[PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 14910, REGULATION OF DEVICES CAPABLE OF CAUSING RADIO INTERFERENCE]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71R00510A000300210015-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: March 6, 1968
• Content Type: OPEN

March 6,
Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I have no
further requests for time and yield back
the balance of my time.
Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. Speaker, there
being no further requests for time, I
move the previous question on the reso-
lution.
The previous question was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The
question is on the resolution.
The resolution was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the
table.
PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION
OF H.R. 14910, REGULATION OF DE-
VICES CAPABLE OF CAUSING RA-
DIO INTERFERENCE
Mr. DELANEY. Mr. Speaker, I call up
House Resolution 1084 and ask for its
immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as fol-
lows :
H. RES. 1084
Resolved, That upon the adoption of this
resolution it shall be in order to move that
the House resolve itself into the Committee
of the Whole House on the State of the
Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R.
14910) to amend the . Communications Act
of 1934, as amended, to give the Federal Com-
munications Commission authority to pre-
scribe regulations for the manufacture,' im-
port, sale, shipment, or use of devices which
cause harmful interference to radio recep-
tion. After general debate, which shall be
confined to the bill and shall continue not
to exceed one hour, to be equally divided and
controlled by the chairman and ranking mi-
nority member of the Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, the bill shall be
read for amendment under the five-minute
rule. At the conclusion of the consideration
of the bill for amendment, the Committee
shall rise and report the bill to the House
with such amendments as may have been
adopted, and the previous question shall be
considered as ordered on the bill and amend-
ments thereto to final passage without inter-
vening motion except one motion to re-
commit.
Mr. DELANEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield
30 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio
[Mr. LATTA], pending which I yield my-
self such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 1084
provides an open rule with 1 hour of
general debate for consideration of H.R.
14910 to amend the Communications Act
of 1934.
The bill would add a new section 302
to the Comunications Act which would
empower the FCC to prescribe reason-
able regulations governing the interfer-
ence potential of devices capable of
emitting radio energy which could cause
harmful interference to radio commu-
nications. These regulations would be
applicable to the manufacture, importa-
tion, sale or offering for sale, shipment,
or use of such devices.
Such regulations would not be appli-
cable to carriers transporting such de-
vices without trading in them; devices
constructed by electric utilities for their
own use; or devices for the use of the
Federal Government, or devices intended
solely for export.
The legislation also provides that such
devices for the use of the Federal Gov-
ernment be designed so as to reduce ra-
Approved
1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
H 1719
taking into account the
dio interference
,
needs of the national defense and se-
curity.
Devices capable of causing radio inter-
ference are, among others, electronic ga-
rage door openers, certain electronic
toys, high-powered electronic heaters,
diathermy machines, welders, radio and
television receivers, ultrasonic cleaners,
and remote control devices for such
equipment as industrial cranes.
I am happy to say this legislation will
not result in any additional cost to the
Government. I
Mr. Speaker, I urge the adoption of
House Resolution 1084 in order that H.R.
14910 may be considered.
(Mr. LATTA asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I agree with
the statements just made by the gentle-
man from New York concerning this bill.
The present law is often the fact and
and causes the FCC to proceed on a case-
to-case basis in locating devices which
are causing radio interference. With the
passage of this legislation they will be
able to regulate the manufacture of such
devices and prescribe regulations relative
to their manufacturer so that they will
not cause interference. This is the sole
purpose of the bill, according to the
gentleman from West Virginia [Mr.
STAGGERS] at the time he appeared be-
fore the Rules Committee.
However, I raised a question about the
language in the bill as it seems to be
much broader. He has assured me and
the other members of the Rules Commit-
tee that the FCC already has these ad-
ditional powers and no new authority is
being granted herein.
I do wish to call to the Members' at-
tention lines 5, 6, and 7, on page 2,
which read as follows:
Such regulations shall be applicable to the
manufacture, import, sale, offer for sale,
shipment or use of such devices.
That language raises in my mind a
question as to whether or not the new
language, if it is new language, will
give them power to go out to every home
that has electronically operated garage
doors and tell the owners how to operate
and use them, or does this give the FCC
the authority to tell the owner of one of
these little walkie-talkies that he is not
operating it properly or that he is on the
wrong frequency.
These are questions that I hope will
be answered during general debate. They
were not answered to my full satisfac-
tion before the Rules Committee, but,
with the assurance of the chairman of
the full committee that this bill only
grants additional powers to the FCC
relative to the manufacture of these
devices, I voted to report this legislation.
Mr. Speaker, I have no further re-
quests for time and yield back the bal-
ance of my time.
Mr. DELANEY. Mr. Speaker, I have no
further requests for time. I move the
previous question on the resolution.
The previous question was ordered.
The resolution was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the
table.
DISARMAMENT ACT, AS AMENDED
Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Speaker, I move
that the House resolve itself into the
Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union for the consideration
of the bill (H.R. 14940) to amend the
Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as
amended, in order to extend the authori-
zation for appropriations.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The ques-
tion is on the motion offered by the gen-
tleman from Pennsylvania.
The motion was agreed to.
IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE
Accordingly the House resolved itself
into the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union for the con-
sideration of the bill, H.R. 14940, with
Mr. FULTON of Tennessee in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
By unanimous consent, the first read-
ing of the bill was dispensed with.
The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MoR-
GAN] will be recognized for 30 minutes,
and the gentlewoman from Ohio [Mrs.
BOLTON] will be recognized for 30 min-
utes. The Chair recognizes the gentle-
man from Pennsylvania.
(Mr. MORGAN asked and was given;
permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield
myself 10 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R.
14940. H.R. 14940 authorizes $33 million
to finance the operation of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency for a
3-year period. The bill makes no change
in existing law except for the amount of
money.
The last previous authorization was
enacted in 1965 and authorized $30 mil-
lion for the 3 fiscal years 1966, 1967, and
1968.
The work of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency involves primarily
the backup of the U.S. negotiators who
participate in international negotiations
on arms control and disarmament.
The Agency was established in 1961
because it was generally recognized that
the United States could not very well
refuse to participate in such negotiations,
and that if we were going to participate,
our representatives should have avail-
able to them adequate expert 'assistance
and technical information in this highly
complex field.
Mr. Chairman, I do not suppose that
there is any agency of the U.S. Govern-
ment Agency is trying to undermine the
the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency.
Every once in a while I hear someone
say that the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency is trying to undermine the
Defense Department, that the United
States is spending money out of one
pocket to build up our Armed Forces,
and that we are spending money out of
another pocket to weaken these forces or
to put them out of business.
This idea completely disregards the
facts. In the first place, the Department
of Defense is fully informed about every-
thing the Arms Control Agency does or
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R00510A000300210015-4
 H 1720
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4 vl-
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE March 6, 1968
proposes to do. The Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency reports to, and all
of its operations are reviewed by, the
Committee of Principals which consists
of the Secretaries of State and Defense,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Chairman of the Atomic
Energy Commission, the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, the Special Assistants
to the President for National Security
Affairs and for Science and Technology,
the Administrator of the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration, and
the Director of the U.S. Information
Agency.
In the second place, let me point out
that arms control does not diminish U.S.
security. Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has said:
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that
national security can be improved by bal-
anced, phased, and safeguarded arms con-
trol agreements limiting the military capa-
bilities of nations in a manner conducive to
the achievement of a secure, free, and peace-
ful world.
The military posture of the United
States would be stronger and our secu-
rity would be greater if we could get an
effective agreement with other nations
to limit the size and nature of their
forces and weapons.
Secretary McNamara has stated the
issue very clearly in the recent discus-
sion of anti-ballistic-missile defenses.
If both the Russians and ourselves
maximum our anti-ballistic-missile de-
fense and then maximize our vehicles for
penetrating these defenses, neither
country will be more secure but both
will be poorer.
The main job of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency is to enhance
the security of the United States. The
function of the Agency is to see that the
United States goes into any arms con-
trol agreement with its eyes open.
Another misconception about the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
is that it is an organization that believes
that the Russians can be trusted. There
are those who -argue that it is a com-
plete waste of time to negotiate with the
Russians on arms control since any
agreement will not be worth the paper
it is written on and that the people in
charge of the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency are unrealistic and
gullible.
Let me say that my experience has
been that the more contact people have
with Russian negotiators, the fewer il-
lusions they have. The Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency is fully aware of
the pitfalls and the frustrations.
Nevertheless, we have to consider that
the Russians on occasion may find that
an agreement will serve their interests
as well as ours. They have been known
to live up to agreements when it is to
their advantage to do so.
The United States could refuse to
enter into any negotiations relating to
arms control and disarmament -on the
grounds that the Russians cannot be
trusted. Nearly all of the governments of
the world fear the consequences of
atomic war and give top priority to ef-
forts for arms control.
If we are to participate in such
negotiations, it is essential that we know
what we are doing.
The highest degree of military and
scientific knowledge must be readily
available to our negotiators. The job of
the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency is to see that the United States
has the proper backup for our negotia-
tions.
After 7 days of hearings, which in-
cluded testimony from distinguished citi-
zens such as John J. McCloy, General
Gruenther, and Lewis L. Strauss, former
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission, the committee decided to ap-
prove the full amount of funds requested
and the 3-year authorization as re-
quested.
The bill received strong bipartisan sup-
port in the committee. The Foreign Af-
fairs Committee has 36 members-21
Democrats and 15 Republicans. There
were only five votes against the bill out
of 25 voting.
During the hearings, most of the dis-
cussion centered around the nonprolifer-
ation treaty, a draft of which has been
approved by the United States and by
the Soviet Union, and is now pending be-
fore the 18-Nation Disarmament Con-
ference in Geneva.
Several witnesses and some members of
the committee are against the nonprolif-
eration treaty, but almost every one f a-
vored the continuation of the Agency.
Although the nonproliferation treaty
is a matter of concern to the Members of
the House and to the Committee on For-
eign Affairs, this bill does not have any-
thing to do with the approval of the
treaty.
The real issue which confronted the
committee was whether the operation of
the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency should be curtailed or whether
it should continue at its present level.
The Agency has had appropriations of
$9 million a year for fiscal 1967 and fiscal
1968. They are asking $10 million for
fiscal 1969. This does not involve an ex-
pansion of the Agency's operations.
The Agency has to find the money to
finance the employees' pay raise which
the Congress enacted last year.
The Agency also has to finance the
entire cost of field tests since funds for
sharing the cost of such tests was elimi-
nated from the Defense Department ap-
propriations.
This is a small agency with only 268
jobs. Its functions are highly spe-
cialized. It does not have the sort of
budget which can absorb cuts and con-
tinue to perform all of its functions.
Ten million dollars for fiscal year 1969
means that the Agency will be able to
continue its present scale of operations.
It does not mean an expansion.
The Agency has never had a 1-year
authorization. The original authoriza-
tion in 1961 was adequate for 2 years.
In 1963 there was a 2-year authoriza-
tion, and in 1965 the Congress author-
ized funds for 3 years.
The committee was impressed by the
argument of John J. McCloy, who said:
I think the 3-year authorization is very
important. Particularly at this state, if there
was any limitation of the 3-year provision
at this point, I think perhaps there would
be undue significance attached to it.
Perhaps this is the chief reason I would
urge you not to limit the authorization to
one year but that you continue with the
3-year period, that it is rather important
psychologically at this point. *
In short, I think that with the annual
review which is incidental to every appro-
priation bill, together with the fact that at
any point this committee can call on any-
one to come down to testify and report on
its affairs, that it would be unfortunate to
give any indication at this point that there
is any hesitation about our attachment to
the policy of arms control and disarma-
ment which are consistent with the security
of the country. (Hearings, pp. 225 and 226.)
Over half of the funds requested are
to finance external research. That is re-
search performed under contract by
private firms or by universities, or by
Government agencies such as the
Department of Defense or the Atomic
Energy Commission, which are reim-
bursed for research services.
Although there is always a tendency
to be suspicious of research expenditures
by'operating agencies, this Agency has
a major research function.
In the first place, the Agency is re-
quired to carry on research in a dozen
categories which are defined by statute.
These are set forth on pages 2 and 3 of
the committee report.
The Director of the Agency is directed
to do research in these fields. A sub-
stantial cut in funds would mean that
the Director could not discharge the re-
sponsibilities imposed on him.
In addition, although the Defense De-
partment and the Atomic Energy Com-
mission carry on much larger research
programs relating to atomic- and other
weapons, there are a number of problems
that are peculiar to the arms control
and disarmament business that are not
of particular concern to other agencies.
A case in point involves the detection
of the existence and the characteristics
Such detection is a major responsibility
of the Department of Defense and the
inte'ligence community. Their efforts are
directed to a large degree to detecting
such weapons by covert means.
The Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency faces the problem of developing
techniques for such detection when the
country involved has avowedly opened
its doors to inspection. While much of
the technical information needed for
open inspection can be obtained from
the Defense Department or the Atomic
Energy Commission, there is a different
kind of problem which requires special
research.
Many pages of the hearings and sev-
eral pages of the additional views which
are printed with the committee report
deal with the desirability of making
atomic weapons available to NATO.
This discussion really has nothing to
do with H.R. 14940, but the Nonprolifer-
ation Treaty does require that none of
the countries which have atomic weap-
ons-both the Soviet Union and the
United States have agreed on this
point-shall transfer nuclear explosive
devices to any one-including NATO.
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
March 6, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
This provision of the treaty is in com-
plete accord with the Atomic Energy Act
which forbids such transfers.
At least one member of the Foreign
Affairs Committee believes that the
treaty should be changed so as to permit
transfer of nuclear weapons to NATO.
The overwhelming majority of the
committee do not support this point of
view.
Nuclear weapons are now located with
NATO forces and are available to carry
out NATO defense plans. These weapons,
however, belong to the United States
and are subject to U.S. control. I do not
believe that there are many in the Con-
gress or among the people of this coun-
try who want to change this arrange-
ment and turn over to NATO control
over nuclear weapons now controlled by
the United States.
Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield
myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, On January 24 the
President sent a message to Congress,
asking continuation of the Arms Con-
trol Agency for another 3 years and for
authorization of needed appropriations.
H.R. 14940, to amend the Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Ac., in order to ex-
tend the authorization for appropria-
tions, was reported out of the Foreign
Affairs Committee on February 27.
It authorizes an appropriation of $33
million to finance the continued opera-
tion of the Agency for 3 years. For 1969
the Agency is requesting $10 million in-
cluding $4,682,000 to finance its pro-
gram operations and $5,318,000 to fi-
nance external research. The Agency
also has programed $12 million for fiscal
year 1970 and $11 million for fiscal year
1971.
Except for the authorization of funds,
the bill makes no change in the existing
authority of the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency. There is a measure
of congressional control because annual
appropriations are required. All pre-
vious authorizations have been for more
than 1 year.
Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield
8 minutes to the gentlewoman from New
York [Mrs. KELLY].
(Mrs. KELLY asked and was given
permission to revise and extend her re-
marks.)
Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Chairman, this bill
is intended to extend the life of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency for
another 3 years. The title of the Agency
raises questions and fosters misgivings. I
can readily understand why this is so.
One day we are voting for increased
military appropriations; the next day
we are voting on a bill authorizing funds
for arms control and possible future dis-
armament. It makes a Member feel like a
split personality.
I regret the inclusion of the word "dis-
armament" in the title of the Agency.
It diverts attention from the immediate
and more basic objectives of arms con-
trol. The decision to give the Agency
jurisdiction in that far-out field was that
of Congress.
It was Congress that provided the
guidelines and objectives when it created
the Agency in 1961. The basic statute
reads:
This organization must have the capacity
to provide the essential scientific, economic,
political, military, psychological, and tech-
nological information upon which realistic
arms control and disarmament policy must
be based.
It then enumerated the primary func-
tions of the Agency:
(a) The conduct, support, and coordina-
tion of research for arms control and dis-
armament policy formulation;
(b) The preparation for and management
of United States participation in interna-
tional negotiations in the arms control and
disarmament field;
(c) The dissemination and coordination -of
public information concerning arms control
and disarmament; and
(d) The preparation for, operation of, or
as appropriate, direction of United States
participation in such control systems as may
become part of United States arms control
and disarmament activities.
Those who criticize the- Agency for
moving on too many fronts at one time
would do well to read what Congress has
expected of it.
In an effort to do its job, the Agency
has identified five broad objectives within
which research is conducted that is basic
to the national security:
First, to limit and reduce armed
forces, armaments, and military expend-
itures through arms control and disarm-
ament measures;
Second, to prevent the proliferation
among nations of nuclear weapons, nu-
clear delivery vehicles, and conventional
armaments;
Third, to reduce the risk of outbreak
of armed conflict, to inhibit its escalation,
and to limit its destructiveness and dura-
tion through arms control and disarma-
ment measures;
Fourth, to avert harmful economic
consequences of reduced defense spend-
ing resulting from arms control and dis-
armament measures, and to study the
most constructive use of the resources
thus released; and
Fifth, to assist in achieving an inter-
national environment conducive to arms
control and disarmament negotiations.
During its short span of life the Agency
has given a high priority to the control
of nuclear weapons. This is a period that
coincides with a breakthrough in nuclear
technology. Where once the only concern
was with the military application of nu-
clear energy, it suddenly offered the
prospect of cheap electric power. No
longer is nuclear energy an element of
war alone; it is the hope for human hap-
piness. As the Agency has, noted, the
world "must find a way to survive the
first if it is to enjoy the benefits of the
second."
The Agency has directed its limited re-
sources toward curbing the indiscrimi-
nate pollution of this planet with atomic
matter. The groundwork that went into
the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and
the Outer Space Treaty of 1966 pro-
vided a wealth of experience to the
Agency in conducting the negotiations
for the recently completed Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty. Studies of a highly sophisti-
cated nature preceded the final agree-
ment. Let me suggest a few of these in
order that the Members may appreciate
better the detailed attention which the
Agency has given to this difficult sub-
H 1721
ject. One was a study on techniques for
inspection of ballistic missile testing; an-
other concerned the reduction of ICBM
leadtimes; another was a study of the
validation of records of production.
Some critics of the Agency have raised
questions about the merit of other con-
tracts into which the Agency has en-
tered. I can understand the basis for
concern. But their worth can only be
judged against the poverty of material
that marks the entire field of arms con-
trol. Any one of the projects by itself
may seem insignificant, even irrelevant.
But each has to be viewed as part of the
total effort to weigh past experience and
to explore unknown paths. After all, if
the end results of each research project
were known, there would be no need for
research.
Members should know that the work
of the Agency is under the scrutiny of a
General Advisory Committee of 15 mem-
bers. This, is a statutory body whose
Chairman is the Honorable John J. Mc-
Cloy. Mr. McCloy has devoted many
years under several administrations to
work in the field of armaments and dis-
armament. Another outstanding Ameri-
can on this committee is Gen. Alfred M.
Gruenther, now retired, who is so well
known and respected by all of us at
home and abroad, and who was in com-
mand of NATO. The committee was for-
tunate to have the carefully considered
views of these two gentlemen when the
bill was under consideration.
In his testimony Mr. McCloy stated:
I think at this stage we might be on the
verge of another arms race which could
achieve an intensity that would be quite dan-
gerous and sinister. I think of all times in
my experience with the Agency, this is the
time for a vigorous, well-researched and com-
petent agency to deal with this rather com-
plicated problem.
I asked Mr. McCloy very bluntly
whether the United States would be bet-
ter off or be more secure if the Agency
went out of business. His answer was
equally blunt:
No; I think it would be less secure. I think
that the disarmament business and arms
control are so extremely important at this
stage. It is important to avoid an intensive
arms race with the hazardous nature, as
history shows, of those races in the past, and
the dangers that would be involved in having
nuclear weapons on everyone's doorstep. I
think the secruity of the country would be
considerably lessened if it did not have an
expert, objective group of people in the Gov-
ernment looking at this problem seriously
from day to day.
This bill carries an authorization for
$33 million-and I stress the word mil-
lion-over a 3-year period, an average of
$11 million a year. As Members know, our
committee has been reluctant to recom-
mend long-term authorizations. Both
General Gruenther and Mr. McCloy
made a persuasive case for an exception.
In response to a question whether the
Agency should be continued for 3 years,
General Gruenther gave a wholehearted
"Yes" and added:
To reach any solution other than that
would be almost a catastrophe from the
standpoint of our posture in the world-the
things we as a nation stand for. I would re-
gret very much to see any deterioration in
that position.
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
 H 1722
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4 r
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE March 6, 1968
Mr. McCloy was no less emphatic
when he stated:
If there was any limitation of the 3-year
provision at this point I think perhaps there
would be undue significance attached to it.
This is particularly true in view of the fact
that . . . we are at a critical stage in the
whole problem of arms control and disarma-
ment. There are some plans that do have to
be prepared over more than a 1-year
period . with the annual review which
is incidental to every appropriation bill, to-
gether with the fact that at any point this
committee can call on anyone to come down
to testify annd report on its affairs, that it
would be unfortunate to give any indication
at this point that there is any hesitation
about our attachment to the policy of arms
control and disarmament which are consist-
ent with the security of the country.
Mr. Chairman, when all the evidence
is weighed, it is my firm conclusion that
the work which this Agency has done and
is committed to do is in our best national
interests. Compared to the billions that
we spend-and properly so-for our de-
fense, the amount contained in this bill
is so small as to defy a meaningful com-
parison. Yet these small expenditures
may yield dividends of untold propor-
tions, not capable of expression in dol-
lars, for the happiness and peace of
mankind.
Mr. Chairman, the pursuit of peace
through inspected, verified arms control
is the most urgent-and perhaps the
most under rated-task confronting the
U.S. Government.
We must all realize that the rapid
proliferation of nuclear weapons in re-
cent years has brought mankind to the
threshold of a disaster which can be
triggered by the frustrations or an emo-
tional breakdown of even a single major
field commander..
If the entire Government of the United
States can move into armed action
against a distant country-as we did a
few years ago-on the basis of an ad-
mittedly incomplete report of an attack
on one of our ships, what greater dangers
are involved in the positioning of nuclear
weapons in the proximity of war zones
unless we have U.S. control.
