INTRODUCTION OF RESOLUTION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00364R000600110011-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 6, 2006
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: October 3, 1968
• Content Type: OPEN

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1961 ' ; CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
Only about 25 percent of them are liter-
ate. Less than a fourth of the children
of school age are in school, and less than
2 percent ever complete secondary
education. Pupil-teacher ratios of 100
to 1 are common, compared to about 25
to 1 in the developed countries.
To help meet this challenge, the
United States, through the Agency for
International Development has estab-
lished cooperative educational programs
in 58 nations. In each the goal is the
same: To train people who in turn can
train teachers, prepare suitable texts
and teaching aids, and themselves devel-
op a strong educational program in their
respective countries. Assistance Is pro-
vided for all levels of eduction-primary,
secondary, and higher education; fQr all
age groups and types of schools-voca-
tional and technical as well as general
education; and for construction and
equipment as well as for technical assist-
ance.
In 1962, AID obligated $93 million In
U.S. funds plus an additional $98 million
in U.S,-owned local currencies to assist
the developing nations In meeting acute
educational problems.
In Bolivia, AID projects are being car-
ried out to improve commercial educa-
tion. Libya, a program in vocational
training for farmers, tradesmen, and
handicraft artisans is in progress. In
Iran, U.S. aid helped to establish an en-
tire vocational education system for the
Iranian armed forces.
In Pakistan, an AID team taught
Pakistani railwaymen-few of whom
spoke the same language or dialect-
how to operate diesel locomotives.
With independence approaching in
Kenya, an AID-assisted special project
has begun to train 47 local government
officials for positions of high responsi-
bility in the government when independ-
ence is granted.
A fascinating example of an AID proj-
ect covering several levels of education
is the program in Nepal.
Nepal's first teacher-training center
was established in 1954 under the direc-
tion of the University of Oregon. In
1956 mobile teaching teams were orga-
nized to carry teacher training to the
remqte provinces.
A college of education was established
and a staff trained to educate up to 2,000
teachers a year. A bureau of textbook
publication was established and several
of Its Nepalese staff members were sent
to the United States for special training.
The bureau printed 55 different titles
and 225,000 pieces of educational litera-
ture in its first-5 years of operation.
More than 2,400 part-time teachers
were trained for literacy education, and
they in turn taught more than 1,000
adults to read and write in their first
year in the field,
Nepal's first national university was
established with colleges of liberal arts
and sciences, agriculture and forestry,
education, law, nursing, and medicine.
Before the AID program began, Nepal
had no national university, no teacher-
training institutions. Only 1 child in
200 was in school, and only 2 percent of
the Nepalese people could read and write.
At the end of the first 5 years of the
education project, more than 1,500 new
primary classrooms had trained teach-
ers, 200 new schools were receiving fi-
nancial aid, and 20 new primary texts
had been published. Nearly 200 second-
ary teachers had received bachelor of
education degrees and 45 high school
teachers had undergone a 1-year course
for the improvement of English instruc-
tion. In addition, Nepal's entire second-
ary school curriculum had been re-
vamped to include vocational instruction
urgently required in agriculture, home
economics, commercial education, and
industrial arts.
A program similar to the one in Nepal
Is now being carried out in India with
the assistance of U.S.-AID education
teams from Ohio State University and
the Teachers College of Columbia Uni-
versity.
In Cambodia a teacher-training pro-
gram has been under way for 5 years.
Prior to 1958 Cambodian students with
a sixth-grade education were given a
summer of training and then pressed
into service as elementary school teach-
ers. Under the AID contract Cambodia's
first teacher preparation center was
established and has already become the
largest educational institution in the
country. Each year the center trains
200 elementary school teachers. An-
other similar Institution is now being
established with AID assistance to train
secondary school teachers.
Television represents a potentially
valuable educational medium for the de-
veloping nations. In Nigeria, for ex-
ample, AID has provided an experienced
American educational television execu-
tive as an adviser to the Nigerian staff
of a new educational television station.
From 1960 to 1962 the station has tele-
cast more than 700 different programs
for a total of 350 hours of instruction to
100 village schools equipped with tele-
vision sets supplied by the Nigerian
Ministry of Education.
Not only teachers, but also classrooms
are in short supply in most underdevel-
oped nations. AID has encouraged the
building of new schools and classrooms
in many countries by providing techni-
cal help and materials while local resi-
dents provide the construction labor on
a volunteer basis.
The Guatemalan Government
launched a self-help school construction
program in partnership with AID in 1960.
AID and the Guatemalan Government
agreed to share equally any costs not
absorbed by the local communities. At
the beginning of the project, it was ex-
pected that volunteer labor would cover
about one-third of the cost of construc-
tion. In fact, it has accounted for
nearly 44 percent of construction costs.
During the 3 years since the pilot project
began, self-help schools have been built
and are now operating in every province
of Guatemala. More than 1,100 class-
rooms in 300 schools have been com-
pleted. The enthusiastic turnout of vil-
lagers for each school dedication symbol-
izes the impact of such AID assisted proj-
ects on the lives of the people.
Self-help school construction programs
like the one in Guatemala are now un-
derway in Chile. Liberia, El Salvador,
Haiti, and Honduras.
MORI/CDF Pages _1 thru 7
14265
Another serious educations problem
facing many developing natic. ;?. is that
of adult literacy. In Turkey t, unique
approach to the problem has .,+n insti-
tuted with U.S. aid. Literac- training
has been given to more th n 150,000
Turkish soldiers and an additional
120,000 are expected to corm- ~! e train-
ing each year.
In addition, more than 3,&o primary
school teachers have gain: literacy
teaching experience at the m:tit;ary cen-
ters. This group will farm t- Leaching
nucleus of a planned civili 1 literacy
program. The goal is 1o reciure illiter-
acy in Turkey from 70 to 30 u.+rcent by
1975,
In the Turkish project, as !: most lit-
eracy projects, U.S. experts i;elp local
educators prepare training materials,
texts, and followup rear=ing n ;terials for
use by the newly literate..
As of 1962, the Agency fF,r Interna-
tional Development had o?rdertaken
projects to increase th=- supr' and Im-
prove the quality of prima. -Y and sec-
ondary school teachers I 33 Latin
American, African, and Asoarr nations.
In Afghanistan, U.S. aid is h., only bi-
lateral assistance permitted } the Gov-
ernment in the sensitive an of educa-
tion.
Because English has becoi,?e the near-
est thing to an internationa? _i-nguage in
many underdeveloped natic AIL) has
been providing technical s -I tance for
the teaching of English in 4 Asian and
African countries.
Finally, 75 America c uni u 'sities and
colleges are working under A..I o contracts
in the establishment and roorovement
of facilities for higher edue- rim n in more
than 26 Asian, African, and ruth Amer-
ican countries.
Of the many needs of ti developing
countries none is more crit'ti.1 than the
need for education, in the t, --, d.est sense
of the word. And of the r .v vv parts of
our foreign aid program nr-ir is more in
keeping with American id a s, and the
aspirations of Americans fir =-heir fellow
men around the world; tha,i educational
assistance.
INTRODUCTION OF PE3OLUTION
FOR THE ESTABLISII 4 -,'NT OF A
JOINT COMMITTEE IN FOR-
EIGN INFORMATION 'ND INTEL-
LIGENCE
The SPEAKER pro temi r (Mr. Roy-
sAL). Under previous orde:.o c the House,
the gentleman frond Ne,: York [Mr.
LxiwsAy] is recognized fr,r, 60 minutes,
10 minutes of which havc already been
consumed by the previou presentation
of the gentleman from li a o nesota [Mr.
FRASER].
(Mr. LINDSAY asked 2,i was given
permission to revise and x i end his re-
marks.)
