COMMENTS ON INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY PAPER PREPARED BY THE PEACE THROUGH LAW GROUP IN CONGRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00337R000100170007-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2001
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: August 7, 1970
• Content Type: MF

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7 August 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Comments on Intelligence and Policy paper
prepared by the Peace through Law Group
in Congress
1. A review of this paper leaves one with the impression
that, by and large, it would have to be virtually rewritten to make it
factual or rational. It is in great measure a collection of biased, self-
serving declarations, reaching conclusions with the same lack of objec-
tivity which the unknown a t ho r--,s charge to CIA and the Intelligence
Community.
2. The "Summary" paragraph (p.l) lists four sources of
information "fed" to the President by CIA, NSC, the State and Defense
Departments, and the President's own personal advisors. These four
sources, in the authors' concept of importance are, first and "most
important". the open press and technical magazines of the world;
second, satellite reconnaissance; third, "technical sources such as
radio and radar interception", and fourth, "human sources such as
defectors.'' These sources apparently do not include clandestine
agents. Obviously, this order of priorities cannot hold, for it
depends on the type of information we are seeking as to the tools we
employ in a given situation. The authors also note that the President
can release such intelligence information as he chooses to Congress,
the press or the general public, but that, in the case of Congress, only
a very select number receive this intelligence. It would appear that
this statement is a backhanded charge that the President can manipulate
the information he receives by selective release.
3. The confusing opening sentence of the section on
"Assessment and Presentation of the Threat" (p. 2) seems to imply
that the evaluation and presentation of intelligence to the President
is "directly linked" to the policy alternatives to be drawn from these
facts---in other words, slanted information to support policy. This
section also notes that in national security threat situations requiring
immediate response, the press, public opinion and Congress are
neither consulted or considered. The authors do not point out the
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obvious security problems inherent in such consultation, or that
probable Congressional and public reactions are usually weighed by
the decision-makers in reaching their conclusions.
4. In the section on "Intelligence Products" (pp. 4-5) the
authors state that "each major component" of the U. S. intelligence
agencies generally tries to produce its own intelligence product "at
the highest classification permitted"; and that this is "a symptom of
inter and intra agency rivalry. If This charge overlooks the fact that
many of these publications are quite specialized and are for differing
audiences and purposes. It also does not consider the fact that these
reports would not be useful or accurate if they did not contain the best
information available at any classification. This section also ignores
the fact that NIE's are based on departmental contributions in part.
The authors underline their suspicion that the Armed Services repre-
sentatives dissent in footnotes to estimates in order to retain evalu-
ations to support their programs and requests for funds.
5. The section on "Intelligence Assessment and Decision
Making'(pp.7-8) is both self-serving and insidious, and repeats
charges that have been made by irresponsible sources since the begin-
ning. Noting CIA's paramount role in evaluation, the authors raise
the question of the extent of CIA departure from objectivity in order
to make policy, and to what extent the evaluation process is governed
by selectivity and biased ideological or political beliefs. While admit-
ting that the answer is impossible to determine, the authors nevertheless
conclude that it would be "foolish to discount these factors as insignificant."
It is their position that the intelligence officer plays an important policy
role by determining what data the President or senior policy officials
will see. The authors view the problem in part as stemming from CIA
functioning "as a body protecting its own credibility",and they raise
the question as to whether the President makes the decisions or merely
selects one of the alternatives that are presented by his advisors. To
avoid the bias or "self-fulfilling prophecies" which the authors say the
NIE's may "often" contain, they conclude that there is a "clearly defined"
need for Congress to become involved in matters pertaining to national
security. For once to credit these authors with an unassailable position,
one can agree with their statement here that Congress as a whole is ill-
suited to deal with matters affecting national security if only because
the security problem in so large a group is enormous. They add that
regional interests and political allegiances may also affect a
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Congressman's ability to assess these matters objectivity. Neverthe-
less, they aver that certain Senators and Congressman, other than
members of the Armed Services Committees, should have extended to
them the responsibility to evaluate NIE's. And because a sound know-
ledge of international affairs is important, the authors suggest that it
would be "wise" to draw upon the expertise of members of the Foreign
Relations Committees.
6. As a result of the reasoning and conclusions presented
in their paper regarding the intellectual dishonesty of CIA in particular
and other intelligence components in general, the authors recommend
(p. 9) the establishment of a Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence
which would include members from the Armed Services and Foreign
Relations Committees in both Houses as well as additional members
at large. This Committee would serve as "an official liaison" with
the NSC; might be used to reconcile U. S. government plans with foreign
policy; and would serve as a watchdog to insure that CIA operations do
not interfere with or undermine such activities as foreign aid and
educational programs abroad, the latter an obvious sop to Fulbright.
