THE MIDDLE EAST AND AMERICAN SECURITY POLICY REPORT OF SENATOR HENRY M. JACKSON TO THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE DECEMBER 1970

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00337R000200170001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Report
of
Senator Henry M. Jackson
to the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
United States Senate
December 1970
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Letter of Transmittal
December 21, 1970
The Honorable John Stennis
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D'. C.
Dear Senator Stennis:
On November 16 I returned from participation in the North Atlantic Assembly
meeting in Europe, followed by a visit to Israel. As you know, I have been con-
cerned for some time by the threat to vital American interests arising out of the
deepening involvement of the Soviet Union in the Middle East.
Section 501 of :Public Law 91-441 (91st Congress), which I introduced in
June 1970, was enacted in response to this serious and continuing threat, which
the Congress has declared to be a "clear and present danger to world peace."
I traveled to Israel to assess the nature and extent of Soviet penetration
of the Middle East, to discuss with high Israeli officials the nature of their
concern, and to determine those military and political measures that the United
States might prudently undertake in support of the stability of the region as a
whole and the security of the state of Israel.
In Israel I was able to travel extensively. I visited the Golan Heights,
where I met with the Commanding General of the Northern Command, and from there
followed the present cease-fire lines along the Jordan, the scene of considerable
terrorist activity and. cross-border shelling. I had occasion to visit the
northern Sinai, traveling through Gaza and Al Arish to Al Qantarah and Israeli
positions along the Suez Canal. I had an opportunity to discuss the security
situation in the Sinai with the armor Commander of the area, and to visit Israeli
fortifications at various points along the Bar-Lev Line.
In Jerusalem I had a most helpful and informative discussion with Prime
Minister Golda Meir. I was able to discuss the state of the Israeli economy, and
the impact of a defense budget taking 27-29/ of the GNP, with Finance Minister
Pinhas Sapir, and the Governor of the Bank of Israel, David Horowitz.
In Tel Aviv I met with Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, Chief of Staff Bar-Lev,
and the chief of military intelligence, General Yariv; and, at a major Israeli
base, with the Commander of the Air Force, General Hod. These later discussions
were particularly exhaustive and detailed, and especially helpful in view of the
complex strategic situation associated with the determination of defensible
borders.
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My visit, though a brief one, enabled me to meet with dozens of Israeli
officials at all levels. I talked, with Air Force squadron leaders, pilots, base
commanders and intelligence and logistics specialists, with Army personnel, and
with the young men and women who serve in the front lines of the Israel Defense
Forces. I met with the Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and
with several members of the ministry.
I left Israel with two major convictions: First, that the Israelis are
determined to provide for their own defense, even under adverse conditions, and
that they have the skill, determination and courage to do so. The frontline of
Western defense in the Middle East is manned by the men and women of Israel, who
ask only for assistance in obtaining the tools with which to defend themselves
and for the prudent d:Lplomatic support of their friends and allies.
Second, that the people of Israel and their elected representatives deeply
desire a secure and lasting settlement that will enable them to live within
secure, recognized and defensible borders.
I have tried, in the attached report, to bring together my impressions of
the political and military situation in Israel as I was able to observe it, and
as I believe it affects the peace and security of the Middle East generally.
I wish to thank our Ambassador in Tel Aviv, Mr. Walworth Barbour, for a
most kind and helpful reception.
Sincerely yours,
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Page
Letter of Transmitta3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Middle East and Western Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Russia's Historic Ambition in the Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The Extent of Soviet Penetration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Soviet Strategy: The Exploitation of Instability . . . . . . . . . 7
Soviet Naval Policy in the Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
The Strategic Importance of the Suez Canal . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
The War of Attrition Against Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
The August 7 Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
The Soviet-Egyptian System of Air Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
U.S. Mishandling of Cease-Fire Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A Policy for Rectifying the Adverse Effects of the Cease-Fire
Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
The Geography of Israel and Israeli Security . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Israeli Security and the Six Day War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
The Role of the United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
The Importance of Defensible Borders and the "Rogers Formula" . . . 18
Conclusion and Recormnendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Appendix
Strategic Maps of Israel
Before the Six-Day War
After the Six-Day War
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THE MIDDLE EAST AND AMERICAN SECURITY POLICY
Re2art of Senator Henry M. Jackson
Three times since World War II -- in 1948, in 1956 and then again in 1967 --
the Middle East has been torn by general war. In the intervals between these
increasingly destructive conflicts, lesser violence has been the order of the day:
raids, reprisals and acts of brutal terrorism. For the people of the region,
mistrust and hostility, tension and insecurity have become inescapable burdens of
daily life. But for the Soviet Union, these emotions are the fertile ground upon
which its political influence has been able to take root and spread.
For some time, I have been warning that as the Soviet Union approached parity
with the U.S. in strategic arms, its leaders would be likely to become more
energetic in trying to spread Soviet influence and more willing to run dangerous
risks in the international arena. That this prospect was not groundless is
indicated by the deepening Soviet penetration of the Middle East we have
witnessed in recent years. One would expect this increased Soviet activity to be
concentrated in those countries that are without formal defensive ties with the
United States; for it is in such areas that the Soviets would be tempted to
conclude that the risk of a direct confrontation (perhaps escalating to the
nuclear level) is minimal.
My concern for the consequences for NATO and the West of the accelerated
Soviet penetration of the Middle East was the key reason for my participation in
the meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly in Europe in November, and for my
visit to Israel which followed.
The Middle East and Western Security
Soviet hegemony in the Middle East would gravely imperil the vital flow of
oil, essential for industry and defense, from the Middle East to Europe and
Japan. 70% of Europe's oil now comes from that region; for Japan the figure is
80%o, and there are no near term prospects for the development of adequate and
economic alternative sources of supply. The capacity of our NATO allies to
resist Soviet pressure over a prolonged crisis would be drastically impaired if
the petroleum pipeline could be shut down by Moscow.
With the exception of Iraq, and to an increasing extent, Libya, the major
oil producing and exporting countries of the Middle East are politically moderate,
commercially aligned with the West and inclined to view with disfavor the growth
of Soviet influence among their radical neighbors. Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia
and the Gulf States are, not surprisingly, extremely sensitive to the direction of
American policy in the Middle East. Signs of American weakness in the Middle East
in the face of increasing Soviet pressure would call into question our determina-
tion to contain Soviet influence there, thus weakening the capacity of the more
moderate Arab states to resist the encroachments of Soviet influence. American
vacillation or uncertainty in standing by its friends and allies in the Middle
East could set in motion a crisis of confidence that would make accommodation
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with the Soviets, on Soviet terms, their only alternative to unremitting and
unopposed pressure from Moscow. Moreover, uncertainty as to America's concern
carries with it a high risk that the Soviet Union might drift into an unanticipated
confrontation with the United States. Such miscalculation as that evidenced by
the Soviets in Cuba in 1962 is extremely dangerous, and policies that increase
the likelihood of miscalculation are a subtle and inadvertent invitation to
extreme crises.
