AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR MILITARY PROCURMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MISSILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RESERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00364R000300100001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 630
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 13, 1969
• Content Type: OPEN

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August 13 1.969
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENA
was gathered as he taxied the ship up to
the grand stand. While passengers told re-
porters, "We've never been more comfort-
able or less wearied," Gloria Swanson chris-
tened the plane from New York with another
bottle of grape juice.
In two days and two nights, 20 people in
two airplanes had crossed the continent-
2,343 miles by air and 970 miles by rail. No
other scheduled passenger carrier had ever
done that before.
And so it all began with fanfare, signals
flashing across the country and movie stars.
A few years later, the diary writer noted,
"if we can believe what they are telling
us about new planes coming along, some-
day another young Lindbergh, flying in a
fast jet-propelled or rocket ship will make
the trip so fast that he'll get there before
he started." And so it may be in the '70s?
because of the three-hour difference on the
clock, a supersonic transport will arrive in
Los Angeles before it leaves New York.
RECESS
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Presi-
dent, I ask unanimous consent that the
Senate stand in recess, subject to the call
of the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(At 12 o'clock and 29 minutes p.m., the
Senate took a recess, subject to the call
of the Chair.)
(At 12 o'clock and 48 minutes p.m.,
the Senate reassembled, when called to
order by the Presiding Officer (Mr.
EAGLETON in the chair.)
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, I suggest 'the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the
S 9965
it I and ordering conceive it as an
from Wisconsin planned to debate . changing
had already made some other plans imaginary instrument and then moving
concerning other matters that I must from that imaginary stage into the re-
look into in my home State. alities of the hardware and the putting
I called the Senator from Wisconsin together of the pieces and the creation
this morning and explained the situation. of a powerful item, like this plane, that
We had an understanding that each of will really operate.
We have to imagine this crisis over a
6- or 7-year period and the changes that
will come about, the competition for the
engineering talent and the scientific
talent, the competition for various kinds
of metals, the competition even in the
skilled labor field and all of the things
that go over a 6- or 7-year period. That is
the time over which this contract has
run.
I point out in the beginning that I
strongly support the items now in the
bill and the C-5A. However, I do not
approve of the kind of contract that
This was
first
us would proceed when we could. So in
view of these other pressing matters, I
am going to proceed, and I hope that the
Senator from Wisconsin will be here be-
fore too long. I believe that he will.
Mr. President, the pending amendment
concerns what we call the C-5A, which
is a new, large cargo-carrying plane. The
aircraft carries Army men and cargo as
well as for the Air Force. It has just
reached the point where we are close to
having the production line product roll
out, ready for use.
Mr. President, earlier in life one of my
favorite teachers?one that I have re-
membered all of these years, not only
for what she was, but also for many
things that she said?laid down a cardi-
nal guideline for her students in a spe-
cial talk one day when she said, "Always
keep your eye on the ball."
Regardless of all the things that may
come up about the contra& who nego-
tiated it, who signed it, who proposed it,
and who went into the matter, the ball
that we must keep our eye on is our na-
tional security.
The C-5A aircraft is an essential part
In these modern times of the military
plan for our national protection and our
national security. Part of that plan for
our national security is that we think it
Is necessary to protect certain other areas
of the world as part of our front line
was used in this case. s was
large trial that that type of contract had.
It will be fully explained later in the
debate. I am just debating the matter
now to hit the high points for the RECORD
so that it might be read during the
recess.
That contract will be explained fully
and critically by each side of the debate,
I think, but certainly I do not defend it.
I know it has been proven to be a bad
type of contract, a type that should not
be employed any further. Perhaps one
of the reasons it worked so badly in this
case was because, without having prior
use, it was used for one of the largest
contracts that we have ever gone into. At
any rate, it did not work out for this
case. It was bad for the Government and
It was bad for the contractor, too, as will
defense. very readily appear.
roll. This large cargo plane will replace The point I want to emphasize is that
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask
others that we have in use at the present we must keep our eye on the ball. Ac-
unanimous consent that the order for
time that are not as adequate and do not cording to all the testimony, I believe
the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without have the qualities this one possesses. This we have a good product. We have a good
isa modern plane. plane. We have one that is beyond the
objection, it is so orde
As a member of the Armed Services expectations of the Air Force, beyond
Committee and the one member of thatthe requirements of the specifications. It
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA- committee with special responsibility at
TIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 this time, I have been disappointed re-
FOR MILITARY PROCURMENT, RE- peatedly this year by the lack of sur-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND veillance over several contracts that has
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MIS- been exhibited by our Department of
SILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJ- Defense. I have not only been disap-
ALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RE- pointed in it, but frankly, I have been
SERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH greatly surprised.
The Senate resumed the consideration I have said several times during the
of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize appro- last several years that whatever might be
priations during the fiscal year 1970 for said about the past Secretaries of De-
procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval fense concerning their judgment, the
vessels, and tracked combat vehicles and acts they performed or did not perform,
to authorize the construction of test and what advice they gave or did not
facilities at Kwajalein Missile Range, and give to the President, I thought that we
to prescribe the authorized personnel were superb in our standing at the buss-
strength of the Selected Reserve of each ness table, at the contract table.
Reserve comronent of the Armed Forces, I really have been greatly surprised by
and for other purposes. the lack of surveillance and lack of at-
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, what is tention given a number of these larger
the pending business? contracts.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. I emphasize that if we really want to
ALLEN in the chair). The pending busi- understand the matter, we must get on
ness is amendment No. 108 offered by the the ground and appreciate the great
Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE) . problems that go with acontract to cre-
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Chair. ate something that is not in being, to
Mr. President, this matter was made create a new concept of a plane, a mis-
' the pending business yesterday. It was sile, a ship, or a submarine, to conceive
my impression at that time that there it in our minds from the beginning and
would be no debate on the amendment. get it on paper, and finally, through trial
However, I learned later that the Senator and error, starting and stopping, and
has had its usual bumps during the
trial-and-error period, but there is no
evidence that it is not going to come
through in a fine way, and its per-
formance is beyond expectations and
requirements.
I refer to one witness, the Senator
from Arizona. I requested him to go
down there and go through this plane,
go over it, and I was very much pleased
when he returned with his report. He
not only looked at it but also flew it, and
he will give a report on that.
We move now to this amendment. The
amendment, Mr. President, seeks to
strike from this bill $533 million for the
procurement of 23 of these aircraft and
certain lead funds.
We have what we call the No. 1 run,
run A. That is composed of 58 planes
in all-5 for research, development,
and testing, and 53 for regular type, the
finished product. All that has been taken
care of by money that already has been
authorized and appropriated. It is not
involved in this bill.
So that moves us over to run B, under
the contract referred to as run B, and
that will consist of 57 planes in addi-
tion to the 58 I have mentioned; but
this bill contains money for only 23
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S 9966 Approved For Relem
planes out of run B. At issue Is the
sum of $533 million for 23 C-5A aircraft.
What would be the effect of taking
this money out of the-bill with the adop-
tion at this amendment? It should be
understood that we do not have a single
plane yet for use; but they are on the
assembly line; they are moving. If this
amendment is adopted. it would require
a report from the GAO in 90 days; but
that is purely incidental. It would take
away the money for the plane. At the
very best, we would, lose 1 year. There
would be a delay in the entire program.
More money must benautherized by Con-
gress; otherwise, the production lines
will soon come to a grinding halt. We
will have a standstill,
That is just a fact of life regarding this
fine product which is just coming to
fruition and which wanted.
If we were to cut on the money, if we
ever were to get any planes for use, the
company would have to proceed solely
with its own money to complete the first
run of 58 planes, run A It is estimated
that if this should happen, the company
would sustain a loss of at least $600 mil-
lion. I doubt that any company can Stand
such a loss.
Incidentally, I wish to point out that
no one estimates that this company is
going to make a great deal of money even
if it gets all the contract?the planes
beyond the number called for by this bill.
Various estimates have been made. The
Air Force has estimated that the com-
pany will lose a certain amount, and the
company says they will lose less than
that. But all agree that there will be a
loss to the company under either situa-
tion.
According to the contractor, Lockheed,
if all the aircraft in run B are bought,
its loss would be in the neighborhood of
$13 to $15 million. The Air Force says
that if we buy all it is possible to buy
under run A and run B. they think the
Lockheed loss will be in the neighbor-
hood of $285 million. I mention that just
to indicate that by no kind of figuring or
estimates is this a contract in which the
contractor is going to make money.
There will be a loss either way it goes.
We talk about a 90-day investigation
by the GAO?whatever that may mean.
I will return to that later. But what the
amendment really does is to take the en-
tire project out of the bill and disallow
e money.
There is one thing fui ther about the
number of planes involved, and it is not
in the bill, and it does not have to be
decided now. If the Senate keeps the
money in the bill?as I trust it will do?
there still will be a question of whether
or not we are going to buy 34 additional
planes at a later date. That is a matter
that would be left up LI the Defense
Department initially. I do not know what
their decision will be. I do not know what
their recommendation will be. We cannot
decide that now. That is just another
rnileboard down the road.
We cannot possibly come to it now. It
is not involved in the bill. That is a
judgment to be made by the Secretary
of Defense. It would be up to him to
make that judgment and to give Con-
gress a recommendation
Mr. President, if this program is killed
now as a result of the failure to provide
funds in the bill for the 23 aircraft now
in question, additional Government
costs will be over $100 million because
there will be termination costs of at
least $30 million and $72 million in long-
lead funds approved last year and al-
ready committed. Those are costs that
are involved in the termination of a
contract. Sometimes we have to incur
them in the termination of contracts.
However, it is a necessary part of any
contract involving manufacturing of
extensive products like this. It is a cost
of doing business. It certainly is to be
considered and measured when we get
into the question of whether or not we
are going to terminate the manufacture
of a product that is more than good, it
is essential, and a product that we ac-
tually need in the years to come.
Mr. President, when these planes are
placed in operation they will replace other
planes and actual savings will be had
in connection with the operation.
In connection with the matter about
the General Accounting Office?and I
mention this with all deference to that
fine agency of the Government that is
certainly a great deal of help to the
Committee on Armed Services?they
have advised me that this amendment
provides for them to make a study and
to report in 90 days. They have inform-
ally advised me that at the best, any
study would take at least 6 months, even
in connection with those items they are
competent to study. They are not com-
mitting themselves by any means to say-
ing they are competent and have the
type men with the type training that
would be necessary to carry out all of
the requirements.
Mr. President, just a word about a
matter that was in the newspapers
lately. I wish to pause at this point to
say that I think the Senator from Wis-
consin has done a lot of fine work in
this matter. He is diligent and he always
pursues a matter. He is frank, clear,
and forceful in giving a report to the
Senate about his work. I am proud he is
that type man. It is a pleasure to work
with him in the Senate.
There has been a great deal of pub-
licity and many fancy names used about
this contract. They have called the C-5A
contract the Golden Handshake, and so
on. However, let us remember that the
main questions are whether it is a good
plane and whether we need it.
There has been a crack in the wing in
the testing A crack occurred in the wing
in a static test on July 13. I am advised
over and over by those who know?and
other members of the committee would
be more competent to speak on this mat-
ter than I am?that that is a normal
expectation in every aircraft develop-
ment. The failure occurred at 125 percent
of the load for which the airplane was
designed.
Every aircraft wing, as I understand
it, is tested upward and upward to the
point of breaking. That is how they find
out the terminal point. Where does the
strength of this mighty wing stop after
? all?
ATE August 13, /969
In this case it did not crack mitt' it
had reached the point of 125 percent of
the weight for which it was designed.
As I said, almost all aircraft, partic-
ularly the heavier ones, have experienced
failures of some components during
static testing. 'That Is what static test-
ing is for. To determine the amount of
stress and learn its breaking point Wieg
failure occurred on the B-52A, our
present so-called big bomber, at 139 per-
cent of the design load. In the C-130A
it occurred between 127 percent and 135
percent; in the C-1-0B it occurred at
139 percent; in the F-1040 It occurred
at 135 percent; and the C-141 had a math
landing gear frame failure at 129 percent
of loan, a vertical tall failure at 135 per-
cent, a fuselage failure at 120 percent,
and a men landing gear failure et 145
percent.
Many additional examples could be
cited. Failures of this kind are not unex-
pected. In fact, it is a part of the de-
velopment and testing process regular-
ly to be expected. They reveal these pos-
sible weaknesses in the structures at an
early stage of development to permit
design modifications in the production
of aircraft.
We have had much debate here about
the amount of money in this bill for re-
search and development. This is an il-
lustration of how Par removed from
real research, as we ordinarily term this,
is this testing we have been talking
about. Over and over again a good part
of the money for research and develop-
ment is really research, development,
test, and evaluation.
If I have any bearing at all with the
Department of Defense when they bring
over the recommendations next year,
they will have this research and devel-
opment account, as they call ft. broken
down with more commonsense and
divided up into categories where Sena-
tors will have at better opportunity to
know what they are passing on.
What is the need for the C-5A?
Certainly that has already been estab-
lished, Or there never would have been
such a plane devised and contracted for.
Six squadrons of the C-5A's will per-
mit the phasing out of such obsolete and
inefficient aircraft as the C-124's and
the C-133's. "C" means here "cargo,"
Mr. President.
With the C-5,A's we will reduce the
number of airlift aircraft in the fnrce
by one-half while providing more than
three times the transport capability.
Mr. President, that is the key fact
in this whole debate.
Times have changed. Modern aircraft
are altogether different. Versatility of the
C-5A is greater and its capability more.
Thus, I repeat, with the C-5A', we will
reduce the number of airlift aircraft in
the force by one-half, while providing
more than three times the transport
capability.
When we reduce the number of aircraft
by one-hail, we also reduce the number
of pilots, navigators, and the rest of the
crew members, including maintenance
men?all will be reduced, including repair
parts and all other items that go to Make
up the expensive line of operation. At the
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August 13, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RtCURD? SEN ATE S 9967
same time, we will have three times the
transport capability.
Second, the C-5A's operating cost per
ton-mile will be way lower than any
other airlift aircraft. It will be 2.9 cents
for the C-5A against 5.3 cents for the
C-141. That is the operating cost per
ton-mile. It will be almost one-half as
much for the C-5A as it is for the C-141
that is now in such extensive use.
Three, under any theory, the 23 air-
craft in the fiscal year 1970 request are
needed. They are ready now to start com-
ing off the assembly line. These will take
us only to four squadrons?the number
I am talking about-81 aircraft versus
the six squadrons of 120 aircraft, to be
approved as a minimum requirement by
the Secretary of Defense and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. That is under review by
the Joint Chiefs all the time.
As I pointed out a few minutes ago,
that will be a determination for the Sec-
retary of Defense, as to whether the last
purchase is made. It is not before us now.
If he decides to quit at the end of the
81 aircraft that the bill will build up to,
that is a matter of judgment, and also
a matter of judgment for Congress
whether to approve it, if the Secretary
of Defense does recommend it. But this
is no time to stop on a good plane just
as the first ones start coming off the line
for use.
Mr. President, despite cost overruns,
every indication is that the Air Force
will get an aircraft with fine performance
characteristics. It is the only aircraft
which can carry weapons and equipment
of any Army division; namely, tanks,
bridge launchers, armored personnel
carriers, and helicopters, concurrently
with the personnel associated with the
equipment.
If the C-5A is used to carry only man-
power, light equipment, and the lighter
weapons, it is so large that it can carry
an enormous load with great rapidity of
movement.
Mr. President, we have heard a great
deal of talk about overruns. I am going
to be quite brief on that matter, but the
idea is false that there can be a cer-
tainty and a fixed final figure in a con-
tract like this, without running into a
lot of big money, and it would cost just
as much to the Government in dollars,
even though not called overruns.
This contract had a form of sliding
scale. If there had not been a sliding
scale as to cost, any contractor, in order
to protect himself, would have required
a fixed amount, in much larger propor-
tions, in order to provide a cushion of
protection, even before we get to the
concept of profits.
I have already mentioned profits. As
I pointed out, so many changes came
about that it not only caused the so-
called overruns, but absorbed chances for
profit.
I would in no way try to defend over-
runs as such in any kind of contract. I
point out, however, that one reason for
the genuine overruns has been the in-
flation which has been raging in our eco-
nomy since 1964. There was a clause in
this contract which covered part of the
inflation, but we had an extraordinary
situation existing during those months
and years, which made the situation
different from what it had ever been. I
covered this point in my opening remarks
on this entire bill, and I would like to
restate my remarks at this time, which
occurred on page S7702 of the CONGRES-
SIONAL RECORD of July 8.
MAIN REASONS FOR OVERRUNS
The committee has found as a general
proposition that the principal reasons
that the original cost estimates in these
programs have been invalid in recent
years are as follows:
First. Subsequent to the original esti-
mates there were changes in the weap-
ons programs, that is, revision to the
total number of weapons to be produced
and the schedule at which they would
be produced, both factors causing an
increase in the unit cost.
It is possible to alter these two factors
in such a manner that unit costs will be
reduced. However, such decisions in re-
cent years have resulted in increasing the
costs of these programs. The assumptions
on which original estimates were made
were therefore invalidated to the extent
of these changes.
I think we have moved too rapidly
from research into procurement with re-
spect to some of these goods. In some
cases, the need exists, accentuated by
the war. So we had to move forward
regardless of cost.
Second. The military services them-
selves have requested changes in the
weapons through either a change in
technology or a policy decision which
caused an increase over the original
estimate.
Third. There appears to have been a
lack of sufficient management supervi-
sion over these various programs to take
timely action to either correct or recog-
nize, early, the overrun problem.
Fourth. There has been the fact of
abnormal inflation since 1964, which has
reduced the Defense procurement dollar
to a substantial degree. There is no pre-
cise index on the effect of the. Vietnam
war on the procurement dollar itself.
Some estimates, however, indicate that
the overall loss of purchasing power of
the defense procurement dollar would
approximate 25 percent.
Inflation since 1964 has affected not
only Defense moneys but many other
activities in the economy.
Between 1964 and 1968 the interest rate
on 3 months Treasury bills rose from 3.5
to 6.15 percent or an increase of 75 per-
cent; the interest yield on FHA home
mortgages from 5.45 to 8.05 percent, or
an increase of 48 percent; services?less
rent?rose 21.6 points from 117 to 138,6
or an increase of 18 percent; the cost of
food rose 12.9 points from 106.4 to 119.3
or an increase of 12 percent.
I point this out not by way of excuse.
I am not defending any of those con-
tracts. The military as such and civilian
groups as such were given some of the
hard reasons why some of the increase
occurred and have been given some com-
parison.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, without
attempting to fully cover all the ramifi-
cations of the contract and the plane, I
have presented the high points of what
the original conception was, the need for
the plane, the contract, and the type of
contract which was entered into in 1964.
I have covered the fact that it proved to
be the wrong type of contract.
I think one reason why the Depart-
ment of Defense got into the contract
for this large plane, involving so many
millions of dollars, was that it just did
not take time to try out that type of
contract on smaller missions or smaller
projects. If it had, these defects in it
would have shown up. But that is all be-
hind us now, and nothing can be done
about it. We have to start from where we
are.
This program is in fine form now,
right to the point where the planes are
going to start coming off the assembly
line. We certainly will need the ones we
have already appropriated money for.
The number is 58 in run A; and, by all
standards, we are going to need the 23
out of run B, as provided in the bill.
A great deal of testimony on this sub-
ject was taken by another committee. It
is entitled to consideration, of course. We
considered this item from every view-
point. Then for all of the public who
were interested, we had 2 full days of
hearings, in which that testimony was
taken. Nothing came out, either in public
or private, that attacked the plane, or the
product. Nothing came up that ques-
tioned the motives or questioned the im-
partiality of the Defense Department in
awarding the contract. All the evidence
is that, whichever way it goes, it is not
going to be a profitable contract for the
company. It is going to lose money, ac-
cording to its own estimates and accord-
ing to the Air Force. It is going to cost
more money than we or they thought it
would. We regret that, but it is another
illustration that, over these long periods
it is impossible to foresee what the future
holds. Who can contract with certainty
about the cost, particularly with things
moving forward as rapidly as they are
now in the field, for example, of elec-
tronics. It has gotten to the point where
over half the cost of a plane is in elec-
tronics.
In preparation of this vast matter, we
prepared a series of questions that re-
lated to the financial status of the pro-
gram and the developments and effect
of various lines of effort. We sent those
questions to the Department of Defense
for answers. I have the questions in my
hand. The questions are ours. The an-
swers are those of the Department of
Defense.
Having checked through those an-
swers, I believe they are substantially
correct. The staff believes they are gen-
erally and substantially correct.
For the information of other Senators
and all interested parties, I ask unani-
mous consent that the questions of the
Senate Committee on Armed Services
and the answers of the Department of
Defense thereto be printed in the RECORD
at this paint.
There being no objection, the ques-
tions and answers were ordered to be
printed in the RECORD, as follows:
Question No. 1: Financial Status of the
Program:
(a) How much has been obligated to date?
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE August 13, 1969.
(b) How much has been expended to date?
(a) On what date will present funds be
expended?
Specify these funds by fiscal year and
those under the continuing resolution.
AS OF JUNE 30, 1969
[Dollars in millions]
R. & D. Aircraft procurement
Fiscal
sear Obligations
Expendi- Expendi-
tures Obligations tures
1964
1965
10.0
42.0
10.0
42.0
1966
158.9
158. 9
1967
278.6
278. 6
1968
340.7
314. 2
196)
123.6
68. 7
Total _
953.8
872.4
385. 6 383. 7
414. 2 394. 7
443.7 414. 2
I. 243.5 1, 192. 6
On July 28, 1969, the Department of De-
fense, under the authority of the continu-
ing resolution for FY 1970, approved addi-
tional funding in the amount of $100 million
to protect production continuity. Of the
$100 million, $80 million has been obligated.
The difference of $20.0 million will be obli-
gated to the most urgent requirement con-
sistent with the financial management of
the total program. Based on the present rate
of expenditure, presently available funds may
be exhausted by 1 October 1969.
Question No. 2: Provide a summary of funds
that have been authorized prior to fiscal year
1970 and indicate how they have been ex-
pended or obligated.
Answer:
R. & D. AND PROCUREMENT AS or JUNE 30, 1969
[Dollars in millions'
Fiscal year
Program Expended
1964 10.0 10.0
1965_ 42. 0 42. 0
1966 _ 158.9 158.9
1967 667. 0 662.3
1968 781.9 708.9
1969 624.7 482.9
Total 2, 284. 5 2, 065. 0
Question No. 3: Provide a summary of the
effect on the present 0-5A aircraft program
If no fiscal year 1970 procurement funding
is forthcoming and the program is delayed
one year.
Answer: Failure to provide FY 70 pro-
curment funding would Void the current
contract option commitments for Run B. The
contract options between Lockheed and Gen-
eral Electric and their subcontractors and
suppliers would lapse. The Air Force would
be obligated to pay the $30.5 million Run B
termination liability if requested by Lock-
heed.
The $225 million over ' target funds re-
quested for FY 70 would still be required
to fund the contracts from target to cell-
sag for Run A. Additional funds would be
required because of the additional target and
ceiling associated with the repricing appli-
cation of the Run B option exercise in Jan-
uary 1969. These additional funds would
not finance Lockheed until FY 1971 funds
could be made available. IS is doubtful that
Lockheed would be able to finance on its
own the coats of continuing the Run A pro-
duction during this time period. As a result,
there is a substantial likelihood that the
contractor would be forced to default the
contract for the Run A aircraft.
If it is assumed that the costs of continu-
ing the current Run A production could be
sustained by the ootnractor there would still
be a production gap of about 18 months
between Runs A and B. During this gap, as
many as 40,000 employees could be affected.
Hp to 20,000 at Lockheed would probably be
laid off and 20,000 involved with subcontrac-
tors and vendors either laid off or put on
other work. The rehire and/or retraining of
these people would be extremely difficult.
Negotiation of the prices of the Run B air-
craft after this delay would be in a sole
source environment with no contractual
commitments or price options available. A
rough estimate of the cost increase is from
$400-$550 million for Run B.
Reduction in the Run A production rate
In order to stretch Run A and avoid a pro-
duction gap would void the existing contract.
Neogtiation of the stretch in Run A produc-
tion would probably permit Lockheed to
recover most of its presently projected losses
on RDT&E and Run A. This. negotiation
would be essentially sole source and again
with no contractual commitmente or price
options. It is likely that the program cost
increase would equal or exceed the cost in-
crease associated with the gap in the produc-
tion line discussed earlier. In addition, while
the total number of employees affected would
be reduced, the lower production rates would
require almost immediate lay-offs of people
by both Lockheed and their subcontractors
and vendors.
Question No. 4: What have we received for
this money so far? How many airplanes will
be delivered from prior appropriations?
Answer: Thus far, the bulk of the R&D ef-
fort has been completed. Five R&D aircraft
have been completed and about 600 hours
of flight testing have been accomplished.
About nineteen production aircraft are in
various stages of assembly. A substantial
amount of maintenance and operational
training equipment has been delivered. The
first operational aircraft is scheduled for
delivery in December 1969. We have high
confidence of securing a much needed stra-
tegic airlift capability with the delivery of an
aircraft that will meet all of its performance
guarantees. Fifty-eight (58) aircraft are con-
tractually required to be delivered from prior
year appropriations.
Question No. 5: Give a complete statement
of the effect of the repricing formula and the
reverse incentive on the procurement of the
23 aircraft proposed in the bill.
Answer: Our interpretation of the present
contract is that the repricing formula came
into effect when we exercised the Run B op-
tion in January 1969. It will apply to the 23
Run B aircraft requested for FY 70 and
will result in a new target cost and ceiling
price for the 76 production aircraft. This
means that some, but not all of the contrac-
tor's RDT&E plus Run A over-ceiling condi-
tion will be eliminated. This over-ceiling re-
lief would be only a fraction of that which
would obtain by applying the repricing for-
mula to all 57 Run B aircraft.
No reverse incentive (see questions 10 and
20) exists with the 23 aircraft being re
quested for FY 70. We are negotiating with
Lockheed to eliminate the possibility of a
reverse incentive, before more than the 23
FY 70 Run B aircraft are procured.
Question No. 6: What could the Air Force
be expected to receive in the way of opera-
tional C-5A aircraft in the event no addi-
tional funds other than the $225 million for
over-target costs on Run A in the present
bill and prior year funds were available?
Answer: Contractually, the Air Force can
expect to receive 58 aircraft when the $225
million is added to the Run A contracts.
Realistically, in view of Lockheed's projected
loss on the sale of only 58 aircraft, it is
questionable whether the contractor could
proceed if a decision were made not to buy
any Run B aircraft. If the contractor de-
faulted the contract, it is possible some 10
to 20 airplanes could be delivered.
Lockheed is contractually committed to
provide the 58 R&D and Run A aircraft. The
Government is committed to provide the
$225 million over-target funds requested in
the FY 70 Budget plus whatever additional
costs may result from the application of the
repricing formula relative to our exercising
the Run B option in January 1969, If Run B
were terminated, an additional $30.5 million
of termination liability would be also
required.
Question No. 7: Is the company not legally
committed to furnish 68 aircraft under
Run A?
Answer: The company is committed to
furnish five test aircraft under RDT&E and
53 operational aircraft under production Run
A, a total of 58 aircraft. This commitment is
legally binding so long as the Government
meets its commitments. This means that
funds must be provided in a timely manner
for the allowable costs associated with pro-
ducing these 58 aircraft.
Question No. 8: What changes, if any, are
being considered in the contracting methods,
i.e., repricing formula, abnormal escalation,
etc.?
Answer: It is the Air arce's intention to
change the C--5A Lockheed contract as fol-
lows:
a. Remove the reverse incentive possibility
feature from the repricing clause, which does
not arise until more than four squadrons are
procured;
b. Incorporate a new delivery schedule in
the contract;
c. Modify the methods Of procuring/pric-
ing spare parts;
d. Negotiate the disagreement as to the
intended application of abnormal escalation.
Other secondary issues and attendant mat-
ters will be clarified and resolved within the
overall negotiation package_
e. Negotiate the scope and operation of
the Correction of Deficiency Clause so as to
better clarify its meaning and to facilitate
Its administration.
Question No. 9: Summarize in simple terms
the cost elements of Run A.
Answer: The cost elements for R&D plus
Run A may be expressed in the following
way. These are based on the assumption that
only three squadrons are procured and no
repricing is involved.
Cost to Cost to
Government produce
Lockheed-Georgia Co __ 1,764 2,436
General Electric Co 534 558
Other program costs 214 214
Initial spares 201 201
or
R. 8.1. & E 1,003 1,246
Procurement 1,509 1,962
Initial spares _ _ 201 201
2, 713 3, 409
2,713 3,409
Question No 10: ?tarnish a graphic analy-
sis of how the reverse incentive operates.
Answer: Price adjustment in accordance
with Air Force position: (Applicable Run A
actual cost $1526M, Run A target cost
$832M).
Increase in
Increase in Overall con-
overall tract ceiling
contract for each $1
Quantity of Run a ceiling price over run A
Aircraft (millions) ceiling
AT-23
AT-33:
AF position ___ 393
Lockheed position 558
AT 57 680
$292 0.66
.89
I. 01
1.54
Reverse
incentive
No.
Na.
"yes.
Yes.
Question No 11: Can the Air Force give
assurance that the reverse incentive pro-
vision will be deleted frorn the contract? Ex-
plain the manner in Which the repricing
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formula will operate on the proposed pro-
curement of 23 aircraft.'
Answer: As Dr. Seamans publicly stated,
the nature of the Air Force commitment
beyond the 4th squadron is dependent upon
the results of negotiations. In large meas-
ure, these revolve around the deletion of
reverse incentive feature in the contract.
This deletion is a prime negotiation objec-
tive of the Air Force prior to procurement
of the balance of Run B aircraft. Presently,
operation of the reverse incentive on the
proposed FY 1970 buy of 23 aircraft depends
upon whether or not we procure the fifth
squadron. If we stop at 23 aircraft, repricing
of the contract Orget cost and ceiling will
be made only on the basis of the items
actually ordered. The total amount of Run
B costs to be treated in the repricing formula
will be just the target cost associated
with the 23 aircraft and associated support.
It is specifically noted that the procure-
ment of the 23 aircraft does not involve any
reverse incentive feature when the repric-
ing formula is applied.
Question No. 12: Explain in precise terms
the elements of the C-5A aircraft contract
which will be controlled by military person-
nel and those elements controlled and ad-
ministered by civilian* personnel. In other
words, what is the chain of authority for the
contracting and administration of the pro-
gram?
Answer: Authority and responsibiity for
procurement decisions concerning major Air
Force systems, such as the C-5, rests com-
pletely with the Secretary of Defense and
Secretary of the Air Force. Military people
evaluate technical material, selection data
and procurement approaches and make rec-
ommendations when required. Final deci-
sions clearly and completely rest with the
statutory civilian appointees with the De-
partment of Defense.
Statutory procurement authority for ex-
ecuting contracts for the government within
the Air Force flows from the Secretary of the
Air Force through the Chief of Staff to the
Deputy Chiefs of Staff (Research and Devel-
opment) and (Systems and Logistics) and
to the Director of Procurement Policy in Air
Force Headquarters and then to Air Force
Systems -Command and Air Force Logistics
Command.
Under this authority the Deputy Chiefs of
Staff and the Director of Procurement Policy
are responsible for providing the Commands
with broad policy and procedural guidance
resolving issues beyond Command jurisdic-
tion, assessing Command compliance with
established policy and guidance, and for
supporting the Air Force Secretary in con-
nection with his statutory and administra-
tive responsibilities to Congress.
In the C-5 aircraft and engine procure-
ment, the Air Force followed its standard
source selection procedures. The Air Force
Secretary was the Source Selection Author-
ity. The Source Selection Advisory Council
and Evaluation Board functions were carried
out by senior military members of the Aero-
nautical Systems Division and C-5 System
Program Office respectively at Wright Field,
Ohio. Contractors submitted proposals cov-
ering all elements in great detail. Proposals
were evaluated by a large, highly skilled
group of specialists specifically picked for the
task. Recommendations of these Source Se-
lection bodies were reviewed at appropriate
levels in the Command chain up to the Air
Force Secretary. Based on a detailed review
of these recommendations plus those of the
major Commanders and Chief of Staff, the
Air Force Secretary determined that the rec-
ommendation of General Electric for the en-
gine would be accepted and the award of
the airframe contract to Lockheed was in
the best interest of the Government. The Air
Force Secretary provided a detailed report to
the Secretary of Defense.
In addition to source selection decision,
others are required during regularly sched-
uled program reviews, program change re-
quests, or when a program varies from the
cost schedule or performance requirements
of the contract. Again, these decisions are
made by the Secretary of the Air Force or
Defense.
Question No. 13: The current cost esti-
mate under which you are operating is based
on a study culminating in late October which
Is now ten months old. Lockheed and the Air
Force have serious disagreement about cer-
tain provisions of the contract and how they
apply. The question is, if the October 1968
estimates should be substantially wrong?
substantially lower?and the alleged ambi-
guities in the contract should be decided in
favor of Lockheed, how does the Government
exposure change?
Answer: The Government exposure will
Increase if our October estimate to complete
production Run A (53 aircraft) is substan-
tially low. This is so because in exercising
the Production Run B option in January
1969 we activated the price adjustment
clause.
The Government exposure is the contract
ceiling price and the price adjustment clause
adjusts the contract ceiling price. Opera-
tion of the price adjustment clause and the
resultant increase in ceiling price, is dic-
tated by (1) the cost to complete Run A air-
craft, and (2) the total number of Run B
aircraft procured.
In addition, if the abnormal economic
escalation estimates increase, the contract
ceiling would increase further by that
amount.
The current negotiations with Lockheed
are being conducted with a view toward mu-
tual resolution of all of the ambiguities
presently in the contract. One of the prin-
cipal ambiguities relates to the use of the
abnormal escalation in the repricing formula.
Should we be unable to resolve these ambi-
guities in negotiation, the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) and/or
the courts would be resorted to. A judgment
favorable to the contractor in these cases
would also increase the Government ex-
posure.
Question No. 14: Based on the October cost
data, what was the estimated cost per
aircraft
(a) Under Run A with 53 aircraft? (5
R&D not included)
(b) Under Run A plus 23 aircraft of Run
B?
Answer: The procurement cost for the 53
Run A aircraft (assuming completion of the
Run B buy) was estimated at $1,901 million
for an average cost of $35.9 million per air-
craft. If we had decided at that time not to
buy Run B, the repricing formula would not
have become effective. The procurement cost
of the 53 aircraft would have been $1,509
million for an average cost of $28.5 million.
It is very unlikely that this cost would be
valid if we decide now (after exercising the
Run B option in January) not to buy Run
B. The cost of the Run A aircraft would
probably be decided in court, if the aircraft
were produced at all. The average price would
probably be substantially higher than $28.5
million. As noted earlier, however, there is
no assurance that Lockheed would be able
to complete Run A if Run B is eliminated.
If we procure Run A plus only 23 aircraft
of Run B (76 production aircraft), consid-
ering the effect of the price adjustment
clause, the average procurement (flyaway
plus AGE, training, and data) cost for the
76 aircraft would be about $29.9 million.
Question No. 35: On page 24 of the C-5A
study the following appears:
"It should be noted that the costs to the
Government reflected above are based on the
detail cost review completed in October 1968.
There is a distinct possibility that costs may
continue to increase. A quick look cost re-
view is now in the process of being completed
by the Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD).
Preliminary information from this cost re-
view indicates that the estimated cost to
complete the program (i.e., the contractor's
cost) may increase above the October 1968
estimates."
Furnish some estimate as to what the
maximum cost to completion will be, based
on the information now available.
Answer: A revised cost estimate is now be-
ing completed by the System Program Office.
Preliminary information indicates a poten-
tial increase in the two to four percent range
for the six squadron program. Part of this
increase is associated with the schedule slip.
The October 1968 estimate was based on a
Run B production rate of four aircraft per
month. The Air Force changed to three per
month in order to extend the decision time
for the fifth and sixth squadrons pending
more definitive cost data. That action ex-
tended the production period several months
and results in some increased cost in Runs
A and B. These factors combined with in-
creased inflationary trends contribute to the
potential cost increase.
Question No. 16: How will the spares be
provided and how will it affect the contract?
Answer: We are now negotiating with the
contractor to determine specifically how the
spares are to be provided and how their pro-
curement will effect the contract. Our in-
tent is to get good spares at reasonable prices.'
We intend in our negotiation to establish a
reasonable break-out of the spares and in-
sure that we procure from Lockheed only
those spares and equipment that cannot ef-
fectively be procured directly from the sup-
plier. We do not intend for the procure-
ment of the spares from Lockheed to off-set
the losses expected to be incurred as a re-
sult of their RDT&E and Run A efforts.
Question No. 17: Is the aircraft meeting
all performance specifications, specifically,
the sink rate, the lower flap speeds, and wing
failure?
Answer: The aircraft is predicted to meet
or exceed all of its mission performance
guarantees. Its weight empty is projected to
be exceeded by less than 1%. However, the
aircraft is more streamlined (less drag) than
required and this more than offsets the slight
additional weight and permits it to meet or
exceed the performance guarantees. Some
minor changes were made to some specifica-
tions. This was done to produce a better air-
plane through a more balanced design and
to reduce cost to the Government. No deg-
radation of safety or mission performance
resulted. Equitable consideration was re-
ceived by the Government. The sink rate,
flap speeds, etc., all meet established mili-
tary standards. Critics who do not under-
stand the technical details may allege the
Air Force reduced criteria to "help" the con-
tractor. This is not the case. For instance
the sink rate was changed from 10 feet per
second maximum to nine feet per second.
The FAA standard is 10 FPS; but the FAA
allows a lower weight for 10 FPS. The Air
Force nine FPS at a higher weight is equiv-
alent to the FAA standard of 10 FPS at its
lower weight.
The flap speed criteria change affected only
the use of full flaps. The criteria for use of
partial and take-off flaps were not changed.
Since the flaps on the C-5 are not consid-
ered a braking device, the reduced speed for
use of full flaps will impose no diverse limit-
ation on operation or performance.
The static test failure in the wing of the
test article was not related in any way to
any specification changes made. This failure
was not unusual for the static test program
the purpose of which is to demonstrate the
aircraft capability to withstand flightloads
up to 150% of its design limit load.
Question No, 18: How many significant
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changes have been made and have any of
them resulted in a degradaZion of the per-
formance specifications?
Answer: Only minor changes have been
made in the specifications as outlined in the
answer to Question 17. None have resulted
in any degradation of the mission perform-
ance of the airplane.
Question No. 19: How real is the threat Of
termination if no funds are available by the
end of August?
Answer: The contract, as amended, permits
Lockheed to request termination if Run B
funding is not provided before 1 September.
The contract also permits equitable cost and
schedule adjustments associated with the
funding delays. The purpose of these provi-
sions is to maintain program continuity and
to protect vendor commitments. The risk of
termination, depends largely on the con-
tractor's confidence that ry 70 funds will
be ultimately provided. Both contractors
have a number of subcontractor funding
commitments which must be met. The Air
Force would attempt to assist in this interim
funding problem. It is likely, however, that
there would be a cost increase to the program.
If funds were delayed for several months
after the 1 September date, it is probable
that a number of the vendors and subcon-
tractors commitments would lapse. There
would be a substantial cost increase and a
schedule slip. The General Electric contract
does not permit them to request termination
if funding is delayed but price and schedule
adjustment could result, depending on the
extent of the delay.
Question No. 20: Define in simple terms:
(a) The meaning of the repricing formula
(b) The reverse incentive as it applies to
the repricing
Answer:
(a) The intention of the repricing formula
was to preclude catastrophic losses to the
contractor. A formula was devoloped In rec-
ognition of the early commitment to opera-
tional aircraft prior to development. The
clause provided that if the actual costs as-
sociated with the production of Run A air-
craft exceeded the contract target costs for
that effort by a specified amount or greater,
the contractor is entitled GO an adjustment
in the overall target and ceiling price. The
amount of this adjustment and the changes
to the contract prices are determined pur-
suant to the application of the formula. Un-
til the target for Run A aircraft are exceeded
by 130%, the repricing formula is not in-
voked.
(b) A point can be reached where, for each
additional dollar of oast occurring in the
production of Run A aircraft, the result is
an increase in total contract target and
ceiling of more than a dollar. This potential
could encourage a contractor to add costs to
Run A so as to reduce his overall loss on
both the Run A and the Run B production.
Question No. 21: What would be the im-
pact of delaying appropriation of FY 70
funds for procurement of the Run B aircraft
until after completion of a 90 day review
of the program?
Answer: The Air Force has requested $533
million for the 23 FY 70 aircraft of Run B.
In the event the appropriation of FY 70
funds is delayed 90 days, the actual delay in
applying these funds to the C-5 contract
would probably amount to four or more
months. The Lockheed contract as amended
requires FY 70 fun& for the 23 aircraft to
be on contract by 1 September 1969. The
contract stipulates that if such funds are
allotted after 1 September, an equitable ad-
justment in the price, delivery schedule, Or
both may be made provided the contractor
has incurred additional costs or delay due
to the funding delay. Further, the contrae-
tor can request termination for convenience
of the Government in the event funds are
not allotted by 1 September.
There would be a substantial impact as-
sociated with this funding delay. Existing
contract options between Lockheed and Gen-
eral Electric and their subcontractors and
suppliers would be voided. As a result, pro-
duction costs would increase by about $140
to $170 million depending on whether the
Run A delays were stretched to preclude a
production line gap or not.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, for the
time being, that will conclude my re-
marks. I believe they are the main high
points.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield
to the Senator from Virginia, a valuable
member of our committee.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr-President,
I would like to say a fey words with re-
gard to the Senator from Mississippi.
This is the sixth week that the Senate
has been debating the pending legisla-
tion.
During all this time the Senator from
Mississippi has been on the floor and he
has carried the burden of answering the
many questions?proper questions--
which have been put to him as commit-
tee chairman.
I doubt if there have been any commit-
tee chairmen in recent years who have
been under such intense pressure in re-
gard to work here on the floor for such a
long period of time as has the distin-
guished Senator from Mississippi in han-
dling on the floor of the Senate this very
important and very difficult bill.
When the legislation was first sub-
mitted, the budget request sought by the
Johnson administration totaled $23 bil-
lion. Then the new administration came
into office, and the budget request was
revised somewhat to $22 billion. Then
the Committee on Armed Services, of
which the Senator from Mississippi (Mr.
STENNIS) is chairman, went over this
proposal in great detail.
The bill which finally came before the
Senate represents, in round figures, a
total of $20 billion for procurement of
military weapons for the fiscal year 1970.
So the committee brought about that
reduction and now recommends to the
Senate that the budget request of the
Nixon administration be reduced by $2
billion.
I favor such a reduction.
That is, in round figures, a 10-percent
reduction.
The committee is aware of the need
to carefully scrutinize all items in the
budget, whether it be a budget for the
Defense Department, or a budget for the
Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, or any of the other departments
of the Government.
The committee went into these matters
very carefully and, as I mentioned be-
fore, has recommended to the Senate
that the authorizations for military pro-
curement be reduced from the amount
originally requested by $2 billion.
That is a substantial reduction, but I
think it is one that can be sustained.
I think that we can accomplish, with
the reduced amount of money, all that
Is necessary to be done to protect the
security of the United States.
I say again, Mr. President, that I have
great admiration for the way the dis-
tinguished chairman of the committee,
the Senator from Mississippi (Mr.
STENNIS) has handled this legislation on
the floor of the Senate during 6 difficult
weeks. The hours have been long each
day, and there has been a keen debate.
I say to those whose viewpoints have
differed from those of the Senator from
Mississippi and the Senator from Vir-
ginia that I think it is important and
desirable that Senators do just what they
have done for the past 6 weeks: go into
these budgeted figures item by item, and
require justification.
I believe that the Senator from Mis-
sissippi has fully Justified what the com-
mittee has recommended, and I state
again that I am pleased to be astociated
with the distinguished Senator. I com-
mend him on his handling of a very dif-
ficult problem over a long period of
time.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank
the Senator from Virginia for his gra-
cious remarks. What little I have done
required much help, and help was forth-
coming from many different sources, in-
cluding the Senator from Virginia. He
played an important part in the making
of this bill, in tearing it apart, as it were,
and then putting it back together. We
all owe him a debt of gratitude for his
fine work; I do, particularly as chairman
of the committee. / appreciate his state-
ment, and I give him fair warning that
I am looking forward to getting a lot
more work out of him.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. PROXIVIIRE. Mr. President, be-
fore I yield to the Senator from Indi-
ana, which I shall do in a moment, I
wish to say that I concur in everything
the distinguished Senator from Virginia
has just stated about the distinguished
Senator from Mississippi. This has been
a very difficult and trying 6 weeks for
him. He has done a magnificent job. I,
as one who has disagreed occasionally
with the Senator from Mississippi, can
say that he has been most helpful and
accommodating, though he has certainly
been under unusual pressure. Rarely in
the 12 years I have been in the Senate
has any chairman, had to meet chal-
lenges as often as las the Senator from
Mississippi on this measure; and he
has done the great job of meeting them.
I agree wholeheartedly that this de-
bate is certainly in the national inter-
est, as well as in the interest of a more
intelligent and healthy fiscal policy.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank
the Senator from Wisconsin. There has
been a little effort, from some sources,
to try to drive a wedge between Senators
who might have differing viewpoints. I
am proud of the Senator from Wiscon-
sin for not letting them do it. I, too, did
my Part in not letting them do it. After
all, we are all here working for the same
cause. I do not deserve any credit for
the days I have spent on this floor; for
It is a privilege to be a Member of this
body. It has been a little bit rugged at
times, but it is a privilege, and I think
trying to do our duty is reward enough
for all of us.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I
think every Senator is proud of the way
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August 13, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? StiNA
that the Senator from Mississippi has
done his duty and handled his work on
this measure.
I yield now to the Senator from In-
diana.
Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, before
I begin my prepared remarks, I, too,
would like to express my appreciation
for the outstanding work done by the
Senator from Mississippi. He is well
versed and well informed, and takes
the debate in his stride, in a manner he
might not do if he did not have the
feeling that the debate on the Senate
floor is entirely sincere on both sides,
and with good purpose, and that differ-
ences of opinion do not necessarily mean
that those who hold them are disagree-
able otherwise. The Senator from Mis-
sissippi has stood up extremely well un-
der the strain, and I compliment him,
before he leaves the floor for a well
deserved recess, for the fine work he
has done.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator
from Indiana. He has always been an
important contributor to the debate on
these matters.
F?I4 : A $25 BILLION MONUMENT TO THE PAST?
Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, the
pending military procurement bill con-
tains a $239 million authorization for the
purchase of a new Navy fighter plane,
the F-14A. This item is significant be-
cause it marks the first procurement re-
quest for a new fighter system which
may run to a cost of nearly $25 billion
over the next decade. In this year of the
taxpayers' revolt, I believe that no new
system of such major proportions should
escape close congressional scrutiny.
My own interest in the F-14A has been
heightened by some disturbing news?I
have been informed that according to a
recent cost comparison study conducted
by the Pentagon, the relative cost of
carrier-based fighter strength far ex-
ceeds the cost of comparable land-based
strength. The F-14A, a carrier-based
fighter, will require reevaluation if these
high costs can indeed be avoided by bas-
ing our air strength on land. At any rate,
our consideration of the F-14A should
be undertaken with full knowledge of
these cost relationships, and so I am re-
questing today that the Defense Depart-
ment release to the Congress this most
recent study of the problem, which clari-
fies the economy of land-based air
strength and which adds measurably to
the doubts which already surround the
proposed F-14A. I have sent a letter to
the Secretary of Defense requesting the
immediate release of this revealing cost
comparison study.
It will be difficult, of course, for the
U.S. Senate to conduct its own study of
the F-14A. This new fighter aircraft is
an enormously complicated weapon, just
as complicated as the ABM or the
MBT-70. The features of the F-14A must
be described in a technical jargon which
requires our closest attention; the need
for the F-14A must be measured in un-
certain probabilities about the future;
and the high cost of the F-14A must be
judged against the far higher cost of in-
adequate military preparedness.
But we must not let these difficulties
prevent us from taking a hard, critical
look at the F-14A. Whenever the ex-
penditure of so much money is at issue,
the Congress has a responsibility to do
no less. Accordingly, I shall outline some
of my own doubts about the F-14A, and
suggest some alternatives to the blank-
check approval of that weapons system
which is found in the bill as it reads
today.
In the words of Secretary of the Navy
John Chafee, the current F-14 program
is an outgrowth of the cancellation of the
F-111B, the Navy version of the ill-fated
TFX tactical fighter-bomber. In fiscal
year 1969 .Congress appropriated $130
million to finance engineering develop-
ment of this new plane; and now, for
fiscal year 1970, the Senate Armed Serv-
ices Committee has recommended ap-
proval of the $224.6 million F-14A pro-
curement request, with an additional
advance procurement of $14.4 million.
These funds represent new obligational
authority for development only?techni-
cally, real production of the aircraft will
not begin until fiscal year 1971, accord-
ing to Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Robert A. Frosch. This year's money will
be spent building airplanes, but test and
evaluation models only, not full-scale
production models.
The F-14, when fully developed, will
be a multipurpose carrier-based fighter.
The A model, designed to become opera-
tional in 1973, will be a swing-wing, tan-
dem seating, supersonic aircraft?with a
new airframe design incorporating the
engine and the avionics of the now
abandoned and ill-fated F-111B. It was
envisioned as a replacement of the Navy's
F-4 Phantom, to perform a fleet air-
defense mission, carrying the yet-to-be-
developed Phoenix air-to-air missile.
The F-14B and F-14C models will be-
come operational in the middle and late
1970's as advanced technology engines
and advanced avionics become available
to replace the older component systems
planned for the F-14A.
Doubts about the wisdom of producing
the F-14A in quantity stem in part from
this mismatch between a new airframe
and an old engine. By producing the
F-14A, the Navy hopes to replace our
F-4's by 1973, 2 years before the F-14B
is scheduled to become operational. This
may be a worthy goal, but it is not yet
clear that a hybrid aircraft such as the
F-14A is the proper means to reach that
goal. By rushing the F-14 airframe into
production before its engine and avionics
components are fully developed, the
Navy may find itself saddled with an
expensive, low-performance substitute
for what it really needs, resulting in the
worst of both worlds.
Surprisingly, well-known flaws in the
F-14A design are not even mentioned in
the committee report. That report de-
scribes the F-14A as an aircraft of "su-
perior range, endurance, and maneuver-
ing performance over the F-4, allowing
greater utilization of its supersonic capa-
bilities in the combat situation." This
evaluation is misleading because it does
not mention the fact that the air combat
performance of the F-14A has been com-
promised by its multipurpose specifica-
tions and its hybrid design. The airframe
of the F-14A was not designed to carry
S 9971
the heavy weight of the F-111B engine,
and when fully loaded with the 1;000-
pound Phoenix missiles, the aircraft will
not be capable of anything approaching
"superior performance." I have learned
that the acceleration of the F-14A, when
it finally becomes operational in 1973,
will be less than the best Soviet fighter
in operation today, in 1969.
The committee report also fails to
mention the serious difficulties which
have plagued the Phoenix missile, the
complement to the F-14A. I have learned
that the Phoenix, which has been under
study and development since 1957, was
tested live for the first time only last
year. These tests, however, did not meas-
ure the capability of the weapon against
maneuvering targets, multiple targets, or
jamming. The Phoenix missile is fan-
tastically complicated?five times as
complex as our next most sophisticated
radar missile?and we must not take its
successful development for granted.
Finally, and perhaps most important,
the committee report failed to mention
the conceptual flaws of the F-14A sys-
tem. Technical difficulties aside, it is
simply not clear that a carrier-based
fighter is needed in the 1970's. This
brings me back to my point about the
relative costs of land and sea based air
strength. But it also raises the question
of just what mission the F-14A would
perform. The F-14A was originally de-
signed to protect the fleet from a Soviet
bomber attack, but as we know, the
Soviet bomber threat has never ma-
terialized. Chairman MAxoN of the House
Appropriations Committee made this
point clearly enough during hearings in
1968 when he said:
The bomber threat against the fleet, as
you know, has been predicted by Navy offi-
cials for some time. It has not, of course,
developed to date.
I understand that Chairman MAHON
has expressed concern again about the
substances of this, even as late as today.
Later in 1968, a report on the U.S.
tactical air power program by the Senate
Armed Services Preparedness Investi-
gating Subcommittee, made a similar as-
sessment of the Soviet bomber threat,
and drew the obvious conclusions with
regard to the F-14A when they said:
The F-111B was designed primarily for
fleet air defense against Soviet supersonic
bombers. But that threat is either limited
or does not exist; 'and therefore, we believe
the Navy should re-examine the prime re-
quirement for the VFX-1 (F-14A) as to its
most important role, in the light of the most
predictable threat to the fleet.
If our fleet were to come under Soviet
attack in a conventional war situation,
of course, Soviet submarines would pose
the most predictable and by far the
greatest threat to our carrier force. As
unlikely as that contingency may be, it
Is clear that the F-14A will not be of
much help in meeting the danger of a
submarine attack.
Clearly, the F-14A deserves a more
critical appraisal than it has received
to date. My own assessment of the F-
14A suggests two alternatives to blank
check approval. First, we could prohibit
the purchase of any production model
F-14A's. Second, we should deal with the
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G972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-- SENATE August 11, 1969
conceptual as well as the technical flaws
in the system. We should admit to our-
selves that a multipurpose carrier-based
fighter is never going tote able to provide
superior air combat performance.
It has been 20 years since the United
States has developed a single purpose,
air-superiority fighter; in those same 20
years the Soviets have developed four
such fighters. Our air superiority over
the Soviet Union could be threatened if
we continue to develop .110K-type multi-
purpose designs.
The proposed Air Force F-15 shows
more promise than the F-14A for this
very reason. There has been a firm deter-
mination, reinforced by a directive from
the Air Force Chief of Staff, not to com-
promise air-superiority capability of the
F-15 through corollary mission require-
ments. Unlike the F-14A, the F-15 will be
a single seat, fixed wing aircraft with a
thrust-to-weight ratio of better than
1 to 1. I believe it is a mistake to assume
that anything less will provide us with
adequate air combat strength, and I be-
lieve that we must pass judgment on the
F-14A with this comparison in mind.
In conclusion, Mr. President, I hope
that my remarks will stimulate a more
thorough review of this $25 billion wea-
pons system. I intend to continue my
discussion of the F-14A until all relevant
information has been made available to
the Congress, and until the troublesome
issues which I have raised are fully
clarified.
I ask unanimous consent to have print-
ed at this point in the RECORD a letter
written by me to Secretary of De-
fense Melvin Laird under date of August
13, 1969.
There being no objettion, the letter
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
AUGUST 13, 1969.
Honorable MELVIN LAIRD, '
Secretary, Department of Defense,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As the Senate con-
tinues to review the pending military pro-
curement bill, it will be helpful to insure
Congressional access to all relevant informa-
tion detailing comparative out and advan-
tages of various weapons systems under
consideration.
Accordingly, I would like to request the
release of a cost comparison study, con-
ducted in the Office of Systems Analysis,
which measures the relatiVe cost of carrier-
based and land-based air strength.
Sincerely,
Mr. HARTKE.
my friend, the
from Wisconsin,
VANCL FIARTICE,
U.S. Senator.
Mr. Pre,sident, I thank
distingue,hed Senator
for yielding.
C-5A : AN UNNECESSARY PLANE?A FISCAL
DISASTER
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I
thank the Senator from Indiana, and I
thank him especially for the substance
of his remarks.
I think it is most desirable that this
very expensive, new plane which is of
highly questionable value be critically
examined, as the Senator intends to ex-
amine it.
I think this has a great deal of merit.
It is an example of how we can save a
great deal of money. Certainly, by means
of fiscal pressure, the Senator from In-
diana and I will try to hold down the
budget and decrease the immense
amounts being spent in the military area.
I think the Senator has found one
area in which we can make substantial
savings without any real loss.
Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I thank
my friend, the Senator from Wisconsin.
He is well known for his diligence in
pursuing such matters. He is trying to
cut down on the Government expenses
where it can be done without threatening
our national security.
C-5A: AN UNNECESSARY PLANE, A FISCAL
DISASTER
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I
thank the Senator.
Mr. President, the purchase of the
C-5A by the Air Force from the Lock-
heed Corp. already represents one of the
greatest fiscal disasters in the history of
Federal procurement. The purpose of
my amendment is to make the best of a
bad situation, to suspend pouring good
money after bad, to permit an investiga-
tion based on current data and the latest
analyses.
WEAK CONTRACT
The C-5A contract is one in which
there is now every evidence of a "buy in"
bid. That is a deliberate low bid, im-
possible of fulfillment, in order to get
the award of a major contract.
It is a contract in which the target
cost has been greatly exceeded.
It is a contract in which the "ceiling
cost" has also been broken.
It is a contract in which there is a $2
billion overrun.
The planes are being built in a
Government-owned plant, with large
amounts of Government-owned machin-
ery, and where huge "progress payments"
are made which in effect supply the
working capital.
The Federal Government investment
in this matter is very great. The Lock-
heed investment is minimum.
REVERSE INCENTIVE
But, in addition, it is a contract which
has a repricing formula in which there
Is a blatant reverse incentive. If the costs
of the first 58 planes exceed the original
estimates, the contractor is rewarded.
Each additional plane will cost -more,
not less. The contract gives incentives
for excessive costs and inefficiencies. Just
think of that: the contract gives incen-
tives for excessive cost and inefficiency.
It is a contract in which the "reverse
incentive" becomes effective if any part
of the second run of planes beyond the
original 58 is authorized. This is the
"golden handshake" in which millions
are at stake in my amendment.
It is a contract under which there is
already a 6-month delay in delivery.
MODIFIED SPECIFICATIONS
It is a contract in which the original
specifications have already been modi-
fied and reduced. FAA requirements are
not to be met. The landing sink rate has
been modified. The wing stress failed to
meet specifications.
It is a contract in which the contractor
has thus far failed in meeting key re-
quirements in some aspects of quality,
timely delivery, and costs; and, under its
outrageous terms, the contractor will
be rewarded for inefficiency if my
amendment is not adopted.
HEARINGS BY COMMITTEES
The Subcommittee on Economy in Gov-
ernment first looked into the C-5A last
November. Since that time at least three
other congressional committees have
held hearings and heard testimony about
this contract. In addition, a recent study
has been conducted by the Air Force,
The Air Force study, entitled "Review
of the C-5A Program," was released or
July 28, 1969. The striking fact, however,
is that none of the investigations of the
costs of the C-5A since last year have
been able to proceed on the basis of any
significant and substantial information
gathered since the hearings before the
Subcommittee on Economy in Govern-
ment in November, 1968. The fact is
that even the recent Air Force review.
published only a few weeks ago, failed
to gather any new cost data. I quote from
the Air Force study:
It should be noted that the costs to the
Government reflected above are based on
the detailed review completed in October
1968.
The information gathered by the Sub-
committee on Economy in Government
was also based on the cost review com-
pleted in October, 1968. That informa-
tion led the subcommittee to conclude
that there would be a cost overrun in
the C-5A program of approximately $2
billion.
Mr. President, I point out that only
five of these planes have been produced
out of 120, and they already have an
overrun of $2 billion in a contract that
originally was to call for $3.4 billion. It
is costing $2 billion more than that. SPe-
cifically, according to testimony received
by the subcommittee, the original esti-
mate of the cost of 120 C-5A airplanes
was $3.4 billion. Because of cost over-
runs mainly being experienced in the
performance of the Lockheed contract,
actual costs would total $5.3 billion.
These estimates included the cost of
spare parts. I will come back to the sub-
ject of spare parts later, because I am
sure there will be a dispute on the floor
with respect to this matter when we re-
turn in September; and there was a dis-
pute when I was briefed by the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force, Mr. Whit-
taker, as to the actual size of the over-
run. The difference is that, somehow,
the Air Force does not want to include all
the spare parts, including replenishment
parts. When they are questioned on it,
they admit that the spare parts are es-
sential parts of the plane. They have to
be purchased. They should be included
both in the first estimate and in the last
estimate, and that is what I have done.
EMBARRASSING FACTS
At first the Air Force refused to com-
ment on the C-5A cost overruns. I can
well understand this refusal. In light of
earlier Air Force assertions and repre-
sentations to Congress about the C-5A,
it must have been extremely embar-
rassing for the Air Force when these
facts came to light. Only a few months
prior to our hearings, the Air Force had
testified before another committee of
Congress that the current costs of the
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0 veiugust 13, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL REC ?
S 9973
C-5A were within the original cost esti- to the performance of the C-5A as well tation programs which are desperately
mates?in other words, no cost overrun, as to the costs. Both of the Air Force needed.
For example, on March 6, 1968, Alex- spokesmen to whom I have referred also
DOUBLE HOUSING FUNDS
ander H. Flax, Assistant Secretary of the testified that the plane would be delivered It is almost double all the funds we
Air Force for Research and Development, on time, and that the first delivery was intend to spend in 1970 for low- and
testified before the House Subcommittee scheduled for June 1969. They also testi- moderate-income housing by HUD.
on the Department of Defense, of the Bed of their high expectations of the The overrun on the C-5A is more than
Committee on Appropriations. Secretary performance of the plane. Now we know twice as much as we intend to spend in
Flax was asked whether C-5A program that these claims were also overopti- this entire fiscal year for low- and mod-
was within the original cost estimates. mistic. The fact is that a substantial erate-income housing for the entire
He replied: delivery slippage has occurred. The Air country. If there is one economic shame
We believe it is within the range between Force was to have its first C-5A's last in this country, where we have really
the target and ceiling costs at the moment. June. They were not delivered. In other fallen down, it is in low- and moderate-
Secretary Flax went on to say: words, the contractors have already income housing.
failed to meet their delivery schedule. It is only slightly less than all the $2.3
in the program office the contractor is in the The first deliveries are. now scheduled billion in the fiscal 1970 budget for Fed-
According to the best estimates of people
range where he should be between the tar- for next December a slippage and de- eral outlays to elementary and second-
get and the ceiling costs, lay of 6 months. ary education.
Whether the plane when it is finally The C-SA overrun would virtually pay
Secretary Flax added that the aver- delivered will perform according to the for all non-service-connected pensions
age weapons systems cost of the first 53 contract specifications is also a clues- for the U.S. veterans for fiscal year 1970.
production aircraft would be $22 million tion, in my opinion. For we have learned It is more by $300 million than all the
each and that the average weapons sys- t the C-5A has developed a wing money we spend on veterans' hospitals
tems cost for the first 115 aircraft would
be $18.6 million per copy. To be generous
with Secretary Flax, his testimony was
wildly overoptimistic.
SECOND TESTIMONY
On May 8, 1968, the Air Force again
testified to Congress, this time before the
Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations
for the Department of Defense. General
Robert G. Ruegg, Deputy Chief of Staff,
Systems and Logistics, was asked to de-
scribe the C-5A program. He responded:
The design, development and manfacture
of the C-5A aircraft is progressing very sat-
isfactorily and is generally on schedule.
General Ruegg then stated that the
current average weapons systems unit
cost for the approved program of 120
C-5A aircraft was $19.6 million per
plane.
It should be noted that there is a
slight discrepancy between the testi-
mony of Secretary Flax before the House
Subcommittee on the Department of De-
fense of the Committee on Appropria-
tions and the testimony of General poor families for an entire year. eu weof the American people on t e ot er,
Ruegg before the Senate Subcommittee are having trouble getting the full $100 the time has come to call a halt to such
on Appropriations for the Department million for that program. The $100 mil- outrageous excesses.
of Defense. The discrepancy amounts to lion needed for the program for the en-
a mere $1 million per plane. Secretary tire country is only one-twentieth the $2 AIR FORCE PRESS RELEASE
Flax testified that the cost would be billion overrun on this one plane. As I stated, at first the Air Force would
$18.6 million for 115 aircraft, while Gen- COMBAT TROOPS not officially comment on the disclosure
eral Ruegg testified that the aircraft Mr. President, the $2 billion, at $10,000 of the overrun. Finally on November 19,
would cost $19.6 million for 120 aircraft. per man per year, would finance the pay 1968, a week after the disclosure wasmade before the Subcommittee on Econ-
It seems strange that the unit cost of and allowances and associated personnel omy in Government, the Air Force did
120 aircraft would be more than the costs for 200,000 combat troops or more make a statement in the form of a press
unit cost of 115 aircraft. But this dis- than 10 combat divisions for a full year. release. The press release stated as
crepancy and this confusion in the wake That is why many of us say this coun- follows:
of the real facts as we now know them try would be stronger if we spent defense C-5
is neither here nor there, unless one funds more efficiently. The prime contract for the C-5, with Lock-
were to expect consistency and accuracy The $2 billion overrun on one plane heed Aircraft Corporation for the airframe
on the part of the Air Force with re- and one contract would finance all the and General Electric Company for the en-
gard to the costs of its weapons systems. economic assistance or AID funds in gines, were the first on a "Total Package"
Again to be generous to General Ruegg, the fiscal 1970 budget of $1.973 billion, basis, which was an innovation in Govern-
his testimony on the costs of the C-5A The $2 billion is five times the amount ment procurement. Under these contracts,
was also wildly overoptimistic, in the budget for rural electrification, designed to check the large cost increases
COST AND DELIVERY SLIPPAGE It is more than five times the amount of the past, the competing contractors made
commitments with respect to production C-5
The point is that the Air Force has the Interior Department will spend on airplanes prior to their development.
been asserting as recently as 6 months all forms of recreation. In view of the great risks inherent in such
before the hearings before the Subcom- The $2 billion excess to be spent on commitments, which embraced a period of
mittee on Economy in Government--my the C-5A is almost 20 times the $212 seven years, the contracts contained safe-
subcommittee?that there was no C-5A million in the Department of Transpor- guards both for the Government and thecontractors. The Government is protected by
overrun, and the Air Force assured Con- tation budget for urban mass transpor- contractual provisions which create increased
gress that the program was proceeding tation to which the President addressed motivation for the contractors to produce
satisfactorily. These assurances, by the himself with such vigor in the past few technically superior equipment on time at
way, related to the delivery schedule and days?and high-speed ground transpor- the lowest cost possible. For example, the
crack during static testing in the last and medical care.
few weeks. Just how serious this wing The $2 billion overrun on the C-5A is
crack is and how it relates to, the over- almost three times the $742 million in
all strength or weakness of the C-5A air- the Federal budget in fiscal year 1970 for
craft has not been publicly disclosed so law enforcement, justice, and civil rights.
far. What kind of priority system is that
In any event, one can well understand when our cities are burning, when our
the embarrassment of the Air Force to Courts are jammed, when the crime rate
see the public disclosure of the $2 billion has risen, and when millions of Amen-
overruns in November 1968. cans still suffer the stigma and indig-
HUGE FUNDS AT STAKE nities of second-class citizenship?
Mr. President, $2 billion is a phe- These are among the reasons this con-
nomenal amount of money. These are tract is outrageous. What kind of pri-
not the funds for the yearly procure- orities do we have when we spend $2
ment of an entire military service. Two billion more on one single plane than for
billion dollars is the amciunt of money any one of the programs I have men-
by which costs will exceed the estimates tioned aboVe?
on one weapon system alone. That is the The alarming thing about it is the Air
hard, shocking, scandalous fact. Force performance. They have backed
Look at the alternatives to spending and filled. They have tried to hide the
the money on the overrun. facts. They have atempted to cover up
Two billion dollars would pay for the the excesses.
housing subsidy under the new home- CHANGE PRIORITIES
owners section of the 1968 Housing Act, For the sake of the security of the
for some 3% million housing units for country on the one hand, and the welfare
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 13, 1969.
contractors pay 2O-SOc of every dollar above
the target price of 2B$. The Government is get an investigation to determine wars and one minor "brushfire" war.
whether that was desirable.
That is we assume, not that we might
not obligated to pay anything above the
ceiling price of 2.4B$ for the first 58 airplanes Why would not the 58 C-5A's present- have to fight these two wars in succession
including their engines atoll the research and 13r authorized, funded, and under con- or in a relatively short space of time;
development. Similarly, should the Govern- struction not meet whatever military re- rather, we assume that we might have to
ment proceed with a follow-on buy, the con-
quirements exist?
wage the wars all at once, simultaneously.
c
tract contains a formula whi+la would reduce My information indicates that the I might add, that how this farfetched and
but not eliminate large lOsses that the on-
tractors might incur on the nrst 58 airplanes, Air Force and the military already have questionable assumption crept into our
by increasing the target cost of the follow-on more than adequate aircraft capability defense policy and our foreign policy is
airplanes. All of these terms were contained with the cargo planes in its inventory, a mystery to me and until a relatively
,
In the original competivelv awarded con- In addition, the Air Force has access to short time ago, very few Members of the
tracts, the cargo capability of private carriers. Congress, on the basis of my information,
The Government is nate considering the The Air Force has traditionally utilized knew that there was such an assumption,
question of ordering c-5 aiepl.ines beyond the private carriers for its airlift needs. This In any event the military requirement
original 58, but no decision has been made, seems to me to be an eminently sound for the C-5A, and specifically for the full
The incentive for the contractors to reduce
costs remains in effect; and any such order policy. But with the addition of the C-5A 120 aircraft, is based on the 2-plus war
and the excess cargo airlift capability contingency Plus the McNamara rapid
will provide continued posit,ive motivation. ? . . ? -
to maintain cost control. which it would bring to the Air Force, I deployment strategy.
At the beginning of this pr,-Tam over three predict that there will be a change in this
years ago, the Air Force estimated that the Policy. Already there are signs that the LS IT COST EFFECTIVE?
cost of development and production of the military is cutting down on its use of In my judgment, the 23 aircraft from
first 58 airplanes would be $1.3 billion. The private carriers. I think this is unf or- run B cannot be justified even if we ac-
corresponding estimate for the 120 airplanes tunate, that it represents a mistake in cent the assumption that we must be
ultimately contemplated was $3.1 billion. judgment, and that it will impair our prepared to engage in two major con-
ng
private carrier fleet. ventional wars and one minor war, siuml-
?
lation and all other factors, ;,re $3.25 billion
Current estimates, includi economic esca-
THE 58 PLANES WOULD BE PRODUCED taneously, which, as I have indicated,
and $4.3 billion, indicating increases of 41 .
and 39% respectively. strikes me as an unrealistic if not irra-
Now let me explain that my amend- tional assumption.
These additional costs result from: (1)
increased costs for labor and materials result- ment would not end the C-5A program I do not say that the United States
ing from the combination of a significant war altogether. Fifty-eight planes has been should not have any rapid deployment
effort and an unprecedented demand for authorized and are under Construction, Capability. No doubt some rapid deploy-
civilian aircraft, both of which occurred after as I have stated. My amendment does not ment capability is desirable. That is not,
the original estimates, (2) the introduction apply to the 58 aircraft under construe- the question here. The 58 C-5A's now
of new technology, and (3) modifications to tion. These aircraft are known as first under production will give us substantial
overcome technical difficultiv.; inherent in
the development of all new aircraft. production run, or run A. A second pro- rapid deployment capability. What is at
Based on flight experience to date, the duction run is also contemplated by the issue is the question of whether the 23
C-5 will exceed its technical rfor Air Force. In fact, the Air Force may be additional C-5A's will add significantly
guarantees. contemplating several subsequent pro- to our deployment capability. In my
duction runs,
judgment, it will not. The 23 additional
What all that verbiage means is that The second production run is known aircraft will add only the capability to
the Air Force was admitting that the as run B. The total number of aircraft move the equipment for half an Army
120 C-5A's would cost approximately $1.2 in run B is 62 units. The authorization division to Europe in 3 weeks and for less
billion more than the original 1965 esti- bill before us today contains funds for than one-quarter of a division to Asia in
mates. This concession, although it did 23 aircraft from the second production the same period.
not represent the whole kWh, indicated rim, or run B.
This is a very small capability con-
part of the magnitude of the problem.
My amendment applies only to the 23
CONGRESSONAL RESPONSI aILITY sidering the very large price we are being
aircraft in run B. The funds that my asked to pay. I would also add that the
'The problem revealed by the C-SA case amendment would strike from the bill McNamara rapid deployment concept is
goes far beyond the cost of a single weap- are the funds earmarked for the 23 air- questionable because the C-5A is justi-
ons system, even though the cost prob- craft. The amendment provides that no fled only during the very early move-
lem alone is very great. The problem is more than 58 C-5A's, meaning run A, ment requirements following the out-
whether the Congress is willing and shall be purchased until after the Comp- break of hostilities. Only for the 1- to 3-
ready to exercise its full responsibility to troller General of the United States has week period following the beginning of a
the American people with regard to the completed and submitted to the Congress war can the C-5A be justified. At any
military budget. In my view, military a comprehensive study and investiga- later period, that later than 3 weeks,
spending for many years has been out tion of the projected costs of the C-5A's. ships become a much more efficient and
of control so far as the Con aress is con- Among the facts the Comptroller Gen- effective means of moving men and
cerned. The Congress, in short, has failed eral should gather are those which would equipment. Ships, of course, can move
to properly exercise its constitutional allow us to judge, whether the purchase many more men and much larger ton-
responsibility to provide fOr the common of the 23 aircraft from run B would add ages than aircraft.
defense. This responsibility should not significantly to the deployment capa-
signify the complete abdication of au- bility of the military forces of the United As an example, if we plan to move our
military forces to Europe from the
thority by the Congress over the military States. This in effect is the military
United States in a period of 2 weeks,
budget in general and military weapons requirement,
systems in particular. ships become more economically efficient
The essence of the military require- than C-5A's. If we plan to deploy our
The C-5A program symbolizes the fail- ment Justification for the C-5A concerns forces to Asia during a 314-week period,
ure and the breakdown of the present the rapid deployment strategy envisioned ships are more economically efficient
system, by the former Secretary of Defense, than C-5A's.
way A 0-5A? Robert McNamara. This strategy con-
In the first place, Congress unthink- templated the availability of military SHIPS LESS EXPENSIVE
ingly permitted the military to sell the forces for very rapid deployment. It The question should be asked, what is
C-5A concept to it. Is there a real mill-our realistic readiness capability? The
would therefore depend upon a strategic
tary requirement for the C.-5A? What is deployment force which could deliver the fact is that our military has never dem-
the nature of this military requirement? necessary military forces with unpre- onstrated the capability to assemble and
Why do we need 120 C-5A's? even assum- cedented speed,
deploy more than one or two light air-
ing that there is a real requirement? TWO AND ONE-HALF WAR STRATEGY borne or marine divisions in a matter of
a few weeks. Any plan we may have to
I may emphasize that my amendment All of us have now heard of the 21/2 assemble, transport, and reassemble for
would permit 58 C-5A's, already author- war contingency. This means that our combat 12 or more heavy, mechanized
ized. It would simply mean that the ad- entire defense strategy is based on the or armored divisions in a period of a
ditional 23 C-5A's--or going to 81 C- assumption that we might have to fight few weeks is completely unrealistic based
5A's?would be held up until we could simultaneou
sly two major conventional on our experience and our peacetime
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Augusf 13,
training. If we take our experience into
account and allow for the relative readi-
ness capabilities of peacetime troops,
ships are far more inexpensive than the
C-5A for equal deployment capability in
a 2-month period after D-Day. Accord-
ing to information that I have received,
ships are one-half to one-sixth as ex-
pensive as the C-5A for such a period.
In other words, if 23 additional air-
craft are not purchased there will be
only a minor impact at best on our over-
? all rapid deployment capabilities. This is
because of the relatively minor incre-
mental advantage to be gained from
the purchase of the 23 additional planes,
considering their cost. The fact is that
we already have more than an adequate
aircraft capability from our available
C-141's, C-130's, and our civilian reserve
aircraft. Indeed this aircraft caPability
is already adequate even assuming the
21/2 war contingency. According to my
information currently procured air-
craft forces are adequate even for emer-
gency wartime supply.
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS STUDY SAYS PLANE NOT
JUSTIFIED
I recently asked Philip N. Whittaker,
the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force,
Installations and Logistics, to brief me
on the military requirement for the 23
additional aircraft or for the 120 aircraft.
Mr. Whittaker replied that the military
requirement is based on classified infor-
mation. I can well understand the Air
Force's reluctance to discuss the military
requirement publicly. I have learned that
the most recent study by the Office of
Systems Analysis into the C-5A program
concludes that the 23 follow-on aircraft
cannot be justified on either military or
economic grounds.
Mr. President, I suspect that this is
probably the most important statement
I shall make this afternoon, and I wish
to repeat it. I think if all Senators know
of this statement, very considerable
question will arise in their minds as to
whether they should vote for this C-5A;
and I think it would be very persuasive
to many Senators to vote for my amend-
ment. Let me, therefore, repeat it: The
most recent study by the Office of Sys-
tems Analysis into the C-5A program
concludes that the 23 follow-on aircraft
cannot be justified on either military or
economic grounds.
That is an analysis by the Office of
Systems Analysis, in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. I do not know how
we can get a better qualified authority,
and it is especially persuasive in view of
the fact that the Secretary of Defense
and the Defense Department have asked
for these aircraft and yet their own
analysis shows they cannot be justified
on either military or economic grounds.
TWO BILLION DOLLAR OVERRUN
The second major issue in the C-5A
procurement is the matter of costs. I
have indicated that the conclusion of the
Subcommittee on Economy in Govern-
ment was that the cost of 120 aircraft
will be about $2 billion more than was
estimated when this contract was en-
tered into in 1965.
This brings us to a discussion of the
C-5A contract. Since the largest portion
of the overrun and the problems revealed
so far deal with the Lockheed contract,
I will refer to it. The contract entered
into by the Air Force with Lockheed was
a negotiated, fixed price incentive con-
tract. It was the first contract utilizing
the so-called total package procurement
concept?TPPC. When the Air Force
announced the award of this contract, it
did so very proudly. It was proud of the
contract as a new concept in procure-
ment, that is, the total package procure-
ment concept which was supposed to
achieve two major objectives. Because
the C-5A contract gave birth to this new
concept, it is important to understand
what it was supposed to do.
FAILURE OF TOTAL PACKAGE PROCUREMENT
First, total packaging was supposed to
act as a deterrent against cost overruns
in less than promised performance. To
accomplish this objective, all develop-
ment, production, and as much support
as is feasible of a system throughout its
anticipated life, was to be procured in a
single contract, as one total package.
The contract for the C-5A includes price
and performance commitments by the
contractor, which is supposed to motivate
him to control costs, perform to specifica-
tions, and produce on time. In view of
the enormous overrun and the 6-month
delay in the delivery schedule, at least
two of the three criteria for performance
of the contract show negative results. It
has been our experience that contractors
have often bought into an R. & D. con-
tract by offering to perform it at a low
price and making other promises, often
unkept, in order to place themselves in a
position to be the prime contractor or the
sole source contractor for the production.
The production of a weapons system, of
course, is usually the more lucrative end
of the job.
INEFFECTIVE METHOD
Second, total packaging was supposed
to motivate contractors to design for
economical production and support of
operational hardware.
In May of 1966, several months after
the award of the C-SA contract, the Air
Force published a description of the total
package procurement concept. This de-
scription contains the following pas-
sages:
Most simply stated, the TPPC as conceived
by the Air Force, envisions that all antici-
pated development, production, and as much
support as is feasible of a system through-
out its anticipated life is to be procured as
one total package and incorporated into one
contract containing price and performance
commitments at the outset of the acquisition
fees of a system procurement.
In other words, the C-5A contract with
Lockheed included R. & D. production,
and support; that is, spare parts. The
contract also contained priceand per-
formance commitments.
PAST FAILURES
In explaining why the Air Force felt
the need for this new contractual device,
It stated:
Thus, the history of defense procurement
is replete with cost overruns and less than
promised performance which were, at least in
part, the results of intentional "buy in" bid-
ding where cost estimates are understated
and performance and scheduled estimates
overstated on the initial contract and this
has been the case even where there has been
no substantial increase in the then state of
the art.
The principal benefits enumerated by
the Air Force in this publication are that
the contract:
First, requires a tightening of design
and configuration and discipline.
Second inhibits the unrealistic sales-
manship or buy in bidding, includes
overestimates of performance as well as
underestimates of cost.
Third, motivates the contractor to de-
sign initially for economical production,
and should produce not only lower costs
on the first production units, but also a
lower takeoff point on the production
learning curve, thus, benefiting every
unit in the production run.
Fourth, permits the Department of
Defense to negotiate with a contractor
on the basis of binding commitments
concerning the performance and the
price of what is really required?opera-
tional equipment.
OBJECTIVES -:17NOBTAINED
These were the expressed objectives of
the total packaging concept as embodied
in the C-5A contract. They are desirable
objectives. Unfortunately, none of them
were obtained in the C-.-5A contract.
There is considerable evidence, in my
judgment, that Lockheed engaged in un-
realistic salesmanship and that its intent
was to buy into the C-5A. It did this by
underbidding the Boeing Corp. which
was also a candidate for the C-5A by
$300 million. Lockheed also underbid its
nearest competitor in price, the Douglas
Corp. by $100 million. The enormous cost
overruns cast Lockheed's low bid in a new
perspective. In light of what we now
know, Lockheed's low bid is ludicrous,
and it can be reasonably concluded that
Lockheed knew or had reason to know
that its bid was unrealistic. The proposal
submitted by the Boeing Corp. by the
way, was considered superior on tech-
nical design grounds than the Lockheed
proposal by the Air Force Source Selec-
tion Board.
The Air Force assertion that this con-
tract was based on binding commitments
concerning the performance and price is
especially foolish or deceptive in view of
what we now know. This brings us to a
discussion of the now famous repricing
formula and it also brings us to the sub-
ject of spare parts which I said earlier I
would more fully discuss.
REPRICING FORMULA
The repricing formula contained in
the contract was first publicly disclosed
in hearings last November. The repricing
formula is the most blatant reverse in-
centive in Government contracting that
I have ever encountered. It provides, in
effect, that the second production run,
run B, is to be repriced, on the basis of
the actual cost of the first production
run, run A, and in accordance with a
specific formula. The effect of using the
repricing formula is to renegotiate with
the contractor over the price of the
follow-on production, run B. It means
that in the event the actual costs of the
first 58 planes exceed the original esti-
mates, the contractor receives a higher
price for the follow-on production. In
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S 9976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 1$, 1969
other words, the higher the cost to pro-
duce the first 58 planes, the higher the
prices goes for the follow-on aircraft.
As can be seen, there is a very limited
incentive to control the costs. Instead of
being penalized for exceeding these cost
estimates, the contractor in this case is
awarded a higher price for the follow-on
production.
NO BINDING COMMITMENT ON COST
How firm, therefore, are the firm price
commitments which the Air Force has
claimed for the C-5A contract? I asked
this question of the then Assistant Secre-
tary of the Air Force, Robert H. Charles--
the father of the package procurement,
and some Senators say he wrote the book
on it?when he testified before the Sub-
committee on Economy in Government
on January 16, 1969. The colloquy with
Mr. Charles on this point follows:
Mr. PROXMIRE. Do we really have binding
commitments on the C-5A price if the con-
tract is repriced for future production runs
in order to take care pf cost overruns in the
initial production? Do we not lose one of
the main advantages of the total packaging?
MT. CHARLES. No, I think not.
Chairman PROXM/RE. I do not see how we
can have binding commitments, on the one
hand, on price and a repricing projection at
the same time.
Mr. CHARLES. I do. It is a binding clause
In the contract. Any contract adjustment is
made pursuant to a formula to which the
competitor bids. I see nothing non-binding
about it.
In other words, to the Air Force a con-
tract clause provides for a firm price
commitment even though another clause
in the contract provides for a waY to
increase the price. It seems to me that
under that kind of arrangement, the only
party committed is the American taxpay-
er and he is committed to pay any price,
no matter how high and excessive it
might be, once the Air Force decides it
wants a new weapons system.
AIR FORCE NOW ADMITS MISTAKE
But even the Air Force has recently
admitted that the repricing formula was
a mistake. The Air Force states in its
recent review of the C-5A program:
This provision was well intentioned but
poorly comprehended at the time of award.
In operation it is beset with ambiguities,
complicating its implementation and rais-
ing the prospect of a reverse incentive. Un-
der a selected set of conditions, the point
can be reached where, for each additional
dollar of cost occurring in the production
of Run A aircraft, an increase of total con-
tract target and ceiling of more than a
dollar could result. This potential could
encourage the contractor to add costs to
Run A so as to reduce overall loss on both
the Run A and Run B production.
GOLDEN HANDSHAKE
Contrary to Air Force claims at the
early stages of this program, when it
was being sold to the Congress and to
the public, the contract has not produced
lower costs for the first production units.
The costs for the first production units
are greatly exceeding the original esti-
mates. Thus, instead of a lower takeoff
point on the production of learning curve,
benefiting every unit in the production
run, we have a higher takeoff point on
the production learning curve, thus in-
flating every unit in the production rim.
On top of all this, we have the repricing
formula, which has been called the
"golden handshake," which further in-
flates the cost of the run B aircraft. The
Subcommittee on Economy in Govern-
ment concluded in its unanimous report
the following:
Not only were the price increases made
possible by the repricing formula, but the
cost overruns which are resulting in the
higher prices may very well have been en-
couraged by the existence of the formula
and by the nature of the formula. For the
mere fact that a repricing provision existed
in the contract constituted a built-in get-
well remedy for almost any kind of cost
growth. According to this provision, the price
of the second increment (run B) could be
increased ori the basis of excessive actual
costs on the first increment (run A). The
motivation, if any, of the incentive feature
of the contract is thereby largely nullified,
provided the contractor is confident that
the Government will exercise the option. Why
bother to keep coats down if their increase
forms the basis for a higher price? Addi-
tionally, because of the nature of the for-
mula, the higher the percentage of overrun
over the original contract ceiling price on
the first increment, the higher the per-
centage by which the second increment is
repriced.
As I have indicated, the Air Force itself
now recognizes that the repricing for-
mula was a serious mistake. The mistake
was so serious that the Air Force says it
would now like to renegotiate the con-
tract to remove the reverse incentive fea-
ture. The Air Force review of the C.-5A
program calls for such a renegotiation.
The problem, however, cannot be so
easily resolved. Revising the contract to
eliminate or modify the repricing form-
ula will not make this a good contract
nor will it necessarily reduce the cost of
the C-5A to the Government. And the
cost is what is at issue here.
SHOULD STOP AFTER FIRST RUN
There is no way, in my judgment, to
get out from under the huge cost of this
program without curtailing it at this
point. If the program is. ended at the
completion of the first 58 aircraft, Lock-
heed would be forced to absorb the cost
of overruns for which they are responsi-
ble, over and above the ceiling price in
the contract. There is no reason for Lock-
heed not to absorb the costs over and
above the ceiling price.
And these costs, by the way, would in-
clude the possibly extensive costs brought
about by the recent failure of the C-5A
wing to meet structural strength require-
ments. I might add here that the failure
of the C-5A to meet the structural
strength requirements in the contract is
a serious matter. It is no excuse to say
that the plane is satisfactory to 100 per-
cent of its designed load limit, and that
it only fails to meet 150 percent of the
designed load limit. The fact is that the
150 percent provides for a safety feature
which is absolutely essential before any
plane can be deemed airworthy. The FAA,
according to my understanding, would
require this plane to meet 200 percent of
its designed load limit. But the Air Force
has decided for some reason which it has
not made known, not to seek FAA certi-
fication, although the contract provides
for FAA certification. In addition, the
fact that the plane failed to meet the
static tests indicates that it would more
than likely fail under dynamic condi-
tions. Static tests only simulate dynamic
conditions. The static tests that occur on
the ground do not create the same kind of
stresses on an airframe that is created
during the dynamic conditions that occur
in the air.
LETTER TO SECRETARY
On this point I wrote a letter to Robert
Seamans, Secretary of the Air Force, on
July 18, 1969, inquiring about the report-
ed crack in the C-5A wing. I also ad-
dressed certain questions to the Secretary
relating to recent changes in the C-5A
specifications which seem to represent
degradations in its performance stand-
ards. So far I have had no response from
the Secretary of the Air Force to my
letter, although I wrote him on July 18!
However, I believe that what I said to
him was pertinent to this discussion:
JULY 18, 1969.
The Hon. ROBERT C. SEAMANS, Jr.,
Secretary of the Air Force, Department of
Defense, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
DEAR Ma. SECRETARY: I have noted the re-
cent announcement by the Air Force that
tests of a C-5A aircraft produced a crack in
one of its wings.
This development seems to me to raise ad-
ditional questions about the C-5A program.
You may be aware of recent testimony by
Mr. A. E. Fitzgerald before the Subcommittee
on Eat:moray in Government with regard to
certain changes in the C-5A specifications.
One of the changes, according to Mr. Fitz-
gerald, is a decrease in the maximum speed
for lowering flaps on landing from 205 knots
to 180 knots. Another change is a decrease
In the maximum allowable sink rate at land-
ing. It occurs to me that both of these
changes represent degradations in the C-SA
specifications.
What are the reasons for lowering the
standards of the C-5A specifications?
Have wing cracks, fuselage cracks, or any
other substantial defects been produced in
the C-SA prior to July 13, 1969, by ground
static tests or other tests or usage of this
aircraft?
Were the performance standards for the
C-&A lowered because defects were produced
in previous tests?
Would you be normally advised of any
defects produced from the C-SA during tests?
Will the delivery schedule for the C-5A be
affected by the current difficulty? If the
delivery schedule will be delayed, please esti-
mate the amount of the delay.
Please estimate the cost of fixing the cur-
rent difficulty (the cracked wing). Who will
pay the cost of necessary modifications, the
Government or the contractor?
