THRUST INTO N. VIETNAM HELD U.S. ACE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00337R000200230009-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 134
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: May 14, 1970
• Content Type: NSPR

WASH) V'GT ON p0 Z' DATE 14 t44kt-10 PAGE
pproved For elease 2004/03/17 : 236009-3 .
('p-w~'~aQy+r
~r be ashIngton Merry-Go.ReU
But other intelligence speci- I led to deliver in south Carolina
1iciC~l2~s yarnt Soof .vnnk T-TP hacked his tux
enam field AS. ice
Thrust luth N.
,it may be denied because
of the antiwar ferment, but
President Nixon has on his
d e s k detailed confirigeney
plans culling for VA ground
troops to cross" into- North
Vietnam if Hanoi should "at-
tempt to break through the
demilitarized zone.
This daring move is part of
tie military action that possi-
bly woulc'1 be taken if the
North Vietnamese s h o u l d
tiireateri the orderly withdraw-
that we will move decisive) ly destroyea the uiiuc=s=~ - _~
and not step by step." network and compelled the Mond (R-S.C.) picked up an tin-
North Vietnamese to return to expected anecdote for the law-
The intensity of the anti.
war protests, however, may
deter the President. Those
who consulted with him on
the Cambodian operation say
he was prepay-od to take bold-
er action if the public-opinion
,polls had showed he had popu-
lar support. Conversely, the
antiwar frenzy -has stunned
the President, and may per-
suade him to pull his punches.
Another military move that
.has been taken up with the
al" of American roops' `from
So ith Vietnam: the Tresideiit
b
t
du
o a
-
ct
is prepared to con
ora.te, Cambodian-style foraysi
across the North "Vietnamese
blriTfl, ntcations supply _a n eelr ,lay e17 ruled out, say
staging centers. insiders`, ecause of-the diffi-
This its what he musE have cult terrain and the dubious
had in mind, say insiders, prospects.
.
when he told a press confer- pads eanwhile, it is apparent)
ence last week. "If the~North that the Cambodian action
Vietnamese did what some sn't going to destroy COSVN,
have suga massive might do he supreme Communist mili-
-move " a maassive force of
ary headquarters, which the
250,000 to 300,000 across the President said was the pri-
DMZ against our Marine nary target of the invasion.
Corps people who are there w The President is furious
I would' certainly not' allow ith the Joint Chiefs for mis-
those men to be 'massacre eading him about the possi-
without using more force and ility of destroying COSVN.
more effective force against
North Vietnam" hey visualized the enemy
ommand center, apparently,
Thursday, May 14,106
fTWGT07,vt1-0 sfi G 7
#olcTed tTs t~utckly-a'Yf Jana an exula au=~ 4??u .~~.___ ..~
1.1110.
le
w..faj, .g
ommunfgts ""' to 1TYa style downtown Washington. When
f warfare, not unlike that he returned, thieves had brok-
thers
f
f
ore
a
ised by our own
o wrest independence, from en into his car and made off
_ __.._a =v_ S
tor's fancy tux
ee
hose who fight by the book. a
ll -Mar-
h
it
i
c
e
Martha M
Rl
eaehind the Scenes tha Mitchell's dipped-in-curare
Campus Agitators - Secret
films of the recent violence
on some campuses reveal that
the hard-core militants, who
shouted the loudest for blood,
quietly pulled back when the
violence erupted. These pro-
fessional agitators, apparently,
are adept at ducking out on
the violence they stir up. In
this way, they can avoid ar-
rests and move on to other
campuses. Only the suckers
get hurt.
Troop Withdrawals - Presi-
dent Nixon has carefully em-
phasized how many troops he
verbal darts are surprising
those who remember her as a
southern belle back in Arkan-
sas. They describe her as a
"typical flower of the South,"
a pretty, smiling girl who sel-
dom raised her voice above a
delightful drawl. Attorney
General John Mitchell married
her in Elkton, Md., an elope-
ment center, a few days after
his divorce from his first wife
became final.
Northern Segregation - The
Health, Education and Wel-
fare Department is quietly pre-
paring to go ahead with its
new mandate to enforce school
integration in the North. J.
Stanley Pottinger, the new
civil rights director, has called
a conference of his key people
in Denver this month to lay
out the strategy. Meanwhile,
77 per cent of the nation's
black children still attend pre-
dominately black schools.
? 1970, Beli-McClure Syndicate. Inc.
expects to withdraw from Viet-
nam, not how many he intends
to leave behind. His secret
plans call for continuing the
pullout until the U.S. force is
down to about 60,000 men.
They will remain to furnish
air, artillery and logistical sup-
port for the South Vietnamese
until a settlement is reached.
Later dress confer-
ed significantly s a jungle version of their
ence, he add the:
that the Cambodian action wn 'elaborate, Pentagon-style
s
putt th e enemy on?" eadquarters. Their attack-
war"
ing that if it escalates while pon the Communist ,i lar infraoP-
we are 'trying to de-escalate,
President is a thrust into
Laos to cut off the North
Vietnamese supply lines that
wind through Laos down the
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SEC K .
25X1
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Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel
Thursday - 14 May 1970
Page 2
4. Briefed Ed Braswell, Chief of Staff of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, on recent developments regarding
SA-3 deployment in Egypt, TU-95 flights to Cuba, Soviet OB in the Far
East, and status of Foxbat,
r Braswell said it would be helpful if Senator Stennis could have, for
use in the floor debate, unclassified facts and figures regarding major
Soviet weapons programs, i. e. , missiles, aircraft, submarines. I pointed
out our difficulties inproviding unclassified material, but Braswell said
"we never can get anything we want out of the Pentagon" and he would
appreciate our giving it a try.
In response to Braswell's questions, I generally described the
current military situation in Cambodia. Braswell said he had misplaced
the maps we had provided him some time ago and would very much like
a new set, including several duplicates of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia
he could mark up to use in briefing Senator Stennis, who is having
difficulty keeping on to of the Southeast Asia situation in addition to his
other responsibilities./
SECRET
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Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel Page 3
Thursday - 14 May 1970
6o Met with Russ B.landford, Chief Counsel, House
Armed Services Committee, and discussed the Cambodian situation which
Blandford insisted was "disastrous. If
cc:
ER
O/DDCI
Mr. Houston
Mr. Goodwin
DDI
DDS
DDS&T
OPPB
EA/DDP
Mr.
Mr.
SEC ti
JOHN M. MAURY
Legislative Counsel
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I'n in Senate
To Bar War Fun odi
By JOlil1T,.W, Fes'
WASHINGTON, May 12-Thel
Senate Republican leadership
countered a bipartisan move to
cut off funds for future mili-
:a;ry activities in Cambodia,by
,uggesting legislation today that
vould sanction actions taken
ender the President's power as
;ommander in Chief,
Senators J,ohn Sherman
iooper, Republican of Ken-
ucky, and Frank Church,
)emocrat of Idaho, _ immedi-
itely protested that ,a, loophole
vas being proposed that would
;eve a. "blank` check" to the
'resident to ungertake future
nilitary actions in Cambodia.
The cqi nternnove was., pro-
)died today Senator-Hugh
Scott of Persylvania, the
ienate`Republican leader, in the
for t_~, awn rnendm n tg a
form,,; that
the Sen-
ate iewWr or Wednes.
day:
Senator Scptt..said the new
amendment, approved by the
White House Would be submit-
test bs i P for an
men ? ~preriQUSIy offered
by Senators Cooper Ond curch
a'nsored b,y. SeeUt
Mike Mansfield of Montana,
the Senate Democratic leader,
and Senator George D. Aiken;
of Vermont, the ranking Re-[
publican on the Senate Foreigial
Relations Committee.
With the White House action
today, the lines were drawn,`-
more sharply t han ever for a
constitutional debate between
the Executive and the Legisla-
tive branches over war-making
powers, a debate that was?set
off by President Nixon's dis-
patch of American troops into
Cambodia.,, The first twit t of
strength, is to come in the dis-
cussion of the rival ajnepd-
The Cooper-Church amend-
ments on Cambodia,
ment-already approved by thf
Senate Foreign Relati~.Q ,;
mittee in a 9-to-4
day-provides that,
oe usea oy me rrestuenz for
"retaining" United States forces
in Cambodia, for supplying
military advisers or mercen-
aries to the Cambodian Govern-
ment or for conducting any
combat air activities over Cam-
bodia support of the Cambodian
Government forces.
The substitute amendment
contains the same restrictions
on operations in Cambodia as
the Cooper-Church amendment,
in identical words. But it adds
the exemption that funds can
be spent by the President for
military actions in Cambodia if
they are "required to protect
the armed forces of the United
States."
Until today's developments,
the Cooper-Church amendment
was believed in many ' Senate'
quarters to command majority.
support.
Details Given by Scott
In disclosing the substitute
amendment before reporters in
the Senate Press Gallery, Sena-
tnr.. S att, who had helped draft
the measure, repeatedly con-
veyed the impression that thel,
wording had been cleared with,
the White House and that the!
amendment 'had the approval of i
the Administration. He de- ~
scribed the measure as "accept-{
Dable" to the White House andl
"something the Administration ~
believes it can live with."
Henry A. Kissinger, the Pres-
But a somewhat different
ident's national security ar'
version came from Gerald B.
wiser, met privately in the
Warren, assistant White House,
orning on Capitol Hill with a
press "secretary, who said the
Congressional delegatio invited
White House "has not en-
by the White House and come
dorsed any substitute." Mr.
nosed largely of Administration
Warren emphasized that the
supporters. One Renublican
Administration was opposed to Senator afterward `dAscriherl
` it
any abridgment of the Presi
as "a halftime pep talk." with
dent's powers as Commander in
the Cambodian onerat'on thus: enormous
Chief and therefore was not re-1 far described as "an
"
to any amendment. success.
Senator Scott told reporters
that the Administration would'
have preferred no amendment
but decided to support the sub-
stitute "when I told the White
House that the Senate wanted
to be heard on the Cambodian
question."
The substitute, he said, willl.
"make clear that the Senate
Wants us out of Cambodia as
soon as possible" while at the
;protecting the con-
_J:resi
s werpt
as o e f 7
F en IA-RDP72-00337R000200230009-3
~~aer~r l~amnr rat _01
I4a,rl.-Hatfield. !
nepuuucan or Oregon, Harold
E. Hughes, Democrat of Iowa,
Charles E. Goodell, Republican
of New York, and Mr. Church
-took the unusual step of buy-
ing a half hour of television
time tonight so they could pre-
sent their case for an amend-
ment that would require the
withdrawal of all United States
forces from Vietnam by mid-
1971. Their $70,000 program
was scheduled for presentation
on N.B.C. television at 7:30 P.M.
Gavin Sees Clash With China
James M. Gavin, a reteired
Army lieutenant general who
has long been critical of the
Vietnam war, expressed con-
cern to the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee that the na-
tion might be headed for a "cat-
astrophic confrontation" with
Communist China. General Gav-
in proposed that a Cabinet-
level official be appointed with
:he assignment of drafting l
Mans to "extricate" the United'
States from Vietnam as soon as
)ossible."
College student lobbyists,
;till swarming through the Cap-
tol in droves, seemed to be
laving some impact. Two
'outhern Democratic Senators
-Ernest F. Hollings of South
;arolina and Herman E. Tal-
nadge of Georgia - made
;peches criticizing intervention
n Cambodia made without the
approval of Congress, Both
sited tl:c student protests in
suggesting that the time had
come for Congress to place re-
strictions on the President.
Behind the scenes, the Whit(,
House was engaged in its own
lobby to defeat the Administra-
tion critics in Congress.
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'SENATE UNPOM
TO RESTRICT FUNDS
INICAMBODIp,WA R
Assent of Congress Would
~~:
Be Needed t9 Pa r4n
New Militar
Bill Would ){arm Powers
.:Of Commander in Chief
u coa 1 eep him from em-
3arkmg on future military ac-
MIS inn Cambodia without the
approval of Congress.
The amendment would pro-
tide that the President could
lot use any funds appropriated
,y congress for "retaining"
4rn erican military forces in
;aTAodia for providing Ameri.
ati MAttary adviser`s instruc-
meuu. bLaUS ,
~ment said, it might be inter-
reted as diminishing the fun-
p
damental powers of the Presi-
dent "thus limiting the Presi-
dentls -authority to take actions
which he finds to be essential
for the defense of United States
forces."
The State Department also
objected that sections in the
amendment-particularly those
advis-
prohibiting any military orted
ers or United States-supported
V mercenaries to the mercenaries for Cambodian
gii
n Go verni 'forces-were "subject to a
reat variety of interpretations
g
Cry ge 17,olumn I which might adversely affect
'd t' olicy on Viet-
s
y Pag
g
u
V Y
c-_
over Cam1 odia in support of
Cambodian forces.
The amendment was adopted
the committee by a vote of
b
y
9 to 4 shortly after the State
Department sent a letter raising
to
a constitutional objection
restrictions on the President's
authority as commander in
Chief. David
in a letter signed by Abshire for Congre,ssioAssistant
Relations, the
State Department said the)
"general thrust" of the amend-
ment was "in consonance with,
the President's expressed inten-
tions concerning the limited
role of United States forces in
Cambodia."
"`As a general principle,"
By JOHN W. FINNEY
J$peolat to The New Y'ork'nmee
WASHINGTON, May 11-
)yer State Department ob-
ections that Congress 'was
)roposing to restrict the Pres -
lent's constitutional powers as
"ommand6r in Chief, the Sen-
tte' Foreign Relations Commit-
;ee approved an amendment
today to cut off funds for fu
:ure American military activi-
;ies in Cambodia.
The amendment, attached to
a foreign mifitary sales bill,,
now goes to the Senate floor,
where it will provide a test of
sentiment on. the Cambodian
operation. It could also provoke
a -constitutional dispute be-
tween the Senate and the ex-
ecutive department over the
war ,powers of the President.
With a group of Senators
seeking to challenge President
Nixon on his decision to extend
United States attacks into Cam-
bodia, the amendment was
rushed through the Foreign Re-
lations Committee after one day
of discussion. It was scheduled
or pons der ti by the Senate
later this wey'k1 prababl~y start-
ing 1ursday -
present Effort, Excluded
As f rnretned by its sponsors
->n tgr Jo Sherman
Cooper, }~tepu can o en=
-
however, the letter said, "we
do not consider it desirable
that actions of the Commander
in Chief should be subject to
on
't' "
p
the Press en
lion and steady replace-
ment of American combat
forces in Vietnam."
The State Department sug-
gested that the amendment be
revised to "make it clear that
the President is entitled to take
action to protect the lives of
American troops within the Re-
public of Vietnam."
Not only did the committee
reject this suggestion, but it
proceeded to strengthen the'
amendment beyond the original
proposal offered by Senators
Cooper and_ Church.
Originally the amendment pro-
vided that n0 fuunds could be
used by the President for re-
taining "U.S. ground combat
forces" in Cambodia. In light of
the disclosure that the United
States Navy was assisting a
naval operation up the Mekong
River in Cambodia, the commit-
tee decided to broaden the pre-
scription to include. "United
States forces."
.
statutory restric i
In particular, it continued,! As interpreted by the amend-
"no such amendment should re-I ment sponsors, this broader
strict the fundamental powers definition would mean that the
of the President for protection President could not send either
of the armed forces of the o d combat naval forces
roain the future.
,UblMd States."
the Cooper Church amend- The one sp
thtanplaecould still
provide combat support for
South' Vietnamese units operat-
ing in Cambodia.
Democratic and Republican
leaders differed on the pros.
pects for the amendment.
Text of Amendment
Senator Mike Mansfield of
Montana, the Democratic lead-
er, predicted the amendment
would be approved by the Sen.
ate.
. But Senator Hugh Scott of
Pennsylvania, the Republican
leader, said that the amendment
would have the support of only
30 Senators.
Following is the text of the
Church-Cooper amendment,
to Cambodia":
"In order to avoid the in-
volvement of the United States
in a wider war in Indochina
and expedite the withdrawal of
American forces from Vietnam,
it is hereby provided that, un-
less specifically authorized by
law hereafter.enacted, no funds
authorized or appropriated pur-
suant to this act or any other
law may be expended for the
purpose of-
1. Retaining United States
forces in Cambodia;
2. Paying the compensation
or allowances of, or otherwise
supporting, directly or indirect-
ly, any United States person-
nel in Cambodia who furnish
military instruction to Cambo-
dian forces or engage in any
combat activity in support of
Cambodian forces;
3. Entering into or carrying
out any contract or agreement
to provide military instruction
in Cambodia, or to provide per-
sons to engage in any combat
activity in support of Cambo-
dian forces; or
4. Conducting any combat ac-
tivity in the air above Cambodia
in support of Cambodian forces.
ran ufc ,
tucky, and
Iemocxfit of IEio-- a amen3d
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r>lent would na'tei
dent fiom c ~. _141 I ....
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 ?,;,Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200230009-3
sequences. The bill also recognizes that
an extensive review of banking regulation
is long overdue. I offer this proposal with
the hope that it will generate worthwhile
discussion and May produce legislation
which is more, precisely directed at
achieving a healthy and competitive
banking industry as this Nation moves
into the 1970's.
The '?RESIDING OFFICER (Mr. AL-
LEN) . The bill will be received and ap-
propriately referred; and, without ob-
jection, the bill will be printed in the
RECORD,
The bill (S. 2823) to amend the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956, and for
other purposes, introduced by Mr.
BROOKE, was received, read twice by its
title, referred to the Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency, and ordered to be
i
pr
nted in the RECORD, as follows:
8.3823
(2) by striking out thte period and insert- (1) that the customer shall obtain some
Ing in lieu thereof the following: 11; or (3) other credit, property, or service from a bank
any company the management or policies of holding company of such bank or from any
which such bank holding company has the subsidiary of such bank holding company;
power directly or indirectly to direct." (2) that the customer some
(e) Subsection (g) of section 2 of such provide
bank hold-
credit, property, or service to the bank hold-
Act is amended- ing company of such bank or to any subsidi-
by striking out "end" at the end of ary of such bank holding company; or
pa(1)
graph (2); ) that the customer not obtain
(2) by redesignating paragraph (3) as some other credit, p operty,horllservice from
paragraph (4) ; and a competitor of such bank, bank holding inserting paragraph as follows after paragraph (2) a new company of such bank, or any subsidiary
descendants, or once A_~:~ individual The Board may by regulation or order per-
shall be deemed tube owned or controlled m it such exceptions to the foregoing pro-
SEC. 3.44) That part of section 4(c) of
the k Holding Company Act of 1956
precedes the numbered paragraphs is
not, with respect to any bank holding com-
pany, apply to-11.
ra
(b) para
h
8
f
g
p
(
) o
section 4(c) of such
Be it enacted by the Senate and use
Act is amended to read as follows:
of Representatives of the United Sta s of "(8) Shares retained or acquired in any
America in Congress assembled, Tha this company engaged in activities which are au-
Act may be cited as the "Bank Hol ng thorized under subsection (e) of this sec-
Company Act of 1970". tion;
SEC. 2. (a) Section 2 of the Bank Holding (c) Section 4 of such Act is amended by
Company Act of 1956 is amended by striking at the end thereof the following:
out subsection (a) and inserting in lieu "(e A bank holding company or
thereof the following: any subsidiary of may engage in any
"(a) 'Bank holding company' means any activity that the Boar determined, after
company (1) that directly or indirectly notice and opportunity for h gs, is func-
owns, controls, or holds with power to vote tionally related to banking. In rmining
25 percentum or more of the voting shares whether an activity is functionally re d to
of any bank or of a company that is or banking the Board shall consider whethe e
..........o ...,.auG -1 to a 13
tine of this Act, (2) that controls in any Ing transaction or is one providing assistance
mariner the election of a majority of the of a type which a customer normally looks
directors of any bank, or (3) that has the to a bank or other financial institution to
Power directly or indirectly to direct or obtain. Notwithstanding a determination
cause the direction of the management or that an activity is functionally related to
policies of any bank. For the purposes of banking, the Board may deny permission to
this Act, any successor to any such com- engage in such activity if it finds that the
pany shall be deemed to be a bank holding engaging in such activity by the bank hold-
company from the date as of which such ing company or subsidiary thereof has or
predecessor company became a bank hold- may have significant anti-competitive ef-
in
g company. Notwithstanding the forego- fects.
1- "(B) A bank holdi
ng company or any sub
"(A) No bank and no company, owning or sidiary thereof may engage in any activ y
controlling voting shares of a bank is a bank which is not functionally related to ba ng
holding company by virtue of such bank's if such bank holding company a any
Ownership or control of shares in a fiduciary banking subsidiary thereof do extend
capacity except where such shares are held banking services to any Gustoes r or sup-
under a trust that constitutes a company as plier of such bank holding pany or sub-
defined in subsection (b) of this section, or sidiary thereof engaged in z0ch activity. Not-
as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of withstanding the foregonig, the Board may
subsection (g) of this section. by regulation or order permit the rendering
"(B) No company is a bank holding com- of such banking serviced in such amounts or
pany by virtue of its ownership or control of under such conditions as it. determines will
shares acquired by it in connection with its not be contrary to the purposes of this sec-
underwriting of securities if such shares are tion.
held Only for such period of time as will "(2) In the event of the failure of the Board
permit the sale thereof on a reasonable basis. to act on any application for an order under
"(C) No company formed for the sole pur- this subsection within the 91-day period
pose of participating in a proxy solicitation which begins on the date of submission to
is a bailk aoxnpa11y by virtue of its the Board of the complete record on that
Control of votingrights of shares acquired application, the application shall be deemed
in the course of such solicitation." (b) Sub- to have been granted.
Section (b) of section 2 of such Act is "(3) The Board shall include in its an-
amended to re as follows: nual report to the Congress a description of
"(b) `Company' means any person, estate, each activit approved by it by order or by
trust, partnership, corporation, association, regulation under this subsection during the
or similar organization, but shall not include period covered by the report."
any corporation, the majority of the shares SEC. 4. (a) As used in this section, the
of which are owned by the United States or terms "bank", "bank holding company", and
by any State." "subsidiary" have the meaning ascribed to
(c) Subsection (c) of section 2 of such Act such terms in section 2'of the Bank Holding
is amended by inserting after "demand" the Company Act of 1956.
following: "arid which is engaged in the (b) A bank shall not in any manner ex-
b,winess of Alaking commercial loans", tend credit, lease or sell property of any
d) Subsection (d) of section 2 of such kind, or furnish any service, or fix or vary
Ac Is amenciesi. the consideration for any of the foregoing,
(1) by striking out "or (2)" and inserting on the condition, agreement, or understand-
in lieu thereof, "(2)"; and ing-
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE r S'6~J11
on as it considers will not be contrary
to the purpose of this section.
(c) The district courts of the United
States have jurisdiction to prevent and re-
strain violations of subsection (b) of this
section and of section 4(e) (1) (B) of the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, and it
is the duty of the United States attorneys,
under the direction of the Attorney General,
to institute proceedings in equity to pre-
vent and restrain such violations. The pro-
ceedings may be by way of a petition set-
ting forth the case and praying that the vio-
lation be enjoined or otherwise prohibited.
When the parties complained of have been
duly notified of the petition, the court shall
proceed, as soon as may be, to the hearing
and determination of the case. While the
petition is pending, and before final decree,
the court may at any time make such tem-
porary restraining order or prohibition as it
deems just in the premises. Whenever it ap-
pears to the court that the ends of justice
require that other parties be brought before
it, the court may cause them to be sum-
) In any action brought by or on be-
of the United States under subsection
of section 4(e) (1) (B) of the Bank
for witnesses living out of the district in
which the court is held at a greater distance
than one hundred miles from the place
of holding the same without the permission
of the trial court being first had upon
proper application and cause shown.
(e) Any person who is injured in his busi-
ness or property by reason of anything for-
bidden in subsection (b) or section 4(e) (1)
(B) of the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956 may sue therefor in any district court
of the United States in which the defendant
resides or is found or has an agent, without
respect to the amount in controversy, and
shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained, and the cost of suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
(f) Any person, firm, corporation, or as-
sociation may sue for and have injunctive
relief, in any court of the United States hav-
ing jurisdiction over the parties, against
threatened loss or damage by a violation of
subsection (b) or section 4(e) (1) (B) of
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, un-
der the same conditions and principles as
injunctive relief against threatened conduct
that will cause loss or damage is granted by
courts of equity, under the rules governing
such proceedings. Upon the execution. of
proper bond against damages for an in-
junction improvidently granted and a show-
ing that the danger of irreparable loss or
damage is immediate, a preliminary injunc-
tion may issue.
(g) Any action to enforce any cause of ac-
tion under this. section shall be forever
barred unless commenced within seven years
after the cause of action accrued.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 11, 1970
SEC. 5. (a) (1) There is hereby established a subpena of the Commission issued sue under
a National Commission on Banking (herein- paragraph (1) of this subsection, after
(2) The Commission ionshall onsistoffifteen any failurertogobeythenorder of the court the "Commission!'). order members to be appointed by the President thereof.
may be punished by the court as a contempt
as follows:
(A) Six shall be from private life and rep- from the head mof any ission may rah require d r dly
resentative of the banking industry; and
(B) Nine shall be representative of the partment or independent agency available
public interest and may be appointed from information which the Commission deems
private or public life, including persons em- useful in the discharge of t agencies duties, oil de-
ployed by State or federal agencies. partments and Independent Not more than three persons amibinted to Government shall cooperate with the Com-
the Commission shall be, at the time of their mission and furnish all information re-
uested by the Commission to the extent
appointments, employed in a full-time capac-
ity by the United States.
(3) The President shall designate one of
the persons appointed to the Commission to
serve as Chairman.
(4) A vacancy in the Commission shall not
affect its powers and may be filled in the same
manner as the original appointment,
(5) Eight members of the Commission
shall constitute a quorum.
