PROPOSALS FOR REORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00508R000100030011-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2002
• Sequence Number: 11
• Content Type: REGULATION

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OPOSALJ1OR REORGANIZATION OF THE
NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM
kte_
Set forth below are certain basic assumptions which determine
the organisation appropriate for the administration and direction of
the National Re cesutai mimic* Prograxn (NRP). rhsee assumptions
reflect a general COPIII?aiiii of opinion of qualified individuals item
the intelligence and scientific communities who have observed or
participated in the National Reconnaissance Pregrara since 1934-.J
A. The national character of this essential inteUlgence
enterprise mast be maintained through a joint endeavor 014 the
part of Del) and CIA.
B, Tho potentialities of U.S. technology n&st be aggri.atvsty
and imaginatively exploited to develop oyster" s for the collection
of intelligence which are fully responsive to Intelligence needs and
objectives. In the development of new systems maxisnaza use meet
inp made of the onqperience, reeources, facilities and technical
competence of appropriate components of the Defense Lmpartaranat
and CIA.
C. Scheduling and targotting of satellite and manned aircraft
reconnaissance missions over dented areas should he Or responsii.
bility of the DC! and the tlatva States Intelligence Board (USI:13).
D. A new organisational framework is required which,
particularly in the field of satellite rilIC01111111.igfille41 operations
11114 ayetenis development. will: (1) provirie a clearly ertabliebod
delineation of the roles and responsibilities of components of the
Governrs,ent engaged in these activities. anc (2) ensure atiective
coordination of the.. activities -under centra.lized policy guidance
and coritrol.
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An Litecittive Committee. consisting of the Deputy Secretary of
Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, *ill be eetablistissi
te formulate. guide. sad regulate the NRF. Specifically the linecuatve
Committee will:
1. Examine IhAs reconnaissance rim rentable provided
by USIB against technical and fiscal capebilities, se ask to
establish an appropriate level of effort for the IMP. bt this
rola it 4411 rely largely as cost estimates and technical
feasibility analyses prepared by the DNR and the component
elitreente of the Nit Orgaaisation and MU; views expreured
with knowledge of cost factors.
2. Approve or modify the consolidated NR program and
Its budget as forwarded by the DNR.
01/1?411irfv" koit'ONAt
I. Acting through the DNIt afloat's* respeessibilityd,
to CIA andior DOD for research and preliminary design.. '
studies for "LOW systems.
Dvv-A-
t. Allocate development respassibilitylior specific ?-\-"--4/'
TOCCUalial1141,14C ? progra-ns to DOD or CIA. and establish
guidelines for mutual support upettere appropriate. It shall
be tree to use technical advisory groups as necessary.
S. Assign operational responsibilities to either DOD
or CIA for various typos of L.:mimed overflight misSi03211t
subject to the concurrence, as appropriate, of the 303 Co anthem,.
6. Review periodically the essentiaL features of the
major program elements of the NRP.
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ROLE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NA'r1014AL RECONNAIIIIIANCIt:
To insure the coordination of CIA and DOD reconnaissance
Activities a Director of National ROCOBibilie Mite* Will be appointed by
the Secretary of Defense with the concurrence of the Director of
Central Intelligence. He Mil prowl& a *Ingle point of Wegner!**
for the planning and budgeting a the National Receenaisseace Pregrem
and will be responsible to the Executive Committee for the estecutt
of the program. Specifically, he will:
1. Assume such cern naad rs sponsibilitie is over DOD
elements of the NRP as the Secretary of attestse may designate
Ho will establish suitable lines of coardtinoties nith thee* Item
components which do net respond directly to him.
Z. Be kept fully and completely tafuri4 d of ..11 roweilmarbitio
since activitios in CIA and DOD.
3. Schedule the use e: the space tau, hlag tvecldng and
recovery facilities.
4. Review budget proposole submitted by apprepriato
elements of CIA and DOD sad prepare mid submit a consolidated
budget for *sambaed= and approval bi the Zsecutlyee Committee.
S. Ensure the flow of feuds from the NRP appropriations
to CIA and appropriate 1)01) elements in lump sum transfers
each fiscal year. lacremectel fundiag from reserve or re-
programming eources will be used for supplemental programa
approved by .ExCorsi.
6. Deal with the operating head of the CIA or his deetwsated
alternate on all matters of policy, coortination or guidisace.
He will not exercise command control over subordinate elements
of CIA or its personnel.
7. Sit v.4th the USIB for the matters affecting
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3. Appear before the 303 Committee to the extent ds.4rsd
25X1A by the DCI or the Deputy Secretary of betels.* to M44111190 approval
for overhead 'swanned!! canes IWO clone.