In the event that Congress does not auth-
orize the purchase of the Run B aircraft,
who would pay the costs of the modifica-
tions made necessary by the cracked wing?
In the event that Congress does authorize
the purchase of Run B, who would pay the
costs of the modifications?
Your early response to these questions
will be appreciated.
Sincerely,
WILLIAM PROXM/RE,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Economy in
Government.
IS GOVERNMENT LIABLE FOR REPAIRS4
The question that we also need an-
swered is whether the purchase of the 23
additional aircraft would make the Gov-
ernment liable for the cost of repairs and
modifications necessary to correct the
structural defect. This is one of the ques-
tions which my amendment seeks to an-
swer. In the amendment, the Comptrol-
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August 13, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL ? A
ler General is instructed specifically to
seek an answer to this question.
I should add here that according to the
lawyers for the contractor, the Govern-
ment would be liable not only for the
costs of repairing the cracked wing and
making whatever modifications are nec-
essary, but would also be liable for all
contractor losses and termination costs
if the full 120 aircraft are not procured.
This view is based on the fact that the
Secretary of the Air Force early this year
exercised the option to purchase the fol-
low-on aircraft.
The exercise of this option was an-
nounced on the morning of the January
16, 1969, hearings before the Subcom-
mittee on Economy in Government, of
which I am chairman. This announce-
ment came in spite of my request to the
Secretary of Defense that the Govern-
ment not commit itself to purchase the
Run B aircraft until a complete investi-
gation of the cost overruns could be com-
pleted. The investigation I asked for was
not even started on the morning of Jan-
uary 16, when the announcement of the
Government was made.
COST OF SPARES
The amendment I have introduced ad-
dresses itself to several other cost issues,
including the cost of spares. The Air
Force has consistently tried to gloss over
and obscure the huge cost increases that
have occurred on the spare parts. It has
even attempted to create the impression
that the original contract did not include
the cost of spares. This is not true. The
contract entered into in 1965 with Lock-
heed did not include the cost of spares.
Now the Air Force claims that the ori-
ginal contract included only the cost of
Initial spares as distinguished from re-
plenishment spares. The difference, as
it has been explained to me by the Air
Force, is that the initial spares would be
comparable to the first set of tires on an
automobile needed to replace the ori-
ginal tires, while the replenishment
spares would be the second and third set
of new tires.
The question, then, is whether the ori-
ginal contract estimates included the cost
of the replenishment spares.
REPLENISHMENT SPARES IN CONTRACT
In answering that question, I would
first point out that the contract itself
contains a provision covering the costs
of replenishment spare parts and repair
spare parts. Secondly, it has always been
assumed by persons familiar with the
contract from its origin that replenish-
ment spares were included in the orig-
inal contract estimates. This assump-
tion is based on the description of the to-
tal package contract described by the
Air Force in 1966 and on an early brief-
infl document written in 1965. The Air
Force's description of total packaging,
as I stated earlier, indicated that all
anticipated development, production,
and as much support as is feasible was
to be included in the total package con-
tract. This would include spare parts,
whether initial or replenishment.
Further, the briefing document which
I referred to states explicitly that re-
plenishment spare parts are to be in-
cluded as part of the C-5A package. I
will now read from this briefing docu-
ment. On the title page is the following:
Contract AF 33(657) 15053 FPLF-VP, C-5A,
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Lockheed?
Georgia Div.
On page 3 of this document, which was
prepared by the Air Force, is the follow-
ing:
What we bought: Item A?RDT&E, Sys-
tem Integration and Assembly ACFT/Mis-
sion Kits, Training/Training Equipment,
AGE, System Test, System Management,
Data and Reports.
On page 4, this list of what the Air
Force bought continues:
What we bought: Item B?Production,
ACFT/Mission Kits, Training & Train-
ing Equipment, AGE, Contract Technical
Services.
Provisions for: Initial Spare and Repair
Parts, Replenishment Spare and Repair
Parts, Up Dating/Modification Changes.
It will be noted, of course, that the
list of what the Air Force bought with
the C-5A contract included initial spare
and repair parts as well as replenishment
spare and repair parts.
In my judgment, the Air Force is in-
tentionally attempting to confuse the
Congress and the people on the subject
of spare parts.
Mr. President, I go into the detail on
replenishment spare parts because again
and again we have had different esti-
mates as to the original cost of the C-5A
and as to its present cost. Repeatedly,
those who have argued that the overrun
is not $2 billion but some lesser figure
It is $1.4 or $1.3 billion?have said that
in the initial estimates, replenishment
spare parts were not included, and that
by adding the cost of replenishment
spare parts in the present estimates, we
are not comparing the same things. I go
into this detail today to estabilsh beyond
any question the documentation to show
that I am comparing the same things,
that the replenishment spare parts are
included in both, and that on that basis
there is a $1.9 billion to $2 billion
overrun.
Rarely has there been a case with so
much concealment and obstruction on
the part of a Government agency with
respect to its handling of public funds
that has been so well demonstrated and
documented in public hearings. The cal-
lous and devious treatment by the Air
Force of one of its employees, Mr. A. E.
Fitzgerald, well illustrates this point.
FITZGERALD CASE
Mr. Fitzgerald has been the deputy
for Management Systems, Office of the
Secretary of the Air Force, for almost
4 years. His responsibilities until recent
months included development of the
management controls used on the C-5A
program. He was also a member of the
steering committee reviewing the financ-
ing of the C-5A. He was first asked to
testify before the Subcommittee on
Economy in Government last November
because of his recognized expertise in
the area of management systems and
cost controls.
Mr. Fitzgerald's problems began when
he was invited to testify. The Air Force
first attempted to deny his appearance
before the subcommittee altogether. Only
S 9977
after repeated urgings by my office did
the Air Force finally relent and grudg-
ingly permit him to appear. However,
the Air Force notified me that Mr. Fitz-
gerald was to appear only in the capacity
of a "backup" witness. The main witness
was to be someone else. But this some-
one else was an individual with whom
the subcommittee was not familiar and
whom it had not invited.
In other words, the Department of De-
fense was attempting to dictate to the
Subcommittee of Congress who was to
be its principle witness: and the Depart-
ment of Defense had taken it upon itself
to inform us of the appearance of some-
one who was not invited, while relegating
the individual who was invited to
"backup" status. Of course, the subcom-
mittee insisted on hearing from Mr.
Fitzgerald, and we did.
However, the Air Force denied Mr.
Fitzgerald the opportunity to prepare a
written statement, although the sub-
committee had requested a written state-
ment from him in our letter of invitation.
A written statement permits the witness
to organize his testimony in an orderly
way, and to prepare statistical data,
charts, and other materials. It also
provides a committee with a chance to
become familiar with the testimony in
advance of the hearing, to prepare
thoughtful questions, and to have a more
fruitful dialog with the witness. But the
subcommittee was denied this oppor-
tunity because of tbe directive to Mr.
Fitzgerald not to prepare a written
statement.
The only explanation, in my judgment,
is that the Pentagon was attempting to
interfere with this witness' testimony by
gagging him as much as possible.
This explanation is amply supported
by the events that followed Mr. Fitz-
gerald's oral testimony in November. In
his oral testimony, responding to direct
questions from me, he conceded the fact
that there would be a cost overrun on the
C-5A, possibly as high as $2 billion.
COMPUTER ERROR
Less than 2 weeks after his testimony,
he was notified of his loss of Civil Service
tenure. Imagine that. Less than 2 weeks
after this man testified before a congres-
sional committee and simply answered a
question put to him--and as far as we
know he answered it honestly?he was
notified of the loss of his civil service
tenure by the Air Force. The Air Force
claims that this action was only coinci-
dental to the fact that he had recently
testified before the Subcommittee on
Economy in Government about the C-5A.
It was called a "computer error." We
checked on the basis of the latest testi-
mony and found that the,computer made
very few errors. It had made two errors
before that were similar to this one, al-
though it made some 50,000 decisions.
Whether the Air Force's action in strip-
ping Fitzgerald of his job protection was
a coincidence may be judged from the
events that followed. For the subcommit-
tee subsequently obtained a copy of a
memorandum to the Secretary of the Air
Force from the Secretary's administra-
tive assistant. The memorandum was
dated January 6, 1969.
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S 9978 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 18, 1969
GET RID OF )11ZGRRALD
The intriguing feature of this memo-
randum is that it concerns ways in which
the Air Force could get Ad of Mr. Fitz-
gerald. I think the Members of this body
ought to think about this a few minutes.
Here was the Secretary of the Air Force,
Harold Brown, receiving an interoffice
memorandum from his administrative
assistant. The subject of the memoran-
dum was ways by which the Air Force
could get rid of one of its civilian em-
ployees. The civilian employee happened
to be Mr. A. E. Fitzgerald. The civilian
employee happened to have testified be-
fore a committee of Congress on the costs
of the C-5A cargo plant. The civilian
employee testified that there would be a
$2 billion cost overrun oh -this program.
Previously the Air Force had gone to
great lengths to hide the costs of the
overruns. Less than 2 weeks after his
testimony the civilian employee was
stripped of his Civil Service public ten-
ure. A few weeks later a memorandum
is prepared by the administrative assist-
ant on how to get rid of the civilian em-
ployee. Is this still a coincidence?
The memorandum itself explained for
the benefit of Secretary Brown three
separate actions "which could result in
Mr. Fitzgerald's departure" They were,
first, adverse actions for cause. Second.
reduction in force. Third, conversion of
Mr Fitzgerald's position from an ex-
cepted category to career service, and
then eliminating him in subsequent com-
petitive procedures. To etplain the last
possibility, the memorandum contains
this example of Air Force ethical
constraints:
This action is not recommended since It
is rather underhanded and Would probably
not be approved by the Civil Service Com-
mission, even though it is legally and pro-
cedurally possible.
A coincidence?
I have done everything in my power
to prevent the Air For oe from taking
punitive action against Mr. Fitzgerald.
In my view, he is a dedicated, loyal Fed-
eral employee and citizen, whose conduct
is beyond reproach. His only offense is
that he is cost conscious. His job is to
control costs, to save the taxpayers'
money. He works at this job conscien-
tiously and tries to save as much of the
taxpayers' money as possible.
He is extremely competent in this area.
He is one of those rare persons who is
highly gifted and who has had the char-
acter and the strength to persist in what
is an unpopular job of trying to hold
down costs. This is the kind of conduct
which engenders real hostility on the
part of contractors and others who
worked with him in the Air Force and
the Pentagon.
COLD CLIMATE FOR F/TZGERALD
Unfortunately, there are those in high
places in the Air Force and in the De-
partment of Defense who do not agree
with this approach to Government
spending. And these persons have been
responsible for the peculiar coincidences
affecting Mr. Fitzgerald's job. Even now
they are attempting to hound and dis-
credit him.
His major responsibilities have been
taken away from him. Instead of the
major weapons systems for which he was
formerly responsible, his new job is to
look into the cost overruns on a bowl-
ing alley in Thailand.
But perhaps the most reprehensible
and dangerous acts committed by the
Air Force in connection with Mr. Fitz-
gerald's appearance before the subcom-
mittee relates to the supplemental testi-
mony the subcommittee requested last
November. The subcommittee had asked
Mr. Fitzgerald to prepare certain cost
data and other information in writing,
to be submitted to the subcommittee fol-
lowing the close of oral testimony. Among
other things, the? subcommittee had
asked for a breakdown of the C-5A cost
overruns. The request was made on No-
vember 13, 1968.
DELAYED TRANSMITTAL
Not until December 24, 1968, did the
subcommittee receive the materials from
Mr. Fitzgerald, and only after the sub-
committee has raised strenuous objec-
tions to the delay in transmitting the
supplemental testimony. In fact, as the
subcommittee later learned, Mr. Fitz-
gerald had prepared his supplemental
testimony within a few days of the No-
vember 13 apeparance and had turned
it over to the Air Force for transmittal
to the subcommittee. The Air Force had
held on to the supplemental testimony
and intentionally delayed its transmittal
for more than 4 weeks.
The materials received on -December
24, were labeled "Insert for the Record
testimony of A. E. Fitzgerald." How-
ever, upon checking with Mr. Fitzgerald,
the subcommittee learned that the mate-
rials received on December 24 were not
the same materials prepared by Mr. Fitz-
gerald. They had been altered by the
Air Force. More importantly the Air
Force had altered the C-5A cost esti-
mates prepared by Mr. Fitzgerald. The
alterations made it appear that Mr. Fitz-
gerald's figures corresponded with the
official Air Force figures contained in its
November 19 press release.
The subcommittee advised the Air
Force that it would not accept the mate-
rials received on December 24 as the
testimony of A. E. Fitzgerald. We in-
sisted on our right to receive the true
and accurate testimony of the witness,
unaltered and uncensored by the Air
Force. The subcommittee finally, on
January 15, received Mr. Fitzgerald's au-
thentic and uncensored testimony.
The Air Force's attempts to muzzle,
interfere and alter the testimony of Mr.
Fitzgerald cannot be justified. They ap-
pear to have been almost desperate and
panic stricken in their efforts to prevent
public disclosure of the C-5A overrun.
The Air Force testimony in two separate
committees of Congress in March and
May of 1968 that there was no C-5A
overrun should be considered in this con-
nection.
LATE REPORTING OF OVERRUN
What also needs to be considered is
the fact that they began to learn of
the C-15A overrun as early as November
1966. During that month an Air Force
team, which included Mr. Fitzgerald, vis-
ited the Air Force plant in Marietta,
Ga., where the C-5A was being pro-
duced. The review team found overruns
of up to 100 percent in key segments of
the program.
That was in 1966, a year and a half
before Mr. Flax testified before an ap-
propriations subcommittee of the House
that there were no overruns, and that
the costs were between the cost and the
ceiling.
The second visit 3 weeks later con-
firmed the initial observation. The over-
run in the C-5A program grew steadily
in late 1966. Yet, according to the evi-
dence received by the subcommittee, evi-
dence of its existence began disappear-
ing from Department of Defense internal
reports. In 1968 evidence of the over-
runs also disappeared from internal Air
Force reports. In fact, the Air Force re-
ports had been changed by directive from
higher headquarters to eliminate the
evidence of the C-5A overruns. Mr. Fitz-
gerald requested an audit to determine
the true facts about the C-5A costs but
it was never performed.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. PROXMIRE. I am happy to yield
to the Senator from Virginia.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. The Senator
from Wisconsin mentioned that the rec-
ords were altered, and I believe he said
by higher authority. Could the Senator
identify the higher authority more pre-
cisely?
Mr. PROXMIRE. I cannot identify it
other than by saying that the informa-
tion, the testimony of Mr. Fitzgerald, was
sent to us and we received it. We then
checked with Mr. Fitzgerald and he said
that that was not his testimony, that it
had been changed by persons in the Air
Force. Unfortunately, at the present
time, I do not know and I cannot tell
the distinguished Senator from Virginia
who it was that changed that testimony.
I will do my best to determine the
identity of that person, or persons, and
provide it for the RECORD.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I was not so
much concerned about that as whether it
was done within the Air Force or by a
higher echelon; namely, the Depart-
ment of Defense as differentiated from
the Air Force.
Mr. PROXMIRE, Again, I would have
to say to the distinguished Senator from
Virginia that I am not sure. I think he
makes a good point. It could come from
either source. It would not be fair to the
Air Force to assume that it was likely
they, because it might very well have
come from the Department of Defense.
Mr. Fitzgerald worked insthe office of the
Secretary of the Air Force. His superior
was in the office of the Secretary of the
Air Force. On the other hand, he did
work with the Department of Defense in
this, and it could have come from either
area, both of which, of course, would be
higher headquarters than Mr. Fitzgerald.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I have had
great concern about this contract, just
as has the Senator from Wisconsin. I
shall not further interrupt the Senator
at this time, but when he finishes his
address, I should like to go over a few
points with him.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Very good.
Mr. President, I believe that the evi-
dence in the case indicts the Air Force
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August- 13, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE S 9979
and Department of Defense for its han-
dling of the C-5A program. The C-5A
has been mismanaged and public funds
have been mishandled. The Air Force
has shown its great disregard for the
heavy responsibility it has over the use
of public funds, and it has shown serious
disrespect for Congress by its high-
handed conduct.
MISMANAGED WEAPONS SYSTEM
I might point out that the Air Force
is not alone in this regard. The House
investigation of the Army Sheridan tank
program revealed similar disclosure
problems, deceptions, and mismanage-
ment on the part of the military. The
Aerospace Daily and Executive Report,
a trade newspaper, on July 30, 1969, com-
mented on certain aspects of the tank
and the C-5A cases. I believe what the
Aerospace Daily has to say on this mat-
ter is significant because that journal
can by no means be labeled as critical
of military spending or of the aerospace
industry. I will therefore read excerpts
from what the Aerospace Daily has to
say:
Pentagon internal reporting has come un-
der fire and suspicion as an outgrowth of
findings of the House Army tank investiga-
tion and Congressional hearings on the C-5A
jet transport cost overrun.
In the $2.5 billion Army tank procurement,
House Armed 8ervices Committee investiga-
tors found internal reports misleading, in-
accurate and deliberately optimistic. Officials
connected with the program were criticized
for failing to provide objective information to
high command upon which logical and sup-
portable decisions could be made.
In the now $4.6 billion C-SA Galaxy trans-
port procurement, Air Force admits that it
deliberately did not report for two years
initial and continuing cost growth which
showed up only five months Into the eight-
year program.
In the fl7st case, Army claimed it wrote
optimistic reports on development of the
M-551 Sheridan light assault reconaissance
vehicle and its Shillelagh weapons system
because at every reporting period developers
"believed" serious deficiencies were shortly
to be corrected. The House investigation
shows they were not in many cases, despite 10
years of work.
In the second case, Air Force said it with-
held cost growth because it did not want to
jeopardize the financial condition, in the
stock market and elsewhere of its only C-5A
supplier.
As a result of these faulty reports, Con-
gressmen and Senators charged with respon-
sibility for authorizing and appropriating De-
fense funds have been abashed to discover
they are the last persons to find out about
unsolved developmental problems and cost
overruns. In a time of inflation, high taxes
and serious Federal budget constraints, they
are placed in a tenuous position vis a vie
their constituents.
The article then points out that the
Senate Armed Services Committee has
requested quarterly reports on cost,
schedule, and performance on 31 major
weapons systems and that it is consider-
ing having the General Accounting Office
monitor contracts, The Aerospace Daily
continues:
How effective this step will be has to be
seen. House tank investigators found that
GAO was denied access to Army records, a
procedure which the Pentagon can invoke
under "executive privilege" precedents. Fur-
ther complications are caused by differing
record-keeping and auditing procedures used
by the services and by their contractors.
A price example is the fact that in the
C-5A procurement Air Force estimates that
contractor Lockheed Air Craft will lose $285
million. Lockheed estimates it will lose $13
million but make a profit after spares are
ordered. The systems analysts in Laird's of-
fice have still another set of figures.
It remains that the Pentagon's veracity has
been hurt by the findings of Congressional
inquiries into the tank and transport pro-
curements. Members of Congress can forgive
and forget if they feel they made a bad de-
cision based on objective information. But if
the information they received was not honest,
they will look at future Pentagon reports
askance, and take them with a very large
grain of salt.
TIME TO CALL A HALT
What all of this adds up to, in my
judgment, is that the Congress must call
a halt to Pentagon shenanigans. The C-
5A case symbolizes the worst aspects of
military procurement. The Air Force has
been managing this program since 1965
and it has utterly failed to do a good job.
Public funds have been squandered on a
program of dubious value which will cost
at least $2 billion more than Congress
originally agreed to pay. Where are the
C-5A overruns leading? The recent Air
Force report admits that "there is a dis-
tinctive possibility that costs may con-
tinue to increase." I believe that this
statement means that the Air Force is
putting the Congress on notice that it
will come in at a later date to ask for
even more money for the C-5A.
Mr. President, let me add that when
Assistant Secretary Whittaker briefed
me in my office a few days ago he said
that, too. He said that there is evidence
of further cost growth, that we have not
seen the end of the overruns on the C-5A,
that we cannot say that $2 billion is the
limit; it could be more. There is every
Indication that it will be more. As a mat-
ter of fact, the Air Force now is being
franker in predicting overruns than it
has been at any time.
The American people deserve a better
accounting of its tax money with respect
to the C-5A program than we can now
give. My amendment will at least place
the Congress in a position of knowing
what the real military requirements for
the 23 additional aircraft are and what
the economic justification for them is.
The amendment asks the General Ac-
counting Office for an investigation of
the facts and to submit its findings with
recommendations to the Congress within
90 days.
NEED MORE KNOWLEDGE
Clearly it is not unreasonable to re-
fuse to authorize any additional C-5A's
until we know more about this program.
Furthermore, if it is determined that
there is a military requirement for the
23 additional aircraft, then I believe we
ought to know what they will cost and
whether their costs will be ballooned by
the re-pricing formula. I therefore urge
the adoption of the amendment.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that sections from the.Subcommit-
tee on Economy in Government Report
on the Economics of Military Procure-
ment, on the C-5A overruns, which in-
eludes a table on the cost overruns, be
printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the excerpts
were ordered to be printed in the REC-
ORD, as follows:
2. COST OVERRUNS: THE C?CA CARGO PLANE
The Air Force selected the Lockheed Air-
craft Corp. as the airframe prime contractor
for the C-5A, a large, long-range, heavy
logistic aircraft, on September 30, 1965, after
proposals had been received in response to
Requests for Proposals (RFP) from 5 firms,
and preliminary contracts had been entered
into with 3 of them in 1961. It is not clear,
from the evidence, how much price compe-
tition had to do with the selection. Secretary
Charles testified that there was competition
among the firms. But when asked how low
Lockheed's bid was compared to the others,
he refused to disclose the figures on the
grounds that "this is company proprietary
information". A similar procedure resulted
in the selection of General Electric as the
engine manufacturer.
The contract with Lockheed is a negotiated,
fixed price incentive fee contract. It is also
the first contract utilizing the total pack-
age procurement concept (TPPC). Two major
objectives of the concept, according to the
Defense Department, are to discourage con-
tractors from buying in on a design and de-
velopment contract with the intention of re-
covering on a subsequent production con-
tract, and to motivate contractors to design
for economical production and support of
operational hardware. Thus, TPPC is sup-
posed to act as a deterrent against cost over-
runs and less-than-promised performance.
To accomplish this, all development, pro-
duction, and as much support as is feasible
of a system throughout its anticipated life,
Is to besprocured in a single contract, as one
total package. The contract includes price
and performance commitments to motivate
the contractor to control costs, perform to
specifications, and produce on time, As the
C-5A is an incentive contract (TPPC 'does
not necessarily result in incentive contract-
ing) it contains the usual financial rewards
and penalties associated with incentive con-
tracting.
The C-SA contract for the airframe pro-
vides for five research, development, test and
evaluation (R.D.T. & E.) aircraft plus an ini-
tial production run of 53 airplanes (the total
of 58 planes is called run A), and a Govern-
ment option for additional airplane. The
present approved program for the C-5A is
120 airplanes comprised of run A (58 air-
planes) plus run B (57 airplanes) plus five
airplanes from run Cl.
The testimony received during the No-
vember 1968 hearings indicated a cost over-
run in the C-5A program totaling as much
as $2 billion. A "cost overrun" is the amount
in excess of the original target cost. Accord-
ing to the testimony, the program originally
called for 120 C-5A airplanes to cost the
Government $3.4 billion, but because of cost
overruns mainly being experienced in the
performance of the Lockheed contract actual
costs would total $5.3 billion,
Following the November hearings, Senator
Proxmire asked GAO to investigate into the
causes and amount of the C-5A overruns and
other matters relating to the contract.
On November 19, 1968, the Air Force an-
nounced, in a press release, that the original
estimate for 120 C-5A aircraft was $3.1 bil-
lion, compared to the current estimate of
$4.3 billion. Subsequently, in response to a
request by the subcommittee, Mr. Fitzger-
ald, who was responsible for the develop-
ment of a management controls used on the
C-5A and who was on a steering committee
directing a financial review of the C-5A,
supplied a breakdown of the estimates of
C-5A program cost to completion. This data
showed Air Force estimates for 120 airplanes
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 13I 1969
was $3.4 billion in 1965, and $5,3 billion in cal advances beyond the state of the art, dismayed to learn that this decision was
1968, indicating an overran of about $2 bil- The inflation argument, which is supposed made before the completion of the GOO in-
lion. The difference between the Air Force to account for $500 million of the cost vestigation and without a full disclosure of
press release and the data supplied by Mr. growth, appears questionable. The contract the reasons for the cost overruns. The public
Fitzgerald seecos to be accounted for in the contains an inflation provision to protect the interest in economy in Government was not
figures for spare parts. The data supplied by contractor from unforeseeable price changes served by this precipitous decision, an-
Mr. Fitzgerald shows $0.3 billion for spares in the economy, to go into effect 3 years after flounced a few hours before the start of a
estimated in 1965, and $0.0 billion in 1968. the issuance of the initial contract, that is, congressional hearing and a few days before
If the figures for spares are celded to the esti- October 1, 1968. The initial 3-year period the inauguration of the new President,
mates in the Air Force press release, the tele was supposed to be considered &normal busi-
sets of figures are close to r.ne another. new riek. The Air Force official explanation Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President,
In the January 16 follow up hearing, GAO of this provision states: "The contract thus will the Senator from Wisconsin yield?
reported on its investigation, the nature of included in the price an amount which re- Mr. PROXMIRE. I am happy to yield
Which is discussed below on page 40. Briefly, fleeted a projection of the mounting cost to the Senator from Virginia.
GAO transmitted to the subcommittee lig- trend in the economy of labor, materials,
urea supplied by the Air Force 2 days prior equipment, and subcontract prices." If fu- Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I do not want
to the hearing. These figura; indicated a sub- ture inflation for at least 3 years was in- at this time, to comment on the amend-
to
overrun but a smaller total cost for eluded in the price, it is hard to see why ment offered by the Senator from Wis-
the overall C-5A program than the $5.3 bil- inflation should be a major factor in later consin because I want to give it more
lion figure shown in the November hearth. s increasing the price. Without a more study than I have had the opportunity
The reason for the lower total was the orals- thorough investigation of the Go5A program, to give it up to this point. However, I
sion by the Air Force at the COatS Of the the technical problems encountered, the commend him for going so fully and into
spares, failure to anticipate them at the time of the
Nevertheless, testimony and other en- negotiation, and operations of the inflation such detail in regard to the C-5A con-
dence received in the course of the hearings provision, the subcommittee cannot form any tract.
confirmed the existence of the approximately firm conclusions about the reasons for the It seems to me the Senator from WiS-
$2 billion overrun in the CaiA program, the enormous overrun. consin has rendered both the Senate and
reverse incentives contained in the repric- A repricing formula built into the contract the American people a real service.
lag formula, and large overruns in other Air was also revealed in the November testimony. I have been deeply concerned with re-
Force programs. The latest estimate of the The repricing formula is one of the most gard to this contract, which appears to
total cost of 120 C-5A's, including spares, blatant reverse incentives ever encountered me to be so flexible and so ambiguous
provided by Secretary Charles., is $5.1 billion, by this subcommittee, it should be recalled
This is close to the estimate previously sup- that the Coco contract is supposed to repre- that either party can do almost anything
plied by Mr. Fitzgerald, and about $2 billion sent an important step toward cost control. it might wish to do.
more than was estimated in 1965. The eel- An Aix Force manual on the total package In that connection, I ask unanimous
lowing table shows the estimates supplied procurement concept dated May 10, 1966, consent to insert In the RECORD at this
by Mr. Fitzgerald, the Air Force press re- states that "It should produce not only lower point some inquiries that I put to the
lease of November 19, 1468, and Assistant Costs on the first production units, but, in
Secretary Charles: president of Lockheed and other officials
turn, a lower take-off point on the produc- of Lockheed when they appeared before
COMPARISON OF ESTIMATES OF C 5A PROGRAM tion learning curve, thus benefiting every the Committee on Armed Services. That
unit in the production run." The facts about
Iln billions of dollar A the C-5A axe just the reverse. Costs for the testimony begins on page 2150, beginning
Whether the actual performance of the t.-D&
Fitzgerald
Air,Forre
relcasel
Charles
1965
1968
1965
1968
1965
1968
120 aircraft:
ROT. & E. plus
production
AFLC 2 invest-
$3.1
$4.4
$3.1
$4.3
p.3
ment
.3
.9
.8
Tote:
3.4
5.3
3. 1
4.3
5,1
with, "Senator BYRD of Virginia. Thank
first production units are greatly exceeding
original estimates, resulting in higher take- you, Mr. Chairman," and goes through
off point on the production learning curve, page 2152, ending with, "Senator BYRD
thus inflating every unit in the production of Virginia. Thank you very much."
run. In addition, the contract is supposed to There being no objection, the extract
provide the Government with binding COM- was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
mitrnents on price and performance. Obvi- as follows:
ously, there is in fact no binding comm..
rnent on price if the price can be modified Senator Byrd?
upwards, as is being done in the C-5A, be- Senator BYRD of Virginia. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman,
cause
cause actual costs are exceeding estimates.
lives up to its promise remains to be
shall not attempt to second-guess either
the Air Force or Lockheed on this contract.
seen.
On the matter of delivery, it is
Necessarily it is a very
interesting
complicated one. It
1 The Air Force press release of Nov.19.1968, did not provide to note that the Air Force announced on does seem to one after 2 days at hearings it is
cost breakdowns between RAT. & E. (iesearch development, February 25, 1969, a 6-month delay in the a very flexible one and a very ambiguolis one
testing, and engineering), production ruus, and AFLC invest- first operational C-5A aircraft from June I woud like to get an understanding of a
meat. The figures given seem to omit Atia investment. 1969 to'Deceinber 1969. couple of things.
by Fitzgerald includes spare parts; that submitted by Charles
2 AFLC (Air Force Logistics Command) investment submitted
Not only were the price increases made As I recollect Mr. May's chart, Lockheed
includes initial spares, replenishment .pares, and support. possible by the repricing formula, but the says that the cost to the Government when
Table submitted by Secretary Charles (heilings, pt. 1, p. 311) cost overruns which are resulting in the high- Mr. MAY. Yes, sir.
the contract is completed will be $3.2 billion.
does not include estimates for 1965.
er prices may very well have been encouraged
The cost growth in the 0-5/1 program can by the existence of the formula and by the Senator BYRD of Virginia. Now the Air
be seen in the table. The figures supplied nature of the formula. For the mere fact Force testified yesterday, said I checked my
by Fitzgerald show an ineeease from $3.4 that a repricing provision existed in the memory a little while ago, that the cost to
billion in 1965 to $5.3 billion in 1968. The contract constituted a built-in get-well rem- the Government will be $4.3 billion, or a
Air Force press release can be reconciled with edy for almost any kind of cost growth. difference of more than $1 billion, and could
the Fitzgerald figures if the AFSLC inveet- According to this provision, the price of the it be explained where that $1 billion is?
meat (spares) is added to each of the esti- second increment (run B) could be increased Mr. MAY. Senator Byrd, I think we have to
mates. Thut, the $3.1 billion estimate for on the basis of excessive actual costs on the recognize that the Air Force estimates are
1965 would total $3.4 billion, and the $4.3 first increment (run A), The motivation, if for the total program, including the Govern-
billion estimate for 1968 would total $5.2 any, of the incentive feature of the contract ment-furnished engines. Our projections that
billion. Secretary Charles' own figures far is thereby largely nullified, provided the con- we showed you are only for that portion of
1968 total $5.1 billion. The subcommittee re- tractor is confident that the Government the cost that Lockheed is responsible for,
jects the attempts of Air Force spokesmen will exercise the option. Why bother to keep and this involves primarily the airframe.
to minimize the size of the program or the costs down if their increase forms the basis Now that differential that you speak of, as
size of the overrun by removing spares 8.8 for a higher price? Additionally, because of best I can understand it consists therefore
an item of oost. Spares are an integral part the nature of the formula, the higher the of items that are not within the framework
of the Co5A program and shOuld be included percentage of overrun over the original con- of our contract, plus the difference in esti-
in any consideration of costs, tract ceiling price on the first increment, the mates that exist between what the Air Force
According, to the Air Force, tile coat growth
higher the percentage by which the second feels our mete will be and what we feel they
in the Ch-&A program has resulted from nor-
increment is repriced. will be for 115 airframes.
mal development problems associated with The subcommittee learned, on the morn- Senator BYRD of Virginia. You feel that
complex weapons and inflation However, the ing of the January 16, 1969, hearing, that the your cost will be a great deal less than the
subcommittee notes that the C--543 was Air Force had exercised the run. B option Air Force believes your cost will be?
chosen for the first application of the total for 57 additional C-5A aircraft, apparently Mr. MAY. I think the Air Force estimate is
package procurement concept partly for the committing the Government to spend at least approximately $200 million higher than ours
complex weapon system requiring technologi.
reason that it was not considered a highly $5.1 billion an aircraft originally estimated through 115 airplanes, and that the differ-
to cost $3.3 billion. The subcommittee was ence in those numbers that you are citing
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'August 13, 1969
is accounted for by the prime contract with
the General Electric Co. for the furnishing of
their TF-39 engines.
Senator BYRD of Virginia. Then the cost to
the Government, if you take Lockheed's
figure, is not $3 billion which your chart
shows? That is only your part of the contract?
Mr. MAY. Yes. We feel that is the only por-
tion that we are competent to testify about.
Senator BYRD of Virginia. Yes, I agree with
that, but I wanted to get clear that the total
contract, the total cost to the Government
will not be $3.2 billion for the total con-
tract. It will be $3.2 billion if you are correct
insofar as Lockheed's share is concerned.
Mr. MAY. That is correct, sir.
Senator BYRD of Virginia. You have a dif-
ference between the Air Force and the Lock-
heed Company, there is a difference of about
$272 million, as I understand the figures.
The loss would be 285 if the Air Force is cor-
rect, while it would be roughly $13 million if
Lockheed's figures are correct.
Mr. MAY. Yes, sir.
Senator BYRD of Virginia. How much has
Lockheed actually spent_on the C-5A pro-
gram to date? Do you happen to have those
figures?
Mr. MAY. The number is approximately
$1.5 billion, Senator, and we will supply the
precise number for the record if we may.
Senator BYRD of Virginia. You will supply
the precise figure for the record?
Mr. MAY. Yes, sir.
(The information furnished is shown
below.)
"Through May 30, 1969, Lockheed has ex-
pended $1,372,112,173. In addition unliqui-
dated progress payments to subcontractors
amounted to $197,580,196. In total, through
May 30, 1969, the amount was $1,569,682,369."
Senator BYRD of Virginia. Now, how much
has Lockheed received from the Federal Gov-
ernment up to this point?
Mr. MAY. I will have to supply that for the
record, sir.
(The information furnished is shown
below.)
"Cash receipts from the Government
through May 30, 1969, are as follows:
"Final billing for contract line
items delivered $494,
878,
575
"Progress payments to Lock-
heed for work in progress
827,
609,
140
Total 1,
322,
577,
715
"Progress payments to sub-
contractors for work in
progress
197,
580,
196
"As additional information, through May 30,
Lockheed had incurred $91,966,571 in un-
reimbursed work in process costs."
Senator BYRD of Virginia. I am not sug-
gesting that this be done at all, but if the
contract were canceled at the end of Run A,
do you have an estimate as to what Lock-
heed's profit or loss would be?
Mr. HAUGHTON. We do not hal4 such an
estimate, Senator, and we think that it is
past the time when it would be canceled at
Run A, because we already have funding on
Run B, so Rttn B would have to be included
now.
Senator BYRD of Virginia. And as I under-
stand from your reply to one of Senator
Symington's questions, Lockheed feels that
it has a contract for 155 C-5A aircraft.
Mr. HAUGHTON. Subject to certain funding
requirements, yes, sir.
Senator BYRD of Virginia. Of course Con-
gress has not approved the funding, but
Lockheed feels that it does have a contract
for 115 aircraft, provided the Congress funds
the 115 aircraft?
Mr. HArrorroN. Right, yes, sir.
Senator BYRD of Virginia. Now it was testi-
fied yesterday that Lockheed is 6 months be-
hind schedule. Does Lockheed concur in that
assertion?
Mr. HAUGHTON. Yes, sir.
Senator BYRD of Virginia. The contract pro-
vides for a penalty up to a total of $11 mil-
lion for schedule delays. As I understand it,
no penalties have been determined or assessed
at this point.
Mr. HAUGHTON. That is right. There have
been no penalties assessed, because the oper-
ational aircraft are not required for delivery
as of this time.
Senator Bran of Virginia. Yesterday the Air
Force testified that it is not, at this time,
able to estimate as to what the Government
would lose if the program were terminated
at the present time. Does Lockheed have an
estimate as to what the Government loss
would be if the program were to be termi-
nated?
Mr. HAUGHTON. No, sir; we do not, because
it goes out into termination clause for all
the suppliers of the program, and I do not
have that figure. I think that figure would be
very difficult to develop with any accuracy.
Senator BYRD of Virginia. The next ques-
tion may be one that you would prefer not
to answer and I will not press it if you feel
that way for business reasons, but what
percent of the business of the Lockheed Corp.
does the C-SA program represent?
Mr. HAUGHTON. Well, there Is going to be
2 or 3 years in here when it is going to ap-
proximate 25, close to 25 percent of our total
sales. Our sales last year ran $2.2 billion,
and I think our sales average on the C-5
over a 3- or 4-year period would be about
$500 million a year.
Is that about right, Torn?
Mr. MAY. A little higher than that, but
substantially 25 percent.
Mr. HAUGHTON. About 25 percent, maybe a
little more, give or take a little.
Senator BYRD of Virginia. Thank you very
much.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President,
may I ask the Senator from Wisconsin
his estirnate as to the total cost to the
Government if and when the contract is
completed.
Mr. PROXMIRE. The total cost to the
Government, on the basis of the evidence
we have now?and, as I said, my esti-
mate would have to be conservative be-
cause the Air Force tells us it is going to
be higher?is $5.3 billion for the 120
planes.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. As I understand
It, that is the estimate which the Sena-
tor and his staff made. It is not the Air
Force estimate?
Mr. PROXMIRE. I understand the
Air Force estimate is $5.2 billion.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. The Air Force
estimate for the completed contract is
$5.2 billion?
Mr. PROXMIRE. $5.2 billion.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. And the esti-
mate of the Senator from Wisconsin is
what?
Mr. PROXMIRE. $5.3 billion.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Through May
30 of this year, Lockheed has expended,
in round figures, $1.570 billion, accord-
ing to testimony submitted on page 2151
of the committee hearings. Lockheed has
received, during the same period of time,
up to the date of May 30, $1.520 billion,
in round figures, on this contract from
the Government.
Mr. PROXMIRE. This is an important
colloquy. The Senator is pointing out
that Lockheed has received almost 100-
percent reimbursement?not quite, but
very close to it.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Lockheed has
received practically 100-percent reim-
bursement, which means Lockheed has
been operating on Government money.
Would the Senator not agree?
Mr. PROXMIRE. The Senator is abso-
lutely correct, not only with respect to
progress payments, but the Government
owns the plant in which Lockheed is
building the plane. $150 million worth of
equipment is also owned by the Govern-
ment. Therefore, Government capital,
the capital supplying the equipment, is
largely, but not entirely, Government
capital; a great deal of it is; and almost
all of the working capital cost is pro-
vided by the Government.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. So Lockheed
has had the benefit, I calculate, of some-
where around $150 million in interest. If
the Government had not put up the
money and Lockheed had had to go on
the market to borrow the money, Lock-
heed would have been billed for that
money and would have had to pay it.
Mr. PROXMIRE. The Senator has
made a point that escaped me. That
point should be made. $150 million is just
about right. It may be a little more than
that in view of what has happened to
interest rates, but it is close to that.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I would like to
make a further study?
Mr. PROXMIRE. If the Senator will
yield, I want to make the point that
interest payments are not reimbursable.
They are not allocable. So the point is
well made that it would have had a great
effect on Lockheed.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. So Lockheed
has had the benefit of $150 million of
otherwise nonreimbursable cost that has
been paid by the taxpayers.
Mr. PROXMIRE. That is correct.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. So when we
speak of the total cost of the contract,
I think it is well to consider the interest
charges, as well as the other figures the
Senator gave, to make up the total.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I agree wholeheart-
edly with the Senator.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I would like to
read into the RECORD at this point one
paragraph of the statement I made be-
fore the committee last June when the
officials of Lockheed appeared before the
committee.
Now, just another brief comment or two.
Mr. Haughton has mentioned the lack of
flexibility in the contract.
Lockheed had been complaining of lack
of flexibility.
Continuing the statement:
I admit I find the contract very difficult
to understand, but it seems to me that here
is a great deal of flexibility in that contract,
and a great deal of ambiguity in the contract,
to the extent of at least $272 million worth,
because that is the difference between what
the Air Force figures the final figure will be
and what the company figures it will be, so it
seems to me there is a great deal of flexibility,
and the taxpayers will be called upon to
pay somewhere between those two figures,
the one mentioned by the Air Force of 285
million and the other by the company of $13
million. In the way of flexibility, while I
say I do not fully understand the contract, it
seems to me there is a great deal of flexibility
in this contract and a great deal of am-
biguity,
The question lam suggesting is wheth-
er the public interest is being adequately
protected by the Department of Defense,
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S 9982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 18, 1969
particularly the Department of the Air
Force. It is not Lockheed's responsibility
to protect the taxpayer, but it is the Air
Force's responsibility to protect the tax-
payer. The Air Force is a Government
organization. It is part of the Depart-
ment of Defense. It receives all of its
money from the taxjaayerS. It is the
responsibility of the Government--the
Air Force in this case?to say that any
contract made on behalf of the Govern-
ment adequately and /Fully protects the
general public and the tax funds that
come out of the pockets of the wage
earners of our country.
What passed through my mind, as I
was listening to the distinguished Sena-
tor from Wisconsin as be spoke on the
Senate floor this afternoon and bro'ught
out many facts and figUres, just as went
through my mind during the committee
hearings, was whether the Air Force in
its procurement practices is adequately
protecting the taxpayers. I think it is
Important that all Government agencies
handle their contracts in a way that will
adequately protect the taxpayer.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the Senator
from Virginia. His point is well taken.
We should be concerned not only with
the Lockheed contract. That is only one.
The Air Force spends billions and billions
of dollars of the taxpayers' money every
year. It is important to focus attention
on the practices which have been high-
lighted by the way the-Lockheed situa-
tion was handled. No matter what action
Is taken on my amendment, the im-
portant lesson we should learn from the
Lockheed contract is that the Air Force
simply must handle its procurement
practices more honestly as far as Con-
gress is concerned and_ ft must handle
them with far greater regard for the
American taxpayer than it has in the
past. I think that is the point made by
the Senator from Virginia, and it was
made extremely well. I think it was the
most important point Of all made with
reference to the Lockheed contract, in
terms of what we can save in the future.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. The Senator
from Wisconsin has rendered a splendid
public service in focusing attention upon
this fact. As he pointed out a moment
ago, it concerns not just the C-5A con-
tract or just the Air Fbrce, but all de-
partments of Government, and partic-
ularly the Defense Department, because
that is where the greatest spending oc-
curs and that is where these large con-
tracts are. It is important that the De-
partment of Defense promulgate prac-
tices and procedures which will protect
the tax dollars taken from the pockets
of the wage earners. What the Senator
from Wisconsin has been doing in recent
weeks in this regard, and what he is d0-
ing today on the floor, I believe will
contribute substantially toward the pro-
tection of the dollars of the American
taxpayers.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the Senator
from Virginia. I assure him that our sub-
committee has just started hearings,
which will continue through the recess,
into the spending of a number of GOT-
emment agencies?not the Defense De-
partment alone.
Mr. President, the current issue of Life
magazine, on August 15, 1969, contained
an article entitled "The New Math of
Inflation," which should be a lesson for
everyone in politics, particularly those
who serve our country in the Senate and
the House of Representatives. It says:
For a decade it's been called "the affluent
society," but suddenly the U.S. public is be-
ginning to think all those dazzling statistics
and ever-rising curves are a giant con game.
Between inflation, which today is at an an-
nual rate of 7.2%, and the relentless in-
crease in Federal, state and local taxes, we
are all running to stand still. In fact, many
have begun to fall behind, and the average
citizen is furious about it. The Life Poll,
conducted by the opinion research firm of
Louis Harris and Associates, Inc., reveals
that 86% of a nationwide cross section 4:4
young and old, rich and poor, rural and city
dweller assess their anger at current tax
policies as either "high" or "very high."
Eighty-two percent of them want major cuts
in federal spending now, and a surprising
56% are even ready to see wage and price
controls imposed to stabilize prices. Twenty-
one percent claim they are ready to take part
in a tax revolt, and another 22% who could
never openly oppose their government said
they could sympathize with those who did.
The Bureau of the Budget made an
analysis last year of controllable and
uncontrollable spending. They found
that about $100 billion of our Federal
spending is controllable. We obviously
cannot control such items as interest on
our national debt; we could pass all the
resolutions in the world, and still could
not do it. We cannot cut social security
payments. But 80 percent of all our na-
tional spending is in the budget.
As the Life magazine article points
out:
The potential savings in the post-Vietnam
defense budget are estimated by the August
1 Fortune at $17.6 billion out Of $78.7 bil-
lion. . . . To get this monstrous 40% of all
federal spending under control would be the
biggest single step toward a more rational
schedule of national priorities.
In this connection, Mr. President, I
call to the attention of the Senate a
series of very thoughtful and revealing
articles in the current issue of Look
magazine, which I shall ask to have
printed in the RECORD.
The articles are entitled as follows:
"The Defense Establishment," writ-
ten by Charles W. Bailey and Frank
Wright.
"Defense Contract: The Money Web,"
written by Gerald Astor.
"Generals for Hire, written by Berke-
ley Rice.
"The Waste," written by David R.
Maxey.
"How to Cut the Budget," written by
David R. Maxey.
"The University Arsenal," written by
Ruth Gelmis, showing how the univer-
sities have become involved and en-
meshed, and what the effect has been.
A fine epilog by Averell Harriman,
entitled "Our Security Lies Beyond
Weapons."
I ask unanimous consent that the arti-
cles which I have listed, published in
Look magazine for August 26, 1969, be
printed in the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the articles
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
Tale DEFENSE ESrABLISHMENT
(By Charles W. Bailey and Frank Wright)
For the first time in 30 years, the American
defense establishment is on the defensive.
Not since the 1980's?before World War
the cold war, the Korean War, Vietnam--
have those who build and manage our mili-
tary machine been seriously challenged.
The argument this year in Washington has
been centered mainly on the ABM?the anti-
ballistic-missile system that President Nixon
proposed to defend our own intercontinental
missiles and bomber bases against surprise
attack.
But the issue has become much broader:
What is the proper place of the nation's de-
fense establishment in the Government and
in American society? Has the military ma-
chine grown so large that it threatens to
throw that society critically out of balance?
Once again, critics are raising the specter of
the "military-industrial com.plex"-- -the
shorthand label for that combination of
political, military and economic pressures
that influence U.S. security policy, military
strategy, armed forces and defense spending.
The Vietnam war has dragged on for years,
and military victory, despite repeated predic-
tions by the nation's civilian and military
leaders, is now admittedly beyond our grasp.
Military spending has grown steadily until
it swallows almost $80 billion a year?more
than 40 cents of every dollar in the Federal
budget?and requests for new and more cost-
ly strategic weapons may offset any savings
that would result from a cease-fire in Viet-
nam.
Pressures are rising for greater Federal out-
lays to meet the dcanestac needs of -a nation
whose multiplying urban problems are com-
pounded by racial, social and economic
stresses. The voices of concern do not sing
in unison, sad most of them recognize both
the complexities of the keue and also the
high motivse of those with whom they dis-
agree. The chorus is rising nonetheless.
"I don't question the patriotism of any-
one," says Sen. Mike Mansfield of Montana,
majority leader of the VB. Senate. "But I
do question the judgment of creating a mili-
tary-industrial-labor complex which exer-
cises such great power. You have to control
the money?control the spigot?and then you
can get into philosophy."
Former Vice President Hubert Humphrey
says, "It isn't as if bad men were conspiring
against good people. It is that events com-
bine to bring about a preponderant alloca-
tion of resources to defenee. That preponder-
ance inevitably affects national polities, in-
evitably brings a looseness of control, and
feeds on itself."
Walter F. Mondale of Minnesota, a young
Democratic liberal in his fifth year in the
Senate, sees the issue as one of national pri-
orities: "I've watched every fiscal dividend be
dribbled away. There's not a dime left for
people. We ought to write a book on our-
selves. The first chapter ought to be what
we think we are as white people. The rest
should be on what we really are and what
we do to people who can't defend them-
selves?the Indians, the blacks, the Mexican-
Americans. Then we call them animals be-
cause they don't react right after we've beat
them fiat. If you Want to destroy the defen-
sive capacity' of our nation, just keep it up
the way we've been going. If these young
militants on campuses anti in the political
parties are going to be the leaders?and
someday ithey are?they aze not going to be
interested in keeping this kind of society
together."
John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, who
speaks for anti-ABM Republicans in the
Senate, recalls his early efforts to question
big defense outlays: "You couldn't find out
anything. The Armed Services Committee
would say, 'It's classified,' or 'We've gone
into this already and have more information
than you'."
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August 13, 196Vrovd S9983
Another anti-ABM spokesman, Democratic
Sen. George McGovern, knows firsthand the
kind of pressures that can be generated.
Some of his South Dakota constituents
urged him to try to get an ABM site in the
state because of the economic benefits it
would bring. "I don't think there's any con-
spiracy between the military and industry,"
he says, "but it does develop a momentum.
Even the clergymen know their congrega-
tions are swollen by defense installations.
There's a subtle influence on labor unions,
business, community groups."
The defense establishment is complex. It
Is huge. It is also one of the most pervasive
institutions in the nation: one out of every
ten Americans who works for a living is
part of the defense establishment. In the
fiscal year just ended, an estimated $78.4
billion was spent on defense?nearly nine
percent of the gross national product.
There are 500 major military installations
in the continental United States, and 6,000
smaller ones. The Defense Department con-
trols 45,000 square miles of land?an area the
size of Pennsylvania. Overseas, we have 3,400
big and little bases in 30 foreign countries,
Hawaii and Alaska.
Some 22,000 U.S. corporations are rated
"major" defense contractors, and another
100,000 or so get a piece of the action through
subcontracts. One example of the geographic
spread of the defense dollar: When Lock-
heed Aircraft Corp. got the contract to build
the C-141 Starlifter jet transport for the Air
Force, it bought parts and services from
1,200 other firms. Just one small part for the
plane?a fuel-pump switch?required ma-
terial from New York, Connecticut, Illinois,
Ohio, California, Wisconsin and Massa-
chusetts.
The major share of defense spending?$44
billion last year?goes for weapons and other
equipment. Two-thirds of that went to the
100 biggest defense contractors, and a whop-
ping one-quarter of the total?$11.6 bil-
lion?was paid out to these ten: General
Dynamics, Lockheed, General Electric, United
Aircraft, McDonnell-Douglas, American Tele-
phone & Telegraph, Boeing, Ling-Temco-
Vought, North American Rockwell and Gen-
eral Motors.
Even the university campus can be a big
defense contractor. Last year, both MIT and
Johns Hopkins University were among the
top 100.
Some states do better than others. Cali-
fornia got one out of every seven defense-
procurement dollars last year?or $6.5 bil-
lion. Texas was second with $4.1 billion. The
rest of the top ten are: New York, Connecti-
cut, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Massachusetts, Mis-
souri, New Jersey, Indiana.
How did it all start? And how did the de-
fense establishment get so big? There are
many reasons for its growth?but only one
for its birth: We live in a dangerous world.
At the end of World War II, the nation
rushed?as it had after every war?to dis-
mantle it,s armed forces and turn its atten-
tion to the search for the good life. Suddenly,
however, the U.S. faced an unprecedented
military and ideological challenge. The Soviet
Union sought to expand its dominion west-
ward across Europe and southward into Iran,
Turkey and Greece. In Asia, another Com-
munist government came to power in a bitter
civil war In China. The United States hesi-
tated?and then, in an extraordinary series
of basic policy decisions, moved to check the
Communists. The rationale was "contain-
ment," which came to mean a U.S. commit-
ment to meet, if necessary with armed force,
any Communist encroachment on independ-
ent nations that asked for our help. This
required our nation for the first time to
maintain a large peacetime military force.
Beyond this, there was another reason for
the pyramiding growth and cost of defense:
atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, jet airplanes
and, finally, intercontinental missiles made
the tools of war astronomically costly. The
complexities of these weapons dictated years
of research and dayelopment before they
could be ready. Their capacity to strike a
single, sudden, devastating blow meant that
a nation committed by political decision to
constant readiness for conflict could no longer
wait until war began to beat its plowshares
into swords.
There are other reasons?some of them un-
related to either high policy or the march
of science?why defense spending has grown.
Neither Congress nor the White House has
been able to find ways of exercising any-
thing like the critical scrutiny that is
routinely applied to much smaller domestic
programs. Many congressmen are reluctant
to vote against anything for "our boys in
service." Secrecy labels applied to many proj-
ects hinder those who do raise questions.
Finally, there is "pork"?the economic bene-
fits that defense spending can bring to a
community.
There are positive factors too. By and large,
the Pentagon and its industrial allies have
done all they can to encourage congressional
permissiveness. This year, there are 339 De-
fense Department employees assigned to
"legislative liaison"?the bureaucratic eu-
phemism for lobbying. That works out to
two Pentagon agents for every t.hree members
of Congress; no other special-interest group
comes close to having so many.
Defense Department lobbyists don't limit
themselves to pushing the Pentagon's legis-
lative program. They also spend much of
their time currying favor with congressmen
in other areas?passing advance word of con-
tract awards so members can get political
credit for "announcing" them, or handling
inquiries about the problems of constituents
in service.
They also give special attention to con-
gressmen who hold major influence over
defense affairs. The South Carolina district
of Chairman L. Mendel Rivers of the House
Armed Services Committee is chock-full of
Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps
bases. Georgia?home of Sen. Richard B.
Russell, for years, chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee and now head of
the Appropriations Committee?is loaded
with armed services installations and defense
Industry. The congressional military barons
get some personal benefits too. The Air Force
routinely provides planes from its "VIP" fleet
to ferry them around the country. And one
night this spring, the Defense Department
not only turned out its top brass for a Mis-
sissippi testimonial dinner for Chairman
John Stennis of the Senate Armed Services
Committee but also flew in the entertain-
ment?a Navy choir from Florida, an Army
WAC band from Alabama and an Air Force
string ensemble from Washington, D.C. - -
If the Pentagon can bring heavy pressures
and blandishments to bear on Congress, the
defense industry?companies and unions
alike?can exert massive leverage on both.
Its lobbyists, ranging from high-priced vice
presidents to clerks, do most of their work
In private, staying out of public debate over
weapons systems or budgets.
Industry's influence in Congress is some-
times magnified by outside help?from cham-
bers of commerce, state and local officials
or labor unions eager to impress on con-
gressmen the benefits of defense bases or
contracts. A study two years ago of 27 firms
slated for prime contracts on the ABM sug-
gests the potential for this kind of pres-
sure; the firms operate more than 300 plants
In 172 congressional districts spread across
42 states. Thus, at least 256 senators and
representatives had some economic stake?
direct or indirect?in the ABM. A recent
estimate that 15,000 firms, including subcon-
tractors and suppliers, would share in ABM
spending suggests that the impact is even
broader.
At the Pentagon, several factors combine to
bolster industry's standing. First, the grow-
ing complexity of modern weapons has made
it ever harder for Government to keep its
provisioners at arm's length. No longer does
a service simply decide what it wants, design
It, and then advertise for somebody to build
it; now, industry's "sss men"?strategic-
systems salesmen?and engineers play a
major role in military-weapons design.
Industry and the military join hands in
other ways too. There are the service as-
sociations, to which active and retired officers
as well as industry representatives belong.
The groups are large (the Air Force Associa-
tion counts 100,000 members) and often
rich?upwards of $2 million yearly income
In some cases, with industry providing much
of it through dues and advertising in as-
sociation magazines that advocate bigger and
better weapons.
Another factor is the ease with which
some men move from defense industry to the
Defense Department, and vice versa. Secre-
taries of Defense, and lesser officials, have
come from industry, and returned to it. Re-
tired military officers flock to defense in-
dustry, often going to work for a firm whose
operations they had monitored while on
active duty.
When industry and the Pentagon go hand-
in-hand to Congress, they find powerful
friends awaiting them. A few senior mem-
'hers control congressional action on mili-
tary matters; four committee chairmen?all
Southerners, all conservatives, all well along
in years, all with over 20 years of service?
make up the elite:
Rivers, 63, a congressman for 28 years,
chairman of the House Armed Services Com-
mittee.
George Mahon of Texas, 68, .a congress-
man for 34 years, chairman of the House Ap-
propriations Committee.
Stennis of Mississippi, 68, a senator for 21
years, chairman of the Senate Armed Serv-
ices Committee.
Russell, 71, whose 36 years of service make
him the Senate's senior member, chairman
of the Senate Appropriations Committee.
These men are strong and talented in
their own right. But the primary source of
their power lies in the seniority system, in
the way members are chosen for advance-
ment, and in the structural and jurisdic-
tional tradition of Congress.
The Southern flavor of the defense posi-
tions?one official calls it "the South's re-
venge in perpetuity for Gettysburg"?is a
self-feeding process. Warm weather and ease
of year-round operation lead the military to
spend much of its money in the South. Mem-
bers of Congress from Dixie therefore gravi-
tate to the committees that deal with mili-
tary affairs, and because it is relatively easy
for them to get reelected, they build up se-
niority and thus control the committees,
This process is even more marked in the
Senate, where the smaller membership al-
lows senators to serve on more than one
major committee. The result has been the
creation of interlocking directorates; the
three topranking members of Armed Serv-
ices?Stennis, Russell and Republican Mar-
garget Chase Smith of Maine?are also on
Appropriations. Such dual membership and
parallel inclinations almost always produce
the same result: Armed Services approves
Pentagon proposals and Appropriations pro-
vides the money to finance them.
There are more personal ties to the Pen-
tagon too. Two members of the Senate
Armed Services Committee hold commis-
sions as major generals in the Reserve forces,
a third is a retired two-star Reserve gen-
eral. The man who writes the military-con-
struction appropriation bill each year?Rep.
Robert L. E. Sikes of Florida?is a major
general in the Army Reserve. A 1967 Minne-
apolis Tribune survey of the entire Congress
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S 9984 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August IS,- 1969'
turned up 82 senators and 107 representa-
tives with Reserve COMMiSs11113s.
One reason military ccentattees generally
have their way is the systeM itself; If you
attack the other fellow's committee on the
floor, he may do the same Ws yours. Armed
Services and Appropriations members defend
their bailiwicks with relentless zeal against
either indivdual attack or jurisdictional raids
by other committees. The bulk and com-
plexity of programs, the frequent censoring
of reports and hearings records for "security"
reasons, and the traditionally one-sided na-
ture of the testimony that is_published?all
these also inhibit Opposition to military out-
lays.
The debate on the defense establishment
has been highlighted this year by a new
round of "horror stories" atout Pentagon
mismanagement and inefficiency: $2 billion
increase in the cost of a new_tiant jet trans-
port; the belated cancellatiga of a contract
for a new helicopter that was badly flawed.
Such disclosures of waste are only ancillary
to the basic issues in the rising debate over
the proper role and size of the nation's de-
fense establishment. But saving a billion
here and a billion there hes its merits?
especially in the light of the military's post-
Vietnam "shopping list" of hew and even
more costly weapons.
The new weapons list is long and varied.
It includes a replacement for_the Minuteman
missile, now the backbone of our strategic
force; multiple warheads to boost the strik-
ing power of missiles; a long-range bomber
to replace the 5-52; fighter planes for the
Navy and Air Force; three nuclear-powered
aircraft carriers at a half-billion dollars each.
There are dozens of others.
All of these systems would cost money.
But critics argue that some of them?
especially the Multiple Inapendently-tar-
geted Reentry Vehicle (MIRV), as the multi-
ple-warhead project is called could also
seriously escalate the U.S.-Soviet arms race.
To some in Congress and elsewhere, MIRV
is a greater menace than the ABM.
The case of MIRV points up the critical
Importance of how decisioni are made on
whether or not to build a Weapons-system.
The crucial decisions are male, in the end,
by only one man: the Preaclent. But the
coinage of presidential actions is often
minted long before it is issued by the White
House. Proposals for foreign and defense
policy, for military strategy and for the
spending to implement them come to the
President's desk from many sources: the
Secretaries of State and Defense, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Coun-
cil, the Budget Bureau, the Congress. Policy-
making decisions should, in theory, flow in
an orderly sequence: first, basic foreign
policy, defense policy to support it, military
strategy to implement defense policy, mili-
tary forces to carry out the strategy; finally,
budget decisions to pay for the forces. But,
in fact, it sometimes goes the other way:
money decisions determine force levels, these
in turn affect strategy, strategy influences
defense policy?and defense policy then dic-
tates foreign policy.
One man who served two Administrations
in a top national-security sae puts it this
way: "What is needed is a counter to the
parochially presented programs and deci-
sions of the Defense Department. No other
part of our society functions with so little
check and balance. This is not a plot?it is
the failure of the rest of our society to de-
velop the expertise to permit reasoned deci-
sions on basic policies."
Can this be done? Many people who know
the problem firsthand are gWomy. But the
effort is going to be made. A half-dozen pro-
posals for study of the defense structure,
and its implications for future national pol-
icy, are under way or about to start?includ-
ing several in the Defense Department it-
self. The suggestions cover the waterfront
and include privately financed research cen-
ters to review programs, a new joint Senate-
House committee with a strong grant of au-
thority to review national priorities, a new
independent defense-review office to analyze
military spending, expansion of the Budget
Bureau's staff. Some think that a deter-
mined, open fight will have to be made on
the floor of the House and Senate over every
major defense issue.
Even with much stronger congressional
control, the President will have the key role.
"The question in defense spending is 'how
much is necessary?'" President Nixon said
In June. "The President of the United States
is charged with making that judgment."
Still, questions of costs and priorities per-
sist. None of the answers will come easily,
especially in a world where nations build
great military forces not to make war but
to deter it?a world where weapons are built,
as one scholar suggests, "not to be used but
to be manipulated."
But however hard the questions, they are
at least being asked, some for the first time
in 20 years, some for the first time ever.
Upon the course of the debate that has just
barely begun, and upon the kind of answers
that emerge, may depend the place of the
United States in the next decades -or the
next century.
DEFENSE CONTRACT: THE MONEY WEB
(By Gerald Astor)
The Pentagon has long been able to jet
combat troops to fight 5,000 miles from
American shores if a President decided to
apply kill power there. But heavy equip-
ment?tanks, cannons, helicopters, portable
bridges and trucks?all traveled slow water
freight. So the word went out from the Pen-
tagon to U.S. industry: build us a really big
bird.
Lockheed won, and the droopy-winged
C-5A Galaxy, 247 feet in length, is the big-
gest bird yet to get off the ground. In one
load, the four engines will lift an M-48 bridge
launcher (128,420 pounds), four quarter-ton
trucks with trailers, two ambulances, two
five-ton trucks with trailers, two three-quar-
ter-ton trucks with trailers plus 52 soldiers
to erect the bridge and drive the vehicles.
The C-5A gives the U.S. armed forces mas-
sive airlift power, but when it grabs its maxi-
mum gross weight of 762,000 pounds and
flings itself into the air, a lot more than mili-
tary hardware goes into the wild blue yon-
der. In the three and a half years since Lock-
heed got the contract, it has added 10,000
workers to its Marietta, Ga., plant. Chubby
C. U. Dixon, Jr., a mason who earned $5.55
an hour, signed on for $3.75 an hour to stuff
C-SA wings with electrical gear. "Outside,
there's no vacation, no retirement, no credit,
and it don't rain in here," says Dixon point-
ing to the 76 acres of U.S. Air Force Plant
B-1.
Perhaps another 9,000 Lockheed-Georgia
people who worked on other projects have
moved on to the C-SA along with the new
recruits. In fact, of Lockheed's $6 million
weekly payroll, approximately $4 million goes
to C-5A workers. For 15 years Gene Amos has
been drawing paychecks from Lockheed. "I'm
one of the lucky ones, never been laid off,"
says Amos, a troubleshooter on the produc-
tion line. "It's a funny thing," he goes on,
"but when the union's negotiating a con-
tract, businesses in the area all seem to raise
their prices just before the contract's signed.
So all you keep are the fringe benefits."
Employees of Lockheed-Georgia spend
their money In 85 counties, and most of
them pass along their dollars in the Atlanta
area and Cobb County, where Marietta is.
Gray-haired Len Gilbert, director of the
Cobb County Chamber of Commerce, crosses
one leg over the other and says, "What does
Lockheed mean to us? A heckuva lot, In
1961, a low point when they had about 13,100
employees, the total wages for a quarter in
Cobb County amounted to $33 million." He
paused to locate the figures. "In the last
quarter of 1968, Cobb County showed a pay-
roll of $85 million." Corresponding figures
for 1961 and 1968 show an increase in retail
sales from $133 inillion to $368 million. "A
payroll dollar turns over seven times," points
out Gilbert, making the C-SA responsible for
a big chunk of those sales. While the popu-
lation of Marietta shows only a slight in-
crease since the 1960 census figure of 25,000,
suburban Cobb County has added 66,000
folks to the 114,000 that lived there then.
Marietta Mayor L. Howard Atherton remem-
bers when the former tenant of the factory,
Bell Aircraft, stopped making B-29's in 1945,
and 32,000 people lost their jobs. "It felt like
the end of the world, but it wasn't so bad.
When Bell shut down, the people left town.
It was a transient population. Now, it's dif-
ferent. Lockheed is culturally and economi-
cally a part of Marietta. Lockheed people are
much more solid, they pay their bills, par-
ticipate in the community life. They couldn't
just move away."
Atherton, who is a drugstore owner, believes
that even in the unlikely event that Lock-
heed should go the way of Bell, his com-
munity would survive. "There's been so
much building in the last few years, con-
struction's had a bigger effect than Lock-
heed." In the next breath, Mayor Atherton
calls the company "vital not only to Marietta
but the whole state."
Some local citizens agree with him. The
head of a jewelry outlet says business is up,
and not just because of the aircraft workers.
"But I often say if Lockheed goes, every-
thing goes. Yet there is a helluva lot of new
industry around." The manager of a small-
loan company says, "We're not solely de-
pendent upon Lockheed, and with Atlanta
coming out this way, it wouldn't be that
bad if there were a outback."
The C-&A spins a web of money that
touches far beyond Marietta-Atlanta or even
the rest of Georgia. Through subcontracts.
the money flows to people in 44 states plus
Canada and the United Kingdom. One large
satellite effort belongs to Avco in Nashville,
Tenn., which builds the 223-foot wings.
Avco also makes fuselages for Bell heli-
copters, wings for other Lockheed planes and
metal office furniture. But the largest num-
ber of employees, 1,500, work on the droopy
C-5A wing, making it, in effect, the largest
project in Nashville industry. Few workers
joined Avco for this particular job?most
sifted over from other assignments.
Avco's $125 million C-5A contract sounds
like handsome business, but General Man-
ager and Vice President Charles Ames says,
"We couldn't live on programs like the
C-5A." When and if Lockheed goes ahead
with the L-10-11 air bus for civil transport.
Avco expects to add workers.
One smaller subcontractor operates out of
an abandoned shopping center in Caldwell.
N.J. Nash Controls, Inc., a subsidiary of Sim-
monds Precision, turns out small actuating
devices. Business dropped when the Pentagon
canceled production an Lockheed's Cheyenne
helicopter but picked up with the C-5A. Sen-
sitive to recent congressional rumblings an
the "overrun" in the C-5A price (perhaps $2
billion extra), Lockheed officials blame the
higher costs on severe inflation in their in-
dustry and production-capacity shortages.
Whether one talks to executives, assembly-
line workers or local officials, the fears of the
military-industrial complex get midget shrift.
"We gat enough problems building the
C-5A," says Gene Amos, "without worrying
about that." "It's all a lot of nonsense," says
Avoo's Charles Ames. "The civilians I know
in the Department of Defense are very dedi-
cated, have the highest integrity. There's no
desire to perpetuate any military-industrial
complex."
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S 9985
GENERALS FOR HIRE and colonels at Lockheed makes one wonder around. The salesmen take care of selling,
about their objectivity.
but if you don't have an intro like me, you
(By Berkeley Rice) There are same limits on what kind of work waste your time with underlings who don't
For those who have trouble understanding these men may do when they retire. Federal have any power. If I want a contract, I know
the complexities of the military-industrial laws prohibit retired officers frsm selling to exactly who to go to. Some other guys may
complex, one graphic illustration is the traffic the Department of Defense for three years know the technical stuff, but I know the
in retired military officers who join the de- after retirement and to their own service for people. That's my expertise."
Such expertise may raise questions about
conflict of interest, but not to most retire
officers who have joined the defense industry.
Says Pete Higgins, "You take a man who
retires around 45 to 50, with his kids ready
for college, and he's got a problem. Ile can't
do it on his retired pay. He's got to have a
second career. Many of these men have no
other marketable experience. Where the hell
else do you want them to go!"
No one seems to know, but as they con-
tinue to go into the defense industry the
contracting process may suffer. One Defense
official claims, "the fact that these lucrative
job opportunities exist cannot help but in-
fluence those who deal with defense contrac-
tors. I remember trying to hold down costs
on a large contract once, and a general work-
ing with me said, 'I must be out of my mind,
trying to cut the overhead on this company.
I'll be part of that overhead in a few years.'"
When military men spend much of their
careers dealing with companies they may
eventually work for, they naturally develop
some concern for the company's point of
view. When 90 percent of the major defense
contracts are negotiated in such a congenial
atmosphere, price and the public interest
can easily become secondary considerations.
A normal buyer-seller relationship has a
built-in check against this sort of thing,
because the buyer must spend his own
money. The services do not, a fact which
Pentagon officials and procurement officers
often seem to forget.
Despite all the criticism of defense spend-
ing, most military men look on the growing
traffic betweeti the services and the defense
industry as natural and proper. An admiral
who has bade the transition himself claims,
"It's good for the military, It's good for the
company, and it's good for the country."
tense industry. More than 2,000 retired gen- life. However, the laws are vague about what
erals, colonels, Navy admirals and captains constitutes "selling." Since 1962, the Depart-
now work for the 100 largest defense con- ment has taken action in only one case in-
tractors. Their numbers have tripled in tale volving a major contractor. Asked why, a
last ten years. The top ten firms employ more Defense Department legal officer comments,
hen half of the 2,000. Many of these had ?I doubt if anybody here is vigorously beat-
been involved in the contracting process on
major weapons systems. Their decisions often
meant millions of dollars to companies for
whom they now work.
Sen. William Proxmire (D., Wis.) calls this
a dangerous and shocking situation." While
not charging anyone with corruption, he
claims the trend represents "a distinct threat
to the public interest." The threat, he says,
is twofold: high-ranking retired officers may
be using their influence at the Pentagon to
affect decisions on contracts with their com-
panies; active officers involved in procure-
ment may be influenced by the prospect of
jobs with companies they are buying from.
Defense contractors, of course, deny the
charges of influence-peddling, and insist
they hire ex-military men because of their
expertise, and not in reward for past favors.
Despite these denials, research on the em-
ployment of retired officers reveals some in-
triguing patterns. Take the Minuteman II
missile program, which has climbed from an
original price of $3.2 billion to $7 billion. One
of the major subcontractors is North Ameri-
can Aviation ($669 million in 1968 defense
contracts). Its autonetics division produces
the missile's guidance system for the Air
Force. Two Air Force plant representatives
and a project officer for the contract recently
retired and joined North American auto-
netics, one as division manager. Lt. Gen. W.
Austin Davis, ex-chief of 'USAF's Ballistic
Systems Division, which handled the con-
tract, is now a vice president of North Amer-
ican. His chief procurement officer also joined
of 104
ing the bushes trying to discover violations
of the selling laws."
Since the purpose of defense companies is
to sell to the Defense Department, some ob-
servers feel the question as to which em-
ployees are engaged in sales is ridiculous.
Anyway, most large firms now call their sales-
men "marketing men." As defense companies,
many of the marketing men are retired offi-
cers, but they do not sign the contracts.
W. T. "Pete" Higgins, a former Navy officer,
Is "marketing manager for naval programs"
for an electronics company. "I come with the
team that makes the presentation," he
admits, "but only as an adviser. With my
background in naval electronics, I know
damn well I'm helping the company get con-
tracts." Does this mean using his influence?
"That's nonsense," says Higgins. "Anything
of significance goes through ten to fifteen
levels in the chain of command before a final
decision. Only peanuts are settled on a single
level that could be influenced by personal
interest."
Helping the company get defense contracts
is a popular non-selling job for high-ranking
retired officers. They usually have titles like
"assistant to the president" or "director of
advanced planning," but they are known in
the trade as "rainmakers." Regardless of how
much clout they have at the Pentagon, they
bring to their companies valuable inside
knowledge of service plans for future weap-
ons systems. When a general or admiral who
has been involved in planning or research on
the company, which employs a total
a big project retires, defense contractors bid
high-ranking retired officers, including sev- for his services as eagerly as any professional
eral other Air Force generals. football team after a top college quarterback.
Asked if this employment pattern is un- When Maj. Gen. Harry Evans retired in 1967
usual, a senior Pentagon official remarked, "It as vice director of the Air Force's $3 billion
happens all the time. Almost all the officers Manned Orbiting Laboratory program, he was
who have anything to do with procurement immediately hired as vice president and gen-
go into the business. Naturally, they go to eral manager of Raytheon's Space and Infor-
the companies they've had the most contact mation Systems Division. In 1966, Bell Aero-
with. If you check the history of any missile space Corporation, the Army's largest sup-
or weapon program you'll find the same Pifer of helicopters, hired Gen. Hamilton
story." Howse, former chief of Army Aviation, as
The story usually ends with the Defense vice president for product planning.
Department paying far more than the origi- Most of the large defense companies have
nal estimate. When the Navy contracted with high-ranking ex-officers in their Washington
Pratt & Whitney for 2,000 engines for the offices, Everyone denies that they have any
controversial TFX, or F-111, the original bid influence on defense contracts, but they are
was 6270,000 per engine. By 1967, when pro- obviously there because they know their way
duction began, the price had risen to more around the Pentagon. One of them is Lt. Gen.
than $700,000 apiece. The man who signed William Quinn, former Army Chief of Pub-
the production contract was Capt. Patrick lie Information, arid now in charge of "Wash-
Keegan, the Navy's plant representative at ington operations" for Martin Marietta, which
Pratt & Whitney. Soon afterward, he retired Produces many of the Army's missiles. "We
from the Navy and joined P. & W. as special maintain liaison with Defense," says General
assistant to the executive vice president. Quinn, "but I don't go over to the Pentagon
Sharing his office was another special assist- on any sales matters." Asked about using his
ant, a former colonel who until his retire- influence, he admits he knows "half the peo-
ment had been in charge of engine purchases pie in the hierarchy over there," but claims
for the Air Force, he never uses his contacts for business. "Be-
The problem of plant representatives is lieve me," says Quinn, "this operation is as
crucial, for they are the watchdogs who sup- clean as a hound's tooth. Our real contribu-
pos,edly guard against delays, failures and tion is in maintaining a dialogue between our
cost overruns on a contract. At Marietta, Ga., companies and the military people."
where Lockheed Aircraft Corporation ($1.8 Just how retired officers can help to "main-
billion in 1968 defense contracts) is turning tam n a dialogue" can be seen in the work of
out the giant C-5A jet transport, 230 Air an ex-Navy officer who prefers to remain
Force officers watch over production. Despite anonymous. He retired in 1968 from the
all this supervision, however, the C-SA is well Bureau of Naval Weapons, where he had been
behind schedule, and the final price on 115 involved in the selection of contractors. He
planes has climbed from the original bid of now works for one of them as a $200-a-day
$1.9 billion to $3.2 billion. The fact that some consultant in Washington. "I know a lot of
of these Air Force production supervisors will Navy, people here," he says, "and I sort of
probably join the 210 other retired generals help the company's men find their way
It's certainly good for the companies thriv-
ing on defense contracts. It may be good, or
at least comforting, for the military to deal
with former comrades who understand their
problems and look forward to jobs in in-
dustry. But as defense costs continue to drain
funds desperately needed for domestic pro-
grams, some AMeriCallS are beginning to
wonder if "it" is really good for the country.
THE WASTE
(By David R. Maxey)
Remember Robert Goodloe Harper? No?
He's the prophet who said, in 1798, "Millions
for defense, but not one cent for tribute."
We haven't let Bob down. Harper's hyper-
bole, now puffed to $80 billion annually, is
still part of the American way of life. Con-
gress has traditionally watched domestic
spending like a hawk, but focused loosely on
defense. Here are some examples of looseness
that have stirred interest. How do you like
them?
DIVE! DIVE!
In 1964, the Navy planned to buy 12 Deep
Submergence Rescue Vehicles. Purpose: to
lend aid to disabled submarines. Cost: $3 mil-
lion each. In June, hideous new cost esti-
mates surfaced. Now, the Navy will buy six
vehicles for $80 million each. Cost increase:
2,666 percent. Since the 1920's, we have had
one submarine accident at which the DSRV
might have had a chance of being useful.
One.
THE RUSSIANS WERE COMING, THE RUSSIANS
WERE COMING!
The threat of Soviet bombers in American
skies caused us to build a gigantic air-de-
fense system. One estimate of cost: $18 bil-
lion. The Russians failed to uphold their part
of the bargain by not building enough bomb-
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S 9986 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August
ers to be a real threat. We ahould be grateful
for that, because our air-afense system does
not work very well. Now h*r this testimony:
Senator Cannon: "In osfter words, the Air
Defense Command agrees that if the Soviets
sent over (deleted) heavylrombers now, we
would only knock down (deleted) out of the
(deleted) ?"
Dr. Foster [of the Defense Department]:
"I cannot speak for the Air Defense Com-
mand, sir; but I am not the least bit stir-
prised. (Deleted)."
Senator Cannon: "I am shocked at that."
Senator Symington: "Inteedible."
The system maligned abeee costs annually
at least $124 billion to operate, with out-
siders betting on $2 billion.
DIS/NGENUITY WALTZ
Gordon Rule, Director of Procurement Con-
trol and Clearance, U.S. Navy, told Sen.
William Proxmire at a meeting of his eels-
committee recently why defense-procure-
ment programs so often cost much more than
estimated: "We play games. The contractors
know if they tell the Department of Defense
how much a system will really cost, they'll
scrub it. The Department of Defense knows
If they tell the Congress the real cost, they'll
scrub it. You start in with both sides know-
ing its's going to met more." Proxmire
shouted that was dishonest. Rule replied
that he preferred to call it disingenuous.
BALLAD OF ERNIE FITZGERALD
In November, 1968. A lernest Fitzgerald.
Deputy for Management Systems for the Air
Force, told the Proxmire itibeommittee he
estimated the Lockheed a-BA cargo? plane
would cost about $2 billion more than the
Air Force had originally estinsated. Pentagon
executives became cross with Fitzgerald for
his candor. Twelve days later, he found that
his Civil Service status had been revoked.
"Computer error" was blamed for giving him
that status in the first plaee. Senator Prox-
mire then unearthed a memo to Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force Robert Charles.
The memo discussed ways 'eel fire Fitzgerald.
Fitzgerald still has a shriveled version of his
job, but cost control on large weapons pro-
curements is not part of it, The Air Force
has since verified that Fit raid's estimate
of a $2 billion overrun on the C-5A is very
close to right. Lockheed first estimated that
it would lose $13 million on the C-5A, then
allowed it might make a feW bucks.
THE LITTLE HELICOPTER THAT COULDN'T
Helicopters are crafts of real beauty only
when they work. The Cheyenne helicopter
was never beautiful. It was to be a gunship,
built as such from the grolund up. Willis
Hawkins, then Assistant Soseretary of the
Army for Research and Development, sup-
ported the idea. Hawkins had mine to the
Army in 1983 from a vice president's job at
Lockheed.
It took time to decide what firm should
build the Cheyenne Experts first rated Vertol,
Bell, Lockheed and Sikorsky in that order.
A Source Selection group a generals made
changes, rating Lockheed first, then VerboI,
Sikorsky and Bell. A final pier gave the con-
tract to Lockheed. Why? "Stronger manage-
ment." "What general," rips a critic, "could
rate Lockheed's management anything but
high when he knows that the Assistant Sec-
retary came from Lockheed?"
On March 23, 1966, Lockheed got the re-
search-and-development cOntract. Three
months later, Willis Hawkins resigned and
save $450 million. Benson also proposed
billion assumption, was never debated in
returned to Lockheed. The first Cheyenne shortening basic training for soldiers not
appeared in May, 1967, followed by nine more. the Congress, even though the Defense De-
aimed at combat roles?that is, most of
Test flights began. In March. 1969, a Chey- partment has made it vrey, very clear that them. Saving: $50 million a year. The Air
enne off California threw three rotor blades it is covering the possibility of such a war. Force and the Navy have already short-
and plunged, killing the pilot. In April, the Once our contingencies are agreed on, ened basic training for their men. And why,
Army threatened to cancel the contract for Schultze said, we take the step of asking asks Benson, should every Army officer be
lack of satisfactory performance. Estimated what force levels we need to handle them, shuttled around as if he were in training to
costs had soared all the way from $138 mil- How many men? Then, what weapons sys- be Chief of Staff? Right now, men move
lion to $186 million for 15 ships. In May, 1969, tems should we buy? on the average of once a year. Benson shows
the Army canceled the Cheyenne, after So. An orderly process, from commitment savings of $500 million if assignment changes
spending $159 million, to contingency to force level to weapons could be lowered by 25 percent
137 1969
BUT IT WORKS ON PAPER Systems. Schultze cautions that every de-
A study by Richard Stubbing of the Bu. cision along the way needs fresh scrutiny,
erau of the Budget said we're getting worse, because, for instance, the decision to be ready
not better, in the design and application of for two and a half wars does not make the
electronics system for aircraft and missiles, force level needed to fight them obvious and
Strubbing listed 13 major Air Force and Navy unchangeable. Schultze delights in the ex-
aircraft and missiles produced since 1955, ample of the Navy's aircraft carriers. Cur-
pointing out that only four had electronics renter, the Navy has 15. Why 15? One tea-
systems that were over 75 percent reliable, son is that the Washington Naval Disarrna-
Eleven other systems, which coat $25 billion, ment Treaty of 1921 ladled out national
sputtered below the '75 percent standard, quotas of capital ships. The U.S. got 15. After
Four programs were either canceled or phased World War If, the Navy saw that the 15-
out for low reliability. Stubbing said we'd battleship force was obsolete. The aircraft
do better to ask systems contractors to build carrier became the new capital ship, but we
working models rather than promising re- cling to the magic number still.
liability based on paper estimates. He also' Carriers are what one critic calls
hide-
thought competition between contractors ously vulnerable" to air attack. They work
would concentrate their minds wonderfully, best, when the U.S. has unquestioned air
THE HIGH COST OF ABORTED MISSILES superiority, such as in Vietnam. But does
their vulnerability, and the number of dry-
Sen. Stuart Symington of Missouri pointed land fields, justify having 15? It the force
out last March that over $4 billion had been could be cut to 12, say, the U.S. would Save
Spent since 1944 for missiles that never got about $360 million. And the direct cost of
Into position to be fired. They all perished building one new carrier is about $540
million.
Schultze comes down hard on the mili-
tary tendency, logical only in a werld of
limitless wars and money, to plan for every
possibility, remote or not, and build forces
and weapons systems to meet it.
Currently, we are planning AWACS, the
Airborne Warning and Control System, to
add to our existing air-defense system. The
logic of air defense tortures the mind. We
built the system to shield us from Russian
bombers, which the Russians never really
got around to building. Now, we spend to
improve it in order to discourage Russia from
getting around to building bombers. Pro-
ponents of AWACS say it will warn us of
Kamikaze-style attacks from Soviet medi-
um-range bombers. How likely is that? And
would it feel better to know that if our cities
crisp in a nuclear war, we'd be burned by
missiles instead of bombers? There is. by
the way, much reason to doubt that
AWACS will work any better than the cur-
rent system.
In June, 1968, Congressional Quarterly,
putting civilian and military officials off the
record to elicit candor, did an exhaustive
reporting job on the Defense budget. CQ
found Pentagon Insiders estimating that,
aside from savings on weapons systems we
don't need, around $4.2 billion could be
excised by cutting the size of the armed
services. That estimate did not assume an
end to the Vietnam war, but only a reduc-
tion in the proportion of support troops to
combatants (now about three to one), and a
drop in the number of men in the "tran-
sient" category?men budgeted in excess of
force requirements because they'll be travel-
ing, not working.
Nine months later, Robert Benson, for-
merly of the Comptroller's Office, Defense
Department, wrote in Washington Monthly
that he saw another $1.5 billion in savings
from troop reductions in Europe. We have
over 300,000 there now, plus 200,000 depend-
ents. Benson argued that the U.S. will not
send troops into Eastern Europe anyway
during the research-and-development phase
of their lives. Big as that figure is, it's smaller
than if those missiles had been produced and
depolyed, then found to be technically sick
or obsolete. Fifteen other missiles did get
into position, then were scrapped. Cost:
$18.8 million.
How To Cue THE BUDGET
Vietnam is a giant teaching machine.
Without the mind-riveting pain it causes,
we might still be leery of questioning the
operations of the Department of Defense. We
might still be dreaming that since our
military establishment is the finest in the
world, the running of it is better left to
military experts, well-supplied with money.
Such dreams have faded. Congress, less
afraid of being labeled unpatriotic, is asking
penetrating questions. And the answers
prove beyond imagining that if to err is
human, the Pentagon is full of mortals.
From that finding, it is only a step to asking
Whether we can't have sufficient defense at
lower cost, and perhaps use the savings for
programs with lower priorities, like healing
our cities and making poverty an anachron-
ism. The answer to the first part of that
question is yes. The Defense budget can be
cut without radically thinning our blood.
Some of the best thinking about the
military budget has been done by Charles
Schultze, former Director of the Bureau of
the Budget and now a Senior Fellow at the
Brookings Institution in Washington,
Schultze, a rational man, hopes that our
defense planning proceeds logically. First,
we examine what our commitments around
the world are. For instance, we now have
in force better than 40 mutual-security
agreements involving the U.S. in the defense
of large chunks of Earth. Should we be all
that involved? Do some pacts need re-
thinking? Given those commitments, what
kind of fight might we get into? What threats
should we plan for?
This June, Schultze reminded Sen. Wil-
liam Proxmire's Subcommittee on Economy (witness Hungary, Czechoslovakia), so the
in Government that our contingency plan- forces can be reduced without critically
ning now says that we should be able to diluting the American, presence.
start fighting, simultaneously, a major Benson found further savings in people.
"NATO" war in Europe, a major war with He figures that if annual leave time for a
China in Southeast Asia, and a minor scuffle serviceman were cut from 30 days to 20
in Latin America, such as our last trip to (to more nearly match civilian vacations), it
the Dominican Republic. Schultze pointedly would slice manpower requirements enough
said that the China war contingency, a $51,0
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u rt 13, 1969A pproved Fotin: 00001-3
Between them, Benson and the Congres-
.sifytal'Quarterly staff agreed on a cut in the
Defense budget of $9 to $10 billion a year,
Vietnam or no Vietnam. Benson's estimate
includes a 15 percent increase in the effic-
iency of defense contractors. That might
take some doing.
In the broadest terms, and with examples
almost too fierce to mention, the Proxmire
subcommittee found that there never has
been much interest in cost control, either
on the part of contractors or their customers
in the armed services. Ernest Fitzgerald, who
first identified the $2 billion cost "overrun"
on the Lockheed C-5A jet transport that
cost control is seen as "antisocial aeivity."
He cited the case of the Mark II avionics sys-
tem, a "black box" for the navigation gear
and radar on the F-111 fighter-bomber. Costs
on the system, experts bet, have risen from
a planned $610 million to $2.5 billion.
In June, Secretary of Defense Melvin
Laird, doing some digging of his own, pro-
duced a study of 12 weapons systems that
showed cost overruns ranging from 0.2 per-
cent to 194 percent on nine of them. The
latter increase was on SRAM, the Air Force's
Short Range Attack Missile, now expected
by the Pentagon to cost $313.9 million more
than was estimated. Outsiders bet the SRAM
bloat is worse than that. Laird dryly noted
that $1.4 billion of the nine overruns was
due to "optimistic original cost estimates"
on the part of weapons contractors.
But contractors suffer from more than
simple optimism. They sometimes underesti-
mate their costs deliberately, in order to bid
low and grab a contract. This practice is
called "buying in." It is based on the as-
sumption, valid historically, that the cus-
tomer services will pay the costs no matter
how they creep. Former Assistant Secretary
of Defense Robert Charles could not recall
for Proxmire when he'd last seen a major
defense contractor lose money on a contract.
That, in spite of the fact that over 90 percent
of all weapons systems end up costing twice
what the contractors' original estimate said
they would.
Fitzgerald has some ideas of how to bring
an atmosphere of candor and concern for
cost into the military-industrial dialogue. In
the process of explaining them, he has made
public a privileged language. For instance,
when a manager of a weapons-system pro-
curement finds that costs are outrunning the
money Congress gave him, he has a "funding
problem." In other words, costs are not too
high, his funds are too low. Fitzgerald re-
ports that since he's been in the Pentagon,
he has never heard of cost reduction as an
answer to a funding problem. A? "credible"
cost estimate is one high enough so that
actual costs do not produce an embarrass-
ing overrun.