The Middle East is today the "soft underbelly of Europe", not only because
it possesses oil that Europe requires, but because of its strategic location. Our
position in the Mediterranean, to say nothing of the Persian Gulf and Indian
Ocean, is severely prejudiced by Soviet encroachments in the countries lining
its shores.
There is another reason why the United States cannot remain indifferent
to political developments in the Middle East. This country and Israel, whose
security is threatened, by the current crisis in that region, are bound together by
shared values, cultural affinities and a common ethical and religious heritage.
The United States actively participated in helping to create the State of Israel,
and since its founding the people of this young nation have won the admiration
of the great majority of Americans by the valor they have demonstrated in standing
firm before their hostile neighbors. Unlike some countries of the Middle East,
Israel is a stable democracy, and a profoundly egalitarian and spirited one.
These qualities, too, inspire the respect of many Americans, who feel something
like a sense of personal involvement in the destiny of Israel. Today, Israel is
serving as the front line of Western defense in the Middle East.
The peace and stability of the Middle East is now threatened by the
aggressive ambition of the Soviet Union, which transcends the tragic conflict
between Arabs and Israelis and, indeed, is based upon its exploitation. This
policy of Russia to manipulate the conflict in the region for its own advantage
is the key reality upon which American Middle East policy must be based.
Russia's Historic Ambition in the Middle East
There is, of course, nothing new about Russian interest and ambition in
the Middle East and the area of the Persian Gulf. It is interesting to note that
Catherine the Great, desiring to hasten the collapse of the Turkish Empire by
threatening it from the rear, rendered military assistance to the Mameluk Ali-Bey
of Egypt. In 1788 she urged "the chiefs of the government of Cairo" to shake off
the yoke of the Suzerain and to make a treaty of alliance with her, promising them
every assistance in vessels, troops, war munitions and money.
With the close of World War II and the emergence of the Soviet Union as the
second ranking world power, Moscow openly pressed claims to bases on the
Mediterranean shores of Africa. Before and during the Potsdam Conference, both
Stalin and Molotov attempted to secure Soviet trusteeship over one of the former
Italian colonies, preferably Libya. As reported in the official records,
Secretary of State Byrnes felt that, "the Soviet foray into a region so close to
the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf shook up Churchill more than any other episode
at the Conference."
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In the postwar ;period it was the Soviet threat to Turkey and Persia that
drove these countries to seek American support, thus initiating the sequence of
events that led to the Truman Doctrine and the extension of NATO to Turkey.
After the Korean peace in 1953, the Soviets again turned their attention to
the Middle East. This time they did not attempt a direct attack on the Turkish
or Persian positions -- both of which were reinforced by Western-supported
alliances. Instead they chose a tactic of leapfrogging and went to the Arab
countries which lay beyond Turkey and Persia, particularly Egypt.
Professor Bernard Lewis, a respected authority on the Middle East, writes:
"There seems little doubt that the initial purpose of the
Soviet intervention in Arab affairs from 1955 onwards was to
take Turkey and Persia from the rear, and achieve a position
from which these countries could be menaced and deflected
from their policy of alignment with the Western powers."
Thus, using Egypt as its Trojan horse, the Soviet Union has made itself the
most influential extra-regional power in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, the People's Republic
of South Yemen, Libya, the Sudan and probably Algeria, countries that contain
some 70%o of the people of the Arab Middle East and produce in excess of 55% of
its gross national product.
In Egypt the Soviet Union has established a major naval base at Alexandria;
and Algiers, Latakia, Port Said, Tartus, Port Sudan, Aden and Berbera have become
her ports of call.
The Extent of Soviet Penetration
Since 1955 the extent of Soviet penetration of the Middle East has increased
at an accelerating rate. As of this date, there are 10,000 to 15,000 Soviet
personnel in Egypt, a, large number of whom are involved in the command, control
and operation of a sophisticated network of surface to air missiles. Russian
soldiers have been integrated into Egyptian units down to the company level and,
for the first time in postwar history, Russian pilots are flying missions from
bases located in foreign territory: the UAR. (Indeed, some of these Russian
pilots have actually been shot down in air-to-air combat with Israeli pilots.)
Mechanics, communications specialists, intelligence experts (whose activities are
at least partly directed at the U.S. Sixth Fleet) and other technical advisers
are now working alongside Egyptian military forces.
The air traffic control of the Egyptian combat air force is carried out by
Russian military personnel. The extensive air defense network deployed along the
Suez Canal, most of it in violation of the U.S. initiated cease-fire, has a large
complement of Soviet operating personnel. In fact, the operation of the many
sophisticated SA-3 missile complexes deployed throughout the UAR is entirely in
Russian hands.
As of December 1970, Soviet ships call at Alexandria at a rate approaching
one every four days, discharging military cargoes that include bridging equipment
that could b~1p1o~el'o~F~'~67?~IgCQi-F~~7d3bb02b M7B66i?t cease-
fire line.
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According to State Department calculations, the Soviet Union, by the end of
1967,, had already poured into the Middle East military equipment and related
assistance valued at more than $3 billion, of which $1.5 billion went to the UAR.
This compares with a total of $5.5 billion in Communist military aid to all
non-Communist states from 1954 through 1967. During 1967 (before the recent
heavy investment in increasingly sophisticated weapons, estimated by some at an
additional $1.5 billion), the UAR became the largest single recipient of such
military assistance. Moreover, approximately one-third of all Soviet economic
credit to underdeveloped countries made its way to the Middle East, with over
$1 billion going to Egypt alone.
A few figures will serve to give some indication of the level of armament
the Soviets have lavished upon the UAR:
-- 40 heavy tanks
-- 1,200 medium tanks
-- 150 amphibious tanks
-- 900 armored personnel carriers
-- 1,750 field guns
-- 50 surface-to-surface missiles
-- 12 submarines
-- 19 missile firing patrol boats
-- 465 combat aircraft including approximately 300 bombers
and fighter-bombers
-- several thousand surface-to-air missiles and associated
radar and launchers
Impressive as these statistics are, they took on added meaning for me when,
during my recent trip to Israel, we stopped at a military hardware "graveyard"
on the outskirts of Tel Aviv. This was a huge area some two blocks long and
one block wide filled with captured Soviet tanks, personnel carriers and military
trucks -- a fraction of the battered remnant of the Six Day War.
