, Ubon and
Korat air bases.
Five wings-375 aircraft-are stationed at
the five bases, one to a base, and all five are
concentrating on the two "wars" In Laos.
Part of another F4 wing, stationed near
Danang in South Vietnam, is also engaged in
the Laotian operations, the source say.
In addition big AC47 gunships-with guns
sticking out of their bellies and sides-are
used to interdict trucks and men moving
toward South Vietnam.
The problem to be resolved, sources claim,
is whether the United States can frustrate
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 3, 1970
North Vietnamese advances in the North
and along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. It was
frankly admitted that the real stumbling
block is the unwillingness---or' inability--of
the Laotians, including the Meo tribesmen
to fight off the North Vietnamese.
The claim heard here is that saturation
bombing by B52s and lesser bombers could
stop the North Vietnamese drive in the North
especially along the main road in Laos.
But because of political considerations?
the uproar of critics and fear of escalating
the Vietnam war-Nixon has so far kept the
bombing limited and has forbidden bomb-
ing near the North Vietnamese border in the
North:
TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE
MORNING BUSINESS
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the previous order, the Senate will now
proceed to the transaction of morning
business in which Senators' remarks
will be limited to 3 minutes.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I did
riot anticipate that the Senator from
South Dakota was going to speak, and
I have some comments on the same sub-
ject which I wish to make at this time.
WHAT IS THE NATIONAL INTEREST
OF THE UNITED STATES IN LAOS?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the
time has come. to take a close hard look
at what is the real, the genuine national
interest of the United States in Laos.
Although the administration refuses
to admit it, reliable press reports indi-
cate that the military involvement of
the United States in that remote king-
dom is growing by the day. The Gov-
ernment of the United States may soon
have to decide whether to go all the way
in Laos-that is, to make it another Viet-
nam-or to get out.
Senators will note that I said the Gov-
ernment of the United States" may have
to decide this. The Government includes
Congress as well as the President, and
I, for one, am not going to accept a de-
cision in which Congress does not play
its proper constitutional role. In view of
our tragic experience in Vietnam, I do
not think Congress and the people will
accept it either. Congress can play its
proper role only if it can debate-in pub-
lic-the nature and extent of the present
U.S. involvement in Laos. If the Ameri-
can people are going to be asked to en-
tangle themselves in another Asian
quagmire, they are entitled, at a minl-
mum, to know the truth about how and
why they got there. I, therefore, again
call upon the administration to declas-
sify the hearings which were held on
.Laos last October by the Subcommittee
on U.S. Security Agreements and Com-
mitments Abroad of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee headed by the distin-
uished Senator from Missouri (Mr.
SYMINCTON).
But there is a more fundamental ques-
tion even than what we are now doing
in Laos. That question is: How :un-
lortant in Laos to the national security
of the United States and to the peace
and well-being of the American people?
This is the crucial, the all-important is-
sue upon which all other decisions are
dependent.
It would be difficult to make a case
that Laos has any intrinsic importance
to the United States. It has an area of
89,000 square miles, a little larger than
the State of Utah, and a population of
2.5 million, approximately equal to met-
ropolitan Washington. It has no signif-
icant natural resources. Its total gross
national product is scarcely more than
Montgomery County, Md., spends on Its
public schools. The :Lao people by all ac-
counts are peaceful, gentle souls. The
1954 edition of the Encyclopedia Amer-
icana devotes less than one column to the
country.
The importance of Laos to the United
States, if any, stems not from the coun-
try itself but rather from its geograph-
ical location and its relationship to the
rest of Southeast Asia and especially to
Vietnam.
A most Illuminating article on this
point, as well as upon the policy of Viet-
namization, was published in the Wash-
ington Star March 1 under the byline of
Mr. George Sherman. I ask unanimous
consent that the entire article be printed
in the RECORD at the conclusion of my
remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it Is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. FULBR]GHT. The article is based
on interviews with the usual anonymous
sources-who we can be sure are ad-
ministration officials willing to present
a one-sided case in private rather than
the full facts in public. These sources,
according to the article, "confirm the
tight link the Nixon administration sees
between the two wars, in Laos and South
Vietnam." Further, these sources say,
"there is the real danger that the surge
of air sorties in North Laos is hurting the
attacks on the Ho Chi Minh trail." The
article then goes on:
Experts say Hanoi is using the offensive in
northern Laos to try to end the highly
effective American air interdiction of the
He Chi Minh trail farther south.
The North Vietnamese ploy, in this view,
is to either blackmail or force out of office al-
together Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma.
Their immediate aim, after taking the
Plain of Jars and the important road junc-
tion at Muong Soui, is to move southwest
against the two key bases of Meo tribal
units-the chief fighting force of the Lao-
tian government.
There is little doubt in informed circles
here that the North Vietnamese can over-
run these two bases at Sam Thong and
Long Chien, less than 100 miles north of
Vientiane, Souvanna Phouma's capital. Once
in control of the bases, and having wiped
out pro-government 'neutralist' forces and
occupied their territory, Hanoi could threaten
to wipe out Sou.vanna Phouma and his capi-
tal if he refuses to stop American bombing
of the Ho Chi Minh trail.
The sources here claim that such an order
would be catastrophic to the American war
effort in South Vietnam. They contend it
would destroy all hope of turning the war
over to the South Vietnamese and with-
drawing American ground forces, since Hanoi
would be free to infiltrate as many men
and massive supplies as needed to take over
South Vietnam.
There are several interesting points
about this anonymous revelation of what
we can safely assume is the administra-
tion view.
For the first time, American bombing
of the Plain of Jars is explicitly related
to American bombing of the Ho Chi Minh
Trail, but in a most curious way. On the
one hand, we are told that bombing in
the north-which, be it noted, did not
prevent a Communist takeover of the
Plain of Jars-has already diverted
planes from attacks on the Ho Chi Minh.
Trail. On the other hand, we are told
that if we do not prevent a Communist
victory in the north--presumably by
more bombing-then we will have to stop
bombing the trail anyway.
Finally, we are told that if American
air strikes against the Ho Chi Minh Trail
are indeed stopped, either through diver-
sion to the north or as a consequence of
Communist pressure on Souvanna
Phouma, then all hope of Vietnamiza--
tion will be destroyed. 'This confirms a
suspicion many of us have had about the
fragility of the policy of Vietriamization.
How can you say you are Vietnamizing
the war in Vietnam when the success of
this effort is totally dependent on in-
definite continuation of massive air at-
tacks on the Ho Chi Minh Trail?
Aside from Vietnam, Laos is said to be
important to the United States because
it borders on Thailand. If Laos goes
Communist, so runs this argument, then
Thailand can be expected to go next-
and then Burma and Cambodia and Ma-
laysia, and so on. This is the domino
theory which even Dean. Rusk once pri-
vately admitted to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee that lie did not
believe in.
More ominous, perhaps, is the possi-
bility that a Communist victory in Laos
would trigger the United States-Thai
contingency plan which Secretary of De-
fense Laird has publicly disavowed, but
which nonetheless was updated last
summer.
It is also interesting in this connection
that high officials of the administra-
tion-if I may resort to the journalistic
technique to protect individuals-have
made the argument to members of the
Foreign Relations Committee that Laos
is even more important than Vietnam.
Mr. President, the fact that high of-
ficials of the administration think this
scares me to death. It suggests an omi-
nous and dangerous future for us in that
remote country. If Vietnam was impor-
tant enough to justify the commitment
of half a million American troops, then
in this view how many more could justi-
fiably be committed to Laos. which is one
of the few worse places than Vietnam
to fight a war?
All of this has gotten things com-
pletely out of proportion. Let us take a
fresh look at our interests in Asia, at-
tempting to put first things first.