What Fitzgerald and others are telling us
is that bargaining and cost control, twixt
military and contractor, is not gimlet-eyed
jockeying in the best sense of free enterprise.
It is more the murmuring of lovers.
Fitzgerald would like to see the Pentagon
use what are known as "should-cost"
studies. These studies, sharp penciled by
efficiency experts, try to answer what a
weapons system should cost, assuming for
one sweet, fleeting moment that the con-
tractor operates in a reasonably efficient
way. The Government would function as a
management consultant to show the com-
pany how to hold costs down. Previous
should-cost studies found considerable waste
motion and superfluous workers, sometimes
overstaffed up to 60 percent for the work
needed. Taken together with hard-nosed
devotion to economy on the part of top
Pentagon offieials, should-cost studies and
other techniques, Fitzgerald thinks, could
result in the saving of billions. Think that
over. Billions.
We should lay to rest now the notion that
defense cuts would damage the economy.
Arjay Miller, ex-Ford Motor Co. vice chair-
man, told LOOK Senior Editor Al Rothen-
berg: "I think a reduction in military ex-
penditures . . . would have a plus effect
on the economy. When rumors of peace break
out, the stock market goes up...."
If the Pentagon moves sharply to slash
costs, the size of the Defense budget will
depend all the more on the decisions made
in the White House and Congress about
how ambitious the country's defense policy
should be. Charles Schultze is not impressed
with the idea that a well-organized mili-
tary-industrial complex has been siphoning
cash out of the Treasury with evil design.
Rather, he said, the American people "have
pretty much been willing to buy anything
carrying the label 'Needed For National
Security.'" Schultze talked about involv-
ing the Bureau of the Budget, traditionally
the President's watchdog, more deeply in
the writing of the Defense budget. Previously,
the Department of Defense was less scru-
tinized than any other Cabinet department.
President Richard Nixon recently took
Schultze up on that, giving Budget Director
Robert Mayo what Mayo called his "march-
ing orders" to examine Defense thoroughly.
All the talk of cost-cutting now, of reduc-
ing the Defense budget, echoes down the road
to a time when the bad dream of Vietnam will
be over. Then, we will find out what kind of
"peace dividend" we'll get, i.e., how much
money will be available for use in domestic
programs or for paying out to taxpayers in
the form of lower taxes. Projecting tax gains
from a growing economy and the savings
from not being in Vietnam against the auto-
matic increases in domestic programs and
the growth in non-Vietnam defense spend-
ing, Schultze forecast a cumulative fiscal
dividend of $35 billion by 1974. That sounds
large, until we note that increases in military
spending already planned will use up the $20
billion' a year we save from leaving Vietnam.
The Defense budget can go marching on
without the war. Whatever fiscal dividend we
do get will come from the gain in tax reve-
nues from a full-tilt economy. And Schultze's
projection does not include the costs of large
new weapons systems, or an escalation in the
arms race. Those would poison the dividend.
The Nixon Administration has already cut
$1.1 billion in expenditures from the 1970
Johnson Defense budget. Recently, the Man-
ned Orbiting Laboratory, a project on every-
one's list of extraneous matter, was un-
manned. Future savings from that surgery
will be at least $1.5 billion, perhaps more.
And Laird has given every indication that
his study of nine weapons systems would not
be the last hunt for waste.
But we also have the word of Robert Moot,
Defense Department Comptroller, that the
Pentagon expects no significant cutbacks be-
low the $80 billion budget, even after Ameri-
can forces move out of Vietnam. He guessed
$75 billion would be somewhere near right,
unless "our commitments and our missions
can be cut back." And the responsibility for
thinking about that, aside from the Presi-
dent's, lies with a Congress now somewhat
awake to the chances of saving some dollars
for domestic consumption.
THE UNIVERSITY ARSENAL
(By Ruth Gelmis)
Angry students and newly formed groups
of concerned faculty are raising some tough
questions on college campuses. The Ameri-
can multiversity, it seems, is fast on its way
to becoming a docile Pentagon pet, depend-
ent on military financing and deeply en-
meshed in the defense establishment.
On March 11, more than 1,400 students
crammed into Stanford University's Memo-
rial Auditorium to demand the facts about
that school's involvement in war research.
(Stanford ranked 46th last year among the
nation's defense research-and-development
contractors.) The answers were to come from
S 9987
five university trustees. One was William
Hewlett, president of Hewlett-Packard, whose
defense sales last year totaled $34 million.
Hewlett is also a director of Chrysler ($146
million in defense contracts) and FMC Cor-
poration ($185 million) . Another trustee was
Charles Ducommun, a director of Lockheed
($1.9 billion) .
Among the trustees who were not there
were the president of Northrop Aircraft and
the 'chairman of General Dynamics.
A trustee began, "I don't think it's fair to
say that the university is participating in
the war." The audience groaned. He con-
tinued, "Many people within the university
are actively opposing the war."
"It's very nice," a student shouted, "to
view the university as an open -place where I
do my thing and you do your thing, only
your thing happens to be doing research on
weapons of destruction and death in the
name of the university."
The two-hour confrontation turned very
nearly into a rout, as the trustees' answers
became progressively inadequate, irrelevant
and evasive. At one point, Hewlett flatly de-
nied a charge that FMC manufactured nerve
gas. The students presented evidence; Hew-
lett countered that his source was the presi-
dent of the corporation. Finally he admitted
FMC had been making nerve gas up to six
months earlier.
The trustees' performance at that meeting
radicalized a good many students, including
Mike Sweeney, a former editor of the Stan-
ford Daily who was sufficiently respected by
the administration to have been appointed
two important student-faculty committees.
Sweeney walked in a liberal and walked out
a radical. Now he pickets and demonstrates.
"I've lost all my credit with the Establish-
ment. It doesn't matter; you no longer care
that much whether your future is going to
be destroyed, whether you're imprisoned,
whether you'll be physically endangered?
because there's no alternatives."
The Stanford University trustees appoint
the Board of Directors of the Stanford Re-
search Institute. SRI was created in 1946 as
a nonprofit "wholly-owned subsidiary" of
Stanford to "improve the standard of living
and the peace and prosperity of mankind."
It does nearly half its research ($29.7 million)
for the Defense Department. Ten percent of
its work ($6.2 million) is military research
directly related to Southeast Asia. SRI oper-
ates top-secret counter-insurgency projects
in Thailand, including a new $1.8 million
contract accepted last December. It has also
done secret counterinsurgency research in
Vietnam, Honduras and Peru. One classified
project is summarized as "considering the
advantages and disadvantages of providing
U.S. operational assistance to the armed
forces of the Government of Peru engaged in
counterinsurgency operations."
SRI'S board includes:
Ernest Arbuckle, chairman. Arbuckle is a
Stanford trustee, a director of Hewlett-Pack-
ard and a director of Utah Construction &
Mining .Utah built B-52 bases in Thailand,
and its affiliate, Marcona Corp., mines iron
ore in Peru.
Edmund Littlefield, also a Stanford trus-
tee, and president of Utah.
Malcolm MacNaughton, president of Cas-
tle & Cooke, which owns 55 percent of Thai-
America Steel and 84 percent of Standard
Fruit. Standard Fruit imports bananas,
nearly half its supply from Honduras.
Edgar Kaiser, chairman of Kaiser Alumi-
num, part owner of Thai Metal Works. Kaiser
also has an 80 percent interest in the phos-
phate deposits of the Sechura Desert in Peru.
Fred L. Hartley, president of Union Oil of
California, which has drilling rights off the
Thai coast.
Gardiner Symonds, chairman of Tenneco,
which now has extensive concessionary rights.
in.Indonesia.
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S 9988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
August 1; 19?
Counterinsurgency is not the brainchild
of these directors, but it protects their in-
terests very well.
Jerry Dick, a young physicist and father of
two, is opposed to the Vietnam war. In Feb-
ruary, at a meeting sponsored by the Stan-
ford chapter of the American Association of
University Professors, Dick heard SR/ Presi-
dent Charles Anderson argue that no re-
searcher was forced to take on any project
he found morally objectionable,
Dick stood up: "Sir, I was pressured into
doing chemical-warfare research." That can-
dor, he learned later, nearly cost him this
security clearance.
I went looking for Dick, and an employee
told me, "I think he's still here, but he may
not want to see you." Couldn't I talk to him
on the telephone? "Well, that might net
work either. It's clear that they can bug the
switchboard, and a lot of us here think they
probably do."
I asked Weldon "Hoot" Gibson, execu-
tive vice president of SRI, If Dick was still
working there. His face flushed with anger.
"I don't know. I really don't. Have you seen
him? Don't bother. . . . People like that
have a decision to make?do they want to
_ support the organization or not?"
When I found Jerry Dick, he'd been fired.
William Rambo is associate dean of the
Stanford School of Engineering and director
of the Stanford Electronics Laboratories
target of a nine-day student sit-in in April.
The labs held $2.2 million la classified con-
tracts, primarily in electronic-warfare re-
search, before the faculty senate di-
rected on April 24 that the contracts
be phased out. Shocked faculty mem-
bers learned meanwhile, from the sit-in stu-
dents, that contract titles and summaries
had been carefully edited to delete military
references, apparently to faellitate approval
of the contracts by a watchdog committee
on classified research. "Applied Research in
Electronic Warfare Techniques," for ex-
ample, became "Applied Research in Elec..
tromagnetics."
Rambo is on the board of, and holds stock
in, Itek, an electronics firth that held over
$80 million in defense contracts at the end
of last year.
He is also a member of sEVLial military ad-
visory committees, including the Defense De-
partment Advisory Group on Electronic War-
fare and ECOM?the Army Electronics Com-
mand. In other words, he is called upon as an
expert to advise the Defense Department on
the usefulness of the kinds of equipment
Itek supplies.
Rambo, in all sincerity, stt yS he wonders
"how much talent we are denying the Gov-
ernment by this sensitivity regarding con-
flicts of interest."
In a 1966 memo, Hubert Heffner, then
Stanford's dean of research a ad now Nixon's
deputy science director, aeknowledged that
it was "not uncommon" for faculty mem-
bers to be directors of private firms, and, de-
clining to set rules, urged teachers to be
"sensitive" to potential conflicts of interest.
Sensitive or not, professors acrass the nation
sit on the boards of defense industries and
advise military committees.
MIT'S research budget for the academic
year 1967-68 was $174 million, and 95 per-
cent of this came from the Federal Govern-
ment, with $120 million from the Defense
Department alone.
Such heavy dependence on one source wor-
ries many university administrators, includ-
ing Cornell's former preddent, Jamee Per-
kins, who warned that the "acceptance- of
Government work and corporate donation
has been known to result in a slowing down
of the university's critical faculties."
One laboratory director may already be
In trouble because of his Cautiously critical
views. Dr. Wolfgang Panofsky, who directs
the AEC-funded $30-mil1ionea-year Stanford
Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC), believes
university scientists ought to play a crucial
role as an independent source of public re-
view of defense policy: "It can't come from
people who work directly for the Defense De-
partment because they're obligated to live
by official policy. It can't very well come
from the contractors whose living depends
on the Defense Department. So the universi-
ties are the only places with the technologi-
cal expertise left. The real problem is how
do you keep the universities from becoming
captive in the process of furnishing this ad-
vice?" One answer, he says, is that "the live-
lihood of the university must in no way de-
pend on Defense Department support."
A professor at the Center, arguing that
"the director of a laboratory Is not a free
man," attributes SLAC's current funding dif-
ficulties to political reprisals. "This lab is
not being pleasant politically anymore. Most
of the people here have come out against
the ABM, so the Center has begun to lose
a few of its friends in Congress. And the
way you get a budget increase is, you have
friends on the AEC, friends on the Joint
Atomic Energy Committee."
A few months ago, as if deliberately to
substantiate that charge, Francisco Costag-
liola, who was at the time an AEC Commis-
sioner, wrote to Stanford and MIT threaten-
ing that should the schools decide against
doing classified research, he would press for
withdrawal of all AEC research money.
Sidney Drell, another SLAC professor,
found himself in an awkward position when
he addressed the Stanford March 4 Convoca-
tion. (Stanford and more than 30 other
universities held convocations that day to
raise the issue of war research.) Drell care-
fully avoided taking a public stand on the
ABM that day because he felt constrained by
his position as a member of the President's
Science Advisory Committee. He is an op-
ponent of the ABM.
Money, or the lack of it, has boxed a num-
ber of university administrators into a corner.
Some admit a desire to pull back from de-
fense work and reorient research priorities,
but complain there is simply rio alternate
source of comparable financing. The one
agency specifically charged with supporting
basic research, the National Science Founda-
tion, has only enough in its till to support 12
percent of that research. But the Defense
Department, NASA and the AEC do support
a good deal of basic research, partly because
they can more easily get appropriations.
When pressure on the Defense Department
compelled it to cut back on some of its con-
troversial foreign-country projects, it offered
to transfer $400,000 of its own $7.8 billion
research budget to the State Department.
The Department of State's current budget for
research contracts is $125,000.
Stanford's President Kenneth Pitzer com-
plains, "Our national priorities are wrong."
But when he needs funds for university re-
search programs or expansion, where is he to
go? The new Stanford Space Engineering and
Science Building, for example, was made pos-
sible by grants of $2,080,000 from NASA and
$992,000 from the Air Force.
Universities have learned that it doesn't
hurt to have a Pentagon man on your staff.
When the president of the California Insti-
tute of Technology, Lee DuBridge, left for
Washington to become Nixon's Science Ad-
viser, he was replaced by Harold Brown, then
Secretary of the Air Force. Last year, Caltech
received $3.5 million from the Defense De-
partment, much more than its entire student
tuition. NASA and the AEC supplied an addi-
tional $5 million. Caltech also operates the
nearby $214-million-a-year Jet Propulsion
Laboratory for NASA.
A year ago, the University of Rochester,
whose defense contracts increased from $1
million in 1966 to $13 million in 1968, hired
as its vice president and provost, Robert L.
Sproull. Sproull is the current chairman of
the Defense Science Board, the top Pentagon
science-advisory committee.
The University of California. holds $17 mil-
lion in defense-research contracts and ad-
ministers the $250-million-a-year missile-
development and testing laboratories at
Livermore and Los Alamos. Its new president
is a former Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Charles Hitch. The -university also maintains
an $80,000-aeyear office irrWashington.
MIT chose Jack Ruins to be vice president
in charge of the Lincoln and Instrumenta-
tion laboratories, -which do most of their
business ($92 million) with the Defense De-
partment. A former Pentagon official, Ruina
Is a pragmatist: "You can say you'll with-
draw the labs [from military work], but
who's going to pay their sedary?"
The heavy investment in military research
has a snowballing effect. As one professor
complains, "The trouble is, when you de-
velop it, somebody will want to build it."
The researcher who takes on a military con-
tract because that'a where he can most easily
get funding, and then develops a new tech-
nique or weapon, frequently starts a new
"spin-off" corporation to produce it. Route
128 around MIT and Harvard and the 900-
acre industrial park owned by Stanford Uni-
versity are crowded with hundreds of aero-
space and electronics spin-offs, most of them
doing most of their business with the De-
fense Department. In recent years, 160 new
firms have spun off from MIT alone.
The new corporations in turn hire univer-
sity consultants (MIT professors may con-
sult one day out of five) and graduating
students. For that one-third of MIT's grad-
uate students who support themselves as re-
search assistants, future careers are deter-
mined by the kind of research they do while
In graduate school. In 1968, 45 percent of
MIT's industry-bound graduates took jobs
with the top 100 prime defense contractors.
Many still receive draft deferments for work-
ing in a defense plant.
Every new employee of a defense-oriented
corporation has a vested interest in a swol-
len defense budget. His livelihood depends
on it.
Half of all U.S. research and development
is military in nature. Last year, the U.S.
spent four times as much an chemical and
biological warfare as it did on cancer re-
search. The man who invented napalm was
not a Dow employee but a Harvard profes-
sor working in a Harvard lab. Universities
and nonprofit research institutes received
$665 million from the Defense Department
in 1968, for work on the ABM and MIRV. for
research on aerial-weapons systems, anti-
personnel bombs, chemical and biological
warfare, incendiary weapons, counterinsur-
gency, and such mind-teasers as the cla,ssi-
fied contract titled "Beliefs and habits of cer-
tain foreign populations of significance for
psychological operations."
Talent and funds that could be applied to
problems of urban blight, disarmament, pol-
lution, poverty, and disease are drained into
newer, bigger, better weapons systems.
Dr. James Killian, chairman of the MIT
Corporation (he was the nation's first pres-
idential Science Adviser), has recommended
to a Senate subcommittee that an ad hoc
task force be created to review our weanons
technology and strategic policies. Scientists
thus "free 03 organizational loyalties" could
make recommendations "without being con-
strained by any departmental commitments
or biases."
Such a task force is not even in the plan-
ning stage. l'Ugh t now, if the President wants
a detailed study of, say, Russia's strategic
capabilities vis-a-vis the U.S., he asks the
Defense Department to ask the Air Force to
ask the Rand Corporation to do the study.
There is no large-scale, eivilian-sUpported
"think tank" to which the public or Con-
gress or even the President can go directly
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PAugust 13, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE
for advice on strategic policy. The scientist's
voice is captive, reaching us only after It has
been filtered through Pentagon agencies and
distorted by military interpretation.
OTJR SECTIRITY LIES BEYOND WEAPONS
(By W. Averell Harriman)
Like Many other Americans, I am fearful
about the present role of the military in our
national life. Military men have as their pri-
mary responsibility the defense of the nation,
and they are miscast when they are expected
to be omniscient on other vital national con-
oerris. It is in some ways unfair to ask them
to accept responsibility for decisions on
which they are clearly unqualified to give a
balanced judgment.
I have worked closely with our military
officers during the past three decades and
respect them for their competence and dedi-
cation to our country, I have held many of
them in the highest esteem, among them
General Marshall. I vividly recall Marshall
explaining to President Roosevelt that his
advice was given purely from a military
standpoint.
When military men advised extreme action
In Vietnam, I am not sure that they fully
realized the limited character of our objec-
tives there. We are not there to win a war,
but simply to stop the North from taking
over the South by force, and .to permit the
people of the South to decide their own fu-
ture. I am not sure that all those advising
the President fully understand how limited
our objectives are. Somehow or other, there
is a feeling that we are fighting the inter-
national Communist conspiracy?rather than
Vietnamese national Communists who do not
Want to be dominated by either Peking or
Mosoow. The international Communist sit-
uation is quite different today than it was
in the early postwar period. During those
days, I was always on the side of those want-
ing more arms for our nation. When South
Korea was attacked, we had a military
budget of only about $14 billion, and we suf-
fered greatly from it. But today, we have a
military budget of almost $80 billion, and
have so many other requirements in our
country that it is time to call a halt to our
arms buildup. The war in Vietnam is an un-
fortunate drain on our resources, and will, I
hope, be brought to an early settlement. The
money we spend there is urgently needed
now to reunite our own divided country.
It is not the military's job to know how
that is to be done, and they cannot be ex-
pected to weigh the technological require-
ments of the military against the require-
ments in our cities. The military today are
asking for new weapons that in my judgment
are clearly less important than other na-
' tional needs.
We obviously must maintain nuclear ca-
pability giving us a second strike force that
would deter the Soviet Union or anyone else
from hitting us. But that does not mean
we have to be ahead in every aspect of nu-
clear capability, nor does it mean that we
must have many times the power to over-
kill any enemy.
In 1941, I was in -London as President
Roosevelt's representative to Prime Minister
Churchill and the British Government. Even
then, I was struck by the difference in the
role of the military in Britain and in the
U.S. The British War Cabinet consisted of the
political leaders of the country, and the
ministers of the armed services were not
even members of it. I am not suggesting
that the British military leaders were not
highly respected or that their views were
not given full weight. But they were given
weight within the Cabinet in balance with
the other problems of the British nation. The
military chiefs of staff were advisers to the
Cabinet. The military establishment was in-
tegrated into the policy-making procedures
of the British Government. They had no
contact with the Parliament, nor did they
glee any public expression of their views.
This is altogether different from our pres-
ent procedures. Not only the Secretary of
Defense but also the Chiefs of Staff go to
the committees of the Congress and testify
on all sorts of matters. As a result, a num-
ber of senators and congressmen get an un-
balanced view of our nation's needs from
military men who are responsible for only
one aspect of our national concerns. What
I am suggesting is that we have a group of
senators and congressmen whose attention is
concentrated on military needs. That is why
we had one member of the Congress saying
a short while back that if we turned over
the Vietnam war to the soldiers, they would
win it in a month.
Nothing could be more absurd than that
statement. But it indicates the mind-set that
some members of Congress get after steady
bombardment by the views of our military.
Their responsibility is the security of the
nation, and they must look at the worst of
everything. Those who see only the possible
military threats would drive us into another
world war. That is why isolated military
judgments of political situations are not
sound. Robert Kennedy wrote that during
the Cuban missile crisis, he was struck by
how often his brother's military advisers
took "positions, which, if wrong, had the
advantage that no one would be around at
the end to know" how wrong they were.
All of us abhor Soviet repression of free-
doms at home and in Czechoslovakia, and
their support for Communist subversion in
independent countries. But I decry the at-
tempt that is being made today by some in
the Defense Department and Congress to
scare the American people into believing
that the Soviets are scheming to attack us
with nuclear weapons. No one knows the
intention of the Kremlin, but I can speak
from my Russian experience that dates back
over forty years. I am convinced that the
Soviets are as anxious to avoid destruction
of their country by nuclear war as we are of
OUTS.
It is particularly alarming that there ap-
pears to be a new policy in the Pentagon, to
have the civilian-directed offices of Interna-
tional Security Affairs and Systems Analysis
support the recommendations of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and not question them.
It is reassuring that the Congress is in-
creasingly showing concern over military
programs and exercising its independent
judgments on decisions.
I believe that negotiations we are now
starting with the Soviets to control the
nuclear arms race are the most important
we have ever undertaken. They can be suc-
cessful if we act wisely.
From my talks with Mr. Kosygin and other
Soviet officials, I am satisfied that they want
to stop the nuclear arms race for two rea-
sons. They don't want to divert further ex-
penditures from their pressing internal needs.
And they believe the U.S. and the Soviet
Union should come to an understanding now
to reduce the risk of nuclear war. This is a
time of world opportunity?a split second
in history. I have been told by my scientist
friends that both sides can develop effective
MIRV's (Multiple Independently-targeted
Re-entry Vehicles) in a relatively short time.
It is vital that agreement be reached before
this occurs. We can each tell the number of
missile sites the other has but we cannot
know the character of warheads fitted to the
missiles without detailed on-site inspection.
I was very much shocked to hear that the
military had gone ahead to order these mul-
tiple warheads without telling the Congress
or the public that they had done so.
There are advisers in our defense establish-
ment who are on record as opposing an
agreement with the Soviet Union on nuclear
restraint. They are entitled to their opinions,
S9989
but it would be inexcusable If actions Were
taken that committed us to the arms race
without the widest possible discussion. I am
sure President Nixon believes that an agree-
ment on nuclear restraint is of vital import-
ance to our nation, and most Americans
share this judgment.
It Is interesting that it took eight years for
the Congress and the public to understand
what President Dwight Eisenhower was talk-
ing about when he warned about the mili-
tary-industrial complex. It is only recently
that we have begun to question the new
weapons programs, the wisdom of immediate
deployment of the ABM, and testing of the
MIRV. Until now, the pressure from the Con-
gress has been to appropriate more money
than the Administration requested for new
weapons programs. Pressure comes now in the
opposite direction, The turnaround is due
largely to the unpopularity of the war and
the urgency of domestic needs. We are be-
ginning to recognize the danger of a mili-
taristic attitude on the part of our country.
Our security will not come from the number
of our weapons. It will come from the
strength of our moral force at home and
abroad, from our economic and social
strength, and from the unity of our people.
Mr. PROXMIRE. In addition, Mr.
President, I call attention to two editori-
als, published in the New York Times of
August 11, 1969, one entitled "Homage
to the Astronauts," and the other entitled
"Portrait of Mars." I read briefly from
the first editorial, as follows:
This background makes it particularly un-
fortunate that the formal celebration planned
this week has such a narrow, nationalistic
cast. In the words of the plaque they left on
the moon, the astronauts "came in peace for
all mankind." Yet their visit to the United
Nations next Wednesday will be very brief,
while the rest of the day will be devoted to
an American celebration of an American
achievement.
Perhaps it is not too late for more imagina-
tive planning to emphasize the role of the
astronauts as envoys of all humanity, emis-
saries whose trip was made possible by con-
tributions of knowledge from many nations
over many centuries. Better than any men
before them, after all, Armstrong, Aldrin
and Collins know that this one planet is
one world and that what unites men is far
stronger and more important than the forces
dividing them.
I also wish to quote briefly from the
followup editorial, on where we go from
here, entitled "Portrait of Mars." After
discussing what the remarkable shot we
have seen in the last few days has re-
vealed about Mars, the article says:
Whether the Pimentel-Herr hypothesis is
right or wrong, the case is strong for further
intensive study of Mars by unmanned satel-
lites?as against a precipitate switch to the
much more costly alternative of manned
exploration. A race to put men on Mars would
be a moondoggle for whit% there is neither
need nor justification.
I hope when we look at the space
authorization bill, which I understand
will be before us shortly after we return,
we will keep that in mind. The National
Advisory Council advised some time ago
that we can save a billion if, for the
next 3 or 4 years, we limit our space
exploration to unmanned exploration.
Our voyage to the moon is the most
remarkable achievement in centuries.
Having accomplished that, our next step
should be unmanned space exploration, A
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August 1A 1,060
t get Up to a comfortable 70 degrees or so at penditure of at least $2 billion on re
best, they descend at worst to hundreds of search, development, test and evaluation
degrees below zero. For lovers of comfort,
Mars is as uninviting as the THOM, and weii alone?before any of these aircraft enter
over a hundred timet as far away. our strategic arsenal
The irrepressible optimists who refuse to
believe that earth alone has life in this solar
system did get something to cheer about
from Mariner 7. Professors Piznentel and
Herr believe they detected methane and am-
monia in Mar's south polar region, and they
suggest this may have a biological origin,
i.e., there may be some primitive form of life
In that past of Mart.
It is an exciting hypothesis worth further
investigation, but for the moment the idea
must be viewed as an extremely long shot.
Methane and ammonia can arise from non-
biological processes, Moreover, there are
serious contradictions between some of the
Pimentel-Herr conclusions and thote of other
Investigators using different data sent hack
by Mariner 7.
Whether the Pimentel-Herr hypothesis is
right or wrong, the case is stneng for fur-
ther intensive study of Mars by unmanned
satellites--as against a precipitate switch to
the much more cottly alternative of manned
exploration. A race to put men on Mars
would be a moondoggie for which there is
neither need nor justification.
The fascinating close-approach photo-
graphs sent back by the two Mariners covered
only 20 per cent of the planet, and they
offered no explanation for the changing pat-
terns of dark and light that telescopes have
shown on Mars for centuries. /additionally,
Mariner 7 has uncovered an intriguing mys-
tery by demonstrating that the bright area
called Hellas is decidedly atypical in not
having craters. That revelation immediately
raiees the question of what processes have
obliterated the craters that meteors must
have created in Hellas too
with less potential loss of life and a grew
saving in funds.
I ask unanimous consent that the New
York Times editorials from which I have
quoted be printed in the IlEcoae at this
point.
There being no objection, the edi-
torials were ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, RS follows:
HOMAGE TO THE Asteineenes
By this morning, if all goes as planned, the
three Apollo astronauts Wall have been re-
leased from quarantine Wad reunited with
their families. Then they Will begin receiving
the world's homage for their historic accom-
plishment in a celebration that will start
with Wednesday's grueling cross country
parade.
Armstrong, Aldrin and Coning richly de-
serve the heroes' acclaim they will receive
in the days immediately ahead As no earlier
feat has ever done, their aueeessful trip to
and return from the moon captured the
imagination of men and women almost
everywhere. In the universal glow produced
at least briefly by their suer-eel, many of the
normal divisive barriers arineng men broke
down. They were hailed in afiecow as Well as
in Washington, in Cairo as Well as in Jerusa-
lem, in New Delhi and Karaehi, in East Ber-
lin and West Berlin.
This background makes it particularly un-
fortunate that the formal eelebration plan-
ned this week has such a narrow, nationalis-
tic cast. In the words of the plaque they
left on the moon, the astronauts "came in
peace for all mankind." Yet their visit to the
United Nations next Wednead will be very
brief, while the rest of thai day will be
devoted to an American celebration of an
American achievement.
Perhaps it is not too late for more imagina-
tive planning to emphasize the role of the
astronauts as envoys of all reoinanity, emis-
saries whose trip was made pessible by con-
tributions of knowledge frcall many nations
over many centuries. Better than any men
before them, after all, Armstrong, Aldrin and
Collins know that-this one planet Is one
world and that hat unite: men is far
stronger and more important than the forces
dividing them.
PORTRAIT OF MAR':
On that eventual day when the first men
walk on the surface of Mars, ',hey will fired
much "magnificent desolation' akin to that
seen by Neil Armstrong and Edwin Aldrin
when they strolled on the mom last month.
That virtual certainty emerges from the
brilliantly successful exploration of the red
planet just completed by Mariners 6 and 7.
Their expedition lacked the human drama
of Apollo 11, but the scienaile information
they returned may well qinilify the two
Mariners as the moat scientlfieally produc-
tive enterprise men have yet e irried out in
space.
. Generations of science fictien writers?
from H. G. Wells and Edgar Rice Burroughs
to Ray Bradbury?were mistaken, it turns
out, in their visions of human or nonhuman
civilizations on Male. On thaeentrary, Mars
it a bleak, arid wasteland, a gee----gist's night-
mare of twisted plains and innumerable
craters whose typical landscape is almost ene
distinguishable from that of the moon.
True, Mars has a thin atmosehere?whose
ground-level pressure is about that found
twenty or thirty miles above the earth?but
it is composed mainly of caelion dioxide, and
cauld never support any coMplex life fa-
miliar here on earth. Woree yet, the Martian
surface--or most of it anyway -is bathed
daily in a deadly shower of ultraviolet radia-
tion, and there is no equivalent of the life-
saving protection provided by the atmos- 1
phere here. While Martian temperatures may
I might say at this point, Mr. Presi-
bomber, we are talkingenes1 ecord,c
dent, that in talking about this new
bomber, we are talking about a system
the eventual cost of which could be as
high as or higher than that of the Safe-
guard anti-ballistic-missile system about
which we have just debated for some 5
or 6 weeks. Moreover, it is contemplated,
according to a recent issue of Aviation
Week & Space Technokiey:
Under the new schedule, USAF will select
by November 1 a single contractor for the
final development and production of the
AMSA.
We are clearly at the threshold of a
major new expenditure, We should not
be drawn into it little by little without
having a clear idea of where we are going
and why. I believe, therefore, that the
time is at hand for a thorough exarnina-
tion of our entire strategic bomber
program.
With the cosponsorship of the Senator
from New York (Mr. GooDELL), the Sen-
ator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD) , and
the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROX-
MIRE), who have been leading the effort
to review our military outlays, have
proposed an amendment to the pending
bill which aims to hold AMSA to the
fiscal 1969 spending level; in other words,
to avoid an acceleration of work on the
system. It would leave $20 million in the
For the scientifically minded or even the pending authorization hill, to be e0M-
merely curious, the rich harvest of the bined with $5 million in carryover au-
Mariners can only whet the appetite for more thority from fiscal 1969
knowledge.
ADVANCE MANNED STRATEGIC
AIRCRAFT
Mr. MeCIOVERN. Mr. President, the
military procurement authorization bill,
S. 2546, represents a significant increase
for an advanced manned strategic air-
craft.
In fiscal 1969 the approved program for
this project was $25 million. It is pro-
posed that we spend $100.2 million in fis-
cal 1970, for purposes outlined by De-
fense Secretaries Clifford and Laird in
their respective posture statements.
Secretary Clifford raised the figure to
$77 million, to "continue the competi-
tive design phase initiated with fiscal
year 1969 funds and to advance the
development of the long leadtime avionics
and propulsion systems."
Secretary Laird added another $23 mil-
lion, to "shorten the competitive design
phase and permit the start of full-scale
engineering development in fiscal year
1970. While no decision on produc-
tion and deployment must be made
now, the accelerated research and de-
velopment effort could advance the initial
operational capability?I0C--of this air-
craft by 1 year."
While we might take some small com-
fort from the fact that we can avoid a
final decision this year on a system es-
timated to cost a minimum of $12 bil-
kin, it is nevertheless important to rec-
ognize that present plans call for the ex.-
Mr. President, this would be the ef-
fect of reducing by $80 nhilli the
amount requested in the pending au-
thorization bill for work on a new
bomber.
In the meantime I hope we can initiate
a more extensive review of the alleged
need and justification for any strategic
bomber force at all and for this elaborate
new system in particular. I am especially
interested in learning more about the
administration's contentions in this
regard.
For my own part, I must say that at
the end of a substantial amount of
study, including briefings from the Air
Force officers in charge of the AMSA
program, .1 have been unable to escape
the conclusion that the many legs upon
which the AMSA case rests, even in com-
bination, cannot begin to support it.
The case for retaining any kind of a
bomber deterrent is almost as doubtful.
I will call up my amendment for active
consideration shortly after the recess.
In preparation for discussion at that
time, and so that all of us can develop
a clear understanding of the Admin-
istration's position, we have submitted
to Defense Secretary Laird the following
list of questions bearing on the strategic
bomber program. Most of them have been
discussed with Air Force oincials in both
classified and unclassified terms. I have
asked that they be answered in wilting
for the public record, and that the re-
sponse be supplied to me by the end of
the recess.
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August 12, 1969CONGRESSIONAL RECOR ? S 9725
ing and technical direction of system
developments; operations analysis and
long-range military planning; and gen-
eral and continuing research and experi-
mentation in support of military R. & D.
Our study of the nonprofits, including
a Defense Department briefing, indicates
that there has been a general tightening
of management and control of the de-
fense FCRC's, including a noticeable re-
duction in the fees which have been paid
to the major FCRC's. However, the sub-
committee took issue with the Defense
Department criteria for determining the
reasonableness of FCRC executive com-
pensation rates. It does not seem appro-
priate to the subcommittee that
executive salaries for these nonprofit, no-
risk Government-sponsored and Gov-
ernment-funded activities should be
equated to compensation for profitmak-
ing organizations in private enterprise
having the same operating budget or the
same "sales." We found it difficult to jus-
tify a salary of $97,500 for the chief
executive of an FCRC when the salary
of the Secretary of Defense is only $60,-
000. That was the basis for the recom-
mendation by Senator HARRY BYRD Of
the restrictive language in limiting such
executive compensation. Senator BYRD'S
amendment is contained in section
204(a) of the authorization bill.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. McINTYRE. I am happy to yield to
my colleague on the Armed Services Com-
mittee and also my colleague on the Re-
search and Development Subcommittee.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President,
first may I congratulate the distinguished
Senator from New Hampshire for the
tremendous amount of work that he has
put into the handling of this legislation
as chairman of the Subcommittee on Re-
search and Development. He has handled
it with great ability and great industry.
In regard to the amendment the Sen-
ator from New Hampshire just men-
tioned, I think we should emphasize for
a moment just what it will do and what
it will not do.
It does not prevent the. payment of
salaries in excess of $45,000, but it does
make mandatory that any such salaries
above the figure of $45,000 must be ap-
proved by the President of the United
States.
As it is now, the salaries for these
Government-sponsored, nonprofit orga-
nizations are in effect determined by
self-perpetuating boards of trustees, and
then those salaries, set by the boards of
trustees, must be approved by the De-
partment of the Air Force or the appro-
priate department in the Department of
Defense.
So this provision would take away from
the Department of Defense the right to
establish salaries in excess of $45,000,
and would require that they have the ap-
proval of the President of the United
States.
The reason why both the subcommit-
tee and the committee felt such a pro-
vision was desirable was that, as a prac-
tical matter, all of the funds for the
Govermnent-sponsored, nonprofit or-
With these proposals, which I strongly
urge the Congress to enact, we can en-
hance America's human resources. By
opening up the opportunity for man-
power training on a large scale, we build
a person's will to work; in so doing, we
build a bridge to human dignity.
RICHARD NIXON.
THE WHITE HOUSE, August 12, 1969.
MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE
-.A message from the House of Repre-
sentatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its
reading clerks, announced that the
House had agreed to the amendments
of the Senate to the bill (HR. 10107) to
continue for a temporary period the ex-
isting suspensionf ty o ertain-istle.
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
TIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR
MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RE-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MIS-
SILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJA-
LEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RE-
SERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH
The PRESIDING 0101,10ER (Mr. EA-
GLETON in the chair). The Chair lays be-
fore the Senate the unfinished business,
which will be stated.
The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A
bill (S. 2546) to authorize appropriations
during the fiscal year 1970 for procure-
ment of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels,
and tracked combat vehicles, and to au-
thorize the construction of test facilities
at Kwajalein Missile Range, and to pre-
scribe the authorized personnel strength
of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve
component of the Armed Forces, and for
other purposes.
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield
myself 40 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from New Hampshire is recognized
for 40 minutes.
Mr. McINTYRE: Mr. President, I have
a prepared statement here that defends
and replies to the thrust of the amend-
ment being offered by the distinguished
Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT) .
I want to make it clear that I do not
plan to yield for questions or any col-
loquy during the presentation of this
proposed statement, with one exception.
I shall be glad to yield to the distin-
guished Senator from Virginia (Mr.
BYRD) who is a member of the Subcom-
mittee on Research and Development of
the Armed Services Committee, since I
will be referring directly to actions which
took place in that subcommittee and in
the full committee.
Mr. President, this amendment would
make a further reduction of $45,614,000
of the R.D.T. & E. portion of the au-
thorization bill. I would call the Senate's
attention to the fact that the bill, as re-
ported by the Armed Services Commit-
tee, has already reduced the $8.2 billion
request by $1 billion and $43 million.
This represents a total reduction of some
121/2 percent of the funds requested for
R.D.T. & E.
The areas in the field of military re-
search that the Senator's amendment
seeks to reach and further reduce over
and beyond the committee's recommen-
dation are:
First, Federal contract research cen-
ters;
Second, DOD contracts with foreign
research institutions;
Third, policy planning studies with
foreign policy implications;
Fourth, the Themis program; and
Fifth, Project Agile?R. & D. on low
level conflict.
The Armed Services Committee has al-
ready cut this overall field of military
science research by $50.5 million. Most of
this cut will be absorbed by the five pro-
grams under attack in the Fulbright
amendment?about $40 million.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield to me? ?
Mr. McINTYRE. I have already indi-
cated that I do not plan to yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. This is not for a
question. I wanted to modify my amend-
ment, so the Senator will know what I
have in mind.
Mr. McINTYRE. I yield for that pur-
pose.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
wish to modify my amendment on page
3, line 24, to add the following new sec-
tion:
SEC. 205. None of the funds authorized to
be appropriated by this Act may be used
to carry out any research project or study
unless such project or study has a direct
and apparent relationship to a specific mili-
tary function or operation.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be so modified.
FEDERAL CONTRACT RESEARCH CENTERS
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, let me
first discuss the Federal contract re-
search centers. These are the so-called
"think tanks." These are one of the re-
sources which gives the Department of
Defense a capability to meet the chal-
lenging requirements for new system
concepts and their orderly and timely
development into operational military
systems. Other parts of the mix of re-
sources for doing this job include in-
house laboratories and contracts with
profit-oriented industry. During the
past 5 years the R.D.T. & E. funding for
the nonprofits or Federal contract re-
search centers has been decreased sig-
nificantly in an orderly, but programed
fashion. I would caution against a pre-
cipitate reduction without proper plan-
ing and laying of the groundwork for
transfer of tasks being performed by
these FCRC's to other scientists and en-
gineers?either in-house or contractor
employed. Large reductions without pre-
planning will probably result in the dis-
banding of talented teams of scientists
and engineers with a consequent serious
impact on many high priority programs.
The time lost and the added cost of re-
creating these teams at a later date
would nullify the cost savings achieved
by this reduction.
It was the feeling of the subcommit-
tee that these nonprofit corporations
serve a useful purpose in three areas:
System planning and systems engineer-
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S 9726 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 12, 1969
ganizations come from the American
taxpayers.
That being the case, the committee felt
that the salaries shad be more in line
with those paid by the Government for
positions of great restionsibility, such as
the Secretary of Defense and other Cab-
inet officials.
But the committee recognized that
there are many technical experts whose
services are needed, and in those cases
higher salaries may be set if they have
the approval of the President of the
United States.
I will take just one corporation, the
Aerospace Corp. In fiscal 1969 its operat-
ing budget was $71272,000. Of that
amount, it received Its entire funding,
$74,272,000, from the Tiedartment of De-
fense.
In regard to Aerospace, the informa-
tion submitted to the- committee shows
that there are 68 persons in Aerospace
earning in excess of. $30,000 per year.
There are 19 who earned in excess of
$42,500.
To give the Senate the range of sal-
aries, the President was paid last year
$97,500. A senior vice president was paid
$66,000. A vice president for operations
was paid $65,000. Another vice president
for operations was paid $58,000. Another
vice president and general manager was
paid $55,000. Another vice president was
paid $50,000. Another vice president was
paid $50,000. Another vice president was
paid $50,000. Another vice president was
paid $50,000. Another vice president was
paid $45,000. Another vice president was
paid $45,500.
The committee went into this matter
very carefully. It felt that there should
be some restraint with regard to what is
done with respect to these 16 Govern-
ment-sponsored, nonprofit research or-
ganizations.
With that in mind, the amendment
which is included in the bill was devel-
oped and was approved by the committee.
I thank the distinguished Senator
from New Hampshire for yielding to me
at this point.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I com-
pliment the Senator from Virginia for
his work, not only On the particular
amendment he has been discussing, but
generally for his help, counsel, and ad-
vice on the subcommittee, and, of course,
his activities on the full committee. It
has been a pleasure to be associated with
him, particularly as we have delved into
this matter of research and development
during the past year.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Presi-
dent, will the Senator Veld?
Mr. McINTYRE. For what purpose?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I wish to
compliment the Senator.
Mr. McINTYRE, Oh. I always yield for
that.
The PRESIDING OPeICER. The
Senator yields for a compliment.
Mr. BYRD of West Vir iinia. Mr. Presi-
dent, the Senator yields for a compli-
ment that is well deserved. I have been
greatly impressed by the presentations
that have been made during the debate
on this bill by the able junior Senator
from New Hampshire. I think that he
has been exceedingly diligent in his work
as chairman of the subcommittee; and
the statements that he has made, his
participation in colloquies on the floor,
and his answers to questions have indi-
cated that he has a very thorough grasp
of the subject matter. I know that one
can only acquire the knowledge with re-
spect to a bill that he obviously has ac-
quired with respect to this bill through a
great deal of hard work, effort, and dili-
gence. It is gratifying to see Senators
come to the floor who are so well pre-
pared to present their case on a bill, and
the Senator from New Hampshire has
certainly set an extremely fine example.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I
thank the Senator from West Virginia
for his very kind remarks, but I would
add that, as one of the so-called junior
Senators, I have learned much and have
profited greatly from watching my dis-
tinguished colleague from West Virginia
in his Presentations, because I think it is
generally recognized that there is no
harder-working Member of this body
than my distinguished friend from West
Virginia.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I thank
the Senator. I think the Senate is in-
debted to him, and he has done a great
service for the country, on the subject
matter of the legislation which his sub-
committee has delved into. It is a very
difficult subject matter, and I have lis-
tened to his presentation with interest.
I wanted to pay him this tribute be-
cause I felt it was well deserved, and
again I say the Senate is indebted to
him. I congratulate him, and I know he
will continue to do great work on the
Committee on Armed Services.
Mr. McINTYRE. I thank the Senator
very much.
Furthermore, the subcommittee felt
that there should be a general reduction
in the level of effort of FCRC's, par-
ticularly since we see an overall reduc-
tion in the total DOD research and
development budget. In addition, we
noted that the Defense Department has
instituted a policy authorizing Defense-
sponsored FCRC's to invite them to take
up to 20 percent of their business from
non-DOD sources.
The subcommittee recognized that the
total operating budget of the Federal
Contract Research Centers is not neces-
sarily, indeed not usually, funded from
a single account. For example, the line
item for Aerospace Corp. under Military
Astronautics and related equipment is
$24.7 million, whereas its operating budg-
et planned for fiscal year 1970 is $78
million. The rest of the funding is pro-
vided from various programs for which
Aerospace Corp. provides system en-
gineering and technical services. We rec-
ognize the difficulty of identifying ap-
propriate accounts to which a reduction
should be charged. It is expected that the
impact on the FCRC's will be in excess
of the recommended cut.
The efforts of the Federal Contract
Research Centers are generally charac-
terized by two attributes. First, each
center has a "mission oriented" rather
than a "scientific discipline-oriented"
charter; that is, each center is given
tasks directly connected to the Services'
operational needs. To carry out these
tasks, an FCRC must involve many kinds
of scientists and engineers. Thus, the
contributions of any one center are carte
varied?in terms of scientific disciplines
and areas of technology, and in terms
of the duration and scope of effort lead-
ing to a contribution.
Second, many investigations are con-
ducted concurrently within each center,
and the culmination dates of investiga-
tions are widely staggered. Thus, a small
sampling of the contributions made by
all FCRC's during a given short period
of time is not representative of their
long-term cumulative value.
Because of these two characteristics,
what I wish to point out is: First, a
rather detailed listing of some of the
important developments from one FCRC,
the Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns
Hopkins University; and second, a sam-
pling of illustrative contributions by
other FCRC's. This should provide a
"feel" for both the range of the center's
activity as well as the larger range of
work accomplished by this entire cat-
egory of R. & D. orga,nizations.
APPLIED PHYSICS LABORATORY
The Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns
Hopkins University, working primarily
for the U.S. Navy, has long been a pro-
ductive member of the DOD's research
and development team. The fiscal year
1967 DOD funding of this organization
-was $31.4 million. The level of technical
effort haS been reasonably constant over
the past several years. In return for this
Investment the Applied Physics Labora-
tory has:
Developed the basic surface-to-air
missiles, Terrier, Tartar, and Tabs,
which are now deployed on upward of
60 ships and has undertaken the job of
improving the capabilities of these sys-
tems against new threats, countermeas-
ures, and other environmental factors.
Released to production, in December
1966, design modifications for the Terrier
and Tartar missiles to extend the capa-
bilities of the missile.
Mr. President, I am now talking about
the missiles on our warships today, on
the high seas of the world.
Formulated testing methods and devel-
oped the necessary ancillary test equip-
ment to permit the rapid determination
of the state of operability of the ship-
board weapon systems of the Tartar and
Terrier ships. A system dynamic tester
has been developed that provides real-
istic target simulation for the fire con-
trol system and generates a test problem
similar to that of engaging a stringent
target. The functioning of the Ere con-
trol system is automatically evaluated
and a scoring is displayed. The first
model of this equipment was successfully
tested aboard the U.S.S. Berkeley in the
fall of 1966. A further advance in oper-
ability testing involved the design of
automatic equipment for the evaluation
of the Navy tactical data system com-
puter complex already aboard Terrier
ships of the DLG-26 class. This com-
Priterized test program was successfully
demonstrated aboard the U.S.S. Wain-
wright and work is proceeding for the
installation of the teat program aboard
all the Terrier ships having the NTDS
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rr-Ralease,2, ,E4A,RDP7e1EMO
system. The testing programs materially
contribute to the online readiness of the
DOD CONTRACTS WITH FOREIGN RESEARCH proposed project, and fourth, at least
INSTITUTIONS one of the following special conditions is
shipboard weapon systems. The amendment by the Senator from inherent in the proposed work.
Conceived and developed the Navy Arkansas would reduce the authorization First. The research or development in-
navigation satellite system. This sys- for Defense Department contracts at for- volves geographical, environmental, or
?
tem provides extremely accurate navi-
gation fixes for the Polaris submarine
fleet, independent of weather conditions.
The entire development, including the
concepts, the computing programs, de-
tailed satellite design, construction and
checkout, the development of the ship-
board navigation receivers and com-
puters, and the development of the sup-
porting ground system for tracking, com-
manding, and controlling the satellite
was accomplished by the Applied Physics
Laboratory.
AEROSPACE CORP.
Aerospace Corp.: They devised a pro-
gram for modifying formerly operational
Atlas E and Atlas F missiles into configu-
ration suitable for target vehicle boosters
for the advanced ballistic reentry sys-
tem program and the Nike ABM test pro-
grams. The total projected cost saving
of modifying 134 boosters over procure-
ment cost of that many new target ve-
hicle boosters is estimated at $1.47
billion.
Within the past 2 years Aerospace
Corp. has developed an analytic method
for predicting radio frequency attenua-
tion caused by the plasma-sheath sur-
sounding reentry vehicles. This is a sig-
nificant contribution, in the efforts to
overcome the problems resulting from
radar and telemetry signal attenuation
during a critical portion of the missile
or space capsule flight profile.
HUMAN RESOURCES RESEARCH OFFICE
Human Resources Research Office,
George Washington University: During
the last 12 months they have conceived
and designed a radically new training
device for aviators. This device will re-
duce required instrument training flight
time from the present 50 hours to 40
hours. The savings in projected flight
costs are estimated as $1,700 million
per year.
or flora not
eign institutions by $2 million, culturalcon ion , ,
The Department of Defense has con- found and not feasible to duplicate or
tinning priority needs for certain se- simulate within the United States and its
territories.
Second. The work involves diseases,
epidemiological situations, or availability
or clinical material which are not present
within the United States.
Third. The work involves a unique re-
search idea highly relevant to DOD
needs.
In this fiscal year 1970 budget the De-
partment of Defense requested $5,700,000
for work in this impotant field of re-
search, the field of research which is de-
voted almost entirely to physical sciences,
otherwise called the hard sciences. The
Armed Services Committee has reduced
this request by some $513,000 leaving a
total authorization of approximately
$5.2 billion. The amendment of the Sen-
ator from Arkansas calls for a further
reduction of $2,000,000 reducing this pro-
gram to a figure of $3.7 million or in ef-
fect practically gutting this type of work,
for the reduction overall would be great-
er than one-third. The reduction of one-
third of these high priority research in-
vestigations which can only be carried
out abroad include, as I have said, in-
vestigation of parasitic diseases of rele-
vancy to naval and military personnel
in foreign areas, to long-range global
communications and of environment in
foreign areas of importance to our mili-
tary. A reduction of this scope would
eliminate further progress on more than
100 projects planned for foreign investi-
gators.
Last year, fiscal year 1969, there were
451 research undertakings in 44 coun-
tries at a cost of $9.2 million. The cost
of this program of fiscal year 1970, after
the committee reduction, has reduced it
to $5.7 million, in which there will be 207
projects. This is the present plan but not
all the projects have been approved and
there rhay well be some changes in these
numbers because of the cut already made.
Of the $5.7 million only $300,000 at the
very outside that could possibly be la-
beled social and behavioral sciences and
all these may not be programed during
the year.
I ask unanimous consent that a com-
plete list of the projects planned for fis-
cal year 1970?their contracts for re-
search?for foreign institutions along
with the nature of the research and the
amounts of funds be printed in the REC-
ORD.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the REC-
ORD, as follows:
lected foreign research and development
projects. One very important area is that
of long-range radio communications re-
quired for our worldwide communica-
tions network. Interaction of solar radia-
tion with the earth's upper atmosphere
produces global extent ionization of the
region called the ionosphere. The rapidly
changing conditions of the ionosphere
affect in a primary way Defense com-
munications. For this reason we support
ionospheric and radio propagation re-
search in Australia, Canada, and Nor-
way to acquire essential data not obtain-
able within the United States.
A second area of prime importance is
that of military medicine in foreign
countries where our American troops are
stationed or operating. Many diseases are
endemic to a specific geographic locale
and their presence greatly affects the
force strength of our command and force
units. It is not desirable nor feasible to
pursue stateside research on many ?of
these diseases since it is not desired to ,
bring them into the United States.
Therefore Defense supports selected re-
search projects in military medicine in
such countries as Japan, Israel, Italy,
and Brazil.
A third area of key importance is that
of environmental and meteorological
phenomena related to the land, sea, and
air that our Defense units operate on or
over the globe. It is simply not possible
to carry out the required research from
stateside alone. Foreign investigators
having a daily presence and long estab-
lished experience in specific geograph-
ical areas are important contributors to
the basic knowledge that we require
about terrestrial sciences in foreign
lands, about the oceans and seas far dis-
tant from the United States and about
MITRE CORP. atmospheric weather phenomena in for-
Mitre Corp.: They developed an inter-
eign areas. To meet priority Defense re-
q
ferometer radar technique to provide auirements, selected research projects
are supported in Berlin, Canada, Den-
capability for rapid and precise deter-
mark, Greece, and other countries.
mination of satellite orbits and ballistic Defense has established stringent cri-
missile trajectories and information re- teria for selection of research and devel-
garding the physical configuration of
opment projects by foreign performers.
the target satellite or missile. All ongoing or further research and ex-
This gives an idea of some of the tre- ploratory development by foreign per-
mendous research advances that these formers shall be supported by DOD only
so-called think tanks have come up when it has been determined that, first,
with. it is clearly significant in meeting urgent
I now turn my attention to the De- defense needs of the United States; sec-
partment of Defense contracts with for- ond, it cannot be deferred for later ac-
eign research institutions. This is an- tion; third, the proposed foreign investi-
other area that the Fulbright amend- gator certifies that he is unable to obtain
ment attacks. support from any,other source for the
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S 9728 i,uNGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE August 12, 1969.
Military department and
contract agency
Tine
Argentina:
N Universidad de Buenos Aires
F Consejo National de Invest.
Cient.
F National University of L.a
Plata.
F Consejo Nacional He I nvesti-
gaciones.
Australia:
A tVlonash University
N University of Queensland__ _ _
F University of Sydney
F University of Adelaide _
F University of Sydney
Austria:
A Institute of Hygiene, Univer-
sity of Vienna.
F University of Vienna
Belgium:
A Von Harman Institute
F Von Karmen Institute for
Fluid Dynamics, Rhode
Saint/Genese.
F Von Kerman Institute for
Dynamics, Rhode Saint/
Genese,
F Von Karmen Institute for
Fluid Dynamics, Rhode
SainVGenese.
Do
F Von Karmen Institute for
Fluid Waterloorhode-St
Genese,
F University of Liege _
Born-Bunge Foundation
Bolivia:
D Colegio San Calixto . _ _
F San Andres University
Brazil:
A University of Sao Paulo
A Minas Gerais University
A Federal University of Bahia
A Universidad Mackensie
Do_
A Institute Adolfo Lutz
N University of Sao Paulo
F Comissao Nacional De Activi-
dades Espac, J Dos Campos.
F Fundacao Service Especial de
Saude Publica.
Canada:
A York University
A McGill University.
A Royal Victoria Hospital
A University of Manitoba
N McGill University
Do
Do
Do
N Computing Devices of Canada_
A Manitoba University
N Institute of Oceanography_...
N British Columbia Research
Council.
N York University
N McGill University
N McGill University
N University of Toronto
N University of British
Columbia.
F Laval University
D McGill University
D Canadian Armament Re-
search and Development
Establishment.
? RCA Victor, Limited
Ceylon: A Medical Research
Institute.
Funds
planned
for fiscal
year 1970
Development of effective protective and thera-
peutic drugs for radiation sickness.
X-ray spectrometry of galactic sources from
7.76outhern Hemisphere.
Wearch in stellar spectroscopy
Wilecular mechanisms of steroids action on
tespiratory systems,
Microbiological and immunological studies of
_pathogenesis and virulence in leptospirosis.
Haute and pharmacological action in toxin
from deadly jellyfish.
*My of cosmic radiations at extremely high
eil
Reoevich directed toward propagation of solar
pai iicles.
Steliar intensity interferometer
andentiology, virology, and immunology of
tO-horne encephalitis and other tick-
be. oe diseases.
Cnmposition and content of meteorites
Flow characteristics associated with V/STOL
model testing in wind tunnel.
The influence of cross flow on 2-dimensional
sep iration.
Applantion of the blunt-trailing edge blade
to p 1.
taesiiir separation in hypersonic flows
Lem-density high-temperature gas dynamics__
E*i ,iental aerodynamics.
High resolution atmospheric I R absorption and
sky background emission interfermoetric
Dead i ipment of sleep patterns, women doctor
en,' use.
Spech ,ii characteristics of infrasonic acoustic
wa /vs and related seismic research:
lay research at high altitude
Control of ribonucleic acid synthesis in gian
chromosomes.
Schietosemiasis drug screening
Pathogenesis of diarrhea in severe strongy-
toidasis.
Ai:atmospheric studies LA 60
Solar inicrowave radio emission LA61
Ariteuirus studies in Sao. Paulo, Brazil
Mathematical investigations of problems of
ocean surveillance of navigation.
Measuiements of the earth's total magnetic
Kehl and its variations.
Epideiciological studies of Amapari virus
Kictelo.i. of atmospheric constituents
Extremely low frequency electromagnetic
pheilemena.
Investigation of pathogenesis and treatment
of si jock.
Shrift of factors influencing the passage of
dreg.; into the malarial parasite plasmodium
Be yir.
Electric properties of ice
Arctic plankton ecology_
HE audio absorption in ice
Energy budget and other tropical microclima-
tolovical research.
Antehlatic detection and classification
Investigations of pheromones as chemosteri-
lent-. tor insects with special reference to
synthetic queen substance and its analogs.
Sydeimitics biology and hydrographic rela-
tion or seine species of calanus.
Mitine borer biology
Brain nucleic acid changes during learning_ __
Mechanisms of polymer degradation
High magnetic fields and insulators
Very high altitude missile and decoy gas
dynamics; missile aerodynamics for broad
altiiiide ranges. ,
Fundamental air-sea exchange processes and
then relation to wind wave generation:
()online turbulence.
Nalizehemoral control of thyrotrophic activity.
Psychological processes of the central nervous
system.
Hypervelocity Research program
10.0
24. 0
12.0
16. 0
18.0
12. 0
50. 0
25. 0
60. 0
20. 0
Military department and
contract agency
Title
Chile:
A Comisten Nacional de
Investigacion.
F Universidad de Chile__
F Catholic University of Chile__
F Catholic University of Chile
F Comision Nactional de
I nvestigacion Cientifica y
Technologica.
Colombia:
F Universidad Nacional de
Colombia.
F Universidad del Valle
Costa Rica:
A University of Costa Rica
Denmark:
N Marine Biological Laborto_
F Danske Meteorologiske
Institute.
17.0 Equador: On..
F Universidad Central del
10. 0 Equador.
Finland:
15. 0 F Institute of Occupational
Health.
France:
A Ecole Pratique des Hautes
Estudes-Sorbonne,
15.0 A Institute for Cell Pathology.
N Campagne de Recherches et
d'Etudes Aeronautiques.
F Observatorie de Paris
F University of Lyon
Germany:
A Institute for Animal Phys-
iology, J. W. Goethe Uni-
versity.
A Free University of Berlin .
A Research Office for Physical
Bioclimatology.
A Rheinisch-Westfaifische
Technische Hochschule.
F Bochum Radio Observatory
F Technische Hochschule
Munchen, Munich.
Ghana:
F University of Ghana, Accra_
20. 0
15. 0
20. 0
30. 0
50. 0
14, 0
15.8
12.0
5. 0
8. 0
5.0
15. 0
20. 9
7. 0
Greece:
F University of Athens
D Seismological Institute of
8. 0 Athens University.
Iceland:
N Surtsay Research Society.....
India:
A Bombay National History......
12. 0
IS. 0
25. 0
20. 0
10.0
15.0
20. 0
20. 0
150.0
20. 0
13.0
10. 0
15. 0
26, 0
11.0
15.0
50, 0
15.0
140. 0
700 0
Radar 5ackscatter studies 100. 0
LeMnspirosis-A serological survey of occupa- 1.0
demi groups in Ceylon,
F University of Calcutta
Indonesia:
A Lembaga Biologi Nasional
Iran:
D Pahlavi University
Israel:
A
Structure function relationships inhuman and
high elevation adapted mammal hemo-
globin.
_ Form and function invariants in the visual
system.
_ Nervous connections in the vestibular system_
Studies in synaptic mechanisms
I3iochemical properties of nerve membrances_
Studies of ecology and disease transmission__
Disease ecology of tacaribe group viruses _
Physiological studies of leishmania
_ Ecological investigations on bottom living
marine animals.
Ionospheric research using active satellite
transmissions.
Arctic geomagnetic observations
Studies of psychotomimetics
Funds
planned
ter fiscal
year 1970
20. 0
21.0
8. 0
7. 0
8. 0
0.0
30. 0
7.0
10.0
14. 0
3.0
6, 0
Mathematical and electrical analogs of heat 10.0
transfer in man.
Metabolic and sensory stimuli in the regula-
tion of food intake-behavioral and electro-
physiological study.
Laser action on living cells
Rheo-electricat apalogy: Supercavitating pro-
peller design.
Research directed toward the improvement of
planetary phettogrammetrY.
Neurophysielogical mechanisms of The states
of sleep.
Microcirculatory behavior In shock___ _
Daily analysis of circumpolar 30 and 10 mb
maps E486.
Atmospheric aerosols between 700 and 3,000
meters, [-1127.
Measurement of thorny concentration of
lower atmosphere.
Ionospheric studies using active synchronous
satellite t ra nsmissions.
Investigation of spectral radiation properties
of Atmosphere and earth.
Ionospheric studies using active satellite
transmiisions.
20. 0
20.0
10. 0
18, 0
10. 0
6,0
20 0
10,0
15.0
7.0
10.0
7.0
Ionospheric research using active satellite 15.0
transmissions.
Aftershocks and crustal structure in Greece__ 20,-S
Ecological succession of biota on a newly
formed oceanic land mass. _
Studies of the bionomics and taxonomy of the
birds of India, taxonomy of the birds of
Bhutan.
Radio, astronomical and satellite studies of the
ionosphere.
Migratory animal pathological sur-
vern(gdnoesnieasia), avian studies in
Nutritional studies -Iran_
Israel Institute of Applied Social Re- Investigation of leadership quail-
search, ties of kibbutz-raised young
men.
A Rogoff-Wellcome Medicine Research In- Isolation of snake venom toxins
stitute. and study of their mechanism of
action.
A Technion Institute of Technology Photochemistry of antimalarial
drugs.
N Institute of Technology Techn ion-Israel_ _ Cross-stresses In the flow of gases
(Reiner-effect).
Basic theories Inc nonnumerical
data processing.
Effects of heat sources on plane-
tary circulation,
Ionospheric research using Sat-
ellites.
Seismk source Identification tech-
niques.
Pharmacological and biochemical
changes in animals made acres-
sive by isolation.
Immunological reactions in viral
hepatitis.
Hebrew University
Hebrew University
F National Commission for Space Research.
D Weizmann Institute of Science
Italy:
A Pharmacological Research Institute
A University of Genoa
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20.
10. 0
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S 9729
Military.department and
?
contract agency
Title
Funds
planned
for fiscal
year 1970
Italy-Continued
A Chemical Institute of University of Rome__ Individual activity coefficients of
ionic species.
F University Degli Studi di Pisa Comparative neurophysiology of
F University of Ferrara Research on mechanics of breath-
ing.
F National Institute of Optics___ Problems in visual performance of pilots
F University of Milan Neutron flux of earth's radiation environment__
F University of Sassari Identification of photodynamic systems in the
retina.
F Arcetri Astrophysical Ob- Solar radio spectroscopy and detection of sun
servatory spectral lines.
F University of Milan Physiology of cerebrospinal fluid
Jamaica: Ionospheric studies using active satellite
F University of West Indies. transmissions.
Japan:
A National Cancer Center
Research Institute.
Kyushu University
A Institute of Microbial
Chemistry.
A Nara Medical College
A _ Do
A Kitasato University
A Sasaki Institute
A Nara Medical College
A Japanese Foundation for Can-
cer Research.
A Kitasato Institute
A National Institutes of Health
A Do
A Kitasato Institute
A Yamashina Institute or
Ornithology.
A Kanazawa University Neuronal activities on the regu.ation of
feeding.
A Hokkaido:University Physiological activity of the brown adipose
tissue.
A Kumamoto University Biological reactions to cellular antibodies
with special reference to their immune-
pathological and immuno-chemical prop-
erties.
A Do Endogenous mechanism of vascu.ar response
in inflammation, with special reference to
biologic significance of specific permability
factors and their inhibitors newly isolated
from inflammed sites.
A Kirume University Interaction between arbovirus and myxovirus_
A Shi-Ehime Preparatory of Life cycle and control of paragoniumus in
Japan. Shikoku area.
F Tokyo Medical and Dental Gamma-aminobutyric acid in sensory physi-
University. elegy.
F Kumamoto University Neural organization of sensory information for
taste.
Measurement of human complement com-
ponents in dengue shock syndrome.
Taxonomical and ecological studies on lung
fluke, paragonimus in Pacific area; with
special reference to Southeast Asia.
Microbial drug resistance (genetics and evolu-
tion of It factor and plasmids).
Polymeric structure of hemoglobin and its
relation to function.
Localization by electron microscopy of several
phosphatase activities.
Nature and mode of action of local antibody in
intestine.
Investigation of cell component structural
changes in homologous transplants com-
pared with normal cells.
Electron microscope studies on several phos-
phatase activities in neurons and gliacytes
infected with Japanese encephalitis virus.
Differences in antigenic specificity and im-
munogenicity of tissue transplants.
Cytochemical studies on ultrastructures o1
toxoplasma gondii and allied organisms.
Mode of infection of scrub typhus
I mmunologica studies on scrub typhus and
its center in Japan.
Studies on encephaiitozoon (nosema cuniculi)
infections in man.
Migratory animal pathological survey
Kenya:
F College of Nairobi, Kenya__ _ Ionospheric studies of radio emissions
Korea:
A Seoul National University____ Multiplication and antibody formation of Jap-
anese encephalitis virus in snakes.
A Kyung-HEB University Migratory animal pathological survey(Korea)_ _
A Seoul National University_ _ Ecological survey and mass chemotherapy of
filariasis on Cho Do, Korea.
Malaysia:
A University of Malya Mosquitoes of Malaysia 20.0
A Do Weathering of rocks under humid tropical 20.0
conditions.
?
Netherlands:
A International Training Center 4.0
for Aerial Survey.
N Central Laboratory, T.N.O 20.0
10. 0
15. 0
10. 0
6. 0
10. 0
3. 0
10. 0
15. 0
4.0
10.0
7. 0
12.0
3. 0
3. 0
7.0
7. 0
3. 0
6. 0
10. 0
15. 0
15. 0
20. 0
5. 0
8. 0
6. 0
6. 0
12. 0
5. 0
5. 0
8. 0
5.0
10. 0
13. 0
5. 0
15.0
Role of image quality of photogrammetrjc
pointing accuracy.
Mechanical strength of filled elastomers of the
types used as solid propellants in rocket
motors.
Antilymphocyte serum, homologous bone
marrow transplantation and irradiation.
F Radiobiological Institute of
the Organization for Health
Research.
Norway:
A Electroencephalographic Lab- Brain, behavior and intracerebral blood flow__
oratory.
A University of Oslo Neuropsychological studies of mechanisms of
visual discrimination.
A Do Photochemical atmosphere model containing
oxygen and hydrogen. .
N Universityr of Bergen Degradation of marine surfaces by salt re-
quiring bacteria.
F Auroral Observatory Ionospheric studies using satellite transmis-
sions.
F University of Oslo The investigation of variable radio and optical
solar phenomena.
F University of Bergen X-ray and particle radiations at high altitudes
in the auroral zone.
D University of Bergen Detection seismology
D Norwegian Defense Research Norwegian seismic system phase II
Establishment.
15.0
20. 0
5. 0
5. 0
20. 0
10. 0
13. 0
15. 0
Military department and
contract agency
Title
Funds
planned
for fiscal
year 1970
Peru:
A University Peruvian Caye-
tam Heredia.
A Do
A Do
A Do
A Do
A Do
F Institut Geofisica Del Peru
Lima.
Do
F Geophysical Institute of Peru_
F Institute Geofisico Del Pero_ _
D Institute Geofisica! Del Peru_
Philippines:
A Mindanao State Univer-
sity.
A National Museum
A University of Philippines
A Do
A National Museum
A University of Philippines
A Do
F Manila Observatory
Spain:
F Observatory of Ebro_
F University of Salamanca_
Sweden:
A Sahlgrens Hospital, Uni-
versity of Goteborg.
N University of Goteborg,
Medical.
F Stockholms Universitet
Stockholm.
F Kiruna Geophysical Ob-
servatory, Kiruna.
F Royal University of
Uppsala.
Do
F Kiruna Geophysical
Observatory.
F University of Goteborgs
D University of Uppsala
Switzerland:
A University of Lausanne
A University of Basel
A Physiklisch-Meteorologische
Observatorium.
F Universitat Bern
F Universitat Zurich
Taiwan:
A Tunghai University
A Kaohsiung Medical College___
A Tunghai University
A National Taiwan University
A Do
Thailand:
A Applied Scientific Research
Corp.
A Do
A Medical Sciences University
Facility for Tropical Medi-
cine.
A Bangkok School of Tropical
Medicine.
University of Medical Scien-
ces.
A Do
D Applied Scientific Research
Corp.
United Kingdom:
35.0 A Liverpool School of Tropical
675.0 Medicine.
Physiologic changes in the cardiopulmonary 15. 0
system by ascending to high altitudes.
Endocrine alterations at high altitude 0.0
Coagulation studies in newcomers to high 5.0 '
elevations LA-134.
Hormone metabolism in men exposed to high . 10.0
elevatien LA-128.
Respiratory physiology on ascent to high 15.0
altitudes. .
Role of adrenal cortex in process of acclima- 20. 0
tization to high elevation.
Equatorial ionospheric effects study 10.0
Research directed toward the study of the 20. 0
. airglow at low latitudes.
Radio solar measurements 9.0
Observations of earth magnetic field 5. 0
Observation and study of infrasonic waves in 30.0
the atmosphere.
Migratory animal pathological survey (South .5.0
Philippines).
Migratory animal pathological survey (North 5.0
Philippines).
Filariasis studies in the Philippines 7.0
Fluorescent antibody test in ineasurement of 7.0
malarial immunity.
Ecology. of Southern Samar 15.0
Determination of malaria vector on Pangut- 0.0
aran Island, Sulu Archipelago.
Determination of choloroquine resistant P. 8.0
Falciparum Parasitas Impalawan and other
Provinces of the Philippines.
Conduct radio observations of the sun 30.0
Ionospheric studies using active satellite 3.0
transmissions.
Morphobiochemical correlations involved in 6.0
the differentiation eye lens.
Newer advances in treatment of shock in man 10.0
Effects of noise on inner ear cells 30. 0
Rocket sampling of solid particles in tlPe 2. 0
mesosphere.
Study of characteristics of auroral ionosphere 10,0
and its irregularities.
Research, design and development refraction 33.0
and gravity experiments.
Evaluation of high latitude cosmic ray data_ _ _ . 7.0
High latitude geomagnetic data 4.0
Integrated nervous control of the cardiovascu- 10.0
lar and gastrointestinal systems.
Seismic body waves and surface waves 15.0
Investigation on structure and biological activ- 12.0
ities of human immunoglobins M. & D.
(IGM and IGD).
Variation-resistant matrices and related 5.0
mathematical topics.
Measure of direct solar radiation and sky- 5.0
brightness in UV and visible part of spec-
trum.
Pulmonary pathology of oxygen toxicity 12.0
Sugar and peptide intestinal digestion and ab- 10.0
sorption.
Migratory animal pathological survey 5. 0
Biochemical studies on toxic nature of snake 10.0
venoms.
Biology and pathophoricity of biting midges 7.0
(Diptera: Ceratopogonidae) in Taiwan.
Hast-parasite relationships of Schistosoma 8.0
Japonicum in Taiwan.
Studies of cardiotoxin and vasoactive sub- 20.0
stance releasing components of cobra
venom.
Migratory animal pathological survey (Thai- 8.0
land FE 315).
Migratory animal patholog cal survey (Thai- 5.1)
land FE 316).
Investigation of filariasis in Thailand 10. 0
Leptospirosis in Thailand, with special ref-
erence to epidemiology, pathology and C.
Investigations on the patterns of epidemiology
and endemicity of diseases occurring due to
largescare environmental changes in north-
east Thailand.
Schistosomiasis in Thailand, studies on inci-
dence, epidemiology, life cycles and its
causing .cercarial dermatitis (carry-on and
redirection of above).
Reaearch? on tropical environmental data
(trend)and basic environmental data (bend)
in Thailand
Chemotherapy of rodent malaria drug action
against exoerythrocytic stages and drug
resistant strains.
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20. 0
200. 0
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MIONTINi citffiti31-q?sYkiff?3ool0000tta
ziugust, 12, 1.969
Military
contract
department and
agency
IC
Funds
planned
for fiscal
year 1970
United Kingdom?Continued
A Maybridge Chemical Co
A Royal College of Art
F U. College
F Imperial College
N University of Cambridge,
Department of Pathology.
N Oxford University, Pharma-
cology and Physical Chem-
istry Departments.
N Sir William Dunn School of
Pathology, University of
Oxford.
N University of Sussex
Potintial antimalariais based on quinoline-7-
carboxylic acid.
perimental cartography
search for determination of air density
temperature and winds at high altitudes.
rigin of auroral primaries
tyoprotective mechanism
-Studies on decompression sickness and inert
- gas narcosis.
lielhods of protecting Navy personnel against
- biological toxins.
iiai pattern recognition in naval tasks
10.0
20.0
10.0
7.0
6.0
02.0
20.0
10.0
Military department and
contract agency
Title
Funds
planned
far fiscal
year 1970
United Kingdom?Continued
N Royal College of Advanced The absorptiOn of sound by Polymer solutions_ 9.0
ech
N University of Keefe Recombination reactions of importance it 7. 0
propulsion.
N Cambridge Language Resi- Semantic research for automatized language 8.0
i
dent Unit. translation and inforthation reBieval.
F University of London
F Kings College ion marls sPeCtrometry of the lower ionosphere_ 50.0
Gravitational physics 10. 0
N Trinity College, University of Body temperature regulation 10.0
Dublin.
F University College, Dublin__ Radio and entice !emission from high energy 20.0
osmic rays.
Uruguay:
A Univeisidad de la Republica... Relationship between wild entourages and - 4.0
mycoses, especially S. American blastomy-
cases.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, the
subcommittee and committee have gone
over this list and scrutinized it carefully
and find strong justification for the con-
tinuation of this program at the level of
$5.7 million as approved.
Mr. President, I turn now to policy
planning studies.
The amendment of the Senator from
Arkansas is also aimed at policy planning
studies with foreign affairs implications
carried out by DOD. The total requested
for such studies was $6.4 million.
The Armed Services Committee has al-
ready recommended a cut of $0.7 million
from this amount. The ndditional cut
proposed by the Senator from Arkansas
would reduce the program to $2.7 mil-
lion, or a total cut of 58 percent. Clearly
the cut suggested by Senator FULBRIGHT
would severely curtail the policy plan-
ning effort.
Policy planning studies seek to insure
that military strategy does not lag be-
hind social and political change and be-
hind weapons technology and weapons
development.
Through it we try to better understand
the circumstances, situations, and en-
vironments that may be controlling in
the future application of military re-
sources.
Because this is such a nebulous area,
it requires particularly intense, profes-
sional exploration of the problems to ar-
rive at judgments which materially en-
hance national capacity and effective-
ness.
Yesterday and, I arti sure, on many
other days, we heard the distinguished
Senator from Arkansas talk about pro-
grams, projects, and studies of the
Turkish Revolution from 1916 to 1921,
the Ataturk revolution. The Senator
mentioned a program effort involving
Ceylon.
In the colloquy had between the Sena-
tor and me, I tried tn point out that
he was really nitpicking, picking on what
I call horrible example so as to intim-
idate the opponents and picture the en-
tire program in a manner that I con-
sider to be completely unfair.
I point out for the RECORD that this is
a sample I have chosen of some of the
programs that would be considered under
this area. The following are typical
broad subject areas:
PROJECT TTTLiO
Japanese Rearmament, Nuclear, and Space
Programs.
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
A study of factors and developments af-
fecting the Japanese military contribution to
the U.S. effort in Asia, including the security
pact.
PROJECT TITLE
Soviet Military and Foreign Policy.
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
A continuing study of Soviet military doc-
trine, use of military strength for political
purposes, foreign policy, and political in-
stitutions in the Soviet Union and East
European states.
PROJECT TITLE
Strategic Analysis of Southeast Asia--1969
(SALA).
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
Includes analyses of Malaysian foreign
policy, regional military cooperation, and
Australian foreign and military policy.
PROJECT TITLE
Strategic Postures Study (SPOST).
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
Work supporting a continuing Army staff
study effort to analyze and evaluate alterna-
tive postures for the US, the USSR, and CPR
in the 1968-80 period.
PROJECT TITLE
Navy Policy Planning Study.
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
To identify tasks the Navy would be re-
sponsible for in the post-1975 period for im-
proved inputs into the Navy Strategic
Planning process.
PROJECT TITLE
Navy Role in Exploitation of the Ocean
Resources.
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
To define the Navy's interests, objectiVes
and options in the exploitation of the oceans'
resources.
PROJECT TITLE
The Future Security Posture of Japan
1970-1985.
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
Assesses the likely security postures of
Japan during 1970-85 and the implications
for USAF long-range planning.
PROJECT TITLE
Strategy, Concepts and Military Objectives
Studies to Support Air Force Long-Range
Planning.
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
Analyzes future changing political eco-
nomic and military trends to insure that the
Air Force is responsive to U.S. security needs.
PROJECT TITLE
Sino?Soviet Economic Potential.
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
A continuing study of the economic back-
ground of Soviet and Communist Chinese
military power. Presently it includes studies
of outlays, employment, and organizational
problems in Soviet R&D, Soviet foreign eco-
nomic relations and Chinese civil aviation.
PROJECT TITLE
European Security Issues.
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
An examination of a range of alternative
security arrangements and the role of the
U.S. presence in Europe.
PROJECT TITLE
Command & Control Problems for the Na-
tional Command Authority.
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
A study of information and control facili-
ties, system.% and procedures required for
management of crises and control of conflicts.
PROJECT TITLE
Communist China.
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
A broad effort to correlate and evaluate
data on Communist China's political, eco-
nomic, military objectives and to determine
the foreign policy implications for the U.S.
These are the types of studies that
chew up the money. These are not the
funny, horrible examples that the Sen-
ator from Arkansas dragged out last year
and this year. These are the types of stud-
ies and programs that I would think the
present occupant of the chair or the Sec-
retary of State would like to know are
ongoing in the event a decision has to be
made involving this area. I think I would
want it.
I cite these in order to present a better
idea of just what this program Is about.
It was clear to the committee that
most of these studies are more properly
a responsibility of Federal agencies other
than the Department dr Defense. Specifi-
cally, most of these policy planning stud-
ies would appear to be more logically a
responsibility of the Department of
State. We have recommended that these
projects be taken over expeditiously?
this year?by the appropriate agency and
that the Defense Department phase it-
self out of this area of research except in
cases that are direcly defense related. I
think that the Senator from Arkansas
should recognize that if the Defense
funding for these studies is withdrawn
the plans of the Armed Services Commit-
tee to transfer rather than eliminate
these studies will be thwarted. There
would be no funds with which to continue
many programs previously initiated,
since it is too late this year to include
them in any other agency's budget.
As the Senator from Arkansas is aware,
the Defense Department has made a
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August 12,, 1969
ApprovestrieesassiVaniffijafkIREPAT364R000300100001-3 S9731
variety of efforts to decrease its role in programs which would have to be re-
social science studies related to foreign ducecl OT cancelled in the event of an
policy and to increase the role of other additional cut, which the Senator from
agencies. These include cuts in the level Arkansas is suggesting, in the Agile funds
of effort, curtailed field work overseas, include:
offers to transfer funds to the Depart- A reduction in vital equipment devel-
ment of State, and proposals for a high- opment and field experimentation in the
level interagency committee under non- Small Independent Action Forces. This
DOD leadership to develop priorities and is a system approach toward the need
responsibilities for knowledge and analy- of patrol size operations being under-
sis dealing with the external world. How- taken by Advanced Research Projects
ever, the ability of the Department of Agency jointly with the Army and Ma-
Defense to affect what other agencies do rine Corps.
is appropriately limited.The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
I know that the Senator shares my be- of the Senator has expired.
lief that our foreign and defense policiesMr. McINTYRE. I yield myself 5 adcli-
need to be better informed about the ex- tional minutes.
ternal world, not less. In recent hearings There is a great need for a systematic
under his direction, the important point and integrated study of the small hide-
was made that we need a strong effort pendent action force?the patrol?with a
to understand how the world looks to view toward making this most hazard-
ous, but vital, military operation a more
effective and less risky venture. This
program is examining the various com-
ponents of the Small Independent Action
Force?the man, equipment, environ-
ment, techniques, and the interaction of
these components to determine how they
can be improved.
The proposed reduction would have a
serious impact upon a major element of
the Agile budget, namely border control
systems. Research in this critically im-
portant area in order to advise friendly
nations to effectively protect the inte-
grity of their borders and desist from
offensive actions is highly significant to
the United States. For example, a major
fraction of the current activity is related
the Fulbright amendment is too drastic to Korea which is now facing increased
and should be defeated. North Korean infiltration attempts
THE AGILE PROGRAM which, if not halted, could embroil the
The Senator from Arkansas would re- United States in an undesirable con-
duce Agile by an additional $5 million. frontation. This effort which ARPA re-
Agile is one of the elements of the budget cently initiated is a direct result of a
activity which is "other equipment" in request for assistance from General
the Defense agencies budget. The Armed Bonesteel, Commander of U.S. Forces in
Services Committee reduced that budget Korea. The lessons learned could also be
activity by $25 million. In making this applicable to other areas in support of
reduction, the committee recognized that U.S. policy, if necessary.
because, this budget activity funds a A third example of research which
number of very high priority programs? would be adversely affected by a sub-
I am now talking about the category stantial Agile reduction is the study, in ,
"other equipment"?the $25 million re- Thailand, of Communist terrorists' lines
duction ordered by the Committee on of supply and their mode of operation.
Armed Services would be reflected by In conversation with Dr. Foster yes-.
substantial cuts in the Agile program. terday, which was substantiated today,
"Other equipment" includes such pro- Dr. Foster, who is No. 3 in the Depart-
grams as intelligence data-handling ment of Defense, the Chief of Research,
systems, advanced sensors, cryptologic Testing, Evaluation, and Development,
activities, and a number of classified pro- assured MO that if this further cut ad-
grams which are vital to our national vanced by the Senator from Arkansas
security. For example, one program (Mr. FULBRIGHT) is agreed to, it would
which is included is the provision of $74 have a substantial impact on the Agile
million for nuclear weapons effects tests. program.
Senators will recall that this activity is These are directly relevant and im-
part of the program to provide safe- portant applications of research to im-
guards to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. proving our ability to cope with existing
h t dvised and threats to our Armed Forces. I believe this
are progressing satisfactorily and con-
tributing significant new knowledge and
techniques to established defense re-
quirements. This would diminish the
contributive research efforts of approxi-
mately 60 university faculty members
and 120 graduate students on important
defense related research problems in 10
different universities and colleges.
The issue here is whether it is desir-
able to encourage new centers for re-
search. A good start has been made in
this direction by Project Themis, and the
evaluation of results so far is promising.
The Armed Services Committee did not
believe that the Themis project should
be completely canceled nor suffer such
reduction as this amendment calls for.
The Themis program for fiscal year
1970 requested $33 million.
A 12-percent reduction of the Armed
others and to avoid imposing our parte- Services Committee reduced this by ap-
ular cultural views on others. I suggest proximately $4 million. The Fulbright
that we miss the point when we limit our amendment would now add $8 million to
efforts to curtailing the activities of the the $4 million reduction recommended
Department of Defense alone. Instead, I by the full committee.
invite the Senator from Arkansas to join This will reduce the program a total of
with me and my colleagues on the Armed ? about $12 million, to a total of $21 mil-
Services Committee to see to it that na- lion, and would cut it- 36 percent.
tional needs for rational understanding In view of the fact that this is the last
of the world are met by the government year of new starts for the program, the
as a whole with an appropriately dimin- total reduction of $12 million will mean
ished role for the Department of that there will be no new starts this year.
Defense. I wish to state, too?with emphasis?
THE THEMIS PROGRAM that the Themis program is concerned
Mr. President, on the subject of the only with unclassified subject matter?
Project Themis, which is the fourth area and deals exclusively in basic research.
under attack in the amendment of the It is the opinion of the committee that
distinguished Senator from Arkansas,
this is a recommended cut in this amend-
ment of some $8 million. I would want
to put this proposed cut in the full con-
text of what the Research and Develop-
ment Subcommittee and full Committee
of the Armed Services have already done.
This program is based upon a 1965
Presidential request to all executive de-
partments requesting more emphasis on
establishing new centers of research ex-
cellence at universities in fields relevant
to the Department's missions. DOD's
plan provided for starting 200 new uni-
versity programs over' the four-year pe-
riod from fiscal year 1967 through fiscal
year 1970, an average of 50 new pro-
grams each year. The university response
was very enthusiastic; more than 1,000
proposals were submitted by universities
in the first 3 years, from which 118
projects were selected and funded. In the
fourth and final year of new starts in
fiscal year 1970, 25 new starts are planned
which require $10 million of funds.
Since the cut in this amendment super-
imposes itself on a reduction of some 12
percent already made by the Armed Serv-
ices Committee, this cut of $8 million
would cause: In 9 when
First. The elimination?if it has not consented to the treaty it insisted that kind of research deserves our support.
been eliminated already?of the 25 new these safeguards be instituted. I, per- Mr. President, the point here is that
fiscal year 1970 starts. This will defer sonally, would not like to see our efforts Agile has already sustained a reduction
the growth of research skills in the im- in this field reduced by action of the in its funding in this bill by action of the
portant defense-related areas of detec- Senate. The Test Ban Treaty requires Armed Services Committee which
tion and surveillance, structural me- these tests to be conducted underground, reduced the "other equipment" category
chanics of defense vehicles, oceanog- and underground nuclear testing is ex- by $25 million. This additional reduc-
raphy, and resuscitation and treatment pensive. It is one of the prices we pay tion now recommended would cut deep
of the wounded. for the reduced tensions which grow into valuable programs.
Second. Will also be the termination of out of limitations on atmospheric nuclear Mr. President, in summary, let me say
approximately 10 of the 118 ongoing testing. that the amendment we are considering
Project Themis contracts all of which Some of the research and development here would reduce research efforts by
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s 9732 Approved For ReleaniM4/11/30 ? CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3
RESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 12, 1969
-
an additional $45 pillion. These same Mr. McINTYRE. I am happy to yield to Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is
research efforts havd already been cut the distinguished chairman of the Corn- correct.
by the Senate Armed. Services Commit- mittee on Armed Services. Mr. STENNIS. There really is not
tee by more than $504nillion. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, in spite enough time. However, we cannot pass
Many of the programs which are of of my contact with the subject already on these matters unless we hear the
particular concern 10 the Senator from this year to sonic extent, I have been very arguments.
Arkansas will be cdt in the reduction much interested in what the Senator has Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think the Senator
made by the Armedaer vices Committee, had to say about these projects. is correct.
It is my feeling, Mr. President, that I do not see how anyone could listen to Mr. McINTYRE. I yield the floor.
further cuts in the littoral Contract Re- his statement of facts?and I know it is Mr. PULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
search Centers, beyarel those made by correct?without being most favorably yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Ben-
the Senate Armed Se; vices Committee impressed with these programs. ator from Michigan,
including the efforts made by the De- Like everything else these programs Mr. HART. Mr. President, first, I wish
pertinent of Defense_ to further reduce need regulation, they need thorough sur- to repeat what I have said before the
FCRC expenditures -by taking more of veillance, and they need annual review. Senator from New Hampshire. He has
their income from non-DOD sources, is I appreciate the statement made by the done a magnificent job hi scaling down
as far as we should go at this time. Senator that it is his purpose as the or, to use his own expression, scrubbing
As with all of the questions raised in chairman of the subcommittee to eon- out or cleaning up, some of the aspects
connection with the research programs tinue surveillance over the various pro- of the bill. We are all in his debt. The
we have under considaration here, the grams and the multitude of other items taxpayers are in his debt. Having said
Research and Development Subcommit- that are not included in the amendment. that, I wish to disagree with his chara,c-
tee, which I chair, IX going to consider I thank the Senator, and I salute him terization of the action of our friend
these programs in great depth during the and congratulate him for a very fine job from Arkansas (Mr. PULBR/GETT ) as "nit
coming year. We will he in a better con- in a tedious and sticky area where it is Picking."
dition at this time next year to provide very difficult to get the real merits of the I disagree completely that the Senator
the Senate with a more comprehensive situation. from Arkansas yesterday, in comment-
understanding of these programs and I also reiterate my interest with refer- lug on some of the research projects,
their meaning to the total DOD mission. ence to all of these projects to see if the was trying to endanger the whole pro-
But, continuing. This amendment executive branch cannot review them, gram unfairly. The programs that the
would severely cut agray great parts of pick them out, and place some of them Senator from Arkansas discussed are a
the research at foreign institutions, so that those they wish continued, can Part of the package. This is what we are
Since 1968, the DOD-has cut the funds be placed somewhere else in the budget, being asked to authorize money for. If in
for this research from $13.1 million to in some other department, so that better the eyes of any of us some of the items
the $5.7 million requested this year. We surveillance over them can be had, make something less than good sense,
need this research, Mr. President, be- I thank the Senator. ? then our responsibility is to talk about
cause it involves conditions of geography, Mr. McINTYRE, Mr. President, eer- them.
culture, disease and e-xpertise which are tainly under the leadership of the chair- Just as I have commended the Senator
not possible of study in the United States man of the Committee on Armed Serv- from New Hampshire for scrubbing up or
or not available in this country. ices, the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. scaling down, I commend the Senator
This amendment proposes a $3 million STENNIS), the committee has given this from Arkansas for putting his finger on
cut in policy planning research. The DOD military authorization bill the best study something that, to us, does not make
Is quite willing to have much of this re- in depth I have seen in the short time sense. Nobody will be intimidated by
search done elsewhere lad the imposition I have been in the Senate. that.
of the cut made by the Senator from The Fulbright amendment attacks We are talking about an item of $7
Arkansas would elimTnate the research areas we have already acted on and billion-plus. We are suggesting that in
and that would leave the DOD without where we continue to work, as the Sen-
that reach of $7 billion is some money
much valuable information which is ator has emphasized. It is apparent that that does not have to be authorized or
available in no other place. these projects are being scrubbed down some proposal that need not be under-
The amendment by the Senator from and scaled down. It is important that' the taken.