(b) (1) The Commissfon shall study and
appraise the role of banking in the national
economy with a view to determining whether
existing State and federal statutes, regula-
tions, and administrative practices are con-
sistent with the objectives of economic
growth and vigorous competition in the
banking industry and among financial insti-
tutions consistent with reasonable safety of
depositors' funds. Such study and appraisal
shall include but not be limited to-
(A) restrictions on bank entry;
(B) restrictions on the formation of
branches of banks;
(C) restrictions on the investment powers
of banks;
(D) restrictions on the payment of interest,
on bank deposits; `
(E) reserve requirements of banks;
(F) merger policies affecting banks;
(G) restrictions on banks engaging 'in
control of funds apply to appropriations of
the Commission.
(5) Ninety days after submission of its
final report the Commission shall cease to
exist.
(f) There are authorized to be appropri-
ated such sums as may be necessary to carry
out the provisions of this section. Any money
so appropriated shall remain available to the
Commission until the date of its expiration,
as fixed by subsection (e) (5).
ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS
8. 3417
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I ask unan-
imous consent that, at the next print-
ing, the name of the Senator from Ken-
tucky (Mr. COOK) be added as a cospon-
sor of S. 3417, to amend the Gun Control
Act of 1968 to permit the interstate
transportation and shipment of firearms
used for sporting purposes and in target
competition.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
INOUYE). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
S. 3722
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that, at the next
printing, the names of the Senator from
Maryland (Mr. TYDiNCsY, the Senator
from Oklahoma (Mr. HARRIS), the Sena-
tor from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL), and the
Senator from Montana (Mr. METCALF)
be added as cosponsors of S. 3722, a bill
to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 to require prior approval for deliv-
ery of excess defense articles to a foreign
country.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
port (Mr. HOLLINGS). Without objection,
it is so ordered.
nonbanking activities; (e) (1) The Commission may, without re-
(Ii) restrictions on bank holding, compa- gard to the provisions of title 5, United
Hies; and States Code, relating to appointments in the
(I) the desirability of consolidating fecr competitive service or to classification and
eras bank supervisory functions into one General Schedule pay rates, appoint and fix
agency. the compensation of an executive director.
(2) The Commission shall report its find- The executive director, with the approval of
ings, together with such recommendations the Commission, shall employ and fix the
for legislative and administrative action as compensation of such additional personnel
it deems advisable, the President and to as may be necessary to carry out the func-
the Congress not later than June 30, 1972. tions of the Commission, but no individual
(c) (1) The Commission, or any three so appointed may receive compensation in
members thereof as authorized by the Corn- excess of the rate authorized for OS-18 under
mission, may conduct hearings anywhere in the General Schedule.
the United States or otherwise secure data executive director, with the ap-
study. expressions of opinion pertinent to the (2) The
study. In connection therewith the Commis- proval of the Commission, may obtain serv-
sion is authorized by majority vote- ices in accordance with section 3109 of title
(A) to administer oaths, 5 of the United States Code, but at rates for
(B) to require by subpena the attendance individuals not to exceed $100 per diem.
and testimony of witnesses and the produc- (3) The head of any executive department
tion of all documentary evidence relating to or independent agency of the Federal Gov-
the execution of its duties, ernment may detail, on a reimbursable basis,
(C) in the case of disobedience to a sub- any of its personnel to assist the Commission
pens issued under this subsection to invoke in carrying out its work.
the aid of any district court of the United (4) Financial and administrative services
States in requiring compliance with such (including those related to budgeting and
subpena, accounting, financial reporting, personnel,
(D) in any proceeding or investigation to and procurement) shall be provided the
order testimony to be taken by deposition Commission by the General Services Admin-
before any person who is designated by the istration, for which payment shall be made
Commission and has the power to admin- in advance, or by reimbursement, from funds
ister oaths, and in such instances to compel of the Commission in such amounts as may
testimony' and the production of evidence be agreed upon by the Chairman of the
in the same manner as authorized under Commission and the Administrator of Gen-
subparagraphs (B) and (C) above, and eral Services. The regulations of the General
(E) to pay witnesses the same fees and Services Administration for the collection of
mileage as are paid in like circumstances in indebtedness of personnel resulting from
the courts of the United States. erroneous payments apply to the collection
(2) Any district court of the United States of erroneous payments made to or on behalf
.within the jurisdiction of which an inquiry of a Commission employee, and regulations of
is carried on may, in case of refusal to obey that Administration for the administrative
permitted by law.
(4) The Commission may enter into con-
tracts with Federal ]or State agencies, private
firms, institutions, and individuals for the
conduct of research or surveys, the prepara-
tion of reports, and other activities necessary
to the discharge of its duties.
(5) The Commission may delegate any of
its functions to individual members of the
Commission or to designated individuals on
its staff and to make such rules and regula-
tions as are necessary for the conduct of its
business, except as otherwise provided in
this section.
(d) Members of the Commission who are
appointed from the Government shall not
receive additional compensation by reason
of their service on- the Commission, but they
shall be reimbursed for travel, subsistence,
and other necessary expenses incurred by
them in the performance of the dutiies
vested in the Commission. Other members
of the Commission shall receive compensa-
tion at a rate of $100 for each day engaged
in the business of the Commission, and
shall be reimbursed for travel expenses, in-
cluding per diem in lieu of subsistence, as
authorized by law (5 U.S.C. 5703), for per-
sons in the Government service employed in-
SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
66-SUBMISSION OF A CONCUR-
RENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING
THE PRINTING OF ADDITIONAL
COPIES OF SENATE HEARINGS ON
SPACE PROGRAM BENEFITS
Mr. ANDERSON submitted the follow-
ing concurrent resolution (S. Con Res.
66) ; which was referred to the Commit-
tee on Rules and Administration:
S. CoN. REs. 66
Resolved by the Senate (the House of Rep-
sentatives concurring), That there be printed
for the use of the Aeronautical and Space
Sciences Committee six thousand additional
copies of its "hearing held during the ninety-
first Congress, second session, o; Space Pro-
gram Benefits
SENATE RESOLUTION 405-SUBMIS-
SION OF A RESOLUTION DECLAR-
ING A POLICY FOR PEACE IN IN-
DOCHINA
Mr. MUSKIE (for himself, Mr. HART,
and Mr. MONDALE) submitted a resolu-
tion (S. Res. 405) declaring a policy for
peace in Indochina, which was referred
to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
(The remarks of Mr. MUSKIE when
he submitted the resolution appear later
in the RECORD under the appropriate
heading.)
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Afar 970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 6913
SENATE RESOLUTION 406-SUBMIS- tional policy of the Post office dictates AMENDMENT OF THE FOREIGN
SION OF A RESOLUTION TO PRINT that mail pay its way.,But we all know it MILITARY SALES ACT-AMEND-
AS A SENATE DOCUMENT MATE- costs more to send a letter across the MENT
RIALS RELATING TO SENATE CON- country than across town; yet no one is AMENDMENT NO. ego
CURRENT RESOLUTION 49 suggesting differential rates to account Mr. COOPER, (for himself, Mr.
Mr. ANDERSON submitted the follow- for this. A continuing Government sub- CHURCH, Mr. MANSFIELD, and Mr. AIKEN)
ing resolution (S. Res. 406) ; which wasrate rate is because it involved is c conssiddered an postage integral stamp submitted an amendment, intended to be
ro
referred to the Committee on Rules and part of the service the Post Office should proposed 156 b by y) them, jamendointly the to the bill
Foreign
Administration: provide even though it does not lend
S. RES. 406 itself to exacting economic balance Military Sales Act, which was referred to
Resolved, That there be printed with illus- sheets. the Committee on Foreign Relations and
trations as a Senate document, in such style The book rate should be similarly ordered to be printed.
MENT NO 621
ND
on Printing, a compilation of materials relat-
ing to S. Con. Res. 49, providing Congression-
al recognition to the Goddard Rocket and
Space Museum, Roswell, New Mexico, to-
gether with certain tributes to Dr. Robert H.
Goddard, American rocket pioneer; and that
there be printed for the use of the Aeronau-
tical and Space Sciences Committee seven
thousand additional copies of such docu-
ment.
considered. It performs an important and AME
necessary service for the American pub- Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, on behalf
lic. It permits the transfer of educational of myself and Senators JACKSON, MAG-
and cultural materials at a cost which NUSON, GRAVEL, SCOTT, PERCY, PACKWOOD,
their users can afford. It lowers the cost PEARSON, WILLIAMS OF New Jersey, HOLL-
to students and school systems of educa- INGS, CANNON and ANDERSON, I submit
tional and study materials. It permits today an amendment to the Foreign
people who otherwise might never see Military Sales Act, H.R. 15628, which
a book to have access to all the works of would authorize U.S. assistance, at a
a modern urban library. Thus, while level of $200 million, to encourage posi-
its tive and rapid implementation of a pro-
its way
s not pa
ic
d
,
y
oe
e
this serv
BAPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZA- value to the American people warrants gram of land reform by the government
TION OF THE POSTAL SERVICE- that it be continued. The continuing 10- of South Vietnam.
AMENDMENTS percent budget subsidy is designed to I ask unanimous consent that the text
- AMENDMENT NO. 619 cover just such nonpaying services as of the amendment be printed in the
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I sub- this. RECORD following my remarks.
mit an amendment, intended to be pro- One other feature of my amendment Mr. President, last December, I intro-
posed by me to the. Postal Reorganiza- should be noted. The legislation present- duced an amendment to the Foreign As-
tion Act, S. 3613, which will require that ly before the Post Office and Civil Service sistance Act of 1969 which would have
the Post Office maintain special "book Committee will place rate-making au- provided American support, in the form
rates" similar to those now offered for thority in a commission and the Post- of commodities, for a comprehensive
various, educational and cultural ma- master General. My amendment will not program of land reform in South Viet-
terial. This refinement of the Reorgani- affect this authority. It merely requires nam. At that time, President Thieu's
zation Act is necessary for several rea- that the same relative benefit that is en- "Land to the Tillers" bill was in a very
sons. joyed by "book rate" mail today be con- precarious position, having been diluted
First, the Nation's libraries do a great tinued under postal reorganization. and rendered virtually ineffective by the
deal of mailing, both to other libraries Whenever letter mail rates are adjusted lower house of the South Vietnamese
and to borrowers. In 'my State` of Alaska up or down; the book rate would be pro- legislature.
rural residents are completely dependent portionately adjusted. Since that time, however, the status
on the mails for obtaining library books I ask unanimous consent that the text of the land reform program in South
from our public library system. The of my amendment be printed in the REC- Vietnam has altered significantly. On
sparsely populated areas of my State can- ORD, immediately following my remarks. March 26, 1970, President Thieu signed
not support local libraries and the mails The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- into law one of the most comprehensive
offer the only means of obtaining books pore (Mr. HOLLINGS). The amendment land reform programs in modern history.
from the larger urban libraries. The spe- will be received and printed, and appro- Under the new law, every piece of ten-
Cial "book rate" makes the use of the priately referred; and, without objection, anted land in South Vietnam will be re-
mails for library borrowers economically the amendment will be printed in the turned to the tenants now farming it.
possible. Even with this lower rate, we RECORD. Approximately 21/2 to 3 million acres of
still have many people who cannot af- The amendment (No. 619) was referred land will be transferred to some one mil-
ford to use the libraries because they to the Committee on Post Office and Civil lion families.
cannot afford to pay the return postage. Service, as follows: Some of the specifics of the land re-
Eliminating the "book rate" would not On page 85, line 16, strike "4359, 4452, or form bill are as follows:
only make it impossible for many" more 4554" and insert in lieu thereof "4359 or First, all land not tilled directly by the
Alaskans to use our libraries, but it could 4452". land owner will be affected;
make the initial mailing of the book by on page 85, line 25, and page 86, line I, Second, landlords will be fully com-
the library too expensive for the library strike "4358, 4452(b), and 4554(b) and (c) " pensated by the Government of South
to continue to offer this vital service. and insert in lieu thereof "4358 and 4452 (b) ". Vietnam, on a ratio of 10 percent cash
The second reason for retaining the On page 86, lines 5 and 6, strike "4359, 4452 and 80 percent 8-year bonds redeemable
book rate is the need to provide schools (a), and 4554(a)" and insert in lieu thereof according to an established schedule.
and students with a low-cost method of "4359 and 4452 (a) ". Third, farmers receiving land under
obtaining study materials. The cost to on page 86 following line 9 insert the fol- the new law will be exempt from all kinds
rural schools for obtaining needed books, lowing new subsection: of tax relating to the transfer of land,
note books, and other classroom aids " `(f) Notwithstanding any other provision and also from any land tax in the first
would be exorbitant in many parts of of this section the Commission shall include year of ownership;
my State, and the cost of obtaining neces- in any recommended decision for changes in Fourth, the Government of South Viet-
rates or fees, rates of postage for the classes will encourage the establishment of
sary study materials could be prohibitive of mail or kinds of mailers under section nam w
, farm ill cooperatives to facilitate e tmf
to many Alaskan students. 4554 of this title, as such section existed on
I have. pointed up these two reasons the effective date of the Postal Reorganiza- provement of agricultural methods;
because. of their immediate and severe tion Act, which bear the same ratio, as nearly Fifth, bonds used to compensate for-
impact on my Slate. The present book as is practicable, to the letter mail rate con- mer landlords may be pledged, trans-
rate is also supported by many other rea- tamed in such decision as the rates pro- ferred, used as payment of credit obliga-
sons, ThOt is why Con ress has seen fit vided in section 4554, as such rates existed on tions and land tax, or to buy shares in
the effective date of the Postal Reorganiza-
to lxiaintain this rate for so many years. tion Act, bear to the first class rates as they private or national enterprises;
The, major opposition to maintaining existed on the effective date of the Postal Sixth, strict punitive measures are pro-
vided to deal with any person acting to
the hook, fate s that the new opera- Reorganization Act."
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?_,, .,,_, - CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May-11,4070
prevent implementation of this law; and
. Seventh, land will be distributed to the
following: present tillers, next of kin of
war dead, soldiers and civil servants
when discharged soldiers and civil serv-
ants forced to abandon cultivation be-
cause of the war, in that order.
Mr. President, in recent days we have
witnessed new and serious developments
in our involvement in Southeast Asia,
developments to which a significant seg-
ment of the American populace is op-
posed. Arguing that we need to take ad-
ditional steps to insure the security of a
decreasing number of American troops
in Vietnam and to strengthen our own
negotiating position, as well as that of
the South Vietnamese, President Nixon
has chosen to step up military activity.
I suggest that comprehensive land reform
can serve both these ends, without risk-
ing more American lives and resources.
It is estimated that the majority of
American casualties incurred in this war
are directly or indirectly traceable to
peasant support for the Vietcong. We
cannot expect to totally arrest peasant
defections to the Vietcong-presently
running at an estimated 40,000 a year.
But by encouraging rapid implementa-
tion of land reform, we can strengthen
the possibility of a significant shift in
peasant allegiance toward the central
government.
I suggest further that by broadening
the base of support for the central gov-
ernment, land reform can strengthen the
negotiating position of South Vietnam-
a necessary accomplishment which raises
serious questions as to the purpose and
success of Vietnamization. By giving the
peasants a stake in the preservation of
their country, rapid implementation of
the new land reform program can sup-
ply a new incentive to achieve political
settlement-which most of us will agree
is essential-by threatening the enemy
with the erosion of its rural support.
On the Vietnamese side, I feel that the
political will exists in South Vietnam to
carry through with this program. Distri-
bution over the past year of some 200,000
acres of government-owned lands lends
substantial credibility to President
Thieu's intentions. And viewed in an
even broader context, this particular pro-
gram may have broad implications for
the success of similar programs enacted
in other nations throughout the world.
Therefore. I feel that now, perhaps
more than ever, it is important that the
United States lend its support and en-
couragement to a rapid implementation
of the program. Opposition among some
100,000 landlord families to the success-
ful operation of land reform will be stiff.
Heavy financial de}nands-brought
about by a need to strengthen the credi-
bility of the program by compensating
landlords as soon as possible, and. by the
government's intention to complete this
program on schedule-will come to bear
on an econofny already overextended by
inflationary pressures and increasing ex-
penditures for defense.
The United States must move Quickly
in the direction. of encouraging imple-
mentation of land reform as rapidly as
possible. The Government of South Viet-
nam has set an outside limit of 3 years
for carrying out this program. We who
are sponsoring this amendment feel that
this schedule can ahd must be stepped up,
if the program is to have an immediate
effect on ending the fighting and killing
and on the consequent progress of our
withdrawal from Southeast Asia.
Mr. President, the amendment which
I am introducing would authorize $200
million for support of rapid implementa-
tion of land reform in South Vietnam,
This amount is less than the cost of sev-
eral days of the war. Yet a successful land
reform program could shorten the war
by many more than several days.
There are those who will argue that
the support we are advocating repre-
sents only a further encroachment by the
United States in South Vietnamese af-
fairs, at a time when we are trying to dis-
engage ourselves from these affairs; that
American support of this program will
have the effect of propping up a govern-
ment which does not deserve our sup-
port.
To this argument I reply that it has
long been my conviction that we cannot
really wind down this war unless in some
way we can find a political solution to
the conflict. I think that a political solu-
tion inevitably involves a broadening of
the base of political support for the Gov-
ernment of South Vietnam-the present
one or one,which succeeds it as a result
of free elections. I think that land re-
form, by giving the people of South Viet-
nam a stake in things as they are, could
do a great deal to encourage and pro-
mote the development of a viable politi-
cal solution.
Mr. President, the United States has
spent a great deal, in terms of lives and
money, under the pretense of protecting
the sovereignty of South Vietnam. The
legacy we leave behind when we are
finally disengaged from this conflict may
not- be a pleasant one to remember. 'It
will be extremely difficult for us to meas-
ure the degree to which we have im-
proved the lot of the average South
Vietnamese, or strengthened our own
national security. In this light, I urge my
colleagues to weigh seriously the need for
our support of a program which is prob-
ably the most important thing to happen
in South Vietnam in recent years, in
terms of long-range social and economic
gain, and which could be the most posi-
tive legacy which the United States will
leave behind.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
ALLEN). The amendment will be received
and printed, and appropriately referred;
and, without objection, the amendment
will be printed in the RECORD.
The amendment (No. 621) was referred
to the Committee on Foreign-Relations,
as follows:
H.R. 15628, an Act to amend the Foreign
Military Sales Act viz: On page 4, after line
17, add the following new section:
"SEc. 7. (a) The success of a land reform
program in Vietnam is a material factor in
the future political and economic stability
of that nation, and the speed with which
such a program is given effect may have
consequences with regard to the termination
of hostilities there.
"(b) The President is authorized to use
funds appropriated pursuant to this section
to encourage and support the rapid imple-
mentation of the national i&nd reform pro-
gram enacted in March, 1970, by the Gov-
ernment of South Vietnam. The use of such
funds for land reform in Vietnam shall be
contingent upon the attainment of mutually
agreed goals of accomplishment stressing
economy, efficiency, and advanced implemen-
tation of the program by July 1, 1972.
Tranches for land reform assistance to the
government of Vietnam shall be made at
quarterly intervals based upon satisfactory
achievement towards the 1972 target goal.
"(c) Grants may also be made, out of
funds appropriated pursuant to this section,
for the purchase and shipment to Vietnam
of goods and commodities, manufactured or
produced in the United States, which, by
their introduction into the Vietnamese econ-
omy, will contribute to sound economic de-
velopment in Vietnam. Such goods and com-
modities (1) shall be of a type approved by
the President for such programs; (2) shall
include goods suitable for agricultural sup-
plies, business inventories in nonluxury en-
terprises, and capital goods for economic
development; and (3) may be exchanged for
bonds issued by the Government of Vietnam
to compensate landowners whose lands are
transferred to other persons under such pro-
grams, or used in such other way as the Gov-
ernment of Vietnam may determine, con-
sistent with the purposes of this section.
"(d) In order to carry out the provisions
of this section, there are authorized to be
appropriated $200,000,000 in fiscal year 1971.
Funds appropriated under this section are
authorized to remain available until ex-
pended."
ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF AN
AMENDMENT
AMENDMENT NO. 609
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that, at the next
printing, the names of the Senator from
Michigan (Mr. HART), the Senator from
Minnesota (Mr. MCCARTHY), the Sen-
ator from Connecticut (Mr. RISICOFF),
the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr.
KENNEDY), the Senator from Idaho (Mr.
CHURCH), and the Senator from Maine
(Mr. MUSKIE), be added as cosponsors
of amendment No. 609 to H.R. 17123, an
amendment to end the war in Southeast
Asia.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HOL-
LINGS). Without objection, is is so or-
dered.
Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that, at the next
printing, the name of the Senator from
Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON) be added as a
cosponsor of amendment No. 609 to
H.R.17123, an amendment to end the
war in Southeast Asia.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BELL-
MON). Without objection, it is so or-
dered.
ANNOUNCEMENT OF HEARINGS ON
PREVENTIVE DETENTION
Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, the Con-
stitutional Rights Subcommittee has
scheduled 9 days of hearings on the sub-
ject of pretrial release in the Federal
courts. The hearings on May 20, 21, 26,
27, and June 9, 11, 16, 17, and 18, con-
stitute a resumption of those we began
in January and February of 1969 which
were designed to serve as the first step
in a comprehensive review of the Bail
Reform Act of 1966 and related laws and
procedural rules.
At our initial hearings we received
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THE EVET, $r Release 2004/03/17 CIR-t [~FT! 0 3009
THE CAMBO6M
Nixon Bypassed Usual Path
Deciding to Use Troops
y JAMES DOYLE laird was urffiTli, with all of the military
--,anaratinns that had been approved, even
star staff writerc U,gh he said he presented the plan to
"Ti 4tlt! ouncil during the first major for- LnrUJL Wu at 111-1-.y
ld see as a new offensive operation, but
wou
'' crisis of his achninistration. ~. 14;- not a serious escalation of the war.
r
f a" OR9 of inquiries by Star reporters. at home, but he apparently did not expect
:.."' that a.:.tnnnber -- -l.Y ,.,_..,....,.. apparently nn
dicat
uuucl a~u=c r
r ralations. accompanied the candi ate Nixon delivered a major political
VV , frig missions above the demilitar- during the eight years of Johnson and Ken
--
r- -4 + ?ca the National
they
wh
n e
30
e
-
.Us leading to April
,
an#rotYticed his decision to send troops
-
gm'" io ia, is full of still-secret informs
" avai able information suggests
a
all
"-
o -
y Vila
ers. The decision represents a
a
wrrea ,11 l ala .. .. ,
and
cklcura1fons, without the measi ed
of
r
u
o
p
formal analysis by the larger g
40i gals that were statutory members, or
Teiential designates, to the National
t f ouncil. The President previously
d-and sometimes criticized-
t
n
o
e
been
the cool and measured manner with
which he had handled other situations.
as 1T as within the United States. I
ir' are indications that the president
ifered so quickly that Secretary of State
William P. Rogers was unaware, until the
rove
last minute, of the dii>e
'? 41~ I ~
and that Secretary of efense Melvin
LOP
JUJU U~
planning group, he may have felt that its
een one and tl`iat Mere ?v r-a "
an a l raication of his course
d
.staff for some years studie
alternatives concerning Cam-
ese studies became mare gerti-
auk on" March 18.
mented
l
e
arently acted and imp
lan without ordering a full-
p
.,11iffil
revrew of how such an escalation
Continued From Page A-1
urltyauiycll "to integrate
our diplomatic, military and
economic policies."
"In its place there have
been catch-as-can talkfests
between the President,
staff assistants and various
others," Nixon said.
. And in his state of the world
message last February, the
President proudly listed the 37
meetings of the NSC in 1969
and said, "American strategy
must not be merely the result
of piecemeal tactical decisions
forced by the pressure
events."
yet there is strong eviden ce
ries of piecemeal tactical deci-
and that it was forced
ns
i
s
o
, by what Nixon . saw as the
pressure of events.
For the past five years there
has been strong military pres-
sure on the White House to
allow icursi-ins into Cambo-
dia to clear out Viet Cong and
North Vietnamese sanctuaries.
Even during the height of the
search and destroy strategy in
South Vietnam, no large scale
incursions were allowed, and
none at all was officially sanc-
tioned.
When Nixon on April 20 an-
nounced his plans for with-
drawing 150,000 U.S. troops
m over the next
,/OV~ax~IlARB
X41ooo Communist troops were
riot uctine overt aggression
Yrtst t'ie 'Uainbod inn gov-
ernment and that if they
should jeopardize American
forces in Vietnam, he would
not hesitate to act.
Move for Support
But he also said there was a
decrease in enemy force levels
in Vietnam, and a decrease in
U.S. casualties.
The size of the announced
troop withdrawal was widely
interpreted as a move to bol-
ster political support at home
by making the first long term
commitment of troop with-
drawals. Previous announce-
ments had covered periods of
only a few months.
But the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
who reportedly were tal cen by
surprise by the sine of the
withdrawal announced, appar- I
ently began a new effort to
gain permission to attack the
sanctuaries in Cambodia while
the U.S. was still in Vietnam
in force.
The m i I i t a t y arguments
were that the Lon Nol govern-
ment would accept an Ameri-
can invasion, the 150,000 troop
reduction would make the
sanctuaries more dangerous
as the troops left, time was
running out because,,the Cam-
bodian government vvas under
attack and might fall and the
monsoon rains would prevent
action after May.
This seems the first time
that the President seriously
began to consider the idea of
an invasion.
Gen. Creighton Abrams,
commanding general of U.S.
forces in Vietnam, and Ells-
worth Bunker, U.S. ambassa-
for in Saigon, may have in-
,reased their pressures`tar a
nove against the sanctuaries.
they were the only two men
nentioned by name when Nix-
tn announced his decision,
`after full consultation' with
us advisers.
While the onset of the mon- 1
;cons became an argument for
t quick invasion, that factor,
Hong with the lower casualty
'ates and the lower enemy
orce levels in Vietnam, could
Piave been used to argue for a
lelay until after the monsoons
had lifted and the enemy's in-
tentions became clearer.
