REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION UNITED STATES SENATE EIGHTY-FOURTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION TO ACCOMPANY S. CON. RES. 2 TOGETHER WITH THE INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF MR. HAYDEN

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00364R000600070037-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 24, 2005
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: February 23, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

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Calendar No. 1595
84TH CONGRESSl
2d Session J
{REPORT
No. 1570
JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
REPORT
COMMITTEE ON
RULES AND ADMINISTRATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-FOURTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
TO ACCOMPANY
S. Con. Res. 2
TOGETHER WITH THE
INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF MR. HAYDEN
FEBRUARY 23 (legislative day, FEBRUARY 22), 1956.-Ordered to be printed
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1956
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CONTENTS
Page
Explanation of Senate Concurrent Resolution 2-----------------------
1
Amendments-------------------------------- --------------------
2
Summary of objectives of Senate Concurrent Resolution 2--------------
2
Introduction------------------------------------------------------
3.
Background of the Central Intelligence Agency: ,;
1. Historical------------------------------------------------
3
II. National Security Act of 1947-------------------------------
4
III. The CIA Act of 1949______________________________________
5
IV. Other pertinent legislation----------------------------------
6
Investigations of the CIA:
I. Four surveys of the CIA------------------------------------
6
IT. The First Hoover Commission Report (1949) -----------------
6
III. The special com.mittee-------------------------------------
7
IV. General Doolittle's group (1954)----------------------------
7
V. The Second Hoover Commission Report (1955) ---------------
8
A. The Clark Task Force Report:
1. Recommendations---------------------------
9
2. Comments:
(a) Soviet bloc--------------------------
10
(b) Allen Dulles-------------------------
10
(c) Ad'rinistration flaws__________________
10
(d) Public relations______________________
11
(e) Congressional affairs------------------
11
(f) Agency enjoys wide exemptions-------
12
3. Permanent "watchdog" commission ------------
12
B. The sole recommendation of the Hoover Commission ---
12
President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities:
1. Origin of Board ----------------------------------------13
II. Composition of Board ----------------------------------------
13
III. Executive Order 10656_____________________________________
13
IV. White House comments------------------------------------
14
V. Why the Board, by itself, is not enough ----------------------
15
Selected comments on the establishment of a congressional committee to
exercise legislative surveillance over CIA:
1. By the Director of CIA____________________________________
15
II. Editorial comment----------------------------------------
17
The argument for a Joint Committee on the Central Intelligence Agency:
1. Analogy to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy ------------
17
II. To provide adequate congressional liaison with CIA -----------
18
III. Studies of CIA by temporary groups are not sufficient ---------
19
IV. Security, for security's sake, invites abuse____________________
19
Conclusion--------------------------------------------------------
20
21
Appendix: References-------
---
------------------------------------
Individual views of Mr. Hay
den
-------------------------------------
23
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84TII CONGRESS
2d Session
Calendar No. 1595
SENATE I REPORT
No. 1570
JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
FEBRUARY 23 (legislative day, FEBRUARY 22), 1956.-Ordered to be printed
Mr. GREEN, from the Committee on Rules and Administration, sub-
mitted the following
REPORT
together with the
INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF MR. HAYDEN
[To accompany S. Con. Res. 2]
The Committee on Rules and Administration, to whom was referred
the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 2) to establish a Joint Com-
mittee on Central Intelligence, having considered same, report
favorably thereon, with amendrnents, and recommend that the
resolution, as amended, be adopted by the Senate.
EXPLANATION OF SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 2
This concurrent resolution, sponsored by 35 Senators, would estab-
lish a joint committee of Congress to have legislative oversight of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Such committee would be composed of six Members from the
Senate, and six Members from the House of Representatives. Mem-
bership on the joint committee would be limited to Senators and
Representatives already serving as members of Subcommittees on
the Central Intelligence Agency of the Committees on Appropria-
tions and Armed Services in both branches of Congress.
These Members would select their chairman and staff and have
full. cognizance and supervision over matters relating to the Central
Intelligence Agency, with power to advise, inquire, and report.
Staff and other committee expense for the first year was set at $250,000
by the Rules and Administration Committee.
