PACIFICATION IS VITAL FOR SAIGON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00364R000300160001-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 30, 1969
• Content Type: NSPR

l.
THE E VWillgATORelease 2003/03/25 : CIAIIINAB43i?1444e0t60(134-9.E
mi (HANG/NC
Pacification Is Vital for S
By DONALD KIRK
Asia Correspondent of The Star
HOA DA, South Vietnam?This fish-
district on the central coast 13D
s northeast of Saigon could hardly
e categorized as a "pacification show-
One American adviser was trans=
wed for failure to get along with
th district chief. Another was skinned
ye by some Viet Cong whom he had
ached on a sand dune under the
ession they were "friendly" South
amese troops. A third was killed
ambush.
The province chief, in the provin-
capital of Phan Thiet, on the coast
miles to the west, contented himself
th signing papers and attending cere-
monies.
His underlings in the district spent
most of the time in their compounds
end rarely visited units or projects out-
ifide the main villages.
And, according to the province
or adviser, Daniel Leaty, the Viet
_t*ilg "have a damn good infrastruc-
ture" here.
"The attitude of some officials is
_negative. They don't seem to grasp
?Associated Press
Boys play in a South Vietnamese refugee village.
their duties and responsibilities. They
need _skong leader " said Leaty,
a veteran of nearly et years in Viet-
nam.
THE PROBLEM of Boa Dra (Es-
trict?and the province as a Whole?
seems typical of some of those con-
fronting the pacification program in
aigon
The United States, as President Nixon noted
in his Nov. 3 address, is yiehling "primary
responsibility" for the war fa the Saigon
government. This is the third of four arti-
cles on problems encountered in fulfilling
that goal.
almost all South Vietnamese towns and
villages.
The only difference, perhaps, was
one of degree. Officials claimed Hoa
Da was below the standards of most
other districts. Hoa Da, they said,
might be comparable to the situation
in a typical Vietnamese district after
.the Tet and May offensives in 1968.
Since then, the United States has
engaged in one of the most intensive
pacification efforts in history. For the
first time, in fact, senior American
military officers reluctantly admit this
aspect of the war might prove more
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP71B00364R00030im45-0
oot
important than combat operations.
i
for this change in at-
titude is that American commanders
feel they have no chance of winning a
"military victory" as Tong no flip
continued FAPII3F9e4-1F?r Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP71-B00364R000300160001-7
- ADVISERS CITE countless cases
in which self-defense force members
have vanished at the approach of the
enemy. These part-time troops, rang-
ing from teen-agers to old men, are
improving, they say, but the main
irs...ue of the program is more political
than military.
Regional and popular forces still
are lax at setting up ambushes at night
thoroughly patrolling their areas.
visers here reported one case in.
Which an RF' patrol had killed several
gherrillas but another in which RF
*Idlers had run away in the face of
What they thought was a larger enemy
force.
Enemy "millers" to the govern-
Ment side rarely are important figures
in the Viet Cong organization. They
generally "rally" after the government
has established some degree of control
or influence and the Red leaders have
fled.
Some 350,000 of those no kniger
considered refugees still live in the
ape refugee camps?merely renamed
resettlement areas." And thousands
of others stay in towns with relatives
or friends but would gladly retun to,
their old homes if they thought they
could live in them safely.
United States is committed to a policy
of withdrawal of its combat forces.
The hope for anti-Communist
fortes in Vietnam appears to lie in
strengthening the will and resources of
the populated regions before the enemy
again Is able to mount a large-scale
military offensive.
The _pacification program, inaugu-
rated a an integral part of the Ameri-
can military command in 1967, com-
bings political and military, civilian
ad guerrilla efforts in a concentrated
drive to put 99 percent of the popula-
tion of South Vietnam under control
of the government before American
combat troops have withdrawn.
"The regular military units have
to keep the government in such a posi-
tion that the enemy cannot win a mili-
tary victory," said a senior official in
the vast American pacification program
called CORDS or Civil Operations for
Revolutionary Development Support.
"That means the enemy must wage
a war of protraction," he went on.
AMERICAN OFFICIALS admit,
perhaps more frankly than they ever
have, the problem of pacification, but
they seem more hopeful now than a
year ago of the program's eventual
success.
They cite an array of statistics to
Support this point:
? The People's Self-Defense Force,
a civilian militia organization, has
frOVvii from almost nothing to 1 early
3 million members, half of whom have
received a week or so of trainin
Almost 400,000 of them are armed wi
cast-off weapons, ranging from shot-
guns to carbines.
? The regional and popular forces,
full-time territorial troops, now total
nearly 500,000 men, up 200,000 from be-
fore the Tet 1968 offensive.
? More than 40,000 enemy opera-
tives, most of them low-level guerrillas,
porters, messengers and the like, have
"rallied" to the government side under
the Open Arms program this year as
opposed to 18,171 in 1968 and 27,178
In 1967.
? The number of those classified
as refugees has declined from 1.4 mil-
lion early this year to 500,000. Approxi-
mately 400,000 were dropped from the
refugee rolls after they returned to
their homes once rendered uninhabit-
able by war.
? Nine-tenths of ' the country's
villages and hamlets have held elec-
tions for chiefs and councils. An elec-
tion was a prerequisite for a village
to receive a fund of a million piasters?
roughly $7,000?for investing on its own
In local community projects.
No responsible American official,
however, would deny that the facts
behind these statistics were sometimes
disillusioning.
Approved
The most bitter disappointment--
and the sharpest sign of latent enemy
strength?has been the lack of suc-
cess of the "Phoenix" program, an
effort at coordinating all intelligence
activities on both the provincial and
district levels.
AMERICANS CLAIM the program
has "neutralized"?killed, captured or
persuaded to defect?some 16,000 en-
emy agents.
But intelligence analysts doubt if
the program has substantially dam-
aged the top of the VC "infrastructure"
on which the enemy bases its efforts.
They estimate the manpower of this
"infrastructure" at approximately
75,000.
The inadequacies of Phoenix are
manifest in this district, where the
Viet Cong have long maintained an
effective network even in the populated
"secure" areas.
"The people actually are very un-
cooperative in reporting enemy activ-
ity," said a lieutenant in charge of ad-
vising the District Intelligence Coordi-
nating Center. "In incidents where the
VC come right into a village it's hard to
get any information."
Even in Hoa Da, however, officials
saw hopeful signs.
Military assistance teams were
training RF and PF troops on the use of
M16 rifles. Roads, although not secure
at night, were generally open in the
daytime. An American could wander
unarmed through the main fishing vil-
lage of small shops and homes.
For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300160001-7
ON A RIDE through the twisting
roads of one of Hoa Da's hamlets, ad-
visers pointed to a long low wall pro-
tecting a row of houses from a canal
leading into the sea.
"This place was just a junkyard
beside the stream," said one of the
advisers. "The villagers built this wall
out of the one million piasters the gov-
ernment has allotted each village for
local construction."
On the negative side, advisers note
that village funds often are spent on
small dams, storage rooms and the like
that benefit only an "in-group" of mer-
chants and officials?or the funds are
deliberately misappropriated or not
spent at all.
One difficulty here, as in almost
every other district in the country, is
communicating the aims of the govern-
ment to the people.
The Vietnamese Information Serv-
ice, a government agency designed to
spread propaganda, functions sporadi-
cally or not at all in many areas. _
"Information officials don't go to
the villages for very long," explained an
American charged with studying over-
all problems in CORDS.
"They talk on loudspeakers for a
few minutes and then leave," he said.
"There's no follow-up. It's the same
problem you have in other programs of
relating the central government to the
countryside."
THE FLAWS in the Phoenix and
information programs to some degree
epitomize the basic weakness of the
entire pacification effort.
"It is all much too thin and far-
spread," said an American who has
lived here a number of years. "You get
the feeling one good crisis could mix it
out."
Pacification officials hope that by
stressing village development they can
solidify the gains made since the Tet
offensive.
The emphasis on the village is a
belated effort at persuading the farmers
to contest Viet Cong influence without
direct support from remote, often cor-
rupted, officials in Saigon or some pro-
vincial capital.
"The object is not just to build
'things,' such as dams and schools, but
to build a community," explained the
deputy American ambassador, William
E. Colby, a former CIA agent in charge
of the over-all pacification effort.
"The war is about people. The more
people you get, the more likely you are
to win."
Tomorrow: Politics?Talk of "Coal-
ition" and "Neutrality."
Apl'AiliteWor Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300160001-7
NEW YORK TIMES DATE 2,4004.61/ PAGE 40
filtration Dips Again, Rogers Reports
By TAD SZULC
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Dec. 23?
Secretary of State William P.
_gers reported today that
NOiTh Vietnamese infiltration
into South Vietnam had
tapered off in the last three
iNtteks and that over all it was
down by 60 per cent compared
with last year.
Speaking at a news confer-'
erl?e, Mr. Rogers cautioned,
however, that it was still too
early to assess the significance
of the drop.
He said that while there was
"a rather significant increase"
in -infiltration in November, the
rth Vietnamese movement
troops and supplies had
wed off again, -so that it
re comparable to the rate
n_ctober."
"Mink it is fair to say that
the infiltration this year corn-
pardd to last year is sienifi-
cantly down," he said. "On a
conservative basis, I would say
it is down by 60 per cent. That
includes the increase in No-
venter."
Over the weekend White
House officials had let it be
known that while the rate of
infiltration was dropping, more
time wa's required to assess
the North Vietnamese move-
ments. It was left to Mr. Rogers
to place the information on the
record.
?i
What the significance of it is," strategy of limited but sharp
he said. "It could could be engagements, especially with
either." South Vietnamese troops. If
Intelligence sources had that is the case, they said, then
been reporting a step-up in the reduction in infiltrations
North Vietnamese infiltration
since the end of the monsoon
season early last month.
Although it is impossible to
produce precise figures, Ad-
ministration experts said, the
accepted view is that 5,000 to
10,000 main-force North Viet-
namese troops have entered
pouth Vietnam in the last two
Or three months over the so-
called Ho Chi Minh Trail. There
had been lesser movements on
other routes before the end of
the monsoon period.
It takes one to four months
for units to reach their des-
tination. The belief here is
that most of the troops moving
late this year have gone to the
Mekong Delta and, to a lesser
extent, to the Central High-
lands.
Saigon Has Delta Role
Under the Nixon Adminis-
tration's "Vietnamization" pro-
gram?the gradual turning of
combat responsibilities over to
the South Vietnamese forces?
the rice-rich delta is entirely
defended by the Saigon Gov-
ernment's troops, with United
States air and logistic support.