And while the administra-
tion justified its attack in
Cambodia on the basis of ene-
my force buildups in the sanc-
tuaries, the fear also was
being expressed in Washington
that Communist troops would
overrun the Cambodian capi-
0337R0002002 6b6 om Penh.
 Concern Grows Approved Fpr e s OKRA'
? egamst C5%
oulapby
": & JJi-,000'F0 230ffl&,e31ouse Briefings
According to White House dent's commitment to a 150,000 The first announcement of the
sources who talked to the press, reduction. operation was made by the
th resident's concern for the That same day Secretary Rog- South Vietnamese government
SttUa ion grew the same day that ers told the House Foreign Af- in Saigon Wednesday, and con-
he a ae his. troop withdrawal fairs Committee that sending firmed in confusing language by
Epee, and was the reason that "U.S. ground troops into Cambo- the Pentagon.
he Keturned unexpectedly to dia would defeat our whole pro- The President went on televi-
Wigton From California on gram in Vietnam." sion Thursday and announced
Monay, April 20. T ,pext day Henry A. Kis- for the first time the extensive
T$,r greater concerti over c"inger, Nixon's loreig affairs use of American troops, saying
Calibo is is said to have been v.iWL began meeting with the confidently, "Tonight,-American
ca e by some views that Com- "Wi te'"panel i on Special Action and South Vietnamese units will
xrittlltst forces were attempting .Stllp, a of senior ad- attack the headquarters for the
e to 4k - (T -
,&v, visersinostl career dl 1 mate, entire Communist military o er-
heir santeuagen a esli red with drafting grans o ation in South Vietnam." p
t l'v s tdesilyt met specific oblem. Later Pentagon sources de
troop acty was gnecTo On F"rida , rif 24, Nixon scribed this headquarters as a
to protect the sanctuaries a1- went to Camp David. The United honeycomb of caves and tunnels,
f'ei dy held from Cambodian Sles Embassy in Saigon was deep enough to withstand B52
troopS. to preparelo implement a t t a c k s, containing massive
the pew government of Cam- fe- - p ans it had- been urging. communications equipment, a
bgdia is been pressing -fhe 1isSStiger 'went to Camp David sophisticated hospital and exten-
06nimUnists toleave, had shut a o~ff~}} Saturday, and on Sunday and sive files.
z~Ajqr port through which some 1hday, back at the White' To date nothing that elaborate
h_A r_ ?s:___
....
t ...141.1 bas been discovered although
e
the
ill trained army incoming chairman of the Jointl I uontnctmg stories or wna>=
x
r'c- _
- n
< E....1.. n um-1
happened and what was happen-
o
f
-
er
ield Iame
he
d
k
?
. i? r eta
s en
n but apparently wee
dude meere n wasn't much to be Activate Plans stories of general officers being
e
ofted by supplying arms be On Monday, the embassy in disappointed with what they
c use the Cambodian arm was !Saigon was told to activate a found, then in lowering their es-
apt. trained sufficiently to "be '1 n'for the South Vietnamese tajnates of what they would find.
Lon Nol said he was
mbodia
i
k th
C
t
tt
P
'
`
a
n
er
e
rem
o a
ac
n arms
to us America51ll y
e
' u ^nn f?ariee with .the assistance not informed in advance of the
I When the briefings for mem-
bers of Congress were held at
the White House on Tuesday,
May 5, the confusion was even
greater. The duration of the op-
eration was listed as anywhere
from five to eight weeks.
A White House spokesman
confirmed that the President
promised members of the For-
eign Affairs Committee that the
incursions would be limited to 35
kilometers (about 21 miles), but
the next day the same spokes-
man said the President didn't
consider that a firm commit-
ment.
While the President emphati-
cally insisted the operation was
not an invasion, in predicting the
Soviet response he compared it
to the world reaction to the 1963
invasion of Czechoslovakia by
the Soviets.
The role of Atty. Gen. John
Mitchell in the strategic decision
is unclear. It probably was an
important one, although it is
being played down by the ad-
ministration.
Mitchell is Nixon's confidant,
the only member of the Cabinet
who always can go directly to
the President. He has attended
all important National Security
Council meetings.
The attorney general was re-'
ported to have urged an even''.
wider invasion, one that would
include an amphibious landing
aimed at buttressing the port of
Sihanoukville at the same time
that the sanctuaries were en-
tered.
Laird reportedly argued
against the more extensive ac
tion. Rogers is said to have
argued against the entire enter-
prise, although the State Depart-
ment disputes this.
Today, eight days after Nix-
on's speech announcing the oper-
ation into Cambodia, a good deal
about it remains murky, includ-
ing its scope and its duration.
Whether this is a policy prob-
lem, a public relations prob-
lem, or even inadequate re-
porting by the press is not yet
certain.
But the highest members of
the government have themselves
appeared uncertain of just what
was happening and what was''
planned. Tonight at 10 o'clock
Nixon holds a press conference,
presumably to attempt to
straighten things out.
V44
e' nesday, April 22, the' of U.S. air support, medical ' attacks, that they violated Cam-
11~Rtionaecurity Council met evacuation teams and air con- bodia's integrity and that he was
suhlecf of Cambodia and trollers on the ground. considering a formal diplomatic
no decision on how to Rogers, in a meeting with the' protest. He never made it.
wit' Senate Foreign Relations C'.nm-
ted extensive arms and Kissinger again and with Rog seep ounxers ana various supply
. .. . . ,
... _
__
b
neovere
caches l
- -L-"-
S
ave
een u
fo
nd
t
r
LiiJ411tdU Luc cU1111 t1tl.l.cc
at ing to mention the use of
Warned of Air Strikes
On Saturday May 2, Laird an-
nounced he would urge air
strikes against North Vietnam if
Hanoi moved troops across the
DMZ. Bombers already had
flown such missions.
Its was only two dais before
re was an air of Crisis these men, it was welt
,ed. For example Under-
y of State Elliot L. c`tii
who by presidential de all NSC meetings
riday in Boston witTi: the_
1;V11111
rnment at Harvar an f
r ?
over onbaay o met
em
his family
Io
the-, thhee-, Defense ? De-fi
?f the sanctuaries, 0& b
10L A rentl`y-tfie .&
Laird then admitted to three
sllch strikes, and discovered to
his chagrin that there was a
fourth he didn't know about.
The New York Times subse-
quently reported high officials
that the bombing sor-
had urged
not be reported because it
ties
.
would embarrass the country.
for the bomb-
The justification
ing of the North was that it
continued present policy, al-
though to most observers it ap-
peared a sharp reversal of the
peared
announcement by Lyndon John-
son that bombing has stopped.
Nixon, appearing somewhat
tired, went to the Pentagon on
Friday morning, May 1, and
made the impromptu statement
About "bums blowing up the
campuses," a comment that,
brought a storm of criticism.
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SECRET
STATSPEC
25X1
25X1
Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel
Friday - 8 May 1970
Page 2
5. Delivered to Mr. Ralph Preston, House
Appropriations Committee staff, a copy of the "Horse Blanket" which
was promised by John Clarke as a supplement to the Agency budget
outline. Mr. Preston reiterated that the name of the game for the
meeting on Monday is Cambodia, which has occupied a substantial
part of the Chairman's time and energies during the past week.
Mr. Preston suggested that it would be well to consider leading off
the briefing with Cambodia.
SECRET
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1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
dollar inorease-above- the budget will be
offeredz alld Carpaigned for by way of
an .lacr, ase.~_ t. we-throw away all fiscal
reatrahl s, this ctlpntry will have had it,
atld, while we may not pay in taxes for
what-we. ,ar endpg, we will pay in
ruti a 'o- Inflation, which is worse than
taxes.
SCr. GROSS I_note with this bill the
Cost of administration of the Bureau
of the Public Debt will be more than
$63 million on an annual basis. I can re-
member.. when Ifirst came to the Con-
gress the appropriation for the Bureau
of the Public Debt was about $20 million
and perhaps even less. Now $63 million
is being expended simply to administer
the office. This does not include a single
dollar for the carrying charges of $20
billion a year on the public debt. It is
simply to administer it. This is almost
unconscionable.
Mr. MAHON. Well, of course, the ad-
ministering of the public debt at this
time ' of economic disturbance is very
difficult. Many operations are necessary
now that were not necessary at an earlier
date.
I see the gentleman from Oklahoma
(Mr. Sxz n) , the chairman of the sub-
`Committee that handles that appropria-
tion, is here, and I will yield to bind for
a comment.
Mr. STEED. In regard to the form of
administering the public debt, the
largest item in the $63 million is nearly
$31 million which goes for postage. Then
the next largest item is the fees that we
pay the Federal Reserve banks and the
commercial banks of the country for
cashing savings bonds and doing other
'functions, for the Treasury Department.
Mr. GROSS. I note that there is con-
tained in this supplemental appropria-
tion bill an increase of $250,000 with
which to print Treasury certificates. Is
this just to purchase oil for the printing
presses or is it to buy new printing presses
in order to expedite the printing? What
is the story?
Mr. STEED. Mr. Chairman, if the gen-
tleman from Texas would yield further,
the bonds, notes and the paper money
that they have to purchase in this coun-
try I believe last year according to the
Treasury they had to issue about 174
million pieces of paper called bonds,
notes or bills. This is just an increase in
the cost of the material which they have
to use. There has been an unprecedented
increase, as the gentleman from Iowa
understands, in the cashing of savings
bonds. This is to pay a 15-percent fee for
each bond cashed. This is an uncontrol-
lable item. So, it just reflects the volume
of selling and buying which is going on
in this field these days.
lrl~Y {NCazAsz 1- YROPRIsrxo s
Mr. GRO, Mr. Chairman, if the gen-
tleman will yield for one further ques-
tion--
Mr. MAR.ON, I yield further to the
gentleman.
Mr. GROSS. Did the committee in set-
ting up this figure of $1,350 million to
fund the . recent pay increases, pull to-
gether any figures as to the number and
cc" of pay increases for, say, the last 10
Mr. MAHON. The various subcommit-
tees screened the variuos pay requests
that were made. We insisted that the de-
partments absorb as much of the pay
increase as possible. Large sums will be
absorbed. This bill contains certain
transfer authority which will help en-
able the agencies to meet these require-
ments; otherwise, the bill would be
greater than it is.
It is a matter of great concern, of
course, to the committee and to the gen-
tleman from Iowa as well as to the peo-
ple generally as to the great cost which
is involved.
Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield for a question?
Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman
from Illinois.
Mr. PUCINSKI. Has the chairman
been able to make an estimate as to
what this supplemental appropriation,
plus the regular appropriation, will do in
terms of increasing the national debt?
What will be the net increase in the na-
tional debt?
Mr. MAHON. Well, I assume t hot. we
will have a rather spirited debate he
the public debt. There will be an in-
crease in the public debt. What effect
this will have I could not predict at this
time.
Mr. PUCINSKI. I have seen various
estimates, one as high as a $15 billion
deficit, for fiscal 1970.
Obviously, if we had some indication
as to what the figures are, it would cer-
tainly affect our action on this legisla-
tion.
The gentleman suggests that much of
these expenditures are uncontrollable. I
do not quite understand that.
Mr. MAHON. Nearly 90 percent of the
bill is for legislated pay increases and
other mandatory-type payments, as page
2 of the committee report clearly indi-
cates. Congress raised the pay and after
we raised the pay, unless we rescind that
action, it is more or less uncontrollable,
unless therg is a vast reduction in per-
stance, authorize a of
money for education and then we only
fund one-half of it. We have a lot of
programs around here where we author-
ize substantially more than we appro-
priate. It is not uncommon, as a matter of
fact, for the Appropriations Committee to
hold the line on almost every single
authorization.
As the gentleman said, we did raise the
salaries, but has any effort been made to
reduce the number of Government em-
ployees to pick up some of that slack?
Mr. MAHON. An effort certainly has
been made, but after Congress screens
the requests, appropriates for the various
programs, and the people are on the pay-
roll you have to pay them for their serv-
ices at the authorized rates. That is es-
sentially what is involved here.
Mr. JONAS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman
from North Carolina.
4005
Mr. JONAS. Mr. Chairman, I would
ask the gentleman if it is not true and
fair to say that when Congress votes a
pay increase that is not the same as au-
thorizing a ceiling on a new program?
That is a legislative enactment of a pay
increase, and I do not see how the Com-
mittee on Appropriations could possibly
fail to approve the money that Congress
has voted in pay for Government workers
and servicemen.
Mr. MAHON. The gentleman is cor-
rect. There is no comparability, as I see
it, between authorizations and uncon-
trollable items such as we have in the
bill.
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Chairman, if the
gentleman will yield further, if my mem-
ory serves me correctly, when President
Johnson was faced with a similar situa-
tion he put a freeze on all new jobs in
the Federal Government. There were no
new jobs created, and no new jobs filled
for at least 6 months or a year.
I was wondering if there was any
agreement like that, perhaps, to help
meet some of the additional costs if
indeed we are going to be faced with a
M billion deficit?
ON. I will undertake to place
into the RD what hasInbeen done with
regard to th ersonnel. some areas it
has gone down, nd in other areas it has
gone up. I will Nut some facts on the
subject in the ex sion of my remarks.
Mr. Chairman, y I add for the rec-
ord that there are va ou5 statistical data
published regularly n Federal employ-
ment. Executive bran h employment has
been trending down and in the current
fiscal year.
The monthly it of the Joint Com-
ditures for March A970--a summary of
which I placed in he RECORD on May 4
at page E3843 hows a reduction in
overall executiv ranch civilian employ-
ment from 1 June through this past
March of a t 65,000. In 7 months there
were redu ons; in 2 months there were
increa , reflecting seasonal and other
temp ry factors. But the aggregate is
d by some 65,000.
Limiting the figures to full-time em-
ployment, last June there were 2,633,000
employees in the executive branch. In
March 1910, there were 2,572,000, a re-
duction of about 61,000. The March fig-
ure is considerably under the budget
planned figure for June 1970.
Some detail by agencies and depart-
ments of the changes is given in my re-
marks in the May 4 RECORD.
Mr. BOW. Mr. Chairman, I yield my-
self such time as I may consume.
(Mr. BOW asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his re-
marks. )
Mr. BOW. Mr. Chairman, the distin-
guished gentleman from Texas, the
chairman of the Committee on Appro-
priations (Mr. Mnxox) has reported on
this bill and has given us a very fine ex-
planation of the details. There is little
left for me to add.
But I do say to the gentleman from Il-
linois, who is concerned about the reduc-
tion in the number of personnel, that I
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 ftarl, 4 af&igM 7 tDEZ40 000200230009-may 7, 1970
`41016 &VAUAPO
interest on ev
points o order. t~ by a
and in otherwho
terested in cities ldebt.
spending waiver of on
do not er, I am sure that the bgentlema efore me. How-
Texas, who puts out these lists each issues, shoulconsider that $35,769 that Mr. GROSS. My questi is, Why not
month, could recall that there were you are now paying every minute for in- cut out the $700,000 until they provide a
many suggestions made about how the terest. Think of what you could do with p gr h t should I mittr~ying e
previous administration was going to re- those moneys. lus duce employment. But employment still an eSo this nd. deficit spending must
have to do something oetry to I note there is the $2Develop00 Bank. grow. continued to not b
Now, I do not believe we are going to to and reduce this debt. The amount is It seems to me that the time is coming
have a $15 billion deficit. That is cer- now some $374 billion. Do you realize h9w when we are going to have to stop appro-
tainly not anticipated. There has been much that is? The gentleman from North priating to these international financial tions. It
me a
seems
savings some indication that we may expect a Carolina has (Mr.
used in the past and which coulduhave been made there without a
slight surplus under the unified budget, which he
and this is a different situation than we I have used that illustrates the sharp dif- bit of trouble. I do not understand $2
have had in the past. ference between a million dollars and a million more for the National Founda-
The gentleman from Texas has also billion dollars. If you were to give your tion on the Arts and Humanities. Did
made a point with respect to the use of wife a million dollars and tell her to go they not receive $20 million last year?
the unified budget. However, if you ex- and spend $1,000 a day she woud be back Mr. BOW. Yes.
amine the unified budget, the same in 3 years for more money. But, if you Mr. GROSS. Why another $2 million
budget we are using now, in the last year gave here a billion dollars and told her to for that?
of the Johnson administration, you find go and spend $1,000 a day-$1 billion- Mr. BOW. I believe this is for the pay
we had a deficit of $25 billion. Therefore you would not see her again for 3,000 incrre CROSS It seems to me this is one
the problem is not the unified budget, years.
and when you talk about the increase This is how much of a difference there place where they could certainly have
in the public debt, and the increase in is between a million dollars and a bil- chopped off to take
BOW. $2 I million. like to correct the
interest, you must also go back and look lion dollars. Our debt is $374 billion. care re of the
at the deficits of the previous adminis- We must begin to reduce this debt so Mr. tration. Past deficits are the reason we that instead of using these moneys for statement pay iI n made. The $2 million is not for are faced with this public debt situation interest on the debt, we can begin to did
you
say? today. It isn't the use of a unified budget. use them for the benefit of the American MMr. r. GBOWROSS I had t said to the gentleman
Now, the gentleman from Texas has people.
also referred to the limitation on desig- Again I say I support this bill, and I that this amount was to take care of a
nated uncontrollables. I am concerned hope the bill will pass without amend- pay increase, and I was in error. It is
about this limitation, although I will ment. We have now been notified that not a pay increase. It is an additional
support it. ' 1Sny ceiling on uncoritrol- there is going to be an amendment of- apMrpropriation.
GROSS. So it is another handout
fables, is almost a contradiction in terms. fered which was never considered in the of $2 million?
Let us look at our experience in 1970- committee. We knew nothing about this Mr. BOW. The funds are to match
and I ' might say that I supported amendment until we came to the floor o-e corporations this kind of limitation for that year. day, and I hope the Members will defeat gifts made from Is privatthat not nice? How
Our experience with that ceiling on un- it when it is offered. . GROSS.
are us to put up
controllables should have certainly Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the another $2t? Itijus t causes
taught us the lesson that we cannot do gentleman yield? We about
much with these items. By the time Mr. BOW. I yield to the gentleman controlling the trying to money sop from
President Nixon took office and sub- from Iowa. the Federal and Teeeasur going to to sopped
mitted his revised budget last April the Mr. GROSS. I am looking at the ap-flation, it is be
am.6unts for these items had been in- propriation provision on page 5 of the this way, Mr. Chairman.
I yield 10
creased by at least $1.6 billion over the bill, "Commission on Population Growth Mr. BOW.
mutes to the gentleman . Chairman, from Arizona
original Johnson budget submitted 3 and the American Future." minutes
.
months earlier. How long has this Commission been in and was given
By this February, when the 1971 bud- operation, without having produced a (Mr. RHODES to revise revise asked and extend his r n
get was submitted, the estimate for 1970 program?
uncontrollables had been revised again Mr. BOW. I would ask the gentleman marks.)
Mr. Chairman, I am in-
Further adding at least another $4.3 billion. from North Carolina (Mr. Jones) to re- formed that there will h an amendment
Further increases are now apparent. spond to that. It is in his bill.
No ceiling is going to prevent these costs Mr. GROSS. I am asking about this offered by my good friend from Mas-
from increasing. Only a responsible fiscal Commission on Population Growth and sachusetts which will have approxi-
policy that is adhered to for a number the American Future, and why $700,000 mately the Mme effect as the various
of years will ultimately correct this should be carried over or transferred amendments might have had to the mili-
problem. without a program having been provided tary authorization bill which we passed
However, a ceiling may help to focus to the committee-which apparently is on yesterday had those amendments
attention on what is going on. It does the reason. Why not Just cut it out until been adopted. I am sorry the gentleman
I
mean that every time a further adjust- they come up with a program rather intends to hi stn the and amendment, but to
ment is made we are reminded of what than continue the $700,000 for it? r~gnire his right
is happening. Mr. JONAS. I did not hear the gen- do as he ap las am a Memsure that he feels
ber of Congress
As the budget director told us on April tleman's original question. strongly, as 13, the interest on the public debt was Mr. GROSS. Why is the $700,000 being doing his duty, he feels constrained to do
estimated at $16.8 billion in January, carried over, apparently protected by a 1this.
were no such amendments of-
1969, By February, 1970, it had risen to waiver of a point of order? Why not just
$18.8 billion and it now looks like as if withhold the $700,000 until they come up fered at the time the American forces
that estimate, must be further increased with a program? How long have they in Vietnam were increased from the 653
by $400 million. been in operation without providing a in Vietnam when President Eisenhower
No one has any real control over these program? left office, over 16,000 by the late Presi-
designated items in the budget. I think Mr. JONAS. This is a brand new or- dent Kennedy
it Is almost futile to put a ceiling on these ganization. it Is a subject about which a There were no such limitations of-
- unctsfrtrollables. considerable amount of current discus- fered when President Lyndon B. Johnson
May'I also comment on the latest esti- sion is going on. They had originally re- decided to bomb North Vietnam. In so
mate I have received of the cost of in- quested funding for the entire 3 years doing he extended the war to North Viet-
terest on the national debt. Take your and we reduced that. We did not wish to nam a real escalation, but there were no
watch and look at the sweep-second unduly delay this program because of the such limitations offered which would
hand. Every `time it goes around-each extent of current concern, but believed ha a ha of the Command eff ect f inhibiting the of
minute-you' will have paid $35,769 for further planning was necessary This the Chief
Extract from CR "Second A Supplemental Appropriations Bill, 1970"
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 May 7, 1970 H 4007
the Armed ;Forces of the united States,
in conducting the war which he felt was
authorized by the Gulf of't'onkin`reso
lution adopted by the Congress of the
United States. There were no such lim-
itations offered when this same ?resi-
dent raised our troop level in Vietnam
from time to time until it reached 546,-
000, as it was when President Nixon was
inaugurated
In my opinion this limiting amend-
merit, if adopted, would have the effect
of inhibiting this President of the United
States in conducting' the operations in
Southeast Asia which were authorized
by the Congress under the Gulf of Ton-
kin resolution.
Let me say first that I am no hawk.
As a matter of fact, I do notthink any-
body wants to end this war in Vietnam
any more quickly or urgently than I" do.
I have one very personal reason for
wanting to end the war, in the shape of
my son, who is now serving as a captain
in military intelligence in Vietnam. I
have other, and perhaps even better,
though less personal, reasons for want-
ing to end it. I feel very strongly that
the world will little note nor long re-
member who controls Southeast Asia, but
I think the world may long remember
what, was done in this, particular period
in history to keep the United States of
America strong in all areas of defense, so
that no enemy with more sophisticated
weapons than those possessed by the
North Vietnamese or any other such
country might,-by miscalculation, think
it could earn a cheap victory over us
and thereby find 'its way to world domi-
nation.
To me that type of preparation is the
most urgent duty which faces the Presi-
dent of the United States of America to-
day. That is the main reason why I yield
to no one in my desire to get out of the
Vietnamese: involvement just as rapid-
ly as we can, because tie effort and treas-
ure spent there could and should be
spent in deterring and preventing a con-
flict much more deadly to- our Nation
and to the entire world than the one in
Vietnam.
Let us look at the situation as we find
it, because we cannot change it. Whether
we like it or not, we are in Vietnam. If
we decided.today, to get out of Vietnam,
we could not possibly do it for weeks and
months, because- the physical facilities
for moving that many troops and their
equipment are not available. So we might
as well look at the situation as it is.
I was in Vietnam about a month ago.
I started with the IV Corps in the Me-
kong Delta, and I went to the III Corps,
to the I[ Corps, to the I Corps along the
DMZ. 1 also went into Laos and spent
2 days in that country. I intend to report
to the House at greater length, when it
becomes possible for me tq have the time
free from:,.. Appropriations Committee
hearings to prepare it properly.
I am pleased to report to. the House
now, however, that I have never seen and
I do not think anybody else has ever
Sen. llr}e troops or a better equipped
Army, Navy, and Air Force than I saw
in Vietnam. I never have seen better
morale among fighting men than I saw
among the American men in South Viet-
nam. I never have seen people more dedi-
cated to the task they were performing
or better able to perform that task than
I saw among the troops wearing the uni-
form of the United States of America
in South Vietnam.
I can also report that a very definite
part of their everyday life, their routine
and objective, is Vietnamization. Major
General Wright, the distinguished com-
manding general of the 101st Airborne
Division a division well known for its
fighting qualities, but not so well known
for its peaceful pursuits, was most em-
phatic in telling me that his main mis-
sion today is Vietnamization, that he is
responsible for training the popular
forces and the regional forces in South
Vietnam so that they may take over and
keep the country free once the Americans
have gone.
I saw this all. Vietnamization is work-
ing. The 1st South Vietnamese Infantry
Division, is an outfit which can stay on
anybody's battlefield, and any American
officer will tell you this is so.
There are several other Vietnamese
divisions which are almost up to that
stage of training. So we are seeing the
plans of President Nixon to get the
United States out of. Vietnam, by Viet-
namizatipn, working. They are working.
Vietnamization is working. But it does
take time.
It has been well said by many of us
here on this floor and many people who
are not Members of this body that the
proof of the pudding on Vietnamization
will come in some few months when the
second 150,000 troop increment has been
removed from that country. Remaining
in the country will be American troops-
mainly communications, maintenance,
arfd supply troops. This is when the dan-
ger may come. This is when the North
Vietnamese may decide they can strike
quickly at our diminished force, humili-
ate the United States of America, and
earn a cheap victory. The real metal of
the South Vietnamese will be tested,
when they try to defeat this attack, which
I predict will come from the North Viet-
namese, at the time when the balance of
American troops in South Vietnam is
such that the people who are the rulers
of North Vietnam will deem the time
proper and right for the success of such
a mission.
The President of the United States
knows this, The Secretary of Defense
knows it. Practically everybody who is
in the defense business in the, Congress
knows it. We have been worried about
this fateful day when we might be faced
with that type of situation. We all want
to do everything possible to insure that
this attack, when it comes, will be unsuc-
cessful.