Mr. LINDSAY. Mr. ; c iker, I rise
today to introduce a resi3iutlon for the
establishment of a Joint - 3,mmittee on
Foreign Informatio7i an intelligence.
I propose that the comr_e%;aee be con-
stituted roughly along tlw* lines of the
Joint Committee on Atop -c Energy and
that it have its own funs mnd staff re-
sources. I propose also `'rat it make
continuing studies in the ;hole area of
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14266 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
g
our foreign information and intelligence thority in these areas? Of course it does mittee on National Security Staffing and
programs. not. Congress has always asserted its Operations.
In my remarks this afternoon, how- right to concern itself with even the most If we are going to refrain from looking
ever, Mr. Speaker, I do not Intend to sensitive areas of Government. And, into the affairs of executive agencies,
dwell at great length on the precise terms where matters of the highest secrecy even agencies which report directly to
of this particular resolution. I think it have been involved, Members of both the President, than I fear we are going to
is a good resolution but I am perfectly Houses have shown themselves perfectly have to disband a large number of our
ready to be persuaded that a better one capable of exercising the utmost re- committees, or at least to curtail severely
might be devised. The question of the straint. This was never more clearly their activities. Of course we in the
exact structure and composition of this demonstrated than by the experience of legislature cannot and should not inter-
committee seems to me significantly less the Manhattan project during World vene in areas beyond our competence.
important than the more general ques- War II, when members of the two appro- But in my view we have not only a right
tions of principle involved. I rise today, priations committees were kept fully ap- but a duty to maintain a general surveil-
not to make propaganda on behalf of a prised of the progress of the project lance over agencies like the Central In-
particular proposal of mine, but rather without on any occasion breaking secu- telligence Agency, which are established.
to raise a matter which I think is in need rity. And I am sure all Members of the by statute and sustained by funds voted
of the widest possible and most intelli- House will agree that the record of the by the Members of these two Houses.
gent public discussion. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in
As most Members are aware, the pro- this connection has been impeccable. These excumenly executiveng secrecy
posal of a Joint Committee on Foreign As in the case of the Atomic Energy and, the exclusively executive nature of
Intelligence is not a new one. In one Committee, i take it for granted of
the intelligence community-are at least
form or another it habs b
i
een
ntroduced course that much of the work of the new
into this House in each of the last 10 committee-perhaps almost all of it-
sessions; in 1955 it was the subject of a would be conducted in private and that
2-day hearing by the Rules Committee. the results would be made public. only
In the Senate the Committee on Rules of ter a close screening by the appropriate
and Administration reported on it favor- Government agencies. Nevertheless, i
ably in 1956, and for 2 days it was de- admit that particular concern might still
bated on the floor of that body. Nor is be felt about CIA, since breaches of
It partisan in nature. Back In 1959 res- security involving CIA might endanger
olutions similar to mine were sponsored the lives of American operatives in other'
in the House by eight Democrats and countries, and also the lives of agents of
four Republicans. Earlier this year the other nations working in cooperation
matter was brought to our attention by with us. I think this is a legitimate Ion-
a member of the other party, the dis- cern, but I hope to show later in my
tinguished gentleman from Florida [Mr. speech that there are many important
RocEasl. Moreover, when Mr. MANS- aspects of intelligence work which could
FIELD'S resolution came to a vote In the usefully be studied without any need to
Senate in 1956, the minority in favor inquire in detail into the activities of
included many Members on both sides particular persons and units in the field.
of the aisle. On that or-ion one _
junior Senator from Massachusetts, now
the President of the United States.
If the Proposal for a Joint Committee
on Foreign Intelligence has come up so
often and been supported by so many
Members, why has it never been
adopted? Frankly I do not find that
u
q
estion easy to answer, Particularly
since some of the arguments against it
consistent. But strangely enough those
who oppose resolutions similar to thi
s
that for these reasons Congress should
abstain entirely from overseeing the in-
telligence community, but that on the
contrary congressional oversight is al-
ready more than adequate. Senator
RUSSELL made this claim in the debate
already quoted, and it was reiterated by
Mr. Allen Dulles, the former Director of
Central Intelligence, in his recent article
in Harper's magazine. What is in fact
the extent of congressional surveillance
at the moment?
In both the House and Senate the
bodies responsible for overseeing the in-
telligence community are small subcom-
mittees of the Appropriations and Armed
Services Committees. Neither the House
another argument that has also beenYad-, ate Foreign Relations Committee has
~urfsdfctin in this area despite
m their
vanced frequently in discussions of this rest in intelligence matters.
question-namely, that the intelligence obvious interest
community exists solely to serve the This might not matter were it not for the
President and the National Security fact that the surveillance exercised by
Council, and that therefore we in the the four existing subcommittees is almost
Congress have no right to seek a juris- example, my Both cursory and sporadic. For
dictional position. This doctrine was example, last year during a debate in the
S
enate the c chuset shed senior SenatoMr.
extreme seem to me so feeble. Take, to begin stated HAYDEN in the Senaform te in 195 6 by from
r Massa
ts, with, the argument about secrecy. It is that time: T STALL, as asked fri end, ime
an argument that
has been advanced the ArmdLServicesSubcommitteet ee
ttell every time the proposal has been dis- of the Presiden. U derethegCo c stitution i voted to the CIA affairs. Mr. SALTON-
cussed. During the Senate debate in feel we have no right to attempt to regulate STALL was perfectly frank. He said:
1956 the chairman of the Senate an agency which Is designed solely to pro- I say on the floor of the Senate that we
Armed Services Committee, Mr. Rus- vide the President, who, under the Consti- spend several hours and go into many details
SELL, went so far as to say that, rather tution, is responsible for our foreign rela- of operations, of expenses, of administration,
than have a committee set up and in- tions, with information to enable him to and so on.
for
ti
ma
on made available to Members of make decisions.
Congress, "it would be better to abolish I, for one, cannot accept that doctrine.
the Central Intelligence Agency and, by As every Member knows, these two
doing so, to save the money appropriated branches of our Government, the execu-
and the lives of American citizens." A tive and the legislative- are not water-
former Vice President, Mr. Barkley, took tight compartments separated by steel
the same view in the same debate. bulkheads; the material between them is
Now no one denies that CIA and.other flexible and porous. There are any nuin-
intelligence agencies must conduct a very ber of congressional committees which
high proportion of their operations in keep a watch over the executive agencies.
secret. Secrecy is of the essence of their In this House we have, to name only two,
work; without it they could not function, the Foreign Affairs Committee which in-
and the security of our country would quires constantly into the policies and
be jeopardized. No one denies that. But actions of the Presidentand his agents,
what is true of the intelligence commu- and the Government Operations Com-
nity is also true in many other areas of mittee which closely scrutinizes the en-
government: in the fields of atomic en- tire organization of the executive
ergy, weapons development, and foreign branch. The Senate has a subcommittee
policy, for example. But does this mean whose area of operations borders on the
that Congress is to have no effective au- very area I am discussing: the Subcom-
I ask Members to note the phrase
"several hours"-not weeks or even days,
but hours. The members of one of the
most important committees in the other
House devote only hours to, the affairs
of one of the most important agencies of
our Government. The reasons for this
are surely clear. The members of the
four subcommittees lack any staff spe-
cialized in these matters; they them-
selves can have little time or thought to
devote them. But even if these subcom-
mittees do have more time for intelli-
gence, nevertheless the disadvantages
of having responsibility for the intelli-
gence community divided up among four
different subcommittees would, I think,
be obvious to everyone. I maintain'that
congressional surveillance of the intelli-
gence community is not now adequate,
=Au
u,'t 15
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1963'__
and cannot be adequate as long as it
continues to be organized as it is at
present.