The heavy equipment losses sustained by Egypt and Syria in the Six Day War,
incidentally, far from discouraging the Soviets from a continuation of their
unchecked arms policy in the Middle East, have actually been replaced by new and
larger shipments. In the case of the UAR, for example, Soviet shipments of both
aircraft and armor had reached, in January of this year, 170% of their June 1967
levels. In the Syrian case the figures are 220% and 180% respectively. Moreover,
older weapons lost in 1967 have been replaced by newer, more sophisticated and
costly versions in practically all categories. For example, MIG-15 and MIG-17
fighter-bombers have been replaced with the far more effective SU-7's; MIG-19's
have been replaced with MIG-21's, and the T-34 tank of wartime vintage with the
superior T-54/55.
Soviet Strategy: The Exploitation of Instability
Why has the Soviet Union lavished such large sums of money on the UAR, Syria
and other Arab countries? I don't believe that it is because the Soviet Union
is in genuine and unselfish sympathy with the claims of the radical Arab states
to the territory of Israel. Russia voted for the partition of Palestine and
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the creation of Israel and was among the first countries to recognize Israel's
independence. At the time the central motive was a desire to dislodge British
influence from the area, a desire that has been supplanted by a keen desire to
drive American influence from the Middle East. Indeed, this is the crux of
Soviet policy in the Middle East: to drive out Western influence, and to increase
its own.
In pursuit of these ambitions, the Soviets have been intriguing to keep the
conflict between Arabs and Jews alive. A realistic peace settlement that
guaranteed the security of all states in the area, or even a lessening of
tensions and hostility -- these are precisely the things the Soviet Union does
not want to see come about. Sir Bernard Lewis has stated his conviction that it
was in large measure due to Russian prompting and encouragement that President
Nasser took the steps that eventually culminated in the Six Day War. Since that
war, Russian arms shipments have continued at an accelerating rate. And more
recently, we have seen the Russians and Egyptians cooperate in a calculated and
prolonged violation of the agreed cease-fire that shows every sign, from the way
in which the first infringements were executed, of having been planned by Soviet
personnel.
By keeping the Middle East in a state of ferment, the Soviets hope to make
the radical Arab countries so dependent on them for arms, economic assistance,
technical expertise and diplomatic backing that, gradually and imperceptibly,
these countries will be drawn firmly into the Soviet orbit.
In short, if there were no Arab-Israeli conflict, the Soviets would invent
one. The flagrant exploitation of the tragic conflict between Arabs and Jews
ranks high among the cynical designs of Russia's postwar policy.
Soviet involvement in the Middle East has, more generally, been based on
a policy of encouraging and assisting radical expansionist regimes to realize
their designs on their neighbors. This policy encompasses not only assistance
to Egypt, Syria and Iraq in their collective determination to destroy Israel, but
also assistance to Iraq against Kuwait and Iran, Syria against the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan, and Egypt in adventures in Yemen, Lebanon and the Congo.
I have often thought that, in its foreign policy, the Soviet Union is like
a burglar who walks down a hotel corridor trying the handles of all the doors.
When he finds one unlocked, in he goes. Looking back on the history of the last
decade, it is unfortunately all too clear that Egypt and the other radical Arab
states were such unlocked doors. It is too late now to try to keep the Soviets
out. But we can limit the amount of mischief they will be able to do from these
bases of operation.
In this connection, it is worth observing that Soviet imperialism in the
Middle East is faced with a number of very real constraints and obstacles.
Arab nationalism is a powerful force, and as the Kremlin's heavy hand comes to
meddle more and more openly in the internal affairs of Arab countries, we can
expect the Soviet-Arab collaboration to be subjected to many strains. These
strains will doubtless be aggravated by the inevitable tensions that develop
when skilled personnel of an advanced country are sent to an underdeveloped
country to work side by side with its less competent personnel. It is perhaps
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ironic that the extent to which Arab nationalism sets itself in opposition to the
Soviet ambition to dominate the Middle East will in large measure depend on
whether the United States has made it clear, by its support of Israel and the
moderate Arab states,, that for those countries that choose it, resistance to
outside domination is still very much a live option.
Soviet Naval Policy in the Middle East
The acquisition by the Soviets of naval installations in the Mediterranean
comes at a time when the desire to expel the Sixth Fleet from those waters has
become a specific Soviet objective. In April 1967, not long before the Six Day
War, Leonid Brezhnev told an audience of European Communists that: "There is no
justification whatever for the constant presence of the U.S. fleet in waters
washing the shores of southern Europe.. .The time has come to demand the complete
withdrawal of the U.S. Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean."
The development of Mediterranean bases has been paralleled by a sharply
higher level of Soviet naval activity. In the first six months of 1967, Soviet
operating days in the Mediterranean were 400% greater than for all of 1963.
Submarine operations there have increased, in the same period, by 2,000%. The
present fleet numbers approximately 40 ships and, on occasion, reaches a figure
closer to 60. Soviet jet medium bombers, based in Egypt and bearing Egyptian
Air Force markings, routinely monitor the movements and training activities of
the Sixth Fleet.
Soviet naval penetration of Mediterranean ports is not only facilitated
by her intervention on the side of the radical Arab states in the Arab-Israeli
conflict, but is an intermittent element in the conflict itself. There is no
doubt that the augmenting of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean by 10 warships
in May and June of 19'67 contributed to the willingness of the Egyptians and
Syrians to mobilize for war.
The Strategic Importance of the Suez Canal
The utility of the Soviet Navy, as well as its merchant fleet, would be
dramatically increased by the reopening of the Suez Canal, which has been closed
since the Six Day War. With the Canal open to Soviet passage, ships based in
Odessa can circulate efficiently throughout the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans.
With the Canal closed, Soviet naval access to the Indian Ocean is by way of
Vladivostok or, from Odessa, via the Cape of Good Hope. The additional distance
to, say, the Persian Gulf that Soviet ships must travel as a result of the
closure of the Canal is many thousands of miles. One typical Soviet sea route
helps to indicate the magnitude of the distances involved. The journey from
Odessa to Bombay through the Canal is 4,200 nautical miles. The same Odessa-
Bombay trip by way of the Cape of Good Hope involves a distance of 11,900 miles,
nearly triple the Canal route.
