HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON UNITED STATES SECURITY AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS ABROAD OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS SECOND SESSION PART 7 JUNE9 AND 11, 1970

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00337R000100110004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 115
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 11, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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UNITED STATES SECURITY AGREEMENTS
AND COMMITMENTS ABROAD
GREECE AND TURKEY
HEARINGS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON UNITED STATES SECURITY
AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS ABROAD
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS
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UNITED STATES SECURITY AGREEMENTS
AND COMMITMENTS ABROAD
GREECE AND TURKEY
HEARINGS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON UNITED STATES SECURITY
AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS ABROAD
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
35-205 WASHINGTON : 1970
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
J. W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, Chairman
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama
GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana
KARL D. MUNDT, South Dakota
ALBERT GORE., Tennessee
CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho
JOHN
SHERMAN COOPER, Kentucky
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
JOHN
J. WILLIAMS, Delaware
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut
JACOB
K. JAVITS, New York
CLAIBORNE PILL, Rhode Island
GALE W. McGEE, Wyoming
CARL MARCY, Chief of Staff
ARTHUR M. KUHL, Chief Clerk
SUBCOMMITTEE ON U.S. SECURITY AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS ABROAD
STUART SYM:INGTON, Missouri, Chairman
J. W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, Kentucky
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
PAT HOLT, Staff Assistant
WALTER PINCUS, Chief Consultant
ROLAND A. PAUL, Counsel
NOTE.-Sectio:as of this hearing have been deleted at the request of the Department
of State and the Department of Defense. Deleted material is indicated by the notation
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CONTENTS
Stat
ements by:
Davies, Hon. Rodger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs_______________________________
Page
1770
McClelland, Roswell D., nominee to be Ambassador to Niger -------
1869
Inse
rtions for the record:
Letter to Senator Symington from Assistant Secretary of State for
Congressional Relations David M. Abshire, dated June 24, 1970,
concerning NATO and SEATO Treaties________________________
1772
Statement concerning U.S. commitments under North Atlantic
Treaty, Department of State----------------------------------
1774
Statement concerning article 5 of North Atlantic Treaty, Department
of State------------------------------------------- --------
1774
Letter and attachment to Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Rustu
Zorlu from U.S. Ambassador Fletcher Warren, dated May 16, 1960
1776
Letter to U.S. Ambassador Fletcher Warren from Selim Sarper,
June 16,1960 -----------------------------------------------
1780
"Athens Given U.S. Arms Despite Ban," article by Bernard D.
Nossiter from the Washington Post, June 3, 1970----------------
1786
"Excerpts From Council of Europe's Report on Treatment of Pris-
oners in Greece," from the New York Times, April 16, 1970------
1793
Equipment released following Czechoslovakia crisis________________
1800
French Mirage aircraft sold to Israel_____________________________
1815
Military supply from France to Israel____________________________
1815
Soviet shipment to the United Arab Republic_____________________
1816
Use of Voice of America facilities by Greece______________________
1818
Reports about attempts by King Constantine to broadcast over Voice
of America facilities during his unsuccessful counter-coup attempt-
1819
Greek and Turkish contribution-Korean conflict-----------------
1821
Total of U.S. economic and military aid to Turkey________________
1822
Total U.S. economic and military assistance to Greece-------------
1822
U.S. ship visit- Yugoslavia_.------------------------------------
1833
"Arms Suspensions: A Big Stick or a Weak Reed?", Department of
State-------------------------------------------------------
1836
Visits to Greece by U.S. general and flag officers since April 1967 ----
1839
Announcement of U.S. embargo on delivery of certain items of mili-
try assistance to Greece following the coup____________________
1841
Equipment currently suspended______________________
1842
Voluntary statement on delivery of military assistance to Greece, and
addendum, issued June 3., 1970, Department of State ------------
1845
Annual costs for U.S. facilities- Greece --------------------------
1846
Correspondence between President Johnson and Prime Minister Inonu,
June 1964, as released by the White Rouse, January 15, 1966 -----
1848
Pact of mutual cooperation between Iraq and Turkey (Baghdad
Pact, subsequently redesignated Central Treaty Organization)---_
1856
Declaration Respecting the Baghdad Pact between the United States
of America and Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom-_
1857
Agreement of Cooperation Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of Turkey---------------
1857
Distinction between CENTO Treaty and SEATO Treaty, Depart-
ment of State-----------------------------------------------
1858
Annual operating costs for U.S. facilities-Turkey -----------------
1860
Support personnel in Izmir_____________________________________
1864
JUSMAT reductions------------------------------------------
1866
Summary index---------------------------------------------------
1879
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UNITED STATES SECURITY AGREEMENTS AND
COMMITMENTS ABROAD
UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON U.S. SECURITY
AGREEMENTS AND COMMrr1NII;NTs ABROAD
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:05 a.m., in room
S-116, the Capitol building, Senator Stuart Symington (chairman of
the subcommittee) presiding.
Present : Senators Symington, Fulbright, Pell, and Javits.
Also present : Mr. Holt, Mr. Paul, and Mr. Pincus of the commit-
tee staff.
Frank Cash, country director for Turkey, Department of State;
Alfred G. Vigderman, country director, Greece, Department of State;
Robert L. Pugh, Department of State, Turkish desk officer; Stephen
M. Boyd, Department of State, Acting Assistant Legal Adviser, Near
East and South Asian Affairs; Charles N. Brower, Assistant Legal
Adviser for European Affairs, Department of State; Lt. Col. Melvin
G. Goodweather, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force; Peter Knaur,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs; Sophocles H. Hero, Office of the General Counsel, Depart-
ment of Defense; H. G. Torbert, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations, Department of State; Capt. Edward Krebs
(U.S. Navy) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-
national Security Affairs, Turkish desk; Charles W. Quinn, Office, of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs,
Greek desk; and Joseph J. Wolf, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs,
Department of State.
Senator SYMINGTON. The subcommittee will come to order. It is the
custom for witnesses who testify before the subcommittee to take the
oath.
Will. you rise, please. Raise Your right hand. Do you swear the testi-
mony you give this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. DAVIES. I do.
Mr. PRANGER. I do.
Senator SYMTINGTON. All right.
Will you identify yourself, starting on the left, for the reporter.
Mr. HERO. Sophocles IF. Hero, Office of the General Counsel, De-
partment of Defense.
(1769)
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Colonel GoonwnA,rmuz. Lt. Col. Melvin G. Goodweather, Office of
the Secretary of the Air Force.
Mr. BrowER. Charles N. Brower, Assistant Legal Adviser for Euro-
pean Affairs, Department of State.
Mr. Born.. Stephen M. Boyd, Department of State, Acting Assistant
Legal Adviser, Near East and South Asian Affairs.
Mr. Puon. Robert L. Pugh, Department of State, Turkish desk
officer.
Mr. WOLF. Joseph J. Wolf, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs,
Department of State.
Mr. KNAL-R. Peter Knaur, Office of the Assistant Secretary of De-
fense, and :C would like to say, Mr. Chairman, there will be two
l)efense backup witnesses arriving. They will be a little late, if it is
all right with you.
Mr. VrGnrrN:AN. Alfred G. Vigderman, Country Director, Greece,
Department of State.
Mr. ('Asti., Frank Cash, Country Director for Turkey, Department
of State.
Mr. TORBERT. H. G. Torbert, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Con-
gressional Relations, Department of State.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. You have a prepared statement,
do you not?
Mr. DAVIES. I do, sir.
Senator SYinzlNcTON.Today we will discuss American military
forces, facilities, and programs in Greece and Turkey. We will hear the
testimony of Mr. Rodger Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Near East and South Asian Affairs, and Mr. Robert J. Pranger,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the same region.
Mr. Davies, will you proceed with your statement ?
TESTIMONY OF HON. RODGER DAVIES, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SEC-
RETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AF-
FAIRS, ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT J. PRANGER, DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Mr. I) vi S. _Mr. Chairman, both Mr. Pranger and I are pleased to
be able to appear before this subcommittee to discuss some of the
political-military aspects of U.S. interests in Greece and Turkey, in-
chrding some of the factors which have led to our current NATO
relationship with Greece and Turkey which is the basis of our com-
mitment to these NATO partners. Representatives of your subcom-
mittee have grad the benefit of briefings on U.S. activities, installations
and U.S. forces in both Greece and Turkey. Your subcommittee has
also heard Generals Burchinal and Polk. In addition, you will hear
from Mr. Elliot Richardson, Under Secretary of State and General
Goodpastcr, commander in chief, U.S. European Command.
United States cornet tments to Greece and Turkey are based on the
strategic importance of these nations, both to the United States and to
the NATO alliance. The geographic position of Greece and Turkey
make them important obstacles to Soviet attempts to expand into the
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eastern Mediterranean area. Immediately following World War II
the Soviets embarked upon a concerted policy of extending their in-
fluence and control into this area. Though Soviet techniques have
varied since that time, domination of the eastern Mediterranean clearly
remains a primary goal of Soviet policy. So long as this is true, the
United States and NATO will continue to share strategic interests with
Greece and Turkey.
It was in recognition of these interests that the United States first
acted, under the Truman Doctrine of 1947, to provide economic and
military assistance to Greece and Turkey to enable them to resist
Soviet expansion. The entry of Turkey and Greece into the NATO
alliance in 1952 derived from the basic importance of these two coun-
tries to the West as a. whole. The participation of Greece and Turkey
in NATO contributed substantially to the strength of the alliance
and remains of great importance, given the increasingly complicated
situation in the eastern Mediterranean area.
NATURE OF U.S. COMMITMENT TO GREECE AND TURKEY
The heart of our commitment to both Greece and Turkey stems
from article 5 of the NATO Treaty which provides that an armed
attack against one or more members in Europe or North America shall
be considered an attack against them all. The United States is, there-
fore, committed to go to the aid of both Greece and Turkey in the
event of external attack by taking such action as we deem necessary,
and in accordance with our constitutional processes.
Senator SYMINGTON. Which one of the two countries would we de-
fend if they started to fight each other?
Mr. DAVIES. Sir, the NATO alliance is a defensive alliance and
an attack within the alliance by one member upon another is not cov-
ered by article 5, and I hope would never take place.
Senator SYMINGTON. As chairman of the Subcommittee on Near
East and South Asian Affairs, I discussed this with Mr. Vance and,
as you know, at times it got pretty close.
Mr. DAVIES. Yes, and the matter affected our relations with the
Turkish Government.
Senator SYMINGTON. Under the SEATO Treaty, no country has
to act unless at the time of the crunch it is considered in its interest
to act, and that has become a practical matter as a result of so few
of the SEATO signatories helping us with respect to whatever it is,
we are trying to do in the Far East. Does the NATO Treaty require us
to come to assistance if a member is attacked, or do we have the right
to make the decision at the time?
Mr. DAVIES. It is my understanding, sir, that we are obliged to take
action, but the nature of the action would be decided in accordance
with our constitutional. processes.
Senator SYMNGTON. Presumably that would mean coming to the
Congress.
Mr. DAVIES. I believe, sir, that any administration would want to
have congressional support. However, the President must exercise his
constitutional obligations.
Senator SYMINGTON. I understand. That is not the thrust of my
question. The thrust of my question is, is there a similarit in this
regard between the NATO Treaty and the SEATO Treaty
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Mr. DAVIF,s. Yes, sir. May I just check?
Senator SYMINGTON. Why, don't you supply it for the record. Never
mind, Mr. Holt gives me article 5 of the NATO Treaty :
The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and
consequently they agree that, if such pan armed attack occurs, each of them, in
exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article
51 of the charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked
by taking forthwith, individually and In concert with the other parties, such
action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall im-
mediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated
when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and main-
tain international peace and security.
I am still not entirely clear as to whether that requires us to respond
or whether we have an individual unilateral right not to.
Mr. DAVrv,.1. believe, sir, the key words are "such action as it deems
necessary." Article 11. of the NATO Treaty provides--
This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions: carried out by the parties In
accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
(The following additional information was later supplied by the
Department of State.)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
lion. STUA$T, SYMINCTON Washington, D.C., June 24, 1970.
.
C1
hairm?an, Subcomoiulttee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad,
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate.
DEAR Ma, CHAIRMAN: When Deputy Assistant Secretary Rodger Davies ap-
peared before Your Subcommittee on June 9, the Subcommittee requested that
the Depa.rtmenr, of State provide for the record information with respect to the
differences between the North Atlantic Treaty and the Southeast Asia Collec-
tive Defense Treaty, as well as a statement regarding the question of whether
the United States is obliged automatically to come to the aid of a signatory of
the North Atlante Treaty with military assistance in the event of external at-
tack upon such signatory.
The information you requested is as follows :
Roth treaties were submitted to the Senate which gave its advice and consent
to their ratification.
None of the commitments contained in these treaties requires an automatic
response from the United States. In the event of an armed attack within the
scope of the commitments, the United States is obligated to decide upon and take
appropriate action to meet the common danger. Such action shall be taken in
accordance with U.S. constitutional processes.
Should a situation arise calling into play these commitments, the Executive
would seek to assure that, the Congress at that time fulfills its proper role under
the Constitution in the decision-making process. The Executive would keep the
appropriate committees and congressional leadership fully informed, and would
cooperate to the maximum in Congress' fulfillment of its responsibilities.
7 Ite North Atlantic Treaty
The North Atlantic Treaty is central to the U.S. collective defense system.
Article V Of that treaty provides : (1) t:hat an armed attack against one or more
of the parties shall be considered an attack against them all ; (2) consequently
e3uh party will assist the party or parties so attacked; (3) each party will
take forthwith individual or collective action as it deems necessary, including
the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic
Treaty area. Article XI of the treaty further provides that implementation shall
be in accordance with the parties' respective constitutional processes.
There is nothing in the North Atlantic Treaty which could require an auto-
matic declaration of war on the part of the United States. In the event of an
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armed attack against one of the parties, there is an obligation to assist, but the
Treaty does not prescribe in advance the extent, manner, and timing. The obli-
gation has been described by Secretary of State Acheson, testifying at the time
the North Atlantic Treaty was before the Senate, as follows :
"* * * [W]hen the attack occurs, which is an attack upon all of them by
definition, each party considers what the objective under the treaty is.
"That objective is -to restore, if it has been violated, and to maintain after
it has been restored, the security of the North Atlantic area, and if it pledges
itself to take any sort of action, including armed force, if that is necessary in
its judgment-to take whatever action its judgment says is necessary to bring
about that result.
"That might be a declaration of war and use of all the resources of the coun-
try. It might be something much less, depending on what happens as the result
of the attack. If the attack is something which has not been deliberately planned
but has flared up in some way, it might be dealt with by means not involving
the use of armed force. It might be dealt with by reason, and that sort of thing.
"If, however, it were a deliberate plan, a highly mobilized attack on the whole
w area then I assume that the only thing that could possibly have any effect in
restoring and maintaining the security would be every possible physical effort
on the part of the country. So you are not automatically at war. You take what-
ever action you think is necessary in the circumstances."
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty
The collective defense arrangements in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty incorporate the so-called "Monroe Doctrine Formula". In 1823 President
Monroe warned the members of the Holy Alliance that "we should consider any
attempt on any portion of the hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety."
In this treaty, the recitation that an armed attack against one of the parties
would be dangerous to the "peace and safety" of the oth:ers~ is followed by a
declaration that each party "will act to meet the common danger in accordance
with its constitutional processes."
With regard to the action required to implement this and similar treaties,
Secretary of State Rusk has stated :
"These treaties represent legally binding commitments to take appropriate
action at the request of an ally that is the victim of aggression. These com-
mitments do not bind us to any particular course of action. Most of them state
that in the event of aggression we would act to meet the common danger in
accordance with our constitutional processes. How we act in fulfillment of these
obligations will depend upon the facts of the situation. Some situations will
requires less participation on our part than others. What is fundamental to the
fulfillment of our obligations under these agreements is that we act in good
faith to fulfill their purpose. Thus, while the agreements permit great flexibility
in choosing the means by which we would assist other countries in their defense,
we could not expect what we would be regarded as fulfilling our obligation
through the provision of minimum assistance when the survival of the country
clearly necessitated greater aid."
Conclusion
In reality, the distinction between the obligation of the United States under
the North Atlantic Treaty and the obligation under the Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty is more a textual than a practical matter. The Department of
State has stated on several occasions that the difference is "not appreciable."
The response of the United States in a situation of armed attack against any
State which is a party to any of its collective defense treaties would in the final
analysis depend an the nature of the attack, the defensive capacity of the State
or States attacked, and other relevant circumstances. While the language of the
North Atlantic Treaty regarding the use of armed force is somewhat more speci-
fic and direct than that of the other treaties, the response of the United States in
every case, regardless of the particular treaty creating the commitment, would
depend upon the requirements arising from the situation.
I trust that you will find this submission responsive to the Subcommittee's
request.
Sincerely yours,
DAVID M. ABSHIRE,
Assistant Secretaw ii for Congressional Relations.
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Senator SYBSINOTON. I understand that commitment of the United
States in. event of attack by one NATO country on another but the
point I want to make is, are we obligated in the opinion of the State
Department, to came to the defense of a country [deleted] if it is
attacked by the Soviet Union or can we make the decision at the time
it becomes imminent. Second, what has been done, if anything, with
respect to any plan if Turkey and Greece became exacerbated over
any particular problem, as example, the most obvious one is Cyprus,
to the point where one attacked the other?
Mr. DAVIES. Sir, I will provide a detailed statement for the record.
Senator SYivrTNOToN. Thank you. Will you proceed?
(The information referred to follows:)
On the first: point, the response is covered by the report of June 6, 1949 of the
Committee on Foreign Relations on the North Atlantic Treaty which includes
the following: "The Committee emphasizes that this clearly does not commit
any of the parties to declare war.... Action short of the use of armed forces
might suffice, or total war with all our resources might be necessary. Obviously,
Article 5 carries with it an important and far-reaching commitment for the
United States ; what we may do to carry out that commitment, however, will
depend upon our independent decision in each particular instance reached in
accordance with our constitutional process."
On the second point, pursuant to Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty the
United States would plan to consult with its NATO Allies.
Mr. PAUL. May I interrupt to ask just one question? You said the
possibility of an attack by one NATO member on another was not
covered by article :i. I believe Secretary Acheson testified before the
Foreign Relations Committee on this very point on April 27, 194'.).
I am also informed that the Tripartite Declaration of October 3, 1954--
section V of the final act of ,the London Conference-may bear on
this point, I wonder if your lawyers could review this matter and give
us your position. on it?
Mr. I)AVIES. We will research, Mr. Paul, and provide it for the
record.
(The information referred to follows:)
The Department of State has reviewed the matter with specific reference to
the legislative history referred to by Counsel and is of the opinion that Article 5 of
the Treaty does not cover an attack by one NATO member on another.
Mr. PRANOER. There is an exchange, of letters between President
.Johnson and Premier Inonu at the time of the crisis of 1964 which
is published in the Middle East Journal where this question is taken
up and the President at that time was loath to intervene in the
dispute on the ground that this was an unthinkable thing to happen
between NATO allies and furthermore, he did indicate that we would
have to consult with our allies before any moves against the Soviet
Union if they intervened. But this is in the Middle East Journal
and maybe we could supply this correspondence for the record, toe.
(The information referred to appears on. page 1848.)
CREEK AND 'riRKISH CONTINGENTS ON CYPRIIS
Senator SY INGTON. `What understanding exists governing U.S. sup-
plied MAP equipment used by Greece and Turkey?
Mr. DwrES. Sir, this is supplied in accordance with the commitments
of the, two powers to NATO. It is equipment provided for the com-
mon defense within the Alliance.
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Senator SYMINGTON. Have there been any waivers permitting either
Greece or Turkey to transfer war equipment to Cyprus?
Mr. DAVIES. Only in connection with the two contingents that are
maintained by the two powers on Cyprus under the Zurich Agreement,
sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. What does that mean?
Mr. DAVIES. Each of the guaranteeing powers has a small con-
tingent of forces on the island. There is a Greek force and a Turkish
force.
Senator SYMINGTON. And we supply both?
9 Mr. DAVIES. They are detached from their national armies so,
obviously would have the equipment provided their forces under our
NATO program.
Senator SYMINGTON. Are they part of NATO or are they Greek
and Turkish forces?
Mr. DAVIES. They are Greek and Turkish forces in support of
NATO, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. Do they report to a NATO commander?
Mr. DAVIES. No, not on the island. They would report to several
governments.
Senator SYMINGTON. How could they be NATO if they are
Turkish?
Mr. DAVIES. Well, the NATO forces, sir, as I understand it, are
assisted by the United States and other NATO powers as forces in
support of NATO, and you cannot distinguish between elements with-
in those forces.
Senator' SYMZNGToN. How many people does Turkey have on the
island?
Mr. DAVIES. About 650, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. And how many have the Greeks?
Mr. DAVIES. The Greeks have about 950, as far as we know, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. Why do we let the Greeks have more than the
Turks?
Mr. DAVIES. The London-Zurich Agreement, to which we are not
party, established the force strengths of these countries, taking into
account the fact that the Greek Cypriot population is about four times
that of the Turkish Cypriots.
Senator SYMINGTON. Are the force levels decided on the basis of
population on the island?
Mr. DAVIES. I believe, sir, when the powers negotiated the Zurich
Agreement the population balance was important because each thought
that its forces would be elementary security for their particular seg-
ment of the population.
Senator SYMINGTON. Do we supply more to Greece because they
have about 950 than we do to Turkey because they have about 650?
How do we work that out so far as military supplies are concerned?
Mr. PRANCER. The military supplies for the Greek and Turkish
forces, I believe, come just through the ordinary supply channels for
Greek and Turkish MAP. At that point the distribution is made to
these forces, presumably by the Greek and Turkish forces and notby us.
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Senator SYMINGTON. Then, are you saying the decision as to how
much we supply Greece in the way of military equipment on Cyprus is
decided, by the Creeks and what we supply the lurks is decided by the
Turks?
Mr. PRANGGEPR. No, the volume of U.S. supplied military equipment
which the two countries might take to Cyprus was established by
agreement with Greece and Turkey in 1960 and the disposition of
MAP furnished equipment given these countries is currently being
monitored by means of equipment utilization reports which are filed
periodically by the Military Assistance Group.
Senator SYMINOTON. I)o we know what equipment they have taken
out of Greece to put into Cyprus?
Mr. PRANGcR. I do not have a record of it, sir, but I could look into
the matter and supply it for the record.
Senator SY74IINGTON. Could you find out for both countries?
Mr. PRA NMI?. Yes sir. -ire can get a T.O. & E. for you.
(As of the, date of publication, the Staate Department had been
unable to gain Greek Government approval for declassification of the
document referred to.)
(The information referred to concerning Turkey follows:)
No. 1727.
His Excellency FATIN RITSTU ZORLU,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
EXCELLENCY : I have the honor to draw the attention of the Government of
Turkey to the provisions of Article 4 of the Agreement on Aid to Turkey of
July 1947, and with regard to the desire of the Turkish Government to use
certain Military Assistance Program material for its planned military force
in Cyprus to request that Turkey ask formal consent of the United States Gov-
ernment for such use for a purpose other than these for which the material was
furnished.
It must he clearly understood that United States consent for the use of this
equipment in Cyprus, which will be granted immediately upon receipt of Turkey's
request, should not provide a basis for requests for additional Military Assistance
Program material. The equipment sent to Cyprus, which was provided by the
U.S. as grant aid under the Military Assistance Program cannot be dropped
from accountability and will be considered as assets available to requirements
for the Military Assistance Program for Turkey. The material to be deployed
initially to Cyprus has been agreed upon by the Turkish General Staff and
JUSTMAT and is listed in the attached schedule and any Military Assistance
Program material Turkey may subsequently wish to deploy to Cyprus will have
to be the subject; of a separate request.
I have the honor to propose that, if this Note is acceptable to Your Excel-
lency's Goverment, this Note and Your Excellency's Note in reply, asking for
formal United States consent and agreeing to the list submitted, shall constitute
an agreement between our two Governments which shall enter into force on the
date of Your Excellency's reply.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
FI.ETCTTHR WARREN.
Ordnance equipment
Nomenclature: Quantity
Gas Mask----------------------------------------------------------
600
Binocular M3----------.---------------------------------------------
101
Compass 1l2---------------------------------------------------------
101
)Machine Gun ca:l. 30 (7.(12 mm) A4___________________________________
42
Thompson Submachine Gun ----------------------------------------------
158
Rifle, M1 (7.63 mm) U.S---------------------------------------------
334
Tripod Mount, Machine Gun------------------ ------
40
Mortar, 60 mm-------------------------------------------------------
4
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Ordnance equipment-Continued
Nomenclature-Continued Quantity
Recoilless Rifle, 75 mm--------------------------------------------- 2
Recoilless Rifle, 57 mm--------------------------------------------- 4
Tool Set (Armorer's set) ------------------------------------------- 3
Tool Set (General Mechanic's set) ----------------------------------- 10
Minor Repair Set--------------------------------------------------- 1
Repair Set, metal parts--------------------------------------------- 1
Set No 1, Second Echelon------------------------------------------- 2
Set No 2, Second Echelon-------------------------------------------I
Set No 2, Supplement, Second Echelon----------------------------- 1
Set No 7 (hoist), Second Echelon-----------------------------------1
Set No 8, (Fire Removing) Second Echelon__________________________ 1
Welding Set, portable----------------- ------------------- 1
Cabinet, Spare Parts, type 1 Model 1940----------------------------- 6
Iron Chains, %" x 16"---------------------------------------------
Iron Chains, ?r" x 16"--------------------------------------------- 3
Special Set B, Jeep------------------------------------------------ 1
Special Set A, Jeep------------------------------------------------ 2
Special Set B, % ton truck--------------------------------------- 1
Special Set A, % ton truck----------------------------------------- 2
Special Set B, Reo truck------------------------------------------ 1
Special Set A, Reo truck------------------------------------------ 2
Special Set, Third Echelon, Jeep------------------------------------ 1
Special Set, Third Echelon, s/4 ton truck________________________1
Special Set (Reo), 21/2 ton truck----------------------------------- 1
Leather-Canvas Repair Set, Third Echelon__________________________ 1
Basic Set, automatic vehicle, Third Echelon-------------------------- 1
Electric-Fuel System Repair Set, automotive vehicle, Third Echelon__ 1
Repair Set, Optical Instruments------------------------------------ 1 1
Repair Set, M1 (7.62) Rifle--------------------------------------- 1
Repair Set, K1 (7.62) Rifle-----------------------------------------
Repair Set, A12 AA Heavy Machine Gun______________________________ 1
Repair Set, Recoilless Rifle, 75 mm--------------------------------
Repair Set, Recoilless Rifle, 57 mm_________________________________
1
81 mm (60) ------------------------------------
Mortar
Repair Set
1
,
,
Trailer 1/t ton-----------------------------------------------------
-
3
Trailer, 11/2 ton----------------------------------------------------
8
Truck, T-137, 1 ton------------------------------------------------
7
Truck (Reo), 21/2 ton----------------------------------------------
9
Wrecker, M62, 5 ton-----------------------------------------------
2
Ambulance, M63, % ton--------------------------------------------
Trailer, Water tank, 250 gal---------------------------------------
2
5
------------------------------
Hose, spiral-------------- ----------
5
fuel ----------------------------------------------------
Hand pump
5
,
Hand pump, All ----------------------------------------------------
:i
Jerry Can, fuel, 5 gal-----------------------------------------------
53
2
Telescope m-65, Battery Commander's-------------------------------
2
Mount, M3---------------------------------------------------------
2
Mount, Recoilless Rifle, 75 mm--------------------------------------
1
Aiming Circle------------------------------------------------------
Plotting Board, M-10-----------------------------------------------
650
Steel Helmet -------------------------------------------------------
1/4 ton------------------------------------------------------
23
Ammunition
Nomenclature : Quantity
Shell, smoke, WP, M302, Mortar. 60 mm -------------------------- 72
Shell, smoke, WP, 57 or 57A1, Mortar, 81 mm____________________ 96
Pyrotechnics, AN-M41, red-green, two-star -----------------------
Pyrotechnics, AN-M42A1, yellow-green, two-star------------------- 324
Hand grenade, fragment (W/fuse)_______________________________ 680
Cartridge Clip, 8-round, M1 Rifle--------------------------------- 2,004
50
Demolition Block, 1 lb------------------------------------------
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Ammunition-Continued
Nomenclature--Continued Quantity
l)omolition Block, M3, (C-3 demolition) 21,12 lb-------------------- 16
Demolition Block, All, chain-------------------------------------- 80
Fuse, electrical, special ------------------------------------------ 100
Fuse, demolition, special------------------- - 250
F;
----------------------
Cord, time fuse (foot)--------------------------------------------- Cord, detonating (feet)-----____------------_--__ ------------- 5(0
Mine, light antitank, M7, simulator -------------------------------- ~0
Mine, anti-personnel, M2, simulator -------------------------------- 20
Cartridge, 45 cal Thompson Sub 1VIG---------------------
Cartridge, ball, 7.62 mrn--------------------------------------------- 74, 816
Cartridge, tracer, 7.62 mm---------------------------------------- 2,004
Cartridge, AT, 7.62 mm------------------------------------- -- 70, 000
Shell, HE, M 306A1, 57 mm, Recoilless Rifle-.--------------------- 160
Shell, HP;, AT, M 307A1, 57 rum, Recoilless Rifle__________________ 20
Shell, WI', smoke, M 308 Al, 57 mm, Recoilless Rifle ---------------- 20
Shell, HE, M 309A1, 75 mm, Recoilless Rifle-.__-_-__--_ 34
Shell, HE, AT, tracer, 1VI 310A1, 75 mm, Recoilless Rifle ------------- 15
Shell, WP, Smoke, M 311A1, 75 mm, Recoilless Rifle--------------- 16
Shell, NE, M 49A2, 60 mm, Mortar ---------------------------------- 432
Shell, illuminating, Al 83A2, 60 mm, Mortar ------------------------ 72
lingincer equipment
Nomenclature :
ti
Quan
ty
Com
ass
p
------------------------------- ----
t
ft
'
6
u
('
)-----------------------------------------------------------
Magnifying glass-------------
Carpenter Equipment, Set No. 1----------------------------------- Engineer, Equipment, Set No. 1---------------- ----------------
-----
Mi
T
10
t
ne
ape (roll)-------------------------------------------------
8
Calipers (set) -----------------
-------------------------------
R
d
l
epro
uction Set--------------------------------------------------
Illuminating set No. 3, electrical -_-__------_---__--_.--_
Water purification Set----- ----------------------------------------
W
t
1
a
er Quality Test Set------------------------------------------
T
l
h
1
e
ep
one 258.-----------------------------------------------------
R
52
adio, SCS399----------------------------------------------------
R
i
1
ad
o, AN/WC-9 -------------------
R
di
A
10
a
o,
N/WC-535 ------------------------------------------------
R
di
I
33
t-300.................................. -----------
a
o, SC
9
Radio, ANC/SRR- 5-------------------- -----------------
Switchboard
TC-12
,
___.------------------------------- Switchboard, BD-72---------------------- -------
-----------------
Reel, R-1-27-----------------------------------------
- ---------------Test Equipment IE-17_.-_-_---_-__-_
Case CS 1}SO
o
Climbers DC-5 - - - --
-- ---------------
cl
Mine Detector SCR-625------____-___------
------------------
Switchboard
BD-71
?