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occupied by such a commissioned officer. The Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the
Director during his absence or disability.
The Director of Central Intelligence, in the performance of his
responsibility, receives pertinent information from all branches of
the Government engaged in the collection of intelligence, including the
Atomic Energy Commission. He gives advice and recommendations
to the National Security Council on such matters. The function of
the National Security Council is to advise the President with respect
to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating
to the national security so as to enable the military services and the
other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more
effectively in matters involving the national security.
The report "Intelligence Activities" (a report to Congress from the
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Govern-
ment, Washington, D. C., June 1955) prepared by a task force under
the chairmanship of Gen. Mark W. Clark, The Citadel, S. C., com-
ments on the establishment of CIA as follows:
The CIA well may attribute its existence to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor
and to the postwar investigation into the part intelligence or lack of intelligence
played in the failure of our military forces to receive adequate and prompt warning
of the impending Japanese attack.
That investigation of events leading up to the "day of infamy" impressed upon
Congress the fact that information necessary to anticipate the attack actually
was available to the Government: but that there was no systemi n existence to
assure that the information, properly evaluated, would be brought to the attention
of the President and his chief advisers so that appropriate decisions could be
made and timely instructions transmitted to the interested military commanders.
It also demonstrated that in the prewar Government organization no single
official was responsible for whatever failure of intelligence was involved; and the
blame for the military surprise fell, justly or unjustly, on the military commanders
present and immediately involved in the debacle.
Therefore, in 1947, when legislation for a national intelligence organization was
being considered, there was a widespread feeling among Members of the Congress
that responsibility for the coordination of the production of national intelligence,
as distinguished from departmental intelligence, and for its dissemination, must
be centered at one point.
Creation of the Central Intelligence Agency, with its Director charged with
the coordination of the intelligence effort, was authorized to fill this need * * *.
III. THE CIA ACT OF 1949
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (Public Law 110, 81st
Cong., 1st sess., approved dune 20, 1949; 63 Stat. 208) followed
2 years later to strengthen CIA administration. This act dealt
with such matters as procurement, travel, allowances, and related
expenses. It contained an alien-admission clause to aid the Nation's
intelligence mission. The statute further gave protection to the
confidential nature of the Agein y's functions, and allowed special
instruction of Agency personnel. Among other provisions were these:
Sxc. 7. In the interests of the security of foreign intelligence activities of the
United States and in order further to implement the proviso of section 102 (d) (3)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 253, Eightieth Congress, first
session) that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting
intelligence sources and methods from authorized disclosure, the Agency shall be
exempted from the provisions of sections 1 and 2, chapter 795 of the Act of August
28, 1935 (49 Stat. 956, 957; 5 U. S. C. 654), and the provisions of any other law
which requires the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names,
official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency: Provided,
S. Itept. 1570, 84-2-2
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JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL I
the lack of an adequate top-level evaluation board or section, whose duties are
confined solely to the evaluation of intelligence, with no responsibilities for general
policy or administrative matters.
The Eberstadt Task Force recommended:
* * * That vigorous efforts be made to improve the internal structure of the
Central Intelligence Agency and the quality of its product * * *; that there be
established within the Agency at the top echelon an evaluation board or section
composed of competent and experienced personnel who would have no adminis-
trative responsibilities, and whose duties would be confined solely to intelligence
evaluation.
Six years later another task force (the Clark Task Force) was also
recommending efforts to improve the internal structure of the CIA
and the quality of its product.
On this special committee the New York Times Magazine of May
27, 1951, reported, as follows:
A special committee of three civilians of extensive wartime experience in
intelligence-Allan W. Dulles, William It. Jackson, and Mathias F. Correa,
which was appointed to study CIA operations, found much cause for dissatis-
faction. Continued demands for improvement led to the appointment in 1950
of Lt. Gen. W. Bedell Smith as Director. * * *
IV. GENERAL DOOLITTLE'S GROUP
Another comparable board of consultants was also set up by the
White House later on in 1954. Announced publicly for the first time
on October 14, 1954, as a group charged with investigating the secret
operations of the CIA, this was a board of four men headed by Lt. Gen.