These issues are seldom discussed. At
times it seems as if a conspiracy of si-
lence existed to shield the public from
the recognition of the dangers involved
in a mass distribution of tactical and
strategic nuclear weapons.
These reasons make it imperative that
we approve an aderuate authorization
for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency.
The $11 million a year authorization
requested for this Agency is frightening-
ly small when compared with the $76
billion which we will spend this year-
of necessity-to develop even greater
military power.
I urge, therefore, that the House show
a sense of responsibility and a sense of
proportion by refusing to approve any
amendment reducing the authorization
for the Arms Control Agency and pass
the bill H.R. 14940 by an overwhelming
vote.
Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield
5 minutes to the distinguished gentle-
man from Indiana [Mr. ADAIR].
(Mr. ADAIR asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, the bill
before us today provides for a 3-year
authorization for an appropriation of
$33 million-$10 million for fiscal year
1969, $12 million for the following year,
and $11 million for the year after that.
The Agency is currently operating un-
der a 3-year authorization which became
law in 1965. It is my belief, Mr. Chair-
man, that this is too long an authoriza-
tion for this Agency. At the proper time
I propose to offer an amendment reduc-
ing the time to 2 years, and the dollars
to $22 million. The reason I shall offer
that amendment, as I will explain more
fully at the time I offer the amendment,
is because I believe that every Congress
ought to be given the opportunity to
take a long, hard, careful look at this
Agency and its operations.
Mr. Chairman, I suppose it is an over-
simplification to say that this Agency
acts in two general areas. It performs
research and it negotiates treaties. On
the question of research it is interesting
to note that substantially more than
one-third of its budget for this year is
being used for contracts for research
made with other institutions. I for one
happen to believe that this is far too
high. If you will examine the supple-
mental views signed by several of us,
along with the committee report, you
will find listed there some of the mat-
ters for which research is being done.
In my opinion a great deal of this
research is possibly repetitive, and does
not really contribute to the increase of
knowledge which would be useful for this
Agency.
There are some other matters that
concern some of us. For example, there
is a prohibition against the use of nu-
clear weapons in outer space, as the
Members know.
Some time ago Secretary McNamara
announced that the Soviets had a ca-
pability, had a vehicle which could travel
in outer space, and was capable of con-
veying nuclear weapons. When members
of the Agency were asked whether or not,
in their opinion, this was a violation of
that treaty, they said "No," because this
vehicle did not have to make a complete
circuit around the earth. In other words,
on the flimsy excuse that the vehicle
could make only a fractional or part of
an orbit, the Agency took the position
that it was not therefore in violation of
the treaty.
I would submit that this is a danger-
ous position for us to take. It is extreme-
ly dangerous to us as a nation to rely
upon that kind of advice. Therefore, Mr.
Chairman, I do feel it is highly desirable
for this, and a great many other rea-
sons-that it is highly desirable that we
limit somewhat the length of time for
which we authorize this Agency to con-
tinue.
I would not want it thought that I
would do away with the Agency. I would
not-I intend to vote for this bill. I think
it is useful and important that we have
a body of people with knowledge and
skills who are constantly studying these
problems and able to negotiate on them.
If we did not have an agency of this kind
now, I feel quite certain that someplace
in our Government we would find it very
desirable to establish a body of people
with their special talents and skills.
There are now 263 people working for
the organization according to the last re-
port that we had. It is not a large agency
either in terms of personnel or in terms
of the relative amounts of money in-
volved.
I recommend that we limit the time
and funds and then pass the bill.
Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield
7 minutes to the gentleman from Cali-
fornia [Mr. HOLIFIELD].
Mr. HOLIFIELD. I thank the dis-
tinguished chairman of the committee
for yielding to me.
I want to commend the chairman and
the members of this committee who have
supported and recommended the bill,
H.R. 14940. This bill represents in my
opinion one more example of the nu-
merous forward-looking and desirable
pieces of legislation that have emanated
from the Committee on Foreign Affairs
during Congressman MORGAN's chair-
manship over the years.
Mr. Chairman, I am not on this com-
mittee. I used to be on this committee,
and I regret that the pressure of other
work en the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy and of the House Committee on
Government Operations made me feel it
was necessary to resign from the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs and go on the
other committees.
I do not ordinarily intrude myself
into the discussion of legislation of other
committees. But there is so much in this
report about the nuclear problem that I
feel from my background of 21 years
on the Joint Committee that I know
a little bit about it and therefore I have
asked the chairman for this time.
I have alternated as chairman and vice
chairman on this Joint Committee since
1961.
Beginning in 1959 when the United
States was negotiating with the U.S.S.R.
on a test ban treaty, I have been con-
tinuously an adviser of our representa-
tives negotiating in Geneva on nuclear
weapons test limitations and nonprolifer-
ation treaty arrangements and periodi-
cally have participated in actual negotia-
tions.
I was the chairman of the subcom-
mittee of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy which made the study of the pro-
gram and prepared a report which was
sent to President Truman recommending
that the United States proceed on a crash
basis to develop the hydrogen bomb.
I have been a consistent and strong
supporter of a nuclear navy and the de-
velopment of strong nuclear deterrent
force for the United States.
I have personally observed atomic and
hydrogen bomb tests and I know the tre-
mendous destructive forces that they
represent.
I wish that I could bring to every Mem-
ber of this House the experience of seeing
a hydrogen bomb test, with the millions
of tons of TNT force that is released.
I would say to those who would oppose
a bill like this to think about it and think
about nuclear war in this world. If there
is anything under God's sun that can be
done by mankind to avoid this suicidal
race toward their own extinction, I think
it ought to be done. I think one of the
ways of doing it is to explore, explore,
and explore with patience, taking every
little bit of progress you can get, every
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
March 6, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
little step further that you can get to pre-
vent this country from going down the
road to a nuclear war. That is my interest
on this floor today.
And when I hear people talking about
the proliferation of nuclear weapons un-
der any kind of situation, such as is con-
tained in this report, I will tell you it
chills my blood, too.
I say that every step that we can take,
in the name of God we should take it, to
prevent any proliferation we can prevent.
We cannot prevent it all. Of course, some
of these nations may decide to manufac-
ture their own nuclear weapons. But if
you get them signed up not to do it, that
means they are signed up not to receive
nuclear weapons. -
That does not mean they will always
live up to their treaties. Treaties have
been broken ever since mankind started
to make them. Of course there will be
nations that will break treaties. This
treaty is not binding even on the United
States. Article X provides the means for
the United States to get out of it-for
the purpose of protecting the national
security of this country.
The use of the Nonproliferation
Treaty that has been discussed here to
destroy this bill is using something that
is extraneous to the authorization for
continuance of the ACDC. You may
agree with the treaty or not. But the
Congress of the United States will pass
on the final form of that treaty. The
ACDS is negotiating. They are trying to
arrange it. They are trying to develop
it. When they do develop it, it will be up
to the other body, of course, to turn it
down or to accept it. But in the name of
God, do not prevent a continuing search
for a treaty that may save mankind.
The Joint Committee has followed
every step of this treaty. We have fol-
lowed every word and every phrase. We
have had something to do with the writ-
ing of this treaty, because we have con-
stantly advised those who are in charge
of the negotiations that the Congress
will not accept unrealistic language in
a nonproliferation treaty. So we have
had something to do with it, both Re-
publicans and Democrats. This has not
been a partisan matter in the Joint
Committee, and I hope that this subject
matter never becomes a partisan
matter.
I can state categorically that the pro-
posed nonproliferation treaty in no way
affects the current arrangements of the
United States with our NATO allies per-
taining to their nuclear defense. You
talk about nuclear_ defense, weakening
NATO in its nuclear defense. Every one
of those 6,000 weapons that are located
in the NATO countries is for their de-
fense. They are defense weapons for,
their defense, if they are attacked, and
I would hope we would never use nu-
clear weapons unless we were attacked.
The Atomic Energy Act, since first
passed in 1946, has never permitted, and
still prohibits the transfer of nuclear
weapons by the United States to any
nation except in time of war or when
the President, as Commander in Chief,
shall so direct on the basis of preserv-
ing our Nation. That is the only way we
can transfer nuclear weapons into the
sole sovereign control of any other na-
tion, and I hope that it always stays that
way. I do not want any other finger on
that trigger except the flinger of the
President of the United States, and I
do not care whether it is Eisenhower,
Johnson, Nixon, Percy, Rockefeller, or
Romney. I want the President of the
United States to have the final finger on
that trigger. That is the way the law pro-
vides at the present time.
When you talk about "fuzzing" this
thing up and preparing for some fear-
some eventuality in the future, you are
talking nonsense. We will take care of
the future when the time comes. This
Congress will take care of it. There will
be no change in the present situation by
the Arms Control Agency or by anybody
else until the Congress has the final
say-so as to whether it will be changed,
and they will say how it can be changed.
As I said, we have over 6,000 nuclear
weapons in the NATO countries, but
those weapons,are under a dual control
system. First, the nation where the
weapon is has to agree to use it. Second,
the President of the United States has to
agree to the use of that weapon. Let
us keep it that way. When I think of
transferring to any nation, weak or
strong, the control of the nuclear weapon
and the use of it, for example, to West
Germany-the Germans do not want it.
They have never asked for it. It would
destroy NATO if we transferred nuclear
weapons into the sole control of West
Germany, and everybody in this zoom
knows it. It would create a wave in this
country that we could not stand, and
any man who voted for that would be
endangering, in my opinion, not only his
political career, but more importantly
the security of the Nation.
This is a rough job. The gentleman
from Illinois has challenged me to give
some of the things that are wrong in
his statement. I do not have the time to
do it, but if, during the 5-minute rule,
I can get some time, I will be glad to
show the gentleman where his state-
ments not only are in error, but where,
in my opinion, his assumptions are un-
founded.
I am serious about this. Before I do so,
I will be glad to talk to the gentleman
to let him know what I will be talking
about, before I get the floor. I know time
is limited, and I feel I am imposing upon
this Committee by taking this 7 or 8
minutes, but I want to make three or
four points in the minute I have left.
There is a nuclear umbrella in the mili-
tary agreement with NATO, which is
working, and NATO is satisfied with it.
There are bilateral military agreements
with the principal NATO nations-not
all, but the ones who want them-and
they are satisfied. Nobody is raising any
problem about that. We are training
other nations' teams of all the nations
who want to participate and who are par-
ticipating with us in bilateral agree-
ments. We are training teams to use
these weapons when and if the dual con-
trol method is exercised.
I am sorry I do not have any more
time, but I would say let us go ahead and
seek ways to prevent a nuclear holo-
H1723
caust. Let us keep the control in the
Congress of the United States. Let us not
let this genie out of the bottle and let it
loose among any more nations in the
world than can get it on their own. That
we cannot prevent, but we can prevent
giving them this terrible destructive
nuclear weapon force.
Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield
5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman
from Illinois.
(Mr. DERWINSKI asked and was
given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. 'Chairman, I
would like to remind the Members that
we are debating a 3-year authorization
for the Arms Control and Disarmamnt
Agency. We are not debating the treaty
that became the subject of discussion
between the gentleman from California
and my colleague from the State of
Illinois.
At the risk of sounding facetious, I
would suggest to the gentleman from
Illinois and the gentleman from Cali-
fornia, that if they wish to continue their
battle they might repair to one of the
side rooms and fight a duel at 10 paces
with press releases, while we get back to
discussing the authorization.
Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
. Mr. DERWINSKI. I yield to the gentle-
man from New Jersey.
Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, I
presume the gentleman means a non-
nuclear duel?
Mr. DERWINSKI. Of course.
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield, since the gentleman
mentioned my name?
Mr. DERWINSKI. I yield to the gentle-
man from California.
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I was
surprised to see this nuclear treaty ques-
tion brought into this discussion, but this
is about the only thing in the additional
views of the gentleman from Illinois, and
it is in the report, and, of course, that is
the only thing I would repair to.
Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Chairman, let
me say to the gentleman that I appreciate
his discussion with the gentleman from
Illinois, since that frees the rest of us to
debate with the chairman of the commit-
tee. I think the gentleman has balanced
and equated the views of the gentleman
from Illinois.
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, the
views of the gentleman from Illinois
were on the Nonproliferation Treaty.
Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. DERWINSKI. I yield to the gen-
tleman from Illinois.
Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, I am
sure the gentleman will agree that about
the only topic which was thoroughly dis-
cussed in the hearings was the draft
treaty on nonproliferation, and also that
the only real product of the past 3 years
of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, at least any product that needs
and deserves our attention at this point,
is that same draft treaty.
I hope he will agree it is quite appro-
priate for us to take some time at this
point in connection with the prolonged
life of this Agency to see what the Agency
has accomplished in the past 3 years.
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
 H 1724
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE March' 6, 1968
Mr. DERWINSKI. I wish to emphasize
the concern we should have this after-
noon; do we need a 3-year authorization
for this Agency? In view of the concern
over the treaty and in view of the rather
perfunctory attention which our com-
mittee gave this Agency, I believe it
would be in the interest of the Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency if their
officials would give us the word that
they would support the pending amend-
ment of the gentleman from Indiana
[Mr. ADAIR], and would accept a 2-year
authorization.
There are a number of arguments we
could use. For example, those who are
interested in old-fashioned economy in
Government ought to be reminded that
there are more supergrades in relation-
ship to total employment in the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency than
there are in any other department or
agency of the Government. One out of
six employees of this little Agency is in
a supergrade status. The next best
staffed supergrade operation is the White
House.
Just by looking over the budget of this
Agency every 2 years instead of every
3 years we might achieve a few proper
economies.
The thought that Congress could ef-
fectively exercise legislative oversight
during the period when the bill does not
come before us is not at all a sound
argument. Please note that our commit-
tee theoretically has jurisdiction over the
U.S. Information Agency, but they have
an open end authorization, and we have
about as much influence on the U.S. In-
formation Agency, in setting its author-
ization and its policies-as I would hope
the Foreign Affairs Committee would-
as Senator MCCARTHY has on present for-
eign policy of the White House.
We cannot control, we cannot have
proper legislative oversight unless there
is legislation before the committee in. a
necessary fashion.
I would consider that a 2-year au-
thorization would be in the interest of
the Agency.
I want to underscore that the gentle-
man from Illinois and the gentleman
from California diverted attention from
the basic issue. I should like to empha-
size we did not write opposing or minor-
ing views. We wrote supplemental views.
As friends of the Agency, we would prefer
a 2-year authorization to scrutinize it
properly, to save it from criticism, to save
it from the possibility of escaping con-
trol.
The gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr.
THOMSON] has a very interesting
amendment to offer. He suggests that
perhaps we link the disarmament pro-
gram with arms sales, so that the left
hand and the right hand in Government
will know what they are doing.
There are a lot of questions which
could be asked. They should be asked at
least every 2 years instead of every 3
years.
I feel that if there is any need for leg-
islative oversight, if we in the Congress
take our responsibility to heart, at least
once in a 2-year period, at least once in
the lifetime of every Congress, we should
review the authorization and scrutinize
this and every other agency.
I would hope that Members would join
us at the prober time in passing a 2-year
authorization. I believe this would be a
progressive step and would achieve the
proper congressional control, restraint,
and supervision this Agency deserves.
Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, I am
very glad to yield 5 minutes to the gen-
tleman from Wisconsin [Mr. THOMSON].
(Mr. THOMSON of Wisconsin asked
and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. THOMSON of Wisconsin. Mr.
Chairman, I want to supplement what
has been said by the gentleman a from
Illinois regarding a suggestion for eco-
nomy and efficiency in our Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency. You know, it
might be assumed that the bill now pend-
ing is for the only so-called arms control
agency that exists in this country. As a
matter of fact, in the Department of De-
fense we have a Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary in charge of plans and arms con-
trol. So we have another arm control
agency in the executive branch of the
Government. Then I was looking for the
Deputy Assistant Secretary who is in
charge of arms sales in the Department
of Defense. Now, surprisingly enough, it
is not called arms sales in the Depart-
ment of Defense. It is called internation-
al logistics negotiations. Now, this is an
unwieldy term for the average citizen-
international logistics negotiations. So
I thought if we would call it by its right
name, which is arms sales, it would be a
big help. They are spending three-quar-
ters of a million dollars a year in selling
arms. They are annually spending $757,-
000 on the effort to sell arms throughout
the world. Now, if we could get all of
these agencies under one administrative
head, we would have greater efficiency
and we would have some economy, and
the people in America would realize that
we are engaged in the sale of arms while
we purportedly are trying to control arms
and induce other countries to disarm.
Think what a salutary effect it would
have if we had one agency that knew
what countries we were trying to disarm
and what countries we were trying to
arm. It might save a lot of duplication of
effort on our agency personnel who might
be going to the same countries to sell
them arms while another agency thought
that was one of the countries that they
should be disarming.
You talk about your right hand know-
ing what you left hand is doing. I think
it is high time that the American people
realize we are engaged on both sides of
this street and we are spending money
in all these agencies. Therefore I thought
at the appropriate time I would offer an
amendment for the purpose of strength-
ening, streamlining, and improving the
efficiency of this Agency, which amend-
ment would read as follows:
On the first page, after line 7, add the
following:
"SEC. 2. At the end of such Act, add the
following new section:
"'SEC. 51. (a) All powers, functions, and
duties of the United States Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency under this Act are
hereby transferred to the Secretary of De-
fense, together with all personnel, property,
and records utilized by such Agency in the
performance of the powers, functions, and
duties transferred by this section.
"`(b) The Secretary of Defense shall exer-
cise the powers, functions, and duties vested
in him by this section through the Office of
International Security Affairs, which office
shall hereafter 'be known and designated as
the Office of International Security Affairs,
Arms Sales, Arms Control, and Disarma-
ment.' ' 11
I hope that the chairman will be will-
ing to accept the amendments so that we
can improve the efficiency of this Agency
and effect some economy in Government.
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. THOMSON of Wisconsin. Yes. I
yield to the gentleman from Iowa.
Mr. GROSS. And make a little sense
to the taxpayers who foot the bills. They
will better know what is being done to
them and where it is being done.
Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield
4 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois
[Mr. FINDLEY].
(Mr. FINDLEY asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. FINDLEY. 'Mr. Chairman, I am
going to indulge again in discussing the
Arms Control Agency's principal prod-
uct-the draft Treaty of Nonprolifera-
tion-even though this may seem to be
a bit aside to some Members. It is di-
rectly on target, in my view, and in my
opinion it fully justifies our examina-
tion.
The distinguished gentleman from
California - [Mr. HOLIFIELD] indicates
that he shall be forthcoming with some
citations of errors in the remarks which
I placed in the committee report. But
up to the present time I cannot see that
he cited anything as erroneous. I am
afraid the gentleman is indulging in at-
tacking a strawman to some consid-
erable extent, when he talks about those
who want to proliferate nuclear weap-
ons to other nations.
The objective which I seek by the in-
troduction of my amendment is not to
proliferate weapons to any nation what-
soever but, rather, to support and to
implement the position which President
Eisenhower insisted upon in his admin-
istration, that the late President
Kennedy insisted upon under his ad-
ministration, and that President John-
son insisted upon until October 1966.
I am sure no one would accuse any
of these Presidents of being wild or
ridiculous or unreasonable or dangerous
in what they were doing or saying or
seeking to do in regard to nuclear
weapons.
My amendment. would protect what
is known as the NATO option. This is
an option clearly recognized by all three
Presidents up until October 1966 as be-
ing supremely important. We might ask
ourselves, What did happen in October
1966 to bring about a change in our
position?
The only factor which I can cite to
the members of the' Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union is
that by that time President Johnson had
concluded that this NATO option was not
acceptable to the Soviet Union and he
therefore saw it as his proper objective
to modify our purpose and accommodate
the Soviets. However, this does not reduce
one whit the validity of the position
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
March 6, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
taken by our American leaders, by Presi-
dent Eisenhower, by the late President
Kennedy, and by President Johnson until,
that fall period in 1966.
We have retreated substantially from
our previous position as a nation in bar-
gaining with the Soviet Union upon the
question of arms control and nonpro-
liferation.
Mr. Chairman, involved here is the
problem of nuclear guarantees. If this
country makes a deal on what amounts
-to a bilateral basis with the Soviet Union
as it is attempting to establish an ar-
rangement of worldwide nuclear polic-
ing, what guarantees and commitments
do we undertake?
I tell you that the answer to that ques-
tion is murky. President Johnson said,
under the treaty, nations subjected to nu-
clear blackmail could expect "strong
support" from us. What does "strong sup-
port" mean?
Mr. Adrian Fisher testified to the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs in response to
my questions that in his view the adop-
tion of this treaty on the part of the
United States would not increase the re-
sponsibility of the United States to pro-
tect any nation in any respect whatever,
In other words, it would not enlarge our
responsibility beyond present commit-
ments in any manner whatsoever.
Mr. Chairman, if that is the case, what
is the quid pro quo from the standpoint
of the nonnuclear nations? How can we
expect any nation that might feel that its
interests may some day be pressed with a
Communist threat, whether Red China or
the Soviet Union, how can we expect such
a nation to accept this treaty, lacking as
it does guarantees in any practical meas-
ure?
I can give you another little episode
that just became clear. Just today I
learned that our Government, that is,
the officials of the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency, have refused to give
West Germany assurances of continued
supplies of fissionable material for
peaceful uses until they agree to sign this
treaty. To me that is a threat that is rep-
rehensible in dealing with our trusted
loyal, and patient ally that is so exposed
to Soviet threat.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen-
tleman has expired.
Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield
2 minutes to the gentleman from Ala-
bama [Mr. BUCHANAN].
Mr.. BUCHANAN. Mr. Chairman,
America's strength is the world's best
hope for peace. I am not really so much
concerned about the weaponry in the
hands of the police as I am about the
weaponry in the hands of the Cosa
Nostra, nor am I so much concerned
about the rifle in the closet of the law-
abiding citizen of this Nation, which he
might use to defend his family against
the criminal or the insane, as I am about
the weaponry in the hands of the crim-
inal or the insane himself. And even
though there is reason for concern about
nuclear destruction, my concern is not so
much directed toward our own nuclear
power as it is toward the fact that the
most dangerous and irresponsible powers
in the world already are or are becoming
nuclear powers.