The infiltration rate and,
consequently, the intensity of
fighting, are key elements in
President Nixon's judgment of
the wisdom of further with-
drawals of United States
troops.
In this sense, then, the drop
appeared to United States offi-
cials to be an encouraging ele-
ment in the whole equation,
which includes Mr. Nixon's re-
cently announced plans to pull
out an additional 50,000 com-
bat troops next April 15. Sixty
thousand troops have already
been withdrawn.
Intelligence experts said
Hanoi might be shifting to a
The Secretary's estimate on
the infiltration ? the principal,
yardstick used by the United
States Government in attempt-
ing to predict Hanoi's battle-
field intentions ? was based
opthe latest Intelligence data.
Too Early to Tell' -
. Rogers made it clear that
current observations could
answer the question
her Hanoi had simply
n replenishing its forces in
h Vietnam or preparing for
w offensive.
think it is too early to tell
may be illusory.
In general, Mr. Robers said,
the Administration is enour-
aged by the evolution of the
Vietrarnization plan and "by
the fact that the South Viet-
namese have accepted the pro-
gram by carrying out their re-
sponsibilities quite adequately."
He said it was particularly
encouraging that young South
Vietnamese officers were "sup-
porting the program very en-
thusiastically," ecpecially in the
delta area.
"One of the most dramatic
changes that has occurred dur-
ing these last 11 months has
been the change of attitude of
other governments toward our
Vietnam policy," Mr. Rogerz
asserted.
When President Nixon visited
Europe last spring, the Secre-
tary said, most of the discussion
of policy in Vietnam was criti-
cal in tone. But, he added, "as
a result of the President's state-
ments and the Vietnamization
program, the other nations in
the world that I have talked to
have, I think, approved the poli-
cies that we are following, so
that the climate, as far as for-
eign policy is concerned, has
been greatly improved because
of our change of policy in Viet-
nam."
' Progress in Negotiations
The Secretary of State, in re-
ferring to what he described as
a greatly improved interna-
tional climate on the Vietnam
issue, listed a series of achieve-
ments of United States foreign
policy n 1969.
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300160001-7
THE EVENING
LL-For1R-ele4L15&4 .414; NOM
Operation ? hoenix
?
Enters My Lai Row
By ROBERT WALTERS
Star Staff Writer
BALTIMORE?Operation Phoenix, a major counter-insur-
gency program being conducted jointly in Vietnam by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Department, has
been swept into the growing controversy stemming from the
alleged My Lai massacre.
Col. Marshall Fallwall, commandant of the Army's Intel-
ligence School, held a rare ,
I
pre ts conference here today to the Phoenix program and South
deny a persistent report that Vietnamese intelligence."
his instructors teach terror tac- The commandant also ac-
tics and assassination tech- lmowledged that most of Reite-
niqUes to Vietnam-bound intel- meyer's intelligence school class
' ligence officers. of 49 second lieutenants, now in
That allegation stems prin.. Vietnam, had been assigned to
dDally from a court document Operation Phoenix.
itted early this year by But, he said, only a small per-
a Baltimore attorney represent- centage of the school's students
in former Army U. Francis T. go into the Phoenix program.
Reitemeyer, who had attended The school currently has 1,735
Fallwell's intelligence school at students and trains approxi-
Ft. Rolabird here. mately 9,000 students annually
T4
at court document alleged
at Ft. Holabird and an equal through extension
th t the intelligence school in-
numbertors told their students courses, Fallwell said.
fit hiring mercenaries to kill The charges about the intelb-
Viet Cong sympathizers, "male gence training, which Reitemey-
female civilians of any age,,, er raised in conjunction with a
afl that the students also were successful appeal to the federal
inhat frequent "resort to the court for the granting of consci-
t extreme forms of torture entious objector status and dis-
waS necessary." charge from the Army, were de-
scribed by the school comman-
No Relation to My Lai dant as "wild allegations."
"the Reitemeyer case is no Fallwell said Reitemeyer "al-
way related to the alleged mas- leged that he had been taught
1 sticre of at least 109 Vietnamese terror tactics, that he had been
civilians at My Lai, but it may taught to assassinate people."
add new fire to the controversy However, the school official add-
r whether the Army gener- ed, an "informal review" of Rei-
teaches or encourages its temeyer's charges had shown
men to resort to terror tactics, them to be false.
assassination and similar forms "It just isn't done," added
Fallwell. "We know precisely
of violence.
"E the document filed in what the individual instructor is
7 U.S. supposed to get across and how
District Court here last Feb. 14, he is supposed to get it across.
Eteitemeyer was quoted as say- He is supposed to follow that
he was assigned to the script,'
'Phoenix program," established Earlier. Quiz Recalled
teVeral years ago, under the
iofttrol of the CIA and the De- Fallwell acknowledged that
!eila Department in an effort to some instructors might have di-
pinnate the Communist ,,in,. verged from the standard course
restructure" in South Vietnam material to tell "war stories" to
brough the use of sophisticated their classes, but emphasized
nteliigence techniques. that such terrorism and assassi-
nation techniques are "corn-
Reitemeyer, was quoted by his pletely against the Geneva Con-
e er, William H. Zinman, as vention, the Universal Code of
a ng he was told that Opera- Mihtary Justice and Department
ion Phoenix "sought to accom-
lish through capture, intimida-
of the Army regulations."
ion, elimination and assasina- Fallwell further said that Re!-
ton what the United States up to temeyer was questioned on Dec.
li.is time was unable to accom- 6, 1968?months before the legal
lish through the conventional Paper was filed on his behalf?
se of military power, i.e., to about similar statements "that
/hi the war."
he had made in a social gather-
Fallwell confirmed that Reite- mg." Asked at that time where
he ties,
neyer went through a six-week
had heard of the atrocities,
'combat "said he got it out
of the newspapers," Fallwell
told the press conference.
'combat intelligence staff offi-
ers course" which included
'three hours of instruction on
f
pLTri PAGE 4
touDso414000300160001-7
i from the
information rom e platform;
be said no," the colonel added.
Fallwell referred to the plat-
form used by instructors presid-
ing over classes at the school.
Dismissals Reported
A Pentagon spokesman said
today that both lieutenants had
been dismissed from the intelli-
gence school for academic fail-
ure last December.
It also said that Reiterneyer
had denied under oath that he
had told a friend he was being
trained to carry out assassina-
tions.
"I am not being trained in
Atity political assassinations .
I never told (the name of the
friend was deleted by the Pen-
tagon) . . . that I was being
strained to be an assassin nor
that I was to be in charge of a
group of assassins." he was
quoted as having said.
Fallwell acknowledged that
Vietnam-bound intelligence offi-
-eers received some field training
at a mock Vietnam village on
the ground of nearby Ft. How-
ard, but said, "Almost every
Army post has a Vietnam vil-
lage."
Reitemeyer is currently on a
trip through the West and could
not be reached for comment.
His case was heard by the
federal court in conjunction with
a similar successful appeal for
conscientious objector status
from another student at the in-
telligence school, Michael J.
Cohn.
Cohn did not sign the contro-
versial court document, but won
discharge for the same reasons.
Reitemeyer and Cohn, both
about 25 years old, were not
called to testify under oath on
their allegations of hiring killers
1 because Judge Frank A. Kauf-
man decided they had supported
their conscientious obj e c t or
claims without it.
Zinman said that since the
case no longer is pending and in
light of the recent alleged mas-
sacre of Vietnam civilians he
felt public attention should be
directed to the proffer by the
two former lieutenants.
He said he is having a copy
delivered to Sens. J. W. Ful-
bright, D-Ark., Edmund S. Mu-
skie, D-Maine, Edward M. Ken-
nedy, D-Mass., John C. Stennis,
D-Miss., and Charles McC. Ma-
thias, R-Md., in hopes they will
"be inclined to take a hard
look" at it.
The statement to the judge
said:
"Your petitioner was informed
that he would be one of many
Army officers designated as an
adviser whose function it was to
supervise and to pay with funds
from an undisclosed source 18
mercenaries (probably Chinese,
none of whom would be officers
or enlisted men of the U.S. mili-
Approved For Release 2003ggrOX
".
? ? e ex_plieitly
ers to find, capture, and-or kill
- - .-- -
as many Viet Cong and Viet
Cong synipathizers vtilthin a giv-
en number of small villages as I
was possible under the circum-
stances.
"Viet Cong sympathizers were
meant to include any male or
female civilians of any age in a
influence
in
of authority or
in the village who were political-
ly loyal or simply in agreement
with the Viet Cong or their
objectives.
"The petitioner was officially
advised by the lecturing United
States Army officers, who ac-
tually recounted from their own
experiences in the field, that the
petitioner as an American advis-
er, might actually be required to
maintain a 'kill quota' of 50 bod-
ies a month.
"Your petitioner was further
informed at this intelligence
school that he was authorized to
adopt any technique or employ
any means through his merce-
naries, which was calculated to
find and ferret out the Viet Cong
or the Viet Cong sympathizers.
"Frequently, as related by the
lecturing officers, resort to the
most extreme forms of torture
was necessary."
The proffer claimed a lecturer
told of an occasion where a civil-
ian "suspected of being a sym-
pathizer was killed, decapitated
and dismembered and parts of
the body prominently displayed
on the front lawn as a warn-
ing . . ."
"Another field technique," ac-
cording to the court paper, "de-
signed to glean information from
a captured Viet Cong soldier,
who was wounded and bleeding,
was to promise medical assist-
ance only after the soldier dis-
closed the information sought by
interrogators.
"After the interrogation had
terminated, and the mercenaries
and advisers-were satisfied that
no further information could be
obtained from the prisoner, he
was left to die in the middle of
the village, still bleeding, and
without any medical attention
whatsoever.
"On the following morning,
when his screams for medical
attention reminded the interro-
gators of his presence, he was
unsuccessfully poisoned and fi-
nally killed by decapitation with
a rusty bayonet.
"The American advisers, who
were having breakfast 40 feet
away, acquiesced in these ac-
tions, and the death of this sol-
dier was officially reported 'shot
while trying to escape."'
The court paper relates what a
field, instructor described as an
incident on the "lighter side."
He recounted that
advisers aiath
surrounded a pool where Viet
Cong soldiers were hiding by
submerging and breathing
through reeds.
"The advisers joined the South
s soldiers in saturat-
0011147hand gren-
ades. At this juncture,
structor remarked to
dents, which included yo
tioner, 'that although th
dent might appear son
gory, while you listen to it
classroom, it was actual',
of fun to watch the bodies"
Cong soldiers fly into the ai
fish," the proffer related.