James H. Doolittle and included, itt addition, William D. Franke,
Assistant Secretary of the Navy; Nlorris Hadley, New York attorney;
and William D. Pauley, former Ambassador to Brazil.
Publication of the activities of the Doolittle group occurred 3
days before the first meeting of the Clark Task Force group, already
named by act of Congress to conduct a similar study. The Doolittle
studies had, however, been under way for some time. This apparent
duplication of effort led to the following comment in the New York
Times of October 14, 1954:
There was some feeling among intelligence circles yesterday that the two
investigations represented some duplication and overlapping, and that some
friction had developed, or might develop. This was said to be partly because
one investigation, that of General Clark, stemmed from legislative, or congres-
sional, authorization, whereas the other-that of General Doolittle-represented
the executive branch of Government.
In any case informed circles agreed that the investigations probably meant that
both Congress and the executive department were determined to improve the
Government's intelligence operations and evaluations.
Experts believe much progress has been made in the development of global
intelligence services but some "leaks" and failures-some of which are inevitable
in any intelligence service--and several recent events have caused some anxiety.
They include the arrest of Mr. [Joseph 5.l Petersen, who handled what was known
in World War II as "Magic"-the information gathered by breaking the codes
of foreign nations; the defection to the Communists of Dr. Otto John, head of
Western Germany's secret service; the earlier but possibly not related defections
of the British diplomats, Guy F. De Money Burgess and Donald D. MacLean;
the case of British atomic physicist Dr. Klaus Fuchs now in prison as a traitor;
and the amazing network of intrigue, espionage, and counterespionage recently
revealed in high places in the French Government.
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the. President and was not considered by the Commission because of
its extremely sensitive content.
An extract from the unclassified Clark report says:
Recommendations covering overseas counterintelligence operations, carried out
by the military services and the Central Intelligence Agency, are contained in our
classified report.
From this it is apparent that many pertinent facts about CIA's
overseas functionin.gs were lost to the comment of the full Hoover
Commission. More importantly, it would appear this was also true
of the task force findings on overall CIA organization. A recommen-
dation to the Commission by the task force that the CIA be reorgan-
ized internally carries this footnote:
Details and supporting factual matter relating to this recommendation are
contained in the separate classified report of the task force. They cannot be
incorporated in this report for security reasons.
The unclassified report of the Clark Task Force was published in
the Commission's report to Congress. It makes pertinent recommen-
dations about CIA that may be discussed and considered.
1. Recommendations
The Clark Task Force made nine principal recommendations.
Succinctly stated, they are as follows:
1. That the Central Intelligence Agency be reorganized internally
to produce greater emphasis on certain of its basic statutory functions,
and that the Director of CIA employ an executive officer or "chief of
staff" of that Agency.
2. That a small, permanent, bipartisan commission, composed of
Members of both Houses of the Congress and other public-spirited
citizens commanding the utmost national respect and. confidence, be
established by act of Congress to make periodic surveys of the organ-
ization, functions, policies, and results of the Government agencies
handling foreign intelligence, operations; and to report, under adequate
security safeguards, its findings and recommendations to the Congress,
and to the President, annually and at such other tL-nes as may be
necessary or advisable. This "watchdog" commission would be
empowered by law to demand aril receive all information needed for
its use and would be patterned after the Hoover Commission.
3. That increases be made in the salaries of the Director and other
key employees of CIA, and that additional medical, hospital, and
statutory leave benefits be accorded CIA employees on overseas duty.
4. That the CIA be authorized to employ other retired military
personnel without regard to the laws limiting their compensation.
5. That all intelligence agencies recheck the security status of all
personnel at intervals not to exceed 5 years.
6. That responsibility for procurement of foreign publications and
for scientific intelligence be transferred from the State Department
to CIA.
7. That Congress appropriate funds for adequate CIA headquarters
in or near Washington, D. C.
8. That methods for selection of the coordinating committee mem-
bers on atomic energy intelligence be made highly selective.
9. That a comprehensive coordinated program be developed to
expand linguistic training in the overall intelligence effort.
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JOINT COMMITTE A
(d) Public relations.-
The task force feels that the American people can and should give their full
confidence and support to the intelligence program, and contribute in every
possible way to the vital work in which these agencies are engaged.