The Soviet Union is a very sophisti-
cated nuclear power. Red China is be-
coming a nuclear power. And it seems to
me that there is reason for concern about
the 3-year continuation of the life of an
agency without any review at all by the
91st Congress, the whole thrust of which
is to press toward more and bigger and
better treaties with such nations as the
Soviet Union. It seems to me that consist-
ently in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the
Space Treaty, and the proposed Non-
proliferation Treaty, the effect has been
to bind the hands of the good guys who
wear the white hats, who live up to their
commitments and their treaties,.and free
the hands of the bad guys who wear the
black hats and who do not honor their
treaties or their commitments.
The Soviet Union only signs such
treaties when it is in its military stra-
tegic interest to do so, and honors one
only so long as it is in its military and
strategic interests to do so.
I would reiterate, Mr. Chairman, that
-it is not the weaponry in the hands of
the innocent about which I am con-
cerned, but the weapons that are in the
hands of the guilty. And I repeat that
America's strength is the world's best
hope for peace.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman has expired.
Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield
the remainder of our time to the dis-
tinguished gentleman from New Jersey
[Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN].
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman
from New Jersey is recognized for 6
minutes.
(Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN asked and
was given permission to revise and ex-
tend his remarks.)
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chair-
man, interesting as the discussion has
been with respect to the so-called non-
proliferation treaty, I should like to re-
mind the Committee that the subject
before us today is simply whether to
amend the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Act so as to extend the authoriza-
tion for appropriations for a 3-year
period. If we keep that in mind I believe
we will realize we have a relatively sim-
ple issue. It is one that I would hope
most Members of the Congress would
accept.
We may get into an argument, but
I believe it should raise no blood pres-
sures, as to whether the authorization
should be for a 2- or a 3-year period.
Let me simply remind the Members
that in 1961, when this Agency was es-
tablished, the vote in the House was 290
in favor, and 54 against. When the au-
thorization was extended in 1965 the
vote in the House was 302 in favor and
63 against. In the other body in 1961
the vote. was 73 in favor, and only 12
against, and in 1965 the other body voted
74 in favor and 11 against.
I would guess there will be some, prob-
ably somewhat more than a handful,
who will again oppose any extension of
the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency. However, I would suppose that
the overwhelming majority of the Mem-
bers on both sides of the aisle would con-
tinue to feel as they did at the outset;
H 1725
surely, it is a reasonable suggestion to
have a focal point in the executive branch
of our Government, a relatively small,
highly motivated group, less than 300 in-
dividuals, who admittedly are highly
paid in comparison to the average bu-
reaucracy, to provide the expertise
needed to develop an attitude toward
these basic problems of national security.
I would suppose ? that support for this
Agency continues because the world is
no less stable than it was in 1961. The
threat of war is at least as great. The
urgency of doing something about the
problem of other countries acquiring nu-
clear weapons is at least as urgent. Thus
the need for an arm control agency is
clear.
We can easily be misled if we get off
in a discussion of what is basically the
prerogative of the other body; that is,
whether a treaty to prevent further pro-
liferation by providing limitations on
both nuclear states and nonnuclear
states is a good thing or not.
I would suppose the other body has
enough good sense, and it certainly has
the responsibility, to face up squarely to
its responsibilities prior to any ratifica-
tion of that treaty.
I, myself, find myself very strongly in
agreement with the Chairman of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in
his expression of doubts as to the wisdom
of any proliferation of weapons by this
country with our allies, individually or
collectively.
I say this recognizing the importance
of NATO to our own security, but in the
belief that the present arrangements
with our NATO allies are of sufficient
clarity and sufficient definiteness to pro-
tect both us and them.
We in the House have no direct con-
trol over this treaty, and I certainly urge
that we should not try to torpedo the
Agency and its employees. Certainly we
should not put any restriction on the
pay of employees of the Agency because
we individually may have reservations
about the wisdom of preventing individ-
ual NATO allies or others from getting
nuclear weapons from us.
It does seem to me essential that we
keep this point in mind.
One final point which will come up is
whether to provide a 2-year authoriza-
tion or a 3-year authorization. I, my-
self, do not think it makes a great deal of
difference to anybody, except perhaps
the employees of the Agency, whether we
grant a 2- or 3-year authorization. I
have mixed emotions myself. Thus far,,
I find myself and probably I shall con-
tinue to be, in favor of a 3-year author-
ization. It seems to me that a shorter
authorization does not do anything ex-
cept pose the question to the Committee
on Foreign Affairs as to the advisability
of taking a close look at what the Agency
is doing.
Yet this year-and I do not feel I am
revealing any secrets by saying this-
we on the committee are coming up with
no farreaching recommendations, either
to increase or reduce the number of em-
ployees of the Agency. Nor are we mak-
ing any serious suggestions either as to
expanding or contracting the nature of
their research program.
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
 111726
Regardless of the length of the au-
thorization for the Agency, there is a
definite obligation on us as members of
the committee to watchdog this opera-
tion closely.
I assume if we have not done this in
the past, we will do it in the 91st Con-
gress whether a bill such as this comes
up 2 years from now.
Mr. MATHIAS of Maryland. Mr.
Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I yield to the
gentleman.
Mr. MATHIAS of Maryland. Mr.
Chairman, I rise in support of the bill
and in support of the point that the
gentleman has just made which is very
well taken. -
I think this is a necessary area of over-
sight and one that perhaps we have not
exercised as vigorously as we should have
in the past.
I have particular reference to the area
of study of the economic consequences of
disarmament which is a tremendously
important field in which I think more
could have been done, and perhaps we
in the Congress should have done more.
Mr. Chairman, there is no cause more
vital than the cause of peace. In this
difficult year, it is especially important
for the Congress and the United States
to reaffirm, in clear and unmistakeable
terms, not only our constant hope for
peace, but our continuing commitment to
lessening international tensions, slowing
down the arms race, curbing nuclear
proliferation; and generally reducing the
omnipresent threat of nuclear war.
Passage of H.R. 14940, to extend the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
for 3 additional years, would by such a
reaffirmation, and I strongly support this
bill today. In so doing, I might point out
that, considering the gravity and the ex-
tremely technical nature of the Agency's
assignment, this is a very modest bill. It
would authorize the expenditure of only
$33 million during the next 3 entire fiscal
years. Meanwhile, at current cost levels,
we are spending that much, $33 million,
every 9 hours in Vietnam.
Other Members will discuss the con-
tributions of ACDA to the drafting of
the Nonproliferation Treaty, the devel-
opment of workable nuclear inspection
systems, and other tasks. I would like to
focus briefly on one very important part
of the Agency's mandate: the question of
economic conversion, or the economic
impact of disarmament.
It is ironic that the United States, a
nation dedicated to peace, has lived so
long under the clouds of war and inter-
national tensions that the needs of na-
tional defense have become the single
largest influence on our economy. When
President Eisenhower warned us of the
influence of the "military-industrial
complex," our defense budget was about
$40 billion per year. Now, 8 years later,
that budget has almost exactly doubled,
to about $80 billion, and the impact of
defense spending on.our entire economic
structure is even greater than it was
during the Eisenhower administration.
I do not cite President Eisenhower's
remarks to suggest that there is any-
thing sinister, improper or threatening
about the alliance between our Military
Establishment and American industry.
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE March 6, 1-9 68
Certainly the strength of our national
defenses is a tribute to the talent and
technology of American free enterprise.
But it is a fact, one which we should
not ignore or discount, that our entire
economy is extremely sensitive to
changes in the scope and direction of our
defense effort, and that reductions in
defense spending have a direct, immedi-
ate, and lasting impact both on indi-
vidual defense contractors, and on our
economy as a whole.
My own congressional district felt this
impact several years ago, when the De-
partment of Defense ceased ordering the
famous "flying boxcars" which had been
produced by the Fairchild-Hiller Corp.
in Hagerstown. Many of my constituents
remember vividly the unemployment
which resulted in western Maryland
while Fairchild-Hiller was converting to
other types of production. They and I
would not want changes in defense re-
quirements to put workers out on the
streets again.
If the effect of one change in military
procurement can be so great, we can
imagine the nationwide impact of a re-
duction in the overall level of defense
spending, including both procurement
and research and development. A out of
10 percent in the overall Defense De-
partment.budget would take $8 billion in
orders and employment out of the econ-
omy. The end of fighting in Vietnam
would have a much greater effect on
production and employment rates. Even
if a sizeable share of our current Viet-
nam expenditures were redirected to
strengthening the defenses elsewhere
which are now stretched so thin, the
eventual reductions in spending, assum-
ing that no other similar conflict
emerged elsewhere, would completely
change our economic picture, cause
hardships in many communities now de-
pendent on defense payrolls, and com-
pel us to reexamine our overall economic
policies.
Mr. Chairman, no matter how distant
peace in Vietnam or around the globe
may appear right now, I feel that we
cannot afford to neglect these ques-
tions. The Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency has done some very valu-
able research on the economic impact
of defense cuts, and on the types of re-
adjustments which would be required. A
year ago, the President established a
special Cabinet-level Coordinating Com-
mittee on Economic Planning for the
End of Vietnam Hostilities, and directed
that group to "begin at once a major
and coordinated effort to review our
readiness to make the economic adjust-
ments which a termination of hostilities
in Vietnam might require."
Mr. Chairman, I am today asking the
Chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisers for a report on the work of this
Coordinating Committee, the level of its
activities to date, and any preliminary
findings or recommendations which it
may have shaped.
In general, I feel that far more should
be done, beginning now, to increase our
readiness not only for any reduction in
the level of combat in Vietnam, not only
for the distant dawn of gradual general
disarmament, but also for such even-
tualities as the return of significant
numbers of American forces from Eu-
rope and a reduction in our expenditures
in that theater.
In intensifying our work in the field of
conversion, we should regard economic
readjustment not as a threat but as an
opportunity. We have already begun to
see how much our defense industries,
with their advanced technology and
modern management techniques, can
contribute to the solution of many of our
most urgent domestic problems, such as
transportation, air and water pollution,
urban development, and economic plan-
ning. I have joined the gentleman from
Massachusetts [Mr. MORSE] and many
of our colleagues in sponsoring leg-
islation to create a Commission on
Public Management to develop means of
putting American free enterprise to work
on public policy. I believe that this
legislation, too, should be considered and
passed this year, and such a study of
possibilities should be coupled with in-
tensified research on economic readjust-
ment.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, passage
of this bill today has both international
and domestic significance. It will reaf-
firm our commitment to continuing the
search for peace in a nuclear world, a
search begun during the Eisenhower ad-
ministration, and even more critical now
than it was then.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I thank the
gentleman. I might say the Agency has
taken a look, and is continuing to take a
look, in that area. I would agree with the
gentleman that it is an important area. I
would agree with him also that it might
well be that the Committee on Foreign
Affairs could do more than it has to see
individually what has been accomplished
by this agency and what it is planning
to do.
Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield
the remaining time to the gentleman
from New Jersey [Mr. GALLAGHER].
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog-
nizes the gentleman from New Jersey for
2 minutes.
(Mr. GALLAGHER asked and was
given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, I
think it is a great paradox of our time
that young men are chasing each other
with rifles in distant places while we in
Washington are trying to prevent a nu-
clear war, and yet finding a way to pre-
vent incineration of this planet must be
as meaningful as our desire for peace in
Vietnam.
It seems to me at the end of this de-
bate there are three outstanding issues:
First is the issue raised by the distin-
guished gentleman from Wisconsin that
these men are arms salesmen. Actually
they are not salesmen. They are em-
ployees of an agency engaged in perhaps
the world's most important work: how to
prevent the world from becoming a pile
of ashes. I do not think the gentleman's
amendment is germane.
The other issues we have are whether
or not we should have a 2- or 3-year
authorization. All of the witnesses, in-
cluding Mr. McCloy and General Gruen-
ther, indicated that the most efficient
and economic use of the limited funds
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
 'Z Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
March 6, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD - HOUSE
that this agency has available can be
had by a 3-year authorization.
As to the men employed in this
Agency, the gentleman from New Jersey
[Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN] did state that they
were highly motivated men, and I agree
thoroughly with that statement. These
men are highly motivated. Most of them
could obtain higher salaries on the out-
side. They are highly skilled and dedi-
cated, and they ought to have a right to
know whether or not their careers can
be extended and what the future may
hold for the Agency. So while it is a
value judgment, the fact is that. the
preponderance of the evidence before the
committee was that it should be a 3-year
authorization.
The other issue before the Committee
that we shall vote upon is the amend-
ment of the gentleman from Illinois. I
think we should put this within its proper
framework. We are not here today to
discuss and debate whether or not this
body should consent to the Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty. This is an agreement that
has been reached after the considered
judgment of those who must advise the
executive branch. We have already indi-
cated that we would join in the Non-
proliferation Treaty. So that is not the
issue of the debate.
The gentleman from Illinois has reser-
vations. We all have reservations on
many things, and so this is his reserva-
tion, as to whether it should continue.
But withholding the salaries of the peo-
ple in this Agency is no way to go about
expressing displeasure. This is a govern-
mental decision that has been made, and
to deescalate the people that are pres-
ently on the Federal payroll is not the
way to reexamine that decision:
Mr. Chairman, on January 30, I intro-
duced H.R. 14941-a bill identical to the
one now before the House. Its purpose
was to extend the life of the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency by au-
thorizing appropriations of $33 million
for the next 3-year period. After hearing
many distinguished witnesses-both pro-
ponents and opponents of the draft legis-
lation-the Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs reported the bill favorably, without
.amendment.
I rise today to express support for the
committee's report, for the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, and for its
work which President Johnson has char-
acterized as "the most urgent business of
our time."
This concept of arms control is not a
partisan one, and never has been. In an
address before the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly in 1960, former President
Eisenhower said armaments must be
controlled "if civilization is to be assured
of survival." And just a few weeks ago
Senator BAKER pointed out in the Repub-
lican "state of the Union" presentation:
We must be imaginative enough to use
nuclear energy to make peace instead of war,
to promote cooperation instead of conflict.
To these ends the work of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency is
dedicated.
It is to promote these objectives that
I support a 3-year authorization-an au-
thorization no longer than the current
one.
Mr. William C. Foster, Director of the
Agency, in testifying before the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, said:
Contrasted with the enormous expendi-
tures undertaken by the United States each
year for defense purposes, the requested au-
thorization is small-both in amount and
duration . . . For the United States to cut
back on the length of its future authorized
arms control effort at this time could have
an adverse impact on U.S. objectives.
Such a cutback could be interpreted
as a withdrawal of support for the U.S.
arms control effort. Adherence of non-
nuclear countries to a treaty to prevent
the further spread of nuclear weapons
depends largely on whether they are con-
vinced that the nuclear weapon coun-
tries are sincere in their pledge to work
for curtailment of the nuclear arms race.
A decrease in our effort to curtail the
arms race, therefore, could decrease our
security by frustrating the nonprolifera-
tion policy of the U.S. Government-a
policy endorsed by every national ad-
ministration since World War II.
This has also been the consistent pol-
icy of Congress, which clearly closed the
U.S. option to proliferate nuclear weap-
ons to other countries in 1946 with the
adoption of the McMahon Act. The
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which suc-
ceeded it, prohibits the transfer of atomic
weapons in foreign commerce. This pro-
hibition applies both to other countries
and to international organizations.
Given this established U.S. policy, it is
appropriate for the United States to get
an international,, commitment from the
Soviet Union not to proliferate nuclear
weapons, and a commitment from pos-
sible nonnuclear nation recipients not to
receive or acquire such weapons.
In 1966, U.S. efforts to reach agree-
ment on a nonproliferation treaty re-
ceived overwhelming support in connec-
tion with Senate Resolution 179. This
resolution passed the Senate by 84 to
0, with all but one absent Senator de-
claring in favor.
In spite of all this, Mr. Chairman, an
amendment has been proposed today
which denounces the U.S. policy to pre-
vent the further spread of nuclear weap-
ons. The amendment would condemn as
wrong the policy of every administra-
tion since World War II and frustrate an
express policy of the Congress.
I submit, Mr. Chairman, that this
amendment is wrong. It would cut off
Agency funds unless the nonprolifera-
tion treaty is revised to permit the
United States to transfer nuclear
weapons to regional defense organiza-
tions such as NATO.
Our NATO allies have not asked for
this. Under the circumstances, Mr.
Chairman, I submit that this amend-
ment would make the United States more
allied than the allies-or as the saying
goes, more Catholic than the Pope.
It has already been pointed out that
the Atomic Energy Act prohibits the type
of transfer of nuclear weapons advo-
cated by the gentleman from Illinois
[Mr. FINDLEY]. But even if the Atomic
Energy Act were amended to permit
transfer to regional organizations of de-
fensive nuclear weapons which had been
"safed" so they could not be- used for of-
fensive purposes, Mr. Fisher testified be-
H1727
fore the committee that, by the use of
X-rays and other scientific techniques,
another country could obtain classified
design information on the warhead. This
would show the design of a sophisticated
thermonuclear weapon which could be
used offensively.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, the Honorable
John J. McCloy, former High Commis-
sioner for Germany under the Eisen-
hower administration, testified before,
the committee that amending the Non-
proliferation Treaty to permit the trans-
fer of defensive weapons to NATO "would
frustrate the objectives of the treaty."
The Nonproliferation Treaty would, in
fact, have to permit proliferation-and
in a manner contrary to U.S. policy and
contrary to legislation enacted by Con-
gress.
I suggest the defeat of any such
amendment.
Mr. Chairman, negotiations to end the
nuclear arms race are delicate, im-
mensely complex, and difficult. Though
progress has been slow and deliberate,
earlier landmarks, such as the 1963 "hot
line" agreement, the Limited Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty and, more recently, the
Outer Space Treaty, give us good reason'
to hope for continued, if slow, progress.
We have within our ability the power
to end the human story here on earth.
We now share that power with at least
four other nations. The efforts to turn
us back from the brink of nuclear holo-
caust and to preserve the world for our
children are and should be supreme. We
should never give any indication other
than that the United States is the lead-
ing advocate of peace in the world today.
We cannot afford to do otherwise. I ask
strong approval of this 3-year authoriza-
tion of our official agency for peace and
stability in the world.
Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, nuclear
war is insanity. The prevention of nu-
clear war is the most pressing task facing
man today.
For the present we are dependent on a
balance of nuclear terror to keep the
peace and prevent holocaust. Each year
the world produces more terrible, more
deadly weapons. These new developments
threaten the balance of terror and lead
to seemingly unstoppable arms races.
It is the job of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency to research the
problems of reversing this awful spiral.
This Agency advises the President, the
Department of State, the Department
of Defense, and other departments of
the Government on matters related to
arms control-supplying scientific, mili-
tary, psychological, and legal informa-
tion necessary to the formulation of pol-
icy and the negotiation of agreements.
Three of what history may view as the
largest steps away from world nuclear
destruction have been taken in this dec-
ade. In each the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency has in good measure
been responsible for the progress we have
made. As an original sponsor of the bill
establishing this Agency, and as a man
firmly convinced of the primacy of the
objectives of arms control, I am gratified
with these striking developments.
One year. after the establishment of
the Agency the Limited Nuclear Test
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
 I1 1728
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R00510A000300210015-4
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE March 6, 1968
Ban Treaty was signed. This treaty has
protected our lives by eliminating radio-
active fallout from atmospheric nuclear
explosions by signatory countries includ-
ing the United States and the Soviet
Union. This treaty has also had a salu-
tary effect in limiting the development
of newer and more terrible weapons by
these countries.
Last year the Agency saw the fruition
of its considerable efforts to ban the ex-
plosion and the presence of nuclear
weapons from outer space, with the exec-
ution of the Treaty on Outer Space.
This year, after considerable efforts
by the Agency, there is a draft Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty to stop the
spread and development of nuclear
weapons in nonnuclear nations. This
treaty, which is acceptable to both the
United States and the Soviet Union and
to many nonnuclear nations, has been
presented to the 18-Nation Disarma-
ment Committee in Geneva for consid-
eration.
These three treaties are singular ac-
complishments of the 1960's, and in each
the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency has been largely and effectively
involved.
Today, we are asked to consider the
future of this Agency-and we are asked
to prove to this country and to the world
our dedication to the principles of arms
control. I think this is a question we can-
not fail to answer loudly, strongly, and
affirmatively-the Arms Control Agency
must be continued. It should be afforded
the $33 million this bill asks, and it
should be given a new 3-year mandate
to pursue its overwhelmingly necessary
efforts.
Some Members have raised questions
concerning the propriety of a 3-year au-
thorization for the Agency. I am not a
pessimist, but I do not foresee the end of
the need for this Agency's work in the
next 3 years. The world is looking to us
today to determine how much .we believe
in arms control. At this point to limit the
Agency to a 2-year authorization would
-be to depreciate the credibility of our
national commitment to disarmament.
Further still, and as the committee re-
port points out, the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency is dependent on a
well-trained and highly motivated staff.
The recurrent question of continuing the
Agency takes a toll on the morale and
the quality of this staff.
In short, I can see no valid reason why
we should not today act to enable the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
to continue seeking ways to halt the arms
race and to avoid Armageddon.
Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, the Ameri-
can people are beginning to wonder just
how many more of their tax dollars are
going to be wasted on the disarmament
folly. The Communist leaders in Moscow
and in Peking must "burn the midnight
oil" devising plans for disarmament that
we will "fall for." To them disarmament
is but another dialectic device to be used
as a means to accomplish world domina-
tion. We negotiate, then capitulate to
their demands, then execute a treaty,-
only to see it breached by the Soviets.
When will we learn that the mere
negotiation of those types of treaties will
not usher in a great era of world peace?
More important, when will we learn this
accrues to their distinct advantage?
Mr. Chairman, I am at a loss at how
good faith can be demonstrated by the
Communists in the realm of disarma-
ment when they are the ultimate cause
of the arms race today? They are supply-
ing the arms that sustain aggression in
Vietnam and that is bleeding American
youth white. They have perpetrated an
arms race in the Mideast and have
fanned the flames of Arab emotions with
Communist guns, planes, and rockets.
They will supply the needed arms to any
revolutionary group in any part of the
world if it will further their goal of world
domination.
