FUNDING REQUEST FOR THE CONCEPT EVALUATION PHASE OF AN ADVANCED AERODYNAMICS RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEM UNDER THE FY-69 GENERAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (AIRCRAFT) BUDGET

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP71B00822R000200130013-9
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
20
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 17, 2004
Sequence Number: 
13
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Publication Date: 
November 25, 1968
Content Type: 
MF
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PDF icon CIA-RDP71B00822R000200130013-9.pdf481.9 KB
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Approved For rR~elease 20041 2 lA-RDP71 B0082_22ROO0200130013-9 I MEMORANDUM FOR: Comptroller, OSA SUBJECT Funding Request for the Concept Evaluation Phase of an Advanced Aerodynamics Reconnaissance System under the FY-69 General Research and Development (Aircraft) Budget Attached is Deputy for which supercedes in total Research and Development Special Activities ASD/R&D/OSA 25 Nov 1968 Distribution: Copy 1 - COMPT/OSA 2 - B&F/COMPT/OSA 3 - D/SA 4 - D/R&D/OSA 5 - D/M/OSA 6 - D/O/OSA 7 - CMD/COMPT/OSA 8 - ASD/R&D/OSA 9 - ASD/R&D/OSA(Chrono) 10 - RB/OSA 25X1 25X1 25X1 SECRET 25X1 N RO ApA" EE@ftWLqW 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP71 B008 2R000200130013-9 Copy o sc Approved For Release 2004/Q?t JRJJPA-RDP71 B00822R000200130013-9 25X1 o I , Copy MEMORANDUM FOR: Comptroller, OSA SUBJECT Funding Request for the Concept Evaluation Phase of an Advanced Aerodynamics Reconnaissance System under the FY-69 General Research and Development (Aircraft) Budget a) issue o. Advanced Aircraft FY-1969 Budget 1. This memorandum is a request for authorization for the expenditure of to pursue the Concept Evaluation Phase of an Advanced Aerodynamic Reconnaissance System. This is a new FY-69 effort and is appropriate to the General Research and Development (Aircraft) program. 2. The program, as discussed in detail in Attachment I, is to explore various methods of achieving a survivable quick reaction reconnaissance capability (manned or unmanned). The primary objective would be to survive in the lethal envelopes of projected Sovbloc and other defensive environ- ments through the 1975 - 1980 period. In evaluation of an approach to this program, attention is directed to reference (a) wherein it is pointed out that the decision to phase-oat the OXCART vehicle and the decision to discontinue work on the ISINGLASS concept represented a trend away from continuing maintenance of a high-performance covert manned overflight capability in the NRP. Reference (a) further notes that tie cost and effectiveness of alternative vehicle concepts must be examined; for example, should the vehicle be manned or unmanned and in each case what type of launch operation, propulsion, recovery, etc. offers the most promise. These questions are addressed in the elements of the task. 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP71 B00822R000200130013-9 Approved For Release 2O: CIA-RDP71 B00822R000200130013-9 W *490 I I Page 3. It is requested that funds in the amount of be allocated to CIA, for use in FY-69, for the Concept Evaluation Phase of an Advanced Aerodynamic Reconnaissance System, under the General Research and Development (Aircraft) program. 25X1 25X1 25X1 epu y o Research and Development Special Activities Attachment: As stated 25X1 ASD/R&D/OSA Distribution: Copy 1 - COMPT/OSA 25X1 2 - B&F/COMPT/OSA 3 - D/SA 4 - D/R&D/OSA 5 - D/M/OSA 6 - D/O/OSA 7 - CMD/COMPT/OSA 8 - ASD/R&D/OSA 9 - ASD/R&D/OSA(Chrono) 10 - RB/OSA 25 Nov 19 68 Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP71 BU 25X1 Approved For Release 200Q5T CIA-RDP71 B00BJ2R000200130013-9 I*Abol Attachment I t-) PROGRAM DESCRIPTION I. TITLE Concept Evaluation Phase of an Advanced Aerodynamic Reconnaissance System REFERENCE dtd 5 Sept 1967, "Funding 68 General R&D Request Certain FY- (Aircraft) Activities" II. OBJECTIVE To explore various methods of achieving a survivable quick-reaction reconnaissance capability. Primary objective would bk! to survive in the lethal envelopes of projected Sovbloc and other defensive