A moment ago I referred to the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency as one of the
most important agencies of our Govern-
ment. What is true of CIA is, of course,
even truer of the intelligence commu-
nity as a whole. Yet from time to time
those who maintain that Intelligence op-
erations fall exclusively within the execu-
tive sphere-those, in other words, who
are opposed to the establishment of a -
joint congressional committee-try to
persuade us, despite all we have heard
and seen during the past few years, that
nevertheless CIA is a purely advisory
body, that that it is not directly con-
cerned with the making of national pol-
icy. Mr. Allen Dulles himself remarked
several years ago:
CIA is not a policymaking Agency: we
furnish intelligence to assist in the formula-
tion of policy.
Senator RUSSELL during a debate in
the other body was even more blunt:
Some Senators who addressed themselves
to the resolution on Monday last, seemed to
hold the opinion that the CIA was a policy-
making agency. That theme ran all through
the remarks which were made in advocacy
of the adoption of the resolution.
Mr. President, the Central Intelligence
Agency is far from being a policymaking
agency. It makes no policy.
The distinguished Senator went on to
say that CIA was merely a coordinating
and Information-gathering body whose
function was simply to present its find-
ings to the actual policymaking body, the
National Security Council.
Senator RUSSELL said all this in 1956.
In my view it was scarcely plausible even
then. Now in 1963, after our experi-
ences In Cuba, Laos and elsewhere, to
say that CIA is in no sense a policymak-
ing body is to say something that is pal-
pably untrue. The National Security
`Act, under which CIA operates, does not,
of course, formally assign it policymak-
ing functions. But CIA is a policymak-
ing body, and we all know It. The rea-
sons have been well put by Prof. Harry
Howe Ransom, our leading lay student
of intelligence affairs. In his study
"Central Intelligence and National Se-
curity," published as early as 1958, he
has this to say:
Certainly the CIA has no policymaking
responsibility. Yet policy making Is not a
simple static action. Rather it is a dynamic
process. A key element in this process is the
information available to policymakers. The
man, or group, controlling the information
available to policymakers does in fact play
a major if indirect role in policymaking.
A few pages later Professor Ransom
adds:
It would be unrealistic to suggest that the
bright young men of CIA, by training, talent,
and personality, do not hold strong views on
controversial issues of national security
policy. If it is granted that knowledge is
indeed power, it. will be recognized that in
reality the CIA, through an increasing ef-
ficiency-and consequently rising credit with
responsible decision makers-has come to
play a major role in creating national secu-
rity policy.
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE t4267
Surely those statements can no longer
be regarded as anything but the simple
truth. In fact even Senator RUSSELL
appears to have come round. Last year,
during the hearings on the confirmation
of Mr. John McCone to be Director of
Central Intelligence, Senator RUSSELL
remarked:
In this period through watch we are pass-
ing, this office is perhaps seccad only to the
Presidency in Its importance.
A few moments later he repeated the
point. I am inclined to agree with Sen-
ator RUSSELL. And I submit to you that
one does not describe a man as holding
an office "second only to the Presidency
in its importance" if the agency of which
he is the head is not itself a policymak-
ing agency of the very first order of
importance.
Up to this point, Mr. Speaker, I have
been mainly concerned to clear the
ground, as it were-to state as clearly
as I could my objections to the argu-
ments most commonly used by opponents
of the proposal I am supporting. Only
by implication have I suggested positive
reasons why I think a Joint Committee
on Foreign Information and Intelligence
should be established. I want now to ad-
dress myself to the central questions:
why do I think such a joint committee
is necessary? and, equally important,
what work do I think it might usefully
undertake?
But first I have to make one further
point. The Central Intelligence Agency,
and indeed the entire intelligence com-
munity, is highly---and necessarily--se-
cretive in its mode of operations. For
this reason outsiders like myself have no
alternative but to rely for their informa-
tion on newspaper reports, on the oc-
casional published hearings on House
and Senate committees, on the work of
scholars like Professor Ransom, and on
a miscellaneous variety of other sources.
in the very nature of things our com-
ments and criticisms cannot be authori-
tative. We are working in the dark, or
at least in the semitwilight. Neverthe-
less, I think we do know enough to have
reasonable grounds for supposing that
all is not well within the intelligence
community. Even more important, I
think we know enough to be certain that
we need to know snore-and by "we,"
of course, I mean not necessarily the
general public nor even every Member
of Congress, but those Members who
would serve on the kind of committee I
have in mind.
Why, then, do I think such a com-
mittee should be established?
I have two general reasons. The first
concerns the extraordinary number of
specific criticisms that have been leveled
over the years against the Central In-
telligence Agency and, by implication,
against the intelligence community as
a whole. Admittedly, as Mr. Allen
Dulles recently pointed out:
You cannot tell of operations that go
along well. Those that go badly generally
speak for themselves.
And I would not want for a moment
to deny that the Central Intelligence
Agency has scored a number cr quite
spectacular successes-the ti - over-
flights, for example, and the , rthrow
of the Mossadegh regim< in ?a=n. On
balance it is almost certainly t, a:, to say
that the intelligence c,.-)mm t,ty has
served the Nation well. But, tie fact
does remain that on occ-tsion ?;I,e com-
munity has blundered seriousi- _-tad that
for its blunder the citizens of o United
States have paid a heavy pric<
Let me refer to just aa, few rstances.
Back in 1950, as Mr. Dulles h,rself has
tacitly admitted, the intellig, ,i -e com-
munity failed to anticipate t Chinese
Communist intervention in F. ea. We
are still living with the eons i ences of
that particular failure, A -aw years
later an Incident involving he CIA
caused us serious embaa rassr ? it in the
Middle East and may have ,,eitributed
indirectly to the Suez aftai- in July
1956 President Nasser cf Eg', claimed
in a speech at Alexandria thai he had
been strongly advised by a t 3 Govern-
ment official to ignore an Imp -.ant mes-
sage that he was aboui; to r c -ive from
the State Department. It svts subse-
quently confirmed that the , 'fiicial in
question had been the reg, mat repre-
sentative of CIA.
More recently, of course, w had the
fiasco of the Bay of Piiis. C:4=-f respon-
sibility for that lamentable a, fair must
rest with the President of ate United
States. However, ther s can he no ques-
tion but that the Central _- ttelligence
Agency was deeply involved :a the whole
affair, and that its actions and advice
had a decisive effect on ! nv eventual
outcome. Surely most Mei ters of the
House will agree that it wo ip: b8 in the
national interest to know - cz ether such
Incidents were merely pal,.(ular aber-
rations or whether, In fact, trey form a
pattern that is likely to b< repeated in
the future.
My second general =reaso, !,,)r pressing
for the establishment of ti committee
I can state quite bri 'fly. _t is this. I
abhor government by secre e I regard
it as inimical to the effecti.i function-
ing of our institutiats. I regard it as
alien to our American way ,i life. Above
all, I regard it as a threat -.c: our funda-
mental liberties. I ful= - realize, of
course, it should be clear f -?om what I
have said already that a l i tt-h degree of
secrecy is essential to th s workings of
the intelligence communis %
But I fear that with -.pest to the
intelligence community w, are often the
victims of secrecy for i ee recy's sake.
Things are done to us an i in our name
which we know nothing -. I do not
wish to see the legitimate- ?2erets of the
intelligence community r'oorted in the
press and on the air Of 4) arse I do not.
But it does seem to me oj e,iormous im=
portance that a few selec representa-
tives of the people, cho, r by the two
Houses of Congress, rho, e be continu-
ously aware of what t ?f intelligence
community is doing anc_ i ~ the way in
which it is going about ,i sing it. The
American people have a r stake, not
merely their libertic s but } qtr lives.