,
--.-__-_--_--_-_
Flash Light, TT-122 ------------------ ------------------------
100
---------
Test get
------------------
Power Unit, PJ-290/MR------------------------- ------------------
E
R
eel
quipment CE--11.-_____?---------------
Reel Unit
PL-31
i?
,
------------------ Coil, OR--8------------------- ----------------------
Power Unit
PE
75
q
,
-
-------------- ---------------
-----
----------------
Terminal 'Strip TM-184--------------------------- -------------------
Rectifier, RA-91-----------------------------------
10
----- Frequency Motor Set, SCR-211-------------------------------------- Lamp Meter TP-7/U____.---------- ---------------------------------- 1'ool Equipment. TE--33------------------ ---------------------------
-
18
Hydrometer, RY-2---------------------------------------------------
2
Tool, Equipment, TE-41._-___-_
-------------------
1
----------------- Tool Equipment, TE-1]3-------------------------------------------
1
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Engineer equipment-aContinued
Nomenclature-Continued Quantity
Wire, WD-1/TT------------------------------------------------ 100
Wire, WD-1/TT------------------------------------------------ 15
Wire, WD-1/TT------------------------------------------------- 7
4
Wire, WD-1/TT------------------------------------------------
Signal equipment Quantity
Nomenclature :
Vibrator pack, PP-68./0------------------------------------------- 1
Projector, PH-131------------------------------------------------ 1
? Screen, PII-358--------------------------------------------------- 1
Code training set, AN/GSC-T1------------------------------------ 1
Public address system, AN/TIQ-2--------------------------------- 1
Antenna, AB-155/0------------------------------ -------- 71 1
Crystal ---------------------------------------------------------
Antenna reel, RF------------------------------------------------ 36
Tank reel, RF--------------------------------------------------- 36
Quartermaster equipment
Nomenclature : Quantity
Stove, tent----------------------------------------------------- 15
Burner, stover, tent-------------------------------------------- 15
Lamp, kerosene ------------------------------------------------- 50
Field range, package A----------------------------------------- 16
Field range, package B------------------------------------------
Cooking set, small detachment----------------------------------- 2
Burner -------------------------------------------------------- 8
Tripod --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8
Container, galvanized, without cover------------------------------ 16
Container, galvanized, with cover--------------------------- 8
Heater, water------------- ------ 16
Box, refrigerating----------------------------------------------
Stove, diesel fuel ----__-____ ______-- 24
--------------------------_-
Typewriter ---------------------------------------------------- 6
Typewriter, portable------------------------------------------ 14
Reproduction equipment--------------------------------------- 1
Calculating machine, with handle-------------------------------- 2
Tent, individual soldier, U.S. type --------------------------------- 608
Polo, tent---------------------------------------------------- 1,714
Stake, tent----------------------------------------------------- 1,714
Canteen, U.S.type ----------------------------------------------- 660
Cup, Canteen, U.S.type ------------------------------------------ 660
Belt, U.S. type-------------------------------------------------- 660
Belt holding straps, U.S. type------------------------------------ 660
Ammo pockets, U.S. type---------------------------------------- 3,300
Boot, U.S. type-------------------------------------------------- 1,436
Underwear, wool, U.S. type-------------------------------------- 1,386
Socks, Khaki, U.S.type ------------------------------------------ 12,474
Fork, U.S.type -------------------------------------------------- 1,340
Spoon, U.S.type ------------------------------------------------- 1,340
Lantern, U.S.type -------------------- --------------------------- 60
Carpenter Set--------------------------------------------------- 2
Raincoat -------------------------------------------------- ----- 600
Hook,canteen --------------------------------------------------- 660
Cover, canteen-------------------------------------------------- 600
Scale ---------------------------------------------------------- 2
Sling, rifle------------------------------------------------------ 660
Scale ---------------------------------------------------------- 2
Medical equipment
Nomenclature : Quantity
Blanket,cot,small ----------------------------------------------- 1
Evacuation bag------------------------------------------------- 1
Stretcher, solid aluminum poles___________________________________ 4
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Medical equipment- Continued
Nomenclature--con tinufxi Quanthy
Medical chest, No. 1__-.---------
Medical chest, No. 2-_-.-____----- _
- -- - 1
Medical chest, No. 4--------------------------------------------- 1
Medical kit for medical personnel
______.___.__ _
-- - -
Tool set 5
--------------?-------------- --- 1
--------------------------
Dentist set A_-----.---------___---
---- - - - 1
Dentist set B
His Excellency FixrchrER. WARREN, ANKARA, June 16, 1960.
Ambassador of the United States of America, Ankara.
EXCELLENCY :: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your Note of May 16,
1960 which reads as follows :
"ExcELLsNCj- : I have the, honor to draw the attention of the Government of
Turkey to the provisions of Article 4 of the Agreement on Aid to Turkey of
.July 1947, and with regard to the desire of the Turkish Government to use cer-
tain Military Assistance Program materiel for Its planned military force in
Cyprus to request that Turkey ask formal consent of the United States Govern_
meat for such use for a purpose other than those for which the materiel was
furnished.
It must he clearly understood that United States consent for the use of this
equipment in Cyprus, which will he granted immediately upon receipt of Turkey's
request, should not provide a basis for requests for additional Military Assistance
Program materiel. The equipment sent to Cyprus, which was provided by the
U.S. as grant aid under the Military Assistance Program cannot be dropped
from accountability and will be considered as assets available to requirements
for the Military Assistance Program for Turkey. The materiel to be deployed
initially to Cypru has been agreed upon by the Turkish General Staff and.
JUSMAT and is listed in the attached schedule and any Military Assistance
Program materiel Turkey may subsequently wish to deploy to Cyprus will have
to be the subject ()f ,,,t separate request.
I have the honor to propose that, if this Note is acceptable to Your Excellency's
Government, this Note and Your Excellency's Note in reply, asking for formal
United States consent and agreeing to the list submitted, shall constitute an
agreement between our two Governments which shall enter into force on the
date of Your Excellency's reply.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration."
In reply, f have the honor to inform you that my Government is in agreement
with the foregoing.
I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances
of my highest consideration.
icjn '.'ARPF,R.
S
Senator SYMrNATON, These countries have been almost at, each other's
throats two or three times in the last few years; and Turkey came close
to invading Cyprus and is apparently con.sidera'bly stronger. This is
just another ease where the. United States has a heavy military in-
volvement, as well as political obligationg, that are sort of misty. In
any case, will you give us the opinion of the State Department?
Mr.1)AvIEs. We will give you all the data we have, sir.
Senator SY MINCTON.. Thank you. Will you proceed?
MAINTENANCE OF (IFFEK AND TURKiSII NATO c'OMMI'riIIN'r5
BY UNITED STATES
Mr. DAVIES. Member states have agreed to provide military con-
tributions for the common defense as called for in Article III of the
NATO Treaty. Roth Greece arid Turkey, considering the state of their
economies, require outside assistance. As the most powerful member of
the alliance, the United States has and continues to shoulder the pri-
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mary burden for providing Greece and Turkey with the military assist-
ance necessary to maintain their commitments to NATO.
With specific reference to Greece, the United States undertook in
1947 to provide assistance to Greece which was then faced with a
widespread and growing Communist insurrection. At that time the
Joint U.S. Military Aid Group, JUSNTAAG, was established to
oversee U.S. military assistance to the Greek Government.. By 1949
Greece, with our assistance, had successfully put.down the Communist
insurrection. Following the entry of Greece into NATO in 1952,
JUSMAAG has played an important role in our military assistance
programs to Greece which are designed to facilitate Greece s par-
ticipation in NATO and improve her NATO defense posture.
CLOSE MILITARY ASSOCIATION OF UNITED STATES AND GREECE
The close collaboration between the Greek and American Military
Establishments which originated at the time of the civil war has been
of primary importance in Greece's active role in the NATO Alliance.
At the same time, our reciprocal commitment in support of European
defense has been instrumental in Greece's making available installa-
tions and facilities vital to U.S. and NATO forces in the Eastern
Mediterranean.
In addition"to the JUSMAAG personnel, U.S: military forces in
Greece currently occupy a naval communications station north of
Athens, installations and port sites in Crete, military airlift com-
mand facilities at the Athens Airport and POL and storage facilities
at Piraeus. Under agreements with the Greek Government, the United
States and NATO may use various air and naval facilities in the event
of hostilities between NATO and Soviet bloc nations. U.S. military
communications in the Eastern Mediterranean and the operations of
the U.S. 6th Fleet in that area depend very heavily upon use of these
facilities. U.S. military presence in Greece has generally been wel-
comed by the Greek people and has caused no serious public relations,.
problems to date.
EFFECT OF CYPRUS AND COUP ON GREEK-UNITED STATES RELATIONS
Greece's close association with the United States, both through
NATO and bilaterally, has been troubled by two issues in recent
years : Cyprus and the Greek military coup of April 1967. In the case
of Cyprus, U.S. efforts to prevent an outbreak of Greek-Turkish
hostilities and to foster a peaceful settlement of the dispute have at
times irritated militant elements on both sides. Many Greeks have
seen U.S. attempts to defuse the Cyprus question as evidence of pro-
Turkish bias.
More importantly, the establishment of an authoritarian govern-
ment in Greece in April 1967, following a period of instability, has
posed a dilemma for U.S. policy. We disagree with the political
system which prevails in Greece and consider a return to parliamen-
tary rule essential to the long-term stability and prosperity of Greece.
At the same time, we must preserve our important strategic interests
in Greece as a valuable geographic area in the critical Eastern Medi-
terrean region.
35-205-70-pt. 7--2
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Senator Fr-rr.ERTmi'r. Could I ask it question there, Mr. Chairman?
Senator SYMINr; ux. Sure.
-FTR OW OF PREVIOUS CREEK
WAS I?ri tTN'D ST.V"ES INVOLVED INOVE RT.
....-.~.. ...v. .. ._ . ADMINISTIiATiO :.,:. >-.
nator PVLhRmxrrT. You say you disagree with the political system
prevailing in Greece. y T Gav-rate ud ll v ther or not we had
.Dything tq do with the overthrow of t] px tl~ts .r tioon O
Lot
i~t
1V1r. DAVIES. Mr. Chairman, in full honesty, I can say that as far as
I am aware, we had nothing to do with the change in government and,
as far as I am aware,
we were caught by surprise by the developments.
i j or 1 Yf0iIT.,~'_Qn].d.xQ. be art are oL i . in -Lour osltion as
Ik -uty..Ascdstant.Se etf1 V- if +-1-A gx the CIA ha anc In
.it? You woul&.not n$ e s ; be aware of it. Anyway, you di not
brow anything about it if we did
Mr. DAVIEs. Sir, I was responsible for Near Eastern affairs pri-
marily at the time.
Senator F'ULBRIGIIT. In the State Department?
Mr. DAVIES. In the Department of State.
enator F13r,BRIrIIT...l~j OU know an thing about it? What is your
aositron in fU6T . e~'n'se Department
Mr. PRANCER. I am. Deputy Assistant Secretary, ISA.
Senator FUI BRIGI--IT. Were you there at the time?
Mr. PRANGFII. No, I was not. I was in university life, but I can also
tat,e categorically from my reading of the records available to me
that there was no U.S. connivance in the coup.
,6enator I+'uLBRIG73T. Well, but you reallvdo not know. You were
not there, youwoul cT not Meow i It tooter Place.
Mr. PRANCER. That is right.
S=tgx. 4_ :a&IGmT.. Is--t .-u :F, prjec2 t. who was in the De-
pr tment who was in it position to know at that time?
11Tr PRANCER No sir.
enator 'ULBRTi IIT. We l th , , i .g y...uterestil .
Mr. l)vvi ~.Ar. i'liairman, the way things are organized within
our Government, amid from my knowledge of our actions in adjacent
areas, I would think it highly unlikely that there was any connivance
whatsoever. In fact, I would say categorically I am certain there was
not. I believe t.liat I can relay your question back to my superiors and
provide confirmation of that assurance.
enator 'IjumTGnT, TJndero ~h?
rr.DAVIF:s. I am utder...Q;'lth.
Senator T'u13RIGIIT. I know, but they will not be. The point I would
like to make is that we have been deceived so often by official state-
ments that we are very skeptical about it. The actions of the Depart-
t" example only recently, we discovered that in spite of the
declared embargo on shipments you surreptitiously and secretly broke
he embargo and we are just now finding out about it. Your actions
re so svmprcthet.ie to the Greek colonels that it lends very little
credence to your declaration that you are. opposed to them because
you have done everything really that they needed to do to keep them
in power and to give the impression that we approve of them. The
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1783
pressure was very great, to be sure to send a sympathetic Ambassador
there, and you did send a sympathetic Ambassador there.
I recently got a letter from him about the arrest of the secretary
of the Fulbright Commission in Greece. Did that come to your
attention?
Mr. DAvIEs. Yes, it did, Miss Pipinopoulou.
Senator FULBRIGIIT. It is rather disgraceful, it is a small matter. She
is a small person but our attitude is certainly critical. But go ahead.
I do not want to
Senator SYMINGTON. Two new people have come in. Will you iden-
tify yourselves, please?
Mr. QUINN. I am Mr. Charles Quinn, and I work for Mr. Pranger
at the Pentagon.
Senator SYMINGTON. Work for whom?
Mr. QUINN. International Security Affairs.
Senator SYMrNGTON. How long have you been in the Department?
Mr. QUINN. I have been in the Pentagon roughly 23 years, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. The chairman was asking whether or not we
had anything to do with a change in the Greek Government that
resulted in the Papadopoulos setup? Do you know anything about
that?
Mr. QUINN. No, sir; I do not.
Senator SYMINGTON. How long have you been in the ISA part of
the Pentagon?
Mr. QUINN. How long have T been in ISA? Since June of 1954, sir.
I have only been involved in Greek problems since August of 1968.
Previous to that time I was engaged in Arab-Israel affairs.
Senator SYMINGTON. You just came in, sir.
Captain KR E;BS. I am Captain Krebs, Turkish Desk, ISA, Defense.
Senator SYMINGTON. You are pretty well fortified with staff.
Mr. PRANGER. Sir, those are my two additions.
Senator SYMINGTON. I hope it has nothing to do with physical
security. What is the point of having so many different people from
your Department? I was just wondering.
Mr. PRANGEri. Well, sir, I came with no one and then I find my col-
leagues from State brought an entourage.
Senator SYMINGTON. We are used to seeing Mr. Knaur and Mr. Wolf
and are glad to see all of these other gentlemen.
Senator FULBRIGIIT. They had an entourage and so you thought
that it was beneath the dignity of the Defense Department not to
have one.
[Laughter.]
Senator SYMINGTON. I think the more people who know what is
going on the better.
Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to be certain you had the best
possible information that we could give. I am newly arrived in my
responsibilities.
Senator SYMINGTON. I think it is thoughtful of you, and I appre-
ciate it.
Senator FuLBrtrcrIT. What do you mean newly arrived?
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Mr. I)1)vni.,s. I have been handling Arab-Israel affairs for the past 8
,}Tears in the Bureau and it is only since Ambassador Rockwell departed
that I added Greece, Turkey and Iran to my duties.
('Discussion off the re,eorc.)
Senator S YAT [N(;TON. Are you finished, Mr. Chairman?
Senator FULRRT(HT. Yes.
'NTT'. DAvm . We disagree with the political system which prevails in
(;recce and consider a return to parliamentary rule essential to the
long-term stability and prosperity of Greece. At the same time, we
must preserve our important strategic interests in Greece as ,-t valuable
geographic area in the critical ](:astern Mediterranean region. Bal-
ancing these often conflicting interests has been the major concern of
11.S. policy toward Greece since the coup. Our strategic interests in
the area and our commitment to Greece as a member of NATO dic-
tate our maintaining a working relationship with the Greek regime,
but we do not endorse the internal policy of the regime.
Senator FLLuRTGTTT. I do not want to belabor this, Mr. Chairman,
but it raises again the question. Is there anyone in the Department,
does the, Policy Planning Staff or anyone review this assumption which
has prevailed in the Department forever that the only way to prevent
Communist expansion is militarily, and I am reminded of Libya, for
example? The: Russians do not only expand their influence through
invasion and occupation. They do it through political means and the
assumption seems to be all through here in this connection that our
purposes a.re served by supporting this authoritarian, really disgrace-
ful regime; it is one of the worst ones. The stories about their torture
of artists, and so on, are as bad as or worse than anything that ever
carne out of Russia in Stalin's time and I just wondered if the State
Department has made this judgment, apparently years ago, that the
only way to resist communism is militarily. It, completely ignores the
other aspects of this matter, which I think are probably more impor-
t.ant. I am reminded of it in both the United Arab Republic and in
Libya, the Russians did not move there with armies and navies, they
gained influence by the internal political means. And now in Greece
you are aligned with a very weak, I think long-term weak, regime be-
canse these people have no roots in the populace, and one of these days
they will be thrown out and you will be thrown out with them. I think
you are very shortsighted in this policy of thinking that it is in our
interest to go to bed with the Papadopoulos.
Mr. I)nvms. You have raised several very serious, very complex
issues.
Senator FrLERICHT. The first issue is, is there anybody in the State
Department who proceeds to the theory that militarism is not the
only answer and is trying to find other solutions?
Mr. DAVTrs. Yes, there is the Policy Planning Staff.
Senator FTJT,BRTCITT. I do not hear about them any more. I do not
even know who is head of it any more.
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Mr. DAVIES. In many ways we all serve in that category. We accept
discipline but the policies of the U.S. Government are constantly under
review and I would like to think under review as consistently at the
working level as at the policy planning level.
Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, your statement does not reveal that at
all to me. It is just a reiteration of the same thing we have heard year
after year. Here we are faced with some nasty boys but we have got
to support them because our policy is so dependent on them, which
seems to me the same thing we talked about Mr. Thieu, I guess.
Mr. DAVIES. I would put to you, Mr. Chairman, that there has been
11 t1 t b th t G and Turke that onl the tactics
ree
h
istorica . a Irea , o o
of the Soviet Union have changed, we have, I hope, entere a period of
detente, but Soviet intentions are not clear.
Senator FULBRIGIIT. I do not say that.
Mr. DAVIES. Certainly, this administration
Senator FULBRIGIIT. The tactics have changed but not detente. I will
go along with you on tactics. They are not about to invade these coun-
tries but they are about to subvert them in a way that, if that is a
proper word. Libya, for example, they deal with these people more
sympathetically and I think with much greater foresight than we do,
which is the way it goes.
Mr. DAVIES. If I may put on my other hat, sir, my Arab hat. I do
not think the Soviets have had too much success in penetrating Libya.
The Revolutionary Command Council has been very careful to rely
upon primarily its Arab neighbors, primarily the United Arab
Republic.
Senator FULBRIGIIT. I will accept that. I just oversimplified that.
I will accept that amendment. I think you are correct, but they have
also thrown us out of Wheelus.
Mr. DAVIES. We were, in any event, scheduled to get out in 1971.
Senator FULBRIGIIT. I favor it. I am not complaining.
Mr. DAVIES. As far-I am learning my way in Greek affairs, sir,
and I am aware of a very painful dilemma that faces us and I would
like to think that policy recommendations start down at our level. Our
objective is to support the return of Greece to a parliamentary demo-
cratic regime.
EQUIPMENT PROVIDED BY UNITED STATES TO GREECE IN 1968
Senator FULBRIGIIT. Why did you break the embargo and give them
the arms when you did not have to?
Mr. DAVIES. The decision in 1968 was made by the previous adminis-
tration in the light of the--I think I can say honestly, although it is
outside of my bailiwick-in light of the unexpected Soviet invasion
of Czechoslovakia which, I might say, Mr. Chairman, has had as fine
a record of democracy down through the years as had Greece l ,ted .
The brutal invasion of Czechoslovakia caused a reassessment 7777
situation of our suspension program and had stopped delivery of cer-
tain items which were essential to Greece's carrying out its role in
defense of the alliance. We provided equipment which was clearly re-
lated to that NATO commitment. It was
Senator FULBRTGIIT. Why was it kept secret then?
Nfr. DAVIES. As far as I am aware, sir, we went through our con-
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1786
sultations with the Congress, and in October of 1968 we publicly an-
nounced that this exception to deliveries had been made.
Senator FULBR. GIT'T. I was under the impression you had suspended
them. These were tanks, were they not? We were told little things like
rifles and popguns and things of this sort but just recently have I
been aware that you went right ahead with the heavy equipment; it
was in the paper ;lust recently.
Mr. I)AVIES. We have released no tanks.
Senator FULRRTGIIT. What was the story, have you got it? It came
out about 2 weeks ago. What was it?
(The article referred to follows:)
[From the Washington Post, June 3, 1970]
'MIENS GIVEN U.S. ARMS DESPITE BAN
(By Bernard. D. Nossiter)
Despite the embargo on heavy arms to Greece, the United States has quietly
given jet fighter-interceptors, medium tanks and 155-millimeter howitzers to the
colonels' regime in Athens.
The deliveries were described yesterday by officials as a "one time only" breach
of the prohibition, a breach inspired by the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia
in 1968.
.At the same time, it was [earned, the Nixon administration has decided in
principle to scrap the embargo entirely. Knowledgeable sources disclosed that
the ban has been reviewed by the National Security Council and that body has
determined that the embargo has outlived its usefulness. A public announcement
to this effect, however, is being delayed until a more receptive climate at home
and abroad is ensured.
The ban on heavyaarms shipments was imposed after the colonels overthrew
Greece's constitutional government in-April 1907. Sales and gifts of small arms
like automatic weapons, rifles and mortars have continued, however.
Prom time to time, officials have hinted that the embargo has been relaxed but
details have not been available until now. Last summer, Assistant Secretary of
State Joseph Sisco, in a little-noticed statement, said that "delivery of a portion of
the suspended items" was approved by President Johnson, Oct. 18, 1968.
The shipment apparently began late in that year and continued through 1969.
Mr. Johnson approved the delivery of 22 F-102s, 92 medium tanks hnd an undis-
closed number of howitzers.
Officials have now revealed that all 22 planes were given to Greece. But how
many tanks and howitzers were shipped could not be determined.
't'hese deliveries explain what up until! now has been a puzzling jump in arms
shipments to Athens. For the budget year ending June 30, 1968, Greece received
arms estimated at $51 million in value. The next year's total jumped to $93.2
million.
I lowever, this understates the amount of the increase. The Pentagon values
items it considers surplus at about one-fourth of their cost. Thus, if these totals
are adjusted to reflect the original cost of the arms shipped, Greece received $58.5
million in fiscal 1968 and a whopping $170.0 million the next year. All but a small
portion of both figures were gifts rather than sales.
Officials said the embargo was breached because the Czechoslovakian invasion
heightened the importance of maintaining belief in NATO's ability to deter an
aggressor.
Officials also said that leaders from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
?and House Foreign Affairs Committee were consulted about the relaxation of
the ban.
However, Chairman J. W. Fulbright of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee said yesterday he had not been consulted and did not know the embargo
had been broken.
Staff members at the House Foreign Affairs Committee said they knew of no
consultation either. Chairman Thomas Morgan (D-Pa.) was unavailable for
comment.
The disclosure is likely to touch off a fresh Senate outcry against any arms
for Greece. Last year, an amendment to cut off these shipments was narrowly
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beaten, 45 to 38. This year, Sen. Vance Hartke (D-Ind.) is sponsoring a similar
ban.
The Nixon Administration decision to junk the embargo entirely rests on a
belief that the ban will not influence the colonels. The argument runs that they
are firmly in the saddle, can turn to the French and other sources for major
weapons and any continued prohibition only weakens American influence in
Athens.
However, the unimpeded resumption of heavy-arms shipments will probably
be delayed until the congressional temper, inflamed by Cambodia, is cooler. In
addition, Washington is being held back by the opposition of Denmark, Norway
and Italy, where criticism of the junta is exceptionally strong.
Mr. DAVIES. The story was to some extent misleading and the tank
items were simply programed for MAP pipelines, but have not been
released.
Senator FULBRIGHT. This is June 3. Department of State issued a
statement denying the story.
Mr. DAVIES. The Department of State issued a statement that it was
misleading.
Senator FuLBRIGIIT. Was it wrong? I mean, did you not give them
any weapons?
Mr. DAVIES. We did, sir.
Senator FuLBRIGHT. What were the weapons?
Mr. PRANGER. Well, sir, part of the story is correct, [deleted] F-102
aircraft, were released for Greece in its NATO role.
Senator FULBRIGHT. Ninety-two medium tanks.
Mr. PRANGER. No, sir, that is not correct.
Mr. DAVrES. No, sir, that is not correct.
Senator FuLBRiGirT. And an undisclosed number of howitzers.
Mr. PRANGER. We have released [deleted] 175 self-propelled artillery
pieces.
Senator FuLBRIGIIT. Those are awfully big guns.
Mr. PRANGER. Yes, sir.
Senator FuLBRIGHT. The biggest we have.
Mr. PRANGER. Yes, sir.
Senator FuLBRIGIlT. Are they capable of nuclear disposition, nuclear
weapons?
Mr. PRANGER. I am not qualified on that, sir. I do not believe there
are
Senator FULBRTGITT. You mean, you have been instructed not to an-
swer questions on nuclear weapons.
Mr. PRANGER. No, sir, I am just not competent to answer that.
Senator FULBraGIIT. Have any of you been instructed not to answer
questions in certain areas before this committee?
Mr. DAVIES. It is my understanding, sir, that on this subject that
Mr. Spiers was made available, he is our man, the Director of the
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.
Senator FULBRIGIrT. I understand that. Were you instructed not to
answer questions in this area?
Mr. DAVIES. I would have to consult, sir, with
Senator FULBRtGIIT. You know whether or not you were instructed.
Mr. PRANCER. Sir, as far as I know, the 175s have no nuclear capa-
bility but I can correct this record, if I am wrong.
Senator FULBRIG=lIT. I thought they were the biggest howitzers we
have that are mobile. Anyway, you say there were no tanks but [de-
leted] F-102's.
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1788
Mr. PRA NGPER. Yes, sir,
Senator FTJLBRT(3HT, Do you not consider this a very serious breach
of the understanding of an embargo on heavy weapons?
Mr. Pr. mvR. Again, sir, as Mr. Davies pointed out, these were re-
leased to enhance Greece's contribution to NATO.
ADVI 4AnTLTTI" OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR MILITARY BF,CTMF. IN GRFT9(1,T7
Senator FITLTBEVHi r. Finally, in this connection, and I mean in this
particular, lw t year you know this committee attempted to share the
responsibility with the Defense Department by putting in an amend-
ment prohibiting further aid, military aid, until they resumed demo-
cratic government.. Then the administration backed the movement
which took it out in the House. Thus you see all of this contributes to
make your statement sound rather hollow about how you disapprove
of that regime, because the political effect of giving them this aid,
aside from the military effect--your concept of the military relation-
ship, I think, is quite obsolete but that is always true, it is nothing
new--but. politically, you give the appearance that we support the
colonels. They play upon it. It is quite obvious they say we do sup-
port them, we give them money, and we give them arms and this tends
to keep them in and to defeat what you say is our purpose, which is
to return to parliamentary government; this is what bothers me.
1Ir. DAvrTS. Mr. Chairman, if I may return to my previous stat.e-
ment, I think this is a, very painful dilemma. camiot .tELt. tlie_Foreimn Relations Com-
W ittee,even ;ys. ii., 1zu..b t? ta!a i ? 3yue, -not re, whn+.hn r, *;,, oon r[
tVZ1L ..Q.L.1:.Ut. Ilczes this.iLot.at:rike.vou,.asan. x1, .a tT1~.Qll l]1e
:faet you are. uLfhe..Pentsgfl]1, as a ra?the , ij uGiial l ] li
XU71-Own Congress not, eritit.lpr knamiathauglixmi-da-uoLlie,,ii .
late tatsJl._t11e..liost.nvern~m~ant? es this not ever strike ou as a
little. unusual,--jam as-.a&iRana .an and_.,'2 an ('mp es T s
P.eIitn ?
Mr. PRANCER. On this particular question, sir, I would prefer not
to express my personal opinion.
Senator Fijr r,>Riciirr. You do not. Well, as .an American, I mean,
being a Member of the Congress, it does seem that the executive,
branch from. one end to the other has come to regard the Congress as'
Its enemy and does everything possible to prevent the Congress from
knowing what it is doing.
This is a recent development. It, did not used to be that way. In fact,
I am quite sure it grows out of the Vietnam war and the criticism
which has developed.
This seems to be that the executive branch has completely lost any
confidence in the constitutional system. That is that the Congress pare
ti.cipates in. these matters and this is an illustration of it. It is not the
first time. I must say, and probably not the, last time.. We have been
going into this time and time again. Thailand, we make these cone
tingency plans with the'Thai Government. They know all about it but
they could not tell this committee. You are familiar, I expect, you have
heard rumors about this. And this is really what disturbs so many
)eople who still believe in the constitutional system which we in.
Merited, and are trying to make it work, and this is why we are not
eally being contentious about you and I know you are under instruc
,ions but I would think, as simply a? citizen of the country here we
are giving up the constitutional system and going to the executive
system such as the Greeks have, and which obviously the State De..
partment does not regard with any horror. They cooperate with the
colonels with the greatest, of ease, but it is a rather startling thing in the
course of these hearings to come to the conclusion that the executive
branch has no longer a.ny role in fully informing the legislative about
what is going on.
I do not know, take this matter But here yon come un-?
willing to testify about it. We alrea~yiit. feleted you are in
structed not to discuss this with us. This is what has seemed so odd,
you see, and this is the real point. We do not ask you these questions
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to try to find out from you what it is. We are trying to make a record
that is useful to the Government and to the CCongress, because ulti-
mately the decision is whether or not this policy which has been fol-
lowed so long has been in the interest of this country. Are we going to
continue to maintain these innumerable bases all around the world
which are breaking the country, this is what is at issue. I was not just
trying to pick your brains about [deleted]. We know all about that,
and I do not understand it, why you are given instructions not to dis-
cuss it. You are not keeping from us any information. You are just
showing the contempt of your Department for this committee and the
Senate. That is all you are doing. I think it is a very sad development,
frankly. Because the country is reflecting in many areas a deterioration
of confidence and faith in our constitutional system. And I think it is
too bad that this has arisen.
It is really difficult to say why the Greek Government, being the kind
of-government it is [deleted].
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF PRESENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN A COUNTRY
You will have to admit, do you not think, Mr. Davies, that there
would be grave political implications from having nuclear weapons in
[deleted] any [deleted] country?
Mr. DAVIES. Sir, the NATO alliance rests on a strategy of flexible
response. The whole question is one which is addressed by our NATO
k allies, and I would not presume to answer for our partners in NATO
as to their attitude toward the common defense strategy.
,Senator FULL'RIGIIT. I did not ask you what t ieir attitude was.,_I
said do you not think having nuclear weapons in a country has grave
political implications ?
Mr. DAVIES. Sir, my answer is, I think it is basically a strategic
1concept which is agreed upon by sovereign and equal nations within
an alliance.
en~tor FULBRIGUT. think ou hgU,lcl_?dthP7=? y-.you refu o
or ai 1awcr yS4 mg at is EQ101'apt n an hl [71h rlsh
'lis ps Sao relation to my question does not rinake_inuch of a record.
t-w sl - 135 SOlT"CI e aL l ihor n f O~ gay So.
