TRANSMITTAL OF 5-15 YEAR PAPERS RELATING TO QUICK REACTION SYSTEMS AND SECURITY/CONTRACTING POLICIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00822R000100110005-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: June 7, 1965
• Content Type: MF

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7 JUN 1965
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MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy Director for Science and Technology
SUBJECT : Transmittal of 5-15 Year Papers
Relating to Quick Reaction Systems
and Security/Contracting Policies
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Transmitted herewith is
concerning above subject.
with attachments
(Signed) Jack C. Ledford
JACK C. LEDFORD
Brigadier General, USAF
Assistant Director
(Special Activities)
NRO review(s) completed.
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Exeladeu Ira;a aatamatie
dawnsradleg And
dectassltiatlen
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D/TECH/OSA:John Parangosky:hmj (4 June 1965)
Distribution:
1 - DD/S&T
2 - AD/OSA
3 - SS/OSA
4 - PS/OSA
5 - D/TECH/OSA
6 - APD/OSA
7 - D/TECH/OSA (Chrono)
8 - RB/OSA
9 thru 14 - D/TECH/OSA
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QUICK REACTION, IMAGE FORMING INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION SYSTEYS
IN THE PERIOD 1965-1980.
I. Introduction
This memorandum surveys the prospects and needs for
image-forming intelligence collection systems (photographic,
etc.) for quick-reaction to world crisis, which can be
available in the following fifteen years. Specifically
excluded are strictly military systems, (e.g. post-strike
reconnaissance) and those which could politically only be
employed in a hot-war situation, either because of the high
risk of operator loss or the absence of a "plausible denial'
capability. Included are all systems forming intelligence
information images of the terrain and culture;
ra er, is memorandtx
is limited to vehicles and systems designed to give rapid
access to intelligence in specific crisis situations. (Theke
crisis systems may be, in fact, special applications of normal
systems, where this capability can be built in.) The crisi.-may be "tactical", where one wishes information regarding the
details of the situation in a specific, local area, or it may
be "strategic" where one needs information on the overall
stature and war-readiness of a prospective major opponent
such as the USSR or China. Normal systems include the
currently undeveloped and unexploited "socio-economic" photo-
graphic intelligence application.
2. The Meaning of "Quick Reaction"
Frequently, in the discussion of system improvements'
to the intelligence collection schemes, reference is made
to the need for quick reaction. For this memorandum, the
meaning of "quick reaction" is:
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While maintaining a state of readiness, at a
reasonable cost, the system can obtain and return
to the policy makers, the necessary information
in a minimum time (on the order of 24 hours)
after the call for the information. Reaction
time includes time for flight and recovery
of the information, time needed to prepare the
system for a particular mission, time to return
the necessary data from the recovery site and
time to analyze and submit to the policy makers.
It is within this last item, analysis and submission, that
there is often misunderstanding. On the one hand it may be
considered necessary to submit to policy makers a hard copy
of high resolution photography; on the other hand, it may
be considered necessary to submit only the results of the
analysis, as read by competent analysts. In actuality, the
analysis is all that is logically required; the policy
makers are generally not the competent analysts, do not have
time for detailed analysis, and thus cannot extract the
needed information from raw photographs. However, one
cannot deny the psychological impact on the policy makers
of having in hand a picture, no matter how little under-
stood, which demonstrates the information on which the analysis
is based. In addition, photographic data is needed at a
central location for correlation with prior photography and
other sources.
The reaction time includes the time necessary to generate
the mission plan. As systems develop, computer software 25X1
improves; given the target location, the mission can be
generated automatically. As our backlog of information N RO
increases from the routine CORONA flights, the
knowledge of what needs to be obsL7= articular sit-
uation also improves, as well as our knowledge of the
geographic location of the areas of interest. The increasing
automation is not without its pitfalls, as it is all too
easy to attempt to substitute computer logic for reasoning
decision.