More important, perhaps, is the fact that with the Canal open the Soviets
can use ships of either their Atlantic or Pacific fleet to reinforce the other
in the event of a diplomatic or military crisis. Finally, when the Suez Canal is
open and funs o rov dsF?or elWdsetl0b/03M. CF 6p7y1-t 0662t 6''f66&1 1 value 16
to the Egypti
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For all these reasons, then, the Soviets and the Egyptians have a common
interest in seeing the Canal reopened as soon as possible. To the Soviets, it
is a matter of top priority, a fact which may partly explain their encouragement
of the Egyptian war of attrition against Israeli forces along the Bar-Lev Line.
The opening of the Canal, which could be accomplished only by Israeli
acquiescence, must be considered a trump card in any forthcoming settlement of
the Arab-Israeli dispute. As such, agreement on this point should be withheld
until a settlement of the fundamental issues is reached.
With the Canal back in operation, one of the chief incentives the Soviets
have to make concessions on other outstanding differences will vanish. For this
reason, among others? we share a common interest with Israel in the security of
the Bar-Lev Line, the Israeli network of fortifications on the east bank of the
Canal.
The War of Attrition Against Israel
The war of attrition, which has been quieted by the current cease-fire,
claimed heavy Israeli casualties during the period from March 8, 1969 until the
cease-fire went into effect on August 7/8, 1970. In July, 1969, for example,
39 Israelis were killed along the Bar-Lev Line and some 76 were wounded in
intense Egyptian artillery attacks. While these figures may not appear
impressive, the equivalent numbers for the vastly larger American population
would be 3,000 and 6,000 respectively.
In the period following the March 8 shelling, thousands of rounds were
routinely directed at Israeli positions along the cease-fire lines. There had
been prior breakdowns in the cease-fire that had gone into effect upon termination
of the Six Day War, but the events of March 1969 marked the beginning of what
Nasser termed the "war of attrition."
About three months later, in July 1969, Israel, using her aircraft as
"flying artillery", began to counter the costly Egyptian artillery attacks with
air strikes against Egyptian positions on the west bank of the Canal, with the
result that the number of Israeli casualties declined considerably.
The effects of the cross-Canal exchanges of larger millimeter fire have been
dramatic. I visited-Al Qantarah, a once thriving Egyptian town with a
population of 50,000, located on the Israeli side of the cease-fire lines.
Al Qantarah, which was abandoned by Egypt in the aftermath of the Six Day War,
has been virtually reduced to rubble by the constant Egyptian shelling of
Israeli positions nearby.
I am convinced that the Israelis are in a good military position to hold
the Bar-Lev Line should they choose to do so. Israeli fortifications along the
Canal have been constructed with ingenuity, and losses from Egyptian shelling
could be held to tolerable levels in the event that the present cease-fire were
to yield to a resumption of hostilities.
Israeli concern over a possible crossing of the Canal by an invading
Egyptian force lends stra e is i o e t 1? 3L} here may
be ways in whra~i8~et ~X g11d.~~-dim2n0 ->
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The defensive importance of the Canal lies in the topography of the Sinai
and the ease with which large military forces can be moved through the broad
expanse of desert to the east of the waterway. I traveled by helicopter from
Tel Aviv to the Canal across the northern Sinai, a trip which impressed me with
the importance of the Canal as a, natural barrier to large scale military movement.
Nowhere in the northern Sinai is there a remotely comparable topographical
feature that would impede an invasion of Israel from the west.
The Suez Canal can, of course, be crossed along virtually its entire
length. Its value lies in the vulnerability of military units to interdiction
both at a limited number of staging areas along the Canal and during an actual
crossing. Israeli. deployments of armored units in the Sinai are well positioned
to prevent a crossing of the Canal, especially since the Air Force could be
expected to exact a heavy price against concentrations at the Canal itself.
It is known that the Egyptian army has received equipment from the Soviets
that could be used to cross the Canal. Egyptian troops have been observed train-
ing in the use of bridging equipment and amphibious operations.
The utility of the Canal as a defensive position has been seriously impaired
by the installation of an extensive air defense system along its west bank. For
some time prior to the U.S. initiated cease-fire of August 7, the Soviets and
Egyptians had endeavored to build up an integrated air defense system along the
Canal consisting of anti-aircraft cannon and surface-to-air missiles supplemented
by MIG interceptors piloted by both Egyptian and Russian airmen. The Israeli
Air Force was highly successful in suppressing this development while also
conducting air strikes to interdict Egyptian shelling of the Bar-Lev Line. As
the Soviet-Egyptian effort to deploy SAM's intensified, however, Israel faced
a mounting level of attrition from ground fire.
The August 7 Initiative
Unfortunately, the August cease-fire made it possible for the Soviets and
Egyptians to construct the air defense network that had proved unobtainable in
the face of Israeli air strikes.
The August cease-fire provided that, "Both sides will refrain from changing
the military status quo within zones extending 50 kilometers to the east and
west of the cease-fire line /the Suez Canaf . Neither side will introduce or
construct any new military installations in these zones. Activities within the
zones will be limited to the maintenance of existing installations at their
present sites and positions and to the rotation and supply of forces presently
within the zones."
No sooner did the cease-fire with its standstill provision start, than the
first Soviet-Egyptian violations occurred. The extent of the illicit movement
of men and equipment removes any doubt that the violations might have been
spontaneous or unauthorized. Indeed, the movement greatly exceeded the level of
activity characteristic of the weeks before the cease-fire and must be seen as a
calculated effort to take advantage of Israeli compliance. The hand of the
Russians, even more than that of the Egyptians, was at work in the planning and
execution of the violations.
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In any event, it was unwise in the extreme for the American Government,
which was sponsoring the cease-fire, to agree to starting the cease-fire in the
middle of the night, under the cover of darkness, an oversight that was
carefully exploited by the Soviet Union and the UAR.
In my view, the calculated violation of the cease-fire strongly parallels
Soviet behavior during the Cuban missile crisis. Even more than that, however,
it looks like the familiar Soviet tactic of beginning negotiations -- which were
then to take place under the Jarring mission -- with aggressive behavior designed
to test the adversary's resolve. Berlin in 1961 comes to mind.
By failing to corroborate at once Israeli evidence of Soviet-Egyptian
violations, we merely invited still further illegal movement of missiles and
other military equipment in the 50km cease-fire zone. The result has been a
massive Soviet-Egyptian build-up so that today the west bank of the Canal is
lined with new and larger artillery and the most elaborate system of air defense
ever deployed.
