POINTS FOR DCI'S DISCUSSION WITH SECRETARY VANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00508R000100060039-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 25, 2003
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: June 16, 1965
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
DRAFT:JABROSS:ag (16/6/65)
SUBJECT: Points for DCI's Discussion with Secetary Vance
1. The following are a number of items w ch require
decisions, either within the framework of a new O or ad hoc
between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense. It should be noted
that action on many of these items has bee intentionally postponed
pcas#iraay-.raf-.tese
for as much as six months or more,
that -what will
ing reorganization of the NRO.
or -my under s tangy e4.
mortis -- rni e of tVe--NROi--- -Me eta. rgs e- the Exe t e
Ce ltrtt~re-v~re a held~p C at ~y-once a wveek.but o- orr al- reel d
oL--el cis ions ways-4
2. NRP.Budget - FY 1966: In July 1964 CIA submitted
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Agency budget estimates for FY 66 which totaled approximately
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CIA has recently requested an apportionment for
FY 66 of f_Vnds for the NRP to fund projects for which CIA is responsible
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Between July 1964
and tVie present date, the D/NRO eliminated approximately
NRO review(s)
completed.
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eliminated without any consultation with the elements of CIA
responsible. Dr. McMillan, in a personal communication to the
DCI on this subject, conveys the impression that CIA is now asking
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This E4Ta..'
tir the figure used in the presentation to the Appropriations
Committee of Congress. It does not necessarily follow
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deficit should be entirely made up
at the expense of CIA projects. At least two of these are
more than the original estimate. It is true that some
of the items which CIA now wishes to fund are different than the
items enumerated in the original request. The aggregate amount,
however, is approximately the same. This whole subject of the FY 66
budget raises a number of issues, of which two are particularly important:
a. There is the question of the procedure for
reviewing and approving all items in the NRP. In our
opinion this should be the responsibility of the Executive
Committee of the NRO which should act on the basis of a
staff analysis by NRO of all projects comprehended in the
NRP and after listening to the proposals and comments of
individual agencies.
b. Dr. McMillan is right in asserting that the total
appropriation P'the NRP is limited
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activities of considerable importance and should not
be rejected or curtailed unilaterally by the D/NRO.
One of these is ISINGLASS, for which approximately
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has been requested. Nobody questions the
need for a very high performance follow-on to the OXCART
and the only question is how and where to produce this
capability. It should not be postponed or suppressed
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for lack of funds/ The other important project is
for whicH
was requested. Here again, there
were sharp differences of opinion but the agreement between
Mr. Mc Cone and Mr. Vance was, as I understood it, that
a final decision would be made whether to proceed or not
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to proceed with
after a review of specific tests.
This project and others should be reviewed at the Executive
Committee level before apportionments of the FY 66 budget
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is inadequate to fund
these and other priority intelligence programs, additional,
funds should be sought elsewhere if necessary through
a supplemental appropriations. On this point, I think
that the concluding paragraph of Dr. McMillan's letter
is misleading. It is not my personal impression that
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either committee of Congress wanted to effect reductions
with the budget at the expense of reconnaissance programs,
especially those conducted by CIA.
3. OXCART. Initial plans for the redeployment of
OXCART vehicles have been discussed. Ultimately it will be
necessary to decide the issue of long-term responsibility for OXCART
(and other covert overflight operations conducted in manned aircraft).
This, in my opinion, should definitely not be done except in the context
of an over-all renegotiation of the NRO.
4. The Selection of a New General Search System. You
are aware of the status of the current review of these systems by Dr.
Land. It will be necessary at some time to rearh agreement, acting
on the basis presumably of-the PSAC Reconnaissance Pane as to
/C I
which system to carry into the final testing stage.
5. CORONA Management. The history of the CORONA
project is long and extremely confusing. The project was authorized
by the White House and CIA was assigned responsibility in April 1958
for development and procurement of the reconnaissance payload,
camera film, recovery vehicle and sI was advise
y d by the
President of Itek as early as 1961 that the Air Force was making
every possible effort to eliminate CIA's control of this program.
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contractors in this program must be read against this background.
It do.e.s_ not follow that-CIA must retain control-of-the program or
the contracts. The decision, }gar,. should be made on the basis
of principle and not as a result of biw piecemeal:'Yrosion of the CIA
position.