Mr. DAVIES.1 would prefer not to answer.
C^n --FT7LERTfAT. Just say so. Do not make a funny record when
falling
'
sM
0 11 t ~a T on man a oiUt?that the ue
tI askked ou is what would be the political Implications or =ere
not grave political implications of having nuclear weapons in a coun-
try. You say you do not wish to answer it. I am not goin to-
Mr. DAVIES. I believe this is basically a strategic basic defense ques-
tion in the alliance.
Senator FULBRIGTIT. I asked you more specifically in Greece and you
just said you did not wish to answer it. I did not ask you about stra-
tegic implications. I asked you if you do not think it would have any
political or you wish not to say that.
Would you go so far as to say you do not believe that the presence
Vi American nuclear weapons in a country has no political implica-
of
tions, would you do that for me or do you wish not to answer?
DAVIES. [Deleted.]
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1806
Senator FULEJ IGHT. What about anyy country, [deleted] ? Do you
think if we had them in country X, would you still say you do not know
whether there are. any political implications?
Mr. DAV[ES. I think that there could be political implications, sir.,
relative to the concept, of the threat. I believe if a, nation believes its fu-
ture is threatened, its way of life is threatened, that the NATO stra-
te-ry would be a factor of reassurance.
These doctrines, sir, are hammered out in committees within NATO.
And as far as I am aware, have. the general support of [deleted] the
other Western governments.
Senator FirLBRIGHT. Do you believe that the presence of nuclear
weapons it a. country on the border of Russia would have any influence
at all on the attitude of Russia toward that country?
Mr. DAvi . The alliance, sir, is purely defensive--
iw ?tnr, I uu, , L not ask von about the alliance. If you do
i~12ti3i~Li] tr arasv ? you-. e-at. fect.libat:i to a;T, hnt to of o ?
k1r_. Dnvi vs. Senator, this is not too relevant.
Senator F. ULAFTGTPT. [Deleted] IF asked you about the existence in it
j country on the border of Russia.
Mr. Dnvi rs. It is certainly a factor in the Soviet Union and it is cer-
tainly a factor in the military balance.
Senator 'FuLxuiwrr. That is all I was seeking to inquire. Why do you
find that so difficult to answer? It is not all that painful, is it?
Mr-1: Dnvu,s. No. sir.
, itor; FvLT rc r r r. -1. VwOn eoachc ~~ _ca,reful__ about
,what you s ~~ to tFtis eo nmittee and it isTharTto met it out.
Mr. DAVrFs. Mr Chairman, aye not beenat'rec. was told -by
our Secretary or we have all been told to be as cooperative as possible
within the regulations of our Department, and I hope that you, sir,
as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, are in a, position to
know that we. have been as forthcoming in the past on a variety of
delicate matters on some of which I have participated in drafting
r?esnonses to your queries.
Senator FuimucalT. With regard to this question, you know we have
already had testimony that [deleted].
Mr. Dnvirs. I am not aware of any, sir.
'Senator FULRRIG,IIT. You are not aware of them. We already have
had testimony to the effect, which raises very serious questions, in deal-
in ; with a government like this raises the question, which of course,
we find it extremely difficult to discuss and explore because of the at-
titude of the Department, in effect [deleted] and it is very difficult
to resist the conclusion that one of the reasons why as you said it is
a dilemma,, 1Tou could not have it as a, dilemma unless underneath you
had it certacn reluctance to be associated with an extremely cruel and
barbarous regime. [deleted] but, you see, the political implications
of this are. very grave and I just. wonder whether or not our Govern-
inent has any longer the capacity to make an independent judgment
about the regime, if we are not a prisoner of this arrangement, just
as I think we are a prisoner of Thieu and Ky. 'We no longer have any
independence to make. a judgment on our own behalf unless the Con-
gress can do it. You see, these are grave implications if there is anything
to that.. 1,
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MEANS BY WHICII UNITED STATES SIIOULD PROMOTE DEMOCRACY ON GREECE
Mr. DAMES. Sir, I can assure you that within the administration,
within the Department of State, we consider the problem of Greece
to be very serious. I think all Americans of my generation have a
philosophic attachment to what Greece has meant down through the
years. We have close we have had very close ties with the Greek people
down since, particuiarly since 1948. We have over 2 million Greek-
Americans in this country. The question is whether we try to use what
influence we have to move this situation toward greater participation
with the Greek people and their Government, restoration of civil liber-
ties, or whether we turn our back and try to isolate the regime. And as
I said earlier, sir, I think this is a very painful dilemma and it is one
of those things being examined minutely within the National Security
Council.
Senator FuLBRIGIIT. Of course, the way you put it is the way you
put the very thing in Vietnam. You assume the very matter at issue.
The matter at issue then, as we put it, is not the objective of return
to parliamentary government ; we all agree on it. What we are arguing
about is the means. You are saying, in effect, that the way to promote
a return to free government is to support the colonels. What some of
us are saying is the way to return to free government is not to support
the colonels, and not to let the Greek people know we are behind them,
that we give them arms, ammunition, money if they need it. We are
really arguing about the means.
The President says he wants to get out of Vietnam; we all. applaud
it. We all want to get out. Then, when he says the way to get out is to
invade Cambodia we all leave him. We area 11 arguing about the ques-
tion. You just assume supporting the colonels is the way to move
toward a democratic system. But this is the very question at issue. Some
of us, including me, do not believe that by supporting the colonels and
giving every evidence that we are behind them is a way to move. We
think it only solidifies them in power.
Mr. DAVIES. This is indeed, sir, a question that has been looked at
today. The administration's selective suspension of MAP deliveries
is still in effect and this is part and parcel of the consideration of how
best we can achieve our objective.
Senator FULBRIGHT. It is still in effect with exceptions on the things
they really want and also the papers give clear indications you are on
the verge of making a decision to assume full aid, that is what we have
read; I have read several times lately just as I read yours, they antic-
ipate you are going to give arms to others in the Middle East. But it
is very difficult for us to develop any exchange of views or to play any
part at all where these questions are just assumed, and we cannot de-
velop a real exercise with regard to it in the way of a discussion of
what is the best way to return Greece to a free country.
I think it is rather notable that in this case, as in Vietnam and
others, that most of our friends, traditional friends in NATO, for
example, do not approve of our policy. They are not supporting the
colonels on the theory that this will return them to free government,
are they? Are any of them taking the same position we do?
Mr. DAVIEs. I am not aware that they are.
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1808
Senator F'uLBRIGTTT. You are not aware. So, again, as in the case of
Vietnam and other ones we stand alone against the judgment of all
of our best friends. I do not necessarily believe you ought to always
follow your friends, but after a while I think when it is almost um.-
versa.lly that way time after time, there ought to have at least suffi-
cient humility to reexamine your premises, and maybe it is possible
t that Supporting the colonels is not the best way to promote Greer;
democracy.
Mr. DAVIES. May I interject one. element, sir?
Senator FU.TLERIGIrr. Certainly.
nIRAPPROVAL BY UNTITED STATES Or PRESENT GREEK REGIME
Mr. DAvIEs. The policy of suspension of MAP deliveries, selective
suspension, is an indication of our disapproval of the extra constitu-.
tional. nature of this regime. It remains in effect, has remained in effect.
We believe--
Senator FUI.RRTGH'r. With exceptions, I mean, you have already
gone over the exceptions.
Mr. DAVIES. There is--there are about 56 million dollars worth of
undelivered equipment in storage or undelivered.
Senator FULimroirT. Yes, but you have already discussed the break-
ing of the embargo which we--you do not have to repeat it, I say with
exceptions of that you have just finished delivery of the F-102's. I just
want the record to`he clear, I do not want to say it here and at another
place to make it equivocal any more than it is.
Mr. DAVIES,. Sir, I wise I had the answer as to how to bring about
the restoration of parliamentary government in Greece. I can assure
you that Amhassuidor Tasca. is fully aware of the desire of his govern-
-nent to move the junta in that direction and in my view, has done an
outstanding job and. in vigorously making our points in Athens.
Senator Frrr,RRTGIrT. Well, I think you may have in a way but as I
said earlier (deleted] as we have in the commitments, the colonels,
just as General Thies, feel that we are hostage, and that he can do
as he pleases and tell ns where to go and we cannot do anything about
it. Otherwise, how can you explain the lack of influence? If you say we
have exerted every argument we have and yet you look at the results
and they are nil, there is some reason why a great country givil
them. I do not know how many billion dollars, has so little influence
on their policy.
TREND TOWARD CONSTITr7TI0NAL GOVERNMENT IN GREECE
Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Chairman, there is a trend toward constitutional
government. There have been these decrees previously mentioned. I
believe that it is the quiet but persistent influence anplied by the
TT.S. Government and Ambassador Tasca. which have brought about
this trend, and we would like to see it accelerated. Ambassador Tasca
is doing everythin n possible to accelerate it.
Senator F17L1371I(;HT. Well, you have offered no very convincing proof
of a,ny trend other than just the words you use. I mean, I know of no
actions that T can think of they have taken which would support their
statement. Have you any evidence to offer?
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1809
Mr. DAVIES. I believe, sir, that the April 10 decrees set up certain
judicial guarantees which are being observed.
Senator FULBRIGHT. In the face of that, we have just gone over it,
they continue to imprison people without any cause, send them off to
islands. There is very little evidence of change. This comes from the
press which, unfortunately, many of us feel it is a little more unbiased
than the Government's report.
Mr. DAVIES. May I, sir, for the record, in your interest, supply some
recent information that has come through on releases that have oc-
curred?
Senator FULBRIGIIT. Yes, I would like something other than just a
release. I mean, these words that, "We are going to be good boys,"
what have they actually done? Have they actually quit imprisoning
n who
ma
eople? This mattex I am frank to Say, about voun~ wo
ovph n n up. nroyram is an a sur
case I mean, absurdrom tl int of view of thereein an]u-
ti ca i gut -her -d prison fGr ~. vPa.r. Is very reecce~n . u
eciLrPte evidence, aside a ment,
ious statement that the love liberty, I wish you would putt it-ib.
really do not t in k we oug it to burden the record witn' ese PIOU6
statements.
Mr. DAVIES. I will provide a list of recent releases, sir, I wish it were
longer, but there have been some
Senator FULBRIGHT. I do not want releases, I want some evidence
about it.
Mr. DAVIES. The names.
Senator FULBRIGHT. The musician, I forget the name.
Mr. DAVIES. Theodorakis.
Senator FuLBB.IGIIT. Do you consider that significant?
Mr. DAVIES. No, there are other cases that I can cite.
ESCAPE OF ELENI VLACIIOU
Senator FOLBRIGHT. As a matter of fact, the woman, Vlachou
Mr. DAVIES. Eleni Vlachou. She is in Washington this week.
Senator FULBRIGHT. But she escaped by subterfuge, that shows no
relinquishment of their totalitarian attitude, does it?
Mr. DAVIES. She escaped, sir, I believe, in 1967.
Senator FuLBEIGHT. I mean, she escaped. She is here, as a matter of
fact, I think I am scheduled to meet her somewhere in the next day
or two. I never have met her. I was invited to.
Mr. DAVIES. She is a great woman.
Senator FuLBEIGIIT. Do you know her?
Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir.
Senator FuLBEIOUT. Does she support your theme they are moving
toward democracy?
Mr. DAVIES. I have not seen her since 1968 in London. I met her at
a mutual friend's at that time. She was highly critical of the regime
and hoped the United States would use whatever influence it could to,
move it toward more liberal policies.
Senator FULBRIGIIT. Will you see her when she is here?
Mr. DAVIES. I will see her when she is here; I will see her tomorrow
night socially.
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Senator FULRRTGIIT. Will the Department, will the President the
Secretary see her? ,
_Mr. Dwn~s. I: am quite prepared, I am delighted to see her, certain-
ly.
Senator FuLr3RTCxT. I mean officially.
Mr. DAVTFS. Yes, she is being received officially.
Senator F'Tn,BRrc' wr. By the Secretary or whom?
Mr. VIODRRMAN. By the Assistant Secretary, Mr. Sisco.
Senator F ULuRTOHT. Publicly or is this secret?
Mr. Dnvrns. Not ,secretly. She is a distinguished lady.
Mr. ti IGDRRMAN.. fete is nothing secret about a reception.
Senator FULnRTGTTT. I mean is it published, is all. I do not know
v hether the colonels approved of your receiving her. Have they given
their approval ?
Mr. ViGDERM,vN We have not consulted the, colonels about that, sir.
Senator FTTLRRTr.UT. Y"ou have not, consulted?
Mr. VTGDFRMAN. Certflinly not.
REFUSAL OF PRF.STPENT To SEE PRTNTE MINISTER OF SWEDEN
Senator FVrLRRIOTI!'. I notice you refused to, the President refused
to, seethe Prime Minister of Sweden last week, which is a very broad-
minded approach. So why should you receive -Madam Vlachou.
We cannot receive the Prime Minister of one of the oldest friends
this country has had simply because he disagrees with our current
policy. It is a rather immature attitude frankly it strikes me. The only
similar exa.mnle T can remember is when the President refused to see
a. Prime Min ster or e President, althouLyh the Secretary of State did
see him, and that was when Castro visited here in 1959-60. Do you
remember this, were any of you here at that time?
1MMIr. DAVITS. No, sir. I was in Baghdad.
Senator FTJLTuRTGTTT, Were you here at that time ?
Mr. VTGDIRRMAN. No, sir.
Senator FT LRRTOi1T. Well, that may he the precedent for not receiv-
i.1o Mr. Palme. They asked the Vice President. Who was the Vice
President?
Mr. Hnr,,. Vice President Nixon.
SPnc for FrTLRRTCITTT. Sa.w Castro?
Mr. TIor'r'. Yes, sir.
Senator FTTJmTOTTT. The reason this committee saw him, the De-
p,artment asked us to, the. Department asked this committee to receive
C"astro. They were not quite sure what his role was. They did not want
to completely rebuff him, but they did not want to receive him either, so
they asked this committee to receive him, and he came. in here. It is the
only time T have ever seen the bearded one. But I was quite ashamed of
our attitude toward the Prime Minister of Sweden.
I think it would have been very useful if we really do have a justi-
fi~-,ition for our policy to give him a little instruction about it and see
if we could. not persuade him rather than ignore him.
This is, I dunk, a very insulting attitude toward an extremely
civilized country, far more civilized than most countries.
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GREED OPPOSITION TO PRESENT REGIME AND PERSONALITIES
Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Chairman, with respect to Greek opposition and
personalities, there is no reason why we should not see them. Ambassa-
dor Tasca, in his sampling of Greek opinion, is talking to those who
oppose the regime at home.
I was to have seen Andreas Papandreou when he was here, but
Something occurred.
Senator FULBRIGIIT. Did you see him?
Mr. DAVIES. I was waiting; something came up that he did not come
in.
Senator FuLBRIGIIT. Are you sure? I was under the impression the
Department refused to see him.
Mr. DAV[ES. No, sir; that is not correct. It was very short notice. I
canceled a meeting I had and said I was ready to receive him-Mr.
Sisco was not available but I was ready, willing, and able to receive
him.
Senator FCTLBRIGIIT. If I should see Madam Vlachou would I be at
liberty to tell her that the Department would be glad to receive her,
and at what level? Sisco is the highest level? The Secretary would not
see her, would he?
Mr. VIGDERAIAN. The arrangements with Mr. Sisco have already been
made. The appointment is fixed.
Senator FULBRIGIIT. Already made. I just wanted to know where we
stood. The matter might come. up.
Mr. DAVIES. She is a charming woman and her paper was the New
York Times of Greece.
Senator FULIBRIGICT. I am reminded that-what was that you said,
the New York Times of Greece?
Mr. DAVIES. Let me say it was an eminent paper, sir. May I recall
that remark, sir. It was one of the best papers in Athens.
Senator FULBRTGIIT. And one of the first to be closed up. That may
happen here.
Mr. DAVITS. I believe, sir, she closed it voluntarily as an action of
protest against the extraconstitutional. nature of the regime. It was a
voluntary action on her part.
The regime sought to get her to reopen it in order to reestablish
normalcy, and I suppose to indicate their tolerance of opposition
elements.
Senator FULBRIGIIT. But it is a fact she escaped; they did not allow
her to leave, is that not so?
Mr. DAVIES. It is my understanding.
Senator Fi77.11RIGIIT. I just read a story a few days ago in which she
described the. subterfuge.
Mr. VIGDERMAN. Yes. She has just written a book called "House
Arrest," in which she describes it.
Senator FnLBRIGIIT. I have just been handed a note that Mr. C. L.
Sulzberger, in Foreign Affairs, said that the plan the colonels followed
in Greece was originally drawn up as a part of the NATO contin-
gency plan to protect the Greek Government under the code name,
I believe, of Prometheus.
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I)o you know anything about that?
Mr. DAVIES. I have read that article sir. I am not aware of the facts.
Senator FULBRIGIIT. Is it accurate or inaccurate?
Mr. DAVIFS. I do not know.
Senator FuLBRIGFIT. Does anybody in the Department? Do you
know'?
Mr. VromERMAN. I do not; no, sir.
~Senatol? I'ur,RRTOnT. _Do yu know?
Mr. PRANCER. No, sir. I believe Mr. Richardson and General Good-
paster are coming before the committee. It may be at that level there
is better information on. the subject. We do not have it.
Senator DAVITS. What is that?
Senator FuLBRmrrr. Sulzherger, he wrote an article that said that
the plan the coup followed was the plan originated by NATO called
Prometheus for the protection of the Greek Government. They just
took it over and tried to dispose of the Government.
Do you have any questions?
SOVIET OBJE'(7TIVES IN EASTERN 14IEDITERRANEAN
Senator J1vivs. Tf the chairman is willing, I would like to ask a
question, and please correct me if this has been asked before.
I must apologize to the chairman, Senator Symington, but I am
the author of the. administration's bill., and the sponsor of $1.5 billion
to desegregate the schools, and I had to be there for the first hearing,-.
If you have not testified on the present crisis respecting the Eastern
Mediterranean, which is wrapped up in the Israeli-Arab confronta-
tion, and the Russian, the new Russian, participation in the Nile River
Valley, I woiild like to have your comment because I note you say in
your statement on page 2:
Though Soviet techniques have varied since that time, domination of the
Eastern Mediterranean clearly remains a primary goal of Soviet policy.
How does that relate to the existing crisis ?
Mr. DAVIES. Senator Javits, I believe it is directly related. The Soviet
objectives have not ,hanged. Some of their tactics have.
The strength of Greece and Turkey and the alliance, in my judg..
ment, is a very important factor in our Arab-Israeli situation.
The Soviets have parlayed. the impasse between the United Arab
Republic and Israel into gaining more. and more military concessions
from President Nasser.
The establishment of SAM-ITT sites serviced by Soviet technicians,
the flying by Soviet pilots in Egypt give the Soviets not only greater
and greater influence in the country, but also integrate them more and
more. into the Egyptian forces.
(Deleted] the Soviets ire conducting surveillance of the 6th Fleet.
In my judgment, the Soviet squadron in the Mediterranean is basically
a political-military force, and Soviet political influence has increased
by the factor by which ou:r military-political influence is decreased, and
I believe that any weakness in the NATO Alliance ipso facto gives the
Soviet greater influence in this situation in the Eastern Mediterranean
and in the Arab-Israel conflict.
Senator JAV-ITS. Now, we must accept, tragic as it may sound and be,
the fact that if the Soviet Union wished to throw its might against
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Israel it could eliminate Israel; isn't that true? Isn't that an enemy
capability?
Mr. DAVIES. It is an enemy capability. I doubt very much, sir, that it
is the enemy intention.
Senator JAVITS. I know, but your own experience and mine indicate
that when you are assessing the situation you do not give the benefit of
good intentions to the enemy. You assess their capability.
Now, suppose they did eliminate Israel, what would be the effect
upon the NATO alliance in terms of that in the way you state it, domi-
nation of the Eastern Mediterranean clearly remains a primary goal of
Soviet policy?
Mr. DAVIES. I would assume, sir, and this is a hypothetical situation
which I cannot imagine coming about, but that this would mean that
the Soviet Union in supporting the Arab cause would have established
it so firmly not only in the United Arab Republic but still have some
way to go before they have seriously compromised Egyptian inde-
pendence, as well as other Arab countries where Soviet influence is,
at best, slight or nonexistent.
I think the Near East, and the North African littoral of the Mediter-
ranean would increasingly be hostile to the Western free world, West-
ern free world position.
Senator JAVirs. What would it mean to Greece and Turkey in terms
of the strategic situation ?
Mr. DAVIES. It would be serious, sir, because the Soviet military
power would have leapfrogged the alliance. [Deleted.]
Senator JAVirS. Would it have any effect, in your opinion, on Italy
or Spain or both?
Mr. DAVIES. I believe in the long run, sir, it would enhance the Soviet
military-political situation in the Mediterranean. I believe, [deleted].
Senator JAVITS. To the Soviet Union?
Mr. DAVIES. To the Soviet Union.
IMPORTANCE OF SETTLEMENT OF ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT TO
EUROPEAN SECURITY
Senator JAvITs. Have you gentlemen assessed at all the effect upon
Europe of the domination of the Middle East which contributes 50
percent of Europe's energy resources to Europe's ability, outside of
the Mediterranean littoral countries, to function as an industrial ma-
chine? Would they have to make concessions to the Soviet Union for
economic reasons?
Mr. DAVIES. If the terms of delivery from the Near East became so
as to put a Soviet hand on the tap, the economies of Western Europe
would be hostage to the Soviet Union or their supported governments
in the Near East.
Senator JAVITS. Is this wishful hoping that this could not happen
or what is the State Department's thinking on the subject?
Mr. DAVIES. We believe that NATO is a very important element in
this, sir, and the strength, of our NATO Allies.
We believe also that the best way to prevent this from happening
is to work strongly toward a settlement between the Arab States and
Israel and, as you know, sir, we are energetically involved in pursuit
of this objective at this very moment.
35--205-70-pt. 7-4
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Senator I' AM 'S. IS Our. only hope a political settlement at any price
or are we prepared to help Israel to maintain its national integrity
through the use of arms, if need be ?
Air. 1)nvns. Sir, Israel's defensive capability is important as Greece's
in stabilizing the situation in the Near East, and it is a factor which is
very much weighed i n current planning.
Senator JAVITS. Is it fair, you are testifying about Greece and Tur-
key, is it fair to say that Israel's survival and effectiveness is an im-
hortant factor in respect of the security of Greene and Turkey?
Mr. I) avn s. In my judgment, it is, sir. The strength and stability
of Greece and Turkey are also major factors in the Near Eastern
eitnatloll.
If the alliance should come asunder I think that our position in the
Near Fast, and the position of our friends there would be substantially
weakened.
Senator .1;avr rs. Well now, you speak of the Near Eastern situation,
hut this is the European situation.
lYliut 1 a111 tryinrr to get at is whether or not it is ,,t fact that what we
11 re doing or what we should do about Israel is equally important to
hnnope. is it is to the. Near Fast..
Mr. D1VIrs. A sett.lentent of the Arab-Israel problem and the con-
tinned independence, security of Israel, are, in my judgment, essen-
t +al to the. strength and security of Europe.
Senator .IrVTTS. Now, we (rather, at least. I gather-I will be ver.17
personal about this that the European some of them, at least and,
>erha.ps rnan- of them, Ire not, as impre `sed with that, and they think
they can (lo jrist as well if Israel is expendable.
Could you comment on that. Is that or is i t. n ot. a fact'?
Mr. Davt.rs. I know of no Western European state, sir, which is not
as seriously concerned about the deteriorating situation in the Near
East, as we are., and this goes for France as well as our other allies.
Senator JxviTS. Well now, what are they prepared to do about it or
are they just going to hold our coat?
Mr. I~avlrs. I think all, si.r, are willing to involve themselves poli.t-
irally, and we are in clo=e consultation with the British and French
in our neii-ot.iations with the Soviets, and we are, as von know, getting
snpnort from our allies in the four-power talks in New York.
Senator Svi.rrw(-,Tox. Excuse me, would you repeat that.
4[r. I)AVTES. We, are getting s'm port from our Western allies in the
four-power talks in New York. IDeleted.1
Senator Frrr,ruarrn'r. If the Senator will yield attain, do you think
after Israel paid for the planes and France not only refused to deliver
,hem but gave them to Arab countries, that is evidence of supporting
ourposition?
Alr. DAVrrs. I believe that the planes that were purchased, sir, are
still in Israeli custody in France.
As far as 1. know, they physically have, been turned over to Israel but
their export has not been permitted.
Senator SA-AITNOTON. If the Senator will yield just once more, this is
the first time I have ever heard that. Will you cheek that out and let
me know what the facts are?
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Mr. DAVrES. I will send you the facts, sir, but it is, I believe, true
still.
(The information referred to follows:)
FRENCH MIRAGE AIRCRAFT SOLD TO ISRAEL
Export of the [deleted] Mirage aircraft sold to Israel was not permitted
[deleted].
Senator JAVITS. However, they are not yet prepared, the European
powers, including France are not yet prepared, to do anything by way
of military supply.
Mr. DAVIES. To Israel?
Senator JAvrrs. Yes.
Mr. DAVIES. Senator, may I provide for you and for the committee
the latest estimate of what is goi11 r to Israel from France?
Senator JAvrTs. All right.
(The information referred to follows:)
Prance has maintained its policy of embargo- on all armaments shipments to
Middle East nations directly involved in the conflict. [Deleted.]
Could we also know from you or, perhaps, we ought to call Secretary
Laird, what is the assessment of Israel's capability to hold off this
formidable armada, including the Russians, and what supply is re-
quired to enable them to do it, and what casualties are likely to be
imposed, and can Israel absorb such casualties. Could we get any light
on that? I assume the Defense Department has made those estimates.
Mr. DAVrES. Senator, in response to the President's request, the en-
tire question of the Arab-Israel. arms balance was gone into in intensive
detail.
Senator JAVITS. Well, has there been in the Defense Department an
assessment of the Soviet capability beyond their intentions?
Mr. PRANCER. Sir, speaking from the Department of Defense stand-
point, I think maybe it is wise to put in the record that on June 1, 1970,
there were 43 Soviet ships connected with a squadron in the Mediter-
ranean. This is a rather low number compared with some other past
figures in recent months.
Among these are certain guided missile frigates and cruisers with
surface-to-surface potential.
In response to your question as to whether the Department of
Defense has looked into this matter, I can say that we watch the Soviet
fleet very closely with our 6th Fleet, and this is a constant source of
concern to us, both from the standpoint of the Middle East and from
the standpoint of the coastal protection of Greece and Turkey.
Senator JAVITS. Yes.
Mr. PRANCER. So we do follow the movement of these ships very
closely, including the submarines.
Senator SYMINGTON. Inasmuch as the Soviets are putting their fleet
underwater, while we maintain ours on top, isn't it just as fair to say
that the Soviet Navy is following our fleet as it is to say that the
U.S. Navy is following their fleet?
Mr. PRANCER. Yes, sir.
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Senator SYMTNGTON,, Especially as they consistently have their-
planes over our carriers, as is well known through pictures in tie
press ?
Mr. PRANCER. Yes, sir. T think that the composition of the Soviet
fleet includes some other interesting elements, including helicopter-
carriers and guided missile frigates and cruisers with surface-to-sur-
facemissiles whkeh [deleted].,
Senator SY rii c c'roN. Thank you. Senator?
Senator J,wrr . Thera is a direct relationship and, if so, what is it
With relation to the size and composition of the Soviet fleet and the.
capability of the Soviet Union to carry on air or other operations
against Israel should it choose to do so by way of enemy capability?
Mr. PRANGER. [Deleted.] There have. been some maneuvers by the-
Soviet fleet, but these maneuvers have been primarily oriented against
or in relation to our (th Fleet [deleted].
It is difficult to see from maneuvers of the fleet, with the exception
of some landing exercise, I believe, which was held in Syria recently-
or sometime, just what exactly the fleet will do, and the Soviet squad.
ron-it is not a fleet, it is a squadron, made up of North Sea and'
Black Sea elements, but this was due- one could use one's imagina-
tion, but I would not care to speculate on this point.
MEANS BY WHICH SOVIET CAPABILITY IS MEASURED
Senator JAVITS. Now, T was thinking of it more in aid of aircraft.
Is there any other answer than that that you could give us? In other
words, is the Soviet capability to be measured solely or almost solely
by ability to fly planes from the Soviet Union to Egypt which, of
course, is very simple, or must it also be measured by the degree
of servicing, POL, and so forth, which would come by way of the
squadron?
Mir. PRANCER. Yes, sir; I see what you mean.
The Soviets, of course, are running a very active freighter traffic
between their ports and the UAR, and so this element of the naval
squadron does not include the freighter traffic into Alexandria.
Senator JAVETS. Has that traffic materially increased?
Wr. PRANGER. I will have to scratch the reports
Mr. DAVrES. If I may,. at the time of the decision to put in the
,AAT-III, we detected a sizable, increase in shipping and air flights.
T have not checked it recently, Senator Javits, but I believe it is now
back to normal.
Senator.TAvrrs. Could you check it and let us know?
Mr. DAVIES. [ will, Sir.
(The information follows:)
.SOVIET SHIPMENT TO THE VAR
Confirming my earlier remarks, we detected a substantial increase in surface
7n(1 air shipment, during the spring months. During late May and early June the
flow of shipments appeared to slack off in the direction of more normal levels
although they did not fall back to the approximate situation which prevailed
be. fore the marked increases began in February.
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ENFORCEMENT OF PROVISIONS OF MONTREUX CONVENTION
Senator JAVITS. My last question along this line, aside from the
Soviet Union's capability, and the Israeli ability to contain the situ-
ation, is the question of whether any estimate has been made of the
elements of attrition which would occur in respect to Israel's airpower
if the Soviet Union should adopt a more active role as, for example,
to give air cover to the building of the SAM-III sites in the Suez
Canal Zone, which it is not doing now?
Mr. DAVIES. This has been a part of the assessment.
Senator JAVITS. Assessment.
Mr. DAVIES. Which is, as you know, continually examined.
Senator JAVITS. Does Turkey enforce the provisions of the conven-
tion which require Russian naval craft to proceed in daylight and
identified?
Mr. DAVIES. Generally, the Montreux Convention provisions are
strictly observed.
Senator JAVITS. Is that an important element of U.S. policy in rela-
tion to Turkey? Would that be enforced?
Mr. DAVIES. It is, sir.
RELATIONSHIP OF UNITED STATES AND GREEK MILITARY
Senator JAVITS. Finally, about Greece itself, and I listened with the
greatest interest to our chairman's questions, does the State Depart-
ment have a projection as to what it expects and what it is pressing for
with the colonels in terms of opening up the situation in Greece, and
to what extent does it have the cooperation of the Defense Department?
We are advised, at least I am advised, that very friendly relations
continue with our military people, and that this is a source of great
comfort to the colonels.
I noticed what you say about the limitations on the nature of the
military supply. But this obviously is a very delicate, and also a very
worrisome situation ; that is, my information is, that we won't take
too much more time to have the colonels so deeply entrenched that it
e n long time before you will get them out on whatever terms
will ben'
,they want to face.
Mr. DAVIES. Senator Javits, our military relations with Greece have
been very close since 1948.
