THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S 'SITUATION REPORTS,' 1947-1951

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00121A000100020002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1951
• Content Type: PAPER

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'I aL NTELLirENCE AGENCY+S "ST" ATION R PO1TSr'" 1947.1951
Paper No. 10
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AtEI+tCY'S u SITUATION REPORTS," 1917-1951
Between 19:7 and 1951s the Central Intelligence Agency proceed
gence handbooks whose primary purpose was to arrive at conclusions
printed documents called "Situation Reports." These were
regarding the relationship of a given country or area to the security
interests of the United States. Along with these conclusions, the
on Reports furnished detailed date concerning the politic
military, economic, and diplomatic status of each country treated, in
rms of the time when the Report was published.
The Situation Report program was never popular. The Office of
Reports and Estimates of Central Intelligence, which produced the
Reports, accepted the burden with great reluctance. The program was
strongly criticized in the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report of 1 January
1949. Beginning in 1948, the intelligence arms of the Departments of
Arn*y, Navy, and the Air Force became increasingly resistant to
the Series as an unnecessary burden upon themselves.
Reports were produced by a slow, laborious process and were
often out of date before they were published. Some of then were of
lower quality than should have been permissible under the circumstances.
Some set as high a standard for intelligence of their type as could
reasonably be asked.
e than anything else, the weaknesses in the Situation Report
program were a consequence of confased planning in the early stages of
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the formation o
el.ligence, To begin with, there seems to
on no disposition on the part of those who initiated the program
over whether or not the facilities for its accomplishment were
tent. Second, there were involved, not one but three ideas as to
she program should be. Third, officials shoved a greater willingness
to ,sake plans for the program than to furnish aid in csrzying them out.
weld not be correct to say that the Situation Reports served
ood purpose, but neither would it be correct to say that (as finally
developed) they were appropriately allocated to a central intelligence
Because the Situation Reports were forced upon Central Intelli-
however, they consumed an immense amount of its tune, much of
which might better have been expended in other activities.
II. BACKGROUND
Lion Report program baeca a reality early in 1947, partly,
least, as a result of ideas on the role of the Central Intelligence
up as a research activity that became current after the adoption of
Directive of the National. Intelligence Authority in July, 1946.
Such ideas often concerned the Group's Office of Reports and Estimates
which was called upon to perform many marginal functions (including the
on of Situation Reports) before it was ready for them. (See No.
ng to a mov randum written in the Office of Reports and
d dated May 18, 1949 the origin of the program was as foliowsa
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*The SRI a had a tea-fold origin. Within ORE, as early as 196,
there was a feeling that estimates produced could be substantiated by
studies of the basic situation in each country. Pendi
completion
of the NIS series, a series of brief basic situation studies was felt
to be the answer,
handbooks of small sire and limited content, for high-level briefin
time, upon instruction from `NO, ONI
apprrached CIA with the inquiry whether CIA could provide basic country
area of this requirement by CIA was verged with the OR
The actual origin might better be described as three-lbld than
project,, and the result was, the SR series."'
d, for there were three distinct elements in it. The "feeling"
e Office of Reports and Estimates in 1946 was that it might
his, on occasion, to supplement bare estimates with detailed
e there could be presumed to be doubts over the authenticity
of the estimates or ignorance, of some of the factors underlying them.
Such studies, h^rwever, would have been produced. only when they were
acaaired.
The second element in the origin of the Reports was an essentially
nt ideas having to do with the recurrent rather than occasional
L proposed that the Office of Repeats and Estimates "issue
issuance of intelligence studies., The idea is summed up in a -aerorandum
to the Assistant Directors Reports and Estimates, from F. K. Wright,
tDeputy Director of Central Intelligence, dated January 13, 1947. General
on the several strategic areas of the rld,..,on a
basis. Each new issue should supersede the previous issue, the
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being recalled for destruction. Strategic Intelligence Esti tes
should also be prepared by the motional Branches for their seve
subjects. If well done and kept currently up to date1 these estimates
should come to be regarded as forming a handbook for the reference
purposes of policy officers and intelligence chiefs....'i
General Wright's approach to the problem of the Central Intelligence
Panction in providing guidance to the formation of policy was shared
Intelligance field including some in the Office of Reports
and Estimates. (See Nos. and ) The majority of the latter,, however.,
a of the target. They so a spare sed themselves in a r. randum
to any such attest to hit the bullseye by covering the
`anuary 31, 1947 which reads in part as follos "....the draft
(proposes? a series of monthly situation reports, yet another
rrerzt reporting. Such overemphasis upon routine.. periodic
tably divert the attention and aims of ORE from the
. or of emer
analysis of fundamental protalems, as exemplified in 1ORE
gent critical, situations as they develop or are foreshadowed. The
already projected programs for the ORE series contemplates the prepara-
of general coverage of fundamental studies, as a basis for
determination of requirements and as a plane
;nt analyses of emergent situations. Such subsequent report
however, should be produced as indicated b
2
rather than on a routines, periodic basis,"
eveloping situation
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paper was prepared in connection with the
frt (See No. ) 3e. folder on that sabb watt
Files,
"Situation Report" folder in historic. Files.
also No. ahere much the same idea was proposed in
onnection .tb the "Defense Project.
nation Report's folder in Historical
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Whether or not Genera. ?Jright's demands for periodical intelligence
reporting miht have prevailed in any case, action in this
was made certain through a request from the Chief. of Navsi Intelli ence
the Director of Central Intelligence forwarded in January, 1911?.
The Navyt s request was not for anything, quito as elaborate as the
the thl.re element in the origin of the situation Report program.
Reports berme, ,mat Adrr:iral Inglis as Chief of Naval Irit elliw
gence seems to have been seeking was a relatively modest set of handbook
provide. genera. fnfori tior on various foreign countries for
benefit of persons who were not familiar with these. The Office of
Naval Intelligence had itself begun work on such a project and sent the
was that the Ce:itrel. Intelligence Group take over an complete this
or, along with its requests samples of what it had dome. The pro-
project as, in effect, a service of no on concern.