Beyond this, the Soviets are develop-
ing missile systems that either breach or
are an open subterfuge of the much
praised Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, to say
nothing of the so-called Outer Space
Treaty. Orie example of this is the frac-
tional orbiting bombing system, that
Robert Strange McNamara disclosed last
year. The former Secretary showed his
usual lack of concern in this area, -and
said that the United States was in a
defenseless position against this missile
system which could become operational
this year. He stated he was not con-
cerned. Not only that, but he jumped to
the Soviets' defense by pointing out that
the flying three-fourths of the way
around the earth on a new low orbit with
a nuclear warhead would not be a viola-
tion of the Outer Space Treaty. Mc
Namara could hardly wait to tell the
Soviet Union that we would never ac-
cuse them of thinking evil thoughts. In-
stead of an immediate outcry, he sug-
gested this orbiting weapon would really
travel more through "outer inner space"
than through "inner outer space." It
would not fly in full orbit, he said, but
in a fractional orbit. What this would
mean is that before it could complete a
full orbit, it would be detonated over
American cities. Robert Strange Mc-
Namara's samantical disarmament
mumbo jumbo could well be the last that
our country may hear. I do not wish to
beat a "dead horse," but I am glad his
poor judgment is out of Defense.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, we must awake
to the realities of the disarmament
game. The computers and the ivory
towers are not aware of these realities,
nor is the Disarmament Agency. Let us
not waste our resources on this self-de-
structing folly.
The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.
The Clerk will read.
The Clerk read as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That the sec-
ond sentence of section 49(a) of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Act, as amended
(22 U.S.C. 2589(a) ), is amended by insert-
ing immediately after "$30,000,000", the fol-
lowing: ", and for the three fiscal years 1969
through 1971, the sum of $33,000,000,".
AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. ADAIR
Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I offer an
amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. ADAIR: On the
first page, beginning in line 6, strike out "and
for the three fiscal years 1969 through 1971,
the sum of $33,000,000" and insert in lieu
thereof the following: "and for the two fiscal
years 1969 through 1970, the sum of
$22,000,000".
(Mr. ADAIR asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, I make
the point of order that a quorum is not
present.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will
count.
Thirty-eight Members are present, not
a quorum. The Clerk will call the roll.
The Clerk called the roll, and the fol-
lowing Members failed to answer to their
names:
[Roll No. 48]
Ashmore
Gibbons
Moss
Berry
Green, Oreg.
Nelsen
Bray
Hawkins
Passman
Brown, Calif.
Holland ,
Pepper
Cederberg
Howard
Philbin
Celler
Jones, Mo.
Resnick
Corman
King, Calif.
Rosenthal
de la Garza
Kluczynski
St. Onge
Diggs
Macdonald,
Selden
Dowdy
Mass.
Sikes
Fallon
Machen
Stanton
Accordingly the Committee rose; and
the Speaker pro tempore having as-
sumed the chair, Mr. FULTON of Tennes-
see, Chairman of the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union,
reported that that Committee, having
had under consideration the bill H.R.
14940, and finding itself without a
quorum, he had directed the roll to be
called, when 400 Members responded to
their names, a quorum, and he submitted
herewith the names of the absentees to
be spread upon the Journal.
The Committee resumed its sitting.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from
Indiana [Mr. ADAIR] is recognized.
Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, the
amendment which is before the House
would reduce the period of authoriza-
tion from 3 years to 2 years, and would
reduce the amount of money authorized
from $33 million to $22 million.
The appropriation request is $10 mil-
lion in fiscal year 1969; $12 million in the
following year, and $11 million the fol-
lowing year.
So my amendment would make avail-
able to the Agency the amount of money
which it has requested for the next 2
fiscal years.
As I said earlier, I feel very strongly
that every Congress should have an
opportunity to examine the operations
of and pass judgment on this Agency.
By limiting the authorization to 2
years, we are giving it enough time to
operate; yet we are assuring ourselves
that it will be back here during the next
Congress so that we can secure informa-
tion and raise questions, as may seem
necessary or wise.
Let me recall a little history. In 1961
this Agency was authorized for 2 years.
In 1963 it was authorized for 2 years.
In 1965 we wound up with a 3-year
authorization. In that year the commit-
mittee reported out a 4-year bill, if
my memory serves me correctly, provid-
ing $55 million. The House reduced it to
3 years at $40 million, and the bill as
eventually signed into law was for 3
years at $30 million.
The amount appropriated for the cur-
rent fiscal year was $9 million. The
Agency has apparently been able to op-
erate very well on that amount of money.
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R00510A000300210015-4
 Approved For Release 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
March 6, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
In fact, the 263 employees which it now
has on its payroll is an increase over
the number that it had at the beginning
of the last fiscal year. So I think the
question of money should not be one that
would bother anyone who is inclined to
support this move for a 2-year program.
Mr. Chairman, I conclude by saying
that this is a simple amendment. It does
not penalize the Agency dollarwise. It
simply assures the 91st Congress of an op-
portunity to look into this authorization
and to check the activities of the Agency.
Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, I
rise in opposition to the amendment.
I believe it is a measure of the accept-
ance of the Agency on the part of this
body that the only primary issue is
whether or not we should have a 2- or
3-year authorization. The gentleman has
indicated his reasons for suggesting a 2-
year authorization and, as I said during
my remarks in the general debate, I think
this is a value judgment that must be
made.
The reasons that the committee voted
out a 3-year authorization hinged on the
fact that this is a highly specialized
Agency. There is a limited number of
employees in the Agency. All of them are
skilled. They are scientists and people
with specialized backgrounds, people
who could find other more lucrative em-
ployment. I think it is necessary to them
to know that the Agency shall be in
business.
Similarly, in the programing of con-
tracts, if they can program these re-
search contracts out over a 3-year period,
it gives them a better opportunity to do
so economically and efficiently. All of the
people who testified before the commit-
tee thought that the compelling reasons
that justified the 3-year authorization
still in fact exist.
John McCloy, who was asked about
this 3-year authorization, and who was
one of the principal figures in the ad-
visory group, along with General
Gruenther, said-
I think the 3-year authorization is very
important. Particularly at this stage, if there
was any limitation on the 3-year provision
at this point, I think" perhaps there would
be undue significance attached to it.
Perhaps this is the chief reason I would
urge you not to limit the authorization to
one year but that you continue with the
3-year period, that it is rather important
psychologically at this point.
In short, I think that with the annual
review which is incidental to every- appro-
priation bill, together with the fact that at
any point this committee can call on anyone
to come down to testify and ieport on its
affairs, that it would be unfortunate to give
any indication at this point that there is
any hesitation about our attachment to the
policy of arms control and disarmament
which are consistent with the security of
the country.
So while we are here today debating
whether it should be 2 or 3 years, the
preponderance of knowledgeable exper-
tise related to these matters all combine
to say that we should vote out the 3-year
authorization. I urge that the Committee
do so, and I urge that this amendment be
defeated.
(Mr. HOSMER asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in
support of the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I doubt if many of the
Members of the 'House realize that in
the charter of the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency there is a provision
unique to any agency or department of
the U.S. Government-that is, this
Agency is authorized to propagandize
domesti cally in the United States. In
other words, it can spend its money to
talk the people of the United States into
any kind of disarmament or arms con-
trol provisions that it desires. It is a
unique and extraordinary power this
Agency has. Certainly when the gentle-
man wants to have a look at the funding
of the Agency oftener than every 3 years,
and at the most every 2 years, this is one
of the most important considerations
that should be in the minds of Members
of Congress.
We have a great suspicion in this coun-
try of using the people's money to propa-
gandize them, whether it be on domestic
issues or foreign issues or anything else
that our Government does. It is one of the
most risky things I know of to use U.S.
public funds to control U.S. public opin-
ion. I say this in support of the gentle-'
man's amendment and urge the Members
to support the amendment with that cau-
tion in mind.
I listened to the remarks of the gentle-
man from Illinois [Mr. DERWINSKII in
which he seemed to imply that the only
reason I am against the Disarmament
Agency's money is that the Agency has
negotiated this nonproliferation treaty.
This is not the fact. I simply used the
nonproliferation treaty as an example of
the Agency negotiating a treaty before it
did its homework and found out whether
or not the treaty was in the interest of
the United States. The treaty may be or
it may not be. The trouble is that ACDA
never looked to find out, which was its
job to do before negotiations ever began
and which it has not yet done.
As a matter of fact we set up an Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency for
the specific purpose not only of finding
the good arms control arrangements we
could get into, but spotting the bad ones,
so we coup stay away from the pitfalls.
The Agency has not performed this
function and, as a consequence, its fund-
ing should be looked at more frequently,
or better, stopped until reforms are ac-
complished.
I also pointed out this Agency has
failed to do its research in the proper
manner. It has hired a lot of people to
come up with studies that support and
agree with the preconceived opinions of
the people who head the Agency. In-
stead, it should be doing an impartial
and an honest job of impassionate anal-
ysis of these various kinds of disarma-
ment proposals.
We pay money to this Agency to sup-
port it as insurance against going down
the wrong road, and the Agency is not
producing and not doing the kind of re-
search job that is needed to keep us from
inadvertently going down a wrong road
in these negotiations at an international
level. Congress should require it to do so
or cut off its funds.
Again, I might say this Agency has
managed to hire so many people in its
H 1729
own research staff that it does very little
contracting out of research, and what
contracting out it does, it also seems to
me, it does with like-minded organiza-
tions who are not going to upset the
applecaxt and oppose any of its views.
This is not the way an agency should
operate, particularly an agency with this
important function.
That again is an argument in favor of
the gentleman's plea to look at what the
Agency is doing every 2 years, instead
of letting it go 3 years in a row, and let
it get way down the pike before we have
an opportunity to overcome the damage
it might do us because it is sloppy in
doing its job.
Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. HOSMER. I yield to the gentle-
man from New Jersey.
Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, I
thank the gentleman for yielding.
I think the RECORD should be clear that
half of the money this Agency will get
will go into contracts and research and
development.
Mr. HOSMER. That is true possibly
according to the new budget, but let
me make this additional point relative
to the Agency. The Agency has been ad-
ministered in such a manner that it has
not bothered, before negotiating, to do
this research needed to determine if it
is negotiating toward the proper ends.
More contracting out of research Will
not obviate this deficiency. Only re-
formed administration can. The Agency's
negotiators still will go out over the
green tables and get themselves out on
a limb on some proposition, and then its
researchers will be told to, and have to,
back them up, regardless, instead of hav-
ing the chance to tell them they are
wrong. The only remedy for this is to
put negotiating responsibilities back in
the State Department and confine the
Agency and its proper sphere of honest
research.
Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in
opposition to the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I can understand those
who are opposed to an authorization in
this case, but it is very difficult for me
to understand why anyone who is in
favor of the authorization would wish
to limit it 2 years, rather than making it
a 3-year authorization.
Now, the 3-year time period suggested
in the bill and recommended by the ad-
ministration was a time period which
was set by the Congress itself. This was a
compromise worked out on the floor of
the House.
It seems to me there are enough prob-
lems in making progress in this field
without the Congress trying to hamstring
this Agency in this way. Right now the
Agency is trying to work out a nuclear
nonproliferation treaty. It is asking
many non-nuclear nations to renounce
nuclear weapons. The non-nuclear coun-
tries naturally want the nuclear powers
to halt the nuclear arms race if they also
are to renounce their own nuclear ambi-
tions.
The best we can do is to promise to
keep talking in good faith about arms
control, to keep it within the same degree
of effort as before. That seems to me to
be the essential point.
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
 H 1730
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4 r;
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE March 6, 1968
How can the United States hope to
convince the nonnuclear countries of
our good faith in this effort if the Con-
gress cuts back on our arms control ef-
fort? How can we get them to renounce
nuclear weapons if the Congress will not
even give talks to halt the nuclear arms
race the same support it gave them
when this measure was last before the
Congress, in 1965?
This Agency was created in 1961 by
bipartisan effort. Republican supporters
of the bill at that time included Dwight
Eisenhower, Henry Cabot Lodge, Robert
Lovett, Thomas Gates, John McCloy, and
Alfred Gruenther.
Progress can only be made with con-
tinued bipartisan support. We have to
have bipartisan support if this Agency
is going to do a job. It would be a sad
day if what we did here were construed
as manifesting partisanship in any par-
ticular.
That is why I was so glad the chair-
man of this great committee called in
-John McCloy and Alfred Gruenther to
get their views. Mr. McCloy was asked
if he thought the question of the length
of the Agency's authorization should be
a partisan matter. He replied:
I think this particular agency was born
in a nonpartisan atmosphere. I was just
talking to General Gruenther about that to-
day, although this was put forward by a
Democratic administration, the extent to
which the Republicans supported it put it in
the class of a nonpartisan action. A former
Republican President gave statements in
favor of it and so on.
I gave other reasons why I thought it
would be unwise to limit its existence at this
particular stage in history. But in any stage
of history I think this matter of the security
of the country is one of a nonpartisan
nature.
Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. ALBERT. I am glad to yield to the
distinguished gentleman.
Mr. ADAIR. Does the gentleman feel
that the Agency was less efficient, less ef-
fective, during those periods when we did
give it a 2-year authorization?
Mr. ALBERT. The gentleman is not
responding to the issue by his question.
The gentleman's question assumes that I
might think it was not efficient. My ob-
servation is that if we change what the
Congress did by shortening the term it
might be interpreted by the world as an
indication that the Congress itself, today,
is not as strongly behind this Agency as
it was 2 years ago.
Mr. ADAIR. If the gentleman will yield
further, I pointed out earlier that two
times previously we have limited it to a
2-year authorization.
Mr. ALBERT. The gentleman is cor-
rect.
Mr. ADAIR. And only once provided a
3-year authorization.
Mr. ALBERT. Had we never given it a
3-year authorization, the gentleman's
argument would be very valid. Once hav-
ing done that, we have said to the world
we believe this Agency is important
enough to require a 3-year authoriza-
tion. It seems to me it would be a re-
treat should we now curtail the authori-
zation to 2 years. It would have been
better never to have had a 3-year
authorization at all.
SUBSTITUTE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. GROSS
FOR THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. ADAIR
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I offer a
substitute amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. GROSS as a sub-
stitute for the amendment offered by Mr.
ADAIR: On the first page, beginning in line
6, strike out "and for the three fiscal years
1969 through 1971, the sum of $33;000,000"
and Insert In lieu thereof the following: "and
for the fiscal year 1969, the sum of $5,000,-
000."
(Mr. GROSS asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I listened
with a great deal of interest to the gen-
tleman from Oklahoma, the distin-
guished majority leader, and his plea
for a 3-year program. We do a lot of
ludicrous things around there, but I can-
not think of anything more ludicrous
than to authorize continuance of this
disarmament outfit at $11 million a year,
or a total of $33 million for the next 3
years.
There are many agencies and depart-
ments of Government, including the
State Department, which are not au-
thorized to be funded for 3 years. They
have alleged policies in the State De-
partment, the Agency for International
Development, and many others but they
are funded annually.
This disarmament agency is one of
the most incongruous, contradictory
operations in Government. It has spent
millions to talk about disarmament while
the Pentagon peddles $1 billion worth of
arms around the world each year. I do
not mind keeping a few warm bodies in
circulation to go through the motions
of talking about disarmament if some-
body wants to talk about it. Therefore
I have left $5 million in this bill for 1
year, and that is too much, but I want
to get started down.
This program is overfunded and has
been overfunded. It is now proposed to
overfund it again. It needs to be closely
scrutinized every year, and I would hope
that next year it would be cut far below
$5 million.
We were spending on an average, for
years, until the New Frontier and then
the Great Society came along, less than
$1 million a year on this disarmament
business and just as much was accom-
plished as there will be by spending $33
million. Where is the disarmament and
where is the peace for the money al-
ready expended on this Agency?
Let me call your attention to a few of
the contracts of this organization. Here
is one to the Purdue Research Founda-
tion. It provides that-
Sociological and psychological principles
relevant to the nature of international assur-
ance will first be surveyed. Finally the study
will consider the social and psychological
factors involved in the actual inspection
process, such as the conditions under which
organizations and individuals divulge infor-
mation of various kinds to organizations, au-
thorities, and foreigners.
What business has the Disarmament
Agency in research and studies concern-
ing the divulging of information? We
have the FBI; we have the CIA; we
have security operations in the State De-
partment and in the Defense Depart-
ment--and in all the military services.
Why should the Disarmament Agency
spend a single dollar on research in this
field?
Then, Mr. Chairman, there is a con-
tract to Johns Hopkins University as
follows:
The Peacekeeping Proposals of the U.S.
"Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty of
General and Complete Disarmament in a
Peaceful World."
Description: A panel of experts from the
Washington Center of Foreign Policy Re-
search, which is affiliated with the Johns
Hopkins School of Advanced International
Studies, considered the basic problems of
maintaining the peace in the three stages of
disarmament and after general and complete
disarmament is achieved. Their analysis was
made in the light of existing U.S. proposals
in the U.S. Treaty Outline for General and
Complete Disarmament tabled at the Geneva
Conference in April 1962. The panel members
wrote individual essays elaborating on the
various topics discussed in the panel ses-
sions. These essays constitute the final re-
port.
Mr. Chairman, I wonder who among
all of these essay writers won the prize
for the best essay? This involves that
wonderful "Alice in Wonderland" disar-
mament proposal, a three-stage deal by
which we would put our Army, Navy, and
Air Force into the United Nations under
an international command.
Mr. Chairman, when I asked the ques-
tion during the course of the hearings
this year as to what has happened to this
fantastic deal, I received virtually no an-
swer. They gave the impression they had
forgotten about it. No one knows how
much money was expended through the
years on thi,; three-stage disarmament
booby trap. Apparently it is tempo-
rarily a dead issue, something of a moot
issue.
Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. GROSS. I yield to the distin-
guished gentleman from California.
(Mr. HOSMER asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, this
three-stage disarmament proposal is cer-
tainly not a moot question. It is my opin-
ion that the Members of the House of
Representatives should be reminded of
the fact that the policy of the Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency therefore
of the present administration of the U.S.
Government is, in fact, the execution of
this three-stage disarmament proposal,
leading to total and complete disarma-
ment.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen-
tleman from Iowa has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. GROSS
was allowed to proceed for 3 additional
minutes.)
Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman from Iowa yield further?
Mr. GROSS. Briefly.
Mr. HOSMER. And this administra-
tion wholeheartedly supports other
treaties too: a treaty to halt the produc-
tion of nuclear materials; a treaty to
halt the production of nuclear delivery
vehicles; a treaty to scrap nuclear weap-
ons. There are several others, too, which
at the moment I cannot recall.
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
 ? Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
March 6, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
Mr. Chairman, all this is true and
somewhat frightening; so I do not won-
der why the distinguished gentleman
from Iowa is worried and wants to look
over the operations of this agency fre-
quently and thoroughly.
Mr. GROSS. I say to the gentleman
from California that what we have heard
on the floor of the House today has been
a discussion of nuclear warfare. There
has been no discussion of chemical war-
fare, or bacteriological warfare, and no
discussion of conventional arms. Virtu-
ally no information was provided by the
disarmers before the Committee on For-
eign Affairs and none here today in the
Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union with reference to con-
ventional arms, the weapons that are
being used now, today, with which to kill
Americans in Asia.
Mr. Chairman, as I said before, here is
this Government using the Pentagon to
peddle $1 billion worth of arms a year
around the world and yet it has the colos-
sal guts to ask for $33 million to continue
futile talks about disarmament. This is
not merely a contradiction; this is an-
other addition to the Great Society's
"credibility gap."
Mr. Chairman, permit me to read to
the Members of the House the descrip-
tion of a research contract with Colum-
bia University:
This study, a follow-on contract to ACDA/
E-45, will undertake a comprehensive de-
scription and analysis of a number of the
emerging reforms to the fiscal and financial
systems in Poland, Hungary, in Czecho-
slovakia and compare these record-keeping
systems with the Soviet Union to provide an
understanding of the role of statistical and
economic analysis in the ratification system.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the
distinguished gentleman from Okla-
homa, the majority leader, to explain
what business we have in entering into
a contract of this kind. The gentleman
insists that we ought to spend $33 mil-
lion in the next 3 years on the Disarma-
ment Agency.
Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Chairman, will the
distinguished gentleman from Iowa
yield to me at this point?
Mr. GROSS. Yes, I yield to the gen-
tleman from Oklahoma.
Mr. ALBERT. Why would the gentle-
man from Iowa want a 1-year extension
or any extension if he objects to the
3-year extension?
Mr. GROSS. On the basis of its dem-
onstrated failure, I would cut it out alto-
gether. However, I am attempting to get
something started toward the phasing
out process.
I said before I would vote to keep a
few-
Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Chairman, would
the gentleman yield?
Mr. GROSS. In just one moment. I
would vote to keep a few warm bodies in
circulation so that, if the Russians or
somebody else-the Czechoslovaks, the
Hungarians, or the Nigerians-wanted to
talk about disarmament we could go
through the motions, but this futility
ought not to cost the taxpayers more
than a few thousand dollars, not $33
million.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from Iowa has again expired.
Mr. O'HARA of Illinois. Mr. Chairman,
I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, we are told that Nero
fiddled while Rome was burning. Wheth-
er that is true or not, I do not know, but
I do not want this.House to fiddle when
our country is in the greatest danger it
has ever faced. We are requesting $33
million for the purpose of looking for a
way to peace, and we quarrel about it and
we fiddle. Why waste words over pennies
for peace when we vote billions for war
without a murmur?
My colleagues, it is my deep conviction
that we have but 3 years in which to save
our civilization. I am not dramatizing.
I am not putting an exaggeration on my
reasoned conclusion. Today the two great
nuclear powers are Russia and the United
States. Either can destroy the other
within a matter of hours once the first
nuclear bomb is dropped. There is no
secret about it. And that is why Russia
and the United States, however much
they may disagree in other areas, have a
common interest in working to avert a
war that would destroy all of Europe, all
of America.
A nuclear bomb is exploded, and with-
in 24 hours all of America is wiped out.
It is that simple. It is that horrible.