The personnel of the Greek Military Establishment have not changed,
and to that extent it has continued. At the same time, I would like you
to know we have one of our strongest ambassadors in Athens who is
running the show for the U.S. Government. There is no change that
I am aware of either in the field or here to our approach to the Greek
'Government.
As far as assessment of what we can expect subsequent to Mr. Ab-
shire's conversation with the chairman, we have asked Ambassador
Tasca to prepare a report which will. be made available to the com-
mittee.
Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
FUSE OF VOICE OF AMERICA INSTALLATIONS BY GREECE
Senator FULBRIGHT. Could I ask one or two questions?
I was asking you about the radio. I understand we built for our
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own use and the Greeks use it also as a very extensive radio broadcast-
ing facility beginning in 1962?
Mr. DAVIES. We have some Voice of America installations in Greece,
sir, if this is what you are referring to.
Senator F'L'LBRTG7rr. Yes.
Mr. Dnvn s. We have a medium wave, shortwave transmitter in
Rhodes from which we broadcast to the Near East primarily in Arabic.
,'here is an 'installation at Kavalla, and one at Salonika.
Senator i ULBRm HT. At the time, of the. coup, of course, which
Brought to power the Greek colonels, we recognized their right to use
his, these facilities, the Greek Government, did we not?
Mr. VIGDERMAN. No, sir.
Senator FITLURmr3T. WTe did not? Put it this way, then the counter-
toup, when the, King o-,' Greece attempted a countercoup, and he at
Poe point cried to send a message to be broadcast to Greece over the
mice of America outlet, that it never was done; is that not correct?
They refused to do it; is that not right?
Mr. ViGDEFrNr,AN. I do not brow, sir.
Mr. DAvizs. I am not aware of that, sir. The King was at Larissa,
where there was a very low powered Greek transmitter which he used.
Senator F ILLSRTGrrT. But under the arrangement with Greece [de..
lc ted.]
Mr. D,vvrrs. Mr. Chairman, I will provide the answer for the record,
Senator FTTLBRTGHT. We have the answer, but I thought you would
be willing to confirm. it. I want this in the record. This is what the:
agreement says.
But do von know whether the Greeks are still using these facilities
'for their 'Purposes?
Mr. D,vrss. I do not, sir. I will find out for the record.
(The information referred to follows:)
Under an arrangement with Greece there is to be a loan of a 250 KW short-
wave transmitter and of the use of a 150 KNV medium-wave transmitter primarily
daring daylight hour,. when these facilities now under construction are com-
pleted, in addition to the use at present during daylight hours of a medium-wave
facility at Thessaloniki.
Senator Frur3Rrrrrr. Does your aide--I did not -,et your name,
Si r--
Mr. VrGDERMAAN. My name is Vigderman.
Senator FPrrr,BumTrT. Are you on the Greek Desk?
Mr. VIGDE iMAN. Yes, si r.
Senator FTTr,mirGr3T. Would you know about this?
1Ir. VrGn_Ew%IA\'. My recollection is a little shaky, but what it comes
to is that part of the deal in connection with all of the Voice of
America facilities was that a station we had built would be turned
over to them and for their use, going back to 1962.
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1
0
0
Senator FULBrIGHT. Well, that is, a loan, that is under one, loan of
a 50 kilowatt medium wave transmitter. In addition to loans of similar
transmitters at Corfu under the 1955 agreement, and Athens under
the 1955 agreement, and the Government of Greece agrees to allot
some time on this on a nonpriority basis. That is one.
I am talking about full priority use at U.S. Government expense of
the 250 kilowatt shortwave transmitter. Is that still in effect?
Mr. VIGDERMAN. I am not sure, sir.
Mr. DAVIES. I will find out from the Information Agency.
Senator FuLBRmIIT. Would you find out whether or not the Greek
King sought to broadcast over this facility and it was denied to him
the use of it at the instance of his attempted counter-coup?
Mr. DAVIES. I will look into the files, sir.
(The information follows:)
REPORTS ABOUT ATTEMPTS BY KING CONSTANTINE To BROADCAST OVER VOICE OF
AMERICA FACILITIES DURING HIS UNSUCCESSFUL COUNTER-COUP ATTEMPT
Immediately following the failure of King Constantine's effort to oust the mili-
tary regime in December 1967, rumors that the King had tried to use Voice of
America facilities during his attempted counter coup circulated both within and
outside Greece. Specifically, the King was alleged to have prepared a tape, calling
for support from the Greek people, which he tried to have broadcast over the VOA
station in Rhodes.
Whether or not the King prepared such a tape, there is no record that the
King or any representative of the King contacted U.S. officials in an attempt to
broadcast over VOA facilities.
Senator FULBRIGIIT.They can use this 250-kilowatt shortwave
transmitter to broadcast to Greeks all over Europe, can they not,
in the Greek language?
Mr. DAVIES. I assume so, sir. A 250-kilowatt
Senator FULBRIGIIr. When you assume so, can you find out and
say yes or no?
Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir ; I will.
(See above.)
Senator FULBIiIGHT. The significance of this is here. I wish to show
by these agreements, the continuation of them, there is this close asso-
ciation with the Greek Government under these continuing agree-
ments. This agreement was for 15 years, although it is cancelable, it
may be terminated with 1 year's notice. If it is not terminated it
will run for 15 years, and the continued support of the Greek colonels
and the continued use, we believe, of the transmitter's facilities, which
again confirms in the eyes of the Greeks and nearly everyone else,
our close support of the Greek Government.
Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Chairman, the facility is of great use to us in
our information program. I am familiar with our Arabic programing
which does have some impact in the area.
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1.320
Senator F7_LB]RTGITT. Apparently adverse, is it not? Most of these
are adverse, apparently. You do riot pretend that they are favorable,
do you?
Mr. DAVIF,S. Whenever I have been in a crisis situation in the area
T think invariably the Foreign Office officials, the Government turns
to the "Voice of America" for accurate information.
117?t0r F1-r,nT,TG1vr. Accurate information?
Mr. Dnvr_Es. Accurate news on developments. In my opinion, sir,
it does have impact.
Senator Firr,BrliGnT. Well, it is sort of hard to take that, you know,
when the Secretary of State comes before this committee 2 days before
the invasion of Cambodia and testifies without mentioning it, and for
you to say that you regard this as a source of accurate information
by everybody else, it is a little difficult for me to take without
protesting.
Mr. DAV[FS.. I am quoting, sir, my Arab colleagues. I do not think
they listen to it for entertainment, but in my view they do consider
news broadcasts over the "Voice of America" as free from distortion.
Senator Fu r BRrGTIT. WW-'ell, I do not think I have any more questions,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator SYtirrNGTON. Perhaps this might be a time to stop because
we, have a Policy Committee lunch. If it is all right with you we will
resume at 2:30. Fine, thank you.
(Whererrgon, at 12 :30 o'clock p.m., a recess was taken until 2:30
o'clock p.nm., the same day.)
Senator SYMINGTON. The meeting will come to order.
Mr. PATH. I believe Mr. Davies was reading his statement on page 6,
Mr. Chairman,
TESTIMONY OF RODGER DAVIES, ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT I.
P:RANGER--(Resumed )
Mr. DAVnrs. Turning to Turkey, in the post-World War II years the
Soviet Union demanded that Turkey cede two of its provinces border-
ing the Soviet Union and that it be allowed to establish military bases
in the Turkish Straits. Turkey rejected these demands, but it felt a
grave and continuing threat from the Soviet Union. The position of
Turkey appeared even riskier early in 1947, when an economic crisis
forced Great Britain to withdraw precipitately from the supporting
role it had played for both Greece and Turkey, leading to the Ameri-
can assumption of this role, as enunciated in the Truman Doctrine.
From mid-1.94 7, then, the United States has been Turkey's principal
~sorurce of military assistance and, until recent years, the primary pro-
V (Ier of economic assistance.
From the first discussions among Western nations of a defense pact
to protect Europe from the Soviet threat, Turkey actively sought to
be included in any such arrangement. Recognition of the depth of
Turkey's and Greece's commitment to participate in the common de-
felise against the expansionary efforts of Communist nations fol-
lowed their contribution of effective contingents to the United Nations
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forces in the Korean conflict. Membership in NATO became a reality
early in 1952, and a new phase developed in America's relationship
with Turkey.
CONTRIBUTIONS OF GREECE AND TURKEY TO KOREAN CONFLICT'
Senator SYMINGTON. Let me interrupt there for a minute. Would you
furnish for the record what equipment and/or personnel each country
furnished to the Korean conflict?
Mr. DAMES. Yes, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. Also how long they stayed there and whether
or not we put up the money involved.
Mr. DAMES. Yes, sir.
(The information referred to follows:)
GREEK AND TURKISII CONTRIBUTION-KOREAN CONFLICT
Greece furnished one (1) augmented infantry battalion plus a squadron of
seven (7) C-47 aircraft. Turkey provided one (1) brigade consisting of three (3)
infantry battalions. The Greek battalion strength was mostly in the 850-1100
range. Whereas the Turkish unit strength peaked at about 5455. Greece and
Turkey provided pay and allowances with the U.S. furnishing weapons, equipment
and logistical support. Turkey is still represented in Korea by an eleven-man
Honor Guard attached to the United Nations Command.
IMPORTANCE OF TURKEY IN AIR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS
Mr. DAVIES. A vital airbase was constructed [deleted] near Adana,
in south central Turkey, and another air base several years later near
Izmir. Turkey has become a vital link in our air transport operations
from Europe and the Mediterranean to the east and sough. A number
of facilities also were established to make use of Turkey's natural
geographical advantages in support of the common defense.
CAPACITY OF TURKEY TO DEFEND HERSELF
Turkey's own defense efforts have been greatly facilitated by Amer-
ican military assistance; its unwieldy and too-large army, which in.
1947 was perhaps a quarter of a century behind the Soviet and Western
forces, was scaled down in size, and its capability considerably en-
hanced through the provision of modern equipment and technical
training. Turkey's capacity to defend itself, especially as part of
NATO has been immensely improved. A large volume of American
economic assistance has also been instrumental in assisting Turkey to
score impressive gains in its economic, social, and political develop-
Inent. Our continued substantial assistance in both these areas is essen-
tial to the attainment by Turkey of self-sustaining economic growth,
which should begin in the mid-1970's.
U.S. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO TURKEY
Senator SYMINGTON. Would you supply for the record the amount
of economic and military aid the United States has given Turkey to
date?
Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir.
(The information referred to follows:)
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1822
TOTAL OF U.S. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO TURKEY
Economic aid from the United States to Turkey during the period July 1946
through June 1969 totalled $2,555.3 million. Of this total, loans accounted
for $1,370.6 million and grants amounted to $1,184.7 million. Military assistance
during the same period totalled $3,045.1 million, of which $154.9 million repre-
sents grants from excess stocks and the remainder Military Assistance Program
and other grant aid.
U.S. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO GREECE
Senator SYi1ITNGTON. And also the same information for Greece.
Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir.
Senator SYmINGToN. Thank you.
(The in formation referred to follows:)
TOTAL, UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
In the period 1946 to 1969 United States economic aid to Greece in all forms
totaled $1,883 million.
United States economic assistance to Greece through AID and its predecessor
agencies totaled $1,061 million. The last AID grant assistance was made in
:1962. the last aid program loan In 1964.
Other programs, Food for Peace (PL 480 titles I and II), long-term EX-IM
Bank loans, Greek-Turkish aid and surplus property credits came to $821 mil-
lion. The last of the expenditures, in the amount of $700 thousand, was made un-
dcr the Food for Peace program in 1968.
I:eginning in 1947 (during the Greek-Turkish aid period) through 1969, United
Slates military assistance to Greece totaled $2 billion. Under the Military As-
sistance Program beginning in 1950, and through 1969, the total is $1,456 million.
During the -am(! period excess equipment with a utility value of $101 million
w-,),,, delivered to Greece.
During FY 1970 actual deliveries of U.S. military assistance to Greece will
come to about $46.5 million ; $33.6 million in grant assistance, $12.9 million in
excess equipment.
I)1?TERIORATION OF UNITED STATES-TURKEY RELATIONS OVER CYPRUS
PROBLEM
l Lr. DAMES. The American presence in Turkey grew steadily dur-
ing the first decade of Turkey's membership in NATO (1952-63) , and,
although minor difficulties cropped up, the United States-Turkish
relationship was mutually satisfactory. The eruption of the Cyprus
problem, and America's role in attempting to dissuade Turkey from
exercising its treaty right to intervene on the island, resulted in wide-
spread disillusionment, in Turkey. The national frustration the Cyprus
problem produced, and sustains, brought about a climate in which
minor grievances with the United States grew larger, and a certain
level of di ;enchantment with the United States lingers on in tandem
with the I;crsistence of the Cyprus situation. The United States and its
presence became convenient targets for a hostile and increasingly vio-
lent element of extremists, chiefly far-left students. [Deleted.] The
Government of Turkey seems today to have the public and institu-
tional. support needed to maintain order when it is threatened, and, it
is moving to strengthen its hand through a range of legislative meas-
ures recently introduced in the parliament.
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IMPORTANCE OF TURKEY TO NATO
Turkey is an effective and dedicated member of NATO whose geo-
graphical situation has been-and continues to be-of considerable
importance to the defense of the NATO area. Equally important for
Turkey is the coincidence of its alliance membership with its desire
to participate fully in the Western family of nations. That is the
,end of the statement.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
REQUEST FOR DECLASSIFICATION OF WITNESS' STATEMENT
This document is classified "Secret." What is secret about it?
Mr. DAVITS. Primarily, sir ; the reference to military installations
and certain comments about the political difficulties that both govern-
ments have. If you desire, I am certain that we could go over it and
lower the classification.
Senator SYMINGTON. Let us have a declassified copy.
Mr. DAVIES. All right, sir; I will. have it done.
Senator SYMINGTON. It is no secret that we have military installa-
tions in Greece, is it?
Mr. DAVIES. Nor in Turkey.
Senator SYMINGTON. Nor in Turkey. What else should be secret?
Mr. DAVIES. We will go over it, sir; as part of the declassification
process.
Senator SYMINGTON. Fine. But it is your statement and you origi-
nated the classification. What is there in it that should not be
declassified?,
Mr. DAVIES. Primarily, sir; the description of onr various military
establishments in both States.
Senator SYMINGTON. What is secret about our military installations?
Mr. DAv15s. On page 4, sir; the last paragraph on the page touches
upon our military
Senator SYMINGTON. Isn't all that known?
Mr. DAVIES. Sir, we will go over it and, in particular, I would like
to take a look at some of the comments we have made about our Greek-
Turkish relations.
Senator SYMINGTON. You bring up this paragraph :
In addition to the JUSMAAG personnel, U.S. military forces in GreeC'e
currently occupy a Naval communications station north of Athens.
Everybody knows that, don't they?
Mr. DAVIES. I would assume so, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. Certainly the people of Greece do-"
installations and port sites in Crete." That is known. The people cir-
culate freely among the Americans, do they not, in the community?
Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. "Military Airlift Command facilities at the
Athens airport," I have been there previously, everybody knows about
that, "and POL and storage facilities at Piraeus." They must know
that.
"Under agreements with the Greek Government, the United States
and NATO may use various air and naval facilities in the event of
hostilities between NATO and Soviet-bloc nations."
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1524
? Well, that is perfectly clear to everybody, is it not, under the NATO
agreement ?
Mr. DA`JIFS. Yes, sir. I think this is a case of overclassification and
it will be remedied.
Senator SYMINGTON. "U.S. military communications in the Eastern
Mediterranean and the operations of the U.S. 6th Fleet in that area
depend very heavily upon use of these facilities." Everybody knows
that, do they not?'
Mr. DAVIFS. Yes, sir.
Senator SY'_1IINGTON.Finally, "U.S. military presence in Greece has
generally teen welcomed by the Greek people and has caused no serious
public relations problems to date." I should think you would want that
known. Is there anything classified about that?
Mr. D:wrrs. No, sir.
Senator SSIINGTON. Who classified this for you, because this is the
paragraph that you brought up as the reason for classification.
Mr. D_}vlES. This was put together on the basis of several drafts, sir,
that were submitted.
Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Wolf, do you know anything about it?
Mr. 'Wor,F. Well, Senator, this statement, as all of the statements of
the key witnesses who have appeared before this committee, have been
written with a view to getting the maximum part of it released.
Senator SYMINGTON. Where is it declassified ?
Mr. WOLF. We will declassify it, sir. We have not been over that yet,
but I would say in this statement probably 85 to 90 percent could be
released.
Senator SYMINGTON. What could not?
Mr. WOLF. I am not prepared to say, sir. I have not studied it..
Senator SYiITNG TON. As far as I can see there is nothing in the state-
ment which is not known. If it is generally known by the Greeks and
the Turks and all the other people, why shouldn't the American people
know about it?
Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Chairman, there are a few allusions here I would
like to see eliminated if we are going to publish it. [Deleted.]
Senator SYIfTNGTON. senator Pell, we welcome you this afternoon.
Do you have any questions you would like to ask the witnesses?
L' IOILS ACCFSS OF TT.S. COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES TO GREEK KING
Senator PE ..r,. I a.m just particularly interested in Greece, nd I
wanted to take advantage, of your hospitality to sit in. I look forward
to reading the record of this morning's session.
There is one particular question I would like to ask you about.
Senator SYMINCTON. Fine.
Senator PELL. Concerning communications. When the Greek King
was over here the one, thing he. was interested in more than anything
el-;o, at least in his talks with me, was if he organized a coup whether
he would have access to communications, and he was much more inter-
ested ?in that than military factors.
At the time of the coup, I understand this morning this question
was discussed, but I amn not sure it was fully answered, I believe he
made an effort in that direction. I believe pert of the rights that the
TTSIA, part of the arrangements are, that the USIA has with its
facilities is that the local government has access to it.
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1825
I believe this was one of the questions that the King raised with
President Johnson. You probably have a memo of this conversation,
of that, in the State Department, and I am curious, did the King ask
for access to communications facilities?
Mr. DAMES. Senator Pell, I am personally unaware of this situa-
tion. I undertook to examine the record we have ai.d to supply the
answer to the committee.
Senator PELL. I thought you were, what you were unfamiliar with,
was the arrangement, the treaty arrangement.
Mr. DAVIES. No; I also am unaware that he actually did ask.
Senator PELL. I am asking, did he ask.
Mr. DAVIES. I do not know. Do you know?
Mr. VIGDERMAN. No ; I do not know.
Mr. DAVIES. I will look into it.
BRUTALIZATION PERPETRATED BY GREEK GOVERNMENT
Senator PELL. Two more questions of a general nature concerning
Greece. Is it accepted as a matter of course that if one is interrogated
for political activity, and one is not famous, well-known, that one is
pretty brutalized ?
Mr. DAVIES. I think there were some excesses.
We are somewhat reassured by the fact that the International Red
Cross was permitted to send a team there in November, and it is still
there, and I believe it has access to all places of detention in Athens.
I have not seen their reports, but the fact that the group is still there
I find. somewhat reassuring.
Senator PELL. Is it not correct that the reports are submitted to the
Greek Government and that is one reason why we have not had access
to them.
Mr. VIGDERMAN. That is correct.
Senator PELL. Unfortunately.
So there is no reason why you should. In other words, this is a
report to the Greeks.
The other point is do they have access, and do they take access to
the police stations? Nobody has said there were any cruelties per-
petrated when people have been sentenced. The problem arises in
the presentencing stage.
Do they have access and do they take advantage of that access?
Mr. DAVIES. This I cannot answer.
My impression, Senator, from talking to people on our staff who
have recently come back, is that there were some excesses, that the
regime has not been conscious of its public relations responsibilities,
and its responsibilities as a government to publicly disassociate itself
from these excesses.
It is our impression that things are slowly getting better, although
there are still cases of isolation of detainees [deleted].
It is our hope that with the presence of the ICRC, a very strong posi-
tion on the need for the government to make certain none of its of-
ficials trespass on the right of the individual, this will bring an end
to practices which, as you know, are fairly general in this part of the
world, have been even before the revolution.
Senator PELL. Not to this degree.
Mr. DAVIES. No, I quite agree.
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1826
BEI; I FF of GRFE [c PEOPLE THAT JIJN'rA IS SUPPORTED BY
UNITED STA`I77S
Senator PELL. With regard to the opinions of the Greek people, I am
sure you will ao'ree with me that the majority of Greeks, not the in-
tellectuals mayoe, but the majority of Greeks believe that the junta
enjoys the support of the United States. Would you disagree with
that statement
Mr. DAVIES. I have not been to Greece since the revolution, sir. I
would prefer not to answer until I have been there. I hope to get there
next month and spend some time.
Senator PELT.. I wonder if there is au body in the phalanx behind
you who has been in Greece more recently who has an opinion in this.
regard.
Mr. VTODERISIAN. I was there on the order of 2 weeks in January, and
the question you are asking is a very hard one to answer because, in
effect, it is a current Gallup Poll question, what do the Greek people
believe.
I am convinced that a respectable portion of them do believe, in
fact, that the Government is supported by the United States.
Senator PELL. Certainly every bit of intelligence--I will not use tha
word "intelligence"--but the Impression from the conversations :[
have had is to that effect.
Do you have any thoughts as to what can be done as a matter of
policy-presumably this view of mine is correct-what can be done
to d'sillnsion the Greek people of the fact that they enjoy the suppor~;
oil the American Government or does it enjoy the support of the
Arnerican Government?
Ir. DAVTES. Senator. I believe that--
Senator PFLL. This is a, policy question, and I am interested in your-
reaction as Assistant Secretary.
Mr. DAVIES. I think we have made clear through the selective sus-
l pension of shipments of military equipment which the administra-
tion. that is, the Executive, undertook after April of 1967 is one effort
to open some light between us and this extraeonstitutional regime.
V.S. POLICY OF MAINTAINING. WORKING. RELATIONSTiTP WTTII GREECE
Our nolicy is one of maintaining working relations with this Gov-
ernment in order to keep up our ties with the Greek people while,.
at the same time, urging the regime to move toward the restoration
of a parliamentary government.
It is very difficult to maintain these working relationships and, at
the same time, take a very high torte public policy of criticism. This is
part of the dilemma which we were discussing earlier.
But quite certainly I know of no one in the Department of State, at
least, who condones the long-term continuance of this extraconstitu-
tional regime.
Senator PET.r. But the fact remains that no principal officer of our
Government has uttered the slightest word of public criticism of the
administration to the Greek Government since the junta came in.
Mr. DAVIES.'Senator, I believe that the effort has been to work quietly
in Athens primarily to use what influence we have to, in the first in-
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stance, establish the trend of return to parliamentary constitutional
government and, in the second, to accelerate this trend.
The trend is there, I think you can point to certain things that have
been done. It is too slow and, as we were discussing this morning, we
still do not have the question answered whether there will be elections
next year.
-Senator PEInL. Finally and, as you know, I appreciate your offer to
give me a briefing on the Tasca report, but before giving you my
reply, I want to consult with our chairman because there are other
members of the committee who are interested in it as well as I am. I
personally think we should see it.
DOES TASCA REPORT RECOMMEND RESUMING SHIPMENT OF -MILITARY GOODS
TO GREECE?
But does it recommend the resumption of the shipment of military
goods back to Greece? Can you answer that?
Mr. DAVIES. Let me clarify the status of the Tasca report, Senator
Pell. The Ambassador has provided a whole series of reports. He has
had over 100 conversations with members of the regime, some of the
opposition, intellectual, professional people, and the report itself is in
response to an NSC directive and, as such, is privileged.
We have asked Ambassador Tasca to put together for us, to transmit
to you and the chairman, if he so desires, a statement of developments
as he sees them in Greece, where they are trending, and what the pros-
pects are.
I have not-this is not in yet, but in the main these reports con-
stitute only one element in the decisionmaking problem.
The Ambassador has filed at least one report of conversation every
day, and some of them have been tremendously revealing of the
situation there. And, taken as a whole, they will be one part of the
decision which has to be made by the administration of where we are
going to go with this regime.
Senator PELL. My question was specifically though does the Ambas-
sador recommended the resumption of arms shipments.
Mr. DAVIES. I am afraid I cannot comment on that, sir, because it
is part of the NSC response.
Senator PELL. Right.
FAILURE OF UNITED STATES TO DE-IONSTRATE OPPOSITION TO NATURE OF
GREEK REGIME
I want to add I am not trying to heckle you in any way as indi-
viduals, but this has been a matter of concern to ine for several years
now, and I could not understand why we worked, indicated to our
friends at the Council of Europe., that we did not like their actions with
regard to Greece.
I would have thought we would have encouraged the Council
of European Nations, as a means of demonstrating our position at
the same time, as you know, in Rome, we did all that we could to dis-
courage any action on the part of Denmark and Norway and, I believe,
Germany. I am not sure.
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1828
If what you say is correct, that we disapprove of the government in
reece, why don't we just let things take their course? Why do we try
to act as their defender with other nations ?
Mr. DAvm s. The consideration here is the integrity of the alliance
a t a time when we are having problems in. the eastern Mediterranean.
Senator Pr;r,r,. But, forgive me, the country that is most concerned
about the alliance would be, I think, Norway which would be the
closest to the possible enemy, and they are the ones who think most
strongly that the (;reeks should be out of NATO.
Mr. DAVITS. The views of our allies were exchanged in Rome. They
are on record as deploring the nature of the regime.
Senator Pr:r.L. Excuse me, did we publicly, did we privately, state
that in the presence of the Greek Ambassador that we deplored the
nature of the regime?
Mr. DAVITS. No, I am sorry. They are on record, the Danes, in
particular.
Senator PELL. Yes, they are on record publicly.
Mr. DAVIES. I think the question is-and I do not have the answer
here--is whether the community, the western community, working
together cannot expedite the return to parliamentary government ir.
Greece by keeping working relations with it rather than attempting
to isolate it.
The regime is it military regime and, as far as I can see from the
reports that are, in, it has the support, of the military, the Greer:
military.
Sea'a.tor PFrr,. That is where we differ. I think we can do a greater
job of nudging.
To be very specific with regard to our relations with the regime, am
T correct in saying there was a high level military Greek delegation
here in the last few weeks?
A-fr. PRANCER. Sir, Admiral Margaritas came to visit Admiral
Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations.
Senator Prr,r.. What. is his job?
Mr. PRANGER. He is Chief of the Greek Naval Forces.
Senator Pt:r L. That is a, high level military visit.
Mr. PRANGER. Yes, it iS.,
Senator I'Fr,r.. What did they do in Washington when they were here?
Did they just stay with the Navy Department?
Mr. PRANGER. Yes, he did. He was here as a guest of the Chief of
Naval Operations as part of an annual visiting program which the
Chiefs of Staff have with military leaders worldwide and, I believe,
he was the first Greek, senior Greek, official here since the coup.
Senator PELL. Was the visit publicized in Greece?
Mr. PRANGr,R. No, it was not.
Senator PELL. Are you sure?
Mr. PRANGER. Well, I do not know. I have not read--
Mr. VIODER:1MAX. If it was it did not seem to rise to the level where it
was reported back to us.
Senator PELL. I am surprised it was not mentioned in the Greek
press.
Mr. PRANGER. [Deleted]
Senator PELL. Would not our national interest suffer at all if he had
not been invited?
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1829
Mr. PRANCER. This is a matter which is, I suppose one could argue,
[deleted].
Bijt again, our Navy has had a close relationship with the Greek
Navy since the days of the-our first days in Greece, [deleted]. 7
Senator PELL. Thank you. I have taken too much of the chairman s
time, but I did want to ask these questions.
Senator SYMINGTON. Not at all.
Have you finished, Senator?
Senator PELL. Yes. Thanks.
Senator SYMINCTON. You have asked some very interesting ques-
tions.
Mr. Counsel.
PROSPECTS OF GREECE'S RETURN TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT
Mr. PAUL. You mentioned this morning, Mr. Davies, certain steps
that you see the present Greek regime taking in the category of civil
liberties or individual rights. But what would you say is the prospect
of a return to democratic government as distinguished from these civil
liberty steps?
Mr. DAvIEs. As I noted this morning, the schedule for promulga-
tion of the Constitution is to be completed, according to the regime,
by the end of the year. I would not want to deceive you. I think we
are going to have to wait until the end of the year and see whether
on promulgation the regime then moves ahead to announce a schedule
for resumption of political activity and scheduling of elections.
I would hope they move in this direction, but I do not think any
of us would care to say categorically that this is going to happen.
Mr. PAUL. When we were in Athens last year [deleted] !told us
there is no effective opposition in Greece today that could by strength
of arms or otherwise overcome the regime but the regime has not devel-
oped any substantial support among the Greek people such that it
could win a fair election and, accordingly, the prospects for it opting
for a democratic election are very poor indeed.
Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Paul, it is my understanding that-and again this
is based on reporting from the field that-while the regime is not,
perhaps, popular in Greece, there is a level of acquiescence. The regime
is country oriented.
Most of these officers [deleted] have taken certain reform measures
which are of an egalitarian nature, which have been welcomed in rural
communities.
One that I particularly recall was the abolishment of church fees
by which the wealthy could get first-class funerals and the poor would
have to make do with whatever the ininimurn service was.
It would seem to me that in a parliamentary situation it would
depend pretty much on what level of activity was permitted political
parties; that is, whether the regime would permit the organization of
political parties and their free functioning in a period long enough
before the elections to make clear what the Issues are.
Mr. PAUL. Are you implying by that that if the colonels and their
group allowed political parties to flourish for any length of time the
colonels would not be the prevailing party in an election?
- Mr. DAvIEs. I have a very hard time seeing any people sir, voting
for a military regime.
35-205-70-pt. 7-5
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Mr. PAUL. ,~~2LI tell us } w manor people and rnximately are
Iu~v im I isoned in Greece Itlcal reasons?
Ac.i?ere .re appro:xlmate 1,200, according to our latest
Q.S. ROLF. IN RESTORING CONSTITUTION IN GREECE
Mr. PAUL. I know ,you have referred to this at various times this
morning, but could you just briefly, so the record is clear, give us
your view as to what the American role and responsibility is toward
moving Greece toward a more liberal situation?
Mr. DAVIES. We believe that in maintaining a working relationship
with the Greek Government we should not lose any opportunity for
making clear that the level of our relationship, the warmth of our
relationship, depends to a large; extent on the progress made toward
restoration of a, constitutional situation in Greece.
From my familiarity with Ambassador Tasca's activities, he has
done a splendid job in making this point clear at the top of the govern-
ment.
Mr. PAUL. But what :is it that snakes this a goal of American foreign
policy, not that I disagree that it should be, but why do we look upon
it as our business?
Mr. DAvms. Because we believe that the future stability of Greece
will depend on a return to a constitutional parliamentary order.
Mr. PAur. With that. as a basis, would you say that the Greeks need
our support more than we need theirs ?
You referred to the Greek role in NATO as their contribution to
us. But would you say on balance that they need our support more
than we need them or the other way around?
Mr. DAVMS. I think this is a reciprocal arrrangement. We have
certain security needs which they share. I believe that the Greeks have
resources to acquire from others those things which we have in suspense,
and they very well may do so.
I do not think the present regime would acquire Soviet equipment, I
may be wrong, but there are other vendors, including some from
among the ranks of our close allies.
I believe that the policy we have sought to follow [deleted] gives
promise of moving the situation l:)ack to a constitutional order.