It would probably have been difficult for General Vandenberg to
the Navy's request. Six months had passed since he had prey
upon the National. Intelligence Authority to authorize a research function
irodiction of intelligence during that period,, As General "alright
tral Intelligence. No notable increase had taken place in the
had observed in his memorsndum of January 13 (see above), people were
asking "when G is going to produce intellii ence.* It wits true that
what the Navy had asked i'sr involved basic research which was not among
the activities contemplated for the Group's estimating evpartmant; yet
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The Navy's me.rrorandum has not yet. come to light in ? files,
*situation teportw !older in Ri$torneal Men ibr a aop
this se*oraada.
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in view of Vaanderbergaz suacssasful efforts to gain acceptance of the Fifth
Directive, it might have seemed unwise to balk on that ac
fallacy, if any, was not so such in accepting the I avy-ts
proposal as in doing so without consulting the Office that would be
cl ergea?. with ra eponstbiltty for the conseruence of accepting It. Instead
e Director seems to have done after accepting the ttavyt
request,
pass it on to the Interdepartmental Cocrdiraaatirg and Planning Staff
rather than the office of Reports and Estimates for further action.. This
Eta" night, in turn, have called upon the Office of Reports and Estimates
for cars nt or to draw up plans, but instead, it proceeded entirely on i,
Own, The Office of Reports and Estimates, in fact, knew nothing about
the t^uik in store for it until it received a mer,raanc for the late
departmental Coordination and Planning Staff dated February 26, 1947,1
calling for production of the new Reports.
The Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff, which could
not be considered the ideal group to draw up plans fbr the production of
because it was insufficiently frsiiiar with the practical
problems involved, was aware of the program. suggested by ? eneraa1, Wright
a month before (see above), The Staff apparently believed that it could
cotttbine,Wright I s ideas on periodical intelligence coverage with the
series of country studies suggested 1 the Office of Naval Intelligence,
what the Coordinating and Planning Staff proposed in its memorand
bruaryr 26th ways, in effect, a repetition of W rightts whelps of
January, now complicated by the Navl' a proposals for what was essentially
ogether different type of stu r.
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The Coordinating and Planning Staff called for separate studies
he s strategi c and national policy aspects" of each country
should be analyzed, There were also to be "functional" (as opposed
aseui th
itudies. All these were to be written at a very rapid
month) and were to be brought up to date monthly. 'thus.,.
to be worked out--the policy rakers would have before
and scientific problems) which could be kept in mind in relation
or other appropriate geographical area'" (as well as analyses Of
tegic analyses, with complete background,; of "each signifies
day-to-day events reported by Central Intelligence in the current
In addition,, the *OEM* series of reports and estimates was
to be continued to provide analytical coverage of develonts as they
emerged,
pint of view of the Office of Reports and Istimatee,
not only open to all the objections already set forth
of January 31, 1947 above) but it contained the added
drawback of being naive. For any orgaidsation to prodece the type of
publication wanted in the quantity wanted, and with the constant revi-
specified, would be a monumental task. The Office of orts and
tea was as yet very far from prepared for any part of such a
teak, even supposing that under any circumstances this was the sort of
work it ought to be doing.
All protests from the Office;, however, were uratbill,
Despite
^P nfficsers_ held on ikrch 5, l947, at which the proposal was
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unanimously declared to be outrageous, and de
randum of protest
d by the Assistant Director for Reports and.IstiMtes, the program
became the duty of the Office of Reports and Estimates to
ory. (For above see also No. Is pp.
find ways and weans whereby at least the equivalent of the proposed pro-
however impractical, could be carried out. 'Analyses i
and national policy aspects" of a country was a description
too broad to furnish much guidance. The specification later furnished
by the Planning Staff that Situation Reports were not to be merely
:other form of current intelligence" was inconsistent with the demand
for tim elinesel while the admonition that Situation Reports were not
be ebasic intelligence,* if observed, would tend to rule out the sort
of study the Navy wantted.
The concept of what a Situation Report Was to be was somewhat
ed when the eubbect was discussed at the tenth me
Intelligence Authority, hold on June 26, 1947. Actor
to the statement
ankl oetter at this meetings the Situation
o be concise, loose-leaf handbooks,, kept up to date, and
.odically by an *overan analysis of the world situation
step further. First, the Central Intelligence Group would
ON Rillenkoetterta statement, in other words,,, carried
*Vp93r ha -_ ks (extensiveness not specified) on each significant
ould dial
d with respect to each 'functional" specialty. Then i'
from, these something in the form of *strategic intelligence
would be kept up to date in monthly revisions.
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ly, it would combine these strategic analyses into a sort of was
situation estimate, which it would issue periodically.
he spring of 1947, when the Situation Repo
three, only
sideration. The first was
related, ids" to take into
onoeept of broad
strategic estimates periodically issued and regularly kept up to dat+
second the Navy plan for producing intelligence handbooks of general
information, and finally the idea held by the Office of Reports and
Estimates of producing detailed strategic studies in cases where they
were needed to explain or document a situation needing analysis, What
would actually emerge was left largely up to the Office of Reports and
Estimates.
Obviously, the new program, however it was develop
aced to the National Intelligence Survey series (See
which was already planned and in progress. It should be not
theleea, that this relationship does not seen to have been d
with reference to the Situation Reports at the time when Situation
Reports were being proposed. The reason undoubtedly lay in the fact
that during the spring of 1947 the Survey program was in such an amorphous,
state that it was not seriously considered as an effort that sight
vntuauy come into competition with others. Although the two programs
e xisteed side by side from the beginning, there is no evidence to show that
the Situation Report Series was deliberately .planned as a stopgap measure
to provide intelligence studies until the National Intelligence Surveys
should be completed.
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. PRODUCTION OF Tf R PORTS
h, 1947s it became necessary for the Office of karts and,
es to find the practical means whereby the somewhat theoretical
end conflicting theories concerning Situation Reports might be made a
concrete reality, The recurrent comprehensive analyses fostered by
the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff had already been,
`e et, rejected by the Office of Reports and Estimates and we:
beyond the capabilities of the Office in any case. The Office's own
concept of analyses relating to particular situations was still possible
but was rendered difficult if the Navy-sponsored list were to be followed.