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I. EAR mai d% en roommate/mac* teekaology sad preliminary
design of new systwas will be encouraged sad sappeorted, is bedit
CIA and DOD. It wilt be suppoireed by a lamp 011D1 111000USIR fife=
riRp feats to .ac -a grop at a level to be established by Ilb?
c:xecutive Cora-nines.
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i. prescrtbed snipe:IC*1 times resources will be allesets4
for supper: of 'stoic research Gi seconnistssaace technology to
nulate aad assi:re the bins* Tiro: f thist B&W. The OMR will
be kept fully informed at all activities' and develeprosena in this
consaction for the purpose of ea suiting appropriate coordination
and preventing unwitting dilco:W*1AS well at eneettrogiag joint
exploitation of new tschniquee.
1.3k Preliminary design and small teschrticel feasibility
dermenstrutiesse el skew reconasissence piston-4s will also be Nailed
from this ianovetion rioseurce. Suck work can grew autii Ts-
quitirnents originating with Mai. the ilxCovm or the DWI ter
littprevementa in existing capabilities. or can result from spooduneoet-
leitiativa in the cif% end 00.1) participating ele-veate. lionvever, it
is ape:taut that the DNR and ExCwm receive sack ronath a
apirebeasive report on the initiation, status, or cearitssien01
ouch efforts. fa this .vay. competitive study efferts will be
recognised, approved or diecoaraged, and cyndtreslised for
later decision actions.
It is intended that these lands sad tbortr produitt
the flexible cutting edge of the POCOMIAMSJIMMICR program They
Ouetati v5t be used te fend actual developatent or operational
activities.
`11
5vsT pir,VEL.011.4.484 1 .
1. 0, hitil a new syste'n coacept has been officiest,
defined and its technical feasibility Issteblielarr-lb the eittieteittiort
tue 1.11c...-.3 :rt, It ireettld he bscladed in the tawniery of the filtP.
^it this poi**, it should receive necessary funding limn line item.
in the bedget identified With thta. ayetents. These its waste!
then be sliecated to CIA and/or DOL. to sopecifie eievalop-
toed by tb- ;::arC01-11.,
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2. The *lenient of CIA and/or DOD assign.ed develops:taut
responsibility for a new system will be responsible for eelectbiti
and supervising capable contractors; for establishing such
systems engineering support aa they deem necessary; for
rendering periodic reports on program progress to the iaNit
and i:;,x(,:Orn and generally for the success of the program.
3. Satellite reconnaissance systems are characterised
primarily by the payload (cameras, spacecraft data recovery
system) air well as by their boosters. /he interface between
the launch system IMO the payload is of critical importance
and planning for compatible checkout and launch facilities,
boosters, tracking and recovery mast proceed with the payload
develop Me nt. The DNR will be responsible for the mecums of
this interface. 21
4 its a matter of principle. In order to avoid licatiort
and ?mote efficiency and economy, devslopme res-ponei-
bilitie will be rt?tgarod with 4. tr,iew to utilia to the fullest
extent hie established corripetence cyst reemarees
isadt or s as space ,and re-entry cl hoosteits-.,and
reiated *qui ent. Ne bard find Is rule4-,c an govern deeteions
allocating tee. .nubility for dove pment of systems or compri::-
nents of system and general ciples of efficitioy, based
on informed co sense iust prevail.
A normal phas
I. the initial flight t
of the completed p
coasducted by
lauc
nh and
the direct
of the re
deveto
per
I satellite development programs
orbit and engineering proof
stem. These flight teats will be
L responsible for assevnbly.
vehicle, (pre surnably usher
eue regard to\the adviceIY.w
n CIA or DOhich has
must obviously he
ei an appropriate
payload to he
yload ?
lament of
ght 'control
pervision of DNR)
seentatives of the *ler*
the payload. Flight test
mod under circumstances whi
rtunity for those who have develop/0
rd on matters which may affect their engineering...0r
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technical sta. nights wo expected to include
as many tate (ince t rgets re cattaitt with the
primary develop ctive so that any ilm recovered
would have intents* us. Whim n a systirm had been
successfully de strateclAint lasted operationally
reliable. i ould enter the operation* se.
itaint/WE OPERATIONAL PRASE:
I. ils` hen the satellite payload has been successfully
developed, it becomes a part 4.4 the operational asset* of the
NR?. The payloads, together with appropriate boosters,
launciwsre and tracking stations, represent the NAP cepability
to obtain orbital photography, and accordingly represeat part
of an orderly program to acquire intelligence in response to
USIS requirements, target lists and priorities.\The DN
must play the central role in planning this prograrrs. A
involves far-sighted budgeting for payload production as well
as booster procurement and modification. It involves judicious
scheduling of operational launches from fixed resources, in
eddition to development flight tests. ft requires a plan with
sufficient flexibility to respond to changing world situations
and the corresponding intelligence needs. it is a complex
managerial task for which a single individual must in the last
analysis be responsible.