The Soviet-Egyptian System of Air Defense
The heart of the Soviet designed air defense system consists of SA-2 and
SA-3 missiles supplemented by radar controlled anti-aircraft cannon and MIG
interceptors. These weapon systems are, individually, of considerable effective-
ness. The combination, however, provides an extremely formidable defense, and
one to which neither we nor the Israelis have a ready response. The SA-3 is
effective at low altitudes and, in combination with anti-aircraft cannon, makes
it difficult and costly for planes to penetrate and operate by flying at extremely
low altitudes. The addition of SA-3's, which have been installed in large
numbers during the cease-fire and in blatant violation of its standstill pro-
vision, has thus frustrated the Israeli tactic of low altitude penetration.
The SA-2 high altitude missile system, also installed in large numbers during
the cease-fire, is effective against aircraft flying at altitudes not covered
by the SA-3. Moreover, the recently installed SA-2's are an improved version
that utilizes radar frequencies much more difficult to counter with electronic
means and radar-homing air-to-surface missiles.
The position of some elements of this air defense network is such that they
are effective against aircraft operating several miles on the Israeli side of the
Canal. The net effect is to imperil the effectiveness of the Israeli Air Force
as a means of preventing both cross-Canal fire and an actual crossing of the
Canal itself.
U.S. Mishandling of Cease-Fire Violations
In my judgment, we should have immediately insisted through diplcinatic
channels that the illicitly emplaced Soviet missiles be removed prior to, and as
a condition of, substantive negotiations. Our failure to do so has
encouraged the Soviets in the belief that they have much to gain, and little to
lose, by overt duplicity.
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In my view, the Soviets clearly gambled that the U.S. response, if any,
would be weak and ineffective. That they should have engaged in this deliberate
deception is serious enough; that we should have proved their estimate of our
response correct is more serious still. This deliberate deception, executed
within hours of an agreement, must raise considerable doubt as to the validity
of Soviet assurances and agreements elsewhere.
Moreover, our bargaining position vis-a-vis the Soviets has been severely
damaged. We should remember that weakness and hesitancy with respect to the
cease-fire violations can have far-reaching consequences for America's bargaining
reputation. Fred Ikle has stressed the importance of this reputation in the
following terms:
"A government acquires a reputation much as an individual
does. On the basis of its performance in past negotiations,
others will impute to it a diplomatic style, certain motives
and objectives, attitudes toward the use of force, a degree
of political will, and other attributes of power. Bargain-
ing strength depends not so much on what these attributes really
are as on what others believe them to be. Hence the
importance of this reputation...."
The diminution of confidence in U.S. assurances in a case so clearcut as
the August cease-fire must affect us adversely elsewhere in the world; and this
will continue to be the case even if the Soviets refrain from exploiting the
appearance of our retreat. Our failure to insist on adherence to the terms of
an initiative proposed and arranged in Washington, and concurred in by Moscow,
may well have the effect of encouraging the Soviets to run greater-risks elsewhere
in an effort to consolidate the momentum of their advantage.
Israel's confidence in our willingness to stand by our repeated assurances
of support for her security has been badly shaken. In Cairo and Damascus and
especially among our friends and allies in the Middle East our position has
suffered, rather than gained, by the impression of weakness and indecision.
Among the Arab population of the Middle East such credit as may be given
for American restraint is undoubtedly going, not to Washington, but to Moscow,
on the grounds that American inaction resulted from timidity in the face of
Russian pressure.
A Policy for Rectifying the Adverse Effects of the Cease-Fire Violations
At this point in time mere insistence on a roll-back of the illicitly
emplaced missiles appears futile and unproductive. It is my impression that
most Israelis share this view. But this does not imply that we are without means
to rectify the adverse military and political impact of the cease-fire violations.
We have both military and diplomatic options available to us that may go some
way in making plain to the Soviets our determination to restore the military
balance that prevailed. before August 7.
One such measure is the provision of adequate compensatory arms to Israel.
We have begun to do that under section 501 of the Defense Procurement Act
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with the provision of some $500 million in military credits. Among the military
equipment purchased by Israel under this credit program, aircraft and devices
for the suppression of surface-to-air missiles are of vital importance.
The problem of restoring the military balance in the Canal region could be
remedied if we had, or were able quickly to develop, some system or systems
capable of efficiently countering SA-2 and SA-3 missiles. But nothing in the
current American arsenal can make more than a partial contribution to this mission.
If the present uneasy cease-fire deteriorates and hostilities resume, the Israeli
Air Force would pay a high price in lives and aircraft in attempting to destroy
the SAM defense system. We can assist in mitigating this situation by doing what
we can to assure that the Israelis will have the aircraft necessary for this
purpose. A failure to do so might well force Israeli recourse to an alternative
strategy, which I would hope could be avoided, of attacking less well defended
targets elsewhere in the UAR if hostilities should be resumed.
M,y own view is that the size of the Israeli Air Force will have to be
increased considerably as a result of the SAM deployment in the vicinity of the
Canal, and that other equipment will be required as well. There is no denying
the fact that the military balance in the Middle East has shifted as a result of
the violations. This does not mean that Israel is no longer in a position to
provide for its own defense. On the contrary, I am convinced that the Israeli
people have the skill, determination and capability to defend themselves. Nowhere
in Israel did I encounter signs of uncertainty on this point. But the military
balance, in this case as in others, is not a simple matter of black or white,
security or insecurity. There are, rather, degrees of security and insecurity.
Any way one looks at it, the burden Israel must bear to sustain an adequate
level of security is greater now than before the U.S. guaranteed cease-fire. For
one thing, a resumption of the earlier level of hostilities along the Canal would
claim a higher number of Israeli casualties, both on the ground and in the air,
than was the case prior to August 7, 1970.
Israel is presently spending between 27 and 29 percent of its GNP on
defense, a large fraction of which is used for procurement of weapons and
ordnance. For a country with a gross national product the size of Israel's,
this burden of defense expenditures is severely prejudicial to economic
stability, particularly in its excessive claim on limited foreign exchange
reserves.
One serious, and often overlooked, problem faced by Israel is the severe
economic dislocation that results from the absorption of manpower and capital by
the defense effort. One plausible strategy for weakening Israeli defenses is
to require that she continually maintain a high state of readiness, utilizing
much of her trained manpower for defense purposes. Such a "war of economic
attrition", if actively supported by the Soviets through her Egyptian and Syrian
clients, is a severe threat to Israel's industry and economic development.
Israel has always in the past paid for weapons acquired in the United
States. For many of the 22 years of its history Israel was forced to pay prime
rates for second-hand arms. As the United States has come to appreciate its
own security interest in the Middle East, Israel has had access to sophisticated
aircraft and other weapons manufactured in this country. A realistic appraisal
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of the Israeli economic and financial situation indicates that it will not be
possible for Israel to maintain the level of defense expenditures necessary to
meet the increased threat from Soviet-supplied: countries without American financial
assistance, both for weapons and economic development.
