SEABED AND THE LAW OF THE SEA TRIBUTE TO SENATOR PELL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00337R000200260001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 21, 1970
• Content Type: OPEN

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S 20998
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE December 21, 1970
marines serviced in international waters from
a tender based in Cuba. But it hopes that
the Soviets will not force the issue by putting
the Cienfuegos base into operation.
Ever since 1962, State Department officials
have alluded to a vaguely defined "under-
standing" between John Kennedy and Nikita
Khrushchev that the U.S. would not invade
Cuba if the Soviets did not build strategic
bases or install nuclear weapons there. Last
month the White House let it be known
that this understanding had been "renewed."
In the meantime, however, the Cienfuegos
base is all but ready to service Soviet nuclear
missile submarines.
SEABED AND THE LAW OF THE SEA-
TRIBUTE TO SENATOR PELL
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I want
to acknowledge today the leadership of
a man who,, more than anyone else in the
Senate, has brought our attention to the
need for new international agreement
governing the exploration and exploita-
tion of the resources of the oceans. My
distinguished colleague from Rhode Is-
land, Senator PELL, knows well the lone-
liness of -the long distance leader; for
years he has been way ahead of us in rec-
ognizing the need and pursuing the goal
virtually alone. But-he has pursued it
well, and we are now seeing some of the
fruits of his leadership and influence in
actions beingaken by the United States
and the United Nations.
On November 26, Senator PELL, as a
U.S. representative to the United Na-
tions, spoke on the seabed and law of the
sea to Committee I. Addressing the need
for a Law of the Sea Conference, he said:
The principal issues that need to be con-
sidered at the conference are familiar. to all
of us. There is the need for treaty arrange-
ments on an international regime for, and
definition of, the area of the sea-bed and
ocean floor beyond the limits of national jur-
isdiction, including appropriate machinery.
In addition there is the question of the
breadth of the territorial sea and related
questions of international straits and, con-
servation and management of the living re-
sources of the high sea, including the inter-
est of coastal states with respect to fisheries
on the high seas. We and many other delega-
tions also recognize the importance of tak-
ing conference action to secure effective
regulation of marine activities to prevent
pollution, taking due account of the forth-
coming Stockholm Conference on the :Human
Environment and work of interested bodies
such as the International Maritime Consulta-
tive Organization. If there are other matters
which may be ripe for action, the conference
should be free to consider them.
Last week, Mr. President, the U.N.
General Assembly approved a declara-
tion of principles governing the sea-bed
and the ocean floor and the subsoil
thereof beyond the limits of national jur-
isdiction, and also called for considera-
tion of a Law of the Sea Conference in
1973. This action was an important first
step leading to the recommendations
made by Senator PELL. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that Senator
PELL'S statement to Committee I on No-
vember _26, and the declaration of prin-
ciples passed by the General Assembly
be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the state-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
STATEMENT BY SENATOR CLAIBORNE PELL
It is a great pleasure for me to join in the
discussion of this item at the United Na-
tions and at this particular time. I have fol-
lowed the work of the Sea-Bed Committee
since my distinguished friend and colleague,
Ambassador Pardo, first proposed discussion
of the sea-bed problem three years ago. Like
him, I had for some time been concerned
that the advancing pace of technology, both
military and industrial, would soon signal
a new area of conflict on the ocean floor.
In the fall of 1967, I introduced in the United
States Senate the first proposals designed
to encourage international action on this
item, and the following year I presented to
the United States Senate a draft treaty on
ocean space. I have followed ocean matters
closely in my capacity as Chairman of the
Oceans Space Sub-Committee of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations of the United
States Senate.
Looking back, I am sure that are many
here who will understand when I say that
there was a certain sense of loneliness then-
the kind of loneliness that comes from the
pursuit of a new idea which few appreciate
and many are ready to criticize.
In these past three years I have partici-
pated as an advisor to the United States
delegation to the Sea-Bed Committee. in your
work here at the United Nations. I have also
taken an active part in discussions within
my Government and with leaders of other
Governments on these matters.
And so it was a great satisfaction to me
that the oceans policy announced by Presi-
dent Nixon last May, and the proposals pre-
sented to the Sea-Bed Committee in August
based on that policy, were not the fuzzy re-
sult of compromise, but a bold venture into
the future. I am very glad too that the ap-
proach and many of the ideas contained in
my original draft treaty are included in these
draft proposals.
It is my conviction that when we look back
upon the decisions made here, what we do on
this question will be seen as one of those
crucial turning points at which we either
choose the path of hesitation, delay, and fin-
ally conflict, or we choose a braver course
which may speed not just the development
of the resources of the oceans, but the de-
velopment of new patterns of cooperation
our world so badly needs. We do not want to
see a "flag nations" rush towards new colo-
nial empires. Rather, we wish to see the
ocean resources and usufruct available to all
the world's peoples.
President Nixon expressed this theme in
the General Assembly on October 23 when
he said,
"It is in the world interest for the resources
of the sea to be used for the benefit of all-
and not to become a source of international
conflict, pollution and unbridled commercial
rivalry. Technology is ready to tap the vast
largely virgin resources of the oceans. At this
moment, we have the opportunity to set up
rules and institutions to ensure that these
resources are developed for the benefit of all
mankind and that the resources derived from
them are shared equitably."
A great deal of useful work has already
taken place. Of particular note is the work
of the UN Sea-Bed Committee under the able
and respected leadership of its Chairman,
Ambassador Amerasinghe of Ceylon. The
work on seabed principles, on which he and
others have labored so industriously and with
such a great measure of success in recent
weeks, is particularly heartening. We are-
pleased that, as the result of Ambassador
Amerasinghe's skillful and tireless consulta-
tions within the Sea-Bed Committee he has
been able to submit a draft declaration of
seabed principles to the First Committee,
and I shall comment on that text at the
appropriate time.
The Sea-Bed Committee and this General
Assembly have helped develop an increased
understanding of the complex issues in-
volved in developing an international regime
governing the exploration and exploitation of
the deep seabed, including appropriate ma-
chinery, reflected in the most recent report
of the Sea-Bed Committee. 'The Committee
has benefited from the Secretary General's
excellent report on international machinery.
Ambassador Galindo Pohl and Denorme
have provided valuable leadership through
their chairmanship of the Legal and Eco-
nomic and Technical Sub-Committees, re-
spectively.
At the last meeting of the UN Sea-Bed
Committee, several proposals were made re-
garding the preparation of an international
regime for the seabed. I am particularly hap-
py that one such proposal was made by my
own Government in the form of a draft,
United Nations Convention on the Interna-
tional Seabed Area.