It is wildly absurd to say that Laos
and Vietnam, singly or together, have
the capability of doing harm to the
United States-except as we permit it
through embroiling ourselves in interm-
inable wars in those countries. What we
are really concerned about in Southeast
Asia is the power of mainland China, or
more accurately, the extension of that
power beyond China's borders.
We can all agree, I think, that the
mainland Chinese are hostile to the
United States. It is in our national in-
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terest, therefore, to counter or deal with
that hostility as best we can. Fighting
wars in peripheral, insignificant coun-
tries is certainly. not the best way to do
this. On the contrary, it may well be the
worst way.
I dare say the simple presence of the
United States in Vietnam and Laos in-
nires greater Chinese interest in those
untries than would otherwise be the
s~se. Certainly the Russian presence in
Cuba excited a` greater Amercan inter-
est in that country than had previously
been manifest.
Furthermore, Chinese hostility to the
United States does not necessarily im-
ply Chinese aggressiveness against
China's smaller neighbors. Irrational
though they may be, the Chinese Com-
munists can scarcely equate Laos and
Vietnam with Japan, the Soviet Union,
and India-unless we force them to do
so. Madness in Washington may very
well beget madness in Peking.
Finally, Mr. President, one's assess-
ment of the importance of Vietnam and
Laos to the United States has to be bal-
anced against the cost of protecting
whatever U.S. interest one perceives in
those two countries. There is room for
honest differences of opinion on both
sides of this equation. Although I do not
share this view myself, I can understand
how one might possibly argue that the
U.S. national interest in Laos justifies
the expenditure of, let us say, $200 mil-
lion a year and the loss of some hundreds
of American lives-if, and I emphasize
if, this would achieve American objec-
tives or at least maintain the status quo.
The question we have to face now is
how much more, in blood and money, are
we willing to spend if this does not
achieve our objectives. And the cost is
not just what we spend in Laos, or Viet-
nam. The most important part of the
cost is that which cannot be quantified,
either in money or lives. This is what we
are doing to ourselves. It is the corrup-
tion of our national life.
Even if we assume that our objectives
in Southeast Asia are desirable, we have
to ask ourselves, Are they possible of at-
tainment at any reasonable cost? It
seems clear to me that the answer has
to be in the negative.
Two centuries ago, Edward Gibbon be-
gan his epic work, "The Decline and Fall
of the Roman Empire" with these words:
In the second century of the Christian era,
the Empire of Rome comprehended the fair-
est part of.the earth, and the most civilized
portion of mankind. The frontiers of that
extensive monarchy were guarded by ancient
renown and disciplingd valour. The gentle
but powerful influence of laws and manners
had gradually cemented the union of the
provinces. Their peaceful inhabitants en-
joyed and abused the advantages of wealth
.and luxury. The image of a free constitution
was preserved with decent reverence: the
Roman senate appeared to possess the sover-
eign authority, and devolved on the emperors
all the executive powers of government.
That is not a very inaccurate descrip-
tion of the United States in the last half
of the 20th century of the Christian era.
But let us listen to Gibbon further:
It was reserved for Augustus to relinquish
-the ambitious design of subduing the whole
earth, and to introduce a spirit of modera-
tion into the public councils. Inclined to
peace by his temper and situation,,it was
easy for him to discover that Rome, in her
present exalted situation, had much less to
hope than to fear from the chance of arms;
and that, in the prosecution of remote wars,
the undertaking became every day more diffi-
cult, the event more doubtful, and the pos-
session more precarious, and less beneficial.
I wish the administration would give
heed to the lessons of history. Surely
President Nixon would rather be referred
to by future historians as Gibbon refer-
red to Augustus and not as the man who
presided over the decline and fall of the
American Republic. He talked like it in
expounding his Nixon doctrine. I wish
he would act like it in Southeast Asia.
[From the Washington Star, Mar. 1, 1970]
ExHrsrr 1
LAOS: WHAT THE UNITED STATES Is DOING
(By George Sherman)
.Washington sources revealed yesterday
more details on the United States' involve-
ment in the secret war in Laos and its direct
tie to the war in Vietnam.
According to these sources, upwards of 200
combat sorties a day are being flown by U.S.-
marked planes against North Vietnamese
armed forces which have overrun the Plain
of Jars and threaten the military and politi-
cal balance in Laos.
More than 200 other air missions are flown
against the Ho Chi Minh infiltration trail
farther south through the 125-mile jungle
panhandle of Laos from North to South Viet-
nam. In all, there are from 400 to 500 sorties
of U.S. Air Force. planes over Laos every day.
According to these sources, U.S. B52s flew
missions for two successive days over the
Plain of Jars, "around" Feb. 17 and 18. The
raids, which have provoked charges in the
Senate of escalating U.S. Involvement in Laos,
were approved directly by President Nixon,
the sources say. .
They also say that the attacks did not ac-
complish their purpose-stopping the drive
of parts of two North Vienamese divisions of
nearly 16,000 men-across the Plain of Jars.
The claim is that the political decision to use
the strategic bombers was delayed too long
in Washington, despite advance warning of
North Vietnamese moves.
Also, the sources say, by the time the U.S.
commander in Vietnam, Gen. Creighton W.
Abrams, ordered the B52 raids, the North
Vietnamese forces "grouped" in the rolling
Plain of Jars had vacated their sites. Abrams
is said to give priority to B52 raids against
enemy concentrations in South Vietnam and
truck convoys along the Ho Chi Minh trail,
since they are more directly related to Ameri-
can ground fighting-and lives-in the
South.
According to the sources, the U.S. ambas-
sador in Laos, G. Murtrie Godley, asked for
as many sorties as possible-not just B52
raids-when it was clear early this month
that the North Vietnamese were massing for
a major offensive. The request went to
Abrams, who relayed it to Hawaii to Adm.
John S. McCain, commander of U.S. Forces
in the Pacific, and from there to Secretary
of Defense Melvin S. Laird and the President.
'Under the presidential decision, the B52
raids were limited in scope and time. There
was not the saturation bombing many ob-
servers predicted when U.S. aircraft, working
with the Laotian government, evacuated 18,-
000 persons from the Plain of Jars early in
February.
Also in the present scheme B52 raids in
the Plain of Jars-which have never been
officially announced-must be ordered di-
rectly by Washington. Decisions on raids
along the Ho Chi Minh trail against highly
selected targets, and in South Vietnam, are
left to Abrams.
S 2819
TRIBESMEN FLY
The present rate of 200 sorties a day
around the Plain of Jars represents a jump
from 30 a day at the beginning of the enemy
offensive, the sources say. The raids are usu-
ally conducted with a Meo tribesman riding
behind the pilot to point out enemy caves.
According to the sources, there is the real
danger that the surge of air sorties in North
Laos is hurting the attacks on the Ho Chi
Minh trail.
Sources here say the plan is to work out
a more flexible plan for rationing the use
of air power-the strategic B52s and tactical
planes-between Laos and South Vietnam.
The matter of priorities and coordination is
believed to have been high on the agenda of
a series of top-secret conferences in Saigon
Thursday and Friday.
The top military men and diplomats deal-
ing with Southeast Asia-U.S. ambassador
to South Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker, U.S.
ambassador to Thailand Leonard Unger, as
well as McCain? Abrams and Godley-were
there.
Sources here and reports of the meetings
from Saigon confirm the tight link the Nixon
administration sees between the two wars.
in Laos and South Vietnam. Experts say
Hanoi is using the offensive in northern Laos
to try to end the highly effective American
air interdiction of the Ho Chi Minh trail
farther south.