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14268
Despite all I have said so far, there
would, of course, be little point in estab-
lishing this joint committee unless we
had some fairly clear idea of what we
thought it should do, of what subjects
we thought it should study. I propose,
therefore, to continue by discussing four
questions, all of high importance, which
I think might usefully be investigated:
first, the relations between the Central
Intelligence Agency and the State De-
partment, especially overseas; second,
the relations between intelligence-gath-
ering on the one hand and so-called
special operations on the other; third,
the selection and training of intelligence
personnel; and fourth, the whole ques-
tion of Intelligence evaluation. I pro-
pose to deal briefly with the first three of
these questions and to say rather more
abouhe fourth.
First, the relations between CIA and
the State Department.
The problem here has been posed suc-
cinctly by Henry Howe Ransom in the
book I have already cited. On page 216
he writes:
The operation by the U.S. Government of
a farflung secret apparatus for Intelligence
gathering and political action could have
widespread diplomatic ramifications. There
may be a basic incompatibility between the
maintenance of accredited diplomatic mis-
sions In some 78 foreign posts (as of 1958)-
The number would be considerably
greater now-
and the existence of American secret agents
in most of these same foreign areas. Great-
est care must be exercised in keeping U.S.
diplomacy separated from spying and back-
stage political maneuvering, at least on the
surface, yet the diplomats probablyto should
not be lompletely In the dark as the
activities of American secret agents.
The possibly disruptive effect of hav-
ing, on the premises of American em-
bassies abroad or in the field, agents
who owe allegiance to someone other
than the ambassador and to an organi-
zation other than the State Department
and who may be engaging in activities
running counter to expressed State De-
partment policy, scarcely needs spelling
out In detail.
Nor are these dangers merely specu-
lative. It seems, for example, that to-
ward the end of the Chinese civil war
remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's Na-
tionalist Army moved into parts of
northern Burma. These troops claimed
to be eager to harass the Communists
across the border, and CIA accordingly
supplied them with large quantities of
money and arms. But according to
available reports the Chinese had long
since tired of fighting. Instead of at-
tacking the Communists, they proceeded
to settle down, to occupy much of the
best agricultural land in northern
Burma, and to cultivate opium-all with
the assistance of U.S. funds.
This would have been a melancholy
episode in any case. But what made it
worse was the fact that our Ambassador
in Rangoon apparently had not the
faintest idea of what CIA was doing.
When the Burmese Government formally
complained to the United States, the
Ambassador issued a categorical denial;
he said the United States had nothing
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- HOUSE ?Augit?t 15
to do with the activities of the Nation-
alist Chinese. Our Ambassador of course
believed he was telling the truth. But
what he was saying was in fact not true,
and naturally the Burmese were shocked
by this apparent evidence of American
duplicity. What was the upshot of this
episode? The American Ambassador re-
signed, the U.S. Government was deeply
embarrassed and the Government of
Burma threatened for a time to break off
diplomatic relations.
Admittedly, this incident was particu-
larly ludicrous. But it is not without
parallel. Our policy in the early stages
of the Laotian crisis appears to have
been constantly bedeviled by a lack of
effective coordination between the CIA
and the State Department. Similarly
with Cuba prior to the Bay of Pigs in-
vasion. Mr. Tad Szulc and W. Karl
Meyer, in their able account of that
affair, describe how, on its own initiative,
CIA established close working relations
with exiled supporters of the former dic-
tator Batista. They add:
This decision marked the inauguration of
what, In effect, became its Independent for-
eign policy toward Cuba, in cavalier disre-
gard of the thinking in the White House
and the State Department.
Note that all this occurred despite the
efforts of an earlier Secretary of State,
Mr. Christian Herter, to regularize rela-
tions between the State Department and
CIA. Since then the Herter-Allen Dulles
agreement on the relations between Am-
bassadors and CIA personnel in the field
has been reaffirmed by Mr. Rusk and Mr.
McCone. And by now we have reason
to hope that the responsible foreign
policymakers-the President and the
National Security Council-have reas-
serted their authority over the Central
Intelligence Agency. I agree that to a
considerable extent this Is a problem of
particular persons and particular situa-
tions. But it is also the case that, as
long as both State Department and CIA
personnel are working in the field, as
long as both agencies are responsible for
the collection of information, and-per-
haps most important-as long as CIA
continues to be responsible for special
operations, the problem of integrating
the Central Intelligence Agency into our
general-foreign policy apparatus will re-
main difficult and will remain worthy of
close and continuous examination. The
exercise of surveillance in this field I
conceive to be one possible function of
a Joint Congressional Committee on For-
eign Information and Intelligence.
A moment ago I alluded to the con-
duct by the CIA of so-called special op-
erations; that is, the fomenting of oppo-
sition against hostile governments, the
arming of insurgents, the- provocation of
enemy action, and so on. The question
of housing these special operations-or
additional services or other functions or
whatever you want to call them-under
the same roof as the CIA's purely Intel-
ligence-gathering operations has, of
course, long been a matter of controversy,
and it is this question that I suggest
might usefully be the second of the new
joint committee's areas of study.
I do not suppose we need to be re-
minded of the importance of this ques-
tion. The Bay of Pigs invasion was only
the most spectacular and. best publicized
of CIA's special operations. There was
the Iranian affair In 1953, and the fol-
lowing year the overthrow of the Arbenz
regime in Guatemala. CIA also appears
to have had a hand in the main risings
in Eastern Europe, in East Berlin and
Hungary. Operations of this sort, unless
carefully supervised and controlled by
responsible political officers, could un-
wittingly involve the United States in a
-major international crisis, possibly in
war. If this was not clear before the
Bay of Pigs, it. ought to be clear now.
The institutional danger here is read-
ily apparent and has often been stated.
As Professor Ransom puts it:
To mix the two functions--
That Is, of information gathering and
special operations-
Involves the danger that foreign agents col-
lecting facts and trying at the same time
to bolster or cause the overthrow of a foreign
government In America's apparent interest
may develop a less than objective sense for
distinguishing between fact and aspiration.
Messrs. Szulc and Meyer make the
same point apropos of Cuba:
The CIA men were not only shaping, in
effect, foreign policy, but were exempt from
any meaningful outside checks on their ac-
tivities. Indeed, they were in the enviable
position of both organizing a clandestine op-
eration and preparing the intelligence data
through which the validity of the venture
could be judged.
The obvious solution to this problem
would, of course, be to deprive CIA en-
tirely of its special operations function.
Unfortunately the people In the most fa-
vorable position to collect clandestine
Information are often also the people
best placed to engage in subversive polit-
ical activities. In addition, a total di-
vorce between the two functions might
lead, in Ransom's words, to "competi-
tion, duplication, and even outright con-
flict."
For a time the Maxwell Taylor Com-
mittee, appointed by the President to in-
quire into the Bay of Pigs affair, ap-
pears to have toyed, at least, with an
alternative idea-the idea of transfer-
ring the bulk of CIA's special operations
to the Defense Department. But this
solution would have had the equally ob-
vious disadvantage of ensuring that the
uniformed military-and hence the
credit and prestige of the U.S. Govern-
ment-would become involved as soon as
any paramilitary operation became a
matter of public knowledge.
In the event, It seems that routine
covert operations have been left in the
hands of CIA, with control to be trans-
ferred to the Pentagon only if a particu-
lar project becomes so big as to warrant
open military participation. Mr. Hanson
Baldwin in the New York Times summed
up the matter thus:
The general rule of thumb for the future
is that the CIA will not handle any pri-
marily military operations, or ones of such
size that they cannot be kept secret. How-
ever, each case will apparently be judged
on its merits; there Is no hard-and-fast
formula that will put one operation under
the CIA and another under the Pentagon."