Israel's imfled.iate arms requirement for the nett fiscal year (1972) will at
least equal the $500 millioh credit extended thif year. Unless some relatively
inexpensive method to suppress SAM missiles is d scovered, which seems unlikely,
grant aid for certain items will be needed.
I had occasion to visit installations of the Israeli Air Force, including
a base at which newly acquired American Phantoms were being phased in, to visit
Israeli Army units near the Suez Canal, and to meet with the officers and men of
the Northern Command at the Golan Heights and of the Southern Command along the
Suez Canal. None of the men or women of the Israel Defense Forces, from the Chief
of Staff to the commanding officers to squadron leaders to recruits, has the
slightest doubt that Israel can defend itself against any force or combination
of forces in the Middle East, barring, of course, a massive Soviet invasion.
All that is asked of us is help in getting the essential means in adequate
quantities with which they can do the job.
In addition to assuring an adequate supply of arms, we can help affirm our
determination that the calculated contravention of the August 7 cease-fire will
not succeed by giving solid support to Israel's "right to live in peace within
secure and recognized boundaries" as she returns to the Jarring talks, and in
any subsequent deliberations.
Israel agreed to indirect negotiations through the offices of Ambassador
Jarring in the framework of the Security Council Resolution (Number 242) of
November 22, 1967. ]:srael, Egypt and Jordan have all accepted. the Security
Council Resolution; it has been rejected by Iraq and Syria. The resolution
calls for the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in
the recent Dune 1967) conflict." It also calls for the "termination of all
claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in
the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries
free from threats or acts of force." Finally, Resolution 242 affirmed the
necessity for (1) "guaranteeing freedom of navigation for international waterways
in the area"; and, (2) for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political
independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establish-
ment of demilitarized. zones."
It is my conviction that the present Israeli leadership has no desire to
retain territory acquired in the Six Day War,* except insofar as the possession
of certain occupied territory contributes to the goal of "secure and recognized
boundaries." This was a topic on which I heard the views of the Israeli Prime
Minister and senior members of the Israeli Cabinet and armed forces. Such an
impression is, of course, inevitably a matter of judgment, and it should be noted
*All concerned parties are in general agreement that Jerusalem must remain unified
under some arrangement guaranteeing the rights of Arabs and Jews and the security
of and access to the holy places of the area.
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that there are individu:ls, and even political parties, within Israel who would
press more extensive territorial claims. But the current government certainly,
and the leadership likely to enjoy power for the foreseeable future, are
unanimous on this point.
The : ;eo raphy of Israel and Israeli Security
It is almost impossible to travel within the pre-1967 borders of Israel
without being continually in sight of territory formerly occupied by Arab armies.
In Israel's largest city, Tel Aviv, more than half a million people live less
than 15 miles from the formerly Jordanian village of Kalkilyah from which
terrorist attacks and artillery were directed against Israel. The road from
Tel Aviv to Haifa runs along a narrow strip of Mediterranean coast less than
10 miles wide at the point where the 1949 Armistice line with Jordan comes
closest to the coast. The densely populated Upper Jordan Valley lies under the
imposing shadow of the Golan Heights from which Syrian guns regularly shelled
Israeli settlements prior to the Six Day War. The most precarious situation was
that of Jerusalem, which was almost completely enclosed by Jordanian-held
territory, except for a narrow corridor in the West through which there winds,
along a route at points directly under the guns of former Jordanian fortifica-
tions captured during the June war, the vital highway connecting Jerusalem with
Tel Aviv.
The military significance of the border changes that resulted from the Six
Day War are apparent from little more than a glance at the accompanying maps.*
Before the war virtually all of populated Israel, with the exception of a strip
of Mediterranean coast around the city of Haifa, was vulnerable to artillery in
Arab territory with a range of 16 miles, or to Russian artillery rockets of the
kind used so indiscriminately by both Arab and Vietcong terrorists. (It should
be noted that the large area in Southern Israel shown on the map as beyond the
range of Arab artillery is the virtually uninhabited Negev desert.) The northern
and southern halves of the country could be divided by attacks from Jordan across
the narrow coastal strip between Haifa and Tel Aviv. Although such an attack
could not be carried out by the Jordanian army alone, the possibility made the
introduction of other Arab armies into Jordan a possible casus belli and
necessitated the organization of the Israeli army into separate regional commands.
The much narrower corridor connecting Tel Aviv and Jerusalem was subject to
interdiction by even the Jordanian army alone. Along the Mediterranean coast
the Gaza Strip provided a salient that enabled the Egyptian army to deploy barely
thirty miles, along flat and sandy coast, from the city of Tel Aviv and Israel's
major population concentration. In the south, an Egyptian push across the open
Negev desert separating the Sinai from Jordan, in some places by only a few miles,
could cut the vital port city of Eilat off from the rest of the country. In the
north, the Syrian army, while too weak to use its topographical advantage to
attempt a major assault on the centers of Israeli settlement around the Sea of
Galilee and along the upper Jordan River, could nevertheless utilize this
advantage to subject towns and farms to heavy shelling, shelling which could only
be halted by a difficult assault up the steep Syrian heights and a consequently
large number of Israeli casualties.
*See Appendix.
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The problem of ground defense tells only part of the story. As the events
of 1967 demonstrated, air power is potent in the Middle East, and the defense of
Israel against air attack was almost impossible within the pre-1967 borders.
Former Egyptian air fields at Al Arish are only 80 miles, or twelve minutes
flying time, from Tel Aviv. These short distances not only mean that warning time
is practically non-existent and opportunities for air defense severely limited,
but they allow maximum flexibility for attacking aircraft in choice of payloads
and attack routes and maximum time over targets. Syrian, Jordanian, and Iraqi
air bases were located at greater distances from targets in Israel, but most of
the length of their approaches was over Arab territory, with only a few miles,
and fewer minutes, for detection and destruction over Israeli territory. The
limited area of Israel made dispersal of her own air force difficult. Under these
circumstances it is little wonder that the greatest fear in Israel during the
crisis of 1967 was of catastrophic civilian casualties in air attack should the
Arabs obtain even a temporary initial advantage if war were to break out. These
strategic circumstances explain much of the instability in the situation produced
by the 1967 Egyptian build-up in Sinai, and dictated the bold high-risk tactics
of the Israeli Air Force in the opening hours of the war.
