FUNDING REQUEST FOR THE CONCEPT EVALUATION PHASE OF AN ADVANCED AERODYNAMICS RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEM UNDER THE FY-69 GENERAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (AIRCRAFT) BUDGET
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP71B00822R000200130013-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
20
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
February 17, 2004
Sequence Number:
13
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 25, 1968
Content Type:
MF
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP71B00822R000200130013-9.pdf | 481.9 KB |
Body:
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Comptroller, OSA
SUBJECT Funding Request for the Concept Evaluation
Phase of an Advanced Aerodynamics Reconnaissance
System under the FY-69 General Research and
Development (Aircraft) Budget
Attached is
Deputy for
which supercedes in total
Research and Development
Special Activities
ASD/R&D/OSA 25 Nov 1968
Distribution:
Copy 1 - COMPT/OSA
2 - B&F/COMPT/OSA
3 - D/SA
4 - D/R&D/OSA
5 - D/M/OSA
6 - D/O/OSA
7 - CMD/COMPT/OSA
8 - ASD/R&D/OSA
9 - ASD/R&D/OSA(Chrono)
10 - RB/OSA
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Comptroller, OSA
SUBJECT Funding Request for the Concept Evaluation
Phase of an Advanced Aerodynamics Reconnaissance
System under the FY-69 General Research and
Development (Aircraft) Budget
a)
issue o. Advanced Aircraft
FY-1969 Budget
1. This memorandum is a request for authorization for
the expenditure of to pursue the Concept Evaluation
Phase of an Advanced Aerodynamic Reconnaissance System. This
is a new FY-69 effort and is appropriate to the General
Research and Development (Aircraft) program.
2. The program, as discussed in detail in Attachment I,
is to explore various methods of achieving a survivable
quick reaction reconnaissance capability (manned or unmanned).
The primary objective would be to survive in the lethal
envelopes of projected Sovbloc and other defensive environ-
ments through the 1975 - 1980 period. In evaluation of an
approach to this program, attention is directed to reference
(a) wherein it is pointed out that the decision to phase-oat
the OXCART vehicle and the decision to discontinue work on
the ISINGLASS concept represented a trend away from continuing
maintenance of a high-performance covert manned overflight
capability in the NRP. Reference (a) further notes that tie
cost and effectiveness of alternative vehicle concepts must
be examined; for example, should the vehicle be manned or
unmanned and in each case what type of launch operation,
propulsion, recovery, etc. offers the most promise. These
questions are addressed in the elements of the task.
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3. It is requested that funds in the amount of
be allocated to CIA, for use in FY-69, for the Concept
Evaluation Phase of an Advanced Aerodynamic Reconnaissance
System, under the General Research and Development (Aircraft)
program.
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epu y o
Research and Development
Special Activities
Attachment:
As stated
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Distribution:
Copy 1 - COMPT/OSA
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2 - B&F/COMPT/OSA
3 - D/SA
4 - D/R&D/OSA
5 - D/M/OSA
6 - D/O/OSA
7 - CMD/COMPT/OSA
8 - ASD/R&D/OSA
9 - ASD/R&D/OSA(Chrono)
10 - RB/OSA
25 Nov 19 68
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Attachment I t-)
PROGRAM DESCRIPTION
I. TITLE Concept Evaluation Phase of an Advanced
Aerodynamic Reconnaissance System
REFERENCE dtd 5 Sept 1967, "Funding
68 General R&D
Request Certain FY-
(Aircraft) Activities"
II. OBJECTIVE To explore various methods of achieving
a survivable quick-reaction reconnaissance
capability. Primary objective would bk!
to survive in the lethal envelopes of
projected Sovbloc and other defensive
environments through the 1975 - 1980 period.
Elements of the task encompass items
3 and 4 of the referenced memorandum.
III. BACKGROUND In anticipation of approval for this
study, the Office of Scientific Intelligence
(OSI) was requested to provide their
most realistic estimate of the Soviet
Bloc and the non-Soviet-Bloc defensive
environments for the 1975 - 1980 period.
A summary of the results of the OSI effort
are presented in Exhibit (A). These
results in Exhibit (A) together with a
quick reaction capability are used to
establish an approach to the problem.
IV. APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM
Survivability would be considered as
two distinct environments, i.e., Soviet
Bloc and non-Soviet Bloc. Exhibit (B
identifies how each of these two en-
vironments would be investigated. Since
a "wait and see" approach is recommended
for the non-Soviet Bloc environment, ,he
effort for FY-69 reduces to concentra-.in ;
only on the Soviet Bloc task. This task
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would be performed by a "Think Group"
and an airframe contractor. The pro--
posed program organization and elements
of the task are shown in Exhibits (C-
and (D).
