FUNDING REQUEST FOR THE CONCEPT FORMULATION PHASE OF AN ADVANCED AERODYNAMICS RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEM UNDER THE FY-69 GENERAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (AIRCRAFT) BUDGET

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00822R000100070031-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: November 6, 1968
• Content Type: MF

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SUBJECT : Funding Request for the Concept Formulation
Phase of an Advanced Aerodynamics Recorrnaissnnce
System under the FY-69 General Research and
Development (Aircraft) Budget
MEMORANDUM FOR: Comptroller, OSA
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: (a)
Issue No. 9, Advanced Aircraft
1. This memorandum is a request for authorization
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C0 LU6t 71p,,) Formulation Phase of an Advanced Aerodynamic Reconnaissance
System. This is a new FY-69 effort and is appropriate to
the General Research and Development (Aircraft) program.
2. The program, as discussed in detail in Attachment 1,
is to explore various methods of achieving a survivable
quick reaction reconnaissance capability (manned or unmanned).
The primary objective would be to survive in the lethal
envelopes of projected Sovbloc and other defensive environ-
ments through the 1975 - 1980 period. In formulation of an
approach to this program, attention is directed to reference
(a) wherein it is pointed out that the decision to phase-out
the OXCART vehicle and the decision to discontinue work on
the ISINGLASS concept represented a trend away from continuing
maintenance of a high-performance covert manned overflight
capability in the NRP. Reference (a) further notes that
the cost and effectiveness of alternative vehicle concepts
must be examined; for example, should the vehicle be manned
or unmanned and in each case what type of launch operation,
propulsion, recovery, etc. offers the most promise. These
questions are addressed in the elements of the task.
NRO review(s) completed.
FY-1969 Budget
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3. It is requested that funds in the amount of
be allocated to CIA, for use in FY-69, for the concept
formulation phase of an Advanced Aerodynamic Reconnaissance
System, under the General Research and Development (Aircraft)
program.
ep y or
Research and Development
Special Activities
Attachment:
As stated
ASD/R&D/OSA,I:anw/5 Nov 1968
Distribution:
Copy 1 - COMPT/OSA
2 - B&F/COMPT/OS
4 - D/R&D/OSA
5 - D/M/OSA
6 - D/O/OSA
7 - CMD/COMPT/OSA
8 - ASD/R&D/OSA
9 - ASD/R&D/OSA(Chrono)
10 - RB/OSA
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PROGRAM DESCRIPTION
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t_,~'. LV -r (wnr
Concept Formulation Phase of an Advanced
Aerodynamic Reconnaissance System
REFERENCE dtd 5 Sept 1967, "Funding
Request for Certain FY-68 General R&D
(Aircraft) Activities"
II. OBJECTIVE To explore various methods of achieving
a survivable quick-reaction reconnaissance
capability. Primary objective would be
to survive in the lethal envelopes of
projected Sovbloc and other defensive
environments through the 1975 - 1980 period.
Elements of the task encompass items
3 and 4 of the referenced memorandum.
III. BACKGROUND In anticipation of approval for this
study, the Office of Scientific Intelligence
(OSI) was requested to provide their
most realistic estimate of the Soviet
Bloc and the non-Soviet-Bloc defensive
environments for the 1975 - 1980 period.
A summary of the results of the OSI effort
are presented in Exhibit (A). These
results in Exhibit (A) together with
quick reaction capability as stipulated
by-.-U~SIB for the indications satell-i#e.,
are used to establish an
approach to the problem.
IV. APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM
Survivability would be considered as
two distinct environments, i.e., Soviet
Bloc and non-Soviet Bloc. Exhibit (
identifies how each of these two en-
.vironments would be investigated. Since
a "wait and see" approach is recommended
for the non-Soviet Bloc environment, the
effort for FY-69 reduces to concentrating
only on the Soviet Bloc task. This task
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A to
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would be performed n-- quenae by a
"Think Group" and 4h n- an Airframe
contractor. The proposed program
organization and elements of the task
are shown in Exhibits ((s) and W).
V. ELEMENTS OF THE TASK
The elements of the task would encompass
the specifics as outlined in Exhibit (4.