It would also permit the "matching" of intelligence information with
press reports and independent observations which Congress would
receive from diverse sources. The authors are quick to note that
the purpose of the Committee is not to manage CIA, because the com-
plexity of our organization and Congressional lack of experience makes
this impossible!
7. It should be noted that this paper contains the background
information which led to the introduction on 6 August of Concurrent
Resolutions in the House and Senate to establish a 14 Member Joint
Committee on Intelligence. These resolutions present one new provision
which I do not believe previous resolutions for an Intelligence Committee
contained. fat Section 2(e) of these Resolutions providefthat one Joint
Committee member from the House and one from the Senate should be
appointed to serve "at the invitation of the President, as representatives
to, and non-voting members of, the U. S. Intelligence Board."
8. The paper contains several other recommendations, which
appear on pp. I and 6, and which are partly duplicative. The first
VP ' Y t::,
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(Recommendation 1, page 1, and Recommendations 1 and 7, page 6)
calls for a drastic curtailment of covert action programs and their
personnel and that, where appropriate, these programs should be
continued overtly by the Departments of State and Commerce, and
AID. It is also recommended that human resources programs
(i. e. , clandestine operations) should be cut back drastically. In
support of these recommendations, the authors note the decline in
importance of human [collection] resources in the face of technKogical
procurement. In their back-up material (p. 5) the authors indicate
their lack of knowledge of how covert action programs are initiated
and controlled; their recommendations that such programs can be
overtly handled by State or other departments show their complete
25X1C lack of knowledge and understanding of such work.
9. Recommendations 3 (p.1) and 4 (p. 6) state that informa-
tion obtained by satellites in such fields as earth resources, food and
agriculture should be declassified and shared with competent scientists
lite programs have been publicly released. Subjects covered by these
releases include,weather forecasting and mete orology., oceanography,
studies of sea patterns, storm surveillance, wind data, snow and sea
ice mapping. Earth resources and at least preliminary studies in the
field of generalized land use mapping have been released from the man-
ned satellite programs, Gemini and Apollo.
10. Recommendation 5 (p.1) calls for a full Congressional
inquiry regarding the use of intelligence data to justify U. S. weapons
development programs. This presumably is aimed at such things as the
ABM dispute.
11. Recommendation 3 (p. 6) calls for clearer lines of
responsibility to be drawn between CIA, DIA and NSA to eliminate
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duplication of effort and unhealthy competitiveness. This recommenda-
tion presumes that these "unhealthy" conditions exist in any large mea-
sure and overlooks the fact that it would be better to have some duplication
rather than risk a gap in intelligence performance.
12. Recommendation 5 (p. 6) states as a fact that "inter-
service parlochialisms distort the estimative process and lead to
unnecessary weaponprocurement. " As a result it is recommended
that the military services should be required to cite before Congress
only the majority position in NIE's, rather than their service footnote.
This recommendation overlooks the fact that the entire estimative
process was set up to eliminate departmental parochialism and dis-
tortions. Furthermore, the DCI's testimony before the appropriate
Congressional Committees, both substantive and appropriations, sets
forth the agreed Community estimate. If subsequent service testi-
mony dissents from that position, it is up to the Committee before
which such dissenting testimony is given to evaluate the differences
and reach their own legislative determination as to who is correct.
13. Recommendation 6 (p. 6) states that the Board of
National Estimates should include representatives from non-intelligence
and non-governmental sources. It is obvious that the authors of this
paper are not aware of the make up of the Board of National Estimates
and i5 inclusion of such "outsiders" as Professor Strayer and Mr.
Barger, or the work of ONE's consultant pastel.
Walter Pfo*rzzheirfie r
Curator
Historical Intelligence Collection
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
EXTENSION
NO.
Legislative Counsel 7D35
4151
DATE
6 August 1970
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
E
4
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d i
h
"P
Th
A
h
DDI 7
4
e
s t
ttac
e
eace
roug
2.
Law" Committee paper sent over
by Senator Goldwater on which
the Director would like comments.
3?
Would appreciate your thoughts
on recommendation three page 1
regarding use of unclassified
4
Satellite Photography for peace-
ful purposes. Would also be
5.
happy to hear from you on any
other point on which you care to
comment
6.
.
7.
JOHN M. MAURY
Legislative Counsel
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FORM No. 237 Use previous editions GPO: 1968 0 - 297-542 (40)
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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
Legislative Counsel
Room 7D-35
2
3
4
Remarks s
Jack:
This is a difficult paper on which to
comment because it is so biased and ir-
rational.
With regard to the recommendation
on satellite photography, the authors were
not aware or chose to overlook the very
weather forecasting, oceanographic data,
and other services at an unclassified level.
I had Walter Pforzheimer draw up
additional comments which are attached.
6
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO S FENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE