U-2 BACKGROUND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00310R000100460001-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 19, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 4, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

I
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attached memorandum pry erred by
Houston as part of a package for
Senator Stennis.
copies were given to Col. White and
70
? 4 August 1970
ck Maury on 4 August 19
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OGC SUBJECT ESPIONAGE
OGC Has Reviewed
SUBJECT: U-2 Background
known that aerial photography of Russia would provide important
information on such military.. targets.
2. After consulting all the experts, President Eisenhower
directed the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of
the Air Force to collaborate in the secret development and procure-
1. During the missile crisis of the early 1950s, classic
intelligence collection efforts against the carefully guarded Soviet
missile target were virtually useless. However, it had long been
t
ment of a capability for overflight. Lockheed Corporation had
already designed the basic concept of the U-2, which had been
rejected by the Air Force as unsuitable for tactical intelligence
needs. But, CIA believed it was the best available design for
strategic overflights, primarily because of its unequalled altitude
capability. The Air Force concurred.
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3. From the very first consideration of the U-2 program
it was recognized that security was all important, as it was estimated
that the Russians, with the equipment they then had, could not shoot
down the U-2 at altitude but that if they knew that the U-2 was being
built and what its capabilities were they could develop surface-to-
air missiles which would be effective.
4. CIA believed that its procurement methods would assure
a high degree of protection and when the Bureau of the Budget took
the initial position that the building of airplanes should be done by
the Air Force, senior representatives of the Air Force agreed that
their procurement methods probably could not assure adequate security
and CIA's procedures would give much greater assurance of such
protection. CIA, therefore, undertook the development and planning
of the entire program for procurement and operation of the U-2.
5. A letter of intent was given to Lockheed at the end of
December 1954, and the first plane flew in August 1955. This
unprecedented speed, resulting from intensive supervision of the
program, was important from a security point of view as the
sooner the plane was operational the less opportunity would be
given to the Russians to develop countermeasures.
6. The first USSR overflight was in July 1956. For four
years the U-2 covered the length and breadth of the USSR, bringing
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back photographic coverage of hundreds of thousands of square
miles, including mos k: ? ~r the strategic areas.
7. Due to the elaborate security precautions taken by CIA
in the procurement, testing, and operational stages, it was many
months before the first inkling of the U-2's existence appeared in
the western press. During this time the Russians were aware that
overflights were being made, but it took them a considerable period
of time to ascertain what the capabilities of the machine were and
what countermeasures would be needed. Indeed, there.is still
a question whether it was not more luck than improved equipment
which brought about the shoot down of Gary Powers in 1960, thus
ending the USSR overflights.,-
8. Without CIA's concentration on strategic intelligence
programs, its know-how in secure procurement and operations, and
its streamlined management procedures, it is probable that the U-2
operation would not have taken place and the United States would have
been without one of the most successful intelligence operations in
history at a very critical time.
9. Aside from the resolution of the missile problem, the
U-2 program produced an over-all evaluation of USSR atomic
capability during the period 1956-1960, accurate prediction of the
1956 Middle East war through photography of military preparations,
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and positive identification of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962.
These are but some of the most significant of the many, many
contributions of the U-2 program.
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3 August 1970
YJ.-2 BACKGROUND
During 1954 the problems of defense against
surprise missile attack by the Soviet Union occupied the
attention of those people who bore the responsibility for
the nation's security. Secrecy surrounding Soviet national
defense efforts and Soviet hostility virtually negated
classic intelligence collection efforts against the missile
target. For many years it had been clear that aerial
photography of Russia would provide direct knowledge of
her growth, new centers of activity, and possible military
targets.
2. In 1954 Dr. Edwin Land headed a Presidential
Technological. Capabilities panel, Office of Defense
Mobilization, which addressed itself to the lack of
information re14tive to Soviet defense and missile capabil-
ities and what measures the US could adopt to learn more
about this. The Panel concluded that it would be desirable
to institute an overflight program such as was offered in
the U--2 proposal. This conclusion was later endorsed during
1954 `when a special Study Group, under General Jimmy Doolittle,
recommended the development of a high altitude photographic
reconnaissance capability. On 24 November 1954 President
Eisenhower agreed that there was a requirement for re-
connaissance flights, and he directed the Director of
central Intelligence and the Secretary of the Air Force
to collaborate in the secret development and procurement of
a capability for overf iiff To assure secrecy, information
as to funds allocated for this purpose was -carefully
controlled. The first aircraft was delivered on 25 July 1955,
with the first flight on 5 August 1955, less than nine
months after the decision to proceed. The first U-2
operational mission took place on 20 June 1956 with an
overflight of Poland, with the first USSR overflight on
4 July of that year.
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for up to two years of the four-year overflight effort*
shoot the U.2 down. Secrecy as to the altitude capability
and other details aaboua aircraft must have delayed
the Soviets in their defensive efforts and may have accounted
activities. Even after they were aware of the overflights,
it took almost four years to acquire the capability to
surrounded it. Had the Soviets known that-M a 'rcra 't
was being developed, they could have started work on
defensive equipment to shoot it down. They might also
have tried to hide some of the more important military
3. The entire U_2 program from 1956 to 1960 owes
its success to a very great extent to the secrecy which
reducing the cost.
reporting and documentation could be eliminated, therefore p
technique which CIA procurement practices over and above
those of the more elaborate military regulations. It was
felt that CIA could offer a sole source procurement with
far less repercussions and reviews than would be necessary
in the DOD establishment. Further, normal DOD contractual
A second consideration was the streamline management
organization, undertake a covert program of selected flights.
being shot down over enemy territory. Rather than have
the effort interpreted as a military aggressive act (no
statesman, as Land put it, could run the risk of provocation
towards war) it was deemed appropriate that CIA, a civilian.
could be grave political repercussions to an ,overflight
4. In addition to the ability of CIA to conduct the
development of the U-2 program in secrecy, there were
several other factors which prompted the assignment of
this program to CIA. First was the realization that there
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5. Some important accomplishments by the U-2 air-.
craf t;.,were
a. Overall strategic evaluation of USSR atomic
capability during the period 1956-1960.
b. Prediction of the 1956 Middle East war. Based
on U-2 photography, the time of the invasion was
predicted very accurately indeed.
c. Positive identification of Soviet missiles in
Cuba in 1962.