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE
All of us, I think, will agree that this
is an area in which hard-and-fast for-
mulas are not appropriate and in which,
in the nature of things, organizational
gimmicks cannot solve the major diffi-
culties. As in the case of relations be-
tween CIA and the State Department,
much depends on particular people and
particular situations. But largely be-
cause the problem is of this sort, because
it is a problem which can never finally
be solved, I feel very strongly that con-
tinuing congressional surveillance is
urgently required. If a joint committee
had been in existence in the early stages
of the first Cuban crisis, and if it had
had cognizance of this matter, would the
Bay of Pigs fiasco have occurred? I
think it is at least possible that it would
not.
Discussion of the Bay of Pigs leads me
naturally to the third of the questions I
think a joint committee might investi-
gate: the whole question of recruitment
and personnel within the intelligence
community. For it seems to me perfect-
ly clear that one of the things that went
wrong with the abortive Cuban inva-
sion-not the only thing, but one of the
things-was that much of the CIA per-
sonnel responsible for the operation con-
sisted of the sort of people who could not
distinguish between the reactionary and
the democratic elements in the anti-
Castro camp, between the opponents of
Castro who were acceptable to the Cuban
people and those who, as former sup-
porters of Batista, were anathema to
them.
Let me quote again from Szulc and
Meyer. In their book, "The Cuban In-
vasion," they write:
Thus the CIA established contacts in Mi-
ami with pro-Batista organizations and with
exile groups whose entire political philosophy
was dedicated to the return to the pre-Castro
status quo in Cuba. ? * * These factions
were placing themselves not only against Cas-
tro but against history; whether or not the
CIA operatives were aware that total regres-
sion is Impossible, the contacts with the
rightist factions ran. counter to official U.S.
policy, aimed at encouraging social reform
in Latin America."
A few pages later they remark that
the activities of the CIA agents reflected
a desire to promote anti-Castro groups
which they could manipulate. They con-
tinue:
It also reflected an attitude of hostility to
left-of-center exile groups by second-rate
field operatives. This in turn affected the
top level of the agency and resulted in a lack
of understanding at the top. It is not clear
to what extent the CIA attitude was ideolog-
ically motivated or was simply a response
based on the agent's view of what was prac-
tical or realistic.
This tendency on the part of the CIA
to seek out and support the most anti-
Communist groups in the field, regard-
less of whether or not such groups are
politically viable, has of course been
manifested on a number of other occa-
sions-in Laos as well as in Cuba, and
apparently in Algeria and the Congo as
well. It is a persistent tendency, and
one that on occasion has had a damag-
ing effect on our policy. I suspect it has
something to do with the kinds of people
the Central Intelligence Agency gets to
work for it.
Is it wise, for example, to rely to the
extent CIA seems to do on the services
of retired service officers? One would
suppose that retired service officers,
though almost always men of great abil-
ity, would have an instinctive tendency
to take a rather narrow, strictly "opera-
tional" view of the problems confronting
them. Similarly, is it wise to rely too
heavily on the services of political exiles
and refugees? It seems reasonable, for
example, to suppose that an exile from
Ruritania, especially someone who has
passionate convictions about what course
events in his homeland ought to take,
may not be the best person to assess
what course events in his homeland actu-
ally are taking, especially if what Is actu-
ally happening is not to his taste.
Please do not misunderstand me. I
do not mean to impugn the enormous
amount of valuable work being done by
retired service officers and by exiles and
refugees in the CIA. Without their help,
the organization simply could not func-
tion. Altogether the Central Intelli-
gence Agency undoubtedly commands
some of the ablest minds in the U.S. Gov-
ernment. And of course I do not mean
for a moment to suggest that CIA should
be staffed with "soft-liners" or people
who have had no personal experience of
the countries in question. That would be
absurd.
But what I do think is that we have
to be sure that what we are getting are
actually the facts, and not what we
would like to be the facts. This is not a
matter of personal preference one way
or the other. It Is a matter of finding
out what is actually taking place-and
personal preferences enter only as they
may color one's judgment. I suspect
that the judgment of the CIA is some-
times colored by the preference of its
employees. I suspect that CIA ought to
take special care to recruit and employ
men and women of widely differing back-
grounds, temperaments, and opinions. I
suspect that in these kinds of situations
one gets at the truth only when a wide
variety of Inclinations is brought to bear.
But remember that these are my feelings
only. I have little data at my command.
All I am saying is that I have a hunch
that CIA recruitment policy has had an
effect on CIA's Performance. I may be
wrong, but I submit that the only way
we in Congress can find out is by our-
selves conducting an inquiry into the
subject.
The whole question of personnel and
recruitment is, then, the third of the
areas I would like to see a joint com-
mittee study. I would only add that of
course no investigation need inquire into
the names and histories of particular
individuals involved; there need be no
breaches of security or secrecy. The
matter we are concerned with is one of
general policy.
Finally, I want to turn to what is
perhaps the most difficult of the four
questions I referred to earlier: the ques-
tion of how best to organize the evalu-
ation of the enormous amount of ma-
terial collected every day by the various
agencies of the intelligence community.
Obviously evaluation of some sort takes
place at every echelon within the com-
munity, but I am particularly concerned
14269
with the top-level U.S. Ini ,.gene
Board and its auxiliary bock ies.
Probably a few words are in vier on
how these agencies are orga -i :ed. I
think the following description-i r 3ughly
accurate, though the Central In, ""ligence
Agency refused to provide me Ch au-
thoritative information so I ha ; had to
rely on data from publish ^d so es.
By the phrase "intelliger e com-
munity" I mean the nutrerow. a rencies
within the executive bra?.ich -)i icerned
with Intelligence collection am evalua-
tion: the CIA, the new Jlefen Cntelli-
gence Agency, the State De ?s etment,
RAND, and so on. The Comm*rr4ity as a
whole is responsible for pros c1.1ig the
national estimates--described '~? Profes-
sor Ransom as "these vita: milding
blocks of national security polio .' With
the exception of the ultrasecr, >. _iet esti-
mates which are produced by s= eoial ma-
chinery within the Na tiona Security
Council, most estimates ire pr, -) Bred un-
der the aegis of the so-caller Board of
National Estimates. .
This Board consists of a sm: < ii number
of intelligence experts- -sold r;, diplo-
mats, and scholars-whn, to ' v its Ran-
som again, "preside as a kind Manning
general staff for the intelli--rce com-
munity." The Board an 1--Hate the
preparation of an estimate. I ough it
usually does so only on reque-:c from the
President, the Director ~f Ce. ~t~ul Intel-
ligence, or some other membe of the Na-
tional Security Council. In iz t cases, the
Board of National Es':imat, sets the
terms of reference, breaks r problem
up into feasible comporents, ird assigns
appropriate tasks to the varir:c.. agencies.
The resulting staff studies arllated by
the small Office of Nations -:stimates.
The Board then drafts eitht i straight
estimate-that is, one which i tempts to
assess a foreign nation', inte~,t=ons or fu-
ture policies with Implicit as noptions as
to future U.S. policy or a e'ieral esti-
mate--that is, one involvir. stated as-
sumptions concerning liossib changes In
U.S. policy. After the draft _,I-mate has
been returned to the partic} a ting agen-
cies for their comments and iticisms, it
Is submitted, possibly with =IFsents, to a
committee which used to be _rown as the
Intelligence Advisory Com +tee but Is
now named the U.S. Yntell:c ace Board.
It the Board of Estimate Is the plan-
ning board for the Intel p igence com-
munity, the Intelligence 34tard Is its
board of directors. As Rar ri puts it, it
is the "final forum for th ;professional
Intelligence community." t resolves
jurisdictional dispute; wit' i i the com-
munity and is finally respc s.ble for for-
warding the nationr.I esttrnates to the
National Security Counc?;. Invariably
the attempt is made to p s lace agreed
estimates, and usually the - ,.z empt is suc-
cessful; but on occasion di s xrting opin-
ions will be submitted. T: Intelligence
Board meets usually one a week. It
consists of the leadi rig It iigence offi-
cials of the community ar ? ,s chaired by
the Director of Central I: iligence,
Two aspects of thi, proi:_ in particu-
lar are worth noting. 'I first is the
central role of the Centr i Intelligence
Agency. A high proporti, Ti of the intel-
ligence community's far Fathering is
done by CIA. The Bee t of National
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14270 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -
Estimates functions as a part of CIA.