I believe the draft Convention reflects the
common interests of the international com-
munity in a seabed regime; interests which
we already share, and which we will share
more vitally in years to come. Among them
are:
Preservation of the broadest. possible pre-
cisely defined area of the seabed as the com-
mon heritage of mankind, open to use by
mankind, open to use by all, with equitable
sharing of benefits by all, particularly de-
veloping countries;
Preservation of the area exclusively for
peaceful purposes;
Creation of new and uniform rules of law;
Establishment of a new international or-
ganization with regulatory powers that per-
mit it to adapt rules of changing situations
and to ensure that rights and obligations are
respected;
Protection of human life and safety and of
the marine environment;
Protection of the interests of coastal States
in the exploration and exploitation of re-
sources; and
Creation, for the first time in history, of
an independent, substantial source of inter-
national revenues to be used for interna-
tional community purposes, particularly to
promote the economic advancement of de-
veloping countries.
Much remains to be done. The exploratory
phase of our work is now ending, and the
negotiation of treaty arrangements must now
begin. This is not the time to address the
substance of these negotiations. But it is the
time to decide that the problems will be solv-
ed by prompt international negotiation.
The moment is, however, a fleeting one.
The technology is within our reach now. And
now is the time that we must decide whether
those who possess it will work out their own
means of accommodation, or whether we will
plan ahead for the equitable sharing of
benefits from what is truly the common
heritage, and perhaps the most valuable her-
itage, of mankind. In truth, this is the
world's new frontier-and its last frontier
where we have a choice of developing it
sensibly and peacefully for the benefit of
mankind.
Mr. Chairman, in stressing the importance
of diplomacy keeping abreast of science and
technology, I think this Committee's over-
whelming commendation of the draft sea-
bed arms control treaty is well worth recall-
ing. That commendation evidenced a strong
conviction to prevent the extension of the
nuclear arms race to a new vast area. The
wisdom of that decision cannot be contested.
We must strive for a similar diplomatic abil-
ity to ensure the best use of advances in
undersea technology which is now making
the theoretical wealth of the seabed an actu-
ality.
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DecemberX 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 20997
Nations document,lgried by the U.S.S.R. Carenas and have installed-antiaircraft em- "
consider it binding; we should know what
Denial of these Masi( lguts today at best placements. They have also built apier for our obligations are under it and what the
/remind of s sligrt melriory abou- t docking submarines and elaborate rest and corresponding Soviet obligations are. We
list humanity and at worst re' recreation facilities. The Bay now contains
should know whether it has been
acts a$a
th
i
e
two storage barges designed to rece
ve
. . kindles fear of a recurrence of one of discharges of nuclear contaminated effluent breached by the construction of this
man's darkest hours in Nazi Germany. from submarines. The tender that touched Soviet missile base. I respectfully, but
Elie Wiesel, a survivor of the horrors off the September announcement is still emphatically, urge the administration to
.ro*1 of Auschwitz and noted author, has writ- cruising the Caribbean, and could return to speak to us on this issue-to assure the
ten that civilization is but "foam that Cienfuegos at any time. American people-to state publicly and
arests the wave is band eing vanishee." Once The story also mentions that in his for the record, our national position on
fa led in World. War IIwhen it when it tolerated edterated most recent news conference, President this apparent crisis.
in World Nixon said he was not worried by the Mr. President, I repeat what I said in
the Intolerable. It
the
not fail fail to hiis $ time Moscow is i in speaktive loudly and ase and did not regard it as a threat October: If we retreat in the face of this
clearly to speak louddcondemning ly athis d to our security. latest Soviet probe-if we acquiesce to
co Mr. President, I am quite frankly the placement of a Soviet military facil-
new The Soviet Union Snitiin. alarmed by this whole episode. I think ity of this magnitude in our hemisphere,
Tp is f f handy its Jew- the Senate and American public are en- we will not be winning security or sta-
young u g Jews most have onred dy to demand scapegoat. titled to a full and complete report on bility or respite; we will be in effect
The Ish
y yo this base. inviting new and potentially more dan-
el their rights to live ve heritage. with their On October 14, on the Senate floor, I gerous probes. The Soviets will under-
religious-culturaage. They have made the following statement: stand our actions as weakness and we
appealed to the United Nations Human If the early intelligence is correct and the will inevitably be subjected to further,
Rights Com other ages ies, It Red Soviets are in fact developing a submarine more sinister tests. If we acquiesce, we
Cross and nd other agencies. is widely base in Cuba, we will have to deal with only will not be avoiding the ultimate nuclear
feared that the trial of the 34 in Lenin- two alternatives: either the stand this Na- confrontation-we will be bringing it
grad is designed as a showpiece to dis- tion took in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 closer.
suade others from similar attempts. dies, or we take some affirmative counterac- There being no objection, the article
AS we condemn these actions in the floe; for the presence of such a Soviet nu- from Time magazine was ordered to be
Soviet Union, it is important to remem- clear sub base on our door step is incompati-
ber and purge ourselves of our own tend- ble with the reaffirmance in 1962 of the Mon- printed in the RECORD, as follows:
ency to look for scapegoats. Instead of Toe Doctrine. CUBA
examining the most fundamental causes I do not think, Mr. President, and I do THE SUBS OF CIENFUEGOS
of our manifold ills, we too often prefer not think other Senators believe, that the Last September the White House an-
to i Monroe Doctrine should be discarded. nounced that the Soviet Union was building
t0 find an easily identifiable culprit, and It is quite another matter if our early a base to service missile-carrying submarines
then divert our anger, fear, or frustra- intelligence is wrong or has misled us. In at the south Cuban port of Cienfuegos. The
tion toward him, that case there would be no problem of any news set off shock waves of fear that an East
In the United States,, as elsewhere, we magnitude. But if the early signs are tor- West confrontation comparable to the 1962
find It easier to blame militants, doves, rest, that the Russian Communists Intend Cuban missile crisis was imminent. But then
hawks, hard hats, intellectuals, or the to have an operational submarine base in the Soviets removed their imminent. tender
Cuba, then it behooves the United States to from Cienfuegos, and the moment of alarm
mass media for problems in foreign reassess its whole foreign policy vis-a-vis So- seemed to pass.
policy, on campuses, in ghettos, in sub- viet Russia.
urbs rather than looking for causes and Mr. President, I would urge most emphat- Despite PNixon's press-conference
statement Despite that President n was unworried press -conference
Soviet
then seriously trying to right fu Ida- Ically that the Department of Defense pro- naval presence in the western Atlantic, there
mental errors. teed immediately to determine, with the
Mr. President, the first candle of more than' adequate means at its disposal, is some evidence that the crisis has merely
whether the Soviets intend to place a per- been postponed. U-2 reconnaissance photo-
of December Hanukkah will be lighted on the evening manent submarine base or station in Cuba, graphs show that the base is almost complete.
of Dece23. Hanukkah, the Festival and that it report to Congress and the Amer- In addition to bunkers for storing subma-
of Lights, is the commemoration of the ican people the results of its Investigation. rive-borne nuclear weapons, the Russians
religious-cultural-political victory won If the Soviets have no such intention, we have built a steel antisubmarine barrier net
by the Jews under the leadership of the should know it. If the Soviets are building between the shore and the island of Cayo
Caxenas acements. have installed anti-aircraft em-
such an installation, we should know It and pl
Maccabees.
than They have also built a pier for
More More than 2,000 years later, Soviet know it as soon as possible. It occurs to me docking submarines and elaborate rest and
Jews are still struggling for the right to that we have a right to know the full facts
recreation facilities. The bay now contains
their own identity in the Diaspora. on this matter at the earliest possible date, two storage barges designed to receive the
so that we can take appropriate action. Can- discharges of nuclear-contaminated effluent
Let us hope the weight of the world's didly, I am not satisfied with the informs- from submarines. The tender that touched off
moral indignation will persuade Soviet titan which has so far been made available the September announcement is still cruis-
pffieiais to abandon all forms of anti- to the Congress. ing the Caribbean, and could return to Cien-
Semitism; that this will be the last Mr. President, I stand by that state- fuegos at any time.
