ABOLITION OF THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL ACTIVITIES - PROS AND CONS.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00508R000100040002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 7, 1963
• Content Type: MF

 Approved For Release 2001/03/0 I -~ P7 B00508R000100040002-1
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DCI (Cpys 1 & 2 of 7)
cc+- CI (Cpy 3 of 7)
EX DIR (Cpy 4 of 7)
Deputy to i Cift' IP (Cpy 5 of 7)
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DDS&T Ch.rono (Cpy 7 of 7) - held by Laq (NRO Vital Files)
D/S&T Subject (Cpy 6 of 7) b held by Laq (NRO Vital Files)
DD/S&T Chrono (ref sheet)
DD/S&T Subject (ref sheet)
25X1A
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 Approved For Release 2001/03/02: CIA-RDP7t90' *8 MMA&WM
TOP 1"rFT
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Abolition of the Office of Special Activities - Pros
and Cons.
1. This memorandum is for your information.
2. In connection with Fiscal Year 1965 budget and manpower limi-
tations, it has been suggested that CIA withdraw voluntarily from the entire
National Reconnaissance Program and that the ~Htie Office
of Special Activities be transferred to the U. S. Air Force.
3. Such an action would reduce the CIA manning table by approxi-
25X1A mY:_ately^ half of them Air Force ;personnel on. assignment to whom we
25X1A
have made no career commitment. By doing so, we would save only M
in Fiscal Year 1965, since all of the developmental and operational pro-
grams are now funded in the Air Force (NRO) budget. This elimination
would reduce DD/S&T by Mnd eliminate our residual substantive
influence on the reconnaissance program.
4. However, the tragedy in such an elimination would be a national
one. The Intelligence Community now depends on satellite and aircraft
photography for the majority of its raw intelligence on the Soviet-Sino Bloc.
TOP SE1 ET
Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP71 B00508R000100040002-1
25X1A
 Approved For Release 2001ID0W:DP71 B00508R000100040002-1
Two systems have produced all of this photography to date - the U-2 and
CORONA - both products of the Office of Special Activities and its prede-
cessor, the Development Projects Division. These two systems also provide
an unusual amount of hard intelligence on the uncommitted and semi-friendly
world. Were it not for an in-house CIA developmental and operational
capability, albeit strongly supported by the Air Force, there is real question
in everyone's mind whether we would now have either of these priceless
national assets.
5. The U-2 flew higher and farther and took pictures because intel-
ligence was its only mission. Likewise, the CORONA succeeded and was
gradually improved because national intelligence was its only mission. On
the other hand, intelligence will always rank fourth or fifth on the Air Force
priority list, as compared with strategic and tactical warfare, not to mention
military space. This is as it should be, but it does not presage a dramatic
change in Air Force policy.
6. The essential fact in evidence is that CIA (Office of Special
Activities) has demonstrated by performance an ability to identify, pursue
and operate reconnaissance programs which provide the majority of our
national intelligence. I submit that they do so because they are in the Intelli-
gence business. The Office of Special Activities represents the only proven
group in the Government - or at least outside the Air Force - which can carry
Approved For Release 2001/0T/":
V, 'e+p '71B00508R000100040002-1
.useMy 9.,
 Approved For Release 2001/0'/O : PJD71 B00508R000100040002-1
a development program through from conception to operation. Continuity of
civilian personnel in the organization and CIA flexibility in bringing outstand-
ing non-Government people into participation on a meaningful basis are major
reasons for this record. The argument that this activity is a parasitic one is
handily abolished by OXCART which is leading both DOD and civilian (SST)
supersonic aircraft by a wide margin. This capability has been painfully
developed over the past ten years and now represents a major national resource.
It is not a resource to be brokered away lightly.
7. ThekaaWAian - of OSA to the Air Force would do little to enhance
their capabilities and would assure no greater control of the National Recon-
naissance Program for the Intelligence Community. Neither is it a factor in
influencing the NRO, for its role has been progressively reduced from that of
a wife to a domestic. Rather, it would remove the one pacing group from the
reconnaissance field. By executive decision, manned overflights of denied
territory have been carried out only by the CIA since 1956 so as to assure
maximum secrecy and permit plausible denial. To transfer this function to
the Air Force should be made a matter of Presidential decision.
8. It is not clear that the operational role played by OSA, especially
in the U-2 Program, could be effectively handled by the Air Force. Elaborate
base negotiations and is a new assignment for the
25X1A
Air Attaches in areas where DD/P coordination of intelligence activities is
Approved For Release 2001/0 q1 pg71 B00508R000100040002-1
 Approved For Release 2001i V:I DP71 B00508R000100040002-1
r :.~.~
already strained. It is not clear that adequate, secure AF communications
exist to existing and planned bases. Certainly, there is question in my mind
whether an Air Force U-2 Program could or would exploit the opportunities
offered by U. S. Navy carrier platforms.
9. There is also a very serious question whether covert contracting,
under CIA's unique legislation, and proper security could be maintained if
OSA were abolished, since these functions are now performed in-house by
special arrangement and appear in the OSA personnel budget. CIA security
influence over the entire National Reconnaissance Program would certainly
diminish if the structure of security controls were transferred to the Air
Force.