. Beth the long range requirements frsateUits :Mosier ?
and he shifting targets for specific nigh come properly from
the in Iligence community in -which al elan ents of the Government
have a r ? e The community has mad COMOR as the staff
to provide t se requirements in?orderly way, subject to
approval by U
3. The Satellite equireisnts Progra Center, formerly
known as the Satellite ations Center, is the next step In
that sequence of events, Its action is to ntan specific mission
coverage in light of C.,OMOR tar t airements. It does so
by first studying the' spectrum of or. choices available.
These r ? supplied by various groups on e West Coast and
represent specific launch vehi141 propulsion IapabiUtina,
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curreht raiige safety rastrictioos. etc. Thee. feasibLe
orbits a rs thea computer away sad in 0. itehington to optimise
target overage in light of itul4 angli . predicted weather
COTOlitio\au and target priorities. A4 orbit is selected and
camera Orograt.a ?stablished for this mission./ This is
basically an intelligence function.
4 . in the case of ZORON,A coverage.
Requieements Progran. Center has play
in cietermining\the ?pheirAsris of the mi
comp,xterined glticiarics to the launch au
sprin f 196). the Center was locate
next to COMOR, nliert it was lured ?
awl t.41CION1 flights nd was in I
with trio ?st Coast acilities.
e vita with a vie to extendi
Satellite
i.efttral role
arid tranamftting
ority. Until tbe
t CIA Aeaciernerters
clesively in CORONA
eon .rounication
It than moved to the
should tie Qs* 41.1 to provide
gulden& s of all satellite op
will differ between syste
unctions/
intelligent* tnous tor missies
API ions recognising that procedu ea
or example to the
'3. Although most/ of the .-fa
team 1.. fulfilled when a estellite
,
there are perstuasi;ve argurnerts wk
develop Mont OtbetAld COAtilMe t 3 have
operttional ;Alas*. The most compel
payloads systesike are being 41311timusil
should 13e. The remarkable irnproverne
.7. onoscopic to stereo and then to tieubled
double recovery vehicles is al *MAT: pie.
are extremely delicate instruments and :
7
a given stern are quite aliko. This dosa
Col T i Pti a 'contractor should fire a THOR ox
the contrary ouch operational activitiee nit
not a .Livided authority. it doss ONO lin that the
,int in the J r esc +Aron,* int , pr(xluction or ooerati
&tbtlity of the deveioning
load is ooclared operational,
ee responsible for
nein role io the
rrAint is that
improved -- and
t ef CORONA fro=
? capacity via
lrtherniore, these
oftyloatis trot.
n&n that the
S. C.saito to
e s
is no
nal eassiusitce
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at w hit ...III* can entirely elin iruate trie payload team 4,0erptett.ly ,
l'ayloas grill be delivered in kccordane with agreed irchecteles
for asserr into the laancli vehicle. During the assembly of
boaster and 'pa load, there most be doquat. repreeentatten
for ,3 4.th poses \of advice sae consul tion frorn the Government
agency as well** the contractor reaposibJe for developing
t14.? NI load. Th?OsEPNR, dealt the Defense Department
agency cesnonsible or boost r, asser.--bly and launching ( over
which iie presumably s nagerial authority) and given
staff authority on be the txecutter Committee should be
able to see that this int* ? works.
6. Once a satel t. payloa is launched n orbit it
enters a crucial pe od at real ti e tracking. monitoring and
control. Trackin anci telemetry r cording from low attitude
photography is s4conpllsh.ci by Air ce stations. MiS data
is transn.ittecl 45 Sunnyvale, Caliternia? where the operatiOn is
run. Liflight decisions inchado d.ci.lons o recover if a male
functi3_n is sitspected and traesmiesions of atnera program
changes to'the satellite so as to take advent e of changing
we at he r?Or other opportunities. The premise
an intipiliganc
re-3re sEntativ? available for consultation to the uthortty
raspo1ibia for inflight control of the vehicle willte
en re that these decisions are taken with appropriate regard
for intelligence interest..
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U. Alternatives.
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Alternative organisetional prep-oasis considered include:
A. Allocation of exclusive responsibility tor the develop-
ment and w.ration of satellite reconnaissance systems to:
(1) an existing component of the Defense Departmeat. or (2) CIA.
or (3) some new agency to be created along the lines of 1454A.