Hanukkah that cannot be observed free- ment. It now appears that the Soviets Double capacity
ly by_ our Jewish brothers and sisters in are determined to build a nuclear sub- One U.S. naval official describes the Cien-
Russia; and that we use our concern for marine facility in Cuba. It is about to fuegos base as "smaller than Holy Loch and
Jews in Russia teach strengthen our commit- become an accomplished fact. larger than Rota," referring to U.S. nuclear
meet to fudge each man on his merits, submarine bases in Scotland and Spain. It
to seep causes rather than sc egoats for What shall be our posture in the face could service any of the Soviet navy's 76
our problems, of this development? It seems to me that nuclear submarines, including those of the
THE RUSSIAN SUBMARINE BASE over. I think it Incumbent upon our tegic effect of the base will be to double the
IN CUBA Government to advise the Congress and Soviets' nuclear submarine capability in
the people of our position on this mat-
American waters; one Yankee submarine will Lq, _ - _? Mr, President, I ,ask ter-of our intentions, of our policy. be able to perform a surveillance mission
17 0, GG}sont to include in today's that required two such ships before
We have heard and seen in the press The Nixon Administration faces a dilemma
ediW, li) a story Time from
concethe December 28 a number of stories about the Soviet- over how to react to the base at Cienfuegos.
dlti,Rrting the Soviet
building at Cienfuegos in Cuba. The story American understanding at the time of An outright confrontation with the soviet
the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. The Union, in an area deep within the traditional
eiteli tat; time has come, in my judgment, Mr. "U.S. sphere of influence," would almost cer-
T ; un lg glice photographs show that tainly rule out the advancement of top.
at ienfu egos) is almost co mplete. President, for a full statement concern-
priority i2 era for storing submarine ing that understanding-we should know Administration objectives concerning
g the SALT talks, the war in Viet Nam, and
bQr#3&,.,l~u lear ~Jeapons, the Russians have In the first instance whether such an the stalemate in the Middle East, The U.S.
Dilitei Lantisubmarlne barrier net be- understanding exists; whether we con- seems to be resigned to the presence of Soviet
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THE WASHINGT ON POST DATE 2A(fit & l 0 PAGE
A-Sub Base
In Cuba Held
Nearly Ready
NEW YORK, Dec. 20 (UPI)
-The 'Russians have nearly,
completed a nuclear subma-
rine base,- on the south coast
of Cuba. that, could cause an
East-West confrontation sim-
ilar to the 1962 missile crisis,
Time magazine said today.
The Time report said U-2 re-
connaissance photos show that
the Soviet base in Cienfuegos,
Cuba, reported under con-
struction in September, is
near completion.
The magazine said the Nix-
on administration hopes to
avoid a confrontation that,
might interfere with the SALT
talks and other U.S.-Soviet
ventures, but it is not certain
that avoidance is possible.
Despite President Nixon's
press conference statement
that he was unworried by
Soviet naval activity in the
western Atlantic, there is
some evidence the crisis has
merely been postponed, Time
said.
[The White House made
clear the following day that
the President was, speaking
specifically of the day of his
conference.]
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CUBA
The Subs of Cienfuegos
Last September the White House an-
nounced that the Soviet Union was
building a base to service missile-car-
rying submarines at the south Cuban
port of Cienfuegos. The news set off
shock waves of fear that an East-West
confrontation comparable to the 1962
Cuban missile crisis was imminent. But
then the Soviets removed their sub-
marine tender from Cienfuegos, and the
moment of alarm seemed to pass.
Despite President Nixbn's press-con-
ference statement that he was unworried
by Soviet naval presence in the western
Atlantic, there is some evidence that the
crisis has merely been postponed. U-2 re-
connaissance photographs show that the
base is almost complete (see map). In ad-
dition to bunkers for storing submarine-
borne nuclear weapons, the Russians
have built a steel antisubmarine barrier
net between the shore and the island of
Cayo Carenas and have installed anti-
aircraft emplacements. They have also
built a pier for clocking submarines and
-elaborate rest and recreation facilities.
The hay now contains two storage barg-
es designed to receive the discharges of
nuclear-contaminated effluent from sub-
marines. The tender that touched off the
September announcement is still cruis-
ing the Caribbean, and could return to
Cienfuegos at any time.
Double Ccipaci+y. One U.S. naval of-
ficial clesci-ibes the Cienfuegos base as
"smaller than 'holy Loch and larger
,than Rota," referring to U.S. nuclear
submarine bases in Scotland and .Spain.
It could service any of the Soviet navy's
76 nuclear submarines, including those
of the Polaris-type Yankee class, of
which the Soviets presently have 13.
,The practical strategic effect of the base
will be to double the Soviets' nuclear
submarine capability in Ahierican wa-
ters; one Yankee submarine will be able
to perform a surveillance mission that re-
quired two such ships before.
The Nixon'Administratio n faces a di-
lemma over how to react to the base at
Cienfuegos. An outright confrontation
with the Soviet Union, in an area deep
SOVIE SUB PAST
Cayo Carenas
J \~ ?\ Enlisted men's barracks
not
(25 ft. below I
surface)
C U \ B
Submarine-
logistics
storage area
Havana Caribbean
Sea
Matanzas
C U B A
13ay of Pigs
CIENFUEGOS BAY r =~
within the traditional "U.S. sphere of in-
fluence," would almost certainly rule
out the advancement of top-priority Ad-
ministration objectives concerning the
SALT talks, the war in Viet Nam, and,
the stalemate in the Middle East. The
U.S. seems to be resigned to the pres-
ence of Soviet naval vessels in the Ca-
ribbean, with the submarines serviced
in international waters from a tender
based in Cuba. But it hopes that the So-
viets will not force the issue by putting
the Cienfuegos base into operation.