The. neighboring nation of Cambodia
for many months has been an unwilling
sanctuary for troops of North Viet-
nam. At the end of the Ho Chi Minh
Trail and the Sihanouk Trail supplies
were cached, in South Vietnam at first
but later also in Cambodia, in a sanctu-
ary which our troops and allies did not
hit, They did not hit it because Cam-
bodia was a neutral nation. So as a result
the supplies were built up in these areas,
and as a result those areas of South Viet-
nam to Cambodia, particularly in the
IV Corps Mekong Delta, became strong-
holds of the Vietcong and the North
Vietnamese.
Not too many months ago the situa-
tion changed, because Prince Sihanouk,
then the ruler of Cambodia, was able to
see that his people did not like the idea
of so many Vietnamese being on their
territory. He could see there were so
many of them and they were so well
equipped that they were a danger to his
own regime. So he started to cut off the
supplies which came through the port of
Sihanoukville. He asked Russian and
China to order the North Vietnamese to
leave.
Later on, as we know, when he left the
country, he was overthrown and another
government came in, which not only con-
tinued to cut off the supplies at Siha-
noukville but also cut off the Sihanouk
Trail. They let it be known they expected
the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong
to quit using Cambodia as a sanctuary. .
This put the North Vietnamese to the
test, because they had some pretty ago-
nizing decisions to make. One alternative,
of course, was to withdraw troops before
they used up their supplies and get them
out of danger. A second alternative was to
stay in place and try to supply their peo-
ple as they now are. A third alternative is
to attack, widen their area of domina-
tion, and increase their supply systems
capability. Soon, movements of North
Vietnamese into the interior of Cam-
bodia, and toward Sihanoukville, made it
apparent that Hanoi had chosen the
third alternative, and were trying to turn
Cambodia into a real supply and opera-
tions bastion of communism.
Such a bastion would outflank the
Mekong Delta and the Saigon area. The
delta situation had so improved that
American troops had been pulled out. The
improvement had accelerated after the
closing of Sihanoukville. -
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen-
tleman from Arizona has expired.
Mr. BOW. Mr. Chairman, I yield the
gentleman 5 additional minutes.
Mr. RHODES. Sihanoukville supplied
the IV Corps, which is the Mekong Delta
of Vietnam, and the III Corps, which is
the area in which Saigon is located, with
many goods and supplies. In fact, we are
told that the IV Corps got 75 percent-of
its supplies and equipment through Si-
hanoukville, and the III Corps got 50
percent of its supplies and equipment
through Sihanoukville. Thus, this was a
very important port. No wonder the
North. Vietnamese would be most anxious
to reopen it.
So the thing which they did, after they
were faced with this decision, was to
widen the area which they occupied in
Cambodia to start a drive in the general
direction of Sihanoukville.
It was at this. time and this time only
that the President of the United States
and, I am sure, the President of South
Vietnam went through a rather agonizing
reapprafsal. As long as the troops who oc-
cupied these sanctuaries were in rela-
tively small pockets, there was not an
overwhelming danger that could not be
contained, even by our diminished forces
after the 150,000 troop withdrawal, and
the South Vietnamese. Now, when you
start connecting, those pockets, and
building it up into a continuous chain
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 H 4008
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of supply depots, increasing the capacity ally giving encouragement to the ene-
t
i
h
d
h
of the fio Chi Minh Trail, then it becomes
apparent that Cambodia is about to be-
come a real arsenal for attack against the
South Vietnamese and "the remaining
Americans. It was ' at 'this time and at
this time only that the'President of the
Unitedtates and the;"president of South
Vietnam came to the conclusion that this
was a risk to the lives of our men which
they could not and would not take. So,
as a result, the operation which is now in
progress'was decided upon, and begun.
Now let us look at the North Viet-
namese. Many people are saying that the
United States is an invader and an ag-
gressor in Cambodia. Let us deny that
right now, because the North Vietnamese
are the aggressors. They are the ones who
are there illegally. Nobody asked the
United States and South Vietnam to get
out of Cambodia. They have asked the
North Vietnamese to do so. So, if there is
any'law involved, it is on our side.
It is also being said that we made this
move because we want military victory.
I say this is not true. They are there be-
cause they want military victory. They
are not talking in Paris because
they want military victory not a ne-
gotiated settlement. The Nixon admin-
istration has not changed its prev-
ious pronouncements that what we are
doing in South Vietnam is trying to cre-
ate a climate whereby the South Viet-
namese themselves 'can choose and keep
the type of government which 'they, the
South Vietnamese, .want. I recognize the
fact that the gentleman from Massachu-
setts' amendment will apply only to fiscal
year 1971, which begins after July 1.
However, it has been well said-and the
President of the United States said it
himself-that these American troops will
be out of Cambodia before June 30. What
assurance do we have that if we give an
open invitation like this for the North
Vietnamese to return to those areas,
o no
c
mies of this country wh
t
ey
deserve. We are prolonging the war, not
helping to end it.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen-
tleman has expired.
Mr. BOW. Mr. Chairman, I yield the
gentleman 2 additional minutes.
Mr. RHODES. We are making it possi-
ble for them actually to increase the
number of American casualties in South
Vietnam instead of decreasing them.
Mr. Chairman, I will close by saying
what I said when I started out. There is
nobody who wants to get out of South
Vietnam any faster than I do, but I want
to get out after accomplishing the na-
tional objective by taking the process of
Vietnatnization through'to its culmina-
tion, which will be when the South Viet-
namese really can defend themselves
against North Vietnamese aggression. I
am satisfied that we will be able to do
it, and we are all working toward that
end. The. morale of the South Viet-
namese is magnificent.
When I was there in 1964, every South
Vietnamese I met gave me the impression
that he thought every North Vietnamese
was 9 feet tall and there was not any pos-
sibility that they could be defeated by
the South Vietnamese on the battlefield
or any other way. But, now it is different.
They have confidence. They know they
can do the job because we have helped
them get the arms and equipment with
which to get the job done.
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. RHODES. I yield to the gentle-
Mr. McCLOSKEY. I am disturbed
about the question as to the estimate a
to how long it will take Vietnamization
to work.
Mr. RHODES. I only yield to the gen-
tleman for a question.
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Let me give the
gentleman the question.
The present strength of the South
Vietnamese under arms is 1.2 million
men. The strength of the North Viet-
namese and Vietcong has never exceeded
270,000. We have about a 4-to-i or 5-to-1
strength advantage today and we have
at least a 4-to-1 superiority in numbers
along the Vietnam and Cambodian
border.
How long does the gentleman feel it
will take for the Vietnamese in the III
and IV Corps areas to be successful so
they will not do it? What you are doing'
here, then, is to say, "All right, Mr.
Nixon, You go ahead and 'blow up the
privileged sanctuaries and the bunkers
and confiscate the supplies and all that,
but only in fiscal Year 1910. After that
you will get out and you cannot go back.
You cannot go back under any condi-
tions." But you say to the North Viet-
Amese that they can come back and use
this, again as a privileged sanctuary,
from which to attack' and kill our di-
minished forces:
I submit to you that this 'makes no
sense. If we are going to put up with that
tin which occurred on the :door yester- ?---
numbers game. All I can say to the gen-
d -and I am afraid which wifl occur tleman from California is that the South
here today-then maybe the Congress of Vietnamese have made great strides in
the United States ought to look at its their training and in their equipment.
hole card and realize that we are actu- They are much better now than they
were in 1964 when they had 700,000 men
under 'arms. They are making a great
effort and they are united in their pur-
pose. I believe they will succeed, and do
so in a reasonable time.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield
myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. MAHON asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
TROOPS IN C4MBODIA
Mr."MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I under-
stand that an amendment will be of-
fered relating to the utilization of Ameri-
can troops in Cambodia. I further under-
stand that certain substitute amend-
ments may be offered.
My feeling is that we ought to have a
sharp up or down vote on the issues
involved.
It has been suggested by some that
we might have a limitation offered to
the title V expenditure limitation read-
ing about like this:
Of which expenditures none shall be avail-
able for use by American combat forces In
Cambodia, unless the President shall report
to the Congress that such ground forces are
necessary to protect the lives of the Ameri-
can troops remaining within South Vietnam.
I believe the House ought to vote down
all amendments of this type. We should
not undertake to fix war strategy on this
appropriation bill.
The President as Commander in Chief
of the Armed Forces is committed to take
all appropriate steps to save American
lives and bring the war to an honorable
conclusion at the earliest possible date.
I would think that a vote for an
amendment of the character which is
being proposed would represent a vote
of no confidence in the President. I do
not believe that such an amendment
would be meaningful or helpful. I think
it would tend to worsen our already com-
plex and difficult situation.
Mr. Chairman, I appeal for the sup-
port of the House.
Mr. BOW. Mr. Chairman, will the gen-
tleman yield?
Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman
from Ohio.
Mr. BOW. I quite agree with the gen-
tleman. I would hope that we could face
this one issue, the amendment that is
going to be offered, as it is and without
watering it down. Let us face right up
to this question. I hope that no addi-
tional amendments or substitutes will be
offered, so that we can vote this question
up or down.
Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman
from Illinois.
Mr. ARENDS. Let me state to the gen-
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that the South Vietnamese can hold off
this smaller number of North Vietnam-
 IMay 7, 1970
Approved Fo AJ17 6M 7 gIR000200230009-3
look she was scheduled to speak to a
group of college students.
Says the Washington Star, in conclud-
ing its puerile editorial:
She might be disappointed In the spread-
ing urban blight and the multiplication of
beer cans on the landscape, but the coun-
try is strong enough to spare her a look.
Yes; this country is strong enough, but
if given the chance she would probably
be glad to take up residence among the
beer cans, and why should this Gov-
ernment expend the slightest energy and
expense on throwing this ingrate out of
the country and returning her to Egypt?
Our compliments to Attorney Gen-
eral Mitchell and the Justice Depart-
ment for rejecting this visa application,
and a Bronx cheer for the jellyfish in
the State Department who would creep
and crawl to any adult..An}erican, man
or 'woman, who willfully and willingly
renounces his or her citizenship to carry
the torch of, communism.
Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman will the gen-
tleman Yield?
Mr. GROSS, I am glad to yield to my
friend, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr.
HALL) .
Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, generally I
w
u
o
ld like to associate m
lf
yse
with the
remarks of my colleague, the gentleman
from Iowa, but I wonder if the gentle-
man could define a little more clearly
what he means by a Bronx cheer?
(Pause.)
I will relieve the gentleman of that def-
inition inasmuch as the gentleman is
in the well of the House. But in all seri-
ousness, I would like to know what the
gentleman means when he said Madam
DuBois "threw up" her citizenship and
fled to Ghana, Does the gentleman mean
threw up in the sense that one eructates,
spews, or vomits forth?
Mr. GROSS. Yes, she renounced her
citizenship, she threw it up.
Mr. HALL. Oh, I understand.
Does the gentleman recall numerous
private bills that have come before us on
the House Calendar either to cause us
to allow people without citizenship to
remain in the United States, or a long
list of names in a bill which, if not
acted on, allow the. Department of Justice
and/or the Attorney General to bar de-
portation? And does the gentleman not
f
e
e
l th
at if Madam DuB
i
"
o
s or this
pu-
erile" person who may be attempting back, and who did vomit fo th
and voluntarily renounce her citizenship,
might become one of these "private bills"
edited by some "bleeding heart" or social
so that we would have to work
o
r
u
wi
l
l o
n
t
his House flo
or and keep her
in the United States among the beer
tang?
Mr. GROSS.
have no doubt that had
she been permitted to come to this coun-
try, the Congress would have been faced,
sooner or later, with a private bill to re-
store her citizenship.
Mr. HALL, We need another "kook"
like this back in this country like we
need an extra hole in the head. Let us
"throw-up" a bar against her return.
Mr. GROSS. The bar is already up
and I ho
p
e it
s
t
ays up
I th
k
.
an
the gen-
tleman for his comments.
I would point out that in this bill there
is $892,000 in additional money to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service
to provide for unanticipated costs of
transporting, detaining, and expelling
illegal aliens.
The Clerk will read.
The Clerk read as follows:
RELATED AGENCIES
OFFICE Or EDUCATION
CIVIL RIGHTS EDUCATION
For an additional-amount for "Civil Rights
Education", including not to exceed $250,000
for salaries and expenses, $5,000,000.
Mr. ROONEY of New York. Mr. Chair-
man, I would like to explain this item
with regard to the Office of Education.
(Mr. ROONEY of New York asked and
was given permission to extend his re-
marks at this point in the RECORD.)
Mr. ROONEY of New York. Mr. Chair-
man, I merely wish to state that I per-
sonally was in favor of the full amount
requested for the item "Civil rights edu-
cation, Office of Education."
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.
The Clerk read as follows:
INCREASED PAY COSTS
For additional amounts for appropriations
for the fiscal year 1970, for increased pay
costs authorized by or pursuant to law, as
follows:
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, in view of
the fact that title II relates only to in-
creased pay costs which have been ex-
plained in previous debate, I ask unani-
mous that title II be considered as read-
title II goes from line 11 on page 17
through line 11 on page 47-and I also
ask unanimous consent that the title be
open to amendment at any point.
The CHAIRMAN. is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from Texas?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any points
of order to this particular title?
Mr. BOW. Mr. Chairman, I make the
point of order that a quorum is not
present.
The CHAIRMAN.The Chair will count.
Eighty-one Members are present, not
a quorum. The Clerk will call the roll.
The Clerk called the roll, and the
following Members failed to answer to
their names:
[Roll No. 106)
Addabbo Foley Ottinger
Andrews, Ala. Ford, Gerald R. Poage
Ashley Fraser Pollock
Baring Gilbert Price, Tex.
Bell, Calif. Hagan Pryor, Ark.
Berry Harshs Robison
Blatnik Jarman Roudebush
Bay ne, f Johnson, Calif. Schneebeli
~ nner
Kazan
Stubblefield
Celler
Kee
Taft
Chisholm
Kirwan
Teague
Calif
Clark
Langen
,
.
Teague
Tex
Clawson, Del
Lloyd
,
.
T
Clay
L.J.
n
unney
Corbett
M
Waggoner
Cramer
cCarthy
McClory
Whitten
Wiggins
Dawson
McMillan
Wilson
de la Garza
Madden
,
Charles H
Dent
Melcher
.
Wold
Dickinson
Meskill
Wright
Diggs
Mollohan
Yatron
Dowdy
Moorhead
Zablocki
Fallon
Murphy
Ill
Flowers
,
.
Murphy, N.Y.
Accordingly the Committee rose; and
the Speaker having resumed the chair,
H 4019
Mr. O'HARA, Chairman of the Committee
of the Whole House on the State of the
Union, reported that that Committee,
having had under consideration the bill
H.R. 17399, and finding itself without a
quorum, he had directed the roll to be
called, when 357 Members responded to
their names, a quorum, and he submitted
herewith the names of the absentees to
be spread upon the Journal.
The Committee resumed its sitting.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there amend-
ments to title II?
If not, the Clerk will read.
The Clerk read as follows:
TITLE V
LIMITATION ON FISCAL YEAR 1971
BUDGET OUTLAYS
SEC. 501. (a) Expenditures and net lending
(budget outlays) of the Federal Govern-
ment during the fiscal year ending June 30,
1971, shall not exceed $200,771,000,000: Pro-
vided, That whenever action, or inaction, by
the Congress on requests for appropriations
and other budgetary proposals varies from
t
the Budget he President's recommendations reflected in
the Director of the (Bureau o91-240 ' rt 1),
f the Budget
shall report to the President and to the Con-
gress his estimate of the effect of such action
or inaction on budget outlays, and the lim-
itation set forth herein shall be correspond-
ingly adjusted: Provided further, That the
Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall
report to the President and to the Congress
his estimate of the effect on budget outlays
of other actions by the Congress (whether
initiated by the President or the Congress)
and the limitation set forth herein shall be
correspondingly adjusted, and reports, so far
as practicable, shall indicate whether such
other actions were initiated by the President
or by the Congress.
AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BOLAND
Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Chairman, I offer
an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. BOLAND: On
page 53 on line 25 after the amount, insert
the following: ", of which expenditures none
shall be available for use for American ground
combat forces in Cambodia."
Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Chairman, i know
that most of the Members now in the
Committee will feel that we have been
here before on this amendment-and
so we have, almost. But there is, I think,
a difference.
If the members of this Committee will
glance at the bill, they will know that
the amendment I have offered pertains
to title V of the bill, and that refers t
o
expenditures for the fiscal year 1971.
I made no effort, and none of the
Members on this or on the other side
of the aisle have made any efforts to
limit expenditures in the fiscal year 1970.
So, Mr. Chairman , this is a very clear-
cut issue. All the histrionics on this mat-
ter were wrung out yesterday. I think
the suggestion made by the chairman
of the full Committee on Appropriations,
the gentleman from Texas (Mr. MAHON)
that we ought to meet this issue head on
now, and not freight it down with
amendments tojmy amendment, but just
vote up or dovIn on the amendment I
have offered.
What I have offered here is precisely
what the President of the United States
says he wants to happen. He indicated
that it was his desire, his hope and ac-
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 H4020 Approved For p99i /AL : (FMZ2 MVM00200230009-3 May 7, 1970
tually his command when he met with Mr. BOLAND. I yield to the gentleman I hope and pray this latest maneuver
the members of the Committee on For- from Illinois. ordered by our Chief Executive does not
sign Affairs of both Houses, and the Mr. YATES. In fact, the President lead to similar involvement in Laos,
Senate and House Armed Services Com- himself said that the incursion into Thailand, Burma, or anywhere else in
mittees, that American combat ground Cambodia was for the purpose of ad- Southeast Asia where the threat of
troops would be out of Cambodia in 6 to vancing his policy of Vietnamization. I enemy activity is part of the everyday
8 weeks. do not know that it will, but that is his life.
So he still has that opportunity to ful- judgment and this amendment will give Mr. DADDARIO. Mr. Chairman, I sup-
fill that promise to the American people, him the time he has said he will need. port the amendment of the gentleman
to the Congress, and to the committees Mr. BOLAND. Let me tell the Members from Massachusetts (Mr. BOLAND). The
of Congress. This amendment does not of the Committee that this is the proper House of Representatives finds itself to-
restrict that desire. vehicle for this kind of amendment. I day in a position where it can by its ac-
The amendment that I have offered think all of us should join-Republicans tion lower the level of tension which has
deals solely and only with expenditures ought to join with Democrats-in adopt- been built up and which has reflected it-
in fiscal 1971. Someone asked me, when ing this amendment and let the country self so tragically throughout our coun-
I offered this amendment a moment ago, know that the Congress does have a try as a result of the invasion of Cam-
Why offer this amendment now?" Be- voice and does have a power in these bodia by U.S. troops. The Congress does
,cause I believe that this is one vehicle matters. It most assuredly has an have a constitutional responsibility
and one way in which the Congress it- obligation. which it can assert by supporting the
self can assert its own prerogatives and The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen- Boland amendment-but it can also show
its own power in a matter that directly tleman has expired. that it is sensitive to the emotion that is
concerns this Nation in a very vital way. Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I ask engulfing our young people because they
This is an appropriation bill. This is a unanimous consent that all debate on did believe that President Nixon meant
proper place for this kind of an amend- the amendment and all amendments to withdraw from Vietnam-and are dis-
ment; this amendment pending the ex- thereto conclude at 4 o'clock. mayed by his actions which now includes
penditure of funds in fiscal year 1971. It The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection Cambodia in that tragic course.
justifies permit
prohibits expenditures in fiscal year 1971 to the request of the gentleman from hot he pur, what he decisi orof the President
hot
for American combat proposed troops Texas?
in Cambodia. There was no objection. pursuit, into the nation of Cambodia, is
As a matter of fact, in the Defense De- GENERAL DEBATE to be deplored and condemned. It is based
partment appropriation bill of 1970 there Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I ask on military intelligence indicating that
was a'similar amendment which was of- unanimous consent that all Members geographically this nation harbored
fered in the other body which ask ac- may revise and extend their remarks at threats to the American troops in Viet-
cepted in conference and by this House. this point in the RECORD. nam and that the elimination of these
It related to the countries of Laos and The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to threats would somehow speed American
Thailand. the request of the gentleman from troop withdrawal. No one could have
This amendment relates solely to the Texas? greater awareness than I of the potential
country of Cambodia, the area that is There was no objection. and the uncertainties of combat Intel-
now giving this Nation so much frustra- Mr. GAYDOS. Mr. Chairman, I am ligence. At any rate the results of the
tion, so much anxiety, and so much pain. gravely concerned about the President's Cambodian invasion as they have been
This is one way to help alleviate, in my decision to send American troops into reported do not appear to have war-
judgment, some of the pain, some of the Cambodia, a nation which heretofore ranted any enlargement of our combat
frustration, and some of the anxiety that has been adamant in her declarations of activities into Cambodia. They certainly
is now developing all over this land. international neutrality. do not support the tragic domestic con-
We are not touching the funds for I am not privileged to know what in- sequences which have followed in the
1970, only 1971. Over the past year, over formation led the President to order this wake of our expansion of the. wax in
the, past couple of years, not alone in action. I must, of necessity, therefore as- Southeast Asia.
this administration, but the past adman- sume the President is doing what he be- An administration which came into
istration, we have been told that we can lieves is best for the Nation. However, I power on the slogan of "Bring Us To-
build up the forces in South Vietnam am unequivocally opposed to any future gether," seems to be trying to drive us
and that ARVN with its own troops and expansion of this conflict, or this Na- apart. The lamentable confrontation-
.the great amount of equipment the tion's participation in any conflict, until and the tragic deaths-at Kent State
United States has supplied to them to such time as the Congress is given all University reflect rising national tension
take care of the situation in South Viet- the whys and wherefores, as the administration reacts unwisely to
nain. I question the reasoning for using our increasing dissent to its policies. I find
Let me say that with the standing troops in Cambodia on the grounds that that nothing can be said to defend the
army the South Vietnamese now have, that country is a sanctuary for the Viet- policies of an Ohio State administration
and with immense amount of equipment tong and North Vietnamese forces. This which authorizes live ammunition and
-
demon-
and materiel that we now have sent has been common knowledge for years. deadly force to full-scale control student investigation of
them, if they are not now able to defend What I cannot understand is why the strations. a be held.
their, own areas in Saigon from some of President will use American soldiers to this in tragedy A fCongress ull- the must now
can most help-
in this greater effort be most
,the sanctuariethat were in Cambodia, invade this sanctuary when our forces We
the princi- in tis greater teer effort amendment if we rt
never will-be able to do it. We have are prevented from invading fin
gone in, I believe the present campaign pal stronghold of the enemy-North Representative s not interfere with the Presienr
' has met with some degree of success, in Vietnam. it ddooees actions in Cwith t e, but d will
c10ning out the sanctuaries of some Nonetheless, our troops are in Cam- pr it
hospital supplies, food supplies, muni- bodia and there are predictions they will prevent t further 1urthes without the involvement t in in that that area
ea approval and
bons and huts. But before long the be out in 6 weeks or so. I wonder. I can aftef Congress.
North Vietnamese will be back in the recall a prediction made during the Ko- consent of of the the New Jersey. Mr.
sanctuaries. rean conflict that American troops would ChaiMr. DANIELS of rman, I rise in support of the
It would seem to me that the obliga- be home before Christmas of a particular nt offered by the gentleman
tion, npw js upon the ARVN, the South year. However, Red China entered the menfromdm dm Massachusetts amendment off re e (by he gent
Vc tpens ,ifese theArmy, to defend its own po- fray and Christmas was a long time com- recent decision r
si the President
t are attacked from the ing. The
to extend the war in Vietnam si nt
S~actuaries tit the ARVIN troops go in I want no more Koreas, Vietnams, neighboring nation of Cambodia con-
a" clean out the sanctuaries. We have Cambodian or any other undeclared war statutes, in spite of what the President
done our part, as we are now doing, and started at the discretion of any Presi- has stated, a grave escalation of the war
which the President thinks will be a sue- dent. I believe the authority to plunge well as a constitutional crisis.
as
cars: Ali of us pray it will be a success, this Nation into bloody battle should
' 'AI'FlS. Mr. Chairman, will the rest where it was placed by the Constitu- The President failed to consult with
gentleman yield? tion-in the hands of the Congress. either the Senate which has direct
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 May 7,1970 Approved Eff
H 4021
constitutional authority to "advise and Moreover, the Secretary specifically duties.' No report is required. No de-
consent" in matters of major foreign stated that the administration would termination is required. It applies simply
policy, or the House which holds the want to consult fully with the Congress to troops that are there for a specific
powers of the purse in all matters con- because the administration recognized purpose.
cerning Federal spending, including for- the need for public support. Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, I make the
eign and military assistance. The failure It would seem obvious that in order to further point of order that it is legis-
to formally consult with either House or, support our men in Cambodia, we would lation on an appropriation bill.
informally with any Members of the require the continued presence of at . The CHAIRMAN (Mr. O'HARA). The
i di Chair has examined the proposed amend-
-
t
only branch of Government most respon-
sive to the changing attitudes of the
people.
This failure of the President is not
only an insult to Members of Congress
and their constituents, but evinces an
intention on the part of the President
to assume greater powers than given him
by the Constitution. Never before, has a
President invaded another country with-
out first consulting with Congress.
Furthermore, the President indicated
that the reason for sending troops to
Cambodia, an independent sovereign
country, was that it was necessary to
destroy the North Vietnamese headquar-
ters operation as well as other enemy
installations and materiel.
At this time the Cambodian operation
has been a military failure as I shall
point out.
In the past few days since the invasion,
I have received hundreds of letters from
constituents in Hudson County deploring
the President's action. When I left my
office, letters, telegrams, and phone calls
were still coming in. Some were from
people who had never before written to
me. Some constituents were so enraged
they called for the impeachment of the
President.
The President has created a situation
bordering on hysteria among many peo-
ple who believed that he meant to de-
escalate and end the war, not create a
new and larger one.
I am appalled by this unilateral deci-
sion to substantially enlarge and mate-
rially change the scope of what I always
believed has been limited to a war in
Vietnam. The President's decision runs
the risk of a major conflagration involy-
ing all of Southeast Asia and China.