Judge Kaufman filed an
ion July 14 ordering the
charge of Reitemeyer and Cl
The Army filed notice of api
but withdrew it in October.
WA SHIIAIPPC914911ftraRelease 209)30q5 :
LA tr?r-44,4
Senate Voies to Bar
Role in Asia Wars
By Spencer Rich
Washington Post Staff Writer
The Senate yesterday untrni-
money adopted an amett1-1
ment to prevent the United
States from "sliding into War"
lfl Laos or Thailand without
the consent of Congress, but
tiree hours of wrangling over
tJe Tauage left the precise
legai effect unclear.
Sen. John Sherthan Cooper
(Ray.), who "StiMbred -the
language, gave it a broad
, terprOatien, saying it would
bar ITS troops from engaging
In "combat, hostility or war in
sa of local forces in Laos
ot Wand." Asked the mean. I
ing of "local forces," he said 1
in 'Thailand it would mean 1
"Thai forces fighting in Thai- z
land against insurgents."
However, Sen. John Stennis
(D-Miss.), floor manager of the
military procurement bill to
which the amendment was at-
taehed by an 86-to-0 vote, said
the language of the amend-
ment did not actually go near-
ly as far as Cooper wished, He
said it was only on the basis of
much more restricted inter-
pretation that he accepted it
and voted for it.
Stennis indicated that the
Cooper language, in his opin-
ion, simply prevented any
money in the category of mili-
tary assistance?for which the
bill provided $2.5 billion ?
being used to finance combat
operations in Laos or Thai-
land. Reading from a Sept. 15
Pentagon memorandum, he
said the Defense Department
took the same view of the
amendment's language as he
did.
Stennis added that in his
view, the language would not
achieve Cooper's aim to block
the armed forces from using
money provided under other
budget headings to support
U.S. troops if they became en-
gaged in combat in the two
Southeast Asian countries.
See SENATE, A15, Col. 1
Cooper insisted that as spon-
;or, it was his right to inter-
pret the meaning of the
amendment, and that what he
wanted to do, "in bluntest
terms," was to prevent "if pos-
sible, the U.S. from moving
step by step into war in Laos
or Thailand as it did in Viet-
nam."
He acl,cled that his amend-
ment would not prevent use of
U.S forces in Thailand for
bombing and other operations
against the enemy in Vietnam.
Nor would it prevent the U.S.
troops from defending them-
selves if U.S. bases in the two
countries were directly at-
tacked (he accepted a floor
amendment to cover the latter
point).
But he said any participa-
tion in a Vietnam-type intern-
al war would be absolutely
barred.
11,
Stennis wettld not yield to
pooper's broad reading, re?
/barking that before he or the
Senate could accept any inter ?
pretation of such bread con
sequence?to which, he hint
ed, he might ultimately be
sympathetic ? extensive hear
lags and committee considera
tion should be undertaken.
Several senators who votec
for the Cooper amendmer
said later they did so on th(
lasumption that Stennis' nar
row reading was correct. One
told a reporter, "The legisla
tive intent of this thing ha/
been so muddied that the
amendment is next to mean
ingless,"
364R000300160001-7
PAGE
But one who favored Coop
er's broader Interpretation
said, "Even if we accept the
thing on Stennis' terms, it
means the Senate has gone
on record against spending
any of the $2.5 billion in mili-
tary assistance to commit U.S.
troops to local combat in I,,aos
or Thailand. The assistance
money can now only be used
for materiel, supplies and the
like for the local country
forces."
After the Cooper amend-
ment, the Senate, with Sten-
nis' agreement, adopted two
other amendments:
? By a vote of 85 to 0, the
Senate approved an amend-
ment by Sen. William Prox-
mire (D-Wis.) directing the
comptroller general to coni
duct a study of profits on de-
fense contracts and report
back by Dec. 31, 1970. Prox.
mire said it was time we "get
some notion of what defense
profits really are."
? By a 71 to 10 vote, the
Senate agreed to an amend.
ment by Marlow W. Cook (R
Ky.) to put a ceiling ei
3,461,000 on the number of
men in the armed forces and
to require that this figure be
reduced on a one-to-one basis
by the number of men with-
drawn from Vietnam hereafter.
(if 60,000 are withdrawn, total
armed forces strength must
drop by 60,000). Stennis said
actual overall troop strength
on July 1 was 3,461,190, and
the Pentagon was expecting to
reduce overall levels anyhow.
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NEW YORK TIMES
DATE < PAGE 1
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300160001-7
iIn1ikrationinLie7iz
to FoliowU . S. Pullout
_
tAffrao, -South' Vietna
Sept._ '4?United Sta es mili-
tary titfiOritfes here report
that North Vietnam has sharp-
ly intensified the infiltration
of Teeth: arir?y units into the
kont., Delta in the four
ks since the last American
o
10t pr e region as part
of President:: Nixon's with-
drawal* Plan.
At least four and possibly
seven battalions of predomi-
allay cl4Ortli Vietnamese regu-
lars haVe crossed the border
from Cambodia and slipped
Into the heart of the delta, ac-
cording to the United States
military authorities.
??Three to four more bat-
talions-1,800 to 2,400 men?
hive been spotted maneuver-
ing on the Cambodian side of
the frontier opposite Chaudoc
Province. Intelligence analysts
believe one battalion Slipped
across last Thursday under
cover of the series of attacks
that follqwed the 72 - hour
cease-fire proclaimed by the
Vietcong in memory. of HO Chi
Minh, President of North Viet-
nam.
The infiltration of regular
By TERENCE SMITH
speotat to The
Nem York Times
units was first spotted last
May, but it was intensified
sharply in the four weeks
since the American units left
as part of the initial with.
drawal of 25,000 United State;
troops.
South Vietnamese Army
troops have replaced the
Americans in Dinhtuong aric
Kienhoa Provinces, and some
officers suspect that the Soutt
Vietnamese may well be the
target of the North Vietnam,
ese regulars.
"I frankly don't knoW,what
they are up to,? said Mar Gen,
Roderick Wetherill, senloi
American military adviser ir
the delta, in an interview at
his headquarters in this. delta
town 80 miles southwest of
Saigon. He continued:
"But it is possible at they
are planning some sort of mini-
Tet offensive in the area that
was previously protected by
the United States Ninth Division.
It is one of the things they
could do to cause a major po-
litical splash in the United
States. If they sustained an at.
Continued on Page 11, Column 1
tack for tei . days and managed'
to take some district towns
from the South Vietnamese, it
would have quite an effect
back in the states."
Before this summer, the
enemy in tbit delta consisted
mostly of indigenous Vietpong
units and guerrillas, many of
whom worked during the day
in the rice fields and fought at
night. The only North Viet-
namese we troops and of-
ficers who led some of the
guerrilla units: They numbered
about 800 as against an esti-
mated total of 49,000 Vietcong
soldiers and support troops.
Vietcong InAsion Appeared
In early May, the first ele-
ments of the 273d Regiment of
the Vietcong Ninth Division ap-
peared in the delta. Aiid intel-
he New York Times Sept. 15, 1969
North Vietnamese troops
are reported moving into
delta (arrows) as the U.S
quits 2 provinces (shaded).
ligence officers believe that a
a result of manpower losses th
division is pow about 80 pe
cent Northyjetnamese, clespit
its designation as a Vietcon,
unit.
In late Aufnist, as the las
of the American infantry unit
were being withdrawn, ele
anents of the North Vietnames,
Army's First Division enterei
the delta from Cambodia. Sev
eral battalions of the 18th I
Regiment of the division an
said to have been located am
identified. At least two batal
lions are believed to? be hidini
In caves in a group of hills ir
Western ' Chaudoc ". Province
kriown as the Seven Sister!
Tvinuntainc
,
Tn The main, the North
Vietnamese have been avoid-
ing contact as much as pos-
sible and concentrating on
moving their supplies and
troops south into the u Minh
forest in the Camau Peninsula,
which fs dominated by the
Vietcong. General Wetherill
believes they will rest there
until they are up to strength
and ready to strike out at a
target.
Establishing a Presence
Although the goal remains a
mystery, many military ob-
servers believe that Hanoi is
out to establish a significant
military presence in the delta
to strengthen its position in
the peace negotiations in Paris.
"The Delta is the richest plum
in Vietnam," one American
colonel said. "And when it
comes time to divide the spoils,
the North Vietnamese will want
to be able to lay claim to at
least part of it."
The South Vietnamese Army
has the equivalent of three di-
visions of infantry and artillery
units based throughout the
delta. The only Americans in
the region- since the withdrawal
of the Ninth Division are the
advisers attached to the South
Vistnamese Army and regular
force and militia units.
Their principal role is to call
in American air support when
the fight gets rough. There are
no longer any American infan-
try units operating in the IV
Corps, or delta, area.
Thus, if the North Vietnamese
decide to test the South Viet-
namese Army's ability to fight
alone, the stage is set in the
delta.
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NEW YORK TIMES
Approved For Release 20 3/
-Continued from Page 1, Col. 7
NIXON SEES AIDES their only hope for "victory is a
collapse of American deteimi-
ToDA . NviETNA nation. TheAmbassador is also
said to have urged Mr. Nixon
.......AL
eeting Comes Amid Signs
of Disagreement Among
His Principal Advisers
By Pk?HARD HALLORAN
special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Sept. 11?
President Nixon's scheduled
meetipl here tomorrow with
his piincipal 'advisers on Viet-
nam comes amid evidence of
disagreement in the Adminis-
tration on hOw to proceed in
,Vietnam and signs of Congres-
sional discontent with the Ad-
ministration's policy.
Congressional sources sait
they were aware of a revivaI
sentiment among both cl4
vilian officials and military
leaders that the United States
should seek a clear victory in
Vietnam and should play down
the attempt to reach a negoti-
ated settlement.
(, In Saigon, a United
States spokesman said that
enemy combat activity had
increased significantly, fol- '
lowing the end of the three-
day cease-fire declared by
the Vietcong and partly hon-
ored by the allies.]
The United States Ambassa
dor to South Vietnam, Ellswortt
Bunker, has brought President
Nixon optimistic reports of the
political situation under Presi.
dent Nguyen Van Thieu oi
South Vietnam and of improvi
ing combat capabilities of the
South Vietnamese Army, the
n ressional sources said.
r. Bunker is said to have
told the President, when they
met Tuesday, that the North
Inetnamese have been bad-
ly hurt on the battlefield and
lentnIntidi on Page4, COIumn 3
to hold off on negotiations, con-
tending that the longer the
talks in Paris are deadlocked,
the better it is for the United
States and South Vietnamese
military position.
The United States military
commander in Vietnam, Gen.