? Ever since 1962, State Department of-
ficials have alluded to a vaguely de-
fined "understanding" between John
Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev that
the U.S. would not invade Cuba if the
Soviets did not build strategic bases or
install nuclear weapons there. Last
month the White House let it be known
that this understanding had been "re-
newed." In the meantime, however, the
Cienfuegos base is all but ready to ser-
vice Soviet nuclear missile submarines.
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NEW YORKJi ,'s
Soviet Tender Still Plying Caribbean
By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to Th? New Yank T1tnes
WASHINGTON, Dec. 2-High
Administration officials are said
to suspect that the Soviet Union
is playing a maritime "cat-and-
mouse" game with its sub-
marine tender in the Caribbean.
"If I were the Russians, I'd
run that ship around for the
t
i
month- " a senior nf-
nex
s
x
Government analysts believe
the Soviet Union is doing.
The 9,000-ton tender, of. a
class known as -Ugra, has been
the center of the controversy
that has been simmering,, both
publicly and privately, between
the Nixon Administration and
the Kremlin since late Septem-
ber. It started when a Soviet
naval squadron, for the third
time in 15 months, called at
the Cuban ports of Havana and
Cienfuegos between -Sept. 9
and 12.
Soon after; the principal
Soviet ships, including a
guided-missile cruiser and a
gulded-missile home. Several auxili destroyer,
n g ?_ At the
a few days ago. That is whatJtiheI important" thin,-g,-.'-'-
including the tender and two and was now somew?nere suuui
special barges, remained at of Haiti.
Cienfuegos. United States U-2 Asked whether he was sur-
reconnaissance aircraft photo- prised that it was still in
graphed the ships as well as Caribbean waters, he replied in
new shore construction, and in- the negative, but he said he
telligence experts alerted the would be 'surprised if it "serv-
White House. iced ~a Soviet submarine" in
Before going abroad today, Cuban waters in view of a So-
Secretary of Defense Melvin R. viet declaration in October that
Laird discussed Soviet naval the agreement that ended the
deployment in the Caribbean. 1962 Cuban missile crisis was i
same time he said that there
were no indications that ~a So-
viet submarine had been serv-
iced in Cienfuegos or other
Cuban waters by the tender.
He said the tender was mov-
ing around in the Caribbean
Mr. Laird agreed Lnai me
accord did not preclude such
servicing outside Caribbean
waters.
"I assume that the tender!
will be used to service sub-
marines in the future and I
don't know what reason they'd
hang on to it if they didn't
service submarines," h' added.
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T HE WASHINGT ON POST
Administration Deeply Disturbed
DATE 2L ) / PAGE _L_
The ciibaiSub Base Affair
By Chalmers M. Roberts
Washington Post staff writer
Although it refuses to dis-
close details of the "under-
standing" with the Soviet
Union over Cuba, the Nixon
administration is deeply dis-
turbed by Soviet activity at
the Cuban port of Cienfue-
gos.
It is contended that the
new "understanding" with
Moscow precludes the use of
that port to support Soviet
nuclear missile submarines.
While no official will say di-
rectly that Moscow is violat-
ing the "understanding," of.
ficials do say the continued
presence of Soviet vessels
useful for submarine sup-
port is inconsistent with the
"understanding."
It seems evident that
Washington wants to warn
Moscow but, thus -far, also
wants to avoid a direct pub-
lic confrontation over the
Cuban issue. Nevertheless,
the issue has cast a deep
pall over the whole range of
Soviet-American relation-
ships including such on-
going negotiations as those
on Berlin. and on the limita-
tion of strategic arms.
"If the Soviet Union
wanted to establish a basis
of confidence with the
United States, this is not the
way to do it," was the coin-
inent of one key official.
What follows is a run-
through of the history and
current status of the Cuban
base affair, so far as it has
been made public by the
United States and the Soviet
Union and from what offi-
cials are willing to say pri-
vately but not on the public
record.
The administration has
tried, and continues to try,
to keep secret the details of
the Soviet-American discus-
sions leading to the "under-
standing." But press probing
forced onto the public rec-
ord Tuesday's formal ac-
knowledgement that secret
meetings had led to the "un-
derstanding" although there
is "no document of record in
writing."
See BASE, A4, Col. 1
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 'I'bis capital is full of skep-
tics, Including men in high
administration offices, who
view the whole Soviet sub-
marine base issue as essen-
tially an exercise in domes-
tic politics and/or in execu-
tive branch lobbying for
more congressional funding
for the Pentagon.
It Is a fact that more than
a month before the recent
election some officials who
knew what was going on
said that President Nixon
was afraid he might be
Paced with "a Democratic
Keating." That was a refer-
ence to former Sen. Ken-
neth Keating of New York,
a Republican Who unsettled
the Democratic Kennedy ad-
ministration in 1962 also a
congressional election year,
with accounts of Soviet mis-
siles moving into Cuba.
President Kennedy later re-
vealed such movements at
the beginning of the Cuban
missile crisis that October.
Others, who do not as-
cribe dark political motives
to the administration, be-
lieve there is no "under-
standing" beyond what Mos-
cow has publicly said and
they expect the Soviet
Union to keep port facilities
at Cienfuegos for its sub-
marines.
There also are those in
Washington today who con-
tend that the "understand-
ing" now announced
amounts to giving Moscow
something for nothing. The
argument is that the United
States has publicly assured
the Soviet Union that it has
no intention to "Lruvade or intervene" in Cuba in ex-
change for an unwritten So-
viet promise to live up to a
part of the 1962 missile cri-
sis outcome.
Whatever political content
was involved in Mr. Nix-
on's thinking, the elections
are now past. But there is
deep resentment in high ad-
ministration circles over the
substantive charge of giv-
ing something for nothing.
The administration's argu-
ment, it can be said authori-
tatively, is that there are
only two ways to view the
outcome of the 1962 crisis
that led the world to the
brink of nuclear war:
Either the then Soviet
Premier, Nikita Khrushchev,
agreed not to install offen-
sive weapons in Cuba in ex-
change for an American
pledge not to invade Cuba
or he withdrew the missiles
without 'any agreement-in
which case Moscow was free
to reintroduce such weapons
and Washington was free to
invade Cuba.
Hence, it is argued, since
an American invasion is not
in the cards, what is wrong
with giving a non-invasion
pledge now in exchange for
Soviet agreement not to em-
place offensive nuclear
weapons in Cuba?
The details of just when
and how the "understand-
ing" was reached remain se-
cret. But the available, evi-
dence indicates that it was
reached chiefly through
talks between Henry A. Kis-
singer, the President's for-
eign policy adviser, and An-
atoliy F. Dobrynin, Mos-
cow's long-time ambassador
in Washington. The evi-
dence also indicates the "un-
derstanding" was reached
around Oct. 10, a few days
after Ms. Nixon returned
from his European trip.