A specific point at issue arises from a recent communication
from Dr. Wire - to the DCI advising that the D/NRO has taken
certain action (specifically with regard to i1 contract with Lockheed)
which has the effect of giving Aerospace responsibility for technical
direction of the assembly and launching aspects of the CORONA
program. - McMillan asserts that Mr. McCone agreed
to tlaas.ep. Mr. McCone and General Carter both have ~y
denied that they l& made any such agreement. General Carter
wrote Mr. Vance on the 28th of August 1964 specifically stating:
". . . we have no record of at discussions regarding
this proposed contractual change.
Mr. McCone dissented from the proposal that Aerospace
be given a contract as Systems Manager in lieu of the
current related contract with Lockheed.'
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The point here is that tale future responsibility for the
management and control of,CORONA muste established as a matter
ILLEGIB
for systems engineering or technical direction of a given p ogram
of principle. Such issues as selection of the contractor appropriate
Executive Committee of the-..r
6. Satellite Operations Center (SOC). As of last April
should l not preoccupy the time of the
there appeared toobeeneral agreement between the Secretary of
operate under the control of the DCI., The purpose of this center
S%A
Defense and the DCI that the SOC should be
',located in Langley, and
is to provide operational targetting and camera programs for existing
reconnaissance photographic systems. It has not so far provided
although it has functioned for CORONA J
and ARGON. c'i April of 1963 it was moved to the Pentagonwhere,
this service for
tile- pre-set-proposal is, it-hou.ld be located. We have recently been
advised of NRO proposals to create a capability equivalent to that of
the SOC on the West Coast. This would appear to be needle,gsly dupli-
cative of the SOC which should remain as one of theA( instrumentalities
through which intelligence controls over the satellite reconnaissance
program are maintained.
7. The foregoing items illustrate most of the outstanding
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issues which have developed between CIA and the NRO and/or the
Air Force. They are:
a. The need for an arrangement through which the
DCI can participate, at the level of the Deputy Secretary
of Defense, in decisions relating to the allocation of
funds and the approval of important programs. This
was the responsibility contemplated for the Executive
Committee.
b. The question of how the DCI and the intelligence
community is going to ensure that the orbital plans for
satellite reconnaissance operations are designed to provide
coverage in accordance with intelligence priorities. This was
the purpose behind the proposal to relocate the SOC in Langley.
c. There is the question of the role appropriate for
CIA in the research, development and production phases of
new reconnaissance systems. It has generally been the
position of the Agency that CIA should play a role in the
invention, selection and development of new systems.
Acting on this principle, the Agency has developed a
component under DD/S&T with competence for this
mission. It is argued that this component should be
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responsible for development and production (as well as
conceptual design) for systems for a number of reasons:
(1) CIA is the most important user of
the product of the system and the only agency
exclusively concerned with intelligence.
(2) The Agency record in the development
and production of new systems has been impressive.
(3) Funds are expended for the production
of these systems under the DCI's authority to spend
money on an unvouchered basis. At least some of
the programs should be administered under his
direct control.
(4) If CIA (and/or the DCI) is to have any
responsibility for the effectiveness and efficiency
of systems development in the reconnaissance field,
he must have the staff necessary to establish
independent judgments concerning the most effective
program. Unless CIA is given more than a technical
advisory responsibility, it will be impossible to keep
a staff with appropriate qualifications.
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3. The CIA argument is based to some degree on the
analogy of the
Program under which the Navy develope.$~
a payload which is put into orbit by the Air Force on an Air Force
booster. This arrangement in fact has worked on the CORONA program.
Opposition to CIA participation in the development and
production of payloads is based on arguments to the effect that CIA
is trying to build an empire in space and partly on grounds of
organizational tidiness. *ti. Alternativefto the kind of arrangement
we have proposed is allocation of this responsibility to the Air Force,
which would then become the single instrument of reconnaissance,
or to a new agency to be created under the Defense Department (or else-
where).
19----` `ham ?are-ab }e coons to all.a# the s-e -prnpo se-d' arrarrgu--
rents--but-this -app-aa rs to me ,g.Y :the wit-.cal issue-to be-de ified,
JOHN A. BROSS
D/DCI(NIPE
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16 June 1965
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Conversation with Dr. Land, 14 June 1963
1. The Director entertained Dr. Land at a dinner meeting
on 14 June 1965. Mr. Helms, Dr. Wheelon and Mr. Bross were
also present. Significant portions of the discussion were as follows.
2. The Director described his interest in a fifteen year
plan for resources and activities. He said that the important thing
was to define objectives and identify the resources and programs
which were best calculated to meet these objectives. He asked Dr.
Land how far he could see into the future and what future technology
promised for intelligence purposes.