MOVE TO SOUTH
The North Vietnamese ploy, in this view,
is to either blackmail or force out of office
altogether Laotian Premier Souvanna
Phouma. Their immediate aim, after taking
the Plain of Jars and the important road
junction at Muong Soui, is to move south-
west against the two key bases of Meo tribal
units-the chief fighting force of the Laotian
government.
There is little doubt in informed circles
here that the North Vietnamese can overrun
these two bases at Sam Thong and Long
Chien, less than 100 miles north of Vientiane,
Souvanna Phouma's capital. Once in control
of the bases, and having, wiped out pro-gov-
ernment "neutralist" forces and occupied
their territory, Hanoi could threaten to wipe
out Souvanna Phouma and his capital if he
refuses to stop American bombing of the Ho
Chi Minh trail.
The sources here claim that such an order
would be catastrophic to the American war
effort in South Vietnam. They contend it
would destroy all hope of turning the war
over to the South Vietnamese and withdraw-
ing American ground forces, since Hanoi
would be free of infiltrate as many men and
massive supplies as needed to take over South
Vietnam.
EFFORT DOUBLED
At the moment, these sources say Hanoi
is already mounting a massive new supply
effort along the Ho Chi Minh trail-even with
heavy U.S. air raids. It is double what it was
last year at this time, the sources said, and
may be preliminary to another big enemy
offensive.
The amount of supplies being moved south
has gone straight up since the dry season
began in October and is expected to continue
to climb until the May rains come.
According to these sources, the North
Vietnamese put into the trail, at the northern
entrance in the Mu Gia, Pass, an average of
700 trucks a week during the first three weeks
of February. An average of 350 a week-each
carrying 4 tons of supplies-was able to reach
the southern terminal in the Ashau Valley. In
the week ending Feb. 17 American planes are
reported to have taken out 4#5 trucks-90
percent of them at night. But 442 trucks
still got through the same week.
The North Vietnamese maintain special
logistic and antiaircraft forces along the
trail-in addition to the estimated 85,000
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CONGRESSIONAL 'RECORD - ENA E March 3, B70
combined fighting and supply forces con-
ducting the campaign In the north. They
have tried to establish some Soviet-made
ground-to-air missiles, but the jungle ter-
rain makes these SAM weapons difficult to
operate.
Nevertheless, officials say, American plane
losses over the Ho Chi Minh trail reached the
point In mid-February where sorties has to
be turned away from truck convoys and
against antiaircraft installations for three
days one week. In November, American plane
losses were 18, in December 16, in January
15 and in February 14.
The American bombing has been so suc-
cessful, it is claimed, that Soviet trucks have
become a leading import for the war effort
in Hanoi.
According to these sources, the Soviet
Union is sending 160,000 tons--about 30
shiploads---of supplies and equipment a
month into Haiphong harbor.
They say that 76 percent of all North
Vietnamese military Imports-including
those from China and the Soviet Union--
come by sea, 25 percent by land over the rail-
road from China, but that no major Soviet
:items are sent by land because of Chinese
pilferage In transit.
The major problem :racing the Nixon ad-
ministration is how to counter this coordi-
nated drive in Laos and South Vietnam with-?
out becoming "over Involved."
Sources note that the limited use of air
power in Laos on the Ho Chi Minh Trail?
admitted by the President-is the first 'test
of the "Nixon doctrine" for lessening Ameri-
can involvement in Asian wars.
Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird re-
peated on Thursday the President's claim
that no American ground forces are in Laos.
He insisted that there had been no change
of policy, that all efforts in Laos still were to
protect the American position in Vietnam.
But his definition was broad enough, ob-
servers noted, to allow for use of American
air power In other places than the Ho Chi
Minh Trail. The sources have now provided
details of operations farther north.
The planes all carry U.S. Air Force mark-
ings, the sources say, since they have been
requested officially by the Laotian govern-
ment.
FIVE UNITS USED
The sorties around the Plain of Jars are
flown mainly by 728 jet fighter-trainers, F4
Phantom supersonic jet fighter-bombers, and
F105 Thunderchief jet fighter-bombers based
at five sites in nleghboring Thailand-Udorn,
Takhll, Nakhon Phanom, Uban and Korat
air bases.
Five wings- -375 aircraft--are stationed at
the five bases, one to e: base, and all five are
concentrating on the two "wars" in Laos.
Part of another F4 wing, stationed near
Danang in South Vietnam, Is also engaged in
the Laotian operations, the sources say.
In addition big AC47 gunships-with guns
sticking out of their bellies and sides--are
used to interdict trucks and men moving to-
ward South Vietnam.
The problem to be resolved, l.ources claim,
is whether the United States can frustrate
North Vietnamese advances in the North and
along the He Chi Minh Trail. It was frankly
admitted that the real stumbling block is the
unwillingness-or inability-of the Laotf.ans,
including the Meo tribesmen, to fight off the
North Vietnamese.
The claim heard here Is that saturation
bombing by B52a and lesser bombers could
stop the North Vietnamese drive in the North,
especially along the main road in Laos.
But beetuse of political considerations--
the uproar of critics and fear of escalating
the Vietnam war- txon has so far kept the
bombing limited and has forbidden bombing
near the North Vietnamese border in the
North.
MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE?
ENROLLED BILL SIGNED
A message from the House of Repre-
sentatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its
reading clerks, announced that the
Speaker had affixed his signature to the
enrolled bill (R.R. 11702) to amend the
Public Health Service Act to improve
and extend the provisions relating to as-
sistance to medical libraries and related
instrumentalities, and for other purposes.
COMMUNICATIONS FROM EXEC-
UTIVE DEPARTMENTS, ETC.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid be-
fore the Senate the following letters,
which were referred as indicated:
IIEPORT ON SPECIAL PAY TO CERTAIN OFFICERS
OF THE ARMED FORCES
A letter from the Deputy Secretary of De-
fense, reporting, pursuant to law, that the
permissive authority vested in the Secretary
o Defense to pay special pay to certain
officers was not exercised during calendar
year 1969; to the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices.
REPORT ON SHIPMENTS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE OF CHPIMICAL MUNITIONS
A letter from the Secretary of State, trans-
mitting, pursuant to law, a classified report
on shipments by the Department of Defense
of Chemical Munitions (with an accompany-
ing report) ; to the Committee on Armed
Services.
1?EPORT ON SPECIAL PAY FOR DUTY SUBJECT
TO HOSTILE FIRE
A letter from the Deputy Secretary of De-
fense, transmitting, pursuant to law, a re-
port on special pay for duty subject to hostile
fire, for the calendar year 1969 (with an ac-
companying report); to the Committee on
Armed Services.
TEMPORARY ADMISSION INTO THE UNITED
STATES OF CERTAIN ALIENS
A letter from the Commissioner, Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, Department
of Justice, transmitting, pursuant to law,
copies of orders entered granting temporary
admission into the United States of certain
aliens (with accompanying papers) ; to the
Committee on the Judiciary.
REPORT ON SURVEY OF LENDER PRACTICES
RELATING TO THE GUARANTEED STUDENT
LOAN PROGRAM
A letter from' the Acting Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare, transmit-
ring, pursuant to law, a report on a survey
of practices of lending institutions relating
to the guaranteed student loan program,
dated February 1970 (with an accompanying
report); to the Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare.
PROPOSED LEGISLATION To PROVIDE FOR THE
SETTLEMENT OF THE LABOR DISPUTE BETWEEN
CERTAIN CARRIERS EY RAILROAD AND CERTAIN
of THEIR EMPLOYEES
A letter from the Secretary, transmitting
a draft of proposed legislation to provide for
the settlement of the labor dispute between
certain carriers by railroad and certain of
their employees (with an accompanying pa-
per) ; to the Committee on Labor and Pub-
lic Welfare.