I NIPORTANCb: OF GREECE TO NATO
Mr. PAUL. Has the State Department-not the Defense Department
or the Ceualln .allicrar may, but the State Department itself--
made a careful assessment of the importance of Greece to NATO, of
our need for Greece considering the fact that we have Turkey, we
have the ability to close the Straits as long as we are allied with
Turkey, and Greece can make very little contribution to the central
region of NA TO; have you carefully assessed the benefits?
Mr. DAVI:ES. This has been looked at very carefully.
Mr. PAUL. By the State Department?
Mr. DAVI s. r :t Lg ~ .ice c3 ~ Q,Inci hnt h State.
l e Ial~ment c.ontribiLeL a sis nento this-irate
- ha-
?N"TDr+ v
,icleration.
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i
The facilities we enjoy in Greece are important for our mutual de-
fense and for the viability of the Alliance system.
Mr. PAUL. Let me just take that. The facility at Iraklion is obvious
in its importance.
Would you say the same thing for all the other facilities in Greece
as far as their importance to the American and NATO military
posture?
IMPORTANCE OF NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS IN GREECE
Mr. DAVIE. s. As you know, Mr. Paul, my primary interest is the
Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East, and I consider the im-
portance of the 6th Fleet, as a military-political weapon to be of great
importance.
Therefore, I think the naval communications in Greece are im-
portant. I think the fact that our ships can put into Greek ports is
extremely important.
Mr. PAUL. Considering the alternatives to each of those positions,
you still think they are important?
Mr. DAVIES. Yes. At the present time we have no other area in the
Eastern Mediterranean where our 6th Fleet ships freely could put
into port.
As you know, in Turkey we do not have the same freedom in,mak-
ing fleet visits that we used to enjoy, although we do make some ship
visits to that country.
Senator SYMINGTON. Why is this?
Mr. DAVIES. Because it is a complicated story, Mr. Chairman. But,
at the time we attempted to dissuade the government of Turkey from
intervening militarily in Cyprus, the story ran through Turkey that
the 6th Fleet had been positioned to prevent a movement of Turkish
forces onto the island.
Senator SYMINGTON. Is that true?
Mr. DAVIE, S. It is not true, sir. It is also
Senator SYMINGTON. Where was the 6th Fleet when it happened?
Mr. DAVIES. I do not know, sir, where it was, but it was not there,
I am told.
Senator SYMINGTON. Would you supply for the record where the
6th Fleet was, including the carrier task forces?
Mr. DAVIES. I will supply it.
(The information referred to is classified and in the committee
files.)
Mr. DAvIEs. The second rumor, which also spread, was that we
used electronic means to block Turkish communications so that the
military operation could not be carried out successfully, also a canard.
Senator SYMINGTON. Is that true?
Mr. DAVIES. It is not true.
When the small extremist student groups began to object to 6th
Fleet visits, particularly to Istanbul, in the main their efforts were not
too unpopular with some Turkish people, because the residues of sus-
picion of what the 6th Fleet had done in the Cyprus crisis still exist.
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Senator SY IINGTOx. Flow many Americans did they throw into the
water when. the fleet visited there, not the last time, but the time before
last?
Mr. DAVIES. It was 10 or 12 who were dumped of# the pier in
Istanbul.
Senator SYNIINGTON. They did not throw any in the last time, did
they ?
Mr. DAVIFS. No, sir. There have been no injuries to Americans. There
h ave been some Turkish casualties.
Senator SYDTINGTON. The last time there was a lot of Turkish police
protection.
Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir.
Senator SYKINGTON. How many Turks were killed as a result of
-our fleet visit?
Mr. I)AVIES.. There were three Turks kille-d in February of 1.969,
sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. Have the fleet carriers visited Turkey since
that time?
Mr. DAVIES. We have put a cruiser in, but no carriers, [de] eted].
Senator SY.VIINGTON. Where did you send the crews that were in
port?
Mr. DAVIES. To Izmir, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. Would you call a cruiser a smaller vessel?
Mr. DAMES. This was the last major visit.
Senator SYMINGTON. Where was that sent, and on what date?
Mr. DAVIES. December 1969.
Senator SYMINGTON. When were the three Turks killed?
Mr. DAVrns. February 1969.
Consequently, speaking on the basis of my information, on the basis
of the political impact of the fleet on the Near Eastern problem, I
believe- the facilities we enjoy for the 6th Fleet are of value to us.
Senator SYMINGTON. What do you enjoy if you cannot send the fleet
into ports any more without having riots?
Mr. DAVIES. I am sorry, sir, I was speaking of Greek ports.
Senator SYMiNGTON. I see.
Mr. DAMES. So this is, if we are not permitted to put our ships into
these ports, the closest ports are those of Italy.
Senator SYMINGTON. Yes. But you are no longer permitted to put
your ships into a lot of ports.
Mr. DAVIES. No Arab ports, sir.
Senator SYMTINGTON. Can you put them into Morocco?
Mr. DAMES. Yes. But that again does not help us in the Eastern
Mediterranean where we are concerned as to what is going on.
Senator SYMINGTON. But there are also problems in the Western
Mediterranean. For example, ;you cannot put any ships into Mors el
Kebir in Algeria, can you?
Mr. DAMES. No, sir.
Senator SYMrINOTON. Isn't that an important problem?
Mr. DAVIES. Yes. We are fairly well confined, sir, to the Northern
Mediterranean littoral.
Senator SYMINoTOx. Except for Turkey.
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Mr. DAVIES. Including Turkey; we can put ships into Turkish
harbors.
Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think the U.S. Fleet could still put into
Greek ports if we refused to give Greece any more military aid?
Mr. DAVIES. I do not know the answer to that question, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. What would be your estimate?
Mr. DAVIES. I would believe, Senator, that we could reach a point
where the Greeks would find it inconvenient for-to extend certain
privileges if we began to take steps which lower our working relation-
ships.
Senator SYMINGTON. If they did that, that would leave Italy and
Morocco. You cannot berth in France. Where else could the fleet visit?
Mr. DAVIES. I would think Spain, sir, Portugal.
Senator SYMINGTON. Well, you could go into Spain.
Mr. PRANGI:R. Malta.
Mr. DAVIES. Malta.
Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, Majorca.
Mr. DAVIES. The problem, as I see it, Senator Symington
Senator SYMINGTON. What I am trying to say is your fleet is quite
limited as to where it can go, especially in the eastern Mediterranean.
Mr. DAMES. It is circumscribed, Sir. It can stay at sea, but port
facilities are increasingly limited; and, as we noted this morning, at
sea it is pretty well followed, as we follow the Soviets.
Senator SYMINGTON. Did you ever put the fleet into Yugoslavia?
Mr. DAVIES. I am not aware
Mr. PRANCER. Individual ships, sir, but not the fleet itself or a
task force.
Senator SYMINGTON. How large a ship?
Mr. PRANCER. Cruiser at one time.
Senator SYMINGTON. When was that?
Mir. PRANGER. We can supply that for the record, sir.
(The information referred to follows:)
U.S. SHIP VISIT-YUGOSLAVIA
The US'S Conynham (DDG-17) and the USES Furer (DEG-6) visited Dubrov-
nik, Yugoslavia 27-30 April 1970.
Senator SYMINGTON. I am worried about carriers in the Mediter-
ranean, because you not only have the development of sea-to-sea mis-
silry, as exemplified in the destruction of the Israeli destroyer, the
Elath, by an elementary Soviet missile of the Styx class; but you also
have the more sophisticated weaponry that the Soviets have developed,
including air-to-sea televised weaponry. Also, because of the narrow-
ness of certain parts of the Mediterranean, you have the problem of
land-to-sea missiles, which canbe a pretty short range, what we would
call tactical missiles.
The Mediterranean is becoming more of a Soviet than an American
lake-as you know, they have tremendously increased their number of
ships in the Mediterranean.
Mr. PRANCER. It becomes even more of a problem, sir, when you con-
sider what is in the Black Sea where they have a fleet that is extremely
large, [deleted] major surface combatant vessels, and [deleted] subs.
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Senator SYMINGTON. Yes,, and their pressures on the Turks have
reached the point where; now they can pretty much use the Dardanelles
as they wish; isn't that, a fact as far as the passage of their fleets is
,concerned ?
'Montreaux Convention . - .,i,.,~, "'v vvaci v uuctl U IL Lne
[deleted].
Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, but they can pass through, and what dif-
ference does the convention make?
Mr. DA` IES. But in accordance with the notificat'
io
n process, and cer-
tain-on the surface in the daylight is the convention.
Senator SYMINGTON. I Deleted 1
Mr. DAvnns. I think that is of major im iortan T k'
will to insist upon observance of that convention. ~' ur sit ability,
LESSENING OF U.S. GOODWILL IN TURKEY
Senator SYMINGTON. Do you believe that the enerRI 1 F
goodwill all over the world today, so far as the United Statesnis con-
cerned is primarily due to our excursion into Indochina? You would
be the first to agree that we have lost a lot of goodwill with the Turks
in the, last decade; would you not?
Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Chairman, I think perhaps the pivotal event in
our re'ations with Turkey was the necessary position we took on the
Turkish desire to intervene on Cyprus in 1964.
Senator SYMINGTON. That does not answer my question.
Mr. DAVr_Fs. I believe that the--
Senator i;YMINGTON. If you said no you would be belying Your own
testimony you gave a few minutes ago. It is clear we have lost a lot
of goodwill with the Turks, is it not?
Mr. DAVITS. Yes, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. All right.
Why did we take the side of the Greeks to the extent we did against
the Turks? The Turks are stronger and, certainly, in my Opinion,
would be at least as valuable a, military ally for many different
reasons.
Mr. DAVIES. The decision was taken, sir, that a confrontation be-
tween two allies, a war between two allies, would divide the alliance
or have extremely adverse impact on the alliance.
Senator SYMINGTON. Which alliance?
Mr. DwrEs. The NATO alliance.
The Turks, in a letter from President Johnson, were informed that
if the Soviets reacted as a result of any Turkish move on Cyprus, that
the guarantees of the alliance would not necessarily apply.
Senator SYMINGTON. Did we have the right to say that without con-
sultin i the ot]-er members of NATO?
Did we have the full support of our allies when President Johnson
wrote to Inonu?
Mr. DAVIES. In view of the very short time available to us before
the Turks apparently intended to move, we had very little time with-
in which to react. The letter pointed out that Turkey should not under-
take such an action without full consultation with its NATO allies.
Senator SYMTNGTON. V9hy did the Turks stop?
Mr. DAVIES. Primarily, mainly, because of the strong indication of
U.S. disapproval, sir.
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I think they felt that this would be a major rupture in Turkey's
relations with us, which they quite obviously valued highly, and I am
talking about the Turkish Government of that time.
Senator SYMINGTON. But less highly than they did before; right?
Mr. DAVIES. That was a problem, sir, of whether we had a war
between Greece and Turkey, and taking a strong position, I think
the letter was drafted very hurriedly, and it did ruffle Turkish feelings.
Senator SYMINGTON. What was the reason we thought it was to
our disadvantage for the Greeks and Turks to fight?
Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Chairman, I am certain that any administration
would be anxious to take steps to prevent war.
Senator SYMINGTON. Where?
Mr. DAVIES. I would hope anywhere in the world.
Senator SYMINGTON. Everywhere?
Well, do you think the fact we have been heavily escalating the
war in Laos in secret while, at the same time, we were deescalating
it publicly in Vietnam, and have now gone into Cambodia, shows we
are anxious to avoid war?
Mr. DAVIES. My conviction, sir, is that the Government, the ad-
ministration, has set itself the objective of terminating the war in
Southeast Asia. The measures that are being taken I would have
to leave to my senior officers and those responsible for it.
STRENGTH OF UNITED STATES-TURKEY ALLIANCE
Senator SYI4IINGTON. I was just wondering why we interfered in
that situation which has perhaps lost us our most valuable ally in
the eastern Mediterranean.
Mr. DAVIES. No, sir. I think our alliance is still strong. I think the
growth of nationalism in Turkey has been inevitable, as they develop
more confidence in themselves, and their forces, and I look upon
Turkey and Iran as conspicuous examples of the success of U.S.
policies.
We have achieved what we set out to achieve, the emergence of
strong states devoted to their own independence, and I thought this
was our end in view. We want to wean
Senator SYMINGTON. Like Greece?
Mr. DAVIES. I think we hope that we can see the Greeks increasingly
take care of their own defense requirements.
Senator SYMINGTON. I hope so too.
Mr. Counsel, will you proceed.
GREECE-TURKEY SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO CYPRUS
Mr. PAUL. Mr. Davies, could you tell us now what the situation is
with respect to Cyprus between the Greeks and the Turks?
Mr. DAVIES. The Turkish Cypriot leadership, and the Greek Cypri-
ots are in the midst of intercommunal talks which are directed toward
establishing areas of agreement which can lead to an eventual settle-
ment of the conflict.
'There has been. very little progress made. However, the talks are
going on, and both communities and both Turkey and Greece desire
that they go on.
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In March was the last flareup on Cyprus. There was an assassination
attempt made against President Makarios, and a successful assassina-
tion of the formerMinister of Interior, Georkjadis.
[Deleted.]
At the present time, the Cypriot Government is heading into elec-
tions. I believe that they will take place so that the situation will
emerge roughly as it is now.
I would he very hesitant to make any prognosis as to how fast these
intercommunal talks are going to produce results.
EF'F'ECTS of WI.THHOI,DING MILTrAgy AID By - NITED STATES
Mr. PAur,. 't'urning to another situation. The December 24, 1969
issue of the Washington Post quotes Secretary Rogers, in referring to
a classified study by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence
and Research on the ,subject of the effect of military assistance DR
countries for which such assistance is terminated, as follows:
It is interesting to me that we have had a study made of how many times we
have been able to influence the policy of another government by withholding
military aid, and we find that it has not been successful in any instance.
This morning you provided me with an unclassified version of this
study, which I would like to place in the record at this point.
(The document fol lo ws : )
ARMS SusesNsIoNs: A Tiia STICK OR A WEAK REED?
Since World War Ti, the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as other
countries, have attempted on a number of occasions to use the suspension or
cut-off of military assistance as a direct policy tool. In no instance has the action
been an unqualified success, and on several occasions, there have been distinctly
negative consequences for the supplying nations..
Despite the general lack of hoped-for effects accompanying past stoppages
of military as.sist.ance, the practice is still seen by many countries as an impor-
tant means of exercising influence over the recipient country. An. examination
of the cases where a. program of military aid has been suddenly modified or cr.r-
tailed suggests, however, that the results desired by the donor can only 3e
achieved under the rather exceptional circumstance of a total and exclusive
dependence by the recipient on the supplier.
Some of the generalizations derived from past experience include :
1. (Putting off or suspending military aid rarely achieves the desired purpose:-
The examples are legion. The ti"S has not been able to forestall coups in Latin
America or to persuade post-coup governments to restore representative govern-
ment ; the Soviet cut-off of arms deliveries and military assistance to China has
only make Peking even more truculent toward Moscow ; and the French refusal
to supply Israel with arms after the 1IXI~7 war, while somewhat improving
Mranee's standing in the Arab world, has not had the slightest impact on Israel's
policy.
Rather than achieving the recipient's policy goals, cutting off military aSd
Often has the reverse effect.-Suspending military aid can be a two-edged sword.
Far from mal;ang the recipient more ;amenable to the supplier's viewpoint, such
moves often exacerbate relations between the two nations, and, in the end, the
costs outweigh the benefits. China's reaction to the Soviet cut-off of aid has
already been cited; the 17S embargo of arms to both sides following the outbreak
of the Indo-Pakistan War in 1965 encouraged Pakistan to seek out new supplies
in the USSR and Communist China.
3. Military aid will not provide enough leverage to force a recipient to take
any actions contrary to his vital interests.-Po have any real chance of effective-
ness, the threat to end arms supplies must be aimed at an issue other than ore
which the recipient considers vital to its survival. Neither the UAR nor Israel,
quite obviously, will feel constrained unless perhaps in a transitory and tactical
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way, from taking whatever action it feels necessary to safeguard its position.
Equally, Batista did not let the threat of losing US assistance stop him from
using US-equipped units against Castro's guerrillas.
Despite the generally negative and unsatisfying results from using or carrying
out the threat to suspend or end military aid, such tactics have, at times, at least
partially achieved their aims. But success (in the supplier's terms) has then
usually come only under somewhat special conditions.
1. In general an arms cut-off will not succeed unless the recipient has no other
source of supply.-Given the option, any nation denied arms for what it considers
political or unjustified reasons, will quickly turn to alternate suppliers. The
current UN embargo on arms shipments to South Africa, for instance, has failed
because other countries have made military supplies available to Pretoria, and
because Pretoria can build up its own military industry at home.
2. Arms cut-offs will not succeed unless the supplier uses all other means at its
disposal to reinforce the police. -No recipient is liable to take seriously a suspen-
sion of military assistance while aid and relations through other channels remain
unscathed. This ambivalence led to the failure of the US embargo on arms to
Nationalist China from August 1946 to May 1947. The same factors are also
present in US policy towards the military junta in Greece.
3. Chances of arms cut-off success may grow if the recipient is given a face-
saving enit.-Because most nations tend to react to a threat by digging in their
heels, the threat to cut arms aid is likely to meet success only if the recipient has
available, by design or accident, a means of complying without seeming to give in.
The Soviet cut-off of aid to North Korea from 1963 to 1965 may have succeeded
at least partially because Khrushchev's removal from power (as well as Peking's
inability to meet Pyongyang's needs) allowed the North Koreans to swallow
their pride and meet some of Moscow's desires.
4.. Arms cut-offs are most likely to succeed if the aid is a decisive component
in the recipient's security.-When suspension or withdrawal of military aid has
succeeded in its aims, a decisive factor appears to have been the fact that the
recipient considered the aid vital to his national security, and that no alternative
source of supply was available. The US has thus been able to use the prospect of
suspending its military aid to Laos to influence events in that country, and the
Soviets have had similar success in manipulating the rate and quantity of their
aid deliveries to Iraq and Syria.
In sum, it is probably true that the provision of military aid is usually a posi-
tive factor in the relations of two countries, and that it furnishes some incentive
to the recipient to avoid provoking the supplier. However, an explicitly hinted,
definitely threatened, or actually implemented suspension of military aid as a
means of forcing the recipient to follow a certain course of action is at best a
risky policy. While it can succeed under certain specific (and relatively unusual)
conditions, it all too often can fail completely ; in either case, furthermore, the
high pressure tactic can have serious detrimental effects on the long-term rela-
tions between the supplying nation and the recipient.
Mr. PAUL. But I gather, having read it now, that the study does
say that under certain circumstances a termination of military as-
sistance or the anticipation of termination of military assistance or
the prospect once a termination has occurred that perhaps military
assistance would be resumed have had some effect.
Mr. DAVI:ES. If the donor is the sole resource of the recipient state.
This is not true, for instance, in the case of Greece.
I recall back in 1960, the Soviet Union suspended the delivery of
spare parts to Egypt as a. gesture in the face of the United Arab Re-
public of disenchantment with Communist inroads in Iraq.
As I recall, Mr. Paul, the Soviets had to resume shipments because
not only was President Nasser not intimidated but he reacted in such
a way as to damage Soviet interests in other parts of the Near East.
MILITARY EQUIPMENT PROVIDED BY FRANCE TO GREECE
Mir. PAUL. For the record, has France since the coup sold military
equipment to Greece or otherwise provided it with military equip-
ment?
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Mr. PRANCER. Pardon me?
Mr. PAUL. Has France provided Greece military equipment since
April of 1967?
Mr. PRA.NOER. Yes, it has. The French have sold the Greeks [de-
leted] patrol boats and we are told, are dickering on Mirage fighters
and helicopters.
EFFECTIVENESS OF IJ.S. EMBASSY VERSUS MILITARY PERSONNEL
Mr. PAUL. With respect to another subject which was raised this
morning, Mr. Davies, what would you say is the relative effectiveness
in dealing with the Greek Government between our Embassy person.
nel, on the one hand, and our military personnel, on the other hand,
considering the military nature of the regime?
Mr. DAVIES. As we discussed this morning, Mr. Paul, the long-stand-
ing close relationship between the United States military officers and.
the Greek officers, obviously continues, but the American Ambassador
is the U.S. Government's representative in Athens, the principal
representative, and he is responsible for all political activity there
and, I believe, is the primary contact between this government, the
U.S. Government, and the top of the Greek Government, the Junta.
Mr. PAUL. We have not had an Ambassador until rather recently
to Greece. There had been quite a hiatus for a while.
During that period when there was not an Ambassador available,
was the position of our military such that it could involve itself in
ways, perhaps, unintended to give an impression of rapport with the
Greek regime that perhaDDs had there been an Ambassador would not
have existed ?
Mr. DAVIES. We had a very competent charge d'affaires, Mr. Ros-
well McClelland.
It is my observation, although Greece was not my primary respon-
sibility during this period, that the country team operated effectively
during this period, and that there was no question but that the atti-
tudes and views of the U.S. Government were imparted through the
American Embassy.
RESTRICTIONS ON U.S. MILITARY IN GREECE
Mr. PAUL, Could you specify any restrictions that were placed upon
our military, either those that were stationed in Greece or those that
visited, to be sure that they did not foster or encourage the Greek
regime in illiberal policies?
Mr. VmGAN. Any specific restrictions?
Mr. PAUL. Yes.
Mr. VIDGERMAN. I think the policy laid down by the Pentagon, as
spoken to by Mr. Pranger-I mean we were sensitive to that, and
visitors and others were instructed that the policy was to be laid
down on the State Department Embassy side.
Mr. PAUL, Was there a monitoring of military-to-military con-
tacts since the coup by our foreign policy officials in the State
Department?
Mr. PR.ANGER. 'T'his subject of military-to-military contacts is a
matter of some concern between the Department of Defense and the
Department of State.
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[Deleted.] It is a difficult problem, given the intimate command
relationships [deleted] with the many people who travel throughout
the NATO area on various assignments and missions.
VISITS BY GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICERS TO GREECE
Mr. PAUL. Do you think you could provide for the record a list of
the visits, to the extent that it is available, of general and flag officers
who have visited Greece since April 1967?
Mr. PRANGER. I think we could get such a list from the services; yes.
(The information follows:)
VISITS TO GREECE BY U.S. GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICERS SINCE APRIL 1967
Number
1967: of visits
GEN D. A. Burchinal-------------------------------------------- 1
ADM J. S. McCain, Jr------------------------------------------ 1
VADM W. I. Martin--------------- -------------------- 2
RADM L. R. Geis ---------------------------------------------- 2
RADM R. W. Paine, Jr------------------------------------------ 2
-RADM J. E. Dacey----------------------------------------------- 1
1968:
MG G. Ruhlen--------------------------------------------------- 1
MG W. E. Greer------------------------------------------------ 1
GEN T. W. Parker---------------------------------------------- 1
GEN J. H. Polk------------------------------------------------- 1
MG W. H. Craig-------------------------------------------------- 1
BG A. Hurow---------------------------------------------------
MG E. Helton--------------------------------------------------- 1
GEN D. A. Burchinal-------------------------------------------- 1
LTG R. H. Warren---------------------------------------------- 1
VADM J. A. Tyree----------------------------------------------- 1
VADM W. I. Martin--------------------------------------------- 1
VADM D. C. Richardson----------------------------------------- 3
RADM V. G. Lambert-------------------------------------------- 2
RADM L. R. Geis------------------------------------------------ 1
RADM W. E. Lemos---------------------------------------------- 2
RADM J. F. Calvert---------------------------------------------- 3
RADM V. P. Healey---------------------------------------------- 5
RADM E. C. Outlaw-------------------------------------------- 2
1969:
GEN A. J. Goodpaster------------------------------------------- 1
ADM W. F. A. Wendt--------------------------------------------- 2
GEN J. L. Throckmorton---------------------------------------- 1
MG W. A. Enem,ark----------------------------------------------- 1
LTG H. M. Exton------------------------------------------------ 1
RADM D. W. Wulzen--------------------------------------------- 1
MG A. J. Bowley------------------------------------------------- 1
MG R. B. Marlin------------------------------------------------ 1
MG R. Forbes---------------------------------------------------- 1
RADM Cassell--------------------------------------------------- 1
MG J. N. Ewbank------------------------------------------------ 1
1969:,
BG E. B. Edwards----------------------------------------------- 1
VADM D. C. Richardson----------------------------------------- 3
RADM W. E. T.emos--------------------------------------------- 1
RADM P. M. Charbonnet---------------------------------------- 1
RADM J. M. James--------------------------------------------- 3
RADM P. B. Armstrong------------------------------------------- 3
RADM F. H. Price ------------------------------------------------ 1
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RADM R. E. SRreen------------------------------ C
----------------- RADI H. W. Dobie, Jr--.------------------_-_ --------------
RADM H. C. Outlaw---------------------------------------------- 1
RADM A. F. Fleming--.---------------------------
MG N. 0. ~Ohman - - --? -; - _ 1
-------------------------
MG J. T. Scepansky---------------------------------------------- I
LTG H. J. Lemley------------------------------------------------ 1
1070:
GEN D. A. Burchinal------------------------- ----------- ------- 1 w
BG L. N. Boyle------------------------------------------------- 1
M G R. U. Anthis1
-------------------------------------
'ADM 1). C. Richardson_________________________________ --- 3
RADII W. H. House 2
------------------------
RADM G. C. Talley--------------------------------------------- 4
RADM H. W. Dohie, Jr-------.---------__
RADM L. H. Hubbell--------.----____--
--------------
RADM A. F. Fleming----------------------------------------------
,A NDREAS PAPANDREOU
Mr. PAUI,. Finally, on a political matter, if Andreas Papandreou
had won the election that was to be held in 1967, would he have with-
drawn Greece from NATO, as has been suggested in some of the public
media'?
a1 fr. DAVIES. That is a. hypothetical question, Mr. Paul.
The Center 1:7nion Party supported Greece's association with NATO.
Mr. Andreas Papandreou has made a number of statements, and I
do not think from any of them one could say conclusively that he would
have taken Greece out of NATO had he won the election.
Senator SYMINGTON. I was in Greece in early 1967, I believe it was,
and our Ambassador was--
Mr. 'DAVias. Talbot.
Senator SYMTNCTON. Phil Talbot. There was quite a fight going on
with Andreas Papandreou and his father George. Andreas had come
back from the coast and said, "I really don't mean it. I still want to be
a Greek, and I would like my citizenship back." Then he began gutting
his own father is the story I was given when I was out there. The room
was bugged, and the papers were loaded with it. There was a big fight
between George Papandreou and his son, and suddenly the colonels
took over and that ended the Papandreou regime.
1)o you know about that?
Mr. VIGDERMAN. Yes. I think that is
Senator SYMINGTON. That is a pretty accurate description, isn't it?
Mr. VIGOERMAN. There is certainly no question about the fact that
there was ill feeling between the father and son.
Senator SYAIINGTON. As I remember, Andreas Papandreou was
pretty anti-American before he was toppled.
Mr. VIGDFRWfAN. Yes. He tended to give interviews to Egyptian
newspapers and talked about the necessity of following an. "independ-
ent" foreign policy, and that is, I think, what lies behind Mr. Paul's
question about what Andreas Papandreou would have done.
The problem with it is he made no commitment to any particular
thing. But the tone of what he said was such as to make a lot of people
nervous about exactly what he might do.
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Senator SYMINGTON. All I can tell you is what I was told. Follow-
ing the situation in Greece is pretty difficult at times.
LEVEL OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE IN 1967
Mr. PAUL. On the subject of military assistance to Greece, what was
the level of the military assistance program for Greece when the selec-
tive suspension went into effect in April of 1967 ?
Mr. PRANCER. Fiscal year 1967 was $70.4 million.
TERMS OF 1967 SELECTIVE SUSPENSION
Mr. PAUL. What were the terms of the suspension, Mr. Davies or
Mr. Pranger?
Mr. PRANCER. The suspension was that-you mean the items in the
suspension?
Mr. PAUL. What was it that we suspended, and were there any con-
ditions expressed in the announcement of the suspension to allow
for its resumption and were there any other significant dimensions
of the suspension?
Mr. PRANCER. Well, I will read the political conditions. The United
States on October 18-let me see-Mr. Davies, maybe you could take
the political conditions. There were political conditions.
Mr. DAVIES. At the time of the coup, sir, and following on our con-
sultations, we announced-I do not have the text of the--I will submit
it for the record.
Mr. PAUL. Why don't you supply it.
Mr. DAVIES. The announcement.
Mr. PAUL. I think that would answer the question.
(The document follows:)
ANNOUNCEMENT OF UNITED STATES EMBARGO ON DELIVERY OF CERTAIN ITEMS OF
MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE FOLLOWING THE COUP
Verbatim excerpt from the Department spokesman's regular noon briefing,
May 16, 1967:
Question. Bob, have we stopped the flow of American military equipment to
Greece?
Answer. Let me answer that by saying something for background : In connec-
tion with our continuing review of the Military Assistance Program for Greece,
we have withheld shipment of certain major items. We are examining our rela-
tionship with the new Greek Government, and look forward-
Question. Is that word "examine" or "re-examine"?
Answer. We are examining our relationship with the new Greek Government,
and look forward to concrete evidence of progress toward a return to constitu-
tional. processes.
Question. Can you identify those items?
Question. Bob, when you say "major items," does this mean that minor items
are still in the pipeline?
Answer. For background, certain items in the military program continue.
Question. By "major," you mean the size of them? Um?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Can you identify them?
Answer. No, sir. I am not at liberty to do that.
Question. Can you tell us what the size of the program has been again?
Answer. Fiscal 1966, military-and they are the last figures I have-all grant-
$78.7 million.
Question. Didn't you once say this year's was supposed to run about the same?
Answer. It's possible I did. If I did, I will stand on it.
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Question. Was this decision taken Just recently, or has this been -when was
this decision taken?
Answer. Recently.
Verbatim excerpt from the Department spokesman's regular noon briefing;
August 17, 1967:
Question. Bob, where do we stand on the United States aid to Greece?
Answer. Well, on economic aid, that, in a large measure, has been pretty much
phased out. I think perhaps there are some limited programs mainly to voluntary
agencies.
Question. This was before the coups
Answer. Yes, -and unrelated. However, there was and continues to be a suspen-
sion on deliveries of military items.
Question. You say there continues to be?
Answer. Yes. Now, as I recall, this mainly had to do with some of the large)-
pieces of equipment in those programs, and no decision has been reached to
change that. Yes?
Question. This suspension was related specifically to the coups
Answer. That's correct.
Question.. So I think it is correct to say that suspension of deliveries on certain
viilitary items?
Answer. Yes.
Mr. PRANGFR. The suspension was immediate on certain items which
we can also supply.
Mr. PAUL. Would you do that?
Mr. PRANCER. YeS.
(The information follows:)
EQUIPMENT CURRENTLY SUSPENDED
[Deleted] Aircraft
[Deleted] Jet Trainers
[Deleted] Aircraft
[Deleted] Military Helicopters
[Deleted] Personnel Carriers;
[Deleted] Tanks
[Deleted] Tank Recovery Vehicles
[Deleted] Artillery Pieces
[l )eleted] Self-propelled Motar Carriers
[Deleted] Minesweepers
[Deleted] Bullpup Missiles
[Deleted] 90-mm. Cartrides
NOTE.-Value approximately [deleted] million.