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3. Basic Needs
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With the development of high-altitude aircraft and
satellite reconnaissance photography over the past 15 years,
the intelligence community has come to rely to an increasing
extent on the "hard" intelligence derived from such systems..
The search is for ever quicker receipt analysis of the
information. Concurrently, the increasing capability of
ground-air defensive networks in denied areas force considera-
tion of less vulnerable systems. In addition to the active
defensive networks coming into operation, increased Soviet
bloc activity in the passive, camouflage defensive techniques
is probable. For some intelligence requirements there is
need for a more detailed rendition of the targets, i.e.,
high resolution systems. The needs fall naturally into
four categories, in order of importance:
a. increased speed of response
b. less vulnerability to active defenses
c. less vulnerability to passive defenses
d. more detailed rendition
of targetry
In time of crisis, the first two are of utmost importance,
as one expects more definite effort to negate reconnaissance
and time is critical. The third item, camouflage penetra-
tion, is not critical in this year, but will become signifi-
cant within the next ten years. The fourth item, higher
resolution, reflects the continuing demand for more detail
(at the same time, the coarse looks tend to be more accurate,
with better detail). As any design is a set of compromise*;,
it appears likely that the ultimate needs will be best
satisfied by a mix of systems designed for specific tasks.
Specifically, there is a real need for continuation of aero-
dynamic vehicles and balloons, as well as satellites; the
aerodynamic for tactical applications and specific targets,
balloons for economic observation of certain types of targets.
The impact of the above listed four basic categories of needs
on development areas, platforms, sensor systems, and data
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handling is illustrated in Appendix I. The following sections
of this memorandum discuss the developmental areas in general
details. The timing of expected developments is estimated
in Appendix II.
4. Platforms
i/a. Aerodynamic Vehicles: Following the development of
IDEALIST and OXCART manned aircraft, and TAGBOARD drone
aircraft, future developments in aerodynamic vehicles for
overflight purposes can come in two different regimes:
first, hypersonic vehicles, initially the boost-glide
system such as ISINGLASS, and second, powered flight vehicles,
based either on rocket engine or on an air-breathing engine
such as the SCRAMJET. These vehicle developments are
required in order to reduce the vulnerability of the vehicle
to manageable levels, by reducing the reaction time of the
defense systems. (An alternate approach to reducing defensive
reaction time is the terrain-following, low altitude, high-
speed aircraft (B-58, F-lll). For reconnaissance, these low-
altitude aircraft suffer from very limited cross-track
coverage and they can be employed only under war-time circum-
stances. The camera problems associated with the high angular
rates inherent in these vehicles are severe, but can probably
be managed. We consider this type of aircraft to be limited
to the Defense Department, for development and use in war-
time tactical applications.)
The boost-glide ISINGLASS vehicle using rocket propulsion
is feasible in the next five years for application in the
following five. Subsequent development should allow powered
flight. Air breathing, hypersonic aircraft are a longer
range development; the prime need is for validation of the
supersonic combustion ramjet (SCRAMJET) engine concept. This
concept is promising at this time, and is being actively
pursued by NASA and the Air Force. However, there has been,
to date, no solid demonstration. When available, the
SCRAMJET will provide the payload capability for meaningful
sustained hypersonic flight. Other advanced propulsion
concepts are generally only meaningful in extended orbital o:_'
inter-planetary flight. The application of nuclear propulsi,,-,-.
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may have some significance for the reconnaissance operation?
but the nuclear aircraft is not being actively pursued by the
government at this time; its eventual application to the
reconnaissance mission has not been examined in detail.
However, it would appear to have primary benefit for long-
te?ii flight in more normal speed-altitude regimes. The
extremely high specific impulse rocket engines (plasma,
photon, etc.) are generally low thrust, and not usable for
near-earth applications. The use of hydrogen-flourine seeks
the best available specific impulse for chemical rockets,
in this application with hydrogen-oxygen being more generally
appied for economic reasons. (The five year program cost
for ISINGLASS using flourine oxidizer is about double the
oxygen system.)
b. Satellites: Currently satellites are limited in
application to quick reaction by several factors:
Count-down time, time from request for data
to launch, including mission planning and vehicle
preparations.