As long as nuclear weaponry is in the
exclusive control of the United States
and Russia, self-interest can be depended
upon to avert the tragedy of a civilization
it has taken centuries to build being
blown into oblivion in a matter of hours.
Now, Red China has become a nuclear
power, as have France and Britian to a
limited extent. Within 3 years Red China
will have nuclear weaponry, and by
"weaponry we mean not only power to
build nuclear bombs, but to fly them and
explode them all over the world-in
Washington, Chicago, New York, and
Moscow.
I say 3 years. Other people say 5. But
they all agree that within 7 years at the
utmost Red China will have nuclear
weaponry-and then what? And then
what?
For all the centuries China has
dreamed of world dominion. Russia wipes
out the United States and the Americas;
the United States wipes out Europe in-
cluding Russia-and Red China takes
over. It is that simple. It is that horrible.
And here we are in this historic Cham-
ber, facing the possible annihilation of
our civilization, and quarreling over
spending $33 million in 3 years to seek
the way to peace and understanding.
Mr. Chairman, I was privileged and
proud to be at the White House the night
of the final framing of the language of
the bill creating the disarmament agency
that was drawn up. I served with Dr.
Foster as a delegate to the United Na-
tions. I have never known a more devoted
and dedicated man in my life. His life,
every impulse of his being and every
image of his brilliant intellect, is devoted
to finding the way of peace.
And here we are, the wise men and
women of our Nation, representative of
the American people, quarreling over a
pittance of $33 million in 3 years, looking
for the way to peace while we vote bil-
lions for war, and here we are fiddling-
oh, I should not say that. I have the
111731
utmost faith and confidence in the patri-
otism, wisdom, and integrity of all my
colleagues, but in this matter for all that
is sensible let us get together. We are
fighting for peace. We may not attain it.
In 3 years the nuclear war may have en-
gulfed us. But with faith and courage
and unity we can prevail. While the civi-
lization of which we are a part and
which means so much to us is endan-
gered, for the sake of Providence, let us
not fiddle as we quarrel over pennies.
Those who would survive a nuclear
war, the very few, would go back to the
caves to begin again the long, long tedi-
ous climb from the caves to another
civilization. It is too horrible to contem-
plate. It surely is the part of wisdom and
of prudence to do all within our power to
protect the civilization that has built by
the millions upon millions in the years
alone that have climbed from the caves
to give us what we have.
Mr. RUMSFELD. Mr. Chairman, I
move to strike out the last word.
Mr. Chairman, I do not intend to take
the full 5 ,minutes, but I do want to make
a few comments in support of the amend-
ment offered by the gentleman from
Indiana.
There has been a great deal of discus-
sion here this afternoon about the quan-
tity-the number of dollars. And there
has been some discussion about the
length of time.
With the exception of some contribu-
tions here on the minority side about
the quality of the work and the impor-
tance of it, there really has not been
much attention given to that most im-
portant question.
Now, it has been suggested by the dis-
tinguished majority leader that if the
amendment offered by the gentleman
from Indiana carries, the people of the
world will say that this country is not
backing up its concern, its desire, its
goals, and its articulated and frequently-
restated goals in this very vital area of
arms control and disarmament.
You know, it recalls when, in debating
the extension of the Selective Service
Act, there was an amendment pending to
cut that extension of the 4-year program
to a 2-year program. The comment on
that side of the aisle was that if we did
cut the extension of the Selective Serv-
ice Act from 4 years to 2 years why, it
would be showing the world that we lack
resolve.
I must say that I do not agree with
that viewpoint.
In the first place, I do not think any
of us know exactly what the world is
going to say as to what is the motive
behind our acts. If I personally were to
guess, I would guess that the world would
think that we were not doing our job
if this Congress did not review these
programs more than every 3 or 4 years.
It seems to me our responsibility in
the legislative body is to do that, and I
do not think we ought to say to the
Agency that we cannot do it or we will
not do as is suggested by the majority
leader.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. RUMSFELD. I am happy to yield
to the gentleman.
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
 I1 1732
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4 r,
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE March 6, 1968
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I do not know
whether the gentleman was here when
I remarked that I did not think it should
raise anyone's blood pressure too much
whether we have a 2- or 3-year au-
thorization.
Mr. RUMSFELD. I was not.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I think the
legislative history that is being written
is most unfortunate.
I personally regret the remarks of the
majority leader when he indicated that
there was some partisan approach to
the 2-year suggestion.
I am a Republican, and I see no dam-
age in a 2-year authorization. Nor can
I buy his argument that this would in
any sense represent a retreat on the part
of the Congress regarding the impor-
tance of continuing our efforts to bring
arms under more reasonable control
than they are today.
I do not buy his argument that a
treaty is less likely to be negotiated with
a nuclear or nonnuclear power because
of the length of the authorization that
Congress may provide for this Agency.
In fact, if anything, his speech made
me lean in favor of the 2-year authoriza-
tion instead of the 3-year authorization.
I do not think the legislative history of
this bill should indicate that we accept
this argument, that it would represent a
retreat on the part of the Congress about
the necessity of gaining greater control
over this problem of arms control than
now exists.
Mr. RUMSFELD. I thank the gentle-
man for his contribution. I think he is
right on the point and I agree
completely. -
My point is simply this. This commit-
tee has jurisdiction over this subject
matter. I think this committee should
review it every year, if possible-or every
2 years-but certainly not merely every
3 years and certainly not every 4 years.
If the goal is worth the money and it
is, then it is worth the time of this com-
mittee and the Congress every year or
two to review not merely how long the
act should be extended and not just how
much money should be expended, but
more importantly the quality of the
work that they are doing.
As the gentleman from Iowa pointed out
what is the real substance, merit, and
basis for their effort? Is it enough? Is it
too much? Can it be better directed? I
think it is time, that we frame these
questions on an accurate basis. It is time
that we frame them on the basis of what
is our job as legislators. What is the role
of the legislative branch of this country?
It seems to me we have a responsibility
in this area that is not being done par-
ticularly well. I know it can be done con-
siderably better, and we are much more
likely to do it if we adopt the amendment
offered by the gentleman from Indiana.
Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in
opposition to the amendment and in op-
position to the substitute.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from
Pennsylvania is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, it is
very surprising to hear Members offer
these amendments. We have before us
a substitute amendment which would
provide only $5 million to operate the
Agency for 1 year. I suspect that the
gentleman from Iowa will find that
more money is spent in his State on
agricultural research than that in 1
year. We do not have a 1-year author-
ization for the agriculture appropriation.
We have a continuing authorization.
The Committee on Agriculture gets along
without the House passing on their au-
thorization each year.
I suppose it is possible that we spend
more money on hoof-and-mouth disease
than we will spend on this whole program
over a period of 3 years to support its
effort to bring peace to the world.
I wonder whether or not we spend
more money on fish research than we
are going to spend in this Agency. There
is no annual examination of these other
research programs except by the Appro-
priations Committee. This is the same
process by which this program will be
examined every year by the great sub-
committee headed by the gentleman
from New York [Mr. RoONEY].
As chairman of the Committee on For-
eign Affairs, I can assure the gentleman
from Illinois that my committee keeps
busy. We work hard. I spend a great
deal of my time following the operation
of our subcommittees, including the one
on which the gentleman himself serves.
There is nothing unusual about this 3-
year authorization. The agency has been
operating under a 3-year authorization.
Never once during that 3-year period has
any member of my committee or any
Member of this House come to me and
said, "Why don't you call the Arms Con-
trol people up here and find out what
they are doing?" I have never had such
a request, not one. The pressure has al-
ways been from the people down in the
Agency, who have kept bothering me
to invite them to come up here and in-
form the Foreign Affairs Committee of
what they are doing.
Even though the Committee has a
heavy workload we have always found
time to hear them two or three times a
year and to review their progress and
their plans.
This small Agency has done a good
job.
If-this authorization is cut back from
a 3-year authorization to a 2-year au-
thorization, it is going to have effects
upon the nonnuclear nations all over
the world whom we are urging to accept
this treaty. I am afraid they will ques-
tion our determination and our sincerity
in our support of nonproliferation.
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. MORGAN. I am glad to yield to
the gentleman from Iowa.
Mr. GROSS, The gentleman spoke of
agriculture research. I do not recall any
time, except under Henry Wallace and
the New Deal, when we encouraged
farmers to produce more and then hired
someone to come out and tell the farmers
to destroy what they had produced. In
this case we are peddling arms around
the world at the rate of a billion dollars
a year, and then we are going through
the motions of telling the people that we
are trying to do something about dis-
arming.
Mr. MORGAN. I know the gentleman
does not approve of the work of this
Agency. He apparently does not believe
in any form of international cooperation
to enaance our security. This treaty is
not consistent with the concept of for-
tress America. I know there are many
that adhere to this concept of our na-
tional defense. As a previous speaker has
just said, we live in the most dangerous
age in the history of the world. We can-
not risk a "fortress America" concept any
more.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentle-
man from New Jersey.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chair-
man, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I must say, as a supporter of the
Agency-and my chairman knows I am
a supporter of the Agency-I again re-
gret he should be using the line of argu-
ment that a 2-year authorization, in-
stead of three, could be used in any
sense and construed fairly as any indi-
cation of a lack of sincerity on the part
of any legislative branch about the de-
sirability of reaching some kind of agree-
ment on a nonproliferation treaty.
It does not.make sense to use that kind
of argument when basically there is no
substance to a 2- or 3-year program,
except that it points a finger at our com-
mittee and suggests we ought to take a
closer look than we have. It does not indi-
cate, in my opinion, and I do not think
the legislative history should indicate
this, that there is any slackening of
desire on our part to come to terms with
this most serious problem of nuclear
weapons.
Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I want
to conclude by pointing out that in my
opinion, it will inevitably cause con-
cern among the nonnuclear countries
around the world, and I want to compli-
ment the majority leader for taking the
position which he has so ably discussed.
We are also in danger of losing our
highly competent technical people, who
want assurance that they are working
for a continuing agency.
The 3-year authorization was backed
by John McCloy. Mr. McCloy has been
in this disarmament business for a great
many years. He was head of the original
arms control and disarmament opera-
tion created by President Eisenhower
back- in 1959. He came before the com-
mittee only a couple of weeks ago and
made a strong plea for a 3-year author-
ization. He was backed up by General
Gruenther. Both of these distinguished
citizens, as Members are aware, know
the problems of operating a government
agency and they are also in close touch
with what is going. on overseas.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from Pennsylvania has ex-
pired.
(On request of Mr. ALBERT, and by
unanimous consent, Mr. MORGAN was
allowed to proceed for 5 additional
minutes.)
Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the distin-
guished majority leader.
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R00510A000300210015-4
 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
March 6, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Chairman, in order
that the legislative history may be clear,
in view of what the distinguished gen-
tleman from New Jersey has said, I think
we should refer back to the testimony of
Mr. McCloy in the hearings in response
to a question by the gentleman from
New York [Mr. FARBSTEINI when this
was said:
Mr. FARBSTEIN . . .
Gentlemen, do you think that the ques-
tion of internal politics should enter into
the determination as to whether or not this
disarmament organization should be con-
tinued for 1 year or 3 years, or do you think
that this is way above and beyond the ques-
tion of politics, because, after all, this is
a rather delicate year.
Mr. MCCLOY. I think I can respond to that
very quickly. I think this particular Agency
was born in a nonpartisan atmosphere. I
was just talking to General Gruenther about
that today, although this was put forward .
by a Democratic administration, the extent
to which the Republicans supported it put
it in the class of a nonpartisan action. A
former Republican President's gave state-
ments in favor of it, and so on.
I gave other reasons why I thought it
would be unwise to limit its existence at
this particular stage in history, But in any
stage of history I think this matter of the
security of the country is one of a non-
partisan nature.
I think Mr. McCloy's answer to a spe-
cific question as to whether that issue-
the length of the authorization-should
be partisan is important. .I am not saying
to the gentleman from New Jersey that
he does not support this Agency, and I
am not questioning the motives of the
distinguished gentleman from New Jer-
sey, who is a strong supporter of this pro-
gram, but the question of partisanship as
to the period of the authorization was
brought out in the hearings and was
commented upon by Mr. McCloy. It
seems to me, therefore, on that issue
there should be no partisanship, because
the whole thing, from the beginning to
the end, has been the result of bipartisan
or nonpartisan effort. I do not think it
should be otherwise in any area of this
matter at all. As I have previously
pointed out Mr. McCloy is a Republican
and a strong supporter of the work of the
Agency.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman
for yielding.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentle-
man from New Jersey.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chair-
man, what dumbfounds me, and I might
say appalls me, is that the majority
leader keeps dragging in this issue of
partisanship. No one argues the fact that
the Agency was created on a bipartisan
basis, and no one argues the fact that
the Agency is going to be continued and
be supported on a nonpartisan basis.
The only thing is whether it would be
advisable-and again this is done on a
nonpartisan basis-to continue this for a
2- or a 3-year period.
For the majority leader to be dragging
in the red herring that in some way there
is a plot afoot on the part of one of the
major parties to destroy or to disrupt
this Agency, or to try to prevent the rati-
fication of the treaty, strikes me as most
unkind.
Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the majority
leader.
Mr. ALBERT. The gentleman is going
far astray. I did not say any such thing
as that. The truth of the matter was I
was merely quoting from the hearings.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The record
says nothing except it should not be par-
tisan. Who suggests it but the majority
leader?
Mr. ALBERT. The record was made in
response to a question as to whether the
extension should be for 1 or 3 years, and
directly in response to that question Mr.
McCloy said "No," it should not be par-
tisan.
I am asking the gentleman to go along
with all of us, with those Republicans
who are for a 3-year authorization, so
that there will not even be the appear-
ance of partisanship in this matter. It is
too important.
Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentle-
man from California.
Mr. HOSMER. I believe the majority
leader is under a misapprehension which
ought to be cleared up. He keeps talking
in terms of the existence of this Agency.
This Agency is legislated, on the law
books. We are not talking about its exist-
ence. We are only talking about for how
long is its current funding to be auth-
orized? For 3 years? For 2 years? For 1
year?
There is no question about its exist-
ence.
I do hope the majority leader will
acknowledge that fact, so that there is
no question on the record that the ex-
istence of this Agency is at stake, but
only the period of extension.
Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, if the gen-
tleman will yield for one comment, how
will the Agency exist without an author-
ization?
Mr. HOSMER. Just as it would if we
passed this for 3 years. We would pass
the next one. If we pass it for 2 years,
then we will pass another. The same is
true if we pass it for 1 year.
I believe the majority leader is not
being fair, confusing the House on that
basis.
Mr. ALBERT. The majority leader is
only trying to cite the record. He is not
trying to confuse the House.
Mr. HOSMER. Then admit that the
existence of the Agency is not at stake.
Mr. ALBERT. It will be, if we do not
pass an authorization. If we do, of course
it will not be at stake, if we pass a 1-year
or 6-month authorization. But the ex-
istence of the Agency is at stake in the
authorization.
Mr. HOSMER. If we pass it for 3 years,
it will be at stake at the end of 3 years.
Mr. ALBERT. Of course.
Mr. HOSMER. It is not at stake any
more in any one length of time or the
other.
Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, it is not
the majority leader who has me con-
fused. I was under the impression, back
in 1961, that the gentleman from Califor-
nia was a strong supporter of the Agen-
cy. I know he voted for the original Act.
He apparently has changed his posi-
H1733
tion here today, I remember that in 1961
he was a supporter.
Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentle-
man from New Jersey.
Mr. GALLAGHER. I thank the gentle-
man for yielding.
Perhaps to bring the debate back into
focus, the issue of partisan indictment
was not raised, really, by the majority
leader nor by my colleague from New
Jersey. The real nub of this argument is
who raised the fact that a lack of 3-year
authorization would be construed as les-
sening of our interest in the Agency. Ac-
tually, the fellow who raised that point,
the gentleman who first raised the point
about the psychological impact of a less
than 3-year Agency authorization, was
John McCloy. He said:
Perhaps this is the chief reason I would
urge you not to limit the authorization to 1
year but that you continue with the 3-year
period, that it is rather important psychologi-
cally at this point.
I thank the gentleman.
Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentle-
man from Alabama.
Mr. BUCHANAN. I believe it would
be fair to say that some who hope for
a 2-year authorization do so out of faith
in the American people, who this fall
will elect the 91st Congress, and out of
faith that that Congress will be as dedi-
cated to peace as this Congress is. It
would seem to me to be no violation of
the world's hope for peace to give the
91st Congress a shot at review of the
authorization of this Agency, as we have
had in the 90th Congress.
Mr. MORGAN. I am sure that most of
us agree that John McCloy is a hard-
headed realist, that he knows something
about our Government and that he also
knows something about the attitudes in
foreign countries.
As the gentleman from New Jersey
[Mr. GALLAGHER], just pointed out, he
thinks the 3-year authorization is im-
portant. I am ready to accept his judg-
ment.
Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, I move
to strike the last word.
Mr.. Chairman, the distinguished
chairman of the committee mentioned
that I supported this Agency as a free
agent when it was first established and
asked the question why I had changed
my mind about it. I want to assure him
that I have the same feeling now as I had
then. I feel there is great value to the
national security of the United States
to have an agency which does an excel-
lent job or at least a good job of evaluat-
ing arms control and disarmament
measures. My quarrel is not with the
principle of having such an agency. My
quarrel is with the Agency as it now
operates.
I think if you had watched it as
closely as I have, you could not give it
much more than a D plus and more like-
ly a D minus or even an F on the way it
has operated. So I think it is up to the
Congress now to insist that the Agency
do a better job. One of the ways this
insistence could be evidenced is by a
shortening of the term of the authoriza-
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
 111734
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE March 6, 1968.
tion of the money. I think it would be
neither burdensome nor unhealthy to
bring the Agency down out of a dream
world for a few days every year or two
and bring it before the Congress so that
it could reevaluate itself and explain to
the American people what it is doing.
This is not an outrageous proposal.
I want to caution people also on this
business of trying to interpret what
the people overseas are going to make
of what we do here in the House. I serve
as an adviser to our delegation to the
18 Nation Disarmament Conference. A
couple of years ago I was over there, and
I mentioned how the United States was
really interested in arms control and
disarmament because we have this
Agency set up for that very special pur-
pose. One of the Soviet delegates chal-
lenged me on this and said that "the
people you have in arms control are not
the military people. You avoided the is-
sue by establishing a civilian agency. It
is the military that controls and uses
arms. In the U.S.S.R. we have our mili-
tary people directly assigned to the nego-
tiations in Geneva. The military is in-
volved, and therefore we are doing a bet-
ter job than you, and your civilian dis-
armament agency is a sham." So please
do not go too far out on a limb in trying
to interpret what people overseas are
going to say or attribute to what ac-
tions we take here. They may misinter-
pret anyway. I think the safest thing
to do is to see this thing through for a
couple of years and then let ACDA come
back and justify itself.
Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. HOSMER. Yes. I yield to the gen-
tlewoman from Ohio.
Mrs. BOLTON. Does it not seem pos-
sible to you that people overseas would
feel we are being particularly careful
because we would want to go into the
work of this Agency every 2 years in-
stead of letting it go for 3 years?
Mr. HOSMER. I would think they
would say, "Well, the Congress of the
United States regards arms control and
disarmament as an important matter."
Mrs. BOLTON. Yes.
Mr. HOSMER. Sufficiently to take the
time and trouble to review it more fre-
quently. Not just to pass a 3-year author-
ization and then walk away and not think
about it again for 36 months.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HOSMER. Yes. I am glad to yield
to the gentleman from New Jersey.,
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I said earlier,
Mr. Chairman-and this proves I am a
poor prophet-that I doubted that any
blood pressures would be raised by our
discussion of whether this should be a
1- or 2-year authorization. Certainly the
majority leader's blood pressure is up.
It seems to me that what we have here
is primarily an internal housekeeping de-
cision on whether to put the bee on the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs by
saying that within 2 years you have a
specific obligation to come back with a
renewed authorzation request if this
Agency should be continued. We think
you should do it in 2 years instead of in
a 3-year period. As I said, I see no neces-
sity for us to be pointing at it in that
way, because we could be doing that job
on an annual basis where there was an
authorization. I see no possibility for
justifying the claim that there is any
partisan advantage either sought or to
be obtained by an individual or members
of a party taking a position on this one
way or another. In spite of and not be-
cause of what the majority leader says,
I still think I will go along with a 3-year
authorization, but the proponents of that
program have, in my opinion, stated a
poor case and written poor legislative
history.
I thank the gentleman.
Mr. HOSMER. I yield back the balance
of my time.
Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, I
move to strike the requisite number of
words.
(Mr. GALLAGHER asked and was
given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, I
rise merely to point out the fact that the
first vote will come on the Gross substi-
tute which will, in effect, gut the entire
program by reducing it down.to $5 mil-
lion.
Mr. Chairman, although we have been
debating the Adair amendment, the first
vote will be on the Gross substitute, and
a vote for that substitute will be a vote to
eliminate, in effect, this Agency.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on
the substitute amendment offered by the
gentleman from Iowa [Mr. GROSS] for
the amendment offered by the gentleman
from Indiana [Mr. ADAIR].
The substitute amendment was re-
jected.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on
the amendment offered by the gentleman
from Indiana [Mr. ADAIR].
The question was taken; and the Chair
announced that the noes appeared to
have it.
Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I demand
tellers.
Tellers were ordered, and the Chair-
man appointed as tellers Mr. ADAIR and
Mr. GALLAGHER.
The Committee divided, and the tellers
reported that there were-ayes 87, noes
88.
So the amendment was rejected.
AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. FINDLEY
Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer
an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. FINDLEY: On
page 1, line 7, immediately after "$33,000,-
000," strike out the period at the end of
such sentence and insert in lieu thereof the
following: "Provided, That no funds author-
ized by this Act may be spent for salaries
or other expenses connected with preparing,
advancing or negotiating proposals which
preclude the provision of nuclear materials
for purely defensive purposes to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization."
Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, those
who have looked at the committee re-
port will recognize that this amendment
is the same one as set forth in the lan-
guage of my additional views.
Admittedly, the amendment is not the
ideal way for this House to bring about
a change in the draft treaty on non-
proliferation, but it is certainly the one
most readily available and probably the
only one that will be available to the
House in the time between now and the
time the draft treaty will be initialed
and placed before the Senate.