On Oct. 10, ~a Soviet sub-
marine tender and a tug,
which had first raised the
Cuban base issue when they
put in with two barges at
Cienfuegos on Sept. 9,
For Re ase 003103/
MEN :
United Press International
During Oct. 22 meeting, President Nixon escorts Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko after 15-minute private chat.
near Havana on the north two vessels put in at Mariel,
r n
shore, administration offi-
cials dismissed this as mean-
ingless, predicting that the
ships soon would leave for
home. They clearly felt that
Moscow intended to live up
to the "understanding."
The story of the the talks
first broke in the Chicago
Tribune on Oct. 17 and in
The Washington Post Oct..
18. The Tribune account said
that "the United. States
forced Russia through secret
talks to dismantle a Soviet
submarine base being built
in Cuba." Coming during
the election campaign, the
tone of the story helped cre-
ate suspicions that the move
was politically motivated.
This was furthered by the
remark on Nov. 2 of Herbert
Klein, the White House com-
munications director, that
submarine base construction
had been halted after the
administration a p p i i e d
"strong but quiet diplo-
macy."
Klein's remarks stirred an
internal storm and his :right
to speak on foreign affairs
thereupon was severely cur-
tailed by presidential. order.
By the time of Soviet For-
eign Minister Andrei Gro-
myko's call on President
Nixon at the White House
on Oct. 22, Washington
thought it had a firm and
viable agreement. Given
the delicate state of
Soviet-American relations,
in the wake of what was
considered Soviet collusion
in violations of the Mideast
,standstill and in view of the
SALT and Berlin negotia-
tions, the administration's
hope was to be able to say
nothing about the Cuban af-
f air.
After Gromyko left the
White House officials said
had been extended to cover
potential submarine bases in
Cuba.
But over the weekend of
Oct. 31-Nov. 1 the submarine
tender and tug arrived again
at Cienfuegos. Even then of-
ficials privy to the "under-
standing" said they were
not alarmed, guessing the
ships would stay a few days
and then leave. The arrival
of the ships was made pub-
lic on Nov. 9, six days after
the elections.
A that point officials said
that if the ships did not
soon leave "we'll have an-
other situation." The ships
are still there and the new
situation is what so disturbs
the administration.
It was theorized here
that, in returning the ships
to Cienfuegos, the Soviet
Union, perhaps was making
the point that it had a right
under the "understanding"
to have its ships call at
friendly ports.
In an official state-
ment by the Soviet press
agency Tass on Oct. 13,
which the United States
quickly and by predesign
termed "positive," the So-
viet Union had coupled a
statement that it "has not
built and is not building its
military base on Cuba" with
they felt the Cuban issue a declaration of its "inalien-
had been dissolved. because able right" to have Its ships
cials said that the presence
at Cienfuegos of the tender,
tug and barges (the barges
had never left) could not
come under that classifica-
tion. It can be presumed
that representations on this
point have been made to the
Soviet Union.
On Tuesday the State De-
partment spokesman, when
asked if the presence of the
ships at Cienfuegos consti-
tued 'a violation of the "un-
derstanding," replied that
his "judgment would be
that it does not, but it re-
quires careful and close
scrutiny, which it is get-
ting."
In essence, the administra-
tion does feel that a viola-
tion is Involved, or certainly
will be if the vessels do not
quickly leave, but it has
avoided creating a public
confrontation with Moscow
on the issue.
On Wednesday, there was
a call in Congress for just
such a confrontation. Rep.
Henry B. Gonzalez (D-Tex.)
said in a floor speech, "It is
time that we confront Russia
and determine what is going
on in Cuba." Rep. Paul G.
Rogers (D-Fla.) called on
ments President Nixon "to make
public xn i 11 agree-
an all
which concern Cuba
adding that "Congress and
d
the people of the United
States have a right to know"
what they are.
The Tass statement of
Oct. 13 said Moscow "is not
doing anything that would
contradict the understand-
ing reached" with Washing-
ton in 1962. Moscow, it
added, "has always strictly
adhered to this understand-
ing, will adhere to it in the
future, too, and proceeds
from the assumption that
the American side will also
strictly fulfill this under-
standing."
But was there an "under-
standing" at the end of the
1962 crisis?
On Oct. 13 when State De-
partment spokesman Robert
J. McCloskey characterized
the Tass statement as "posi-
tive" he also was prepared,
if asked, to say that there
was no understanding in
1962. The reason: Castro
failed to permit United Na-
tions inspection of the So-
viet missile withdrawal, a
part of the public Kennedy
offer of an agreement to
Khrushchev. But n o b o d y
the vessels hadA FAWa iF01'cKb1ease1 g
gos and becau oscow ports, me i a
had acknowledged a 1962 tro's Cuba.
"understanding" and it now But this week, U.S. offi-
A-RDP72-00337R000200260001-8
aSxeu iv1U iUSxey LLeL que5
tion.
According to Elie Abel's
1966 book on the missile cri-
sis, Robert Kennedy assured
Dobrynin on Nov. 20, 1962
that if the Soviet bombers
started moving out the Pres-
ident would issue his no-in-
vasion pledge within 30
days. The bombers did
leave the last one on Dec. 6.
On that same Nov. 20,
however, President Kennedy
,at a press conference said
"important parts of the un-
derstanding" with Khru-
shchev "remain to be car-
ried out" and he mentioned
Castro's refusal to permit
U.N. inspection. He never
issued a public no-invasion
pledge. Castro in 1966 assert-
ed that the United States
had made several secret con-
cessions to solve the crisis
but he would give no de-
tails. The State Depart-
ment denied his claim.
On Sept. 25 of this year
about l0'days or two weeks
after Washington concluded
a submarine base was being
put together in Cienfuegos,
a White House official, not
identifiable, said that the
Soviet Union "can be under
no doubt that we would
view the establishment of a
strategic base in the Carib-
bean with the utmost seri-
ousness."
He cited the Kennedy
words from that Nov. 20,
1962, press conference that
"if all offensive weapons
systems are removed from
Cuba and kept out of the
hemisphere in the future,
under adequate verification
and safeguards, and if Cuba
is not used for the export of
aggresive communist pur-
poses, there will be peace in
the Caribbean." The official
cited no "understanding"
from 1962
.
On Nov. 13, in making the
first partial disclosure of
the new "understanding"
McCloskey did not claim
one from 1962. He put it this
way: "In view of President
Kennedy's press conference
statements on Nov. 22, 1962,
and to which this adminis-
tration has referred, and the
Soviet government's state-
ment issued by Tass Oct. 13
this year, we are confident
that there is understanding
by the two governments of
the respectve positions on
the limits of their actions
with regard to Cuba."
Five days later, this was
expanded by McCloskey into
an unwritten "understand-
ing," reached this fall by
private talks. In short, the
administration now was con-
ceding that it had done what
President Kennedy had not
done, at least on the public
record, despite the S o v i e t
contentions: given a pledge
not to Invade Cuba.