environments through the 1975 - 1980 period. Elements of the task encompass items 3 and 4 of the referenced memorandum. III. BACKGROUND In anticipation of approval for this study, the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) was requested to provide their most realistic estimate of the Soviet Bloc and the non-Soviet-Bloc defensive environments for the 1975 - 1980 period. A summary of the results of the OSI effort are presented in Exhibit (A). These results in Exhibit (A) together with a quick reaction capability are used to establish an approach to the problem. IV. APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM Survivability would be considered as two distinct environments, i.e., Soviet Bloc and non-Soviet Bloc. Exhibit (B identifies how each of these two en- vironments would be investigated. Since a "wait and see" approach is recommended for the non-Soviet Bloc environment, ,he effort for FY-69 reduces to concentra-.in ; only on the Soviet Bloc task. This task SECRET 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP71 B00822R000200130013-9 Approved For Release 2004/0? i$-RDP71B00822 000200130013-9 lawl A ment ] to 25X1 Page 2 would be performed by a "Think Group" and an airframe contractor. The pro-- posed program organization and elements of the task are shown in Exhibits (C- and (D). V. ELEMENTS OF THE TASK The elements of the task would encompass the specifics as outlined in Exhibit (E). Further amplification of this exhibit is noted below: Kofiles and Tactics - Using the [as- he limitiIg 25X1 minimum rea , investigate maximum capable concepts. Implicit in the development of these concepts will te the realization that future defensive systems expected 10 years hence can only be postulated. Therefore, the sensitivity of survival to variation in defensive system performance parameters must be considered. All conceivable and potentially feasible vehicle profile=s and tactics would be considered for survivability. No technological con- straints would be imposed on either al- titude or speed. Realistic maneuvers, countermeasures, and radar cross-se-,:tio -x, as they effect the engagement geometry between the SAM and the vehicle, would be evaluated. b. Candidate Concept Survey - Based using viable profiles and tae ics developed sult above, this survey should ideally re in one or more concepts. This segrent would be the sole responsibility of the airframe contractor under Headquarters direction. Flight Modes - All modes would bc examined to determine if one or mole emerges as a superior approach. T'tbe launch phase would include investigatiw SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP71 B00822RQ00200130013-9 Approved For RRelease 2004/91R.EGJA-RDP71 B00842 000200130013-9 At a I KU .3 Pa vehicles which are air launched, ground launched, boosted or self-accelerators. The significant, i.e., intelligence gathering phase, would consider but not be restricted to glide, powered, throttling techniques, high-altitude, low altitude and combinations thereof and speeds to encompass from hypersonic to sub-sonic in consonance with the profiles and tactics. Technology Background - The contractor would avail himself of the latest materials manufacturing and engineering technolo y. All of the technology background deriv--!d from previous programs would be considered so as not to "replow old ground." The most futuristic NASA data would be con- sidered for applicability. Operational Considerations - The cas- of manned vs. unmanned would be considered in depth with all compromises both from the vehicle design standpoint and from the cost and reliability standpoint being weighed. The type of launch and recovery and the basing facilities would be reviewed as they effect the design capability. Considerations necessary to maintain a covert program would be addressed. c. Analysis - A determination/ assessment of how well each concept meets the problem would result from this phase of the task. Force Fit - It is highly unlikely that any one design would prove superior in all aspects and certain weight would have to be given to the various aspects of the problem during the analysis. 