CONVERSATION WITH DOROTHY FOSDICK, STAFF DIRECTOR OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, ON THE IMPACT OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS ON SOVIET WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00337R000100130050-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 10, 2006
• Sequence Number: 50
• Publication Date: May 21, 1969
• Content Type: MFR

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QLC 69-0451
2i may 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Conversation with Dorothy Fosdick, Staff Director of the
Subcommittee on National Security and international
operations, on the Impact of the Cuban -Missile Crisis
on Soviet Weapons Development Programs
1. 1 saw Dorothy Fosdick today in an effort to put to rest the question
we have been discussing in the last few days on the impact which the Cuban
missile crisis had on the development of the Soviet weapons programs. Miss
Fosdick contacted us on this subject several days ago when the asked if we
could provide classified and unclassified papers for their use which would
buttress the position that, following the Cuban crisis, the Soviets were
determined that they would never again let themselves he put in a position
of having to back down in a similar situation and, therefore, engaged in a
major weapons buildup.
2. 1 had previously told Miss Fosdick that, although the misslie
crisis certainly had an impact in a number of areas, the effect which it had
on the Soviet weapons program was not of major significance; it was more a
question of increased. emphasis and reduced timing than it was a tuatter of a
determination to engage in specific new programs. I added that once this had
been said this was about all that could be said onthe subject.
3. When I entered Miss Fosdick' s office today, she asked if we had a
paper for her. When I indicated we did not, she said "I think you people are
taking this position because you feel that anything you give us in support of
thesis will buttress Secretary Laird' a office on the ABM issue and you
are opposed to the Secretary's position. " She then said,incldently. I
she was needling me about statements in the press regarding the Director' a
risks to the ,business Council. She said she was not, she was referring;
to the fact that "'some of your people at the working level have been telling
members of the Press that Secretary Laird's position on the ABM is not
supported by intelligence date. " At this point she had to leave the office to
e Senator Jackson briefly.
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4. When she returned, I told Miss Fosdick I had originally thought
she was needling me but I now had the impression she was serious and, if
she were, we should go back and straighten this situation out. I told her
she certainly knew that we had been cooperating with Senator Jackson and
her to the utmost, providing them with a considerable amount of nxaterial
in response to their requests. I pointed. out that in the present situation we
did not feel there was much which could be said in support of her thesis
over and above that which I had given her. I went on to say that, as she also
knew, the Director is very meticulous in not taking sides in matters of this
sort and he has been especially careful in. the ABM issue. I said that we
were trying to be totally objective and factual and where we could, in good
conscience, provide her with material which she requested, we would do so.
I also said Agency personnel were not authorized to discuss intelligence
information outside authorized channels and I asked her who was involved
in the situation, which she had mentioned regarding the press. She said
she could not name names but the person who had received the information
had appeared on nationwide. television.
5. In discussing the ramifications of the ABM Issue I used the
statements which had been made by various individuals on FOBS. As an
example. I referred to John Foster' a testimony before the Senate Armed
Services Committee in response to Senator Symington' a interrogation on
the 1120 questions". I pointed out that, although Foster subscribed to the
intelligence position on the "Z4 questions" including FOB*, his stated
answer gave one an impression which could be construed as as partially
contrary to the agreed intelligence position--which was that we have no
evidence to Indicate the Soviets have deployed FOBS. (I used the P OBs
example deliberately, since on two occasions--in public statements--
Senator Jackson has said that the Soviets have deployed the FOBS. )
amies Fosdick picked this point up and said Jackson' a position
erived from information provided by the Department of Defense.
ent on to say that Senator Symington had been criticizing Senator Jackson
b.
his position on this. She said that Jackson had rechecked this with DOD.
She then stated the DOD Position in somewhat stronger terms than Foster' e
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. She said on the
basis of this, Jackson decided not to back down from his earlier statement
and he has repeated it since.
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7. Miss Fosdick retreated considerably from the almost hostile
posture which she had assumed in the beginning of our conversation and
I am inclined to think that her actions were created by the tension of the
present situation. I think she feels that the Senator has relied too strongly
information given hire by DO1 and she is becoming rather irritated and
defensive as a result.
S. We concluded our conversation on the usual friendly basis.
Miss Fosdick asked if I would have our people prepare a paper saying
essentially what I had told her at the outset of our conversation or
"whatever you feel that you can say on the subject. - She said she had
been very persuaded. by the testimony of Professor Phillip Mosley on the
Soviet posture since the Cuban crisis and gave me a copy of his testimony
before the Military Applications Subcommittee of the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy. She asked that I show this to our people who would be
preparing the paper for her. I told her I would be happy to do so.
25X1A
Deputy Le
OLC./CLC.gs(24 May 1969)
Distribution:
Original - Subject
I - OSA (Bruce Clarke
Y- Chrono
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