The President previously stated in his
campaign that he advocated the deesca-
lation of the war at an early date. It was
largely upon that promise that he was
elected. However, this new military, ad-
venture into Cambodia is not in fact ' a
deescalation of the war in Vietnam, nor
can it lead to its termination. Together
with other recent acknowledgments of
out unauthorized activity 'in Laos and
Thailand, it is an ill-considered escala-
tion and the possible beginning of'a new Amendment offered by Mr. FINDLEY to the
war' in Southeast Asia which could in- amendment offered by Mr. BOLAND: In front
volve over, a million men in a guerrilla of the period insert the following: "except
war. I am opposed to this escalation in those which protect the lives of American
Southeast a? troops remaining within South Vietnam."
On April 20, President Nixon promised Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I make
to roi e by withdrawing 150,000 a point of order against the amendment.
April Vietnam froln , S Seec cre etary the of end Stat te Ro1970.gers The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will
Ox1l 23 state his point of order.
told a Hallse Appropriations Subcom- Mr. MAHON. I make a point of order
mittee incept that_ tes he , aininistration had no on the ground that the amendment re-
incentive to escalate. Our whole incen- quires particular and special duties.
tive is to uelate," said the Secretary. The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman
He contininuedd:
We realize that if we escalate and get"in- from Illinois wish to be heard on the
point of order?
valved in Cambodia with our ground troops
that our whole (Vietnamization) program Is Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, I feel
defeated. that it does not impose any specific
nizes the gentleman from Michigan (Mr.
RIEGLE).
Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. Chairman, as I un-
derstand the Boland amendment it would
give the President some 7 weeks to con-
clude American military operations in
Cambodia. I believe this is reasonable,
and hence I support the Boland amend-
ment. I believe that beyond that time, if
the President feels the strategic interests
of this country are really on the line,
he should then do exactly what the Con-
stitution requires; that is, come before
this body and seek formal congressional
authorization to proceed beyond that
point.
The other day in our subcommittee of
the Appropriations Committee we had as
a witness the AID Director from Viet-
nam. He made the comment to me that
his wife had been with him in Saigon for
the past 10 months, and had just come
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n
least the 150,000 men the Presiden
cated would be withdrawn. Thus, this ment to the amendment. In the opinion of
es an amendment
administration has created the greatest the
entito the
rllencirlient con proposed
credibility gap of all.
The President indicated that the pur- the limitation that was offered by the
pose of this invasion was to destroy gentleman from Massachusetts, does not
enemy headquarters, military materiel constitute additional legislation, and is
and communications. As of this date no germane. Therefore the Chair overrules
such headquarters have been found to the point of order.
exist, no major documents have been Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, I ask
turned up, no important officers cap- unanimous consent that the Clerk read
tured-the military materiel seized can ameeBola d by my amendment t as it would be
be quickly and easily replaced.
The definition of success of this inva- The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to
sion has, therefore, intentionally been the request of the gentleman from
revised downward by the President. I un- Illinois?
was no objection.
derstand that the "new definition of suc- There
The Clerk read the Boland amendment
cess" will involve military supplies and it would be amended by the Findley
pounds of rice captured and installa- as
tions destroyed. All can be quickly re- amendment as follows:
placed or rebuilt within a short time. Amendment
as amended by the L FD of
Moreover, the military invasion or- Mamendment: On page n 53 on line 25 after ley
dered by the President, as recognized by amount, insert the following: ", of which
the Secretary of State, so changed the expenditures none shall be available for use
character of our involvement in South- for American ground combat forces in Cam-
east Asia that he was constitutionally bodia except those which protect the lives
bound to consult with and obtain the ap- of American troops remaining within South
proval of the Congress before taking Vietnam."
military action in Cambodia. Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, I would
The Constitution specifically provides hope that no Member of this body would
that the power to declare war and deter- wish to leave the impression, by support-
mine its strategic course rests with Con- ing any amendment today, that sub-
gress. sequent to July 1 he would wish the
The Founding Fathers were explicit in President of the United States as Com-
this regard. They were unwilling to be- mander in Chief to fail to do what he
stow upon one man both the power to feels is necessary to protect the lives of
declare and the power to conduct a war. American troops remaining in South
I do not wish to obstruct the Presi- Vietnam.
dent in, his duty as commander in chief, That is why I propose this amendment.
but neither will I, as a representative of The CHAIRMAN. The question is on
the people who elected me, accede to the the amendment offered by the gentleman
President powers conferred upon me by from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY) to the
the Constitution and which the people amendment offered by the gentleman
of Hudson County expect me to exercise from Massachusetts (Mr. BOLAND).
in their behalf. The question was taken; and on a di-
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog- vision (demanded by Mr. FINDLEY) there
nizes the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. were-ayes 50, noes 87.
FINDLEY).
So the amendment to the amendment
AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. FINDLEY TO THE was rejected.
Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer
an amendment to the amendment offered
by the gentleman from Massachusetts
 Approved For ftI Qf(R&L i& 72 ~L000200230009-3May 7, 1970
H 4022 U
back to Washington, D.C., and lie said made this difficult decision-to protect Haverford College were determined not
she actually feels safer on the streets of American lives-American soldiers who to resort to violence, but they had to have
Saigon than she does on the streets of may, in the future, serve in Vietnam. some vehicle or path to follow to indicate
Washington, D.C., our Nation's Capital. I say we should defeat this amend- their profound opposition to the Presi-
What a sad admission this is., that we ment, because if we keep saying to the dent's decision. The whole college, all the
should devote so much effort and atten- North Vietnamese that you should come students and the faculty, have decided to
tion to Southeast Asia that we should on back after we blow up these sanctu- come to Washington today to speak to
actually make the streets of Saigon safer aries and make more sanctuaries and say their Co grr es their q views in r epp tly, to
than those of our Nation's Capital, or to the American Government that you let Detroit or Los Angeles, or of any other cannot go in and destroy them, it is no to what
a statement President nt has do ie. Peer
of by
major c,ity in this country, way to protect American lives. gave
I believe that in supporting the Boland The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog- John R. Coleman, president of Haver-
amendment we have an opportunity to nizes the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. dford ent Cf leg ;Thomas L. en Stanley
ity in regain the our proper formulation of constitutional national author-
policy. . YATES). YATES. The gentleman from J. Murphy, past president of the student The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog- Arizona, my very food friend, premises council. They announced their purpose
"to express to our representa-
nizes the gentleman from Wisconsin his argument on the fact that there as being
the "to depth of our concern epfor
(Mr. OBEY). should be a permanent force of North wtives hat the Cambodian crisis is doing
or
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman I rise in Vietnamese in Cambodia and says there- American hat Clife, a and n learn from them
support of the amendment by the gen- fore we ought to allow a permanent force can about tha arms."
tleman from Massachusetts (Mr. BOL- of American troops in Cambodia or else what we added:
AND) to prevent the expenditure of the permit them to come back at some time They funds under this act after July 1, 1970, for in the future if they are needed. We akethisortege st Wof ova n al-
ground combat operations in Cambodia. Mr. RHODES. Will the gentleman m msee ite o coll way to respond ration-
and creatively to this respond r have crisis. We
The President has said that our Cam- yield? cause the entire
bodian adventure is no-open-ended ar- Mr. YATES. I will not yield, already seen the frightening consequences
rangement. All this amendment seeks to Mr. RHODES. The gentleman is put- from the enlargement of the war in South-
do is to guarantee that fact. ting words in my mouth that I did not east Asia. We have seen much of the educa-
The President has said that we will be say. tional process undermined in this past week
out in 6 weeks. This amendment takes Mr. YATES. I decline to yield, Let me as doubts, t fear, ,anand bitternesscttake over on
e thought
him at his word. It gives him the time he finish my statement. that a"bunis" who fter campus. We
to see the logic in
asks for and no more. I believe that is a The President of the United States that it Is a war in oto narrow it, in
reasonable compromise and it deserves himself has said that he is going to stay assert that at as in order rderu men row IthWe
the support of this House, in Cambodia for 6 to 8 weeks. We have that are troubled by the path now being
(Mr. OBEY asked and was given per- taken him at his word by this amend- pursued in Vietnam and Cambodia.
mission to revise and extend his re- ment. The gentleman from Massachu- We come to Washington, as members of an
marks.) setts proposes a limitation of funds for educational -community, to speak out and to
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog- the appropriations beginning July 1, 1970, learn. We do not pretend to have any easy
nizes the gentleman from Arizona (Mr.' and to continue through the next fiscal answers on which we unite. But we are
ES). year. The President would be permitted united in our determination to act with
R Mr. RHODES asked and was given to have American troops in Cambodia to courage, sense, and taste in expressing fear
about what is now going on and hope about
(
permission to revise and extend his re- carry on their duties until June 30, 1970, what Congress can do to save us from fur-
marks.) Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the ther calamity in Asia and further division at
Mr. RHODES. Mr. Chairman, let there Boland amendment. I am opposed to home.
be no doubt about this. The North Viet- President Nixon's decision to send Amer- Mr. Chairman, we must give tyoung
namese troops who are in Cambodia. ican troops into Cambodia. The gentle- men and women w this country give the the ong
and
are just as much a part of the war in man's amendment would limit the Cam- men d o of tthe to
South Vietnameas if they were stationed bodian expedition to June 30, 1970; it know ortnn to en x t
there permanently. They fight in South would permit the President the 6 to 8 kthat their ow are listening opportunity.
shoed be hit. poses there. The day will come, Mr. Chairman,
If these bases are not hit they will be- M Mr. Chairman, together with the coun-
come the nucleus of a Communist supply try, I was shocked by President Nixon's when the Executive will consult the Con-war and operations 'bastion- which will decision to invade Cambodia. I-thought it When before tar nglt a country into
it as we
seriously threaten the diminished Amer- was an unfortunate reversal of the wind- w insist upon icy that the
ican next 150,00remaining b Is withdrawn. after the bing elieveWthn at lthe Pr s dent was promul- Bo land amendment. Themeasure Preident
n
next 1 are increment Adrawn.
There e amany fine young g Americans ring our troops out of Vietnam. His an fore uhehordeed Americana boys to Cam-
nouncement that he had ordered the bodia. The constitutional provisions are
tion in Washington I today defend protesting the ac-
do this, dgr ewihg thtoem withdrawal of 150,000 American troops clear. We cannot abide unilateral action
th ths, though I disagree with them was accepted as being in line with this of this kind by any President.
thoroughly. from
Arizona I sincerely hope that none them will suiting the Congress, a without con- The gentl
RHODES) hase stated that North Vietnam
ever do, have to serve will in Vit emo If they e down the war, the President escalated it has stationed a permanent force in Cam-
left hope they wnot 0 among Americans those by sending American boys into Cambodia. bodia. He argues, therefore, that the
left after the next they part of that are I consider the President's action to be President should be able to move into
pulled out. o they are apa t by ill-considered, an action that will fac- Cambodia at will to battle that force as
threatened force, I erha they err not by tionalize the country to an even greater frequently as he wishes to do so. Such
t threatened and perhaps overrun
Ban e- degree than it is now and will loose ex- an argument gives substance to the fear
Cambodia. fdiar. o If from this should privileged
a pehave battle-
shood Cambo to aries In Camld occur, thplosive forces. It at were quiescent. lOexacerbate tensions ne has only to 1 k dia that hasmany b come cans
I sure` that each such person would h at the press to see that every university ground of the widened war, that if the
he, acids success of the effort an are en campus In the country has been stirred President feels justified in moving our
gaged and,d2embers of this body, dy, are en- into reaction against his decision. Armed Forces across boundaries of na-
The ho facts s are that any American sot- Mr. Chairman, earlier today, I was vas- floor without the approval of Congress,
Biers W" o is,'- that'diminished force, if ited by a young man who lives in my he can do so if he deems it advantageous
these privileged sanctuaries are allowed district, Peter Temple, who attends Hav- to advance our position in the war. Such
to remain, will be in very grave danger. erford College. I was impressed by the an argument assumes the rightness of
That` s the precise reason the President young man. He said that the students at invading Cambodia not once, but as often
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as he desires to carry the war into Thai-
land or into such other countries as he
deems necessary to support `our goals in
that war, all this without cbngressiofial
approval. Such a thesis violates the Con-
stitution and places too much power in
the hands of the President. ram opposed
to the doctrine of "the moving ' sanctu-
ary," of attacking sanctuaries no matter
where they may be.
I believe we ought to end the Cambo-
dian invasion as quickly as possible and
bring an end to this new Nixon doctrine.
I will support the amendment of the
gentleman from Massachusetts to limit
our intervention.
Mr. Chairm an, I discussed the situa-
tion in my recent newsletter to my con-
stituents in which said:
President Abraham Lincoln told the story
of his friend from Illinois who was a member
of a group of visitors to the state peniten-
tiary. After the group had viewed the entire
institution and was preparing to leave, Lin-
coln's friend became separated and suddenly
found himself alone and lost. Finally, after
wandering through the corridors for a while,
in desperation he turned to a convict who
was looking out from between the bars of his
cell door and cried: "Say, how do you get out
of this place?"
We have been trying for a long time to get
out of the war in Vietnam but without suc-
cess. In 1965' when large contingents of
American troops were sent to Vietnam, brief-
ings were initiated by the President for
members of Congress at which "experts"
from the Department of State and the De-
partment of Defense would advise us on
what was happening in the war. When we
inquired, as we invariably did, how long they
thought the war would last and whether
there was any possibility of reaching an
agreement with the other side of a cease-
fire, the answer given was that there was no
telling how long the war would last, that it
would end not by any agreement but by the
enemy "just'fading away" after having en-
countered the massive power of our armed
forces.
The war, of course, has not faded away
and it does not appear likely to do so in
the near future. Rather than disappearing,
it has suddenly taken new force and shape
with major fighting in Laos and Cambodia.
It was against this background that Presi-
dent Nixon made his statement on, Vietnam
last week, a statement that left many ques-
tions unanswered. Although he said nothing
in so many words about the United States
moving into Camb'o'dia, his subsequent ap-
proval of sending captured communist weap-
ons to the Cambodians, followed by Secretary
of State Rogers' condemnation of the out
break of fighting as "an invasion" would
seem to indicate the PresidentIs flirting with
ieve ould
intervention, an act which I'bel
be disastrous and would escalate the' war,
I 'have written to PresidentpNixon voicing my,
strong objection to any, such participation
on our part.
-In his stateni,ent ' President Nixon reaf
'firmed his_ policy of Vietnan ization which'
Is supposed eventually the swar hift to ththe e nacre
burden of,carry ng on
of South Vietnam without, the ,continue4?
aeslstance of American troops. -But It is such
a long process. Even with the withdrawal aT'
450,000 Americans under the President's or-
der over t 4e, neiit 1 oxt at4 this time
next year there wi11'stbe2,000 American
boys in service in Vietnam, many of whom
will lose their lives as the.war goes on. If
peace is to come, it must come through
agreement rather than Viefnamization.
Although the Paris oonference is presently
at an impasse and although he President's
statement .discounted the chances 'Ioz any
fruitful discussions in this forum, I found
some hope in the passage from his statement
which read :
"A fair political solution should reflect the
existing relationship of political forces with-
in South Vietnam. We recognize the com-
plexity of shaping machinery that would
fairly apportion political power In South
Vietnam. We're flexible. We have offered
nothing on a take it or leave it basis."
If this passage means what at seems to
say, it opens a whole new negotiating front
because it indicates the President is not
firmly and inexorably tied to the Thieu-Ky
government. In my letter I urged him to re-
activate the Paris negotiations with the ap-
pointment of a new ambassador of highest
rank to represent us. I liked his use of the
word "flexible." Flexibility on both sides can
point the road to peace.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog-
nizes the gentleman from New York (Mr.
KocH).
(Mr. KOCH asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. KOCH. Mr. Chairman, every day
that we are in Cambodia violates our
Constitution. I support the Boland
amendment as the best that can come
through this House, but I think we ought
to be out today.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog-
nizes the gentleman from Indiana. (Mr.
LANDGREBE).
Mr. LANDGREBE. Mr. Chairman, the
sacred sanctuaries in Cambodia have cost
the lives of unknown thousands of our
finest young men. I was within 4 miles of
that border last year myself. The com-
mander of our post in this small town
that I was in had lost his life because of
the shelling from the safety behind the
borders. These men are there and they
are our finest young men. They are
willing to die to protect the freedom of
the South Vietnamese, the freedom of
America, and the free world. Those
sanctuaries should have been destroyed
years ago. I do not think that Congress
in this bill should be placing limitations
on the actions of our President in his
effort to not only protect the lives of our
boys who are in South Vietnam nor this
country's efforts to win military victory
over the Communists in Southeast Asia.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog-
nizes the gentleman from New York (Mr.
FARBSTEIN).
Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, the
purpose of this amendment is to keep our
soldiers out of Cambodia after June 30,
and I am all for it. We continue to divide
our people and permit the fomenting of
a condition that can only injure our
Nation. The President said we shall only
go 21 miles into Cambodia. This explodes
the sanctuary theory, because beyond
that area there will remain a permanent
sanctuary. Hence what is the point to be
gained? Let us get them out. Let us get
them out as soon as we can, and if we
can get them out by June 30, we will
save so many more lives. Let us give the
President the opportunity to carry out
his, pledge and pass the amendment.
Mr. HECHLER of West Virginia. Mr.
Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. FARBSTEIN. I am glad to yield to
the gentleman.
(Mr. HECHLER of West Virginia
asked and was given permission to re-
vise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. HECHLER of West Virginia. Mr.
Chairman, I rise in support of the
amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I support the Boland
amendment because I believe we never
should have gone into Vietnam or Cam-
bodia, and should withdraw from both
areas as quickly as possible. I have sent
the following telegram to the Secretary
of the Interior, the Honorable Walter
Hickel, which I would like to read. I em-
phasize that I am categorically opposed
to violence, whether on the campuses, on
the streets, or in Southeast Asia. Those
misguided students and radicals who re-
sort to rock-throwing, bottle-throwing,
bomb-throwing and other forms of vio-
lence, including the burning of build-
ings, are inviting counterviolence and I
deplore and denounce these tactics. By
the adoption of the Boland amendment
and a quick exit from both Cambodia
and Vietnam, we can take positive steps
toward peace in the world and tranquil-
lity at home. Now I would like to read
the telegram which I sent to say to the
Secretary of the Interior:
Hon. WALTER HICKEL,
Secretary of Interior,
Washington, D.C.:
Heartiest congratulations to you on your
courageous letter to the President. It has
been a sad week in American history, and
developments in Cambodia and on the col-
lege campuses have left millions of Ameri-
cans confused, frustrated and disillusioned.
The fact that a member of the President's
cabinet has the courage to speak out in the
frank terms lends new faith to those who are
-deeply concerned about the future of our
nation. I trust that statements like yours
can be accompanied by a spirit of coopera-
tion, communication and better understand-
ing between high Government leaders and all
the people of this nation. Words alone can-
not unit this nation, yet words have been
misused to accentuate divisions among our
people. Millions of determined Americans
are anxious to reverse this war madness and
once again place the priority where it be-
longs-on the life and dignity of human
beings, and their ability to live and breathe
in a healthy environment. As one whose
official responsibilities extend to our environ-
ment, I once again congratulate you for
your leadership and urge you not to retreat
in your determination to hold to the views
expressed In your letter to the President.
Congressman KEN HECHLER.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog-
nizes the gentleman from Indiana (Mr.
DENNIS).
(Mr. DENNIS asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, what will
be absolutely essential and necessary to
our interest and our safety months from
now, no one here today knows, or can
know. Yet here on this floor this after-
noon, acting under political pressure,
and some of us seeking to make political
headlines, we are asked, as to this par-
ticular President, to circumscribe the
powers of the President of the United
States, powers which he has exercised as
Commander in Chief of the Armed
Forces since the very earliest days of the
Republic. It is an ill-considered thing,
Mr. Chairman, which we ought not to do.
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H 4024
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog- We have spent billions and billions Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Mr. Chairman,
we ha hundasreds wlMr. WALD1IE. I y eld to the gentleman
nizes the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. thof dollars, ousands ofetrohave ops, sent
WILLIAM D. FORD) .
(Mr. WILLIAM D. FORD asked and the South Vietnamese in their efforts to from New York (Mr. LOWENSTEIN). STE
d was was $ ven permission to revise and ex- dragsao 1z and on and on interminably giv nrpermissn toINreviseaskeandd d
tend is his remarks.) Mr. Chairman, I am convinced, as I his remarks.)
Mr. WILLIAM D FORD. Mr. Chair- Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, I
must act the
support of the Only peo lcertain e, that are
favorably on want to associate myself with the re-
man, I ene t because is the on
portunity we will have to express y our- this amendment to demonstrate Con- marks that were made by the gentle-
selves we question o - man from California, and to ask how
selves r the question of whether
onot g a and to reduce the American lposition we are going to Vietnamize the war in
an troops lor
tried American me to get a clear in that struggle. Our entry into Cam- Vietnam by Americanizing the war in
into Cambodia. of sending
into Cambodia. this Issue and bodia flies in the face of that policy. Cambodia?
failed. W on this consulted. tedy the Mr. Chairman, in my opinion this is a The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog-
Preo nizes the gentleman from Massachusetts
beforere not e the fact t was ac com m- - very positive manner in which the Con-
President We were
plished. We now are doing the very best gress can assert is prerogatives and show (Mr. CONTE).
we can with this amendment to express its leadership in trying to reduce the (Mr. CONTE asked and was given per-
our appeal to the President not to fur- American effort in Southeast Asia. mission to revise and extend his re-
ment broaden the war and our involve- Mr. Chairman, I support the amend- marks.)
ment in Indochina. ment which has been offered by the gen-
I suggest to the gentleman from Ari- tleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Bo- Mr. CONTE. Mr. Chairman, I do not
intend to take much time because we dis-
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog- cussed this at great length yesterday.
cern and a bout w out what who our are so actions deeply herem ma- ay LAND).
say to a nizes the gentleman from California The issue now is the same as it was when
say a little the North Vietnamese that they (Mr. WALrIE). we'debated the Leggett amendment-it
saying to the (Mr. WALDIE asked and was given is whether this body is going to assert it-
pay a Actions bit more attention
you g prople a ofi today this dare saying ty thare permissio) L to revise and extend his self on the question of Cambodia.
looking young to peo with tthe country. on They their remarks.) As the gentleman from Massachusetts
lips, "Can the political l system o of the Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Chairman, the in- (Mr. BoLANn) has said, his amendment is
country deal within the framework of vasion of Cambodia seems to me to be an substantially similar to the amendment
our Constitution with the most serious incredible admission by the administra- adopted by the House last year. It was
question dividing this country today?" tion of the failure of the President's then known as the Church amendment,
Mr. Chairman, if we leave here today highly touted Vietnamization policy. If and it provided that no expenditures
as we did yesterday demonstrating the 1.2 million South Vietnamese under shall be available for American ground
fact that we are incapable of even taking arms cannot defend the leisurely with- combat forces in Laos and Thailand. The
the President at his word and prevent- drawal over a period of several years of amendment offered now by Mr. BOLAND
ing further expansion of the war we will 200,000 American troops from that would merely add Cambodia to that list.
be saying to every young person in the country, unless the enemy is entirely de- This is a very mild amendment. It does
country that the Government of this stroyed by American troops, then Viet- not hinder what President Nixon pro-
country and its institutions are impo- namization means the South Vietnamese poses to do because it does not go. into
tent and incapable of dealing with this will be able to stand alone in South Viet- effect until July 1. It does not endanger
serious and direct threat to the very nam only when the American Armed any of our troops. Therefore, I think the
foundations of our Nation. Forces have destroyed the enemy. That House should assert its authority and ap-
Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, will the was the policy of the prior administra- prove this amendment.
gentleman yield? tion. I supported the Leggett amendment
Mr. WILLIAM D. FORD. I yield to the Mr. Chairman, I cannot think of a and I now support the Boland amend-
gentleman from California. worse policy for this country to engage in ment because I think we in this body
(Mr. COHELAN asked and was given and of a worse action than that which must speak up-and speak. up loudly and
permission to revise and extend his the President engaged in last week. clearly-to the people of this great Na-
remarks.) The President should take his eyes off tion. They are looking to the Congress
Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, I would the jungles of Cambodia for a moment for guidance at this critical period, and
and look at his own country. His con- I think we must respond-now.
recog-
like i an and to compliment the associate gentleman mean myself with from centration with the glamor of military
strategy has prevented him from noting he CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog-
his re
his remarks. that his policies are causing convulsions nizice.es the the . ge gentlnte.man from New Jersey
1Vll
r. BRA8CO. eman an yfelc yield? Mr. Chairman, will the of violence and dissent in this country.
Whatever temporary military advantage (Mr. THOMPSON of New Jersey asked
Mr. WI>,hIAM D. FORD. I yield to the might be gained by expanding this war and was given permission to revise and
gentleman. will seem of no consequence if American extend his remarks.)
(Mr. 'BRAS asked and was given society erupts into violence and chaos as Mr. THOMPSON of New Jersey. Mr.
permission to revise and extend his a result. That tragedy is not remote but Chairman, we are in the debt of our dis-
remarksJ is real and present. tinguished colleague, the gentleman
,pls. , of tthe heBay ola Chairman, I ient a Lyddell-Hart, the great western mili- from Massachusetts (Mr. BOLAND) for
suggest h to cure he dilemma a tary strategist, laid down a basic limi- offering this absolutely reasonable and
that this House this H the way to cure take positive tation on all military tactics. No matter sensible amendment. The time has come,
that thfaces is to ta Cod, how wise and effective a proposed mili- notwithstanding all the rhetoric to the on Boland action
The C the MAN. Then Chair today. tary tactic might seem its effectiveness is contrary, for this body to exercise our
The CHAIRMAN. The Cn Connecticut limited by the adage, "He who pays the responsibility in this regard. It is a rea-
nrs the gentleman' from Connecticut piper, calls the tune." sonable, thoughtful, and constructive , G'~A~O asked and was given Mr. President, the youth of this Na- amendment, , statements and of I those who associate myself with
(MMr GIAIMO),
support the
riiis`sion to revise and extend his tion, the mothers and fathers, the wives amendment. Actually it i in essence, the
pe1`x
Urks) and sweethearts, those who "pay the more opportunity for us to express our
Mr: GIATMO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in piper" of your dangerous attachment to to the war in Vietnam and
support of the amendment which has military solutions in Vietnam, are sick, oppositioCambodin . to shall continue such effand
silChpeen offusetts ered by (Mrthe gentleman from Mas- insyllou and this adminit ation They are until we have the victory which Mr.