15. Authorisation to CIA and Dol) and its components to
continue inuependently the development and operation of satellite
reconnaissance system a subject tc arrangements for levying
intelligence requirements an the exchange of iniermetion and
provision of gradual support. with decisions concerning orate's*
allocation and uitillaation to be cnade ad hoc by the Secretary of
Defense and the DCI or the 303 Committee.
C. Establishment of an institutional basis for centralised
control ant, direction of the program based on; (1) an Natscstivs
Committee, consisting of the Deputy Secretary of Defease aad the
DCI, responsible for the formulation of basic policy, budgetary
decisions and the broad allocatioa of program responsibility
(2) a Director of Malarial Reconnaissance responsible to the
Executive ?S;omrnittee for coordination ot the entire program
with staff responeibility for all components engaged in recenusi
san.ce activities other than such si.erosixt* of the Defense liepartment
or the Armed Services as may be assigned to his -,-Arect supervleiou
by the Secretary of Defames; and (3) recognition ot the DC! and
USIA responsibility for determinin requirements for mission
coverage and frequency and ?stabtishrttent within CIA of faciiiiiire
for the formulation and transmission of guidance governing
intelligence targets and objectives insofar as these determise
the epheinerie at all satellite reconoatesance missions.
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III. Discussion of Alternatives.
A decision to assign exclusive control of the operetta= and
development of all satellite reconnaissance systems to the Dufense
Department would obviously be incompatible with the aoeumption Mit
it is essential to preserve CIA's technical competence and experience
as a contributing factor in the satellite pregram. Moreover, active
participation by CIA in the research. development and production
phases of satellite reconnaiseanCe Devisors waald *sem highly desirable
for the puree** of ensuring that development or imprwrement of
satellite payloads for reconnaissance purposes is fully and exclusively
responsive to intelligence needs. Because of its charter respoesi-
billties CIA's participation in reconasissance irysterns doiroloposont
provides assurance that payload designs will not be diverted or degraded
to iCCOXIAISIodate, non-intelligence gathering purposes.
Allocation of &a eaChtaive franchise to CIA for all ',heaps of
satellite reconeaissance would place responsibilities on CIA whisk
exceed its capacities and provoke strong apposition, particulasty on
the theory that this would create a third agency in apace with undefirebie
consequences. A decision giving CIA exclusive rsspoasibility for
payload development would deprive the program of resources enter
Dol) control and glimisoto desirable competition.
The proposal to create a new NSA-type organization responsible
for all recoonaissaace activity offers few advantages. Implementation
of such a proposal could involve the establishment within a now qiinet-
autonomous agency of all the facilities and authority neeeppeary to carry
out all aspects of the entire reCellaiLial&AUS pregren suck as launching.
tracking, reeovery, and other operational, procurement and R&D
facilities including assumption of CIA's present responsibilities ter
covert relations with foreign governments in connection with U-4 operations
and the DCI's authority to expend enveuchered funds wider Public Law 110.
Or it could involve retention ef earns of thee* reeponsibilities and
facilities in CIA and existing components of D.D. This altereative,
therefore. either involves creation of formidable new agency with
far reaching jurisdictional ireplicatiend in the spate, intelligence and
RAID fields. Or it only serves to cemplicate rather than remakes the
problem of achieving a coordinate( progratr under centralize( direction
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The altereative u.ader which CU and keD would independently
continue development and operation of reconsaisaance systems Ileidar
a loose co?rdinating arrangement simply perpetuates the existing
unsatisfactory and chaotic situation.
Some *elution along the limes of alternative (paragraph In
appears imperative. The broad outline, of such an arrangemeilit
have been suggested by the DCI from time to time and were diseiseeed
by hin with the Secretary of Listens, and the Leputy Secretart
at
Defense on 27 fehrsary. The details of the proposed institotienni
arrangements are described and explained in some detail in a
n emorandum outlining CIA orgasisatienal proposals for the
organisation of the National Reconnalensace Program (sainexe4I as
Tab 1). by way of introduction, however, it may be helpful to
identify aome of the major organisational features of the proposed
arrangement acid discuss very briefly sorra of the t:onsiderations
which the organization suggests.
a. Executive Committee. The proposal to zonfiren and
formalise this con mines reflects recognition of am inevitabie
duality of responsibility as between .0.1) anti LLk for the program
as a whole. nits device appears to be about the only way to
ensure contributions en a fully coordinated basis by subordinate
elements of CIA and DOD to a 4:omplea progran ? which
involves very substantial operational, develepnlental exad pro-
curement responsibilities withou; doing vielence to the integrity
of managerial lints of command. Given the importance and
character of the program. it ..an confidently be expected that
officials at the level repreeentec on the k:xecutive Con rrittee
will reach agreement on all issues sAbmitteo to the committee.