One of the aims [should be] the creation of a compact commission * * * to
keep the public assured of the essential and trustworthy accomplishments of our
intelligence forces, and to enlist public support and participation in the intelligence
effort.
Action of this sort is needed to promote a general awareness and appreciation
among the people of the significance and objectives of the intelligence program.
There is a corollary demand for clarification of misunderstandings which have
arisen in the public mind, largely as a result of the misapplication of secrecy.
[Emphasis supplied.]
(e) Congressional affairs.-
The task force further is concerned over the absence of satisfactory machinery
for surveillance of the stewardship of the CIA. It is making recommendations
which it believes will provide the proper type of "watchdog" commission as a
means of reestablishing that relationship between the CIA and the Congress so
essential to and characteristic of our democratic form of government, but which
was abrogated by the enactment of Public Law 110 and other statutes relating to the
agency. It would include representatives of both Houses of Congress and of the
Chief Executive. Its duties would embrace a review of the operations and
effectiveness, not only of the CIA, but also of all other intelligence agencies.
[Emphasis supplied.]
The task force report adds:
The task force fully realizes that the Central Intelligence Agency, as a major
fountain of intelligence for the Nation, must of necessity operate in an atmosphere
of secrecy and with an unusual amount of freedom and independence. Obviously,
it cannot achieve its full purpose if subjected to open scrutiny and the extensive
checks and balances which apply to the average governmental agency.
Because of its peculiar position, the CIA has been freed by the Congress from
outside surveillance of its operations and its fiscal accounts. There is always a
danger that such freedom from restraints could inspire laxity and abuses which
might prove costly to the American people.
Although the task force has discovered no indication of abuse of powers by the
CIA or other Intelligence agencies, it nevertheless is firmly convinced, as a matter
of future insurance, that some reliable, systematic review of all the agencies and their
operations should be provided by congressional action as a checkrein to assure both the
Congress and the people that this hub of the Intelligence effort is functioning in an
efficient, effective, and reasonably economical manner. [Emphasis supplied.]
Within the Armed Services Committee, there is a liaison channel between the
Congress and CIA which serves a worthy purpose, but which cannot include
private citizens in its membership and has not attempted to encompass the wide
scope of service and continuity which this task force considers essential for
"watchdog" purposes.
The task force recognizes that secrecy is necessary for proper operation of our
foreign intelligence activities but is concerned over the possibility of the growth
of license and abuses of power where disclosure of costs, organization, personnel,
and functions are precluded by law.
On the other hand, sporadic investigations in this field might inadvertently
result in unauthorized disclosure of classified information to the detriment of
the intelligence effort. Periodic audits or studies by some qualified, impartial
agency would remove both of these dangers and would also allay any suspicions
and distrust which have developed in the public mind by the complete secrecy
of these operations. Such a procedure also might serve to shield our intelligence
program from unjustifiable attacks upon the agencies concerned, and enhance
public confidence and support of this vital work.
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 legalized the administrative
procedures for the Agency. It was passed by the Congress on the unanimous
recommendation of the Armed Services Committee.
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JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 1
The "first" recommendation did not carry out wholly the task force
recommendation for a "watchdog" commission. The Hoover Com-
mission comment on this was specifically to the point that-
while mixed congressional and citizens' committees for temporary service are
useful and helpful to undertake specific problems and to investigate and make
recommendations, such committees, if permanent, present difficulties.
The "second" recommendation of the Hoover Commission, concern-
ing a joint committee on foreign intelligence, was wholly new and
arrived at independently by the Commission after a survey of the
task force findings. Its mention of the current Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy is especially germane.
PRESIDENT'S BOARD OF CONSULTANTS ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES
This Board was named at the White House, on January 13, 1956,
pursuant to the above recommendation of the Commission on Organi-
zation of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Com-
mission), and after consultation with the Director of Central Intelli-
gence. Although it is slated to look into the administration of all
Government foreign intelligence activities, the Board's chief concern
will be with the CIA. The eight-man board was named under the
authority of Executive Order 10656, title 3, dated February 8, 1956.