Arkansas would kill al new starts in the Senator realizes that this matter has Each of us has a family budget. Unless
Themis program arat severely hamper been looked into carefully, we are operating on the poorest poverty
some of the ongoing programs. This pro- Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator base, we all know that the budget con-
gram was established to provide new again. I express my regret that more tains some money that really does not
centers of excellence with a broad Senators cannot be present to hear these have to be spent, and the survival of the
geographical representation in fields matters discussed by each side in order family would not be destroyed or even
relevant to the DOD mission. All of these to hear the arguments pro and con. I do seriously jeopardized if we did not spend
advantages would be practically elimi- not see how it is possible to vote on a some of the money that we have set aside
nated by the pending amendment. matter so involved as this matter with-
to spend.
The Agile program ha received a major out having a chance to hear more of the We might ask ourselves what it would
s
reduction from the action of the arguments, be like if we had a family budget of $7
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will billion. Is it not likely that somewhere
Armed Services Committee. The proposed
amendment would reduce funds for Agile the Senator yield? there would be certain expenditures that
by an additional $5 million. Since there Mr. McINTYRE. I yield, really need not be undertaken? One does
Is only $27 million in Agile in the begin-
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I not have to be a Ph. D. in domestic sca
fling, it is obvious that this additional cut -
certainly agree with the Senator from ence, home economics, or general eco-
Mississippi on what he has just said. nomics to know that if we are given $7
will severely cripple a program dealing
billion a year, we probably do not have
Some Senators have reverted to their old
with counterinfiltraton systems, new ina
to spend all of it, and that the economy
customs too quickly. We were able to get
trusion detection sensors, border control
might even be stronger if we did not
quite a bit of interest in connection with
analysis, border area security systems,
pacificationspend all of it.
the ABM discussion, but now we have
efforts, and village defense
corps selection and training, the same attendance on these amend- The Senator from Arkansas yesterday
meets that we used to have on the old gave a list of some projects that struck
Mr. President, I urge that the end- bill. I wish Senators would remain in the him, and struck others of us, as examples
meat by the Senator from Arkansas be Chamber. We would make much better of why it is not necessary to go all that
defeated. We must- be austere. We have progress. I share the Senator's regret way. I think it is not an tmfairness to the
been austere. We must not go beyond that more Senators are not present, program to hold that view.
prudence.
Mr. STENNIS, I thank the Senator. Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, will
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the However, I wish to add that they do have the Senator from Arkansas yield to me
Senator yield? many other duties, on my own time?
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August 12, 1969
atar from Michigan is recognized for 5
additional minutes.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does the Senator
from Michigan yield to me for an obser-
vation?
Mr. HART. Indeed I do.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the
Senator from New Hampshire does not
deserve any criticism at all, even though
the Senator from New Hampshire did
cut these programs by 8 percent from
the budget request, I believe. But the
budget went up on most of these items,
contrary to most Government programs
that I am familiar with on the civilian
side.
The amount for Federal contract re-
search centers, for example, in 1969, I
am informed was $263.3 million. The
1970 request is $277.4 million. That is a
5-percent increase.
On social behavioral science research,
the 1969 figure is $45.4 million and for
1970 it is $48.6 million, a 7-percent in-
crease.
If I understand correctly, the Sen-
ator from New Hampshire did cut back
the budget request, but actual cut over
what it was in actual expenditures last
year is not quite that much. But, in any
case, I agree with the Senator that it
looks like nit picking when we are talk-
ing about $45 million in a budget of $80
billion. But in practically any other pro-
gram before this Congress,. $45 million
would look like quite a substantial
amount. $45 million would be a great
deal for a project on the White River or
the St. Francis River in my State, for
example. My senior colleague, Mr. MC-
CLELLAN, and I?he in particular?have
often put out a great deal of energy to
get $45 million for a natural resource
development.
Just because this is only a small part
in such a huge appropriation request,
only $45 million, we can call it peanuts
or we can call it nit picking, but only in
the sense that it is small in comparison
to the total.
But it is not small relative to any other
standard in this country but the stand-
ard of the Pentagon and the Defense
Department.
In a letter which I put in the RECORD
yesterday, dated July 24, and which is
from John S. Foster, Jr. of the Defense
Department, it was stated, after con-
siderable discussion, that it is not pos-
sible to arrive at the cost of the projects.
We are met with that argument very
often. In reply to the Senator from New
Hampshire's question as to why we do
not discuss current projects, I asked Mr.
Foster in my letter of June 10, why we
could not get the cost. He said:
The funding of these projects is based on
a total project cost, with such multiple out-
puts anticipated. Any effort to isolate a cost
figure for a given report would be arbitrary
and probably not represent the actual costs
involved. Nor would such a cost estimate rep-
resent a measure of the payoffs from the re-
search.
Then in the next paragraph, which is
a significant one and which is the type '
of thing which is ongoing?I believe
it is ongoing, in the words of the Senator
from New Hampshire, and which I think
ought to be stopped?Mr. Foster says:
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. McINTYRE. Let me try to give an
example to the distinguished Senator
from Michigan.
Mr. HART. Take the proposal that the
distinguished Senator from Arkansas was
discussing. Those are the ones I am say-
ing were not used to intimidate any-
one?
Mr. McINTYRE. I do not know?
Mr. HART. To respond to this.
? Mr. McINTYRE. Here are some of the
'programs discussed yesterday by the
Senator from Arkansas:
First. "The Attaturk Revolution in
Turkey."
Second. "Gandhi, Nonviolence, and
the Struggle for Indian Independence."
Third. "The Sinhalese Buddhist Revo-
lution of Ceylon."
Fourth. "The Egyptian Revolution,
Nasserism, and Islam."
Fifth. "Militant Hindu Nationalism:
The Early Phase."
Mi. HART. Now, with respect to
that?
Mr. MeINTYRE. All right. Just a min-
ute now. I have the floor. There is ab-
solutely not one nickel in the 1970 budget
for these program& What is the Senator
bringing them up for? What is he bring-
ing them up for but to intimidate and
scare the rest of Congress into thinking
they are spending that money this fool-
ishly? My statement has a number of ex-
amples in it of the type of ongoing pro-
grams and projects that we are making
today; otherwise spotlighting these other
programs the Senator from Arkansas has
Mentioned, in my opinion, is nit picking.
Mr. HART. I think we could more
aptly say that he is talking about mis-
takes we have already made. Does not
the Senator agree with that?
Mr. McINTYRE. I am not prepared to
defend the 1968 budget here. I am here
to talk about the 1970 budget.
Mr. HART. Maybe we cannot agree on
the characterization of the studies the
Senator has just enumerated and which
were discussed yesterday, but if we had
to do it all over again, would we really
buy a book on Ataturk? If we had it to
do all over again, would we really do any
of those things which, in my book, rep-
resent the kind of thing that the national
family budget really does not have to
spend money on to get?
Mr. McINTYRE. I cannot judge what
determination was made prior to 1968.
Those we talk about now have not been
funded at all since 1968. Maybe if it
seemed important to study the theories
of revolution. It may well be interesting
to have some scholarly expertise study
into the Ataturk Revolution, or the rev-
olutionary process in Ceylon. The point I
want to make is that we are here talking
about the fiscal year 1970 budget. Why
do we not talk about the programs in
1970 instead of pulling these things out
of the past trying to scare the rest of the
Senate into voting against the bill?
Mr. HART. What about providing em-
pirical trade conclusions about ideolog-
ical goals which support insurgency? We
are funding that and that has been an
ongoing one. That was mentioned.
Mr. McINTYRE. Insurgency has been
quite a problem for the Department of
Defense during the past 3 or 4 years in
a place called Vietnam.
Mr. HART. Does the Senator think
that the University of Massachusetts un-
der this contract will either get us out
of Vietnam or keep us out of another one
like it by this kind of study?
Mr. McINTYRE. I am not going to
indulge in what the University of Mas-
sachusetts can do. The able Senator from
Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE) is now in
the Chamber. Perhaps he can reply to
that.
Mr. HART. No; if there is still time
remaining?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
yield 5 additional minutes to the Senator
from Michigan.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Michigan is recognized for 5
additional minutes.
Mr. HART. Let me explain why I rose
to react as I did. It is not nit picking.
Whatever it is, it is a discussion of chap-
ter and verse on projects which were
authorized by Congress for the Depart-
ment of Defense to undertake. There are
those of us who hold a deep 'conviction
that whatever else it is relevant for, or
to, whatever agency of the Government,
if any, should be buying the Military
Establishment should not.
If there is any nit picking, it is nit
picking of ourselves because routinely
over the years we have said to them, "Go-
ahead, if you think you need it. Here is
the money."
The Senator from Arkansas and others
are saying, and I too think it is not
Inappropriate, in the review of military
requests, to review what some of us be-
lieve to have been mistakes made by the
military. Heaven knows, when we come
in here looking for money for school
feeding programs, or when we try to get
aid started or even to maintain it, we
are lectured at considerable length about
what happened last year and the year
before with some of the money we gave
them then. In a sense, that is what we
are doing with the Department of De-
fense right now. I think the Senator
from Arkansas performs a very useful
service in attempting to do just that.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Michigan yield?
Mr. HART. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I appreciate what
the Senator has said. I repeat, I think
the Senator from New Hampshire has
done a good job in undertaking to criti-
cize it at all. It has never been done be-
fore, to my knowledge. He has been a
tower of strength in getting anything
underway. But the situation here, as I
see it, has been built up over a number
of years before the Senator was even on
the committee or even a Member of the
Senate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
of the Senator from Arkansas has ex-
pired.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
yield myself, or the Senator from Mich-
igan, 5 minutes and then I will let him
yield to me because I want him to par-
ticipate in this colloquy. I yield 5 min-
utes to the Senator from Michigan so
that he may yield to me.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
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S 9734 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 12, 1969
In the case of projects not yet completed available for R. 8z D. this current year wish to ask the Senator from Michigan
and for which only into reports are avail- that it had the previous year.
Looking at the request the Depart- a question?
able, significant results can be expected in
the future. In the case et tonapleted projects, Mr. BROOKE. No.
the final report represattts only a portion af ment of Defense made for research this Mr. FULBRIGHT. 1 wanted, as a mat-
the total output. For exalinple, in one project year, $8.2 billion, apparently the Depart- ter of fact, to continue a bit on what
funded over a period of nine years, a total ment does not understand the meaning the Senator says, particularly as to uni-
of 29 technical reports, 7f.2 scientific journal of the close vote on that amendment. versity research, This is one of the large
publications, and significant contributions But, to its great credit, the Armed Serv- items. The budget request for university
to a book were produced in addition to the ices Committee has responded in, I think, research for 1969 was $254.4 million, and
final report Which you received, as has been said several times before, for 1970 $305.9 million, which is a 20 per-
That is the sort of thing which I think very effective fashion. cent increase,
is beyond the normal or proper activities The Defense Department this year re- As a matter of fact, we do know of,
of the Department ofi)clense. It is not quested an authorization of $8.2 billion, and there is a great deal of evidence of,
a literary institution Created to produce The committee reduced the figure to $7.1 the disapproval by many of the students
books. In my view, it is not supposed to billion, more than $1 billion less than of the intrusion of the military program
So out and produce research works on the Department sought, which is more into our universities.
Ataturk or warlordisrit, or Islam, or the than $600 million less than authorized I ask unanimous consent to have
Sinhalese Revolution-in Ceylon. These the last fiscal year and about $400 mil- printed in the RECORD, because it Is ex-
studies are irrevelant to and beyond the lion less than was appropriated last fig- actly on this point, an article entitled
proper scope of the Defense Department.cal year. "Turned-Off Young Scientists Force
That is the math point. Again I commend the committee for Major Cutbacks in Military Research,"
Actually, the cut ram proposing is its review and its recommendations, but written by Victor Cohn, and published
relatively very small as compared with I think the further reduction, modest as in the Washington Post of May 12, 1969,
the basic research total in the bill which it is, proposed by the Senator from which describes the attitude of young sel-
ls $430 million. That is a large amount of Arkansas is possible. entists in the various schools. Under the
money for basic research. By "basic" 1 None of us is sure what causes unrest headline it says, "Caution: The military-
mean not related to any specific project on the campuses, but to the extent that industrial complex is armed and dan-
in the Defense Department. Of course, the student knows that research and de- gerous. ABM is an Edsel," referring to
the nonbasic research is far greater than velopment by the Federal Government is signs carried by physicists picketing the
that. But basic researth is the type of overwhelmingly entrusted to the De- White House April 30.
research we would expect to be done in partment of Defense-- There being no objection, the article
a graduate school at Harvard or Yale The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
or Princeton, and so on, generally. It is ator's time has expired, as follows:
sometimes called pure science. It has Mr. HART. Mr. President, will the Sen- -
A. URNED-OFP YOUNG SCIENTISTS FORCE MAJOR
nothing specific in mind. ator yield me 1 additional minute? CUTBACKS IN MILITARY RESEARCH SCIEN-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes. TISTS FORCE RESEARCH CUTBACKS
of the Senator has expired. Mr. HART. That those engaged in re-
(By Victor Cohn)
Mr. FTJLBRIGHT. I yield myself 5 search, contrary to general assumptions,
minutes more, are not the universities primarily, but "Caution. The military-industrial complex
is armed and dangerous."
1 hope the Senator from New Harnp- the think tanks as the Senator from "ABM is. an Edsel."?Signs carried by
shire and the Senator from Mississippi Arkansas has developed, if they see the physicists picketing the White House April 30
would inform me if there is anything ratio of the Federal Government's allo- In a less violent, but equally radical way
that they especially do not like in the cations of research and development for science students, younger scientists and
amendment. I would certainly entertain the military and then compares it to the many older professors of physics and physi-
some revisions to it. Otherwise, I would amount of money the Federal Govern- ?logy have been raising their own hell on
like to have a vote on it It is a worth- ment allocates for research in new tech- the campuses.
while amendment. niques for housing, for antipollution ef- In the view of Prof. Don R. Price, Har-
vard political scentist, this is "a new kind
As I said before, it is the first time in forts, and so on, he gets a very obscure of rebellion," linked only in part with the
25 years that we have made a serious notion of our priorities. Perhaps, more activist kids and college students in general.
effort to bring the whole authorization correctly, such students get an illustra- It is a rebellion of young and discontented
for the Pentagon under review. tion of priorities which offend them and technologists?against the ABM and other
outrage them.
I was Just handed the annual report costly milltary-technological systems, against
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- "weaponeering" at secret laboratories on or
of the Rand Corp., for 1968. Over
ator's 1 minute has expired, near campuses and, in many cases, against
10,000 publications have been produced,
Mr. HART. May I have 1 minute more? doing any research, secret or non-secret, to
with some 500 new titles published each help the military.
F
Mr. ULBRIGHT. I yield 1 minute.
year. It sounds like a big publishing it is a rebellion against computer (enters
Mr. HART. When we say, "Let us put and social science projects serving the CIA.
house such as they have in New York,
first things first," what do we identify It is a rebellion against what one young
publishing fiction and other paperback
in our minds as having first claim? physicist called "the whole misuse of tech-
books. Most of these titles that I have
Look at this bill. Look at the bulk for nology to spoil rather than. save the country."
read have nothing to do with the proper
research. Look at the bill in its totality. Sometimes painstakingly logical, some-
responsibilities of the Defense Depart-
ment. So I hope the Smalor from New Then compare it with the programs, in times only emotional and shrill, this rebel-
some cases of long standing, intended to test
swbeeele in
csn it
hcaslion reasingly effective. In the
Hampshire would consider going a little
relieve hunger and to insure a broader
further in his cut. Caused or helped cause giant Stanford
... availability of medical care. One does University--derided by the new dissidents as
Mr. HART. Mr. President, of course I
share that hope. not have to be a member of the SDS to the "Pentagon of the West"?to decide to
The effort we are making to reduce the Jump up and scream, "Your allocations phase out half the secret military projects
and your priorities are all out of whack." at its Stanford Applied Electronics Labora-
authorization for research and develop- So can we not persuade ourselves, in tory. The Stanford rebellion was conducted
ment and evaluation began actually addition to the reduction that the com- largely by undergraduates, but sympathetic
more than a year ago. On April 18, 1968, mittee has made of more than $1 billion and vocal professors gave them vital meral
the Senate defeated an areendment that for research, to add $45 million for the authority.
I proposed reducing thedefense author- Made Stanford's trustees place a mora-
reasons so eloquently assigned by the torium on new chemical and biological war-
ization for those activities from the
Senator from Arkansas?
fare contracts at the nearby Stanford Re-
committee-approved total of $7.8 billion
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time search Institute, nominally "independent"
to $7.3 billion. That was a reduction of of the Senator has expired. but in effect owned by the university trustees.
$508 million. That defeat was on a roll- Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, will the Caused huge Maasachusetts Institute of
call vote, and we lost 28 to 30. Senator yield? Technology to call a moratorium on taking
any new secret contracts at a pair of crack
If the amendment had been approved,
the Department of Defense would have Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, / radar and rocket guidance laboratories that
yield myself 5 minutes,
have supplied much of the brainpower be-
had about the same amount of money Does the Senator from Massachusetts hind U.S. weaponry.
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August 12, 1969
Forced American University in Washington
to cancel a partly secret Army research
contract with the University's Center for
Research in Social Systems.
Seen physicists picketing the White House;
professors buttonholing Senators and Rep-
resentatives and organizations with many
names but like purposes?Project Daisy, Ad
Hoc Committee of Concerned Scientists?
spring up at campus after campus.
?This movement and student protests in
general have in the past year forced the
Defense Department to cut in half?from
some 400 to 200?its "classified" or in com-
mon parlance secret research and develop-
ment contracts on U.S. campuses.
REPORT ON CONTRACTS
This week Dr. John Foster, director of de-
fense research and engineering, is expected
to discuss the problem at a news conference.
According to figures he has gathered, there
are now such contracts or grants in effect
at some 60 universities.
He will say they now represent about $20
million worth of all the department's some
$250 million this year in 5500 campus
projects.
In addition, the department finances what
another official estimates to be $200 million
in work?most of it classified?at "research
centers" like MIT's Lincoln Laboratory and
Instrumentation Laboratory, Caltech's Jet
Propulsion Laboratory and Johns Hopkins'
Applied Physics Laboratory.
Most of these centers are operated by the
universities on "not-for-profit" contracts,
partly to keep secret work off the campuses
themselves.
Foster may also report that the principal
concentrations of classified research (accord-
ing to one of his staff) are at:
MIT and Stanford. MIT's are entirely at the
Lincoln and Instrumentation (or "I") Labs,
neither of which MIT consider part of its
teaching campus. There are no classified
projects on the MIT campus proper, but the
"I Lab" is on the campus fringe and both
labs have close staff and graduate project
connections.
University of Michigan, many at a uni-
versity facility at Willow Run. Despite
wrenching 1967-68 protests by students and
faculty, the university this academic year has
rejected just one classified proposal and ap-
proved 36 others.
University of California at Berkeley, Uni-
versity of Texas, Georgia Tech, Ohio State
University and New Mexico State University.
For well over a year the Defense Depart-
ment has been straining to reduce classified
work on the campuses. "We still have some
that need not be classified," an official re-
ports, "mainly where a contracting officer has
just used that as an easy way to give investi-
gators access to classified material. This is not
the only way to do this, and we want to
reduce unneeded classification to zero."
There will then remain a hard core of still
classified projects that both Defense officials
and many professors and colleges consider
proper and necessary. These deal with sub-
jects like laser and maser detection (of dis-
tant objects like missiles) , electronic coun-
ter-measures, advanced radar, underwater
sound?"things that in the national interest
need to be kept secret" and need to be done
for the country's defense, in the view of Dr.
Charles Kidd, a deputy to Dr. Lee DuBridge,
the President's science adviser.
But DuBridge?though no activist?re-
moved secret work from the Caltech campus
as "inappropriate" 20 years ago.
ONE-DAY STOPPAGE
"Inappropriate" was a mild word on March
4, 1969, when MIT students?some of the
country's brightest future scientists and ad-
vanced engineers?joined turned-off faculty
members to hold a "one-day research stop-
page to protest "misuses of science." The
University of Pennsylvania, the University of
Rochester and some 30 other campuses saw
similar demonstrations. And new organiza-
tions began to proliferate.
Some coalesced or merged loosely with a
group started in New York City in February
around a lanky elementary particle physicist
from Stanford, Dr. Martin Pearl, as "acting
secretary." This "Scientists for Social and
Political Action" or SSPA quickly counted
500 or so members in "40 or 50" local chap-
ters.
Pearl?at age 42, standing between the
young and the old in science?bows to the
"atomic scientists" who first attempted polit-
ical action after World War II, and in bitter
battle helped win civilian control of atomic
energy. "But now," he says, "these men are
the scientific administrators. They have to
be careful of what they say. Now a second,
fresh voice is needed."
NOT RESPONDING
A younger associate, Brian Schwartz of
MIT, is blunter: "These older men have lost
contact with the real world. They're not re-
sponding to the younger problems."
The younger problems exploded at Stan-
ford in early April. For nine days, student
dissidents occupied the Applied Electronics
Laboratory, site of some $2 million a year
in defense research.
The younger problems were hoisted onto
picket signs in Washington April 30, when for
the first time in history, it was stated?first
time or not, it was rare-1'75 pale, variously
bearded, bookish-looking physicists pick-
eted the White House. Their target: the ABM.
Their leaders: David Nygren of Columbia and
Tom Kir ic of Harvard.
The physicists were here for the American
Physical Society's annual meeting. This usu-
ally staid convention has boiled up into an
indignation meeting over President Nixon's
proposed Safeguard ABM system," said a news
report. Wearing "Stop ABM" buttons, physi-
cists prowled hotel and Congressional corri-
dors. "Even the controversy over the security
'trail' of J. Robert Oppenheimer in the 1950s"
wrote William Hines in the Chicago Sun-
Times, "did not match this intensely politi-
cal climate."
MORATORIUM ARRANGED
The younger problems boiled up again at
both MIT and Stanford. At MIT, students
marched into the office of President Howard
Johnson for a sit-in and talk-out, especially
about secret work on military helicopters and
multiple-entry atomic missile guidance. All
agreed to move to a lecture hall. Next the
MIT faculty met. The upshot was a morator-
ium on secret projects until a special 22-man
group studies the whole role of the Lincoln
and "I" Labs, sites of some $95 million a year
in Pentagon contracts.
At Stanford too there were more demon-
strations and faculty meetings. The upshots
there: (1) a start on an "orderly" phasing out
(or conversion to non-secret) of some $2
million a year in secret contracts, represent-
ing about a third of the Applied Electronic
Labs' defense work; (2) a pledge to end chem-
ical and biological warfare research and
counter-insurgency studies at Stanford Re-
search Institute (worth about $1.1 million a
year).
At both Stanford and MIT many professors
have balked. Someone must defend the coun-
try, they indignantly say. Someone must pro-
vide the knowledge. And many of the best
minds are on campuses. If universities sev-
ered all Defense ,Department ties, says Jack
Ruins, iv= vice president for the special
laboratories, "the country would be left in
the hands of the professional military and
industrial group."
At Stanford, Prof. 0. G. Villard Jr.?radar
researcher and son of the late Oswald Garri-
son Villard, crusading editor of the Nation?
said: "As the son of a liberal who was a
devoted pacifist, I have searched my con-
science and always felt I have been com-
pletely faithful to the pacifist traditions of
my family. I have always considered that my
research was 100 per cent directed toward
saving human lives. This development essen-
tially brings my research here to an end, and
I believe the decision will have a most un-
fortunate effect on the long-term viability
of the School of Engineering and even of the
university."
These men were talking mainly about
classified and directly linked military
research.
PENTAGON FINANCING
But there is still another trend, against
even open, non-secret basic study financed
by any military or para-military agency. The
Defense Department finances much basic re-
search in physics, chemistary, electrical
engineering and the like, partly because it
knows that almost all such knowledge is ulti-
mately needed; partly because it wants to
maintain contacts With bright scientist-
consultants. Of some $1.5 billion in Federal
basic research money now going to colleges,
some $247 million (16 per cent) comes from
the Pentagon.
Last month University of Maryland stu-
dents picketed a computer center doing non-
secret work on pattern recognition for the
CIA. At MIT last week, disaffected students
protested a Defense-financed, non-secret
project to make new computer methods
available to any social scientist?whether
working on Vietnam peasantry or the succor
of the American poor. At Stony Brook, the
Students for a Democratic Society, stormed
another computer center. The computer cen-
ter may be fast becoming the American Bas-
tille.
To most young or old scientists, if not
to their students, this is illogical.
SYMPATHY FOUND
Still, there is great sympathy among them
for these many youths who are coming to
consider almost all research "complicit"
war research "for the system."
An important answer to the very young,
maintains Stanford's Martin Perl, is to turn
much research to social purpose. "The un-
controlled spawning of technology has pro-
duced pollution and contributed to socially
destructive conditions," says his new orga-
nization. "Yet there is no real attempt to
apply technical skills to improve life."
"This is what we want to tell people," said
one of the new scientists during the Physi-
cal Society meeting here. "We're not very vio-
lent types. We're not about to riot. We just
want to exercise our democratic rights."
Is all this the high-water mark of a tem-
porary scientists' movement or is it a be-
ginning of something larger? Only time will
tell, but if the young scientists keep talking,
there may be a new element in the American
political dialogue. After years of relative si-
lence, says Dr. Charles Schwartz of the Uni-
versity of California, "a large number of sci-
entists are coming out of their little dark
laboratories," and things may never be the
same.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. On May 1, 1969,
the Washington Post published another
article entitled "MIT Curbs Secret Mili-
tary Research," written by Victor Cohn.
It was the MIT delegation of students
and a professor who came to call on me,
asking me what they could do to dis-
associate to a much greater degree?
they were not adamant that it be com-
plete?the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology from military research.
They did not like their university being
considered simply an adjunct of the
Pentagon. I ask unanimous consent that
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research?as Dr. Edward Teller suggested last
week?it plans to almost eliminate it on
campuses and diminish aignificantly in the
off-campus university laboratories.
The Pentagon's ooncern about its mu ver-
city research program, which accounts for
one-third of its entire research effort, was
heightened last month when two of the
Nation's most prestigious institutions Stan-
ford University and the Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology---decided to begin cutting
back their Defense involvement.
In an effort to improve its image among
the Nation's university students and young-
er faculty to ward off new and more serious
criticism and protect its valuable relation-
ship with the institutions, the Pentagon has
begun looking for ways to make accommoda-
tions.
Under the guidance of Dr. John S. Foster
Jr., director of Defense Research and De-
velopment, it has recently:
Cut its classified research projects in uni-
versities from 8 per cent of the total to 4
per cent and hopes to get down to 1 or 2
per cent.
Urged Congressional committees at every
opportunity not to take primitive measures?
such as criminal legislation or fund outoffs?
against student militants and radicals. In-
stead the Pentagon recommends "leaving the
initiative for solving the problem with the
university administration."
Emphasized that the scope of a university's
defense research is a decision to be made
independently by the university, and en-
ootuaged and aided universities in diversi-
fying their research in non-defense areas.
Brought university scientists and admin-
istrators to Washington to explain campus
problems to the Defense officials who oversee
the research activities.
Accelerated the formerly combersome pro-
cedures for Pentagon review and release for
publication of papers prepared by university
researchers In Defense-sponsored activities.
The number of classified projects has been
trimmed largely by declassifying, not by end-
ing them.
While the Pentagon insists publicly that
this declassification is purely the result of
an accurate application of existing security
guidelines in areas where there was too much
caution before, it is nevertheless clear that
some relaxation of standards is involved.
"We just make sure now that, indeed, the
work is truly classified," one high Pentagon
official said, "and that it's not a case where
someone at a lower level decided to classify
it just to be safe. Classified Projects are re-
viewed now at the highest levels."
Foster, speaking to the American Nuclear
Society in Seattle lett Wednesday, said that
"some applied research and development con-
tracts funded by the Defense Department at
universities?normally at separate off-campus
labs?are and must remain classified."
While the Pentagon's classified projects are
a handy-target for campus militants, there
is a question about how much of an issue
they actually are.
Since only 4 per cent of the total is classi-
fied, Foster says, "I believe this issue Is over-
rated, and many of the people at universities
Who have investigated the facts agree."
Rep. Lawrence Hogan (R-Md.), one of 22
GOP congressmen who toured campuses re-
cently to determine the causes of student un-
rest, said the problem was never mentioned
to him, although there was a broad dissatis-
faction with professors who spend more time
on Defense projects than in dealing with stu-
dents.
A Pentagon official who deals with Univer-
sity research says there has been no change
in the number of proposals received from the
institutions themselves for projects. POT
every proposal it approves, the Pentagon re-
ceives eight.
One Pentagon official suggested that a
small amount of classified work should be
the article to which I have referred be
printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the REC-
ORD, as follows:
[From the Washington Post, May 1, 1969]
MIT CURBS SECRET MILITARY RESEARCH
(By Victor Cain)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology?
the Nation's leading science and engineer-
ing university?has ordered -a temporary halt
on accepting new secret military research
at two famous laboratories-.-
The action was in rsponse to mounting
student and faculty protests against mili-
tary research by U.S. universities?and
against big new weapons systems like the
anti-ballistic missile.
As evidence of that growing movement,
some 175 young anti-ABM physicists picketed
the White House for 45 minutes yesterday,
then presented Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, the
President's science adviser, with a petition
opposing the Safeguard ABM system pro-
posed by President Nixon.
The petition was signed by nearly 1200
members of the American Phycal Society
now meeting here.
Other physicists went to Capitol Hill
to give Congressmen ang-Safeguard peti-
tions signed by 729 colleagues at many uni-
versities. versities.
"A large number of scientists are earning
out of their little dark laboratories" to
give the public their opinions on weapons,
Charles Schultz, a Univerffity of California
physicist, told a group of House membess.
Just such a coming out--starting with a
one-clay research stoppage iSlarch 4--culmi-
nated in MIT' decision to declare a morato-
rium, perhaps until fall, on new classified
projects at the two laboratories.
A 22-member panel will review the labs'
roles?and perhaps, said one MIT source,
"recommend that they be sold or otherwise
disposed of, to be operated with no MIT
connection."
REPORTS SOUGHT
MIT President Howard rehnson asked the
panel to make a temporary report by May 31
and a final one by Oct. 1. Panel Chairman
Frank Pounds, MIT School of Management
dean, said he will try to have the final report
ready May 31.
All work on present projects will continue
in the meantime and the laboratories may
accept "contract modifications."
One of the affected labs is the Lincoln
Laboratory, which has been doing missile
detection studies important to ABM develop-
ment, though not working on ABM system
hardware. The other is the Instrumentation
Laboratory, which is working on the guidance
system for MIRV (multiple independently-
targeted re-entry vehicles) Warheads for the
sea-horse Poseidon missile.
The Linooln Laboratory Cmn. buildings out-
side Boston and in Cambridge) was estab-
lished 18 years ago at Defense officials'
"urgent" request?so MIT recalled?to de-
velop radar and associated air defense sys-
tems. Almost all its work is for the Defense
Department.
CONTROLS FOR ROCHETS
The Instrumentation Laboratory (on the
fringe of the MIT campus in Cambridge)
works on guidance, navigation and controls
for rockets and spacecraft. Three-fifths of
its work is for the Defense Department, two-
fifths for the civilian space effort.
Together, the two labs have 3700 employes
and a current annual budget of $116 million.
Their scientists are not part of the MIT fac-
ulty, and MIT has labored to keep their secret
efforts at arm's length; there are no secret
projects now on the MIT campus proper.
Still the labs' staffs and MITs faculty
have close links. And these links have been
given much of the credit for the labs' high-
quality work and high-quality staffs.
MIT President Johnson initially named
Pounds to head an 18-member panel includ-
ing faculty, students, alumni, Lincoln and
Instrumentation Lab staff members and MIT
trustees. Among the panel members are
Julius A. Stratton, former mrr president
now board chairman of the Ford Foundation,
and Dr. Victor Weisskopf, noted physicist
and a member of the Union of Concerned
Scientists that held the March 4 research
stoppage.
FOUR PANELISTS ADDED
Pounds added four supplementary panel-
ists, including Roam Chomsky, celebrated
MIT linguistics professor and another March
4 protester.
Protest against the ABM has been the
loudest item of unofficial business during
American Physical Society meetings here
this week. Some 3000 physicists and their
wives jammed a convention hall Tuesday
night to hear an anti-ABM debate, and 1216
voted overwhelmingly against Safeguard in
an informal ballot (76 per cent opposed it,
21 per cent favored it).
Physicists have been visiting their Sen-
ators all week carrying anti-ABM petitions.
"Every swing Senator has been visited," said
Martin Perl, Stanford physicist and an or-
ganizer of Scientists for Social and Political
Action.
The Physical Society officially said its mem-
bers have voted 8559 to 6405 to meet next
January in Chicago, despite many members'
protests over police handling of disorders
during the Democratic Convention. The so-
ciety also named a committee to seek ways
for concerned physicists to examine scien-
tists' role in society?a lesser response to
demands for a new division on science and
society.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I ask unanimous
consent to have printed in the RECORD
the following additional articles:
An article entitled "Defense Research:
Pentagon Declassifying Projects Studied
in University Labs," written by Richard
Homan, and published in the Washing-
ton Post of June 23, 1969.
An article entitled "MIT Curb on Se-
cret Projects Reflects Growing Anti/mill-
tary Feeling Among Universities' Re-
searchers," written by William K.
Stevens, and published in the New York
Times of May 5, 1969.
An article entitled "Dissident Scien-
tists Brew Defense Program Tempest,"
written by John Lannan, and published
in the Washington Star of February 5,
1969.
There being no objection, the articles
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Washington Post, June 23, 1969]
DEFENSE RESEARCH?PENTAGON DECLASSIFY-
ING PROPECTS STUDIED IN UNIVERSITY LABS
(By Richard Homan)
Faced with the threat of serious disruption
of its research activities in universities, the
Defense Department is making a determined
effort to adjust them to the changed atmos-
phere on the Nation's campuses.
Within the past year it has cut by half the
amount of classified defense research?a par-
ticularly provocative reminder of Pentagon
presence?done in universities.
As a matter of policy, basic research proj-
ects in universities are no longer classified
and a program of high-level, stringent peri-
odic review of applied research projects has
been established to determine whether their
classification is still justified.
Although the Pentagon does not expect to
do away with all classification of defense
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kept on campuses?to provide a target for
the most violent radicals so they wouldn't
turn their attentions to unclassified projects.
Until the reassessment of Pentagon-spon-
sored activities by Stanford and MIT, only
two serious challenges to classified research
had arisen on campuses in more than a
decade. In 1967, New York University and the
University of Pennsylvania canceled projects
dealing with chemical and biological war-
fare.
At a speech before the American Institute
on Problems of European Unity last week,
Dr. Teller, one of the world's foremost nu-
clear physicists, complained that security
classification was "scattering our scientists
away from defense work."
In a broad attack on all secrecy in research,
Teller said, "we must adopt a policy of open-
ness. We have classified everything; we have
succeeded in a fabulous manner in confusing
the American public, the Congress, by this
secrecy.
"Secrecy has not succeeded in slowing
down Russian research, even in the most
secret areas such as my own, nuclear ex-
plosives. Secrecy does not hurt anybody ex-
cept ourselves. I think a thoroUgh review of
secrecy is needed."
[From the New York Times, May 5, 1969]
M.I.T. CURB ON SECRET PROJECTS REFLECTS
GROWING ANTIMILITARY FEELING AMOITG
UNIVERSITIES' RESEARCHERS
(By William K. Stevens)
The Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy, by declining temporarily to accept new
programs of classified research from the Gov-
ernment, has spotlighted a new stage in the
evolution of what might properly be called
the Federal-industrial-academic complex.
This vast, interrelated social organism has
been the main instrument of scientific in-
quiry and technological advance in the
United States since the instrument was born
of wartime necessity, in total secrecy, three
decades ago.
Since then it has undergone successive
mutations?first with post-World War II de-
mobilization, then with the onset of the cold
war and the start of the space age, and now
with a rising tide of antimilitary feeling
among university researchers.
That feeling coupled with a growing inter-
est in how science and technology might
serve the nation's social needs, is said to have
lent urgency to M.I.T.'s decision, announced
last week, to place a moratorium on new
secret research projects.
PANEL TO REPORT
The moratorium will last until Oct. 1,
when a 22-man panel is to report on its re-
examination of the institute's relationship
to two of its semi-independent divisions, the
Lincoln Laboratory and the M.I.T. Instru-
mentation Laboratory, which are two of the
country's major contractors for research
sponsored by the military.
The study of the two laboratories' roles
was undertaken, M.I.T.'s president, Howard
W. Johnson, said in an interview last week,
as part of a continuing internal reassessment
of the institute. But he said the laboratories
were made the subject of a special separate
study because of "widespread concern" about
secret military research among M.I.T. pro-
fessors and students.
The ferment is rooted in fears of military-
industrial dominance, in a deep sense of un-
certainty about nuclear war as expressed in
dissent over the antiballistic missile system
and, especially, in the Vietnamese war, ac-
cording to Dr. James R. Killian Jr., chair-
man of the M.I.T. Corporation, who was a
science adviser to President Eisenhower.
"A SHIFT IN INTEREST"
"There is now a shift in interest," Dr.
Killian said in an interview in his office
at M.I.T. "There was a period when the cut-
ting edge of technology was in the areas of
the military and space. But there is a feel-
ing now that in terms of national need we
ought to devote a larger proportion of work
to other fields." He mentioned transportation,
bioengineering, medical research and social
problems generally.
"I would lay great stress on this shift of
mood," he said.
Today's mood is far different from the one
in which some of the nation's leading sci-
entists found themselves in the fall of 1939
when Dr. James B. Conant, then president
of Harvard University, invited them to his
home to talk about the role of science and
scientists in the war that had just begun.
KISTIAKOWSKY IN GROUP
"I was among them," Dr. George B. Kis-
tiakowsky, the Harvard chemist who later
succeeded Dr. Killian as President Eisen-
hower's science adviser, said in an interview
last week. "We talked of the possibility of
offeringiour services to the British. We would
also be learning the problems of warfare in
case the United States should become in-
volved."
Separately, a group of American physicists
had become concerned over the prospect of
using nuclear fission to produce a bomb of
vast destructive power.
"In view of this situation," Dr. Albert Ein-
stein wrote to President Roosevelt on Aug. 2,
1939, "you may think it desirable to have
some permanent contact maintained between
the Administration and the group of physi-
cists working on chain reactions in Amer-
ica."
After the fall of France in 1940, Mr. Roose-
velt gave the concerned scientists official
power by chartering the National Defense
Research Committee, headed by Dr. Vannever
Bush. Its purpose: to organize American
science and technology for war.
COORDINATED EFFORT
Expanded into the Office of Scientific Re-
search and Development (0.S.R.D.) , the Bush
group coordinated the country's over-all sci-
entific effort throughout the war and over-
saw the initial development of the atomic
bomb until the Manhattan Project was set
up separately.
With the end of the war, 0.S.R.D. was de-
activated, and most universities got out of
the business of secret research. But the coun-
try was left with an 0.S.R.D. legacy that is
the basis of the country's scientific and tech-
nological effort, and of the Federal-indus-
trial-academic complex, to this day: the Gov-
ernment contract as the main mechanism for
financing private research.
PATTERN ESTABLISHED
Basic research had all but stopped during
the war, and Government contracts let main-
ly by the Office of Naval Research, under-
wrote its rebirth afterward. Had it not been
for this, Dr. Bush said the other day, the
result for scientific research "would have
been a catastrophe."
Within a few years other Government
agencies were financing research across the
whole spectrum of scientific activities. For
the most part, money to universities was
for nonsecret basic research, and that re-
mains the pattern.
The Federal Government during the cur-
rent fiscal year is spending more than 85-bil-
lion for the support of research and nearly
$11-billion for development, or the fashion-
ing of new products based on the fruits of
research.
Of the 85-billion for research, about $1.5-
billion is going to the colleges and univer-
sities. Of this $1.5-billion, $247-million?or
about 16 per cent?comes from the Depart-
ment of Defense.
Of the $247-million from the Defense De-
partment, only about 4 per cent goes for
secret research, Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, Presi-
dent Nixon's science adviser, told the Senate
Government Operations subcommittee last
week. Ile said this was down from 8 per cent
two years ago.
Since shortly after World War II, few uni-
versities have done secret research. And Dr.
DuBridge said in an interview last Satur-
day that almost all the money going from
the Defense Department to universities for
nonsecret projects was for basic research.
He defined basic research as research in
which the only goal is the pursuit of new
knowledge, wherein "you can't tell in ad-
vance whether it's going to be socially useful
or not."
Most of the disengagement from military-
oriented research in the academic commu-
nity, he said, is in the realm of applied sci-
ence?that is, research directed toward a
specific goal.
M.I.T. SHARE LARGE
However, most of the applied research in
military matters is done in the Defense De-
partment's own laboratories or by industrial
contractors. The government this year is
spending about $1.3-billion in these two
categories.
M.I.T. has a disproportionate share of
military research contracts. Not only is it
allocated more Federal research grants than
any other university ($96-million worth in
the fiscal year 1967, the latest year for which
comparative figures are available), but near-
ly half the amount?$47-million worth?is
from the Department of Defense.
By comparison, the recipients of the next
four largest Federal allocations were: Uni-
versity of Michigan, $56-million total, in-
cluding $13-million from Defense; Univer-
sity of Illinois, $52-million, $12-million De-
fense; Columbia, $52-million and $11-mil-
lion; University of California, Berkeley,
$48.8-million and $7-million.
M.I.T.'s high proportion of defense research
funds can perhaps be traced to the Lincoln
and Instrumentation laboratories. The Lin-
coln Laboratory?created in 1951, early in the
cold war, to develop early warning systems
for the detection of incoming enemy bomb-
ers an,d missiles?has spent $05-million, of
which $64-million came from the Defense De-
partment.
The instrumentation Laboratory, which is
the world's leading research center for self-
oontained missile-guidance systems, received
$30-million to develop the guidance systems
for the Thor, Polaris and Poseidon missiles.
In the fiscal year 1968 it spent $20-million
for development of the guidance and naviga-
tion system of the Apollo spacecraft under a
contract from the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration.
Few of those interviewed believe the two
M.I.T. laboratories will or should be closed
clown. The main point at issue is their fu-
ture form and relationship to the institute
at large.
"I hope this problem won't be solved by
S.D.S. pressures," said Dr. DuBridge, refer-
ring to Students for a Democratic Society.
"It's important for universities to look at
themselves when they're not in a period of
crisis," Dr. Johnson of M.I.T. said, "and we're
not."
[From the Washington Star, Feb. 5, 19691
DISSIDENT SCIENTISTS BREW DEFENSE PROGRAM
TEMPEST
(By John Lannan)
A new tempest is brewing in the national
scientific community over whether the de-
fense establishment absorbs too much of
the oo-untry's scientific and technological
energies.
In New York this week several groups of
younger physicists are pressing a host of
proposals for political activism and at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology an
activist step has already been taken?a day-
long "research stoppage" has been called for
March 4.
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In Manhattan, the cans for action were fOr university research as between 1969 cost of -$71,600,000, which amounts to an
heard during the aamrial meeting of the and 1970. average of $59,000 per man-year.
American Physical Society. The research In Project Themis, which is generally That is quite a sizable sum to appro-
stopPage at MIT has been scheduled by a
newly formed Union of ncerned Scientists,
called the Federal aid-to-education proj- priate, to turn over to an organization for
at the Instigation of more vocal members in ect of the Pentagon, there is a 13-percent no specific purpose, in a sense to do with
Oci
the physics department. increase in the budget request. I am un- as they please, and at these rates.
?This is not a strike in terms of the able at this point to estimate precisely Rand, in turn, agreed "to perform a
standard use of the word," said the union% what effect that has over the actual ex- program of study and research on the
chairman, Prof. Francis T Low. "It's not penditure last year on these particular broad subject of aerospace power, with
directed against MIT. It a psychological items. The Senator stated the overall the object of recommending to the U.S.
amounts but it was not broken down into Air Force preferred methods, techniques,
specific items. and instrumentalities for the develop-
On this matter of social behavioral ment and employment of aerospace
science research, the one which has at- power."
tracted much of the criticism, there was I presume that out of that profound
an increase of 7 percent between the 1969 research they came up with a project
and 1970 budget requests. There was a like the C-5A. That is one example, I
specific reduction of $1.5 million, as I un- presume; I hope it was not, but I do not
derstand it, by the committee. know what they produced that has been
As to the Federal contract research of great value.
centers, there was a 5-percent increase. We were told yesterday, much to my
This represents a very large amount; the surprise, by some Senators, that our air-
actual amount, as to these research cell- planes are inferior. One of the Senators,
ters, is $263.3 million in 1969, and $277.4 in the course of the debate, said they are
million in 1970, a 5-percent increase. inferior. I do not believe that, myself;
As I understand it, the committee ac- but it seems that whenever there hap-
tion does not specifically cut these items; pens to be a problem and if they want
it provides for an overall cut, which may more money, the argument is that the
be applied, according to the report, in product is inferior. If we are talking on
broad categories; and, of course, this is the Fourth of July, on the other hand,
one reason why it is of no particular we have got the best planes and equip-
significance to say, when the Senator is ment in the wOrld. It all depends on the
defending this item, "you should specify circumstances how good the products
the precise ones you have got." I do, not are. My guess is that our planes are as
know that the committee specified ex- good as anybody's. We certainly have
actly what they thought. If I correctly spent as much money as anyone on them.
understand the report, on page 49, the Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the
committee recommended reductions in Senator yield?
the general areas as follows: The Army, Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
$10 million; the Navy, $15 million; and Mr. MURPHY. Possibly the Senator is
the Air Force, $12 million, which is very making reference to remarks made by
much in the same pattern as my amend- me yesterday, in which I pointed out that
ment. We more or less used the same ap- we had not had a new model fighter
proach, but we went one step farther. plane laid down, I believe, since 1954,
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- and that the B-52's being used so effec-
ator's time has expired. tively?thank goodness we have them?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield myself 5 ad- are, many of them, 10 years old, and
ditional minutes. some of them older than that.
We went one step further in at least I do not think I used the word 'in-
recommending, although the amend- ferior." I might have implied that we
ment itself does not require it, cuts of could have had better planes had we
specific amounts within the categories, had better planing in the Department of
I am not at all sure that it is wise prac- Defense, in the background. I think
tice for the Senate to go beyond that, somewhere along the line we have been
other than as to some one very specific negligent; and I know my distinguished
up political activism. At least
item that might be called to our atten- colleague agrees with me that when we
two and pos-
sibly three groups are bent on making the tion, such as the ones we mentioned, the send our boys out to defend the security
prestigious American Physical Society more Ataturk study and some of the others. of the country, we do not want to give
responsive to what they say are the needs It is very hard to find out about those them second-class equipment.
rather than the fears of people. until after the studies have been author- Mr. FULBRIGHT. I agree with the
INVOLVEMES4 r SIGHT ized and are in process, or well along. In Senator, but I have never been under
One group is trying to change the society's many cases, it is difficult to know what is the impression that they have had sec-
constitution, (a move that failed almost two being done until the study is completed. ond-class equipment.
to one last year,) to get it involved with On the "think tanks," the funding of The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
contemporary problems. AIP's constitution the "think tanks," it seems to me, is ex- ator's 5 minutes have expired.
rather than public policy. tremely loose, Rand being one of the Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield myself 5 ad-
now limits its activities to scientific issues
Still another is trying to broaden the AIP's principal ones?a very large operation. I ditional minutes.
role in the education, of the public to the wish to explain briefly why I think that The planes we have lost, for example,
dangers as well as the benefits of scientific is a very loose way to control these in Vietnam, were not lost because they
and technological advance. operations, were confronted by superior airplanes,
Still a third is trying to establish some The financing of these research cen- but because they were shot down with
sort of an action group ,uch as that spawned ters, commonly called "think tanks" is ground-to-air missiles and other ground
by the MIT faculty. not on a project-by-project basis at all, fire, which I do not think a better plane,
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Here is an area in but under agreements by the various if there was one, could have avoided.
which the evidenceL is quite clear, I be- military agencies to provide long term They have not been outclassed in air
lieve, that it is not in the interests of our support to the organizations they sport- battles. At least, such incidents have not
universities nor, I think, in the long-term sor. The current Air Force contract with been brought to my attention.
interests of the Pentagon itself, to Rand, for example, covers the 5-year pe- / read in today% newspaper that we
alienate the young scientists or the young nod from 1966 to 1971, and is for a mini- have sent 72 more new Phantom jets to
people of this country. Yet there is a 20- mum of 1,277.8 man-years of prates- Spain to impress the Spanish with what
Percent Increase in the budget request sional scientific effort, at an estimated good planes we have. They are more
protest."
OTHER CAMPUSES PRESSED
The MIT group is seeking to spread ite
disaffection with the w4 things are to other
campuses.
"We've made contact with 10 to 20 others
already," said Murray Ed n, a professor of
electrical engineering. "We're sending letters
to other institutions anil maybe a couple of
hundred are going or have gone out."
The letter-writing catriptign, LOW explain-
ed, is a person-to-person one, faculty mem-
bers at one institution writing to colleagues
at another. Though each union member's
goals may differ, the basic idea is the same:
That the nation is dissipating on defense its
scientific capabilities for bettering human
life.
The Vietnam conflict appears to be little
more than a precipitating factor in bringing
on the March 4 protest at the Defense De-
partment's single largest research contractor
amongst educational institutions.
"I think we're all very unhappy about the
Vietnam war," said Lou. "but that's not
what we're protesting about."
CONFIDENCE sHAEEN.
But the 42 faculty members who signed
the original statement of purpose nearly a
week ago said Vietnam hes "shaken our con-
fidence in (the government's) ability to make
wise and humane decisions."
They also pointed out that "there is also
disquieting evidence of an intention to en-
large further our immense destructive ca-
pability." They said the response of the
scientific community to these intentions
"has been hopelessly fragmented."
The union's proposals include a call to
start "a critical and continuing examination
of governmental policyln areas where science
and technology are of actual or potential
significance:" to turn research from defense-
oriented to environmental-oriented projects,
to start their students questioning their fu-
ture professional commitments; to express
opposition to the anti-ballistic missile sys-
tem and, finally, to organize scientists into
an effective and vocal political action group.
In New York, several groups of younger,
concerned physicists are busily drUrnming
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modern than the F-100's which they re-
placed. However, that is not .exactly the
point.
The Rand Corp., the "think tank," has
a free hand to spend $71 million during
this period of 5 years at an average of
$59,000 per man-year.
I think this is loose accounting. And
I protest strenuously under the present
budget conditions and the difficulties we
had in getting money for the education
bill just recently passed, and for other
bills.
Efforts are made to cut items out of
the education bill and other bills.
I protest the disproportionate amount
we are spending in these research proj-
ects which have very questionable rele-
vance to the mission of the Defense
Department.
They have nothing whatever, in my
opinion, to do with the protection of the
men in Vietnam. These are not research
projects for a better plane.
That is not what the Rand Corn is
really doing. These are different proj-
ects. They fall under a different cate-
gory. All these behaviorial science re-
search studies have nothing to do with
the qualities of a plane or any other
hardware. They have no relevance to the
hardware used to fight. Some of the
studies are designed, in my opinion, to
assist in brainwashing either the enemy
or our own soldiers or someone else, I
guess, because they fall in the field of
psychological research, which is an inter-
esting subject but is unrelated to the
mission of the Defense Department.
The university research is sort of in
a class by itself. Regardless of what ef-
fect it may have upon the Pentagon ac-
tivities, I do not want them to further
undermine the integrity of our universi-
ties or schools.
This is a much more serious matter
than whatever they may wish to do to
the program of research of the Penta-
gon itself.
I feel the same way about research in
foreign institutions. We are having
enough trouble with our foreign rela-
tions. This is an area with which we are
all familiar. We know about the protests
all around the world at our foreign re-
search activities and the difficulties we
have had.
The President came back from one trip
abroad and reported that everyone is en-
thusiastic about the United States. If
everyone is as enthusiastic about the
United States, I think the enthusiasm
is limited to the moon shot. It would
be very strange indeed that the attitude
toward many of the policies we are fol-
lowing would be changed 'that quickly.
The important thing is that to intrude
our defense-sponsored research into the
foreign institutions harms our relations
with the foreign nations.
There was a specific example of this in
Sweden last year. The Swedes protested
the program we had paid their universi-
ties to undertake.
We know what has happened in Japan.
We know about the violence originating
In university circles in Chile when the
Camelot was brought to light. In India
last year, approximately a year ago, we
remember what happened there.
I have an article entitled "India Sus-
pects U.S. Scholars," written by Bernard
D. Nossiter, who is one of the most re-
ceptive and able reporters the Washing-
ton Post has. The article was published
In the Washington Post of August 15,
1968.
I read the first paragraph:
American scholars in India are again sus-
pect after parliamentary explosion here over
a Himalayan research program supported by
Defense Department funds.
Here we have an actual injury to our
relations because we intrude with De-
fense Department funds into foreign
academic research. What we are doing is
driving friendly countries away from us.
They certainly simply do not like it. I
do not blame them for that. They do not
wish to be an appendage of the Penta-
gon. I think they are quite justified. I
think that that item, which is $5.7 mil-
lion, should be eliminated.
I do not see any excuse for our going
abroad and subsidizing these people. I
assume that originally there was some
idea that we might cultivate them and
that they would be ingratiated and
would respond.
Domestically, when we give a contract
to people, they usually respond and are
appreciative of the money. Perhaps the
specific professor who got the contract
abroad might even have been apprecia-
tive. However, on balance, the people in
the institutions and in the country do
not like it. It is bad policy.
The PRESIDING OlenCER. The time
of the Senator has expired.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
yield myself an additional 2 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Arkansas is recognized for an
additional 2 minutes.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed at
this point in the RECORD the article to
which I have just referred and also an
article entitled "India Still Wary on U.S.
Scholars," Written by Joseph Lelyveld,
and published in the New York Times on
August 14, 1968.
There being no objection, the articles
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Aug. 15,
1968]
INDIA SUSPECTS U.S. SCHOLARS
(By Bernard D. Nossiter)
NEW DELHI, August 14?American scholars
in India are again suspect after parliamen-
tary explosion here over a Himalayan re-
search program supported by Defense De-
partment funds.
The incident centers around the Himala-
yan Border Countries (HBC), a project affili-
ated with the University of California at
Berkeley. The nature of the research ap-
pears to be innocuous and of no military
significance. But opposition politicians on
the left and right have created a storm be-
cause $282,000 is coming from the Pentagon.
In reply to questions in Parliament last
week, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi said
she would "very carefully look into" the
project. Her Minister of State for External
Affairs, Bali Ram Baghat, said that the
government views the program "with con-
cern" and is "reviewing the advisability of
permitting" it to continue.
FOUNDATION ORDERED our
India has already ordered the Asia Foun-
dation here to pack up because it received
' money from the Central Intelligence Agency.
In view of the rising wave of Indian national-
ism, American researchers say they would
not be surprised if the government now for-
bade them to enter the sensitive Himalayan
region near China and denied visas to
scholars supported by military or intelligence
money.
The blowup was forecast last winter by a
California professor of anthropology, Gerald
53. Berreman.. He resigned from the Hi-
malayan project, writing its director, Leo
Rose, a political scientist at Berkeley:
"It seems unlikely that one would be per-
mitted by the governments of host nations to
pursue anthropological research (and pre-
sumably most other social science research
which takes place in the countryside) if it
were known that the money came directly
from the United States military establish-
ment."
OPPOSED TO VIET WAR
Berreman also resigned on what he called
moral grounds, citing his opposition to the
war in Vietnam. He is now in India under a
Fulbright-Hays fellowship, hoping to study
urbanism in a northern city. Yesterday, offi-
cials in the Ministry of External Affairs ques-
tioned him about the Himalayan project.
The program began in the late 1950s, sup-
ported entirely by Ford Foundation money.
When this source began drying up, Director
Rose hunted up other outlets and found
funds at the Defense Department's Advanced
Research Project Agency, the Smithsonian
Institution and elsewhere.
The project has produced analyses of the
relations between Tibet, India and China;
the political system of Nepal; and other
studies in linguistics, ethnology and anthro-
pology.
Berreman, who examined the Pentagon
contract, says it places no curbs on the schol-
ars. It enables them to choose their own
projects and guarantees that none of their
findings shall be classified.
FOES IN PARLIAMENT
The furor in Parliament was touched off by
a member of the Revolutionary Socialist
Party. Members of the Jana Sangh, a party of
right-wing Hindu fanatics, and Communists
suggested that the research is merely a cover
for American espionage.
The National Herald, a daily that usually
reflects the government's line, said that per-
mission for the scholars to work in the Hima-
layas "should never have been approved by
anyone alive to the nation's self-respect and
security . . . Whichever organization in the
United States finances it, research and in-
telligence have been inextricably involved
during the postwar period."
Perhaps as a result of this affair, professors
here say, there have been unusual delays in
granting visas to other American researchers
with grants from the Health, Education and
Welfare Department's Fulbright-Hays pro-
gram. Ironically, India appears to have dis-
covered the military sponsorship of the Him-
alayan project from hearings held last May
by Sen. Fulbright's Committee on Foreign
Relations.
[From the New York Times, Aug. 14, 1968]
INDIA STILL WARY ON U.S. SCHOLARS?.
CONCERN OVER PENTAGON OR CIA IN-
VOLVEMENT STRONG
(By Joseph Lelyveld) ?
NEW DELHI, August 13?Three months ago
Prof. Gerald D. Berreman, a University of
California anthropologist, applied for a visa
to come to India for a year of research and
teaching. Today he called at the External Af-
fairs Ministry here to assure worried officials
that he was not an operative of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
It is an assurance that Indian officials now
feel they must have from all American schol-
ars interested in their country. But there was
a special irony in Professor Berreman's case
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August 12, 1969
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
because he helped to start the controversy
that made the Indians edgy.
Last January he sent Senator J. W. Ful-
bright, chairman of the Foreign Relations
'Committee, a copy of a letter he had written
withdrawing from participation in a research
project on the Himalayas. He felt that the
project had been cendpromised by financial
support from the Pentagon.
The anthropologist Wryly describes himself
as a wild-eyed opponent of the wax in Viet-
nam. His letter explained that this was the
basis of his "moral abler. lion" to taking the
funds. It also cited what he termed a prac-
tical objection?that the project and all other
serious academic resejVcir by Americans in
India could easily become controversial here
as a result of the Defense Department's in-
volvement
Dr. Berreman, who later got a grant from
the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, discovered to his dismay how ac-
curate his forecast was. In fact, the contro-
versy that has blown up here has caused the
Government to hold up on all visa applica-
tions from Americans with any kind of aca-
demic pursuit.
Indians became conscious of the Penta-
gon's support of scholarly research only a few
weeks ago, when there were press reports of
Congressional testimony by Adm. Hyman G.
Rickover before Mr. Pulbright's committee.
The outcry in Parliament was immediate.
One member charged that the Pentagon and
C.I.A. were busy infilhating spies into the
Himalayas, not only as scholars but also as
artists, bird-watchers and yogis.
Privately, Inidan officials say they do not
really suspect the scholar:, of being spies. But
they make it clear that research underwrit-
ten by the Pentagon has no future here.
COOPERATION IN etlE PAST
This is also ironic, for India's own Ministry
of Defense has cooperated in the past with
the Advanced Research Project Agency, which
gave the Himalayan projek t a grant of $280,-
000.
As Professor Berreman e ,plains it, the proj-
ect was not an integrated program of re-
search but a pot-pourri of diverse studies
in several disciplines thrown together for the
specific purpose of attracting funds.
The anthropologist, who wrote an article
last February for The Ne Lion decrying the
"moral imperialism" of the Peace Corps,w
as
asked whether there was any clear moral dif-
ference between taking money from the De-
fense Department and taking it from the De-
partment of Health, Educe tion and Welfare.
"Oh, I know I can't be entirely consistent,"
he replied. "If I were to be entirely con-
sistent, I wouldn't 134q my taxes and
I wouldn't be teachin,; at the Uni-
versity of California. Its not consistency that
I want but impact?in the form of opposi-
tion to the war."
Professor Berreman, who is here on a two-
month tourist visa now, hopes to return next
month to do a study of urbanization in Deb-
ra Dun, a town near the Himalayas but not
in them. The author of a book called "Hindus
of the Himalayas," he Atomised the officials
he saw today that he would not try to do any
further research in the mountains.
Among others waiting for action on their
visas are a dozen graduates of professional
schools at the University of California who
should already have arrived here for a year
of further studies. A University of Wisconsin
student of linguistics who Ed hoped to study
Tibetan and Sanskrit in Darjeeling has been
asked to move from the Himalayan resort to
Benares.
American officials say they are not unduly
alarmed by the difficulties the scholars are
meeting. "Remember," one said, "we've had i
our moments of xenophobia and obscurant-
ism too."
Mr. HART. Mr. President, in the
course of the discussion it has been sug-
gested that there are certain research
projects which more appropriately could
be undertaken by other agencies and de-
partments of the Government. How-
ever, they are not doing it. The Defense
Department is. Without the Senator's
amendment, some of these worthwhile
things would terminate. A willingness to
assist in the transfer from the Defense
Department to department X has been
voiced.
I ask the Senator if it is not true that
If there are projects of a research na-
ture which are trimmed back by agree-
ment to the Senator's amendmdnt, proj-
ects which are thought to be worthy as
research projects, there is on the Senate
calendar a bill to authorize appropria-
tions for activities of the National Sci-
ence Foundation. That bill in regular
order will follow the disposition of this
bill by the Senate.
I know of no way in which we can
operate here as jugglers. We will have to
take a stand here at some time, and I
hope that it is now. We will have to say
no to some of these rather esoteric and
certainly not directly defense-related re-
search projects and cut them off and,
happily, we are in a point of time in
relation to the Senate bill in which the
measures that will follow have value,
and something may be picked up in the
following bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
time of the Senator has expired.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
yield myself an additional 5 minutes.
Mr. HART. We are ready to make the
transfer. However, before we are in a po-
sition to be able to transfer, we have to
saw off the defense from that kind of
research.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
agree with what the Senator says I am
a cosponsor with the Senator from Okla-
homa of a measure to create a founda-
tion for research in the behaviorial
sciences. That would be a perfectly prop-
er place to transfer these behavioral
projects, assuming that they are good
projects.
Mr. HART. Mr. President, that bill will
follow the pending bill.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
agree with the Senator. I think that his
Point is well taken.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed at this point in the
RECORD for the information of the Sen-
ate a list of a number of particular in-
stitutions.
This one is for the fiscal year 1968
from the Department of Defense. It gives
the name of the contractor and loca-
tion and the amount of money for the
fiscal year 1968.
I also ask unanimous consent to have
printed at this point in the RECORD for
Project Themis, a list of the universities
that consist of both private and public
universities. The list gives the funding
for 1967, 1968, and 1969. That, of course,
s the latest we have. I.do this to show
how extensive is the intrusion of the
Defense Department into Practically all
of the important institutions of the
United States.
Mr. HART. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
This again goes too far and lends cre-
dence to the allegations of those who
say that we are becoming a militaristic
nation and that our civilian government
and civilian life is being subordinated
to the overwhelming influence of the
military.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
SECTION Il?NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1961
lExcerpt from Department of Defense listing of 500 contractor
according to net value of mtary prime contract awards to
research, development, test, mid evaluation work]
Rank
Name of contractor and location
Thousand:
of dollar
10 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. _ _ _ _ 119, 17!
Cambridge, Mass - 31, 66,
Lexington, Mass 87, 51.
20 Aerospace Corp 73, 33,
El Segundo, Calif 73, 30
San Bernardino, Calf 3:
22 Johns Hopkins University 57, 61
Baltimore City, Md 2,71
Silver Spring, Md 54,90
--
30 Mitre Corp., Bedford, Mass 35,71
36 Stanford Research Institute 28, 71
Ethiopia _
19
Thailand 5
Homer Village, Alaska 1
Menlo Park, Calif__ 27,60
Stanford, Calif ....1. 32
Mercury, NeV 43
Cheyenne, Wyo- 7
40 Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif 19,13!
44 California, University of 17,39,
Berkeley, Calif 5,76;
D3Vis, Calif 12-i
Irvine, Calif 61
La Jolla, Calif 5, 51(
Los Angeles, Calif 1, 471
Point Mugu, Calif 12
Riverside, Galif 89
San Diego, Calif 3, 182
San Francisca, Calif_ 256
Santa Barbara, CaliL 870
Santa Cruz, Calif44
? -., ,
45 System Development Corp 17,372
Huntsville, Ala 414
Lompoc, Calif 700
Los Angeles, Calif_ 61
Santa Monica, Calif 13, 120
Washington, D.0 863
Belleville, Ill 350
Lexington, Mass 375
Rome, N.Y 191
Dayton, Ohio 303
Falls Church, Va 1, 226
Hampton, Va 234
Norfolk, Va 35
46 Stanford University 1 ,422
Palo Afto, Calif 218
Stanford, Calif 1 ,204
51 Rochester, University of Rochester, N.Y....._ 13,182
55 Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, Inc 12, 500
57
60
64
65
Edwards, Calif 86
Buffalo, N.Y 11, 889
Wright-Patterson, Ohio 37
Fails Church, Va 448
ITT Research Institute 12,172
Chicago, III 7,017
Annapolis, Md 5,130
Wright-Patterson, Ohio.. 25
Institute for Defense Analysis, Arlington,
Va 11,691
Pennsylvania Sate University, University
Park, Pa 10,513
Research Analysis Corp 10,967
Iran 155
Vietnam 880
McLean, Va 9,273
Various &mettle ?241
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364R0003001
SECTION II-NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, FISCAL YEAR SECTION II-NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, FISCAL YEAR
1968-Continued 1968-Continued
SECTION II-NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, FISCAL YEAR
1968-Continued
Rank Name of contractor and location
Thousands
ot dollars Rank Name of contractor and location
66 Columbia University, New York, N.Y
70 Michigan, University of
Honolulu City, Hawaii 1,600
Ann Arbor, Mich 6,947
Willow Run, Mich 734
Ypsilanti, Mich 197
71 Illinois, University of
Chicago, Ill
Urbana, Ill
72 Battelle Memorial Institute
Germany_ _ _
Washington, 13.0
Columbus, Ohio
Richland, Wash
78 U.S. National Aero Space Agency
Edwards, Calif
Moffett Field, Calif
Pasadena, Calif
Washington, D.0
Houston, Tex
Ridgeley, W. Va
Thousands
of dollars Rank Name of contractor and location
9,929 147 Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pa
9,478 151 Harvard University
Boston, Mass
Cambridge, Mass
Fort Davis, Tex
153 Minnesota, University of, Minneapolis,
8,583 Minn
- 154 California Institute of Technology, Paso-
89 dena, Calif
8,494 155 Texas A. & M. Research Foundation, College
Station, Tex
8,322 156 Purdue Research Foundation
85 Riverside Research Institute, New York, N.Y_
92 Washington, University of, Seattle, Wash_
94 Texas, University of
57
114
8,036
115
Lafayette, Ind
West Lafayette, Ind
160 New York University
Thousands
of dollars
2,575 254 Smithsonian Institution 1,082
2, 524
Washington, D.0 1,067
182 Cambridge, Mass 15
2,182
160 260 Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind 1,044
261 Kansas, University of 1,044
2,507
2,487
2,475
2,455
2,442
13
Kansas City, Kans 18
Lawrence, Kans 1,026
262 American Institute of Research 1,038
Palo Alto, Calif 93
Silver Spring, Md 145
Camp Lejeune, N.0 54
Pittsburgh, Pa 746
2,304 265 Case Western Reserve University, Cleve-
land, Ohio 8,011
266 Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, N.Y.. 1,001
267 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission ' 995
7,026 Bronx, N.Y 731
- New York, N.Y 1,513
25 Syracuse, N.Y 25
40 University Heights, N.Y 35
19
77 167 Maryland University of 2,100
155
6,710 Baltimore City, Md 703
College Park, Md 1,397
6,315
5,552
5,386
Alamogordo, N. Mex 10
Austin, Tex 4, 598
College Station, Tex 68
Dallas, Tex 43
El Paso, Tex 502
Galveston, Tex 135
Houston, Tex 30
96 Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, Woods 5,143
Hole, Mass. ' 175
105 Utah, University of 4,356 181
182
' Dugway, Utah 283
Salt Lake City, Utah 4,073
107 Syracuse University Research Corp 4,172
Burlington, Mass 94
Syracuse, N.Y 4,078
117 Dayton, University of 3,610
Dayton, Ohio 3,358
Wright-Patterson, Ohio 252
118 Cornell University 3,595
Arecibo, P.R 1,585
Ithaca, N.Y 1,949
New York, N.Y 61
123 George Washington University 3,306
Washington, D.0 3,295
Alexandria, Va 11
128 Southwest Research Institute 3,149
Wright-Patterson, Ohio 226
Dallas, Tex 35
San Antonio, Tex 2,888
131 Denver, University of, Denver, Colo 2,902
133 Ohio State University Research Foundation_ 2,958
Columbus, Ohio 2,686
Wright-Patterson, Ohio 272
134 American University, Washington, D C 2,944 229
138 National Academy of Sciences 2,838 234
Washington, D.0 2,756
Watertown, Mass 47
National Academy of Sciences, Dover, NJ_ 35
139 Duke University, Durham, N.0 2,012 235
140 New Mexico State University
Alamogordo, N. Mex 24
Las Cruces, N. Mex 640
University Park, N. Mex 1,612
White Sands MS., N. Mex 511
143 Alaska, University of, College Village,
Alaska 2,695
146 Miami, University of 2,602
Coral Gables, Fla 1,141 248
Miami, Fla 1,461
252
172 New Mexico, University of 1,906
Albuquerque, N. Mex
Sandia; N. Mex
174 New York State University of
Washington, D.0 175
Germantown, Md 39
Las Vegas, Nev 270
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Albuquerque, N. Mex 451
Oak Ridge, Tenn 40
Richland, Wash 20
934
1,052 268 Illinois Institute Technology, Chicago, III__ 988
270 U.S. Commerce Department 985
1,982
Boulder, Colo 540
Albany, N.Y 1,538 Washington, D.0 324
Buffalo, N.Y 318 Gaithersburg, Md 46
New York, N.Y 115 Rockville, Md 10
Stony Brook, N.Y 11 Suitland, Md 65
1,969 271 Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J 983
Oregon State University, Corvallis, Dreg--- _
Florida, University of, Gainesville, Fla
Princeton University, Princeton, N.J
184 Midwest Research Institute
Kansas City, Mn
Wright-Patterson, Ohio
186 Louisiana State University of, Baton Rouge,
La
188 Georgia Tech Research Institute, Atlanta,
Ga
195 Stevens Institute of Technology
1, 842 273 Southern Research Institute, Birmingham,
1,803 Ala 965
275 Colorado University 964
1,762 - -
Boulder, Colo 706
1,615 Denver, Colo 258
147
277 Northeastern University, Boston, Mass 952
279 Washington University, St. Louis, City Me_ . 933
1,754 281 Brown University, Providence, R.I 932
282 Pittsburgh, University of 921
1, 596 Washington, D.0 195
Pittsburgh, Pa 726
Hoboken, N.J 1, 559
New York, N.Y
197 WisconsinAniversity of, Madison, Wis
204 Hawaii, University of Honolulu City, Hawaii
210 Analytic Services Inc., Falls Church, Va
212 Cincinnati, University of Cincinnati, Ohio_ _ _
214 Oklahoma State University of Stillwater,
Oklahoma.
218 Iowa, State Univ of Science and Technology,
Ames, Iowa.
219 Chicago, University of
Chicago, III
Lemont, III
222 Florida State University, Tallahassee, Fla _
225 Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colo_
226 Kansas State University of Agriculture,
Manhattan, Kans.
228 Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute of
Brooklyn, N.Y 1,274
Farmingdale, N.Y 30
Catholic University of America, Washington, 1,304
D.C.
Research Triangle Institute 1,254
2,707 236
37 293 Missouri, University of 876
1,591 Columbia, Mo 798
1, 568 Kansas City, Mo 50
1,495 Rolla, Mo 28
1,446
1,422 296 Notre Dame, University of, Notre Dame, Ind _ 855
297 Oregon, University of 846
1,372
Eugene, Oreg 531
1,360 Portland, Dreg 315
1,320 298 Oklahoma, University of 840
40
Fort Sill, Okla 100
1,338 Norman, Okla 335
1,329 Oklahoma City, Okla 405
1,321
309 Virginia, University of, Charlottesville, Va 787
1, 304 316 Tennessee, University of 751
Iran
Durham, N.0
Triangle Park, N.0
Georgia Institute of Technology Atlanta, Ga.
New Mexico Institute Mining and Technol-
ogy.
China Lake, Calif
Socorro, N. Mex
238 Syracuse University
Syracuse, N.Y
Utica, N.Y
Pennsylvania, University of Philadelphia,
Pa
Rhode Island, University of, Kingston, R.I_
Knoxville, Tenn 520
Menphis, Tenn 64
Tullahoma, Tenn 167
317 Southern California, University of 749
Los Angeles, Calif 735
296 San Diego, Calif 14
606
352 319 Southern Methodist, University of, Dallas,
Tex 735
1,220 321 Delaware, University of, Newark. Del 732
8,218 325 Georgetown University, Washington, D.C_. _ 714
328 Yale University 709
200
1,018 New Haven, Conn 684
Alamogordo, N. Mex - 25
1,197
334 Houston, University of, Houston, Tex 680
1,184 338 Auburn University, Auburn, Ala 657
13 339 University Corp. Atmospheric Research 655
Boulder, Colo -40
1,125 Sunspot, II. Mex 695
1,084
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SECTION II?NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, FISCM. YEAR SECTION II?NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, FISCAL YEAR
1968?Continued
1968?Continued
Thousands
Rank Name of contractor and location of dollars
341 Dartmouth College, Hantiiir, N H ____ ____ 652
342 Arizona State University, emple, Ariz_ 649
348 American Society for Engineering, Wash-
ington, D.0 621
351 Lowell Technical Institute 618
--- _ ?
Billerica, Mass_ 40
Lowell, Mass 578
?
0
352 Lovelace Foundation, Allhiuerque, N. Mex_ 613
354 Ohio University,Athens Jo
608
358 Northwestern liniversity,Iyaastos, Ill 590
357 American Institute for Reieatch 569
--
Washington, D.0 26
Pittsburgh, Pa 481
370 Mississippi State Universtr, 'alate College,
Miss .. 564
371 Travelers Research Center Hartford, Conn__ 561
376 North Carolina State Untyamity, Raleigh, _
N. r
C " 551
388 Massachusetts, University ot _ 511
--- - ?
Amherst, Mass 493
Waltham, Mass 18
---- -
Rank
Name of contractor and location
Thousands
of dollars
390 Arizona, University of, Tucson, Ariz__ 504
396 National Society Professional Engineers,
Washington, D.0 493
418 Michigan State, University, East Lansing, 464
Mich.
427 Boston College 455
Chestnut Hill, Mass 318
Weston, Mass 137
. _
428 South Dakota School of Mines and Tech- 454
I . .
444 Nevada, University of Reno, Neu
446 Flight Safety Foundation, Phoenix, Ariz ._
462 North Carolina, University of, Chapel Hill,
N.C.
464 U.S. Interior Department___ _
SECTION II?NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, FISCAL YEAR
1968?Continued
Rank Name of contractor and location
Thousands
of dollars
468 Tufts University 380
---- --
Boston, Mass 41
Medford, Mass 339
_
478 Arctic Institute of North America._ 35:4
Canada_ _ 75
Washington, D.C___ 279
479 Alabama, University of... 351
426 Birmingham, Ala 176
423 Hontsville, Ala_ 102
390 University, Ala _ 73
aga 483 Utah State University of Agriculture Cccl
applied science 344
Denver, Col 50
Washington, D.0 37
Bartlesville, Okla 85
Albany, Oreg
Pittsburgh, Pa 165
467 Presbyterian Hospital, Chicago, III_ 384
Bedford, Mass------------- 62
Logan, Utah 82
485 Iowa, State University of, Iowa City, Iowa _ 342
487 Lehigh University, Bethleham, Pa 241
Total . 665.35
PROJECT THEMIS
The list shows all the Themis piojects funded through fiscal year 1969. The original 4-year plan called for 50 new starts for each of fiscal years 1967,. 1968, 1989, and 1970 for a total of 200
programs. During the first 3 years only 118 of the planned 150 new starts were approved. The fiscal year 1970 budget request for $33 million provides tor (1) 25 additional new projects lobe started
during fiscal year 1970 which would require $10 million, and (2) the renewal of the ongoing Themis programs which would require $23 million.
PROJECT THEMIS PROGRAMS?FUNDING BY FISCAL YEARS ($1,000)
Military
Department
State and institution
Alabama:
A Auburn University
Al University of Alabama
A Alaska: University of Alaska
Arizona:
N Arizona State_
AF Do
AF University of Arizona
AF University of Arizona at Tucson
California:
AF University of California, San Diego'
N University of Cilifornia, Riverside
Colorado:
N Colorado State_
N Colorado State.
AF Colorado State at Fort Collins_
Connecticut: University of Connecticut__ _
AF Delaware:
A University of Delaware
N University of Delaware at Newark _ _
District of Columbia:
AF Georgetown University.
N Catholic University _
N Catholic University
N Catholic University
Florida:
Al University of Florida
A University of Florida
N Florida State_
A Florida State__
N Florida State
Georgia:
A Georg ?Tech.
Al Georgia Tech
N University of Geo iia at Athens..
Hawaii:
N University of Hawaii
Al University of Hawaii
A University of Hawaii at Honolulu
Illinois:
Al Illinois Institute of technology.
A Illinois Institute of Technology at Chicago
Indiana:
Al Indiana University
N Notre Dame University
Iowa:
N Iowa State.
Al do_
A University of Iowa
N _do
Kansas:
A University of Kansas
Al do
Al Kansas State
N do
Al University of Kentucky
A Kentucky University at Lexington
Al do
A University of Louisville
Louisiana:
A Louisiana State_.
AF do
Kentucky:
Program topic
Information processing
Structural mechanics
Human ecology
Human performance in isolation
Detection devices, techniques and theory
Precision optical systems
X-ray and XUV radiation physics
Transport phenomena in flow systems
Solar radiation effects
Tropical weather disturbances, surface effects
Predictability of low-altitude winds_
Effects of environment on sensors
Structural fatigue
Fluid mechanics and heat transfer
_ Oceanography
Laser technology
Vitreous state structure and dynamics
Dynamics of cable systems
Underwater acoustics
Solid state materials
Logistics and information processing
Geophysical fluid dynamics
Prediction of tropical weather phenomena_
Computer aided instruction
Low-speed aerodynamic
Interface phenomena
Statistical analysis and information retrieval
Astronomy research
On-line computer systems
Vector-borne tropical diseases
V-STOL aerodynamics
Degradation of structural materials
. Environmental hazards
Deep sea engineering
Automatic navigation and control
Ceramic and composite materials
Vibration and stability ot military vehicles .
Application and theory of automata
Remote sensing instrumentation
Social and behavioral science
Performance in altered environment_
Nuclear radiation effects on electronic components
Fiscal year Fiscal year
1967 1968
343
404
380
171
202 ...
190 --
409
409
398 200
500
430
410
563 281
404
400
340
600
202
386
402
200
170
300
500
460
339 170
350 195
350 175
409
409
400 198
400 200
400
449
400
400
400
Metal deformation processing
Research in electrochemical processes
Environmental stress physiology
Performance assessment and enhancement
Infectious and communicable diseases
Digital automata
200
224
500
400
200
200
200
577
468
399
342 171
368 400
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Fiscal year
1969
120
400
200
203
460
522
400
250
215
400
205
280
480
202
193
201
500
200
170
350
250
230
170
200
215
220
205
400
205
400
200
200
200
225
750
200
200
200
200
288
204
460
400_
200
170
200
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PROJECT THEWS PROGRAMS?FUNDING BY FISCAL YEARS ($1,000)?Continued
S9743
Military
Department State and institution
Program topic
Fiscal year Fiscal irz
1967
Massachusetts:
N University of Massachusetts Deep sea structures
N Boston College Elementary chemical kinetics
Michigan:
AF Michigan State University at East Lansing Behavioral studies
Minnesota:
N University of Minnesota Infrared detector and laser technology
N Gas turbine technology
N __ do Organization performance and human effectiveness
Mississippi:
A Mississippi State Rotor and propeller aerodynamics
AF University of Mississippi Biocontrol systems
Missouri:
A University of Missouri at Columbia_ Fluid transport properties
N University of Missouri at Rolla Aqueous aerosols in atmospheric processes
AF do Basic studies on electronic materials
A do Terrestrial science research
AF Washington University at St. Louis Control, guidance and information studies
AF ___do_ Optimum detection systems
AF Nevada: University of Nevada Cloud physics -
AF New Hampshire: Dartmouth College Time-shared computing systems
New Jersey:
AF Rutgers University Fluid flow aerodynamics
N Stevens Institute Nonlinear physics of polymers
A do Cryogenic sciences and engineering
A do .. Evaluation of terrain vehicle systems
New Mexico:
N New Mexico Institute M. & T Environmental sciences
N University of New Mexico Radiation effects on electronics
New York:
AF SUNY-Albany Modification of environment
N SUNY-Buffalo Environmental physiology
A Rensselaer Polytechnic Electrochemical power sources
N __do Radiation effects
A __do Optimum digital signal processing
N Yeshiva University, New York City Research on thin film materials
North Carolina:
North Carolina State Materials response phenomena
Digital encoding systems
North Dakota:
A North Dakota State Control of vectors of diseases of military importance
N University of North Dakota High pressure physiology
Ohio:
A Case-Western Reserve Research in R. & D. management
A Ohio University Low-level navigation
Kent State University Liquid crystal detectors
University of Cincinnati Internal aerodynamics in air-breathing engines
Oklahoma:
A Oklahoma State Electronic description of the environment
N University of Oklahoma Mechanism and theory of shock
N Oregon: Oregon State On-line computer environmental research
Pennsylvania:
A Drexel Institute of Technology Powder metallurgy
AF do Forecasting by satellite observations
N Jefferson Medical College Pathogenesis of acute diarrhea! disease
A Lehigh University Nonlinear wave propagation
N _do Low-cycle fatigue in joined structures
N do Fluid amplification
N Hahnemann Medical College Bioamines in stress
A Rhode Island: Rhode Island University at Kingston___ Photoelectronic imaging devices -
A South Carolina: Medical College of South Carolina Resuscitation and treatment of wounded
N South Dakota: South Dakota School of Mines Modification of convective clouds
AF
AF
A
Tennessee:
0 University of Tennessee at Knoxville
AF _do
AF
A
A
A
A
A
AF
A
AF
AF
A
AF
A
Fiscal year
1969
360 180
380 190
400 200
278 139
409
446
400
399
460
400
324
342
406
370
399
600
199
290
200
162
171
460
180
440
400
190
200
415
140
204
220
200
400
400
400
400
250
290
162
170
200
203 268
185 185
199
300
460
.430
400
300
407
482
580
200
350
230
215
400
390
200 200
396 200
393 197
527 263
150
200
410
400
241
405
290
510-
408
390
400
400
Dynamic sealing
Remote sensor research
- University of Tennessee at Tullahoma MHD power generation
Vanderbilt University Coating science and technology
Texas:
Texas A. & M Optimization research
__do Meteorology research
Aircraft dynamics of subsonic flight
Texas Christian Human pattern perception
University of Houston Information processing
Rice University Coherent and incoherent EM radiation
do ' Remote sensing of gamma ray signatures
Southern Methodist Automatic navigation
..do Statistics in calibration methods
Texas Tech Performance and man-machine effectiveness Ai
Utah: University of Utah Chemistry of combustion
Vermont: University of Vermont Isolation and sensory communication
Virginia:
University of Virginia Learning control systems
do Atomic interaction in gases
do Cryogenic instrumentation
Virginia Polytechnic, Blackburg Vehicle engineering and control
V/STOL aerodynamics
West Virginia: West Virginia University
Total
368
260 130
300
400
430
272
380
150
408
400
550
200
215
388
100
190
350
400
398
200
502
470
200
410
342 171
408
416
150
200
205
200
240
202
290
255
204
195
200
200
400
520
400
184
100
150
204
200
275
155
215
194
135
190
175
400
200
296
235
200
255
170
200
400
400
208
19,375
28,180 29,239
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if it is
convenient to the Senator from Arkan-
sas, would he be willing to allow the
Senator from Massachusetts to speak at
this time.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, that
is agreeable. I yield to the Senator from
Massachusetts.
Mr. STENNIS. If the Senator from
New Hampshire will yield time, Mr. Pres-
ident?
Mr. Mc1NTYRE. I yield 12 minutes to
the distinguished Senator from Massa-
chusetts.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, if I may
take a somewhat different approach to
the proposal as set forth by the Sen-
ator from Arkansas, let me first say
that the policy and general philosophy
as set forth by the Senator's proposal
was shared and was considered by the
Subcommittee on Research and Develop-
ment of the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices, under the able leadership of the
distinguished Senator from New Hamp-
shire. In fact, it is in keeping with the
policy as mandated to that subcommit-
tee by the distinguished Chairman of the
Armed Services Committee, the Senator
from Mississippi. So the matters which
the Senator from Arkansas raises are
matters which the committee had before
it in its deliberations and in its final
decision, in its report to the full Armed
Services Committee.
Mr. President, I should like to analyze
very briefly the contentions of the Sen-
ator from Arkansas and then conclude
by proposing certain questions to the
Senator from Arkansas which I trust he
will answer and which may be helpful
in this debate.
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Attguat 12, 1969
Mr. STE/sINIS. Mr. President, may we
have order, so that those of us who wish
to hear may do so?
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
RELLMON in the chair). The Senate will
be in order.
Mr. BROOKE. The Senator from
Arkansas proposes a $45.6 million cut, in-
cluding a 10-percent, or $27 million, cut
in Federal contract research centers; a
$2 million, or one-third, cut in research
by foreign institutions; a 20-percent, or
$5 million, cut in project Agile, counter-
insurgency work, which includes largely
technological work, not just social and
behavioral research; $3 million from
other social science research; and $8
million, or 25 percent, from project The-
mis, a program for university research.
If the Department of Defense distrib-
utes the committee's 12-percent cut in
the research budget evenly across all
categories, the Federal contract research
centers will be reduced by more than
Senator FULBRIGHT has proposed. All the
categories that the Senator has men-
tioned are subject to the large cut the
committee has imposed already, unless
the Defense Department considers them
of such high priority that other pro-
grams are reduced disproportionately.
Moreover, social and behavioral re-
search on foreign military environments
and policy planning studies are specifi-
cally cited by the committee as an area
to be reduced by 12 Percent or by $1.5
million of the $13.3 million, and by the
recommended transfer of approximately
$4 million in projects to other agencies
with responsibility in these areas. For ex-
ample, some policy planning studies
might go to State, ACDA, and AID; and
some more basic research might go to
the National Science roundation. Work
in these areas already has been reduced
by approximately 11 percent since fiscal
1968 and by the effects of inflation, which
the Senator has not mentioned, and
which I am sure he would want to take
into consideration.
Thus, a thorough pruning of work in
this area is already assured by the com-
mittee's action.
Apparently, Senator FULBRIGHT has
several concerns: allegedly worthless re-
search; defense connections with the
universities; the SUPPOSed hazards of do-
ing research under defense auspices in
foreign countries, on the assumption that
it may lead to engaging in military ac-
tion there at some time.
Mr. President, many knowledgeable
people agree that some of the research
Involved might better be carried out un-
der other auspices, and the committee
has provided for this. But unless the
State Department and other agencies
obtain greater authorizations, this of
course, will be impossible.
Thus, the effect of adopting the Ful-
bright amendment simply would be to
reduce further what is widely recog-
nized as an inadequate national effort in
social and behavioral research. Surely,
we should first seek to create better me-
chanisms for funding work in this gen-
eral field before we trim the limited ef-
fort already underway.