Creighton W. Abrams, ha
given the same optimisti
evaluation through military
channels, the sources said.
General Abrams arrived in
Washington from Saigon today
to attend tomorrow's meeting.
Such reports were reflected
In a speech in Sacramento to
day, by Gen. Leonard F. Chap-
man Jr., Commandant of the
Marine Corps. General Chap-
man told the Comstock Club.
"We have, I think, reached
point of crisis in this war. Time
the weapon employed so wel
by the enemy, is beginning t
work against him now. Hi
raids and attacks against al-
lied forces have lessened. He
has cut down his imput of re-
placements and materiel." ,
According to a text made
available here, General Chap-
man said that the enemy "is
running out of options. Time,
and the American casualties he
can inflict in that time is still
his hope for breaking American
determination. But that same
time finds a stronger and more
DATE
atgifartiPgrtgACP?41:i4
public of Vietnam taking_ on
more of the fighting."
Earlier, the views of the gen-
erals are reported to have
helped persuade the President
to delay his decision on
whether to withdraw a second
contingent of American troops
om South Vietnam.
Ambassador Bunker, with the
support of General Abrams, is
said to have urged the Presi-
dent to go slow on withdrawals
in order to give President Thieu
time to improve his political
osition and to permit the
outh Vietnamese Army to in-
rease its fighting capability.
These views are reported to
have caused considerable dis-
may among some of President
Nixon's political advisers, who
contend that the American peo-
ple have grown ever more
weary of the long war and are
eager to see it ended.
Such reports have also caused
concern among some high offi-
cials of the State Department
and the Central Intelligence
Agency who believe that the
reports do not accurately re-
flect the ability and determine-
ion of the enemy to keep on
ighting despite serious losses.
These disparate views help
xplain the pulling and hauling
at has come into public view
recent weeks.
The State and Defense De-
partments have openly, disputed
the significance of figures on
Infiltration from North Viet-
PAGE
galteWiiiitaiNgtor-the Penta-1
gon tended to downgrade them,
for fear that they would lead
to stronger demands for with-
drawing American troops from
South Vietnam.
The State Department, in
contrast, publicly labeled the
figures as a significant sign
that implied a North Vietna-
mese willingness to reduce the
level of fighting and move to-
ward a negotiated settlement.
The recent cease-fire declared
by the Vietcong gave rise to addi-
tional contradictory statements.
State Department officials let it
be understood that the Urtited
States was prepared to see the
cease-fire extended beyond the
proclaimed three days, if the
enemy so chose, as a sign of
movement toward peace.
At the White Hou, how-
ever, the President's press sec-
retary, Ronald L. Ziegler, termed
such reports speculative and
made clear that the President
did not entertain the idea that
the cease-fire Could be pro-
longed into a scaling down of
military activity. This, well-
informed sources said, was the
basis of an understanding with
President Thieu.
Officials who have watched
the development of United
States policy on Vietnam for
many months explained that
part of the disagreement was
cyclical. They said that there
had always been diffiring
assessments of the actual situ-
ation in Vietnam, 15011tically
and militarily.
Approved For Release 2003/03/25: CIA-RDP71600364R00030
ine sourc,es said that while
such disagreements often occur
between the State and Defense
Departments, they are, by nO
means purely interagency
-
dis-
putes.
There are varying assess-
ments within each department
and even within the C.I.A.
and other organizations in the
intelligence community, the
sources added.
Therefore, different proposals
on how to proceed in 'Vietnam
are considered natural. When
the Administration approaches
a major decision, as it Is now
doing, these differences are ac-
centuated as those concerned
try to make their influence felt
on the coming decision.
President Nixon is known to
have encouraged the presenta-
tion of disparate views and to
have instructed his special as-
sistant on national security af-
fairs, Henry A. Kissinger, to
seek them out. But once the
President makes a decision, he
cts the Government to
ak With one voice.
Thus, the meeting at the
White House tomorrow, which
informed sources said ,was
WASHINGT ON POST DATE
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PAGE EDIZI(
DI-'71 B00364R000300160001-7
Division on Infiltration
By Jack Anderson
THE STATE and Defense
Departments still can't agree
whether the North Vietnam-
ese infiltration rate has de-
clined and what effect this
might have on the Paris
truce talks.
The State Department is
eager to believe intelligence
estimates that the number of
troop replacements from
North Vietnam dropped to
? 100,000 during the first half
,* of the year, as compared with
200,000 for the same period
lait year.
? These estimates are based
s
,e largely upon our readings of
the sensors that have been
e planted along the infiltration
7 routes and the electronic ,
s, gadgets that our helicopter
crews use to detect people
)e
hiding in the jungles. The
State Department, which is
responsible for peace, would
like to interpret the elec-
trimic reports as evidence of
a Communist move to ease
the fighting and prepare for
a truce.
The Army, however, has
detected infiltrators who ap-
parently' have managed to
Slip into South Vietnam with-
out registering on the elec-
tronic devices. Also, captured
documents contain plans for
offensives, not withdrawals.
Therefore the Army, which
Is responsible for the battle-
field, is dubious about an
enemy letup. The Commu-
nists' failure to mount an
effective offensive, in the
opinion of most generals, is
the result of our own mili-
tary superiority.
Some experts believe that
the North Vietnamese don't
want to conduct a military
campaign that might delay
the American withdrawal
from Vietnam.
Other experts insist that
the North Vietnamese desper-
ately want to break up an or-
derly withdrawal, that they
would like to force a precipi-
tate withdrawal. With this as
their goal, say these experts,
the Communists have sought
?to make the Vietnam war as
painful as possible for the
American public.
White House security ad-
viser Henry Kissinger, on the
other hand, has cautioned
President Nixon that it takes
three or four months for
Hanoi to shift strategy and
get the word to all the cadres
in the field.
Tigress in Congress
A FORMER schoolmarm
who sometimes lectures Con-
gressmen as if they were in-
attentive pupils will leave
her stamp upon U.S. educa-
tion. She is Rep. Edith
Green, gray-haired and
grandmotherly chairman of
the important House educa-
tion subcommittee, who has
worked vigorously to counter
the crisis in our schools.
In 1967, she stirred up a tu-
multuous floor fight over
school aid. Conservatives
scowled and liberals howled
as she fought, first, for an ex-
panded federal aid program,
then for local administration
of the program.
She firmly maintained that
local authorities know more
about their school problems
than do Washington sages?
political heresy among her
fellow Northern Democrats.
Throughout the ensuing up-
roar, the diminutive but in-
domitable congresswoman
from Oregon sat in the eye of
the storm, prim and cool, her
feet barely touching the
floor. She finally got her way
The liberals got their re.
venge this summer by block.
ing her plan to curb student
disorders. She wanted to
deny federal funds to any col
lege that failed to file a plan
for handling disruptions.
"No one challenges the
right of dissent," she argued,
"but many of us question the
wisdom of requiring others to
pay taxes to finance it." She
warned the liberals, who
voted downlefbill, that con-
servatives would. ram
through a far more punitive
measure. This is now what
they are driving to do.
Edith Green, a veteranof
14 years in Oregon class-
rooms, began lecturing her
colleagues a few days after
she entered Congress in 1955
when she scolded congress
men for taking too mud
time to extol the groundhog
for his weather prediction
Her first concern, as it wa5
in her teaching days, is foi
education. Sinking almost oul
of sight behind the huge ma
hogany desk in her congres
sional office, 'Edith Green
summed her feelings:
"I came across a statement
recently which rings very
true. 'In a country like this?
if there cannot be noone
found to answer the commor
purposes of education, there
is something amiss in the rul,
ing political power.' George
Washington made that state
ment almost 200 years ago.
think it is time we put out
priorities straight."
cif. 1969. nen-McClure Syndicate. Inc.
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NEW YORK TIMES DATE - PAGE
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA DP71600364R000300160001-7
tate and Defense Departments
ict to Ease Infiltration Dispute
entagon Official Emphasizes Caution
in Interpreting the Decline, While
McCloskey Calls It Significant
By RICHARD HOLLORAN
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Aug. 28 ?
State and Defense Depart-
aits tried today to reconcile
ir public differences over
interpretation of a decline
the infiltration of North
tnamese soldiers into South
tnam.
IL noticeable difference re-
ined, however. The State
_te Department continued to
ard the decline as signicant
ile the Defense Departmen
led at it cautiusly. Both d
-tments appeared to be
wking from the same figures.
The disagreement came
Linst the backfrop of the is-
sion in the Administration
but whether and when to
hdraw more American
ops from South Vietnam.
No Indication of Response
:tate Department officials in-
ated that their interpreta-
-i was intended to prod the
-th Vietnamese at the Paris
xs into confirming a reduc-
-1 of their war effort. Other
cials indicated that the in-
Dretation could also be_used
justify another, and possibly
ater, withdrawal of Amen-
- soldiers after the first con-
gent of 25,000 has left by
end of this month.
Dfficials here said they had
eived no indication from the
sting in Paris today that the
-th Vietnamese had re-
lided. The American delega-
there also told the other
that the fate of B-52 bomb-
missions in South Vietnam
! been decreased for more
ai a month. This was in-
Ked as another piece of evi-
ce of American intentions to
McCloskey, said that he stood
on his earlier evaluation that
the decline might be "signifi-
cant" as an indicator of enemy
intentions. The Defense Depart-
ment spokesman, Jerry W.
Friedheim, said that "we are
interpreting it cautiously."
Mr. McCloskey said he had
no figures ?on infiltration that
were different from those of
the Defense Department. He
said that "Defense is the - fosi-
tor for t is in. ? in o ? a-
on a I e ense
speak for the, Government on
this matter." /
Mr. Friedheim, in a prepared
statement, said that the two de-
partments "believe that enemy
infiltration into South Vietnam
is down considerably compared
to last year's average."
"It also appears to have been
lower during July than it was
earlier this year," he continued,
adding that 'the enemy has suf-
fered a decline in total troop
strength in South Vietnam.
Mr. Friedheim said that the
North Vietnamese had infil-
trated about 1000,000 men into
South Vietnam during the first
six months of 1969. This com-
pared with 200,000 men infil-
trated during the same period
last year, he said.
However, he added that "a
direct comparison of the first
half of this year with the first
half of last year must be made
cautiously" because of the Tet
offensive, the half in the bomb-
ing of North Vietnam and
weather variations last year.