The old borders were insecure in one other important respect. Despite
Israel's small area, her borders were extremely long and tortuous. This meant
that infiltration could not be prevented by defensive installations and patrols,
and reprisals were resorted to instead. While this had little to do with the
instability of the crisis of May of 1967, it had much to do with the increase in
tensions that led to it.
Israeli Security and the Six Day War
The changes produced by the Six Day War were dramatic. While the area
controlled by Israel increased from 20,000 to 90,000 square kilometers, the
length of the land borders actually decreased from 600 to 400 miles. The
artillery threat against Israeli population was removed everywhere, except for
small areas south of the Sea of Galilee and around Eilat. The threat of
artillery fire from Jordan and invasion from Gaza was removed. Instead of
facing the Egyptians across the open border in the Negev, the Israelis now have
the natural defenses 'provided by the Suez Canal and terrain which rises to the
east of it. Instead of facing Jordan and Syria up steeply rising terrain, Israel
now enjoys a topographical advantage as well as the natural barrier provided by
the Jordan River.
The most important changes were probably those involving air power. The
distance from Egyptian air fields to Tel Aviv has been increased from 80 to more
than 250 miles, with a comparable increase in Israeli warning time and
opportunities for anti-aircraft fire. While air fields in other Arab countries
are no further than they were before, control over a greater portion of the air
routes from Iraq, Syria and Jordan greatly simplifies the problem of air defense.
The most important effect of these changes is that Israel is now able to
confront an Egyptian army of 250,000 men with only a fraction of the force that
was necessary in 1967 to face an Egyptian army in the Sinai of 180,000 men
and barely half the armor and aircraft that Egypt has at present. Not only
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has the immediate threat to Israel's survival been removed, but the much greater
freedom of maneuver which she now enjoys has enabled the fighting that has taken
place since 1967 to be contained on a level below all-out war.
The Role of the United Nations
I cannot share the optimism of those individuals who envisage a prominent
role for the United Nations as guarantors of a peace settlement in the Middle
East. In Israel I found no interest, much less enthusiasm, for an arrangement
under which the survival of the State of Israel might be entrusted to the United
Nations.
The Israeli memory of the days leading up to the Six Day War is as vivid
as my own, and they are understandably unwilling to risk a repetition of the
abject failure of the United Nations to keep the peace in 1967.
In preparing this report I came across a statement I made on May 20, 1967,
just prior to the outbreak of the June war. I said that: "Secretary General
Thant has downgraded the United Nations and has done irreparable harm to its
peacekeeping potential by his precipitate action in withdrawing the UN buffer
that has helped keep the peace between Israel and the Arabs for 11 years."
I can find nothing in the record of the United Nations in the intervening
three and one-half years that would cause me to revise that judgment. Indeed,
my view then that the Secretary General had "...pulled the props out from under
the precarious Near East peace," was all too clearly demonstrated sixteen days
later.
The Importance of Defensible Borders and the "Rogers Formula"
I believe that the argument for supporting the Israeli claim to defensible
borders would be a compelling one, even if our doing so were not an obvious
means of carrying out our pledge that Israel would not emerge from the August 7
cease-fire in a less secure position than she enjoyed prior to it. The simple
fact is that the effect of the cease-fire has been to weaken the Israeli position
in the event of a resumption of hostilities, and therefore to weaken as well
its bargaining position in the Jarring (and any subsequent) talks..
The United States has taken the position that any settlement of the
territorial dispute arising out of the Six Day War should be based on Israeli
withdrawal from the occupied territories except for "insubstantial alterations"
of the pre-war boundaries.
Precisely what is meant by the term "insubstantial alterations" is unclear.
What is clear is that commitment by the United States to the general nature of
a settlement in advance of negotiations was unnecessary and, I believe, unwise.
Moreover, the public statement of this view, by weakening the Israeli position
in advance, merely compounded the initial error of making gratuitous concessions.
It would be a rave mistake t0 apply the ~v~ague formula of "insubstantial
alterations" 4flp&,o~li$.?rf~" Ali ' 'l"rT21{W 9 J 20(1'JO1 -#f
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defensible borders -.- "secure and recognized boundaries" in the words of the UN
Resolution. It would be much preferable to adopt a more functional formula --
perhaps something like "the minimum territorial adjustment consistent with the
establishment of defensible borders", but the precise formulation is of less
consequence than the logic that underlies it. I am hopeful, in this regard,
that the Administration shares the view that the interests of lasting peace, as
well as the credibility of the American position, lies in the search for a more,
rather than a less, secure agreement, and that the crucial element here is the
physical security of any revised map of Israel.
For Israel to abandon the security of her present borders in exchange for
ephemeral concessions from the other side would endanger not only Israel's
survival, but the peace of the world as well. Behind the present cease-fire
lines Israel has room to maneuver. She can cope with crises (such as acute
rises in the level at, which the war of attrition is prosecuted) without
precipitate action and without resort to full scale mobilization.
If, however, after a peace settlement that fails to provide for
defensible borders, the same Soviet-Egyptian forces now contained behind the
Suez Canal were deployed along, say, the pre-1967 borders, Israel could not
wait in readiness in a purely defensive posture. She would have to meet any
acute threat with the same high level of mobilization that was necessary in 1967,
a level of readiness that simply cannot be sustained for more than a few days.
Unless the crisis which requires it can be resolved quickly by peaceful means,
the result would be a, repetition of the general war that engulfed the Middle East
in 1967, but with a highly uncertain outcome. Along more rather than less
defensible borders, therefore, the urgency of crises is substantially lessened.
I have chosen to dwell at length on the importance of negotiating defensible
borders in the context of a general settlement because I believe that a failure
to do so will provide the seed, and the incentive, for continued insecurity,
tension and eventual war.
It seems to me that the "Rogers formula", with its emphasis on part of the
UN Resolution (withdrawal from occupied territories) at the expense of the
ultimately more significant element (secure and recognized boundaries) is
short-sighted and ill-advised.
The stability of any agreement will depend, above all, on the extent to
which it provides physical security for Israel.
Physical security, as the UN resolution implies, prominently includes the
establishment of such measures as demilitarized zones. Given the fact that the
routes eastward from the Suez Canal are few in number and of limited handling
capacity, there is much that could be accomplished by the total demilitarization
of the Sinai, provided that resort to this device is of genuine strategic
significance and not a partial and merely symbolic offering.