If it is insisted that all Defense re-
search must be strictly tied to DOD mis-
sions, we would have to cut out all basic
research in physical sciences as well.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. BROOKE. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Did the Senator
hear the Senator from Michigan state a
moment ago that on the calendar is the
National Science Foundation authoriza-
tion, and it will be up very soon, and we
could authorize an increase to be taken
up?all the items about which the Sena-
tor is talking? Assuming that they are
justifiable research contracts, it would
be a much more appropriate way to do
it, it would seem to me. That bill is al-
ready on the calendar.
May I also say to the Senator that I
told the Senate a moment ago?I do not
know whether he heard it?that a dele-
gation from one of the most prestigious
Institutions in the country, and certainly
in his State of Massachusetts, waited on
me with respect to the problem of the
instrusion of the military. They are not
antimilitary. They simply were making
the point that they hated to see MIT be-
come dominated or too dependent, I will
say, upon a military appropriation. I be-
lieve that MIT last year had $119,175,000.
This is an awful lot of money. In one
sense, of course, it is a great compliment
to MIT. These students, I was told by the
professor who brought them, were among
the best students they had. They were not
dropouts; they were not in that sense.
They were serious, very intelligent young
men who did not wish to see MIT be con-
sidered just a kind of dependency of the
Pentagon. They had great pride in MIT's
reputation as one of theworld's
technological institutions.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am sorry about it.
I would have thought that the Senator,
too, would be interested in preserving the
great reputation of Harvard and MIT as
among the leading educational institu-
tions in the world. It was a great shock
to me?and I think to the entire coun-
try?to suddenly see an eruption on the
campus of Harvard University, the oldest
and I would say probably the most re-
spected institution in America. I cannot,
of course, prove that it was just because
of this.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think it contrib-
uted to it.
Mr. BROOKE. If the Senator would
yield, I would say that that was caused
primarily by ROTC, not defense research,
of which the Senator is well aware. There
may have been some contribution. But I
was about to say, before the Senator
asked his question, that universities
themselves are in the process of gaining
better control of defense research pro-
grams.
I had a conversation recently with
James Killian and Howard Johnson of
MIT. They are well aware of this prob-
lem. What the Senator has said relative
to the students at MIT is certainly shared
by members of the faculty and of the
administration.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.
Mr. BROOKE. They are aware of the
problem, and they are trying to get on
top of the problem, and I think we should
give them an opportunity.
I might also point out that the De-
fense Department is cooperating in seek-
ing better balance and in reducing classi-
fied research to a minimum. These things
are ongoing at the present time, as the
Senator very well points out.
Of course, I am interested in main-
taining the integrity of MIT, Harvard,
and the other institutions of higher
learning in the Commonwealth and
throughout the country; but I think these
programs are now being given close
scrutiny by the administration and the
faculty as well as the student body.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. If the Senator will
permit me, I should like to read an AP
dispatch from Washington dated May 15,
1969:
Dr. John Foster, the Pentagon's research
chief, told a Congressional committee
Wednesday that he saw "no evidence of major
adverse impact from student demonstrations
against defense research at universities."
Mr. President, I submit that Dr. Foster
is just out of touch with the situation in
this country. And it was not just Har-
vard. I mentioned Harvard because it is
such a great institution.
Mr. BROOKE. The Senator mentioned
Harvard specifically.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator will re-
call that at Berkeley, which is certainly
also one of the great institutions, where
there was a very clear protest about the
participation at the university in IDA.
The some situation prevailed at Cornell
and at one university after another. I am
not saying it is the only thing. The war
is probably the greatest single contribu-
tor, but they were also protesting about
the participation of the university in IDA.
There are many aspects to it. It is not just
the military. In many cases it takes the
attention and time of their leading pro-
fessors to go off on these highly paid re-
search projects and leave the teaching of
the students. In other wilds, the stu-
dents are being shortchanged. I know
they are correct because the attention
and time of the finest university profes-
sors in many cases are directed and
siphoned off in very large contracts that
are given them.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have the article to which I
referred printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
FOSTER BACKS U.S. RESEARCH AT UNIVERSITIES
WasunvoroN.?Dr. John Foster, the Penta-
gon's research chief, told a congressional
committee Wednesday that he saw "no evi-
dence of major adverse impacts" from stu-
dent demonstrations against defense re-
search at universities.
Defending the research program, Foster
said, "I hope you will not be misled by those
who suggest that * * ? academic research
[supported by the Defense Department] rep-
resents a sort of sandbox for scholars, ir-
relevant to defense missions, unproductive
technically and, worst of all, inimical to the
best interests of universities. It is more
fundamental.
"It is the great national advantage we
possess because we are able to bring together
essentially independent and well-informed
people?from government, industries and
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universities?over long periods for voluntary
work on our tough prOblems. This is the core
of our capacity for technological superiority,"
As for demonstrations directed at Penta-
gon research, Foster renewed his argument
of a year that responsibility for dealing with
them should be left with university adminis-
trations.
While Foster regarded "some of the current
turmoil as irresponsible action," he added,
"I still have confidence in the ability of the
academic community, in the aggregate, to
cope ultimately with the situation."
Foster warned against congressional effort
to curb such research at universities where
demonstrations have taken place, saying,
"We must not run the risk of eroding nation-
ally important research by precipitate puni-
tive action against features of university life
that are essential to our future."
The PRESIDING Or.VICER. The time
of the Senator has expired.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, how
much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator has 27 minutes remaining.
Mr. McINTYRE. I yield 5 minutes to
the Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I would
appreciate it if the Senator from Arkan-
sas would allow me a little time. I think
the colloquy was very helpful and I am
grateful to him for joining in.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I would be glad to
do so.
Mr. BROOKE. I think this is a healthy
trend and creates an awareness on the
part of the administration, the faculty,
and the members of the student body.
The Senator referred to Dr. Foster.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. But he is not aware
of it.
Mr. BROOKE. He is not aware of it.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. But he is the head
of research.
Mr. BROOKE. I think the Depart-
ment of Defense is aware of the neces-
sity for gaining better control of de-
fense research on campuses.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. But this is the man
who hands out the money. That is the
trouble.
Mr. BROOKE. But he said this is not
caused by defense contracts with the uni-
versities. I think he is attributing this
to the war in Vietnam and the chemical
problems and, as we are all aware,. the
ROTC matter.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. They all contribute.
I agree that no one thing does it; they
all contribute.
Mr. BROOKE. It is a healthy trend,
but to carry it so far that university ties
are severed would be, in my opinion, a
very unwise move.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. By my amendment
we would not sever them.
Mr. BROOKE. I think it would de-
prive the universities of work on national
defense. I am sure the Senator would
agree that it would weaken one of our
best guarantees that open and objective
research and counsel, not alleged pres-
sures of a "military-industrial" complex
are shaping the defense policy. I am sure
the Senator would agree that thus, uni-
versities themselves should determine
whether and under what circumstances
they should engage in defense research.
This is a matter we should leave up to
the universities and not something we
should establish as a matter of policy or
mandate. Such programs should not be
terminated by congressional fiat.
Defense-sponsored social science re-
search abroad is already down by 70 per-
cent since fiscal 1968 and all proposals
are now subject to thorough interagency
review under State Department auspices.
It is a highly dubious and antiintellic-
tual proposition to assume that research
on foreign areas somehow increases like-
lihood of U.S. military involvement. With
all due respect, I do not believe that is
SO.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. BROOKE. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The point I was
making is that the intrusion of our mili-
tary into university life is offensive and
it creates ill will. I believe there is evi-
dence of it in the articles which I have
had printed in the RECORD. I was not
making the point we were more likely to
become militarily involved,
Mr. BROOKE. It could just as well de-
crease it as increase it.
Whether we involve ourselves mili-
tarily is a matter of policy, not research,
and that policy can be most wisely
shaped if careful preliminary research is
done.
The reports subnlitted by the Senator
from Arkansas yesterday, in my opinion,
are hardly the whole story. Out of such
policy studies have come many of the
fundamental concepts and programs on
which national security rests.
Concepts and rationale of stable deter-
rents, the first strike, second strike dis-
tinction, the rationale for security
through arms control rather than arms
competition, the most informed critics
of MIRV and ABM, have all been in-
fluenced importantly by work done on
these research efforts.
Economies are also realized. Overseas
bomber bases were reduced at savings of
billions of dollars a year after studies
in the midfifties revealed their vulner-
ability to missile attack. These and other
savings grew out of such analysis as the
Senator from Arkansas attacks so cate-
gorically, analysis costing only a pittance
of the savings from the basic studies
alone.
If there is waste, payoffs from such
research are sometimes so great as to
. compensate many times over, especially
in view of the relatively small fraction
of the budget in these categories.
It is also utterly misleading for the
Senator from Arkansas to assert that
no one knows the cost of studies he cites.
As the letter of July 24, 1969, from the
Department of Defense, printed in the
RECORD at the request of the Senator
from Arkansas at pages S9621?S9622, in-
dicates, the cost of individual reports are
not easily determined, but the costs of
projects, from which many reports may
emerge, are know.
The costs of the projects from which
the Senator from Arkansas has selected
certain reports to question are specified
by the Department as $11,530,408 over a
period of 15 years.
Many of the concerns voiced by the
Senator from Arkansas are shared by a
number of us.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
time of the Senator has expired.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that I may proceed
for 2 additional minutes.
Mr. McINTYRE. I yield 2 minutes to
the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Massachusetts is recog-
nized for 2 additional minutes.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, that is
why the Subcommittee on Research and
Development and the Committee on
Armed Services took strong action in
these several areas. However, the com-
mittee's action is more than sufficient.
Indeed; many observers will fear that
too much damage has been done to the
defense research effort by the reduction
of more than $1? billion, and we should
not go further at this time.
Mr. President, it is for that reason
that I urge that the Senate agree to the
committee recommendation and reject
the amendment offered by the Senator
from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT) .
Mr. President, I have some questions
I would like to ask the Senator from
Arkansas and I shall submit them to him
inasmuch as the time of the Senator
from New Hampshire is running out.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield
10 minutes to the Senator from Califor-
nia (Mr. MURPHY) .
Mr. MURPHY. I thank the distin-
guished Senator from New Hampshire.
would like to speak momentarily, on
one aspect of the proposed amendment
which has to do with the Federal Con-
tract Research Centers. We have heard
great approaches to many of these mat-
ters in terms of dollars. The understand-
ing, the use of the dollars, and the com-
plexity of the operations concerned,
sometimes have not been fully discussed
or fully understood.
I wish to express my appreciation to
the distinguished Senator from New
Hampshire for permitting me this time,
and acknowledge the concern of the
Senator from Arkansas about spending
by our Department of Defense, which is
widely known, and, of course, I join him.
I think that great economies may be
forthcoming in the future. I do believe,
however, that some attention should be
given to the kinds of Federal Contract
Research Centers that we have, and the
kinds of tasks that they perform. This is
important since the Senator from Ar-
kansas wishes to cut $27 million from
the funding for these organizations
whether or not they are engaged in the
area of social sciences.
As an example of the areas of respon-
sibility in the FCRC's; eight are operated
under the auspices of universities, each
concentrating in the fields in which each
respective university has specific
strengths.
Three others do analysis work and,
sometimes rather loosely, I think, are
called think tanks, because they have a
concentration of very expert brains.
In my hometown of Los Angeles, I be-
lieve there are more Ph. D.'s than any
other place in the world accumulated un-
der one roof. They perform valuable
review of our posture on a continuing
basis. Two other Federal Contract Re-
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August .c12, 12969
search Centers are engaged most spe-
cifically in the systems management
field.
The latter two, it should be pointed out,
were built up under the auspices of the
Congress for the direct purpose of han-
dling profoundly complicated technical
programs on a nonprofit basis so as to be
most scrupulous in avoiding conflicts of
interest in all places wherever possible,
in order to save the taatpayer's dollars.
However, these and other FCRC's have
been of other great benefit to the tax-
payer.
Because of the kind of work the
FCRC's do there have been tremendous
savings of dollars which, this Senator
is convinced, could never have been
achieved in any other way. For instance,
it was documented some years ago to the
satisfaction of the Secretary of Defense
and the Congress that the Aerospace
Corp., acting with its Military partner,
the Air Force, had in fact effected a sav-
ings of a billion and a half dollars in its
ballistic missile progranis in its first 5
years of operation, and it is acknowl-
edged that this same team has brought
about the savings of at least another bil-
lion since that time.
While there are 16 FMC's, I believe
he success of Aerosme Corp., is
typical of them all and., 'Mr. President,
it is easily documented fin' the purposes
of our discussion here today. One of the
most successful programs conducted by
the Air Force and Aerospace Corp. has
been the Titan III project which has en-
joyed a tremendous run tit great savings
to the Government. I have previously
commented on this some weeks ago. The
secret of this success hasTheen outstand-
ing, professional technical management
which brought about a situation whereby
our Nation was able to place operational
payloads on Titan III boosters which were
originally supposed to be R. & D. vehicles.
In other words, they cortibined-research
and development with actual payloads
at one time. Yet, and this is important,
because of this professional management,
about which I speak, the Titan HI took
on operational missions_ while still an
R. & D. vehicle with enorinous success
and tremondous savings. I might add,
parenthetically, that all of our space
flights to date have been launched by
boosters developed by or evolving from
those built by the military.
Another of the most valuable Federal
Contract Research Centers, the Rand
Corp., which has been mentioned today,
has been responsible for sUbstantial sav-
ings in numerous areas;There are two,
however, which are typical of the kinds
of economy these groups do effect.
Rand's study of strategic air bases in
fact developed a new coffeept of opera-
tions which, by the Air Force's own esti-
mate, resulted in net savings of $1 billion
in installations alone, and was judged to
provide the same or better security as
other proposed systems Mating from $10
to $22 billion more over a 4-year period.
So this is really not wasted money. What
we are doing is buying an accumulation
of the very best brains pessible.
In a second typical example, because of
Its noncompetitive status, tbe Rand Corp.
was able to bring the industrial computer
groups together on common ground to
exchange technical information and to
initiate computer sharing among them.
This cooperative pooling of programing
techniques, known as Share, is estimated
by the Department of Defense to have
saved military installations and defense
contractors, and therefore the taxpayer,
approximately $50 million.
There is yet another example of the
kinds of vital work carried on by these
Centers which must be given notice. The
Institute for Defense Analysis completed
a test and evaluation study in mid-1968
only 1 short year after it was under-
taken. This project was a comprehensive
analysis of the testing requirements for
the Minuteman III and Poseidon weapon
systems. The spectacular results showed
how to determine the actual performance
of these systems by testing without the
enormously increased casts the Depart-
ment of Defense feared might be needed
through the use of what up to that time
were the only known testing techniques.
This successful effort by the Institute
for Defense Analysis was accomplished
by forming a team of knowledgeable
staff people along with military officers
and highly qualified engineers from
industry.
In other words, they put together the
very best brains. The work of this team
resulted in the resolution of a severe
problem which the Government itself
had been unable to resolve even after re-
peated attempts. In other words, Mr.
President, if the Institute for Defense
Analysis had not licked the problem, it
probably would not have been done even
today and I, for one, cannot put a price
on that.
While I ant mentioning this specific
Center, I believe it is very important to
note that of the total contract budget of
the Institute for Defense Analysis, only 5
percent is allocated for foreign policy and
social studies. Yet the Senator from Ar-
kansas asks us to reduce the FCRC fund-
ing by 10 percent.
Mr. President, the Department of De-
fense, again with the consent of the Con-
gress, years aeo decided that it would be
necessary to use the Federal Contract
Research Center approach in extremely
complex programs in problem areas.
The PRESIDING Otees.CER. The time
of the Senator from California has ex-
pired.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield
3 additional minutes to the Senator from
California.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from California is recognized for 3
additional minutes.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, if I do
not finish my remarks in that time, I ask
unanimous consent that the remainder
of them be printed in the RECORD because,
obviously, because of this protracted dis-
cussion which has taken place there will
not be time for me to read it all. I ask
this so that Senators who are not pres-
ently in the Chamber may have the bene-
fit, if they so desire, of reading what I
think has been a rather carefully pre-
pared explanation of the exact PucPe6e
of these Centers, why they were put to-
gether and what they do.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, as an ex-
ample of the degree of expertise needed,
the difference between the development
of airplanes and large booster rockets
applies. In the construction of an air-
craft, you Can always taxi it down the
runway, lift off to an altitude of 1 foot
and settle back to the runway subse-
quently analyzing problems within the
machine and correcting them.
However, in the case of the booster
racket with its valuable payload, you
have no such luxury. What is important
here is the stark fact that the booster
alone, without payload, frequently casts
several million dollars. Therefore, it
must work?and work right?the first
time. The military simply does not have
enough people trained in the manage-
ment of such programs in-house to guar-
antee, this kind of success. But, by using
an FCRC's technical ability the job can
be done, was done and must continue
to be done.
Mr. President, so far I have mentioned
the successful story of only three of our
Federal Contract Research Centers. But,
the story with the rest is pretty much
parallel. Yesterday, the distinguished
Senator from Arkansas introduced an
amendment which if I read it correctly,
would have the effect of reducing FCR,C
funding by $27 million across the board.
Yet the thrust of his argument centers
on the activities carried out by these
groups under contract to the Depait-
ment of Defense in the social sciences
and foreign affairs. I submit that this is
dangerous because it uses the area of
foreign policy and social sciences as the
target, but, aims at all disciplines within
the FCRC's with a shotgun or broadside
effect. That is the great danger of
generalizations.
There is an additional perspective to
this question that has received too little
attention here in this debate. It is the
straightforward proposition that it is
vital to our Nation's safety that the
planners in the Department of Defense
be aware of the far-reaching and serious
military consequences of changes in for-
eign governments. Certainly, no one in
the Department of Defense nor in the
FCRC's has any wish to interfere with
the prerogatives of the State Depart-
ment and from my conversations with
them and my study of their work I can
say with certainty they want no part of
it. Yet, military implications of foreign
governmental change do exist?they are
real. Mr. President, it would be folly to
ignore them with possible serious mis-
calculations the result. It has been pre-
viously demonstrated to the satisfaction
of the Congress that the very best way to
analyze such situations is via the exper-
tise offered by the FCRC's and, while
regrettable, we must see today's world
as it is and not as we wish it to be. Thus,
we have an obligation to our own safety
and security to have the advantage of
just this kind of analytical review.
Perhaps, what the Senator is really
saying is that these centers represent
the military-industrial-scientific-educa-
tional complex which he so greatly de-
plores. We have heard much of this com-
plex?I prefer the words "American
team"?of late and we would do well to
remember the gist of the thoughts of our
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August 1.2, 1969
beloved Gen. Douglas MacArthur who,
as a part of his legacy, told us that the
one great reliable strength of our Nation
as it maintained its place in the world
is our industry-military team which was
and is called upon for our security every
day of our lives. Certainly, by now it is
not necessary to once again remind this
body that retiring President Eisenhower
actually pointed to this team with pride.
Furthermore, those who are so con-
cerned about this team would do well to
remember that the Federal.Contract Re-
search Centers do in fact serve as a buffer
or governor on both the military and
the prWate sector. They do not make a
product. They pay no dividend" other
than to the taxpayer.. The important
safeguard which exists here is simple:
Both military and industrial security in
these installations are operated by the
Department of Defense and because the
Secretary has confidence in the FCRC's
they are able to gather together all the
very best proprietary data, gleaning and
coordinating all the best information
while protecting it from piracy, but of-
fering it as an asset to our security.
Nonetheless, we are told here that this
amendment will reduce the authorization
for the Federal Contract Research Cen-
ters by $27 million because the chairman
of the Committee on Foreign Relations
S 9747
executives in enterprises such as the They will go up the street to large pri-
major management consulting firms and vats industrial concerns like TRW,
research organizations, both profitmak- Hughes, North American Rockwell, or
ing and nonprofit. Many of these organi- Lockheed.
zations do Government contract work, Surely, the distinguished Senator from
and compensation in excess of $45,000 is Arkansas is well aware of the fees and
common in most of these posts. Even in salaries that ability and a good rec-
the case of university professors, there ord can draw. The Senator from Arkan-
are a substantial number of senior peo- sas, being the great lawyer he is, has re-
pie whose activities, including consulting, ceived in his lifetime career special fees
bring them incomes in the $50,000 to because of his expertise and knowledge of
$60,000 range. Again, much of this con- the law.
suiting is paid for from Government con- Mr. President, I believe there is an-
tract funds, including Department of De- other important factor worthy of our
fense funds. profitmaking enterprises consideration today which applies to
normally provide additional incentives, bath amendments. I refer to the social
such as stock options, not available in and economic problems that loom so
nonprofit organizations such as the large in America now. It is acknowledged
FCRCs, and universities provide other that the most competent and successful
fringe benefits in many cases. organizations created for the purpose
In the case of most of the FCRC's, the of solving problems are those currently
boards of trustees set the salaries of the engaged in defense and space work. They
top personnel. These trustee constitute have developed a whole new concept
an impressive roster of public-spirited called systems management. Lately a
citizens, including leading public figures, new term has come into common use: I
ex-public servants, university presidents refer to "civil systems" which simply
and industrial executives. These men are means the application of the systems
acutely conscious of their policy respon- management or systems engineering ap-
sibilities and of the public interest nature preach to those enormous problems
of the organizations. They are well able which face us from within. The great
to judge the performance and quality of organizations we have created to solve
the persons whose salaries they set. our defense problems since World War II
These boards of trustees are keenly are in being?they are operating and in
place. They could, in fact, be our most
important national resource when we
turn them to the problems of pollution,
waste disposal, communications, crime,
delinquency, transportation, urban re-
newal, and the eradication of poverty, all
of which are approaching crisis propor-
tions as the distinguished Senator from
Arkansas himself has often said.
So far, Mr. President, the potentially
most promising approach to the solution
to these problems is through the appli-
cation of systems management or the
systems approach or civil systems, if you
will, by our great concerns in the aero-
space industry of which the Federal
Contract Research Centers are such a
vital part. It may well be that other de-
partments of the Government will want
to use the abilities of these centers to-
ward the ends I have just outlined?and
this Senator believes they should. It may
also well be that the Department of State
could profitably use their services, since
is concerned about their work in e aware of the need to attract and to hold
social sciences. Again we have the gen- individuals of the highest caliber in the
eralization which is akin to the old top management position of the FCRC's
apples and oranges?which is akin to if these organizations are to be able to
lumping all the animal world together continue their effective performance in
and saying all must wear horseshoes or? the national interest. The responsibilities
In this case?all will have their rations are great; much of the work is pioneer-
cut since there is a problem with horse- ing and its quality is extremely impor-
shoes. Mr. President, what we are asked tent. Management judgment and talent
to do here is to consider the social sci- is an absolute essential. For all of these
ences, condemn the work the FCRC's are reasons a limitation such as the one
doing in the social sciences, lump the proposed appears inappropriate and in
social sciences together with architect fact harmful.
engineering, weapons analysis, systems The present language, left as is, sug-
management, and cut back on the whole gests that in the absence of Presiden-
works. tial approval, some 20 officials of the
Mr. President, I have the privilege of FCRC's would have to take a cut in total
serving on the Subcommittee on Re- compensation back to $45,000, or leave
search and Development chaired by the their jobs, or the FCRC's affected would
very able Senator from New Hampshire. have to cease doing business with the
I can tell the Senate that under Senator Department of Defense.
MCINTYRE'S leadership, the subcommit- Mr. President, I am reminded that
t into the question of the Federal many years ago I was called before a
Contract Research Centers very thor- committee of this very body to explain
oughly. When the Subcommittee on Re- just why the late Clark Gable could draw we all know how many problems that
search and Development reported to the a salary of $7,500 a week. Many on the Department has had over the past 8
full Armed Services Committee on its committee asked "What does he do?" years, and the Committee on Foreign Re-
work, my friend the distinguished Sena- "How can he be werth $7,500 a week for lations would wish to consider appropiate
tor from Virginia offered an amendment what he does?" My answer was that he funding.
which is included in the bill and would doesn't do anything, but he has an ex- However, it is extremely important
limit the salaries of FCRC technical and pertise?he is an actor of supreme ac- that these organizations, these going
management personnel. I did not co- complishment and in free and open corn- concerns, not be impeded or reduced or
sponsor that amendment for numerous petition he can earn this much money. discouraged here as we consider defense
reasons, but, I certainly understand Clark Gable's name in lights over a Procurement. As a matter of fact, that
and congratulate Senator BYRD for his theater sells tickets and offers an in- so-called military-industrial complex we
motives in offering it. come to all involved as the result of free are supposed to be so concerned about
However, we should remember that the trade. could, through these self-same FCRC's,
complexity and national importance of I do not mean that there is detailed turn out to be the best friend our advo-
the work of the FCRC's require highly commonality between the motion pie- cates of domestic priorities ever had.
talented and competent management. ture business and the FCRC's. I do mean, The importance of independence and
The competition for top people in this however, that these people about whose objectivity in these organizations is
field of endeavor is considerable. The salaries we are so concerned are among paramount, and has long been recog-
major FCRC's are managed by people the finest technical people we have and nized as such. The FCRC's are for the
who would otherwise be serving as senior they are dedicated to their country and most part engaged in highly important
professional executives in industry or in- programs. Should they become discour- and complex research on matters of
dustrial laboratories, as university ad- aged, I can say for certain they will not great significance to military planning
ministraters or senior professors, or as go into $40,000-a-year Government jobs. and national security policy. More re-
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cently, because of the major contribu-
tions of these organizations in the field
of national security, it has been urged by
many, including the Secretary of De-
fense, that they apply their skills and
experience to other impost tent national
problems such as those of the environ-
ment and the cities. A number of them
are doing so, and this is becoming a sig-
nificant portion of their. work. It would
seem unwise and inappropriate to inhibit
the application of this national resource
to domestic problems by placing special
restrictions on them in a military pro-
curement bill.
Mr. President, the distinguished and
highly respected Director of Defense Re-
search and Engineering, Dr. John S.
Foster, stated in his recent testimony be-
fore the Committee on Armed Services
that?
Second, we have reconsidered recently an
issue which has been brought up from time
to time for several years?whether or not
these primarily Defense-sponsored organiza-
tions should be permitted or even encouraged
to apply selectively their specialized capa-
bilities to major domestic problems such as
transportation, urban redevelopment, hous-
ing, and medical services. We have concluded
that when an FCRC has capabilities suitable
to a non-Defense client, ia should be Per-
mitted, to undertake non-Defense work. In
short, we believe that the DOD has developed
in the FCRC's a "national resource" which
should be used as national priorities dictate,
consistent with our needs in the national
security area. Thus I have begun discus-
sions with other parts of the Federal Gov-
ernment and with the FCRC's to introduce
this concept of "selective diversification." I
must add, however, that we do not intend to
fund programs designed to solve domestic
problems, nor do we intend to act as a per-
manent "middle man" in administering any
such programs. Similarly, we do not intend
to reduce or dilute our DOD funding to
FCRC's for national security work, nor do we
expect the FMC's to reduce or delimit their
contribution to defense needs.
Mr. President, it is important to this
bill that there be no further reduction
in funds authorized for Federal Contract
Research Centers. I hope I have made
some small contribution to erasing some
of the misunderstandings that exist
where they are concerned. I have seen
first hand the work they are doing and
I know the capabilities of their people.
I can report with confidence, as can
many of my colleagues, that many of our
most advanced, most significant, and o
most successful new ideas for our security t
begin at these centers.
These Centers are vested ith the tre-
mendous responsibility for sNatems man- t
agement, long range planning and the
solutions to tomorrow's problems. While
I wish today's problems made it possible
for me to join with the Senator from s
Arkansas in his amendment, I believe the
examples I have just cited are so corn- w
pelling as to leave us with the clear re- r
sponsibility to support the funding of w
these Federal Contract Research Centers
as one of our great hopes for the future. w
I depart from my prepared remarks for ? f
a moment to point out that during the
committee hearings concern was ex- s
pressed over salaries in the FCRC's. I eci
attempted to explain the reason. When
the Federal Contract Research Centers se
were put together, it was of extreme ne- $
cessity that the very best and the very
finest brains be obtained.
The PRESIDING OrviCER. The time
of the Senator has expired.
Mr. MURPHY. May I have 1 additional
minute?
Mr. -McINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield
1 minute more to the Senator.
Mr. MURPHY. I know from practical
experience that many of these scientists
and administrators are working in these
projects at a cost to themselves. I know
they could go down the street from Air
Research, for instance, and be hired at
Thompson-Ramo-Woolridge at higher
salaries. I know they could walk down
the street and be hired at Hughes Air-
craft or Hughes Tool and be paid a
higher salary.
I also pointed out that to get the sec-
ond-best brains would be a mistake, be-
cause these are the men who conceive
the ideas, who draw the expert analyses
for the Air Force and other services, to
proceed at the greatest savings, in the
most practical way.
Because of my knowledge of the per-
formance of the Federal Contract Re-
search Centers, notwithstanding that I
dislike to be in opposition to the amend-
ment of the Senator, I shall be forced
to oppose it.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I
thank the Senator from California. He
has been a very helpful member of the
Research and Development Subcommit-
tee and particularly with respect to this
matter.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, if the
Senator will yield me 10 seconds, I have
been on that committee, and I know the
chairman of the committee agrees with
me that there is a real lack of knowledge
of what happens in these centers. I know
he agrees with me that, as soon as we
have the time, he will accept the invita-
tion to come to my State. There are two
of these Federal Contract Research Cen-
ters in my State that I think would be
very good to visit. lam sure we would like
to visit them and have a look at close
range and ascertain what is being ac-
complished and exactly how the pro-
grams works. If we do that, I think we
will have a greater understanding of
what we are discussing
I am extremely happy to be a member
f the Senator's committee, where, for
he first time I believe a great scrutiny
t these matters is being had.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will
he Senator yield me a few minutes on
matter?flother
Mr. FULl3RIGHT. First, may I respond
to the remarks of the Senator from Mas-
achusetts for a moment?
The Senator from Massachusetts
anted to conserve his own time, He was
unning short of time. He submitted in
riting a number of questions to me.
Before I proceed to the questions, I
ish to say that I have great sympathy
or the attitude of the Senator from Mas-
sachusetts, because there are many re-
earch projects in the universities or
ucational institutions of his State.
It is my understanding that Massachu-
tts Institute of Technology, with over
119 million last year, is the largest sin-
R000300100001-3
ATE August 1,2, 1,969
gle educational institution on the payroll
of the Defense Department. Harvard, of
course, has a much smaller alloctaion,
but it is substantial, over $2.5 million.
The University off.Maseachusetts, under
the Themis program, had a substantial
amount, $720,000. Boston College had
$440,000.
However, on the other side, in my view,
is the impact these research programs
may have on the celleges and universities.
What I am more interested in is the
preservation of the integrity of our edu-
cational institutions, whether they are
in my State or in any other State.
The first question the Senator from
Massachusetts asked was: Would the
Fulbright amendment affect the $4 mil-
lion recommended to be transferred to
the Department of State for foreign pol-
icy research?which is in the report?
It would not affect it. As far as I know,
there is no evidence that the Department
of State wants these programs, nor is
there any evidence that the transfer of
the projects are of projects which are
worthwhile of themselves. My own guess
is that it would be better that they be
discontinued. In any case, there is no
evidence it would affect it at all.
The second question of the Senator is:
The Fulbright amendment would impose
a further $2 million, or one-third, cut in
research by foreign universities and in-
stitutions. Is the Senator aware that this
area has already been reduced by 70 per-
cent since fiscal year 1968?
I am aware of that. I already
congratulated the Senator from New
Hampshire for reducing it, but we still
have contracts in 44 different foreign
countries. I have already given my reason
why I think it is bad policy, and it ought
to be reduced to a bare minimum, if not
eliminated.
It is possible that there may be some
unique situations in which a program
would be Justified, but I am quite con-
fident there is no justification to have
them in 44 countries. I air not sure our
foreign policy can stand that much inter-
vention by the Defense Department. It
ought to be kept at a minimum. Besides,
If there are some unique situations in
which research and development would
be justified, I would strongly recommend
that it be sponsored by some other
agency, the National Science Foundation,
or the National Institutes of Health, or
the Department of Commerce, some
agency other than the military.
Surely, it ought to be obvious now to
all Americans that military intrusions is
offensive to small countries, or to any
country. Military intrusion is much dif-
ferent from intrusion by cultural or other
institutions, because people are suspi-
cious of the military, as going to their
own security. We always run Into that
danger. Tourists can go abroad without
harm. People can live in another coun-
try. But when soldiers are stationed in
another country, traditionally it has al-
ways caused suspicion. So I think there
is a great difference, because it arises
from fears of our own country, and I do
not think it is good for our relations.
Mr. IVIcINTYRE. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield at that point?
Mr. FULI3RIGHT. I yield.
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Mr. McINTYRE. One thing that
plagues me is that if the State Depart-
ment and the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee of the Senate and its counterpart
in the House, and the President of the
United States have had something to do
with setting the foreign policy of this
country and setting out the goals and set-
ting out the objectives, once those objec-
tives are made clear, or at least scaled
down to somewhere along the lines the
distinguished Senator from Arkansas
would like to see, I think it would be no
trouble for the Department of Defense to
scale back the activities the Senator
complains about. But the State Depart-
ment and the Senator's committee and
the Administration set the pace, and the
Department of Defense is only trying to
carry it out.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The other day I
discussed the purpose of our country in
this field in connection with the posture
statement. I only wish to say that I have
strongly disapproved of our tendency to
intervention, and I have done that pub-
licly, beginning with our intervention in
the Dominican Republic in 1965.
I thoroughly disapprove of the ease
with which we accept the responsibility
to intervene in another country's affairs
and tell them what to do and tell them
what kind of government they ought to
have, and so forth. The Senator is aware
of my disagreement with our policy.
It is true that I am only one Senator,
but the Foreign Relations Committee has
gone through quite a change in its atti-
tude toward that policy. The foreign
policy I am really complaining about is
that of the previous administration, led
by Secretary Rusk in the State Depart-
ment. I thoroughly disagree with his
definition of the mission of the United
States. This we have discussed. Now with
a new administration and with new of-
ficials in the administration, I had hoped
we would begin to follow a different ap-
proach.
This amendment is a small segment or
part of that approach of downgrading
our intervention and intrusion into for-
eign countries; to treat other countries
more as equals, with greater respect, and,
hopefully, to cultivate better relations
with them.
The foreign programs I am talking
about are one little aspect of it. I am
doing my best to change our policy. I
am doing the best I know how to get out
of Vietnam and change our policy.
? The hearing we had this morning is
in connection with a situation which we
are very fearful may become another
Vietnam. All I can say to the Senator is
that I am doing the best I can to change
it. I have not been very -successful, but
that is all I can do.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield briefly?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. McINTYRE. I hope the Senator
from Arkansas appreciates the position
the Armed Services Committee, with this
authorization bill, is in. Since the Sen-
ator from Arkansas does not set the for-
eign policy of the United States, and the
State Department and the administra-
tion do, he will find that we, as we try to
answer the questions and try to help him
in understanding this particular bill,
more or less find ourselves in a bind be-
tween the position of the State Depart-
ment and the attitude of the distin-
guished Senator from Arkansas toward
the foreign policy of this country.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I do
not know whether the State Department
has really approved these projects or not.
On my inquiry last year, the Bureau of
the Budget was not aware of most of the
projects and had not examined them.
They do not examine Defense Depart-
ment programs as they do other pro-
grams.
I think the participation of the State
Department in the program of the De-
partment of Defense, if at all, is perfunc-
tory. Even this contingency planning
agreement with Thailand is not in the
custody?or-the State Department. I re-
quested it from the State Department,
and they came back with the letter which
I put in the RECORD the other day, say-
ing, "We regret we cannot give it to you,
because the Secretary of Defense is re-
luctant to allow it outside of his control,"
which meant, in effect, that here is an
agreement between Thailand and the
United States, and it is not even in the
hands of the State Department.
So we have a lot of difficulties in this
area, and I am not at all sure the State
Department is a very free agent when it
comes to such matters. The one agency,
and the only agency in the Government,
in my opinion, that can ever exercise any
degree of restraint upon the Defense De-
partment is the Senate, because of its
peculiar characteristics, in that we are
more independent than anyone else in
the Government. We have longer terms,
and that is why we were given longer
terms. We represent our States, and thus
represent larger constituencies than
Members of the House of Representa-
tives. I shall not describe our system of
government further, but I think the Sen-
ate is the only agency that can possibly
bring its influence to bear upon the mili-
tary establishment.
It will be seen that this is not wholly
imaginary, when you look around the
world and look at all the other major
countries, wherever they may be. Most
of them are dominated by their military
establishments. We have got to assume
that the United States and the American
people are gifted with some very special
qualities, if we are to be able to avoid the
same fate. The Senator can look at Rus-
sia, or at China, or where have you;
Latin America, Brazil, Argentina, Peru,
and so on. I shall not call the rolls, but
most of them are largely under the in-
fluence of the military.
There is a reason for it. I do not know;
perhaps in the long run it is better. I do
not think so, with the present state of
my information. I prefer to maintain the
dominance of the civilian authorities;
and our Constitution, I think, was in-
tended to provide for that.
The next question the Senator from
Massachusetts asked me is as follows:
Many of the examples of "questionable"
studies cited by the Senator from Arkansas
were contracted 3, 4 or 5 years ago. Since
then, DOD research has been subjected to
muoh closer scrutiny. Does the Senator have
.any knowledge of current or projected studies
which would substantiate his fears?
I may say that the studies I cited were
the most current that the Defense De-
partment would provide; and I will say
again, as I have said often, that it is not
easy to get some information out of the
Defense Department. We are engaged,
at the moment, as I say, in a very serious
contest with them over this agreement
with Thailand. In this case, we have
used, in our statement and in the in-
sertion, the latest information that the
Defense Department was willing to pro-
vide. I do not have the power of subpena
on the Secretary of Defense or the Com-
mander in Chief, and I cannot make
them give me what the committee wants.
I simply provided the best information
we could get from them.
I think the Senator from New Hamp-
shire will admit that it is not always easy
to get, neatly and efficiently, anything
you want out of the Defense Department.
It is a huge bureaucracy of millions of
people. The Joint Chiefs of Staff itself,
I think, now constitutes some several
thousand people. All I can say is that I
got the latest information that was avail-
able. I asked for the latest, and this is
what we were given.
The Senator next asks whether I have
any views of universities regarding this
amendment.
No, I have not submitted it to univer-
sities. I do have views of universities
about the intrusion of the Defense De-
partment into their activities. I have
already talked about that at length. I
have views as to the reactions of the
students and professors as to the extent
of the intrusion by both research proj-
ects, ROTC, IDA, and what have you.
The Senator's fifth question is as
follows:
The Senator from Arkansas has cited many
"horrible examples." Does he have any in-
formation as to what percentage of actual
research programs this type of prOgram
represents?
No; I have no idea how to arrive at a
percentage. The examples I put into the
RECORD speak for themselves;Some peo-
ple do not think they are horrible ex-
amples. I do not think they are horrible;
that is not the word I used. I think they
are wholly inappropriate to the functions
of the Department of Defense. Some of
them would be defensible as activities of
the National Institute of Health, the Na-
tional Science Foundation, or the De-
partments of Commerce or State, but
they have no relation to Defense, and
the only reason as far as I can see why
they were sponsored by the Defense De-
partment is that the Defense Department
has no difficulty getting any amount of
money it wants, for this or any other
project. That is the situation we seek to
correct.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in RECORD a com-
munication from the Department of De-
fense entitled "Behavioral Sciences Proj-
ects Proposed for Funding in Fiscal Year
1970," issued as of July 22, 1969. This re-
quest is partially in response to the Sen-
ator's questions; although the informa-
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S 9750 ust 42, 1269
tion is not very specific, it gives some idea
of the present attitude of the Defense
Department in this area.
There being no objection, the state-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES PROJECTS PROPOSED FOR
-FUNDING IN FISCAL MAR 1970
ARPA behavioral science research can be
understood Most accurately as level of effort
support for technical areas of special im-
portance to the Department of Defense. In-
dividual contracts vary widely in level of
support and in duration. Frequently a con-
tract is funded over a three-to-five year pe-
riod, and rarely for a longer period of time.
The best estimate of future support is a line
extension of present level of effort for a tech-
nical area, recognizing that individual con-
tracts will change according to research
progress.
RATIONALE FOR MAJOR PROGRAMS
We are terminating almOst all ARPA Be-
havioral Sciences research work outside the
U.S. ARPA has reoriented is behavioral
science research work into a, direction where
there is broad agreement in the research and
defense community that more promise ex-
ists?the interdisciplinary combination of
the computer and behavioral seiences in spe-
cific problem areas. The objective is ta pre-
duce results to Defense user organizations
within five years. Initially, we have extended
support to three basic programs to be con-
ducted at universities where unique talent
now exists. Simultaneously, we began's, man-
agement inquiry to determine how to use an
applied research organization to apply the
results of the basic research to specific and
immediate DOD operational problems. As the
work progresses, and to the extent that the
results of our management analysis warrant,
we plan to phase down ARPA sponsorship of
university participation in the three pro-
grams.
The first university program is the Cam-
bridge Project which seeks_ te provide tools
needed to determine trend and interaction ef-
fects in complex DOD systems. System ex-
amples include designing hardware for effec-
tive human operation, training and educat-
ing personnel, organizing manpower, and al-
locating resources. We have more than
enough data, but we lack tools to enable Us
to extract patterns and raw inferences from
them. The work takes advantage of existing
ARPA-funded interactive ocenputing capabil-
ity at MIT and will have Wide participation
by MIT and Harvard scientists. This effort
will be supported at approximately $2,400,000
yearly.
The second university program, the Center
for Computer-Based Behavioral Studies at
UCLA, seeks to construct a theory and prac-
tice of gaming in order to improve substan-
tially its realism for training and prediction.
As a good example, many vital Don missions
require that DoD people know how to bargain
and negotiate effectively with counterpart
members of other nations; help is needed in
the appropriate training of. military advisors,
defense attaches, and staffs of alliance com-
mands. Faced with analogous problems in
labor relations, major schools of business ad-
ministration and major corporationii have
turned increasingly to gaming (i.e., simula-
tions) for training and predict ion. This effort
will be supported at approximately $1,000,000
yearly.
The third university program, Quantitative
Political Science, seeks to develop quantita-
tive tools and unclassified data bases to im-
prove our ability to predict national security
needs. The work is accomplished at the uni-
versity of Michigan, the University of Hawaii.
the University of Southern California and
Yale University. The data archive at the Uni-
versity of Michigan will be managed by the
Inter-University Consortium for Political
Research which currently distributes other
types of social science data to faculty and
students at 120 member universities. If suc-
cessful, the tools would help us to distin-
guish between likely and unlikely future con-
flict situations. DoD must try to predict fu-
ture security situations and needs in order
to plan for logistics, force structure, strategy,
and research and development. Faced with
analogous needs, government departments
responsible for the domestic economy turned
more than thirty years ago to the develop-
ment of quantitative predictive tools and
supporting data bases. DoD has made only
fragmentary use to date of quantitative po-
litical science for conflict and sociology. How-
ever, even these limited efforts have been use-
ful to JCS, DIA, and Service officials. The
basic university work in building the tools
will all be unclassified and the regults freely
available. The later applications of the tools
to operational DoD problems will probably be
carried out elsewhere. This effort will be sup-
ported at approximately $850,000 yearly.
In addition, ARPA intends during FY 70
to support research in the following areas:
Teaching and Learning?The Department
of Defense must maintain a vigorous and
broad set of education and training activities
for its personnel. As external threats become
more complex. U.S. personnel increasingly re-
quire improved training to perform their
jobs. Much of the new techrtolgy developed
for other military purposes can also be applied
to more effective training and education sys-
tems. ARPA sponsored research in computer
assisted instruction has resulted in prototype
systems which permit the instructor to man-
age teaching aids and resources with greater
flexibility. These systems also promise to cut
costs substantially under the terms of the
instructional funds required for each student
contact hour. The flexibility and economy of
these systems will permit progress in de-
veloping techniques and methods of instruc-
tion which-are most effective with students
whose learning styles and abilities vary
widely. Further research is concerned with the
constraints imposed by different classes of
subject matter and modes of presentation.
Support during FY 70 will be approximately
$185,000. During FY 70 specific contracts will
be funded at Bolt, Beranek and Newman, and
the University of Texas.
Human Performance?The attributes and
evaluation of individual and group perform-
ance is fundamental to the operations of the
Department of Defense. AR.PA's research in
this area is primarily concerned with estab-
lishing rules to assess the relationship be-
tween human capabilities to perform mili-
tary jobs and basic abilities suoh as signal
detection, memory, information processing
and perception. Support during FY 70 will
be approximately $360,000. During FY 70
specific contracts will be funded at the Uni-
versity of Michigan and the University of
Oregon.
Human Communication?This research
area is concerned with principles of human
communication as they affect coordination of
effort in the execution of military tasks. This
effort is and will continue to include work on
competence to learn and use foreign lan-
guages and second languages. The knowledge
gained will then be used to develop and test
educational materials to improve cross-cul-
tural communication. Support during FY 70
Will be approximately $550,000.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield 5 minutes
to the Senator from South Dakota.
Mr. McCrOVIeteN. Mr. President, in
view of the limitation on time, I should
like to speak very briefly on two unre-
lated matters, the first having to do with
the President's welfare message as it re-
lates to our food assistance program, and,
second, to make some remarks on the
prisoner information policy of North
Vietnam.
DOES THE NIXON WELFARE PRO-
POSAL WEAKEN lets; FOOD AS-
SISTANCE PROGRAM?
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, with
regard to the President's historic mes-
sage on last Friday, which he trans-
mitted in greater detail to Congress yes-
terday, there is one matter of very grave
concern to me, and that is the apparent
intention of the administration, as out-
lined in that message, to phase out time
food assistance program for those Per-
sons who choope to participate under
the newly proposed family assistance
program.
Mr. President, I have no objection--
in fact I rather welcome it?to the re-
placement of some of our plethora of
welfare programs with an income main-
tenance program as suggested by the
President. But if in fact the adminis-
tration proposes to offer a family of four
a maximum of $1,600 in cash, and then
tell the family that chooses that option
that they are exCluded from the food
stamp program, it will be, in effect, de-
creasing very substantially the amount
of aid now being received by millions of
Americans. My preliminary estimates
lead me to believe that if this exclusion
policy goes into effect, and we deny food
assistance to those families who choose
the income maintenance program sug-
gested by the President, in 44 out of the
50 States we would actually lose, for
many millions of people, the amount of
assistance they are now receiving under
a combination of food stamps or com-
modity assistance plus the welfare pay-
ments they now receive.
Mr. President, it is a fact that it re-
quires almost all Of the $1,600 that the
President has suggested for income
maintenance to provide a family of four
with an adequate diet. So it is my in-
tention as the chairman of the Select
Committee on Nutrition and Human
Needs that has been looking into the
problem of hunger and malnutrition in
the United States to call administration
witnesses before our committee at a
very early date to clarify the matter.
I hope very sincerely that the Presi-
dent will press his proposal for an in-
come maintenance program, but that he
will not press it to the inclusion of the
food stamp program.
We must do either one or two things.
We must permit both of the programs
to operate simultaneously or else we will
have a very substantial increase in the
income maintenance figure suggested by
the President.
Mr. President, last May, President
Nixon pledged that his administration
would put an end to hunger in America
for all time. He then moved swiftv to
accomplish this goal by sending to Con-
gress a plan to expand and improve the
food stamp program.
In his historic welfare message of last
Friday, the President added to his ear-
lier pledge by Proposing a family as-
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August 12, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
Three-stage deeentraNzation of administra-
tive responsibilities
First, State administration of 25 percent
of apportioned funds when it designates a
"lead agency" and develops comprehensive
manpower planning capability and an ap-
proved manpower plan; second, State admin-
istration of 68% percent of the funds when
it establishes (1) a Comprehensive Man-
power Agency to operate the unified pro-
grams in accordance with an approved plan,
(2) a State manpower planning organization
to coordinate all manpower related programs,
and (3) arrangements to designate Mayors
as area prime sponsors; and third, State con-
trol of 100 percent of its apportioned funds
when the State meets objective standards of
exemplary performance in planning and
carrying out its manpower service system.
Allowances and wages
The basic allowance to individuals enrolled
in a manpower training program will be
based on the average weekly wage In em-
ployment covered by the State's unemploy-
ment compensation law. In FY 1971 the
basic allowance will be 40 percent of such
average weekly wage, in FY 1972-45
percent and in FY 1973 and there-
after-50 percent. Trainees with family re-
sponsibilities will be allowed an additional $5
per week for each dependent, up to six de-
pendents. In lieu of such allowances, public
assistance recipients will receive an incentive
and expense allowance of $30 per month in
addition to their welfare payments during
training.
A completion bonus equal to twice the
individual's weekly allowance, will be paid
upon the successful completion of an au-
thorized training course of 15 Weeks or
more duration.
Workers employed in "work experience" pro-
grams will be paid wages at rates no lower
than the lowest rate prescribed in the Fair
Labor Standards Act. Workers undertaking
employer compensated on-the-job training
will be compensated at the higher of the
applicable minimum wage rate or the pre-
vailing wage rate for similar work in the
locality.
State apportionment of funds
The Secretary of Labor would apportion
at least 75 percent of the funds aPpropriated
to carry out the Act (except its Job Corps,
Job Bank and extended appropriation pro-
visions) each year among the States in
accordance with criteria which he would pub-
lish. Metropolitan areas within States
(Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, or
other designated areas) would be guaranteed
apportionment of an amount in proportion
to the numbers of persons in the labor
force and number of disadvantaged indi-
viduals residing in the area compared with
the State total of such persons. Federal funds
apportioned to the States under the regular
program would be available to pay 90 percent
of program costs.
Incentive apportionment
An amount equal to 5 percent of the funds
appropriated will be available for supple-
mental apportionments to States and areas
which meet the exemplary performance
standards. The Federal Government will con-
tribute $2 for every dollar of available State
funds.
Federal program authority
The remaining 20 percent of the funds will
be available for expenditure directly by the
Secretary to carry out the purposes of the
Act. The Federal Government would be au-
thorized to arrange directly for all or a por-
tion of the operation of program activities
when a State failed to assure its responsi-
bilities under the Manpower Training Act or
when it was only in partial compliance with
provisions of the Manpower Training Act.
In addition, such programs could be con-
ducted directly with funds not apportioned
to the States, in conducting research and
demonstration programs under title III, the
Secretary of Labor will consult fully with in-
terested Federal agencies (including the
Civil Service Commission with regard to the
effect of the programs on the Federal service).
Manpower training as an economic stabilizer
In any fiscal year in which the national
unemployment rate reaches 4.5 percent for
three consecutive months, the Secretary of
Labor could spend additional funds on au-
thorized programs equal to 10 percent of the
amount then appropriated under the Act for
that year. When unemployment drops help*
the trigger level, remaining unobligated
funds will no longer be available.
Computerized Job Bank
A National Computerized Job Bank would
be established in each State, or on a regional
basis where sparsely populated States can be
grouped together, to facilitate the placement
of persons in employment for which they are
qualified. The Bank would be operated with-
in each State by the State Employment Beier..
ice. The Secretary would operate the
interstate phase of the Bank's operation, col-
lecting information from each State and
making it available to all States. Information
regarding both job applicants and joir orders
would be processed through the system. To
the extent that Federal agency vacancy in-
formation may be required, the Secretary
will consult fully with the Chairman of the
Civil Service Commission in developing any
reporting requirements. Federal vacancies
will be filled in accordance with laws
and regulations which apply to Federal
employment.
Advisory bodies
The National Manpower Advisory Com-
mittee will be continued.
A new Intergovernmental Advisory Coun-
cil on Manpower will be established_ It will
be composed of representative Governors,
Mayors, and other elected local officials, and
will advise the Secretary on the Federal-
State-local partnership established to admin-
ister manpower programs.
Other acts affected
The Manpower Development and Training
Act of 1962 and Title V of the Economic
Opportunity Act are repealed and replaced by
the manpower services provisions of this Act.
The provisions of Title of the Econornie
Opportunity Act are also replaced by the
manpower services provisions of this Act. A
new Title I-B of the Economic Opportunity
Act authorizes the Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity to undertake experimental programs
in the employment and employment-related
problems of the poor. Title I-A of the Eco-
nomic Opportunity Act (Jab Corps) is trans-
ferred to the Manpower Training Act, and
administration is placed directly in the Sec-
retary of Labor. ze6/14
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
TIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970
FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT,
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT,
AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF
MISSILE TEST FACILITIES AT
KWAJALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND
RESERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH
The Senate resumed the considera-
tion of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize ap-
propriations during the fiscal year 1970
ler procurement of aircraft, missiles, na-
val vessels, and tracked combat vehicles
and to authorize the construction of test
facilities at Kawajalein Missile Range,
and to prescribe the authorized person-
nel strength of the Selected Reserve of
each Reserve component of the Armed
Forces, and for other purposes.
S 9767
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
ask for the yeas and nays on the amend-
ment.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield
myself two and a half minutes.
'Mr. President, I should like to sum UP
the situation with which we are con-
fronted in connection with the Fulbright
amendment.
The first thing I Wish to make clear
to the Senate is that the Armed Services
Committee already has cut research, de-
velopment, test, and evaluation by over
a billion dollars. The cut suggested by
Senator Fulbright amounts to close to
$46 million, in an area in which we al-
ready have cut $50 million, of which $40
million will be falling on the same pro-
grams about which the Senator from
Arkansas is complaining so strongly.
The committee has had the best of
staff work, excellent staff work. This
year, the chairman set up the R. & D.
Subcommittee, and a hard and close
scrutiny was conducted into these areas
of the budget.
Sometimes when we approach a prob-
lem and try to cut in and reduce the
expenditures, we suddenly become aware
that if we cut too deeply, go a little too
far, we may be doing more harm than
good and may nullify any good that has
been done.
In 1970, we have been able to reduce
this budget. We feel very strongly that
when Senator FULBRIGHT suggests that
some of these small programs be cut by
58 percent, by 36 percent, by 33 percent,
he is in effect reducing these programs
more than he should. So when we con-
sider our own cuts, which have measured
anywhere from 10 to 12 percent on these
programs, it seems that it is piling on too
much and that, in the interest of good
budgeting and forward-looking work for
the research and development and in the
area of military research, the amend-
ment of the Senator from Arkansas
should be defeated, and defeated soundly.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield myself 3
minutes.
Mr. President, there is over $400 mil-
lion for basic research or nonmission
research, in the $7 billion research au-
thorization for the Department of De-
fense. I am proposing the following: to
cut $45 million overall. It will reduce the
funds for the so-called think tanks by 10
percent, or $27 million, which is much the
largest item. There are 16 of these re-
search centers called think tanks.
It will reduce the research in foreign
institutions by $2 million, which is one-
third, which is the point the Senator
meant. I think it should be cut out. It
will cut behavioral and social research
performed in other places by $3 million.
An example of that is the Hudson
Institute.
It will hold the line on new starts under
Project Themis by cutting the budget re-
quest by $8 million. It will reduce the
counterinsurgency research, Project
Agile, by $5 million.
All this amounts to $45 million. All I
can say is that I apologize to the Senate
for being so timid that I did not propose
three or four times this amount, because
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S 9768 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
several of these programs should never
have been started and should be stopped.
The only excuse I can give for not pro-
posing $145 million or $200 million is
that, out of deference to the Senator
from New Hampshire?he has made a
good beginning?I thought I had better
be as modest as I could and hope to get
something beyond what he has done. He
has done a good job, but not good enough,
because a number of these projects
should be discontinued. They are inap-
propriate for the Defense Department. It
does not necessarily mean that all of
them are inappropriate for other agen-
cies, but they are not related to the mis-
sion of the Department of Defense. It is
not a question of redefining the Depart-
ment of Defense mission in this case. It
Is in other areas that we discussed the
other day, particularly in the field of
hardware, but not in these research proi-
ects, especially in foreign universities, in
the behavioral sciences.
I hope the Senate will continue to take
the attitude that from now on we are
going to subject the Department of De-
fense appropriations or authorizations
to the same kind of scriatiny which is
given to other departments of the Gov-
ernment. I may say that $45 million in
any other department of the Govern-
ment would not seem like a pittance. I
agree that in this agency it seems very
small.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
of the Senator has expired.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am proud that the
Senator from Oregon has cosponsored
this amendment with me.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, a par-
liamentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OnsiCER. The Sen-
ator will state it.
Mr. STENNIS. What is_ the situation
as to time?
The PRESIDING OrkiCER. Each
side has 3 minutes remaining.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I will
be pleased to yield to the distinguished
chairman of the Committee on Armed
Services the remainder of my time.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator
for his generosity.
Mr. President, nothing has been gone
over more carefully by a well-informed
subcommittee, unusually well staffed,
than the items about which we have
been talking. That subcommittee recom-
mended a 12-percent reduction in these
items. That reduction was -adopted and
brought here before the Senate. It is
about $40 million.
The amendment of the Senator from
Arkansas would reduce the amount
around $45 million more in those same
categories. A great deal a what the
Senator is talking about here is in the
1968 budget, or at least a part of it. A
great deal of his criticism is that these
items should be in some other depart-
ments of Government. We state in our
report that some of theist should be
transferred to the Department of State.
I suggested yesterday that the Senator
pick out some of them and give them to
the committee. We thought it was too
late in fiscal year 1970 to dump them
out in the waste basket without anyone
having jurisdiction over them. There-
fore, we dealt with the situation as best
we could.
In this group I am fully satisfied
that the subcommittee intelligently and
diligently made an effort to get a firm
recommendation for the Senate. I hope
the Senate takes the recommendation
seriously and approves the work of the
subcommittee with this understanding.
We are sending a letter to the Depart-
ment of Defense and any other depart-
ment involved that all of these items are
to be looked over and divided up and
sent to us the next time so that they will
come to us in more detailed form.
Mr. Y017NG of North Dakota. Mr.
President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield.
Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr.
President, I wish to point out to the
Senator that the Committee on Appro-
priations will also be making cuts.
Mr. STENNIS. Yes.
Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. In
the past the argument was usually made
for the foreign aid authorization pro-
gram that it could be cut later and it
usually was by the Appropriations Com-
mittee. This is not the last committee
that will review the matter.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator.
Any information we have will be passed
on.
Mr. FLTLBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. What the Senator
from North Dakota has said about for-
eign aid certainly does not apply to the
Military Establishment and never has
over the years.
Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. We
rarely appropriate as much as the au-
thorization provides. Our committee cut
$1.5 billion last year over even the House
action.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Is the Senator say-
ing the percentage of the cut on the
Military Establishment has been com-
parable to that on foreign aid by the
Committee on Appropriations?
Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Yes, it
is for other than military personnel costs.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I cannot remember
that ever having been true.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, there is
one additional point. I know the Senators
are busy, and I am also busy and I am
not able to be in the Chamber as much
as I would like to. However, it is tragic
to me to see all the work that has been
done by this subcommittee slashed to
pieces when during the fine debate on
both sides attendance was limited to
three or four Senators. Many Senators
have not heard the real facts.
I thank the Senator for yielding.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield to me for 1 minute?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield all my time
to the Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. STENNIS. I yield.
August n; 1969 "
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, the
thing that is confusing and puling in
this matter is that it has been admitted
that there are some research programs
included here that are not connected
with defense. For the life of me, I cannot
understand in view of this fact how a
cut of $45 million is going to peopardize
the country. I am going to vote for the
cut.
Ur. STENNIS. There is no mention of
unworthy items in here.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia subsequently
said: Mr. President, as a member of the
Subcommittee on Research and Develop-
ment of the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices, I supported a reduction of more
than a billion dollars in the funds re-
quested by the Department of Defense
for research and development. As a mem-
ber of that subcommittee and as a mem-
ber of the Armed Services Committee, I
supported a reduction of 12 percent in
funds requested by the Department of
Defense for research and development.
Some feel that these cuts were too heavy;
others feel that perhaps some additional
reductions might be made. I am a little
inclined to the latter view. I am a little
inclined to think that perhaps we could
further reduce, in a small way, the re-
maining funds. But the majority of the
committee felt that a 12 percent reduc-
tion at this time is as far as we should
go. Most of the members felt that a bil-
lion-dollar reduction in these funds is as
far as we should go at the present time.
So, Mr. President, on the matter of
funds for the Department of Defense, I
feel that there can be and should be
reductions in the amount requested; and
I feel that the Armed Services Committee
has taken an important step in this re-
gard when it has recommended to the
Senate that the requested funds for re-
search and development be reduced by
$1 billion, or 12 percent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
PACK WOOD in the chair). All time has ex-
pired. The question is on agreeing to the
amendment of the Senator from Arkan-
sas (Mr. Futsarear). In this question the
yeas and nays have been ordered, and
the clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk called the roll.
Mr. KENNEDY. I announce that the
Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Goat) is
absent on official business.
I also announce that the Senator from
Nevada (Mr. BIBLE) , the Senator from
Mississippi (Mr. EASTLAND) , the Senator
from Utah (Mr. Moss), and the Senator
from Texas (Mr. YARBOROUGH) are nec-
essarily absent.
I further announce that, if present and
voting, the Senator from Utah (Mr.
Moss), and the Senator from Texas (Mr.
YARBOROUGH) would each vote "yea."
Mr. SCOTT. I announce that the Sen-
ator from Ohio (Mr. SAXBE) IS necessarily
absent and, if present and voting, would
vote "yea."
The Senator from Illinois (Mr. Peacv)
is detained on official business and, if
present and voting, would vote "yea."
The result was announced?yeas 49.
nays 44, as follows:
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August 12, 1.969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE
Aiken
Bayh
Boggs
Burdick
Byrd, W. Vs.
Case
Church
Cook
Cooper
Cranston
Dole
Eagleton
Ellender
Fulbright
Goodell _
Gravel
Griffin
Allen
Allott
Anderson
Baker
Bellmon
Bennett
Brooke
Byrd, Va.
Cannon
Cotton
Curtis
Dirksen.
Dodd
Dominick
Ervin
Bible
Eastland
Gore
[No. 79 Leg.]
YEAS-49
Harris
Hart
Hartke
Hatfield
Hughes
Inouye
Javits
Kennedy
Mansfield
Mathias
McCarthy
McGee
McGovern
Metcalf
Mondale
Nelson
Packwood
NAYS 14
Fannin
Fong
Goldwater
Gurney
Hansen
Holland
Hollings
Hruska
Jackson
Jordan, N.C.
Jordan, Idaho
Long
Magnuson
McClellan
McIntyre
Pastore
Pearson
Pell
Prouty
Proxmire
Randolph
Ribicoff
Schweiker
Scott
Spong
Symington
Tydings
Williams, N.J.
Williams, Del.
Young, Ohio
Mfllet
Montoya
Mundt
Murphy
Muskie
Russell
Smith
Sparkman
Stennis
Stevens
Talmadge
Thurmond
Tower
Young, N. Dak.
NOT VOTING-7
Moss Yarborough
Percy
Saxbe
So Mr. FULBRIGHT'S amendment was
agreed to.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
move to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I move
- to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
AMENDMENT NO. 129
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I call
up my amendment (No. 129).
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment of the Senator from Arkan-
sas will be stated.
The legislative clerk read the amend-
ment, as follows:
On page 5, line 11, strike out the quota-
tion marks and the word "Funds" and insert
in lieu thereof the following: "Not to ex-
ceed $3,000,000,000 of the funds".
On page 5, line 17, strike out the words
"the Secretary of Defense" and insert in lieu
thereof the words "the President".
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
yield to the Senator- from Washington
(Mr. JAcxsoN) without losing my right
to the floor.
CONSTRUCTION, OPERATION, AND
MAINTENANCE OF THE KENNE-
WICK DIVISION EXTENSION, YAK-
IMA PROJECT, WASHINGTON
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I ask
the Chair to lay before the Senate a mes-
sage from the House of Representatives
on S. 742.
The PRESIDING OFFICER laid be
fore the Senate the amendment of te e
House of Representatives to the bill, S.
'742) to amend the act of June 12, 1948
(62 Stat. 382) , in order to provide fol- the
construction, operation, and maintenance
of the Kennewick division extension,
Yakima project, Washington, and for
other purposes, which was, on page 2,
line 4, strike out "fifty-six-year", and
insert "fifty-year".
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, the con-
struction of the Yakima project was ini-
tiated in 191)5. There are presently six
operating divisions in the project. The
Kennewick Division is the most recently
constructed, having been authorized in
1948. S. 742 would authorize an extension
to the Kennewick Division and would
bring 6,300 acres of land under irrigation
and provide wildlife and conservation
benefits.
When the Senate approved this bill last
March, it was the fourth time the legis-
lation had been passed by this body. The
House of Representatives passed the leg-
islation with minor amendments in June.
However, at that time I received a com-
munication from officials of the Yakima
Indian Tribe expressing concern over
whether this project, if approved and
constructed, would jeopardize the water
rights of the Yakima Tribe, and in addi-
tion, whether the construction of this
project in any way would adversely affect
proposed Indian irrigation projects on
the Yakima Reservation.
I have discussed this matter with the
Indians, and members of the staff of' the
Committee on Interior and Insular Af-
fairs have reviewed the questions raised
by the Indians. In addition, the Secretary
of the Interior and his staff have gone
Into the issues very carefully to deter-
mine if the Kennewick Extension would
adversely affect the Indian projects or
impair the water rights of the Indians in
any way.
By letter dated today, the Secretary
of the Interior has assured me that hy
drologically the authorization and s
sequent construction of the Kenne ick
extension would not affect adverse the
water available to the tribe fo their
projects. I quote from the 5 etary's
letter:
Further, in our view, the ? ? for, and
desirability of, the three Indi: projects will
not be affected by the Kenn- ick extension.
These three projects must tend or fall on
their own merits and ju ification. Finally,
there is nothing in our .pinion, in the lan-
guage of S. 742 or legislative history
which we would cons e as adversely affect-
ing the Indian inte is. We will, in the de-
velopment of the , eject, make certain that
any prior and s ? ?rior water rights of the
tribe are fully .rotected and will require
that these rig; be recognized explicitly in
contracts en ed into pursuant to S. 742.
?
Mr. Pr
that the
appear
Th
was
as
dent, I ask unanimous consent
ull text of the Secretary's letter
t this point in my remarks.
e being no objection, the letter
dered to be printed in the RECORD,
110WS:
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Washington, D.C., August 12, 1969.
on. HENRY M. JACKSON,
Chairman Committee on Interior and Insu-
lar Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN': Your letter of June
4, 1969, enclosed for comment a telegram
from Chairman Robert E. Jim of the Yakima
Tribal Connell which expressed concern re-
garding the effects of S. 742, a bill to au-
thorize the Kennewick extension of the
Yakima reclamation project in Washington,
on Yakima Indian rights to the use of water
for their reservation. The Department has
received similar telegrams from Mr. Jim.
S 9769
Since these telegrams were sent, the bill
passed the House of Representatives with a ?
minor difference?not in issue here?from
the previously-passed Senate- version.
The Kennewick project was authorized by
the Act of June 12, 1948 (62 Stat. 382),
which reserved capacity in the main canal
for the future extension of irrigation to
7,000 acres of additional land. S. 712 would
authorize this extension.
Mr. Jim and the Yakima Tribe are con-
cerned that this project will impair the
water available to the tribe and lessen sub-
stantially their chances of obtaining the nec-
essary funding and authorization for three
irrigation projects which they consider ex-
tremely important to the economic develop-
ment of the reservation. We can appreciate
their concern and, for this reason, we met
with them within the last few days in order
to obtain a more complete un
of their position on the legis
try to alleviate their concern
extent possible.
ts
fully the water avail
Wapato Sates unit, t
project which
appropriation
project. We
The
on th
erstanding
Ion and to
the greatest
The irrigation projects
eh the Yakima
Indians wish to cons
in order to utilize
to them are: the
Satus Creek project,
and the Toppenish
eek project.
The Wapato un
Is an authorized Indian
Id irrigate an estimated
5,000 acres at
oat of about $500,000. No
as been requested for this
aye, however, agreed to revievi
the props?
far the purpose of considering
such a r
eat in the near future.
er two projects would be located
atus and Toppeniah Greeks, respec-
tivel
Authorization for these projects has
not
?
?

een requested by the Department to
. We will review these projects and pro-
e you with more information on them
soon as possible,
We have advised Mr. Jim and the tribe
that the Department does not want to prej-
udice their ability to gain approval at all
or some of these projects in the near future,
nor do we want to do anything that would
Impair or infringe on their rights to water
for all of these projects.
We are satisfied, based on information fur-
nished by the Bureau of Reclamation, that
hydrologically the authorization and subse-
quent construction of the Kennewick exten-
sion would not affect adversely the water
available to the tribe for the above projects.
The project is not dependent on water from
the Yakima Reservation. Further, in our
view, the need for, and desirability of, the
three Indian projects will not be affected by
the Kennewick extension. These three pro-
jects must stand or fall on their own merits'
and justification. Finally, there is nothing
in our opinion, in the language of S. 742 or
its legislative history which we would con-
strue as adversely affecting the Indian in-
terests. We will, in the development of the
project, make certain that any prior and su-
perior water rights of the tribe are fully
protected and will require that these rights
be recognized explicitly in contracts entered
into pursuant to S. 742.
We hope that the expression of the De-
partment's views herein will help to remove
the deep concern expressed by the tribe and
result in final passage of S. 742 as quickly
as possible.
It should be noted that the tribe has indi-
cated that their concern is caused partially
by some statements made by the Depart-
ment on the project a few years ago. If you
find any such statements in the record of
this legislation which may have contributed
to the concern of the tribe, we will be glad
to clarify them.
Sincerely yours,
WALTER J. HICKLE,
Secretary of the Interior.
?
?
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S 9770 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 12, 1969
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, in view agencies. It was the Office of Naval Re- peculiar jurisdiction of the Department
of the assurances provided by the Secre- search that stepped into the vacuum left of Defense for basic research. The chair-
tary of the Interior, I move that the by the wartime Office of Scientific Re- man, the Selaator from Arkansas (Mr.
Senate concur in the amenoment of the search and Development to continue FULBRIGHT) said to him:
House.
Federal funding of research at our lead- It would seem that the National Science
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ing universities. The ONR, the Army, and Foundation, NM, or the AEC should have al-
question is on agreeing to the motion of the Air Force all helped sustain the pace most exclusive jurisdiction to do basic re-
the Senator from Wasingtoia, of postwar research and to build up the search as distinguished from applied re-
search. Do you agree with that?
The motion was 45,te41 immense national resource now repre-
sented by our trained scientists and en- This is what the- admiral replied:
gineers, by our laboratories, by the dis- I think the problem you have here is
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA- tinguished science faculties of many that the Department of Defense is able to
TIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR public and private universities. This mil- get large funds for doing basic research while
MILITARY PROCUREM ISNT, RE-
oposesib had a le for discussion other
itary support for research was in the this
inotG?wveith rpineut
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND
national interest during the decade that agencies I
ee-
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MIS-
saw the creation of the research
retary of Defense McElroy on that subject,
pro-
SILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJA-
and this- is the point he made. He said it
grams of the National Institutes . of
LEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RE- is important that basic research be done in
Health, the Atomic Energy Commission, the United States. As I remember his words,
SERVE COMPONENTSTRENGTH and the National Science Foundation he said it was not too important that the
The Senate resumed the consideration Now the situation has changed. Defense Department do it, but that the work,
of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize appro- There exists today a whole panoply of should be done, and since the Defense De-
priations during the fiscal year 1970 for Federal departments and agencies each partment has the funds to pay for the work
procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval with responsibilities for the funding of it is therefore being done by them.
vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and research. The Bureau of the Budget in The ready accessibility of Defense
research, development, test, and evalua- its special analysis Q for the fiscal year funds for research has kept the Defense
tion for the Armed Forces, and to au- 1970 budget lists 14 separate departments Department in the role of a principal
thorize the construction of test facilities and agencies with such responsibilities sponsor or patron. This then is the is-
at Kwajalein Missile Range, and to pre- Their estimated obligations range from sue: Should our research scientists and
scribe the authorized personnel strength $1.491 billion for NASA down to $7 mil- engineers continue to look to the defense
of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve lion for the Department of Justice. The agencies for $1.3 billion out of a total
component of the Armed Forces, and for range of their interests sweeps across the estimate of $5.2 billion of Federal obliga-
other purposes of the life and physical sciences tion for research?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, may and is beginning to extend to the social This is the issue that has attracted the
I say that the next 2 amendments should sciences. They represent an existing attention of many college
students and
not require over 5 minutes' discussion,
mechanism for civil agencies to assume contributed to campus unreSt.
I hope Members of the Senate will re- more responsibility for the overall fund- Consider the recent first report of the
main on the floor. ing of research so that the military can MIT Review Panel on Special Laboras
I yield, without losing my i laid to the concentrate upon its proper functions tories, issued last May 31. Here the re-
floor, to the majority leader, and responsibilities,
view panel clearly expresses its concern
Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. President, the What is our present situation? with heavy emphasis on defense-related
Fanbright amendment which was just Yesterday, Senator PROXMIRE inserted research. It said;
a -
adopted by the Senate is in my opinion into the RECORD nine tables beginning at We find today a heavy emphasis on fie-
of a most significant nature. It should Page 59629. Examination of these tables fense-related research and d,evelopment in
have far reaching effects on realining shows how much our research has come the country at large, an emphasis which de-
the Federal sponsorship of research at to depend upon the Defense agencies, tracts from similar efforts aimed at other
all sources but especially at our academic Particularly basic research of the kind urgent needs of society. Although the em-
institutions, I am particularly pleased that should be sponsored by civil agen-
phasis on defense work cameabout a .
response to perceived national needs, it has
with the adoption of that part of the (tICS, especially by the National Science hampered the nation's ability to cope with
amendment adding a new section 205. Foundation. If we look at table III, we the problems of the oontemporary world
That new section should go a long way see that the Defense Department for As far as M.I.T. Is concerned, the nation's
toward obtaining the needed readjust- the fiscal years 1966 to 1969 has funded emphasis on defense produces a bias toward
ment of sponsorship, more research at colleges and imiversi- specific areas of research at the institute,
I had prepared the following amend- ties than has the National Science Foun- and makes it more difficult to move in other
ment in the event the Fulbright amend- dation. If we look at table IV, we see that directions. M.I.T. has a role to play in a t-
ment were not successful:
over these 3 fiscal years, the Defense tempting to redress this balance, not only
Department in virtually every field of within itself but also at the national level.
On page 3, line 25, insert the following
new section: science is a major Federal sponsor and Many of you will recall the request
"sm. 205. None of the funds authorized far outspends the NSF. Table V makes Made last year for current information
to be appropriated by this Act may be used the case even stronger, for here the De- about ongoing research projects of Fed-
to carry out any research project or study fense Department has been funding as oral departments and agencies. The re-
unless such project or study has a direct and much or more basic research than the suiting 12 cartons have been men-
apparent relationship to a specific military agency which Congress established for tioned many times in this Chamber. 1
function or operation."
this very purpose; namely, the National must confess that trying to get an over-
The amendment is identical with that Science Foundation. all grasp of this massive outpouring of
part of the Fulbright amendment that What has happened is that research information has been no easy task, and I
adds a new section 205. That section 205 has ridden on the coattail of military wonder, based on our experience, what
is now apart of this bill, appropriations simply because that mon- mechanisms exist within the executive
It should be emphasized again as the ey was easy to obtain, branch to grasp the whole of thess
debate continues on this measure that Take basic research as a case in point, varied, diverse research programs.
the vigorous give and take displayed which by definition cannot be closely, di- We have made two preliminary forays
again today is not intended as an attack rectly and visibly linked to a given need into this massive collection of project
upon the military. Rather it is serving or problem. If the linkage is direct and information. Taking one field of science,
to raise and illuminate many important visible, then the work is probably applied chemistry, we counted 1,988 chemistry
Issues, one of which is the extent the De- research, or engineering. A year ago last research projects reported by eight de-
fense Department should fund research, April, the Senate Foreign Relations Com- partanents and agencies. Of these, the
particularly research not directly and mittee held hearings on Department of top three agencies were DHEVV with 617
visibly linked to present and foreseeable Defense sponsored foreign affairs re- projects, NSF with 458, and DOD with
military needs and responsibilities. messiah. At those hearings Admiral Rick- 392. The DOD projects represented costs
The Nation's scientific community has over, who is given to calling a spade by of about $17.4 million for fiscal years
a longstanding debt to the Defense Its Proper name, was asked about the 1987 and 1968. Of these, 124 Air Force
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"Augstst 12, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
projects were with universities and 1'7
with industry; 157 Army projects were
with universities and one with industry;
21 Navy projects were with universities
and five with industry. Taken together,
of the 392 chemistry projects reported by
DOD, 302 were in universities and educa-
tional institutions, 23 were in industry,
53 were performed abroad, and 14 were
with other kinds of organizations.
These figures reveal how much re-
search in chemistry has come to depend
upon DOD funding.
Turning to other fields of science, we
looked at project information reported
under the combined heading of be-
havioral and socisd sciences. Here we
find 280 DOD research projects reported
representing obligations of $14.8 million
for fiscal years 1967 and 1968 combined.
Of these, 186 were going on at universi-
ties: seven were funded by the Advanced
Research Projects Agency; nine by the
Army; 63 by the Air Force; and 107 by
the Navy. Our initial screening identi-
fied 11 subjects in which more than one
Defense agency was sponsoring research;
table I shows this information.
Going further, an admittedly subjec-
tive reading of these project titles for the
behavioral and social sciences suggested
that many could have been equally well
funded by the National Science Founda-
tion. In fact, of the 280 projects reported
by DOD for behavioral and social sci-
ences, as many as 212 representing obli-
gations of $9.7 million out of a total of
$14.8 million for fiscal years 1967 and
1968 combined, seemed appropriate for
NSF and other civil agency support;
table II gives the details. With the per-
mission of the Senate, I would insert in
the RECORD a list of the titles for Defense
research projects reported in behavioral
and social sciences that initial reading
suggests are appropriate for funding by
the National Science Foundation.
The members can judge for themselves
how directly and visibly related to de-
fense needs are such research projects
as "rate-controlled speech and mediat-
ing variables in second-language learn-
ing," funded by ARPA; or "the socio-
economic aspects of command control
in developing nations" by Army; or
"organ pathology and prenatal-post-
natal biochemical responses associated
with early social-developmental rela-
tionships" by the Air Force; or 'organi-
zational, cultural and personal factors
influencing work productivity" by the
Navy.
I cite these titles not to point a finger
of ridicule, for we have no information
as to the scientific quality of the work or
the standing of the investigators. What I
do intend is to question the relevance of
subjects of these kinds to the military
needs of the Nation, and to question why
scientific research of this kind, if needed
in the national interests, is not funded
by other departments and agencies.
Mr. President, this body can long de-
bate the issue of Defense support for re-
search that is more appropriate to other
agencies without ever affecting what is
going on. Debate can frame the issues,
but only action can produce change. The
change that national interests dictates
is to relieve the military of its present
funding of research not clearly, directly,
and visibly linked to its responsibilities
and functions. Whatever action we take
will be painful, particularly if other
members of this body who are concerned
with funding of research by civil agen-
cies under their jurisdiction are not
persuaded to provide the funding so that
DOD can transfer such work without dis-
rupting too much of the ongoing re-
search.
Despite the pains of reductions, or ter-
minations, or transitions, I propose that
our national interests require us to act
now and at least to begin the disengage-
ment of Defense from funding of re-
search not closely related to its needs.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD three
tables which bear on this subject.
S 9771
There being no objection, the tables
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
TABLE I.-RESEARCH SPONSORED BY MORE THAN 1 DEFENSE
AGENCY
Project
Air
Navy Force Army ARPA
Learning foreign languages x x x
Pattern recognition x x x
Learning x x x
Visual perception x x x
Decisionmaking x x x
Teaching complex material x x
Effects of drugs on performance._ x x
Behavior under stress x x
Leadership x x
Group interaction x x
Memory x x
TABLE II,-COMPARISON OF TOTAL NUMBER OF DEFENSE PROJECTS IN BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES FOR 1968 WITH
THOSE POSSIBLY APPROPRIATE FOR SUPPORT BY THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
Number
of
projects
Number
of NSF
type
Fiscal year 1967
Funding for all
behavioral and
Per- social science
cent research
NSF
type
Fiscal year 1968
Funding for all
behavioral and
Per- social science
cent research
NSF Fur-
typo cent
ARPA 12 12 100
Army 22 18 81
Air Force 76 71 93
Navy 170 111 65
Total
$611,683
849,045
1, 595, 000
5, 372, 000
280 212 75 8,427,728
PROJECTS IN THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL Scr-
ENCES REPORTED BY THE DEFENSE DEPART-
TN' 1968 THAT APPEAR APPROPRIATE
FOR SUPPORT BY THE NATIONAL SCIENCE
FOUNDATION
ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECT AGENCY
Research on the psychological origins of
revolution, fy '67, $39,000.
Factors associated with cultural change in
Middle Eastern countries, fy '68, $238,000.
Research on behavior in international sys-
tems, $0.1
Experimental study of the psychological
processes involved in the use of language, $0.
Handbook and casebook for practical eval-
uators, fy '68, $32,000.
Risk-taking and negotiation In leakier and
delegate groups, fy '67, $36,483.
On-line computer studies of bargaining
behavior, fy '67, $216,000.
Computer recognition of patterns of be-
havior, fy '68, $89,775.
The characteristics of incentive systems
and their effect on individual behavior, fy
'68, $95,000.
Psychological processes of the central ner-
vous system, fy '68, $200,000.
Modes of organizing and presenting com-
plex educational material fy '67, $110,800.
Rate-controlled speech and mediating var-
iables in second-language learning fy '67,
$179,400.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
The relationship between subjective a,nd
objective assessments of fatigue. fy '68,
$7,850.
The effects of psycho-active chemicals on
cognitive social skills. fy '67, $10,688; fy
'68, $1,840.
Socio-economic aspects of command con-
trol in developing nations. fy '67, $85,934;
fy '68, $74,000.
Temporal orientation and task perform-
ance. fy '67, $19,528.
Comparative studies of the central mech-
anisms of sensory discrimation. fy '67,
$24,912.
Performance: vigilance-factors influencing
I "$0" means a project is on-going in fy
'67 and '68 but was previously funded.
$611,603
100
1654, 775
$654, 775
100
744,673
87
343,825
340,242
99
1,554, 000
3,030, 000
97
56
1,020, 000
4, 440, 000
1,008,600
2, 824, 000
98
63
5,948,356
70
6, 456, 000
4, 827, 017
74
detection and monitoring. fy '67, $30,667;
fy '68, $30,890.
Effects of drugs on sensorimotor processes
and mentation. fy '67, $32,586; fy '68,
$30,321.
Perceptual lag as a function of onset and
offset visual stimulation. $0 either year.
Stimulus factors in human timing be-
havior. fy '67, $1,899; fy '68, $300.
Remote detection of cortical unit spike dis-
charge; is it possible? fy '67, $18,689.
Sleep and dream research. fy '67, $28,063;
fy '68, $22,500.
Analysis of visual and pupillary function-
ing. fy '67, $14,338.
Basic studies of psycho-physic measure-
ment theory applicable to human sensory
processes. $0 either year.
Adaptation to bodily rotation. fy '67,
$16,436; fy '68, $1,791.
Suppression and fusion in stereopsis. fy
'67, $44,856.
Development of a psychophysical photo
quality measure. fy '67, $10,948.
Interdisciplinary research iii learning con-
trol systems and pattern recognition. fy
'67, $341,500; fy '68, $170,750.
Suppression and fusion in stereopsis. fy
'67, $33,634.
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
An information system for an enclaved so-
ciety. fy '68, $89,000.
Military contribution to modernization-
Middle East and North Africa. fy '67,"
$36,000.
Decision making in situations of practical
action. fy '67, $57,000.
Persuasive communication in functional
organizations. $0.
Visual perception of movement. $0.
- 'Research to improve language training/
Western Europe. fy '68, $49,000.
Political development and moderization
in Islamic countries-military planning, $0.
Measurements of attitude and attitude
change. $0.
Ultrasonic determination of body compo-
sition. fy '67, $28,000.
An experimental study of the develop-
ment of consensus. fy '67, $21,000.
Studies of uncertainty, information search
and decision-making. $0.
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S 9772 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Theory and methods in the study of or-
ganizational stress. fy '67, $112,000.
A model for stimulus releva rice. $0.
Performance and Wooten iical responses
related to social changes veleus chemothera-
py. fy '67, $38,000.
Organ pathology and prenatal-postnatal
biochemical responses asseciated with early
social-developmental relatieleilliPs. $0.
Spatial-temporal effects of high intensity
point sources of light on the induction of
apparent motion. fy '67, 821..000.
Examination of short term :Ind long term
memory processes/role of temporal lobe. fy
'67, $16,000.
Study of the narrative- review in pro-
grammed instruction. $0.
Human selective learning, fy eV, 318,000;
fy '68, $20,000.
Effects of physical and symbolic stressors
on perceptual mechanistm.fy '67, $25,000.
Social-cultural aspects of development. fy
'67, $33,000.
Emergent leaders in deeeleping nations.
$0.
Research in background imigery interpre-
tation. fy '68, 316,000.
Military implications of chnige: Commu-
nist China. fy '67, $104,000. _
Predictive model for intra-geoup negotia-
tion, fy '67, $26,000.
Methodology for analysis_ re" internal so-
cial movements. fy '67, $9,000.
Innovation, social exch,ange and institu-
tionalization. fy '67, $49,000.
Measurement Of reactions to earees. fy '67,
$33,000.
Aerospace power and behavioral knowledge.
fy '67, $105,000.
Psycho-physiological measur ment of re-
sponse to information overload et. complexity.
fy '67, $68,000.
Transfer of technology under military and
related conditions-Japan and other coun-
tries. $0.
Social psychological aspects of stress. fy
'67, $94,000.
Rational models for strategic behavior. fy
'67, $24,000.
Movement, learning and behevior. fy '67,
$30,000; fy '68, $36,000.
Transformational and orgatite Lionel proc-
esses in memory. fy '67, $14,000.
Comparative study of nomad ive behavior
among Japanese and American youth. fy
'67, $34,000.
Social-psyclaological factors in the devel-
opment of new nations. $0. _
Influence of memory factors on sensory
discrimination. fy '68, $15,000.
Leadership, organizational effectiveness,
and human resources. $0.
The desire for group achievement: origins
and effects. fy '68, $61,000.
Operational description of behavioral laws,
fy '67, $19,000.
Cultural differences in task approach and
optimal performance in a. trans. for task. fy
'68, $400,000.
Simulation studies of organiparional com-
munication behavior under Stress. fy '67,
$47,000; fy '68, $43,000.
An analysis of group feedback effects. fir
'67, 330,000.
Allocation of resources in a multirnan-
machine system simulation. fy '68, $40,000.
Elementary processes In petite: n percep-
tion. $0.
Social mobility and professionel motiva-
tion-application to Air Force manpower pool.
fy '68, $11,000.
Speech characteristics as indices of atti-
tude, mood and motivational State. fy
$47,000.
Study of cognitive and affective attitudes.
$0.
Altered levels of consciousness and human
performance. fy '67, $64,000.
Psychophysiological baseline pattern an-
alysis. fy '67, $83,000 fy '68, $32,000.
Elite structure ancl elite tranaformation in
totalitarian political systems. $0.
Perception of dynamic stimuli, Sy '67,
$38,000.
The prediction of subject motivatibility in
laboratory experimentation. fy '67, $29,000;
fy '68, $19,000,
A study in social science decision making.
$0.
Experimental study of the effects of sur-
round brightness and size on visual perform-
ance. fy '67, 079,600.
Organization of information about human
learning transfer and retention. fy '67,
$25,000.
Criteria for the design of new forms of
organization. fy '67, $45,000; fy '68, $65,000.
Remembering, forgetting and recovery of
memory. fy '67, $30,000.
Psycho-physical relations in perception of
space, time and velocity. fy '67, $8,000.
Executive decision making in organiza-
tions under stress and crisis. fy '67, $47,000.
Operational analysis of behavioral situa-
tions, fy '67, $20,000.
Political-idological systems and hostility
patterns. $0.
Movement and perceptual-motor perform-
ance during atypical input conditions, $0.
Individual differences in motor and verbal
skills. fy '68, $62,000.
Expectations of motivations related to
power differences within groups. $0.
Decisions and decision-makers: the effects
of confidence, social risk and commitment
fy '67, 329,000.
Effects of supportive, close and punitive
styles of supervision. fy '67, $5,000.
Improvement of learning capabilities. fy
'67, $87,000.
A systematic investigation of contrast ef-
fects related to vigilance tasks. fy '87, $17,000.
Effects of task characteristics on perform-
ance. fy '68, 350,000.
T.T.S. DEPARTMENT OP THE NAVY
Human engineering guide to equipment
design and evaluation, fir '87, $15,000; fy
$80,000.
Experimental techniques for predicting
performance of electronics personnel. fy '67,
$20,000; fy '68, $37,000.
Properties of visual displays and methods
for evaluating the effectiveness of displays.
fy '68, 320,000.
Functional evaluation of electrolurnines-
cent pictorial status displays. fy '67, $20,000.
Psycho physiological problems of pilot pro-
tection. fy '67, 340,000; fy '68, 330,000.
An integrated system for measuring diver
performance. fy '67, $26,000; fy '68, $50,000.
Development of computer assisted instruc-
tion procedures to aid in teaching complex
concepts. fy '67, $70,000; fy '68, $70,000.
Determination of the relationships be-
tween the electrical activity of the human
retina and the perception of form. fy '67,
$15,000.