Further amplification of this exhibit is
noted below:
a. Profiles and Tactics - Using the
SA-5 ( a ys em as the limiting
minimum 04e, investigate maximum
capable concepts. Implicit in the
development of these concepts will be
the realization that future defensive
systems expected 10 years hence can only
be postulated. Therefore, the sensitivity
of survival to variation in defensive
system performance parameters must be
considered. All conceivable and
potentially feasible vehicle profiles and
tactics would be considered for survi-
vability. No technological constraints
would be impo ed on either altitude or --
speed. ego ealistic maneuvers,pas they
effect the engagement geometry between
the SAM and the vehicle, would be evaluated,
b. Candidate Concept Survey - Based on
using viable profiles and tactics developed
above, this survey should ideally result
in one or more concepts. This segment
would be the sole responsibility of the
airframe contractor under Headquarters
direction.
Flight Modes - All modes would be
examined to determine if one or more
emerges as a superior approach. The
launch phase would include investigating
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vehicles which are air launched, ground
launched, boosted or self-accelerators.
The significant, i.e., intelligence
gathering phase, would consider but mot
be restricted to glide, powered,
throttling techniques, high-altitude, low
altitude and combinations thereof and
speeds to encompass from hypersonic to
sub-sonic in consonance with the profiles
and tactics.
TechnologyN- The contractor would avail
himself of the latest materials, man,i-
facturing and en ;~~,,~ technology. All
of the technologyE~Y from previous
programs would be considered so as not to
"replow old ground." The most futuristic
NASA data would be considered for appli-
cability.
Operational Considerations - The case
of manned vs. unmanned would be considered
in depth with all compromises both from
the vehicle design standpoint and from
the cost and reliability Stan $g.th 'vbeing
weighed. The type of launclari
basing facilities would be reviewed as
they effect the design capability.
Considerations necessary to maintain a
covert program would be addressed.
c. Analysis - A determination/
assessment o ow well each concept meets
the problem would result from this phase
of the task.
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Force Fit - It is highly unlikely that
any one design would prove superior in
all aspects and certain weight would have
tote given to the various aspects of the
problem during the analysis.
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V) SIC
!jw~z ~,
IU ll; ? ( q-
%
Attachment 7
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Reaction - Any intelligence collection
system is useful only if the data are
available to the users on a "soonest"
basis. Therefore, the quick-reaction
ability of the concepts would be given
prime consideration. Both the reaction
time for the actual collection of the
data and also the subsequent steps
necessary for processing, etc., would be
a part of the study.
I H eac.
Man Va4;a - Since politically an
unmanned vehicle would be much more
palatable, the presence of a man must
prove to be of extreme value from the
reliability and mission success standpoint
if se ecte~l he man might be
-2U 'I resent only during the test phase with
the vehicle being droned operationally.
Cost - Naturally any large expenditLre
of funds committed for intelligence
collection can only be justified if n-
'~"""a "^m t fox~.the- intelligence axlsts,
{,l the concept has a high chance of
success of obtaining the data and (b) a
more reliable, less costly, more politically
acceptable approach doesn't exist. There-
fore, in the analysis, it is envisioned
that both the Airframe Contractor and
Headquarters would have an input.
d. Answer - This phase of the task
would represent the end result of the
effort. Only if the results clearly in-
dicated that both survivability and quick
reaction were potentially feasible and
practically achievable, would consideration
be given to a follow-on effort to include
confirmation of system designs and the
investigation of basic technology in certair
critical areas.
VI. The contractor candidates would be selected in accordance
with the criteria of Exhibit (I&). A cost and schedule
estimate is presented in Exhibit (6).
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Projected Defensive Capabilities Through 1975-1980 Period
Soviet Bloc
(A) Barrier Defense and Point Defense of High Priority Targets
SA-5 (Tallinn System) - O
(B) ABM defenses against ICBM and SLBM threats to principal
urban-industrial concentrations
(C) Merging of the two defenses will provide capability . of coping with targets
at all regimes of aerodynamic operation
(D) Capability for either nuclear or non-nuclear warhead 25X1
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4N tO QUICK REACTION
11-01 /1
1F=~$ ELAPSED TIME INCREMENT FROM
OFFICIAL REQUEST FOR NN 1SSANCE COVERAGE TO
RECEIPT OF PROCESSED PDUCT ( INTERPRETERS.