Figures on Enemy Losses
Mr. Friedheim also noted that
L19,029 enemy soldiers were
he
first
am? pr Oleg IIIM 41MAJOS
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Approved For Releag
r !red Press International
ENDS VIETNAM TOUR: Secretary of the Army Stanley B. Resor talking Itth Gen. William
B. Rosson, deputy commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, heft* the Secretary
left Saigon yesterday. At a news conference before leaving, Mr. Retr avoided com-
Mentrng on the case of the eight Green Berets accused of slaying a Vielamese national.
2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300160001-7
WA SHINarrOlfed:fttikelease 2003/0/25 ?
anm Cuts
Infiltration,
U.S. Reports
By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer
Infiltration of North Vietnamese troops into South
Vietnam has dropped below :combat losses, and
total enemy forces in the war now "may be" shrinking,
the State Department said yesterday.
The Defense Department, however, issued a far more
cautious assessment which did not agree with the State
Department that these factorsi
are "significant." The Penta-
gon added that "the enemy is+
substantially replacing h i s
losses."
The Defense Department's
guarded statement was issued
last night only after hours of
discussion behind the scenes
to try to reconcile the two de-
partments' positions. Informed
sources said the State De-
partment's first and more en-
couraging statement was is-
sued with White House ap-
proval.
The State Department's
statement could be used in
Justifying the argument that
"attrition" of North Vietna-
mese forces ultimately would
have the same effect as the
Mutual "withdrawal" of forces
that the United States 'insists
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INFILTRATE, From Al 1
The sudden attention that
focused on the infiltration and
enemy troop strength issue
Was touched off by remarks
made by former Secretary of
State Dean Rusk, speaking in
Madison, Wis., Tuesday night.
Rusk was quoted as saying
that U.S. intelligence indicates
there has been an "almost
total lack" of North Viet-
namese infiltration into South
Vietnam recently, and he saw
that as a hopeful omen. It was
learned yesterday that Rusk
tried to put off the record
that and other answers
questions, but local newsmen
in Madison refused to agree on
grounds that he was speaking
to a public audience of hun-
dreds of bankers.
The State Department used
the opportunity to make a de-
tailed statement expanding on
the reduction in infiltration
but stopping short of claims
that North Vietnamese infiltra-
tion has fallen to zero.
In recent weeks, other U.S.
officials, informally, have also
.reported what they have re-
garded as the potentially very
significant drop in infiltration.
Secretary of State William P.
Rogers, on July 2, said official.
-.1y that "we do have evidence
that the infiltration in the last
two or three months has been
at a fairly low level."
Yesterday morning, State
Department spokesman Robert
J. McCloskey said:
"Well we have indicated on
e se ver al previous occasions
i. that there has been a consid-
erable reduction in North
r Vietnamese infiltration into
f South Vietnam. We believe
Othat the infiltration figure is
.,currently lower than the
'North Vietnamese casualty
figures in the South.
"Now this suggests that they
are not replacing all of their
casualties and that there may
be a net reduction in enemy
field forces which occurs as a
result of attrition in the
North Vietnamese component
of those forces.
"We consider these facts
significant and have said so on
several occasions. However,
what we seek is mutual with-
drawal of all non-South Viet-
namese forces.
"While it could be argued
that this lttrition process
would evem.....ally have the
same effect as 4 withdrawal
by North Vietnamese forces,
it would be a slow and grim
process.
"We prefer to end the con-
flict by negotiation?a negotia-
tion which would lead to the
withdrawal of all non-South
Vietnamese forces."
McCloskey was asked by
newsmen how the State De-
partment reconciles its state-
ment on the reduction of in-
filtration with President Nix-
on's delay in ordering further
U.S. troop withdrawals. Mc?
Closkey replied that "I'm not
trying to draw a broad picture
and relate this to strategy or
military or political" factors.
When asked if the State De-
partment is requesting North
Vietnam, in effect, to acknowl-
edge the drop in infiltration,
McCloskey replied, "If that
can be implied, let it be."
Hanoi is hardly likely to do
so, however; it never has offi-
cially admitted having any
troops in the South.
In answer to questions about
Rusk's knowledge about the
infiltration date, McCloskey
said that Secretary Rogers
meets "from time to time"
With Rusk, but that the former
Secretary is "not a paid con-
sultant."
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wAsHiNdkpefiqvittrmr Release 20173123/24 lelittlidP91600364R000300160001P7(WE 4
Official nails Detectors
Along Ho Chi Minh Trail
By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer
Listening devices the United
States has placed along the
Hao Chi Minh trail to detect
enemy infiltrators "will rank
as one of the major technologi-
cal contributions" of the Viet-
nam War, the Pentagon research
chief said yesterday.
John S. Foster Jr., in mak-
ing that assertion in his an-
nual statement on research
and "development, added that
I'we May well be on the verge"
of keeping a battlefield under
mechanical surveillance around
the clock.
While Foster did not specify
where sensors have been sown
it is known they have been
placed along infiltration trails
in Laos as well as North and
South Vietnam.
at;and combat may well
hssiven revolutionized for
the yeah ahead," Foster said,
"by the emergence of a new
famil3. of sensors for remote
detection and for rapid de-
livery of firepower. Building
o'n mit-e3cperience in Vietnam
the instrumented battlefield
has become possible."
Successful in Siege
research chief said the
anti-infiltration devices ? in-
cluding ones which listen for
vibrations in the ground as
well as noises in the air?
were used with success in the
siege of Khesanh and in the
defense of Saigon.
The fuller system the Penta-
gon is working on calls for
seriSdrs to warn an automated
conitriand ancreoritrol network
of the ajith- of enemy,
troops. Then artillery and
bombing could be loosed into
the area, or infantry flown
there.
The system Foster praised
goes beyond the $1,6 billion
McNamara line of Mechanical
obstacles installed along part
of the DMZ separating the
two Vietnams. Defense Secre-
tary Melvin It. Laird said
earlier this year that the line
?code named Project Dye'
Marker/Muscle Shoals ? had
not lived up to expectations.
To combat a Soviet military'
threat which he said ts sup-
ported by a research intgrarn
growing faster than onr own
(10 per cent growth a year In
military, space and. atomic
energy research cornPared to
1 per cent for the U.S. in "the
last few yeare), Fatter said
he is thinking of building a
giant test submarine With bang-
range missiles inside.
Continue Blasts
While considering such a
weapon for under the sea,
Foster said the Pentagon will
continue setting off nuclear
blasts underground to test
such things as the effect
X-rays have on warheads for
our Polaris and Minuteman
missiles.
In case the United States
reaches an arms control agree-
ment with Russia, Foster said
he has asked a Defense
Science Board task force to
analyze how the Pentagon's
research program should be
rearranged to keep track of
Soviet "capability and intent."
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300160001-7
WASHINGTON POST DATE: 4'111P41L PAGE CiDribt,
Approved For !Release 2093103/25,: CIA-RDP711300364R000300160001-7
? Marquis ehilcis
Vietnam Pacification Drive
Takes a More Realistic Turn
DALAT, Vietnam?During
the 70 years of their colonial
empire in Indochina?Laos,
Cambodia, North and South
Vietnam?the French did
very well for themselves.
The big rubber plantations
?'Were highly profitable, as
were other enterprises
worked by docile natives.
, Among the intellectuals
they spread some French
education. Aristocratic fami-
lies sent their sons and
daughters to Paris to school.
?IlbeY onf erred French citi-
zenship on a favored few. It
was all very cozy in the
French style.
t Yen during their war
With the Viet Minh, as the
Communists were known
then, in the early years
after 1947 they did not do
too badly. The ranks were
largely made up of the For-
eign Legion. They suffered
heavily in military leader-
ship, however, as class after
lass went out of St. Cyr,
the French West Point, to
die in the jungles of Viet-
tam. During the latter
years, before the disastrous
defeat of Dien Bien Phu, the
'United States was pouring
$800 million a year into the
French treasury to sustain
the fr ?filiinst the heavy
n e
their mountain
. this mile high city
a vista of mountain
et in the distance, their
?litvillas, little ray-
by the war, are evi-
dence of their knowledge of
the good life, whether in
France or in the far reaches
of the empire. The Central
Highlands were a buffer be-
tween the Indochinese and
the mountain people, the
Montagnards, and the
French allowed almost no
southerners except for their
servants to settle in Dalat.
Now the responsibility
for pacifying this mountain
area, or trying to bring the
Montagnards into the 20th
century to live at peace with
the Vietnamese, for trying
to get the economy on an
even keel, is jointly that of
the South Vietnamese gov-
ernment in Saigon and the
United States Mission. Am-
bassador William E. Colby,
in charge of the pacification
program, is in Deist for con-
ferences with the local prov-
ince chief, a colonel in the
Vietnamese army, and with
his own officials stationed
here.
Pacification has for long
been a sneer word. It was
bureaucratese for a costly
venture in idealism which
was erased by the Vietcong
shortly after the pacifiers
left the pacified village. Gol-
by's predecessor, Robert
Komer, was a tough-talking
salesman who could marshal
charts and graphs to show
just what percentage of ter-
ritory and people had been
pacified. He met any chal-
lenge by mowing down the
challenger with strong lan-
guage. Korner went from
here to be Ambassador to
Turkey, where the Turkish
Vietnam protesters cele-
rated his arrival by burn-
I, the embassy car.
$1.:NtE last November
ideation has taken a
and snore realistic tack. 'Ile
initial effort is to root (nit
the Vietcong infrastructure,
humatcratese for the Zif-
ia-lik organization holding
rn 'Rages in a discipline
of ite or, so pacification by
day becomes silhmission to
the VC by night. The root-
ing out is done by various
organizations of the Viet-
namese People's Police and
by Operation Phoenix di-
rected by the CIA. Phoenix
undertakes to do to known
terrorists What they have
done to villagers collaborat-
ing with the government?
reprisals such as beheading
and disembowelling. The
process includes road-build-
ing so a village will not be
isolated and subject to VC
incursions.
After at least comparative
security has been estab-
lished the work of pacifica-
tion begins. Various forms
of aid are made available.
Each district chief is given
one million piasters?at the
legal rate close to $100,000.
He can use this for any form
of improvement in his vil-
lages he sees fit.
A 48-year-old Foreign
Service officer, Colby is the
best type of civilian Ameri-
can working in Vietnam. He
brings to his difficult?per-
haps, in the long pull, im-
possible?task dedication
and tireless effort. Besides
the long hours and the sev-
en-day week in his Saigon
office, he travels widely
through the country for a
first-hand appraisal of how
pacification is going.
There is still an inordi-
nate amount of paperwork.
The questionnaire of the
hamlet evaluation survey,
which must be filled out pe-
riodically by the American
adviser to the province
chief, is as detailed as an in-
come tax return and almost
as hard to understand. The
returns are sent to Saigon
and fed into a computer.