The role of motivation in Naval leader-
ship. fy '67, $57,000.
Investigation of habit reversal techniques
of potential use with Navy personnel. fy '67,
$15,000; rY '68, $34,000i
Image enhancement of Navy display sys-
tems, fy '68, $11,000.
Inducing cooperation between adversaries.
fy '67, $41,000.
Psycho physics mechanisms of atten-
tion, memory, information processing and
decision making, fy '67, $31,000; fy '68, $25,-
000,
Dynamics of conflict and cooperation In
small groups, teams, and crews. fy '67, 445,000.
Speech as an indication of stress, $0.
Recognition and discrimination of com-
plex visual stimuli in continuous motion. fy
'67, 355,000.
Pattern recognition of EEG to determine
level of alertness. fy '68, 346,000.
New teehniquee for presenting human-en-
August 12: 1969-
gln.eering data to design engineering. fy '68,
$20,000.
Effect of cold water on divers. fy '67, $30,-
000; fy '68, 337,000.
Systems analysis research on pilot land-
ing performance. fy '67, 340,000; fy '68, $26,-
000,
Development of techniques for using com-
puters to administer and score psychologi-
cal tests to Navy applicants. fy '67, $76,000;
fy '68, $26,000.
Computer-assisted instruction informa-
tion exchange. fy '67, $47,000; fy '68, $56,000.
Diver performance measures. fy '67, $30,-
000; fy '68 823,000.
Machine augmentation of human strength
and endurauee. fy '68, $400,000; fy 88, $167,-
000.
Improving intelligibility of divers using
helium-oxygen breathing mixtures, fy "68,
$44,000.
Comparison of different organizational
structures in terms of crew effectiveness. fy
'67 810,000.
Psychological and physiological factors af-
fecting team performance. fy '67 327,000.
Effects of perceptual isolation on the hu-
man Subject. fy '67 426,000; fy '68 $23,000.
Inetractional strategies In computer as-
sisted instruction. fy '67 357,000; fy '68 $71,-
000. _
Improving search and acquisition for tar-
gets In peripheral vision. fy '67 $31,000; fy
'68 $20,000.
Computer classification of physiological
responses in hazardous environments. fy '67
$34,000.
Application of attitude change principles
to equipment acceptance. fy '68 $39,000.
Relationship between Navy vigilance tasks
and body chemistry changes. fy '68 $40,000.
The effects of persuasive communications
on attitudes. fy '67 $38,000,
Effects of drugs on stress and vigilance he-
havior of Navy operators. fy '67 335.000.
Drug enhancement ancement of performance on Na-
val personnel under stress. fy '67 $22,000; fy
,68 322,o
Electrical activity of human eye muscles
under statin and dynamic viewing conditions.
fy '67 316,000: fy '68 $16,000.
Special methoris for resisting psychological
warfare techniques. fy '67 $26,000; re '68
$65
Comparative study of electroencephal pat-
terns. fy '68 $14,000._
Determination of the relationships among
sensory and display interpretation factors
in man-machine information transfer sit-
uations. fy '67 $35,000; fy '68 335,000.
Organizational, cultural and personal fac-
tors influencing work productivity. fy '67
3131.000.
Determination of the effects of high in-
tensity light flashes on the eye and on visual
perception. fy '67 $4,000; fy '68 $15,000.
Survey of human factors and biotechnol-
ogy research. fy '68 $22,000.
Interaction of drugs with other factors
determining human performance. $0.
The measurement of stress and its rela-
tionship to and effects on human perform-
ance in mental and motor work. $0.
Processing of information sequentially die-
played by computer-driven cathode-ray
tubes, fy '67 328,000.
Work producing capabilities of underwater
operators. fy '67 031,000; fy '68 330,000.
Symposium on applied models of man-
machine systems. fy '68 $4,000.
Defining the conditions which control how
well test material is learned and how long it
is remembered. fy '67 $32,000.
Row human beings acquire and evaluate
Information in the process of Inu-kirg judg-
inents and decisions. fy '88 $30,000.
Military implications of modernization in
the Far East. $0,.
The study of leadership effectiveness in
complex situations. fy 117 $15,000.
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August 12, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-- SENATE
S 9773
It is my further understanding that
before the Senate concludes its business
tonight, the distinguished Senator from
Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE) will lay down
his amendment on the C5-A; that we
will come in at 10 o'clock tomorrow
morning; that the Senator from Wis-
consin and other Senators will lay the
foundation for the amendment. The
amendment, however, would not be
voted on tomorrow, but would be the
pending business when the Senate re-
turned on September 3. It is a very im-
portant amendment, and it is hoped
that a full attendance will be in the
Senate at that time.
In other words, to those of you who
are interested in attending the state
dinner at Los Angeles-and that is only
one factor among many others-if we
go through with what I have just dis-
cussed, there will be no rollcall votes
tomorrow; and all I can say, on that
basis, is Godspeed.
Sound conduction in the ear affecting milt- The measurement of speech intelligibility.
tary communications. fy '67 $26,000. fy '68 $16,000.
Group information processing and cleci- Leadership requirements in differing or-
sion-making in complex situations. fy '67 ganizational settings. fy '67 $23,000; fy '68
$50,000. $30,000.
Military implications of social change. fy Experiments on leadership, authority and
'67 $140,000. , influence. fy '67 $22,000.
Determination of the relationships between Theories and models of military group be-
the responses of humans and the physical havior. fy '67 $37,000.
dimensions of stimulation for the sense of Research on panic behavior. fy '67 $5,000;
taste. $0. fy '68 $4,000.
Research to improve methods of training in The influence of power on group produc-
f oreign languages. fy '67 $19,000. tivity and morale. $0.
Helium speech distortion correction using Reduction of hostility within groups to
an analog simulation of the human ear. fy enhance team performance. fy '67 $20,000;
'68 $35,000. fy '68 $20,000.
Development of classification procedures to Studies of computer-assisted instruction;
Identify pilot vertigo research. fy '68 $50,000. instructional strategies and behaviorally
Biophysical changes affecting behavioral oriented language. fy '68 $68,000.
performance. fy '67 $20,000; fy '68 $20,000. Conference on group decision making. fy
Consulting and advisory services for the '68 $6,000.
social and behavioral science. fy '67 $14,000; Effects of group interaction on problem
fy '68 $17,000. solving. $0.
Identification of variables which predict Identification of factors influencing the
international conflict. fy '67 $26,000; fy '68 effectiveness of management and leadership.
$24,000. fy '67 $28,000; fy '68 $45,000.
Analysis of reward as a means of promoting Theory and measurement of international
adult learning. fy '67 $29,000. conflict. fy '68 $165,000.
Enhancement by drugs of Naval person- Research on how visually patterned stim-
nel performance under stress. fy '67 $65,000; uli are classified by the nervous system. $0.
fy '68 $49,000. Undersea work performance and psycho-
Control of purposive movement through logical adjustment. fy '67, $22,000; fy '68
sequenced electrical stimulation of brain
sites. fy '67 $121,000; fy '68 $51,000. $30,000.
Research on factors involved in the de-
Investigation of methods to reduce train- tection and identification of visual and audi-
ing failures among intellectually able stu- tory signals. fy '67 $35,000.
dents. fy '68 $25,000. Techniques of differential assignment of
Effects of extreme environments on per- personnel. $0.
formance of Navy teams and groups. fy '67 Comparative research on interpersonal per-
$5,000. , ception. fy '68 $15,000.
Mechanisms of human auditory localiza- Characteristics of Navy trainees that en-
tion as related to Naval communications sys- hance or inhibit learning. fy '67 $44,000.
terns. fy '68 $33,000. Comparative analyses of leadership prac-
Techniques for improving human memory. tices. fy '68 $31,000.
fy '68 $43,000. . Implications of organizational stability and
Neural mechanisms involved in the proc- instability for psychological operations. fy
essing of visual and auditory information. $0. '68 $150,000.
Comparative studies of conflict and conflict Experimental analysis of aggressive be-
resolution. fy '68 $36,000. havior. fy '67 $43,000; fy '68 $26,000.
Analysis of the human behavior processes Brain nucleic acid changes during learn-
involved in solving complex problems. fy '67 ing. fy '68 $26,000.
$22,000; fy '68 $20,000.
Basic mechanisms in. attention and vigi-
lance of human operators. $0.
Atlas of principles of group behavior for
studies of crew Isolation and confinement.
fy '67 $15,000; fy '68 $33,000.
Speech analysis of men under stress. fy '67
$25,000; fy '68 $25,000.
Determination of the factors influencing
the perception of form and distance of un-
derwater divers. fy '68 $7,000.
Underwater work measurement techniques.
fy '67 $25,000; fy 68 $34,000.
PROGRAM
ADJOURNMENT FROM AUGUST 13
TO SEPTEMBER 3, 1969
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
move that the Senate turn to the con-
sideration of House Concurrent Resolu-
tion 315, with, of course, the proviso that
the Senator from Arkansas does not lose
his right to the floor.
The PRESIDING .r.riCER. The con-
current resolution 11 be stated by the
clerk.
The legislative cle k read the concur-
rent resolution (H. Con. Res. 315) as
follows:
H. Coil. ES. 315
Resolved by the H
(the Senate concu
Houses shall adjourn
13, 1969, and that
said day they sta
o'clock noon on W
1969.
se of Representatives
ing), That the two
on Wednesday, August
hen they adjourn on
adjourned until 12
nesday, September 3,
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, for
have order?
Mr. PROUTY. r. President, may we
the information of the Senate, it is my
intention shortly to call up House Con-
The PRESID G OFFICER. The mo-
current Resolution 315, but if the dis-
tion is not deba ble.
tinguished minority leader, in the mean-
the floor?
Mr. STENNIS Mr. President, who has
time, has any questions, I will endeavor The PRESID G OFFICER. The ques-
to answer them. tion before -th Senate is an adjourn-
Biophysics of vision for design of optimal
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I would like to ask the distinguished majority ment resolutio and is not debatable.
target displays. fy '68 $4,000. leader about the program for the balance Mr. PROU . Mr. President, I ask for
Attitude change for the enhancement of of the day, but more particularly about the yeas and nays, then, if I cannot
morale. fy '67 $30,000. speak.
Improvements in underwater voice cora- the program for tomorrow, and whether The yeas a d nays were ordered.
munication. fy '68 $34,000. or not there may be recorded votes on The PRESI sING OFFICER. The ques-
Research on psychiatric effectiveness of fu- any amendments that may be submitted, tion is on : : eeing to the concurrent
Research on physical and psychological fac- contingent will be going to the dinner resolution. e clerk will call the roll.
ture weapon systems crews. fy '67 $54,000. knowing, of course, that a substantial
tors involved in underwater speech commu- Mr. STEN S. Mr. President, a parlia-
nication. fy '67 $50,000; fy '68 $57,000. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it is mentary in. iry.
. in California.
Effect of noise on inner-ear cells. fy '67 The PRE- DING atoriCER. The Sen-
$43,000; fy '68 $28,000. a good thing that the distinguished mi- ator will st: e it.
Behavioral science inputs to the prediction nority leader raised that particular Mr. S i IS. What are we voting on?
of conflict. fy '68 $275,000. question at this time. It is my under- The PRE IDING OFFICER. The clerk
Conference on psychological problems in standing that the distinguished chair- will restate the resolution.
large-scale change. fy '67 $7,000; fy '68 man of the Foreign Relations Commit-
$24,000. tee, the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. The legi ative clerk read as follows:
Automatic teaching systems; man-machine FULBRIGHT) , has two amendments whichResolved cc the House of Representatives
interactions involving high speed digital (the Senat: concurring), That the two
computers. $0. may not take too much time. Houses shal adjourn on Wednesday, Au-
Effect of environmental restriction on per- It is my further understanding that gust 13, 19&, and that When they adjourn
formance, fy '68 $4,000. there is a very strong possibility that a on said day they stand adjourned until 12
o'clock noo on Wednesday, September 3,
Factors involved in modifying hostile at- yea-and-nay vote on House Concurrent
1969.
titudes. fy '67 $2,000; fy '68 $36,000. Resolution 315, the resolution to ad-
Comparative study of interaction between journ for 3 weeks, will be asked for;
ideology and behavior. fy '67 $50,000. and, of course, if it is, it will be granted. ment of the pledge made by the joint
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Mr. MANSFIELD. This is a fulfill-
S 9774
leadership to all Senators, and about
which all Senators were informed as
long ago as last January, with no ob-
jection at that time.
The PRESIDING OFFI(ielt. The clerk
will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. KENNEDY. I announce that the
Senator from Tennessee eMr. GORE),
is absent on official business
I also announce that the Senator from
Nevada (Mr. BrseE), the Senator from
Mississippi (Mr. EesTeeeie), he Senator
from Utah (Mr. Moss), the Senator from
Georgia (Mr. RUSSELL) , and the Senator
from Texas (Mr. Yeretoeoueer) are
necessarily absent.
Mr. SCOTT. I announce that the Sen-
ator from Ohio (Mr. Seem) is necessarily
absent.
The Senator from Oklahoma (Mr.
BELLMON), the Senator freer' Utah (Mr.
BENNETT), and the Senator from Illinois
(Mr. PERCY) , are detained on official
business.
If present and voting, the Senator from
Utah (Mr. BENNETT), and the Senator
from Illinois (Mr. PERCIa, would each
vote "yea."
The result was announced?yeas 76,
nays 14, as follows:
[No. 80 Leg.]
YEAS-70
Gurney Montoya
Hansen telnet
Harris mphy
Hart Muskie
Hartke on
flatileld PP ckwood
Hollings EPerson
Hruska PdU
Hughes Proxmire
Inouye aftlidolph
Jackson Ribienff
Javits achweiker
Jordan, N.C. ainith
Jordan, Idaho Saps rkraan
Kennedy >g
Long Sten nis
Magnuson St, yens
Mansfield Symington
Mathias Th,irmond
McCarthy tower
McGee Tydings
McGovern Williams, N.J.
McIntyre Soong, N. Dak.
Metcalf Too rig, Ohio
Miller
Mondale
NAYS-14
Ervin
Goldwater
Holland
McClellan
Pastore
NOT VOTING-10
Bellmon Gore Lambe
Bennett Moss iborough
Bible Percy
Eastland Russell
So the concurrent resolution (H. Con.
Res. 315) was agreed to.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE August 12, 1969*
Anderson
Baker
Bayh
Boggs
Brooke
Burdick
Byrd, Va.
Byrd, W. Va.
Cannon
case
Church
Cook
Cranston
Curtis
Dirksen
Dodd
Dole
Dominick
Eagleton
Ellender
Fannin
Fong
Pulbright
Goodell
Gravel
Griffin
Aiken
Allen
Allott
Cooper
Cotton
Presty
Scott
Talmadge
Williams, Del.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield without losing his right
to the floor?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, may we
have order?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ate will be in order.
The Senator may proceed.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, for
the information of the Senate, there may
well be one or two rollcall votes this eve-
ning before adjournment. I do not think
that the debate on the next two amend-
ments will take very long.
I would suggest that in the interest
of better procedure and a more expe-
ditious departure, Senators stay as close
to the floor as possible so that we can
dispose of the amendments one way or
the other.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
Point out that my statement will not take
over 3 or 4 minutes.
Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield me 1 minute?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
yield 1 minute to the Senator from Wash-
ington.
JURISDICTION OF SENATE COM-
MITTEES ON MASS TRANSIT
MEASURE
Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, yes-
terday the administration sent up a
proposed piece of legislation on mass
transit that encompassed a great num-
ber of transit problems and rapid tran-
sit in urban areas.
It goes back in some instances to the
proposal contained in the original mass
transit bill, the jurisdiction of which lies
in the Banking and Currency Committee.
Many of the suggestions contained in
the bill are also within the province of
the Commerce Committee.
The distinguished Senator from Utah
introduced a bill and had it referred to
the Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency. However, the distinguished chair-
man of that committee and the Senator
from New Hampshire (Mr. COTTON) and
I have an agreement that when they get
through with that measure, it will be
forwarded to the Commerce Committee
so that we may consider the sections
that properly belong within the jurisdic-
tion of that committee.
This is an all-Inclusive, pretty wide-
ranging bill.
I wanted the record to reflect this sit-
uation.
PROPOSED 1VIEETING OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS COMMA:I-IV&
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, be-
fore I make my statement on the pend-
ing matter, there is one other matter
that I should like to point out. Because
of an unexpetted emergency, we were
not able in the Committee on Foreign
Relations this morning to vote on a
pending matter. There was a rollcall in
the Senate much earlier than we had
expected.
As soon as we dispose of the two
amendments, If we can get a quorum, I
would appreciate it very much if the
committee members could come to the
committee rooms so that we might have
a very brief meeting. It should not take
more than 5 or 10 minutes to dispose of
the one remaining piece of business?the
Peace Corps measure?before we ad-
journ.
Mr. President, I hope that the com-
mittee members can come to the com-
mittee room. I guarantee them that it
will not take more than a few minutes.
We will either do it or not do it within
10 minutes. / would appreciate it if after
the disposal of these two brief amend-
ments the members of the committee
would come tAtivoinntittee room.
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
TIONS POR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR
MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RE-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MIS-
SILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJ-
ALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RE-
SERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH
The Senate resumed the considera-
tion of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize ap-
propriations during the fiscal year 1970
for procurement of aircraft, missiles,
naval vessels, and tracked combat
vehicles and to authorize the construc-
tion of test facilities at Kwajalein Missile
Range, and to prescribe the authorized
persoemel strength of the Selected Re-
serve of each reserve component of the
Armed Forces, and for other purposes.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President,
amendment No. 129 does two things.
First, it makes clear that no more than
$3 billion of the funds appropriated for
use of the Armed Perces of the United
States may be used to support the forces
of Vietnam and other free world forces
In Vietnam, or local forces in Laos and
Thailand.
Second, this amendment require.s that
the decisions as to the expenditures of
these funds are to be the responsibility
of the President rather than the respon-
sibility of the Secretary of Defense.
My purpose in proposing this amend-
ment is to tighten up the provisions of
this authorizaton bill.
As it now stands, the Congress would
be authorizing the Secretary of Defense
"on such terms and conditions as he may
determine" to spend, Without any limita-
tion whatsoever, an amount that could
be as high as $80 billion to pay the ex-
penses of armed forces other than those
of the United States.
This, I know, is preposterous. The Vec-
etary of Defense would do not such
hing. But that is precisely what the lan-
uage of title IV authorizes as I read it.
There must be some limit on the
mount we are expected to take from
he use of our Armed Forces and give to
ther free world forces.
I guess I do not know what that limit
My amendment specifies that not more
an $3 billion may be spent on foreign
rmed forces. That is more than we
pend for economic foreign aid and for
any domestic programs. It is but 10
ercent of the some $30 billion which the
ietnam war costs the United States
nnually.
I know it will be said that there must
a broad delegation of discretion in
e expenditure of these funds because
hope that South Vietnam forces will
e over more and more of the burden.
ut I suggest that the Senate is entitled
least to have an estimate of how much
xt year is to be used to pay for the
rces of allies fighting with us in Viet-
a
Is
th
a
111.
13
V
a
be
th
we
tak
at
ne
fo
Dam.
If the chairman of the Armed Services
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August 12, 196APProved FaffR6TORMSORM/3REMitRDPflritioAR000300100001-3
-
Committee is not agreeable to the limit- I want to offer this substitute amend- Mr. STENNIS. I yield.
ing figure of $3 billion for this purpose, ment now. Instead of saying "not to ex- Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President,
I would be interested in receiving some ceed $3 billion," I think we should put there is'a $500 million difference here. As
other estimate. it at $2.5 billion; and if more money is I understand the position of the distin-
It does not make much sense to me to needed, they can get the authorization guished Senator from Mississippi, he
hold elaborate hearings on the Defense for it. agrees with the principle of what is de-
Department budget, to receive detailed So I do not think we should try to step sired by the distinguished Senator from
estimates on the costs of various weapons on the President of the United States by Arkansas. We are in a fight in Vietnam,
systems, and then to adopt language in requiring him to issue a certificate, and we are and have been taking mili-
this bill which says in effect that not- My amendment, which reads as fol- tary action in Laos and Thailand.
withstanding any other law authorizing lows, is offered as a substitute: I would hope that the able chairman of
funds for the Armed Forces of the United On page 5, line 11, strike out the quotation the Committee on Foreign Relations
States, the Secretary of Defense can marks and the word "Funds" and insert in would accept the proposal presented by
spend whatever he desires to support lieu thereof the following: "Not to exceed the chairman of the Committee on
other free world forces in Vietnam and $2,500,000,000 of the funds". Armed Services.
On page 5 line 17, insert for the word "con- Mr. FULBRIGHT. I intended to do
S 9775
local forces in Laos. ditions" the phrase "under Presidential
The Congress must be cautious of such regulations".
wide open delegations of authority.
I hope the chairman of the Committee That will put it forth in the register.
on Armed Forces will accept this amend- The President is responsible for what it
ment. does, anyway. I think that will take care
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President and of the situation.
members of the committee, I call special So I offer that as a substitute, and I
attention to the situation with respect to thank the Senator from Arkansas very
title 4. It may be that a rollcall vote will much for calling attention to that mat-
not be required on the matter. ter. This language, if it is going to refer
I will first make a brief_ explanation of to the other authorization bills, should
title 4 of the bill. It covers what was once have a limit on it, and it is limited. Let
called foreign military aid or foreign aid me repeat for clarity, that it is limited
for the military. But this section is lim- to the forces in Vietnam, other free world
ited to the South Vietnamese and other forces in Vietnam, and the local forces
free world forces in Vietnam, local forces in Laos and Thailand.
In Laos and Thailand, and for related Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
costs during the fiscal year 1970 on such the Senator yield?
terms and conditions as the Secretary of Mr. STENNIS. I yield.
Defense may determine. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Inasmuch as it does
Mr. President, that is the identical deal particularly with the local forces in
language that was used for last year in Laos and Thailand, two countries in
the authorization bill as brought forward which, at least technically and legally,
without any change and also for the we are not at war, does the Senator not
year 1968. think it would be better that this respon-
I am going to propose an amendment sibility be given to the President? We are
as a substitute to the amendment of the now discussing before our committee a
Senator from Arkansas. The funds now matter involving Thailand, and it seems
in the bill for this purpose amount to to me that this is a matter of such con-
only $147 million. That is in hardware sequence that it should be squarely the
The authorization is merely for the Ap- President's responsibility to make a deci-
propriations Committee, concerning such sion on a matter of this kind, as distin-
other amounts as they may appropriate guished from the ongoing war in Viet-
and for whatever purposes they may ap- nam. That is the part of it that struck
propriate. The Appropriations Commit- me?that it should be a presidential re-
tee now has authority to appropriate sponsibility in the law.
items except military hardware for our Mr. STENNIS. I think it should be a
A r Navy but they do not have au- presidential responsibility. He is respon-
thority to appropriate even 0. & M. sible for it, anyway. Certainly, we can
,
funds?operation and maintenance trust him to make the regulations about have the presidential responsibility at
funds?for the Army of South Vietnam. this matter, and then the Secretary of the very peak, but I think he should be
So this would be a general authorization. Defense, acting under those regulations permitted to make the regulations, and
When this matter came before us, my and our law and restrictions, I be- then the Secretary can act on them.
best recollection is that in looking at it, lieve---- Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, a
the Chief of Staff said that this is iden- Mr. FULBRIGHT. Customarily, I say parliamentary inquiry.
tical to the matter of last year, and that to the Senator, under the foreign aid bill The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
was correct. We did not get to the figures which my committee has handled, the ator will state it.
then, however, and they gave me the funds are made available to the Presi- Mr. FULBRIGHT. Is it proper for me
figures later, and showed how it was dent. to accept the substitute or withdraw my
spent last year for this purpose?$2.5 Mr. STENNIS. Yes. amendment?
billion. For this year, it is estimated to Mr. FULBRIGHT. That has been tra- Mr. President, I modify my amend-
be $2.26 billion for this purpose. ditional, since the beginning. Actually,..., ment as proposed by the Senator from
On that point, I did not notice the open this is an item which has been in the Mississippi.
end clause in here, which is the three or foreign aid bill, in foreign assistance, in Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the
four words on pages 1-2 and 15: "under the past. In fact, some Members pres- Senator yield?
this or any other- act." That gives it an ently are considering taking it back into
open end, unlimited authorization. I have that bill. Mr. STENNIS. I do not understand.
not favored that since we built the Air Therefore, I would suggest?I do not The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
Force Academy. I do not like us to make know that it is all that important?that ator from Arkansas has modified his
open end authorizations unless it is it would still be more appropriate for the amendment.
absolutely necessary. That is my record responsibility to be given to the Presi- Mr. FULBRIGHT. I modify my amend-
on it. dent. ment in accordance with the suggested
But I failed to point that out to the Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will words of the Senator from Mississippi.
committee; I am sure I did. That is why the Senator yield? It is his proposal, and that disposes of it.
that when I rose. I certainly accept the
amendment of the Senator from Missis-
sippi as to the amounts. His explanation
of it is understandable.
I say to the Senator from Missouri that
the prosecution of the war, of course, is a
military matter. But this involves far
more than a military matter, as we
found this morning; and it is the very
matter into which the Senator from
Missouri is looking. I think it is primarily
a political matter as to how far we go in
a commitment to support the local forces
in Laos and Thailand in particular, as
distinguished from Vietnam.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I know of the legis-
lative background incident to the matter
we were discussing this morning, and as-
certained that the Secretary of Defense
believes the matter we discussed this
morning, if implemented, would necessi-
tate the approval of Congress.
Again, it is my hope that the chairman
of the Committee on Foreign Relations
would take the language suggested by the
chairman of the Committee on Armed
Services.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am willing to ac-
cept the Senator from Mississippi's pro-
posed amendment in place of mine and
would, of course, support it. I merely
brought that to his attention, in that I
thought there might be a distinction be-
tween the significance of the local forces
in Laos. But if the Senator from Missis-
sippi feels that strongly about it, I am
perfectly willing to accept his amend-
ment as a substitute for mine.
Mr. STENNIS. It is my intention to
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S9776 Approved For Re
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment is so modified.
Mr. STENNIS. I want to discuss it a
little further, but I yield to the Senator
from Kentucky.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
SPONG in the chair). Will the Senator
send the amendment, as modified, to the
desk.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield
to the Senator from Kentucky.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. MiPresident, will
the Senator yield to me first briefly?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Did the Senator
suggest to strike "any other act" and
only confine it to this act?
Mr. STENNIS. No, that was done in
marking it up.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator does
not wish to strike out "any other act."
Mr. STENNIS. No, that is part of it.
The ceiling is on it now. -
Mr. FULBRIGHT Very-well.
Mr. STENNIS. I yield to the Senator
from Kentucky.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I did not
wish to intervene until the Senator from
Arkansas and the Senator from Missis-
sippi had agreed upon the questions
which the Senator from Arkansas had
raised. Now, I wish to raise another ques-
tion on this section. I hope I may have
the attention of the Senate for just a
few minutes.
When I first read title IV on page 5
of the bill, the thought came to me that
it could be considered a commitment as
defined in the national commitments
resolution which was adopted almost
unanimously by the Senate. I may attach
too much importance to language, but
I want to give the reasons for my think-
ing in this direction.
In Vietnam we are furnishing supplies
and equipment to the South Vietnamese
and to other free forces who are assisting
the South Vietnamese. We are also using
our troops in support of the South Viet-
namese.
The same situation may prevail in Laos
and Thailand, as far as I know. We have
authorized the supply of equipment and
materiel to Laos and Thailand. Until a
few years ago such supplies were author-
ized under the military assistance section
of the foreign aid bill; in 1967 the au-
thority was transferred to the military
authorization bill.
My question goes to the meaning of
the word "support." Is it intended in this
section that support of free forces in
Laos and Thailand is limited to equip-
ment, materiel, and supplies, or is it in-
tended that word "support" shall include
the use of our own Armed Forces in sup-
port of the local forces of Thailand and
Laos.
Mr. STENNIS. No.
Mr. COOPER. If use of our forces is
intended, article IV of the bill could be
construed as a commitment of our Armed
Forces.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the Sen-
ator presents a very good question but
I do not hesitate for one moment in
answering. It does not include troop
personnel of that kind.
As a matter of fact, I shall have print-
ed in the RECORD within just a few min-
cataiGNIESBIODOAICIUMFM1B00afflcIA0t3300100001-2
flugust 12 1969
utes an itemization of these very items
for fiscal year 1968, fiscal year 1969, and
fiscal year 1970, prospectively. We are
dealing here with $2,226,400 for fiscal
year 1970 which includes no military
construction at this time, but procure-
ment for the Army, Navy, shipbuilding
conversion, aircraft procurement, mis-
sile procurement, and other procure-
ment, and the operation and mainte-
nance for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps,
and Air Force. So it is strictly military
matters, and military matters alone.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I accept,
of course, as all of us do, the statement
and. intention of the Senator from Mis-
sissippi, about his understanding of the
matter. But it is important that we know
the intention of the language which
speaks of itself. I would ask if the Sen-
ator from Arkansas and the Senator
from Mississippi would be willing to
modify paragraph (2) which now reads
"(2) local forces in Laos and Thailand:"
so as to insert before "local" the words:
"to provide equipment, material sup-
plies, and maintenance thereof to";
The additional language would remove
any question of the intention?I do not
know this is so intended; I hope it is
not intended to use any of these funds
for our forces to support the local forces
of Laos and Thailand.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. COOPER. I base my suggested
language in part on a statement made
by former Secretary of Defense McNa-
mara when he asked that funds to assist
Laos and Thailand local forces be taken
out of the foreign aid bill and placed in
the defense bill. He supported his request
in a letter to Senator RUSSELL, chairman
of the Armed Forces Committee.
We are prepared to provide Laos and Thai-
land the equipment and supplies they re-
quire to combat the armed Communist forces
which threaten their freedom. Therefore, the
transfer itself implies neither escalation of
conflict nor change in type or level of assist?.
ance; it merely reflects the most effeotive
manner to handle the problem.
My amendment would limit the use of
any of the funds, as far as Laos and
Thailand are concerned, to equipment,
material, and supplies
Mr. STENNIS.The Senator might sup-
ply his language on that point. With re-
spect to equipment and supplies there,
we already have a list in the RECORD of
what is represented,
Perhaps the language would provide
this would not include any troops or
U.S. forces. Maybe that would cover it.
Mr. COOPER. "Other than U.S.
forces." -
Mr. MTTLFR. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I would
like to make a comment. Perhaps the
Senator from Mississippi and the Sena-
tor from Kentucky might indicate
whether or not this is within the scope
of the Senator's proposed language. My.
understanding is that maintenance can
be involved as well as the actual sup-
plies and material.
Mr. STENNIS. Yes.
Mr. MILLER. If we are going to have
maintenance, this could indicate con-
tract maintenance, or it could indicate
modifications of _equipment. So I cer-
tainly think maintenance should be in
this language if we are going to use spe-
cific language.
Mr. STNIS.n The word "mainte-
nance is in the bill of particulars that
I am going to have printed in the RECORD.
It does include many things in addition
to military hardware. It really has no
place in this bill, strictly speaking, except
$147 million. As a'inatter of convenience
we put it in 2 or 3 years ago.
I yield to the Senator from Arizona.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I
am certain I know what the Senator
from Kentucky is getting at. I find my-
self in favor of that but I have a question
as to whether or not his exclusion would
be so complete that we could not, for
example, install radars in Laos or Thai-
land, or electronic detection equipment,
or electronic relay equipment that would
require, at least for a time, personnel
from the United IStates. These people
might not be in uniform. They might be
South Vietnamese. Would the idea of the
Senator from Kentucky go that far?
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I shall
try to make myself clear. I do draw a dis-
tinction between operations, on the one
hand, in Vietnam and in Laos and Thai-
land, on the other.
Whatever may be one's views on Viet-
nam, we are assisting Vietnam in at
least two ways: one by the supply of
equipment and materiel; and the other,
and of greateat importance, by the
use of our Armed Forces in support of
Armed Forces of Vietnam and other
free forces. I have never voted against
funds for these purposes.
It has been said by former President
Johnson that we have made a commit-
ment for the use of our Armed Forces by
the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. It has
been debated and debated. In any case,
we are in Vietnam, and we are at war.
I do not know what is occurring in Laos
or Thailand but I know it has not been
declared either by the Executive or the
Congress that we have a commitment in
Laos and Thailand agatnst the Pathet
Lao, or any insurgents in Thailand, or
Loas. The United States is at least not
at war in Laos or Thailand. My purpose
is to be sure that we do not provide
funds for the use of our Armed Forces in
support of the local forces of Laos and
Thailand and thus run the risk of be-
coming engaged in war without joint
authority, of the Executive and Congress.
On June 25, the Senate passed a reso-
lution which had been introduced by
the Senator from Arkansas, which was
later modified and passed almost unani-
mously by the Senate. It states:
Resolved, That (1) a, national commitment
for the purpose of this resolution means the
use of the Armed Forces of the United States
on foreign territory, or a promise to assist
a foreign country, government, or people
by the use of the Armed Forces or financial
resources of the United States, either im-
mediately or upon the happening of certain
events, and (2) it is the sense of the Senate
that a national commitment by the United
States results only from Edfirmative action
taken by the executiveand legislative branch-
es of the United States Government by
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means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent
resolution of both Houses of Congress specifi-
cally providing for such commitment.
Mr. President, this bill when enacted
will become a statute. It will represent
the action of both Houses of Congress.
It leaves no doubt that we are ready to
provide financial resources of the United
States to local forces in Laos and Thai-
land, but if we do not make certain by
proper language that it does not provide
funds for our Armed Forces to engage
in fighting in support of the local forces
of Laos and Thailand, it would be inter-
preted that this statute does provide such
funds for such use of our Armed Forces.
This may be said to strain language, but
if it is strained, we become involved in
Vietnam by strained action, by the
strained premises by the evolution of
events which, I am sure, no one in the
early years intended or thought would
bring us into that war.
I want to provide language in this sec-
tion, that will insure that use of the
funds involves only the financial re-
sources of the United States. That means
our money, our equipment, our materiel,
our supplies and operations related
thereto. It would prohibit the use of
Armed Forces in support and combat
support, of local forces fighting in Laos
and Thailand.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, per-
haps we are missing a danger involved
in all of this; namely, if we lend or sell
equipment to the present Vietnam Gov-
ernment, it is very possible that in the
not too distant future, the North Viet-
namese and the Vietcong could well be
using that equipment against some of
the countries which today are on our
side; specifically, Laos and Thailand.
That, I think, is a great danger, as
evidenced by the fact that in the hear-
ings conducted in the Foreign Relations
Committee last year, relative to the sale
of arms to other countries, we found
there were some 6,000 American tanks
which, in effect, were for sale if it could
be arranged on the right basis to coun-
tries in other parts of the world where
the tanks were not considered obsoles-
cent.
With complete respect for the remarks
of the distinguished Senator from Ken-
tucky, there is no real secret about the
fact that we have and are conducting
military operations in Laos; also that we
are conducting military operations from
Thailand, I believe that it is important
to recognize tonight if Americans are in
danger in Thailand, or if Americans are
in danger in Laos, because of actions
taken over recent years, it is as im-
portant for us to work to defend them
in those countries as to defend them in
South Vietnam.
This morning, in a hearing conducted
in the Foreign Relations Committee with
respect to certain activities, the witness,
not of high rank, testified that before
anything occurred under the contingent
agreement in question, the matter should
be taken up with the Congress.
That, to me, made considerable im-
pression, because at least up to this ad-
ministration, many things took place
in Laos and Thailand which were not
taken up with the Congress. So I checked
the legislative history of the present
Secretary of Defense when he was a
Member of the other body, and found
that he was forceful in stating such
matters should be taken up with the
Congress.
I also found to my satisfaction that
the reason this witness stated it should
be taken up with the Congress was prob-
ably because the Secretary of Defense
believed it should be taken up with the
Congress. I believe, therefore, that we are
in a new era when it comes to the method
and the nature of risking troops and
utilizing equipment, in foreign countries.
I would give full and great credit to the
efforts which have been made by the
chairman of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee so as to clarify this matter in
these hearings.
But, for these reasons and because of
the position taken by the current man-
agement of the Defense Department, I
would hope that we would see fit to pass
title IV as it is now in the bill.
Mr. President, I regret implications?
not made here on the floor of the Sen-
ate?which would imply that we have no
military operations in Laos. We know
we are having them there; and we know
we have built six major bases in Thai-
land.
I believe that title 4 is all right. I think
this discussion has been constructive
from the standpoint of the future.
Mr. STENNIS. As it is, by adoption of
the amendment of the Senator from
Arkansas?
Mr. SYIVIINGTON. That is right; the
amendment of the able Senator from
Arkansas, as modified by the amendment
of the distinguished chairman of the
Armed Services Committee. We will have
both committees working together, and
this part of the bill will be settled.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the Sen-
ator from Texas had asked me for recog-
nition. I yield to him.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I would
like to associate myself with the remarks
of the distinguished Senator from Mis-
souri. I think the thrust of the amend-
ment of the Senator from Kentucky
would be to deny involvement of Ameri-
can personnel. It should be roundly de-
feated, To begin with, what we are talk-
ing about when we talk about Thailand
and Laos forces is paramilitary forces, re-
garding counter-insurgency work. We are
trying to give them the sophisticated
equipment to do anything, for example,
airlift and radar. If we cannot train
them to use the equipment, it is pretty
useless to give it to them.
I might say that our bases in Thailand
are defended by Thai troops. Is is pro-
posed that they get no personnel support
from the troops in Thailand? Are we
going to get no support for the air bases
that are supposed to be defended?
The thrust of the amendment of the
Senator from Kentucky would be to
necessitate using American personnel for
work that they would not have to do if
we were to allow some support of Thai
troops or paramilitary troops.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I would
like to hear from the Senator' from
Arkansas.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if the
Senator will excuse me just a minute, the
Senator from Arkansas and the Senator
from Indiana asked me to yield to them.
I believe the Senator from Arkansas
asked me first. I yield to him.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, as I
said a moment ago on this particular
amendment, it seems to me that, with the
amendment of the Senator from Missis-
sippi, it would be satisfactory. I think the
matter raised by the Senator from Ken-
tucky, however, is a very significant one,
and I do not want, in any offhand way,
to make what might be called a national
commitment with regard to Thailand.
In my next amendment as printed, No.
111, which deals with the question of the
Secretary of Defense making available
reports prepared by outside organiza-
tions, I have in mind such things as
"think tanks," and so on. That amend-
ment is before the Senate.
I have also prepared another section
which I want to discuss as a modification
to my amendment, which provides that?
The Secretary of Defense shall also provide
to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives a
copy of all bilateral contingency plans, signed
by a representative of the Department of De-
fense and an official of a government of a
foreign country, involving use of United
States forces for the joint defense of that
country.
It deals, in effect, with the point the
Senator from Kentucky has raised.
The point of the Senator from Ken-
tucky is a very important one. I do not
wish, through inadvertence, to see an-
other Gulf of Tonkin resolution go
through here without knowing it. I am
inclined to believe that, with the explana-
tion and interpretation given by the Sen-
ator from Mississippi and the Senator
from Missouri, it would be certainly an
outrageous way to interpret it if it were
done that way.
I wonder if the Senator from Ken-
tucky could not offer this amendment at
a later date as his own amendment on
this precise subject. I do not know wheth-
er the next amendment would cover it.
I think the Senator has a valid point,
but I do not think it is necessary, with
what has been said with regard to this
amendment.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if I may
say this, I think the Senator from Ken-
tucky has made a contribution here. I
have enjoyed getting his thought. This is
purely a money bill. This is purely a spe-
cial section here for foreign military aid.
It has 2 years of use as a precedent. Ex-
cept to put a ceiling on it, I believe we
ought to proceed in that way.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator be-
lieves it would be an outrageous distor-
tion to interpret it as authority for use
of our military forces, apart from what
they are presently doing?
Mr. STENNIS. I do not see how it
could be interpreted that way. It would
be a real monstrosity.
I yield to the Senator from Louisiana.
Mr. 'FLI,ENDER. Mr. President, I do
not think there Is any question that the
amount is for military hardware and
uses of that kind, and does not involve
soldiers at all. But I rose to ask the Sen-
ator this question; He earmarked $2.5
billion. During the hearings that were
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S 9778 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE August 12, 1969
held 2 weeks ago, the figure was $2.2 bil-
lion instead of $2.5 billion.
Mr. STENNIS. Thatis correct.
Mr. ELLENDER. Would the Senator
modify his amendmencto include that
figure?
Mr. STENNIS. No. I think there should
be some latitude. The 0.2 billion, which
I mentioned during the, debate, was ar-
rived at when the budget was written up.
We have already had a somewhat aug-
mented program to aid tile Vietnamese
to build up their military forces.
I think that $2.5 billion figure is a real-
istic one.
Mr. ELLENDER. The reason why I
raised the question is that we used the
figure of $2.5 billion during all the hear-
ings we had as being the amount of for-
eign aid to be used for military hard-
ware.
Mr. STENNIS. It will not hurt at all
to have this excess. I suggest that in the
supplemental bills the extra amount of
money will be used. It is better to have
it done that way than to have the de-
partment draw the money from some-
where else and then mune before the
Congress with a big defteit. I think we
ought to accept the figure of $2.5 billion.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, it is late
and I do not want to detain the Senate.
As I have said, I may be straining the
point, but I do not think so.
This is an important matter. For years
we have been talking about_Vietnam, and
cries of anguish have gone up because we
did not look ahead and consider the end
that the steps that were being taken
could lead to-our involvement in war.
This bill before us will become a
statute-could be another step involving
the United States much as the course of
events led to our involveMent in Viet-
nam.
I would agree that it wOUld be a mon-
strosity if the President of the United
States, upon the language of this section,
should consider the language of this bill
as authority to enter war in Laos or
Thailand. It would be a monstrosity, and
I have full confidence in President Nixon,
and that he would not do so, but that
does not relieve us of our responsibility.
It is admitted here by the chairman
of the committee that these funds shall
be used only for what has been termed
miltiary assistance.
. Is that correct?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct,
Mr. COOPER. And, as I understand
that they shall not be used for our
armed forces in support of fighting, or
assisting fighting of the local forces of
Laos and Thailand, other than for sup-
plies. Therefore, I will propose another
amendment. "Military assistance," I be-
lieve, is a phrase of art. Is it not?
Mr. STENNIS. Well, the Senator would
know more about that than I would.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. For years it was In
the foreign aid legislation. I assume it Is
still considered as such.
Mr. COOPER. In the testimony of the
Secretary of Defense before both
the Armed Services Committee and the
Foreign Relations Committee in 196'1, he
spoke of the transfer of military assist-
ance from the foreign aid bill to the de-
fense bill. He called it military assistance.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is right.
Mr. COOPER. That is what it had been
termed when it was considered by the
Foreign Relations Committee.
I propose: On line 15 before "local"
insert the words "military assistance"
so as to read "Military assistance to local
forces in Laos and Thailand." If these
two items, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand,
were separated and distinguished there
would be no problem of a misunder-
standing.
However, the same words are employed
for the use of funds in Vietnam as for
Laos and Thailand, and there could be a
mistake about their meaning. I would
urge that before "local" there be inserted
the words "Military assistance."
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I would think that
would be all right.
Mr. ,STENNIS. We are talking about
money. We are talking about funds. The
first sentence reads "Not to exceed $2.5
billion of the funds authorized for ap-
propriation for the use of the Armed
Forces," and so forth. We are talking
about money, and that is all.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.
Mr. STENNIS. And it would not fit in
there before the Senator's words "local
forces," it seems to me.
Mr. COOPER. I thoughtmy suggestion
would help. I will offer the amendment I
first proposed. Is it in order for me to
offer an amendment?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Will the Senator
read it?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Chair rules that it is not in order for the
Senator from Kentucky to offer an
amendment at this point, except by
unanimous consent.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, a par-
liamentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator will state it.
Mr. COOPER. After the pending
amendment is voted upon, as it has been
modified would an amendment to the
modified amendment then be in order?
The PRESIDING OieloiCER, Will the
Senator from Kentucky send his pro-
posed amendment to the desk?
The Chair would say, in answer to the
inquiry of the Senator from Kentucky,
that after the pending amendment, as
modified, is voted upon, it would be in
order that his amendment be considered.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I think
the amendment has been fully explained.
I ask unanimous consent that the table
of funds to which reference has been
made, the last item being $2.2 billion, be
printed in the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the table was
ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as
follows:
ESTIMATED AMOUNTS INCLUDED IN MILITARY FUNCTIONS
BUDGET FOR SUPPORT OF FREE WORLD MILITARY
ASSISTANCE FORCES IN VIETNAM, LAOS, AND THAILAND
AND RELATED COSTS, FISCAL YEAR 1970
INCLUDING THE AID/DOD REALINEMENT
(In millions of dollars]
BUDGE]
Fiscal
Fiscal
Fiscal
year
year
year
1968
1969
1970
Military personnel:
Army
118. 0
114.2
116. 3
Navy
.8
.6
.1
Marine Corps
15. 0
14. 8
14.2
Air Force
.2
.2
.2
'
134.0
129.8
030.8
Total, military
personnel_
Operation and maintenance:
Army
605.8
708, 0
632. 8
Navy
43.3
47. 5
53.7
Marine Corps _____ _
6. 1
10, 7
10.3
Air Force
55.0
131. 8
157. 1
Total, operation and
maintenance__ ___
710. 2
898,0
853.9
Procurement:
Army
552. 5
1, 243, 5
927. 3
Navy:
Other procurement
5.8
10.2
4. 2
Shipbuilding and
conversion_ __.
4. 5
6, 5
3.4
PAMN-Navy aircraft
and missiles
.2
Marine Corps
68. 5
50 8
88. 3
Air Force:
Aircraft procurement__ _
36.1
88.1
103.9
Missile procurement_ _ ....
.1
Other procurement
67.4
85,4
114.4
Total, Procurement...
734.9
1, 484. 5
1,241.7
Military construction:
Army
1.7
10.7
Navy
1.9
Air Force
9.0
1,5
Total, military
construction
02.6
15.5
Grand total
1, 591. 7
2, 527. 8
2, 226. 4
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I believe
that for the information of Senators,
the clerk should read the amendment of
the Senator from Arkansas, as modified.
The PRESIDING Olor.LCKR. The clerk
will state the amendment of the Senator
from Arkansas, as modified.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
On page 5, line 11, strike out the quota-
tion marks and the word "Funds" and insert
in lieu thereof the following: "Not to exceed
$2,500,000,000 of the funds".
Oct page 5, line 17, strike out the words
"the Secretary of Derense" and insert in lieu
thereof the words "the President".
On page 5, line 17, insert after the word
"conditions" the phrase "under Presidential
regulations".
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the amendment of
the Senator from Arkansas, as modified.
The amendrnent, as modified, was
agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the
Senator from Kentucky now call up his
amendment?
Mr. COOPER, Yes.
The PRESIDING' OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
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August 12, 196u
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, in regard
to the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.
The Senator is very persuasive. It is a
fact, even though I thought it was a
monstrosity, that later the resolution was
interpreted as it was by the President of
the United States, that it was so inter-
preted; and every time the matter came
up it was thrown in our faces. I believe
the Senator's amendment will make the
Senate's intent clearer and more posi-
itive. I do not really see how this can re-
strict the President's obligations, and I
hope the Senator from Mississippi will
accept the suggestion of the Senator from
Kentucky. What we are trying to do is
protect ourselves from such a monstrous
interpretation. That having happened
within the memory of all of us here, I
believe it would be a very healthy thing
for it to be accepted.
Mr. President, I am not sure; can I ac-
cept it? I would be willing to do so, with
the agreement of the Senator from Mis-
sissippi.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the Sen-
ate has voted on the other amendment.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is right.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, a parlia-
mentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator will state it.
Mr. COOPER. I have the floor, but I
will yield to the Senator for that purpose.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the
amendment of the Senator from Arkan-
sas has already been agreed to. Can any
one Senator accept another amendment
to that?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is the
Senator from Mississippi asking that
question as a parliamentary inquiry?
Mr. STENNIS. Yes, of course.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair
rules that it cannot be accepted. The
On page 6, line 15, after (2) insert the
following: "to provide equipment, material,
supplies, and maintenance thereof to".
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, there has
been a very good discussion, but I do
want to have for the RECORD an interpre-
tation of the section. I would not 13e so
interested if I had not been conscious of
the steps by which our country became
involved in the war in Vietnam. I shall
spend a minute or two on the subject.
It all started very simply. Under Presi-
dent Eisenhower, military advisers were
sent to Vietnam. I do not know whether
I should speak of a statement former
President Eisenhower made when he is
now dead, but I think it proper. He came
here one day 2 years ago and talked to
a number of us. He said?
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we
have order?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ate will be in order.
Mr. COOPER. He said that the only
commitment he had made, was to Pro-
vide military assistance in the form of
advisers, and to provide economic aid
as long as South Vietnam made appropri-
ate steps to help itself.
I may say that, after searching the
record, that is all I could ever find that
he had promised.
For years, he had our military advis-
ers in Vietnam. We furnished equipment
to Vietnam; we supported various
regimes?it is hard to remember how
many?and then, as the fighting in-
creased in the outer areas, we began to
send troops to those areas, to assist the
South Vietnamese in actual fighting.
They were finally fired upon, and it be-
came a matter of national honor to de-
fend them, as the President had the right
to do, additional troops were sent to
South Vietnam and step by step we had
become involved in the war in Vietnam. amendment of the Senator from Arkan-
I am sure that President Eisenhower, sas has been voted upon. This is new
President Kennedy, or President John- matter.
son never intended that we would be Mr. COOPER. I hope not, but it is pos-
involved in war and certainly no major sible we may be in war in Laos or Thai-
war. But we conveyed to South Vietnam land; and if we go into war with the con-
the impression that we would stand with current authority of the President of the
them and defend them. I believe we con- United States and Congress, we will un-
veyed that impression throughout South- derstand where we are, and at least Con-
east Asia. gress and the President will have made a
Wars start from small beginnings. I determination that it is in our national
have thought, and many Senators have interest.
thought?it was definitely the expression We may become involved in war with-
of the Senate in the adoption of the out such a determination at some point,
National Commitments Resolution? with some 35,000 troops in Thailand, as
that a likely way to become involved in a I recall.
war is to put our armed forces in an- Mr. FULBRIGHT. There were 45,000
other country where there is a local at the last count, I think.
war. And if we stay there long enough Mr. COOPER. If at some point we thus
and send enough men there, they will became engaged in fighting, we may find
be fired on some day, and then, as I have ourselves at war by the same process as
said, it is a matter of national honor that by which we backed into war in
and, because the President has the con- Vietnam.
stitutional duty to protect our troops, we Again, I point out that the language
will be involved in a war. of the amendment applies both to Viet-
Mr. FULBRIGHT, Mr. President, will nam and to Laos and Thailand. It is the
the Senator yield? identical language.
Mr. COOPER. I yield. I read the language to which I refer:
Mr. FITLBRIGHT. What the Senator uzit EetutnoreigegfzsagronatZf
for
rtatees
has said does revive in my memory very under this or any other Act are authorized
clearly what was said, and particularly to be made available for their stated pur-
what I said, after having been briefed poses to support: (1) Vietnamese and other
and informed by the Secretary of De- free world forces in Vietnam, (2) local forces
fense, the Secretary of State, and the in Laos and Thailand;
The same language is used for both
countries. It is a possible interpretation
that these funds could be used in the
same way in Laos and Thailand as they
are now being used in Vietnam.
I have said that it would be prepos-
terous if the Secretary of Defense or the
President were to use the funds in Laos
and Thailand as they are being used in
Vietnam as a result of the language of
title IV. However, it is our province and
our responsibility to make certain that
the funds are not treated in the same
way. This is the purpose of my amend-
ment. It is simply to provide that as far
as Laos and Thailand are concerned,
these funds will only involve material,
equipment, supplies, and related costs.
The term "related costs" is in the lan-
guage of the bill.
If this is what is intended by the spon-
sors of the bill and the administration,
I do not see why they should not accept
my language. It would remove all doubt.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. COOPER. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Missouri is recognized.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
make two points. In effect, we have been
In war in Laos for years, and it is time
the Ameircan people knew more of the
facts.
Second, the present Secretary of De-
fense states that, if this matter comes
up again from the standpoint of any con-
tingent agreement, he believes it is a
matter which should be taken up with
the Congress.
Mr. ALLOT". Mr. President, I believe
that the previous remarks of the distin-
guished Senator from Missouri, as well
as his just completed remarks, are well
taken.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
thank the Senator.
Mr. ALLOT". Mr. President, I have
been very quiet during the course of this
debate. And, as I have listened to the de-
bate, I find my emotions swelling up
within me to the place where I think I
would be hard pressed to express them
in the period of 3 or 4 hours.
I am not a warlike man, nor am I an
unpeaceful man. But I find it difficult for
anyone who was concerned with the vital
committees of the Senate to stand on
this floor and say he did not know in
the spring of 1964 that we were becoming
involved in the war in Vietnam.
It is impossible for anyone not to have
known it.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President,
Senator yield?
Mr. ALLOTT. I yield.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President,
Senator referring to me?
Mr. sALLOTT. I was referring to any-
one who was e member of the Foreign
Relations Committee or the Appropria-
tions Committee at the time.
Mr. COOPER. Let me say in response
that during that debate I said that I
knew what we might get into. I voted
for the resolution, but I had no misap-
prehension about its possibilities. The
debate will show that on that day I said
that It could lead us into war, but we
will the
was the
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gust 12, 1969
at war or anticipated that we would be Mr. ALLOTT. I apologize. I had my
had confidence in the President that he
would use his authority with Judgment.
However, I do not want the United
States to get into the tame situation
again by the failure of the Congress to
exercise its responsibility.
Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I appre-
ciate the situation of the Senator. And
I ask him, and he can answer it in
any way he wants to, if he does not be-
lieve the Secretary of Defenae of his own
party and if he does not believe his own
President, because we have had assur-
ances from both of them that we will not
have any more commitrnerts of troops
in the Far East.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the
Senator let me respond?
Mr. ALLOTT. The Senator may re-
spond.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. Presid, iit, I believe
in the responsibility of the President,
and I believe in President Nixon. He is
my President whether he is Republi-
can or Democrat. It happans that we
are members of the same pat .y, of which
I am proud.
I understand and respect his respon-
sibility. I believe that he will exercise
it to the best of his ability, and he has
great ability.
I believe also in the responsibility of
Congress, both the House Of Representa-
tives and the Senate. I belieVe that we
have a responsibility to determine also,
whether the United States should go into
war and whether we should become in-
volved in situations which will send us
into war--whether our national inter-
ests, security and proper commitments
are actually involved.
We are talking about the future, and
whether we will take step, or refuse to
take steps that may prevent or inhibit
the possibility of war.
Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I under-
stand the concern of the Senator about
not wanting to become involved in
another Vietnam. However, my state-
ment was that there is no reason for
anyone who was a member of the For-
eign Relations Committee oe the eApa
propriations Committee, and particular-
ly the Defense Subcom.mittte, or the
Armed Services Committee, not to have
known in the spring and summer of 1964
that we were going to become involved in
a war.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. Preskitnt, I yield
for a question.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, it
seems to me that repeating the state-
ment is inviting comment upon a mat-
ter which was discussed at length. And
the Senator looks in this direction.
I was there. It is true that in the
spring of 1964, we had appioximately
15,000 or 16,000 soldiers in Vietnam.
There had been a gradual escalation
from the time that President Kennedy
came in, when there were lesa than 800
men who were considered to bc advisers.
They were not considered to be combat
soldiers.
Mr. ALLOTr. There were G36, if the
Senator wants the exact figure.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I do
not think anyone thought that we were
at war there in the future, dates crossed.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The alleged inci-
dents took place on the second and
fourth of August, 1964. The resolution
had been prepared long before that, I
think. It was intreduced in the House
and it was acted upOn almost instantane-
ously.
Mr. ALLOTT. Let me say to the Sen-
ator that my mind played me a trick
I thought it was before this.
But I will still go back to the state-
ment I made that in 1964 no member of
the Armed Services Committee or the
Appropriations Committee?particuarly
the Defense Committee or the Foreign
Relations Committee--should not have
known that we were being committed to
a war at that time.
Now, Mr. President, I want to con-
tinue?
Mr. FULBRIGIIT. Maybe we should be
a lot brighter than we are, but I did not
know it, I am frank to say.
Mr. ALLOTT. Well, I am not surprised.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. ALLOTT. I yield.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President,
having had some unpleasant personal
experiences about that time in 1964, in-
volving this subject, I can speak with
some experience on it.
I have made the charge repeatedly,
and it has never been denied?and this
information came to me before my cam-
paign actually started?that we did not
drift into this war. We had a small num-
bers of advisers over there in 1960 and
1961, and suddenly 15,000 to 16,000 men
were sent over, with explicit orders to
shoot back.
I tried to bring this to the attention
of the American public; I could not get
anybody to listen to me. r do not think
it would have made a bit at difference.
But we were at war when the Gulf of
Tonkin incident took place. I remember
begging for equal tine on television so
I could present not the Republican side
but this American side of the under-
standing of what was going on in Viet-
nam, and I never got any place. When
you are shooting back in a situation such
as that, you are in war; and although
we had advisers over there who were ex-
plicitly told never to fire on anyone, this
advisory situation ended some time in
1962: when the troops were told to fire
back.
I suggest to the Senator from Ken-
tucky that, unless I am badly mistaken,
even his language could not prevent a
President from giving the same orders or
a Secretary of Defense frotn giving the
same orders.
So I have a feeling that what we are
talking about now gets to the fact of
whether or not we, as Senators, have
faith, regardless of whether we are Re-
publicans or Democrats, in the man who
has been elected President and the men
with whom he has surrounded himself as
Secretary of State and Secretary of De-
fense.
I merely wanted to inject this because
have not heard it brought up. I have
never been challenged on it, and I have
made it and made it and made It.
President Eisenhower had been given
the opportunity to go to war in Viet-
nam and he rejected it?I think very
wisely?on the advice of General Ridge-
way and General Gavin.
I certainly did not think we were get-
ting into war when President Kennedy
sent advisor personnel out there.
It is my impression that at about the
same time he sent troops to Germany
because Khrushchev had threatened
him, he believed, at the meeting at
Vienna.
I do not believe that he intended to
get into war any more than he intended
to get into war in Germany by sending
those troops there.
No action had been taken when it
came to the Gulf of Tonkin incident it-
self?
Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, with all
due deference to the Senator, I said that
I would yield for a question. I have been
listening to the distinguished Senator,
without interrupting him for weeks now.
I yielded for a question, not for a speech.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. Presfdent, I will
put it this way. Has the Senator read
the report of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee on the incidents of the Gulf of
Tonkin?
Mr. ALLOTT, Recently?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. At any time.
Mr. ALLOTT. Yes.
Mr. leutiBRIGHT. Was the Senator
not impressed with the fact that the
representations given to that committee
by the then Secretary of State, Secre-
tary of Defense, and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff proved to be
in error?
Mr. ALLOTT. I am completely aware
of that. And I was present during all
of the Gulf of Tonkin debate. I am aware
of the statements made by various Sen-
ators at that time.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is
aware that the statements made by the
Chairman of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee were based on information given
to him which information proved to be
in error.
The question I ask the Senator is this:
That being so, how can he make the
statement that we all knew?and I as-
sume he means by that intended to ac-
cept?the Southeast Asia resolution was
the equivalent of a declaration of war?
ALLOTT. Mr. President, I have made
no such statement. I have tried to make
my remarks, and I am going to make
them if we stay here until midnight, de-
spite the Senator's loquacity. I never
made the statement or implied the state-
ment that when the Gulf of Tonkin reso-
lution, for which I admit I voted, was
passed, everybody knew we were going to
get into war. That was not in 1964. The
Gulf of Tonkin resolution was not passed
in 1964.
Mr. PASTORE. Yes; it was.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Unfortunately, it
was in August of 1964.
Mr. ALLOTT. I thought it was before
that. I apologize.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I happen to know
about that I was present
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Mr. ALLOTT. I would say to the Sen-
ator that I see no reason to challenge it,
looking backward for 5 years now.
Mr. STENNIS addressed the Chair.
Mr. ALLOTT. I wish to continue.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if the
Senator will yield for this statement?it
is 6 o'clock, and if we are going to have a
vote tonight, I think we should vote,
with all deference to the Senator from
Colorado. I just want to give my opinion.
Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I want to
defer to the Senator, but I have kept very
quiet during the past weeks. My remarks
will be very short. The fact that I would
like to speak for 3 or 4 hours does not
mean I am going to do so or have any
intention of doing so.
Mr. STENNIS. I withdraw my request.
Mr. ALLOTT. If the Senator will per-
mit me to continue for a short time, I
will be very grateful to him.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Colorado has the floor.
Mr. ALLOTI'. Mr. President, looking
sit the present amendment, I wish to say
this: The thing that has concerned me
about many of the rash of amendments
that we have had?some of them have
been meritorious?is that in my belief
the Senate may be moving toward the
position of creating a vacuum in South-
east Asia.
I know that the domino theory was
discredited by all the intellectuals in this
country several years ago. But whether
the domino theory was discredited by
the intellectuals or not, the fact is that
if we do not preserve free governments
in Southeast Asia, we are leaving a
vacuum which is going to be filled faster
than we can turn around by the Red
Chinese and by the North Vietnamese.
As long ago as 1962, I brought to the
attention of the State Department?
without any action or any acknowledge-
ment in any way?the fact that Red
Chinese troops were roaming at will
through a good portion of northern
Thailand. They still are, except that now
they are actually engaging in acts of war.
This is a large area. It is composed of
many people, and with it a lot of the
natural resource wealth of the world.
We have done very well, in my opinion,
in Indonesia; perhaps not as startlingly
well as in Malaysia.
But if we permit Laos to go completely
down the drain, Thailand to go down the
drain, and Vietnam to go down the drain,
as some people would like to do?and
some people would like to have us en-
courage the promotion of a dual govern-
ment there?I do not think it will be long
before Southeast Asia will have become a
Communist strongold. When this occurs,
I think our position in the world will be
much more difficult; our position with
the Philippines will be much more diffi-
cult; our position with Indonesia will be
much more difficult; and our position
with Malaysia will be impossible.
When we formed the tripartite situa-
tion in Laos, I said at the time it would
not work. It has not worked. Today we
find that the Plain of Jars in Laos is
pretty much overrun by the Viet Minh.
If I may have the attention of the
Senator from Kentucky particularly as
I make this remark, I do not want to see
commitments made for ground troops in
this area any more than he does. He is
no more sincere in his belief than I am.
But I am sure he knows that we have air
bases in Thailand. He knows that we
have a naval base in Thailand. That is
no secret. He knows of our activities
now?which I shall not mention?in
Laos, activities which do not involve
ground troops.
I have read his amendment. I say in
all sincerity, looking down the road to
what I think could happen if the Sen-
ate keeps on with this sort of frenetic
pattern it has established during the last
few days and'weeks, that I am afraid we
shall be sending a good portion of the
world down the rain. I have had the
clerk write out the Fulbright amendment
as modified. The amendment, so modi-
fied reads, in pertinent portion:
Not to exceed $2.5 billion of the funds au-
thorized for appropriation for the use of the
Armed Forces of the United States under
this or any other Act are authorized to be
made available for their stated purposes to
support: (1) Vietnamese and other free
world forces in Vietnam, (2)?
And this is where the Senator's
amendment comes in?
to provide materiel, supplies, equipment, and
maintenance thereof to local forces in Laos
and Thailand.
Have I quoted the Senator's amend-
ment correctly?
Mr. COOPER. Correctly.
Mr. ALLOTT. In my opinion, what the
Senator from Kentucky's amendment
could mean is that we could not put
supplies in Laos or Thailand to maintain
our forces, or supplies to protect our air-
ports, our Air Force, our naval bases, or
anything else that we have there. The
legislative history is quite clear, I think,
as it pertains to every Senator, that none
of us wishes to engage in more ground
warfare in Southeast Asia or, for that
matter, anywhere else.
But I cannot read his amendment in
any way except as being a totally un-
acceptable and crippling burden upon
the Secretary of Defense and the Presi-
dent. I know the Senator's concern. I
know he is sincere. I have never seen
him do anything in his life which was
not sincere. He does not play games with
people and he does not play games with
legislation. He is completely a sincere,
honest, and straightforward man.
But just as strongly, I would hope he
would not press his amendment because
I think it places a burden on our Presi-
dent with respect to the protection of our
forces in those areas, which is something
that no one, if he understood it as I inter-
pret it, would wish to do.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. ALLOTT. I yield..
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I wish
to ask the Senator if it is not true that
the President inherited the problems in
Vietnam. I know the wish is shared by
all of us that there had been another way
to solve that problem. I know all of us
wish that there was some way to solve
it now without withdrawing from our
commitments and without doing some-
thing that would not be in the best in-
terests of our country.
However, is it not true that the
President said on several occasions
there will be no more Vietnams in his
administration?
Mr. ALLOTT. That is my understand-
ing of what he has said.
Mr. MURPHY. Would it not be con-
sidered responsible that this man who
has been in public life for many years
and who has been elected by the people
of this country be given the confidence
without trying to write into an authori-
zation bill for military procurement pro-
visions that might be a detriment to the
protection of American people, Ameri-
can troops, and American property?
Mr. ALLOTT. I fully believe so; yes.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I have
listened patiently to the discussion. As I
said at the outset, and as the distin-
guished Senator from Florida stated, this
entire discussion has been a filibuster.
This entire discussion has taken place at
the wrong time and under the wrong set
of circumstances. It should not be a part
of this particular bill. I made that state-
ment on the first day we considered the
bill.
I assure the Senate that the work of
this committee was carefully and
thoughtfully done. It was properly done.
But now it is being shredded, twisted,
and torn up. The more I hear this dis-
cussion, the more I am certain discus-
sion on our foreign policy, present and
future, should take place in this body,
and I would enjoy taking part in it.
However, it would seem to me, and I
hope the Senator agrees, that this eve-
ning, at this stage, in this protracted dis-
cussion this is an unfortunate attempt to
place restrictions on a new President who
has been doing a magnificent job, as far
as I know, in bringing about solutions to
problems that he inherited. By taking a
good hard look at them he will be able
to find solutions.
Mr. ALLOTT. I thank the Senator for
his contribution. I am appreciative of
the Senator's statements.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. ALLOTT. I yield.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I think
this is a dangerous amendment. I think
it is potentially mischievous and very
unnecessary for us to vote on it tonight
when it has not been printed and no one
has had a chance to look at it. There is
no copy available except what has been
scratched in pencil on a piece of paper.
I think the matter requires extensive
debate.
I spent a great deal of time in Laos and
Thailand. I know what we are engaged
in and I know the extent to which we are
involved.
If a rigid interpretation were applied
to the amendment of the Senator from
Kentucky it could seriously jeopardize
the lives of American men. I am not pre-
pared to vote willy-nilly on something
that we know nothing about. We do not
know the reaction of the Department
of Defense to the amendment or how
they would interpret it.
If extended discussion is required on
the matter tonight I am prepared to dis-
cuss it at length as long as anyone is
prepared to sit and listen.
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Mr. STENNIS and Mr. FULBRIGHT
addressed the Chair.
Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I assured
the Senator from Mississippi I would not
retain the floor for more than a few min-
utes. I have no intention of holding the
floor further.
I wish to say to the Senator from Mis-
sissippi that the statement made by the
Senator from California is true. Senators
can rest assured that any matter coining
out of the committee of the distinguished
Senator from Mississippi has had the
most meticulous scrutiny, observation,
discussion, and thought.
While I do not desire to retain the floor
against the wishes of the distinguished
Senator from Mississippi, I felt some of
these things had to be said before this
matter was voted upon because I am
convinced this amendment would wreak
a lot of havoc.
There can be no question in anyone's
mind after this legislative history that
the amendment agreed to a few moments
ago was never intended to put ground
troops in Laos and Thailand.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. Prez,ident, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. ALLOTT. I yield to the Senator
from Missouri.
Mr SYMINGTON. I thank the Senator.
Mr. President, I would hope we could
get on with the bill. I respectfully point
out to the Senate the fact that the lan-
guage was agreed to by the chairman
of the Committee on Armed Services and
the chairman of the Committee on For-
eign Relations. I thought that the lan-
guage agreed to was eminently satis-
factory and that we could have gone
ahead at least 1 hour ago and gotten
through with this part of the bill.
Mr. ALLOTT. I yield the floor.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ap-
preciate the contribution of the Senator
from Kentucky I feel this section is old
law. It already has a meaning. It has
been followed these 2 years. It would be
far better to keep this section now, as
used heretofore, with the ceiling we have
prepared. If the Senator from Kentucky
wants to pursue his thoughts further, I
know what a draftsman he is and that
he does not need anyone particularly, but
if he would put anything he has in mind
in a separate amendment, it would be
helpful to see what others thought.
I am glad now to yield to the Senator
from Kentucky.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I have
taken up a good deal of time tonight. I
must say that I have not filibustered.
Mr. STENNIS. No,
Mr. COOPER. I have taken some -time
because I considered this to be an impor-
tant matter, much more important than
merely reducing the amounts involved,
with due regard to in friend from Ar-
kansas and my friend from Mississippi.
We are dealing with an entirely different
concept: The question of whether funds
can be spent for the use of our Armed
Forces in fighting in support of local
Laos and Thailand forces without a com-
mitment by the President or the Con-
gress or both, which might_ lead to war.
I would therefore urge that the ques-
tion is much more important than the
matter of dollars and cents.
I want to thank my friend from Colo-
rado (Mr. Arzorr) for his statement. I
know him. I know that he has deep feel-
ings about these matters. He does sit
quietly at times, but I know how deep
his feelings run and he speaks with con-
viction courage and force. I appreciate
very much what he has said, and for his
kind remarks about me.
Perhaps I may be sincere, but some-
one else might say that I may be sincere,
but I may not be always right or too
bright about things. Sincerity does not
always make up for those qualities.
My amendment has not been printed.
I had thought about it but as we were
coming to the close of the debate in these
2 days before we recess, I did not expect
to bring it up until after the recess. But
when the Senator from Arkansas offered
his amendment, I knew that mine should
be offered.
I will not press for a vote tonight. I
know that I can withdraw, and offer this
amendment later, but I ask a parliamen-
tary question because I want to be cer-
tain: Mr. President, in the event the
Senator from Kentucky withdraws his
amendment this evening, would it be
Possible for him to submit the amend-
ment at a later date?
The PRESIDING OloioiCER. Yes. That
would be completely in order.
Mr. COOPER. I thank the Chair. I
will withdraw the amendment but I will
bring it up again. I hope that by the
time I bring it up again, the Senator
from Mississippi will have consulted with
the Defense Department to see if they
would be willing to offer language in
title IV conforming to the Senator from
Mississippi's understanding that it was
their intention. The Senator has said it
was intended that funds were to be used
for supplies, equipment, and such. We
have absolute confidence in the Senator
from Mississippi, but the Department of
Defense should spell out clearly the pur-
pose of title IV relative to Laos and
Thailand.
Mr. President, we have been talking
about the President, President Nixon is
my President. He is a Republican Presi-
dent. I do not want to go back into his-
tory, but members of my family have
been Republicans since the Civil War?
longer than some others have been, and
some fought in the Civil War as Repub-
licans. I support the office of President,
I support the great responsibility it car-
ries, and I have great admiration for and
confidence in President Nixon.
But, I also respect this body. We have
responsibilities, too. I do not want the
President of the United States?and we
are talking about President Nixon?to be
hindered in his efforts by the same mis-
takes which have been made before.
It is rather curious that before 1966,
when this item had been carried in the
foreign aid bill for years, it was used
for military assistance, meaning equip-
ment, supplies, maintenance, food, and
money. Then it was changed, and placed
In the Defense bill.
It is rather curious that after it had
been put in the defense bill, we began to
use helicopters in Laos and Thailand un-
der orders of the Department of Defense,
and I understand in railitary activities.
I cannot understand why the language
is not differentiated between funds to be
used in Lade arid Thailand and funds to
be used in Vietnam, It is exactly -the
same language. Perhaps fungi' are to be
used for some military activities such, as
for helicopters. Helicopters mai take
local forces to back areas. tiring on the
helicopters begins, as it did in Vietnam,
and war comes.
In 1963 or 1964?before the Gulf of
Tonkin resolution?I remember the for-
mer Senator from Oklahoma. Mr. Mon-
roney, came back from Vietnam and told
us that our helicopters were carrying men
up the mountains, that there were U.S.
riflemen on the helicopters who were
firing in defense of the helicopters and
the pilots, and that their fire was being
returned from the ground. That may be
what we are doing in Laos and Thailand
now.
The fact that some Senators have
stated we are engaged in fighting in Laos
and Thailand makes it more important
that we limit the funds in this bill, be-
cause if we do not, if we approve that
kind of activity, it may lead?I hope
not?but it may lead us into war.
The SEATO Treaty states that in the
event of armed aggression against any
of the parties thereto, Including the
protocol states, Laos, Cambodia, or Thai-
land, the parties thereto shall take ac-
tion according to their constitutional
processes.
Mr. President, what are the constitu-
tional processes?
It is not defined.
When Secretary of State Dulles testi-
fied before the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee on the SEATO Treaty?I have
read the testimony?he was asked what
constitutional processes, meant. He
replied that it meant the joint authority
of the executive branch arid the Con-
gress.
The national commitments resolution
was recently passed, expressing the same
sense.
If we are fighting in Thailand and
Laos now, we should know it.
The President of the United States?
whether he be President Nixon, Presi-
dent Johnson, or any President, in my
view, has no right to taka our country
into war without first coming to the
Congress and asking for ite authority.
If a situation should arise where our
forces were being attacked, of course, the
President has the constitutional right to
defend them and to protect the security
of our country. But I do not want war
to occur because of carelessness or fail-
ure to look ahead. If we get into war, I
believe that the Senate wants the deter-
mination to be made by the jelat au-
thority of the President and the Con-
gress.
Mr. President, that is the meaning of
my amendment.
I shall withdraw the amendment to-
night because many Senators have not
had the opportunity to read it and to
consider it. Unless the Armed Services
Committee and its chairman modify the
section by amendment?it has to be by
amendment?and by Interpretation so
precise that no one can think anything
to the contrary. I want to say that I will
bring up this admendraent again and we
can determine if this body wants to
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abide by the constitutional processes,
wants to abide by its national commit-
ments resolution and wants to disap-
prove funds for the use of our forces
which could lead us into another war
without the consent of Congress.
Mr. President, I withdraw my amend-
ment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Kentucky withdraws his
amendment.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator
very much for his splendid remarks and
for what I think is a constructive step,
too, in withdrawing the amendment for
the time being. That is all I have to say.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I thank
the Senator, and I may add to my re-
marks that I shall ask for a rollcall.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I do
not know what the wishes of the leader-
ship or of the Senator from Mississippi
are. I have a very minor amendment,
which can go over until September, but
I wanted to inquire as to the wishes of
the Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, a parlia-
mentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator will state it.
Mr. STENNIS. Has the amendment
been adopted?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment has been withdrawn. No
amendment is pending.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, in
other words, the one which I amended in
accordance with the Senator's amend-
ment has been adopted, according to my
understanding.
Mr. STENNIS. That is my understand-
ing.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, does
the Senator wish me to offer amendment
No. 111 at this time or not? The Sena-
tor is familiar with it.
Mr. STENNIS. I cannot agree to it.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thought the Sena-
tor had proposed an amendment to it.
Mr. STENNIS. No; that is the wrong
one. The Senator is referring to another
amendment. I have only seen the amend-
ment the Senator has handed me within
the last hour or two.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. This is No. 111.
Mr. STENNIS. I was handed the wrong
one.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am sorry the Sen-
ator was given the wrong amendment
by mistake. Amendment No. 111 was sub-
mitted and printed about a week ago.
Mr. STENNIS. I am ready for the
,Senator to present his amendment, if he
is agreeable to a proviso.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
'ie Senator yield briefly?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield to the Sen-
tor from Montana.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I do
feel I should let this occasion go by
without expressing my respect, regard,
and affection for the distinguished senior
Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) .
What he tried to say and what he did was
and is in the minds and hearts of all of
us, and has been for almost half a decade,
If not longer.
I want him to know that I honor him
for his persistence as well as for his
sagacity and I am delighted that he is
going to introduce again the amendment
which he has withdrawn, because none
of us can alibi himself out of what he
did on the Tonkin resolution. It was
plain, clear, and legible, and every one of
us understood it, but that does not mean
many of us have not regretted it.
The reason why I am impressed by
what the distinguished Senator has said
is that he has tried, as best he knows
how, to exercise his responsibility as a
Senator of the United States, in the
hope that this body?the Senate of the
United States?will live up to its respon-
sibility, collectively as well as individ-
ually, and that we will participate, inso-
far as we can within the realm of the
Constitution, in making certain that we
act in line with what President Nixon
said just this past month, when he laid
down, in Guam, the Nixon Doctrine for
the Pacific.
He said, in effect, "No more Vietnams."
He said, in effect, we are a pacific na-
tion, with peripheral Asian interests in
the mainland. He said, in effect, we are
not going to get involved in internal dif-
ficulties. He said, in effect, we are not
going to go to war again unless it is nu-
clear and our security is at stake.
So I am delighted that, even though
the hour is late, the Senator from Ken-
tucky did bring up this question. It is
paramount. Everything that is happen-
ing and has been happening in Vietnam
has an indirect and a direct relationship
to many of the other troubles that con-
front this Republic today.
I agree with the Senator that we do
not want to get involved again in an area
which is not vital to the security of this
country, and in an area which has cost
this country over $100 billion?and the
end is not yet in sight?and not just 36,-
000, but altogether 44,000 dead?with
the end not yet in sight?and with
wounded of over 200,000?and the end
not yet in sight.
So I think the warning raised by the
distinguished Senator from Kentucky
should be and will be heeded.
I want him to know that I honor him
for what he has said, and I honor him
for what he has done in this body.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
would like to associate myself with every-
thing the majority leader has said about
the Senator from Kentucky. The Sena-
tor from Kentucky played a leading role
relating to the recent resolution with
regard to the responsibilities of the
Senate and the Congress. In offering this
proposal and in making the statement
he made, he was carrying into effect the
letter, and I think the spirit, of that
resolution. He has rendered a great
service.
I could go further and say that, as a
result of the efforts of the Senator from
Kentucky, I have noticed that the Senate
as a whole in recent weeks has shown a
greater sensitivity to its responsibilities
in this whole area than it has ever done
in the 25 years I have been in the Senate.
I think the Senator from Kentucky de-
serves the credit which the Senator from
Montana so appropriately expressed.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, if the Sen-
ator will yield, I wish to associate myself
with the remarks just made by my col-
leagues. The Senator from Kentucky is
a dear old friend of mine. I make the
practical suggestion that to articulate
this amendment properly it will take not
only the Department of Defense, but it
will take the State Department, which
have a role in trying to coordinate the
military and diplomatic activities of the
United States.
I think the majority leader's words give
added authority to the need for articu-
lating an amendment which will be upon
the level of the one we discussed so long
and which was decided so narrowly, but
which will truly seek to carry out a policy
of the United States. That is what this
amendment is really all about.
I know that I, as a member of the com-
mittee, and I am sure the chairman, will
cooperate with our colleague from Ken-
tucky, so that when he presents the pro-
posal it will truly represent the Senate
declaration as articulated, and which
raises the question which the Senator
from Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT) raised, all
of which is pertinent to our security re-
quirements.
Mr. COOPER. I thank the Senator.
Mr. JAVITS. I think he has rendered
a historic service.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President--
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, who has
the floor?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Mississippi yielded to the Sen-
ator from Arkansas. He had the floor
initially held by the Senator from
Mississippi.
The Senator from Arkansas.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I was going to yield
to the Senator from Kentucky.
Mr. STENNIS. I yield briefly to the
Senator from Kentucky.
Mr. COOK. Mr. President, I wish to
associate myself with the remarks made
by the majority, leader and would like to
say to my colleague that I would hope
he would do us the honor, when he re-
submits the amendment, to consider us-
ing the argument that is now in the
RECORD and disseminating it to the
Members of this body, and that he would
do many of us the honor of asking for
cosponsors to his amendment when it
may be submitted in the future.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield
to the Senator from Arkansas. If he
would rather have the floor, I yield the
floor.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Very well. I will
take the floor. I want to direct an inquiry
to the Senator.
Mr. President, I wish to take the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Arkansas.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is my under-,
standing the Senator from Mississippi
has prepared an amendment to my
amendment No. 111?a proviso, I should
say, at the end?which made the amend-
ment acceptable to him. Is that correct?
Mr. STENNIS. I may say to the Sena-
tor from Arkansas that an additional
question has arisen here about which I
think we ought to have a colloquy with
respect to possibly redrafting the
amendment of the Senator. lam in sym-
pathy with the amendment. I believe
we could work something out along that
line.
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Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does the Senator
wish to do that tonight or at a later
date?
Mr. STENNIS. If the Senator wishes
to briefly offer his amendment, I may
ask him some questions about it. We can
get to it rather quickly.
The amendment is relatively simple.
It would require the Secretary of De-
fense to make available to a congres-
sional committee, upon request, any
study or report prepared outside the
Department of Defense which was
financed in whole or in part by the M-
partment. The purpose is to insure that
the Congress is given access to research
studies performed by the so-called
"think tanks," the universities, or indi-
viduals whose work is paid for by the
taxpayers. The amendment recognizes
the issue of executive privilege and care-
fully specifies that the mandate applies
only to work performed outside?I em-
phasizing "outside"?the Department of
Defense.
This amendment is the outgrowth of
an effort by the Committee on Foreign
Relations to obtain a study prepared by
the Institute for Defense Analysis relat-
ing to the Gulf of Tonkin incident. It is
my understanding that the study con-
tains a review of what happened in the
Gulf of Tonkin, how communications
were handled, and in general how deci-
sions were made. The purpose of the
study, I was informed, was to determine
what lessons could be learned for future
crisis situations. I think that my col-
leagues will agree that there is much
that all of us can learn from that inci-
dent and its aftermath. The committee
has attempted several times to obtain
this study from the Department of De-
fense, but has been refused each time.
The Institute for Defense Analysis re-
ceives virtually all its feeds from the De-
partment of Defense. In fiscal year 1969
this organization receiVed $10,898,000
from the Department of Defense and
the Department proposes to give them
$11,150,000 in 1970.
I believe that the Congress, which im-
poses the taxes on the public to finance
this organization, and which authorizes
and appropriates the money for it, should
have the right to see how that money is
being spent. The issue here is far more
important than this one study?it is a
question of whether the Congress has the
power to obtain information, prepared
outside the Government with tax money,
for which no claim of executive privilege
has been made.
The Senate is beginning, at long last,
to reassert its constitutional prerogatives
and to restore the proper balance to our
system. Passage of this amendment will
be one small, but positive, step in that
direction.
So I do think that there is an impor-
tant principle involved here. The Senator
from Mississippi has proposed a modi-
fication, which I think is proper, but
whch he can discuss, which simply, as I
understand it, says that these reports
must be final in form?not tentative, or
unfinished reports?which is what I in-
tended. I am perfectly willing to modify
my amendment in accordance with that
suggestion.
With this stated, I may say that, as a
consequence of this morning's meeting, I
propose a further amendment which I
hope will be acceptable to the Senator
from Mississippi. I have not previously
prepared it, because it grew out of this
morning's meeting of the committee with
the representative of the Joint Chiefs. If
it is acceptable, I hope the Senator will
add it. If it is not, I will do the same as
the Senator from Kentucky, and reserve
it for further consideration. But if I may,
I should like to read it for the informa-
tion of the Senate. It is only one
paragraph.
I would add, if it is acceptable to the
Senator from Mississippi, the following
language:
The Secretary of Defense shall also provide
to the Conunittees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives a
copy of all bilateral contingency plans, signed
by a representative of the Department of
Defense and an official of a government of a
foreign country, involving use of United
States forces for the Joint defense of that
country.
I mean, of course, that foreign coun-
try. I thought this language might solve
or help solve a problem such as that
which presently confronts us. It speaks
for itself. If the Senator is willing to
accept, it I shall include it; if he is not.
I shall reserve it and see if we can work
out Something mutually acceptable at
a later date.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, address-
ing myself to the last point of the pro-
posal, this is a highly important matter.
It demands the most careful analysis
and consideration of the language, the
implications, and the complications in-
volved; so I very respectfully, at this
time, could not seriously consider ac-
cepting it.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. If the Senator will
yield, I do solicit his assistance, because
I know he has great influence in the
Department of Defense, in working this
matter out. I very deeply regret to have
a difference of view of this character
with the Department of Defense. It in-
volves exactly the same principle of the
right of Congress?and now, of course,
we are speaking of the Senate?to such
Information as "What is the status of
the agreement?"
So, in the interim between now and
the time when I shall offer it later, I
hope the Senator from Mississippi will
use his influence with the Department
of Defense to prevail upon their making
avalable to the committee the docu-
ments, with which he is familiar.
Mr. STENNIS. We will give the prob-
lem attention. It is a matter that the full
committee certainly ought to have a
chance to pass upon. It appears to me
that it is broad enough to include any
and all kinds of war plans that might be
made, or near war plans, so those mat-
ters would have to be taken care of.
Mr. FULBRIGIIT. I emphasize to the
Senator that I did not mean that. This
refers only to matters signed by the rep-
resentative of a foreign country, in this
case the Prime Minister of Thailand.
This is most unusual. I asked the De-
partment, "Is there any precedent? Is
there anything similar to it?" They were
unable to cite any other example of a
similar nature.
Mr. STENNLS. Mr. President, I am
not passing on the facts the Senator re-
fers to. I have not seen it, and know
nothing about the contents of it.
Back to the printed amendment,
though, with the proviso on it, my pro-
viso merely stated, "This shall apply
only to reports, studies, and investiga-
tions which are already or substantially
final and complete, and shall not be ap-
plicable to preliminary or tentative
drafts," and so forth, "and working pa-
pers."
But going back, now, to the substance
of amendment No. 111 as printed--
ANTFND1VrENT NO. 111
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, if
the Senator will yield, I believe I over-
looked calling up amendment No. 111.
I call up my amendment No. 111, and
ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. The Senator
from Arkansas (Mr. FIMBRIGHT)
pro-
poses arid amendment (No. 111) as fol-
lows:
At the end of the Nil add a new section as
follows:
"SEG. 402. The Secretary of Defense shall,
in response to any request made to him in
writing by a committee of the Congress,
promptly submit to such committee a copy
of any report, study, or investigation re-
quested by such committee if such report,
study, or investigation was made in whole
or in part with Department of Defense funds
and was made by a person, organization,
foundation, association, corporation, or other
entity outside the Department of Defense."
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I do not
think this in any way would involve war
plans, because it pertains only to work
done by someone outside the Defense
Department. But I raise this question:
Why should it not apply to other entities
outside the Defense Department, or any
other department of the Government? If
we just say "Defense Department," other
departments could have these studies
made, and pay for them themselves, and
we would have no access to them. Per-
haps we would not want it.
But the main point is this: Suppose
the President of the United States has
an outside organization prepare some-
thing for him, and it should be thus paid
for? Suppose it is military, and very
properly paid for by the Department of
Defense? We could not afford to think ofr
having such an amendment here, requir
ing him to give us the report. That is
purely executive privilege.
Mr. FULBRIGAT. Well, of course
there is no problem. The President ha
executive privilege.
Mr. STENNIS. I think the Senate
should redraft this proposal, with th.
printed language modified to clearly ex-
clude matters of executive privilege, be-
cause there is an instance that just came
to mind a minute ago, that a President
could very well have a department, have
a study made, for himself and the de-
partment.
This executive privilege matter, I
think, is a very serious thing. I have been
through that. I am in sympathy with the
intent of the Senator's amendment and
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its general, primary purpose, but I really
think, with all due respect, it should be
withdrawn.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I be-
lieve I am correct in saying that the
President of the United States can at
any time?and of course he has pleaded
on many occasions?plead executive
privilege. We have never contested that
with him.
I do not see how that would be a real
problem. He is not the one who is with-
holding this. In fact, one request has
been made of the President. I do not
recall any incident with which I have
been associated in which it has occurred.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the
amendment merely provides that any
kind of study, report, or investigation
paid for with the Department of Defense
funds shall be subjected to the will of
Congress.'
I think that is too much. A redrafting
of it would make certain exclusions.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I un-
derstood that the Senator, with his pro-
viso, would accept it.
Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is correct.
I had indicated that. However, in the last
few minutes I have become concerned
about the matter of executive privilege.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, does
the Senator wish for us to proceed with
the debate and vote tonight on this mat-
ter, or does he wish it to go over until
September?
I do not think it is essential to the
survival of the Republic that we vote on
the matter tonight. It is perfectly all
right with me for it to go over.
I do not wish to give up on it. It in-
volves a very critical problem that we
are in the midst of, and particularly the
one I refer to with regard to the amend-
ment.
Mr. STENNIS. I think it has much
merit.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is what I un-
derstood the Senator to think.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr, President, I think
It should spell out clearly the matter
about executive privilege. I do not see
how we can do that tonight.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
want the suggestion of the Senator with
regard to spelling it out. It is not clear
as to how to accomplish what he has in
mind.
Under the circumstances, if I may do
so with the agreement of the Senator, I
will withdraw the amendment temporar-
ily with the assurance that I shall re-
submit it when we return in September.
Is that agreeable with the Senator?
Mr. STENNIS. That is what I had ex-
pected the Senator to do.
Mr. FTJLBRIGHT. Mr. President, is
that satisfactory with the Senator?