It is certainly in the great tradition
of this body for us to attempt to use
the power of the purse, and that is what
is intended by this amendment, in order
to influence action on the treaty.
Now, if this amendment should be
adopted, it would have the immediate
effect of causing our Government-at
least, that is my feeling-to call back
the draft treaty and reinstate a provi-
sion that three administrations over a
10-year period insisted upon; namely,
the NATO option.
During the testimony before the com-
mittee, Admiral Strauss, the former head
of the Atomic Energy Commission,
stated to the committee that in his opin-
ion the committee should use every leg-
islative means at its disposal in order
to protect what is known as the NATO
option. I feel it is badly needed in order
to halt what I would describe as retreat
on the part of the United States in nego-
tiating with the Soviet Union.
This retreat has occurred over a 10-
year period. The United States, begin-
ning in 1957, has changed its position to
our disadvantage on three major points.
It no longer suggested that the nuclear
powers reduce their own stockpiles at the
same time that a nonproliferation treaty
was undertaken. It no longer insisted
upon the arrangement for some individ-
ual self-defense, some form of transfer
of weapons to individual nations. But
the most significant retreat that our
Government undertook in this 10-year
period occurred in the fall of 1966, when
we dropped the requirement that any
arms deal, weapons control deal with
the Soviet Union, must necessarily pro-
tect the future interests of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization. We
dropped the NATO option.
During all of those 10 years that our
Government insisted upon the NATO op-
tion as a condition to any deal with
the Soviet Union, no one raised the ques-
tion whether this would be a violation
of the McMahon Act.
I might say that some of those who
have criticised my amendment on the
floor today were on the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy during that same pe-
riod of time when our Government was
consistently upholding the NATO op-
tion.
Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. FINDLEY. I am glad to yield to
the gentleman.
Mr. MORGAN. Is the gentleman's
amendment contrary to the McMahon
Act?
Mr. FINDLEY. No, it is not indeed.
Mr. MORGAN. Is the gentleman's
amendment contrary to section 92 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1964?
Mr. FINDLEY. No, sir; I do not think
any reasonable interpretation of . the
amendment could lead to that viewpoint
because my amendment does nothing
except prevent foreclosure of a deal
under which a NATO nuclear defense
system could be developed in the future.
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
March 6, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
It does not authorize any nuclear de-
fense system at all.
It does not violate the McMahon Act
or any part of it.
It simply protects the future interest
of a most essential alliance and recog-
nizes that we, as a nation, should be more
concerned over the interests of our
friends and allies than we are over work-
ing out a dubious arms deal with the
Soviet Union.
Mr. MORGAN. Section 92 of the
Atomic Energy Act has this prohibition:
It shall be unlawful except as provided in
Section 91 for any person to transfer or
receive in interstate or foreign commerce,
manufacture, produce, transfer or acquire,
possess or import or export any atomic weap-
on.
How does your amendment get around
that section of the Atomic Energy Act?
Mr. FINDLEY. That is an interesting
observation but it has nothing to do with
my amendment, because my amendment
simply reinstates a bargaining position
that President Eisenhower insisted upon
and that President Kennedy insisted up-
on and until 1966 President Johnson in-
sisted upon-and nobody including the
gentleman who serves with such distinc-
tion as chairman of the Foreign Affairs
Committee, ever raised any question as
to whether that bargaining position was
a violation of the McMahon Act. It was
not and is not a violation.
A-WEAPON TREATY REMOVES NATO OPTION
In the year 1493 leading statesmen
of the world powers perceived that the
struggle for empire might result in war
among the European states as each raced
for the promised bounty of colonialism
in the New World. In an attempt to pre-
serve peace, Pope Alexander VI, with the
acquiesence of the major powers, divided
the world into two colonial hegemonies.
On one side of the line Spain was to have
undisputed access to the wealth of the
New World, while on the other side Por-
tugal, then the other major power, was
granted influence in Africa and the Far
East. It was assumed that the division
would be a stable one for the two major
beneficiaries and would jointly enforce
their preeminent influence in their re-
spective spheres. Of course, these well
laid plans collided with the reality of
Britain's emerging seapower. Determined
to carve an empire upon which the sun
would never set Britain, among others,
proceeded to disregard and dismantle the
Pope's plan.
Not withstanding that experience,
however, almost each successive genera-
tion has attempted through hegemonies
to control what was preceived to be the
greatest danger to peace. Some of these
ambitious plans have been crude and ma-
terialistic such as the carving of China
into commercial and political spheres of
influence, Others have been idealistic,
although ill-fated, such as the attempted
control on naval capitol ships. But, un-
fortunately, all have in time failed, usual-
ly to the detriment of the party proposing
the limitation.
The proposed Nuclear Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty drafts submitted by the So-
viet Union and the United States to the
18-Nation Disarmament Committee-
ENDC-is the latest in the series of these
maneuvers to preserve peace. Its premise
is not unlike that which guided Pope
Alexander. The United States and the
Soviet Union, now the major nuclear
powers, preceive that the spread of nu-
clear weapons endangers the bipolar
status of international politics.
For the last 20 years the world has been
divided essentially into two camps, each
headed by a nuclear superpower. Each
power could impose its will upon its al-
lies, as was proven in the ? Suez and
Hungary crises in 1956.
However, bipolarity was doomed. on
February 13, 1960, when France explod-
ed a tiny nuclear device on the Sahara
desert. Its small yield hid its larger polit-
ical significance. Four years later China
exploded her own nuclear device. Since
that time the power, influence, and pres-
tige of both France and China have
grown to the dismay of their camp lead-
ers, the United States and Soviet Union.
If France and China could so easily dis-
turb the "grand design" of each camp
leader, then imagine, the two camps rea-
soned, what six or eight more nuclear
powers could do.
Prior to the membership increase in
the nuclear club, nonproliferation efforts
were largely propaganda. However, in
the last few years they have been under-
taken with deadly seriousness. Each side
has compromised so much on its original
position that it is hardly recognizable in
the effort to achieve a halt to prolifera-
tion. On its part the United States under-
took every diplomatic measure available,
short of open threats, to disarm the nu-
clear force of France or bring it under
U.S. control, and some authorities have
even suggested that Khrushchev intend-
ed to completely destroy China's em-
bryonic nuclear capabilities before his
sudden political demise.
Before the U.S. Congress is faced with
a fait accompli, now is the time to ques-
tion seriously the motives and purposes'
of our efforts to promote a Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty. There is no better
way to do this than by the bill to extend
the authorization for appropriations of
the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency.
If Congress waits until the treaty is
initialed and presented to the Senate,
the House will be effectively excluded
from making its desires known. At the
same time once the prestige of the Presi-
dent is committed formally to a particu-
lar draft then the Senate will be under
pressure to protect the President's posi-
tion. Whatever influence or control the
House wants to exercise in the Geneva
negotiations must be. exerted in the
framework of H.R. 14940.
In my judgment, the draft treaty which
has been proposed is a threat to the na-
tional security of-the United States and
the free world. It contains the seeds for
the final disruption of the Atlantic Alli-
ance. It may lead to involving the United
States into guarantees of the security of
every non-Communist country in the
world, regardless of its real importance
to our security. It may set the stage for
another German-Soviet Rapallo. Since
neither France nor China will sign the
treaty, their own influence will increase
enormously because of their ability to
1i 1735
transfer nuclear weapons to those coun-
tries who need or desire them but can-
not obtain them from the United States
or the Soviet Union. As a preventative of
nuclear proliferation this treaty has as
little substance as the emperor's non-
existent new clothes. The treaty draft
does not strengthen peace; it weakens
it. In our zeal to reach an agreement
with the Soviet Union we have turned
our backs on the legitimate defense
needs of the Atlantic Alliance and at the
same time have seriously damaged the
prospects for peaceful use of nuclear
energy.
Before outlining eight arguments
against the language proposed in the
treaty, I want to comment on three
aspects of the draft that have largely
been ignored. These are the retreat in
U.S. negotiating position, the question of
guarantees to nonnuclear states, and
the assumption that nuclear prolifera-
tion is imminent.
THE RETREAT IN U.S. NEGOTIATING POSITION
On August 29, 1957, the United States
in cooperation with three other powers-
France, Canada, and the United King-
dom-proposed a scheme that would re-
strict nuclear proliferation but at the
same time require nuclear nations to
cease their production of fissionable mat-
erial for weapon purposes. A caveat to
the nonproliferation proposal was that
nuclear weapons could be transferred for
individual or collective self-defense.
Initially the U.S. position envis-
ioned some nuclear sharing arrange-
ment within the framework of multina-
tional alliances like NATO but it sought
to reduce nuclear weapon production as
well as proliferation. The Soviet Union
on September 20, 1957, rejected these
proposals, especially the collective shar-
ing of nuclear weapons. In 1959, the
United Nations adopted a general resolu-.
tion urging efforts to be undertaken to
prevent nuclear proliferation.
In 1961, the United States undertook
its first significant change in its posi-
tion. It abandoned the transfer of nu-
clear weapons for defense purposes to in-
dividual nations. But it still retained col-
lective sharing under an alliance as a
part of its policy.
From 1962 to August 17, 1965, the main
issue at the Geneva Conference on Nu-
clear Proliferation was whether such an
agreement would prevent nuclear shar-
ing arrangements within a collective de-
fense organization like NATO. The Soviet
Union was anxious to make sure it did,
whereas the United States did not want
to close the door on possible arrange-
ments within NATO.
On August 17, 1965, the United States
made the second major change in its
position, It retained the concept of nu-
clear sharing, but only if the total num-
ber of nuclear states did not increase.
Ambassador Foster stated that this U.S.
position would not preclude the estab-
lishment of nuclear arrangements within
NATO so long as the arrangement did
not constitute an additional entity hav-
ing the power to use nuclear weapons
independent of existing nuclear nations.
In other words, if the United States in-
dependently surrendered its control over
all its own nuclear weapons to a NATO
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
 H 1736
arrangement then a sharing arrange-
ment would be possible. This proposal,
in light of the 1964 presidential cam-
paign in which the President reiterated
that the United States would never sur-
render control of nuclear weapons was
.a farce. Since the Soviet Union realized
that the United States was not about to
turn over voluntarily its entire stockpile
of nuclear weapons to a new organiza-
tion and renounce its right of veto over
them, Moscow could see light at the end
of the tunnel in their efforts to prohibit
any sharing arrangement. On September
24, 1965, the Soviet Union insisted again
that any sharing arrangement within a
military alliance was out of the question.
Objective evidence indicates that the
Soviet Union patience was rewarded on
October 10, 1966, when President John-
son and Secretary Rusk met Soviet For-
eign Minister Gromyko at the White
House. The New York Times reported on
August 25, 1967:
It has since become clear that in their
talks that day President Johnson and Mr.
Rusk gave Mr. Gromyko strong Indication
that the previous United States reservations,
aimed at accommodating some nuclear shar-
ing device in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization had been withdrawn.
After that time the Geneva Conference
marked time waiting for the United
States to finish "consultation" with its
allies. Within less than a year, on August
?24, 1967, the United States and the
Soviet Union came to an agreement on
all particulars except the inspection pro-
vision which was soon remedied by ab-
surdly "agreeing to agree" at some later
date.
In the 10-year period from 1957
through 1967, the United States changed
its position on three major points. It no
longer suggested that the nuclear powers
reduce their own stockpiles at the same
time nonproliferation measures were
taken. It no longer insisted upon some
arrangement for individual self-defense.
Most important, it dropped the require-
ment that nuclear sharing within NATO
be protected.
The advisability of the United States
reducing its nuclear stockpiles is ques-
tionable, but it is imperative, for *reasons
I shall outline below, that the United
States insist upon some provision for
establishing nuclear defense within its
regional defense organizations, prin-
cipally NATO.
THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR GUARANTEES
The United States should ask itself
whether it wants to make such guaran-
tees. By holding out the promise of guar-
antees the United States may find its
role as world policeman greatly ex-
panded. Instead of defense treaties with
43 nations we may soon be responsible
for defending an additional 50 nations.
For instance, the United States presently
has no treaty with Nepal or Afghanistan,
both of which border China. Suppose,
for example, that China threatens nu-
clear attack against either one of these
states. Are we bound to give them, in the
words of President Johnson, "strong sup-
port"? Are we bound to defend two coun-
tries, one a remote Himalayan kingdom,
which previously we did not consider to
be vital to the security of the United
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE March 6, 1968
States? These are questions that should
be answered before we proceed further
on the draft treaty.
Another problem connected with guar-
antees is the ambiguity in language. The
President has had little to say on guaran-
tees. His most important public state-
ment was this one made on October 18,
1964:
The nations that do not seek national nu-
clear weapons can be sure that, if they need
our strong support against some threat of
nuclear blackmail, then they will have it.
To date, however, the President has not
been specific about how such guarantees
might work. Before proceeding further
on the treaty, should we not move be-
yond the domain of the speechmaker,
where the matter presently rests, to
specific measures upon which nations
act? Since the President's position is
couched in sufficiently ambiguous terms
not to disturb anyone, we should not
expect it to have a measurable effect on
the decisions of governments which pos-
sess the ability to develop nuclear weap-
ons. The nonnuclear nations are not
interested so much in defense, as in de-
terrance. A U.S. guarantee therefore must
be really dependable, indeed automatic,
to have value. Nations are not interested
in accepting a Hiroshima on their soil
as the condition precedent to U.S. de-
fense. A policy for the. benefit of a par-
ticular nonnuclear nation may have some
utility, especially if expressely addressed
to an imminent nuclear threat. A uni-
lateral declaration, such as the Presi-
dent's, addressed to the world at large
probably will not be taken seriously by
anyone. Empty guarantees to the world
at large, on the other hand, tend to weak-
en the credibility of the guarantees given
to our allies in NATO.
Ambassador Foster, in his testimony,
sought to meet some of the problems on
guarantees. He stated that the U.N. could
guarantee nations in Southeast Asia and
Asia against nuclear blackmail, but when
I asked him if he anticipated the U.N.
would own and control nuclear weapons
he replied, "Not under present circum-
stances."
Regarding India the only thing he could
promise was "we are working -on a set
of assurances that will partially meet
the concern of India." I, of course, do not
know what these assurances are and by
his own testimony they will only "parti-
ally" meet the concerns of India. Ambas-
sador Foster stated that under the treaty
we are not bound to use nuclear weapons
to defend India or Israel. What did he
offer these countries in the way of U.S.
guarantees? In Israel's case he said only:
I refuse to speculate on that possibility-
That we might use nuclear weapons.'
Of India, he said:
I think that the record of the U.S. In sup-
porting this great democracy of India over
the last twenty years is a very clear record.
I think' that other nations are aware of the
interest the U.S. has in India.
Apparently Pakistan treated this in-
terest casually at the time of the Kash-
mir war and it did not deter China's
invasion of India in 1962.
It is unlikely that New Delhi-or any-
one else-will take such assurances seri-
ously-especially when Ambassador Fos-
ter said further that there "is not a
specific commitment at this moment in
history" to defend India.
The proffer of U.S. guarantees is sim-
ply not credible. The announcement of
virtuous ends does not discharge our re-
sponsibilities or deter aggression. The
futility of unilateral allied guarantees
for the political integrity of independent
smaller states did not deter aggression
against Albert's Belgium, Republican Po-
land, independent China, or Haile Se-
Lassie's Ethiopia, nor did it prevent
Communist aggression in Korea, South-
east Asia, or Eastern Europe.
Ambassador Foster said:
We feel the spread of these (nuclear weap-
ons) is the greatest danger to the survival
of the world.
I disagree strongly with that assump-
tion and I believe a majority of the Con-
gress do also. Of the greatest dangers to
the survival of the world proliferation
ranks well down the list.
In fact, such acquisition might even
preserve the peace in some cases. One
wonders whether Hungary might not be
independent today if she had had a
small arsenal of tactical nuclear weap-
ons to use against Soviet tanks in 1956.
In the final analysis, what preserves a
nation's independence is its own willing-
ness to defend its' territorial integrity,
the determination of its allies, the bal-
ance of power, strategic frontiers, and
an international order which places it
in an unassailible position.
Prohibiting nuclear proliferation with-
in the context of the draft treaty does
not enhance the survival of the world; it
may well threaten it.
THE LIKELIHOOD OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
MAY BE VASTLY OVERRATED
There are numerous obstacles to pro-
liferation. The size of the investment
needed to build a strategic nuclear force
and the cost of a diversified delivery sys-
tem are inhibiting factors. Weapons
technology does not stand still, and,
therefore, research and development are
also heavy cost factors. Domestic politi-
cal pressures may inhibit the acquisition
of nuclear weapons. Outright transfer of
nuclear weapons from one power to an-
other is possible but not probable. Fur-
thermore, it would not necessarily solve
or meet inhibiting factors.
The premise upon which we have ne-
gotiated this treaty is a faulty one. We
have preceived this treaty to be so im-
portant that writing in the July 1965 is-
sue of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador
Foster said:
A heavier cost could be the erosion of. al-
liances resulting from the high degree of
U.S.-Soviet cooperation which will be re-
quired if a non-proliferation program is to
be successful. Within NATO, there could be
concern that the detente would lead to a
weakening of our commitment to Western
Europe, The problem will be particularly
acute in Germany ...
Certainly this is a backward listing of
priorities. But this reasoning of the State
Department is internally consistent, be-
cause they believe, as Ambassador
Foster testified recently that "the So-
viet Union is a responsible nuclear
power." I cannot accept these premises.
Neither did the Foreign Affairs Commit-
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
March 6, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE H 17'37
tee in 1961 when it published a list of 15
countries which the Soviet Union had
threatened with destruction.
Was the Soviet Union a responsible
nuclear power when it abruptly broke the
nuclear explosion moratorium in 1961
and 3 days later inaugurated a lengthy
series of tests-tests that must neces-
sarily have been in preparation while
the Soviet Union was piously proclaim-
ing its observance of the moratorium?
Was the Soviet Union a responsible
nuclear power when it sought to place
nuclear-tipped rockets in Cuba?
Was it a responsible nuclear power
when it defied world opinion and an
outraged United Nations by detonating
the 50-megaton bomb?
Was the Soviet Union a responsible
nuclear power when Chairman Khru-
shchev told how he had intimidated the
Greek Ambassador who said, to him:
I trust the Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of the Soviet Union will never give
the order to drop atomic bombs on the
Acropolis and other historic monuments of
Greece?
On that occasion Mr. Khrushchev re-
plied:
Mr. Ambassador, I do not like to be un-
pleasant, but you are deeply mistaken.
Is our fetish to work out empty ar-
rangements with the Soviet Union so
strong that we take flight of reality? I
sincerely. hope not.
In reviewing the language of the treaty,
it appears to me there are eight principal
arguments against it.
First. It will seriously weaken and may
completely destroy the North Atlantic
Alliance.
I believe the complete destruction of
NATO Is a chief aim of the Soviet Union
in participating in the negotiations on
the treaty. The durability and strength
of NATO depends upon its becoming a
partnership of equals, an alliance in
which the United States permits the
other members to have a fair share in
nuclear strategy. Such a' partnership
cannot grow if a nonproliferation treaty
renders the European nations who do
not possess nuclear weapons forever de-
pendent upon the United States for pro-
tection in the event of an attack re-
quiring a nuclear response.
A treaty denying those powers an
adequate deterrent in the future while
U.S. troops stationed in Europe are cut
back is bound to raise questions regard-
ing the sincerity of our commitment. In
my view a nonproliferation treaty should
not be accorded any priority which pre-
vents the North Atlantic nations from
solving the nuclear sharing problem in
whatever way they decide is best.
William R. Kintner, deputy director of
the foreign policy research institute at
the University of Pennsylvania, has writ-
ten:
Many Europeans who favor a strong At-
lantic Alliance would like to replace Euro-
pean military independence on the U.S. with
a true partnership based upon the interde-
pendence of a powerful United Europe and
a powerful U.S. East-West agreement on nu-
clear nonproliferation would render the con-
cept of interdependence meaningless. Part-
nership implies the creation of a European
deterrent independent of the American deter-
rent, yet closely connected with it. The pros-
pects for creating a European nuclear
deterrent are now slim. An anti-prolifera-
tion treaty might eliminate any future pos-
sibility of such a development.
Second. It will have an undesirable ef-
fect on the Federal Republic of Germany.
Bonn is in a special situation, because
it bears a heavy risk and burden in the
defense of Western Europe, yet is sub-
jected to special restrictions concerning
nuclear arms which were imposed in the
early postwar years. To keep firm ties
with the Federal Republic, it will be nec-
essary for the Western allies to treat
Germany as an equal. The signature of
East Germany, the so-called German
Democratic Republic, on this treaty will
increase its prestige and standing in the
international community at the expense
of the Federal Republic. Continued dis-
crimination against Germany might fan
the flames of extreme nationalism in-
creasing the strength and appeal of the
Neo-Nazi Party. The inspection provi-
sions finally negotiated under the treaty
may well lead to industrial espionage,
and the treaty may preclude Germany's
harnessing nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes.
Since the Atlantic and West German
agendas seem to be ovgrweighed with hot
issues at the present, it is to be wondered
whether top U.S. policy officials have
given sufficient attention to the questions
of timing and priorities in respect to this
treaty.
Third. It will not prevent completely
the spread of nuclear weapons.
Nations follow the course which they
deem in their national interest, and will
manufacture, or decide not to manufac-
ture nuclear weapons whether or not
there is a nonproliferation treaty. In-
deed this treaty, based as it is on unbe-
lievable guarantees, may encourage pro-
liferation. Exaggerated chatter about the
damage that additional nuclear forces
can achieve encourages the notion of
nuclear weapons as "the great equalizer"
in international relations.
Fourth. Its inspection features are not
clearly spelled out.
To approve a treaty such as has been
submitted without knowing what inspec-
tion features may be ultimately agreed
upon is inviting the creation of a dan-
gerous illusion. Without adequate in-
spection a nation may covertly transfer
or manufacture weapons. The possibil-
ity of different standards of inspection
being applied is a real one because each
state to the treaty negotiates inspection
features separately.