The Board is comprised of the following members:
Dr. James R. Killian, Jr. (chairman), president, Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology;
Adm. Richard L. Conolly, retired, president, Long Island University;
Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle, Air Force in Far East, in World War II;
Benjamin F. Fairless, director and member of finance committee,
United States Steel Corp.;
Gen. John E. Hull, retired, former commander Air Force in Far East,
and now president, Manufacturing Chemists Association;
Joseph P. Kennedy, former Ambassador to Great Britain;
Robert A. Lovett, former Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary
of State;
Edward L. Ryerson, chairman of executive committee, Inland Steel
Corp.
The Executive Order 10656, which established the President's
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, was issued by
the President on February 6, 1956, and reads as follows:
By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and
in order to enhance the security of the United States and the conduct of its for-
eign affairs by furthering the availability of intelligence of the highest order, it is
ordered as follows:
SECTION I. There is hereby established I he President's Board of Consultants on
Foreign Intelligence Activities, hereinafter referred to as the President's Board.
The members of the President's Board shat] be appointed by the President from
among persons outside the Government and on the basis of ability, experience,
and knowledge of matters relating to the national defense and security, and shall
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V. WHY TIIE BOARD, BY ITSELF, IS NOT ENOUGH
From the foregoing, several conclusions can be drawn in assessing
the likely merit of the Presidential Board:
1. The Board will report its findings directly to the President.
No provision is made to require the Board to maintain congressional
:liaison. This notwithstanding the fact that many of the findings
which the President appears anxious to obtain, for example, those
relating to the "handling of funds" and "general competence," fall
squarely within the legislative cognizance.
2. The Board functions essentiaAv on a schedule of semiannual
meetings and operates on a per diem and travel allowance basis.
There is no provision for a continuous staff, as envisioned by the
,Clark Task Force, capable of conducting comprehensive surveys.
The Board is a part-time operation.
.3. The Board will report its information, good or bad, to the
President, thus strengthening the already tight control of the Executive
over CIA. This, of course, would be the ultimate result only in the
absence of a joint congressional committee such as is proposed in
Senate Concurrent Resolution 2. The President, by creating the
new Board, has given effect to the first phase of the Hoover Commis-
sion's recommendation.. The second and equally imperative phase
of that recommendation falls within the responsibility of Congress.
That the Hoover Commission con ixmiplated its recommendation be
considered in pari matcria is obvious from the language of the recom-
mendation itself:
In such case, the two committees, one presidential and the other congressional
could collaborate on matters of special importance to the national security.
Adoption of Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 would implement the
Hoover Commission's "second" recommendation relating to the
creation of a Joint Committee on Intelligence. It would complement
the Executive Board, already appointed by the President, in con-
formity with the "first" recommendation of the Hoover Commission.
SELECTED COMMENTS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEE TO EXERCISE LEGISLATIVE SURVEILLANCE OVER CIA
By Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, as extracted
from a feature article entitled "We Tell Russia Too Much", which
appeared in the March 19, 1954, issue of United States News and World
Report (at p. 67):
Question. Has it ever been published how much appropriations you have?
Answer. No, but I have seen some speculation in the press with figures which
were several times exaggerated.
Question. What committees of Congress do you have to deal with regularly?
Answer. We deal with the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the
House, and we deal with both Appropriations Committees. Also we make peri-
odic reports to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
Question. Don't they show in the budget some lump sum that you use?
Answer. No.
Question. Don't you have to appear before committees in executive session and
-explain your operations?
Answer. I appear before a subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee and
talk with them and give them a picture of the nature of the work we are doing, tell
.about our personnel, and where the money goes.
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JOINT COMMITTEE N sL 1
The parenthetical observation ctln he made here that neither can
the security conditions under which the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy must necessarily operate be overstressed. Yet that joint
committee has operated successfully for years.
II. EDITORIAL COMMENT
Two samplings of editorial continent from the public press are
especially cogent.
From the Now York Times of January 26, 1956:
"WATCHDOG" FOR CIA
Creation by President Eisenhower of a so-called "watchdog" board of citizens
to review the Government's foreign intelligence activities, particularly those of the
Central Intelligence Agency, does carry out to the letter one recommendation
made by the Hoover Commission last spring. But we doubt that such a com-
mittee-even though under the distinguished chairmanship of Dr. James R.
Killian, Jr., president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology-is enough
to fill the need.