Mr. STENNIS. Entirely so.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I will also try to in-
corporate it with the provision and get
it to the Senator in advance.
Mr. STENNIS. That is entirely satis-
factory.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
withdraw the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment is withdrawn.
Mr. MANS/. Mr. President, do
understand correctly that the amend-
ment offered by the distinguished Sen-
ator from Arkansas has been withdrawn?
The PRESIDING 0.10.FiCER. The
amendment has been withdrawn.
The Senator from Wisconsin is recog-
nized.
Mr. PROXMTRE. Mr. President, I call
up amendment No. 108 and ask that it
be made the pending business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
The legislative clerk proceeded to
state the amendment.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the reading of
the amendment be dispensed with and
that the amendment be printed in the
RECORD.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment, ordered to be printed
In the RECORD, reads as follows:
On page 2, line 7, strike out "3,965,700,000"
and insert in lieu thereof "$3,432,700,000".
At the end of the bill add a new section as
follows:
"Ssc. 402. (a) None of the funds author-
ized to be appropriated by this or any other
Act may be expended for the procurement of
any C-5A aircraft in addition to those air-
craft for which a contract has been' entered
into prior to the date of enactment of this
Act, and in no event shall more than a total
of fifty-eight of such aircraft be purchased
until after the Comptroller General of the
United States has completed and submitted
to the Congress a comprehensive study and
investigation of the past and projected costs
of such aircraft. In carrying out such study
and investigation the Comptroller General of
the United States shall among other things,
consider?
"(1) whether the C-5A aircraft is an eco-
nomic replacement for the C-141 and other
aircraft in view of the great increase in both
the procurement and operating costs of the
C-5A aircraft;
"(2) whether the purchase of a fourth
squadron of C-5A aircraft would add sig-
nificantly to the deployment capability of the
military forces of the United States;
"(3) whether the purchase of a fourth
squadron of C-5A aircraft would 'make the
United States liable for all contractor losses
and termination costs if a total of six squad-
rons of such aircraft were not procured;
"(4) whether the purchase of a fourth
squadron of the C-5A aircraft would make
the United States liable for the cost of repairs
and modifications necessary to correct the
structural defect revealed in the recent fail-
ure of the C-5A wing;
"(5) the current cost estimates necessary
to complete?
"(a) Run A of the C-5A aircraft,
"(b) the first twenty-three units of Run
B of such aircraft, and
"(c) the remainder of Run B of such
aircraft, including spares and operating
expenses for such aircraft over the next ten
years; and
"(6) the cost results to the United States
of applying the repricing formula contained
in the C-5A procurement contract on the first
twenty-three units of Run B of such aircraft
and on the complete Run B of such aircraft.
"(b) In carrying out the study and inves-
tigation authorized by subsection (a) of this
section, the Comptroller General of the
United States shall consult with the Office of
Systems Analysis of the Department of
Defense.
"(c) The Comptroller General of the
United States shall submit the results of his
study and investigation, together with such
recommendations as he deems appropriate,
to the Congress not more than ninety days
after the date of enactment of this Act."
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, this
is the amendment that pertains to re-
ducing funds for the C-5A.
I stated on the basis of the colloquy
previously between the chairman of the
committee and the distinguished ma-
jority leader that the amendment would
not be voted on until we return in the
fall, but that it would be the first order
of business at that time.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, the Sen-
ator from California wants to confirm
his understanding that the pending busi-
ness when we return after the recess
has already been laid down.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator from
California is correct. The C-5A amend-
ment presented by the distinguished
Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE)
will be the pending business.
Mr. MURPHY. That amendment will
be the pending business.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is cor-
rect.
Mr. MURPHY. It is not the desire of
the Senator to pursue this matter to-
night, but to carry over on it; is that
correct?
Mr. PROXMIRE. I will make remarks
on the amendment tomorrow, but I un-
derstand that there will be no vote on it
until the fall.
Mr. MURPHY. I thank the Senator.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I un-
derstand that there will be no further
rollcall votes tonight. In all candor, there
will be none on tomorrow, either.
THE CALENDAR
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senate pro-
ceed to the consideration of Calendar
Nos. 349 to 358.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
MISS JALILEH FARAH SALAMEH
EL AHWAL
The bill (H.R. 1707) for the relief of
Miss Jalileh Farah Salameh El Ahwal
was considered, ordered to a third read-
ing, read the third time, and passed.
MISS MARIA MOSIO
The bill (H.R. 5107) for the relief of
Miss Maria Mosio was considered, or-
dered to a third reading, read the third
time, and passed.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in
the RECORD an excerpt from the report
(No. 91-357) explaining the purpose of
the bill.
There being no objection, the excerpt
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
PFRPOSE OF THE BILL
The purpose of the bill is to facilitate the
entry into the United States, in an immedi-
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iagust 12,?1969
ate relative status of the adopted daughter
of a U.S. citizen.
BILL PASSED OVER
The bill (H.R. 3213) conferring juris-
diction upon the U.S. Court of Claims to
hear, determine, and render judgment
upon the claim of Solomon S. Levadi was
announced as next in order.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Over.
The PRESIDING 0./01010ER. The bill
will be passed over.
ANTHONY smmico
The bill (H.R. 8136) for the relief of
Anthony Smilko was considered, ordered
to a third reading, read the third time.
and passed.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in
the RECORD an excerpt from the report
(No. 91-360), explaininz the purposts
of the bill.
There being no objection, the excerpt
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD.
as follows:
PURPOSE ?
The purpose of the propoiled legislation is
to credit the annual leave account of An-
thony Smilko, a General rvices Adminis-
tration employee, with 321 hours of annual
leave earned by him during the period begin-
ning April 1959, and ending December 1985,
inclusive which, through adiranistrative er-
ror, was not credited to his annual leave
account.
STATEMENT
The proposed legislation plas-ed the House
of Representatives May 20, 1969. The facts of
the case as stated in the accompanying House
Report 91-204 are as follow':
In its report to the committee on a similar
bill in the 90th Congress, tile General Serv-
ices Administration recomnianded the enact-
ment of the bill with correetions which are
now embodied in H.R. 8136.
Mr. Anthony Smilko served as an employee
of the general Services Adminiatration in the
period rrom April 1959 through the end of
1985 and in that period he was credited with
20 days of annual leave per year. However, It
was subsequently determined that in that
period he was, in fact, entitled to 26 days per
year. The error in crediting Iiis annual leave
occurred because the leave was computed on
the basis of a service computation date of
August 0, 1919, rather than the correct date
of April 5, 1944, which should have been used
for purposes of determining annual leave
computations. In the period In question Mr.
Smilko was credited with 1,1i7 annual leave
hours when he should haft been credited
with 1,438 hours. As a reshit, he was not
credited with 321 hours to which he was
entitled. This is the figure carried in the
bill H.R. 8136.
In its report to the committee, the Gen-
eral Services Administration observed that
this error can only be adjusted by legisla-
tion and, accordingly, it is reeen mended that
the bill providing for a credit in a separate
leave account be made to Anthony Smilko by
enactment of the bill. The Oeueral Services
Administration further stated that the Civil
Service Commission has indicated to the
General Services Administration that they
do not object to the enactment of private
legislation in this instance, for the leave
merely provides for a restoration of the leave
for use only and not for the purpose of a
lump-sum payment. It is also appropriate to
note that, whereas the Civil Service commis-
sion states that future cages ought to be
covered by general legislation, such leglisla-
tion would not normally grant retroactive re-
lief in Mr. Srnilko's case.
In agreement with the views of the Civil
Service Commission, the General Services Ad-
ministration, and the House of Representa-
tives, the committee recommends the bill
favorably.
BERNARD L. COULTER
The Senate proceeded to consider the
bill (H.R. 4658) for the relief of Bernard
L. Coulter which had been reported from
the Committee on the Judiciary with an
amendment on page 2, line
word "of" strike out "C
"Cook".
The amendmen
The amendm
engrossed and
time.
The bill
passed.
Mr. M
unanimo
the REC
No. 91-
the bill.
Ther
was or
as folio'
The
as amen
in settle
States a
of an ace
curred on
nerd L. Cou
motor vehic
as an employ
Justice. The p
bill would also
judgment and cos
ernment employee
the Circuit Court of
upon that accident.
?
e" and inser
as agreed to.
t was ordered to be
e bill to be read a third
S read the third time, and
WIELD. Mr. President, I ask
consent to have printed in
D an excerpt from the report-
55?explaining the purposes of
? being no objection, the excerpt
ered to be printed in the RECORD,
s:
PURPOSE
rpose of the proposed legislation,
sal, is to pay Richard S. Bell $313.66
ent of his claims against the United
Bernard L. Coulter arising out
ent in Chicago, Ill., which oc-
ecember 17, 1961, when Ber-
er was operating a Government
In the course of his duties
of the U.S. Department of
ment provided for in this
In full satisfaction of a
entered against the Gov-
a municipal court of
ok County, Ill., based
I I
?
?
STATEMEN
In its favorable report o the bill, the
Committee on the Judiciary the House
of Representatives set forth ?e facts of
the case and its recommendations ?s follows:
The Department of Justice in a report
to the committee on a similar b I dated
July 22, 1968, stated that it had e mined
the circumstances of the case and , con-
cluded that passage of the bill wou d be
equitable and that the Department ha. no
objection to its enactment.
The report of the Department of Jus ice
notes that had the accident occurred er
March 21, 1962, the effective date of he
Drivers Act Amendment to the Federal T
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2679 (b-e), the Gove n-
ment would have been substituted for r
nard L. Coulter as the sole party defend nt.
The result of this substitution would ave
been that any judgment would have t? have
been paid byathe Government. This end-
ment, which originated as a bill ore this
committee, was intended to otect em-
ployees such as Mr.
just such sit-
uations. Prior to the enactment of these
provisions, this committee had granted re-
lief such as that provided in H.R. 4658 in a
number of cases. It might also be noted that
had the other party electecl,. to bring an
action against the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, a recovery against
the United States would have barred any
action against the Government employee.
This is provided in section 2676 of title 28,
which provides as follows:
"? 2676. Judgment as bar
"The judgment in an action under section
1846(b) of this title shall constitute a com-
plete bar to any action by the claimant by
reason of the same subject matter, against
the employee of the Government whoee act or
omission gave rise to the claim."
In connection with the consideration of
this rnatterathe committee was supplied with
additional facts concerning the accident, It
appears that Mr: Coulter had stopped at
a stop sign at the intersection of 45th and
South Drexel Boulevard in Chicago, Ill., while
traveling in an eastbound direction. On De-
cember 17, 1961, there was Ice on the streets
and after starting the car, the Government
employee realized that due to the icy con-
dition, he was unable to accelerate the car
enough to clear the intersection and avoid
approaching traffic. He, therefore, stopped the
ar after proceeding 4 to 7 feet into the in-
section. The oncoming car continued to
ap roach and struck the Government vehicle
at that point.
The committee has carefully considered
the matter in the light of the recommenda-
tion of the Department and the facts of the
case and has determined that this is a proper
subject for legislative relief. The policy con-
siderations reflected in the provisions of the
Tort Claims Act as noted by the Department
of Justice further provide a basis for such
relief. Accordingly, it is recommended that
the bill, with the corrective amendment rec-
ommended by the Department, be considered
favorably.
The coramittee believes that the bill is
meritorious and recommends it favorably.
THE NAVAJO INDIAN IRRIGATION
PROJECT
The Senate proceeded to consider the
bill (S. 203) to amend the act of June 13,
1962 (76 Stat. 96), with respect to the
Navajo Indian irrigation project which
had been reported from the Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs, with an
amendment, on page 2, after line 3,
strike out:
"(d) The Secretary of the Interior shall
compensate the persons whose grazing per-
mits, licenses, or leases covering lands de-
clared to be held in trust for the Navajo
Tribe pursuant to section 8(a) of this Act
are canceled after the date this subsection
becomes effective. Sulah compensation shall
be determined in accordance with the stand-
ards prescribed in the Act of July 9, 1942, as
amended (43 U.S.C. 315q), and shall be paid
from the moneys received by the United
States from the Navajo Tribe for the full ap-
praised value of such lands under the pro-
visions of section 3(a)."
And, in lieu thereof, insert:
(d) Any permits, licenses, or leases that
have been granted on lands acquired and de-
clared to be held in trust for the Navajo
Tribe pursuant to section 8(a) of this Act
shall be canceled on the effective date of this
Act, except that permits, licenses, or leases
whose term has not expired at the time of
cancellation thereof by this Act, shall con-
tinue in effect for the term of the permit,
license, or lease under regulations for Indian
lands until the land is required for irrigation
purposes. When such lands are required for
irrigation purposes, the permittee, licensee,
or lessee shall be compensated by the Navajo
Tribe proportionately for the value of devel-
opments or irnproveinents made by such
permittee, licensee, or lessee and which sueh
permittee, licensee, or lessee was unable to
utilize fully because of the cancellation of
the permit, license, or lease, as determined by
the Secretary of the Interior.
So as to make the bill read:
S. 203
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of
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mal times involves two complete task
forces in reserve, thereby making the in-
vestment cost of placing one "on station"
three times $1.4 billion or $4.2 billion.
To build an airbase in the Pacific costs
$53 million; a civilian runway can be op-
erational for tactical air with a bare base
set for approximately $36 million.
Third. Because of their high degree of
vulnerability to enemy attacks, carriers
are far less effectiVe than land bases.
In recognition of the carrier's vulner-
ability to attacks by submarines, aircraft,
ship-to-ship and air-launched missiles,
one-half of the cost of a carrier task
force is for carrier defense.
About 25 percent of a carrier's aircraft
are held back for defensive purposes--
during the Korean war, 23 percent of
the total combat sorties flown from car-
riers were defensive, in contrast to 2.7
percent flown from land bases.
Because of its tremendous investment
in a carrier task force, the Navy is slow
to commit the carrier to combat; once
committed the carrier cannot effectively
launch air attacks when attempting to
evade enemy attack.
Rapid advances in missile technology
have produced the STYX and other
more advanced antiship missiles, mak-
ing the carrier's position untenable in
any conflict with a sophisticated enemy.
Fourth. Instead of reducing its carrier
fleet, thereby accepting the realities of
present and future defense needs, the
Navy has continued to augment this fleet.
The carriers which have joined the
fleet since the mid-1950's?eight Forres-
tal class, one Enterprise, and the CVAN-
68?the nuclear carrier which will enter
the fleet in 19'72?are almost double the
size of the older carriers, are equipped
with the most modern aircraft, and,
therefore, have far greater capability for
tactical air than the oldest carriers which
they replace. The Navy has stated that
the nuclear carrier air wing is tactically
more than twice as effective as that of
the World War II carriers.
Since the Navy has followed a "one
for one" replacement policy in the past,
the actual capacity of the carrier fleet
in terms of providing tactical air power
is far greater than 15 carrier' force level
would imply.
There is no reason why the Navy can-
not reduce the number of attack carriers
by retiring two of the older carriers as
each of the modern carriers joins the
fleet.
Since the large, modern carriers are
only effective in very limited conflicts,
the Navy should use some of its,antisub-
marine carriers, CVS, for attack pur-
poses; one of these carriers is now being
used in Vietnam as an attack carrier.
Fifth. The fact that our adversaries
and potential adversaries do not have at-
tack carriers further weakens the justifi-
cation for the present size of the U.S.
carrier fleet.
Neither the Soviet Union or China has
built a single attack carrier, and neither
plans to do so. The British and the
French are the only other nations with
an attack carrier in their fleet, and the
British have decided to phase out their
carriers.
Whether the U.S. goal is military Par-
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRI-
ATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970
FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT,
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT,
AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF
MISSILE TEST FACILITIES AT
KWAJALEIN MISSILE RANGE,
AND RESERVE COMPONENT
STRENGTH?AMENDMENT
AMENDMENT NO. 136
Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, on be-
half of myself and Senator CASE, I am
submitting .an amendment to the mili-
tary authorization bill, now before the
Senate.
This amendment withholds the $377.1
million authorized for laying the keel of
the nuclear attack carrier CVAN-69,
pending a full study and investigation by
the Comptroller General of the justi-
fication for building an additional attack
carrier.
The United States has 15 attack car-
riers, each requiring a task force of
escorts and logistical ships, and it has
maintained the same number?with few
exceptions?since the end of World War
No adequate rationale for a force
level of this size has ever been presented
by the Navy. That? 15 is. an arbitrary
number is indicated by the fact that the
United States has always had at least 15
capital ships since it was allotted this
quota under the Washington Naval Dis-
armament Treaty of 1921. When the at-
tack carrier replaced the battleship as
the capital ship, the Navy switched from
15 battleships to 15 carriers.
With the advent of Minuteman and
Polaris missiles, the attack carrier is no
longer part of our strategic nuclear
forces; its primary mission is to provide
tactical air power. The use of 15 attack
carrier task forces to carry out this mis-
sion is simply wasteful and inefficient.
First. The assignment of nine carrier
task forces in the Western Pacific and six
in the Mediterranean overlaps and dupli-
cates U.S. land-based tactical air
capacity.
The United States maintains some 138
squadrons of tactical fighters and bomb-
ers in active forces on land bases at home
and abroad, including 3,350 active air-
craft and 23 wings.
This capability for land-based tactical
air power is impressive, especially in light
of the fact that with modern mid-air
refueling techniques, the U.S.-based
tactical air forces can be operational in
a very short period of time.
The geographic spread of overseas air
bases operated by or available to the
United States is such as to sharply re-
duce the need for continually maintain-
ing attack carriers "on station" in the
Mediterranean and the Western Pacific.
The Air Force is developing a Bare
Base Support Program, which will enable
the United States to convert 1,000 avail-
able overseas civilian runways into mili-
tary airfields With the use of "pre-posi-
tioned" kits within less than 3 days.
Second. A carrier base is far more ex-
pensive than a land base.
The procurement cost of one nuclear
carrier task force?one carrier and four
destroyers?is a minimum of $1.4 billion,
and it can run much higher. But to keep
one such task force "on station" in nor-
ity or superiority vis-a-vis the navies of
other nations, it is obvious that we could
substantially reduce our carrier force lev-
el without any danger to national se-
curity.
In addition to these arguments, there
are serious foreign policy implications to
the "show of force" role of the carrier
in support of U.S. foreign policy com-
mitments. It is official naval doctrine
that one of the main advantages of car-
rier air power is that it can be employed
unilaterally, without involving third
parties and without invoking treaties,
agreements, or overflight rights. How-
ever, except where the United States it-
self is threatened, it is highly question-
able that we should be prepared to inter-
vene in conflicts unilaterally and with-
out making political arrangements.
If air power is needed to protect our
interests, naval doctrine ignores the
availability of land bases in most areas
of the world. If a "show of force" in the
form of U.S. naval presence is needed,
older attack carriers, antisubmarine
carriers, or other types of ships' will be
adequate.
In the face of these arguments, it
would be fiscally irresponsible to author-
ize an additional carrier at this time un-
til there is a full discussion of the role
of the attack carrier and the necessary
force level needed to carry out this role.
That is why our amendment calls for a
study by the Comptroller General, and
anticipates a full congressional debate
before continuing to spend billions of
dollars on this highly expensive and often
ineffective means of providing tactical
air power.
I ask unanimous consent that the text
of this amendment be printed in the REC-
ORD at this point.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be received and printed,
and will lie on the table; and, without
objection, the amendment will be printed
in the RECORD.
The amendment (No. 136) is as fol-
lows:
On page 2, line 16, strike out "2,568,200,-
000;" and insert in lieu thereof "2,191,100,-
000;"
At the end of the bill add a new section
as follows:
"Ssc. 402. None of the funds authorized
to be appropriated by this or any other Act
may be expended in connection with the pro-
duction or procurement of the nuclear air-
craft carrier designated as CVAN-69; and no
funds may be appropriated for any such pur-
pose until after the Comptroller General of
the United States has completed and submit-
ted to the Congress a comprehensive study
and investigation of the past and projected
costs and effectiveness of attack aircraft car-
riers and their task forces and a thorough re-
view of the considerations which went into
the decision to maintain the present number
of attack carriers. In carrying out such study
and investigation the Comptroller General
of the United States shall, among other
things, consider?
"1. What are the primary limited war mis-
sions of the attack carrier; what role, if any,
does it have in strategic nuclear planning;
"2. To what extent and in what way is the
force-level of on-station and back-up carriers
related to potential targets and the number
of sorties needed to destroy these targets;
"3. What is the justification for maintain-
ing on continual deployment 2 carriers in the
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S 9798 Approved For Repagene41410AlL qiimmallIBM?ilily.W030010000kkust 12, 1969
Charles S. Guy, of Pennsylvania, to be
U.S. marshal for the eastern district of
Pennsylvania for the term of 4 years,
vice James P. Delaney.
On behalf of the Committee on the
Judiciary, notice is hereby given to all
Persons interested in this nomination to
file with the committee, in writing, on or
before Tuesday, August 19, 1969, any
representations or objections they may
wish to present concerning the above
nomination, with a further statement
whether it is their intention to appear
at any hearing which may be scheduled.
Mediterranean and from 3 to 5 in the West-
ern Pacific;
"4. What is the over-all attack carrier
force level needed to carry out these primary
missions;
"5. Does the present `one for one' replace-
ment policy for these carriers have the effect
of maintaining or increasing this force level,
in light of the fact that the newer carriers
and their aircraft are more expensive and
have far more capability than the oldest car-
riers which they are now replacing;
"6. Would a policy of replacing two of the
oldest carriers with one modern carrier main-
tain a constant force level;
"7. How many, if any, attack carriers and
carrier task forces are needed to back-up a
carrier task force 'on-the-line';
"8. What efficiencies, such as the Polaris
'blue and gold' crew concept, can be utilizsd
to increase the time in which a carrier can
stay 'on-the-line';
"9. What type of military threats are faced
by the attack carrier; what proportion of the
costs of a carrier task force are allocated to
carrier defense; what is the estimated effec-
tiveness of carrier defense against various
types and levels of threats;
"10. To what extent does the carrier's vul-
nerability affect its capacity to carry out its
missions; what are the plausible contingen-
cies in which carriers may be committed;
"11. What type of resources should be de-
voted to carrier defense, considering the
range of threats, the costs and effectivenees
of the defense, and the plausible contingen-
cies in which a carrier can be effectively
used;
"12. To what extent can lend-based tacti-
cal air power substitute for attack carriers;
to what extent should the role uf the attack
carrier be restricted to the initial stages of a
conflict;
"13. What are the comparative mysteries
costs for land-based and sea-based tactical
air power, and what is their cOmparative coa
effectiveness;
"14. How is the attack carrier being used
in support of American feteign policy; if
there is a need for a 'show-of force' in sup-
port of foreign policy commitments, can this
need be met by smaller carriers or other types
of ships?
"The Comptroller General of the United
States shall submit the results of his study
and investigation, together with such recant-
mendations as he deems appropriate, to the
Congress not later than June 30, 1970."
GENERAL REVISION OF THE COPY-
RIGHT LAW, TITLE 17 OF THE
UNITED STATES CODE?AMEND-
MENT
AMENDMENT NO. 137
Mr. HART. Mr. President, for the la$1
60 years there has been no change in
the flat fee composers and authors of
musical works have received, under the
Copyright Act of 1909, for the use of their
creations by recording companies. The
fee, called a "mechanical royalty," is 2
cents for each selection recorded.
Although vast changes have occurred
since 1909 in the price of records, the
cost of living and technology in the rec-
ord industry, the composer and author
still get the same 2 cents.
The copyright revision bill S. 543, rec-
ognized the inequity of this and would
increase the mechanical royalty to 24
cents per selection. This is inequitable
since it does not take into consideration
changes in the prices of records by rec-
ord manufacturers. It would impose on
Congress a continuing responsibilitY of
fixing royalty payments.
This burden on Congress in order to
do equity to authors and composers can
be removed by substituting for a flat
cent rate royalty in S. 543 a flexible roy-
alty, namely a percent of the retail price
of the record suggested by the manufac-
turer. This would permit authors and
composers to share in the increased
prices at which records have said since
1909, for example the replacement of
$3.98 records by $4.98 records and by
stereo tape cartridges and cassettes sell-
ing for $6.98 and $7.98.
Mr. President. I am submitting now an
amendment to section 115 of S. 543
which would serve the purpose I have
stated.
The PRESIDING OisisiCER. The
amendment will be received and printed,
and will be appropriately referred.
The amendment was referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary.
NOTICE CONCERNING NOMINATION
BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY
Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, the
following nominations have been re-
ferred to and are now pending before
the Committee on the Judiciary:
Peter Mills, of Maine, to be 'U.S. attor-
ney for the district of Maine for the
term of 4 years, vice Lloyd P. LaFoun-
taM,
John H. deWinter, of Maine, to be U.S.
marshal for the district of Maine for the
term of 4 years, vice Adam J. Walsh.
On behalf of the Committee on the
Judiciary, notice is hereby given to all
persons interested in these nominations
to file with the committee, in writing on
or before Tuesday, August 19, 1969, any
representations or objections they may
wish to present concerning the above
nominations, with a further statement
whether it is their intention to appear
at any hearing which may be scheduled.
NOTICE CONCERNING NOMINATION
BEVORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY
Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President. the
following nomination has been re-
ferred to and is now pending before
the Committee on the Judiciary:
Wayman G. Sherrer, of Alabama, to
be U.S. attorney for the northern dis-
trict of Alabama for the term of 4 years,
vice Macon L. Weaver.
On behalf of the Committee on the
Judiciary, notice is hereby given to all
persons interested in this nomination to
file with the committee, in writing, on or
before Tuesday, August 19, 1969, any
representations or objections they may
wish to present concerning the above
nomination, with a further statement
whether it is their intention to appear
at any hearing which may be scheduled.
NOTICE CONCERNING NOMINATION
BEFORE THE COMMI rrEE ON THE
JUDICIARY
Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, the
following nomination has been re-
ferred to and is now pending before
the Committee on the Judiciary:
"SLUG" SULLIVAN, FOSTER
GRANDPARENT
Mr. MANSFIELD Mr. President, the
VISTA voluntary program has been ac-
tive in many areas of the State of Mon-
tana, and perhaps one of the most Pop-
ular has been the Foster Grandparent
program. This pis:gram is designed to
keep our senior citizens active in working
with the local schools and hospitals.
One of my oldest and closest associ-
ates in Montana, John L. "Slug" Sulli-
van, has become very active and one of
the leaders in the Foster Grandparent
program in Helena. "Slug" Sullivan is
78 years of age and has found his latest
endeavor most worthwhile and satisfy-
ing.
A recent feature story published in the
Independent Record dismisses the pro-
gram at some length and gives an ac-
count of John Sullivan's activities as a
Foster Grandparent. This group of elder
citizens help young people to overcome
feelings of inferiority and to develop self-
assurance and understanding.
"Slug" was one of my earliest political
mentors in Butte, Mont.
I found the article written by Robert
Sibley, a VISTA volunteer, most inter-
esting and ask unanimous consent that
it be printed in the REcom.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
ONCE A FIGHTER , Now A LOVING FosTin
ORANDPAIVENT
(By Robert Sibley)
(NoTE.?Bob Sibley, 25, aVISTA volunteer
from Washington, D.C., is using his master's
degree in journalism to aid the VISTA pro-
gram serving elderly persons in Montana.
Here he describes the Foster Grandparents
segment of the program.)
When Mike Mansfield was first deciding
to run for Congress, he asked his old friend
"Slug" Sullivan what he thought.
"Well, I think you don't know too many
people right ram" Slug answered. "But af-
ter they get to know you, they'll like you.
You should run this first time just to get
advertising for yourself, and next time you'll
probably make it."
Mike Mansfield was defeated in his first
race for Congress, but just as Slug predicted,
he won the second time he ran and has been
winning ever since.
John L. "Slug" Sullivan has a lot of
moments like this that b can recall as
though they happenes just a few hours ago,
even though they may have taken place
more than 40 years back.
"CLEAN rare"
Tan and healthy looking with an easy-
coming smile, Slug's appearance belies his
78 years; nevertheless, that's how old he is.
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August 11, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?
should SEN E S9519
also be designed to deal with the
consequences of new defense spending as
well as the curtailment of spending. In
short, I am suggesting that such a high-
level Commission should be designed to
deal not not only with the economic
problems associated with a reduction in
defense spending but also with all phases
of the relationship between the ongoing
military-industrial complex and the
economy. In regards to the general ques-
tion of conversion to a peacetime econ-
omy, I was pleased to hear President
Nixon state in his inaugural address:
We shall plan now for the day when our
wealth can be transferred from the destruc-
tion of war abroad to the urgent needs of our
people at home.
Following up on this pledge, the Pres-
ident has asked a subcommittee of the
Council for Economic Policy chaired by
Dr. Herbert Stein, to initiate policy plan-
ning for converting our economy to a
peacetime basis.
Mr. President, over the past few
months the military-industrial complex,
its meaning and its dangers, has been
the subject of far ranging, searching dis-
cussion and analysis. On the whole I
think this has been healthy. I hope that
the debate will continue. However, I also
believe that we have reached the stage
where we should do more than talk and
debate. We should begin to act. And in
this respect there are a number of meas-
ures Which the Congress could adopt in
the near future. I have pointed to several
such possible measures today. I again
urge their favorable consideration by the
Senate.
And in closing I would return to Presi-
dent Eisenhower's message. In citing the
dangers of the military-industrial com-
plex, President Eisenhower also stressed
the fact that the complex was the prod-
uct of necessity. Thus we cannot control
these dangers by destroying the complex
as some would seem to suggest. The mili-
tary-industrial complex is a fact of mod-
ern American life. No amount of wish-
ing will make it go away. At the same
time all must recognize that although
there are dangers inherent to the mili-
tary-industrial complex these dangers
are not inherently uncontrollable. In
other words we must keep the military-
industrial complex in a proper perspec-
tive. We must see both its essentiality
and also its potential for abuse. We must
have it, but we must control it. We must
be vigorous in our efforts to see to it that
It is a servant of peace and prosperity
rather than the servant of war and de-
struction.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. PEARSON. I am very pleased to
yield to my colleague from Kansas.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, first of all,
I commend My colleague from Kansas
for a general review of the so-called
military-industrial complex.
I feel that most of us will agree with
many things said. I wish to add that we
are fortunate in this administration to
have a man like Melvin Laird as Secre-
tary of Defense. I know of no one who
has gone to the Cabinet level so well
equipped.
As my colleague knows, Mr. Laird for
14 years was a member of the House
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee.
Mr. Laird was a prober. He was a critic.
He was a questioner. But, above all, he
understood the Defense Department. He
understood its responsibility, he tried to
make the Department responsive and
responsible when he could do so.
At the outset of this administration,
both Secretary Laird and Under Secre-
tary Packard had expressed the philos-
ophy that we should take a close look at
all of the programs and reexamine our
military requirements and validate the
need for any new major weapons system.
I would hope my colleague would agree
that in the span of 6, 7, or 8 months,
progress has been made by Secretary
Laird. I would cite only a few examples
of responsible progress under Mr. Laird.
First, Mr. Laird has established a De-
fense Systems Acquisition Review Coun-
cil within the office of the Secretary of
Defense to advise the Secretary of the
current status and the readiness of each
major system to proceed to the next
phase of efforts in its life cycle.
Second, and I think this very im-
portant, there has been the appointment
of a blue ribbon defense panel by the
Secretary. This is a matter that he pur-
sued with vigor while a Member of the
House of Representatives. A blue ribbon
defense panel has been appointed to re-
appraise the Defense Establishment,
There has been the cancellation of the
manned orbital laboratory. There has
been the termination of the Cheyene
helicopter program.
There have been new, frank, and can-
did reports to both the Senate and House
Armed Services Committees on major
weapons acquisitions.
Mr. Laird has attempted to provide
?Congress with more information. He has
done an excellent job getting facts so
that the Senate and the House can
make valid adjustments. He has also en-
dorsed as recently as July 31 the estab-
lishment of a Commission on Govern-
ment Procurement. He views the Com-
mission as another positive step in re-
porting on the methods of military pro-
curement.
There have been numerous improve-
ments in the management of weapons
acquisition process.
As recently as Saturday we find the
Secretary concurring in the judgment of
the Senate concerning chemical and
biological weapons. As an addition to the
remarks of my colleague from Kansas, I
want the record to show that we have a
Secretary of Defense who is just as dedi-
cated as anyone in the Senate or any-
one in Congress in saving the taxpayers'
money, and just as concerned about any
so-called military-industrial complex.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
GRAVEL in the chair) . Under the prior
unanimous-consent agreement, the Sen-
ate will now proceed to other business.
Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that I may continue
for an additional 5 minutes.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, I am constrained to object. This
unanimaous-consent request was made
last week, as I understand, and Senators
were put on notice that debate an the
pending McIntyre amendment would be
controlled and would last for 1 hour after
the unfinished business was laid down.
Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, I will
withdraw the request. I do appreciate the
situation of the leadership in this respect,
and they were very gracious to give me
time this morning. I can respond at an-
other time. (03424
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
TIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR
MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RE-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MIS-
SILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJ-
ALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RE-
SERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the
previous order, the Chair lays before the
Senate the unfinished business, which
will be stated.
The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A
bill (S. 2546) to authorize appropriations
during the fiscal year 1970 for procure-
ment of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels,
and tracked combat vehicles, and to au-
thorize the construction of test facilities
at Kwajalein Missile Range, and to pre-
scribe the authorized personnel strength
of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve
component of the Armed Forces and for
other purposes.
The PRESIDING 010.FiCER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the amendment of
the Senator from New Hampshire.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield 1
minute to the Senator.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, this
Is getting to be a rather unusual pro-
cedure, to request unanimous consent
for a specific time for a speech and then
nobody can make a rebuttal.
The Senator made an excellent speech.
I do not agree with it in its entirety.
He used President Eisenhower's quota-
tions but he did not use enough of them.
If I have to wait until tomorrow or Sep-
tember, the point I want to make will
have lost its effectiveness.
I think I am going to start opposing all
unanimous-consent requests for this type
of presentation.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I thank
the Senator.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that a brief quorum call may be had
at this time.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the
Senator withhold his request for a
quorum call?
What was the unanimous-consent re-
quest? Did the Senator make a unani-
mous-consent request about limitation?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. No. That
was made last week.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, I ask unanimous consent that
there be a brief quorum call, the time to
be equally divided between both sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, I suggest the absence of a quorum..
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S 9520 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 11, 1966
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, I ask unanimous Consent that the
order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, I ask imanimoui consent that,
at the conclusicm of the vote on the pend-
ing amendment, the alSie chairman of
the Committee on Armed Services be
recognized.
The PRESIDING OtoricER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Who yields time?
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, how
much time does the Senator desire?
Mr. McINTYRE. Ten minutes or so.
Mr. NELSON. I yield 10 minutes to the
Senator from New Hampshire.
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
Mr. McINTYRE, Mr. President, the
Senate today will consider amendment
No. 131, which I introduced last Friday
together with Senators YARBOROUGH,
PROXMIRE, HARTKE, PELL, NELSON, MON-
DALE, STEVENS, GOODELL, and HUGHES.
Had more time been available after
the introduction, I am certain many
other Senators would have joined in its
sponsorship.
On an associated point, Mr. President,
may I say that I was particularly pleased
with Defense Secretary Melvin Laird's
statement Saturday. This statement, ex-
pressing his concurrence with the goals
of this amendment, reflects an admirable
understanding on the part of the Secre-
tary of the need for improved manage-
ment and control of chemical and bio-
logical warfare programs.
Secretary Laird also deserves com-
mendation for recommending a National
Security Council study of these matters,
and President Nixon deserves much
praise for ordering the study.
Most helpful, too, in the present ex-
amination of CBW programs has been
the consistent, progressive leadership of
the distinguished chairman of the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, the Senator
from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) .
We are considering today a coordi-
nated effort to deal with a highly coin-
plex and unpopular part of our defense
structure in such a way as to achieve
the kind of congressional control and
national understanding we feel is needed,
while, at the same time, avoiding in-
volvement of the Senate in the lengthy
procedure which would be required were
we to take up a number of separate
amendments.
Moreover, by bringing together in a
single package a number of proposals
involving ? chemical and biological war-
fare programs, our consideration can be
all the more comprehensive.
The amendment introduced Friday
did not include a section covering one
particular area. The proposal dealing
with this particular area was originally
put forth by the distinguished Senator
from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE) I am happy
to say that since Friday we have reached
agreement on the language for this sec-
tion, a section relating to the subject of
so-called "back-door financing" of CBW
programs.
Mr. President, I send this section to
the desk and ask unanimous consent to
have it added to amendment No. 131, to-
gether with technical changes that have
been made to the original amendment,
No. 131; and I ask unanimous consent to
have it printed at this point in the
RECORD.
The PRESIDING OrtoICER Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and it
is so ordered.
The modification is as follows:
At the end of amendment No. 131 add a
new subsection as follows:
"(g) (1) Except as provided in subsection
(g) (2) of this section, no funds authorized
to be appropriated by this, or any other later
enacted Act may be expended for research,
development, test, evaluation, or procure-
ment of any chemical or biological weapon,
including any such weapon used for in-
capacitation, defoliation, or other military
operations.
"(g) (2) The prohibition contained in sub-
section (g) (1) of this section shall not apply
with respect to funds authorized to be ap-
propriated by this Act."
On page 4, line 3, insert "will" between
"agente and "be".
On page 4, line 6, change "subsections
(e) (1) " to "subsections (d) (1)".
On page 4, line 7, change "(e) (2) " to
"(d) (2)".
On page 4, line 21, change "or an other"
to "or any other".
On page 5, line 2, insert "of the Public
Health Service" after "Surgeon General".
On page 5, line 3, delete "President" and
insert "Secretary of Defense".
On page 4, line 22, insert "or any" after
"lethal chemical agents,".
Mr. McINTYRE, Mr. President, a word
must be said at this point about the ex-
cellent work done by each of the Sena-
tors who have contributed sections of
this amendment. Their individual re-
search, the honing of their proposals to a
remarkable precision of language, and
the spirit of cooperation exhibited in
their willingness to consolidate their pro-
posals into a single amendment is in the
finest tradition of this great body.
As we take up consideration of the
amendment, let us keep in mind that al-
ready included in the overall legislation
before us is a $16 million reduction in
the Defense Department's budget for re-
search and development in lethal offen-
sive chemical and biological warfare.
This reduction was recommended by my
Subcommittee on Research and Devel-
opment and accepted by the full Armed
Services Committee.
I raise this thought so that, as we take
up consideration of the amendment, we
have a comprehensive picture of the ac-
tion we can take in regard to CBW pro-
grams.
Now let me identify each of the sec-
tions of this amendment. I will not go
into detail because I know other Mem-
bers intend to do that.
The first section (402) (a), also de-
veloped by our able colleague the Sen-
ator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE) , Calls
for a full and complete semiannual re-
port by the Secretary of Defense to the
Congress setting forth in detail the total
CBW research, development, test eval-
uation, and procurement program.
This, of course, would provide Con-
gress with the kind of detailed informa-
tion Congress and the public need in
order to understand the programs and
to determine future direction.
The second section (402) (b), developed
by the able $enator from Wisconsin (Mr.
Nztsost), and the able Senator from New
York (Mr. Goorista.), provides that no
funds can be used for the procurement of
any delivery system which is specifically
designed to disseminate lethal agents.
This section, Mr. President, makes
clear our opposition to the use of lethal
CBW agents as offensive weapons and
prohibits expenditure of funds for any
device designed to deliver these agents.
The third section, (402) (c) , expresses
the concern of many about the deploy-
ment or storage of lethal agents and
microorganisms Outside the United
States. Recent accounts of unfortunate
incidents involving such deployment or
storage have prompted new congres-
sional interest in what we may be doing
in this area of CBW activity.
This section will provide for a full
range of reports to the Interested Con-
gressional committees, and will also in-
sure consultation with foreign nations
before we deploy CBW agents on their
soil.
Mr. President, I believe that in gen-
eral we accomplish the substance of this
proposal, but the section makes unmis-
takably clear Congress' interest and de-
sires.
This section is another developed by
the Senator from Wisconsin, (Mr. NEL-
SON) and the Senator from New York
(Mr. GOODELL) .
The next section, (402) (d), also pro-
posed by the Senator from Indiana (Mr.
HARTKE) , relates to recent fears of many
about the possible dangers inherent in
the rail shipment of lethal cherncial and
biological agents.
Basically, this section covers three
areas. It requires the Surgeon General
of the Public Health Service to assure
that shipment will not be detrimental to
the public health.
It would give advance notice of such
shipments to the Congress and civilian
agencies.
And finally, it will bring about the de-
toxification of lethal agents before they
are shipped off for disposal. Again, some
of this already is being done, but this
section makes clear the Congress in-
terest and intent.
I would like to say at this point that
while I am completely in agreement with
this section I think we should always
keep before us the fact that it is not the
chemical and biological warfare service
alone that transports biological agents
around the country, nor Is this service
the principal shipper of such agents. The
National Institute of Health and other
public and private health agencies trans-
port an enormous amount of such agents.
We are not dealing with such agencies
In this particular legislation, to be true,
but we may want to consider this in
other legislation. I think a study would
show that the amount of potentially
dangerous biological agents shipped by
CBW is relatively small when measured
against the total shipment by all
agencies.
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August 11, 1969
The able Senator from Rhode Island
(Mr. PELL), proposed the next section
402(e). While the previous section
dealt with transportation of lethal chem-
ical and biological agents within the
United States, the section of the Senator
from Rhode Island, deals with transpor-
tation of such agents outside the United
States.
It also includes the matter of testing,
development, storage and disposal of
such agents outside the United States,
and it asks for the full consideration of
U.S. international responsibilities when
lethal CBW agents are moved, tested,
disposed of, or developed in foreign
areas.
This section places certain responsi-
bilities in the hands of the Secretary of
State to assure that we are not likely to
violate international law.
The succeeding section 402(f) , an ad-
ditional section developed by the Senator
from Wisconsin (Mr. NELSON) and the
Senator from New York (Mr. GOODELL)
is, perhaps, one of the most significant in
the proposal.
I am sure we have all been concerned
about incidents of the past several years
where outdoor testing of lethal agents
and micro-organisms have jeopardized
both animal and human life.
This particular section of the amend-
ment would eliminate open air testing
except in those instances when the Sec-
retary of Defense, under the direction of
the President of the United States, would
declare that our national security re-
quired such testing, and the Surgeon
General of the Public Health Service de-
termined that the public's health would
not be endangered.
Furthermore, this section would re-
quire that appropriate committees of the
Congress would be informed of all pro-
posed open air tests at least 30 days prior
to the date on which it is proposed to
hold them.
The final section of the amendment,
added by unanimous consent today,
would become section 402(g) (1) and (2) .
This section, proposed by the Senator
from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE) is another
step in congressional control over funds
that can be used in CBW efforts.
It would restrict the reprograming of
funds from other programs into CBW. I
am not aware that so-called backdoor
financing of CBW is presently taking
place, Mr. President, but with the adop-
tion of this section we would assure that
it does not.
In summary, this amendment will
serve the obvious public need to better
know and understand our chemical and
biological programs.
It will provide in-depth information to
the Congress in its continuing considera-
tion of this broad, complex, and frequent-
ly distasteful matter.
And it comes directly to grips with
those incidents that have so disturbed
the Nation recently?the severe illness
of two dozen CBW workers in Okinawa,
the death of the sheep at Dugway, Utah,
and the dangers inherent in moving
deadly CBW agents across the country.
I conclude, Mr. President, by pledging
my determination to make the chemical
and biological warfare program a prin-
cipal item on the agenda of the Researeh
and Development Subcommittee of the
Armed Services Committee during the
coming year.
We will want to examine in detail
every facet of the program.
We will be briefed by a full range of
scientists and other experts and receive
pertinent material from them.
We will want to hear from other
Members of the Senate who have a par-
ticular interest in CBW.
And we will want to survey the effects
of the actions proposed in this amend-
ment and in other sections of the cur-
rent authorization bill.
In short, when we return next year to
consider the 1971 version of the author-
ization bill I sincerely believe that the
recommendations we will? make will en-
able the Senate to meet problems that
may still exist in this program.
In the interim, Mr. President, I
strongly urge the adoption of this amend-
ment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, under
the agreement, who controls time?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The mi-
nority leader and the majority leader or
their designee.
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, how much
time does the Senator from New York
desire?
Mr. GOODELL. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield to me for 10 minutes.
Mr. NELSON. I yield 10 minutes to the
Senator from New York.
Mr. GOODFT.L. Mr. President, before
I begin my formal remarks I wish to offer
my commendations to the distinguished
Senator from New Hampshire.
I would like to ask the Senator from
New Hampshire a question to make sure
a technical correction has been made in
the amendment. I refer to page 4, line 22,
of amendment 131.
Mr. McINTYRE. Is the Senator re-
ferring to the technical amendments I
offered this morning to the original
amendment?
Mr. GOODELL. Yes. I refer to that
point where reference is made to "lethal
chemical agents, disease-producing bio-
logical micro-organisms, or biological
toxins." It was my understanding there
might be some misinterpretation here be-
cause of the words which should read "or
any other."
Mr. McINTYRE. Does the Senator re-
fer to page 4, line 22, where the amend-
ment reads, "None of the funds author-
ized to be appropriated by this or any
other act shall be used for the open-air
testing of lethal chemical agents, disease-
producing biological micro-organisms, or
biological toxins"?
What is the question?
Mr. GOODELL. That is the way the
amendment reads?
Mr. McINTYRE. That is the way the
amendment reads at the present time.
Mr. GOODELL. I simply wanted to
clarify that point. I think it is a crucial
point. We are requiring this procedure of
lethal chemical agents that are tested
and all disease-producing biological
microorganisms, or biological toxins. Is
that correct?
Mr. McINTYRE. The Senator is cor-
rect.
Mr. GOODELL. Mr. President, the
omnibus anti-CBW amendment we are
presenting here today represents an im-
portant break with secrecy over chemi-
cal and biological weapons. It is a modest
measure to check the vast destruction
potential of our CRW arsenal. Still, it
is a significant measure.
It is significant for it opens up the
secrecy which has cloaked the spiraling
gas and germ weapons program. It
checks the weapons spiral. It minimizes
international repercussions over CBW. It
provides for public health and safety by
guarding against the perils in transport,
storage, and disposal of CBW. It puts up
a barrier to future outdoor testing of
CBW. It encourages congressional re-
view.
The distinguished chairman of the
Committee on Armed Services has called
this omnibus anti-CBW amendment a
solid start on the problem, and he is
quite certainly right.
I should like to commend Senator
STENNIS and the members of the Armed
Services Committee for taking the first
major step in controlling the CBW pro-
gram. The committee cut $16 million
from the Pentagon's request for funds
earmarked for research and develop-
ment on offensive lethal chemical and
biological weapons. This significant step
has set in motion other steps to control
the CBW program.
I would like to start today by consider-
ing open-air testing of deadly gas and
disease-producing? germs. It was with
great reluctance that I agreed to modify
the "flat ban" amendment originally in-
troduced by the Senator from Wiscon-
sin (Mr. NELSON) and myself. A flat
ban on outdoor CBW testing would
eliminate the threat that a test cloud of
deadly gas and germs might drift from
the test site to our cities and towns. The
moratorium postpones but does not elim-
inate this threat. We felt we could make
a significant step forward at this time.
On the assurance of the Senator from
New Hampshire that his subcommittee
was going to look intensively at this en-
tire program we have great confidence
he will do so and that we can move for-
ward in the future with greater restric-
tions consistent with national security.
There are pluses and minuses in the
test ban revision. The minus side leaves
the option open for future tests. The
plus side puts congressional control over
testing. The burden of proof is on the
Pentagon if any further tests are to take
place due to national security. I believe
there is agreement here today that no
longer will these tests take place on a
routine basis. There must be a high-level
determination that such tests are directly
Involved with the national security. That
determination must be made by the Sec-
retary of Defense under guidelines pre-
scribed by the President and must be
agreed to by the Surgeon General with
reference to the procedures to be fol-
lowed.
It is my view that it should be unnec-
essary in the future for us to engage in
any outdoor testing, but we do leave
the door open for the very unusual?
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S 9522 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE
August 11, 1969
and I emphasize very:, unusual?sittute duced land designated as "permanent
tion that might arise In the national se- biocontaminated area."
curity.
What next is in store from such CBW
While we are studying this problem in open air testing?
the next year, such tests Might take place As we debate the wisdom of banning
under very careful regulations and safe- open air testing of lethal gas and any
guards. The burden of assurance that disease-producing bacteria or toxin, the
no health hazard will result from any very testing of deadly nerve gasses con-
test rests with the U.S. Surgeon General. tinues. It is of little comfort to me to
In each case, Congress 'will have the eel- hear from the Defense Department that
portunity for hard questioning. On bal- there are no irrunediate plans to conduct
ance, then, the moraterium is accept- outdoor tests of lethal biological agents.
able at this beginning stage of CBW re- It is of little comfort that the Q-fever
view,
field tests at Dugway have been corn-
If the moratorium is to be meaningful, pletecl and now research will shift to the
we simply must be guided by the princi- laboratory to evaluate results.
pie that the security of this Nation be- While the specter of future open air
gins with the health and safety of our tests for disease-producing bacteria
people. Pentagon requests based on na- hangs over us; while outdoor testing of
tional security simply blest be 'viewed such deadly nerve gasses as VX, Tabun?
in this context. If not, tire moratorium GA?Sarin?GB?and Soman?GD---
on outdoor testing wottel be relatively continues; when any open air test of
meaningless. If CBW tests are requested, deadly gas or any disease-producing bac-
every effort must be made to confine teria takes place, the issue of public safe-
them to the laboratory, 'This point cannot ty remains of grave concern.
be emphasized enough. We all know the If just one accidental release of dead-
example at Dugway Provine Grounds in ly nerve gas or disease-producing bac-
Utah where thousands of sheep were teria spreads to our cities and towns,
killed. Had the wind shifted farther a the toll in death and sickness would be
large city in the United States would indefensible. Every precaution must be
have been engulfed by deadly nerve gas, taken to assure the health and safety
VX?odorless and colorless. What a dis- of our people. Animals must be Pro-
aster that would have been. We must tected. Environment must be preserved.
not engage in such tests without the All these things must be done regardless
highest priority given the safety of our of how slight the danger.
people.
Consider the deadly effect of these
One example suffices to explain why chemical agents. Consider the vast de-
CBW testing should be confined to the struction potential of the disease-pro-
laboratory. It is an example which clear- clueing biologicals. Let us take a look at
ly demonstrates that hazards from open these agents in deciding whether in
air tests of chemical and biological terms of public safety alone, we should
weapons are not vague speculations, but ban lethal CWB from being tested out-
grim realities. The example is the new
well-known sheep-killing accident last doors.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
year, caused by an open air test of 'VX
sent to have printed in the RECORD a te-
at the Army's Dugway Proving Grounds ble of chemical and biological agents,
In Utah. Some say that safety rules for together with a table on planned open
CBW testing are sufficient. Safety rules, air testing at various sites including the
they may say, are enough to protect
against the fatal results possible when site at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah,
the Deseret Test Center in Utah, and at
deadly nerve gas is tested in the air. Be-
fore the sheep-killing ineldent and since -
that time, the Army has announced sate- There being no objection, the tables
ty regulations for CBW open air testing, were ordered to be printed in the
Are safety rules at the test site RECORD, as follows:
suf-
ficient for public safety? X simply cannot TABLE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL AGENTS
accept that they are. A freakish wind THE CHEMICAL AGENTS
shift or a poorly supervised test may Nerve gases
(VEE) kills less than 1 per cent of its victims
never occur. Let us consider, then, what GB: An odorless, colorless, volatile gas that and lasts as few as three days; Eastern equine
might otherwise happen, can kill in minutes in dosages of 1 milligram, encephalomyelitis (EEE) is fatal about 5 per
In the 1968 sheep-killing incident, the approximately 1/60 of a drop. In the U.S. cent of the time, if untreated, and can seri-
test at Dugway was to determine howsenal since the late 1940's, it is also known ously cripple the central nervous system of
as Sadn. The gas kills by paralyzing the survivors.
nerve gas VX distributes itself downwind nervous system.
5 to 25 miles per hour to the northeast. Plague: Acute, usually fatal, highly infec-
VX: Another odorless gas that, unlike GB, tious bacterial disease of wild rodents found
This was the information sought. Under does not evaporate rapidly or freeze at nor- in two forms?bubonic and pneumonic.
today's safety rules at Dugway, the teat mal temperatures. Becausee of its low vole- Sypmptoixis of bubonic plague include small
would be limited to winds 15 miles per tatty, it is effective for a longer period of hemorrhages, and the black spots that led the
hour. Even so, would this Prevent another time. VX also is capable of killing in 1 mini- disease to be commonly known as the "black
nerve gas accident? Consider what hap- gram doses and, like GB, paralyzes the ner- death" during the massive epidemics of the
pened in the sheep-killing incident. The vous system in minutes. past. Pneumonic plague is highly infectious
test started. The jet opened its tanks and Incapacitating agents because it is spread from man to man via
began spraying nerve gas over the test BZ: A gas that is either a psychoc,hemical coughing. Symptoms include, fever, chills,
area. After a few seconds the tanks were rapid pulse and breathing, mental dullness,
or a strong anesthetic which can produce
to close and the plane pull up. But the intemiltazorvairy paralysis, blindness, or deafness coated tongue, and red eyes.
Psittacosis: Viral infection in birds that is
BZ has also been k
transmissible to man, with symptoms of high
tanks did not close; the tanks stayed
cause maniacal behavior. Its precise makeup fever, muscle ache, and disorientation. Dis-
open. The plane pulled up with nerve le secret.
gaS still spraying. Then over 6,000 sheep Blot control gases ease can be mild, and last less than a week,
or can cause death in upwards of 40 per cent
Regardless of safety regulations, field grant odor similar to apple blossoms. The may take months.
tear gas that also acts as an irritant to the
upper respiratory system.
Ca: An improved, more toxic tear gas that
quickly causes tearing, coughing, breathing
difficulty, and cheat tightness. C antempo-
rarily incapacitate men in twenty seconds.
Heavy concentrations cause nausea. It Is now
used in Vietnam.
Harassing agents
DM: A pepper-like arsenical gas that causes
headaches, nausea, vomiting, chest pains for
up to two or three hours. It can be lethal in
heavy doses and has been blamed for some
deaths since its first use to. Vietnam in 1964.
DM is widely known as adamsite and was used
in World War I.
HD: A pale yellow gas with the odor of
garlic, popularly known as mustard gas.
Causes severe burns to eyes and lungs and
blisters skin after exposure, but onset of
symptoms is delayed from four to six hours.
Can kill in heavy concentrations. Mustard,
like VX, is not volatile and is usually effective
for days after its use. It caused ons-fourth
of the U.S. gas casualties in World War I.
Defoliants and herbicides
2,4-D: A weed-killing compound known as
dichloropheri-oxyacetic acid that has rela-
tively short persistence in the soil and a rela-
tively low level of toxicity to man, if prop-
erly dispersed. Heavier concentrations can
cause eye irritations and stomach upsets,
however. Dangerous to inhale. Usually used
in Vietnam along with 2,4,5-T (trichloro-
phenoxyametic acid), which has similar?al-
though somewhat more toxic?properties. Ef-
fective against heavy Jungle.
Cacodylic Acid: An arsenic-base compound
used against rice plants and tall grass. Strong
plant killer that gives quick results. One seri-
ous restriction on its use is the possibility
that heavy concentrations will cause arseni-
cal poisoning in humans. Widely used in
Vietnam. It is composed of 54.29 per cent
arsenic.
BIOLOGICAL AGENTS
Anthrax.' An acute bacterial disease that
is usually fatal if untreated when it attacks
the lungs (pulmonary anthrax). Death can
result in twenty-four hours. Found naturally
in animals, which must be buried or burned
to prevent contamination. Symptoms include
high fever, hard breathing, and collapse. Also
known as woolsorters' disease.
Brucellosis: Bacterial disease usually found
in cattle, goats, and pigs. Marked by high
fever and chills in humans. Also known as
undulant fever. Fatal in up to 5 per cent of
untreated oases. Symptoms can linger for
months.
Encephalomyelitis: Highly infectious viral
disease that appears in many forms and
gradations: it can be simply debilitating or
fatal. Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis
were killed.
ON: A non-lethal gas with a deceptive, fra- of those afflicted. Complete convalescence
testing of biologicals at Dug-way, has pro- agent, now in use in Vietnam, Is a fast-acting Q-/ever: Acute, rarely fatal rickettsial
dfls-
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Tularemia: A bacterial disease marked by
high fever, chills, pains, and weakness. Acute
period can last two to three weeks. Sometimes
causes ulcers in mouth or eyes, which mul-
tiply. Untreated, its mortality rate is between
5 and 8 per cent. Highly infectious, and
usually found in animals, fowls, and ticks.
Also known as rabbit fever.
Source: Chemical and Biological Warfare,
America's Hidden Arsenal, by Seymour H.
Hersh (Doubleday Co. 1969).
ease usually found in ticks, but also found in
cattle, sheep, gents, and some wild animals.
The Q-fever organism can remain alive and
Infectious in dry areas Tor years. Rarely fatal
but the resulting fever may last up to three
months.
Rift Valley Fever: Viral infection of sheep,
cattle, and other animals that can be trans-
mitted to humans, usually to the male.
Symptoms include nausea, chills, headaches,
and pains, but the disease is mild: despite
the severity of symptoms deaths are rare and
acute discomfort lasts only a few days. Also
believed to be more virulent among Asians.
Rocky Moutnain Spotted Fever: An acute
rickettsial disease transmitted to man by the
tick. One of the most severe of all infectious
diseases. Can kill within three days. Fevers
range up to 105 degrees F. Often found in
northwestern United States, but susceptibil-
ity to the disease in general. Highly respon-
sive to treatment.
PLANNED OPEN AIR TESTING?MARCH 1968-MAY 1969, DUGWAY PROVING GROUND, UTAH
Item Agent Agent amount
Quantity
M139 bomblet GB 1 round per trial (5 trials).
E139 bomblet GB 1 item per trial (8 trials).
105 milimeter projectile_ GB 1.5 pounds per round_ 1 round per trial (3 trials).
BLU 19/623 GB 1 round per trial (I trial).
Item Agent
Agent amount Quantity
M55 rocket GB
Spray boom (truck) GB
8-inch howitzer shell VX
Spray boom (truck) VX
1 round per trial (4 trials).
2 gallons per trial 3 trials.
143.h pounds per round__ _ 1 round per trail (5 trials).
2 gallons per trail 2 trials.
PLANNED TESTING, FOURTH QUARTER, FISCAL YEAR 1969: APRIL-JUNE 1969
Item Agent
Agent quantity per
item
Deseret Test Center, Utah (Dugway Proving Ground,
Utah):
United States Army:
8 inch shell, 50 foot release VX 15.4 pounds
E139 bomblet GB
Do GB
M55 rocket warhead GB
M23 land mine VX
Test fixture, ground release 1 VX 10 pounds
Test fixture, ground release 1 HD do
155-millimeter shell, ground release 1 GD 12.5 pound
Test fixture, ground release 1 GA 1.2 pounds
United States Navy:
Bomblet G-type
Defense system challenge, ground releasel_ GB or VX
United States Air Force: BLU-19 bomblet GB
3 pounds
do
Number of
items to be
teste
Item
Agent
Agent quantity per
item
Number of
items to be
tested
Edgewood Arsenal, Md.?all Army:
155 mm shell, ground release 1
Test fixture
Do
E139 bomblet (EOD test)
M23 land mine
E139 bomblet
i.
Test munition
Fort McClellan, Ala:8
Bulk agent, poured on a suitable surface for
detection and decontamination exercises.
VX
EA 1356
GB
GB
VX
GA
GB
GD
VX
HD
HD
HD
HD
HD
HD
GB
VX
VX
6.5 pounds
100 grams
50 grams
10 pounds
2 gallons
1 gallon
160 centimeters_
120 centimeters
80 centimeters
40 centimeters
42 centimeters_
42 centimeters
42 centimeters
.
08
?24
?20
1
3
114
8
039
2
1
5
1
1
6
5
5
5
8
4
4
4
4
6
3
3
10
16
6
3
4
LETHAL AGENT, OPEN-AIR TESTS SCHEDULED, FIRST QUARTER, FISCAL YEAR 1970?JULY-SEPTEMBER 1969
Height of
Item release Agent
Quantity
of item
Agent quantity to be
per item tested
Deseret Test Center, Utah (Dugway
Proving Ground):
United States Navy: V Bomblet____ Ground
United States Army:
55-gallon drum?portable water._ do
VX 1 pound 3
GB Less than 2 5
pounds.
HD
VX
M2XR XR 75
155 MI21 projectile GB 28
155 M121 projectile VX 28
155 M121 projectile GB 6
155 M121 projectile VX 6
4.5-inch mortar Ground HD 6 pounds 148
HT
155 do G 12 to 14 pounds___ 30
M23 Land mine VX 12
M56 Warhead (M55 racket). GB 10
United States Air Force:
Test fixture Ground HD 8 pounds 7
Item
Quantity
of item
Height of Agent quantity to be
release Agent per item tested
Edgewood Arsenal, Md. (All Army tests):
155 Howitzer shell Ground VX 6.5 pounds 7
Test fixture do EA1356 100 grams 24-
Do do EA1356 11 pounds 3
On do GB 50 grams 20
E139 bomblet (EN) test) GB 1
Test bomblet do VX 1 pound 8
M23 land mine VX 3
155 Howitzer canister do VX 3 pounds 9
Test spray 1 meter. GA 1.3 pounds 16
Fixture GB 1.3 pounds 8
GD 1.3 pounds 16
VX 10 pounds 2
GB 4
E139 bomblet GD 8
I Ground releases are statically detonated or functioned.
2 Te be conducted this quarter or next quarter, depending on availability of facilities.
a Chemical agent decontamination and detection exercises are conducted to train chemical
specialists in techniques for these operations. The specialists are subsequently assigned to Army
divisions and decontamination teams.
Source: Subcommittee on Conservation and Natural Resources, Committee on Government
Operations, U.S. House of Representatives.
Mr. GOODELL. Mr. President, let us
suppose that VX again escaped from a
testing site. Suppose instead of drift-
ing to a field of sheep, the nerve gas
drifted to a city or town of people. The
deadly nerve gas VX is colorless and
odorless. The protection required against
Its very rapid fatal effect is a gas mask
and protective clothing. First aid sug-
gested is atropine. What chances under
Note: Recent exchanges between Representative Henry Reuss, chairman of the House Conserva-
tion and Natural Resources Subcommittee and Army Secretary Stanley Resor give some idea
of the scheduling of open air tests of chemical agents, including nerve gas.
The unclassified data above lists item-by-item outdoor testing for the periods March 1968 to
May 1969 at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah; April to June 1969 at Deseret Test Center, Utah
(Dugway Proving Ground, Utah); at Edgewood Arsenal, Md.; and at Fort McCelllan, Ala.; July to
September 1969 at Deseret Test Center, Utah (Dugway Proving Ground, Utah) and at Edgewood
Arsenal, Md.
these circumstances would our people
have of surviving?
A ban on outdoor testing of lethal
chemical agents, including VX, would
prevent such circumstances from arising.
I simply cannot accept accidental
death, contaminated land, and the spread
of disease as a price for adding still
more to the already vast offensive capa-
bility of our CBW arsenal.
Mr. President, on Saturday, Secretary
of Defense Laird said that a chemical
warfare deterrent and a biological re-
search program are essential to national
security. He said that research and test-
ing of CBW agents should continue.
If I rightly understand, we can expect
Pentagon requests to break the proposed
"moratorium" on CBW open air tests.
If such Pentagon requests be made and
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311./INAL K SENATE Augwzt .11, 1949
agreed to, I fear we will be back again
where we started. That is, we will be
back with peril to the public health and
peril from a spiraling t7.13W program.
Mr. President, why, in view of the nu-
clear, and other deterrents, are chemical
warfare deterrence andan offensive bio-
logical research program essential to na-
tional security?
To date, research in biological war-
fare has already produced biological war-
heads for the Sergeafii; research has
brought germ warfare U3 the missile age.
Chemical deterrence1 has also found
shelter in the Sergeant. Still, we are told
by the Pentagon that research and test-
ing should continue.
What are we really_ contributing to
when we stockpile munitions filled with
lethal gas and disease-producing bac-
teria? Do we not contribute to that eerie
sense of doomsday? 'What do we mean
to accomplish with gas and germ weap-
ons? To prevent use? But what if the
net result is to proliferate use?
Mr. President, anything so infamous
as germ warfare should be deterred ulti-
mately by eliminating germ weapons.
Some will say that this is a dream. Some
will say that it cannot be achieved. I
cannot accept this reasoning to justify
germ weapons. Today, I call for the day
when we will dismantle can germ arsenal.
I look forward to the day, when the
United States will eliminate the means
by which civilizations of the world could
plunge into the abyss of epidemic and
mass death. I urge today, that we fight
germs with medicine; not with germ
weapons. Medical protection against
germs is reasonable, it is sane. To pro-
tect against germs with germ weapons is
folly; it is madness.
Deterrence with defensive equipment,
such as gas masks and vaccines, is more
reasonable than the deterrence offered
by military science and by hardware
which places gas and germs in grenades
and in nuclear warheads. Deterrence
with defensive equipment has the added
advantage of beneficial "spin-offs" for
peacetime medical applications gained
by gas and germ research It is still un-
clear to me why medical research of this
kind is done by the Defense Department
when such research can be done by the
Public Health Service.
Deterrence with weapons has the neg-
ative side effect of arms race competition
with other nations or indeed, with our
own self. Unilateral armament may be
the net effect, or perhaps is the goal of
our CBW program. Still, we cannot
ignore our contributions to proliferation
of CBW throughout the world.
Mr. President, how does our national
security benefit from CBW proliferation?
We have spent years to check nuclear
proliferation to nonnuclear nations. If
we succeed in nuclear nonproliferation,
then few nations will pose a nuclear
threat to the cities of this country.
Chemical and biological weapons are a
way that many nations can threaten our
cities.
Do we and should we encourage for-
eign nations to build up gas and germ
weapons as a deterrent to a potential
enemy? Should we train foreign officers
in gas and germ warfare? Should we have
CBW courses at Fort McClellan and in-
vite foreign officers to attend?
Mr. President, many people are un-
aware that in the past 20 years, con-
cerning CBW, and prior to 1951, we even
had a foreign officer training program
which trained military officers from
Egypt and Yugoslavia in the use of chem-
ical and biological agents. It has been
charged that, subsequent to that time,
Egypt used deadly gases in Yemen. We
have a share of the responsibility for
this tragic development in the history of
mankind,
Some 35 nations have received foreign
officer training in how to use CBW weap-
ons. This is truly a significant rung up
the balance-of-terror ladder for the
world, because chemical and biological
agents can be produced cheaply by
countries with very small resources.
Unlike nuclear weapons, chemical and
biological weapons which can wipe out
mankind can be produced by small
countries. We must move forward?cer-
tainly our country must?and should not
be a party to escalating an arms race in
this area of CBW.
Certainly it is difficult to look back at
different countries' activities in the past
20 years with any confidence that we
have done anything but contribute to
greater escalation.
It is particularly distressing to me that
our CBW program includes a foreign
officer training program in CBW. The
Army offers two courses in CBW open to
foreign officers at Fort McClellan. One
course is for a period of 9 weeks. The
other is for a period of 9 months. Since
1951, the Pentagon has provided CBW
training to officers from over 35 foreign
countries.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD two
charts showing the countries which have
participated in the Army's CBW train-
ing program.
There being no objection, the charts
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
ARMY'S CBW FOREIGN OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM
PARTICIPATING COUNTRY LIST, FROM 1951 TO PRESENT
FOREIGN OFFICERS TRAINING PROGRAM-I..
9 WEEK COURSE
Fiscal year-
1969 1970
Japan
Korea
Philippines
Taiwan
Thailand
South Vietnam
Iran 1
Lebanon
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia 5 4
France
Germany 2 2
Greece 5 4
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom 3 3
Yugoslavia
Canada 1 2
Argentina
Mexico
Australia 2
Source: Department of Defense
FOREIGN OFFICERS TRAINING PROGRAM-36 WEEK COURSE
Fiscal year
1969
Australia
Japan
Korea
Phillipines
Taiwan
Thailand
South Vietnam
Iran
2
Iraq
Jordan
Lebanon
Pakistan
Egypt!
Austria
Denmark
Germany
Greece
Italy
Norway
Switzerland
Turkey
Yugoslavia I
Canada
Argentina
Brazil
Venezuela
Israel
I Terminated since early 1950's. -
Source: Department of Defense.
Mr. GOODELL, Mr. President, officers
have come here to learn about CBW.
They have come from Europe, from Latin
America, from the middle East and from
Southeast Asia. This year, emphasis has
been given to training officers from Viet-
nam, Thailand, Korea, Taiwan, and the
Philippines.
I am concerned that such training of
foreign officers could inspire an wipe-
tite for acquisition of these insidious
weapons of war. I am disturbed that
knowledge and acquisition of CBW could
propel nations of the world to use CBW
in war. Have we learned nothing from
Yemen? Indeed, sharp review of this
foreign officers training program in Cl3W
is long overdue.
I urge that the Senate Armed Services
Committee make a complete review of
this aspect of the OEM' program. The
question to be faced is whether these
study courses should be continued or
abandoned in the name of reason.
If we fail to halt chemical and bio-
logical weapons spread and build-up
now, what will be in store for future gen-
erations? While we now pause on the
present rung of the CBW balance-of-ter-
ror ladder, we see that we are in a near
perfect model of weapons escalation. If
we have "overkill" in nuclear weapons;
we have "superkill" in chemical and Mo-
logical weapons. If the Pentagon has
asked us to deploy an ABM for defense
against nuclear attack, it is just a matter
of time that the Pentagon will ask us for
funds to deploy an ACBM, an anti-chem-
ical and biological monitoring system?
We simply must guard against the
dangers inherent in the very existence of
chemical and germ weapons. There is
danger in any outdoor testing of lethal
gas and any disease-producing bacteria
and toxin. There is danger in CBW esca-
lation and proliferation. There is danger
in the use of gas and germs in warfare.
Today, we can start to check the
dangers posed by CBW by acting favor-
ably on the omnibus anti-CBW amend-
ment. We can begin today with what
promises to be a very long and difficult
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August 11, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECuKll ? &CNA S9525
road to additional review and further
control of chemical and biological weap-
ons both in this country and throughout
the world.
Yet to be done is a review by the whole
Congress of many general areas of
inquiry:
Why do we have a gas and germ ar-
senal? Is the Pentagon's retaliation in
kind a valid justification given the nu-
clear deterrent?
How does our CBW program contrib-
ute to the proliferation of CBW through-
out the world?
What is the U.S. policy on use of these
weapons in combat?
What steps are the United States will-
ing to take in CBW arms control?
Let us give deep consideration to the
grave moral issues which arise when we
stockpile munitions filled with lethal gas
and disease-producing bacteria. Let us
think deeply on this as we move further
in our review ot CBW from the stand-
points of deterrence, proliferation, use
in combat, and targets for further dis-
armament.
More steps can be taken to control
chemical and biological weapons. These
include:
Presentation of the Geneva Protocol
by the President to the Senate for rati-
fication. The United States signed, but
never ratified, the 1925 Protocol outlaw-
ing use of gas and germs in war.
A report by a nongovernmental Scien-
tific and Medical Advisory Committee on
CBW. This report could focus on scien-
tific, medical, and arms-control aspects
of chemical and biological weapons. The
report should be presented to both the
President and to Congress. Paralleled
with congressional examination and that
of the National Security Council, such a
report could be an important contribu-
tion M options for charting a long-range
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I deterrent and our biological research pro-
should like to respond to the Senator gram, both of which are essential to na-
tional security," the statement said.
from New York and commend him for Senate Armed Services Committee Chair-
the fine work he has done in this area man John Stennis (D-Miss.) said Friday he
of CBW, and to commend also the Sena- would probably support the amendment and
tor from Wisconsin (Mr. NELSON) and predicted its approval.
others, and their staffs, for their close The compromise language, which the or-
cooperation and the fine work they have iginal supporters?said would not harm the
done in trying to bring together and con- amendment, would allow open air testing of
solidate the thinking on control matters
CBW agents only when the Secretary of De-
fense certified that it was necessary for na-
concerning the CBW program. tional security, the U.S. Surgeon General
To this point I would say that all of certified that it would not be hazardous to
these Senators have cooperated. The health or the environment and congressional
compromise may not please everyone; committees had been notified in advance.
but, as the Senator from New York
There are no restrictions on such testing
stated, it represents a beginning of con-
now. The original amendment would have flatly banned it.
trol that Congress should have over this The compromise version was worked out
program. Friday in a meeting between Dr. John S.
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I thank Foster, Pentagon research director, and Sen.
the Senator from New Hampshire. As Thomas J. McIntyre (D-N.H.) , chairman of
chairman of the subcommittee, along an Armed Services subcommittee that had
with other Senators and their staffs, they already recommended deletion of all funds
did a superb job in working out the com-
for development of offensive CBW weapons.
bined amendment. CONCERN CITED
I should like to mention that a num- Laird said that when he took office in Jan-
ber of us have offered amendments of uary he "became concerned with the manage-
various kinds to the budget. It is ap-
ment and control of our chemical warfare
propriate to mention that the original
and that i
biological resesarch programs" i n e " and "felt
eorfe needede se programs."
budget on January 14 was $23,151,660,000. man-
agementin aonvd con
ement control
That was reduced by Secretary Laird's On result of this concern, he said, was
recommendations to $21,963,060,000. And President Nixon's directive in April ordering
then through the efforts of the chairman, the National Security Council to make a
the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STEN- thorough study of CBW activities.
NIS), the budget was cut another almost "Pending the completion of the NSC
$2 billion, down to $20,059,500,000. study," Laird said, "I believe it is prudent
It should not go unnoted that the
that we act jointly with Congress and take
actions, wherever possible, to improve the
chairman and his committee did an ex- management and control of chemical war-
cellent job in reducing the budget. The fare and biological research programs."
fact that a number of us have other Laird emphasized that research and test-
amendments should not cause us to ig- ing of CBW agents should continue even
nore the fact that the chairman did a though the United States has stated it would
fine and conscientious job. use them only in self-defense, because "fail-
ure to maintain an effective chemical war-
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- fare deterrent would endanger national se-
sent to have printed in the RECORD a curity."
news story from the Washington Post of The amendment would also require semi-
yesterday, Sunday, August 10, 1969, on a annual reports to Congress on CBW spend-
course of action on gas and germ weap-
statement by the Secretary of Defense, ing and would bar procurement of further
ons. Mr. Laird, as well as the statement by CBW delivery systems, CBW activities found
These are some more steps we can take Mr. Laird made on August 9, 1969, re- hythteSeci law,
of Statetviolatewithinw-
to control CBW in addition to the omni- garding the CBW amendment pending. le
r
agents iowna within tiiernU?st nited shiptnieatens ts an ndf CBW
to
anti-CBW amendment we are con- There being no objection, the news -
trans-
port to foreign countries without approval
sidering today. article and statement were ordered to be of the foreign nation and notification to
Mr. President, I am not completely printed in the RECORD, as follows: Congress. ?
$2.5 BILLION SPENT
1969]
satisfied with the compromise, but I [From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Aug. 10,
think it is a significant breakthrough. . Since 1960, the Pentagon has spent about
I want to commend particularly the CBW CURB ENDORSED By LAIRD $2.5 billion on CBW activities with little
Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. NELSON) The Defense Department announced un- congressional scrutiny or public knowledge.
The amendment ththtatywo would procurement be at attached bill,
to which for his cooperation in working with me expectedrir yesterday that it would support
$20-b
and others in developing these amend- has been on the Senatefloor for five weeks.
germ warfare weapons.
efforts for strict congressional controls on
the testing and production of chemical and
ments, particularly the three originally Nearly a dozen other amendments are await-
cosponsored by us. I would also like to The announcement by Defense Secretary ing action and Senate leaders said Friday
commend the Senator from New Hamp- Melvin R. Laird virtually insures Senate ap- the bill would probably not come to a final
shire for his continuing concern and in- proval Monday of a revised but still broad vote until September.
terest in this area, and for his coopera- amendment drawn up by critics of the Sen. Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.), a sponsor of
Pen-
ton in working out the amendment tagon's past activities in the CBW field. It the CBW amendment, released this list of
colleges and universities engaged in Pentagon
would, among other restrictions, ban most
which we expect will be carried through CBW contracts:
open air testing of the lethal agents.
in conference and not diluted further. ri approved, the CBW amendment would "Boston Univ., Brooklyn College, Buffalo
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, will be the second major victory for critics of the Univ., Univ. of California at Berkeley, Univ.
the Senator from Wisconsin yield me Pentagon since they failed by two votes last of California at Los Angeles, Univ. of Chicago,
1 minute? week to block initial deployment of the Univ. of Connecticut, Cornell Univ., Delaware,
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, how much Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system. George Peabody College, George Washington
time remains to me? The Senate's liberal bloc won approval Univ., Georgia Institute of Technology, Hah-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Pour mm- Thursday of a potentially far-reaching nemann Medical College, Harvard, Univ. of
Illinois at Urbana, Illinois Institute of Tech-
amendment that would give the General Ac-
utes remain to the Senator from Wis- counting Office greater powers to audit de- nology.
consin. tense contracts. Also, Indiana Univ. Foundation, Iowa State
Mr. NELSON. I yield 1 minute to the .1 am in agreement with the goals of the Also,
Johns Hopkins, Kansas State Univ.,
Senator from New Hampshire. (CBW) amendment," Laird said yterday Univ. of Maryland and its medical and dental
es
schools, Univ. of Massachusetts, Massachu-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- in a statement released by the Pentagon. setts Institute of Technology, Univ. of Michi-
ator from New Hampshire is recognized "I believe this revised amendment will gan, Univ of Minnesota, Univ. of North Caro-
for 1 minute. allow us to maintain our chemical warfare Una, Ohio State Univ., Univ. of Oklahoma,
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S 9526 CO
NGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 11, 1969
Univ. of Oregon, Univ. of Pennsylvania, Univ.
of Pittsburgh, Polytechnic Institute of
Brooklyn.
"Also, Rutgers, St. Louis Univ., Stanford
Research Institute, Univ. of Tennessee, Univ.
of Texas at Austin, Texas AeirM, Univ of Utah,
Utah State Univ., Medical College of Vir-
ginia, Univ. of Washington, Washington
State Univ., Western Reserve Univ., College
of William and Mary, Univ. of Wisconsin and
Yale."
MEMORANDUM FOR CORRESPON?wNTS, AUGUST 9,
1969
Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird today
issued the following statement in response to
queries about the DoD position on the pend-
ing McIntyre amendment.
On assuming the office of Secretary of De-
fense in January, I became concerned with
the management and control of our chemical
warfare and biological research programs. I
felt that improvements were needed in the
management and control of these programs.
That is why in April I requested and the
President ordered a National Security Council
study of these matters. This study Is in
progress.
Pending the completion Of the NSC study,
I believe it is prudent that we act jointly
with Congress and take actions, wherever
possible, to improve the 'management and
control of chemical warfare and biological
research programs.
Members of my staff, principally Dr. John S.
Foster, Jr., Director of Research and Engi-
neering, have been working in recent days
with Senator Thomas J. iliferntyre of New
Hampshire, and with other members of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, on a re-
vised amendment to the pending Defense
Authorization Bill.
I am in agreement with the goals of the
new amendment, which the Senate is sched-
uled to consider on Monday.
I believe this revised amendment will allow
us to maintain our chemical warfare deter-
rent and our biological research program
both of which are essential to national
security.
The history of the use of lethal chemical
warfare agents has demonstrated on three
notable occasions in this country that the
only time military forces have used these
weapons is when the opposing forces had no
immediate capability to deter or to retaliate.
This was true early in World War I, later
in Ethopia and more recently in Yemen.
Clearly, failure to maintain an effective
chemcial warfare deterrent would endanger
national security.
Because it would not always be possible to
determine the origin of attack by biological
agents, the deterrent aspects of biological
research are not as sharply defined. A con-
tinued biological research program, however,
is vital on two other major ?mints.
First, we must strengthen our protective
capabilities in such areas as vaccines and
therapy.
Secondly, we must minimize the dangers of
technological surprise.
It is important that the American people
be informed of why we must continue to
maintain our chemical deterrent, conduct
biological research, and how we propose to
improve the management and control of these
programs.
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, how much
time do I have left?
The PRESIDING OFiviCER. The Sen-
ator from Wisconsin has 2 minutes re-
maining.
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to hare printed in
full in the RECORD the report of the Sec-
retary General on chemical and bacterio-
logical weapons and the eirects of their
possible use.
There being no objection, the repor
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD
as follows:
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
Jusre 30, 1969.
DEAR M. SECRETARY-GENERAL: I have the
honour to submit herewith a unanimous re-
port on chemical and bacteriological (bio-
logical) weapons which was prepared in pur-
suance of General Assembly resolution 2454
A (XXIII).
The Consultant Experts appointed in ac-
cordance with the General Assembly resolu-
tion were the following:
Dr. Tibor Bakacs, Professor of Hygiene, Di-
rector-General of the National Institute of
Public Health, Budapest.
Dr. Hotse C. Bartlema, Head of the Micro-
biological Department of the Medical-Bio-
logical Laboratory, National Defense Research
Organization TNO, Rijswijk, Netherlands.
Dr. Ivan L. Bennett, Director of the New
York University Medical Center and Vice-
President for Medical Affairs, New York Uni-
versity, New York.
Dr. S. Bhagavantam, Scientific Adviser to
the Minister of Defense, New Delhi.
Dr. Jiri Franek, Director of the Military In-
stitute for Hygiene, Epidemiology and Micro-
biology, Prague.
Dr. Yosio Kawakita, President of the Uni-
versity of Chiba, Professor of Bacteriology,
Chiba City, Japan.
M. Victor Moulin, Ingenieur en chef de
armement, Chef du Bureau Defense chimi-
que et biologique, Direction technique des
armements terrestres, Saint Cloud, France.
Dr. M. K. McPhail, Director of Chemical
and Biological Defense, Defense Chemical,
Biological and Radiation Laboratories, De-
fense Research Board, Ottawa.
Academician O. A. Reutov, Professor of
Chemistry at the Moscow State University,
Moscow.
Dr. Guillermo Soberon, Director, Institute
de Investigaciones Biomedicas, thaversidad
Nacional Autonama de Mexico, Mexico City.
'Dr. Lars-Erik Tarrunelin, Chief of Depart-
ment for Medicine and Chemistry, Research
Institute for National Defense, Stockholm,
Dr. Berhane Teourne-Lessane, Medical Co-
Director and Head of Department of Viruses
and Rickettsiae, Imperial Central Laboratory
and Research Institute, Addis Ababa.
Colonel Zbigniew Zoltowskl, Protestor of
Medicine, Epidemiologist and Scientific Ad-
viser to the Ministry of National Defense,
Warsaw,
Sir Sony Zuckerman, Chief Scientific Ad-
viser to the Government of the United King-
dom, Professor Emeritus, University of Bir-
mingham.
The report was drafted during sessions
held in Geneva between 20 and 24 January
and between 16 and 29 April, and finalized
at meetings held in New York between 2 and
14 June 1969.
The Group of Consultant Experts with to
acknowledge the assistance they received
from the World Health Organization, the
Food and Agriculture Organization, the In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross, the
Pugwash Conference on Science and World
Affairs (Pugwash) and the International In-
stitute for Peace and Conflict Research
(SIPRI) , all of which submitted valuable in-
formation and material for the purposes of
the study.
The Group of Consultant Experts also wish
to express their gratitude for the valuable
assistance they received tram members of
the United Nations Secretariat.
I have been requested by the Group of
Consultant Experts, as their Chairman, to
submit their unanimous report to you on
their behalf.
Yours sincerely,
WILLIAM EPSTEIN,
Chairman, Group of Consultant Experts
on Chemical and Bacteriological (Bio-
logical) Weapons.
QUESTION OF' GENERAL AND COMPLETE
DISARMAMENT
[Illustrations not printed in the Recone]
(Report of the Secretary-General on chem-
ical and bacteriological (biological)
weapons and the effects of their possible
use)
Pursuant to General Assembly resolution
2454 A (XXIII) of 20 December 1968, the
Secretary-General has the honour to trans-
mit herewith to the General Assembly the
report on chemical and bacteriological (bio-
logical) weapons and the effects of their
possible use, prepared with the astistance
of qualified consultant experts.
In accordance with paragraph 4 of the
resolution, the report is also being trans-
mitted to the Security Council (8/9292) and
the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Com-
mittee on Disarmamenti as well as to the
Governments of Member States.
FOREWORD DT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
During the past few years, I have become
increasingly concerned by developments in
the field of chemical and bacteriological
(biological) weapons and have given expres-
sion to this concern on several occasions.
A year ago, I stated publicly that "the inter-
national community was not sufficiently
conscious of the dangers inherent in this new
type of weapon of mass murder", and that
"due attention had not been focused on this
very serious problem". In the introduction
to my annual report on the work of the
Organization, in September 1968, I stated:
"While progress is being made in the field
of nuclear disarmament, there is another
aspect of the disarmament problem to which
I feel too little attention has been devoted
in recent years. The question of chemical and
biological weapons has been overshadowed by
the question of nuclear weapons, which have
a destructive power several orders of magni-
tude greater than that of chemical and bio-
logical weapons. Nevertheless, these too are
weapons of mass destruction regarded with
universal horror. In some respects, they may
be even more dangerous than nuclear weap-
ons because they do not require the enormous
expenditure of financial and scientific re-
sources that are required for nuclear weap-
ons. Almost all countries, including small
ones and developing ones, may have access
to these weapons, which can be manufac-
tured quite cheaply, quickly and secretly in
small laboratories or factories. This fact in
itself makes the problem of control and in-
spection much more difficult. Moreover, since
the adoption, on 17 Jane, 1925, of the Geneva
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in
War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of War-
fare, there have been many scientific and
technical developments and numerous im-
provements, if that is the right word, in
chemical and biological weapons, which
have created new situations and new prob-
lems. On the one hand, there has been a
great increase in the capability of these
weapons to inflict unimaginable suffering,
disease and death to ever larger numbers of
human beings; on the other hand, there has
been a growing tendency to use some chemi-
cal agents for civilian riot control and a
dangerous trend to aceept their use in some
form in conventional warfare,
"Two years ago, by resolution 2162 B (XXI),
the General Assembly called for the strict
observance by all States of the principles and
objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 1925,
condemned all actions contrary to those ob-
jectives and invited all States to accede to
the Protocol. Once again, I would like to add
my voice to those of others in urging the
early and complete implementation of this
resolution.- However, in my opinion, much
more is needed. . . ."
"By a letter dated 1 July 1969 from the
Secretary-General to the Co-Chairmen of
the Conference.
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S 9527
At its twenty-third session, by resolutionmeans of warfare; the possible ?long-term logical (biological) agents intended for pur-
2454 A (XXIII), the General Assembly re- effects on human health and ecology; and poses of war were to end if they were elimin-
quested me to prepare, with the assistance the economic and security implications of ated from all military arsenals.
of qualified consultant experts, a report on the development, acquisition mid possible "If this were to happen, there would be a
chemical and bacteriological (biological) use of chemical and bacteriological (biologi- general lessening of international fear and
weapons in accordance with the proposal cal) weapons and of systems for their de- tension. It is the hope of the authors that
contained in the introduction to my an- livery, this report will contribute to public aware-
nual report on the work of the organization The consultant experts to whom I conveyed ness of the profoundly dangerous results if
(A/7201/Add. 1), and in accordance with the these terms of reference accepted them as these weapons were ever used, and that an
recommendation contained in the report of the basis for their study. aroused public will demand and receive as-
the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Corn- It was my intention that the Group of surances that Governments are working for
mittee on Disarmament of 4 September 1968 Consultant Experts should survey the en- the earliest effective elimination of chemical
(A/7189). tire subject from the technical and sof- and bacteriological (biological) weapons."