3. Dr. Land felt that fifteen years is too far to look ahead.
He said it was possible to project the state of the art in various
technologies. What is difficult to predict I. the specific application
which can be made of a given technology. He said that a lensless
camera could be made in which films would register impressions
which could be made visible when seen through a light. Application
of this device to intelligence missions is possible. The Director
pressed him as to whether photographic observation from 2Z, 000
miles at a very low resolution was perhaps a future possibility.
Dr. Land said that tremendous improvement could be made in
photographic surveillance. On the other hand, he wondered whether
the Agency was perhaps overpreoccupied with scientific achievements
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which could as well be accomplished by another agency of the
Government. He thought that CIA should concentrate on the
development of techniques which are truly secret. For example,
he cited the development of the U-2 which was opposed by Air
Force officers largely on the ground that they thought it impossible
to achieve the altitude and performance predicted for the U-2.
The fact that nobody, presumably including the Russians, thought
it could be done added to the potentialities for secrecy and it
was appropriately given to CIA largely because of the security
implications. Dr. Land thought that the Agency should concen-
trate on human resources and develop really clandestine resources.
This led to a discussion of the problem and potentialities of deep
cover. The Director questioned whether a really searching effort
had been made to identify all the possibilities for deep cover and
for agent activity in critical areas, Irr proventent
of the Agency's capabilities for espionage would be, he felt, an
appropriate objective for the proposed fifteen year plan. The
Director emphasized the importance of identifying as specifically
as possible the objectives of operations, the methods and techniques
best suited to achieve these objectives with a view to initiating
necessary action, including the allocation of funds, as promptly as
possible in view of the leadtime required to establish required
resources.
5. After dinner there was a short discussion of the two
Perkin.Elmer general search systems. Dr. Land indicated that
he had been impressed with the demonstration of the oscillating
platen. He was inclined to favor the M system and thought that
Perkin-Amer should be given adequate time to prove the feasibility
of this system. He stated that there would be a preliminary review
of the PE systems prior to the end of the mouth (tentatively, the
25th of June). The Director stated that it was his intention to cut
back on the supporting contracts for associated components (space-
craft, re-entry vehicles, etc. ). Dr., Wheelon pointed out that these
associated contracts ran through the end of the month and that a
final decision as to their continuation or termination could be taken
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after the preliminary review by Dr. Land's Panel. He pointed out
that associated contracts for the two Air Force systems (3K and.
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the configuration of these cameras was quite different from the
two PE systems and too long and narrow to be accommodated in
the space vehicles designed for the latter.
5. The Director and Dr. Land talked together alone
for approximately half an hour.
6. Dr. Land and I reviewed the discussion at breakfast
orning. As regards fifteen year planning, Dr.
that he thought that the Director's objective was to provide leader..
ship to the community as a whole and that as such a fifteen year
plan would be useful. He thought that a guidance, which served
to identify the critical problems of the future, could perhaps be
more useful than an attempt at a detailed plan. In Polaroid
he said that he had two groups of people. One of these attempts to
look well into the future and identify c,*ncepts, designs and ideas
which might have useful application. The other group are in fact
plan re who proceed, on a very conservative basis, to develop
detailed plans for rather specific development of projects which
are coated, etc.
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0. We had a fairly long discussion of the NRO. He felt
that both the Agency and the Defense Department should be continued
as partners is the venture. He thought that both L;L'/g&T and the D/NRO
have been stretching their respective franchises to the limit. He
felt that some solution to the problem was possible within two or
three weeks. He suggested that Benny Shriever might play a useful
role in the NRO and suggested an interim committee to deal with
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NRO problems and allocate responsibility consisting of himself,
Drs. McMillan and Wheelon, and General Shriever. I said that
his introduction tnto the problem would be very helpful; that
G.neral Shriever might overload the committee in the direction
of the Air Force, although he had undoubted personal qualifications
for the job. I pointed out that the critical question was the extent
to which the Agency should remain in systems developirent. An
Agency officials involved in the NRO so far (Bissell, Scoville,
Whoelon) felt it essential to preserve for the Agency a role in the
actual development and production of systems. This responsibility
could not be turned over to a single instra entality under DoD,
particularly one dominated by the Air Force, and be sure that
systems development would be intelligence oriented. Moreover,
if this responsibility is divorced from CIA. the mission of DD/3&T
would be largely nullified. Dr. Land undertook to discuss the
matter further.
{a/
JOHN A. SRO;
D/DCIINIPE
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Distribution:
Cy No. 1 DCI
2 - DDCI
3 - DDIS&T
4 NIPS
5 .. NIPS
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