The administration con-
tends that in return it now
has an "understanding"
which preludes what it 'had
feared was afoot in Cienfue-
gos, the creation of a base
or facility, whether it be a
"Soviet" or a "Cuban" facil-
ity, that could be used to
service Soviet submarines
carrying offensive nuclear
weapons.
It is added that the
United States, as McCloskey
said, has no intention to "in-
vade or intervene" in Cuba.
Ergo, it was a worthwhile
deal for the U.S., it is con-
tended.
But what now troubles the
administration is the fact
that, in its view, Moscow is
not living up to its part of
the new "understanding" for
reasons that are unclear,
Construction continues at.
Cienfuegos, including a road
around the harbor, and bar-
racks are ready to receive
sailors on port leave. As of
yesterday, officials said, the
tender, tug and two barges
 SUNDAY STAR
PAGE
Appr ed or (ease 0 3/03/ 5 ? ~ pea2tQ Ogi0.2OO2gp0n1 R ----
event of a nuclear exchange. has come me close close to c haracteriz-
Russia I-Ias S ub Ia c i YP The t example,
? Russia is thought ;to have be- in the Cienfuegos situation as
tween 11 and 14 Yankee and g
tslot F u l I Base, i n C u being nearly trot when the
Echo-class nuclear subs, more missile confrontation nfronntation wn the
or less similar to the Polaris, world came perilously close to
By JEREMIAH O'LEARY
Star Staff writer
While official Washington
agonizes over Russian subma-
rine activity in Cuba and what
the United States ought to do
about it, the central fact
emerges that the Soviet navy
already has established a fa-
cility at Cienfuegos adequate
to meet the needs of its Yan-
kee and Echo-class nuclear-
powered submarines.
All the background briefings
and press sessions at the
White House, the Pentagon
and the State Department
have created a hangup on the
words, "submarine base."
The single word "base" con-
jures visions among American
officials, press and public
alike of something on the or-
der of a huge establishment
like Norfolk, Charleston or San
Diego.
Serviced by Tenders
What the Russians actually
have put together and what is
causing the concern and confu-
sion ought 'to be called a "fa-
cility." It is a rather simple
servicing stopover designed
for minimal resupply and rec-
reation of crews.
The Russians' new facility
on the south cost of Cuba is
as complete as it needs to be
in order to supply the needs of
Soviet nuclear submarines.
U.S. sources close to the
Cienfuegos situation point out
that a Soviet submarine oper-
ating in the western Atlantic,
or anywhere else in the world,
normally would be serviced by
seagoing tenders. Anything
but major repair work can be
and. is done by these tenders.
Nuclear submarines do not
need refueling; their reactors
See SUBMARINES, Page A-6
Continued From Page A-1'
are good for at least two years,
of operation.
But tenders cannot provide,
relaxation for crews or the,
ki;iTd of recreation that sub-
mariners need after long peri-
ods at sea, mostly submerged.
Similarly, a facility such as
Cienfuegos is useful for pro-
viding the submarines with
treh foods that a tender
might run out of.
From aerial photography
and other sources of informa-
tion, it is clear to U.S. officials
that the Russians have not in-
stalled a major base at Cien,
fuegos. But they have 'estab-
lished there all they need.
There are several barracks
for crews and a soccer field.
(Cuba is a baseb4E-playing
country and soccer fields do
not abound.) There are buoys
for submarines to tie to; two
powerless barges for minor
servicing and disposal of radi-
oaetive wastes, and there is a
tender of the Ugra class which
has been tracked from the
Murmansk area. of Russia to
Cienfuegos, around the north
side of Cuba to Mariel and
now back to Ceenfuegos.
U.S. Navy men know from
their own bases at Holy Loch,
Scotland, and other places that
the needs of nuclear subma-
rioes are not extensive.
The U.S. keeps about 40 nu-
cloar submarines on active
service, scattered around the
world but . generally ringing
the Soviet Union and able to
launch 16 missiles each at
and it is believed at least three World War III.
of these are always on station A White House spokesman,
off the North American main- now widely known to be Hen-
and. Ki - also talked to
The question facing Presi-
dent Nixon, the National Secu-
rity Council and the Pentagon
is not what the Russians are
doing. It appears they have
done it. The question really is:
Does a facility like Cienfuegos
pose a threat to the U.S.?
The issue has become cloud-
ed by statements from Penta-
gon spokesman, White House
spokesmen, State Department
spokesmen and others about
the terms of a so-called "un-
derstanding" b e tw e e n the
United States and the USSR at
the time of the Cuban missile
crisis of October 1962.
Through all the uncertain-
ties, closely held secrets and
hair-splitting about this "un-
derstanding," it is generally
believed: that Russia withdrew
its missiles and promised not
to create any offensive bases
in Cuba in return for a U.S.
guarantee not to invade Cuba.
Almost forgotten is a part of
that bargain that Fidel Castro
did not keep: the permission
for inspection of Cuban sites
that might be considered
threats to the U.S.
It also appears -that, U.S. of-
ficials of the highest level dis-
cuss"d the Cienfuegos situa-
tion with Soviet Ambassador
Anatoly Dobrynin after the ac-
tivity of the tender and barges
was discovered there in Au-
gust. The "understanding" of
1962, it is said, still prevails.
But the real point is whether
the United States will decide
that even a "facility" at Cien-
fuegos is a threat or whether
Washington will decide that a
"facility" is not a "base" and
therefore can be regarded as
less than a clear and present
danger.
Crisis or incident
Officials' comments in
Washington over the last few
wheics indicate the United.
States cannot quite decidi
whether it is faced with a cri-
sis or an incident. Various de-
partments and officials inter-
pret the situation with differ.
ry Doing-r,
reporters for background and
said the USSR could have no
doubt that the United States
would take the most serious
view of a submarine base if
one were established in Cuba.
The StateDepartment
speaks of the ";understanding"
as if the agreement is bases
totally on what is publly
known of the things President
John F. Kennedy said to Pre-
mier Nikita Khrushchev and
what Khrushchev said to Ken-
nedy. This boils down to the
"no bases, no invasion" stand-
off.
In this situation, there is a
fogginess of precise meaning
in determining how a base
differs from a facility and how
it is decided whether a base or
a facility are offensive or de-
fensive and whether either is a
threat.
So while most of the public
airing hinges on the meaning
and extent of the mysterious
U.S.-USSR, "understanding,
the real question is one of in-
tent.
Having constructed a facili-
ty on the south side of Cuba,
do the Russians intend to
make use of it? Have Russian
nuclear submarines indeed be-
gun to make Cienfuegos a port
of call for servicing, resupply,
rest and recreation or will
they do so in the future? If one
or more Russian submarines
does stop at Cienfuegos, will
the ioncern escaliie to
1962
the same pitch as
brink? -
These questions presumably
are what the President and his
advisers now are trying to sort
out. But it is far less clear-cut
a matter for them to decide
than President Kennedy faced
I in 19962.