What is required is not so much a part-time board of private citizens, no
matter how eminent, as a permanent. cenitnittee with strong congressional
representation to provide some guide to broad legislative supervision of the work
of the Central Intelligence Agency. Senator Mansfield, of Montana, has long
advocated a joint congressional commitl ee which would have the same relation-
ship to the Central Intelligence Agency as the present one on atomic energy now
has to the work of the Atomic Energy Commission. Once again we endorse that
proposal.
We are not advocating that Congress or anyone else should interfere with the
day-to-day operation of the Central Intelligence Agency. That would obviously
be nonsensical. But it is not nonsensical for a responsible body of congressional
leaders to be in a position to understand and to evaluate the foreign intelligence
work that is carried out on behalf of the United States Government. And if
such a supervisory body were established we are confident that many of CIA's
troubles with Congress, based on suspicion and misunderstanding, would
evaporate.
Hearings on the plan for a joint congressional committee are scheduled to
begin this week. We hope that Senator Mansfield will not be deflected from his
purpose.
From the Washington Post and Times Herald, of January 21, 1956:
No doubt the creation of this board and the enlargement of the House Armed
Services Subcommittee were in part intended to fend off passage of Senator
Mansfield's bill for a Joint Congressional Committee on Central Intelligence. Some
C[A officials have been skeptical of the Mansfield proposal bill because of the
difficulty of insuring that members would not attempt to direct operations or
blab secrets. Perhaps the new arrangements will serve somewhat the same pur-
pose as a congressional committee, though in this newspaper's opinion a more
specific legislative link would pay dividends if a satisfactory formula could be
found. At any rate, the principle of a continuing outside check on intelligence is
important, and the appointment of the new board is noteworthy on this account.
THE ARGUMENT FOR A JOINT COXGR,ESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON TILE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I. ANALOGY TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY
Congressional oversight has ah, ass existed over atomic energy.
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy functions in an area equally
sensitive as foreign intelligence. It possesses a highly specialized and
competent staff in which it has full confidence. Most of the work
performed by this joint committee is of the highest security classifi-
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Appropriations Committees who are now cognizant of CIA affairs,.
and that they in turn shall select the staff, any objection predicated on
control or security grounds is quickly dissipated.
The record on CIA should now be so complete that further ad hoc
boards to inquire into its functions are no longer necessary. Each
survey has found inadequacies; each survey has found an Agency well.
aware of its shortcomings but always taking steps to correct them..
The findings in the past, for the most part, were secret and were con-
veyed to the White House because of their security classification. If
the substances of the findings were laid before Congress afterward,
there was no permanent congressional staff ready to give them inde-
pendent evaluation.
It is not enough that CIA be responsible alone to the White House
or the National Security Council. Such responsibility should be
shared with Congress in a more complete manner. Until a committee
of the kind Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 proposes is established,
there will be no way of knowing what serious flaws in the Central
Intelligence Agency may be covered by the curtain of secrecy in which
it is shrouded. As Hanson Baldwin has commented in the New
York Times :
[CIA] engages in activities that, unless carefully balanced and well executed,
could lead to political, psychological, and even military defeats, and even to
changes to our form of government.
A congressional auditing of the CIA is compatible with the legiti-
mate purposes of the Government. It is true that intelligence services
of other major countries operate without direct control of the legis-
latures. This is understandable in a totalitarian government, such
as the Soviet Union. It is even understandable in a parliamentary
democracy, such as Great Britain, where the entire administration is
part of its responsibility to the Parliament. Our form of government,
however, is based on a system of checks and balances. If this system
gets seriously out of balance at any point, the whole system is jeop-
ardized and the way is open for the growth of tyranny.
IV. SECRECY, FOR SECRECY'S SAKE, INVITES ABUSE
It is agreed that an intelligence agency must maintain secrecy to be
effective. If sources of information were inadvertently revealed, they
would quickly dry up. Not only would the flow of information be
cut off, but the lives of many would be seriously endangered. In
addition, much of the value of the intelligence product would be lost
if it were known that we possessed it. Secrecy for these purposes
is obviously necessary.