BILLS AND A JOINT RESOLUTION
INTRODUCED
Bills and a joint resolution were intro-
duced, read the first time and, by unani-
mous consent, the second time, and
referred as follows:
By Mr. JACKSON:
S. 3529. A bill for the relief of Johnny
Trinidad Mason, Jr.; to he Ccmmittee on
Foreign Relations.
By Mr. TYDINCS:
S. 3530. A bill for the relief of Miss Rosario
Grandy Ochoa; to the t:ammittee on the
Judiciary.
By Mr. PROUTY (for himself, Mr -
JAvrrs, Mr. Muapra Y, Mr. SCHWEIKE
Mr. SCOTT, and ivfr. SIrITH of I?
nois) :
S. 3531. A bill to establish a National In-
stitute of Education, and ?t or other purposes;
to the Committee on Labor and Public Wel-
fare.
(The remarks of Mr. Prrour)r when he in-
troduced the bill appear lister in. the RIicORD
under the appropriate heading.)
By Mr. NELSON:
S. 3532. A bill to amend' the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act co :as to require a
warning on the label of all oral contraceptive
drugs regarding possible dangers to the
health of persons using such drugs; to the
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.
By Mr. BROOKE
S. 3533. A bill to amend title II of the
Social Security Act so as to remove the limi-
tation upon the amount of outside income
which an Individual may earn while receiv-
ing benefits under such title;
S.3534. A bill to arnerid title II of the
Social Security Act so as G) encourage recip-
ients of monthly benefits thereunder to ac-
cept employment in job-"trainl;ag programs
and day-care centers;
5.3535. A bill to amend title II: of the
Social Security Act to provide for an in-
crease in the amount of a idow's and widow-
er's benefits payable thereunder;
S.3536. A bill to amend title II of the
Social Security. Act to allow certain widow's
who are not under a disability to receive
reduced benefits thereunder at age 50;
S. 3537. A bill to amend the Social Security
Act to extend, in certain cases entitlement
to the health insurance benefits provided
under title XVIII thereof to individuals who
have not attained age 65 but are married to
individuals who have alt tined such age and
are entitled to such benefits; and
S. 3538. A bill to amend title II of the
Social Security Act and the Internal Rev-
enue Code of 1954 to provide that an in-
dividual may elect to have any employment
or self-employment perfr rmed by him after
attaining age 65 excluded (for both tax and
benefit purposes) from coverage under the
old-age, survivors, and disability insurance
system; to the Committee on Finance.
S. 3539. A bill for th >, relief of Cosimo
Lanata; and
S. 3540. A bill for the relief of George K.
Liu; to the Committee on the Judiciary.
(The remarks of Mr. I;aooatE when he in-
troduced the first six bills appear later in
the RECORD under the appropriate heading.)
By Mr. HRUSKA (for himself, Mr.
ALLOTT, Mr. BTDLE, Mr. BOGGS, Mr.
COOK, Mr. COTTON, Mr. CURTIS. Mr.
DOLE, Mr. DOMI^1ICIS, Air. EASTLAND,
NET. ERVIN, Mr. r''ANNIN, Mr. FONG,
Mr. GOLDWATER, Mr. GRIFFIN, Mr.
HANSEN, Mr. R(ut.LINGS, Mr. MILLER,
Mr. PASTORE, Mr ,SCOTT, Mr. SAirrii
of Illinois, Mr. 13rEVENs, Mr. TowER,
and Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota) :
S. 3541. A bill to amend title I of the Omni-
bus Crime Control and .13afe Streets Act of
1988, and for other purposes; to the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary.
(The remarks of Mr. IJEUSKA when he in-
troduced the bill appear later In the RECORD
under the appropriate heading.)
By Mr. GRIFFIN:
S.J. Res. 178. A joint resolution. to provide
for the settlement of tine labor dispute be-
tween certain carriers by railroad and ecr-
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oil product supply to the entire east coast. payments between various parts of the econ-
is now imported and even the Task Force ma- omy. Costs of the present program to con-
jority could find no history of a real shortage sumers have been estimated as high as seven
of home heating oil in New England states or billion dollars based on 1975 use rates, com-
higher prices, as has been claimed for that pared with resource cost of about one bil-
area except higher retail dealer mark-ups, lion dollars annually. But it is the lower
Aside from the national security risks of figure-the net cost to the nation after all
becqmlng dependent on unreliable foreign the transfers from one American pocket to
sources of oil-and these arguments are com- another have been wrung out-that is the
pelling enough-the Task Force report and true measurement of the premium we are
analysis neither mentions nor apparently paying to have a reliable oil supply in sup-
considers the fact that crude oil and crude port of our national security. It appears to
oil product prices have remained remarkably be quite modest in comparison with some
stable since 1959 when the present Mandatory of the other cost elements of our national
Oil Import Quota System was established as security. A nucle wereu 4e4ecraft carrier,
compared with other consumer products. The with its e ed aircraft and defensive
data show that, excluding excise taxes, the screen, co somewhat over two billion dol-
service station price for regular gasoline ob- jars, a our total expenditures for defense
tained by averaging data for more than 50 pure es this year will exceed eighty billion
over the 1958-5$ average while the Bureau :But even the Task Force report left the
of Labor_ statistics consumer price index has 4oonsumer out in the cold as far as any real
risen 26.3 percent. ! or actual savings at the gas pump or in home
And out of the 2.525 cents per gallon aver/ heating oil are concerned.
age increase in service station prices for gasp- "Consumers generally," the report states,
line from 1958-59 to 1969, 1.57 cents ,er "would no longer receive whatever benefits
gallon, or 62 percent, went to dealer in they now receive from low-cost imported oil,
higher margins. The tariff would appropriate the difference
For home heating oil during this riod, uecween Ioreign and U.S. prices (to the U.S.
out of a 1.75 cent per gallon rise, 77 rcent Treasury). Some of that difference may now
As for crude oil itself, while 1969 crud
had risen only 3.6 percent above th
59 average, the wholesale price index
But consumer prices can be made to decline
steadily by combining an Initially high but
steadily declining tariff with a steadily de-
dustrial commodities had risen by 1
cent.
the President's Council on Environmental
Quality explained it this way:
"I would like to begin my remarks by in-
viting attention to one of these aspects that
seems to have drawn more notice than any
of the others; that is, the subject of costs,
primarily as they apply to petroleum energy.
There has been a great deal of confusion as
to the meaning of the figures that have been
used to describe the cost of the current oil
import control program, Basically, two kinds
of costs have claimed most of the attention."
"There is, first, the cost to the consumer of
the present program. This is measured by
the increased price the consumer of oil prod-
ucts must pay because of the existence of
an oil security program. The price that the
consumer pays under the present oil import
program includes not only the moneys re-
quired to provide the physical capacity to
produce additional oil in the United States
but also payments to all producers of oil
because of the higher price of domestic crude
oil. The cost to the consumer, therefore,
consists of two parts: (1) payments required
to bring forth the additional production gen-
erated by the program, and (2) transfers
from the consumer tQ the producers and
refiners of all oil."
"The cost of the program to the nation,
often called the resource cost, measures the
additional economic resources of labor, ma-
terials, equipment, and capital required to
produce additional oil in the United States
or to provide other forms of emergency oil
supplies to the United States."
"The resource cost is, therefore, the dif-
ference between the price of foreign oil In
U.S. markets and our own cost of producing
that part of our oil that we could buy more
cheaply from foreign sources. It measures
the marginal segment of our production that
costs us more to produce at home than it
does to buy abroad. This is a net cost to the
economy that cannot be made to disappear
by passing it around from one sector to an-
other,"
"In the nature of the case, there is a
large difference .between these two. cost fig-
ures due to the large element of transfer
creasing tariff-free quota."