The chairman of the U.S. Intelligence
Board is Director of CIA. And, of course,
the intelligence community's spokesman
on the National Security Council itself
is' also the CIA Director. The second
thing worth noting, however, is the
duality. of CIA's role. Under the Na-
tional Security Act the agency is not
only one of the participants in the in-
telligence community, it is also the chief
agency responsible for coordinating it.
In other words, at many points in the
process of evaluation, CIA is both player
and umpire, both witness and judge.
This ambiguity is implicit in the title
of'the Director who is formally not the
"Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency" but simply "Director of Central
Intelligence."
- Now the danger here is clear. It is
that the Central Intelligence Agency will
become-perhaps it has already be-
come-not merely the chief intelligence
agency but the dominant intelligence
agency, and that it will develop persistent
institutional tendencies, biases, and even
policies. This type of problem is, of
course, not peculiar to the American in-
telligence community but is character-
istic of any complex administrative ap-
paratus. That is the reason it has con-
stantly to be guarded against.
Sherman Kent, a Yale professor and
a World War II intelligence officer, put
the point this way:
Almost any man or group of men con-
fronted with the duty of getting something
planned or getting something done will
sooner or later hit upon what they consider
a single most desirable course of action.
Usually it is sooner; sometimes, under du-
ress, it is a snap judgment of the top of the
head. I cannot escape the belief that under
the circumstances outlined, intelligence will
find itself right In the middle of policy, and
that upon occasions It will be the unabashed
apologist for a given policy rather than its
impartial and objective analyst.
Szulc and Meyer, writing of the Bay
of Pigs, conclude:
Yet CIA was not behaving idiotically; it
was in many senses responding to the insu-
lated rationalism that Infects a sheltered
bureaucracy. Indeed, if there is an institu-
tional villain, it is bureaucracy itself-that
hulking, stubborn giant that seemingly can
only look where it has been and not whither
it is tending.
Professor Ransom calls It simply the
problem of "feedback."
Naturally inthe early months of 1961
the administration addressed itself to
this problem. After the Bay of Pigs it
could scarcely do otherwise. In particu-
lar it reactivated a watchdog group set
up by President Eisenhower in 1956,
originally called the President's Board of
Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Ac-
tivities and now named the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.
This Board, under the chairmanship of
Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., of the Massa-
cuhetts Institute of Technology, studied
the question of evaluation and appar-
ently forwarded one or more reports to
the President in the course of the year.
These reports have not been made pub-
lic, but I think it is possible to piece to-
gether from newspaper reportsroughly
what happened. It seems that the Kil-
lian committee, or at least some of its
members, were unhappy about the dual
role being played by CIA. They proposed
that in future the Director of CIA should
be more of a technician, and that a new
post should be created, probably at-
tached to the White Houses, with some
such title as "Coordinator of Intel-
ligence," the new coordinator would be
in a position to analyse and assess the
results achieved by the intelligence com-
munity without having any bias in favor
of CIA. Reports to this effect appeared
frequently in the press in June and July
1961. In August Mr. Cabell Phillips of
the New York Times stated that the new
post had actually been offered to Mr.
Fowler Hamilton.
Either these reports were inaccurate,
of the administration changed its mind,
or they could not find anyone to occupy
the new post, because in September 1961
the President announced that Mr. John
A. McCone had been named Director of
Central Intelligence without any major
change being made In the structure of
the intelligence community. Subse-
quently, however, in January 1962 one
such change was announced. Hence-
forth the Director of Central Intelligence
was not to function both as Chairman of
the U.S. Intelligence Board and also as
CIA member of the Board. Instead, al-
though the Director was to remain Chair-
man of the Board, his deputy was to act
as representative of the CIA. In a letter
to Mr. McCone, the President noted this
change with approval. He added:
As head of the Central Intelligence Agency,
while you will continue to have overall re-
sponsibility for the Agency,. I shall expect
you to delegate to your principal deputy,
as you may deem necessary, so- much of the
direction of the detailed operation of the
Agency as you may be required to permit you
to carry out your primary task as Director
of Central Intelligence.
Clearly there was a dilemma here. On
the one hand, It was evident that CIA's
intelligence gathering and operational
functions could conflict with its coordi-
nating function-and, of course, what
was true of the Agency was also true of
its Director. On the other hand, the
President and his advisers were almost
certainly aware that an Independent co-
ordinator, who was not himself the head
of a major agency, might find himself
weak, `even powerless, in the face of the
vast intelligence bureaucracies. Inde-
pendence In theory might mean im-
potence in practice. So a compromise
was struck, and the duties of the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence merely
redefined.
How successful this compromise has
been it is probably too early to say. But
from all that I have said, it ought to be
obvious that the problem of evaluation,
like the other problems I have already
mentioned, is a continuing one, and not
one that can be spirited out of existence
by merely institutional gimmickry. It
is also obvious that the problem of evalu-
ation is an enormously important prob-
lem, probably the most important con-
fronting - the intelligence community.
For these reasons, I think that it, too,
should be a continuing subject of scru-
tiny by a well-qualified and well-staffed
committee of Congress.
r ugzisl 15
Mr. Speaker, I do not wish to detain
the House further. I have spoken at
considerable length, yet I am , only too
well aware that I have only skimmed the
surface of this extraordinarily compli-
cated and difficult subject. There are
any number of further questions that I
might have posed-for example, concern-
ing the apparently increasing concentra-
tion of authority within the intelligence
community, or about the role -of- the
U.S. Information Agency. And, of
course, I must repeat that this has
been essentially an outsider's analysis.
I have been trying merely to suggest
what kinds of inquiry a joint committee
might undertake, not to anticipate what
the results of those inquiries would be.
Nor as I remarked at the outset, do
I wish to insist that the resolution I am
introducing today provides the only pos-
sible way- of proceeding. Perhaps the
joint committee should be given rather
different terms of reference. Or perhaps
a body should be established comprising
private citizens as well as Members - of
Congress. I do not want to be dogmatic
about this. My purpose in speaking-to-
day has been to reopen public discussion
of an issue that has too long been dor-
mant, and moreover to reopen it at a
time of relative tranquillity, when the
Intelligence community is not in the
public spotlight, at a time therefore when -
these matters can be considered soberly
and dispassionately.
But we in Congress should not be too
timid about putting ourselves forward.
I wonder how many Members of this
House are aware of the enormous body
of opinion in favor of the creation of a
congressional joint committee. Both
the Hoover Commission and its special
intelligence task force favored congres-
sional - intervention. The New York
Times has consistently supported the
idea in Its editorial columns. Two years
ago the distinguished military analyst,
Mr. Hanson Baldwin, stated that one of
the lessons to be drawn from the Bay of
Pigs was "the necessity of keeping all
secret intelligence activities and opera-
tions under constant top-echelon sur-
veillance and review." He noted that
the machinery for achieving this would
be greatly strengthened by the creation
of a joint congressional watchdog com-
mittee.
Finally, Mr. Speaker, I should like to
quote just once more from the writings
of Professor Harry Howe Ransom who,
as I have already said, is our country's
leading lay student of intelligence affairs.