Z7 r. PAUL. Now, Mr. Prancer, would you tell us since April 1967
on an annual basis what has been the level in dollar amount of mili-
tary assistance that we delivered to Greece, and what have been the
main items that that represents?
Furthermore, so that the whole picture is there, what was the excess
equipment that has been delivered and its value and the main items
of it?
Mr. Pn1NGER. OK.
We began with fiscal year 1968. Delivery value of MAP equipment
in. fiscal year 1968, was $45 million; delivery value in fiscal year 1969
was $56.2 million; estimated delivery value in fiscal year 1970, $33.6
million.
Mr. Pm-f.. What are the items that that represents?
\ir. PR.\NGFR. The items represented are F-102 aircraft, [deleted].
This includes the excess items, and then I will get to the excess price
because this includes both.
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Mr. PAUL. Fine.
Mr. PRANGER. That was an excess item. F-104 aircraft, 104G air-
craft, [deleted] ; F-104A aircraft, [deleted] ; F-SB aircraft, [deleted] ;
T-41C aircraft, [deleted].
Mr. PAUL. Maybe you could summarize a bit.
Mr. PRANGER. Yes.
Mr. PAUL. Fighter aircraft, trainer aircraft.
Mr. PRANGER. Yes.
Mr. PAUL. You said there had been no tanks.
Mr. PRANCER. There are aircraft of the fighter variety and trainer
variety.
There are helicopters, U-6A aircraft; Sidewinder missiles; coastal
minesweepers, trailers and trucks. A variety of trucks from erne-quarter
ton trucks to 5-ton trucks.
There are some 90-millimeter recoilless rifles, some 175 millimeter
guns, a wrecker and a bulldozer tank. According to my list in the
period some time between the first of April 1967 and the 30th of June
1967, there were also [deleted] medium tanks delivered, which I can
only assume were delivered either before the embargo was instituted
which was, I believe, several days after the coup, or were delivered
before the coup itself or were en route. We would not want that con-
fused with the issue that was raised this morning on the other items.
So these are the maj or items.
Mr. PAUL. Would you give us the value of the excess equipment.
Mr. PRANCER. Yes.
The value of the excess equipment in this same period is as follows :
In fiscal year 1967, and we are now talking utility value and not
acquisition value. Fiscal year 1967 was $4.2 million; fiscal year 1968
was $2.5 million; fiscal year 1969 was $25.6 million and for fiscal year
1970 it is estimated at about $5 million.
Excuse me, on the fiscal year 1970, the delivery figure is $12.8 million.
Mr. PAUL. Now, with respect to the items that you mentioned, such
as fighter aircraft, helicopters and other aircraft, were those all in
connection with that special post-Czechoslovakian invasion exemption
from the suspension?
Mr. PRANCER. All of them, I am told, except [deleted] F-5's.
Mr. PAUL. What were they?
Mr. PRANCER. They were delivered before the coup.
In other words, as you will see when we supply this list, there are
asterisks to what the items delivered before were, and we will have
to check those [deleted] tanks for you.
Mr. PAUL. All right.
Now, finally, would you give us what the level of programed mili-
tary assistance to Greece has been for fiscal year 1968 through 1970,
which does not necessarily mean it was delivered in those years.
Mr. PRANCER. Well, I wanted to go back to the earlier time. Here
we are.
We will begin with fiscal year 1967 again. The programed amount
was $70.4 million; $39.1 million in 1968; $37.5 million in 1969 and
$24.5 million in 1970.
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STATUS OF AVAILABLE ITEMS ON SUSPENSION LIST
Mr. PAUL. Let me ask you this : Some of these things that are pro-
gramed have, according to testimony before the Foreign Relations
Committee on the Foreign Assistance Act, have a leadtime sometimes
of 2 years as typical.
What happens to a programed item when it becomes available in 2
years but still is on the suspension list?
Mr. PRANCER. Whenever it beo:*mes available it is put into a, what
we call, pipeline, which is actually a holding or storage operation, and
I would not want, to give the impression that this pipeline was fixed
in any solid sense. That is to say, we can, while items are suspended,
divert from this stock of items for other high priority areas, and we
have clone this occasionally from the Greek MAP items. But basically
these items remain in a storage hold as far as I know, and there
they sit.
We now have, for example [deleted] medium tanks awaiting de-
livery embargoed.
Mr. PAUL. I would like to ask you this: We have had the suspension
in effect for quite a few years now, subject to an exemption.
Are we, perhaps, getting to the point where we are having enough
in. the pipeline that we ought to think in terms of suspending some of
the programs as they relate to items on the suspended list?
I know in the first years the claim was that a leadtime was neces.
sarv. But now we have quite a few items that we have programed and.
would be presumably available.
Mr. Pr.ANCrsii. Well. our concern is solely with the fact that as these
items were programed they wens, originally intended to be phased
into the Greek armed forces in substitution for other equipment.
This equipment really represents a kind of a buildup in the Greek
ground forces and, as we build up the [deleted] tanks plus more, we
are, in essence, saying that there are many tanks, there are that many
tanks, in the Greek armed forces which ought to be retired.
Now, at what point the pipeline becomes so clogged that it is no
longer an economically feasible operation does bother us, and I think
there has been testimony before the various committees that this is
costing us in storage charges each year out of MAP funds. This is
a constant source of concern to the Department of Defense and also to
our planning staff.
Now, at what point decisions will be made along the lines you are
suggesting is simply not for :me to say. This will take place in the
form of the reevaluation of the force goals, and so on, which is strictly
a military question.
RESCJMPT,TON OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE
1-Tr. PATTL. Now, Mr. Davies, according to the Washington Post of
May 13, Ambassador Tasca recommended that full military assistance
be resumed to Greece, and the June 3 Washington Post claimed the
National Security Council had reached a decision to do so, but was
waiting for a propitious time to announce it.
I gather from your statement that at least the June 3 article is
incorrect?
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Mr. DAVZES. It is misleading. I will provide for the record the
Department's statement which was issued that same day.
Mr. PAUL. Thank you.
(The statement referred to follows:)
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT ON DELIVERY OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE
(Issued June 3, 1970)
?A misleading article was given prominence this morning in a Washington news-
paper on the question of military assistance to Greece. No decision has been taken
to lift the suspension of the shipment of major military items to the Greek
Government. The question remains under review.
The selective embargo on the shipment of heavy items of military equipment
to Greece was a measure adopted by the previous Administration soon after the
coup in Athens to demonstrate our concern for the extra constitutional assump-
tion of power by the present Greek regime. This partial suspension of the ship-
ment of major items of military equipment has continued since then (April
1967) with one exception : After the invasion by forces of the Warsaw Pact in
Czechoslovakia in the fall of 1968 the previous Administration decided to lift
the suspension on a one-time basis for certain key items of equipment (such as
minesweepers and some aircraft) essential to the fulfillment by Greece of its
NATO mission.
The decision made by the previous Administration in the fall of 1968 to deliver
some of the equipment that had been suspended was made following consulta-
tions in October 1968 with certain members of the Congress and their staffs, and
announced by me at our regular noon briefing on October 22, 1968.
ADDENDUM: ANNOUNCEMENT OF RELEASE OF CERTAIN PREVIOUSLY SUSPENDED ITEMS
OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR DELIVERY TO GREECE, OCTOBER 22, 1968
Verbatim excerpt from the Department spokesman's regular noon briefing,
October 22, 1968:
Question: Bob, what can you tell us about the resumption of heavy arms or
military equipment delivery to Greece?
Question: We lost the last of your question.
Question: Greece.
Question: Greece.
[Laughter.]
Answer : Let me give you this statement :
During the course of the continuing review of the United States military
assistance policy for Greece, the need for strengthening the NATO Alliance, in
light of recent events in Central and Eastern Europe, has been taken into account.
The suspended Greek military aid items have been examined with particular
attention to the NATO support role. And the decision has been made to release
certain of them, including two minesweepers, and a number of aircraft.
Now at the time of the above decision-at the time that that decision was
conveyed to Greek authorities, which was last weekend-it was made clear that
the United States interest in seeing progress toward representative government
in Greece remains as deep as ever; and that the United States will continue
to press for this.
Question: Can you tell us how many aircraft are involved; what kind?
Answer : I am afraid I cannot.
Question: Is it the United States view that there has been recent progress of
significance in the progress toward representative government in Greece?
Answer : I will stand on the statement.
Mr. PAUL. When would be the time that you would consult with
the committee with respect to the resumption of full military assist-
ance to Greece?
Mr. DAVIES. I have no idea, sir.
Mr. PAUL. I did not mean in terms of a (late, but in terms of
the point in the process, at what stage would you expect to consult
with the Foreign Relations Committee on the resumption of the
suspended items of military assistance to Greece?
35-205-70-pt. 7-6
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Mr. DAVIES. Congressional consultations are envisaged prior to
final action, Mr. Paul, and again I have absolutely no idea of when
this might be.
EFFECT OF SPANISH BASE NEGOTIATIONS ON GREECE
Mr. PAUL. Could you also tell us what you consider to be the effect
on our relations with Greece that result from our current negotiations
with Spain on a continuation of base rights in Spain?
Mr. DAviEs.. I am not aware of any relationship between those two
questions, Mr. Paul.
While what we do for Greece has been deemed part and parcel
of our NATO relationship, helping Greece to meet force levels which
cannot be attained from its own economy, the situation in Spain is
more of a quid pro quo nature.
The Greeks may, perhaps, be watching the course of these negotia-
tions, but I am not aware of any direct relationship.
Mr. PAUL. Turning to our facilities in Greece, besides the statistics
that you provided this morning, could either of you gentlemen tell
us what the total operating costs, including military pay, are for our
facilities in Greece, and also what our overseas expenditures are.
Mr. PRANGER. We can supply it for the record.
Mr. PAUL. Supply it, for the record.
Mr. PRANGER. Yes.
(The information referred to follows:)
ANNUAL COSTS FOR U.S. FACILITIES-GREECE
During Fiscal Year 1970, the U.S. Department of Defense estimated cost to
maintain facilities in Greece was $29 million. This estimate includes all military
and civilian costs as well as the cost of operating and maintaining the facilities.
This cost estimate does not include indirect logistic and administrative costs
from outside the country, nor does it include major procurement or military
construction costs.
The preliminary estimate of the fiscal year 1970 U.S. defense expenditures
in Greece entering the internationait balance of payments from all sources (mili-
tary functions, military assistance, operating costs and investment costs) is
$23 million.
REDUCTIONS AT ATHENS AIRPORT
\Ir. PAi,r With respect to the facilities at the Athens Airport, was
it. the case that in connection with the recent program for the reduc-
tion of costs in Europe there was a proposal to reduce this operation
by 95 percent?
Mr. PRANGER. I am not really free to discuss what is in the offing,
Mr. Paul, but I can give you the actual reductions at Athens Airport
which are--
N-11r. PAUL. Would you just characterize them. They were not nearly
95 percent, were they?
Mr. PRANGER. I would say from my records it was not 95 percent.
I can give you the figures. Would you like them?
fr. PAUL. Yes.
Mr. PRANGER. It is 289 military, 16 U.S. civilian; 109 foreign na.
tionals, for a total of 414, I believe. This is the extent of the reduc-
tions.
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Mr. PAUL. 1Iow many people does that leave at the Athens Airport,
approximately?
Mr. PRANGER. Approximately 1,000.
Mr. PAUL. Thank you.
PHASEOUT AT WHEELUS
Now, has the facility at Iraklion or any other facility in Greece re-
ceived any substantial number of American personnel or equipment
as a result of the phaseout at Wheelus?
Mr. PRANGER. Not that I am aware of, Mr. Paul. That is still under
'' discussion on the Wheelus issue, but I am not aware of. anything in
Greece to speak of. /74 - I Z
,t NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY AT NEA MAKRI ~
Mr. PAUL. Does th.~ n~,v .1 rnmmnnir.Ati.. aCllity ,t e ~~kri
ve a strictly ory communications function and no intelligence
r. PRANGER. Yes.
EFFECTS OF GREEK-TURKISH CONFRONTATIONS AND GREEK COUP
t h e . * # ct of -th k-
nr far It1 Ies In reece yincidents or any Ot j? 14, UUBAW
.
facilities?
f th
ese
t effect on an o
can Mr. Pr,ANGER. one that I am aware o except what wa discuss fi
e
e
Ol
S
5
t i[ m o r n m g re o= LI~
J=n Is. r PATH. jkj_yQU_ know, a_.an , 11 r.. Dav .
DA not know of any. eleted
here was reference to.soxne.anco_4nec
oljaxe not awAre_ofthat ?
AvIFG. i~at aware of -that -specific incident
ivy- '"a'te'. L
Mr PT;, vrER. a ' .ott aware of this. I will-see-if it is Ail-
abig jQ..the--record, and I will e .g tg, supp .7i,_,
Xr...JAw...
EFFECT OF U.S. REDUCTION OF MILITARY PRESENCE IN GREECE
Mr. PAUL. Mr. Davies, what would you say would be the political
significance if we greatly reduced our military presence in Greece?
Mr. DAVIES. At the present time our military presence in Greece
is in support of our roles within NATO.
If we substantially reduced our presence, it would seem to me that
our role in the defense of the -Eastern Mediterranean, the southern
flank of NATO, would be correspondingly reduced.
Mr. PAUL. But I meant what would be the effect on our relations
with Greece or the internal situation in Greece. It is not a military
question that I am raising.
Mr. DAVIES. As far as I have been able to glean from reports, the
American presence in Greece is politically acceptable to the Greek
people who have very vivid memories of World War II and attacks
by the Italians and the Germans, and fearing the Slavic push south
25X1A
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which followed the World War, feel that a powerful ally is a goad
thing. To date I am not aware of any major reaction to the American
presence such as we are beginning to see in Turkey.
Mr. PAUL. But you could not speculate as to what would happen if
we cut our forces in Greece, as has been suggested for other areas cf
the world?
Mr. DAVIES. I do not wish to speculate on that.
COMMUNICATION" BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND PRIME MINISTER OF
TURKEY CONCERNING CYPRUS CRISIS
Mr. PAUL. Turning to Turkey, if we may, I would like to put in the
record at this'tither the letter that was referred to earlier from Presi-
dent Johnson to the Prime Minister of Turkey of June 5, 1964, with
respect to the Cyprus crisis, and the response of Prime Minister Inonu
of June 13,1964.
(The document follows:)
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND P$IME MINISTER INONU,
JUNE 1964, AS RELEASED BY THE WHITE HOUSE, JANUARY 16, 1966
White House steterrient
At the request of the Government of Turkey, the White house is today releas-
ing the texts of letters exchanged on June 5, 1964, between President Johnsolt
and the then Prime Minister of Turkey Ismet Inonu on the Cyprus crisis. Steps
subsequent to this exchange of letters led to the visitof Prime Minister Inonu to
Washington later in that month and constructive discussions by the President
and the Prime Minister of the issues involved.
A joint communique released at the conclusion of those discussions welcomed
the opportunity for a full exchange of views by the two leaders and the occasion
to consider ways in which the two countries could strengthen the efforts ol they
United Nations with respect i:o the safety and security of Cyprus. The communi
qua noted that "the cordial and candid conversations of the twP leaders Strength-
ened the broad understanding already existing between Turkey and the United
States"
The United States continues to value highly the Close and friendly relations
we maintain w4h Turkey. _
President Johnson's Letter to Prime Minister Inoan..Tune 190,x.
1)sAe MR. PRIME, 11TTNTSTER: I am gravely concerned by the information
which I have had through Ambassador Hare from you and your Foreign Minister
that the Turkish Government is contemplating a deeisipnto inneryene by military
force to d spy. por ion of ri
, ;I{rus~~.~ y}!sh ~~rra t"ne fullest friends mp
and frankness, t~iat'?I do not eoSi it er hat such a course of action by Turku
fraught with such far-reaching consequences, Is consistent with the commitment
of your Government to consult fully in advance with us. Ambassador Hare
has indicated that you have postponed your decision for a few hours in order
to obtain my views. I put to you personally whether you really believe that it
is appropriate for your Government, in effect, to present a unilateral decision
of such consequence to an ally who has demonstrated such staunch support over
the years as has the United States for Turkey. I must, therefore, first urge you
to accept the responsibility for eomplete consultation with the United States
before any such action is taken.
It is my impression that you believe that such intervention by Turkey is
permissible under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960. I must call
your attention, however, to our understanding that the proposed intervention by
Turkey would be for the purpose of effecting a form of partition of the Island,
a solution which is specifically excluded by the Treaty of Guarantee. Further, that
Treaty requires consultation among the Guarantor Powers. It is the view of
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the United States that the possibilities of such consultation have by no means
been exhausted in this situation and that, therefore, the reservation of the right
to take unilateral action is not yet applicable.
I must call to your attention, also, Mr. Prime Minister, the obligations of NATO.
There can be no question in your mind that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus
would lead to a military engagement between Turkish and Greek forces. Secre-
tary of State Rush declared at the recent meeting of the Ministerial Council of
NATO in The Hague that war between Turkey and Greece must be considered
as "literally unthinkable." Adhesion to NATO, in its very essence, means that
NATO countries will not wage war on each other. Germany and France have
buried centuries of animosity and hostility in becoming NATO allies ; nothing
less can be expected from Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, a military inter-
vention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet
Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance
to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the
Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention with-
out the full consent and understanding of its NATO Allies.
Further, Mr. Prime Minister, I am concerned about the obligations of Turkey
as a member of the United Nations. The United Nations has provided forces on
the Island to keep the peace. Their task has been difficult but, during the past
several weeks, they have been progressively successful in reducing the incidents
of violence on that Island. The United Nations Mediator has not yet completed
his work. I have no doubt that the general membership of the United Nations
would react in the strongest terms to unilateral action by Turkey which would
defy the efforts of the United Nations and destroy any prospect that the United
Nations could assist in obtaining a reasonable and peaceful settlement of this
difficult problem.
I wish also, Mr. Prime Minister, to call your attention to the bilateral agree-
ment between the United States and Turkey in the field of military assistance.
Under Article IV of the Agreement with Turkey of July 1947, your Government
is required to obtain United States consent in the use of military assistance for
purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished. Your Govern-
ment has on several occasions acknowledged to the United States that you fully
understand this condition. I must tell you in all candor that the United States
cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a
Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances.
Moving to the practical results of the contemplated Turkish move, I feel obli-
gated to call to your attention in the most friendly fashion the fact that such a
Turkish move could lead to the slaughter of tens of thousands of Turkish
Cypriots on the Island of Cyprus. Such an action on your part would unleash
the furies and there is no way by which military action on your ,part could be
sufficiently effective to prevent wholesale destruction of many of those whom
you are -trying to protect. The presence of United Nations forces could not pre-
vent such a catastrophe.
You may consider that what I have said is much too severe and that we are
disregardful of Turkish interests in the Cyprus situation. I should like to assure
you that this is not the case. We have exerted ourselves both publicly and
privately to assure the safety of Turkish Cypriots and to insist that a final solu-
tion of the Cyprus problem should rest upon the consent of the parties most
directly concerned. It is possible that you feel in Ankara that the United States
has not been sufficiently active in your behalf. But surely you know that our
policy has caused the liveliest resentments in Athens (where demonstrations
have been aimed against us), and has led to a basic alienation between the
United States and Archbishop Makarios. As I said to your Foreign Minister
in our conversation just a few weeks ago, we value very highly our relations
with Turkey. We have considered you as a great ally with fundamental common
interests. Your security and prosperity have been a deep concern of the Ameri-
can people and we have expressed that concern in the most practical terms.
You and we have fought together to resist the ambitions of the Communist
world revolution. This solidarity has meant a great deal to us and I would hope
that it means a great deal to your Government and to your people. We have no
intention of lending any support to any solution of Cyprus which endangers the
Turkish Cypriot community. We have not been able to find a final solution
because this is, admittedly, one of the most complex problems on earth. But I
wish to assure you that we have been deeply concerned about the interests of
Turkey and of the Turkish Cypriots and will remain so.
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Finally, Mr. Prime Minister I must tell you that you have posed the gravest
issues of war and peace. These are issues which go far beyond the bilateral
relations between Turkey and i:he United States. They not only will certainly
involve war between Turkey and Greece but could involve wider hostilities be-
cause of the unpredictable consequences which a unilateral invention in Cyprus
could produce. You have your responsibilities as Chief of the Government of
Turkey; I also have mine as President of the United States. I must, therefore,
inform you in the deepest friendship that unless'I can have your assurance that
you will not take such action without further and fullest consultation I cannot
accept your injunction to Ambassador Hare of secrecy and must immediately ask
for emergency meetings of the NATO Council and of the United Nations Security
Council.
I wish it were possible for us to have a personal discussion of this situation.
Unfortunately, because of the special circumstances of our present Constitutional
position, I am not able to leave the United States. if you could come here for a
full discussion I would welcome it. I do feel that you and 'I carry a very heavy
responsibility for the general peace and for the possibilities of a sane and peace-
ful resolution of the Cyprus problem. I ask you, therefore, to delay any decisions
which you and your colleagues might have In mind until you and 'I have had the
fullest and fra nkest consultation.
Sincerely,
LYNDON B. JOHNSON.
Prime Minister Inonu's Response to the President June 14, 1964
Dnea Ma. PS.ES:IDENT: I have received your message of June 5, 1964 through
Ambassador Hare. We have, upon your request, postponed our decision to exer-
else our right of unilateral action in Cyprus conferred to us by the Treaty of
Guarantee. With due regard to the spirit of 'candour and friendship In which
your message is meant to be written, ,l will, in my reply, try also to explain to
you in full frankness my views about the situation.
Mr. President, your message, both in wording and content, has been disappoinI-
ing for an ally like 'Turkey who has always been giving the most serious atten-
tion to its 'relations of alliance with the United !S?tates and has brought to the
fore substantial divergences of opinion In various fundamental matters pertaining
to these relations.
,It is my sincere hope that both these divergences and the general tone of your
message are due to the haste In which a representation made In good-will was,
under pressure of time, based on data hurriedly collected.
In the first place. It Is being emphasised in your message that we have failed to
consult with the United States when a military intervention in Cyprus was
deemed indispensable by virtue of the Treaty of Guarantee. The necessity of a
military intervention in Cyprus has been felt four times since the closing days
of 1963. From the outset we have taken a special care to consult the United
States on this matter. Soon after the outbreak of the crisis, on December 25, 196f,,
we have immediately Informed the United States of our contacts with the other
guaranteeing powers only to be answered that the United States was not a party
to this Issue.. We then negotiated with the United Kingdom and Greece for Inter-
vention and. as you know, a tri-partite military administration under British
command was sit-up on December 26, 1963. Upon the failure of the London con-
ference and of the joint Anglo-American proposals, due to the attitude of Makarios
and in the face of continuing assaults in the Island against the Turkish Cypriots,
we lived through very critical days in February and taking advantage of the visit
of Mr. George Ball to Ankara, we Informed again the United States of the gravity
of the situation. We tried to explain to you that the necessity of intervention to
restore order In the Island might arise in view of the vacuum caused by the rejec-
tion of the Anglo-American proposals and we Informed you that we might have to
intervene at any time. We even requested guarantees from you on specific Issues
and your answers were In the affirmative. However, you asked us not to intervene
and assured us that Makarlos would get at the United Nations a severe lesson
while all the Turkish rights and interests would be preserved.
We complied with your request without any satisfactory result being secured
at the United Nations. Moreover the creation of the United Nations force, decided
upon by the Security Council, became a problem. The necessity for Intervention
was felt for the third time to protect the Turkish community against the assaults
of the terrorists in Cyprus who were encouraged by the doubts as to whether the
United Nations forces would be set up immediately after the adoption of the
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Security Council resolution of March 4, 1964. But assuring us that the force would
be set up very shortly, you insisted again that we refrain from intervening. There-
upon we postponed our intervention once again, awaiting the United Nations
forces to assume their duty.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT : The era of terror in Cyprus has a particular character
which rendered ineffective all measures taken so far. From the very outset, the
negotiations held to restore security and the temporary set-ups have all helped
only to increase the aggressiveness and the destructiveness of the Makarlos ad-
ministration. The Greek Cypriots have lately started to arm themselves overtly
and considered the United Nations as an additional instrument to back up their
ruthless and unconstitutional rule. It has become quite obvious that the United
Nations have neither the authority nor the intent to intervene for the restoration
of consitutional order and to put an end to aggression. You are well aware of
the instigative attitude of the Greek Government towards the Greek Cypriots.
During the talks held in your office, in the United States, we informed you that
under the circumstances we would eventually be compelled to intervene in order
to put an end to the atrocities in Cyprus. We also asked your Secretary of State
at The Hague whether the United States would support us in such an eventuality
and we received no answer. I think, I have thus reminded you how many times
and under what circumstances we informed you of the necessity for intervention
in Cyprus. I do remember having emphasized to your high level officials our due
appreciation of the special responsibilities incumbent upon the United States
within the alliance and of the necessity to be particularly careful and helpful to
enable her to maintain solidarity within the alliance. As you see, we never had
the intention to confront you with a unilateral decision on our part. Our grievance
steins from our inability to explain to you a problem which caused us for months
utmost distress and from your refusal to take a frank and firm stand on the issue
as to which party is on the right side in the dispute between two allies, namely,
Turkey and Greece.
Mr. President, in your message you further emphasize the obligations of Turkey,
under the provisions of the Treaty to consult with the other two guaranteeing
powers, before taking any unilateral action. Turkey is fully aware of this obliga-
tion. For the past six months we have indeed complied with the requirements of
this obligation. But Greece has, not only thwarted all the attempts made by
Turkey to seek jointly the ways and means to stop Greek Cypriots from repudiat-
ing international treaties, but has also supported their unlawful and inhuman
acts and has even encouraged them.
The Greek Government itself has not hesitated to declare publicly that the
international agreements it signed with us were no longer in force. Various ex-
amples to that effect were, in due course, communicated in :detail, orally and in
writing, to your State Department.
We have likewise fulfilled our obligation of constant consultation with the
Government of the United Kingdom, the other guaranteeing power.
In several instances we have, jointly with the Government of the United King-
dom, made representations to the Greek Cypriots with a view to restoring consti-
tutional order. But unfortunately, these representations were of no avail due to
the negative attitude of the Greek Cypriot authorities.
As you see, Turkey has earnesly explored every avenue of consulting continu-
ously and acting jointly with the other two guaranteeing powers. This being the
fact, it can not be asserted that Turkey has failed to abide by her obligation of
consulting with the other two guaranteeing powers before taking unilateral action.
I put it to you, Mr. President, whether the United States Government which
has felt the (need to draw the attention of Turkey to her obligation of consulta-
tion, yet earnestly and faithfully fulfilled by the latter, ,should not have reminded
Greece, who repudiates treaties signed by herself, of the necessity to abide by
the precept "pacta sent servanda" which is the fundamental rule of international
law. This precept which, only n fortnight ago, was most eloquently characterized
as "the basis of survival" by your Secretary of State himself in his speech at
the "American Law Institute," is now being completely and contemptuously
ignored by Greece, our NATO ally and by the Greek Cypriots.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT : As implied in your message, by virtue of the provisions
of Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee, the three guaranteeing powers have, in
the event of a breach of the provisions of that Treaty, the right to take concerted
action and, if that proves impossible, unilateral action with the sole aim of re-
establishing the state of affairs created by the said Treaty. The Treaty of
Guarantee was signed with this understanding being shared by all parties thereto.
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"1'he "Gentleman's Agreement" signed on February 19, 1959 by the Foreign Min-
inters of Turkey and Greece, is an evidence of that common understanding.
On the other hand, at the time of the admission of the Republic of Cyprus
to the United Nations, the members of the organization were fully acquainted
with all the international commitments and obligations of the said Republic
and no objections were raised in this respect.
Furthermore, in the course of the discussions on Cyprus leading to the resolu-
tion adopted on March 4, 1964 by the Security Council, the United States Dele-
gate, among others, explicitly declared that the United Nations had. no power
to annul or amend international treaties.
The understanding expressed In your message that the intervention by Turkey
in Cyprus would be for the purposes of effecting the partition of the island has
caused me great surprise and profound sorrow. My surprise stems from the fact
that: the data furnished to you about the intentions of Turkey could be so remote
from the realities repeatedly proclaimed by us. The reason of my sorrow is that
our ally, the Government of the T7nited States, could think that Turkey might
lay aside the principle constituting the, foundation of her foreign policy, i.e.,
absolute loyalty to international law, commitments and obligations, as factually
evidenced in many circumstances well known to the United States.
I would like to assure you most categorically and most sincerely that if ever
Turkey finds herself forced to intervene militarily in Cyprus this will he done
in full conformity with the provisions and aims of international agreements
In this connection, allow me to stress, Mr. President, that the postponement:
or our decision does naturally, in no way affect the rights conferred to Turkey
by Article I of the Treaty of Guarantee.
Mr. President, referring to NATO obligations, you state in your message that
the very essence. of NATO requires that allies should not wage war on each other
and that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus would lead to a military engagement
between Turkish and Creek forces.
I am in full agreement with the first part of your statement, but: the obliga.
tion for the NATO allies to respect internlational agreements concluded among:
them> .1ves as well as their mutual treaty rights and commitments is an equally
vital requisite of the alliance. An alliance among states which ignore their
mutual contractual obligations and commitments is unthinkable.
As to the concern you expressed over the outbreak of a Turco-Greek war in
case of Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in conformity with her rights and ohli?
gations stipnlat.:,d in interna.tion 'I a.greements. I would like to stress that Turkey
would undertake a, "military operation" in Cyprus exclusively under the con,
ditions and for the Purpose set forth in the agreements. Therefore, a Turco.
Greek war so properly described as "literally unthinkable" by the Honorable
Dean Rusk could only occur in, case of Greece's aggression against Turkey. Our
view, in case of such an intervention, is to invite to an effective collaboration,
with the aim of restoring the constitutional order in Cyprus, both Greece and
the United Kingdom in their capacity as guaranteeing powers. If despite this
invitation and its contractual obligations Greece were to attack Turkey, we
could in no way be held responsible of the consequences of such an action. I
`would like to hope that you have already seriously drawn the Greek Govern-
xnont's attention on, these :natters.
The part of your message expressing doubts as to the 'obligation of the NATO
allies to protect Turkey in case she becomes directly involved with the USSR as
a result of an action initiated in Cyprus, gives me the impression that there are
as between as wide divergence of views as to the nature and basic principles
of the North Atlantic Alliance. I must confess that this has been to us the source
or great sorrow and grave concern. Any aggression against it member of NATO
will naturally call from the aggressor an effort of justification. If NATO's struc-
ture is so weak as to give credit to the aggressor's allegations, then it means
that this defect of NATO needs really to be remedied. Our understanding is that
the North Atlantic Treaty imposes upon all member states the obligation to
come forthwith to the assistance of any member victim of an aggression. The
only point left to the discretion of the member states is the nature and the scale
of this assistance. If NATO riembers should start discussing the right and wrong
of the situation of their fellow-member victim of a Soviet aggression, whether
this aggression was provoked or not and if the decision on whether they have
an obligation to assist the member should be made to depend on the issue of
such a discussion, the very foundations of the Alliance would be shaken and it
would lose its ireaning. An obligation of assistance, if it is to carry any weight,
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should come into being immediately upon the observance of aggression. That is
why Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty considers an attack against one of
the member states as an attack against them all and makes it imperative for
them to assist the party so attacked by, taking forthwith such action as they
deem necessary. In this connection I would like to further point out that the
agreements on Cyprus have met with the approval of the 'North Atlantic Council,
as early as the stage of the United Nations debate on the problem, i.e., even
prior to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. hence long before the
occurrence of ithe events of December 1963.