10. The basic argument against abandoning OSA to the Air Force is
not a bureaucratic one. Rather, it is that OSA represents a unique ational
asset: an experienced, integrated organization with a elem n capability
for developing and operating reconnaissance systems which produce intelli-
gence data upon which this country has come to rely. Until that record is
1,
matched, I submit that we can bar find opportunities to save 25X1A
and. positions somewhere else in the Federal Government.
25X1A
ALBERT D. WHEELON
Deputy Director
(Science and Technology)
Approved For Release 2001/03
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 Approved For Release 2001/03,/02 : CIA7D7,1800508R000100040002-1
~zl
MEMORANDUM FOR: XXPpx#y Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Abolition of the Office of Special Activities: Pro
and Con.
X In connection with Fiscal Year 1965 budget and manpower limi-
tations, it has been suggested that CIA withdraw voluntarily from the entire
P ev tl. Reconnaissance Program and that We, Office of Special Activities
be s-a' Md to the U. S. Air Force. v.
3. Such an action would reduce the CIA manning table by approxi-
25X1A mately- half of them Air Force personnel on assignment to whom we
have made no career commitment. By doing so, we would save only
25X1A in Fiscal Year 1965, since all of the developmental and opera-
tional programs are now funded in the Air Force (NRO) budget. This elimi-
nation would reduce DD/S&T by -a.nd eliminate our residual sub- 25X1A
stantive influence on the Eeconnaissance Program.
-. However, the tragedy in such an elimination would be a national
one. The Intelligence Community now depends on satellite and aircraft
photography for the majority of its raw intelligence on the Soviet-Sino Bloc.
Two systems have produced all of this photography to date - the U-2 and
CORONA - both products of the Office of Special Activities and its predeces-
sor, the Development Projects Division. These two systems also provide
an unusual amount of hard intelligence on the uncommitted and semi-friendly
world. Were it not for an in-house CIA developmental and operational capa-
bildity, albeit strongly supported by the Air Force, there is real question in
everyone's mind whether we would now have either of these priceless
national assets.
The U-2 flew higher and farther and took pictures because intel-
ligence was its only mission. Likewise, the CORONA succeeded and was
gradually improved because national intelligence was its only mission. On
the other hand, intelligence will always rank fourth or fifth on the Air Force
p:ciority list, as compared with strategic and tactical warfare, not to mention
military space. This is as it should be, but it does not presage a dramatic
change in Air Force,aa
Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP71-B00508R000100040002-1
 Approved For Release 200 110 0 IA-RDP71 B00508R000100040002-1
S. The essential fact in evidence is that CIA (Office of Special
Activities) has demonstrated by performance an ability to identify, pursue
and operate reconnaissance programs which provide the majority of our
national intelligence. I submit that they do so because they are in the intel-
ligence business. The Office of Special Activities represents the only proven
group in the Government - or at least outside the Air Force - which can
carry a development program through from conception to operation.
Continuity of civilian personnel in the organization and CIA flexibility in
bringing outstanding non-Government people into participation on a
meaningful basis are major reasons for this record. The argument that
this activity is a parasitic one is handily abolished by OXCART;. which is
leading both DOD and civilian (SST) supersonic aircraft by a wide margin.
This capability has been painfully developed over the past ten years and
now represents a major national resource. It is not a resource to be
bi,.-okered away lightly.
7': The addition of OSA to the Air Force would do little to enhance ,,,
tlii.eir capabilities and would assure no greater control of the National Recon-
naissance Program for the Intelligence Community. Neither is it a factor
ir.. influencing the NRO, for its role has been progressively reduced from
that of a wife to a domestic. Rather, it would remove the one pacing group ?3
from the reconnaissance field. T executive decision, manned overfli
hts 9i' .
g
of denied territory have been car ;lea out .id x only by the CIA s ce l 9 5 . so as to assure maximum secrecy and permit plausible denialtransf er
this function to the Air Force should be made a matter of Presidential
decision.
It is not clear that the operational role played by OSA, especially
base negotiations and is a new assignment
for the Air Attaches ins areas where DD /P coordination of intelligence activ-
ities is already strained. It is not clear that adequate, secure AF commu-
nications exist to existing and planned bases. Certainly, there is question
in. my mind whether an Air Force U-2 Program could or would exploit the
opportunities offered by U. S. Navy carrier platforms.
`gj. There is also a very serious question whether covert contracting,
under CIA's unique legislation, and proper security could be maintained if
OSA were abolished, since these functions are now performed in-house by
special arrangement and appear in the OSA personnel budget. CIA security
influence over the entire National Reconnaissance Program would certainly
diminish if the structure of security controls were transferred to the Air
Force.
in. the U-2 Program, could be effectively handled by the Air Force. Elaborate.
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 Ir g%
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9,. The basic argument against abandoning OSA to the Air Force
is not a bureaucratic one. Rather, it is that OSA represents a unique
national asset: an experienced, integrated organization with a demonstra-
tion capability for developing and operating reconnaissance systems which
produce intelligence data upon which this country has come to rel . Until
that record is matched, I submit that we can better fic and
positions somewhere else in the Federal Governmen .
125X1A
Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP71 B00508R000100040002-1