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$ `> PAG:r:
161I
NEW YORK TIMES DATE
I.S. Officials Say Soviet,. Has Given Assurances
That Nuclear Arms Will Be Kept Out of Hemisphere
per-
the context was synpnymous wirn.tro mlcmeet ngsg epNew Yo klthe S gheth yi saidn eiwas'
By BENJAMIN WELLES 1 nuclear weapons ,
-
Special to The New York Times {
~ The officials 41ild that the last month by Henry A. ,~Kis- no document of record to of
WASHINGTON, , Department Nov. officials 17 -said assuirances reinforced the Oct. i singer, President Nixon's ad- firm the understanding.
today that the United States) 13 statement by the Soviet) visor on national security af- Commitment Not to invade
press agency, Tass, denying fairs, with the Soviet Foreign The United States pdrtion of
had received private assur p
antes from the Soviet Union),,. United States allegations that(Minister, Andreis
F. Dobrynin, +, Russians were building and Anatoly F. obrynin, thetthe a understanding described as
commitment not to invade
fensive weapons into the West Cuba. The officials declined
ern Hemisphere or establish~to specify where, when or in
bases for the use of such weap- what form the assu3''ances had
ons. It was understood that been received.
"offensive weapons" in this They refrained, however,
They also reiteratel the
statement that the Nixon Ad-
mirtistration was confident that
it had an understanding with
nuclear weapons from Cuba. on~tinumg presence, nie saiu,-wbuidTEbouia niritlief build its own
i Nikita S.Khrushchev's orders. not be construe& as.a viola- military 'base, as specified in
Asked whether the Russians tion of the unwritten under- the Vass statement, or a base
the State Department spokes-
man, replied, "I would assume
so."
Mr. McCloskey said that So-
viet naval craft-including a
submarine tender and two
barges used, to collect radio-
active effluent from nuclear
submarines' reactors - were
still at Cienfuegos. Their rnn-
still regarded that commitmentIstanding. for Cuba or for any other coun-
as valid, Robert J. McCloskey, However, he said, they will try to which the Soviet Union
answer when asked whether
continuing construction of So-
viet shore facilities at Cienfue-
gos would, in itself, be viewed
as a violation of the agreement.
Asked whether It was under-
stood between Washington and
Mncrnu, th,,t +F- Y...;,,-,
would have access, Mr. Mc-
Closkey replied, "Yes."
He added that the under-
standing on the part of the
Nixon Administration covered
the entire Western Hemisphere.
He said that the Communist
GGovefnment headed by Premier
Fidel Castro had not been a
-.^^*.? +,. }hn '' "afe evrhanira
Cuba. The officials citea rres-
ident John F. Kennedy's pledge
to that effect at his news con-
ference on Nov. 20, 1962, fol-
lowing the removal of Soviet
of assurances between United
States and soviet officials.
A Defense Department source
said that here had been no
reports of Soviet ship move-
ments in c out of Cienfuegos
in the last24 hours. Last week
well-place, sources said that
they-expcted the 9,000-ton
submarinctender to leave Cien-
fuegos vAin the next few
days.
"I thinkthey're playing cat
and mousewith us," one offi-
cial commsted privately.
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SOV I BT SHIPS ..
CUBAN PORT
U.S. Says Vessels Linked tr
Base Repa t Are in Area
WASHINGTON, Nov.
said, to-
(UPI) - The Pentagon
day that two Soviet spsthat
entered the Cuban port Cien-
fuegos in September, giving
rise to speculation about con-
struction of a submarine base,
were again nearing the port
after a six-week absence.
Jerry W. Friedheim, Deputy
Assistant Secretary'of Defense
for Public Affairs, said the sub-
marine tender and salvage tug
were being followed by the
American destroyer escort
Kretchmer and also watched
by u-2 reconnaissance planes,
He declined to add any new
details to earlier comments by
defense officials that some so t
of construction was apparently
under way at Cienfuegos. Spec-
ulation that a base might
under construction et press agen-
nied by y
c
Mr. Friedheim said it was not
definite at this time that the
two ships were to
Cienfuegos, although
course apparently would take
them there.
,we don't know what their
intentions are, any ? he said.
we've known all along,
The are in the vicinity of
Cienfuegos. They _are within a
day of it. They are still in inter-
national waters."
Mr. Friedheim confirmed
that two Soviet barges that had
been at Cienfuegos since Sep-
tember were still then planes were
keeping n U-2punder close
keepithe port
surveillance.
"I'M not at liberty to discuss
activity at Cienfuegos
any more than I have of weeks,".
over the last couple
he added.
I I
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THE WASHINGT ON :COST
Two Russian Ships
heave Port in Cuba
Two Russian ships-a sub-
marine tender and salvage tug
-have left the Cuban port of
Mariel and are now at sea, the
Defense Department reported
yesterday.
The two vessels were cited
by the Pentagon in September
when it said the Russians ap-
peared to be building a sub-
marine support base at Cien-
fuegos, a deep water port on
Cuba's southern coast.
The Soviet Union denied the
U.S. claims.
The Pentagon announced
Oct. 13 that the two ships left
Cienfuegos and said this made
it less likely the Russians
were building a base there. A
few days later the ships put in
at Mariel, about 25 miles west
of Havana.
Pentagon spokesman Jerry
W. Friedheim said the vessels
left Mariel over the weekend
and "are now at sea east of
Havana and moving easterly."
He refused to comment
when asked if the Russians
were continuing to build naval
facilities at Cienfuegos.
There were unconfirmed re-
ports last month of a secret
understanding between Wash-
ington and Moscow in which
the Russians reportedly
agreed to stop their activities
at Cienfuegos.
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%Ii S
SOVIET REPORTED
TO YIELD ON U~BA
Equipment for a Submarine
Base Would Be Removed
The Uni & ates.,..asid-Ahe
Soviet Union are,ynde>;staod to
have rca.ched a secret..u er-
standing that the Russians
would remove frop}..Q9UjU, gQs,
'tuba, equipment for a base to
serve missile-carrying subm--
l res.
White House and State De-
partment spokesman refused to
comment: yesterday on reports
to that effect. But it was re-
liably learned that departure of
two Soviet ships, a tug and a
submarine tender, from Cien-
fuegos harbor on Oct. 10 was
signaled that the Russians had
started to carry out the under.
standing.
Details of the arrangement,
still officialy undisclosed, were
reportedly worked out,in secret
.diplomatic'contacts in Washing-
ton and Moscow late in Septem-
ber and early this month after
the White House issued a stern
warning that Moscow must
abide by the pledge Nikita S.
Khruchshev made when Premier
to keep offensive missiles out of
Cuba.
promised to Raise Issue
Secretary of State William P
Rogers said at a news confer,
ence on Oct. 9 that he would
discuss Washington's concern
that the Russians might bc
building a submarine base at
Cienfuegos with Andrei A. Gro?
snyko when he met with the
,Soviet Foreign Minister. But
American officials said the
matter was not brought up
when the two men conferred
last Friday night and probably
would not come up when they
meet again tomorrow night.