I think his comment deserves all the
greater consideration because it comes
from a member of the political science
profession-a profession which, as we all
know, has always had a strong bias in
favor of the executive branch of gov-
ernment. On page 206 of "Central In-
telligence and National Security" Pro-
fessor Ransom remarks:
It is common experience for security
policymakers, military and civilian, to find
their fear of congressional interference
changed into gratitude for congressional
support, frequently more effective support
than has been -accorded on the executive side
of Government. No executive agency today
reveals everything to congressional com-
mittees with jurisdiction over its operations.
Officials of central intelligence may be ex-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE 14271
196' ' '
petted to reveal even less. But more ad- congressional supervision in this area is longer ignore this problem. 'n United
vantages are to be gained than lost from itself a serious omission in view of the States and the entire world fai e`i to pro-
establishing a more institutionalized Sys- work required of the foreign policy com- perly plan ahead in the deve >t ment of
tem for congressional surveillance. mittees of both Houses. A variety of our present subsonic jet trap. parts and,
I agree with that, Mr. Speaker, and I congressional committees now handles as a result, millions of people tai oughout
hope that what I have said today will be the Nation's everwidening range of in- the world have had their lives -1rastically - by the by given
air-
of the tiongof congressional supervision is im- t day sdjet transports fl-)rode _e eat which
my colleagues on thoughtful attention
aisle. possible. fields near large urban areas
Mr. NORBLAD. Mr. Speaker, will the The proposed committee would have a Field o he district wlies ju:;t ~ir-;wr. O'Hare
It
gentleman yield? comprehensive view of the intelligence would be world's impossible re i? t. t
Mr. LINDSAY. I yield to the gentle- and information aspects of foreign af-
man from Oregon. fairs. A single committee of this nature fully describe the deaf cuing -) se which
Mr. NORBLAD. Mr. Speaker, I want would provide the existing foreign policy thousands of my corstitu, 'i`s suffer
to associate'myself with the gentleman's committees with more direct and effi- everyday from conventional s osonic jets
remarks. I think we should have had cient service. The agencies under its either . It arriving t be sal ipartingaeO pare
a joint committee to monitor the CIA supervision would benefit as well. A Field.
it was first established.. I have had prime target of the joint committee's ple shouldn't have built aear + airport ;
a little experience in the matter as a efforts would be the improvement of these people were ther=' beff .-e the air-
member of the Committee on Armed their operations and policies. Studies port was built.
Services. As you may know, we have. a of the agencies' problems and programs i believe it is tragic th:.t airplane
subcommittee on the CIA. I was a mem- would, of course, be considerably more manufacturers of the world c. not take
ber of that committee for either 2 or 4 extensive and complete when conducted wthese they consequences into ernidertion
years. We met annually--one time a by a committee with single responsibility tranpptdeveloped the
transport hen the past d,, so a jet
year, for a period of 2 hours in which of intelligence oversight. I was not Member of ingress in
we accomplished virtually nothing. I Ultimately, I believe, both Houses of days, but I feel r is ,e only rmy
think a proposal such as you have made Congress would benefit from the estab- those but the duty feel it
isy vtelof
is the answer to it because a part-time lishment of the proposed joint commit- duty
subcommittee of the Armed Services tee. The Senate and House would be this Congress both in -'he It )t se and in
Committe, as I say, which meets for just afforded a broader opportunity for care- the Senate to recognize the ,:u-,t that we
2 hours, 1 day a year, accomplishes ful consideration of foreign information cannot repeat this erroT7 on tae threshold
nothing whatsoever. I want to compli- and intelligence matters. The agencies of the supersonic air transpart era.
ment the gentleman on his proposal. involved would similarly benefit from must do everyFAA
thing pe ible to in-
from LINDSAY. I thank the gentleman the committee's studies and recom- We
from Oregon and appreciate the con- mendations. sure that this new type o~ .,uper'sonic
tribution he has made. He knows where- Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I hope the aircraft-which is being deg eloped from
in he talks. He is an expert on the House may act promptly on our proposal. scratch-does not repeat the tragic mis-
subject and is a member of the Commit- It would fill a vital gap in our foreign take of its subsonic jet pred:-crssor, FAA.
tee on Armed Services and was a member policymaking process. It would stream- The legislation which I h,we intro-
of the subcommittee supervising the line existing efforts in the areas of for- duced today would prohibi~ i-he opera-
CIA-in theory-and what he says dove- eign information and intelligence. This tion of any civil supcrsoni aircraft in
tails entirely and agrees with the experi- is an area in which congressional re- air transportation through u, navigable
ence, and the statements made in the sponsibility is long overdue. airspace of the Uni ted states which
other body as well. would generate sonic boom u'rpressures
. (Mr. LINDSAY asked and was given STAND- exceeding 1.5 pounds per st s re foot on
permission to revise and extend his re- ESTABLISHING MINIMUM the ground directly benea li the flight
marks.). ARDS FOR OPERATION OF CIVIL path.
(Mr. MORSE (at the request of Mr. SUPERSONIC AIRCRAFT This legislation would fu Cher make it
LINDSAY) was given permission to extend The SPEAKER pro tempore. (Mr. unlawful to operate any civil supersonic
his remarks at this point in the RECORD.) aircraft into or out of U.S s rports un-
Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, I rise to House, Under previous order of the less it can be demonstrated that ground
H, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. noise level generated by sue -`civil super-
uitia v lower than
York rk[M Mr. PvcINSKI] is recognized for 30 minutes.
the Bend my entleman distinguished from New colleague,
Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, I have sonic aircraft is generated
the g
LINDSAY], on the step he has taken in today- introduced legislation designed to that generated by long r?-tie subsonic
k (M .- The gentle- deal with a most serious problem which jet aircraft.
man from his resolution.
taken from New York remedying Lin a h eraa- will confront our Nation in the very near I am not at all persuaded by the argu-
the initiative in policy future. Specifically, Mr. Speaker, my ment that you cannot r ;oil progress.
sus us inadequacy acy in our foreign a foreign t our legislation would establish certain limits Certainly we all are for progress. But
making process. His efforts merit our of tolerance associated with the advent we cannot blindly state th --t we are for attention thoughtful joined the and solid from support. of the supersonic civil transport plane progress when we kn.w tY, -.t such grog-
I ka[Mr. . LINDSAY] in fiemanling fr a om New now being developed by aircraft manu- ress can seriously impair t.e health and
Yank [M resolution which, com- facturers in France and England and emotional stability o' greo numbers of
panion reommtt , Foreign lestablishing being purchased by several American Americans. Nor can we v :y blindly we
a Joint Committee on wuldf fill what lwhat is airlines. Similar efforts to develop a are for progress when we -'c faced with
tion now and Iing holece, would ns supersonic transport are now underway the prospect of seeing '-.ire belts of
now a gaping htle in the congressional in the United States. destruction criss-cr>ssini- the United
mechan At policy. the formulation for- This is a problem which we no longer States from sonic booms - nerated by
mien policy. n present, by can ignore. I have introduced this leg- supersonic aircraft.
matters are haves dled On both OfCap- islation at this particular time, in order It is my belief, that ut,ie ss Congress
Hi committees confusion d but omis- to give airplane manufacturers both in deals with this subsect ratter at this
sev'p
itol i Hill. Not result from t s duet decentral- our own country and abroad ample op- time, we may conceivably c such havoc
sion well peer from Oproposals, propags, portunity to make sufficient changes in wrought upon this i;ount -v from sonic
wintelligence or the design of their powerplants to avoid booms that millions of d Al%trs in dam-
which ch of would supervision.
apply lyto to any Our
information agency, not only the CIA, future distress to millions of Americans. age to property and a serious threat to
The supersonic jet powerplant of the the health of many of o,r people may
would remedy this situation. future must be developed and designed ensue.