It is, as you say, essentially a modest and
cautious program. It proposes to bleed the
petroleum industry to death gradually with
a "phased-in liberalization of the policy"
rather than kill it off instantly. The first
7e arp. nn-
porting more than one-fourth of our d!',
needs and will probably have to import more'
as our use expands. But the only way to keep
foreign oil available and cheap is to have the
reserve capacity ' available from reliable
sources to guarantee self-sufficiency and
avoid dependency on sources that could be
denied us overnight.
In my opinion, tariff on oil imports into
the U.S. would be an unsatisfactory mech-
anism for achieving the precise volumetric
control needed for national security.
A tariff designed to reduce the price of U.S.
crude oil would endanger the national se-
curity by threatening the health of the do-
mestic petroleum industry, putting the U.S.
at the mercy of foreign countries whose in-
valance or power away from us.
Even short-term benefits which
in revenue from a tai'if would be offset by a
decline in domestic taxes and royalties and
the states would lose in.. taxes, employment,
and purchasing power.
The net result of a tariff would be a loss to
the nation in military effectiveness, economic
stability, and political influence.
The supplementary and differing views of
the Chairman of the Federal Power Commis-
slon are positive and emphatic. "Adoption of
the Task Force plan will not only disrupt the
and eventually
e when the
Sunts in
d oil
~n -
oil and gas industry, but will affect our total
energy resource utilization, and consumer
demand for 75% of our current energy base."
The FPC report continues:
"The Task Force Report has virtually ig-
nored the natural gas sector and according-
ly, has erred in this conclusion that adoption
of the Task Force tariff-based oil import
plan will not adversely affect the national
security. Exploration, development and pro-
duction of natural gas and oil are not prac-
ticably separable. Twenty-five oil companies
produce 68% of the natural gas sold in in-
terstate commerce in the United States.
However, the independent oil and gas pro-
ducers found approximately 80% of the new
gas and oil fields discovered in 1967 in the
interior basis of the United States. In 1968,
the regulated pipeline and distribution com-
panies produced only 8J% of the gas trans-
ported through their systems. The natural
gas Industry is dependent almost entirely on
the oil companies or independent producers
of oil and gas for its basic gas supply. Drastic
reduction of oil prices over a term of 3-5
years will significantly reduce additions to
natural gas reserves, curtail the growth of
the natural gas energy sector, and increase
consumer costs."
"The domestic industry supplies as much
energy iii the form of natural gas as in the
form of crude oil. At the point of production,
the average price is about $3.00 a barrel for
crude oil and less than $1.20 for the equiv-
alent energy as natural gas. The average cost
of domestic petroleum energy equivalent to
a barrel of crude oil is one-half of the sum
of these two figures or $2.10, which is about
as cheap as foreign crude oil can be delivered
to U.S. ports."
So these are really the basic issues in-
volved in the oil import controversy.
Undoubtedly, we could have cheaper dairy
products, meat, shoes, clothing, oil, auto-
mobiles, TV sets, and many other consumer
items if we are willing to open our markets
to massive imports of these products which
are produced by workers paid far less than
U.S. workers.
But before bargaining off what little pro-
tection we have left for American workers
employed in competitive industries, I hope
that those who advocate such liberal trade
policies will study some statistics and hard
r laws that have been enacted during
years.
imports are concerned.
And those who advocate control of do-
mestic prices by a flood of cheaply produced
foreign oil or any other competitive import
may well have to suffer the consequences of
the massive unemployment that will surely
follow.
The separate report of Interior, Commerce
and FPC offers a well-reasoned and docu-
mented rebuttal to the Task Force plan and
a sensible alternative plan for revision of the
Mandatory Oil Import Program.
Also the President in deferring action on
the Task Force recommendations said he ex-
pected the new oil policy committee to "con-
sider both interim and long-term adjust-
ments that will increase the effectiveness and
enhance the equity of the oil import pro-
gram ... as well as the information developed
In proposed Congressional hearings."
Hearings have already been scheduled by
the appropriate committees of both the
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Match 6, 1970
house and Senate during which the differing
views of both the majority and minority of
the Task Force will be considered and I in-
vite your attention again to the separate and
opposing views which were included in the
rash Force report.
CLIFFORTI P. HANSEN,
U.S. Senator.
Commitments Abroad of the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, I have had
with the Secretary of State in connec-
tion with the desire of the subcommittee
to hear Ambassador Godley. I ask
unanimous consent that a letter from
me of February 25 to the Secretary of
State, also a letter from me to him a week
later, March 2, plus the Secretary's reply
of March 4, plus my :reply of March 5 to
that letter, be inserted at this point in
the RECORD.
There being no objection, the letters
were ordered to be printed in the REC-
ORD, as follows:
SUBCOMMITTEE ON U.S. SzeunrrT
AGREEMENT AND COMMITMENTS
ABROAD
ORDER OF BUSINESS
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The Senate will now proceed to the
transaction of routine morning business,
with statements limited to 3 minutes.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that I may proceed
for 5 minutes.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
G. MCMURTRIE GODLEY-AMBAS-
SADOR OR PROCONSUL IN LAOS 6
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, last
month an Associated Press story with a
Vientiane, Laos, dateline reported on the
activities in Laos of three American
newsmen; and also gave a statement,
purportedly made by U.S. Ambassador
to Laos, G. McMurtrie Godley, that "the
American mission has lost any interest
in helping out the press whatsoever be-
cause of what happened this afternoon."
I ask unanimous consent that this
newsstory of last February 24 be in-
serted at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the news
article was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
LAOTIANS ARREST THREE NEWSMEN
VIENTIANE, I,Aos,-Laotian army troops
today arrested three Western newsmen who
made their way unannounced to the gov-
ernment base at Long Chang. They were
later released to a U.S. Embassy official.
0. McMurtrie Godley, the U.S. ambassa-,
dor to Vientiane, said in a statement that
the American mission has lost any inter-
est in helping out the press whatsoever be-
cause of what happened this afternoon." He
did not elaborate.
The newsmen arrested were John Saar of
Life magazine, Max Coiffait, of Agency
France Press, and Timothy Allman, a part-
time employe for the New York Times and
Bangkok Post.
Newsmen attempting to cover the fast-
breaking developments in Laos have been
forced to rely largely on American mission
sources for their information, and on the
mission for transportation to battle areas.
The U.S. mission has been reluctant to
intercede with the Laotian government to
help newsmen visit areas where fighting is
going on.
Saar, Coiffalt and Allman were among a
group of newsmen who last week made a
visit to Sam Thong, a supply and medical
center southwest of the Plain of Jars. They
had chartered an Air America transport plane
with the consent of the U.S. Embassy and
the Laotian government.
The three newsmen were last seen walk-
ing along a road leading to Long Cheng,
Headquarters for Gen. Vang Pao. 15 miles
away.
Vang commands Laotian forces in the
area.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, yes-
I.erday the State Department released
a summary of some correspondence
that, as chairman of the Subcommit-
tee on U.S. Security Agreements and
February 25, 1970.
Hon. WILLIAM P. ROGERS,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In view of recent
press reports of serious fighting in Laos, and
the difficulties which have been reported by
press representatives In Laos In ascertaining
the facts, we request that Ambassador G.
McMurtrle Godley be directed to return to
Washington as soon as possible to appear
before the Subcommittee on United States
Security Agreements and Commitments
Abroad.
Sincerely yours,
STUART SYMINGTON,
Chairman.
MARCH 2, 1970.