So).
~5ur polacy, "in Southeast Asia is now "calling the tune," Mr. President, BOLAND's amendment deserves.
bankrupt arid very clearly is flying in and the lyrics of that tune are simple and The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog-
gentleman from California (Mr.
the face of the realities which exist in strong-"end that war and do it now and Moss.)
that area ofthe world. not by expanding it."
1. , M. -.
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(Mr. MOSS asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his re-
a.)
. MOSS Mr Chairman, the gentle-
man from Massachusetts has afforded
us an appropriate opportunity to speak,
out responsibly here in Congress-and if
you need evidence that we need to speak
out, then read the ticker tapes out, in
the Speaker's lobby, and you will find
that the Nation has a great number of its
colleges and universities closed at this
moment.
We find that the Commanding Officer
of the National Guard Bureau has au-
thorized the use of National Guard per-
sonnel as night watchmen around this
Nation. It reads almost like a war com-
munique here in this Nation, and that
has been brought about primarily be-
cause of the very unwise action taken by
the President in acting without the sanc-
tion of the Congress.
Mr. Chairman, I think the very least
we can do is to -take him at his word
and give him his 8 weeks; and cut off
the funds for fiscal 1971..
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog-
nizes the gentleman from Illinois (Mr.
ARENDS) .
(Mr. ARENDS asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr, ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, we cov-
ered this ground at great length on yes-
terday. Now we are preparing to do it
over again. May I simply say that I for
? one do not intend to _tie the hands of
the President in any way in this mat-
ter, none whatsover, because he is my
President as well as yours, and what we
should do is support the" President of
the United States in this case whether
you agree with him politically or not.
I have here. two news releases which
have just come out which indicate in
very clear fashion that progress is being
made, in Cambodia. At the moment it ap-
pears we are on the road toward doing
what the President and the country had
hoped we would be able to do.
As of this very moment we have cap-
tured almost-almost-1 million total
rounds of ammunition. This means 1
million less rounds of ammunition that
are going to be shot at our American
boys just across the Cambodian boarder
in South Vietnam.
Likewise I have a Reuters dispatch
which has just come in over the wire,
and it says:
An Allied force today claimed it captured
the Viet Cong headquarters, which was the
target of the invasion of Cambodia.
.i
Mr. Chairman, this proves that we
are Moving,, in the direction we had
hoped to move,l and Y would trust that
Congress would do noliing at this par-
ticular time t9 slow down what appears
to be real progress in. our ei'forfs to de-
stroy the sanctuaries In Cinibodia.'
air recog-
mizes the Sgentleman from &&w York (Mr.
(Mr. BINHAN1 asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his
remarks,)
meeting Tuesday President Nixon told
the members of the Committee on For-
eign Relations and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and I quote:
We expect the Soviets to protest Our action
(in Cambodia) just as we protested their
invasion of Czechoslovakia.
That is quite an equation. I am not
suggesting that Mr. Nixon regards the
two actions as comparable, but I am sug-
gesting that when he made his decision
on Cambodia, President Nixon seems to
have forgotten the precept of our Found-
ing Fathers that we should show a decent
respect for the opinions of mankind-
and the opinions of mankind include the
opinions of young Americans as well as
the opinions of people around the world.
Mr. Chairman, I believe the adoption
of the Boland amendment would go some
way to repair the damage that has been
done.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog-
nizes the gentleman from New Jersey
(Mr. HOWARD).
(Mr. HOWARD asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HOWARD. Mr. Chairman, I am
sure we are all very happy to hear the
report a few minutes ago from the dis-
tinguished minority whip, who stated, as
the President had indicated, that the
objectives are being met and that we are
destroying the enemy's capability of kill-
ing American men in South Vietnam.
I think that since the President said
we would be out of there by July 1, and
since this amendment of the gentleman
from Massachusetts does not take effect
until after July 1, that we should all give
the President a vote of confidence by
supporting this amendment, and then
we can all go home very happy this
afternoon.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes
the gentleman from California (Mr.
LEGGETT).
(Mr. LEGGETT asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I was
alarmed on reading the newspapers just
a few minutes ago, one of the late re-
leases that came out, that I understand
really violates the President's pledge to
the members of the House Committee on
Armed Services and the Senate commit-
tee that American ground forces would
penetrate no more than 20 miles or 30
miles into Cambodia. I understand now
the U.S. Navy is now floating up the
Mekong River all the way to Phnom
Penh.
I say that we ought to save the Presi-
dent from some of the wild desires of
some of the military leaders.
He said in response to my questions
down at the White House the other day-
I said, "Do you need American ground
forces in Cambodia in the next fiscal
year?" He said, "Congressman, I want to
assure you that I will have the 'head'
(that is a paraphrase) -of the Chairman
of my Joint Chiefs of Staff if we have
them there after July 1."
So I say the amendment
is. directly in point and should be ld a sup-
ported.
As to 'the arguments that have been
made that this is a partisan effort, I re-
mind again the distinguished minority
whip that GERRY FORD, 2 years ago said
the following to President Johnson on
hot pursuit in Cambodia.
[From the Washington Post, Jan. 10, 19681
CONSULT HILL ON "HOT Pussurr," FORD AsKs
House Republican Leader Gerald R. Ford
called on President Johnson yesterday to
clear with Congress before committing U.S.
troops to any "hot pursuit" of Communist
troops across the Cambodian border from
Vietnam.
"Personally I feel they have not made a
case for hot pursuit," he told a news con-
ference in commenting on current Admin-
istration efforts to bar use of Cambodia as
a Communist sanctuary in the war.
"It is important that they [the Adminis-
tration] come to Congress, present the prob-
lem, and get our concurrence before they
adopt a new policy of hot pursuit. This would
be a drastic change," he said.
Ford said he believes North Vietnam is
displaying a "change of attitude" that could
lead to negotiations and an end to the war,
but he warned against any cessation of U.S.
bombing until Hanoi also scales down the
conflict. At a minimum, he said, North Viet-
nam should halve the flow of manpower and
supplies across its border into South
Vietnam.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes
the gentleman from New York (Mr.
LOWENSTEIN).
Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, one
element of this discussion that disturbs
me is the repeated suggestion that some-
how those of us who are concerned about
the effect on young people in this coun-
try of the unauthorized extension, of the
war are less interested in the effect of
the extension of the war on the young
men who are in Vietnam. That sugges-
tion is insulting to the intelligence of
those who make it. It implies that they
do not understand that bringing home
soldiers involved in pointless wars is in
fact the best way to diminish the risks
borne by those soldiers.
The point of course is that passing
this amendment will help all the young
people of this country, the young people
here and the young people in Vietnam
as well-and the not so young people too.
It will help the United States, because it
can help to spare us further bitterness,
and to save lots of money. It can increase
faith in the constitutional processes of
this country at a time when that would
add measurably to our national security.
-Above all, it will save a great many lives
that need not be lost.
It may even help to save us from ever
undergoing again the horror of young
Americans in uniform shooting other
young Americans on a sunny field on
a pleasant campus near the heart of this
country.
Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. LOWENSTEIN. I yield to the gen-
tleman.
(Mr. RYAN asked and,was given per-
mission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, today the
House has an opportunity to rectify the
errors of yesterday, when debate on the
issue of Cambodia was cut off, and when
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the House failed to pass any amend- The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog- tions, or provisions affecting appropriations
ments to the military procurement bill, nizes the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. or other funds, available during the fiscal
H.R. 17123, expressing opposition to the Bow). Year 1970, limiting the amounts which may
President's uniiaterai, unauthorized ac- Mr. BOW. Mr. Chairman, I am op- be expended for personal services, or for pur-
tion in sending American ground corn- eased to the Boland amendment. I which poses involving personal services, ar amounts
bat troops into Cambodia. It is 1,_ week believe this would tie the hands of the Priations may authorizations avtwabl for or
invol ereby for or
since President Nixon's announcement President of the United States. involving such services, , are re hereby increased
that American troops had been ordered This war in Cambodia started 4 years to the extent necessary to meet increased
into Cambodia, and today, the press re- ago when the Communists from North pay costs authorized by or pursuant to law.
ports that 20,000 American, troops are in Vietnam invaded Cambodia and built AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. VANIK
that country. their sanctuaries along the Cambodian Mr. VANIK. Mr. Chairman, I offer an
The gentleman ' from Massachusetts boundary line. These sanctuaries are amendment.
(Mr. BOLAND) has offered an, amendment what we are going to destroy. The Clerk read as follows:
to H.R. 17399, the second supplemental Now let us face the fact that we are Amendment offered by Mr. VANIK: On
appropriation bill for fiscal year 1970, being successful. But whit you say is page 46, after line 23, insert the following:
barring any utilization of fiscal year 1970 that we can be successful only once. You "SEC. 603. None of the funds contained in
funds for American troops in, Cambodia. are saying the North Vietnamese can this act available to the Inter-American
It is essential that Congress exercise come back and build their sanctuaries, Bank shall be used directly or indirectly as
the power of the purse to curb the admin- but we cannot go in and destroy them grants or loans to officers or members, of the
istration's appetite for military answers a second time. You are denying the staff, of the Inter-American Bank."
to the political problem of Vietnam. President of the IfiAted States, as Coin- Mr. VANIK. Mr. Chairman, some time
The amendment is entirely in line with mander in Chief of the Armed Forces, ago I was shocked to learn that the In-
the similar provision adopted last De- the right to protect American lives if ter-American Bank has been making ex-
cember 15 by the Senate, and a
by greed to the Communists return and rebuild their tensive loans to its officers and to its
the House accepting the conference sanctuaries. staff.
report on December 18, 1969, which is The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen- Mr. Chairman, I have discussed this
seetior 64391 the Department of Defense tleman has expired, amendment with the chairman of the
Appropriation Act,'
ct, Public Law, 91-171, The Chair recognizes the gentleman Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of
for fiscal year 1970. It reads: from Texas (Mr. MAHON) to close the the Committee on Appropriations, the
SEc. 643. In line with the expressed nten- debate. distinguished gentleman from Louisiana
tion of the President of the United States, Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, we can- (Mr. PASSMAN), and I should like to ask
none of the funds appropriated by this Act not write war strategy from the floor. A
shall be used to finance. the introduction of at this time if the gentleman from correct
American.ground troops in Laos or Thailand. vote on this amendment does not indi- liana could tell me whether I am correct
Cate whether one is for or against in- in understanding that over 200 loans
Today we seek to expand the import volvement in Cambodia. A vote against have been made to members of the staff
of this provision to include coverage of the amendment would support the Pres- and officers of the Inter-American Bank?
Cambodia. It Is really not even an ex- ident, the Commander in Chief of the Mr. PASSMAN. Mr. Chairman, in re-
pansion of the previously enacted legis- Armed Forces-and affirm that we do not spouse I should like to say to the dis-
lation embodied in, the Defense Depart- propose to tie his hands, and that we tinguished gentleman, that is correct.
ment appropriation bill, but the filling hold him to his commitment to bring the There have been over 200 loans made to
in of a gap unintentionally left by the war to a successful conclusion and at the members and the staff of the Inter-
Senate and House last December. At that earliest possible time. American Development Bank. It is also
time, details of the secret war in Laos Mr. Chairman, it is not possible to re- trye that the Asian Development Bank
and the administration's commitments construct or rehash the arguments of makes the same cost of loans.
in Thailand were beginning to come to yesterday on amendments similar to the Mr. VANIK. I should like to inquire
light. The language then passed was an one facing us today. But on yesterday what kinds of loans these are. Are these
expression of congressional determina- the House voted such amendments down personal loans, property purchase loans,
tion that American ground combat troops by substantial margin. or home modernization loans? What type
would not be used outside of Vietnam. At I think it would be unfortunate, in the are they?
that time, no one even considered that eyes of the country and the world, if the Mr. PASSMAN. It is a combination
the President might take the unthought- House should reverse itself without any of many. In some instances they make
of action of invading the neutral nation substantial reason within a 24-hour pe- home purchase loans. In other instances
of Canl'bodia. Had the thought occurred, riod. We must undertake to act respon- it is merely a loan over a signature.
clearly section 643 would have covered sibly. All Members want to see the war Mr. VANIK. Will the distinguished
this possibility also. The Senate debate ended on honorable terms at the earliest gentleman advise me and advise the
makes this conclusion clear, for the con- possible date. members of this Committee as to whether
cern of the Senate-a concern which the i urge the defeat of the Boland or not the American representative on
House must be presumed to have shared amendment. either the Inter-American Bank or the
in accepting the Senate-passed amend- The CHAIRMAN. The question is on Asian Development Bank has had access
meant-was expansion of the war in the amendment offered by the gentle- to the information concerning the bene-
Southeast Asia. man from Massachusetts (Mr. BOLAND). ficiaries of these loans or the extent of
But, the past aside, the matter of Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Chairman, I de-
major concern now is that American mand tellers. Mr. PASSMAN. I do not quite under-
ground combat troops are in Cambodia. these loans?
No semantic doubletalk is available to Tellers were ordered, and the Chair- stand the gentleman's question.
Mr. VANIK. I should like to inquire
the Pentagon, which has chosen in the man appointed as tellers Mr. BOLAND whether or not the American past to define "ground combat troops" as and Mr. MAHON. represent-
ative on either the Inter-American Bank
excluding "advisers." Here the situation The Committee divided, and the tell- or the Asian Development Bank has any
is starkly clear, and clearly extreme. ers reported that there were-ayes 94, information concerning the extent of the
This amendment would deprive the noes 163. loans or the beneficiaries of the loans.
President of the funds to conduct his new So the amendment was rejected. Is he advised of this practice?
war in Camboda. It offers the House an The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read. Mr. PASSMAN. I car- only speak with
opportunity to assert its constitutional' The Clerk read as follows: respect to the Asian Development Bank.
responsibility on the question of war and 77= VI During our hearings we asked our Di-
peace. There was a sound reason why rector on the Board of the Asian Develop-
the Constitution states that no appropri- GENERAL PROVISIONS ment Bank if he could furnish us with
anon of.money for raising and support- SEC. 601. No part of any appropriation con- the names of the individuals borrowing
ing an army shall be for a longer term tamed in this Act shall remain available for
than 2 years. It was so that the people obligation beyond the current fiscal year the money, the terms and the amounts,
tha unless expressly so provided therein. and he said that information was re-
t
would be hrough Years.
heir to exercise elected
control over athe representatives SEC. 602. Except where specifically in- stricted by the President of the Bank,
creased or decreased elsewhere in this Act, Our own Board member was not privi-
military. Let us do so now, the restrictions contained within appropria- leged to have access as to the amounts of
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 6--rAl NEK4 6M I A
W YOWp'dMF?or Release 2004/03/1-P:`i ? ~ 02M0 -
USE EARS C
N
But Also Rejects Approval of
Intervention in Cambodia
_pekate Is Emotional
The debate concerned)
am endure nts to. a $20.2-billion
hill for,
{q r sirict` he President's au-
American
round combat troops fn eam-
iajao's or Thailand with-
trd the tonsdn o ~e ess.
spectil to Ttitt'NevlY`ark T1m The
ASIrlT1;"l9 B -
q` a of epi~esehtatives, in a
cilmax aft-irtcreas-
eiate on Cam-
by is rdaday either to
`? gsldeiit-,Nixon's in-
0 n r'aibodia or to
] ce cfioris -bri his, au-
i-0-"`undertake military
lops n"5outlzeastAsia.
'House--overwhelmingly
r~ .z
rc~ec~ am tt designed
By JO r W. FTNNE'
would have no' effect, on de-1
forts to achieve a "just peace
- 17
Foreign Relations Committee
Capitol, Sec'retary' of the Trees
David M. Kennedy told the
vwn~ From Page t; Co". 5
tfonal issue deliberately unre-
'bolved.
By a 171-to-144 vote, the
House tentatively adopted an
)mendment by Representative
i Findley, Republican of Il-
Dois, that would have had
ids effect of authorizing the
President to send ground com-
bat troops into Cambodia, Laos
or Thailand if he thought such
Iion necessary to protect the
lives of American troops in
Scnzth Vietnam.
But when it came to final
adoption, the House turned
around and rejected the
amendment by 221 to 32.
was aren that tle
ority of the House waswill-
ug Xo support the President, in
} dde_cision to send troops into
am6oia,- but was unwilling
q?yitex into the constitutipnal
by moving to sanction
ircumseribe the Presidept's
ction. debate now moves to
tie venal e; wht~r~ Admi~tra
'
critics are more numerous,,
tiatfi
fl'l r organized and "lie-
t! tined to place legislaflve
T t'lctions on the President's
Asia
:;Opposition Appears to Grow
IIDespite the inconclusiveness
of the votes, the amendments
provided the first opportunity
fd , a full-scale foreign-policy-
debate in the House since it
adopted a resolution last fall
d
for anAtl''5
ngfy caught up in a Constitu galleries packed with students
tional struggle with Congress opposing the Cambodian attack
took on an Increasingly emo-
pver the wat-tYSk!nb powers of tional tone, particularly after
the piesiaency. Representative L. Mendel Rivers
But when it came` to an of South Carolina, the Chair ces..
endment endorsed bF w1en Committee, finally succeeded in
Nixon, the Hoti using of time limit of 45
n{
hrgu'R` *-P `a"lllameritaty seconds for each sneaker.
eTSa. the "mss situ
Amendmeilfs" to restrict thekult ] by both Republicans -find
'president had been o+)5ptsmd by ocrats indicated that-op-
the White House. To that ex- position was growing as a-te-
tent the votes wete 'a"~ olY sI__` of the Cambodian op ati
i {ration increas- "'TFie-five-hour debate, before
ati .,
Of riot. Details on Page 69.] ijtnistr n ox but the at-
point, loud hisses
v0ft heard from the gallery
after Mr. Rivers observed that
if~the young people were "frus-
ttated" it was because "their
p4rents have not taken enough
bane to talk to them about
patriotism"
The white-haired Mr. Rivers
d impassively in the well
a Cries of "Throw them out!"
a e from members. The stu-
s were allowed to remain.
The members listened in si-
leite as Representative Thom-
as O'Neill Jr. of Cambridge,
a Democrat, arose to
Pest the limitation on de-
bate. "Forty-five seconds," he
complained, "Why, it takes
mo. a time to say hello."
Through a special parliamen-
tary device, Mr. O'Neill ar-
ranged to get five minutes. He
prQCeeded to recound to the
House how "frustrated" aild
"despairing" students had been
crowding his office all day pro-
testing against the Cambodian
operation and li-v his Baugh-
ter., would not , her degree
this year because her college)
w,~s on strike.
.'What good is it to destroy
saqMaries in Cambodia if our
rl tom apart from
whlln._' he asked.
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 NEW YOrc4l1P~r Release 2004103117 p&Z 200Z3Q009
He Says He `Supported Fully'
the Cambodian Incursion
in an ? apparent attempt to
nswer u , is a _xepci s .,hat
at j s in Cambodia.,,
("supported fully" President
IfNixon's decision to employ
American ground troops against
jretary o Defense Melvin R.
By WILLIAM BERCBtR
fpeolal to The New 7lank Times
WASHINGTON, May 6--Sec-
nr ed
Werattto
Asked wheher he had sup-
sion, the Defense Secretary
said: "Yes. I presented these
plans and. briefed the president
and alsp k'he N_tional Security
Contrnumn I
unFil on thestr. particular pro-
osals."
U.S. Arms are Delivered
r4 During the day the State De-
~artmentannounced that the
""first deliveries" of American
Weapons- rifles and carbines
and was given
permission to revise
marks.) and extend his re-
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I had
the privilege of being on a committee
which was set up in the last Congress, by
law, with membership from the Senate
and the House, to study the CVAN-70.
We spent weeks and weeks and weeks of
study. As a result, we came to the con-
clusion which was practically unani-
mous-there was one dissenting vote and
it was not on the fact that we ought to
have modern carriers-but the commit-
tee recommended vigorously that this
carrier be started and pointed out that it
would cost more money if we did not do
it now and that even if we reduced the
number of carriers, we ought to have a
more modern carrier. They evaluated the
factor of cost effectiveness, and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff said there was no
firm showing that there was any saving
whatsoever in the land based approach.
This report referred to by the previous
speaker which was in the Washington
Post, is highly inaccurate.
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, this
would about destroy the military and we
would be gone tomorrow, and so is the
fellow who wrote this-which has been
discredited.
The study mentioned by the preced-
Ing speaker and described in the Wash-
ington Post last Thursday morning ap-
pears only to be another surfacing of
this totally discredited study. There has
been nothing secret about the existence
of this study, nor of its conclusion sug-
gesting a 12 carrier force.
The joint House-Senate subcommit-
tee tried to find its author, Mr. Rosen-
zweig, to talk to him and have him tes-
tify. Was he at the Department of De-
fense where the original study was
made? No; he had left there. Was he
at Brookings Institute where he again
tried to publish the study? No; he had
been let go from there. We tried to reach
him at his home but found he was at
some unbeatable place on the west coast
and unavailable.
This study was so full of holes that
-it was shot down and completely re-
jected by the Department of Defense.
It was so flawed that Brookings refused
to publish it. The Washington Post pub-
lished it as a mysterious new discovery
at a time when it could not be replied
to before the issue is settled in the
House.
What are some of the flaws? The
study assumes that air-based power and
sea-based power are used identically,
whereas, there is a unique capability in
sea-based power.
The study assumes that there will be
plenty of C-5A's available to bring in
the so-called bare-based kit. But only
last week the same opponents rose to
attempt to knock out funds for the
C-5A's and in effect kill that line.
The report assumes that the fuel for
these land-based planes will come in
over the seas yet it does not include any
cost for the maintenance of our su-
periority at sea.
The situation is summed up best by
General Wheeler when he said:
Now, this is an extremely complex prob-
lem and the reason it is complex is that
you first have to calculate what you are
going to charge off against the cost of land-
based tactical air versus what you charge
H 3953
off against sea-based tactical air. And de-
pending upon what you charge off, you come
up with these varying figures.
I must say that I don't regard any of these
studies myself as being definitive and they
certainly are now convincing to me as a
basis for making a judgment as to the
need for sea-based tactical air.
The study paper, which the Washing-
ton Post referred to, is not an official De-
partment of Defense document or even
an approved systems analysis paper. It
was rejected by the Department for its
errors. Neither has it ever been issued
nor approved by Brookings Institute. Its
concept was rejected by the special joint
House-Senate subcommittee and by the
House Armed Services Committee.
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I talked
to a number of people the other day,
who are highly credible people in the
military, about the ships we ought to
have in this bill. They said that above
all things we should retain this carrier,
because this is a large item and it takes
years and years to build. Some of the
smaller craft can be built over a short
period of time, and we might make do
with whatever facilities we have avail-
able, but we cannot make do without
this carrier in the long-range picture.
It costs more money, the more years we
take to start constructing it. This can
be done now relatively economically since
we have just built a similar carrier and
are in the process of building a similar
carrier. But if we wait a year or two, the
cost will accelerate greatly. It would be
a very unwise item to turn down, this
item. Of all items in this bill, this is prob-
ably the most vital to our national
defense.
Mr. Chairman, I include at this point
testimony of Congressman MOORHEAD be-
fore our committee and the responses
from the Navy on points raised:
TESTIMONY OF CONGRESSMAN WILLIAM S.
MOORHEAD BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF
THE HOUSE AND SENATE ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEES STUDYING THE FUTURE ROLE
OF ATTACK CARRIERS, APRIL 8, 1970
Mr. Chairman, as a former officer in an at-
tack carrier task force In the Pacific during
World War II, I appreciate this opportunity
to appear before this Special Joint Commit-
tee to raise some questions about the future
role of attack carriers.
The issue to be determined by this Com-
mittee, it would seem to me, is not whether
we need any carriers now for I know of few
people who would challenge the need for
some carriers. Instead, it would appear that
what needs to be brought out, discussed
and, hopefully, answered is:
1. How many attack carriers do we need
now, In five years or in ten years to supply
the defensive needs of the country?
2. Can part of the tactical air support mis-
sion of the attack carriers be provided more
economically by land based aircraft?
3. And finally, is the mission of the carrier
in the long term being eroded by increasing
technology causing Increased vulnerability
to the point where the Navy ought to give
serious consideration to placing its primary
emphasis on up-grading its capability in
areas other than attack carriers?
As you are aware, an answer to the first
question is imperative if we in Congress are
to fulfill our constitutional role of providing
for the common defense. Since none of the
Communist nations have any attack aircraft
carriers, nor apparently have any intention
of building any attack carriers the question
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 H 3954
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE ay 6, 1970
is whether the present superiority of 15 to 0 of Defense to determine the relative cost conclusions regarding the need for additional
in aircraft carriers should be maintained or of land based and sea based air. The Navy CVA construction:
increased or whether that absolute superior- Staff study on relative costs, which is based 1. There are 11 ships that will be service-
ity of 15 to 0 might be reduced to, say, on the cost data developed by the Joint Study able well into the 1980's and at least one
12 to 0. Group shows: other (the Midway) that will be satisfactory
Although we should not necessarily size "From 1962 to 1969 the average cost of sea until at least 1980. Since it takes about 5
our carrier forces to correspond to Soviet based tactical air, which includes the pro- years to build a CVA, we do not have to fund
forces, it may be useful to look at what the curement, direct and indirect operating costs additional carriers until at least 1975 unless
Soviet Union is doing-especially since so of attack carriers, their air wings and all we want to operate more than 12 CVAs in the
many of our military plans in other cate- supporting facilities amounted to $3.8 billion late 1970's,
gories of defense are based on parity with the per year or 21.3% of the average Navy budget 2. If we want to operate more than 12
Russians. The Soviets are building missile over that period." CVAS in the late 1970's, we must decide now,
cruisers, missile destroyers, high-speed mis- .. Statement on a replacement schedule for the Midway
sile blots, nuclear subs and attack subs- and Essex class carriers.