First, the proposed feint committee with appropriate consideration for noise My bill limits so'iic b,,o n overpres-
would must have give Congress the machinery it abatement. sures not to exceed 15 poi hats per square Its must of the te Nation's intelli- or the oversight t of intThis is far-reaching legislation, But foot on the ground lirect , beneath the
genre activities. The present lack of I submit, Mr. Speaker, that we can no flight path.
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14272 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE Augicsr 15
The best available information on be developed with no consideration being sting requirements which will control the
sonic booms indicates that anything un- given to noise abatement. noise levels of aircraft operating in and out
der 1 pound per square foot in overpres- There is no logical reason why the de- of Ban Francisco International Airport.
sure- by a supersonic aircraft flying at velopment of supersonic air transports Mr. Speaker, I should like to call par-
an altitude of 70,000 feet creates no dam- for civilian use must be based on some ticular attention to the statement which
age to ground structures and no signifi- foolish notion that -a race exists between Indicates that supersonic aircraft are ex-
cant public reaction. Anything under developer nations. I am more interested pected to create a noise level approxi-
1.5 pounds per square foot in overpres- in which nation will be first to develop a mately 16 decibels higher than now
sure creates no damage to ground struc- supersonic civilian transport which meets being experienced by American subsonic
tures but does produce some probability the standards of noise abatement rather jet aircraft. This is incredible. This
of public reaction to moderate sonic than which nation develops a supersonic 16 decibel increase is like firing a cannon
booms. Overpressures between 1.5. transport which will actually knock the next to a 22-caliber rifle. I submit that
pounds per square foot and 2 pounds per world's brains out with deafening noise. if Congress fails to adopt this legisla-
square foot produce significant public I am convinced the nation which develops tion or some similar restrictions on the
reaction day and night but no damage to a relatively quiet supersonic transport degree of noise level which we will toler-
ground structures. - will ultimately get most of the world's ate &t our major airfields from super-
I hope my colleagues from the rural business. sonic aircraft, wewill be creating an ab-
areas will take into account the fact that The city of San Francisco recently rec- solutely inhuman situation for thou-
sonic booms which create significant ognized the tremendous noise problems sands upon thousands of families living
public reaction day and night - in this that supersonic air transports will pro- in the vicinity of America's major air-
category will also have significant re- duce. Belford Brown, manager of the fields. I submit, Mr. Speaker, that a
action on farm livestock. San Francisco International Airport, in 16-decibel increase over the present level
Overpressures exceeding 2 pounds per a letter dated July 18, 1963, to Mr. Robert of noise generated by a landing jet, will
square foot but under 3 pounds per Murray, Jr., vice president of Pan Amer- create conditions which will be com-
square foot at an altitude of 70,000 feet ican World Airways, stated San Francis- plenty unbearable to the human ear
create damage to glass and plaster and co's concern regarding the supersonic and brain. I submit this situation, if
produce widespread public reaction day aircraft noise problem. This letter true, could have serious psychological
and night. Overpressures exceeding 3 should be of particular interest since San effects on vast numbers of Americans.
pounds per square foot produce wide- Francisco has in the past adhered to a Subsonic jets now operating In this
spread window and plaster damage, mi- policy of no operational restrictions on country produce noise levels both on de-
nor structural damage to frame and air carriers.
walls, and profound public reaction. Mr. Brown wrote as follows: thetme and arrival
human artolerance close r-
The U.S. Air Force can produce signif- Recent per-
publications within the air trans- ceived noise decibels. To To permit the
icant figures showing damage claims portation industry and nationwide news- operation of supersonic transports which
paid by our Government for losses due to Wpaper orld reporting indicate that Pan American will produce noise 16 decibels higher
sonic booms created by our military air- Airways Is contemplating the pur-
craft. You will note that my bill does chase of Concorde supersonic commercial than now being experienced by Ameri-
not apply to military aircraft. because transports which have been developed by can subsonic jet aircraft is, in my judg-
ot can apply certainly recognize the fact that the Anglo-French combine. The airport ment, Mr. Speaker, to Invite disaster for
department at San Francisco understands large segments of our American popula-
in the area of national defense, we must from the planners of one European super- tion.
be prepared to suffer some discomfort. sonic airport that the landing configura- I submit, Mr. Speaker, this is a prob-
Furthermore, the Air Force has car- tion of this particular aircraft Is such that lem which must be dealt with by the
ried on an intensive program of rigid con- it is expected to create a noise level ap-
trol in the production of sonic booms so proximately 16 decibels higher than now Federal Government. It is not fair to
that every effort has been made to keep being experienced by American subsonic jet lea leave the a the individual airports of Amer-
the damage to a minimum. I am sure aircraft. responsibility of developing their
this will not be the case when aair- As president of the San Francisco Sound own respective standards.
private Abatement Center you are aware of the noise Such a policy could bring about a wide
lines begin competing against each other problems and community resistance to the
with supersonic air transports. airport's operation at San Francisco Inter- divergence of rules and regulations and
The other part of my proposal today national Airport and of the legal actions standards which could affect the entire
would prohibit flights of civil supersonic now pending and in the hands of our legal configuration of air travel in America. I
aircraft into or out of U.S. airports un- counsel. You are also aware that San Fran- believe in fairness to all themajor air-
less it can be demonstrated that ground cisoo International Airport has never insti- fields of this Nation. The Congress
noise generated by such d that gr and tuted an operational restriction on the air should establish one uniform standard.
raft i suastntiall lowerpersonic
than that carriers of aircraft operating into and out This would insure against unnecessary
of San Francisco International Airport. We economic pressures upon the individual
generated by present long-range sub- have relied wholly upon - our preferential
sonic jet aircraft. runway systems, airport runway extensions, airport operators.
At first blush this may seem like a and community enlightenment on noise Mr. Speaker, this is a matter which
harsh and unreasonable proposal, but through the sound abatement center. we can no longer ignore. Continental
I hope those who would criticize this on July 9, 1963, the Public Utilities Com- Airlines recently signed a $30 million-
proposal will take into consideration the mission of the City and County of San plus contract to purchase three British-
fact that we are now only on the tFrancisco passed Resolution No. 23074 (copy French mach 2.2 jet airliners which,
hold that development of supersonic thres- es attached hereto) setting forth the city's of- when delivered, will provide the first
airframes and velop lants. Unlike the filial position concerning supersonic trans- supersonic service within the United
ortss , it should states be (1) that
development of the subsonic jet trans- surtPersonic jet transports,
able to o States. These supersonic transports
port, which was developed in the first in- operate from the existing and currently would be capable of flying from Los
stance as part of the military defense planned major civil air terminals; (2) that Angeles to Chicago in less than 2 hours.
system when no consideration was given the design of these transports should re- This is the second supersonic air
to noise levels in the development of quire no greater landing or takeoff distances transport order placed by an American
powerplants, in the development of than present-day subsonic jet aircraft; and (3) that the ground level noise firm. Pan American World. Airways'or-
supersonic powerplants we have time and created by
supersonic jet transports should be no great- dered six similar planes for use on its
we know from experience the necessity er in the airport environs than the levels oversee routes.
for taking noise into consideration in the now being experienced. It is estimated that the first Concord
development of such powerplants. ' ' The purpose of this communication is to ordered by Continental should make its
This legislation is designed to put the advise Pan American World Airways of the maiden flight in 1966, with delivery date
whole airplane industry, both in the city's official position in this matter, and in 1969. The Concord is a joint venture
,.to If
United States and in other nations of the in h this comm u u ica nication you that h fnois schar- between France's Sud Aviation and Eng-
world, on notice that the people of the acter co acistics of the Concorde e axe e noise
correct, w correct, w
e land's British Aircraft Corp. It will
United States do not intend to perpetuate will have to forgo our previous policy and carry 104 passengers at speeds up to
the folly of permitting air transports to give serious consideration to imposing oper- 1,450 miles per hour.
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