The matter of length and emphasis was still left undertermined and
would have to develop, The demand for timely and current Reports was
too wide-spread to be ignored. It would certainly be desirable to avoid
imple basic intelligence if for no other reason in view of the conflict
that would eventually ensue with the basic Intelligence program.
'
had
of compromise was in order. The Office of Reports and Estimates
Is choice but to proceed with plans of its own devising and
esulte.
first stela toward initiation on an actual progra
of the Estimates Staff of the Office of Report$ and Estimates (See No. 1.
circulated to all regional branches, an outline on the basis of
k might be begun on the Situation Reports. This outline did
hen divide the projected reports into four sections;
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cal, Economic, Foreign Affairs, and Military.
have been sufficient for the use of persons who knew
n the reports or who were capable of evolving on an acceptable
concept of their own. Inevitably, however, the actual irk of preparin
nation reports was turned over to young and inexperienced members of the
regional staffs. The manuscripts that they produced in haste,, on the bas
of the first outline,
sappointing, being in most cases reminiscent
of the Encyclopedia Britannica.
When the first outline was found to be inadequate for the purpose,
was revised by the Chief of the "Projects Division".,1 rewritten by
of his office, and accepted by the Chief of the Intelligence Staff
and all chiefs of branches. An such, it was distributed throughout the
Office as a "Check List fbr CIA Situation Reports." This documen
undated but must have been prepared during the spring of 19b'T. $*se-
quent3.ys, other and more elaborate instructions relating to separate
sections of the Reports were prepared and circulated., but generally
speaking, this first check list became the foundation for all Situation
Reports that were produced.
The Check List divided the Reports into a Summary ; chapter's on
Economic, Military and Diplomatic offices; and sections
on "Strategic Considerations Affecting US Security," and "Probable
Future Developments Affecting US Security." There were also to be
'ormational appendixes. The sub-sections were in the form of a
questionnaire, for examples
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` of this outline is in the O9ttuatioa
!"ile$.
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:ernent4 Structu
practice
organization and functions of the principal branches (Executive
) The theoretical structure of the Go
(2) The form and operation of the Government
here is a difference)?
ve, Judicial)?
b. Are civil liberties as -uudeeratood in the US allowed?
(This would include control of press, radio, etc.)?"
idea seems elenmentary, it should be noted again that the persons
actually working on the Reports were in need of guidencG.l
Is to evident, this Check List, produced upon the best assumptions
Office could rake in the spring of 19I7, neceeseari
for the future. It meant that Situation Reports volild become
h data as seemed required for the purpose. Taking into con-
or area to the United States. These statements would be backed
is concerning the strategic relationship of a
acton again, however,, the type of analyst who wa;% to do the actin.
work, it was natural that too much attention was likely to be given to
detailed area information, whether directly germane to strategic con.
n Reports to become s ll compendia of information rather than
,one or not. Hence there was a tendency, difficult to stop entirely,,
*strategic au alyyses."
irst priority for production was giveen to the ,country
ad in the first Instance by the Office of Nav
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.a3?
tlbania, Bulgaria, Csechoslovakia, Ru egary, Poland,
Yugoslavia,, Finland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Iceland,
y, Igypt
the Arab States, Korea, China, India, Sian, and Indochina,. The
n because it may be interesting to compare it with
the successive Reports as produced,.
The first Report actually published was on Turkey (disseminated
bruary and March 1947 culminating in the Presidents* request to
1947), The reasons, of course, is to be found in the events of
for appropriations to aid Greece and Turkey in opposing
The interest on the part of Congress in Turkey accelerated
work on the Turkish Situation Report which was actually used by Con-
onal Committees. Because the Report on Turkey had to be
astily produced, it was revised and republished in December 1948, This
was, however, the only one of the Situation Reports that was ever revised.
The Turkish Report having been completed on an extraordinary basisj,
obien arose of an order of priority for the rest of the program.
the method would have been to determine which world strategic
:tions were most pressing and to write successive reports accordingly.
Such a plan? however, would have been impractical.
In May, l9117, the Office of Reports and Estimates was not fully
staffed in any department -certainly for the purpose of research.
Throughout the organisation it was true that while one subregion within
a regional branch might be adequately manned, another would be barely
nder such circumstances, it was manifestly
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political and economic point of view. It should be
would have to be the ability of the Office to produce any
in accordance with
priority, small in area and population and relatively simple
to publish it soon,, and to use it as a
touch
ference
In practice, however, Albania proved less side a problem than
Nonce the selection of Albania, as a strategic country
had been anticipated. It became Situation Rep
ublished until Septesber,, 1947. It might be mentioned in passing that
Reports on other Soviet "satellites," all of which had been planned for
because they ranked high on the Navy request,
d with the exception of ?Ru*ania" which came out in
r, 1.99.
Meanwhile, other *simple" problems were attacked. Specs
Donnark and Norway, although they wero not considered of great immediate
strategic consequence, seemed to present easily realizable goals*
shed (as No, 3) in August; that on Sorwa-
could not be completed until October.
Simultaneously, the 'Far pastern" branch of the Office of Reports
and Estimates concentrated on gorea,aasnAll country with important strategic
iae licaetions, for which the facilities for producing a study happened
nd. The lorean Report (No. 2
in August,
a completed along with the
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terminolocy is used because it was that in force during
period under ,consideration. What was then a '"Branch
it be caned a *Division.*
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-15ia
was published in October. (Yet a Report on tden, which was given No.
7 because
id to appear along with those on Norway and Denmark
was not actually published until April 1949.)
ght) were produced during the last seven. months of 19117 as
may be interesting to note that the sae number of situation
were published during the whole year 1949, despite the fact that the
Office of Reports and Estimates was much larger during the latter ye
than - it had been in the fo rmer, and had two years a experience to go on.
reason could probably be found in the dwindling pressure on Central
cc to produce this type of intelligence and the growing demands
for other types; the developing difficulties of inter-agency coordination
and an aversion to the program within the Office of Reports and Estimates.
