CONVERSATION WITH DR. TORDELLA AND ROY BANNER OF NSA RE PUEBLO MATTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00364R000300150018-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: March 6, 1969
• Content Type: MFR

Approved For Release 2007/03YO8': CIAIRDP71 B00364R000300150018-0
6 March 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Conversation with Dr. Tordella and
Re Pueblo Matter
1. On instructions from the Director, I called Dr. Tordella
this afternoon to report highlights of the Director's appearance before
the House Subcommittee on the Pueblo yesterday. General 25X1
Counsel of NSA, was also on the line.
2. I told Dr. Tordella that:
a. Committee questions centered largely on the
303 procedures;
b. matters of interest to NSA. were brought up by
Frank Slatinshek who quoted General Carter as having said
that the Pueblo loss might have cost us five or six years.
The Director doubted that anyone could make this statement
at this stage, particularly in view of the fact that none of us
knew exactly what kind of equipment of this type the Soviets
might have;
c. the Director said he was much more concerned
about documents than technical equipment.
Dr. Tordella said he fully agreed with this.
4. I said Slatinshek went on to ask whether the capture of
technical equipment didn't help the enemy in breaking our systems,
and that in response the Director said:
a. The Committee had better hear from an expert
on this subject;
Approved For Release 2007/03/08 CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300150018-0
 Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA- P71 B00364R000300150018-0
b. however, it was true that the capture of a crypto
equipment would be very damaging if the loss weren't known,
but the loss is known and corrective action can be taken and
the damage largely prevented;
c. the Director conceded that the Pueblo loss is serious
but emphasized it is not possible to say how serious until present
investigations are completed;
d. meanwhile, countermeasures have been taken on the
assumption that everything on board the vessel may have been
compromised..
Dr. Tordella indicated this was true.
6. I said that Representative Nedzi then commented he was
surprised and glad to hear the loss was not as great as feared, but maybe
it would be a good thing to let the enemy think that they had gotten our
most sophisticated equipment. I said the Director agreed this might be
a good thing.
7. I mentioned the Director's comment that we all get parochial
in the intelligence business and that in fact the truly sensitive secrets
are like the heart of an artichoke and that often a number of layers have
to be peeled off before the real nuggets are exposed. I said the Director
therefore suggested to the Subcommittee that in trying to assess the
damage they take care to make sure everybody understands exactly what
is being discussed.
8. I mentioned the Subcommittee's interest in contingency plans
and suggested NSA, witnesses might get questions in this regard.
9. Dr. Tordella asked if there was a written transcript of the
hearings and if so whether he could see it since it would be helpful to
know the exact context in which the above points were brought out. I said
a transcript had been made and we expected to have a chance to review it
for accuracy. However, I said this transcript was strictly the property
of the Subcommittee and I wasn't sure about the propriety of showing it to
our friends. I said I would mention the problem to the Director.
10. broke in to say that, as Mr. Warner could verify,
these transcripts have been shared between our agencies in the past.
Approved For Release 2007103/08 :-,CIA-RDP71 ~0.N4RDw3 -0
Le is ative ounse