provided they are properly staffed and presented. The
moot serious objection to the arrangement is the demand
which it creates on the time of the two officials involved. this
burden however will be red.aced as the committee succeeds
in establishing broad guideliees governing the allocation at
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research and other responsibilities and to the extent that the
DNRO (contemplated in the proposal) succeeds in gaining the
confidence of the committee and of participating agencies.
b. DP4RO. Considerable concern has been expressed
with the need to define the precise authority and responsibilities
contemplated for this official. The proposal is that he would
function in a nianner and with anti 3V ity substantially cortnieesurate
with that of an Assistant Secretary of a large department. He
would have fell access to all details of all activities and the
right inherent in any staff officer to question program*, proposals
or decisions; to saggest alternatives and to require review through
the appronziate comsrand line or through appeal to the FAiscutive
Committee, on whose behalf he functioas. To the extent that
the Secretary of Defense deems appropriate, he would also
assume direct managerial responsibility for con ponessts of the
refense I epartn ent involved in the progran .
c. Intelligence Input. Orbital plans for satellite in siert*
timet LJS Sigrket to *aware:
(1) that, to the extent that 1nteIlig*1.M targets
deter mine an orbital mission plan, these targets will be
Identified b MIL and incorporated into the flight pinn
thrinigh an instrunkentality of CIA; atte.
(2) that the intelligence comerainity will be in a
position to be aware of the (logroe, if any, to which intelli-
gence consideration* are subordinated to other nork-intitiligence
considerations in the planning or execution of an orbital
flight plan ilnd to protest, if necessary as. post fact*, if
such subordination appears iinreasonaole ?r improper.
Guidance q.ete ruining the ephemeris of a mission ultimately
assumes computerise, form. It As here proposer that, lamas
as the ephemeris is ?stitblishett by intelligence objectiveu, COTE
paterize, guidance for the mission will be formulated b7-
Requirements Progran Centre( analogous to the
present 34 >C) under GLA. control. The process by which the
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sphemeris of a satellite mission is determined is complicated
by the necessity to incorporate guidance to accor..-Imodete
considerations not related to intelligence, such as R&D, weather.
"the health of the bird." etc. The intelligence and non-intellipince
ioput? into the over-all computerised guidance nave to be related
in a on plicated process reflecting a complex interrelatieaship.
By reserving to CIA the authority to develop the computerised
guidance relating to the intelligence objectives of a, particular
r Julian, it is not intended to pre-empt or denigrate the sue:4dt'
of the Defense Department over launching, inflight or recovery
aspects of a mission.
d. R&D. The research, development, testing and production
responsibilities reserved to CIA in the proposed arrangement, to
ensure utiliaation of CIA 8 special competence. are also est intended
to impair the authority and responsibility of the Defense Department
for assembling. launching, orbital control and recovery of
reconnaissance satellites. The agency responsible for exercising the
Defense Departinenti a authority in this respect can (it seems
reasonable to assume) be No organised as to accommodate CIA
representation, in conjunction with their contractors, at the point
of assembly a a payload into a launch unit. ft can also, dorbag
the test stages of a new payload, accommodate the presence of
engineerifig end technical representatives of CIA and their con.
tractors, as consultants to ensure that the flight is responsive te
the technical and engineering objectives of the test.
e. Budgeting. The entire process by which CIA obtains
Its approprietions and by which Lands are authorised and allocated
to the "black budget" for all purpose*. including the funding of
national reconnaissance projects is complicated and probably
deserves review. To the extent that the present organisational
proposals involve budgetary procedures the intent is to make sure
that funds will be allocated in bulk and in azr.ounts roughly commen-
surate with the eatimated costs of programs responsibility for
wlaiL:h has bean allocated as between agencies. The purpose of
this is to encourage rather clear cut allocations of program
responsibility (after aciequate study and evaluation) and discourage
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any propensity on the part of rutwordinato lodestone to nullify or
?reds docision? awarding program resoonsihility by withholding
furics roqiiired for incrornontal aspects of a program the ovor-aii
desirability of which has already boon approved at a polity lorvol.
Nothing in this proposal is intsni.ot_ to limit the right, or elos
responsibility of the DNR to rovisw progran account*, cost
estimates, or budget, or to initiate reprogramming exorcises or,
at any tin*, to oropoos reviow, modifications. or tormination og
program decisions through this tins of command or ths Emoeutivs
Committee.
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