This aversion was not unnatural. The Office was never co nvi
ese, burden. Furthermore, although the Office had been
rability of the program and tended to look on it as an added,
required to undertake the program, it was not given all the support it
d for such an assignment. For example,; on April 16, 1917, the chief
l
of the Latin American Branch
` of the Office of Reports and Estimates
decided that his Branch should concentrate on Situation Reports and made
a proposal for the betterment of the program. It will be impossible,"
he stated, "to produce even reasonably adequate Situation Reports on Latin
America for the following reasons t (a) a serious shortage of personnel
experienced or qualified on this area.. ?.." and (b) a lack of even the
most basic elements of intelligence information on practically every
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country in Latin America.." He therefore aroposed that employees of
his Branch be detailed to specific embassies in Latin fn rica for a
period of fouzr r4onths, during which they would gather material, thus
not only making it possible to produce superior Situation Reports but
ving the quality of the employees and of the Branch files. On
April 22.. however, the Assistant Director declined this request on
grounds that it "does not appear feasible." It would cost money which
it would be inadvisable to request under current circumstances; it would
annoy the State Department ("...State would be opposed to the sending of
tease by 4 IG for the specific purposes indicated"),, Pnd it would be the
wrong way to gather the information. Rather, central Intelligence should
acquire such information as it needed by request to "War, Navy, Commerce,
and others (which) should prove fruitful sources for the desired
material"; and by sending the Situation Report outline to the Foreign
1
Service.
The incident is mentioned because it may demonstrate the general
Gaoler that existed toward the Situation Report program. The Re-
desired; there was insistence that the Office of Reports
rind Estimates should produce them; yet no need was felt strong enough
to prompt more than routine measures for bringing the program to
fruition. The view seems to have been held that a product of high
quality could be produced apart from any extraordinary efforts to pro-
duce it.
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See correspondence between J. R. Huddle, ,DfOR..E and
Chief# Latin A ertcan -ivision, in "Situation Report' folder,,,
Historical ?ilex.
STAT
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By the end or Tuly 1947. three re or'ts (T)enmerit, Turku, and Korea)
had been completed; three -more (Albania, Norway, and Iran) were nearing
completion, whhile forty-nine others were listed as in the process of
being prepared. For each of these projected Reports a "target date"
had been Pssiried. Taker, seriously, these dates indicated completion
of the whole program by May, lllj8, With reference to the original. pro-
possl.s for twelve situation Reports a month, such a plan rd.grt have seemed
unacceptably slow; in view of the realities of production, however, it
was absurdly over-optiriistic.
A To begin with," wrote the Acting Chief of the "Projects Division"
of the Office of Reports and Estimates on 29 Jul) 1947s the 'initial
drafts .....hag in sw cases been in fact a cor-rr ilation of intelligence
information by analysts of P-I or P-2 grade which in no way bears a
reserblance to the final draft. This means that an acceptable initial
draft report cannot be expected within a minima of 30 days of the
time indicated. But the hoped-for Improvement in (1) the acquisition
of personnel, (2) reducing the time required to clear the paper through
the TAB agencies, and (3) getting protest reproduction and dissemination
of the approved reports, has not materialized. The present schedule has,
therefore,, no validity whatsoever."
According to an "igstimate of Elapsed Tire" included in the same
randum 100 days could be expected to intervene before a draft. eSitua-
sport" acceptable to a "Branch Chief" could be cleared by all others
concerned and ready for publication. Even this estimate was optimistic.
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it allowed,, for example, only sixteen days for interagency coordination.
It also took no account of the time required to prepare the Report,within
s."
On October 3, 1947s the Interdepartmental. Coordinating and Planning
in turned its attention to the Situation Report program,, this
i proposing a new form of stacW to be called "Rational Situation
ports." The Staff
sssalss were again drafted without consultation
the Office of Reports and .Estimates.
It is unnecessary to recount details of the plan because no action
2
was taken with respect to them. Suffice it to say that in the opinion
of the Office of Reports and Estimates, the plan was "replete with
absurdities which need not be discussed in detail, but which should be
noted as further evidence of the absolute inexperience of ICAPS personnel
in matters relating to the production of intelligence estimates and their
ignorance of actual O.R.E. production.03 The Planning Staffs a requ
ments for "National Situation Reports" were.* in effect, allowed to dice
in a flurry of memoranda.
Meanwhile, the Situation Report program# despite its unpopularity,
had found a definite place in the scheme of things within the Office of
Reports and Estimates by the and of 190. For one thing, there was
some feeling within the Office that the Reports served an important pur-
e related to the currant publications,, and to special estimates,
which might be insubstantial or meaningless unless read against the type
of background furnished by the Situation Reports. From a purely internal
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See Metrorandb
to ADORE ins &
Acting Chief etimates Group
folder 1 Hi sto riccal Files.
STAT
ee No. 1, pe for a discussion of this memorandum in another
connection.
See 'emorandum from L. L. Montague to 1D/ORL October 2OA 19471
Subjects "National Situation Ueporta* in OFS SR Production
File, Historical Files.
19
1 * From SR-L8 Ireland., 1 April 1949.
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rl9M
point of view, furthermore, it wa ur}.gucstiorably true that work on the
Reports furnished valuable training to the extent that through it analysts
were forced t o consider the tatell._i.genee on their area as a whole retber
than ptecen?a; . Similarly, writing of reports meant enforced ordering
of intelligence files. Finally-and proba:bl_y most important--the momentum
provided by, the fact that azmrk was going forward on the program made it
difficult to stop. Once a certain mount of effort had been expended on
any given paper, it was only human to resist an attempt to cancel the
project entirely.
As to the actual purpose being served by the Reports as they
cessively appeared, it was probably no more than an educational one for
the most part. For example, the official distribution accorded to the
Situation Reports as midway in the progr 's history included:
Office of the President
National Security Council
ional Security Resources toard
Department of State
office of the Secretary of Defense
Depe.rtanert. of the Army
Department of tre Air Force
State-Arne-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Atomic Energy Commission 1
Research and Development Board
The bulk of the copies published, however, went to the Departments of
State, Army, Navy, and. the Air Force. It is most unlikely that th
few sent to the other official recipients were read by anyone of impor-
tance. The four departments specified, however, received fifty copies
apiece. What further disposition they rade of theme copies was their
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ovn internal affair and generally unknown to Central Intelligence. It
is to be assumed, howeveer, that the two hundred copies in question went
to persons in the respective departments who could make use of general
intelligence information about the areas treated. Intelligence schools,
for instance, were furnished with Situation Reports, as were some
attaches and diplomatic representatives. To state that the Reports
served no good purpose would be far from the truth, but to maintain that
they were serving a purpose that *>uld have necessitated the creation of
a Central Intelligence Agency would be absurd.