Even assuming that the safeguards of
the International Agency for Atomic En-
ergy are adequate to prevent diversion
of nuclear materials from declared
peaceful activities it is unlikely that
there will be a provision for inspecting
the nuclear stockpiles or weapon pro-
duction facilities of the nuclear weapon
powers to determine whether they may
be transferring any to nonnuclear pow-
ers. Furthermore, there is no . penalty
provided for in the treaty and any na-
tion could withdraw upon 3-months no-
tice whenever it decided it wanted to pro-
ceed, with open production of nuclear
weapons. It is still not clear how indus-
trial trade secrets would be protected
under a system of international inspec-
tion.
Fifth. It may restrict peaceful develop-
ment of atomic energy for industrial or
energy purposes.
The draft treaty outlaws any "nuclear
explosive device" regardless of whether it
is detonated for peaceful or military pur-
poses..A number of respected nuclear sci-
entists believe the development of "Plow-
share" depends upon peaceful atomic ex-
plosives. Proposals have been advanced,
for example, for atomic explosions for
such massive excavation jobs as creating
a new canal supplemental to the con-
gested Panama Canal. Other large scale
nuclear excavation needs might be
needed in the CHOCO and NAWAPA
water and power projects in Latin Amer-
ica. Underground explosions offer
splendid economic potentials. It has been
estimated, for instance, that the world's
supply of natural gas can be doubled by
nuclear fracturing of impervious gas
formations deep beneath the surface.
On the other hand critics of this argu-
ment claim the draft treaty will not af-
fect peaceful development of nuclear
energy. If this be so then I agree with Mr.
Adrian Fisher's statement that a nation
which can develop nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes likely can develop it
also for military purposes.
Sixth. It would require the nonnuclear
nations to sacrifice a nuclear weapon
capability which might some day be im-
perative for their self-defense without
placing any counterbalancing limitation
on the further acquisition of nuclear
weapons by the nuclear powers.
The nonnuclear powers are required-
under the treaty-to renounce their right
to manufacture or acquire nuclear weap-
ons, but the nuclear powers would not
have any limitations placed upon them
except a prohibition against transferring
to or assisting nonnuclear states in the
manufacture of nuclear weapons, some-
thing they have already chosen not to do.
True, the treaty does require "good faith"
bargaining to achieve more concrete
steps toward general disarmament, but
this has not been achieved in 22 years
of disarmament negotiations and its
achievement is not likely in the foresee-
able future.
The very act of signing a nonprolif era-
tion treaty assumes significance even
though the treaty does not change an
existing de facto situation. The act can
be interpreted as one of signing away
future national security, in an age when -
balance of power politics still prevails,
when nuclear weapons still appear the
ultimate guarantee of security, when re-
gional or international security organiza-
tions are far from being capable of taking
over national responsibilities for defense
an when alliances do not appear to be
guaranteed for all time, if at all.
In other words, the treaty strikes at
he heart of national sovereignty with-
out providing any substitute organiza-
tion principle or any meaningful security
guarantees.
Rumania, an Eastern European Com-
munist state with a growing streak of
external independence, and a member
of the ENDC, accurately stated the
concern of these smaller nations when its
President, Nicolae Ceausescu said:
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R00510A000300210015-4
 H 1738
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4 41
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE March. 6,* 1968
Without precise, firm and efficient meas-
ures, on the part of all states for ceasing
the production of nuclear weapons .... non-
proliferation would not only fail to secure
progress along the way of liquidating the
danger of nuclear war, but would bring about
its indefinite perpetuation. Such an approach
to non-proliferation of nuclear' weapons
would only legislate the division of the world
into nuclear and non-nuclear states.
Indeed, Rumania proposed that if at
the end of 5 years the nuclear powers
had not taken steps for reduction of their
own nuclear stockpile, then the nonnu-
clear signatories would reexamine their
own position. Rumania has also insisted
upon -security guarantees for the nonnu-
clear powers; a precise, just, and efficient
control system and the absolute require-
ment that the treaty not block peaceful
development of atomic energy. It would
appear that the Rumanian delegation-
among others-has a better grasp of
"realpolitik" and its own national inter-
est than some of the major powers.
Seventh. It will weaken the relative
military position of the United States.
It is unlikely that the nonnuclear pow-
ers will sign a nonproliferation treaty
unless it is linked with measures to limit
the nuclear powers to a comparable de-
gree. The treaty may lead to further
disarmament measures which will
weaken our security. Such measures may
include a comprehensive nuclear test
ban or a prohibition against the first use
of nuclear weapons.
The treaty will impede the deploy-
ment of an antiballistic missile defense
system to protect countries from Com-
munist aggression since a successful
antiballistic missile system requires nu-
clear warheads. In the future countries
such as India, Japan, and European allies
might want to build such a defense sys-
tem, but the nonproliferation treaty
would prevent the United States from
assisting them.
Finally the treaty will require the
United States to accept new commit-
ments to help defend the states which
forgo the manufacture of nuclear weap-
ons. Nonnuclear nations cannot be ex-
pected to give up the right to acquire nu-
clear weapons without some sort of guar-
antee of protection against an attack re-
quiring a nuclear defense. Such commit-
ments may overextend the United States,
whereas if nations could acquire their
own nuclear weapons or participate in
regional systems, we would be relieved
of responsibility.
Eighth. It will be a gain for the Soviet
Union.
The Soviet Union is probably in-
terested in securing a treaty for these
reasons:
It will effectively keep Germany from
acquiring a nuclear defense either
through an ABM system or a control or
policy influence in nuclear strategy de-
velopment.
It will aggravate differences within the
Atlantic Alliance among Rome, Bonn,
Paris, and Washington.
China's refusal to sign the treaty will
further isolate her from the world com-
munity and in particular the Communist
movement.
It will prevent certain Eastern Euro-
pean countries from obtaining nuclear
weapons and perpetuate their reliance on
the Soviet Union to defend their position.
It will keep nuclear weapons out of the
Middle East and South Asia where Rus-
sia, perhaps by "Cuban missile type" ar-
rangements, seeks to expand her influ-
ence.
The draft treaty confuses appearance
for reality, symbols for substance. It
would lump'together all the "have-nots"
of the world-the backward and the ad-
vanced, the neutral and the alined, the
subservient and the independent, the
malign and the well intentioned in one
category, and the diverse "haves" minus
two-China and France-in another
category, thus symbolically reversing
alinements and priorities that have pre-
vailed for over 20 years.
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I rise
in opposition to the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I do not know what the
gentleman means by the NATO option.
If he means by the NATO option, the
transfer of nuclear weapons into the sov-
ereign control of NATO, then that is for-
bidden by law.
Now NATO has these weapons, but it
has these weapons through bilateral
agreements with certain specific nations
which we believe are substantially sound
politically and not liable to be changed
from within to either Communist or Fa-
cist states.
I was on the committee during the
years the gentleman speaks of and I know
of no NATO option other than the NATO
option which is now in existence. I say
that history does not record the vague
statements which the gentleman has
made.
I am going to leave that point though
and I am going to consider the gentle-
man's amendment. He says in his amend-
ment, and it is on page 12 of the report,
that no funds can be used for advancing,
negotiating, or preparing proposals which
preclude the provision.
I want you to listen to that-"preclude
the provision of nuclear weapons for
purely defensive purposes."
Now listen to that-"purely defense
purposes."
Now, what does the word "provision"
mean? Does it mean transfer of the
weapons? If it does mean that, the trans-
ferring of sovereign custody, the Atomic
Energy Act prohibits the transfer of
weapons to any other nation whether
they are in NATO or out of NATO, pro-
viding it is transferred into or to sov-
ereign control and not by or under the
dual control which now exists on every
weapon which is located on the soil of a
NATO nation.
I say that the word "provision" Is not
a specific word. The term is not in con-
sonance with the rest of the Atomic
Energy Act. I is ambiguous. It is confus-
ing. I do not know what it means, and I
do not believe the gentleman can ex-
plain what it means in terms of the rest
of the words in the Atomic Energy Act-
"for purely defensive purposes." What
does that mean? The nuclear weapons on
NATO territory-and there are over
6,000 of them-are there for defensive
purposes so far as we know.
Of course, once a war starts, then you
have the problem of deciding, if you
throw a nuclear weapon, is it in defense
or is it in offense? I say that no one can
make that determination between offen-
sive and defensive.
The use of these weapons by a NATO
nation are clearly defined in bilateral or
multilateral , military agreements which
have laid before the Atomic Energy Com-
mittee and to which Members of the
House have had public access for 45 days
before their adoption. In those military
agreements there are specific procedures
and methods whereby nuclear weapons
can be used. I will simplify it by saying
this, that they cannot be used by the
Nation on whose soil they rest unless the
user has the acquiescence of the Presi-
dent of the United States. It is a dual
control. It must be agreed to by the Na-
tion upon whose soil the weapons are de-
posited. It must be agreed to by the
President of the United States. -
If you go fussing around with this ar-
rangement and you get a bunch of fuzzy
words that have no legalistic meaning,
no traditional meaning, no word-of-art
meaning in the Atomic Energy Act and
the agreements, you are headed for
trouble.
The thing we want to do is to keep
the situation the way it is. If the time
ever comes when we want to transfer to
Italy, to West Germany, to NATO as a
group the sovereign use of nuclear weap-
ons, that is the time the Congress ought
to debate this question and debate it
fully and completely, because you will
then be taking a step away from U.S.
control of the use of nuclear weapons. I
do not want to take that step under the
gentleman's ambiuous amendment, and
I do not think he wants to take it. If he
does, let him say so.
Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman., will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. HOLIFIELD. I yield to the gentle-
man from Illinois.
Mr. FINDLEY. All my amendment
does is to keep open such an opportunity
in future years.
Mr. HOLIFIELD. It will be open at the
time it is proposed and brought before
the Congress.
The ? CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from California has expired.
Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, I
rise in opposition to the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, -the gentleman from
California has just given a very lucid
explanation as to why the nonprolifera-
tion treaty is of great benefit and does
not violate existing statutes. However,
this amendment is not really a broad dis-
cussion of the nonproliferation treaty.
The gentleman from Illinois has wisely
surfaced his question so this Commit-
tee could debate what we really think
of the nonproliferation treaty.
However, the real point here is whether
or not this House should take this form
to express its pleasure or displeasure
with the treaty itself. The gentleman
from California [Mr. HOLIFIELD] has
raised the point that no one in NATO has
asked for the authority that the gentle-
man from Illinois [Mr. FINDLEY] would
like to grant to NATO. So it is a ques-
tion, really, of our being more Catholic
than the Pope.
. We are really urging, I think, some-
thing, if we adopt Mr. FINDLEY's line,
something that they have not asked for.
The real issue here is whether we
should eliminate the funding for the
Agency itself. The device embodied in
Mr. FINDLEY'S amendment has been ex-
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 @A000300210015-4
March 6; 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE H 1739
tremely useful in allowing the debate to
center around this nonproliferation
treaty. But It is not our jurisdiction to
discuss whether we consent to the non-
proliferation treaty or not. The gentle-
man from Illinois [Mr. FINDLEY] has
nevertheless given us an opportunity to
do so.
He says in effect that if we vote for
his amendment, then we are against the
treaty in its present form. And the way
we do that is by taking away the funds
from the people who work in this agency,
the very people who do the research, the
very people who supply the knowledge
and the options for the executive branch.
They are going to be deprived of their
salaries because they have done their job.
Even if we express displeasure with the
treaty, we should not take it out of their
salaries, merely because they have done
their job. This is what this amendment
is all about.
Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentlman yield on that point?
Mr. GALLAGHER. I yield to the gen-
tleman from Illinois.
Mr. FINDLEY. There is another possi-
bility, and a more likely possibility, that
should this amendment become law the
administration would see a clear signal
of disapproval and call back the treaty
of nonproliferation and restore the
NATO option.
Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, I
think the gentleman has stated the case,
and it boils down to whether or not we
are interested in the nonproliferation
treaty. If we vote to take these gentle-
men off the payroll, it means we are un-
happy with the nonproliferation treaty
as it exists. Yet, the issue is" whether or
not the United States should go beyond
what NATO has ever asked. The treaty is
a version arrived at through a bipartisan
method of the people engaged in this
work-men like John McCloy and Gen-
eral Gruenther and Arthur Dean, none
of them particularly Democratic, so we
are not going to get into that area. These
men in their wisdom and liberality feel
this is a- good treaty. Our Government
has sponsored this treaty. Many people
are now looking at it. I suggest even if we
do not agree with it, we certainly should
not take these people off the payroll.
That is the only issue here.
I hope we vote this amendment down.
Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, the
gentleman is painfully aware, as I am,
that there is wide criticism of this treaty,
not only in Germany, but in France and
Italy, and the basic question is whether
we are more anxious to please the So-
viet Union on this treaty, or our NATO
allies.
Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, to
my dear colleague I would say the issue
here is what is best for the United
States of America, and I think we feel
that this is in our national interest, and
I think this should be our prime moti-
vation, and, therefore, I urge defeat of
this amendment.
Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I move to
strike the requisite number of words.
Mr. Chairman, I did not intend to get
into this argument, but the last sentence
of the gentleman from New Jersey moti-
vated me to get into it. I am going to vote
-for this thing, because, as pitiful as it is,
it is the best we have, this Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency. I think they
are about as sad a group as we could get
together under one tent any place in the
United States. They have negotiated for
the United States, I suppose, to the best
of their ability, but how did they negoti-
ate? Well, the Russians have a theory
that when they sit down and negotiate,
what is theirs is theirs, and what is ours
is negotiable. That is what the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency peo-
ple negotiated about-what is ours-be-
cause the Russians took a position over
there and we took one here, and these
highly praised lawyers inched over until
they arrived right at the Russian posi-
tion. That is about the best we have been
able to get out of them.. `
I am not against it. As I say, I am for
some kind of arms control and disarma-
ment, and I will go as far as anybody to
talk to the Russians and try to do some-
thing about arms control.
I think it is kind of sad that we sit
around and praise these people, whom I
consider to be incompetent. I like the
chairman, Dr. MORGAN, and I try to agree
with him, and he was right when he said
nobody had ever asked for them to come
up. I will clue the Members that I never
asked for them to come up, because the
less I see of them the better. They are
about the most boring outfit anyone can
find under God's shining sun.
Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. HAYS. Yes, I yield to the gentle-
man from New Jersey, but at the gentle-
man's own risk.
- Mr. GALLAGHER. It may be at the
gentleman's risk, too. I would just like to
say I have been a member or adviser from
the House to some of these negotiations,
and I have sat alongside Arthur Dean
and Bill Foster and Adrian Fisher, and
they have done a good job, and they are
as hardnosed and smarter than any Rus-
sian I have seen at these meetings.
Mr. HAYS. I ask the gentleman not to
drop any names with me. Arthur Dean
does not mean a thing to me. This is my
time, and I decline to yield further.
Mr. GALLAGHER. All right.
Mr. HAYS. I like to travel, I will say
to my friend, and so does the gentleman.
I can advise him of some places he can
go if he wants to go, and he can spend
his time better and more interestingly
and learn a little more than going around
with these fellows. -
I have listened to them, too, and I am
telling the Members that so far as nego-
tiators are concerned, if they had been
negotiating for the coal operators with
John L. Lewis he would have owned the
coal mines.
If -one wants to put it the other way
around, if they had been negotiating for
the coal miners they would have been
paying the operators to work.
That is what I think of them as nego-
tiators.
Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. HAYS. I yield to the gentleman
from Illinois, under the same conditions.
Mr. FINDLEY. At my own risk, I ex-
press the hope that the gentleman's com-
ments can safely be interpreted as sup-
port for the Findley amendment.
Mr. HAYS. We do not want to go too
far in interpreting my comments. They
might be subject to misinterpretation.
I will say to the gentleman that I
would like to see some kind of a NATO
option kept open. I would also say this:
I believe there has been a lot of sound
and fury about something which really
is not all that important, because I do
not believe the draft they have now is
going to be the draft that will be
submitted.
I have heard a lot of statements from
the administration and from people in
the administration who are unhappy
about the draft, that there is going to be
more work done on it. I believe the chair-
man shares that view, that there may be
a good deal more work done on it. I would
hope, if there is, that it can be improved.
I concur that there is a lot of dissatis-
faction in Germany, in Italy, and in other
places. I would hope that we can get a
draft which the Germans and the
Italians can be reasonably happy about,
which we can sign with some hope that
it has something in it which would be
good for us, and that the Russians, too,
would sign.
Up to now, as I view it-and I know
a little about it; I have not sat beside
Arthur Dean, but f have followed this-
I believe we have gotten the worst end
of the bargain.
I just felt I should say that, and that
is about it.
Mr. FINDLEY. Would the gentleman
not agree, however, that an expression
of support for this amendment would be
a useful notice to the negotiators and to
our executive branch on this very im-
portant point?
Mr. HAYS. I am not sure.
I hesitate to oppose the gentleman's
amendment, but I am not sure the
gentleman's amendment would really do
what he hopes it would do.
It might do what some people have
said, with all respect to the gentleman. It
might close the Agency down.
As pitiful as this Agency is, as I said
before, it is the only one we have, so we
had better keep it going.
Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I move
to strike the requisite number of words.
Mr. Chairman, I do not intend to pro-
long the debate on this amendment. It
was my intention, as the floor manager,
to let the debate end after the gentleman
from California had spoken, but I can-
not let this debate terminate without
some good words about the Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency.
I have known Bill Foster, the Director
of the Agency, and Adrian Fisher, his
deputy, for many years. They are both
able and dedicated Americans who are
experts in this very difficult field.
Bill Foster has served with distinction
in the Department of Defense, in the De-
partment of Commerce, and in the Mu-
tual Security Agency. He has served his
country in both Republican and Demo-
cratic administrations. He has done a
good job.
John McCloy is one of our ablest citi-
zens and Arthur Dean spent many
months of hard work over at Geneva. He
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
 H 1'740
is recognized as one of our most able and
distinguished negotiators.
I am not one who travels very often. I
do not have the advantage of traveling
around to the various countries and dis-
cussing with members of legislative
bodies their individual views about the
Nonproliferation Treaty. I suppose that
there are minorities in all these coun-
tries who oppose the treaty. All the evi-
dence I have, however, indicates that the
governments of Germany and of our
other NATO allies, with the exception of
France, are in favor of the treaty.
Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentleman
from Illinois.
Mr. FINDLEY. I am sure the distin-
guished chairman will agree there is
nothing in my amendment that would in
the remotest convey the idea that an in-
dividual nation would ever get control of
nuclear weapons.
Mr. MORGAN. I cannot understand,
then, why the gentleman from Illinois is
so worried about NATO.
Mr. FINDLEY. Because, as a commu-
nity of nations, they have talked over this
same 10- or 15-year period about that day
when it might be useful to them to have
a jointly owned and operated defensive
system.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentle-
man from New Jersey.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I agree with
the gentleman that it would be the
height of folly to cut off the pay of those
who are employed by the Agency be-
cause we may have some reservations
about the Nonproliferation Treaty.
The discussion of the pros and cons of
that treaty lends substance to that point
of view that many Members of this body
would like to be Members of the other
body. It seems to me we must trust to the
good sense of the Members of the other
body in discussing the pros and cons of
the treaty itself, and we should protect
the Agency and those who have labored
so faithfully for it from attack and from
an ill-advised cutting off of funds, such
as this amendment would provide.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on
the amendment offered by the gentle-
man from Illinois.
The amendment was rejected.
AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. FINDLEY
Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer
an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. FINDLEY: On
the first page, line 7, strike out the period
and insert in lieu thereof the following:
"and at the end of such second sentence
strike out the period and insert in lieu
thereof the following: "': Provided, That the
authorization for appropriations contained
in this Act shall not be effective until such
time as the Soviet Union, which is the
United States' co-sponsor of the draft treaty
on non-proliferation (negotiated for the
United States by the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency), ceases to supply mili-
tary articles to our enemy in Vietnam, as de-
termined by the President of the United
States.'"
Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I make
a point of order against the amendment.
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE March 6, 1968
It is not germane and contains matter
not covered by the present act under
discussion.
The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentle-
man from Illinois wish to be heard?
Mr. FINDLEY. I do wish to be heard,
Mr. Chairman. I call the attention of
the Chair to the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD,
page 144, dated January 8,,1964. On that
date the House was considering an au-
thorization bill. In connection with that
authorization I offered an amendment
which read as follows:
The authorization for an appropriation
contained in this Act shall not be effec-
tive until such time as the receipts of the
Government for the preceding fiscal year
have exceeded the expenditures of the Gov-
ernment for such year, as determined by
the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.
On that occasion the gentleman from
Alabama [Mr. JONES] made a point of
order against the amendment, and the
Chair ruled that the point of order was
not well taken. Therefore, inasmuch as
the amendment that is now before this
body is drafted almost to the last let-
ter in conformity with the amendment
which was then ruled as germane, I feel
confident that the Chair will rule that
my amendment is in order.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will read
the rules. Rule XVI, section 7: "and no
motion or proposition on a subject dif-
ferent from that under consideration
shall be admitted under color of amend-
ment."
The purpose of this legislation to-
day is it authorizes an appropriation of
$33 million to finance the operation of
the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency for a 3-year period. The purpose
of the amendment offered by the gentle-
man from Illinois would delay the use
of any appropriated funds pending an
unrelated contingency. Therefore, the
Chair sustains the point of order.
Mr. FINDLEY. Will the Chair hear
me further on that point?
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair has al-
ready ruled.
Under the rule, the Committee rises.
Accordingly the Committee rose; and
the Speaker having resumed the chair,
Mr. FULTON of Tennessee, Chairman of
the Committee of the Whole House on
the State of the Union, reported that
that Committee, having had under con-
sideration the bill (H.R. 14940) to
amend the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Act, as amended, in order to ex-
tend the authorization for appropria-
tions, pursuant to House Resolution
1082, he reported the bill back to the
House.
The SPEAKER. Under the rule, the
previous question is ordered.
The question is on the engrossment
and third reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed
and read a third time, and was read the
third time.
MOTION TO RECOMMIT
Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, I offer
a motion to recommit.