In terms of national priorities it is in- Comment
but no attack carriers. structive to ,point out that we spend more
Comment than twice as much (over $400 million) on CVAN-70 is required to maintain the mod-
This emphasis in Soviet shipbuilding does operating costs of the 15th carrier task force ernity and capability of the carrier force re-
level
nat` support a thesis limiting the value of for one year than we spent for water pollu- gardless In ayt,atta Nimitzcarrier fo c arrives
attack carriers. The principal reason that the tion control programs last year. class
Soviets do not have attack carriers in their THE STATE OF OUR PRESENT CARRIER FORCE become even more vital if the Navy is re-
fleet is a matter of relative priorities within The answer to the question of whether we quired to operate a smaller carrier force. If a
their national strategy. The USSR, centered should build additional aircraft carriers at reduction in force level is made, it should be
done by retiring older carriers in the fleet;
in the Eurasion Inon land mass, is surrounded by this time depends on: six of the Navy's fifteen attack carriers were
her allies. In fact, Russia has military trea- 1. The number of CVAs we want to oper- launched during or shortly after World War
ties with only two nations not sharing a ate in the late 1970's; and
common border with her. Russia considers 2. The number of CVAS we currently have the United States her primary adversary and which will be both seaworthy and capable when the twelve a jack car fleet r 19ev 1,
NATO the primary threat to the USSR as the of operating the modern tactical aircraft in wwe replace the aging, World Woe II designed
principal impediment to her domination of the late 1970's. Midway. Although extensively , World W modernized,
Europe. The Soviets recognize that the na- At present we have nine modern aircraft tlimitations ay. of size, age and aviation tional strategy of the United States is over- carriers; eight Forrestal class ships which the hitfavailable o in the then vi fa-
seas oriented. We have only two interna- have been commissioned since 1955 and the Midway will make that ship less 2-tye -fold
tional borders. Our military strategy depends nuclear-powered Enterprise which was corn- third as will make as that Nimitz than even capable the
upon overseas alliances. 43 of the 45 nations missioned in 1961. In addition, two new account the advantages
nuclear taking ng into o on.
with which we have treaties are overseas. nuclear-powered carriers have been funded without
The bulk of~m~aterial support of these allies by the Congress. The Nimitz, which was To keep pro ulsiok carrier force modern a
must still Oe carrier by sea. Despite the funded in FY 67, will enter the fleet in tinfusion of new ships is required.
spectacular advances in air travel in recent 1972 and the Eisenhower, which was funded continuing coinfusion attack carrier force level, for
years, 97% of all of the support for Vietnam in FY 68-70, will enter the fleet in 1974. Within the construction car of anew carrier
other year means that attack carriers
has gone by ship. It is clearly evident that In addition to these 11 ships, there are 3 every
our security depends upon the continued Midway class carriers. These ships, which will reach an age of 30 years before they are
the are
free use of the seas. were commissioned in 1945-1947, have re- w replaced-the reach an nominal maximum useful
with a maximum level as low force
The attack carrier force of the U.S. Navy calved extensive modernization since that reps cnominal
would be with afy to build a now
is the principal component through which time. The Midway, which is currently under- of a carrier.
erne es aryltoe uil carrie
we assure ourselves `the continued free use going a $200 million modernization program, aa s 12, every would
of the seas in the pursuit of our national will be recommissioned this year. After mod- when they bec21/2 to
ome 30 years old.
objectives. This is because the attack carrier ernization it will be able to operate all of The three Nimitz class carriers, CYAN G8,
represents air power at sea, and history has the modern aircraft envisioned for the Navy CYAN-6h, and CYAN-la are the only carriers, 70,
conclusively demonstrated that naval rota for at least the next decade. authorized or planned from fiscal year 1964
face forces cannot survive in the face of a Comment through 1974, a period of 11 years; this will
determined air threat without local air su- When the CVAN-70 joins the fleet in 1977, average out to but one new carrier every 32/s
periority. Russia's naval strategy therefore is the Midway will then be 32 years old. We years.
primarily designed to interdict the vital have never operated a carrier past an age Statement
overseas lifelines of the western powers, the of 27 years. The Midway's equipment and With this basic equation involving total
links between the United States and the installations were renewed during moderns- size of the fleet and age as background, I
rest of NATO. Although previous Soviet Navy zation to permit the more effective opera- would like to explore certain factors which
colnrrianders-in-chief have 'stated that the tion of modern aircraft, but the hull, main ought to be considered in determining the
Soviet Union intended to construct a carrier machinery, and basic design will be 32 years size of the carrier fleet,
fleet, the first priority has gone to the con- old. Midway will be approaching the end ROLE OF ATTACK CARRIERS
struction of a massive force of submarines of her useful life. On the other hand, the THE
The role of the carrier ATcan be TACK Rsepa-
and guided-missile ships, the stated mission OVAN-70 will represent the most modern
of which is to oppose the U.S. Navy's attack ship design and will be able to operate the rated into three parts which I present in
carrier fleet. most advanced models of tactical aircraft at order of ease of justification: 1) providing
The Russians are building carriers, rela- their most effective capabilities. "presence" in time of crisis but when no overt
tively small but very modern, and are learn- Statement hostile action has occurred; 2) providing tac-
ing the technology of carriers. Large attack tical air support in major but limited en-
carriers are extremely complex. There is only Thus it should be serviceable for at least gagements such as Vietnam and Korea; and
one shipyard in the world today which can 10 more years. The Coral Sea received an ex- 3) some potential role in the event of an
construct a nuclear powered attack carrier. tensive modernization from 1956-1960 and all-out conflict with the Soviet Union.
Th$ Russians are becoming knowledgeable in the Roosevelt was modernized from 1953- Comment
ca3Tiet operations and are developing their rent aircraft exceptthe Rerae At6C.lThey willube The role of the carrier as envisioned in
industrial capacity for carom construction. able to operate all of the Navy aircraft cur- the above paragraph as being comprised
pl summaro, a eography anof the the strategic rently under development; including the of ". . . three parts ... in order of ease of
Rus- F-14 fighter. justification" places undue emphasis on the
far dictated proximity
of her satellr setell ofites pea has thus thus and
no interdiction aan naval strategy of interdletion vice vice con- Finally, there are 5 modified Essex class Collateral rather than the primary function
trol of the 9eas."Uiider'these circumstances, carriers. These are smaller ships which, with and mission of the carrier and of the Navy.
the exception of the Oriskany, were com- At the outset, it should be made clear that
the cion it an dd for modern has n. ot t been conde- - missioned during World War II. They can- "providing presence", listed first in describing
situattion operation has n not operate the modern F-4 fighters or the the role of the carrier, is part of the collateral
veloped. RA-5 reconnaissance aircraft. (not the primary) mission of the carrier.
Statement It is, difficult to determine the age at Providing tactical air support, listed second,
However, the Navy has estimated that 40 which we should replace CVAs. The answer likewise is part of the carrier's collateral mis-
percent of its budget goes to maintaining depends on the cost to keep the ships sea- sion. Department of Defense Directive 5100.1
the carrier fleet. worthy and the extent to which they can clearly lists the primary and collateral func-
Cotnynent_ operate the modern aircraft. While the Navy tions of the Navy, and the carrier is the
The most recent analysis of the percentage has indicated that the carriers have a nomi- principal instrument through which these
of the total Navy budget consumed by the nal life of 30 years, there are many ships now functions are discharged.
attack carrier force 'has been conducted in in service which are substantially older than The primary function of the United States
conneptioil'with the joint Navy-Air Force ad- this. Without going into this issue any fur- Navy and thus the primary mission of the
hoc study group eorlvened by the Secretary that, however, we can draw the following carrier is to gain and maintain general naval
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May 6, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE
H 3955
supremacy, to control vital sea areas, to pro- other hand, troops or land-based air power seas that does not assume that this control
tect vital sea lines of communication, to must be committed, possibly to later repre- is going to be established and maintained.
establish and maintain local superiority (in- sent an Irrevocable and sometimes embarrass- This mission cannot be performed by land
cluding air) in an area of naval operations, Ing U.S. obligation to remain on foreign based air. Statement
to seize and defend advanced naval bases, soil. Likewise, withdrawal of U.S. land based
and to conduct such land and air operations units often requires, as a political prerequi- The carrier has augmented our land-based
as may be essential to the prosecution of a site, the accord of the country in which the aircraft. The questions raised in this regard
naval campaign; in short, to gain, maintain, units were based. Carriers can be withdrawn deal with the relative cost of land based tac-
and exploit control of the seas and the air at the will of the United States, tical air support vis-a-vis carrier based tac-
over the seas, in support of our national ob- While bombers or airborne troops on strip tical air power.
jectives. Control of the sea is vital to our alert at home may, with proper enroute logis- Much of what follows is gleaned from a
national security. This nation's military tical support and prepositioned stocks of fuel well documented paper entitled "Aircraft
strategy is predicated on a forward posture, and other war material, be effective fighting Carriers--Should We Build More?" prepared
with critical reliance placed upon our over- forces to respond in emergencies overseas, by Mr. Herbert Rosenzweig formerly of the
seas allies and our own forward deployed their value in deterring aggression is ques- OSD office of Systems Analysis and from
forces. Of the 43 countries involved in trea- tionable. Troops and aircraft at home are not notes taken in a seminar conducted by Mr.
ties with the United States, 41 are overseas visible deterrerrts; the carrier can be, when Rosenzweig at the Brookings Institution and
nations. There is no current plan for over- the situation so demands. attended by a member of my staff.
seas military operations of tactical ground The Polaris submarine is our principal sea- Comment
or air forces which does not depend upon going nuclear deterrent, but like the strategic
our free use of the seas. In Vietnam to date bomber, it is strictly a strategic deterrent to The 1968, '69 and '70 versions of the Her-
97% of the supplies have gone by sea. Unless retaliate in the event of a nuclear attack. A bert Rosenzweig study on the relative cost
we can assure ourselves 'continued free use nuclear deterrent is not necessarily effective and effectiveness of land and sea based tac-
of the seas against the most determined and against limited war threats. The conventional tical air were never accepted as official pos'.-
capable potential opposition, our entire po- power of the carrier provides the flexible re- tions, either by OSD(SA), his former em-
litico-military posture loses Its credibility. sponse which can serve as a deterrent In sit- ployer, or by the Brookings Institution, his
The collateral function of the Navy, and uations below the threshold of general war. present employer.
hence the collateral mission of the carrier Statement Mr. Rosenzweig first produced his TACAIR
is to interdict enemy land airpower and com- the Congressional debate cost and requirements study in 1968, when
municatians through operations at sea, and Last year during it was cited that since 1945 our carrier forces he was with OSD(SA), under Dr. Alain En-
to conduct close air and naval support for thoven. This draft, provided unofficially to
had been engaged in more than 50 of these the Navy and Air Force for review and com-
land operations. The carrier carries out this incidents throughout the world. Assuming ment, contended that sea-based air was 2.5
role by operating within tactical air radius an average level of 15 carrier task farces dur- to 3.6 times as expensive as land-based air.
of the objective area on a sustained basis, ing this period, this averages out to a cost of Navy reviewers pointed out invalid assump-
and projecting Its striking power over land about $2 billion per incident. I think that tions and basic errors in logic, concept, facts,
by means of its aircraft. Local sea and air even the Navy would agree that $2 billion per and costing. In the critique of the study at-
supremacy are required to permit the carrier Incident is a pretty steep price tag. The fact tended by the Secretary of the Navy and Dr.
to devote a high percentage of sorties to the of the matter is that "providing presence" is tended en's principal deputy, it was agreed
tactical air mission. The carrier must first an imponderable. It is doubtful if so many of that the draft was inadequate and it was
gain control of the sea and airspace operat- our carriers could be justified if all they did
in area with its aircraft, and then use this withdrawn without having received the
g was to provide presence. Furthermore, "pres- status of an OSD approved document. The
operating sector to project its striking power ence" could have been provided with a re-
draft paper had recommended a CVA force
inland. duced total carrier force. level of 12; the Secretary of Defense decided
Statement Comment to maintain the CVA level at 15.
Additionally, the Navy has indicated that Justification of carriers for "providing OSD(SA) circulated essentially the same
attack carriers are necessary to ensure con- presence" is indeed an imponderable; equally basic study in the spring of 1969 for com-
tinuing freedom of the seas in the face of a imponderable is the role of the carrier in ment. This study reflected a reduced ratio of
growing Soviet naval threat. Each of these preventing small incidents from growing to 1.4 to 1 for costs of sea versus land based
roles or missions is somewhat different and war-sized proportions. We will never know, of TACAIR, but Navy's critique again pointed
ought to be explored separately. course, how much the carrier has influenced out gross and detailed errors. Again OSD did
To PROVIDE A PRESENCE the main course of history, but we do know not approve the study. The CVA force level
The first mission that is, providing pres- that after appearance of the carriers in remained at 15.
ence In time of crisis but when no hostile threatening situations such as that in the Under Brookings Institution sponsorship,
action takes place, is perhaps the most dlffi- Taiwan Straits in the 1950's, a potential he has prepared a 1970 study which is once
cult to assess. In this situation the carrier is enemy changed his tactics in apparent re- more essentially a repeat of previous studies,
presumed to act as a "deterrent. Yet as in sponse to the presence of attack carriers. with the same basic faults. He has presented
Since World War II, we have had war or a briefing of the study to a seminar at Brook-
byy case where hostile action is prevented threats of war, and during 9 of the past 25 ings, however Brookings has not endorsed the by pres tential enemy-can no bne ay yrw a even the years we have been engaged in actual fighting work to date.
erring ggre s t the he in overseas areas. We have used our carriers Statement
balance in say factor
Carrier n favor undoubtedly assist. But aggression. effectively in these wars as well as to provide From these and other sources I would con-
strategic potential do our presence to prevent other wars. The cost of elude:
strategic bombers and our r pofor rapid- the carrier In relation to the cost of the war 1. A land based air wing costs $165 million
craft. deploying land forces and land based air- it may have prevented cannot be calculated
realistically, but the statement above, that less per year to operate than a carrier based
craft.
Comment wing provided no air-lift support is required.
the carrier's presence "averages out to a cost Comment
For presence or show of force to be effec- of about $2 billion per incident," is also an Navy staff analysis of the Relative Cost
tive, it must be credible. That is, the op- unrealistic calculation. A Y
ponent must realize that if he does not back COST OF LAND BASED VERSUS SEA BASED of sea-based and land-based tactical air has
down, the threatening force will defeat him. TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT been conducted using cost analyses from a
Then, too, the deterrent force must be capa- Statement joint ad hoc committee formed by request
ble of carrying mit its threat because the of the Deputy Secretary of Defense in May
The ?main mission of the carrier fleet in the 1969 to derive a common methodology for
enemy may call the bluff. Therefore, a de-
terrent force must have the clear capability past 25 years has been to provide tactical air costing land-based and sea-based systems.
to prevail 'in the specific situation. The attack support first during the Korean conflict and The relative cost of sea-based/land-based
carrier with its demonstrated ability to pro- of late in the Southeast Asian war, tactical air forces (TACAIR) was determined
jest Its striking power for more than 600 Comment by comparison of historical direct mission
miles, and its nuclear potential, represents The fact that in the last two wars, Viet- dedicated and allocated costs attributed to
the most versathe and'powerful single weap- nam and Korea, there was no Naval opposi- each system on the basis of cost per air wing,
on systems in our arsenal. When attack trop has permitted the Navy to devote its squadron and Authorized Aircraft Inventory
carriers make e' show of -force, there is no entire tactical air effort to its collateral mis- (AAI) aircraft.
rillstak nB their i'resence `rior the national lion, participation in the land battle. In Navy Total Obligational Authority (TOA)
resd ve,tlia put them in position. recent years this has resulted in primary for mission categories from 1962 to 1969 were
The precise control which can be exercised attention being focused on this single part determined by study of line item by line item
at the fghes# level of national command al- of the broad capability of sea based air. of all direct and supporting costs from the
lows the carrier to be inserted into the mili- It should be noted that the primary entire Navy budget that could be attributed
tary or politico-military situation to the de- misson of sea based air is to contribute to to the Navy missions including _ TACAIR.
gr'e2 desired, l can be avvisable presence if the control of the sea and the air over the 100% of the Navy budget dollars were iden-
retluiZed, yet'not actually intrude into the sea. There is no valid strategy involving the tifled with various mission categories.
~~ o?+ r army ?r air forces over- Air Force TACAIR costs were riot available
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in detail comparable to the Navy cost analy-
sis. The Air Force provided a breakdown of
the Air Force budgets which allocated only
75% of Air Force budget dollars by mission
categories, Including TACAIR. '
The average ratios of cost for the period
1962 to 1969 were determined to be as fol-
Statement
2. If airlift is provided to support the land-
based wing and bare base kits are preposi-
tioned in Europe, Southeast Asia and Ko-
rea, the land-based wing is still $120 million
per year less than the carrier equivalent. In
such a case the land based wing could be
deployed as fast as the fastest possible car-
rier deployment.
Per air wing---------------------------
1.2
Per squadron--------------------------
1.5
Per aircraft (AAI) ---------------------
Statement
1.3
In such a case the land based wings can be
deployed almost as quickly as carrier based
wings.
Comment
Mr. Rosenzweig's analysis of the average
deployment time for the nth, or incremental
CVA, is misleading and ignores the following:
a. CVA force levels are based on a world-
wide scenario which means that even though
they may be deployed in response to a con-
tingency in one ocean, the CVAs in the other
ocean are generally held in reserve' for emer-
gencies in their own ocean.
b. Our national strategy, assumes and we
may normally expect, strategic warning for
any contingency of such a magnitude that
major forces should be alerted and deployed.
One of the major advantages of the CVA is
that it can be deployed at the first hint of
strategic warning and does not have to wait
out the diplomatic maneuvering. This will
usually reduce CVA reaction/response time
to near zero.
c. Quick response time loses its significance
after a few days. We have seen historically
the importance of countering an aggressive
thrust within the first five days. Since we
maximize the inherent utility of the CVA by
maintaining one-third of the force forward
deployed in "peacetime," the response time
impact of the incremental carrier is that one-
third more CVA could be in position to react
within the critical early days of a contin-
gency.
The mobility of the carriers permits con-
centration of sea-based airpower to the degree
required by the task at hand. They can be
moved any place on 70% of the earth's sur-
face covered by international waters, without
any international agreements or basing
rights, at a rate of more than 600 miles a
day and at speeds up to 30 knots.
All carriers in deployed status are main-
tained in a high state of material and per-
sonnel readiness as a quick-reaction, com-
bat capable force available in an objective
area of potential crisis. This-includes those
carriers forward deployed with the Sixth and
Seventh Fleets and those assigned to the
First and Second Fleets where they are avail-
able to reinforce the forward deployed forces
or respond to contingencies in areas not
covered by the forward deployed forces.
The, number of carriers which can be de-
ployed out of the total force depends upon
the national military posture. Under mobili-
zation conditions corresponding to an all-out
declared war, up to 99% of the carrier force
can be maintained in a deployed status. At
the height of the Pacific operations in WW
Ii, approximately 85% of the carrier force
was maintained at sea. Without mobilization
and with peacetime personnel policies and
funding, about 50% of the fleet can be kept
deployed in a surge effort when required in
case of a minor war such as Southeast Asia.
From March 1965 to July 1969, seven attack
carriers were maintained in a forward de-
ployed status (two in the Sixth Fleet and
five in the Seventh Fleet). Currently six at-
tack carriers, are maintained in forward de-
ployed Status. "From a peacetime operating
posture; the reaction response potential of
the carrier force is substantial. About 75% of
all our carriers are either at sea or immedi-11 ately ready to go'"to sea and most of the
remainder- can, be deployed on short notice.
Comment
The Air Force does not identify a kit
method of quick construction of land bases.
However, they are placing great emphasis
on the capability to respond rapidly and eco-
nomically to a variety of situations world-
wide. This capability is outlined in a plan
which provides for an Air Force package.
This package includes five fighter squadrons
of aircraft which would be deployed to an
overseas complex of three bases. To support
this overseas tactical fighter package requires
an initial lift of 6,747 personnel, a cargo of
7,232 short tons, and 1,572 vehicles. The daily
resupply requirements are specified as being
a total of 3,222 tons. That is over 3,000 tons
per day of combat consumables.
With this great requirement for logistic
support, the Navy is required to provide
transportation for ordnance and fuel. Any
consideration of attempting to supply 3,000
tons per day of combat consumables by air
would require large numbers of expensive
logistics aircraft. 109 C-5s would be required
to supply this level from the United States
to Southeast Asia. From the United States
to the Middle East, with en route stops per-
mitted by foreign governments, would re-
quire 76 C-5s, and in case we were moving
to the Middle East and were denied either
overflight or landing rights, the number
would double. 152 C-5s would be required.
This points out the necessity for moving such
great bulks of combat consumables by sea
and the requirement to protect these sea
lines of communication. Notwithstanding
the formidable logistic problems involved in
such a plan, the Air Force is developing the
capability for rapid deployment to "bare
bases" and they are looking forward to using
it wherb air strips exist and if there is a
potable water supply available. However, even
assuming the existence of adequately sized
airfields, the "bare base kit" concept re-
quires the establishment of the logistic sup-
port necessary for modern aircraft-not only
the combat consumables but also all of the
test equipment, tools, and the living facili-
ties for the personnel.
Permission to establish the base must be
secured from the sovereign nation where the
strip is located. The only bases we have spe-
cific permission to use are those in which
we already have a certain number of per-
sonnel situated. Lastly, one other most im-
portant factor is protection of the base. In
establishing a base in a combat environ-
ment, one must be assured that it is not go-
ing to be taken under fire or captured soon
after it is established.
Statement
3. In short term conflicts, carrier based
and land based aircraft experience approxi-
mately equal sortie rates. As the term of the
operation lengthens, the overall sortie rate
and hence the effectiveness of land based
aircraft is from 30% to 100% greater than
carrier based aircraft.
Comment
A land-based wing and a carrier based
wing, using recent data experience in Viet-
nam, have been shown to generate sorties at
about the same rate.
Statement
4. Carrier based aircraft would be more
vulnerable to enemy action in a Central
European war than land based aircraft. In
Southeast Asia, Korea and other areas of
the world, the vulnerability is significantly
lower than in the Mediterranean and North
Sea and, therefore, in these areas vulnerabil-
ity should not be as serious a factor in the
choice between land based and sea based
aircraft.
Comment
Vulnerability to enemy attack should in-
deed be a major factor in choosing between
the two modes of operations.
First, it is clear at the outset that the vul-
nerability of sea-basing tactical air can be as
great as that of land-based tactical air if
and only if direct conflict with Soviet forces
is involved. Other nations such as North
Korea, the UAR, and Communist China have
forces capable of inflicting damage on a sin-
gle carrier and its escorts, but only the So-
viet Union maintains forces which might be
able to seriously threaten a concentration
of carrier strength.
Second, the mobility and defense in depth
characteristics of a carrier task force in-
creases its survivability over that of fixed
installations. For example, the attack car-
rier's aircraft greatly outrange even the most
advanced Soviet cruise missile. And against
ICBM attack, the attack carrier, in con-
trast to cities, industrial complexes, and
other fixed installations is virtually immune
to pre-targeting.
Statement
5. There are more than enough land bases
in Europe to meet our needs. In the North
Asian theater, we can operate 1,200 fighter/
attack aircraft from bases in Korea, Japan
and Okinawa. Differing assessments of the
needs of another Korean-type conflict range
from 500-1200 aircraft for tactical support.
In southeast Asia, we have more than enough
land bases to meet all of our tactical air
needs.
Comment
There are not enough bases today in Viet-
nam to provide full tactical air support for
that war even after the extensive base build-
ing program. The carriers are still there.
Statement
In other areas of the world such as Africa
or South America our needs are likely to be
quite small-probably no more than a few
wings of tactical aircraft. The Middle East
and the southern flank of Europe presents a
difficult problem.
Comment
Although there are a few bases in these
areas, the reliability of these bases, and their
useability when we need them may be ques-
tionable. On at least one occasion, the denial
of even emergency use of a base in a sup-
posedly friendly country for the protection
of U.S. nationals in a third country severely
constrained our actions. Similarly, suspen-
sion of landing and overflight rights by a
country which has been our staunch ally
severely complicated deployment of land-
based tactical air forces.
The only threat of significance to U.S.
Naval forces in the Mediterranean is that
posed by the Soviets. It is true that our
forces could encounter Soviet arms in the
hands of bloc forces, however, their capabil-
ity is very limited. Since the anti-ship missile
threat is considered by some to be of prime
concern, it may be useful to analyze the
orders of battle of potential limited war
enemies in the Mediterranean:
(1) Nuclear powered attack submarines,
cruise missile equipped: None
(2) Diesel powered attack submarines,
cruise missile equipped: None
(3) Diesel powered attack submarines for
torpedo attack (no cruise missile capability)
(from Jane's Fighting Ships, 1969-70)
UAR1 -------------------------------- 16
Albania' ----------------------------- 4
1 Training and material readiness to exe-
cute the torpedo attack mission is doubtful.
(4) Long range aircraft (Badgers) capable
of anti-ship missile delivery:
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UAR (approx) ------------------------
20
Iraq (approx) -------------------------
9
No missiles have ever been observed
any of these aircraft.
on
(5) Surface ships (and craft) equipped to
deliver ant)-ship missiles: (From Jane's
Fighting Ships 1969-70)
Patrol boats (OSA and KOMAR)
East Germany ------------------------
12
Poland -------------------------------
12
Rumania -----------------------------
4
Yugoslavia ---------------------------
0
UAR ---------------------------------
20
Algeria -------------------------------
9
Syria ---------------------------------
10
It is evident from the foregoing that the
principal threat to carriers in limited war is
the anti-ship missile delivered from a patrol
boat.