Hon. WILLIAM P. ROGERS,
Secretary of State. Department of State,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On February 25 we re-
quested that Ambassador Godley appear at
his earliest convenience before the Subcom-
mittee on United States Security Agreements
and Commitments Abroad of the Foreign
Relations Commi:aee.
Would you kindly let us know when we
cau expect his appearance.
Sincerely,
STUART SYMINGTON.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, March 4, 1970.
Ron. STUART SYM'INGTON,
Chairman, Subcommittee on U.S. Security
Agreements and Commitments Abroad,
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S.
Senate.
DEAR STU: I have received your letter of
February 25th requesting that Ambassador
Godley be brought back to appear before
your Subcommittee on. United States Secur-
ity Agreements and Commitments Abroad.
I am sure you will understand that because
of the serious situation presently existing in
Laos, it is not possible to say at this time
exactly when Ambassador Godley will be
available. As soon as the situation makes it
feasible for him to return to this country, we
will arrange to have him do so and he will
of course be prepared to appear before your
Subcommittee at that time.
With best personal regards,
Sincerely,
ROGERS.
MARCH 5, 1970.
Hon. WILLIAM P. ROGERS,
Secretary of State, :Department of State,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR BILL: Acknowledging your note of
March 4 re Ambassador Godley, could you
let us know when we can expect him? We
are anxious to have him as soon as possible.
Warm regards.
STUART SYMINGTON.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
regret that apparently Ambassador God-
ley will not be available for some time,
because it. would seem that it is in the
public interest for him to appear before
the subcommittee as soon as possible.
If our fighting is to continue in Laos,
however, I can understand why there is
no desire to return the Ambassador, be-
cause when I was last in Laos, some 21/2
years ago, the Ambassador at that time,
in addition to his normal State Depart-
ment functions, was not only directly
supervising the extensive military and
nonmilitary activities of the various
U.S. intelligence agencies in that coun-
try, but was also directing the time,
place, and nature of all other U.S. mili-
tary activities against North Laos.
In passing, although traveling on offi-
cial business as a member of both the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and
the Senate Armed Services Committee,
even then I was not fully informed of
some of our military activities, at the
time of this visit or on previous visits ;
and only learned of these activities as a
result of sworn testimony before the
subcommittee in question during hear-
ings held last October.
I did learn, however, that at that time
the Ambassador was also acting as chief
of staff of U.S. military efforts in the
northern part of that country; and if
that is what he is doing now, and because
recently there has been heavy escalation
of U.S. participation in this northern
Laos war, I can understand why there
is some resistance to bringing him back
at this time.
I would hope, however, that as soon as
possible we can find out more about
just what is going on in that country;
and Ambassador Godley--based on his
duties, perhaps it would be better to call
him Proconsul Godley--is obviously the
best person to supply that information.
As background to the importance of
this request is an article in the press this
morning, which article says that Prince
Souvanna Phouma of Laos is apparently
now following the sanctuary policy of
Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia ; this in
that he is now offering to the military
forces of North Vietnam free access to
the Ho Chi Minh trails that are supply-
ing the enemy in South Vietnam; this
offer, provided the North 'Vietnamese de-
sist in their offensive action against
Northern Laos.
I ask unanimous consent that this
article this morning in the Washington
Post, entitled "Laos Offers Hanoi Trail
Use if it Quits Rest of Country" be in-
serted at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the REC-
ORD, as follows:
[From the Washington Post: Mar. 6, 19701
LAOS OFFERS HANOI TRAIL. USE IF IT QUITS
REST OF COUNTRY
VIENTIANE, March 6 -Prime Minister
Prince Souvanna Phouma reiterated today
he would tolerate North Vietnamese use of
the Ho Chi Minh trail through southern Laos
if the North Vietnamese 'Fvould withdraw
from the rest of the country.
"I told the ambassador from North Viet-
nam last year that we will accept the use
of the trail by North Vietnamese troops with
the condition that those troops withdrew
from the important regions of Laos," he,
told a news conference.
Souvanna's renewal of the offer comes al-
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March 6, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
most on the eve of an expected White House
announcement this week shedding new light
on the U.S. role in Laos, where the main
TY.8. Involvement is in blocking the North
Vietnamese supply route to South Vietnam
over the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The renewal
offer also comes as the Laotian government
is under increased military pressure from
the North Vietnamese.
When he first made the offer, Hanoi re-
jected it because he would not invoke his
authority to tell the Americans to stop
bombing the trail. He said publicly that
he had told the North Vietnamese that what
went happened around the trail was be-
tween them and the Americans.
The Premier said: "The Ho Chi Minh Trail,
after all, runs across the deserted part of
our country. What we would like to see is
that the North Vietnamese will not come to
destroy our towns, villages and economy"
Prince Souvanna was asked if American air
raids over Laos constituted a violation of
the 1962 Geneva agreement. He replied, "No.
You must distinguished between two
things--cause and effect. The cause is the
North Vietnamese interference in Laos.
"After 1962, there was no withdrawal of
North Vietnamese troops, and I asked for
American intervention only in May, 1964,
after the North Vietnamese had attacked the.
neutralist forces in the Plain of Jars. Re-
move the cause and the effect will disappear,
withdraw the_ North Vietnamese troops and
the bombing will stop."
Asked If American planes would also stop
bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail, he sad, "I
cannot say. That is a matter for the Ameri-
cans to decide."
Piinee Souvanna said he did not consider
the fall of the Plain of Jars dramatic because
this was only a return to the situation of
five years ago when the North Vietnamese
first overran the plain.
He said, however, "This offensive is differ.
ent by virtue of the use of tanks, of new
model artillery ..." But, he added, "no mat-
ter what will happen, we remain confident
in facing the danger."
The Premier said he would not accept aid
in the form of foreign troops to fight against
the North Vietnamese. "We want to limit the
invasion and we don't want other foreign
troops other than the North Vietnamese
who are already here," he said.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I am glad to yield
to my able and distinguished colleague
from Idaho.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I want
to commend the Senator from Missouri
for his persistent efforts to get the facts
concerning the nature and extent of the
American involvement in Laos. During
my lifetime, this country has fought two
undeclared wars. This is the first time
it has fought an undisclosed war.
The American people are entitled to
have all of the facts, and to have them
now. If the President does make a
lull disclosure this weekend, I think
much of the credit will go to the Sena-
tor from Missouri and to other members
of the Foreign Relations Committee who
have been insisting that the cloak of
secrecy be removed from our involvement
In the combat in Laos, and that the
American people have a complete and
full statement given them concerning
the facts.
I think the Senator renders a great
service to the country, and I simply want
to associate myself with his effort and
commend him for what, he is doing.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the dis-
tinguished Senator from Idaho, one of
the wisest of all members of the Foreign
Relations Committee. He is much too
kind in what he says with respect to my
activities. I would say that he, as well
as two distinguished Senators I see on
the floor this morning, the able majority
leader and the able senior Senator from
Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD), have had at
least as much to do with the bringing
out this problem.
I have not necessarily criticized what
was going on in Laos, from the stand-
point of whether it is right, or whether
it is wrong. I have my opinions, but I do
not know. What I do know, however, as
the able Senator from Idaho has so ably
pointed out, is that this is the first undis-
closed war, to the best of his or my
knowledge, we have ever fought with the
military forces of the United States; and
our military forces are just as much air
and sea as they are ground.
Therefore, the primary thrust of what
I have been trying to do, and, what is
more important, what the subcommittee
which I have the honor to chair has
been trying to do, is to get the facts be-
fore the people. In this connection, we
are only following the recommendation
of President Nixon presented in the first
paragraph of his televised speech last
November 3. 1 ask unanimous consent
that the first paragraph of that address
be inserted at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the para-
graph was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
I believe that one of the reasons for the
deep division about Vietnam is that many
Americans have lost confidence in what the
Government has told them about our policy.