IV. ACIENCY RESISTANCE TO TIC', s ROOR.A1f
The Situation Report program had been in existence less than tut
years before it began to come under attack as a-a obstacle to progress
toward other inteliic ence objectives. A memorandum addressed to the
ref of the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff from
the Intelligence Organization of the Department of State dated 9 November
I9h8 seems to have been the first complaint. Like its successors,, it
proposed abandonment of the Situation Report Program on grounds that it
conflicted with the National Intelligence Survey program.
In a memorandum to the Director, commenting on this proposal,
Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates gave as his view that "The
Office of Reports and EetimaWes is in complete agreement with the principle
implied,,,. that the production of Situation ,Tieports should not be con-
tinued concurrently with the production of National Intelligence Surveys.
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ed, from its inception, the has been considered an interim means
of achieving limited objectives pending the availability of the National
Intelligence Surveys."' Rather than abandon the Situation Reportas, how-
ever,, the Assistant Director proposedr
That the SR series be limited substantially to the
reports listed in Enclosure A (i.e. those on which most work had already
been donee) .
That no department be requested to draft any part of
reports produced subsequent to this date.
c, That departmental participation be restricted to the
preparation of comment on CIA drafts.
That CIA continue to accord a low priority to this series,
a formal reply to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
for Research and Intelligence dated 13 Deceraher 1948s the Director of
Central Intelligence substantially reflected these ideas, saying that
it is thought the program for SRI* should taper off rather than be
summarily abandoned at this time." He suggested that "CIA prepare the"
drafts of the SRaa and the lAC departments merely comment on those sections
of primary interest.
The program thus continued in a general understanding that there
would be no attempt to complete all the Situation Reports originally
listed. Central Intelligence endeavored to keep its demands for con?
tributions of information to a minimum and mould have been willing to
Agency review entirely. The latter functions howeever, was one that
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3 of the Agencies could not overlook without, r rrimg a risk of
ug strategic evaluations to be published with which they might
n agreement,
real change in the situation report program took place as a re-
suit of the negotiations of December 1948. the year later, however,. the
same controversy arose again, In this case, Army intelligence, in a
ember 18, 1949, joined by Navy and State on December
5
the Director of Central Intelligence that the Situation Report
program be discontinued on grounds of conflict between this program and
he National Intelligence Smrv+eys.I
a time, a certain degree of irk had entered into the con-
troversy. The Office of Naval Intelligence, now pressing as hard as the
iginatcr. The complaining Agencies had known in 1947 that both
have the Situation Report program cancellede had of course, been
anal Intelligence Surveys and the Situation Reports were p
but they had entered no objection at that time. It was quite obvious,
that the argument regarding the alleged conflict of the We
not entirely valid. It true that by 1949 some part of
on the National Intelligence keys was go
o constitute an important duplication of effort vi
task. Even the Chief of the Basic Intelligence Group who had charge of
the National Intelligence Survey program gave as his opinion that pro-
duction of Situation Reports should continue in view of the still embryonic
condition of his own program. Evidently, what had really happened within
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however j above, P.
9
?or the three memoranda in reference above,
rtw folder in Historical Files,
,, too, ottA
*Situation
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-23-
amend considerable time in the review of Situation Report manuscripts
offered by Central Intelligence for coordination, but could not sse
personally got sufficient credit for their efforts.
tion Report program than it had ever had, but having gone so far with
he preparation of many unfini shod Reports, it v *s loath to abandon them
on the brink of publication, prom the point of view of Central Intelli-
gence, furthermore, the Agencies' complaint that they were being raver-
worked was absturd, particularly because the alleged overwork was expended
on the review of co*leted drafts. So far as Central Intelligence was
concerned this review was unnecessary and unwelcome. It appeared that
enciess Instated on continuing to furnish copious comments on
antral Intelligence, for its parts had. no more love for the
a a sort of revolt on the part of analysts who had to
written by the Office of Reports and !satieatess, they could at
tv
not complain about this (freo& the point of view of Central Intelli-
the Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates concludedt
'3. It is further believed that it is inappropriate for the
Intelligence Advisory Comdttee to determine the media by which the
ncy insistence on changes in a program of production
ad task. Finally, the atmosphere having become rancorous
ntral Intelligence appeared like undue interference in
of the Agency*
hurls in a memorandum of 17 February 195 addressed to the Director,
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Intelligence Agency exercises its responsibilities for the
production of national intelligence.
d that you decline to accept
of the Department of the kW with respect to termination
1
of the Situation Report program. "
et result of the controversy was again retention of the status
n l95O, when the whole program was cancelled, Si.tuaw
continued to be written, coordinated, and published.
the process did not improve inter-agency relations is eanif+
V. CONCLUSIONS
A list of the thirty-two Situation: Reports actually published by
Iligencee Agency between the authorisation of the program
and its cancellation in 1950 is appended, In length, they
ut seventy-five pages ltnotype. Each contains appendixes
ring such fields as population statistics, topography and. climate,
and individual biographies. All of then contain at least one map.
n China was published with a special supplement containing
eleven maps of various types. The two cowtodity studies (SR-27 ?fin
and SR-28 ercur ) seen strangely out of place along with the regular
reports on countries and areas, but they are, of course, a survival of
the original plans furnished by the Interdepartmental Coordinating
ning Staff which called for 'Rfu tional* as
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stoical Milos.
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+2510
of the completed Reports would be difficult to assess.
interest;
intelligence on which they were based is no longer of
of the material is common knowledge. ft even.
noses of qua' ity naturally prevailed, depending on the abilities of the
r group that produced any given report. Some of the Repor
properlybe said to have developed, from collected and evaluated
e ce ab
to all
a
t
f
____
~?
p
r
s o
1111W intelligence sirruc
Other reports were slight. All in all, what the Program produced was
no more than could have been expected under circumstances which were
not propitious.
these circumstances were the following:
he Situation Report Program was not conceived in relation
to the primary functions to which the Central Intelligence Group had bee
committed by the Presidential letter that established it.