As you will recall, at the meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council held three,
weeks ago at The Hague, it was acknowledged that the treaties continued to be
the basis for legality as regards the situation in the island and the status of
Cyprus. The fact that these agreements have been violated as a result of the
flagrantly unlawful acts of one of the parties on the island should in no way mean
that the said agreements are no longer in force and that the rights and obliga
tions of Turkey by virtue of those agreements should be ignored. Such an under-
standing would mean that as long as no difficulties arise, the agreements are
considered as valid and they are no longer in force when difficulties occur. I am
sure you will agree with me that such an understanding of law cannot 'be ac-
cepted. 1 am equally convinced that there could be no shadow of doubt about the
obligation to protect Turkey within the NATO Alliance in a situation that can,.
by no means, be attributed to an arbitrary 'act of Turkey. An opposite way of
thinking would lead to the repudiation and denial o;f the concept of law and of
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
In your message, concern has been expressed about the commitments of Turkey
as a member of the United Nations. I am sure, Mr. President, you will agree with
me if I say that such a concern, which iI do not share, is groundless especially for
the following reasons : Turkey has distinguished herself as one of the most loyal
members of the United Nations ever since its foundation. The Turkish people
has spared no effort to safeguard the principles of the United Nations Charter,
and has even sacrificed her sons for this cause. 'Turkey has never failed in sup-
porting this organization and, in order to secure its proper functioning, has,
borne great moral and material sacrifices even when she had most pressing finan-
cial difficulties. Despite the explicit rights conferred to Turkey by the 'Treaty of
Guarantee, my Government's respect for and adherence to the United Nations
have recently been demonstrated once more by its acceptance of the Security
Council resolution of March 4, 1964 as well as by the priority it has given to the
said resolution.
Should the United Nations have been progressively successful in carrying out
their task as pointed out in your message, a situation which is of such grave con-
cern for both you and I, would never have arisen. It is a fact that the United
Nations operations in the island have proved unable to put an end to the oppres-
sion.
The relative calm which has apparently prevailed in the island for the past
few weeks marks the beginning of preparations of the Greek Cypriots for further
tyranny. Villages are still under siege. The United Nations forces, 'assuaging
Turkish Cypriots, enable the Greeks to gather their crops; but they do not try to
stop the Greeks when the crops of'Turks are at stake and they act as mere specta-
tors to Greek assaults. These vitally important details may not well reach you,
whereas we live in the atmosphere created by the daily reports of such tragic
events.
The report of the Secretary-General will be submitted to the United Nations on
June 15, 1964. I am seriously concerned that we may face yet another defeat simi-
lar to the one we all suffered on March 4, 1964. The session of March 4th had fur-
ther convinced Makarios that the Treaty of Guarantee did not exist for him and
thereupon he took the liberty of actually placing the United Nations forces under
his control and direction. From then on the assassination of hostages and the be-
sieging of villages have considerably increased.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT : Our allies who are in a position to arbiter in the Cyprus
issue and to orient it in the right direction have so far been unable to disentangle
the problem from a substantial error. The Cyprus tragedy has been engendered
by the deliberate policy of the Republic of Cyprus aimed at annulling the treaties
and abrogating the constitution. Security can be established in the island only
through the proper functioning of an authority above the Government of Cyprus.
Yet only the measures acceptable to the Cypriot Government are being sought
to restore security in Cyprus. The British administration set up following the
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December events, the Anglo-American proposals and finally the United Nations
command have all been founded on this unsound basis and consequently every
measure acceptable to Makarics has proved futile and has, in general, encouraged
oppression and aggression.
DaAR Ma. PRESIDENT: You prat forward in your message the resentment caused
in Greece by the policy pursued by your Government. Within the content of the
Cyprus issues, the nature of the Greek policy and the course of action under-
taken by Greece indicate that. she is apt to resort to every means within her
power to secure the complete annulment of the existing treaties. We are at pains
to make our allies understand the sufferings we bear in our rightful cause and the
irretrievable plight in which the Turkish Cypriots are living. On the other hand,
it is not the character of our nation to exploit demonstrations of resentment.
I assure you that our distress is deeply rooted since we can not make you under-
stand our rightful position and convince you of the necessity of spending every
effort and making use of all your authority to avert the perils inherent in the
Cyprus problem by attaching to it the importance it well deserves.
That France and Germany have buried their animosity is indeed a good
example. However, our nation had already given such an example forty years
ago by establishing friendly relations with Greece, right after the ruthless
devastation of the whole AnatoPfa by the armies of that country.
I)xAR Ma. PRESIDENT: As a member of the Alliance our nation is fully conscious
of her duties and rights. We do not pursue any aim other than the settlement
of the Cyprus problem in compliance with the provisions of the existing treaties.
Such a settlement is likely to be reached if you lend your support and give effect
with your supreme authority to the sense of justice inherent in the character
of the American nation.
Mr. President, I thank you for your statement emphasizing the value attached
by the United States to the relations of alliance with Turkey and for your
kind words about the Turkish nation. I shall be happy to come to the United
Stat,'s to talk the Cyprus problem with you. The United Nations Security Coun-
cil will meet on ]rune the 17th. In the meantime, Mr. Dirk Stikker, Secretary
General of NATO, will have paid a visit to Turkey. Furthermore, the United
Nations mediator Mr. Tuomioj.a will have submitted his report to the Secretary-
General. These developments may lead to the emergence of a new situation. It
will be possible for me to go abroad to join you, at a date convenient for you,
immediately after June 20th.
It will be most helpful for me if you would let me know of any defined views
and designs you may have on the Cyprus question So that I may be able to study
them thoroughly before my departure for Washington.
Finally, I would like to express my satisfaction for the frank, fruitful and
promising talks we had with Mr. G. Ball in Ankara just before forwarding this
message to you.
Sincerely,
ISMET TNQNII,
Prime Minister of Turkey.
Mr. P:~Tm. Mr. Davies, you have given us a general idea as to the
consequences of that letter, but could you tell us just briefly your
assessment of the consequences of that letter today?
Mr. DAVIFS. The Turks still recall that the Unit'e'd States intervened
diplomatically to, in their eyes, prevent their exercise of the right
under the London-Zurich. agreements to intervene militarily on
Cyprus.
Ti accomplished its purpose, but the Turks today regard the letter
as blunt, maladroit and, as a retreat from the obligation of one ally to
another.
Tcu put this picture in perspective, following some very tendentious
leaks in Turkisl-i newspapers, by mutual consent with the Government
of Turkev, we declassified both the Johnson letter and the reply from
Prime Minister Inonu.
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Mr. PAUL. As part of this letter, as you pointed out earlier today,
the question was raised whether the United States would come to the
aid of Turkey in the event of an attack on that country by the Soviet
Union. This is a very interesting interpretation of our NATO
commitment.
Does this suggest that the NATO commitment is not as ironclad
as one might have suspected, NATO being, perhaps, our most sacro-
sanct treaty?
Mr. DAVIES. We do not consider that the treaty requires an automatic
response. While the language of the North Atlantic Treaty making
an attack on one member state an attack on all is the most strongly
worded of any defense commitment to which the United States is a
party, the treaty stops well short of automatically obligating a member
to respond to an attack on another member with armed assistance.
The treaty preserves the right of each member state to take such
action as it deems necessary, and to act "individually and in concert
with the other parties."
Furthermore, in article 11 it is made clear that the treaty in no way
purports to supersede any national constitutional requirements or to
commit either the Congress or the President of the United States to
any action within their respective constitutional spheres.
Therefore, we conclude that the United States would not be com-
mitted under article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty to view an attack
by one member state against another member state as an attack on itself
or to take the further steps contemplated in such an article.
Mr. PAUL. But my hypothesis was not an attack by one member of
another but an attack by the Soviet Union on Turkey.
Do I gather from what you just said that we feel it completely
consistent with our NATO obligation to review the circumstances of
an attack by the Soviet Union on a member such as Turkey before
determining whether to come to the assistance of that member country?
Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir.
Mr. PAUL. Turning to another defense commitment of which Turkey
is a party, namely CENTO, which has its headquarters at Ankara,
I would like to ask you what the American role is and what the Ameri-
can commitment is under CENTO.
Mr. PRANCER. In military terms we have 22 Americans in the
CENTO headquarters,'includingtwo officers of general rank; Lt. Gen.
Andrew J. Boyle, who is the U.S. permanent military deputy serving
on the CENTO Military Committee, and we have Maj. Gen. Rollin
Anthis of the U.S. Air Force, who is Chief of Staff of the Combined
Military Planning Staff or CMPS.
Now, the Military Committee representative, General Boyle, is a
personal representative of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
He serves on that committee with other CENTO generals of equiva-
lent rank or officers of equivalent rank.
The CMPS, of which General Anthis is the Chief of Staff, provides
necessary military support required by the Military Committee.
Now, how does the United States participate in CENTO? Well,
we participate in its military planning exercises, and we participate
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in a limited number of annual CENTO military exercises and other
professional military activities.
These include a small scale exercise in the Persian Gulf, and a
search and rescue exercise.
Now, as far as the precise treaty commitments under CENTO are
concerned, I would defer to my State Department colleague.
Mr. DAVITS. The United States is not a member of CENTO. It is an
observer. Our commitment to LENTO members is contained in the
bilateral ag reements which implement the 1958 declaration.
Unlike the NATO and SEATO treaties. the CENTO bilaterals do
not state that an armed attack against. Turkey, Iran, or Pakistan
-would constitute an attack on the. United States or would endanger
our peace and safety.
Article T of the bilaterals obligates us only to consult on such ap-
propriate assistance as may be subsequently agreed to.
W-Wre have not undertaken an obligation to act to meet a common
danger as we have obligated ourselves in both NATO, article V, and
SEATO, article TV.
Furthermore, our obligation is limited by the reference in article I
to the 1957 Middle East resolution to a ease of Communist aggression.
Mr. PAUL. Would you supply for the record, Mr. Davies. the rele-
vant language involved in the LENTO Treaty among the United
Kingdom, Iraq, Tran, Pakistan, and Turkey, plus the language from
the declarations of the United States that show the American "com-
initment" under CENTO as you have summarized it.
!The information referred to follows:)
PACT OF MUrUAL COOPERATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND TURKEY (BAGIIDAD PACT,
SUBSEQUENTLY REDESIGNATED CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION)
(Signed at Baghdad February 24, 1955; Entered into force April 15, 19.5:5;
Ratified by Iraq and Turkey (Iraq subsequently withdrew on March 24, 1959) ;
Acceded to by Iran (July 3, 1955), Pakistan (September 23, 1955), and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (April 5, 1955) )
Consistent with article 51 of the United Nations Charter the High Contracting
Parties will co-operate for their security and defense. Such measures as they
agree to take to give effect to this co-operation may form the subject; of special
agreements with each other.
ARTICLE 2
In order to ensure the realization and effect application of the co-operation
provided for in article 1 above, the competent authorities of the High Con-
tracting Parties will determine the measures to be taken as soon as the present
pact enters into force. These measures will become operative as soon as they
have been approved by the Government of the High Contracting Parties . . .
This pact shall be open for accession to any member of the Arab League or
any other State actively concerned with the security and peace in this region
and which is fully recognized by both of the High Contracting Parties .. .
Any acceding State party to the present pact may conclude special agreements,
in accordance with article 1, with one or more States parties to the present pact.
The competent authority of any acceding State may determine measures in
accordance with article 2. These measures will become operative as soon as they
have been approved by the Governments of the parties concerned.
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DECLARATION RESPECTING THE BAGHDAD PACT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND IRAN, PAKISTAN, TURKEY, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
(Signed at London July 28, 1958; Entered into force July 28, 1958)
1. The members of the Baghdad Pact attending the Ministerial meeting in
London have re-examined their position in the light of recent events 'and conclude
that the need which called the Pact into being is greater than ever. These
members declare their determination to maintain their collective security and
to resist aggression, direct or indirect.
2. Under the Pact collective security arrangements have been instituted.
Joint military planning has been advanced and area economic projects have
been promoted. Relationships are being established with other free world nations
associated for collective security . . .
4. Article I of the Pact of Mutual Cooperation signed at Baghdad on Febru-
ary 24, 1955 provides that the parties will cooperate for their security and
defense and that such measures as they agree to take to give effect to this
cooperation may form the subject of special agreements. Similarly, the United
States in the interest of world peace, and pursuant to existing Congressional
authorization, agrees to cooperate with the nations making this Declaration for
their security and defense, and will promptly enter into agreements designed to
give effect to this cooperation.
AGREEMENT OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OP
AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY
(Agreement signed at Ankara March 5, 1959; Entered into force March 5, 1959.
Identical agreements were entered into between the United States of America
and (1) Iran and (2) Pakistan also signed at Ankara on March 5, 1959)
The Government of the United States of America and the Government of
Turkey,
Desiring to implement the Declaration in which they associated themselves
at London on July 28, 1958;
Considering that under Article I of the Pact of Mutual Cooperation signed
at Baghdad on February 24, 1955; the parties signatory thereto agreed to co-
operate for their security and defense, and that, similarly, as stated in the above-
mentioned Declaration, the Government of the United States of America, in the
interest of world peace agreed to cooperate with the Governments making that
Declaration for their security and defense .. .
Desiring to strengthen peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter
of the United Nations ;
Affirming their right to cooperate for their security and defense in accordance
with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations ;
Considering that the Government of the United States of America regards
as vital to its national interest and to world peace the preservation of the inde-
pence and integrity of Turkey ;
Recognizing the authorization to furnish appropriate assistance granted to the
President of the United -States of America by the Congress of the United States of
America in the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and in the Joint Resolu-
tion to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East ;
The Government of Turkey is determined to resist aggression. In case of
aggression against Turkey, the Government of the United States of America, in
accordance with the Constitution of the United States of America, will take such
appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually
agreed upon and as envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and
Stability in the Middle East, in order to assist the Government of Turkey at its
request.
The Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the
Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and related laws of the United States
of America, and with applicable agreements heretofore or hereafter entered into
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between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
Turkey, reaffirms that it will continue to furnish the Government of Turkey such
military and economic assistance as may be mutually agreed upon between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of Turkey, in
order to assist the Government of Turkey in the preservation of its national in-
dependence and integrity and in the effective promotion of its economic develop-
ment .. .
ARTICLE IV
The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Tur-
key will cooperate with the other Governments associated in the Declaration
signed at London on July 28, 1958 in order to prepare and participate in such
defensive arrangements as may be mutually agreed to be desirable, subject to the
other applicable provisions of this agreement.
Mr. PAUTL . Also you have made. a distinction between SEATO-let
us take SEATO, being somewhat looser drawn, perhaps, than
NATO-and CENTO. First, you say there is a distinction with re-
spect to the fact that SEATO says that an attack upon another mem-
ber of SEATO would be a threat to the peace and security of the
I Baited States, and you consider that to be a distinction from CENTO ;
is that correct?
1[r. DAVrrs. That is correct, sir.
Ir. PAUL. I wondered if you found fhat to be operative language
i i i SEATO so as to have any significance as a distinction.
Mr. DAVIES. May I provide for the the record the distinction, sir?
Mr. PAUL. Sure.
(The inforlnation referred to follows:)
In our opinion it is a significant distinction that neither the CENTO Treaty
nor our bilateral agreements with Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan contain language
similar to Article IV(1) of the SEATO Treaty which provides "Each Party
recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against
any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unani-
mous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and
safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in
accordance with its constitutional processes." We consider this operative lan-
guage from the SEATO Treaty to constitute a legally binding commitment to
take appropriate action in event of "Aggression by means of armed attack in
the treaty area....."
The operative language in Article I of the bilaterals, however, constitutes an
agreement to take such appropriate action as may be subsequently agreed upon.
Our commitment to the three CENTO members is, therefore, basically an obli-
gation to consult on possible U.S. or joint action in certain circumstances. United
States obligations under Article I of the bilateral agreements with Turkey, Iran,
and Pakistan are limited to cases of armed communist aggression, as are United
States obligations under Article 4(1) of the SEATO Treaty. The United States is,
however, obligated in cases of other aggression or armed attack or other threat
within the SEATO Treaty area to consult with the parties to the Treaty under
tbs provisions of Article 4 (2).
Mr. PATTL . Also, you mention that SEATO says that we will act to
meet the common danger in accordance with our constitutional proc-
esses, whereas in CENTO we say that we will provide assistance, in-
cluding the use of armed forces, on the basis of subsequent mutual
agreement--I am not queuing the language exactly.
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Mr. DAVIES. Obligated only to consult on such appropriate assist-
ance as may be agreed to subsequent to an attack on the parties.
Mr. PAUL. But there is specific reference in the American declara-
tion under CENTO to the possible use of American Armed Forces.
Mr. DAVZES. This stems, I believe, sir, from the reference to the
article, to the 1957 Middle East Resolution.
Mr. PAUL. Could you tell us or ask the Department to give the
specific reason why CENTO was not submitted as a treaty-why
they think it was appropriate for SEATO and NATO to be treaties,
and CENTO not to be a treaty.
Mr. DAVIES. At the time, sir, we did not want to ally ourselves for-
mally with a state-Iraq, which was technically at war with Israel,
Iraq never did enter into an armistice agreement with Israel following
the 1947 Palestine war, and we were concerned that our formal adher-
ence with Iraq at that time, which was the contender for power with
Egypt in the Arab area, might create adverse political reactions in the
Arab area.
Our association with Pakistan would create problems with India.
We believe adherence to the CENTO Treaty would lessen our ability
to moderate intra-area disputes, and the membership would not mean
further aid or support to the members than we could provide as an
observer.
Moreover, our commitment under the Baghdad Pact would have
been greater since our obligations under it would not be limited to
any specific kind of action and would be invokable in case of aggres-
sion from any source.
We still believe that our areawide interests made formal mem-
bership less desirable than the existing arrangements.
Mr. PAUL. Turning to the political situation in Turkey today, could
you just briefly tell us what the status of the democratic processes in
Turkey is today.
Mr. DAVIES. We believe that the status is extremely satisfactory
since the return of power by the military to the civilian element fol-
lowing the 1960 coup.
There has been three general elections. Turkey has a very active
free press. Its constitutional procedures have been observed. The fact
that the President of the Republic is a military man seems to guar-
antee support to the government as a whole by the military forces.
Mr. PAUL. What is the position of the major Turkish political par-
ties with respect to NATO?
Mr. DAVIES. Both major parties support the association of Turkey
in NATO.
Mr. PAUL. What is the State Department's assessment as to the pros-
pects of Turkey moving closer to the position of the Soviet Union
in international affairs?
Mr. DAVIES. We believe that the Turks are firm NATO allies and on
both ends of the political spectrum, the major parties strongly value
the Western association.
The only Turkish political party which is opposed to the NATO
link is the Turkish Labor Party which, in the last election, got some-
where around 21/2 percent of the vote.
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Mr. PAUL. Turning to the American facilities in Turkey, could you
tell us, as you have provided for Greece, what the number of Ameri-
can personnel and dependents are in. Turkey?
Mr. PRANGEP. Yes, sir.
The high point of U.S. military personnel in Turkey was in the
period of 1967 to 1968 when there were around 24,000 Americans con-
nected with the Department of Defense, both working and depend-
ents in Turkey.
The current population in fiscal year 1970 is approximately 18,000,
of which half or a little less than half are military personnel.
Early in fiscal year 1971 this number will drop to about 16,000 of
which less than half will be uniformed personnel.
MT. PAUL. Also would you supply for the record the total operating
costs, including military ;pay, and the overseas expenditures that are
represented.
Mr. PRANOER. Yes, sir.
(The information referred to follows:)
ANNUAL OPERATING Cos'rs FOR U.S. FACTUTIES-TURKEY
During Fiscal Year 1970, the U.S. Department of Defense estimated cost to
maintain facilities in Turkey was $90 million. This estimate includes all mili-
tary and civilian costs as well as the cost of operating and maintaining the
facilities. This cost estimate does not include indirect logistic and administra-
tive costs from outside the country, nor does it include major procurement or
military construction costs.
The preliminary estimate of the fiscal year 1970 U.S. defense expenditures in
Turkey entering the international balance of payments from all sources (military
functions, military assistance, operating costs and investment costs) is $45
million.
Mr. PAUL. Now, could you give us a thumbnail sketch of the facili-
ties that we have in Turkey.
Mr. PRANGEl:. Yes, I can. There are over 20--let us start over again.
There are a large number of detachments locations in Turkey. These
detachments and locations include the following :
First, NATO tactical air units, principally at Cigli and Incirlik,
with the phaseout occurring at Cigli Air Base.
'I'll(, second area of our involvement there is in the [deleted].
The third area is in headquarters and support elements at Ankara
an (l Izmir.
The fourth is in communications facilities; and the fifth in certain
miscellaneous facilities in the form of sealift terminals and a Loran
station.
!-fr. PAUL. Where is the fourth category, communications facilities,
what are you mainly referring to there?
Mr. PRANGKR. Here we are referring to primarily relay facilities,
troposcatter relay and terminals.
Mr. PAUL. What is TUSLOG?
Mr. PRANGF.IL. The U.S. Logistics Group (Turkey). It is our cen-
tral, by our meaning the U.S. Department of Defense, central logis-
tics and command and support command for all of our activities in
Tn rkey.
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It performs a number of functions, including command functions,
legal, labor relations, et cetera.
Mr. PAUL. They account for a lot of the facilities in the Ankara
and Izmir area?
Mr. PRANCER. They do in the Ankara area. We have in Ankara
scattered throughout the town some 24 activities in 10 to 14 buildings
in downtown Ankara.
[Deleted.]
Mr. PAUL. There has recently been a considerable drop in total
American military personnel in Turkey. Would this sumge.zt that we
found out we did not need quite so many people in Turkey as we
thought we did 3 or 4 years ago?,
T lr. PRANCER. Well, this is a combination of circumstances. There
is no doubt in our mind that we are in an economy era and, there-
fore, there have been-there has been a very systematic attempt to
phase down for this reason.
We also have found, particularly in congested urban areas, and
Ankara here is very important to consider, that we do have a rather
large presence which creates a high profile as opposed to a low profile
presence.
Mr. PAUL. Wouldn't you say that it turned out we could get along
without these people? Perhaps, it would have been militarily more
desirable if we could have continued to have Cigli as svell as Incirlik
with a few more people, but the strategic situation has really not been
endangered by this reduction in personnel?
Mr. PR ANGER. No ; it has not, and we have consolidated our NATO
support or our NATO air tactical units in Incirlik and are Pretty
well getting out of Cigli, subject to negotiations with the Turks.
Mr. PAUL. Could you tell us whether there was an effect from the
Greek-Turkish confrontation on our facilities in Turkey in the form
of either incidents or uses of American equipment or otherwise on
our facilities in Turkey?
Mr. PRANCER. Well, we, during these crises, did attempt to ,stay
out of the way, I think, of certain Turk preparations and operations.
As far as incidents are concerned I am not aware of any that took
place.
Mr. PAUL. Who was General Dick?
Mr. PRANCER. He was Commander of LANDSOUTHE AST.
Mr. PAUL. Is he still commander?
Mr. PRANCER. He was.
Mr. PAUL. It was reported that a Turkish officer, in connection with
the confrontation, informed General Dick [deleted].
Could you enlighten us on this incident?
Mr. PRANCER. I have heard of this story but I have no knowledge
of this incident.
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POSITION OF TURKEY IN EVENT OF MIDDLE EAST CRISIS
Mr. PAUL. Mr. Davies,, could you tell us what the prospect is of our
being allowed to use our facilities in Turkey in the event of a Middle
East contingency in which our forces would be directed against Arab
State. interests?
Mr. DAVIEs. The Turkish Government takes the position as does
its Parliament, that our joint defense efforts are directed against an
attack from the Soviet bloc.
[Deleted] the Turks are very anxious to have our military relation-
ship clearly rest on the NATO agreement.
AT'rlTITI)E IN IZMIR AND ANKARA TOWARD U.S. FACILITIES
Mr. PAIL. Could you briefly tell us what the attitude of the local
populace is in Izmir and Ankara toward the facilities that we men-
tioned a few minutes ago in the downtown areas of these two Turkish
cities.
Mr. DAVIN:S. Frank, eau T eall upon you?
Mr.. CASH. Knowledgeable Turks, that is those in a position of
responsibility in government or military, appreciate the value to Tur-
key of our operational facilities, and support fully their continuances.
Some of these find our logistical support facilities less essential.
In no case, however, has the Government of Turkey expressed in any
way a desire for U.S. forces to leave a facility. Those which have
been turned over have been turned over completely at U.S. Govern-
ment initiative.
FACILITIES IN ANKARA
Mr. PAUL. flow many separate facilities do we, now have in doWn-
tow n Ankara ?
Mr. PRANOI;r,. That number I gave was 24 activities in leased build-
i rigs, 14 buildings.
Mr. PAUL,. What is the progress toward moving these out of Ankara
to the facility we have in the suburbs?
Mr. PRANCER. From our standpoint it is not real good. The funds
for t:he. movemmeni; to l3al (Yat have been somewhat limited.
We tried to consolidate facilities wherever possible. I think they
moved the theater into ln7SMAT Headquarters, and this sort of thing
has always been taken and is being continued.
r S. i1IOViE THEATER IN DOWNTOWN ANKARA
Parr. 1'AUL. Taking flu l theater as an interesting situation, could
yam tell us a, little about, the attitude of the Turks which they had
toward this movie theater which, I understand, was used for the
;:elusive use of Americans in downtown Ankara.
MTr. PR.\NoFR. I will refer to Mr. Cash again who, I think, is familiar
with it.
MTr. Cas? r. I think it was mainly a matter of congestion. The theater
was located in. a very congested area of the town., and it was a source
of difficulty for everyone concerned, for the Americans getting in and
nut,, and for the Turks who were living there and got caught in the
traffic jams.
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This is the only complaint we ever had from the Turks to the
theater, that it added to the congestion, and we have wanted to move
it. It was one of the facilities originally designated to be moved in the
plan initiated in 1959.
We still have not gotten the funds to move it completely out to
Balgat, but have gotten it moved out to JUSMAT headquarters out of
town.
Mr. PAUL. Was this a problem for Turkish-American harmony since
1959?
Mr. CAST. It was not a problem, but it was an irritant.
Mr. PAUL. This is for a decade.
Mr. CASH. This was a progressively growing irritant. It was recog-
nized in 1959 that it should be moved out of its location to Balgat.
Mr. PAUL. But it was only moved in 1970.
Mr. CASH. The funds were not available prior to that time, and no
alternate site was available.
Mr. PAUL. You say the problem was congestion. Was it not also
looked upon as a symbol of American privilege?
Mr. CASH. Yes; I think it is probably fair to say that.
Mr. PAUL. What is the situation in Izmir today? Do we still have
facilities in downtown Izmir as part of the TUSLOG?
Mr. PRANCER. Yes. TUSLOG and also we have NATO personnel
there, 20 facilities, and they consist of amain a wide variety of facili-
ties, warehouses, motor pool, personnel support facilities, schools,
medical.
Mr. PAUL. Are there any plans for withdrawing any of these facili-
ties from Izmir or deactivating it?
Mr. PRANCER. No. I believe that the primary emphasis is on deacti-
vation at Cigli where there was some duplication of the facilities
largely because--well, not largely, I cannot measure-but one reason
being the congested road facilities between Cigli and Izmir.
So the emphasis is on phasing out of Cigli and consolidating our
activities in Izmir.
Mr. PAUL. Ilow many personnel do we have in Izmir approxi-
mately?
Mr. PRANCER. The number has run in the neighborhood of about,
let me see, our total presence is about 2,000 and that includes
dependents.
Mr. PAUL. So about half of those are military personnel?
Mr. PRANCER. A little less than half.
Mr. PAUL. Why do you need a facility like that in Izmir, that is, the
TUSLOG facility there?
Mr. PRANCER. Well, there are, some important NATO headquarters
there for one thing. As far as any other activity which TUSLOG
engages in in the Izmir area, in Izmir itself, we can supply that for
the record, but there are NATO headquarters there.
Mr. PAUL. You need a thousand American personnel to support
the NATO headquarters, LANDSOUTIIEAST and the Sixth Allied
Tactical Air Force? These are NATO headquarters, of which others
are members, including Turkey. So why do we have 1,000 people to
support these multilateral headquarters?
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Mr. PRANGFR. We can again give specific information as to their
mission in the Izmir area.
(The information referred. to follows:)
SUPPORT PEB.SONNEL IN IzMu
The U.S. DOD-sponsored population in Izmir is approximately 2,200. About
1,400 of these ,are dependents and 550 are military personnel assigned to the two
NATO headquarters, Land ]5orces Southeast and Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force.
The roroninder are administrative, communication, and supply support personnel
who provide for: schools, commissary, post exchange, hospital, communication,
postal, transportation, sea terminal, and warehousing services. Thus, the sup-
port personnel in Izmir support U.S. personnel throughout Turkey as well as
those assigned to Izmir. They do not support the multinational headquarters
as such.
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT AT INCIRLIK
Dir. PAUL. Now, turning to the tactical aircraft at Incirlik, could
you tell us when these aircraft weave deployed to Turkey, either at Cigli
()j? Incirlik?
Mr. PRANUER. This is a tactical rotation agreement in. February
1957, 1 believe.
Mr. PAUL. [Deleted.]
Dir. Davies, what do you think would be the effect on our relations
%v.Ith 'ri rkey if our fighter aircraft were removed from Incirlik?
Dlr. DAv-rrs. It would depend, sir, on the circumstances, whether it
were done in. consultation with the Turks and were acceptable to both
parties.
Mr. PAUL. Obviously if they agreed, presumably harmony would
follow. But if we wanted very much to take them out would the
'l'urks object, do you thinnk?
Dir. T),1VIES. [Deleted.]
Mr. PRANOER. [Deleted.]
INCIDENT INVOLVING U.S. NAVAL SHIP VISITS TO TURKEY
Al r. PAUL. Mr. Davies, you mentioned an incident in February 1969
with respect to U.S. naval ship visits to Turkey. What are the others
in the last 2 years, to your knowledge ?
Mr. DAVEE~:. The incident referred to, plus the incidents which tool:
place in the last cruiser visit to Izmir, which was December 1.969,
these were the principal events which led our Ambassador to sug-
gest a changed pattern on visits to Turkish ports.
Dir. P.ITr,. What was the extent of the Incident in December 1969?
Mr. CASH. Mainly harassment of personnel who were stationed in
Izmir. That did not take the form of serious attacks on personnel front
the fleet units.
BLACK SEA VISITS
Mr. PAUL. American naval vessels, I believe, go into the Black Sea.
Could you tell us how often they do?
Mr. PRANGER. Yes, sir. They began their regular visits into the Black
Sea in 1959, and have gone there on a semiannual basis, two visits per
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year, two destroyers, until June 1969, and they now go into the Black
Sea more frequently.