Out comes the percentage-
80-plus pacified. One must,
as in the past, take these
percentages with strong re-
servations, although they
are probably more trustwor-
thy than before in light of
the village and district secu-
rity operation.
ac-
it sounds like mortaring
mixed with small-arms fire.
In the morning the old-tim-
ers say it was only outgoing
artillery fire in support of
the defenders of a hamlet
five miles down the road
who came under,VC attack.
Colby visits the mayor, he
inspects the police training
school where recruits are
squirming through the wire
under live ammunition, and
then he is off for Saigon?
with a briefcase full of pa-
pers to be studied during the
hour's flight.
here were more men
Dire. an ewer
41n -serving advisers who
are. legion and ?what. so-
oiled advice is like dust in
the_fierce wind of the Whr,
the chances for arrivingit a
tnam free of war aztrter-
rcir_aysiuld be greatly im-
i0Ifeci.,
1969, United Feature Syndicate
HERE IN Dalat the prob-
lem seems to be security
and a lack of troop protec
tion. That is the complaint
of the province chief who is
# about to be relieved by an-
Approved For Release ea-ili
1600364R0003001600 1-7 01Prit?agitiri
For three hours through
the night the firing goes on,
rrn the par M the newcomer
V4,11.3F-Ax4,4".%
WALL STREET JOURNAL
Approved For Release 2003/0
The Hidden War
Elite Phoenix' Forces
Hunt' Vietcong Chiefs
In an, Isolated Village
Raid Prompted by Informers
Finds Most of roe Gone
And Natives Tight-Lipped
Demolishing a VC Monument
By PETER R. KANN
ttrk.# Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
DON NRON, South Vietnam?Was it a trap?
There was reason for suspicion.
But the risk had to be taken. An unsolicited
it of information offered an opportunity to
strfhe at a local unit Of the Vietcong
**restructure" (VCI), the clandestine politi-
and administrative apparatus through
Which the enemy lays claim to control much of
the Vietnamese countryside.
The affair began like this:
Two ragged Vietnamese, one short and
squat, the other tall and thin, recently walked
into Don Nhon, a 'village about 50 miles south.
Welt of Saigon that is the capital of Don Nhon
District. The pair told American officials that
they Wanted to talk about the VCI in their
honle'village of Vinh Hoa, a nearby community
of about 2,000 persons nestled deep in Vietcong
territory along a Mekong River tributary. A
? Vietcong-sponsored "Liberation Committee"
had been elected- to govern Vinh Hoa five
IhOtiths previously, the informers said.
iLhe U.S. advisers were dubious about tak-
g iTiflitary action on the basis of this intel-
Cc. An ambush might be in the offing.
Boa was ' dangerous territory, several
Miles. from the nearest government-controlled
village. And the informers said they were
refugees, rather than Vietcong defectors, who
kW/11n11y could be expected to be more eager
to talk. But the two stuck to their story of
overt Vietcong control in their village, and
their information checked out with that in
allied files.
PO Priority
w.as a, target...1u
? t I ?? led
zg,j31. he year-old Phoenix campaign ob-
viously is related to the Paris negotiations.
When peace comes, South Vietnam's claims to
control the countryside will be strongest where
the VCI cadre are fewest.
The Vietcong claim that about 1,800 govern-
ing bodies have been freely elected in
"liberated areas" of South Vietnam. The U.S.
dismisses most of the committees as fictions
existing only on paper and claima VCI cadre
are beirilkisitnesjvaar a;rope,gg
MO a Montli. Total VI greritet?
about 70.rinn.
DATE Si, IMAM-4 PAGE
?f .11 1171r,TANP.:rri.
" 73Alr Aar % f I %.4 r
'htZ. ?
?
. Its
methods range from after-dark assassination
strikes by small killer squads to battalion-sized
cordon and search efforts. A small strike
clearly wasn't indicated for Vinh Hoa. The vil-
lage might be heavily defended. U.S. officials
finally settled on a plan for a daylight assault
with helicopter transportation, The U.S. 9th Di-
vision would provide support.
Hunting the Enemy
Phoenix operations are reputed to be highly
sophisticated and productive affairs. The Vinh
Hoa effort proved to be neither. It involved in-
tricate?and apparently flawed?planning,
largely fruitless interrogation of fearful, tight.
lipped villagers, calculated brutality applied to
suspected Vietcong, the execution of one sus-
pect, looting of homes by Vietnamese troops,
systematic destruction of village installations
and a largely unproductive hunt for Vietcong
officials who apparently had fled by sampan
long before the allies arrived.
' The operation highlighted agonizing ques-
tions about Phoenix and the allied methods for
waging war in Vietnam. Because the Vietcong
torture and assassinate, should the allies? Is
there value to an operation that "sweeps" a
Vietcong area and then departs, leaving no
permanent allied presence? Who should be con-
sidered Vietcong? Does the VC include a
farmer who happens to own ancestral rice land
in a Vietcong-controlled village and pays taxes
to the enenly?
.The counter-infrastructure experts are the
ovineTaT R -
I
a-,'
n-
01-7
paries All sro '
elude Camhediau _wad OhinEzerLia Legrl-
a y
She CIA. In two days of planning the Vinh Hoa
force grew to include about 40 PRUs, about 30
Vietnamese speciar combat police and a hand-
ful of interrogators from the Police Special
Branch, Census-Grievance men and psycho-
logical warfare cadre. The Americans taking
part in the operation were two civilian PRO
advisers, two civilian advisers to the special
police( two young Army officers work ag in
Don Nhon District and several radio operators.
Two companies of the 9th Division, abcgif 110
men, were to form a cordon around the village
to prevent Vietcong escapes.
The Last Meeting
Final plans were coordinated at the Tactical
Operations Center of Kien Hoa province (which
includes Don Nhon) the night before the strike,
with more than a dozen Americans and Viet-
namese attending or within earshot, _________f
he meeting troubled CIA men. They worrig.,
just 'ably as-it turned out, that confusion aid
tuiellizence leaks would follow.
At 7 a.m. the next morning, the operation
force is waiting for its helicopter transport at
the airfield at Ben Tre, the Kien Hoa provincial
capital. And waiting. It turns out that the 9th
Division is having difficulty arranging its "air
assets." An outpost under siege in a neighbor-
ing province has to be aided.
The civilian U.S. advisers begin to get rest-
less and irritable: "The U.S. Army is more
trouble than it's worth . . all their maps and
charts and crap . . . goddamned army must
have schools that teach delay and confusion
. . . never seen a 9th Division operation go off
on time. . . ."
25 ?ctigskblon18108
1 7
cling roughty over?tne-ONNAggalb -
_wt. Fluttering from it are thousands of propa-
matt lieflets. He explodes: "Great. Just
Continued From I've One
great. The army is really gee= PaniedcF4r
Fick up a paper and read all about it. Read
about the operation that's coming in to get
you.,,
The PRTJs and Vietnamese special combat
police are wearing a wild variety of jungle fa-
tigues, flak jackets, bush hats, berets, combat
boots, tennis shoes and \ sandals: Some are
barefoot. Initially they are sitting in orderly
rows along the runway. Soon they begin dis-
persing about the airfield.
The PRUs invent a game. As a big C130
cargo plane comes in to land, they sit on the
rimway, then duck their heads as the plane's
wings whip past just above them. "They're the
toughest men in this war," says one adviser.
"They join this outfit because they want ac-
tion."
The American points to a small Vietnamese
half-dozing on the grass. "That man used to be
a VC. He got disillusioned with them, so they
killed his family. He lit out for the bush. Spent
two years out there alone, conducting a private
vendetta against Charlie. God knows how
many VC he killed. Finally he came in and
joined up with the ?MI's. He wants to kill more
VCs."
Hovering Close
Shortly after 9 a.m., two hours late, 10 heli-
copters arrive. The PhOenix force piles aboard
and is flown for 15 minutes across flat rice land
and coconut groves to the landing zone, a rice
paddy less than a mile from the center of Vinh
Hoa. The helicopters hover close to the ground,
and the troops leap out, wading cautiously
through thigh-deep mud and water toward a
treeline from which they expect enemy fire.
There is no firing. At the treeline the troops
are joined by the Don Nhon District U.S. advis-
ers and the two Vietnamese informants who
prompted the operation. They have been sepa-
rately helicoptered to the scene. The inform-
ers, garbed in baggy 'U.S. Army fatigues, are
to remain mystery men, for their own protec-
tion. Their heads are covered with brown cloth
bags with eye and mouth holes. The two pre-
sent a part comic, part frightening spectacle.
The local advisers have bad news. They say
the 9th Division cordon along the southern
fringe of the village didn't get into place until
about 9 a.m., two hours late, leaving the Viet-
cong an escape route. (The 9th Division later
denies any delay.) Now the informers claim
not to recognize the approach being taken to
the village. One American sharply questions
them. Another is cursing the Vietnamese
'Tpsywar" operatives trampling along with the
troops: "All we need are these goddamned
guys with their leaflets. And they're wearing
black pajamas. Beautiful. Now the army (the
9th Division troops) will zap 'em as VC."
Looking Around
Several of the Vietnamese special police
have found an empty farmhouse, recently de-
serted judging by damp betel-nut stains on the
floor. They are passing the time knocking holes
in a water barrel. In another farmhouse, the
occupant, an old lady, stares at a wall while
two carefree PRtTs boil eggs on her wood
stove.
A lone PRU wanders along the treeline
shaking his head and muttering, "VC di di, VC
di di ... (VC gone, VC gone)." The troops
presently advance toward a cluster of houses
nearer the village center. Spaced along the
mud trails at intervals of about 10 yards are
thick mud bunkers, each lams offorcrir d
eral men. The houses also hatid btin ers, Inside
or out. Vinh Hoa, being within an allied "free
strike zone," is subject to air and artillery
agenda leaflets carried in pl-astle ags. Some
Iset20(113/03025ed OS4 RDPIti B001
garlands of flowers. The procession takes on a
festive air.
Ten minutes later the column reaches the
center of the village, a small cluster of houses
and shops facing a square that previously con-
tained a covered marketplace. The market-
place has been bombed out. In the center of the
square is a concrete obelisk about 10 feet high
?a Vietcong memorial, say the Americans,
dedicated to the enemy dead. It is one target of
the Phoenix strike.
The PRUs and Vietnamese special police
begin searching?and sacking?the homes.
They are bored, and restless, because there
has been no "adtion." The psywarriors' plastic
bags, emptied of propaganda, are comman-
deered for loot ranging from clothing to chick-
ens. "Trick or treat," says an American, not
really amused. In one house, some of the Viet-
namese troops are having a small celebration.
