COMMENTS ON A-12 ACCIDENT REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00590R000200040001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 17, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 7, 1963
• Content Type: MF

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TP SECT-T
OXC 5361
Copy I of t~L
7 AUG 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR. Assistant Director, OSA
SUBJECT: Comments on A-12 Accident Report
1. After a thorough review of the Aircraft Accident Report
pertaining to the crash of A-12, S/N 123, on 24 May 1963, I non-
concur with the report in the following areas:
a. The history of flight prefacing the report is adequate
up to a point, but it does not completely tell the story as to
what actually happened to put the aircraft in the position the
pilot found himself after completing the turn he started at
Wendover. Based on information taken from various sections
of the accident report and in an effort to make the History of
Flight more meaningful, I propose that a paragraph 9 be added
to this section with a more detailed account of the sequence of
events that led to the stall and spin (See attachmentl). Two
graphics with supporting information on this paragraph have
been developed: Attachment 2, Flight Profile, and Attachment
3, Airspeed/Thrust Requirements Chart.
b. I do not concur with the Findings and Recommendations
in several places. The major area of disagreement is in the
primary cause which I consider to be pilot error for failure to
take corrective action in a deteriorating airspeed situation and
for operating the aircraft in clouds on a VFR local clearance.
The blockage of the total pressure port would then become a
secondary cause. Concurring or non-concurring remarks as a
reviewing commander are submitted in attachment 4. Action of
this type would be in keeping with the format and reporting re-
quirements of Para 20, AFR 127-4.
c. The Operations Group in their section of the report
make the statement that the pilot was qualified in this aircraft.
To support this statement, the report should, but does not con-
tain:
AUTOMATIC DflNNCRADE: Re lassify OL-
w eo separated front top
S~ r t enclosure.
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TOP SEGRET
(1)
A copy of his last standardization ride.
(2)
A copy of his formal checkout in the A-12.
(3)
school.
A copy of completion certificate on A-12 ground
(4)
A copy of completion of some form of an emergency
procedures examination.
d. The Aerodynamics Section of this report does not come
up with any definite conclusions, findings or recommendations.
Since the aerodynamics analysis of flight conditions just prior to
and during the sequence of events which led to the stall is the key
to what actually happened in this particular accident, specific
conclusions, findings and recommendations by the aerodynamics
group are essential to the validity of the report.
e. We feel there is a certain amount of supervisory error
evident in the areas of (1) quality and manner of conducting briefings
for A-12 missions; (2) chase aircraft SOP's, i. e. , chase aircraft
procedures, chase pilot responsibilities, etc. ; and (3) in that the
pilot failed to take corrective action in a low airspeed/unusual
attitude situation, and failed to recognize the danger signal in the
illumination of the surface limiter light. It is possible that emergency
procedures and flight characteristics may not have received adequate
attention in prior A-lZ training. The need for an A-12 simulator
makes itself quite evident and a recommendation to that effect has
been included in Attachment 4.
f. The Accident Board had no recommendation to make on
contributing causes b. and c. (b. established the fact that the MACH
Trim subsystem added further nose up trim, increased angle of
attack and rate of airspeed bleed off; c. established fact that the
pilot failed to take corrective. action.) Both these findings are ex-
tremely relative in this particular accident and I feel that the Board's
failure to come up with a recommendation for these two causes tends
to "water down" the case. The minimum acceptable recommendation
for both these items would have been that all A-12 pilots be rebriefed
in the accident with emphasis on the flight control systems and flight
characteristics of the aircraft. I note in his comments on the accident
report, I has recognized this point and has taken the
corrective action to brief his pilots on both these points.
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Z. As a result of the Headquarters review and analysis of the
accident report, recommend that a letter be forwarded to Commander,
pointing out the inconsistencies and inadequacies in the report.
This letter should require additional information and/or corrective
action in accordance with the Headquarters review of the accident report.
Deputy for Field Activities, OSA
Attachments - 4
As noted above
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