The purpose for this visit, these visits, is to-the main purpose is
to-exercise our rights under the Montreux Convention [deleted]
we do exercise this right, [deleted] and the Soviets have not registered
much more than standard comments in the last year or so.
Mr. PAUL. Why did you increase it [deleted] in June of 1969?
Mr. PRANGER. Well, as an exercise in the Montreux Convention is
concerned, we can go in when we give notice. [Deleted. I
Mr. PAUL. Turning now to military assistance to Turkey, what is the
present level of such military assistance?
Mr. PRANCER. The 1970, the fiscal year 1970, program is at $100
million, and in 1971 the program is at [deleted] million.
Mr. PAUL. Do we still provide economic assistance to Turkey, Mr.
Davies?
Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir. We do provide economic aid for fiscal 1971, a
development loan program of [deleted] million, and a technical as-
sistance program of [deleted] million are planned.
Mr. PAUL. Do we have any prospect for ending economic assistance
to Turkey in the foreseeable future and making them an AID graduate,
as the term is used?
Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir. We anticipate there will be a continuing need
for economic assistance until around the mid-1970's. At this time we
hope that Turkey will have reached the stage of self-sustaining eco-
nomic growth.
Mr. PAUL. What about the prospects for ending grant military
assistancein light of that?
Mr. DAMES. As Turkey reaches economic viability we would plan
to convert to other forms than grant aid.
Mr. PAUL. In the same timeframe, is that what you are saying?
Mr. CASH. We hope beginning in the mid-1970's.
Mr. DAVIES. In the mid-1970 time frame.
U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP IN TURKEY
Mr. PAUL. How large is the military assistance advisory group in
Turkey?
Mr. PRANGER. JUSMAT, which is the group, is as follows :
There was in fiscal year 1969, 215 military personnel, 42 civilians,
and 137 local hire.
There was, and this total was, and we will give you the total in
just a second, for fiscal year 1970 there will be a reduction on that
to 193 military, 34 civilian, and 118 local hire, and similarly for fis-
cal year 1971 there will be a reduction, and the figures will be mili-
tary 156, civilian 25, and local hire 106.
Mr. PAUL. Where do the reductions in the American military per-
sonnel Usually come from?
Mr. PRANGER. I do not know where exactly these come from, but
I can submit this for the record.
Mr. PAUL. If you could give us a sentence or two indicating it,
and the significance of the cut or the effect of the cut.
(The information referred to follows:)
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The reductions in the military strength of JTJSMAT Turkey were made pro-
portionally in the three service sections and the joint headquarters. The cuts
were applied, to a, large degree, in the administrative and overhead functional
areas, and with only slight reductions in the advisory functions.
Mr. Davies, if T could ask you the similar question for Turkey
that I asked with regard to Greece as to the effect of the Spanish base
negotiations on our military status in Turkey.
Mr. DAVIF,s. Well, as in the case of Greece they are conducted in
it dissimilar framework under divergent imperatives and for dif
ferent purposes.
The NATO Treaty establishes a set of obligations. NATO defense
plans set the parameters in which we work with our NATO allies to
achieve goals designed to make those plans workable, and we have
negotiated and are still negotiating with the Turks in order to re-
define the local ground rules under which we shall continue to meet
our NATO obligations in Turkey'.
Spain is outside my area of expertise, but again I think they
are to arrive at, the negotiations are to arrive at, a straight quid pro
quo arrangement.
Obviously, our relationship in Turkey is considerably more complex
and more clearly understood by both sides. Again I suspect that both
Spaniards and Turks watch carefully to see that the other is not
treated better by the TTnited States.
Mr. PAUL. Now, could you tell us what the status of our American
facilities in Turkey is with respect to the right of the local employees
to strike?
Mr. DAVIES. The Turkish workers on U.S. military sites have the
same rights as Turkish workers in Turkish enterprises. [Deleted.
Mr. PAUL. You have recently had some labor difficulties with regard
to some of our facilities. Could you tell us what the extent of these;
labor difficulties has been.
Mr. DAVIES. Frank, can you respond to this?
Mr. CASH. We have an Air Force contractor in Turkey, the Tum..
pane Co., and they have had two fairly extensive strikes in Turkey
which have gone the route of labor negotiations and bargaining, and
we have reached settlements. In the last contrast which was termi-
nated, the negotiations produced a settlement prior to the strike.
Mr. PAUL. I see.
In this connection, has there been complete accord between the
TUSLOG Command and the Embassy with respect to the policy that
should be followed in handling this labor difficulty?
Mr. CASH. Yes. I think so in general. There have been differences on.
tactics from time to time.
Mr. PAUL. Has the Embassy exercised ultimate control?
Mr. CASH. It has.
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Mr. PAUL. And effective control in determining its policy?
Mr. CASH. It has.
Mr. PAUL. Could you tell us what joint exercises have been con-
ducted with the Turkish ground forces in the last several years?
Mr. PRANGER. I do not have those at my fingertips, but they can be
readily supplied.
Mr. PAUL. Would you do that and would you also supply, if you do
not have it, the same with respect to Greece, joint exercises with Greek
ground forces, identifying in each case any unconventional warfare
exercises.
Mr. PrnNGER. Yes.
(The information referred to is classified and is in the committee
files.)
Mr. PAUL. Thank you very much.
(Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.)
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UNITED STATES SECURITY AGREEMENTS AND
COMMITMENTS ABROAD
UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON U.S. SECURITY,
AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS ABROAD
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 11 a.m., in room S-116,
The Capitol Building, Senator Stuart Symington (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Present : Senators Symington (presiding) and Javits.
Also present: Mr. Holt, Mr. Paul, and Mr. Pincus of the committee
staff.
Senator SYMINGTON. I am sure you will be confirmed for any posi-
tion that you are asked to take by this administration because of the
respect of this committee for your record.
Before we do, however, we would like to ask you some questions
about the Greek situation. I ask these questions in two capacities-first
as chairman of the Subcommittee on Near East and South Asian Af-
fairs, which embraces Greece, and secondly, as chairman of an ad hoc
subcommittee looking into American commitments overseas, which
held a hearing day before yesterday on Greece and Turkey.
I just discussed this matter with the chairman who is in the debate
upstairs on the floor, and with his approval we would like you to take
the oath as we have with other witnesses.
Will you rise and raise your right hand. Do you swear the informa-
tion you give this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. MOCLELL AND. I do.
Senator SYMINGTON. I think you met Mr. Pincus and Mr. Paul.
Mr. MCCLELLAND. I have.
Senator SYMINGTON. As a followup to the hearings on Tuesday, Mr.
Paul suggested that there might be some more questions that he would
like to ask you.
Will you proceed?
Mr. PAUL. Mr. McClelland, when were you last in Greece?
TESTIMONY OF ROSWELL D. McCLELLAND, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO NIGER
Mr. MCCLELLAND. I left about 10-days ago on the 1st of June.
Mr. PAUL. What is the status of Greece today with respect to the
prospects for liberalization and more democratic ways?
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Mr. MCCLELLAND. Well, the, prospects are not as good as we would
like them to be. But the Greek Government is headed in the right
di rection.
flow rapidly they will progress and how satisfactorily is still not
entirely clear.
They have their constitution. [Deleted.]
Prime Minister Papadopoulos has assured the Ambassador on sev-
eral occasions in the last few months that he has every intention of
implementing this constitution, putting the articles into effect by the
end of this year.
There is, however, a lot of supporting legislation. Many of the ar-
ticles state that such and such a situation will prevail in accordance
with the laws. But in respect to many articles these laws have not yet
been drafted.
Mr. PAT-!. What are the prospects for setting a date for an election?
Mr. MCCTELLAND. Somewhat remote at the present time.
Mr. PAUL. What do you see, if I may ask you, as the American
role and responsibility in moving the Greek Government toward demo-
cratic processes?
Mr. McCr FTJ,AND. [Deleted.]
I think as a matter of their own interest they realize that they
have got sooner or later in response to both internal and external
pressure to get back to some form of representative government.
Mr. PAUL. But do we look upon it as in the interests of the United
States for them to return to democratic processes as well as in their
own interests.
Mr. MCCLFTA AND. I certainly think so, yes.
Mr. PAUL. We were told at the hearing earlier this week which the
chairman referred' to that the United States is in somewhat of a
dilemma because of its desire for a more democratic form of govern-
ment in Greece but also our need for Greece in NATO. But the commit-
tee is not fully apprized yet as to our need for Greece, and that creates
one horn of the dilemma.
Mr. McCLFLLANn. Well, I think we have operated on a premise
which I think is correct, that the facilities which Greece accords us
and accords to NATO are extremely important ones. Some of these
are related to NATO, some are more related to bilateral U.S. interests.
Mr. PAUr,. T can readily appreciate that with respect to the facility
at. Iraklion. Are You speaking of facilities other than at Iraklion as
important to us?
Mr. MCCLELLAND. There are a good many facilities, some of which
are related to NATO and some of which are bilateral, such as Nea
Makri.
Mr. PAUL. If I can just ask a question or two with respect to the
relationship of the Embassy personnel, on the one hand, and U.S.
military personnel, on the other hand, with the Greek Government,
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it being a military regime. How would you assess the relative effec-
tiveness of the two arms of the American official establishment, the
Embassy, on the one hand, and our military personnel who are sta-
tioned there and who visit there?
Mr. MCCLELLAND. I do not think we should make really a sharp
distinction. The MAAG chief operates under the Ambassador's di-
rection, participates in all of our staff meetings, and is bound by the
same policy that we are on the Embassy side of the House.
Mr. PAUL. Let me ask you in that regard, if I may, Mr. McClelland,
as you probably are aware, there are a number of statements in the
press suggesting that our military has tended to encourage the
junta in paths that are not completely consistent with that which
the State Department might wish. In this connection, for instance,
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak in the January 8, 1970, issue of
the Washington Post said, "The open and enthusiastic cheers for the
junta from U.S. military officers stationed in and passing through
Athens is a scandal to the rest of the diplomatic community."
I would appreciate your comment on that.
Mr. McCLELLAND. Well, I think that considerably is overstated.
The position of our military mission has been a difficult one profes-
sionally. Their job was to see to it that the Greek forces remained up
to a high level of performance in connection with NATO. It was
their program that paid the piper, so to speak since the military assist-
ance was cut back as an indication of our disapproval of the Greek
Government's political policy. So that the MAAG's mission was prej-
udiced. I think they understandably felt very unhappy about this as
professional military people.
They were paying a military price for certain political ends. But
to go beyond that and to say that for this reason they were disaffected
and took matters into their own hands, I think would not be correct.
Mr. PAUL. Have they had, to your knowledge, conversations with
various members of the junta that might have been out of line with
what you would have liked to have seen said?
Mr. MCCLELLAND. Not that we know specifically.
Mr. PAUL. What sort of restrictions has the Embassy attempted to
place upon our military personnel to avoid this risk?
Mr. MCCLELLAND. Well, I am not sure that it is a risk, or that the
Ambassador has placed restrictions on them.
I think that in regard to any policy discussions they may have had
with the Greek military the Ambassador has been fully informed.
Mr. PAUL. How long were you the acting head of the mission in
Athens? There was quite a time in which we did not have any ambas-
sador.
Mr. ]NCCLELLAND. Almost a year. Ambassador Talbott left on the
20th of January, 1969, and I left on home leave early in December.
Mr. Tasca had not yet arrived then.
Mr. PAUL. You said the Ambassador has placed his restrictions;
are you suggesting there has been a tightening up of restrictions with
the arrival of Ambassador Tasca?
Mr. MCCLELLAND. No, I certainly wanted to keep fully informed on
what the military were doing as did Ambassador Talbot. No, I do
not think it changed.
Mr. PAUL. You are satisfied with the reins that have been placed on
our military in Greece, and also those who pass through, as far as
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keeping there from making the Greek junta feel less concerned than
they should as to our displeasure with the order of things in Greece?
i11r. MCC.vCLELLAND. Well, it is a difficult situation for a military era::i
[deleted].
Mr. PAUL. I can appreciate that, but you also had dealings with the
('reek Government and it might be awkward for you, but I am sure
you still make your comments consistent with American policy, which
is fairly clearly stated.
Mr. MCCLELLAND. [Deleted.]
Mr. PAUL. Let me ask you a more general question: How do the
colonels look upon our large military presence in Greece, and our
continuation of some military assistance to them, as evidence of our
support for their regime regardless of statements made by American
military men?
Mr. MCCLELLAND. They-the colonels--certainly try, in fact go to
considerable lengths, to construe it as political support. This is of
course hard to knock down.
Mr. PAUL. Looking at military assistance, we had testimony this
week setting forth the level of military assistance that has, in fact,
gone on. This so-called selective e:in'bargo has limited it to some extent,
but really a rather large amount of military assistance has gone on.
So, as a political matter has this really been ineffective, the small
amount of military assistance that we have suspended, and even that
small amount was relieved after the Czechoslovakian invasion, to some.
extent.
Mr. McCLr LLAND. What?
Mr. PAUL. Isn't it true the, magnitude of our military assistance i3
such that essentially the Greeks are getting military assistance from
the United States for all practical political purposes?
Mr. MCCLELL AND. Well, they are certainly not getting some of the
items they need quite badly on military grounds.
Mr. PAUL. What are you referring to?
Mr. MOCLELLAND. In particular tanks, armored personnel carriers,
heavy artillery, strictly military weapons as distinct from smaller
arms.
Senator Sir3 NGTON..[f counsel will yield I would ask a couple of
questions. W hat have we given to Greece in the last. 12 months,
Mr. Ambassador?
Mr. MOCLiLLAND. I cannot give you the exact figures, Senator.
Senator SYMINGTON. But you must know roughly what it is.
Mr. MOCLELLAND. We'll?
Senator SYMINrTON. Have we given them planes and tanks?
Mr. 11-ICCLCLLANn. No ; no heavy equipment of that sort.
Senator SYMTNGTON. No heavy equipment.
have they asked for heavy equipment?
Mr. MCCLr.LLAND. They declared to us on numerous occasions that
the table of equipment and their [deleted] is very short [deleted].
Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think they need those tanks?
Mr. McCLELLnNn. Well, I think they do. There is an interesting
little remark that Sulzberger made in a recent "Foreign Affairs" ar-
ticle which has stuck in my mind. He said that whereas an M-48 tank
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is of very little added use over an M-47 for internal security purposes
it is a lot more useful on a frontier in a defensive situation.
Senator SYMINGTON. What do you think the results would be if we
cut off all arms to Greece?
Mr. MCCLELLAND. Well, the most serious result would be to under-
cut the credibility of the NATO deterrent that Greece represents.
Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think it would have any effect on the
position of the Papadopoulos' government with the people of Greece?
Mr. MCCLELLAND. As a symbol of political disapproval, I am sure
that it would shake things. In what direction they would be shaken is
a very tricky point. Would it soften them up or make it more intran-
sigent? That has begn our worry.
Senator SYMINGTON. Do the Greek people know of the arms ship-
ments we are making to Greece? Is that published?
Mr. MCCLELLAND. Well, I guess things are known, equipment comes
into the port overtly, goes into units, and a good many people know it
is coming in.
Senator SYMINGTON. Does it come out in the press?
Mr. MCCLELLAND. I would not say that it is publicized; no.
Senator SYMINGTON. Why not?
Mr. MCCLELLAND. I don't really know.
Senator SYMINGTON. But you must have thought about it if they are
keeping it secret.
Mr. MCCLELLAND. Well, I would not say they are keeping it secret.
Senator SYMINGTON. Why don't they publish it? It is a controlled
press, is it not?
Mr. MCCLELLAND. Less than it was, but it is still under considerable
constraint.
Senator SYMINGTON. Why isn't that information given to the
people?
Mr. MOCLELr AND. Well, I do not know as a matter of policy
Senator SYMINGTON. In other words, do they think it would weaken
them if they were connected with us? Why wouldn't they think it
would strengthen them to be getting these arms from us?
Mr. MCCLELLAND. I think they feel it would strengthen them.
Senator SYMINGTON. Then why don't they tell the people about it?
Have we asked them not to report it to the people of Greece?
Mr. MCCLELLAND. No, no; not to my knowledge.
Senator SYMINGTON. I just wondered. [Deleted.]
Let me shift to another line of questioning which rather intrigues
me.
There was a gentleman over there, a private citizen, who had con-
siderable position with the Greek Government, and he wanted to meet
the Prime Minister with you and me.
Mr. MCCLELLAND. Right.
Senator SYMINGTON. What was his name again ?
Mr. MCCLELLAND. Tom Pappas.
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1874
Senator SYMINGTON. I read somewhere that he gave a dinner for
Government officials and prominent Greeks like Mr. Onassis. What is
tie relationship, to the best of your knowledge, between Pappas and
Mr. Onassis?
Mr. MCCLET,LAND. I think they are rather considerable rivals at
the moment. Tom Pappas is is the oil business and Onassis has just
finished negotiating a very substantial economic agreement with the
Greek Government which is built around a large oil refinery, which
is going to undercut Tom Pappas' refinery in northern Greece.
In other words, they propose to put a ceiling on the output of
Pappas' refinery in order to accommodate Onassis' refinery, so they
are, business rivals.
Senator S YMTNGTON. I see.
Where does Mr. Ni arehos fit into this picture?
Mr. MCCLELLAND. Well, Niarchos is the No. 3 man in the picture,
so to speak.
He also negotiated an agreement with the Greek Government. He
mot the sort of tail end that was left. Just to indicate the order of
magnitude, Onassis' agreement, I think, covers investment on the
order of $fOO mill ion, while Niarchos came up with about $200 million.
He gets a it of the state refinery, including the contract to supply
crude ,and increase the output somewhat. There are going to be three
refineries, the old Pappas one in Thessaloniki, then the Aspro Pyrgos,
which is the state. refiner, near Athens. of which Niarchos is getting
a eat, and finally the new Onassis one at Megara.
Senator SYMIINGTON. Which of the three are the closest to this
particular regime?
Mr. MCCLET.LAND. Well, thev both have their contacts, according to
all evidence--we do not know definitely.
Senator SYMTNGToN. This is an executive session.
Mr. MGCT.ELLAND. [Deleted.]
Senator STMMINGTON. These three gentlemen are very rich people.
Is there any problem with respect to resentment on the part of the
Greek people about exploitation on the part of the United States?
Mr. McCLFLLAND. No, I certainly do not detect that they feel ex-
ploited in any way by us, economically.
Senator SYrINGTON. What is the reaction of the Greeks to our ad-
enture in South Vietnam?
Mr. MOCLET.LAND. They are all for us.
Senator SY_TINGTON. Indochina?
Mr. McCLEI,LAND. They are all for us. They feel this is a fight
against, communism, communist subversion, aggression, similar to the
one that they experienced, and they are; a hundred percent on our side.
GRFFCE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL
Senator SYMJEGTON. Would you say that the Israel Government is
also, in effect, fighting against Communist satellites?
YIr. MCCLELLAND. I would not go so far as to say they are satellites.
Senator SY~.IINGTON. As I remember it when I was there, there was
considerable resentment of the way the Greeks were handling the
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1875
problem, or not handling it, incident to their relationship with Israel
because of their sympathy with the United Arab Republic regime or
their fear of reprisal.
Mr. MGCLELLAND. I remember in your conversation [deleted] you
brought up the subject of why the Greeks did not have full-fledged
diplomatic relations with Israel.
Senator SYMINGTON. That is right.
If the premise is as you say that they support fully our efforts in
Indochina to resist against communist satellites in the Far East,
why do they feel differently about the efforts of Israel to resist com-
parable satellites in the Middle East?
Mr. MCCLELLAND. [Deleted.]
NUMBER OF GREEKS IN UAR
Senator SYMINGTON. How many Greeks are there in the UAR ?
Mr. MCCLELLAND. I would say something like 30,000 left out of a
colony of originally 120,000.
Senator SYMINGTON. Will Nasser let them go if they want to leave?
Mr. MCCLELLAND. Yes, but without their property. There has been a
great deal of confiscation of Greek property. They can go with a
suitcase and perhaps $500 when they may have had a factory and a
fortune there.
Senator SYMINGTON. I see.
How many Greeks are there in Israel?
Mr. MCCLELLAND. I do not know, sir.
I would think very few.
Senator SYMINGTON. Syria-very few. Are there any Greek colonies
in Iraq?
Mr. MCCLELLAND. Iraq, Syria, some in Lebanon, I believe. Egypt
really has the main Greek group. The Greeks also have quite a sub-
stantial interest in Libya. The Greek sponge fishing fleets operate off
Libya and they are anxious to keep their relations good with that
country.
STABILITY OF PRESENT REGIME
Senator SYMINGTON. In early 1967, as I remember it, there was a
feeling on the part of the monarchy, or the King himself, that things
would go well, but things did not go well when he made his effort to
capture power and he is still in Italy.
Mr. MCCLELLAND. Right.
Senator SYMINGTON. Is there any chance, in your opinion, of his
returning?
Mr. McCLELLAND. Not in the immediate future.
IDeleted.1
Senator' SYMINGrON. We have, as you know, a continuing fostering
of resistance against the present Greek Government, perhaps led by
Andreas Papandreou..
Mr. MCCI ELLAND. Andreas, the son.
Senator SYMINGTON. Andreas, yes; Andreas Papandreou, right.
Tlhese names;-itre hard for me to remember.
Mr. MCCI.ELLAND, I can understand that because.I haveAroub*ie with?
them, too.
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25X1 C
Senator SYMTNGTON. What do you think is the future? Is Papa-
dopoulos nailing down his authority more and do you think it is
going to be a relatively permanent regime or do you think he is just
holding his own and his position with the other colonels is bei-ig
weakened?
1Tr. MCCLELLAND. I think his position is pretty solid.
Senator SYMINOTON. You feel the majority of the Greek people are
behind him ?
Mr. MCCLELLAND. Well, that is a difficult point. [Deleted.]
Senator SSYli-INOTON. If they had a really free election, do you think
the majority of the people would support Papadopoulos?
Mr. )VICO EIL,AND. [Deleted.]
Senator SYMTNOTON. Senator Javits.
Senator JAVrrs. I thank the witness very much for his very illumi-
nating testimony.
Senator SYMIxow)N. That was also my feeling toward this witness.
He was most informative when I was in Athens, and I appreciated
it.
GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS
Senator JAVITS. I would like to ask one question before you get
through.
Have you said anything about Greek-Turkish relations?
Mr. MCCI:ELLAND. No,, sir.
Senator DAVITS. As you know, I am identified with a project with
this Greek-Turkish matter. I haven't gone into Greece since the regime
took over, but the project has been pushed along in the best way Ave
can.
Would you have any observations about it? Is it worth carrying on?
Does it have enough of an impact in the area of Greek-Turkish rela-
tions to warrant the time, attention, and some money?
h'fr. Mc:CLELLANn. I think very definitely it does.
Senator JAvlis. It is not U.S. Government.
Mr. MOCLELI ANn. No; I know. I saw Sy Rubin quite recently when
he was there.
Senator JAVITS. You think it is a good thing?
Mr. MCCLELLAND. T think it is. The Greeks and Turks have a long-
standing enmity and problem over Cyprus, as you know, and any areas,
iairtieularly functional ones, such as you are working on, that they can
be brought together on is to the good.
Senator TAVTTS. The Evros River and tourism and fisheries are ap-
parently the three major areas that they have been able to do things on,
so it is looking pretty good.
Well, thank you very much. Ii; has been a job for me, and I just
kind of wanted to sound you out.
Mr. MrCLELLANf. I Wink it is well worth continuing.
Senator JAVIITS. The Turks think so, Dimirel is very partial to this.
and I have been assured by Pipinelis and Caglayangil, their respective
Foreign Ministers, but it is good to get your statement.
l T T , r ? ~ ~
ih_tsto
-_YO1CP Lef_ xl1~Tl(: -IeS we__itip i n (TrPe~a, 2
GREEK USE OF VOA FACILITIES ' T
Mr. PA '9 nQ
kUt,X'r i x mt&did the. Greeks hav fnr ~~th~
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Mr. MCCLELLAND. Yes. The VOA Thessaloniki transmitter, the old
one, the medium wave unit, I would say, gives probably over 80 per-
cent of its time to the Greek broadcasting service. They use it par-
ticularly for broadcasts in Greek into Eastern Europe, because you
can get medium wave into Rumania, Bulgaria, and the neighborhood
countries.
Mr. PAUL. To what extent do we have coordination as to what they
broadcast?
Mr. MCCLELLAND. None.
We have no control over their programs, nor do they over ours.
Mr. PAUL. At the time of the countercoup, did the King seek to use
one of these facilities to broadcast?
Mr. MCCLELLAND. No.
Mr. PAUL. Was there any incident in which the King sought to use
American facilities in connection with his countercoup?
Mr. MCCLELLAND. Not that I know of, he didn't.
U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE
Mr. PAUL. Just one or two other questions, if you will, Mr.
McClelland.
It has been reported in the press that Ambassador Tasca has rec-
ommended full resumption of heavy arms military assistance to
Greece.
Do you believe we should resume full military assistance to Greece?
Mr. MCCLELLAND. Well, my personal opinion on a highly conten-
tious issue of that kind is only one man's opinion.
I think the military assistance and its resumption is a part of a
much bigger complex. It is only one element of the situation.
If you look at it on purely strategic military grounds, the answer
would obviously be "Yes."
If you look at it on political grounds, the impact in NATO, for
example, the answer would probably not be so clear a "Yes."
If our restoring military assistance, for instance, were to precipi-
tate a major division inside NATO, that would certainly have to be
taken into account.
Mr. PAUL. Do the Greeks follow our negotiations with Spain?
Mr. MCCLELLAND. Not to the best of my knowledge; no.
Mr. PAUL. Finally, did the facility at Iraklion or any other Ameri-
can facility receive any significant equipment or personnel as a result
of the phaseout at Wheelus?
Mr. MCCLELLAND. Not that I know of.
Mr. PAUL. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SYMINGTON. We are grateful to you
Mr. MCCLELLAND. I am happy to help you.
Senator SYMINGTON (continuing). And wish you the best of luck
in your new post.
Mr. MCCLELLAND. Thank you, Senator.
I hope you come and visit us.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. It would be a pleasure to see you.
(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock, the subcommittee adjourned.)
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SUMMARY INDEX
Page
Arab-Israel conflict_____ ___________________________ 1813-15,1862,1874-75
Armed Forces, U.S.:
Ankara------------------------------------------------ 1862
Facilities-------------------- 1802-03,1821,1831,1846-47,1860-62,1864
Izmir------------------------------------------------------ 1862-63
JULMAT---------------------------------------------------- 1866
Labor difficulties--------------------------- 1866
Operating costs----------------------------------------- 1846-47,1860
Personnel------------------------------------------------- 1802,1860
Relation to Greek military------------------------- 1817,1838-39,1870
CENTO------------------------------------------------------ 1855, 1858
Commitments, NATO---------------------------------------------- 1780
Commitment, U.S------------------------------------------------- 1771
Communism------------------------------------------------------ 1784
Congressional consultation------------------------------------------ 1804
Coup, Greek----------------------------------------------- 1781-82,1811
Cyprus------------------------------------------ 1774-75,1822,1835,1848
Declassification------------------------------------------------- 1823
Dominican republic------------------------------------------------ 1789
11conomic assistance, U.S------------------------------------------- 1822
Fulbright, Senator J. W.:
Examination of witnesses:
Davies, Rodger------------------------------------------- 1782,
1784-85, 1787-93, 1795-96, 1799, 1800, 1805-12, 1814, 1817-20
Pranger, Robert ------------ 1782-84 1787-90 1795-96 1801-04 1812
Torbert, H. G--------------------------------------------- 1799
Vigderman, Alfred G-------------------------------- 1810-11 1818
Greek-Turkish relations-------------------------------------------- 1876
See also "Cyprus."
Greek-United States relations_______________________________________ 1781
See also "Armed Forces, U.S.: relation to Greek military."
Javits, Senator J. K.:
Examination of witnesses:
Davies, Rodger------------------------------------------ 1812-17
McClelland, Roswell D_____________________________________ 1876
Pranger, Robert----------------------------------------- 1815-16
Korean conflict---------------------------------------------------- 1821
Mediterranean theatre_____________________________________________ 1833
Soviet."
" " See also "Policy
,
Military assistance European----------------------------------- 1795, 1837
Military assistance U.S.:
Aircraft------------------------------------------------------- 1800
Ammunition-------------------------------------------------- 1801
Congressional consultation-------------------------------------- 1798 General________________________ 1785,1789,1821,1841-42,1865,1872-73
MAAG--------------------------------------------------- 1800,1865
NATO allies attitude__________________________________________ 1791
Suspension______________________________ 1796,1798-99,1836,1841,1844
Tasca report_________________________________________ 1827,1844,1877
Montreux convention______________________________________________ 1817
(1879)
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1880
Nuclear weapons Page
----------------------------------------------- 1796,1805
Papandreou, Andrea,S_.--------------------------------------------- 1840
Pant, Rolanr' A. (committee counsel) :
Examination of witnesses:
Cash, Frank. --------------------------------------- 1862-64,1866
Davies, Rodger -------------------------------------------- 1774,
1797, 1829-31, 1835-38, 1840-41, 1845-48, 1854--56, 1858--59,
1862, 1864-66
11c.Cielland., Roswell D----------------------------- 1869-72, 1876-77
Pranger, Robert------------------------ 1774,
1796-97, 1838-39, 1841-44, 1846-47, 1855, 1860-62, 1864-67
Vigderman, Alfred G------------------------------ 1838, 1863, 1865
['ell, Senator Claiborne:
Examination of witnesses:
Davies, Rodger-------------------------------------------40324-29
['ranger? Robert---- ------------------------- 1828
Vigderman, Alfred G-------------------------------------- 1825-26
t-'olicv:
Soviet--____------ _ 1812, 1816, 1833
Turkish------------------------------ 1820--21
U.S.--_ _ 1784,1788,1807-08,1810,1823,1826-27,1830,1870
Political structure, (Preece:
Constitution--- ------------------------------- 1791--93
Democracy ------------------------------ 1807--08, 1825-26, 1829-30, 1875
Political structure, Turkish_-------------------------------------- 1859
Prominent Greeks------------------------------------------------- 1873
Ship visits -------------------------------------------------- 1831-32,1864
Spanish base negotiations ._------------------------------------------ 1846
Strategic importance ------------------------------------------------- 1170
Symington, Senator Stuart:
Examination of witnesses:
Davies, lodger-- ----------------------------------------- 1770-
72, 1774-75, 1780, 1783, 1797-99, 1800, 1814, 1821-24, 1832-35,
1840.
Krebs, Capt. Edward --------------------------------------- 1783
McClelland, Roswell D------------------------------------- 1872-77
Pranger, Robert--------------------- 1775-76, 1783, 1796, 1816, 1833
Quinn, Charles W------------------------------------------- 1783
Torbert, H. G------------------------------------------- 1798-99
Vigderman, Alfred G---------------------------------------- 1840
Wolf, Joseph J----------------------------------------- 1796,1824
Threat---------------------------------------------------- 1795
Turkey-U.S. relations--------------------------------------------- 1834-35
See also "Cyprus."
Vietnam------------------------------------------------------- 1789,1874
Voice of America------------- - - - - - - - --- _----------------- 1817, 1819, 1824
Vlachou, Eleni------------------------------------------------ 18091811
11 -ter
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 ILLEGIB
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Approved For Release 2001/07/26 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000100110004-2