They have unearthed a bottle of rice wine.
A few village residents, women, children
and old men, are assembled along one side of
the square. They squat on their haunches in the
dust. Several male captives are bound a few
yards away. Against a well, the narrow-shoul-
dered prisoner is rocking back and forth, a
trickle of blood running down his head.
Amid whirling dust, a 9th Divison helicop-
ter lands in the square. A lean U.S. lieutenant
colonel in polished boots and trim uniform
steps out with aides in tow. Displaying a map
marked with red grease pencil, he reports the
kill totals of the support troops: "Charlie Com-
pany got three KIAs (Killed In Action), Delta
Company two, we got one from my chopper.
. . ." All the fatalities, he says, were armed
Vietcong, carrying packs. They were shot
trying to flee through the cordon. "They had
low-level documents on them," the colonel re-
ports. Presently the chopper leaves.
In the middle of the square, two Americans
are strapping demolition charges around the
Vietcong monument. A one-minute warning is
sounded. Everyone takes cover. As the charge
explodes, the monument disintegrates into
chunks of brick and concrete. It is exactly
noon.
The Village Church
The explosion seems to galvanize the forag-
ing troops into action. "Don't they have any-
thing to do but loot those houses?" an Ameri-
can PRU adviser shouts to a Vietnamese lieu-
tenant. "Get the men out combing the rest of
this village." Two search parties move out. A
third group, mostly Americans, crosses a nar-
row footbridge spanning a canal to investigate
a church.
Crossing the bridge, the Americans spot
fresh footprints on both sides of the river con-
nected with the canal. For the moment, they
pose a mystery.
The church, a Roman Catholic structure, is
bolted shut at front and rear. Just as two
Americans warily advance to smash a lock, the
front door opens and an elderly man in white
pajamas appears, smiling as though to wel-
come parishioners to services. The inside of
the little church is newly painted and neatly
scrubbed. A row of angled bullet holes along
the metal-sheet roof attests to a visit from a
helicopter gunship.'
In the rear are a large drum and a brass
gong. An American points to them and ques-
gee2609t0 31121511. 0921dPiSP 71 B0036
'What are they for?"
"To call the faithful to worship."
"Did you see any people leaving the village
all abont it by midnight last night. So they blew
614Ftteronbul 6eitrcHdern the river on their
sampans. 'T
, But there may be something to salvage
from the operation. In the square, the group of
squatting villagers has grown to 50 or 60. Cen-
sus-Grievance operatives examine their identi-
fication cards. Few have them; in Vietcong-
controlled areas, the enemy forbids the people
to carry government ID cards and often pun-
ishes those who do.
The two informers, still with bags on their
heads, stand behind a nearly wall, peering at
the villagers. Occasionally they point to a resi-
dent and whisper to a PRU. Those put under
suspicion are pulled to their feet, bound and
taken aside to the prisoner group. The others
remain on their haunches staring silently into
the dust.
The Moving Finger
One villager "fingered" by the informers is
a bowlegged woman clutching a baby. She is
identified as a member of the village "women-
farmer association," a Vietcong citizen-in-
volvement organization not normally consid-
ered important enough to classify as Vietcong
cadre. ("No point picking them up," a U.S. of-
ficial says later in Saigon. "They're more
trouble than they're worth to process and
hold.")
But the woman is moved to the prisoner
group, clutching the baby. Her two other chil-
dren, a boy about six and a girl about 10 years
old, begin to cry loudly. A PRU raises a rifle
butt over their heads menacingly, and the
wails subside into muffled sobs.
From behind a nearby house two shots are
heard. The narrow-shouldered prisoner has
been executed. His body is dumped into a
bunker.
One of the psywar operatives lectures the
villagers on the perils of supporting the Viet-
cong and outlines the benefits of backing the
Saigon government. Propaganda sheets bear-
ing a smiling portrait of President Nguyen Van
Thieu are handed out.
At one side of the square an American ad-
viser muses about the operation and what it
has to do with the war: "There are 30 people
sitting around a table in Paris, and they just
aren't going to hack it. How can they solve this
thing? The people in this village have been VC
for 10 years, maybe 20. How are you going to
-change that? We come here on an operation,
and what does it prove? We've got some crook
sitting in Don Nhon picking up a salary every
month because he claims to be the government
village chief here. He hasn't dared to visit this
village for seven years. The district chief was
too chicken to come on this operation. So we
come in, pick up a few Charlies and leave. The
VC will be back in control here tonight...."
Heading Back
At 3 p.m., with five prisoners in tow, the
troops start hiking back to the landing zone in
the rice paddy for transportation home. Near
the paddy they meet two U.S. soldiers from the
9th Division cordon, leading two prisoners.
Each of the captives wears a neatly printed
"Detainee Card."
The taller and more talkative of the two in-
formers is brought forward to examine the new
prisoners. One is identified as a deputy Viet-
cong village chief, the other as a non-Vietcong.
Both are placed with the other prisoners.
A deputy Vietcong village chief would be the
t etk t
titaftpAill of the day by far, the
bGlitevbi 'cadre at best. "Hey, we
got us a big one," says an elated American ad-
viser, who then cautions nearby PRUs: "You
rive at a substantial farmhouse with flower
beds in the front yard, a manicured hedge and
pillars flanking the front entrAinres of
many prosperous homes in Vrrit Y
? I
Ing, since Vietcong villages usually are poorer
than government-controlled towns. Isolation
from major markets, high Vietcong taxes and
allied bombing are among the reasons.
Behind the house some leaf wrappings are
found. "The VC must have been here," an
American says. "That's what they wrap field
rations in." (Leaves are used by most rural
Vietnamese, VC or not, to wrap food.) The oc-
cupant of the house, an old man who stares at
the interlopers through wire-rim spectacles, is
shaking, through age, or fear, or both.
The aged Vietnamese is questioned briefly.
"Bring him along," an American says sharply.
"Let's move." Another adviser says, "That old
man could be the top dog VC in this village.
You never know." The old man totters along
with the troops. He is released in midafter-
noon when one of the two informers claims him
as an uncle.
Interrogation
At about 11 a.m., an American adviser and
two special police turn up with three captives.
"Found them hiding in a house," the American
says. The informers inspect the captives and
whisper, through an interpreter, that one Is a
Vietcong village guerrilla, the second a Viet-
cong "security section chief" and the third a
non-Vietcong, perhaps a deserter from the
South Vietnamese army.
The two identified as Vietcong are bound,
and one of them, a narrow-shouldered, bent
young man with protruding teeth, is leaned
against a_ tree trunk. Several police interroga-
tors and PRUs gather around hini and fire
questions. They want to know where Vietcong
weapons and ammunition are hidden.
The suspect doesn't know or won't say. Soon
the questions are interspersed with yanks at
his hair and sharp kicks to his head, face and
groin. The prisoner sags against the tree, face
bloodied.
"Americans don't want to be here for any
more of this," says one U.S. adviser, moving
away. "It's a nasty goddamned business." He
adds, "You know, it's a whole cycle of this
stiff. Last week in another village near Don
Nhon the VC marched five government sympa-
thizers intp the marketplace and beat their
heads in with hammers. So we return it on this
guy. It goes on and on."
By now the informers have gotten their
bearings. They lead most of the troops along a
trail to a hospital building behind a hedge of
blue flowers. It is a straw-thatch structure con-
taining eight wide plank beds separated by
white plastic curtains. In one corner is a mud
bunker, in another a crude case of glassware
and medicine bottles, some with French and
American labels. There are no patients or
traces of them.
The Americans decide it is a Vietcong hospi-
tal for wounded enemy troops. "Burn it," an
American adviser directs. Ignited with cigaret
lighters, the hut burns readily.
Vinh Hoa Village
In single file, the troops wind along a trail
toward the center of Vinh Hoa. Since there
hasn't been any firing, the possibility of an am-
bush is discounted. Some of the PFtUs and spe-
cial police are carrying food and household ar-
ticles taken from the outlying farmhouses. The
"psywarriors" are strewing the trail with pro-
"We have Information on how much this
church pays to the VC in taxes. How much do
"ItiMAINNIgaYW-cRfe7p/M
(80 cents to $1.60)."
"The church, how much does it pay?"
"The church does not pay taxes. The church
never pays taxes."
"The hell it doesn't pay," the American
says. "This may be a Catholic church, but it's
Charlie's Catholic church."
A Taciturn Lady
The Americans follow a path past the
church to a cluster of solidly built homes. Most
are empty. In one, two candles burn before a
postcard picture of Christ. In another, a pic-
ture of Pope Paul sits on a small altar beside a
mud bunker. One house is occupied by a
woman with six children. She is interrogated.
"Did you see people crossing the river this
morning?"
"No, I was in my bunker."
"Where is your husband?"
"He went to the market at Cal Mang."
"Why?"
"He always goes when the soldiers come
here. . . ."
"Do you know who are the VC in this vil-
lage?"
"No. We don't know VC. We are Catholic.
Catholics don't know VC."
"We know that a Liberation Committee was
elected here. When?"
"I just heard about it recently."
"Who is the Vietcong village chief here?"
"I don't know. . . ?"
"How much tax do you pay to the VC?"
"More than 1,000 piasters." (About $8.)
"How often do Vietcong song and dance
(propaganda) teams come and visit?"
"Not often."
"What do they say?"
"They say the Americans will go home
soon."
"How often does your husband stand guard
for the VC?"
"Every five?or six days."
"How often do the women here have to
make piing stakes (poisoned stakes) for the
VC?"
"Once or twice a year."
"That's pretty typical," says the American,
heading back across the footbridge to the vil-
lage square.
Disappearing Enemy
An American adviser has figured out the
footprints on both sides of the river. There are
no sampans around the village. Adult males
except for old men, seem almost nonexistent.
The village population is estimated at 2,000, but
no more than 200 persons have been seen on
this day.
The American finds a youngster hiding in a
farmhouse. He poses a few perfunctory ques-
tions, then suddenly demands: "At what time
this morning did all the people leave here by
boat?" Perhaps startled by the suddenness of
the query, the boy replies, "At four o'clock."
The conClusion: Most of the village's Viet-
cong guerrillas, -VCI cadre and Liberation
Committee members have eluded the Phoenix
troops. "They just had to have that big meet-
ing last night," fumes an American adviser,
recalling the last planning session for the oper-
ation. "Everyone had to get in on this god-
damned operation. The VC must have known
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NEW ?icARRrdivrigsr Release 2003/03/25 :glecifpPial60fil3C64p000300160001-7 PAGE I
The Vietnarri o icy Reversal of 1968
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, March 5?