There is, however, a profound difference between an essential degree
of secrecy to achieve a specific purpose, and secrecy for the more sake
of secrecy. Once secrecy becomes sacrosanct, it invites abuse. If we
accept this idea of secrecy for secrecy's sake, we will have no way of
knowing whether we have a fine intelligence service or a very poor one.
Secrecy now beclouds everything about CIA, its cost, its personnel,
its efficiency, its failures, its successes. An aura of superiority has
been built around it. It is freed from practically every Ordinary form
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REFERENCES
Federal Register, volume 21, No. 26, February 9, 1956, page 859 (Title 3, Execu-
tive Order 10656).
Press release, White House, January 13, 1956, Board of Consultants for Foreign
Intelligence Activities.
Intelligence Activities: A Report on Intelligence Activities pursuant to Public
Law 108, 83d Congress, report of the Commission on the Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government, June 29, 1955, Washington, D. C.
(Clark Task Force Report).
National Security Organization: A Report With Recommendations, report of the
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government,
January 13, 1949, Washington, D. C. (appendix G).
Editorial Research Reports, volume 1, 1949, No. 19, May 18, 1949.
U. S. News and World Report, March 19, 1954.
Now York Times, N. Y., October 14, 1954-
Washington Post and Times-Herald, Washington, D. C., October 2, 1952.
21
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INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF MR. HAYDEN
STATEMENT
Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 is based upon the mistaken and
erroneous assumption that the Congress has maintained little or no
control over the expenditures of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
and that Senators and Members of Congress who should be informed
have been kept in the dark as to its activities because of a veil. of
secrecy imposed by the executive branch. The truth is that the
Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives have continuously and do now maintain supervision over
the operations of that Agency to an entirely adequate degree. This
is made clear by quoting a paragraph from a letter addressed or
January 26., 1956, to the chairman of the Senate Committee on
Rules and Administration by the Senator from Georgia, Mr. Russell,
,who is the chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services:
The responsible officials in the Central Intelligence Agency have demonstrated
their willingness to keep the Armed Services and Appropriations Subcommittee
fully informed on the subject of the Agency's activities and operations. Although
I cannot speak with authority on the extent to which all the existing subcommittees
on Central Intelligence Agency carry out their functions, I do know that the
subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee has had periodic contact
with the appropriate Central Intelligence Agency officials. At these meetings
the Central Intelligence Agency representatives have candidly furnished the
desired information and have responded to the specific complaints and criticisms
that have been voiced in Congress and in the press. It is entirely coincidental
but it happens that the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee is holding its first
meeting of 1956 with Central Intelligence Agency officials on the same date that
your committee has scheduled for the consideratian of Senate Concurrent Resolu-
tion 2.
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE JURISDICTION
While no definite rule has been adopted by either body conferring
jurisdiction over legislation relating to the Central Intelligence Agency
upon the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the blouse of
Representatives, there is a clear precedent which establishes that
jurisdiction. The National Security Act of 1947 created the Central
Intelligence Agency and since then the 3 subsequent amendments
to that act affecting the Agency have all been considered by and
reported from those 2 committees.
The functions of the Central Intelligence Agency are essentially
functions of an executive character in assisting the President of
the United States, the National Security Council, the State Depart-
ment, and the Department of Defense to carry out their responsibili-
ties. If a joint committee of the Congress is established to supervise
the work of this executive Agency, it might very well be argued that
due to some failure of the standing committees of both branches of
Congress properly to perform their duties, a joint committee should
23
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JOINT COMMITEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
reorganized so as to improve its effectiveness. It is a fact that suc-
cessive commissions which have investigated the Central Intelligence
Agency have disagreed with the recommendations of their predeces-
sors. It is also a fact that the Agency has adopted legitimate recom-
mendations made in such reports without disrupting the continuity
of its organization and activities.
The majority report also shows that, as recommended in the 1955
Hoover Commission report, tho President by an Executive order
issued on February 6, 1956, has established a board of consultants
consisting of eight distinguished citizens, outside of the Government,
to keep him regularly advised on the conduct of activities in the
foreign intelligence field and to report its findings at least twice a
year. The imposition of another supervisory committee with juris-
diction over the Agency would only serve to complicate matters.