V. ELEMENTS OF THE TASK
The elements of the task would encompass
the specifics as outlined in Exhibit (E).
Further amplification of this exhibit is
noted below:
Kofiles and Tactics - Using the
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minimum rea , investigate maximum
capable concepts. Implicit in the
development of these concepts will te
the realization that future defensive
systems expected 10 years hence can only
be postulated. Therefore, the sensitivity
of survival to variation in defensive
system performance parameters must be
considered. All conceivable and
potentially feasible vehicle profile=s
and tactics would be considered for
survivability. No technological con-
straints would be imposed on either al-
titude or speed. Realistic maneuvers,
countermeasures, and radar cross-se-,:tio -x,
as they effect the engagement geometry
between the SAM and the vehicle, would
be evaluated.
b. Candidate Concept Survey - Based
using viable profiles and tae ics developed
sult
above, this survey should ideally re
in one or more concepts. This segrent
would be the sole responsibility of the
airframe contractor under Headquarters
direction.
Flight Modes - All modes would bc
examined to determine if one or mole
emerges as a superior approach. T'tbe
launch phase would include investigatiw
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vehicles which are air launched, ground
launched, boosted or self-accelerators.
The significant, i.e., intelligence
gathering phase, would consider but not
be restricted to glide, powered,
throttling techniques, high-altitude, low
altitude and combinations thereof and
speeds to encompass from hypersonic to
sub-sonic in consonance with the profiles
and tactics.
Technology Background - The contractor
would avail himself of the latest materials
manufacturing and engineering technolo y.
All of the technology background deriv--!d
from previous programs would be considered
so as not to "replow old ground." The
most futuristic NASA data would be con-
sidered for applicability.
Operational Considerations - The cas-
of manned vs. unmanned would be considered
in depth with all compromises both from
the vehicle design standpoint and from
the cost and reliability standpoint being
weighed. The type of launch and recovery
and the basing facilities would be reviewed
as they effect the design capability.
Considerations necessary to maintain a
covert program would be addressed.
c. Analysis - A determination/
assessment of how well each concept meets
the problem would result from this phase
of the task.
Force Fit - It is highly unlikely that
any one design would prove superior in
all aspects and certain weight would have
to be given to the various aspects of the
problem during the analysis.
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Reaction - Any intelligence collection
system is useful only if the data are
available to the users on a "soonest"
basis. Therefore, the quick-reaction
ability of the concepts would be given
prime consideration. Both the reaction
time for the actual collection of the
data and also the subsequent steps
necessary for processing, etc., would be
a part of the study.
Man Impact - Since politically an
unmanned vehicle would be much more
palatable, the presence of a man must
prove to be of extreme value from the
reliability and mission success stand-
point if selected. The influence of
the presence of a man on the configuration
must be considered, i.e., a large vehicle
to accommodate a man compared to a smaller
unmanned vehicle. If a man must be
included to assure a cost effective
program during the early, less reliable
test period, the man might be present
only during the test phase with the
vehicle being droned operationally.
Cost - Naturally any large expenditure
of funds committed for intelligence
collection can only be justified if (a)
the concept has a high chance of success
of obtaining the data and (b) a more
reliable, less costly, more politically
acceptable approach doesn't exist. There-
fore, in the analysis, it is envisioned
that both the airframe contractor and
Headquarters would have an input.
d. Answer - This phase of the task
would represent the end result of the
effort. Only if the results clearly in-
dicated that both survivability and quick
reaction were potentially feasible and
practically achievable, would consideration
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be given to a follow-on effort to include
confirmation of system designs and the
investigation of basic technology in
certain critical areas.
VI. The contractor candidates would be selected in accordance
with the criteria of Exhibit (F). A cost and schedule
estimate is presented in Exhibit (G).
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PROJECTED RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS
SOVIET BLOC
INVESTIGATE MAXIMUM CAPABLE CONCEPT WITHIN 1975-80 PROJECTED
STATE-OF-THE-ART. THE SENSITIVITY OF SURVIVAL TO VARIATION IN
DEFENSIVE SYSTEM PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS WILL BE CONSIDERED.
NON-SOVIET BLOC
FOLLOW TAGBOARD PROGRESS FOR ONE YEAR
IF SATISFACTORY, INVESTIGATE MODS TO TAGBOARD TO IMPROVE
ALTITUDE AND ADD EWS.
I F UNSATISFACTORY, INVESTIGATE MODS TO A-12/SR-71 FAMILY
TO IMPROVE ALTITUDE.