The American people cannot and should not
be asked to support a policy which involves
the overriding issues of war and peace unless
thye know the truth about that policy.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
wish to associate myself with the re-
marks of the distinguished Senator from
Missouri, who has been doing an out-
standing job, in executive session, in
trying to lay the facts before the com-
mittee, at least, and, hopefully, the Sen-
ate and the American people, in terms
of just what our involvement is In the
arc all the way from Thailand to Korea
in the north, with a number of coun-
tries in between.
I am glad to note by press accounts
that there is a good possibility that the
administration will make a statement
on Laos very shortly; and I am very
hopeful that an accord can be reached
between the distinguished chairman of
the Symington subcommittee and the
State Department, which will bring
about a release of at least as much of
the hearings-and without violating se-
curity-which have been held up by the
State Department and which have been
held in a state of limbo for 5 months
up to this day.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I appreciate the
remarks of the distinguished majority
leader. It is universally recognized in
53127
this body as well as in the other body
where he served long and well that no
one knows more about the history of
what was Indochina and the Far East,
than does he. I am grateful that he
emphasizes the fact we are all trying
not to criticize necessarily what is go-
ing on, but to find out what is going on,
policies, programs, and actions that have
to do with lives of young Americans and
the treasure of all of us.
Mr. MANSFIELD. May I express my
thanks to the distinguished Senator
from Missouri and say that the sugges-
tions which have been made should
react, in my opinion, to the benefit of
the administration. I am well aware of
the fact that the President did not start
this war. He inherited it and he Is sad-
dled with it. I am hopeful, when he has
made his statement, and an accord can
be reached between. the State Depart-
ment and the distinguished Senator
from Missouri, that the fires which are
rapidly spreading will at least be
damped as a result.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. :I yield.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I as-
sociate myself with the comments of
the distinguished Senator from Missouri
this morning. I would hope that out of
these disclosures, or out of further con-
tact with the Defense Department,
among other things we might obtain any
new definitions of what constitutes a
"combatant" or a "military action."
There has been a great deal of dis-
cussion, both in the public press and
otherwise, that we have people in civilian
clothes operating in a, military capacity.
If we have some new definitions as
to what constitutes involvement, de-
pending upon the kind of clothes that
people wear, I think we ought to get
that clearly understood as well.
So I hope the Senator will press for-
ward as he has been doing, not only
to obtain full disclosure of the facts,
but for any new definitions being ap-
plied today that are not in the con-
ventional or familiar form of the defi-
nitions as we have known them, as to
what constitutes "military i_ivolve-
ment," and what might constitute "CIA
involvement."
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The time allotted to the Senator
from Montana has expired.
Mr. MANSFIELD. 1[ ask unanimous
consent to proceed for 3 additional min-
utes.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
DR. MENNINGER FAVORS LOWER-
ING THE VOTING AGE TO 18
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, Dr.
W. Walter Menninger is the youngest
member and the only psychiatrist on the
13-member National Commission on the
Causes and Prevention of Violence. This
Commission was appointed by President
Johnson in June of 1968. Its report was
made in December 1969.
Dr. Menninger is the third generation
member of the famous Topeka psychiat-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 6, 1970
ric family and the youngest son of the
late Dr. William Menninger, cofounder
of the Menninger Foundation, a non-
profit center for professional education,
research, prevention, and treatment in
psychiatry.
Dr. Menninger received his undergrad-
uate degree from Stanford University,
where he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa.
His medical education was at Cornell
University Medical College, New York,
where he was named to the fraternity of
academic scholarship, Alpha Omega Al-
pha in his third year.
He interned with the Harvard Medical
Service at Boston City Hospital and took
psychiatric training with the Menninger
School of Psychiatry in Topeka.
He has been certified by the American
Board of Neurology and Psychiatry. He
is a fellow in both the American Psy-
chiatric Association and the American
College of Physicians.
In September 1967 Dr. Menninger was
appointed by the Surgeon General of the
U .S. Public Health Service and the Secre-
tary of Health, Education, and Welfare
to a 4-year term on the National Ad-
visory Health Council.
During the past 2 years, Dr. Hen-
ninger has followed in the footsteps of
his renowned father, who addressed
some 25 State legislatures on mental
health matters.
He was the keynote speaker for the
Association for Education in Journalism
National Convention in 1968, speaking
on the subject "Roots of Violence."
Dr. Menninger's writings include ar-
ticles on "Reactions to Violence," first
reprinted by the Los Angeles Times :
"Roots of Violence," "Student Demon-
strations and Confrontations." Profes-
sional writings include articles on hos-
pital psychiatry, Peace Corps psychiatric
experience, confidentiality, rehabilita-
tion, and psychiatric perspectives on
violence.
In addition to his work in Topeka, he
served for 2 years with the Peace Corps
Medical Program Division and is cur-
rently a senior psychiatric consultant to
the Peace Corps.
He has also, been active in the area of
prison refor. Five years ago he was
named by the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Prisoners as the only physician
and psychiatrist on a four-member panel
to review the Federal prisons' health
services.
Since 1965, Dr. Menninger has served
as psychiatric consultant to the Topeka
Police Department.
For his activities in his home State he
has been designated "Kansan of Achieve-
ment in 1969" by the Topeka Capital-
Journal.
Dr. Menninger as an undergraduate
at Stanford University proved himself
an effective managing editor of the
Stanford Dally.
I ask unanimous consent that the
statement made by the distinguished Dr.
Menninger on February 16, 1970, before
the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments of the Committee on the
Judiciary, having to do with lowering
the voting age to 18, be printed in the
RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the state-
ment was ordere d to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
LowsRING THE: VOTING AGE TO 18
(By W. Walter Menninger, M.D.)
INTRODUCTION
It is a special pleasure and honor to be
asked to meet with this Subcommittee to
share some views on the proposal to lower
the voting age in our nation to 18. Today,
I come before you as a representative of the
National Commission on the Causes and Pre-
vention of Violence, which in our report--
To Establish Justice, To Insure Domestic
Tranquilitywent on record stating:
"We recommend that, the Constitution of
the United States be amended to lower the
voting age for all state and Federal elections
to eighteen"
To some extent, my presence here is like
carrying coals to Newcastle, since two mem-
bers of the Committee on the Judiciary of
the Untates Senate were fellow Com-
mis ors w ls.laie: Senator Roman Hruska,
wbd' sits with th['!3 subcommittee; and Sen-
ator Philip Hart.
in addition to sharirk with you the think-
ing of the Violence Commission, however,
I wish to review this iesue.from my vantage
point as a psychiatrist and student of human
behavior. In addition to my clinical work,
my perspective includes experience as a senior
psychiatric consultant to and former staff
member of the Peace Corps, and work in
straining VISTA volunteers, I have attempted
o keep in contact with college students and
aware of their views, and through my
!dc! tion in Topeka. Kansas, I have some
sense f the views of high school students
in our a.
VIEWS F THE VICLSNCE COMMISSION
in the earl); clelibeeations of the Commis-
sion on the C ses said Prevention of Vio-
lence, we forma ed some themes of chal-
lenge which we pre need in a Progress Re-
port in Januar7r, 198N to President Lyndon
Johnson. One of those t mess
"The key to much of a violence in our
society seems to lie with he young. our
youth account for an ever ncreasing per-
centage of crime, greater than their increas-
ing percentage of the populatioig The thrust
of much of the group protest aljd collective
violence on the campus, in the ghettos, in
the streets, is provided by our yo g people.