The SPEAKER. Is the gentleman op-
posed to the bill?
Mr. DERWINSKI. I am, Mr. Speaker.
The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report
the motion to recommit.
The Clerk read as follows:
Mr. DERWINSB:I moves to recommit the bill
H.R. 14940 to the Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs with instructions to report the same
back to the House forthwith with the fol-
lowing amendment: On the first page, be-
ginning in line .6, strike out "and for the
three fiscal years 1969 through 1971, the
sum of $33 million" and insert in lieu thereof
the following: "and for the two fiscal years
1969 through 1970, the sum of $20 million."
The SPEAKER. Without objection, the
previous question is ordered on the mo-
tion to recommit.
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER. The question is on the
motion to recommit.
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker,
on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The question was taken; and there
were-yeas 241, nays 161, not voting 30,
as follows:
[Roll No. 491
YEAS-241
Abbitt
Fino
Martin
Abernethy
Fisher
Mathias, Calif.
Adair
Flynt
May
Anderson, Ill.
Frd, Gerald R. Mayne
Andrews, Ala.
Fountain
Meskill
Andrews,
Fulton, Pa.
Michel
N. Dak.
Fuqua
Miller, Ohio
Arends
Galifianakis
Mills
Ashmore
Gardner
Minshail
Ayres
Gathings
Mize
Baring
Gettys
Montgomery
Bates
Goodling
Moore
Battin
Gross
Morse, Mass.
Belcher
Grover
Morton
Bell
Gubser
Mosher
Betts
Gurney
Myers
Bevill
Hagan
Natcher
Biester
Haley
Nichols
Blackburn
Hall
O'Konski
Bolton
Halleck
O'Neal, Ga.
Bow
Hammer-
Pelly
Brinkley
schmidt
Pettis
Brock
Hansen, Idaho
Pike
Broomfield
Hardy
Pirnie
Brotzman
Harrison
Poage
Brown, Mich.
Harsha
Poff
Brown, Ohio
Harvey
Pollock
Broyhill, N.C.
Hebert
Pool
Broyhill, Va.
Heckler, Mass.
Price, Tex.
Buchanan
Henderson
Pryor
Burke, Fla.
Herlong
Purcell
Burleson
Horton
Quie
Burton, Utah
Harmer
Quillen
Bush
Hull
Railsback
Cabell
Hunt
Randall
Cahill
Hutchinson
Rarick
Carter
Ichord
Reid, Ill.
Casey
Jarman
Reifel
Cederberg
Johnson, Pa.
Reinecke
Chamberlain
Jonas
Rhodes, Ariz.
Clancy
Jones, N.C.
Riegle
Clausen,
Keith
Rivers
Don H.
King, N.Y.
Roberts
Cleveland
Kleppe
Robison
Collier
Kornegay
Rogers, Fla.
Colmer
Kupferman
Roth
Conte
Kuykendall
Roudebush
Corbett
Kyl
Rumsfeld
Cowger
Laird
Ruppe
Cramer
Landrum
Sandman
Cunningham
Langen
Satterfield
Curtis
Latta
Saylor
Davis, Ga.
Lennon
Schadeberg
Davis, Wis.
Lipscomb
Scherle
Dellenback
Lloyd
Schneebeli
Denney
Long, La.
Schwengel
Derwinski
Lukens
Scott
Devine
McClory
Shriver
Dickinson
McCloskey
Sikes
Dole
McClure
Skubitz
Dorn
McCulloch
Smith, Calif.
Downing
McDade
Smith, N.Y.
Duncan
McDonald,
Smith, Okla.
Dwyer
Mich.
Snyder
Edwards, Ala.
McEwen
Springer
Erlenborn
McMillan
Stafford
Esch
MacGregor
Steed
Eshleman
Mahon
Steiger, Ariz.
Everett
Mailliard
Steiger, Wis.
Findley
Marsh
Stephens
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
March 6, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
Stubblefield
Vander Jagt
Widnall
Stuckey
Waggonner
Wiggins
Taft
Walker
Williams, Pa.
Talcott
Wampler
Wilson, Bob
Taylor
Watkins
Winn
Teague, Calif.
Watson
Wyatt
Teague, Tex.
Watts
Wydler
Thompson, Ga. Whalen
Wylie
Thomson, Wis.
Whalley
Wyman
Tuck
White
Zion
Ullman
Whitener
Zwach
Utt
Whitten.
NAYS-161
Adams
Fulton, Tenn.
Nix
Addabbo
Gallagher
O'Hara, 111.
Albert
Garmatz
O'Hara, Mich.
Anderson,
Giaimo
Olsen
Tenn.
Gilbert
O'Neill, Mass.
Annunzio
Gonzalez
Ottinger
Ashley
Gray
Patman
Aspinall
Green, Pa.
Patten
Barrett
Griffiths
Perkins
Bennett
Gude
Pickle
Bingham
Halpern
Podell
Blanton
Hamilton
Price, Ill.
Blatnik
Hanley
Pucinski
Boggs
Hanna
Rees
Boland
Hansen, Wash.
Reid, N.Y.
Bolling
Hathaway
Resnick
Brademas
Hays
Reuss
Brasco
Heckler, W. Va. Rhodes, Pa.
Brooks
Helstoski
Rodino
Burke, Mass.
Hicks
Rogers, Colo.
Burton, Calif.
Holifield
Ronan
Button
Holland
Rooney, N.Y.
Byrne, Pa.
Hungate
Rooney, Pa.
Carey
Irwin,
Rosenthal
Celler
Jacobs
Rostenkowski
Clark
Joelson
Roush
Cohelan
Johnson, Calif. Roybal
Conyers
Jones, Ala.
Ryan
Culver
Karsten
St Germain
Daddario
Karth
Schweiker
Daniels
Kastenmeier
Shipley
Dawson
Kazen
Sisk
Delaney
Kee
Slack
Dent
Kelly
Smith, Iowa
Diggs
Kirwan
Staggers
Dingell
Kluczynski
Stratton
Donohue
Kyros
Sullivan
Dow
Leggett
Tenzer
Eckhardt
Long, Md.
Thompson, N.J.
Edmondson
McCarthy
Tiernan
Edwards, Calif.
McFall
Tunney
Edwards, La.
Madden
Udall
Eilberg
Mathias, Md.
Van Deerlin
Evans, Colo.
Matsunaga
Vanik
Evins, Tenn.
Meeds
Vigorito
Farbstein
Miller, Calif.
Waldie
Fascell
Minish
Willis
Feighan
Mink
Wilson,
Flood
Monagan
Charles H.
Foley
Moorhead
Wolff
Ford,
Morgan
Wright
William D.
Morris, N. Mex.
Yates
Fraser
Murphy, Ill.
Young
Frelinghuysen
Murphy, N.Y.
Zablocki
Friedel
Nedzi
NOT VOTING-30
Ashbrook
Fallon
Moss
Berry
Gibbons
Nelsen
Bray
Goodell -
Passman
Brown, Calif.
Green, Oreg.
Pepper
Byrnes, Wis.
Hawkins -
Philbin
Clawson, Del
Howard
St. Onge
Conable
Jones, Mo.
Scheuer
Corman
King, Calif.
Selden
de la Garza
Macdonald,
Stanton
Dowdy
Mass.
Dulski
Machen
So the motion to recommit was agreed
to.
The Clerk announced the following
pairs:
On this vote:
Mr. Passman for, with Mr. Philbin against.
Mr. Del Clawson for, with Mr. St. Onge
against.
Mr. Berry for, with Mr. Pepper against.
Mr. Nelsen for, with Mr. Mosher against.
Mr. Stanton for, with Mr. Corman against.
Mr. Ashbrook for, with Mr. Moss against.
Mr. Bray for, with Mr. Fallon against.
Mr. Dowdy for, with Mr. Hawkins against.
Until further notice:
Mr. Howard with Mr. Conable.
Mr. Dulski with'Mr. Goodell.
Mrs. Green of Oregon with Mr. Byrnes of
Wisconsin.
Mr. King of California with Mr. Macdon-
ald of Massachusetts.
Mr. Burton of California with Mr.
Gibbons.
Mr. Scheuer with Mr. Selden.
Messrs. GRAY and LEGGETT
changed their votes from "yea" to "nay."
Mr. HARDY changed his vote from
"nay" to "yea."
The result of the vote was announced
as above recorded.
Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Speaker, pursu-
ant to the instructions of the House; in
the motion to recommit, I report back
the bill H.R. 14940 with an amendment.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr.
ALBERT). The Clerk will report the
amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
On the first page, beginning in line 6,
strike out "and for the three fiscal years 1969
through 1971, the sum of $33 million" and
insert in lieu thereof the following: "and
for the two fiscal years 1969 through 1970,
the sum of $20 million."
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The
question is on the amendment.
The amendment was agreed to.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The
question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed
and read a third time, and was read the
third time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The
question is on the passage of the bill.
Mr. GERALD R. FORD- Mr. Speaker,
on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The question was taken; and there
were-yeas 305, nays 96, not voting 31, as
follows:
[Roll No. 501
YEAS-305
Adair
Celler
Ford, Gerald R.
Adams
Chamberlain
Ford,
Addabbo
Clark
William D.
Albert
Cleveland
Fountain
Anderson, Ill:
Cohelan
Fraser
Anderson,
Colmer
Frelinghuysen
Tenn.
Conte
Friedel
Andrews,
Conyers
Fulton, Pa.
N. Dak.
Corbett
Fulton, Tenn.
Annunzio
Cowger
Galiflanakis
Arends
Culver
Gallagher
Ashley
Cunningham
Garmatz
Aspinall
Daddario
Gettys
Ayres
Daniels
Giaimo
Barrett
Davis, Ga.
Gilbert
Bates
Dawson
Gonzalez
Bell
Delaney
Goodell
Bennett
Dellenback
Gray
Betts
Denney
Green, Oreg.
Biester
Dent
Green, Pa.
Bingham
Derwinski
Griffiths
Blanton
Diggs
Grover
Blatnik
Dingell
Gubser
Boggs
Donohue
?Gude
Boland
Dow
Halleck
Bolling
Downing
Halpern
Bolton
Dulski
Hamilton
Bow
Dwyer
Hammer-
Brademas
Eckhardt
schmidt
Brasco
Edmondson
Hanley
Brooks
Edwards, Calif.
Hanna
Broomfield
Edwards, La.
Hansen, Wash.
Brotzman
Eilberg
Hardy
Brown, Mich.
Erlenborn
Harrison
Brown, Ohio
Esch
Harsha
Broyhill, Va.
Eshleman
Harvey
Burke, Mass.
Evans, Colo.
Hathaway
Burton, Calif.
Everett
Hays
Burton, Utah
Evins, Tenn.
Hebert
Bush
Farbstein
Hechler, W. Va.
Button
Fascell
Heckler, Mass.
Byrne, Pa.
Feighan
Helstoski
Cahill
Fino
Henderson
Carey
Flood
Hicks
Cederberg
Foley
Holland
H 1741
Horton
Monagan
St Germain
Hull
Moore
Sandman
Hungate
Moorhead
Saylor
Hunt
Morgan
Schneebeli
Hutchinson
Morris, N. Mex.
Schweiker
Ichord
Morse, Mass.
Schwengel
Irwin
Morton
Scott
Jacobs
Mosher
Shipley
Joelson
Murphy, Ill.
Shriver
Johnson, Calif. Murphy, N.Y.
Sisk
Johnson, Pa.
Myers
Skubitz
Jonas
Natcher
Slack
Jones, Ala.
Nedzi
Smith, Iowa
Jones, N.C. .
Nix
Smith, N.Y.
Karsten
O'Hara, Ill.
Springer
Karth
O'Hara, Mich.
Stafford
Kastenmeier
Olsen
Staggers
Kazen
O'Neill, Mass.
Steed
Kee
Ottinger
Steiger, Wis.
Keith
Patman
Stephens
Kelly
Patten
Stratton
Kirwan
Pelly
Stubblefield
Kleppe
Perkins
Sullivan
Kluczynski
Pettis
Taft
Kornegay
Pickle
Taylor
Kupferman
Pike
Tenzer
Kyros
Pirnie
Tiernan
Laird
Poage
Tunney
Landrum
Podell
Udall
Latta
Poff
Ullman
Leggett
Pollock
Van Deerlin
Lloyd
Price, Ill.
Vander Jagt
Long, Md.
Pryor
Vanik
Lukens
Pucinski
Vigorito
McCarthy
Waldie
McClory
Railsback
Wampler
McCloskey
Randall
Watts
McClure
Rees
Whalen
McCulloch
Reid, N.Y.
Whalley
McDade
Reifel
White
McDonald,
Resnick
Widnall
Mich. -
Reuss
Wiggins
McEwen
Rhodes, Pa.
Williams, Pa.
McFall
Riegle
Willis
MacGregor
Robison
Wilson, Bob
Madden
Rodino
Wilson,
Mahon
Rogers, Colo.
Charles H.
Mailliard
Ronan
Winn
Mathias, Calif.
Rooney, N.Y.
Wolff
Mathias, Md.
Rooney, Pa.
Wright
Matsunaga
Rosenthal
Wyatt
May
Rostenkowski
Wydler
Mayne
Roth
Wylie
Meeds
Roudebush
Wyman
Miller, Calif.
Roush
Yates
Miller, Ohio
- Roybal
Young
Minish
Rumsfeld
Zablocki
Mink
Ruppe
Zwach
Mize
Ryan
N'AYS-96
Abbitt
Flynt
Purcell
Abernethy
Fuqua
Quillen
Andrews, Ala.
Gardner
Rarick
Ashmore
Gathings
Reid, Ill.
Baring
Goodling
Reinecke
Battin
Gross
Rhodes, Ariz.
Belcher
Gurney
Rivers
Bevill
Hagan
Roberts
Blackburn
Haley
Rogers, Fla.
Brinkley
Hall
Satterfield
Brock
Hansen, Idaho
Schadeberg
Broyhill, N.C.
Herlong
Sikes
Buchanan
Hosmer
Smith, Calif.
Burke, Fla.
Jarman
Smith, Okla.
Burleson
King, N.Y.
Snyder
Cabell
Kuykendall
Steiger, Ariz.
Carter
Langen
Stuckey
Casey
Lennon
Talcott
Clancy
Lipscomb
Teague, Calif.
Clausen,
Long, La.
Teague, Tex.
Don H.
McMillan
Thompson, Ga.
Collier
Marsh
Thomson, Wis.
Cramer
Martin
Tuck
Curtis
Meskill
Utt
Davis, Wis.
Michel
Waggonner
Devine
Mills
Walker
Dickinson
Minshall
Watkins
Dole
Montgomery
Watson
Dorn
Nichols
Whitener
Duncan
O'Konski
Whitten
Edwards, Ala.
O'Neal, Ga.
Zion
Findley
Pool
Fisher
Price, Tex.
Ashbrook
de la Garza
King, Calif.
Berry
Dowdy
Kyl
Bray
Fallon
Macdonald,
Brown, Calif.
Gibbons
Mass.
Byrnes, Wis.
Hawkins
Machen
Clawson, Del
Holifield
Moss
Conable
Howard
Nelsen
Corman
Jones, Mo.
Passman
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4
H 4742
Pepper Scherle Stanton
Philbin Scheuer Thompson, N.J.
St. Onge Selden
So the bill was passed.
The Clerk announced the following
pairs:
Mr. Philbin with Mr. Passman.
Mr. St. Onge with Mr. Del Clawson.
Mr. Pepper with Mr. Berry.
Mr. Machen with Mr. Nelsen.
Mr. Corman with Mr. Stanton.
Mr. Moss with Mr. Ashbrook.
Mr. Fallon with Mr. Bray.
Mr. Hawkins with Mr. Dowdy.
Mr. Brown of California with Mr. Kyl.
Mr. Howard with Mr. Byrnes of Wisconsin.
Mr. King of California with Mr. Conable.
Mr. Gibbons with Mr. Scherle.
Mr. Holifield with Mr. Scheuer.
Mr. Selden with Mr. de la Garza.
Mr. Thompson of New Jersey with Mr. Mac-
donald of Massachusetts.
The result of the vote was announced
as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the
table.
GENERAL LEAVE
Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent that all Members
may have 5 legislative days in which to
extend their remarks on the bill just
passed.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there
objection to the request of the gentle-
man from Pennsylvania?
There was no objection.
CORRECTION OF THE RECORD
Mr. KAZEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unani-
mous consent that my remarks inserted
in the RECORD of March 4, beginning at
page E1439 be expunged from the REc-
ORD because of numerous typographical
errors therein and that I may be per-
mitted to extend and revise my remarks
today in that section of the RECORD en-
titled "Extensions of Remarks" and in-
clude extraneous matter.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there
objection to the request of the gentle-
man from Texas?
There was no objection.
PERMISSION FOR SUBCOMMITTEE
NO. 4 OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY TO SIT TOMORROW
DURING GENERAL DEBATE
Mr. RODINO. Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent that the Subcom-
mittee No. 4 of the Committee on the
Judiciary may be permitted to sit on
Thursday, March 7, 1968, during general
debate.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there
objection to the request of the gentle-
man from New Jersey?
There was no objection.
DR. ROBERT H. BAHMER, ARCHIV-
IST OF THE UNITED STATES
(Mr. BOLAND asked and was given
permission to address the House for 1
minute and to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Speaker, I rise to
pay my respects, on the occasion of his
retirement, to a distinguished public
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE March 6, 1968
servant, the Archivist of the . United
States. Dr. Robert H. Bahmer began
his Federal career 33 years ago as an
assistant to a former Member of this
House, the Honorable Frank E. Hook, of
Michigan. In 1936 he joined the staff of
the newly created National Archives
establishment. With a number of his
colleagues, he left the agency in 1942
to assist the military services in develop-
ing and administering systems for the
efficient control and disposition of the
tremendous quantities of records gen-
erated by the American war effort. In
1948 he returned to the National Ar-
chives as Deputy Archivist of the United
States. He served in this capacity during
the 17 years that my good friend, Dr.
Wayne C. Grover, gave leadership to the
National Archives and Records Service.
In January of 1966, Dr. Bahmer was
himself appointed by the Administrator
of General Services to the distinguished
post of Archivist of the United States.
He will retire at the end of this week,
March 8.
Dr. Bahmer rejoined the National Ar-
chives in 1948 just a few months before
recommendations of the First Hoover
Commission resulted in a substantial en-
largement of the responsibilities of his
agency, and made it a part of the newly
created General Services Administration.
It has been during the ensuing period,
when Dr. Bahmer served first as Deputy
Archivist of the United States and more
recently as Archivist, that the National
Archives and Records Service has expe-
rienced its period of greatest growth and
development.
A nationwide network of Federal rec-
ords centers has been established, which
by economically storing and disposing of
inactive records of temporary value, saves
the American taxpayers $14 million each
year.
A program of helping Federal agencies
to improve their paperwork systems has
been developed, and this results annually
in a savings of $10 million.
A system of Presidential libraries has
been created, which has resulted in the
free gift to the public of the papers and
memorabilia of every President of the
United States beginning with Herbert
Hoover, and in the gift of excellent build-
ings in which to house these collections.
The National Historical Publications
Commission has been revitalized and now
serves a splendid purpose in encouraging
and supporting with modest grants the
publication of the source materials from
which the history of this great Nation
has been and will be written.
The Federal Register which has among
its responsibilities the publication of the
slip laws and the United States Statutes
at Large, has risen to even greater levels
of efficiency and effectiveness.
And the National Archives itself, the
nucleus around which has developed this
comprehensive system for the care of the
Nation's records, and which is responsible
for preserving and making- available for
use the permanently valuable records of
the Federal Government, has constantly
improved its manifold services to the
cause of scholarship.
The National Archives and Records
Service, to which Dr. Bahmer has given
such distinguished and innovative lead-
ership, is practically unique among Fed-
eral. agencies, because of its dual mis-
sion. It is vitally-and successfully-con-
cerned with efficiency and economy in
the management of the Government's
records, and it is equally concerned with
contributing to the cultural and educa-
tional enrichment of our society.
The Archivist of the United States
must therefore be not only an effective
Federal administrator but also a scholar
of vision and integrity. Bob Bahmer is
such a man, and I am proud to claim
him as a friend. It gives me great pleas-
ure to salute him as he concludes a dis-
tinguished career that has ever been
characterized by a high sense of devotion
to the public good and to the cause of
excellence in scholarship. I am confident
that a great many Members of this House
join me in conveying to him every good
wish on the occasion of his retirement.
VIOLENCE IN THE STREETS
(Mr. CLARK asked and was given per-
mission to address the House for 1 min-
ute and to revise and extend his remarks
and include extraneous matter.)
Mr. CLARK. Mr. Speaker, it almost
seems as though the entire Nation,
within the past few months, has become
concerned with the problem of violence
in the streets. Without assuming the role
of a prophet, I am compelled to point
out that this has been a subject on which
I have been speaking for some time-
sometimes feeling in the past like a voice
crying in the wilderness.
An examination of the CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD of last year will indicate that I
made a plea for greater support for law-
enforcement people-a forceful plea
from me, to provide, equip, and train our
law-enforcement people to deal with the
problems of crime in the streets. Until
the recent plea of the President, in the
form of a special message, my plea went
unheard. Now, all across the land the
cry is up to protect our cities and our
citizens. But the cry may be coming too
late to effectively deal with the problem
that faces us.
At the risk of localizing the problem-
and perhaps generalizing, within the
past week I was presented with a novel
approach to one of the many law-en-
forcement problems that will face this
Nation in the months ahead. There is
now available to the police departments
of the Nation a specially made police
car cover-made of highly developed
plasticized material similar to nose cone
hardness that can be superimposed on
an existing police car that will provide
added protection to police vehicles en-
tering a riot area. It was explained to me
by one of my own constituents who felt
that my prior and continuing interest,
plus my own law-enforcement experi-
ence, would lead me to direct him to the
proper Federal and State authorities. I
did so and found to my consternation
that even if such new and imaginative
equipment were available and even if
the President's crime prevention bill
were to pass, there is not now sufficient
time to order, pay for, and get delivery
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP71 R0051 OA000300210015-4