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PROJECTED RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS
SOVIET BLOC
USING SA-5 (TALLINN SYSTEM) AS LIMITING MINIMUM tNVftOff,
INVESTIGATE MAXIMUM CAPABLE CONCEPT WITHIN 1975-80 PROJECTED
STATE-OF-THE-ART.
REQUEST INDEPENDENT CONCURRENT HIGH PRIORITY COLLECTION EFFORT
AGAINST SA-5 AND ABM SYSTEMS TO HARDEN INTELLIGENCE.
NON-SOVIET BLOC
FOLLOW TAGBOARD PROGRESS FOR ONE YEAR
IF SATISFACTORY, INVESTIGATE MODS TO TAGBOARD TO IMPROVE
ALTITUDE.
IF UNSATISFACTORY, INVESTIGATE MODS TO A-I2/SR-71 FAMILY
TO IMPROVE ALTITUDE.
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PROGRAM ORGAN-i-ZPTION FOR SOVIET-BLOC STUDY
THINK GROUP - Based on reconnaissance targets and ground rules, identify
PROFILES AND TACT-ICS. Options to be rated in order of
preference.
HEADQUARTERS - PROFILES AND TACTICS to be selected based on think group
data plus in-house assessment
t
AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER - Technological survey of all potential CANDIDATE CONCEPTS
.compatible with PROFILES AND TACTICS.
ANALYSIS of concepts to provide rating in order of
preference with supporting data.
HEADQUARTERS - Review and final judgement
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EXHIBIT .
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ELEMENTS OF THE TASK
PROFILES AND TACTICS - THINK GROUP
2. CANDIDATE CONCEPT SURVEY - AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER.
3. ANALYSIS - AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER/HEADQUARTERS
4. ANSWER - AIRFRAME MANUFACTURERIHEADQUARTERS
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to PROFILES AND TACTICS
LOW TO HIGH ALTITUDES
SUBSONIC TO HYPERSONIC SPEEDS
MANEUVERABILITY
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2. CANDIDATE CONCEPT SURVEY
FLIGHT MODES - AIR LAUNCHED VS.. GROUND LAUNCHED
BOOSTED VS. SELF-ACCELERATION
GLIDE, POWERED, THROTTLING TECHNIQUES
TECHNOLOGY1, - OXCART
ISINGLASS
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OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS - MANNED VS. UNMANNED
TYPE OF LAUfI
BASING FACILITIES
COVERT OPERATION
SENSOR CONSIDERATIONS - BROAD SPECIFICATIONS FOR WEIGHT AND
VOLUME ALLOTMENT
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3. ANALYSIS
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FORCE FIT CANDIDATE CONFIGURATIONS RELATIVE TO WEIGHTING OF
VARIOUS ASPECTS OF PROBLEM
REACTION - TIME FOR COLLECTION OF DATA
TIME FOR PROCESSING AND DELIVERY TO INTERPRETER
MAN VAE? - IO, RELIABILITY AND MISSION SUCCESS
I?OLI,TICAI, C D fO S
--IEER, .AAA-?Y..~I~G TEf_
COST JUSTIFIED ONLY IF:
.w
10. ACCEPTABLE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS
fe. NO MORE RELIABLE, LESS COSTLY, MORE POLITICALLY
ACCEPTABLE APPROACH
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4. ANSWER
A. SURVIVABILITY POSSIBLE?
B. QUICK REACTION POSSIBLE?
C. I F BOTH A AND B POSSIBLE, DEVELOP PLAN
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IV. CONTRACTOR CANDIDATES
CRITERIA FOR SELECTION
THINK GROUP
AERODYNAMIC TYPE VEHICLE EXPERIENCE
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS EXPERIENCE
TACTICS/ENGAGEMENT ANALYSIS EXPERIENCE
LOCATION OF FACILITY
SECURITY CLEARANCE CONSIDERATIONS
COST
TIME
A I RFRAME/SYSTEMS
DEPENDENT UPON RESULTS OF THINK GROUP EFFORT.
SPECIFIC FLIGHT REGIME EXPERIENCE
HARDWARE VS. DESIGN STUDY
PROGRAM SUCCESSES
PREVIOUS RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLE EXPERIENCE
PREVIOUS AGENCY AFFILIATION.
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