Once adopted, the Program was allocated to a part of the
t sup which bad been designed for a different type of rcr'k,, rather than
Basic Intelligence organization or to a department especially
zed for the purpose.
Because of the differing interests and concepts involved,
it was impossible to plan a rational approach to the problem which
made the Situation Reports either a strict service of coaaron
concern undertaken in relation to the National Intelligence Surveys;
or a serious attempt to solve the problem of National Intelligence Estimates
by means of broad current conclusions rather than analytical treatment.
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-P.6-
The result was to handicap the producing office in production
both types.
(5) The production problem was made no easier by the requirement
that the Situation Reports must be *coordinated." The result was to add
to the already serious difficulties of producing reports under the cir-
cumetances just described, all the delays, frustrations, and c lications
d be read in connection with go. indicates some of the
h interagency xcooperation." An appendix attached to this
culties encountered in this connection.
ny value they may have had as intelligence studies
applicable to particular purposes, the Situation Reports of 1947-1950
xst be considered as a by-product of the confused planning that attended
the birth of Central Intelligence. If any conclusion can be derived
from a study of thee, it in that no program of intelligence production
should be undertaken until those adopting it are sure precisely what is
wanted and that the means of following the program through are available.
APPM11t Problems in the Coordination of Situation Reports
Situation Reports be ?coordinateedd was inescap-
able in view of the strategic conclusions set forth in the course of these
studies, It was implicit, however, that those considering agreement or
disagreement with these conclusions must also search the evidence offered
in support of them. This, in turn, meant careful--somartimes minute--review
each bulky manuscript that a Situation Report represented. In the
a reviews, it was natural,, if not inevitable, that attention
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16
Records on which the discussion of SR ccgrdination is based
are in Hiatorioal Files, We Va. 840.
ft was an Armor dissent on certain stratsaie asmets
0d in OR-18 "Kwd.co,,e 2 Januar7 19A;
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could be averted
conclusions to the minutiae.
co fiination" was far from what it might hai
theory, under which the fay Agencies and Central Intelligence dis-
cussed and arrived at conclusions to be drawn from intelligence geners.11,
available about a given country. In concrete fart., coordination me.-ant
entral Intelligence became the recixrient of long, detailed coen-
tares on each report which it must incorporate in. a manner satisfac
erned. Even if the process had been no
-sided,
it would still have been laborious, but with five part:icipatingt it was.,
potentially at least., interminable. It should also be mentioned that,,
because of the length of the studies, tie committee system., employed to
a pedite clearance of shorter estimates (See Nos. 9 ), was seldom
for Situation Reports.
however, of the time and deliberation that must n.eces-
taken in the production of a Situation Report, it might be
supposed that eventual agreement would emerge--that Centraal. Intelligence
would not be likely to publish a Report i ttil all participants had been
into agreement. This was true with the exception of
.two Reports. Because the controversies engendered are a
good index to the atmosphere in which Situation reports were produced,
t, of them are separately discussed below:
1.. Chile 1 September 1947
Although this paper was given the data I September 19I.? it
probably not actually circulated until December f having been held up
nation.
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8.
the report contains the following undoubtedly controversial state-
(1) '"Economically and strategically Chile is not a consider-
able factor in US security. It is, however,, the Latin American country
.ere the Communists have the greatest potential for working against ITS
interests."
"Chile: produces no com dities of vital necessity to
nomy in war or in peace."
2The Department of State objected to the first of these statements
on grounds that this generalization cannot be justified in view of
sting situations in, for example, Cuba and Venezuela."
rtment of the Army dissented for three paragraphs on both
nts. As to the second, it thought that Chilean copper would
necessarily become of vital strategic importance to the United States
in case of war. In other strategic aspects, the Army hold that,
aas of war, when denial
e Panama Canal would become a "strong
possibility," Chile could furnish strategic bases for naval interdiction
of the Straits of Magellan. Hence the Army disagreed "with the idea
implicit in several sections of the-report that Chile is of little or
no strategic importance to the United States."
Open to question as the statement made by Central Intelligence
about the strategic importance of Chile might have besn,. no other Agency
k exception to it. Furthermore, the Navy,, which might have been
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presumed to have a prior interest in interdiction of shipping hypotheti-
cally dig
around Cape Rorn, concurred in the Chilean
report without comment (on 23 October 1914?).
estimates, t
as was often the case with Situation Repo
na stated by the participants could lead
fusion on the part of an individual using the report. For exaamples, had
gencies agreed in a statement that the strategic im-
the United States was much greater than had been
indicated by Central Intelligence, it would have been logical to conclude
tral Intelligence had simply been in error. With one military
agency on one sides, however, and with Central Intelligence, State and
the other two military agencies on the other, the reader aright wall ask
at he was to believe.
R**11 airs l l ovenbaer 1 t8
ils..lrlplllll 1!y IIIII ~i1rYWl+-111 NfY~IIiIIIIY.II~f-IYilr.litl~Yi~liYl.
eb, Situation Report was the subject of two dissents, both
of than probably avoidable.
It had wt been the intention of Central Intelligence to say that the
position of the Franco regimme was unstable, or that there was any fore-
son for expecting it to fall. On the co
of the autho.
a Franco government would remain in office indefinitely.
fteaun of the still-strong and widespread unpopularity of Franco so soon
caused the
however, and because of the difficulties for American policy
principal question with regard to Spain was naturally
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or not there might sow time be a change in its government.
ossibilities of change as it cold discovaer,
ntelli.gexsce seem n imtentionaily to have given the impression
ooked upon a displacement of Franco as a distinct possibility.
should have been poSsibl.sb to give this impression, furthermmore,
rising in view of the ambiguities present in some statements
the Report.
particular# p. iii.) A revised and reworded
t of these ambiguities might well have obviated the State,
the Army, dissent. Negotiations, however,, seen to have fallen down
apartment dissented on grounds that the repo
too pessimistic over the Spanish economic situation, whit t'.entral Intel-
of a disharmonious interagency atmosphere. (See No.
e had mentioned as a possible ultimate cause of Franco''s overthrow.
ght not only that the economic situation was more favorable than
had iNplieds but that it would improve.
messed disagreement with the conclusions of the paper: *Thee*
conelusions,? the Ar*y said, *are that, while no charge is probable within
months* the situation in Spain is ultimately one of danger to the
united States because of the possibility of Communist domination of the
a indicated that such domination might result from (a)
tion aided by the U or (b) military aggression by the U t."