(1) The technology of the anti-ship mis-
sile is the newest and most formidable
weapon for future use against the carrier.
However, under the environment of less than
general war, the threat of the anti-ship mis-
sile is substantially diminished. There is
small chance in the immediate future that
the lesser potential enemies will have signif-
icant capability to deliver anti-ship missiles
except in one-shot, isolated surprise attacks.
(a) Although the Soviets are providing
satellites with some modern weapons, they
have not provided them with a submarine
`missile launching capability. Any significant
surface launched missile capability requires
control of the sea, which is not attainable
by the lesser powers alone. Th Soviet STYX
missiles with which the Egyptians sank the
Elath were launched from patrol boats. Sig-
niflcantly, the Egyptians have not duplicated
this feat on the high seas.
(b) It is possible that surface-to-surface
missiles similar to the STYX missile could be
provided to the North Vietnamese, However,
the carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin can and
have. operated beyond the range of land-
based STYX missiles, and no potential North
Vietnamese anti-ship missile launching plat-
form such as a patrol boat or jet aircraft has
ever penetrated the U.S. Naval defenses to
within the effectiveness missile range of our
carriers.
(c) An air launched missile capability re-
quires control of the air to penetrate to
within launching range of carriers. The car-
rier provides its own air Supremacy in the
vicinity of its task force and out beyond air-
to-surface missile range.
Statement
6. In the past, General Purpose Forces
were planned,to support 2V2 wars. The pres-
ent Administration appears to be heading
towards a 111/z war policy. It was difficult to
justify 15 CVA's under the previous policy.
Under the present policy it seems clear that
there ought to be a reduction,
Comment
Although one and one half war policy can
be termed a lesser national strategy in terms
of funding and military capability, it does
not necessarily follow that naval force levels
will be correspondingly lower, nor that they
should be. Policy guidance, coupled with
growing enemy capabilities, actually drive
naval force level requirements upward.
The new strategy of one and one-half wars
places a premium on mobility of combat
forces and their support, and relies on the
manpower of our allies. It reflects a growing
reluctance on the part of the United States
to Insert land based units onto the soil of
other sovereign nations, placing on them
the responsibility for furnishing home-based
units for their own defense, The qualitative
requirements generated by this new strategy.
coincide closely with the capabilities inherent
in naval forces in general, and in CVA strik-
ing groups in particular.
THE NEED FOR ANALYSIS
Statement
As a complete layman in the field of Sys-
tems Analysis, I found the arguments pre-
sented in Mr. Rosenzweig's paper very per-
suasive. In all of the debates over this issue,
I have never Seen any real analysis of the
issues involved. This paper is the rare excep-
tion and I highly recommend that the Com-
mittee obtain a copy for study in order to
get a balanced view of the issue that will
mean billions of dollars in expenditures over
the next few years.
I understand that the Committee has re-
quested the paper from the Brookings Insti-
tution and has been turned down because
Brookings hopes to publish the paper shortly.
However, the Pentagon has a copy of both
Mr. Rosenzweig's Brookings paper as well as
the classified OSD Systems Analysis version
of the paper. The Committee should demand
that the paper be made available on both a
classified and non-classified basis. The issue
of the relative cost-effectiveness of land based
versus sea based tactical air is skillfully
analyzed and is crucial to any determination
of the future role of attack carriers.
QUESTIONS ON THE JOINT STUDY
On this same subject I have the following
questions about this Joint Committee study:
Has the Committee been provided access
to last year's highly touted study by the
National Security Council on the future role
of attack carriers? Has the Committee been
briefed on this study and will it be made
available to Congress?
Due to the enormous sums involved in
the decision of whether to buy any more
attack carriers-has the Committee commis-
sioned any studies on the issues in the seven
months it has been in existence?
Who is studying the foreign policy impli-
cations of the carrier issues?-Is there any
liaison with the Foreign Affairs and Foreign
Relations Committees?
What is the impact of the President's
Guam statement and the new Nixon low pro-
file in foreign policy on the future of attack
carriers?
Have any of the analytical people who are
carrier critics been invited to testify before
the Committee, such as Herbert Rosenzweig,
formerly of OSD Systems Analysis; William
Kaufman of Brookings, M.I.T., and former
Special Assistant to Secretary McNamara;
Alain Enthoven, former Assistant Secretary
of Defense; Arthur Herrington, currently in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Arnold
Kuzmack, formerly of Systems Analysis; and
Ivan Selin, former Assistant Secretary of De-
fense for Systems Analysis. And I am sure
there are other qualified people outside of
the Pentagon who could address these issues
and substantially increase the level of debate.
Now I would like to make some observa-
tions on what I view as a critical issue-the
vulnerability of the attack carriers.
CARRIER VULNERABILITY
The question of carrier vulnerability has
been debated for some time. There are a
number of scenarios that must be consid-
ered-some of them reasonable and some
that are really far less than reasonable. The
first is an all-out war with the Soviet Union.
In such a situation, the war would most
likely be fought with both tactical and
strategic nuclear weapons. In this case, I am
quite sure that even the Navy would admit
that carriers would be extremely vulnerable.
Only through a quirk of fate would any
survive.
1113957
Comment
A direct hit from a nuclear warhead will
destroy any ship, and any other military in-
stallation as well. But there is little or no
chance that nuclear weapons would' be em-
ployed against the U.S. carrier force except
under circumstances of a general nuclear war
with the Soviet Union or with China. Under
these conditions, everything is vulnerable
and great losses will be sustained by both
sides, but even under these circumstances
the carrier is less vulnerable because it can-
not be pre-targeted. However, because the
most probable future wars will be below the
threshold of general nuclear war, limited
conflicts of the type experienced in Korea and
Vietnam can be expected.
Statement
The remaining potential .enemies do not
constitute a significant threat to our car-
riers. The Chinese do have about 30 conven-
tional submarines of medium endurance.
However, their tactical missilery could not
be considered a major threat, although in
any engagement we probably would not get
off Scott free. The North Vietnamese present
no real threat to the carriers. The Egyptians
do present a modicum of trouble for car-
riers in a first strike since they do possess
the Soviet-built Styx missiles. However, it
is unlikely that any sustained attack could
be mounted since the Egyptian patrol boats
would be quickly destroyed. The remainder
of the nations of the world present no sig-
nificant threat to our carriers.
Conventional War at Sea with the Soviets?
These then are the reasonable scenarios.
Let us consider an unreasonable one, but one
which many people continue to dwell upon
with analytical fascination: a conventional
war with the Soviet Union. Carriers do not
fare too well when considering their vul-
nerability in this situation.
The vulverability of aircraft carriers in a
conventional United States/Soviet War is an
issue that has not been sufficiently studied;
or if it has, the results have not been made
available to the Congressional membership.
The Navy has not stated in a clear-cut man-
ner what the survivability of aircraft carriers
would be against a potent enemy such as the
Soviet Union under conventional war time
conditions. Rear Admiral Johnston has stated
that carriers are not completely vulnerable
and they are not completely invulnerable.
This is less than marginal help. Last year
during Congressional debate, Admiral Moorer
made the statement, purporting to demon-
strate the invulnerability of carriers, that
during World War II not a single carrier had
been sunk by Kamikaze attack. This state-
ment is technically correct. However, it is
misleading for two reasons. First, the com-
parison is not good because the Kamikaze is
a vintage 1945 weapon. The weaponry of this
country cannot be predicated upon defend-
ing against an enemy armed with obsolete
weapons. For example, if the Army were to
propose an antiaircraft weapon capable of
destroying Sopwith Camels, I hardly think
the Congress would swallow such a?rationale.
Modern defenses must be capable of coun-
tering an enemy equipped with equally mod-
em weapons. Another reason the Kamikaze
statement Is misleading Is that while no car-
riers were sunk by these human guided
missiles, a number were seriously damaged
and put out of action for extended periods
or permanently. I have been informed that
13 carriers were seriously damaged by Kami-
kaze attacks, but the following list is the
most comprehensive we could put together
on short notice;
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Ship r. Date
Number
of hits Notes
Number
Ship 1 Date of hits Notes
Saratoga (CV-3) ------------- Feb. 21, 1945
4-------- Serious damage, went out of
Others listed as badly damaged
Ticonderoga V-14) a---- -- Jan. 21,1945
--
commission.
2 Returned to base.
by Morison:2
Franklin (CV-13)a---------- Mar. 18,1945 _ _ ______
Bunker Fill(V 17)a-----
--May 11,1945
2-------- Returned to base, went out of
Wasp(CV-18)3_-__________ Mar. 19,1945 _ _ _ ____
Intrepid (CV-11) 3______________ Nov. 25,1944
commission.
2________ Returned to base.
Hancock (CV-19) a__________ Apr. 7, 1945 ----------
Intrepid (CV-11) 8_ -------- Apr. 16, 1945 __________
Enterprise (CV-6)____----------- May 13, 1945
1 plus .... Returned to base, went out of
commission.
1 I. M. Korotkin, "Battle Damage to Surface Ships During World War II," translation 310, David cruise missiles of today to emphasize the ineffectiveness of the Kamikaze, even with the most
Taylor Model Basin, February 1964. sophisticated and reliable guidance system yet conceived-the human brain. The predominance of
2 Vol. 14, pp. 389-392. the human brain is again illustrated by the flight of Apollo 13; the most complex product of our
e Essex class or later. technology is ultimately dependent upon the mental acuity of the astronauts.
Comment: The Navy has in the past contrasted the Kamikaze attacks of World War II to the
Additional information.on the Carriers re-
ferred to is submitted as substantial sup-
port for the Navy's thesis on carrier sur-
vivability:
Saratoga-Completed in 1927 on the hull
of a 1920's battle cruiser-participated in 4
major campaigns in the Pacific. In February
1945 she was 18 years old. Hit between 1700-
1846, she was ready to land aircraft at 2015.
She was under repair for 10 weeks and un-
doubtedly would have seen further action
had the war continued. One might also re-
call that she was a target ship in the Bikini
atom bomb tests of 1946 --and survived the
air burst of a 20KT bomb with superficial
damage.
Enterprise-In May 1545-under repair
for 14 weeks and could have returned to
service had the war been prolonged.
Franklin-War ended 5 months later be-
fore she returned to service. S:.iled from the
Sea of Japan to Boston under her own
power-12,000 miles.
Bunker Hill-War ended 3 months later
before she returned to service. Was, later con-
verted to a CVS and then an AVT before be-
ing stricken in 1966. She is now used as a
moored electronics ship in San Diego.
Ticonderoga-25 years later still in active
service. Over 43,000 combat sorties flown-
dur-ing 4 tours in Vietnam. Returned to U.S. In
September 1969 and is now being converted
to a CVS and will be in the force in the
Seventies.
Intrepid-25 years later and still in active
service. Nearly 25,000 combat sorties flown
during the Vietnam War. Reverted to her
role as a CVS ir} 1969 and scheduled to 1$e
in the force in the Seventies.
Hancock-5 tours and over 38:000 combat
sorties in Vietnam. She left the Tonkin Gulf
on 30 March and she arrived home 13 April
1970-25 years and a week after the damage
cited by Mr. Moorhead.
Statement .
So instead of dwelling on an enemy armed
with historical relics, let us dwell for a
moment on modern weapons that carriers
might face if we were at war with the
Soviets.
Soviet attacks on our carriers might be
expected from one or a combination of three
sources: manned aircraft armed with air to
surface missiles or bombs; surface-?to-surface
missiles launched by surface ships; and sub-
marines launching either torpedoes or un-
derwater launched guided missiles.
AIRCRAFT AND ASM THREAT
Consideriri the first source, that is, armed
manile4 aircraft, we know that the Soviet
Union hax a c9nsicierable force of Badger,
Blinder, and 1 ear-aircraft. These are capable
of carrying up to to missiles per plane.
Statement
From fj tq 10 of these aircraft can be
launched simultaneously which means that
they can direct bursts of from 10 to 20
missiles at the carrier. Since we cannot ex-
pect over 90% reliability of our defense sys-
'tems, the carrier probably would not sur-
vive. Admittedly the utility of these planes
is limited by their range. However, areas of
vulnerability include the Mediterranean, the
North Sea and the area around Japan, Korea,
and off the East Coast of the Soviet Union.
MISSILE AND TORPEDO THREAT
The other sources of potential threat to
Qur carriers stem from missiles and torpedoes
fired from submarines or surface ships. Sur-
face-to-surface missiles launched either
from surface ships or submarines -present a
real threat to our carriers. The enemy objec-
tive is to try to hit aviation fuel supplies
causing extensive damage. Experts estimate
that two to four missile hits are sufficient to
knock out a carrier for an extended period
of time.
Comment
The experience- of the USS Enterprise
would belie this statement.
The hardness of the modern attack carrier
is illustrated by the accident in the Enter-
prise early alst year when nine major caliber
bombs detonated on her flight deck. This is
the explosive equivalent of more than a half
dozen cruise missiles. Yet the ship could have
resumed her scheduled air operations within
hours, as soon as the debris was cleared from
the after end of the flight deck.
. Statement
This particular threat may be increasing
considerably. According to an article in the
Chicago Daily News on April 2, the Soviet
Union is developing a new missile that has
a range far in excess of the Styx. It can be
fired from a submerged submarine and speeds
to its target in the air just above the waves.
The potential danger of such a missile is
increased not just by its extended range or
the fact that it can be stealthily fired, but
also because of its altitude. A low altitude
missile is quite difficult to defend against
with our own surface to air missiles.
Comment
The Navy cannot vouch for the accuracy
of the article in the Chicago Daily News.
However, the implications of the anti-ship
missile threat have been under continuing
review.
Design improvements for protection have
been incorporated in all new carriers built
since World War IT subsequent to the Essex
class, The new Nimitz class nuclear carriers
are the best protected and least vulnerable
carriers ever designed.
The available defenses against anti-ship
missiles for a carrier task force now consist
of:
Inherent mobility (indefinite endurance at
high speed for nuclear ships).
Air attacks by carrier aircraft against:
Surveillance platforms, Launching Platforms,
Missiles in flight.
Anti-submarine force attacks against hos-
tile submarines.
Surface-to-air missile (SAM) defenses in
ships of the task force against anti-ship
missiles.
Close-in gun and missile defense from
carriers against anti-ship missiles.
Both active and passive electronic war-
fare countermeasures from aircraft and all
ships in the task force.
In the event that anti-ship missiles pene-
trate the above defense in depth and close-
defenses, the carrier is well equipped to sur-
vive hits with its built-in protective systems
as follows:
Extensive armor protection for the flight
deck, sides, and underwater body designed
with high probability to defeat high order
contact and penetrating explosives com-
parable to that of an anti-ship missile war-
head.
Watertight compartmentation throughout
the hull which divides the ship into more
than 2,000 watertight and shock resistant
compartments to confine damage to small
areas.
Redundancy of essential systems for com-
mand and control, aircraft operations, ship
control, ship propulsion, and damage control
to provide means for continuing effective
offensive and defensive action while limiting
damage, defeating fires, and restoring cas-
ualties from hits.
The statements above do not mean that
U.S. Navy concern for the potential threat of
the Soviet submarine force or the anti-ship
missile is downgraded. It is recognized that in
a confrontation or in a war with Russia, So-
viet submarines constitute a formidable force
threatening our use of the seas. Therefore,
continuing development of Navy anti-sub-
marine warfare capabilities is in progress in
conjunction with development of defenses
against the anti-ship missile.
The Soviets, in turn, have always been
concerned with the threat posed them by
our Attack Carrier Task Forces. In the 1968's
they commenced allocating an increased
share of their national resources on a pri-
ority basis to their anti-ship missile pro-
gram as a counter to the carrier threat.
Responding to this increased Soviet threat,
the Navy embarked on a broad scale im-
provement of existing defensive weapons.
Recognizing the need for central coordina-
the ASMD (Anti-Ship Missile Defense) Office
was established in February 1968 with a Rear
Admiral, USN as ASMD Program Coordina-
tor. As the first priority, the ASMD office in
1969 published new tactics and doctrine for
countering the anti-ship missile for fleet use.
In that same year, an ASMD Program Plan
was promulgated encompassing all previous
missile defense plans and setting forth
schedules for near term and future improve-
ments to weapons and electronic warfare
equipments.
The general provisions of the ASMD Pro-
gram Plan provide a defense-in-depth con-
cept utilizing all weapons available to a
balanced fleet. The plan addresses immediate
improvements to existing systems as well as
installation of new systems, and integration
of these systems into a reliable anti-missile
capability in both area and self-defense.
The near term effort includes installation
of improvements to surveillance and recon-
naissance platforms, air interceptors, sur-
face-to-air missiles, guns, point defense sys-
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tems, threat recognizers, decoy systems, radar
detection systems, and counter-electronic
warfare systems. New systems in the ASMD
plan include an advanced surface-to-air mis-
sile system, an air and surface launched anti-
ship missile, a manned shipboard multi-
purpose helicopter, and a new radar con-
trolled rapid fire machine gun.
The ASMD shipboard installations are
time-phased in accordance with scheduled
ship overhauls and availability of new or
modified equipment.
The first step of the ASMD program, to
equip 20 destroyers on an emergency basis
for duty in Southeast Asia, is nearing com-
pletion. The second step, commencing July
1970, is to provide aircraft carriers, cruisers,
and frigates with all available equipments
necessary to provide a threat reactive anti-
ship missile defensive suit.
Statement
Torpedoes also constitute a threat to car-
riers. There are two types of torpedoes:
straight running and' homing. The damage
potential of straight running torpedoes is
low. A carrier could probably sustain 20 hits
with low effect. However, according to ex-
perts the damage potential of homing tor-
pedoes is relatively high despite the fact that
counter-measures exist. Homing torpedoes
are generally designed to home on the ship's
pcrews. A carrier most frequently has 4
screws. If two are hit and rendered inopera-
ble the carrier would most likely be incapable
of fulfilling its mission of launching air-
craft. While the carrier might not be sunk
it would have to withdraw for some period
of time.
Comment
Of the major weapons which constitute
threats to the carrier, torpedos are by far
the least effective. The submarine must reach
a point within several miles of the carrier
to fire torpedoes. Furthermore, the torpedo
protective system of modern attack carriers is
extremely effective. Recent technical anal-
yses at the Naval Ship Research and Develop-
ment Center show that a significant number
of torpedoes are required to put a modern
Forrestal or subsequent class carrier out of
action.
Statment
The torpedoes mentioned thus far are con-
ventional in their mission. Experts now be-
lieve that there is a possibility that the
Soviets could develop a new type of torpedo
capable of actually sinking a carrier. Such a
torpedo would be designed to explode under
the hull, in effect breaking the back of the
carrier.
These conventional weapons exist and they
can incapacitate or destroy carriers. This
country does possess carrier defenses in the
form of missiles and aircraft. However, no
one, not even the most optimistic, could ex-
pect these defensive systems to operate in
excess of 90% reliability.
Comment -
Similarly, we cannot expect offensive sys-
tems to operate with perfect reliability.
Statement
Therefore, we must assume that even under
conventional wartime conditions with the
Soviet Union, in the face of determined op-
position attack carriers are quite vulnerable.
Comment
The Navy agrees that in a war between
the United States and the Soviet Union
there would be enormous casualties to both
sides. Soviet submarines ,and missiles would
indeed be serious threats to the carrier as
they would be to all ships, particularly those
with limited defensive capability such as
tankers and other supply ships. These logistic
ships which would transport the vast major-
ity of supplies to sustain any land effort over
seas would have to depend upon the carrier
for protection against antiship missiles. Our
own surface warships, outranged by Soviet
anti-ship missiles, would likewise perform
their missions under the protective umbrella
of carrier aircraft which greatly outrange
Soviet missiles.
Today, carriers constitute the margin of
H 3959
superiority of the U.S. Navy over the Soviet
Navy. In other areas such as members of at-
tack and missile submarines, surface-to-
surface missile ships, missile patrol boats, as
well as general modernity of equipment, the
Soviet Navy is ahead of us, but in carriers,
we have a clear advantage. Our attack car-
riers are the most effective counter to the
anti-ship missile threat. The carrier's air-
craft, with a tactical range of about 600
miles, can search for, keep surveillance over,
and if necessary, attack and sink the hostile
missile launcher.
If we were without carirers entirely or if
there were not sufficient numbers of car-
riers available, enemy missile-launching
ships and aircraft could operate unopposed
in any conflict with the U.S. Our Navy's op-
erations would be severely curtailed. Tacti-
cal air superiority is a necessary prerequisite
for success in any naval operation, be it am-
phibious assault, ASW, or protecting our sea
lines of communications with our allies and
our land forces overseas, and the attack
carrier provides this tactical air advantage.
CONCLUSION
Statement
Mr. Chairman, there are any number of
questions that this committee should an-
swer. Detailed analyses exist that show that
carriers are not cost-effective when com-
pared to land based aircraft. The committee
should study this report. It should request
the navy to provide similar studies justify-
ing its position. Unless the Navy can pro-
vide additional insight and information, ad-
ditional carriers seem not to be warranted
at this time. Beyond the question of cost-
effectiveness there are very real indications
that carriers are becoming increasingly vul-
nerable to sophisticated weaponry such that
in the event of a major conflict with the So-
viets, they would not survive.
For these reasons I believe that a balanced
force should not exceed 12 carriers and that
under these circumstances the Congress
need not make a decision on the procure-
ment of additional attack carriers until 1975.
Date
commissioned
CVA-14__________ Essex__________________ Ticonderoga r--------------- -_
-
1944
CVA-19-
-------------do----------------- Hancock----------- -----------
1944
--
CVA-31---------------- do----------------- Bon Homme Richard___________
1944
CVA-34--
--------_ Oriskany ---------------`-----
-------- -do------
1950
-
-
- --- Midway s--------------------
Midway-
CVA-41
-
1945
-
-----------
-
------------ Roosevelt---------------------
CVA-42----------------do----
41945
-
CVA-43
-
---
--------- do----------------- Coral Sea------------- --------
7 1947
-
-
-
-------- Forrestal_______________ Forrestal ---------------------
CVA-59--
1955
-
CVA-60----------------do----------------- Saratoga---------------------
1956
I To become a CVN 4ASW carrier) when Midway rejoins the fleet in 1970.
2To rejoin the fleet in 1970.
S Undergoing modernization.
4 Modernized 1953-56.
Comment
The Ticonderoga (CVA-14) was designated
an antisubmarine warfare support carrier
(CVS) in October 1969. The modernization
date for Roosevelt (CVA-42) should read
1954-1956, and for Coral Sea (CVA-43)
should read 1957-1960. There are presently
only 4 ASW carriers (CVS5) vice the 8 in-
dicated.
Mr. Chairman, I would also like to in-
clude at this point a letter from the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
Washington, D.C. April 29 1970.
Hon. CHARLES E. BENNETT,
ti
CVACochairman, House-Senate Subcommittee an
~~VV 70, Rouse of ", Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR 4$, CI0A1RMAN This is in reply to
your letter of April 28th which asks that I
Date
Comm issioned
CVA-61----------- Forrestal .......................... Ranger_______________________ 1957
CVA-62----- _---------- do----- .----------- Independence_________________ 1959
CVA-63---------------- do----------------- Kitty Hawk ------------------- 1961
CVA-64---------------- do_________________ Constellation ------------------ 1961
CVAN-65---------- Enterprise______________ Enterprise____________________ 1961
CVA-66----------- Forrestal_______________ America______________________ 1965
CVA-67-?------------- do----- ----------- Kennedy--------------------- 1968
CVAN-68---------- Nimitz--------- _------- Nimitz----------------------- (e)
CVAN-69------- -------- do----------------- Eisenhower------------------- (6)
I Modernized 1956-60.
E Under construction.
Note: Total 18; in addition, there are presently 8 ASW carriers.
comment on a document which was recently
presented at the hearings held by the Joint
House-Senate Subcommittee on CVAN-70.
In particular, you requested my views on
that part of the document which says:
"There are enough land air bases in South-
east Asia and" Europe to base all the tactical
fighter aircraft which the Joint Chiefs of
Staff estimate are required to meet a major
Contingency in those areas."
I am pleased to write you concerning this
matker, especially since the statement to
which you refer tends to convey an errone-
ous impression that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
entertain the view that all of the United
States military tactical fighter aircraft re-
quirements for a Southeast Asian Or Euro-
pean major contingency could be met by
the use of land-based tactical fighter air-
craft. This is not so.
While existing airfields in Southeast Asia
and Europe could physically accommodate
the number of tactical aircraft required to
meet a major contingency in either of the
mentioned geographical areas, this could be
done only at the unacceptable cost of re-
duced flexibility and military effectiveness.
Airfield space accommodations are only one
factor to be considered in determining
whether or not to land-base or sea-base tac-
tical aircraft. Each mode of basing, either
land or sea, offers unique strategic and tacti-
cal advantages not possessed by the other
mode. In weighing these advantages, the
factors considered must not only include the
demands on the use of airfield facilities, they
must also consider the geographical areas of
operations, threat projections, the availabil-
ity of the land bases within operating range
of expected contingency areas, problem re-
quirements for forces to defend land bases or
carriers, the relative vulnerability of land
bases or carriers to attack, the existence or
absence of logistic prestockage, projected
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113960 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE y
sustained sortie requirements, and the Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, my request of the adoption of the Findley substitute,
rapidity with which forces may have to be was not that they be considered en bloc, and I believe this issue should be squarely
disengaged and reengaged in distant geo- but that my time be apportioned. I do before the House.
graphical areas. not believe it is feasible to consider them Moreover, section 401 places no lim-
When all of the operational and planning en bloc. itation upon the funds available, since
factors are considered, including those listed Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, just ex- the language of that section provides for
above, aircraft clear alone that would n would not b