The reason, it was learned,
was that Moscow and Wash-
ington had already exchanged
public as well as private signals
to confirm the secret under-
standing.
The point of concern, under-
scored by the White House on
Sept. 25, was the presence of
four Soviet vessels-a tugboat,
a submarine tender and two
barges for servicing nuclear-
armed submarines-in Cienfue-
gos harbor, along with the con-
struction of some barracks on
shore.
The White House, recalling
the Cuban missile crisis of 1962
and the understanding between
Premier Khrushchev and Presi-
c'cnt Kennedy, warned Moscow
teat it would "view the estab-
T'shment of a strategic base in
tae Caribbean with the utmost
iousness."
Soviet Denied Charge
The first public indication that
the dispute was easing came
on Oct. 13. On that day Tass,
the official Soviet press agency,
issued an authoritative state-
ment saying the American
charges that a submarine base
was being constructed in Cuba
were "a concoction."
Tass went on to add, signif-
icantly: "The Soviet Union has
not built and is not building
its own military base on Cuba
and is not doing anything that
vould contradict the under-
, ;tanding between the govern-
ments of the U.S.S.R. and the
United States."
On instructions from the'
White House, the State De-
partment welcomed the Tass
statement as a "positive" de-
velopment. The Pentagon also
disclosed that two of the So-
viet vessels, the submarine
tender and the tug, had already
left Cienfuegos harbor and had
sailed to the northern shore
of the island, apparently on her
way home. These statements
were evidently public confir-
mation of the private under-
standing.
gme erican officials wire
oncerne at e wo ves-
or es o avana, an and 'Mt
some specia fists _ e most sri-
Qys element in heS Soviet buld-
yp~wpre , ail ~_in ien u os
xgste y.
But White House sources
A7 that they _affstderert~the
situation to be1 as pgsitjve as
departure o t e_two Soviet ves-
sels from Cienfuegos.
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200260001-8
 Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200260001-8
THE WASHINGTON' POS'-,'
Soviets Deny Building
Cuba Submarine Base
By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff'Writer
The Soviet Union officially "to be positive," but added that
and emphatically denied yes- the United States "will con-
terday that it was constructing 1 tinue to watch the situation"
a base for missile-firing sub- around the Cuban port of Cien-
marines in Cuba. fuegos closely.
An official government The Tass report came just
(statement distributed by Tass,.hours before the Pentagon an-
the Soviet news agency, said nounced that a Soviet subma-
I"The Soviet Union is not build-, rive tender that had been in
ing a military base in Cuba port in Cienfuegos since Sept.
and is not doing anything that. 9 had left Saturday morning
would contradict the under-1,and was heading eastward to-
standing reached between the ward open sea,
governments of the U.S.S.R. ~ High-level defense officials
and the United States in 1962.11! say the departure of the tend-
During is the most significant break
During the 1962 Cuban mis- in the activities around Cien-
sile crisis, the Soviets agreed fuegos since the White House
to pull their missiles out of and the Pentagon both pub-
Cuba in return for what they liely accused the Soviets on
not say was invade Cuba. pledge 'Sept. 25 of possibly preparing
At the SDepartment . the harbor there to service
spokesman At the State t Robert J. . McClos McClos-,Russian missile-firing subma-
key said the department con rives
sidered the Tass statement I See BASE, A14, Col. 1
BASE, From Al
Assistant Secretary of De-
fense Daniel Z. Henkin said
yesterday that departure of
the tender "makes it less like-
ly" that the Cuban port could
be used in this fashion.
House nor the Pentagon has
claimed or produced any hard
evidence linking activity there
specifically with "Yankee-
class," missile-firing subma-
rines of the type that already
patrol off the U.S. east coast
from bases in Russia.
Intelligence officials s a y
privately that there is no such
Though defense officials re-
main cautious about Russian
intentions in the. area, they
also believe the tender's de-
parture may be linked to a
Soviet desire not to damage
either the Strategic Arms Lim-
itations Talks, which are to
reopen in Helsinki Nov. 2, or
forthcoming meetings in New
York this Friday and the fol-
lowing Monday between U.S.
Secretary of State William P.
Rogers and Soviet Foreign
Minister Andri Gromyko.
The two major U.S. Polaris
submarine bases overseas at
Holy Loch, Scotland, and Rota,
Spain, both have tenders in
port at all times, and the con-
tinued presence of the Soviet
tender in Cuba had increased
speculation that a permanent
sub base of this type as to e
set up.
In a news conference Mon-
day, Defense Secretary Melvin
R. Laird pointed out that the
two U.S. bases were well
known before the U.S. and
U.S.S.R. agreed to meet last
fall to discuss strategic arms
limitation.
Any attempt by the Soviets
to change the balance now that
the talks are under way would
be viewed as "a very serious
act," Laird said.
Whether the Soviets ever
really intended to set up a
sub base in Cuba, or still bar.
bor such plans, remains open
to considerable doubt.
Though Laird said Monday
that "there is evidence naval
base construction is going for-
ward," neither t'h e White
(Y o O
PAGE-'
evidence and several senators,
Including J. W. Fulbright (D-
Ark.), Clifford Case (R-N.J.),
and Frank Church (D-Idaho),
all of whom are normally
skeptical of Pentagon claims,
emerged from a special Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee briefing by the Defense
Intelligence Agency Oct. 1 and
reported insufficient evidence)
was presented, in their view?
to conclude the Soviets were
in fact building such a base.
On the other hand, it is pos
sible, as some administration!
sources say, that the S~ovietsl
did indeed intend to put such
a facility in, but may now
have been dissuaded by stern
U.S. warnings.
There are, according to in-
telligence officials, some new
buildings at the Cienfuegos
port, but it is impossible to tell
at this time what purpose they
serve.
The Soviets, they point out,
are still in a position to change
their plans for Cienfuegos be-
fore the U.S. can gather any
actual evidence of sub base
construction. Unlike the 1962'
missile crisis, no before-and-
after photos of activity in
Cuba have been made public.
Further evidence that the
situation was cooling off, mili-
tarily if not politically, came
yesterday when administration,
officials, invited to testify on
the Cuban affair in closed ses-
sion on Capitol Hill, failed to
show up.
Rep. Dante B. Fascell (D-j
Fla.), Chairman of the House
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee
on Inter-American Affair s
that had scheduled the meet-
ings, said in an interview:
"I am not suggesting that
there are any domestic politi-
cal motives present in the ad-
ministration's approach to the
Cuban affair, but I do find it
exceedingly strange that the
discussion of a matter which
is alleged to be of such grave
importance as to threaten our
national and international se-
curity should be conducted
strictly between high admin-
istration officials and the
press."
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