The Congress and the President have given the Central Intelligence
Agency a most important job to (to. Subcommittees of standing
committees of the Congress have been created to provide for the
appropriate jurisdiction of the Congress over this activity. The
greatest service we can do now is to facilitate the important work of
the Agency and to let it get its job (lone without being watchdogged
to death.
THERE IS NO SECRECY FOR THE SAKE OF SECRECY
It should be emphasized, most strongly, that secrecy for secrecy's
sake does not exist in, nor is it an objective of, the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Such confidential and secret procedures and operations as necessarily
characterize its activity are designed wholly for the security of this
Nation, the saving of men's lives and the obtaining of essential
information which will achieve these vital ends. There is no present
evidence of any policy of secrecy having become sacrosanct. Upon
the contrary, such secrecy as is being observed is appropriate and
necessary.
Furthermore, I repeat that the Central Intelligence Agency is
subject to congressional review by four established and fully authorized
subcommittees. The first 2 of these are the subcommittees on the
Central Intelligence Agency of the Senate and House Armed Services
Committees; the second 2 of these are subcommittees of the Senate
and House Appropriations Committees. These subcommittees seem
clearly to be adequate for such a supervisory purpose and function.
If they are not doing their job fully and properly, it should be brought
promptly and emphatically to their attention as a more appropriate
and effective means of achieving the end desired than the creation of
a new joint congressional committee for such a purpose.
THE JOINT COMMITTEE STAFF
It would be almost impossible for the staff of such a joint legislative
committee to function helpfully because of the high security demanded
in the work of the Central Intelligence Agency. The information
given to Members of Congress by officials of the Central Intelligence
Agency is given to them personally and their judgment as to what
may be properly reported is final.
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JOINT. COMMITEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 4`(
in the formulation of the foreign policy of the United States, and in
the conduct of foreign relations by the President in carrying out that
policy. Any congressional action which seeks to alter the legally
established relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency
and the National Security Council would tend to impinge upon the
constitutional authority and responsibility of the President in the
conduct of foreign affairs.
The provisions of the National Security Act are a recognition by
the Congress of the highly sensitive nature of Government intelligence
activities. Senate Concurrent Resolution 2, if adopted, will not be
submitted to the President for approval or disapproval. Conse-
quently, any of its provisions which contravene existing law will
have no mandatory effect. The existence of such provisions in a
resolution agreed to by both Houses, however, would lead inevitably
to continuing difficulties of construction and interpretation which
would impair the continuity of sound and proper relationships between
the executive and legislative branches in intelligence matters.
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY
COMMISSION
The Central Intelligence Agency and the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion have nothing in common except the secrecy which is required
because both deal with highly classified matters of the greatest
importance to the national security. Beyond that, their functions are
not comparable. Through the Commission as its operator, the
Government is in the manufacturing business--tlie business of making
nuclear energy. Consequently, the Congress has a very different
relationship with that Commission than any other governmental
agency.
The cost of this business operation is enormous. Beginning in 1941
with the Manhattan project, financed first from the emergency fund
for the President and later in various hidden amounts in appropriation
bills, and continuing with the Atomic Energy Commission since 1947,
appropriations have totaled $15,202,600,000, of which $6,806, 200,000
has been expended for operations and $8,396,400,000 has been
expended for facilities. The total amount made available to the
Central Intelligence Agency since it was created in 1947, is only a
minor fraction of even the smallest of those vast sums.
There has been need to make only minor changes in the act creating
the Central Intelligence Agency, but the problems of Atomic Energy
are constantly changing. Legislation concerning the activities of the
Atomic Energy Commission must be frequently brought up to date
to permit it to function adequately.
The dynamics of the program for developing peacetime aspects
of atomic energy have tremendous potential consequences for major
aspects of national policy. The future production of electric power
from coal, oil, or natural gas may be vitally affected. Atomic Energy
Commission policies can give rise to conflicts of interest between
various groups and individuals and the resulting issues must be sub-
jected to legislative scrutiny. For example, bills before the Joint
Committee have such subjects as construction of industrial facilities,
housing at Oak Ridge and self-government at Hanford, taxation,
patents, contract awards, and guaranty of uranium ore prices. No
such factors relate to the conduct of foreign intelligence.
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