On the cold and cheerless
early morning of Feb. 28,
1968, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen.
Earle G. Wheeler, landed at
Andrews Air Force Base after
in *gent mission to Saigon.
Paging only to change into a
fresh uniform, he hurried
through the rain to the White
Hose ,to deliver a report and
rne a request.
e report was designed to
encourage an anxious Presi-
dent and his beleaguered ad-
visers, but it served only to
This is the first of two
articles written by Hedrick
Smith in collaboration with
William Beecher, and incor-
porating reports by Peter
Grose, John W. Finney, E. W.
Kenworthy, Roy Reed, Ben-
jamin Welles, Edwin L. Dale
Jr. and Max Frankel.
shock them into extended de-
bate.
The request ? for more
troops?was designed to bring
military victory at last in the
eight-year American military
*effort' but it led instead to a
if4414viesaftdecisions that
stand in retrospect as one of
the most remarkable turn-
abouts in United States for-
eign policy.
The month of March, 1968,
became a watershed for a na-
tion and a Government in
turmoil. The Johnson Admin-
istration, by pulling back
from the brink of deeper com-
mitments and moving toward
disengagement, set a cOurse
that affects the daily deci-
sions of the Nixon AdThinis-
tration.
Many of the ingredients of
Continued on Page 14, Column 1
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,4941,pri?It9gfor Releav~03Igfeall/p-RIDP71B00364R00030016001a4?E 7;7
WASHING
CI)ei
Facing Facts
Nixon's Team Is Trying to Determine
What's Really Happening in Vietnam
By Joseph Kraft
THE NIXON Administra-
tion has not yet fully formu-
lated its policy for Vietnam.
But in one critical area, the
new men have decisively
parted company with the
practices of the Johnson Ad-
ministration.
They are not kidding them-
selves, or the country, with
rosy progress reports. In-
stead of merely spouting sta-
tistics and homilies designed
to justify past actions, they
are making a systematic ef-
fort to determine what is
really happening in Vietnam.
THIS WILLINGNESS to
face facts, even unpleasant
facts, finds a notable expres-
sion in what President Nixon
himself said about a cease-
?
fire at his first White House
news conference. In the past,
a cease-fire in Vietnam was
airily Included in the official
line as a distinct possibility.
How could it not be? The
seat of all the trouble was
supposed to be an invasion of
South Vietnam by North
Vietnam. A settlement re-
quired only that the North
leave its neighbor in the
South alone. Once that hap-
pened, a cease-fire was
child's play.
Mr. Nixon came off this
nonsense with a vengeance.
By reference to a guerrilla
struggle, he implicity recog-
nized that the insurgents had
deep local roots all over Viet-
nam. By reference to the pos-
sibility that "one side may
not even be able to control
many of those who are re-
sponsible for the violence,"
he discreetly surfaced some
doubts as to whether the re-
gime in Saigon was all that
peace-minded.
Then he went on to tell the
truth about how mudh of an
illusion it was to expect a
cease-fire. He said: "I think it
is not helpful in discussing
Vietnam to use such terms as
cease-fire, because cease-fire
is a term of art that really
has no relevance, in my
opinion, to a guerrilla war."
IN KEEPING with the new
President's appetite for the
facts, there has been a signif-
icant change in the flow of
Vietnam information to the
White House. President John-
son depended on his special
assistant for national security
affairs, Walt Rostow, a fer-
vent partisan of the Vietnam
involvement. Rostow in turn
looked to a unit in the Lex-
tirnal_Intalligears_alacy
headed by Gegre,a,auver.
Nobody doubts Carver's
knowledge of Vietnam or his
basic competence. But ac-
cording to a wide variety of
officials in both the Defense
and State Departments, the
Carver unit largely served up
to Rostow what he wanted to
hear.
Thus before the Tet offen-
sive of last year, its evalua-
tions were apparently very
optimistic about the progress
being made in subduing the
insurgency. These reports
justified the continuing mili-
tary effort on the ground
that success was not too far
away.
Subsequent to Tet, the
eti'ver Unit apparently filled
,esto,
the air with predictions of a
second and third and fourth
wave of attacks by the other
side. The effect of these re-
ports was to put a discount
on the Paris peace talks on
the theory that the other side
was only using the talks as a
stalling device while winding
up for a knockout blow on
the ground.
Rostow's replacement at
the White House, Henry Kis-
singer, has from the begin-
ning sought to bring on to his
staff a capacity for critical
evaluation of the intelligence
reports. The man he origi-
nally sought?one of Carver's
chief critics?was not availa-
ble.
In the end, Kissinger took
on his staff a former CIA
man, Dean Moore. But Moore
was not a member of the
Carver unit. He is known to
his colleagues at the agency
and at the Departments of
Defense and State as a top-
flight analyst without any
bias.
ALL THIS, to be sure, does
not add up to anything like a
change in policy. But the
ground is plainly being laid
for change. If conditions are
found to warrant it. True
toughmindedness, a disposi-
tion to face facts and to he
skeptical and analytical, Is at
last being substituted for
that ultimate expression of
r omantic sentimentality
which caused so many lead-
ing figures in the Johnson
Administration to equate
fighting a war that could not
be won with hardheaded real-
ism.
ce, 1969, Publishers-Ball Syndicate
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NEW Y04112111141V4f9r Release 2003/03/25 TWEEM71B424666000300160001-7 PAGE
4 Divisions in Nort
arc! Shifting of Units
iously Withdrawn by
oi Puzzles U.S. Aides
WILLIAM BEECHER
clal to The New York Times
HINGTON, Jan. 20?
American Analysts re-
that four North ylanz..-
rmy divisions that were
awn well out of South
late last year appear
oving southward again.
divisions had been pulled
the area between Vinh
nghoi, at least 50 miles
the demilitarized zone.
telligence officials stress
eir present movements
ard are slow and pri-
y by foot rather than in
or vehicles.
e American officials say
they cannot tell whether the
ene;thy divisions will continue
t move south, either through
the',clemilitarized zone or
iitr61.41 it through Laotian ter-
ritory, or whether the troops
wtli;emain poised across the
borde4: in North Vietnam.
Twp regiments of a fifth
North, Vietnamese division,
Which moved into Laos earlier,
are reported back in South
Vietnam, in the Ashau Valley
ea lOuthwest of Danang.
Government analysts, puzzled
the movements, are uncer-
whether they may
e a long-expected offen-
st as the Paris peace
ove into a more sub-
stage, or whether they
erely serve as a threat
derscore Hanoi's ability
Toward DMZ
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The New York Times Jen. 21i19
4
Some enemy units are back in Ashau Valley (1), and others
are heading southward from near Donghoi (2) and Vinh (4).
tion and a 10th is under con-
struction.
By their troop movements
=u,A,
estimated to have reached
about 10,000 in December. In
addition, there are believed to
be about 30,000 men "in the
pipeline" in the southern pan-
handle area of North Vietnam,
on their way to fill out existing
units throughout the South.
Starting late last September,
the enemy began withdrawing
the 324B Division from the
northernmost part of South
Vietnam, moving it to Donghoi,
about 50 miles north of the
border. Other units were moved
toward, and in some . cases
across, the Laotian and Cam-
bodian borders in a general dis-
engagement with allied forces
is 26 rEetitoRDPIT
South.
Ranking officials say this was
anoi osition Bolstere
Officials who have studied in-
telligence reports say that since
the partial halt in bombing of
North Vietnam last March 31
and the full bombing halt on
Nov. 1, the Hanoi regime has
placed itself in a much stronger
position to continue the war
should the bombing be resumed.
The reports indicate that
most major bridges, roads,
'rail hubs and marshaling yards
in North Vietnam have been
Irebuilt and are in active use.
North Vietnam is said to have
'restored about half its thermal
ipower capacity, but restora-
tion of the chemical fertilizer
industeipiarbmenlif orolRe
has lagged. Nine jet airfields
have been put back into opera,
one of the factors behinCthe
Johnson Administration's de-
cision to end the bombing of
-ma???????Nessmr.?....
south to Vinh have been re-
paired and are operating again.
The rail link between Vinh and
Donghoi is under repair.
Large underground oil tanks
have been installed at Than-
hoa, Vinh and Donghoi and at
the entrance to the Mugia Pass,
which leads from North Viet-
nam into the Ho Chi Minh
Trail in Laos. An oil pipeline:
is also being completed be-1
tween Vinh and Donghoi.
Trucks, trains and ships are",
carrying many types of mill-4
tary supplies to ports as far' r
south as Donghoi. In addition,
there are reports of "signifi-
cant stockpiles" of weapon*
I I 01144R000.11001434100167
northern edge of the demili-
tarized zone.
WASHINaMONviRinir Release 21)143jN/2I 2grielDRE41300364R00030016000115AGE 2.3 N.
Vrol11 News bisPatehes
SAIGON, Jan. 11?A report
Saturday from U.S. pacifica-
tion headquarters said nearly
13 million of South Vietnam's
17 million people now live in
areas considered "relatively
secure" from Vietcong har-
.iissment, the highest number
speaking of security, U.S. offi-
cials say A, B & C aree.rela-
lively secure. D,& E are rated
contested and VC means Vitt-
cong controlled.
The Evaluation System has
been criticized by some ob-
servers who believe it gives an
overly optimistic picture of
rural security in South Viet-
,-, Robrt W. Korner,
ever reported.
rO
The report said the South ran pacification until tw
V i e t n a m e s e government months ago, and other Ameri-
gained control over an addi-
can officials have readily eon-
I n
tional 537,000 peasants in De-
ceded that the systems is ot
cember, increasing its overall an exact measurement, but be-
control to 76.3 per cent of the
lieve it is the best available.
population.
Since Nov. 1, South Viet-
namese troops have mbves1
The number of people living .
!i
In. relatively secure areas is 9.1 nto more than 1000 hamlets!
per cent higher than at the in the countryside with a total
1
end of January, 1968, and 16.5
!population of over 1 million.
,,We are moving into a vac-
per cent higher than the low uum," one U.S. official said in
of 59.8 per cent recorded afteri a recent comment on the lack
the Communist Tet offensive i
last January-February. of Vietcong stepped-up pacification pro resistance to the
I
Spokesmen said 2.1 million! gram.
South Vietnamese-12.3, per '
cent?remain under Vietcong ?
Control, while 1.9 million---AA 4
per cent?live in chntestedi
areas.
The report was based on the;
coniputerized Ramjet" Evalua- I
tion System under which
South Vietnam's. 12,650 ham-
1
lets are raiteiplisix c
E, D E and V
AFT4T
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