FOLLOW OTHER PROPOSED ADVANCED AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENTS,
SUCH AS ADVANCED MANNED INTERCEPTOR (AMI), ETC.
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PROGRAM ORGANIZATION FOR SOVIET-BLOC STUDY
THINK GROUP - Based on reconnaissance targets and ground rules, identify
PROFILES AND TACTICS. Options to be rated in order of
preference.
HEADQUARTERS - PROFILES AND TACTICS to be selected based on think group
data plus in-house assessment, p
AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER - Technological survey of all potential CANDIDATE CONCEPTS
compatible with PROFILES AND TACT ICS.
- ANALYSIS of concepts to provide rating in order of
preference with supporting data.
HEADQUARTERS - Review and final judgement.
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ELEMENTS OF THE TASK
1. PROFILES AND TACTICS - THINK GROUP
2. CANDIDATE CONCEPT SURVEY - AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER
3. ANALYSIS - AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER/HEADQUARTERS
4. ANSVWWER - AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER/HEADQUARTERS
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1. PROFILES AND TACTICSISURVIVABILITY
LOW TO HIGH ALTITUDES
SUBSONIC TO HYPERSONIC SPEEDS
MANEUVERABILITY
COUNTERMEASURES
RADAR CROSS-SECTION TRADE-OFFS
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2. CANDIDATE CONCEPT SURVEY
FLIGHT MODES - AIR LAUNCHED VS. GROUND LAUNCHED
BOOSTED VS. SELF-ACCELERATION
GLIDE, POWERED, THROTTLING TECHNIQUES
TECHNOLOGY BACKGROUND - OXCART
ISINGLASS
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS - MANNED VS. UNMANNED
TYPE OF LAUNCH
TYPE OF RECOVERY
BASING FACILITIES
COVERT OPERATION
SENSOR CONSIDERATIONS - BROAD SPECIFICATIONS FOR WEIGHT AND
VOLUME ALLOTMENT
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ANALYSIS
FORCE FIT - CANDIDATE CONFIGURATIONS RELATIVE TO WEIGHTING OF
VARIOUS ASPECTS OF PROBLEM
REACTION - TIME FOR COLLECTION OF DATA
TIME FOR PROCESSING AND DELIVERY TO INTERPRETER
MAN IMPACT - RELIABILITY AND. MISSION SUCCESS
POLITICAL
CONFIGURATION
TEST
COST - JUSTIFIED ONLY IF:
A. ACCEPTABLE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS
B. NO MORE RELIABLE, LESS COSTLY, MORE POLITICALLY
ACCEPTABLE APPROACH
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4. ANSWER
A. SURVIVABILITY POSSIBLE?
B. QUICK REACTION POSSIBLE?
C. I F BOTH A AND B POSSIBLE, DEVELOP PLAN
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IV. CONTRACTOR CANDIDATES
CRITERIA FOR SELECTION
THINK GROUP
AERODYNAMIC TYPE VEHICLE EXPERIENCE
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS EXPERIENCE
TACT I CS/ENGAGEMENT ANALYSIS EXPERIENCE
LOCATION OF FACILITY
SECURITY CLEARANCE CONSIDERATIONS
COST
TIME
AIRFRAMEJSYSTEMS
DEPENDENT UPON RESULTS OF THINK GROUP EFFORT.
SPECIFIC FLIGHT REGIME EXPERIENCE
HARDWARE VS. DESIGN STUDY
PROGRAM SUCCESSES
PREVIOUS RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLE EXPERIENCE
FRLV UUS AGENCY ~,Frj' 'TIC'
R EXHIBIT F
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3. Budget Issue No. 3: "Advanced Aircraft" R&D
program cost quoted includes, in our
estimate, costs for a five-year operation, as well as the
development and procurement of
aircraft. It is possible
that the vehicle would be a. "new hypersonic aircraft", but
this point is, indeed the subject of the study. Such a
solution to the provision for a survivable quick-reaction
reconnaissance system would require expenditure of similar
funds; however, other options may be surfaced which would re-
quire less funds. This determination is the intent of the
study.
Any decision therefore should not address at this time
the need for a hypersonic capability involving a large ex-
penditure; rather, a discussion should confirm the necessity
for performing a thorough study.
Comment 2, with respect to the inconsistency between
consideration of such a system in light of OXCART phase-out
and potential down-grading of SR-71 capability is not germane,
inasmuch as the OXCART/SR-71 do not provide a survivable,
quick reaction capability over the Soviet Union.
While at this time, we cannot forecast unequivocally
that the technology should be pursued in FY 70,
if the hypersonic system
were to be selected as the only viable option.
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