A secure peace must involve a clear recognition by the Arabs that the
existence of Israel is no longer at issue. It must not be possible for a peace
settlement to be regarded as merely a tactical step on the road to eventual
liquidation of the State of Israel. Calculated ambiguity is a frequent tool of
diplomacy, but ambiguity on such a fundamental issue is. dangerous. The
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acknowledgment in a peace settlement of Israel's "right to live in peace within
secure and recognized boundaries" must be made in language and by procedures
so clear-cut that no conflict in interpretation is possible.
But language a:Lone is not enough. A settlement which relies only on
language will be no more successful than the Kellogg-Briand Pact renouncing war
as an instrument of national policy. That agreement was tellingly characterized
by Senator James Reed of Missouri as "a sort of international kiss." A settle-
ment of the Middle Eastern conflict must be more than an "international kiss."
It must not only recognize Israel's right to "secure and recognized boundaries";
it must incorporate concrete arrangements that make clear in advance that any
attempt to violate those boundaries would be doomed to failure.
I wish to be perfectly clear on my view of the importance of defensible
borders for Israel. Obviously the choice is not between defensible and
indefensible borders but, rather, between borders that are more as opposed to
less defensible. Because I am aware of the deep distress of Egypt and Jordan
over the occupation of parts of their territory, I tend to the view that Israel
should press for only such territory as is absolutely essential for the
purposes of national defense. Moreover, I believe that Israel should consider
seriously the use of demilitarized zones rather than continued occupation
wherever possible, and in the context of an overall settlement. My quarrel with
the Rogers formula is that it appears to prejudge the extent of the alterations
that would constitute defensible borders, diminishes the Israeli bargaining
position, and, I believe, ultimately encourages the Arabs to adopt a rigid
rather than flexible position.
National security, for Israel as for the United States, ultimately depends
on political as well as military factors, and in this regard it is worth noting
that in the search for security there is a trade-off between territory and
external guarantees. The extent to which guarantees and territory are inter-
changeable is clearly a subject for negotiation, but neither United Nations
forces nor those of third countries will have the permanence of topography.
Conclusion and Recommendations
One of the central problems in our efforts to bring peace to the Middle
East has been a preoccupation with the notion that the conflict between Israel
and the Arab nations lies at the core of the instability we seek to alleviate.
One result is that we have been far too sanguine in our hopes for Soviet
cooperation in resolving that unhappy conflict.
The Soviets understand that a Middle East characterized by peace and
harmony, by stability and cooperative Arab-Israeli relations, would deprive them
of their access to the continuing penetration of the Arab world. A genuine peace
in the Middle East would diminish the importance of Soviet military support to
Egypt; Syria and Iraq would not require large numbers of Soviet tanks any more
than Egypt would require the presence of the Russian Air Force if a secure
negotiated settlement could be obtained. The unhappy truth is that the Soviets,
far from urging the radical Arab states to make peace with Israel, are determined
to keep tensions high and to nurture the distant hope that Israel will one day
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be destroyed. If the Arab states were ever to despair of the eventual destruction
of Israel, and if they were left free to determine their own best interests, I
believe that the problems of the Palestinians could be solved, Israel could obtain
recognition for defensible borders, and the countries of the Middle East could
set about the business of cooperating in economic and political development.
American policy in the Middle East has not been sufficiently sensitive to
these considerations. We have often, and especially recently, acted on the
assumption that because the Soviets do not want all-out war in the Middle East
they must desire all-out peace. When we come to appreciate that between the
desire to avert war and the desire for peace there is an enormous range of Soviet
policy objectives, we shall have taken the first essential step in designing
an effective Middle East policy.
Nothing is so likely to facilitate Soviet policy in the Middle East as a
settlement imposed on Israel that leaves her in the vulnerable and exposed
position that existed, prior to the Six Day War. Such a settlement would guarantee
that the tensions upon which Soviet policy is based would continue to be exploited
with tragic consequences for Arab and Jew alike.
In summary, these are my recommendations:
1. We need to recognize that the central problem in the Middle East is
the Soviet drive for hegemony, and that
2. The maintenance of a high level of tension between Israel and the
Arab states is the primary vehicle by which the Soviet Union seeks to accomplish
this objective.
3. We should assume, therefore, that for the foreseeable future the
search for peace and stability in the Middle East will be resisted, rather than
supported by Soviet policy.
4. We should recognize that the best prospect for peace in the Middle East
lies in discouraging radical Arab hopes for the eventual military defeat of
Israel -- hopes that lead to a menacing and destabilizing alliance with the
Soviet Union and that deepen Soviet influence in the region as a whole.
5. We should recognize, and make clear our determination to resist, the
Soviet threat to our friends and allies in the Middle East, particularly Greece
and Turkey, Iran and those moderate Arab nations who desire our support. To
that end:
(a) We should actively encourage our NATO allies to join with us in
a strengthening of our common defensive capabilities in the
region; and
(b) We should take immediate steps to explore measures to increase
the strength and effectiveness of the U.S. Sixth Fleet.
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6. In the special case of Israel, whose security is directly and
immediately affected by American policy, I would recommend the following:
(a) We should faithfully implement the basic policy expressed in
Section 501 of the Defense Procurement Act of 1971 -- which is
now the law of the land -- to furnish to Israel the means of
providing for its own security in order to restore and maintain
the military balance in the Middle East.
(b) Recognizing that the Israeli economy can no longer sustain its
recent high :Level of defense procurement, we should stand ready
to assist Israel not only by credit sale but with grant aid for
certain military equipment essential to her security.
(c) We should assist Israel in the development of an improved
indigenous defense production capability in certain areas through
the provision of production rights for equipment of U.S.
manufacture.
(d) We should drop the "Rogers formula" of supporting only
"insubstantial alterations" in the 19+9 armistice lines, substit-
uting, in its place, a formula that recognizes the primacy of
establishing defensible borders for Israel.
(e) Our approach to a settlement should, above all, emphasize
concrete, physical arrangements to assure Israel's security
which, if imperiled, merely invites Soviet exploitation and
plants the seed of future war.
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ISRAEL'S VULNERABILITY TO HOSTILE FIRE
Beirut
BEFORE THE SIX-DAY WAR
.50k
Tiberias
Lebanon 82 km
Syria 77 km
Jordan 581 km
Egypt 206 km
Gaza Strip 59 km
Total 985 km
anafir
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200170001-8
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200170001-8
ISRAEL'S VULNERABILITY TO HOSTILE FIRE
AFTER THE Six-BAY WAR
Cease-Fire Lines
Lebanon 110 km
Syria 80 km
Jordan 300 km
E9frpt 160 km
Total 650 km
e ?SI-~1w~~a
my regions within
li aeti Sun range
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200170001-8