Time from launch to coverage of desired targets
caused by orbital restraints.
Recovery time and transportation of take.
The high cost of an individual launch and cost
of facilities, precluding continued frequent launchirgs
during a crisis period, and also limited economic
usefulness for coverage of localized targets.
The above factors are all generally associated with
the physical recovery of photographic film. The development
of facsimile or "television" readout via radio communicat--on
link would negate most of these objections. Current techno-
logy would allow the early (next two to three years) develop-
ment and operation of somewhat primitive, limited capability
readout systems; a concerted technological development progran
over the next five to ten years would be needed for a really
desirable system. While these readout systems would suffer
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from the orbital mechanics constraints in acquisition of targets-
a modest number of operating systems would allow world-wide
coverage on an almost continuous basis.
Concurrent developments in communications satellites
will eventually allow a real-time observation, of a number
of targets. These developments are probably in order in about
ten years. Such systems are subject to jamming or other active
countermeasures.
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The specific technologies involved are being explored
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c. Balloons: Since the earlier unfortunate experiences
within the government with balloon over-flights, the applica-
tion of balloons to Soviet over-flight has been politically
untenable. However, recent developments in balloon technology
will, if pursued, allow flight in the 25X1A
regime with useful payloads. Such payloads would be inexpen-
sive to fly, but costly to shoot down. Developments are in
hand to allow steering of the balloon with small CEP's. The
projected usage is for short-range penetration, using real-
time readout; a "tactical" system applicable in local hot
spots(e.g. Cyprus, Cuba, etc.)
5. Sensors
Current operational sensors are panchromatic silver
halide recording cameras. Resolution of one foot is accom-
plished at aircraft altitudes, three feet at satellite
altitudes. Developments are conceivable in angular resolu-
tion, allowing better detail recording or higher altitude
operation. However, the most useful developments will be In
the extension to color recording, adding another dimension
to the data. This color recording has several benefits:
b. detection of many types of camouflage,
which can "fool" the panchromatic camera
c. application to socio-economic analysis and
forecasting, (crop analysis, etc.). The
"color recording" noted above might either
be in color film, (e.g., Koda-color) or :gin
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multiple, photographic color separation
cameras (spectral-zonal photography),
including near infra-red recording. The
over-all cost will be considerably higher
than current panchromatic black and white.
(This color recording potential is not
directly related to quick reaction, except
as its use may complicate quick reaction
capability from added complexity.)
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6. Data Handling
As noted above, in the discussion of quick reaction
satellites, a major advance is needed in the data handling
process. The factor discussed there was in data trans-
mission. This data transmission problem is also applicable
to other platforms; in addition, there are a number of othe_-
data handling problems, limiting overall reaction time, whose
solution is probably closely tied in. These are in the fiends
of rapid analysis, storage, and retrieval. Of significance
is that the critical analysis is usually a change detection
and interpretation of the meaning of the change. The change-.
detection involves a comparison of the current photograph
with earlier photographs, hence the need for storage and retrieval.
The application of spacial spectral analysis is of interest
here. Some mechanization of the change detection would spe=_,d
up the analysis process considerably, allowing available mai-
power to concentrate on verifying and interpreting the chan;-es_
The analysis problems apparently have much technology in co-Almon
with the data transmitting, both handling the information
in an electrical or digital analog. Data compression, redu-i-
dancy reduction techniques, and encoding procedures, useful
in transmission bandwidth compression, have promise of
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aiiuwin;~ mechanization of the change detection operation.
We see _ittlo hope of the replacement of human judgment iz.
es-cimat -f ; the si.gni icance of observed changes.
7. Con.