A then proceeded to a refutation. It should be noted, however,
that the statement of the "conclusions is the Army s. There is a
n this statement and what Central Intelligence actually
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To this refutation, the Department of the Army added a paragraph
be difficult to justify as a dissent on what was supposed
to be purely an intelligence appreciation, not only because the Ary*
was objecting not to what the paper said but to what the Amy maintained
the paper ought to have said, but also because the Ares remarks resemble
proposal. The paragraph readse
e Intelligence Division, Department of the Army, con
that the paper fails to bring out the two most pressing problems a
St
ates security which the Spanish situation presents*
ad
potential strategic importance of Spain to the United States in the
event of war with the USSR renders extremely serious the present coolness
of relations between Spain and the United States. Second, the strategic
importance to the United States of Western Europa as a whole renders
equally serious the present coolness of the major Western European nations
toward Spain. The United States has shown that it recognizes the im-
portance to its ova security of the integration of Western Europe econom-
ieslly, politically and militarily. Such integration is incomplete and
i dequate without &pain, yet Spain has been specifically excluded from
all moves in this direction. The Intelligence Division, Department of
the Arz r, realises that the problems of bringing Spain Into the Western
>n believes evolution within Spain is not only passible but
and considers that etotation will lead to battered relations
stern Powers,, including the United States, with the possible
elusion of Spain in the Western defense system. However,
or should they prove so inadequate an to writ no further encourage-
d efforts to achieve a measure of union of Western European nations
t from the Ynited Staters, the strategic value of Spain to
,ad States would warrant increased efforts on the part of the
tea to establish full cordiality in relations between the two
MR-47 Brasil 30 November 194
e of the Situation Report on Brazil, the State
on, not to a statement made by Central Intelligence but to an
inference.
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Under *Strategic Considerations Affecting U. 3. Sacuri
e had stated: "The. political significance of Brazi
ar geographic position lies in the fact that Brazilian policy is
nod in that part of the country lying outside the zone of BS
inance. The Brazilian Government* therefore, has a con-
A footnote to these sentences reach: 'The Intelligence Organiza-
e latitude for independent action.'
the bepartrn
ate does not concur in the above statement.
We believe that the statement is misleading and that the implication
that countries lyin
he zone of US military predominance do not
have considerable latitude for independent action in international affairs
is untrue."
December 1919
No Situation Report was produced quickly or with easel some (e.g.
alwst all the *satellite" reports; the Report on Indochina) never could
be completed. The Situation Report on Germany, which might well have
fallen into the latter class,, was finally published because of special
pressure for completion, but the three-year process was exceptionally
and the final product even then did not receive fu3l approval.
this paper epitomizes all the flaws that underly the
Situation Report program an a whole.
do not show when work on this paper was begun in Central
Intelligence, but it was probably one of the first attested in 191.7.
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ebruary 1949 before a manuscript was ready for
on of the Agencies is not alone testimony to the com-
plexity of the problem attacked. Mare than that, the cause lay in the
inability of those working on the study to produce an acceptable draft.
Seen the draft that was circulated to the Agencies on February 23,
1949 was far from satisfactory to those within Central Intelligence
charged with the review of such ranuscripts. The
at could be
said was that the manuscript being distributed was less obnoxious than
some of Its predecessors had been. The paper was probably released in
it that something was better than nothing.
Cents from the Agencies on this first draft were received in
e of rob. None was enthusiastic. The State Department
dissented, even in this preliminary stage.
of what the Agencies said, revision w
d was apparently completed in Sep er, at which
t out a chapter at a time.
drafts still being serious, it was decided that differences
d at an inter-agency meeting, which was held on October 13.
was followed by another the next day and a third on
October 20th. A *Second revision of draft (Chapters I, 111? TV, 7,
A dixes A through E)* was circulated to the agencies on October 265th.
On this revision, all concurred except State which again dissented in
rand* of November 9, November 25th, and December 7.
asken forth-
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As has been noted$ such meetings were rare on Situation
Reports and were resorted to only in the cue of special
difficulties,
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A decision was then apparently made by Central Intelligence to
publish the Report despite Staters disapproval. This decision was
in spite of objections from within the Office of Reports and
on the part of those who had reviewed the successive versions
of the Report. The fec
according to these reviewers', was that the
tten was not fit to be published and that it would be
to omit a Situation Report on fermany altogether than to expo
The reviewers so recommended on more than one occasion throughout
elligence to well justified criticism on grounds of inferior
the history of 'ASR=20.a
They were overruled* however, and the Situation Report on German,
minus the
y troublesome chapter on Economics, and the Su s ary,
was published on 20 December 19!,9. (The publication data shown on the
ear of the Report (December 9) represents the time when the do
distribution rather than when it was actually distributed.)
was to follow:
dissent with this part of the paper was included. The rest of the
On the same day (20 December), another interagency meeting was
hold for the purpose of adjusting differences between State and Central
concerning German economics problems.
At this meeting, the Christmas spirit did not prevail. The matter
had reached an impasse. By now, furthermDre, so many different manu-
d so many different revisions had been the subject of con-
sideration by the Agencies that all concerned were
German
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including important officials within the a+i:.lttary
had continaa:
consider manuscripts of 'ASR-200
on Frith signing memoranda of comment on them.. All this
was going on, furthermore, (see above) during the period of agency
t the Situation Report program, in general* It could not
king the program any more palatable than it
i meeting of December 20th had no effect on the position of
continued to dissent on January l0th and again on February
The controversy over the Economise chapter, however, dragged on,
and this section, along with the Summary, was not published until
Ranh 7, 1950. The State Department entered a separate dissen
Economics chapter and the Summary.
t of the fantastic procedure outlined above should be
noted--that although the Situation Report on Germany was not actually
completed until March 1950 the information contained in it (See footnote
I-1), is stated to be as of 1 September 1949. Even this statement
ate only in a gener&l way, as ^as noted by State in one of its
dissents: *Although the report purports to be up-to-date as of September
1, 1919, m
and figures lag behind that date.* Much of the
indeed, seems
as of aid-19b8,, For this reason
al, it was frequently suggested during the coordination period (February
h 1950) that the whole paper ought to be rewritten to bring it
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to date. Nov this was to be done under the circumstances must remain
somewhat of a mystery.