25X1 SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP71 B00 22R000200130013-9 Approved For Release 200/ /V/J2TCIA-RDP71B00L222R000200130013-9 A I Reaction - Any intelligence collection system is useful only if the data are available to the users on a "soonest" basis. Therefore, the quick-reaction ability of the concepts would be given prime consideration. Both the reaction time for the actual collection of the data and also the subsequent steps necessary for processing, etc., would be a part of the study. Man Impact - Since politically an unmanned vehicle would be much more palatable, the presence of a man must prove to be of extreme value from the reliability and mission success stand- point if selected. The influence of the presence of a man on the configuration must be considered, i.e., a large vehicle to accommodate a man compared to a smaller unmanned vehicle. If a man must be included to assure a cost effective program during the early, less reliable test period, the man might be present only during the test phase with the vehicle being droned operationally. Cost - Naturally any large expenditure of funds committed for intelligence collection can only be justified if (a) the concept has a high chance of success of obtaining the data and (b) a more reliable, less costly, more politically acceptable approach doesn't exist. There- fore, in the analysis, it is envisioned that both the airframe contractor and Headquarters would have an input. d. Answer - This phase of the task would represent the end result of the effort. Only if the results clearly in- dicated that both survivability and quick reaction were potentially feasible and practically achievable, would consideration Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP71 B00 - 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 20 CIA-RDP71 B0 Q82R000200130013-9 A tachment I toy Page be given to a follow-on effort to include confirmation of system designs and the investigation of basic technology in certain critical areas. VI. The contractor candidates would be selected in accordance with the criteria of Exhibit (F). A cost and schedule estimate is presented in Exhibit (G). 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP71 B00822R000200130013-9 Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP71 B00822R000200130013-9 Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP71 B00822R000200130013-9 Approved For Release 2004/52e i4TRDP71 B00822R000200130013-9 PROJECTED RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS SOVIET BLOC INVESTIGATE MAXIMUM CAPABLE CONCEPT WITHIN 1975-80 PROJECTED STATE-OF-THE-ART. THE SENSITIVITY OF SURVIVAL TO VARIATION IN DEFENSIVE SYSTEM PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS WILL BE CONSIDERED. NON-SOVIET BLOC FOLLOW TAGBOARD PROGRESS FOR ONE YEAR IF SATISFACTORY, INVESTIGATE MODS TO TAGBOARD TO IMPROVE ALTITUDE AND ADD EWS. I F UNSATISFACTORY, INVESTIGATE MODS TO A-12/SR-71 FAMILY TO IMPROVE ALTITUDE. FOLLOW OTHER PROPOSED ADVANCED AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENTS, SUCH AS ADVANCED MANNED INTERCEPTOR (AMI), ETC. Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP71 B00822R000200130013-9 Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP71 B00822R000200130013-9 SECRET PROGRAM ORGANIZATION FOR SOVIET-BLOC STUDY THINK GROUP - Based on reconnaissance targets and ground rules, identify PROFILES AND TACTICS. Options to be rated in order of preference. HEADQUARTERS - PROFILES AND TACTICS to be selected based on think group data plus in-house assessment, p AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER - Technological survey of all potential CANDIDATE CONCEPTS compatible with PROFILES AND TACT ICS. - ANALYSIS of concepts to provide rating in order of preference with supporting data. HEADQUARTERS - Review and final judgement. SECRET Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP71 B00822R000200130013-9 Approved For Release 2004310,j E;TA-RDP71 B00822R000200130013-9 ELEMENTS OF THE TASK 1. PROFILES AND TACTICS - THINK GROUP 2. CANDIDATE CONCEPT SURVEY - AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER 3. ANALYSIS - AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER/HEADQUARTERS 4. ANSVWWER - AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER/HEADQUARTERS Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP71 B00822R000200130013-9 Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP71 B00822R000200130013-9 SECRET 1. PROFILES AND TACTICSISURVIVABILITY LOW TO HIGH ALTITUDES SUBSONIC TO HYPERSONIC SPEEDS MANEUVERABILITY COUNTERMEASURES RADAR CROSS-SECTION TRADE-OFFS SECRET EXHIBIT E Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP71 B00822R000200130013-9 Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP71 B00822R000200130013-9 SECRET 2. CANDIDATE CONCEPT SURVEY FLIGHT MODES - AIR LAUNCHED VS. GROUND LAUNCHED BOOSTED VS. SELF-ACCELERATION GLIDE, POWERED, THROTTLING TECHNIQUES TECHNOLOGY BACKGROUND - OXCART ISINGLASS OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS - MANNED VS. UNMANNED TYPE OF LAUNCH TYPE OF RECOVERY BASING FACILITIES COVERT OPERATION SENSOR CONSIDERATIONS - BROAD SPECIFICATIONS FOR WEIGHT AND VOLUME ALLOTMENT 25X1 SECRET DUI Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP71 B00822R000200130013-9 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP71 B00822R000200130013-9 ANALYSIS FORCE FIT - CANDIDATE CONFIGURATIONS RELATIVE TO WEIGHTING OF VARIOUS ASPECTS OF PROBLEM REACTION - TIME FOR COLLECTION OF DATA TIME FOR PROCESSING AND DELIVERY TO INTERPRETER MAN IMPACT - RELIABILITY AND. MISSION SUCCESS POLITICAL CONFIGURATION TEST COST - JUSTIFIED ONLY IF: A. ACCEPTABLE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS B. NO MORE RELIABLE, LESS COSTLY, MORE POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE APPROACH 1,fP . Approved 'For Release 2004/05/21': CIA-RDP71 B00822R000200130013-9 Approved For Release 20&j/ I.EflA-RDP71B00822R000200130013-9 4. ANSWER A. SURVIVABILITY POSSIBLE? B. QUICK REACTION POSSIBLE? C. I F BOTH A AND B POSSIBLE, DEVELOP PLAN 1$ Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP71 B00822R000200130013-9 Approved For Release 2004/TL1Gh fff RDP71 B00822R000200130013-9 IV. CONTRACTOR CANDIDATES CRITERIA FOR SELECTION THINK GROUP AERODYNAMIC TYPE VEHICLE EXPERIENCE VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS EXPERIENCE TACT I CS/ENGAGEMENT ANALYSIS EXPERIENCE LOCATION OF FACILITY SECURITY CLEARANCE CONSIDERATIONS COST TIME AIRFRAMEJSYSTEMS DEPENDENT UPON RESULTS OF THINK GROUP EFFORT. SPECIFIC FLIGHT REGIME EXPERIENCE HARDWARE VS. DESIGN STUDY PROGRAM SUCCESSES PREVIOUS RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLE EXPERIENCE FRLV UUS AGENCY ~,Frj' 'TIC' R EXHIBIT F Approved For Release 2004/C F . ~C DP71 B00822R000200130013-9 Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP71 B00822R000200130013-9 Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP71 B00822R000200130013-9 Approved For r-Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP71 B0082~2R000200130013-9 3. Budget Issue No. 3: "Advanced Aircraft" R&D program cost quoted includes, in our estimate, costs for a five-year operation, as well as the development and procurement of aircraft. It is possible that the vehicle would be a. "new hypersonic aircraft", but this point is, indeed the subject of the study. Such a solution to the provision for a survivable quick-reaction reconnaissance system would require expenditure of similar funds; however, other options may be surfaced which would re- quire less funds. This determination is the intent of the study. Any decision therefore should not address at this time the need for a hypersonic capability involving a large ex- penditure; rather, a discussion should confirm the necessity for performing a thorough study. Comment 2, with respect to the inconsistency between consideration of such a system in light of OXCART phase-out and potential down-grading of SR-71 capability is not germane, inasmuch as the OXCART/SR-71 do not provide a survivable, quick reaction capability over the Soviet Union. While at this time, we cannot forecast unequivocally that the technology should be pursued in FY 70, if the hypersonic system were to be selected as the only viable option. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP71 B00822R000200130013-9 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP71 B00822R000200130013-9 Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP71 B00822R000200130013-9