It may be here, with tomorrow's g eration,
that much of the emphasis of our st dies and
Our concern with the relationship f youth
and violence prompted our issuing t o state-
ments touching on youth, a state ent on
Campus Disorder, and a statement n Chal-
lenging Our Youth. Let me share wi you ex-
cerpts of those statements which eve some
relevance to the subject of disc Ion today.
At the same time, may I refe you to the
complete statements which chapters in
"Violence by the S oun s by persons of all
ages, has multiple ses, involving many
elements of persei8 ity and social environ-
ment . .
"Many of the young people in the nation
today, however, are highly motivated by the
ideals of justice, equality, candor, peace-
fundamental values which their intellectual
and spiritual heritage has taught them to
honor , . .
"They speak eloquently and passionately
of the gap between the ideals we preach and
the many social injustices remaining to be
corrected. They see a nation which has the
capacity to provide food, shelter, and educa-
tion for all, but has not devised the proce-
dures, opportunities, or social institutions
that bring about this result. They see a so-
ciety built on the principle of human equality
that has not assured equal opportunity in
life. With the fresh energy and idealism of
the young, they are impai,tent with the
progress that has been made and are eager
to attack these and other key problems. A
combination of high ideals, tremendous en-
ergy, impatience at the rate of progress, and
lack of constructive means for effecting
change has led some of tod i,y's youth into
disruptive and at times violent tactics for
translating ideals into reality . . .
"The nation cannot afford to ignore law-
lessness, or fail to enforce the law Swiftly
and surely for the protection of the many
against the depredations of the few. We
cannot accept violent attacks on some of our
most valuable institutions, or upon the lives
of our citizens, simply because some of the
attackers may be either idealistically moti-
vated or greatly disadvantaged.
"It is no less permissible for our nation
to ignore the legitimate needs and desires
of the young., Law enforcement must go
hand in hand with timely rind constructive
remedial action. . . . Whether in the inner
city, in a suburb or on a college campus, to-
day's youth must be given a greater role in
determining their own destiny and in shap-
ing the future course of the society in which
they live .
"Today's youth are capable of exercising
the right to vote. Statistically they constitute
the most highly educated group in our so-
ciety. More finish high school than ever be-
fore, and more go on to higher education.
The mass media---television, news and inter-
pretive magazines, and an unprecedented
number of books on national and world af-
fairs-have given today's youth knowledge
and perspective and made them sensitive to
political issues. We have seen the dedication
and conviotion they brought to the Civil
Rights movement and the skill and enthu-
siasm they have Infused into the political
process, even though they lack the vote.
"The anachronistic voting-age limitation
tends to alienate them from systematic po-
litical processes and to drive them into a
search for an alternative, sometimes violent,
means to express their frustrations over the
gap between the nation's ideals and actions.
Lowering the voting age will not eliminate
protest by the young. But it will provide
them with a direct, constructive and demo-
cratic channel for making their views felt
and for giving them a responsible stake in
the future of the nation."
CRITERIA FOR SUFFRAGE
In other testimony, in previous hearings,
this Subcommittee has been presented the
history of suffrage. Many rationalizations
for the criteria for suffrage in the past are
no longer applicable. The ancient English
Common Law designating 21 as the mini-
mum age for knighthood might have had a
rational basis then in the thought that not
until that age would the young man be
strong enough to bear the weight of armor in
battle. Yet, I think now of my college class-
mate, now Congressman from California,
Robert Mathias, who first won the Olympic
Decathlon at age 17,
Criteria of property ownership, tax paying,
sex, literacy have all been applied restric-
tively in the past. Each suggestion to lib-
eralize the process to increase the electorate
is met with dire predictions, resistance and
concern. Now the question is what age is the
right age to qualify one for the voting priv-
ilege.
It is hard to disagree with the statement
of Senator Michael Mansfield before this Sub-
committee in hearings two years ago, when
he observed:
"The age of 21 is not simply the automatic
chronological door to the sound judgment
and wisdom that is needed to exercise the
franchise of the ballot, or, for that matter,
to assume any other responsibility. Indeed,
it is the age of 18 that has long been re-
garded as the age when young people "try it
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Mansfield
o Laos `Up
To. Our Necks'
8y Richard Homan
v .$Wittngl on Post staff Wrtter
Senate Majority Leader
Mike Mansfield (D-Mont) said
yesterday that the United
States is involved militarily in
Laos "up to our. necks" and
that the presence there of
MANSFIELD, From Al
In a speech on the Senate
floor, Mansfield said:
"Notwithstanding the Ge-
neva Accord of 1962, the North
Vietnamese are deeply in-
volved` in this military situa-
tion.
"So, too, is the United
States. Press reports indicate
that the Thais may also be
engaged.
"The involvement is so
transparent on both sides as
to make less than useless the
effort to maintain the fiction
of the accord or even to ex-
American forces "cannot hey )change charge and counter-
any Ionger." J charge of violations. We are
President Nixon has said
that American planes bomb
the Ho Chi Minh Trail in
southern Laos but neither he
nor any other administration
official has revealed the U.S.
role in northern Laos, beyond
saying there are no American
combat forces in the country.
From other sources, how-
ever, it is known that U.S.
military advisers have been
with'the Laos forces and that
American aircraft have pro-
vided those forces with tact-
ical support.
Mansfield and other critics
of the U.S. involvement in
Southeast Asia spoke after
CIA . DQrector Richard Helms
testified in a closed session
of. the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee.
Although Helms was called
to testify on the need for ex-
pansion of the S a f e g u a r d
anti-ballistic missile system,
-many of the questions dealt
with the scope of U.S. aotivi-
ties in Laos, according to
senators who were present.
"There was some considerable
discussion on it," one said.
Sen. Albert Gore (D-Tenn.)
said that after hearing Helms
he was "more concerned now
than I was before the meet- Committee Chairman J.{
William Fulbright (D-Ark.)!
said he was "very afraid we
are gradually being sucked
into a new Vietnam-type war."!
Mansfield, in his strongest
statement on the shadowy
U.S. presence in Laos, urgedi
the President and Congress to
"corral" the "open-ended mili-
tary involvement in a part of
the world which is not directly,
vital to our security."
See MANSFIELD, A4, Cot. 6
and Americans-and we are
in it up to our necks."
Mansfield said that "what
disturbs me is not only that
both nations are forbidden by
the agreement to use forces in
Laos but that the President
has also made clear that he
does not desire to see U.S.
forces used in Laos."
Mansfield said he has
"every confidence in the Presi-
dent's intentions. Yet the pres-
ence of American military 'ad- I ference at this time.
visers' and other in Laos United States had in mind in-.
cannot be camo tftaged any formal consultations which
longer." I are provided for by the agree-
There are indications, he
said, that U.S. bombing in
Laos is heavier-than it was in
North Vietnam "and that
there could now be as many as
ment and which the various
signatories have used in the
past to discuss Laos.
Sen. Frank E. Moss (D-Utah)
told the Senate he endorsed
20,000 sorties a month." Mansfield's remarks and Sen.
He urged that the United Stephen M. Young (D-Ohio)
States "face up to the implica- said, "Laos is not worth the
tions of this worsening situa- life of one American soldier
tion in Laos" and said the ... yet the fact is that our ifi-'
"danger of our over-extended volvement in recent week 1;1
commitment in Southeast Asia seems to be growing."
needs to be considered frankly
and without delay."
Mansfield commended the
proposal by Laotian Prince
Souvanna - Phouma that a
meeting be called of the signa-
tories to the Geneva Accord
to work out a way to bring
stability to Laos.
State Department spokes-
man Robert McCloskey said
yesterday that the United
States would welcortre infor-
mal consultations among the
14 member nations of the Ge-
neva Conference.
McCloskey made It clear
that' r tfier than a formal con..
Approved For Release 2002/01/22 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010018-6