State dissents are based, not on any one point but on a general
statement that the report wan vii
ate* and a does not convey a sound
g of the situation in Germany."
It would be hard to quarrel with the comment. The manifest futility
whole process involving this paper from begi
dj however,
coaeaentarr on the propriety of saucing plans for a govern-
ment, without adequate consideration of the means by whit they are
to be carried out.
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G&FAW 20
3A9 - Draft to IAC agencies (deadline 1200, . Fri day, 11 March)
3/11A9 - Com eats from Army
1/15/49 - Concurrence without count train Air
91"
9/16M
Dissent fro* State
Appendix A Terrain & Climate (reef d from BIWE to be revised -
atencil)
Appendix B - 1110 rec' d
Appendix C - 1337 reed
Chapto
623 rec+ d
App. As B, C & Chapt. IT to IAC agencies far coo
`
wrraal.ins 1alt'1. 32 Sept.
er.rrrrr^
49 - C
9
recd 1133
IPP4
D) 1.223 reed
App
9/27A9 - Chapt. v, App. D, B to IAC agencies
9/27/49 - Chapt, I - rsc'd 1546
Oct., 1200
9/28/491 - I[sps (100 each) #310E!`3,* 10902-109?8 rec+d from Map Branch
9
'9
nta from State (Mr. Dunn)
III - ree t d alp. 1600
9/30/49 - Comets from State (oral) via Bryson addt' I on Chas t.
10/3x:
Supplemental comments from State on Chapt. IV (.Strauss via D
.o/3/ 9 - Army - Ib - phoned to say co unents delayed*
t.)
1013A9 - Comments from. Air - Chap t. Iii, App. Afil B, & C
asked to consult with units BSA re this.
suggest pp. 6-1Q be rettaln
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/01 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100020002-0
10/3/149 Com ents from ! - Chapt. IV, Apo. kip B, C
10,/44/)49 - Chagts. & TIT JAC agencies (deadline 1200, 14--Oct.)
10/5A9 - Co ents rece d from Area' - Cha pt. IV; App. A, B
10/7/149 . Xero to IAC Agencies calling mtP. 13 Oct. 133Os discuss
C
p
A
2
t
ffi
~
,
p
.
?
s
-ap
Chapt. ITS App. As 8, C & ?
10/7/49 - Ceeatral Records phones that Army's comments Chapt. V, D,
rerc s d 1640
reesntatives Mts. 13 Oct* 1330 Ro
"r7 - 40 . NISCINSOCK
l!ta. Benjamin
Mr. Marcuaae
I#. R. S. Bennett
. Kidd
? P. Toads
ioAoA9 - Comrents f Air on Chapt. T, App. P & I
lm/109
10/10.9
10,/11/13.9
10/159
10/18,9
1018/139
qtr. Frank Irwin
e - Mr. Herbert Marcnse
Mr. Henry Fonda
dir. Donald Benjamin
1/49 - Memo to IAC agencies
10/26/149 - 2nd revision of draft (Chapters I, III, IT, 7; App. A through 1)
toTC agencies. Deadline 1200, >a Mav&
s from Arm on Chapt. '7, App. D & I
a from State on Chapt. V, App. D & I
Comments from ONI on Chapt. V,
. D& B
atinuation of Mtg. 13 Oct. to 14 Oct., 1330 - Room 2523
- State's comments on I & III
Ravy's comments on I & III
- Arm rrs comments on I & III
!nasentatives at Mtg. 20 Oct. at 1330 2519
- Chapter 2 received (Economic Seetia.
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U/7/h9 - Concurrence without comment from CNI on Chapts. I, I
To App., A -
Concurrence without comment from Air on Chaptse
To App, It - I
9 - Die-sent from State on Chapters Is III9IV, V App, A
Concurrence with comments from Artsy
11/10/149 - Chapta. 2, Ills IV, V1 A through B to Reproduction
of9 - Sw aary recd
Sums r.r & Chapt. II to IAC agencies - deadline 1200, 2 Decem-
ber for c is
Dissent froze State
n Chapts. Is III,, Iii, T j A through I received
11/28A9 - Proof returned with Status dissent & To of"
1249 - Concurrence without come:
12/6/49 - Comments f a ONI
- Comments from fir Force
12/?A9 - Dissent from
9
A9 -
Final copy submitted for approval by Reproduction. Binding
and dissemination held up because maps not completed.
Decision made to disseminate without lst map
*tg. 20 December - 1330 - 117 Central Bldg,,
Chairman
D/ii - Messrs. Hawley,
- R. Mullen
none
State Erwin Strauss, Miss
lot section (i apts. Is III, IV, V, etc.) disseminated
STAT
STAT
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Ar
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/01 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100020002-0
1 f 11/5o
deadline 'i'hureday, 26 Jan,. 1950, 1200
.. Dissent from State on teary and Capt. II
Revised draft - Su ary and Chapt. II to IAC agencies
/5 .. Meru from Army suspending action till final decision on We
1/25/50
to IAC with changes in Chapt. II &
back from 26 Jars to 2 Feb,
putting dead-
confirmation of previous dissent on Ch pt.
to Moberg) 'his dissent not based on final revised STAT
2/2/5o
2/6/50
2/6/50
219/50
2AV50
2/20/50
2/20/50
2/23/50
Dissent from State as per moms of 10 Jan, 1950
Concurrence without comment from ONI
Concurrence without comrmnt from Air
Concurrence on Summary; 'No comtr
Chapt. II from Army
Draft to Reproduction (Chapto II, Summary* and State;s dissent)
Concurrence with comment on Summary from army; *No comment" on
t. 11
Page prof rec' d
roof returned
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/01 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100020002-0
STAT
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