In pursuance of this resolution, I ap- entiflc points of view, so that the report I have given the study prepared by the
pointed the following group of fourteen con- could place these weapons in proper per- consultant experts my earnest consideration
sultant experts to assist me in the prepara- spective. It was also my hope that an au- and I have decided to accept their unani-
tion of the report: Dr. Tibor Bakacs, Profes- thoritative report could become the basis mous report in its entirety, and to transmit
sor of Hygiene, Director-General of the Na- for political and legal action by the Mem- it to the General Assembly, the Security
tional Institute of Public Health, Budapest; bars of the United Nations. Council, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on
Dr. Hotse C. Bartlema, Head of the Micro- As the report was to be made available Disarmament and to the Governments of
biological Department of the Medical-Bio- by 1 July 1969, very concentrated efforts by Member States, as the report called for by
logical Laboratory, National Defence Re- the consultant experts were required in resolution 2451 A (XXIII).
search Organization TNO, Rijswijk, Nether- order to cover this extensive field. The mem- I also feel it incumbent upon me, in the
lands; Dr. Ivan L. Bennett, Director of the bars of the Group, acting in their personal hope that further action will be taken to
New York University Medical Center and capacities, carried out this demanding task deal with the threat posed by the existence
Vice-President of Medical Affairs, New York at three sessions between January and June of these weapons, to urge that the Members
University, New York; Dr. S. Bhagavantam, 1969. of the United Nations undertake the fol-
Scientific Adviser to the Minister of Defence, The Group had the benefit of valuable lowing measures in the interests of enhanc-
New Delhi; Dr. Jirl Franek, Director of the submissions from the World Health Organi- ing the security of the peoples of the world:
Military Institute for Hygiene, EpidemiologV zation, the Food and Agriculture Organize- 1. To renew the appeal to all States to
and Microbiology, Prague; Dr. Yogic. Kama- tion, the International Committee of the accede to the Geneva Protocol of 1925;
kite, President of University of Chiba, Pro- Red Cross, the Pugwash Conference on Sci- 2. To make a clear affirmation that the
lessor of Bacteriology, Chiba City, Japan; M. ence and World Affairs (Pugwash) and the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol
Victor Moulin, Ingenieur en chef de l'arm- International Institute for Peace and Con- applies to the use in war of all chemical,
ement, Chef du Bureau Defense chimique at filet Research (SIPRI). I wish to express my bacteriological and biological agents (includ-
biologique, Direction technique des arme- grateful appreciation to all the consultant ing tear gas and other harassing agents) ,
ments terrestres, Saint Cloud, France; Dr. experts for their dedicated work and to the which now exist or which may be developed
M. K. McPhail, Director of Chemical and Bio- organizations and bodies who co-operated in the future:
logical Defence, Defence Chemical, Biologi- in the preparation of the study.
cal and Radiation Laboratories, Defence Re- The Group has submitted me to a unani-
search Board, Ottawa; Academician 0. A. mous report embodying its findings and con-
Reutov, Professor of Chemistry at the Mos- elusions. I wish to avail myself of this
cow State University, Moscow; Dr. Guillermo opportunity to express my gratification for
Soberon, Director, Instituto de Investiga- the very high level of competence with which
ciones Biomedicas, Universidad Nactional the consultant experts have discharged their
Autonoma de Mexico, Mexico City; Dr. Lars- mandate. In a very short period of time, they
Erik Tainmelin, Chief of Department for have produced a study, which, in spite of
Medicine and Chemistry, Research Institute the many complex aspects of the subject
, for National Defence, Stockholm; Dr. Ber- matter, is both concise and authoritative. It
bane Teoume-Lessane, Medical Co-Director is a document which, I believe, provides
and Head of Department of Viruses and valuable insights into the grave dangers that
Rickettsiae, Imperial Central Laboratory tuid are posed by the production and possible
Research Institute, Addis Ababa; Colonel use of these dreaded weapons.
Zbigniew Zoltowski, Professor of Medicine, I am particularly impressed by the con-
Epidemiologist and Scientific Adviser to the
. elusion of the consultant experts wherein
Ministry of National Defence, Warsaw; Sir they state; ,
801131 Zuckerman, Chief Scientific Adviser to "The general conclusion of the report can
the Government of the United Kingdom, thus be summed up in a few lines. Were
Professor Emeritus, University of Birming- these weapons ever to be used on a large scale
ham. in war, no one could predict how enduring
Mr. William Epstein, Director of the Die- the effects would be, and how they would
armament Affairs Division, Department of
Political and Security Council Affairs, served
as Chairman of the Group of Consultant
Experts. Mr. Alessandro Corradini, Chief of
the Committee and Conference Services Sec-
tion, acted as Secretary of the Group. He
was assisted by members of the Disarmament
Affairs Division.
After giving due consideration to the terms
of the resolution and to the views expressed
and the suggestions made during the dis-
cussion of the question at the twenty-third
session of the General Assembly, I reached
the conclusion that the aim of the report
should be to provide a scientifically sound
appraisal of the effects of chemical and bac-
teriological (biological) weapons and should
serve to inform Governments of the con-
sequences of their possible use. Within this
over-all framework, the report would fur-
nish accurate information in a concise and
readily understandable form on the follow-
ing matters: the basic characteristics of
chemical and basteriological (biological)
3. To call upon all countries to reach agree-
ment to halt the development, production
and stockpiling of all chemical ond bacterio-
logical (biological) agents for purposes of
war and to achieve their effective elimination
from the arsenal of weapons.
INTRODUCTION
1. In accordance with the resolution of the
General Assembly 2454 A (X.XIII) the Secre-
tary-General was asked to prepare, with the
assistance of qualified consultant experts, a
report on chemical and bacteriological (bio-
logical) weapons and on the effects of their
possible use. Specifically the experts were
asked to provide a scientific appraisal of the
characteristics of the chemical and bacterio-
logical (biological) weapons which could be
used in warfare; of the effects they could
have on military personnel and civilians; as
well as of their long-term effects on health
and our physical environment. They were also
asked to provide a statement about the eco-
nomic and security implications of the de-
affect the structure of society and the en- velopment, acquisition and possible use of
vironment in which we live. This overriding such weapons and associated weapon sys-
danger would apply as much to the country tems. The report which follows is confined to
which initiated the use of these weapons as these objectives.
to the one which had been attacked, regard-
2. No form of warfare has been more con-
less of what protective measures it might
demned than has the use of this category of
have taken in parallel with its development
weapons. The poisoning of wells has been re-
of an offensive capability. A particular danger
garded from time immemorial as a crime in-
also derives from the fact that any country
compatible with the rules of war. "War is
could develop or acquire, in one way or
waged with weapons, not with poison"
another, a capability in this type of warfare,
("Armis belle non venenis geri"), declared
despite the fact that this could prove costly.
the Roman jurists. As the destructive power
The danger of the proliferation of this class
of arms increased over the years, and with it
of weapons applies as much to the develop-
the potential for the widespread use of
ing as it does to developed countries.
chemicals, efforts were made to prohibit
"The momentum of the arms race would
through international understandings and by
clearly decrease if the production of these
legal means the use of chemical weapons. The
weapons were effectively and unconditionally
Brussels Declaration of 1874 and the Hague
banned. Their use, which could cause an
Conventions of 1899 and 1907 prohibited the
enormous loss of human life, has already
use of poisons and poisoned bullets and a
been condemned and prohibited by inter-
national agreements, in. particular the
separate declaration of the Hague Conven-
tion of 1899 condemned "the use of projec-
Geneva Protocol of 1925, and, more recently,
tiles the sole object of which is the diffusion
in resolutions or the General Assembly of
of asphyxiating or deleterious gases".
means of warfare; the probable effects of the United Nations. The prospects for gener
chemical and bacteriological (biological) and complete disarmament under effective 3. The fear today is that the scientific and
weapons on military and civil personnel, both international control, and hence for peace technological advances of the past few
protected and unprotected; the environ- throughout the world, would brighten. sig- decades have increased the potential of
mental factors affecting the employment of nificantly if the development, production chemical and bacteriological (biological)
chemical and bacteriological (biological) and stockpiling of chemcial and bacterio- weapons to such an extent that one can con-
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TE August ii, i99
ce ve of
their use catviing casualties on a
scale greater than one Would associate with
conventional warfare. At the moment most
of our knowledge confierning the use of
chemical weapons Is band upon the wiper-
ience of World Wax I. Gas was first used in
1914 and the first big attack in 1915 claimed
5,000 human lives. It is eatimated that from
then until the end of the War in 1918, at least
125,000 tons of toxic chemicals were used,
and according to official reports gas casual-
ties numbered about 000,000, of which
about 100,000 were fate/. The agents which
were used in this war ante much less toxic
than those, in particular nerve agents, which
could be used today, and they were dispersed
by means of relatively primitive equipment
as compared with what is now available, and
In accordance with battletield concepts of a
relatively unsophisticated kind.
4. It is true that a conelderable effort has
also been made to develop chemical agents
which have as their pure not to kill but
to reduce a mares capadity to fight. Such
agents are used by civir authorities of a
number of countries in eater to suppress dis-
orders and to control riots, but when used in
warfare they would inevitably be employed
as an adjunct to other forms of attack, and
their over-all effect might be lethal.
5. Since World War II. bacteriological
(biological) weapons hales also become an
increasing possibility. But because there is
no clear evidence that these agents have
ever been used as modern military weapons,
discussions of their characteristics and po-
tential threat have to draw heavily upon
experimental field and laboratory data, and:
on studies of naturally occurring outbreaks
and epidemics of infectious disease, rather
than on direct battlefield experience. Their
potential importance in warfare can be
sensed when one remembers that infectiouti
disease even as late as World War II caused
numerous casualties.
6. The greater threat posed by chemical
weapons today derives from the discovery and
manufacture of new, more toxic compounds.
On the other hand, bacteriological (bio-
logical) agents already exist in nature and
can be selected for use in warfare. Some of
these agents, notably bacteria, have been
known for several decades, but there Is a
vast number of other possible agents, es-
pecially viruses, which have been discovered
only recently, and some of these also possess
characteristics which make their use pos-
sible in war. Increases in potency of these
various types of agent have been made pos-
sible by scientific and technological advances
in microbial genetics, experimental pathology
and aerobiology.
7. As is well known, the use of toxic gases
in World War I generated so powerful a
sense of outrage that countries were en-
couraged to adopt measures prohibiting both
chemical and bacteriological (biological)
weapons. The result was the fieneva Protocol
of 17 June 1925, which prohibits the use in
war of asphyxiating, poisonoW or other gases
and of all analogous liquids, materials or de-
vices, as well as bacteriological methods of
warfare. This established a custom and hence
a standard of international law, and in
practice most States have adhered to the
principle that no one should resort to the
use of such weapons. But despite the adhor-
rence in which they have always been held
by civilized peoples, chemical weapons have
none the less on occasion been used. For ex-
ample, mustard gas was used in Ethiopia in
1935-36, causing numerous casualties
amongst troops and a civilian population
which was not only completely unprotected,
but which lacked even the itest elementary
medical services. It should also be noted that
the existence of the Geneva Protocol of 1925
may have helped as a deterrent to the use
of chemical or bacteriological (biological)
weapons in World War II, even though the
belligerents in that conflict had developed,
produced and stockpiled chemical agents for
possible use. The International Tribunal at
Nuremberg brought into the open the fact
that amongst the new agents which had been
produced and stockpiled during the course
of the war were such highly lethal agents as
Tabun and Sarin. Since then the validity and
effectiveness of the Geneva Protocol have
been reinforced by the approval, by the
General Assembly of the United Nations,
Without a single dissenting voice, of resolu-
tions 2162 B (XXI) of 5 December 1966 and
2454 A (xxin) of 20 December 1968, calling
for "strict observance by all States of the
principles and objectives" of the Geneva
Protocol, and inviting all States to accede
to it.
8. It is simple to appreciate the resurgence
of interest in the problems of chemical and
bacteriological (biological) warfare. Ad-
vances in chemical and biological science,
while contributing to the good of mankind,
have also opened up the possibility of ex-
ploiting th
cal and bacterio-
logical (biological) warfare weapons, some
of which could endanger man's future, and
the situation will remain threatening so long
as a number of States proceed with their
development, perfection, production and
stockpiling.
9. The report, as is noted in the General
Assembly resolution, is designed to submit
to peoples and governments, Ma form easily
understood by them, information on the ef-
pfeerotigileornsf connected possible
bacteriologicse ec(bteiod eflogiuscale) of
ai eeapthonsmai,ncasald re
as to promote a further consideration of
bac-
teriological (biological) weapons. Informa-
tion about the nature of chemical and bac-
teriological (biological) weapons, about their
increase and diversification as technology
has advanced, about their long-term effects
on human beings, animals and vegetation,
and about environmental factors which con-
dition these effects, is provided in Chapters
I to IV of the Report, In Chapter V. which
deals with the economic and security im-
plications of chemical and bacteriological
(biological) warfare, the experts have in-
terpreted the worst "security" to mean both
security in the narrow military sense, and
security in terms of the adverse and long-
term effects which these weapons, given they
were ever used, could have on the framework
of civilized existence.
10. As the present report shows, the out-
standing characteristics of this class of
weapons, and particularly of bacteriological
(biological) weapons, is the variability,
amounting under some circumstances to un-
predictability, of their effects. Depending on
environmental and meteorological condi-
tions, and depending on the particular agent
used, the effects might be devastating or
negligible. They could be localized or svide-
ipread. They might bear not only on those
attacked but also on the side Which initi-
ated their use, whether or not the attacked
military forces retaliated in kind. Civilians
would be even more vulnerable than the
military. The development, acquisition and
deployment of chemical and bacteriological
(biological) weapons--quite apart from ques-
tions of protection--constitutes a real eco-
nomic burden which varies in extent for dif-
ferent countries. Above all their acquisition
could not possibly obviate the need for other
weapons,
11. As chapters I and V of the report in-
dicate, it would be enormously costly in re-
sources, and administratively all but iinpos-
Bible, to organize adequate protection for a
civilian population against the range of pos-
sible chemical agents. Even military person-
nel, if locally engaged in a particular oper-
ation in which chemical and/or bacteriologi-
dal (biological) weapons were used and
where they had the advantage of protective
measures, would be unlikely to escape the
wider-spread and longer-term effects on their
country at large. These might arise, for ex
ample, from the ampractleability of protect
lug soil, plants, animals and essential focal
crops against short and long-term effects
12, To appreciate the risks which bacterio-
logical (biological) warfare could entail, one
has only to remember how a natural epi-
demic may persist unpredictably, and spread
far beyond the initial area of incidence, even
when the Most up-to-date medical resources
are used to suppress the outbreak. The
difficulties would be considerably increased
were deliberate efforts made, foe military
reasons, to propagate pathogenic organisms.
Mass disease, following an attack, especially
of civilian populations, could be expected
not only because of the lack of timely warn-
ing of the danger, but also because effective
measures of protection or treatment simply
do not exist or cannot be provided on an
adequate scale.
13. Once the doer was opened to this kind
of warfare, escalation would in all likelihood
occur and no one could say where the process
would end. Thus the report concludes that
the existence of chemical and bacteriological
(biological) weapons not only cantdbutes to
international tension, but that their further
development spurs the Rams race without
contributing to the security of any nation.
14. The present report will, in accordance
with resolution 2454 A (XXIII), be sub-
mitted to the Eighteen-Nstion Committee on
Disarmament to the Security Connell and
to the General Assembly at its twenty-
fourth session. We hope that it will con-
tribute to the implementation of measures
Which, in the final analysis, will eliminate
chemical and bacteriological (biological)
weapons from all military arsenals.
CHAPTER /. THE BASIC CHARAOIERLSTICS OP
CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL)
MEANS OF WARFARE
15. Since World War I, When chemical war-
fare was first resorted to on a lerge scale,
the variety and potency of chemical and bac-
teriological (biological) weapons has grown
steadily, and there has been a corresponding
increase in the capacity to deliver them to a
target area. The particular threat posed by
chemical weapons today- derives from the
existence of new, and far more toxic, chem-
ical compounds than were known fifty years
ago. Since bacteriological /biological) agents
exist naturally, their increased potency as
weapons has resulted from a process of se-
lection rattier than from the production of
entirely new agents. As Is explained in later
sections of this report, selection has been
made possible by advances in our knowledge
of the genetics of microbes, and through ad-
vances in experimental aerobiology.
16. The most significant result of these
technical developments is the great variety
of %injurious effect which these agents can
induce, and the consequent increase in the
number and types of situation in which
ere might be a temptatoia to use them for
military purposes.
A. Characteristics of chemical and bacterio-
logical (biological) weapons
17. For the purposes of this reports chem-
ical agents of warfare are taken to be chem-
ical substances, whether gaseous, liquid, or
solid, which might be employed because of
their direct toxic effects on man, animals and
plants. Bacteriological (biological) agents of
warfare are living organisms, whatever their
nature, or infective material derived from
them, which are intended to cause disease or
death in man, animals or plants, and which
depend for their effects on their ability to
multiply in the person, animal or plant
attacked.
18. Various living organisms (e.g. rick-
ettsia,e, viruses and fungi), as well as bac-
teria, can be used asi weapons. In the con-
tent of warfare all these are generally recog-
nized as "bacteriological weapone". But in
order to eliminate any poasible ambiguity,
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the phrase "bacteriological (biological)
weapons" has been used throughout to com-
prehend all forms of biological warfare.
19. All biological processes depend upon
chemical or physico-chemical reactions, and
what may be regarded today as a biological
agent could, tomorrow, as knowledge ad-
vances, be treated as chemical. Because they
themselves do not multiply, toxins, which are
produced by living organisms, are treated in
this report as chemical substances. We also
recognize there is a dividing line between
chemical agents of warfare in the sense we
use the terms, and incendiary substances
such as napalm and smoke, which exercise
their effects through fire, temporary depriva-
tion of air or reduced visibility. We regard
the latter as weapons which are better classi-
fied with high explosives than with the sub-
stances with which we are concerned. They
are therefore not dealt with further in this
report.
20. Finally, we recognize that both chemi-
cal and bacteriological (biological) agents
are designated either as lethal agents, that
is to say, agents which are intended to kill,
or as incapacitating agents, that is to say,
agents which are intended to cause dis-
ability. These terms are not absolute, but im-
ply statistical probabilities of response which
are more uncertain with bacteriological
(biological) than with chemical agents. Not
all individuals will die from an attack with
a given lethal agent, whereas some, for
example infants and people weakened by
malnutrition, disease or old age, as well as
a high proportion of individuals in special
circumstances, for example following irradi-
ation, might succumb to an attack with
incapacitating chemical or bacteriological
(biological) agents. With a few chemical
agents, notably some tear gases (lachry-
mators) , there is a negligible probability of
any fatal outcome, and these have been used
by many Governments to quell riots and
civil disorders. When used in this way they
are called riot control agents. Lachrymators
have also been widely used in warfare as
harassing agents, in order to enhance the
effectiveness of conventioxial weapons, or to
facilitate the capture of enemy personnel.
1. Differences Between Chemical and
Bacteriological (Biological) Warfare
21. Although there are some similarities
between chemical and bacteriological (bio-
logical) agents regarded as weapons of war,
they differ in certain important respects.
These differences are related to (1) potential
toxicity; (2) speed of action; (3) duration of
effect; (4) specificity; (5) controllability;
and (6) residual effects.
Potential toxicity
22. Although more toxic than most well-
known industrial chemicals, chemical war-
fare agents are far less potent on a weight-
for-weight basis than are bacteriological
(biological) agents. The dose of a chemical
agent required to produce untoward effects
in man is measured in milligrams (1/1,000
of a gram), except ,for toxins which may be
in the microgram (1/1,000 of a milligram)
range. The corresponding dose for bacteri-
ological (biological) agents is in the picogram
(1/1,000,000 of a microgram) range.
23. This difference reflects the fact that
bacteriological (biological) agents, being
alive, can multiply, and its significance is
that, weight-for-weight, bacteriological (bio-
logical) weapons could be expected to inflict
casualties over very much more extensive
areas than could chemical weapons.
24. Being living organisms, bacteriological
(biological) agents are also very much more
susceptible to sunlight, temperature, and
other environmental factors than are chem-
ical agents. A bacteriological (biological)
agent disseminated into a given environment
may retain its viability (ability to live and
multiply) while losing its virulence (ability
to produce disease and injury).
Speed of action
25. As a class, chemical agents produce
their injurious effects in man, animals or
plants more rapidly than do bacteriological
(biological) agents. The time between ex-
posure and significant effect may be minutes,
or even seconds, for highly toxic gases or ir-
ritating vapours. Blister agents take a few
hours to produce injury. Most chemicals used
against crops elicit no noticeable effect until
a few days have elapsed. On the other hand,
a, bacteriological (biological) agent must
multiply in the body of the victim before
disease (or injury) supervenes; this is the
familiar "incubation period" of a disease, the
time which elapses between exposure to in-
fection and the appearance of symptoms of
illness. This period is rarely as short as one
or two days, and may be as long as a few
weeks or even longer. For both chemical and
bacteriological (biological) agents the speed
of , action is affected by the dose (i.e., the
quantity absorbed) but this secondary fac-
tor does not obscure the basic difference be-
tween the two classes of agents in the time
they take to manifest their effects.
Duration of effect
26. The effects of most chemical agents
which do not kill quickly do not last long,
except in the case of some agents such as
phosgene and mustard, where they might
continue for some weeks, months or longer.
On the other hand, bacteriological (biologi-
cal) agents which are not quickly lethal
cause illness lasting days or even weeks and
on occasion involve periods of prolonged con-
valescence. The effects of agents which act
against plants and trees would last for weeks
or months and, depending on the agent and
the species of vegetation attacked, could re-
sult in death.
Specificity
27. While both classes of agents can be
used to attack men, animals or plants, indi-
vidual biological agents have in general a
much greater degree of host specificity. In-
fluenza, for example, is essentially a disease
of man; foot-and-mouth disease mainly af-
fects cloven-hoofed animals; and rice blast
is a disease confined to rice only. On the
other hand, some diseases (for example, bru-
cellosis and anthrax) occur both in man and
animals. However, chemical agents are much
less specific: nerve agents can affect mam-
mals, birds and invertebrates (e.g., insects).
Controllability
28. By controllability is meant the ability
to predict the extent and nature of the dam-
age which chemical and bacteriological (bi-
ological) agents can cause. This is a most
important consideration in their use as
weapons. The most likely means of deliver-
ing chemical and bacteriological (biologi-
cal) agents is by discharge into the atmos-
phere, relying on turbulent diffusion and
wind currents to dilute and spread the agent
over the area being attacked. Control is thus
possible only to the extent that the meteor-
ological situation can be predicted.
29. Because they infect living organisms,
some bacteriological (biological) agents can
be carried by- travellers, migratory birds, or
animals, to localities far from the area orig-
inally attacked.
30. The possibility of this kind of spread
does not apply to chemical agents. But con-
trol of contamination by persistent chemical
agents could be very difficult. Should large
quantities of chemical agents penetrate the
soil and reach underground waters, or should
they contaminate reservoirs, they might
spread hundreds of kilometres from the area
of attack, affecting people remote from the
zone of military operations. Although we
know of no comparable substance likely to
be used as a chemical warfare agent, the
spread of DDT over the globe illustrates, in
an extreme form, how man-made chemicals
can spread. This chemical insecticide is now
found in the tissues of creatures in all parts
of the world, even in places in which it has
never been used. For example, as a result of
its transfer through food chains, it is even
found in the tissues of the penguins which
live in Antarctica.
Residual effects
31. In circumstances which favour their
persistence, herbicides, defoliants and per-
haps some other chemical agents, might
linger for months, stunting the growth of
surviving or subsequent plant life, and even
changing the floral pattern through selec-
tion. Following repeated use, certain chemi-
cal agents could even influence soil struc-
ture. The risk of residual effects with some
bacteriological (biological) agents is poten-
tially greater, mainly because they could
lead to disease, which might become epi-
demic if man-to-man transmission occurred
readily. Bacteriological (biological) agents
might also find unintended hosts in the ani-
mals and plants of an area, or be trans-
ported by infected individuals over great
distances to new environments.
2. Technology of Chemical and Bacteriologi-
cal (Biological) Warfare
32. The technological problems associated
with chemical and bacteriological (biological)
warfare are of two kinds; (1) those associ-
ated with the production of the agents and
the weapons needed for their dissemination
and (2) those which concern the provision of
the protective equipment and defenses nec-
essary to protect military forces and civilian
populations. Any nation whose chemical,
pharmaceutical and fermentation indvstries
are well advanced could produce chemical
and bacteriological (biological) agents on a
scale commensurate with its other military
capabilities. The assurance of safety in the
production of bacteriological (biological)
agents, problems associated with the syn-
thesis of complex chemical agents, and decid-
ing on the best weapons to disseminate them,
are examples of some of the relevant tech-
nological difficulties. A special problem asso-
ciated with the development and main-
tenance of an offensive capability in bac-
teriological (biological) warfare relates to the
fact that some agents are viable for only a
short time (a few days) after manufacture.
This period can be extended by refrigeration
of the agent or by freeze-drying it before
storage. The drying processes, however, are
very complex and difficult where large quanti-
ties of highly pathogenic agents are involved.
The problems which relate to defence are far
more difficult, for as with most weapons, ef-
fective defence calls for much more stringent
training, and demands far more manpower
and monetary resources than does the of-
fence. For example, alarm systems against
chemical attack are very complex electro-
mechanical devices whose production de-
mands a highly technologically based indus-
try. They cannot be maintained except by ex-
pert and highly trained personnel.
3. Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological)
Weapons Systems
33. The use in warfare, and the possible
military effectiveness, of chemical and bac-
teriological (biological) agents cannot be ap-
preciated if they are thought of simply as
poisons and plagues. They need to be con-
sidered in the context of the weapon systems
of which they would be part.
34. A weapon system comprises all the
equipment and personnel, as well as the or-
ganizational structure? required to maintain
and operate a military device. By itself, for
example, a cannon is not a weapon system.
Only when it is integrated into an artillery
battery, together with trained crew, ammuni-
tion, vehicles, supplies, spare parts, firing
table, forward observer, communications and
command organization does it constitute a
weapon system. Correspondingly, artillery
shells filled with mustard gas or nerve agents
and guns to fire them, or an aircraft with a
spray tank filled with a bacteriological (bio-
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S 9530 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE August 11, 1969
logical) agent, are not by themselves weapon
systems.
35. Many complex technological problems
have to be overcome in transforming a chem-
ical or bacteriological (biological) "agent"
into a "weapon system". A "weapon" is of
little military value if it is not dependable
and if it cannot be delivered to a target with
certainty. This means that In the develop-
ment of a chemical and bacteriological (bio-
logical) weapon system it is not only neces-
sary to consider matters such as mass pro-
duction, storage, transportation, and means
of delivery, but also the limitations on use
set by terrain and weather prediction.
36. In addition, considerations affecting
defense need to be taken into account. Masks,
protective clothing, detection alarms, spe-
cial medical supplies, augmented logistic
facilities and, above all, thoroughly trained
military and civilian personnel. are necessary
parts of chemical and bacteriological (bio-
logical) weapon systems. The concept of a
fully developed chemical or bacteriological
(biological) weapon system is thus exceed-
ingly complex, and implies as much technical
capability and as high a degree of training as
does the operation of any other advanced
weapon systems. While chemical and bac-
teriological (biological) weapon systems are
cheaper and more readily attained than nu-
clear weapons, and while they may in some
circumstances be more effective militarily
than conventional weapons, they are highly
complex systems which for their development
and operation call for sizeable resources and
considerable expertise. But the possibility al-
ways exists that by choosing a single agent
and a simple means of delivery, a nation
could equip itself relatively cheaply to attack
a limited area with a reasonable chance of
success.
B. Concepts of the use of chemical and bac-
teriological (biological) weapons in war
1. Chemical Weapons
37. Chemical weapons could be used either
within the zone of contact of opposing
forces; or against military targets such as
airfields, barracks, supply depots, and rail
centres well behind the battle-area itself; or
against targets which have no immediate
connexion with military opera tions; for ex-
ample, centres of population, farmland, and
water supplies. The circumstances in which
they could be used within a zone of contact
are many anti varied?for example, to achieve
a rapid and surprise advantage against a
poorly trained, ill-equipped military force
which lacked chemical protective equip-
ment; to overcome troops tri dug-outs, fox-
holes, or fortifications where they would be
otherwise protected against fragmenting
weapons and high-explosive; to remove foli-
age, by means of chemical herbicides so as
to improve visibility and to open up lines of
fire, and to prevent ambush; to create bar-
riers of contaminated land on or in the rear
of the battlefield to impede or channel move-
ment; or to slow an enemy advance by forc-
ing them to use protective clothing and
equipment. Such equipment undoubtedly re-
stricts mobility and impedes normal activi-
ties. It is thus highly probable that once one
of two well-equipped sides had been at-
tacked with chemical weapons. it would re-
taliate in kind, in order to farce its opponent
to suffer the same penalties of restriction.
In all such operations civilians who had not
fled from the battle-area might become casu-
alties, as they also would if, while not in the
battle-zone, vapours or aerosols drifted to-
wards them with the wind, or if they strayed
at a latter date into areas contaminated
with a persistent agent. The risk of civilian
casualties would obviously be greater if
chemical attacks were made on military tar-
gets well in the rear of the zone of contact,
and would be very serious in- the case of at-
tacks on centres of population.
2. Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons
38. There is no military experience of the
use of bacteriological (biological) agents as
weapons or War and the feasibility of using
them as such has often been questioned. One
issue which has frequently been raised con-
cerns the validity of extrapolations made
from laboratory experience to military situa-
tions in the field. Some recent investigations
under field Conditions throw light on this
point.
39. In one field trial, zinc cadmium sul-
fide (a harmless powder) was disseminated
in particles two microns (one micron is
1/1,000,000 of a metre in. diameter, from a
ship traveling 16 kilometres offshore. About
200 kilograms were disseminated while the
ship travelled a distance of 260 kilometres
parallel to the coastline, The resulting aero-
sol traveled at least 750 kilometres, and cov-
ered an area of over 75,000 square kilometres.
40. This observation provides an indica-
tion of the size of area which might be cov-
ered by a windborne aerosol, but It does not
tell whether the bacteriological (biological)
agents which might be spread in an aerosol
would still retain the ability to produce dis-
ease. All bacteriological (biological) agents
lose their virulence or die progressively while
travelling in an aerosol and the distance of
effective travel of the cloud would depend
on the rate of decay of the particular agent
in the particular atmospheric conditions
prevailing.
41. Some idea of the relative size of areas
which can be covered by bacteriological (bio-
logical) and chemical aerosols can be gained
from this same experiment. Had the parti-
cles that were carried been a bacterial or
viral agent, they would not have caused cas-
ualties over as large an area as the one
covered, because of decay of the agent while
in the aerosol state. However, depending on
the organism and its degree of hardiness,
areas of 5,000 to 20,000 km2 could have been
effectively attacked, infecting a high propor-
tion of unprotected people in the area. If
the same means are applied to a hYpothetical
chemical attack using the most toxic chem-
ical nerve agent, then about 0.8 kg of agent
would have been released per km. The down-
wind hazard from this, in which some cas-
ualties might be expected, would not have
extended more than one kilometre, and prob-
ably less, unless meteorological conditions
were extremely favourable (see chapter III).
The area covered by such a chemical attack
might thus have been 50 to 150 km., as com-
pared with the 5,000 to 20,000 km2 for the
bacteriological (biological) attack.
42. For purposes of sabotage or covert
(secret, as in sabotage actions behind enemy
lines) operations, small aerosol generators
for bacteriological (biological) agents could
be built, for example, into fountain pens or
cigarette lighters. It is also possible to con-
ceive of the distribution of bacteriological
(biological) agents by hand to poison either
water supplies or ventilation systems, espe-
cially in a situation of breakdown of sani-
tary facilities due, say, to military mobiliza-
tion, or to a nuclear attack. In addition to
producing casualties, such an attack could
produce severe panic. If half a kilo of a
culture of Salmonella (a group of bacteria,
many species of which produce severe intes-
tinal infections, including gastro-enteritis,
food ("ptomaine") poisoning, paratyphoid
fever and typhoid fever) had been added to
a reservoir containing 5 million litres of
water, and complete mixing had occurred,
severe illness or disability would be suffered
by anyone drinking 1 decilitre (about 3
ounces) of untreated water.
43. The same degree of poisoning as would
be produced by half a kilo of Salmonella
culture could be achieved with 6 kilos of
botulinum toxin (see chapter II), 7 kilos of
staphylococcal enterotoxin (see chapter II),
or 50 kilos of V-nerve agent, or in the case of
common industrial chemicals, with five tons
of sodium fluoroacetate (used as a roden-
ticide) or ten tons of potassium cyanide.
C. Chemical and bacteriological (biological)
agents
Chemical Agents
44. Chemical agents are usually described
in terms of their physiological effects and are
characterized as foliates:
Agents affecting man and animals
Nerve agents are colourless, odourless,
tasteless chemicals, Of the -same family as
organophosphorus insecticides. They poison
the nervous system and disrupt vital body
functions. They constitute the most modern
war chemicals known; they kill quickly and
are more potent than are any other chemical
agents (except toxins).
Blister agents (vesivants) are oily liquids
which, in the main, burn and blister the
skin within hours after exposure. But they
also have general toxic effects. Mustard gas
is a good example. Blister agents caused more
casualties than any other chemical agent
used in World War I.
Choking agents are highly volatile liquids
which, when breathed as gases, irritate and
severely injure the lungs, causing death from
choking. They were introduced in World War
I and are of much lower potency than the
nerve agents.
Blood agents are also intended to enter
the body through the respiratory tract. They
produce death by interfering with the utili-
zation of oxygen by the tissues. They, too, are
much less toxic than nerve agents.
Toxins are biologically produced chemical
substances which are very highly toxic and
may act by ingestion or inhalation.
Tear and harassing gases are sensory irri-
tants which cause a temporary flow of tears,
irritation of the skin and respiratory tract,
and occasionally nausea and vomiting. They
have been widely used as riot control agents,
and also in war.
Psycho-chemicals are drug-like chemicals
intended to cause temporary mental disturb-
ances.
Agents affecting plants
Herbicides (defoliants) are agricultural
chemicals which poison or dessicate the
leaves of plants, causing them to lose their
leaves or die. The effectiveness of different
chemical warfare agents against man, ani-
mals and plants is shown in table I. The vari-
ous specific chemical agents are listed and
described in chapter 2.
Methods of delivery
45. Chemical munitions are designed to ful-
fill three objectives: (1) to provide a con-
tainer for the agent so that the agent/muni-
tion combination can be delivered to its
target; (2) to attain an effective distribution
of agent over the target area; and (3) to re-
lease the agent in active form. In the case of
Incapacitating and riot control agents, it is
necessary that the munition itself should
not cause injury or death, and that it should
not start fires. This is particularly important
for devices used in the control of riots.
46. The munitions to be used would depend
on the method of delivery, the shape and size
of the target area, and other variables.
Ground-to-ground munitions include gre-
nades, shells, rockets; and missile warheads;
air-to-ground munitions include large
bombs, dispensers, spray tanks, and rockets:
emplaced munitions Include generators and
mines.
47. Ground-to-ground munitions. Small
ground-to-ground munitions (grenades,
shells and small rockets) function much like
their conventional counterparts. Upon im-
pact in the target area, they would either ex-
plode or burn, and so expel the agent to form
a cloud which Would diffuse and drift down-
wind, resulting in an elongated elliptical area
within which casualties would occur, This
represents a paint source Of dissemination
(chapter II).
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TABLE 1.?CATEGORIES OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS
S 9531
Physical state at 2V C.
Persistency
Main state of aggregation
in target
Effective route of entry Effective against
Nerve agents
Blister agents
Choking agents
Blood agents
Toxins
Tear and harassing gases
Inca pacitants
Herbicides (defoliants) do
Liquid Low to high Vapour, aerosol, liquid Lungs, eyes, skin Man, animals.
Liquid, solid High do do Do.
Liquid Low Vapour do Do.
Liquid, vapors do do Lungs Do.
Solid do Aerosol, liquid Lungs, intestinal tract Do.
Liquid, solid do Vapor, aerosol Lungs, eyes On.
do do Aerosol, liquid Lung , skin Do.
Low to high do Foliage and roots Plants!.
I Some herbicides, particularly those containing organic arsenic are also toxic for man and animals. -
48. Small rockets would frequently be fired (c) be effective regardless of medical coun- to have any potential in bacteriological (bio-
in "ripples", and artillery shells in salvos, ter-measure; logical) warfare.
resulting in a group of impacts over the (d) be able to cause a large number of 65. Protozoa are one-celled microscopic
target area. This would constitute an area casualties (this would imply that any agent organisms which cause several important hu-
source of dissemination (chapter II). chosen would be highly infectious, but man diseases, including malaria. Because of
49. Large ground-to-ground (as well as whether the agent chosen would also be their complex life cycles, they too appear
aerial munitions and missile warheads) easily transmissible from man-to-man, would to have little significance in the present
might carry a number of small submunitions depend upon an intent to initiate an epi- context.
as well as agent in bulk. The parent muni,- demic spread). 66. Parastic worms such as hook-worm, and
tion, upon functioning, would disperse the Agents affecting man . the filarial worms have very complicated
submunitions over the target area. These life cycles. They cause illness and disability
59. All the diseases under consideration
would then disseminate the agent over a only after long exposure and repeated in-
occur naturally, and the causative organisms
wide area rather than a single point of im-
with few exceptions, are known to scientists ,
fection and would be extremely difficult to
pact, as in the case of bulk munitions.
throughout the world. Incapacitating agents
? produce in quantity, to store, to transport,
50. Another military concept is to use or disseminate in a weapon. Insects are also
are those which, in natural outbreaks, cause
large warheads filled with several hundred
illness lout rarely death. If the natural dis- difficult to conceive of as weapons. Some,
Such a warhead, burst at a suitable altitude ease has an applicable mortality, the agent
kilos of an agent of low vapour pressure.
would produce a shower of droplets, effec- is regarded as a lethal one. However, these
tively contaminating everything on which it agents when used as aerosol weapons might
fell. A number of such weapons could bb cause more severe disease than occurs nat-
used to assure that the target was covered. urally.
51. Air-to-ground munitions. Bombs 60. Different populations have varying de-
dropped from aircraft are larger than most grees of resistance to the diseases produced
shells, and consequently would result in a by bacteriological (biological) agents. An in-
higher concentration of the chemical near the fectious disease which might be only mildly
point of ground impact. Bombs bursting incapacitating in one population might prove
close to the ground could be used to achieve disastrous to another. For example, when
a wider dissemination of the agent, especially measles was first introduced into the Hawai-
with chemical agents. ian Islands, it caused far more deaths than
52. A dispenser is a container for submu- in the relatively resistant populations of
nitions, which, after opening, could remain Europe. A bacteriological (biological) weapon
attached to the aircraft. The submunitions which might be intended only to incapacitate
could be released simultaneously or in suc- could be highly lethal against a population
cession. where resistance had been lowered as a re-
53. Small rockets or missiles could also be sult of malnutrition. Conversely, a weapon
used to deliver chemical agents from aircraft. which was intended to spread a lethal disease
The pattern of dispersal would be much might only cause occasional mild illness in
the same as that produced by ground-to- people who had been given a protective vac-
ground rockets or missiles. eine or who had become immune as a result
54. Ground-smplaced munitions. Ground- of natural infection. The history of epi-
emplaced munitions comprise generators and demiology is rich with surprises.
mines. The generator is a tank containing 61. Viruses are the smallest forms of life.
a chemical agent, a source of pressure, and Most of them can be seen only with the
a nozzle through which the agent is forced. electron microscope, and must be grown
Generators would be placed upwind of the on living tissue (tissue cultures, fertile eggs,
target, and then activated by a suitable de- etc.) Genetic manipulation of the whole
vice, virus or chemical manipulation of its nu-
55. Chemical mines would be placed in dela acid, might be used to acquire strains
areas of anticipated enemy activity, and of higher virulence or greater stability to en-
such as the mosquito and the tick are trans-
mitters of disease, and as "vectors", have to
be looked upon as having potential military
significance. Higher forms of life, such as
rodents and reptiles can be dismissed in the
context of the present discussion.
Agents affecting animals
67. Bacteriological (biological) anti-animal
agents, such as foot-and-mouth disease and
anthrax would be used primarily to destroy
domestic animals, thereby indirectly affect-
ing man by reducing his food supply.
68. Outbreaks of contagious disease in
animal populations, knows as epizootics, may
spread much more readily than do epidemics
among human beings. Viral infections are
probably more serious for animals than those
caused by other classes of micro-organisms.
69. Most of the bacterial diseases of ani-
mals which could probably be used in war-
fare are also transmissible to man. Human
beings would be expected to get the disease
if they were affected by the attacking aerosol
cloud, and occasional individuals might con-
tract the disease from infected animals.
Agents affecting plants
70. The natural occurrence of devastating
plant diseases such as the blight of potatoes
in Ireland in 1845, the coffee rust of the
18708 in Ceylon, the chestnut blight of 1901
in the United States of America, and the
widespread outbreaks today of cereal (cape-
would be activated by pressure or trip wires, vironmental
cially wheat) rusts has suggested that plant
62. Rickettsiae are intermediate between pathogens might be used for military pur-
2. Bacteriological (Biological) Agents
the viruses and bacteria. Like the viruses, POSes. There are four major requirements for
56. Like chemical agents, bacteriological they grow only in living tissue. Judging by the deliberate development of a plant disease
(biological) agents may also be classified in the scientific literature, research into the into epidemic (epiphytotiC), proportions:
terms of their intended use, whether de- genetics of rickettsiae has been less intense large amounts of the host plant must be
signed to incapacitate or to kill human be- than into that of viruses and bacteria, present in the region; the agent should be
ings, to incapacitate or kill food and draft 63. Bacteria are larger than viruses, ran.?
?,._ capable of attacking the particular varieties
animals, or to destroy food plants and in- of host plant that are grown; adequate quan-
ing in size from 0.3 micron to several ml-
crops. crons. They can be easily grown on a large tities of the agent must be present; and the
57. Bacteria, viruses, fungi, and a group scale employing equipment and processes environmental conditions within the region
of microbes known as rickettsiae are by far similar to those used in the fermentation should be favorable for the spread of the
the most potent agents which could be in- industry, but special skills and experience disease. An epiphytotic cannot develop if
corporated into weapon systems. There is would be needed to grow them in quantity in any one of the above requirements is not
no assurance, however, that other living or-satisfied.
the particular state in which they readily
ganisms may not in the future become more cause disease. Although many pathogenic Methods of delivery
important as potential agents for warfare. (disease-producing) bacteria are susceptible 71. Bacteriological (biological) agents can,
The selection of agents for use in warfare to antibiotic drugs, antibiotic-resistant in principle, be loaded into the same type of
58. The number of bacteriological (biolog- strains occur naturally, and can be selected munitions as can chemical agents. Other
ical) agents which could potentially be used or obtained through the use of suitable than for covert or "special-purpose missions",
in warfare is far fewer than those Which methods of genetic manipulation. Similarly, bacteriological (biological) weapons, if de-
cause naturally-occurring disease. To be ef- it is possible to select strains with increased veloped for military purposes, would in all
fective for this purpose they should: resistance to inactivation by sunlight and probability be delivered by aircraft or by large
(a) be able to be produced in quantity; drying. ballistic missiles. Aircraft (including cruise
(b) be capable of ready dissemination in 64. Fungi also produce a number of die- missiles and drones) could drop a large
the face of adverse environmental factors; eases in man, but very few species appear number of bomblets from high altitude, or
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spray from a low altitude. Because a small
amount of agent will cover relatively large
areas, bombs would probably be small (1
kilo or less) and dispersed over as wide an
area as possible. They could be released from
clusters or from dispensers in the manner of
chemical weapons, but probably from a high-
er altitude.
72. An aircraft could establish a line of
agent which, as it traveled downwind, would
reach the ground as a vast elongated infec-
tive cloud (see chapter II). The effectiveness
of such a procedure would be highly depend-
ent on weather conditions, but the larger the
area, the larger the weather front involved,
the greater the chances that the predicted
results would be achieved. A small relative
error might, however, involve a country net
in the conflict.
73. It is conceivable that bacteriological
(biological) weapons, probably bomblets,
could be packaged in a laalltstic missile. The
bomblets could be released at a predeter-
mined altitude to burst atetound level. The
effect would be the same as rablet delivery
by aircraft except that it would be more
costly,
74. Unless transmitted by insects, bac-
teriological (biological) agents have little
power to penetrate the intact skin. Infections
through the respiratory tract by means of
aerosols is by far the most likely route which
could be used in warfare.
75. Many naturally-occurring diseases (e.g.
influenza, tuberculosis) are spread by the
aerosol route, and some of them, notably
influenza, can generate into large epidemics.
When an infected person sneezes, congas, or
even speaks, an aerosol is formed which
contains particles ranging widely in size. The
larger particles are usually of little impor-
tance because they fall to the ground. But
small particles (3 microns or less in diame-
ter) dry out rapidly in the air, and are the
most infectious. They may rarain suspended
in the atmosphere for a lot* time. Animal
experiments have shown that a great many
infectious agents (including ins ny which are
transmitted otherwise in nature) can be
transmitted to animals by aerosols of small
particle size. Laboratory accidents and ex-
periments on volunteers have confirmed the
effectiveness of the aerosol route of infec-
tion for man,
76. If bacteriological (biological) warfare
ever occurred, the aerosol technique would
thus be the one most likely to be used, sim-
ply because the respiratory tract is normal-
ly susceptible to infection by many micro-
organisms; because of the Wide target area
which could be covered in a single attack;
and because ordinary hygienic measures are
ineffective in preventing the airborne route
of attack. Since the particle size of an
aerosol is crucial to its ability to penetrate
into the lung (see chapter III for detailed dis-
cussion) , the method for aerosolizing a bac-
teriological (biological) agent would have
to be controllable so as to assure the dissemi-
nation of a large proportion of particles less
than 5 microns in diameter.
77. Aerosols of bacteriological (biological)
agents could be formed by three general
methods. Agents could be disseminated by
explosive means in much the same way as
chemical agents. However, the size of the
resulting particle is hard to control by this
method, and much of the agent may be de-
stroyed by the heat and shock of the ex-
ploding munition. Particles could also be
formed by using pressure to force a suspen-
sion of the organisms threugh a nozzle,
Particle size is determined by tae amount of
pressure, the size of the diselairge orifices,
the physical characteristics of the agent, and
atmospheric conditions. Size eon trol of solid
particles (dry form of agent) can be achieved
by "pre-sizing" before dissemination. Aerosol
particles could also be produced by a spray
by releasing the agent in liqUid suspension
into a high velocity air strewn. This principle
can be applied to spray devices for use on
high performance aircraft.
D. Defence of man against chemical and
bacteriological (biological) agents
78. A comprehensive defensive system
against attacks by chemical or bacteriological
(biological) agents would have to provide for
deteotion and warning, rapid identification
of agents, protectioti of the respiratory tract
and skin, decontamination, and medical
prophylaxis and treatment. Some aspects of
such a system could be dealt with by fairly
simple equipment. Others would necessitate
highly sophisticated apparatus. But the
Whole complex would necessitate a very effec-
tive organization manned by well-trained
personnel. While military units and small
groups of people could be equipped and
trained to protect themselves to a significant
extent, it would be impracticable for most (if
not all) countries to provide comprehensive
protection for their entire civil population.
1. Medical Protection
Chemical attacks
79. No general prophylactic treatment ex-
ists which could protect against chemical
attacks. Antidotes (atropine and oximes) to
nerve agents of value if administered within
half an hour before or within a very short
time after exposure. Atropine is itself toxic,
however, and might incapacitate unexposed
individuals given large doses. Skin can be
protected from the vapours of blister agents
by various ointments, but they are not ef-
fective against liquid contamination.
Bacteriological (biological) attacks
80. Vaccination is one of the most useful
means of protecting people from natural
infective disease, and the only useful means
available for prophylaxis against bacterio-
logical (biological) attacks. The protective
value of vaccines against small-pox, yellow
fever, diphtheria, and other diseases is fully
established, although the protection they
afford can be overcome if an immunized in-
dividual is exposed to a large dose of the
infectious agent concerned. It is probable,
however, that even those existing vaccines
which are effective in preventing natural in-
fectious diseases might afford only limited
protection against respiratory infection by
an agent disseminated into the air in large
amounts by a bacteriological (biological)
weapon. Moreover, whole populations could
not be vaccinated against all poSsible dis-
eases. The development, production, and
administration of so many vaccines would
be enormously expensive, and some vaccines
might produce undesirable or dangerous re-
actions in the recipients.
81. This picture is not significantly al-
tered by certain new developments in the
field of vaccination: e.g. the use of living
bacterial vaccines against tularemia, brucel-
losis and plague; or aerosol vaccination,
which is particularly relevant to vaccination
of large numbers of people. There have been
recent advances in the control of virus
diseases, but at present none of these is
practicable for the protection of large popu-
lations against bacteriological (biological)
warfare.
82. Prophylaxis against some diseases can
also be provided by the adrinnistration of
specific anti-sera from the blood of people
or animals previously innoculated with
micro-organisms, or -products derived from
them, to increase the anti-body levels (im-
munity) in their blood. Tetanus anti-toxin
is used in this manner, and until more ef-
fective methods replaced them, such anti-
sera were used for many diseases. It would,
however, be impossible to prepare specific
anti-sera against all possible bacteriological
(biological) agents and to make them avail-
able for large populations.
83. Other possibilities, for example the use
of therapeutic materials before symptoms
appear, are equally remote from practical
realization. They include immune serum,
gammaglobulin, or drugs such as antibiotics
or sulfonamide drugs. The use of gamma-
globulin to prevent, or mitigate the severity
of, disease may be useful for individuals
known to have been exposed. But since gam-
maglobulin is made by separation frem
human blood, stocks could never be avail-
able except for isolated eases. In theory,
chemoprophylaxis (the use of drugs and
antibiotics to prevent infection) might also
be useful in the short term for small groups
operating at especially high risk. But it would
only be prudent to assume that the bacteri-
ological (biological) agents which an enemy
might use would be those which were re-
sistant to such drugs.
2. Detection and Warning
84. The requirement is to detect a cloud
of a chemical or a bacteriological (biological)
agent in the air sufficiently quickly for
masks and protective clothing to be donned
before the attack can be effective. Usually
the objective would be to try and detect the
cloud upward of the target so that all those
downwind could be warned. There are also
requirements for the detection of ground
contairnanation with chemical agents and
for detection equipment to enable those
under attack to decide when it would be safe
to remove their protective equipment.
Chemical attacks
85. In World War I it was possible to rely
upon odour and colour as the primary means
of alerting personnel that a chemical a"6-
tack had been launched. The newer more
toxic chemical agents cannot be detected in
this way. On the other hand, presumptive
evidence that such weapons had been used
would none the less still be Of value as warn-
ing. Once an enemy had used chemical wea-
pons, each subsequent attack would neces-
sarily have to be presumed to be a possible
chemical attack, and protective measures
would have to be instituted immediately. In-
dividuals would have to mask not only in the
air attack in which spray was used, or when
there was smoke or mist from an unknown
source, or a suspicious smell, or when they
suffered unexpected symptoms such as a
runny nose, choking and tightness in the
chest, or disturbed vision, but whenever any
bombardment occurred. But because of the
uncertainty, it would be clearly desirable to
devise and provide a system of instruments
which can detect the presence of toxic chem
icals at concentrations below those having
psysiological effects, and which would give
timely and accurate warning of a chemical
attack. It would also be advantageous to have
test devices, collectors and analytical labora-
tory facilities in order to determine whether
the environment was safe, as well as to
identify accurately the specific chemical
agent used in an attack.
86. The first and essential component of a
defensive system would be an instrument
Which could detect low concentrations of a
chemical agent. However low the concentra-
tion, a person could inhale a toxic amount in
a short time because he breathes 10-20 litres
of air per minute. Since the human body can
eliminate or detoxify Very small amounts of
many toxic materials, there is no need to
consider very long periods of exposure?the
concern is with the exposures of only a fetv
hours. This is often referred to technically as
the Ot (concentration time) factor. Essen-
tial requirements of a method of detection
suitable for use by military or civil defence
personnel are that it be simple, specifie,
sensitive and reliable. Typical detector kits
contain sampling tubes and/or reagent but,
tons, papers, etc. After being exposed to par-
ticular chemical agents, these detectors
change colour or exhibit some other changes
easily observable without special insturraents.
Chemical detection kits could also be used
to decide when it Is safe to remove proteca
tire masks or other items of protective cloth-
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bag. Obviously, laboratories, whether mobile
or fixed, can perform more elaborate chem-
ical analyses than can detection kits.
87. Warning devices which have been de-
vised incorporate sensitive detectors that ac-
tuate an automatic alarm which alerts indi-
viduals to take protective action before a
harmful dose of agent is received. They are
of two trends: point sampling devices, which
sample the air at one location by means of
an air pump, and area scanning devices,
which probe a specific area for chemical
agents. The disadvantage of point source
alarms is that they must be placed upwind
of the area that has to be protected, and a
rather large number may be needed. If the
wind shifts, they have to be repositioned.
Successful area scanning alarms have not yet
been developed.
88. It must be recognized that in spite
of instrumental warning systems, personnel
near the point of dissemination of a chemical
agent might still not have sufficient time
to take protective action.
Bacteriological (biological) attacks
89. Unlike chemical weapons, bacteriologi-
cal (biological) weapons cannot readily be
distinguished from the biological "back-
ground" of the environment by specific chem-
ical or physical reactions, and much lower
aerosol concentrations of bacteriological (bi-
ological) agents are dangerous than of chem-
ical agents. The problem cal early detection
and warning is thus even more difficult than
for chemical weapons. A partial solution to
the problem has been achieved with certain
non-specific but very sensitive physical de-
vices such as particle-counters and protein
detectors (protein is a typical constituent of
micro-organisms). Presumptive evidence of
a bacteriological (biological) attack might
be obtained if there is an unusual deviation
from the normal pattern of material in the
air recorded by the instruments. The eleva-
tion of such a deviation, however, would
necessitate intensive and prolonged study of
the normal pattern in a given location. This
subject is discussed further in annex A.
3. Physical Protection
90. The primary objective is to establish
a physical barrier between the body and the
chemical and bacteriological (biological)
agents, and especially to protect the skin
and the respiratory tract. Without this no
warning system, however effective, has the
slightest value. Protection could be achieved
by using various types of individual protec-
tive equipment or by means of communal
shelters.
Individual protection
S 9533
casualties because of lack of training, fail- ferred to nutrient media, where sufficient
ure to keep the mask in good condition, growth may take place to permit identifica-
growth of beard, or ' because facial in- tion of some kinds of bacteria within fifteen
juries prevent a good fit, etc. The amount hours. Another method, the fluorescent anti-
of leakage that can be tolerated with bac- body technique, can be highly specific, and
terriological (biological) agents is much less is applicable to bacteria and some viruses. In
because of their greater potency. some cases, it allows of specific identification
9$. Since mustard gases and the nerve within a few hours. But despite all, these
agents of low or intermediate volatility can recent developments, laboratory identifica-
penerate the unbroken skin, even through tion of biological agents is still a complicated
normal clothing, the whole body surface must and unsatisfactory process.
be protected by some form of special cloth- 4.. Decontamination
ing, of which there are two kinds, one which Chemical agents
is impermeable to liquid agents, and the 98. Prolonged exposure to weather and
other which, though permeable to air and
moisture, has been treated so as to prevent sunlight reduces or eliminates the danger of
most chemical agents, which are slowly de-
chemical agents from getting through. Rub-
ber coated fabrics, made into protective suits, composed by humidity and rain. But one
could net rely on natural degradation to
constitute the first, while normal clothing,
eliminate the risk and, in general, it would
treated with chlorimides or absorbents, is an
be essential to resort to decontamination.
example of the second. In addition, some
This would reduce the hazard but it is a
form of impermeable cover, ground sheet or
cape, can be used to protect against gross time-consuming process and would greatly
liquid contamination. Feet and hands are haxnper military operations.
99. A wide range of chemicals could be
usually protected by special gloves, and
used as decontaminants, the choice depend-
either by boot covers or treated boots. ing on the particular agent which has to be
94. Together with a mask, protective cloth- neutralized, the type of surface that needs
ing, properly worn and in good condition, to be treated, the extent of contamination,
will afford excellent protection against known and the amount of time available. Decon-
chemical and bacteriological (biological)
taminants range from soap and detergent in
agents. The greatest degree of protection is water, to caustic soda, hypochlorite and var-
provided by the impermeable type but ,when lows organic solvents, and their successful
worn continuously it becomes very burden-
use calls for large numbers of people, a cop-
some because of heat stress, particularly in ions supply of water, and appropriate equip-
warm environments. Permeable clothing al- ions
lows somewhat greater activity, but even so,
100. Decontaminating solutions, powders,
physical activity is impaired. applicators and techniques have been de-
Collective or communal protection veloped for decontaminating skin, clothing,
95. Collective protection takes the form of personal equipment and water. These would
fixed or mobile shelters capable of accom- need to be used immediately after an at-
modating groups of people, and has been de- tack.
vised not only for civilians but also for ape- 101. Unless food has been stored in metal
cial groups of military personnel (e.g. corn- cans or other containers which were imper-
mend posts, field hospitals). Collective pro- meable to chemical agents, it would have to
tection is the most effective physical means be destroyed. Decontamination of complex
of protection against all forms of attack. equipment and vehicles is a difficult and
Sealing or insulating the shelter will provide ttme-oonsurning procedure. Special pres-
protection only for a limited time, because of suxized sprayers to disseminate powdered
lack of ventilation. Sealing plus a supply of and liquid decontaminants have been de-
oxygen and a means of eliminating carbon veloped for this purpose, as have paints or
dioxide is better, but once again the time of coatings to provide a smooth impermeable
occupancy is limited. The shelter could be surface to preclude the penetration of chem-
none the less safe even though surrounded ical agents.
by fire or high concentrations of carbon 102. Decontamination might even need to
monoxide. The best kind of shelter provides be extended to roads and selected areas. This
ventilation with filtered air to maintain a would involve the removal of contaminated
positive pressure relative to that outside. soil by bulldozing, or covering it with earth,
This positive internal pressure prevents the using explosives to spread a powdered de-
penetration of airborne agents, and permits contaminant over a wide area.
entry or exit of personnel and equipment Bacteriological (biological) agents
without contamination of the interior of the
shelter. Extended periods of occupancy are 103. Decontamination procedures for bio-
logical agents are similcr to those used for
possible. toxic chemical agents. Aeration and exposure
96. These principles of collective protection -to strong sunlight will destroy most micro-
as applicable to all enclosures arranged for organisms, as will also exposure to high tem-
human or animal occupancy. They have been peratures. Thoroughly cooking exposed food,
used to provide protection by: hastily con- and boiling water for at least fifteen minutes
structed or improvised field shelters, mobile will kill almost all relevant micro-organisms.
vans and armoured vehicles, and permanent Calcium hyprochlorite and chlorine can also
or fixed shelters designated for housing be used to purify water. Certain chemical
civilian or military personnel. compounds, such as formaldehyde, ethylene
97. Once a bacteriological (biological) at- oxide, calcium and sodium hypochlorites,
tack had been suspected or detected, it would sodium hydroxide and betapropiolactone, can
be necessary to identify the specific agents be used to decontaminate materials and
involved so that proper protective measures work areas. A hot, soapy shower is the best
could be taken and chemo-prophylaxis and way to decomtaminate human beings.
91. Protective masks are the first line of
defense against all chemical and bacteriolog-
ical (biological) agents. Although protective
masks differ in appearance and design, they
have certain features in common: a fitted
facepiece, made of an impermeable material
soft enough to achieve' an effective seal
against the face, and some means of holding
it in place, such as a head strap, and a filter
and absorption system, in canister or other
form, which will remove particulate (aero-
sol) agents by mechanical filtration. The
canister also contains activated charcoal,
sometimes impregnated to react with agents
in the vapour state, but which in any case
will absorb toxic vapours. Some masksare
made so as to permit the drinking of water treatment planned. Identification would also
while the individual is masked, or attempts help to predict the incubation period and
at resuscitation measures on casualties hence the time available for remedial meas-
without unmasking them. Civil defense urea to be taken. At present the only means
masks are often less elaborate versions of of identifying specific micro-organisms is by
the military mask. Gas proof protectors can normal laboratory procedures. Many routine
be provided for infants, laboratory methods of identification require
92. A protective mask, properly fitted and as long as two to five days, but some recent
in good working condition, will provide corn- developments have reduced this time appre-
plete respiratory protection against all known ciably. It is possible to collect the particles
chemical and bacteriological (biological) from large volumes of air and concentrate
agents. However, a Certalo percentage of them in a small amount of fluid. Bacteria can
masked personnel can be expected to become then be trapped on special filters and trans-
E. Protection of domestic animals and
plants against chemical and bacteriologi-
cal (biological) attacks
1. Chemical Attacks
104. The widespread protection of domes-
tic animals and plants from chemical at-
tack would be impracticable. Once a crop
had been attacked with herbicides there Is
no effective remedial action. The damage
could be made good only by a second plant-
ing of either the same or another crop,
depending on the season.
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2. Bacteriological Biological) Attacks
Animals
105. Animals or flocks could be protec
by collective shelters, although the cost
would be great and, in the absence of an
matic warning devices, it would be impose
ble to assure that the creatures would b
sheltered at the time of attack.
106. The ideal means of protection f
animals would be vaccination. Vaccines hay
been developed, and many are routinely pro
duced, for foot-and-mouth disease rinde
pest, anthrax, Rift Valley fever, hog cholera,
Newcastle disease and others. Vaccination of
animal herds by aerosols Is a promising area
of investigation.
Plants
107. The only hopeful approach would be
to breed disease resistant plants. This Is a
regular part of most national agricultural
programmes, and has as its object the in-
crease of crop yields. But unless the exact
identity of the bacteriological (biological)
agent which might be used were known well
in advance (possibly years), it would not be
feasible to apply this principle to provide
protection to crops against this kind of
attack.
108. Efforts devoted to spraying fungicides
and similar preparations to reduce loss after
attack do not appear to be economically
effective. In most cases the best procedure Is
to utilize available manpower and machines
In planting second crops.
ANNEX A : EARLY WARNING SY,A EMS FOR AIR-
BORNE BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) -AGENTS
An ideal automatic system for early warn-
ing against an attack with bacteriological
(biological) agents would comprise the fol-
lowing components:
(1) a device to collect large volumes of air
and concentrate the particulate matter ob-
tained, in a small volume of fluid or on a
small surface;
(2) a device to quantify and identify the
collected material;
(3) a mechanism to assess the results and
to initiate an alarm if necessary.
To collect and identify bacteriological
(biological) agents and to initiate an alarm
so that protective measures can be taken in
sufficient time to be,useful is extremely diffi-
cult This is so because, firstly, identification
of agents is generally time-consuming and,
secondly, large and fluctuating quantities of
bacterial and other organic materials exist
in the atmosphere at all times. Thus if
pathogens from a cloud released by an ag-
gressor were collected, the device would need,
not only to determine whether the quantity
collected was significantly above the normal
amounts that might occur, but also what the
agent was, or at least that- in the amount
collected, it vras highly dangerous to man.
At present, warning devices are available
which are sensitive but non-specific and
these, unfortunately, would give an unac-
ceptably high proportion of false alanne.
Others are being developed which attempt to
incorporate both rapid respOnse with high
specificity, but none to date thin the produc-
tion stage. Research on this bisportant prob-
lem is being continued and some of the ap-
proaches and techniques that are being used
in this study are listed below.
Classification of automated biodetection
approaches ?
General category: Physical.particle detec-
tion.
Suggested approach: magnification, light
scattering, volume displacement,
General category; key biochemical compo-
nents.
ted Suggested approach: antigen detection by
fluorescent labelling, dyes and staining, bio-
to- lumineecence and iluorescences, optical activ-
ity, pyrolysis products detection, ATP detec-
tion, proteins, nucleic acids, or others.
General category: Biological activity.
Suggested approach: Growth (increase in
or cell mass or numbers), CO. evolution, phos-
e phatase activity, substrate change (pH, Eh,
r 0. interchange), Pathogenic effects,,
-
? Adapted from Greene, WI'S. "Biodetect-
ing and Monitoring Instruments Open New
Doors for Environmental Understanding",
Environmental Science Technology, F'ebru-
ary 1968, pp. 104-112.
CHAPTER I/. THE PROBABLE EFFECTS OF CHEM-
ICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL)
WEAPONS ON MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PER-
SONNEL, BOTH PROTECTED AND 'UNPROTECTED
A. The effects of chemical agents on individ-
uals and populations
109. The effects of chemical warfare agents
on humans, animals and plants depend on
the toxic properties of the agent, the dose
absorbed, the rate of absorption and the
route by which the agent enters the orga-
nism. Toxic agents may enter the body
through the skin, the eyes, the lungs, or
through the gastro-Intestinal tract (as a re-
sult of eating contaminated food or drinking
contaminated liquids) .
110. For a given agent absorbed under the
same conditions, the effect will be propor-
tional to the dose absorbed. This is why It is
possible to define for each agent certain
characteristic doses, such as the dose which,
under given conditions, will on average
cause death In 50 per cent of the individuals
exposed (the 50 per cent lethal dose, or "LD
50"), or the dose which will cause 50 per
cent non-fatal casualties, or the dose which
will have no appreciable military effect.
These are expressed in milligrams of agent,
with reference to a healthy adult of average
weight. They may also be given In terms of
milligrams per kilogram of body weight.
111. For purposes of evaluation it is con-
venient to express the same idea somewhat
differently in the case of gases, vapours and
aerosols absorbed through the respiratory
passages. Here the absorbed dose depends
on the concentration of the agent in the
r, on the respiration rate of the subject,
and on the duration of the exposure, If, for
the sake of Illustration, it is assumed that
the average respiration rate for groups of in-
dividuals engaged in various activities re-
mains relatively constant, it follows that
the dose, and therefore the effect produced,
will be directly proportional to the product
of the concentration of the agent in the
air (C in milligrams/cubic metre) and the
exposure time (t in minutes). This is called
the dosage (or Ct factor), certain charac-
teristic values of which (for example the LD
TABLE I.?GENERAL CHARACTERISTI
Type
50) are used in particular situations for
quantitative estimates of the effects pro-
duced.
112. For toxic agents acting on or through
the skin, the dose absorbed by contact will
often be related to the "contamination rate,"
expressed in grams/square metre, which indi-
cates to what extent surfaces are contami-
natde by the liquid.
113. The consequences of an attack on a
population are a combination of the effects
on the individuals in it, with both the con-
centration of agent and the susceptibility of
individuals varying over the whole area ex-
posed to risk. Different individuals would
respond differently to an attack, and might
have different degrees of protection. Possible
long-term contamination of personnel from
chemical warfare agents persisting on the
ground and vegetation may add to the im-
mediate, direct effects.
314. Protective masks, protective clothing
and shelters and, to a certain extent, de-
contamination when applicable, give sub-
stantial protection against all chemical War-
fare agents. But, as already emphasized, the
mere possession of a means of protection by
no means constitutes an absolute safeguard
against contamination by poisons. Alarm
and detection equipment is important, soil-se-
times vital, because without It timely warn-
ing, which is essential to the proper use of
protective equipment, would be lacking.
Since protective measures are most effective
when performed by trained personnel works
ing effectively in units, military personnel
are more likely to be provided with adequate
protection than a civilian population. In any
event, the civilian population in most coun-
tries is simply- not provided with protection
against chemical warfare.
115. Several chemical warfare agents which
were known during World War I, and others
developed since, have been reported on in
the scientific literature. However, the effects
of the more lethal modern chemical weapons
have not been studied under conditions of
actual warfare. Furthermore, no complete
and systematic field Studies of the use of de-
foliants, herbicides and riot control agents
are available. The following descriptions of
the probable effects of chemical weapons,
based both upon evidence and on technical
judgment, must therefore be regarded as
somewhat conjectural.
1. Effects of Lethal Chemical Agents on
Individuals
116. Table 1 provides a classification of
the most important lethal chemical agents,
and notes some of their characteristics in
terms of the effects they produce. More de-
tails are given in annex A.
CS OF LETHAL CHEMICAL AGENTS
Mechanism Time for onset of effects
Examples
Nerve agent G Interferes with transmission
of nerve impulses.
Nerve agent V Interferes with transmission
of nerve impulses.
Blister agent Cell poison
Choking agent Damages lungs _
Blood agent Interferes with all respiration_
Toxin Neuromuscular paralysis
Very rapid by inhalation (a few Tabun, Sarin, Soman.
seco nds).
Very rapid by inhalation (a few VX.
seconds); Relatively rapid through
skin (a few minutes to a few hours).
Blistering delayed hours to days; Sulfur mustard.
eye effects more rapid. Nitrogen mustard.
Immediate to more than three hours___ Phosgene.
Rapid (a few seconds or minutes)_.. _ __ Hydrogen cyanide.
Variable (hours or days)__ Botulinum toxin.
117. Lethal chemical agents kill in rela-
tively small doses, and ate a rule the amount
that causes death Is only slightly greater
than that which causes incapacitation.
Death may occasionally be caused by high
doses of presumed incapacitating agents and,
conversely, minor effects could be caused by
low doses of lethal agents. Blister agents are
considered with the lethal agents, since a
small but significant fraction of the person-
nel attacked with such agents may die or
suffer serious injury.
Nerve agents
118. These lethal compounds are readily
absorbed through the lungs, eyes, skin and
inteatinal tract without producing local ir-
ritation, and they interfere with the action
of an enzyme (cholinesterase) essential te
the functioning of the nervous system. The
nerve-agerut casualty Who has been exposed
to a lethal dose will die of asphyxiation
Within a few minutes if he is not treated
swiftly by means of artificial respiration and
drugs each as atropine or =iamb. Otherwise
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recovery is generally rapid and complete. Oc-
casionally, it raay take several weeks, but
will be complete unless anoxia or convul-
sions at the time of exposure were so pro-
longed as to cause irreversible brain damage.
119. The route of entry of the agent into
the body has some influence on the appear-
ance of symptoms. Mute develop more
slowly when the agent is absorbed through
the skin than when it is inhaled. Low dosages
cause a running nose, contraction of the
pupil of the eye and difficulty in visual
accommodation. Constriction of the bronchi
causes a feeling of pressure in the chest. At
higher dosages, the Skeletal muscles are af-
fected-weakness, fibrillation, and eventually
paralysis of the respiratory muscles oc-
curring. Death is usually caused by respira-
tory failure, but heart failure may occur. It
is estimated that the most toxic nerve gases
may cause death at a dosage of about ten
mg min/m3.* Less toxic ones are lethal at
dosages of up to 400 mg min/m3.
Blister agents or vesicants A
120. Mustard is a typical blister agent
which, like other members of this class, also
has general toxic effects. Exposure to concen-
trations of a few mg/m 8 in the air for sev-
eral hours results at least in irritation and
reddening of the skin, and especially irri-
tation of the eyes, but may even lead to
temporary blindness. Exposure to higher con-
centrations in the air causes blisters and
swollen eyes. Severe effects of this kind also
occur when liquid falls on the skin or into
the eyes. Blistering with mustard is compar-
able to second degree burns. More severe
lesions, comparable to third degree burns,
may last for a couple of months. Blindness
may be caused, especially if liquid agent has
entered the eyes. Inhalation of vapour or
aerosol causes irritation and pain in the up-
per respiratory tract, and pneumonia may
supervene. High doses of blister agents cause
a general intoxication, similar to radiation
sickness, which may prove lethal.
121. The first step in treating a person who
has been exposed to a vesicant or blister
agent, is to wash it out of the eyes and de-
contaminate the skin. Mild lesions of the
eyes require little treatment. The blisters
are treated in the same way as any kind of
second-degree burn.
Other lethal agents
122. Phosgene and compounds with sim-
ilar physiological effects were used in World
War I. Death results from damage to the
lungs. The only treatment is inhalation of
oxygen and rest. Sedation is used sparingly.
123. Hydrogen cyanide in lethal doses
causes almost immediate death by inhibiting
cell respiration. Lower doses have little or no
effect.
124. Most of the so-called blood agents
contain cyanide, and all act rapidly. The
casualty would either die before therapy
could begin, or recover soon after breathing
fresh air.
125. Botulinum toxin is one of the most
powerful natural poisons known, and could
be used as a chemical warfare agent. There
are at least six distinct types, of which four
are known to be toxic to man. Formed by
the bacterium Clostridium botulinum, the
toxin is on occasion accidentlly transmitted
by contaminated food. The bacteria do not
grow or reproduce in the body, and poisoning
is due entirely to the toxin ingested, It is
possible that it could be introduced into the
body by inhalation.
126. Botulism is a highly fatal poisoning
characterized by general weakness, head-
ache, dizziness, double vision, dilation of the
pupils, paralysis of the muscles concerned
in swallowing, and difficulty of speech. Res-
piratory paralysis is the usual cause of death.
*A dosage of one mg min/m3 consists of an
exposure of one minute to gas at a concen-
tration of one milligram per cubic metre.
After consumption of contaminated food,
symptoms usually appear within twelve to
seventy-two hours. All persons are suscep-
tible to botulinum poisoning. The few who
recover from the disease develop an active
immunity of uncertain duration and degree.
Active immunization with botulinum toxoid
has been shown to have some protective
value, but antitoxin therapy is of limited
value, particularly where large doses of the
toxin have been consumed. Treatment is
mainly supportive.
2. Effects of Lethal Agents on Populations
127. As already indicated, the possible ef-
fects of an attack on populations with lethal
chemical warfare agents would depend upon
the agent used, upon the intensity of the
attack, whether the population was mainly
under cover or in the open, on the avail-
ability of protective facilities, on the physi-
ological state of the individuals affected, and
upon the meteorological conditions, which
might differ from what had been predicted,
and alter during the course of an attack.
128. The importance of meteorological con-
ditions on the spread of agent from its point
or area of release is illustrated by Figures
1(a), 1(b) and 1(c) which show in an ideal-
ized diagramatic form the type of dosage
contours to be expected from a point source,
from multiple sources and from a linear
aerial source respectively when exposed to
the effects of wind.
129. Figure 1 (a) shows the shape of the
zone travelled by the chemical cloud pro-
duced by a point source (for example, one
isolated munition), at the far left of the
innermost cigar-shaped figure under condi-
tions of a strong wind (say, 5-20 km/h) in
the direction indicated.
130. The number on each line indicates
the dosage (Ct = concentration times time)
on the line. The dosage at any point inside
the area delimited by the curve is greater
than the number indicated. On the basis
of these data, it is possible to estimate the
casualties when the characteristic dosages
of the agent used are known. For example, if
the LD 50 value of the agent were 30 milli-
gram-minutes/cubic metre, there would be
more than 50 per cent fatalities in the area
inside the contour marked 30.
131. This figure applies to a volatile agent
such as Sarin, which is usually released in
the form of a vapour or an aerosol cloud.
In the case of a non-volatile liquid released
in the form of droplets which fall onto the
ground and contaminate it, a corresponding
map could be drawn for the level of contam-
ination of the soil (expressed in milligrams/
square metre).
132. Figure 1 (b) shows the same phenome-
non in relation to an area source such as
would result, for example, from attack by
a missile warhead filled with small bombs
or by an artillery salvo.
133. In the case of a volatile agent released
in the form of a vapour or aerosol, the re-
sulting cloud, carried downwind, covers a
zone whose general shape is the same as in
the case of a point source (Figure 1 (a) ), but
its dimensions are obviously much larger and
the dosage values are also larger.
134. If a non-volatile agent were released
In the form of droplets, the hazard would be
very great in the impact area because all sur-
faces (skin, clothing, vehicles, equipment,
vegetation, etc.) would be contaminated. The
downwind hazard caused by the drift of the
most minute particles would extend over a
much smaller area than in the previous case
because only a relatively small number of
minute particles would be carried by the
wind.
135. Figure 1(c) shows the zone covered
by a linear aerial source, as in the case of
dissemination of a non-volatile agent from
an aircraft.
136. The emitted cloud is carried by the
wind and does not touch the ground until it
has travelled some distance away from the
line of flight of the disseminating aircraft;
this depends on the altitude of the aircraft
and on the wind velocity. Since the cloud has
already been subjected to the influence of
turbulent diffusion before reaching the
ground, the dosage values or contamination
rates will be highest some distance away from
the zone boundary nearer the source.
137. Because of meteorological and other
variables, it is impossbile to make general
statements about the quantitative effects of
chemical weapons on populations. The fol-
lowing hypothetical examples, therefore, are
intended merely to Illustrate what might
happen and the degree to which protective
measures could reduce casualties. To provide
representative illustrations, the examples
chosen include the different hazards created
by nerve agents used in a battle zone, on
military targets in the rear and on civilians -
in a town.
Effects of nerve gas on protected
troops in combat
138. A heavy attack with air-burst muni-
tions dispersing non-volatile liquid nerve
agent would create concentrations on the
the ground that could rage from one-tenth
of a gram to ten grams of liquid per square
metre, giving a mean value of about five
grams. This would be extremely hazardous.
At the same time, aerosol concentrations
would be created over almost the entire
impact area (dosages about twenty mg.
min/m3). This would produce casualties
even if there were no liquid hazard.
139. To counter this type of attack, pro-
tective measures of a very high order of
efficiency, including protective masks, light
protective clothing, means for decontamina-
tion, detection systems, antidotes and medi-
cal care, would have to be available. Pro-
tective clothing and rapid utilization of gas
masks would give a certain measure of
protection. But in this case, subsequent de-
contamination and medical care would be
necessary to avoid heavy lethal losses.
Effects of nerve gas on a military
target in the rear
140. An attack from the air with a volatile
nerve agent against a military installation
in a rear area would cause an intense liquid
and vapor hazard in the installation itself,
and a vapour hazard downwind in the sur-
rounding area. As suggested in figure 1(b),
the impact area would be very heavily con-
taminated; gas dosages inside and close to
the impact area would be very high. Further
downwind the gas concentration would de-
crease gradually, and finally become in-
nocuous. A general picture of the way cas-
ualties would occur in a downwind area is
indicated in figure I (a) .
141. After an attack in which tons of
Sarin were used against an area of one square
kilometre, the impact area and the area
immediately downwind from it would be
highly lethal to all unprotected personnel.
Lethal casualties would occur at dosages
above eighty mg. min/m3 and severe casual-
ties down to thirty mg. min/m3. Some very
light casualties would result at dosages
around five mg. min/m3. The distance be-
tween the impact area and the area of lowest
effective dosage would depend on the local
topography and on weather conditions, but
would rarely exceed a few tens of kilometres.
112. Personnel provided only with gas
masks, but not wearing them at the moment
of the attack, would suffer substantial losses
in and close to the impact area, both because
of the effects of the liquid and because of the
high gas concentration inhaled before they
could don their masks. Further downwind,
masks would give essentially complete pro-
tection if warning were provided reasonably
quickly.
Effects of a nerve gas attack on a town
143. The population density in a modern
City may be 5,000 people per square kilometre.
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A heavy surprise attack with non-volatile
nerve gas by bombs exploding on impact in a
wholely unprepared town wcadd, especially at
rush hours, cause heavy losses. Half of the
population might become cainzalties, hall of
them fatal, if about one ton of agent were
disseminated per square kileraetre.
144. If such a city were epared for at-
tack, and if the preparations Included a civil
defence organization with adequately equip-
ped shelters and protective Isn.sks for the
population, the losses might be reduced to
one half of those which would be anticipated
in conditions of total surprise.
145. Although it would be very difficult
to achieve, if there were a high level of pre-
paredness, comprising adequate warning and
effective civil defence procedures, it is con-
ceivable that most of the population would
be sheltered at the time of the attack, and
that very few would be in the streets.
146. Given a town with a total population
of 80,000, a surprise attack with nerve gas
could thus cause 40,000 casualties, half of
them fatal, whereas under ideal circum-
stances for the defence, fatalities might num-
ber no more than 2,000. It is inconceivable,
however, that the ideal woUld ever be at-
tained.
3. Effects of Incapacitating Chemical Agents
147. Incapacitating chemicels, like tear
gases and certain psychochemicals, produce
in normal health people a temporary, rever-
sible disability with few if any permanent ef-
fects. In your children, old people and those
with impaired health, the effects may some-
times be aggravated. They 'are called in-
capacitating because the ratio between the
lethal and incapacitating doses is very high.
The types which could have a possible mili-
tary use are limited by requirements of safe-
ty, controlled military effectiveness and eco-
nomic availability.
Tear and harassing gases
148. Many chemical compounds fall into
this category, of which a-chloaaeetophenene
(CN), ortho-chlorobenzylid :enemalononitrile
(CS), and adamsite (DM) are probably the
most important. They are sands when pure,
and are disseminated as aerosols. _
149. Either as vapour or in areosol, tear
and harassing gases rapidly produce irrita-
tion, smarting and tears. These symptoms
disappear quickly after exposure ceases. The
entire respiratory tract may also be irritated,
resulting in a running nose aria pain in the
nose and throat. More severe exposures can
produce a burning sensation in the trachea.
As a result, exposed persons experience dif-
ficulty in breathing, attacks of coughing and
occasionally, nausea and headaches.
150. Extremely high dosages of tear and
harassing gases can give rise to pulmonary
edema (fluid in the lungs). Deaths have been
reported in three cases afters extraordinary
exposure to sachloracetophenone (CN) in a
confined space.
151. The effects of adamsite (nM) - are more
persistent. Nausea is more severe and vomit-
ing may occur.
152. Results of experiments on various
species of animals (see annex B) and some
observations of human responses lead to the
following tentative conclusions First, CS IS
the most irritating of these gases followed
by adamsite (DM) and sachloracetophenone
(CN). Second, the tolerance limits (highest
concentration which a test subject can toler-
ate for one minute) of DM and CS are about
the same. Third, the least tax- lc of the tear
gases is CS, followed by Datt- and then Cia.
Fourth, human beings vary In their sensi-
tivity to, and tolerance of, tear and harass-
ing gases. And finally, the toxicity of these
gases varies in different animal species and
in different environmental conditions.
153. The symptoms caused by tear gases
disappear, as tears wash the agent from the
eyes, and if the victim gets Out of the tear
gas atmosphere. Some, however, cause red-
dening or rarely even blistering of the skin
when the weather is hot and wet.
Toxins
154. Staphylococcus toxin occurs naturally
in outbreaks of food poisoning?which is the
only medical experience with this toxin. The
symptoms have a sudden, sometimes violent,
onset, with severe nausea, vomiting and diar-
rhea. The time from ingestion of the toxin
to the onset of symptoms is usually two to
four hours, although it may be as short
as a half hour. Most people recover in 24-48
hours and death is rare. Treatment is sup-
portive and immunity, following an attack,
is short-lived. The toxin is resistant to freez-
ing, to boiling for thirty minutes, and to
concentrations of chlorine used in the treat-
ment of water. Staphylococcus toxin could
be. considered as an incapacitating chemical
warfare agent. Symptoms can be produced
in animals by intravenous injection, and
the toxin may also be active by the re-
spiratory route.
Psychochemicals
155. These substances have been suggested
for use in war as agents which could cause
temporary disability by disrupting normal
patterns of behavior. The idea cannot be
accepted in its simple form, since these sub-
stances may lead to more permanent changes,
particularly in individuals who are mentally
unbalanced or who are in the early stages
of a nervous and mental disease. Moreover,
very high doses, which would be difficult to
exclude during use in war, can cause ir-
reversible damage to the central nervous sys-
tem or even death. Psychochemicals could
also have particularly severe effects on
children.
156. Compounds such as LSD, mescaline,
psilocybin, and a series of benzilates which
cause mental disturbance?either stimula-
tion, depression or hallucination?could be
used as incapacitating agents. Mental dis-
turbance is, of course, a very complex phe-
nomenon, and the phychological state of
the person exposed to a psychochemical, as
well as the properties of the agent, would pro-
foundly influence its manifestations. But,
despite the variation in responses between
individuals, all those affected could neither
be expected to act rationally, nor to take
the initiative, nor make logical decisions.
157. Psychochemicals do more than cause
mental disturbance. For example, the general
symptoms from the benzilates are interfer-
ence with ordinary activity; dry, flushed
skin; irregular heartbeat; urinary retention;
constipation; slowing of mental and psy-
chical activity; headache, giddiness; disor-
ientation; hallucinations; drowsiness; occa-
sional maniacal behaviour; and increase in
body temperature. While these effects have
not been fully studied, there would be a
significant risk of affected individuals, par-
ticularly military personnel, becoming sec-
ondary casualties due to unco-ordinated be-
haviour. A single dose of 0.1 to 0.2 mg
L6D25 will produce profound mental dis-
turbance within half- an hour, the condi-
tion persisting for about ten hours. This dose
is about a thousandth of the lethal dose.
158. Treatment of the symptoms of pay-
chochemicals is mainly supportive. Perma-
nent psychotic effects may occur in a very
small proportion of individuals exposed to
LSD.
159. It is extremely difficult to predict the
effects which an attack with psychochemical
agents would produce in a large population.
Apart from the complication of the varying
reaction of exposed individuals, there could
be strange interactions within groups. A few
affected individuals might stimulate their
fellows to behave irrationally, in the same
way as unaffected persons might to some ex-
tent offset the reactions of those affected.
Since the probability of fatal casualties re-
sulting directly from exposure is low, some
normal group activity might be sustained.
Protective masks would probably provide
complete protection since practice/1y all po-
tential psychochemical agents, if used as of-
fensive weapons, would be dessiminated as
aerosis.
4. Other Effects of Chemical Agents
Effects on aniznals
160. The effects of lethal chemical agents
on higher animals are, in general, similar to
those on man. The nerve agents also kill
insects.
Effects on plants
161. A variety of chemicals kill plants, but
as already indicated, little is known about
their long-term effects. The effective dose
ranges of defoliants vary according to the
particular species of plant attacked, its age,
the meteorological conditions and the de-
sired effect: e.g., plant death or defoliation.
The duration of effect usually lasts weeks or
months. Some chemicals kill all plants indis-
criminately, while others are selective. Most
defoliants produce their effects within a feW
weeks, although a few species of plant are
so sensitive that defoliation would occur in
a period of days.
162. An application of defoliating herbi-
cide* of approximately 3 gallons (32 pounds)
per acre (roughly 36 kg per hectare) can
produce 65 per cent defoliation for six to nine
months in very densely forested areas, but in
some circumstances some species of trees
will die. Significantly lower doses suffice for
most agricultural and industrial uses
throughout the world. Defoliation is, of
course, a natural process?more common in
trees in temperate zones than in the tropics.
Essentially what defoliants do is trigger
defoliation prematurely.
163. Desiccation (the drying out) of leaves
results in some defoliation, although usually
the leaf-drop is delayed, and the plant would
not be killed without repeated application
of the chemical. Chemical desiccants cause a
rapid change in colour, usually within a few
hours.
B. The effects of bacteriological (biological)
agents on individuals and populations
164. Mankind has been spared any experi-
ence of modern bacteriological (biological)
warfare, so that any discussion of its pOssible
nature has to be based on extrapolation frosts
epidemiological knowledge and laboratory
experiment. The number of agents which
potentially could be used in warfare is limited
by the constraints detailed in chapter I. On
the other hand, the variability which char-
acterizes all living matter makes it conceiv-
able that the application of modern knowl-
edge of genetic processes and of selection
could remove some of these limitations. Some
species of micro-organisms consist of a num-
ber of strains characterized by different
degrees of virulence, antigenic constitution,
susceptibility to chemotherapeutic agents,
and so on. For example, strains of tularaemia
bacilli isolated in the TJnited States are gen-
erally much more virulent in human beings
than those found in Europe or Japan. Foot-
and-mouth disease virus is another well-
known example of an organism with various
degrees of virulence. The situation with
bacteriological (biological) weapons is thus
quite different from that of chemical weap-
ons, where the characteristics of a given com-
pound are more specific.
1. Effects on Individuals
165. Bacteriological (biological) agents
could be used with the intention of !tilling
people or of incapacitating them either for
a short or a long period. The agents, how-
ever, cannot be rigidly defined as either lethal
or incapacitating, sins* their effects are de-
*For example, the commonly used "2,4-Ds
and "2,4,5-T" which are the butyl esters of
(2,4-dichlorophenoxy) acetic acid and (2,4,5-
triohlorophenoxy) acetic act&
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August 11, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RE.CORD ? A
pendent upon many factors relating not only
to themselves but also to the individuals they
attack. Any disease-producing agent intended
to incapacitate may, under certain condi-
tions, bring about a fatal disease. Similarly,
attacks which might be intended to pro-
voke lethal effects might fail to do so. Exam-
ples of naturally occurring lethal disease are
shown in table 2 and representative incapac-
itating diseases in table 3. A detailed list
of possible agents, NVith a brief description of
their salient characteristics is given in an-
nex C.
166. A number of natural diseases of man
and domestic animals are caused by mixed
Infections (e.g., swine influenza, hog chol-
era). The possible use of two or more differ-
ent organisms in combination in bacterio-
logical (biological) warfare needs to be
treated seriously because the resulting dis-
eases might be aggravated or prolonged. In
some instances, however, two agents might
interfere with one another and reduce the
severity of the illness they might cause sepa-
rately.
167. The effects of some forms of bacterio-
logical (biological) warfare can be mitigated
by chemotherapeutic, chemoprophylactic
and immunization measures (for protec-
tion see chapter I and annex C of this chap-
ter). Specific chemotherapeutic measures are
effective against certain diseases, but not
against those caused by viruses. But it may
not always be possible to apply such meas-
ures, and they might not always be success-
ful. For example, with some diseases early
therapy with antibiotics is usually success-
ful, but relapses may occur. Moreover, re-
sistance against antibiotics may develop in
almost all groups of micro-organisms, and re-
sistant strains may retain full virulence for
man as well as for animals.
TABLE 2.?EXAMPLES OF AGENTS THAT MIGHT BE USED TO CAUSE DEATH
Agents
Diseases
Incubation
period
(days)
Effect of
specific
therapy
Likelihood of
spread from
man to man
Viruses
Rickettsiae
Bacteria
Eastern equine encephalitis__ 5 to 15 Nil
Tick-borne encephalitis 7 to 14 do
Yellow fever 3 to 6 do
Rocky Mountain spotted fever_ 3 to 10 Good
Epidemic typhus 6 to 15 do
Anthrax 1 to 5 Moderate
Cholera do Good
Plague, pneumonic 2 to 5 Moderate
Tularaemia 1 to 10 Good
Typhoid 7 to 21 do
NiI.I
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Low.
High.
Do.
Low.
High.
I Unless vector present.
TABLE 3.?EXAMPLES OF AGENTS THAT MIGHT BE USED TO CAUSE INCAPACITATION
Agents
Diseases
Incubation
period
(days)
Effect of
specific
therapy
Likelihood of
spread from
man to man
Viruses
Rickettsiae
Bacteria
Fungi Coccidioidomycosis
Chikungunya fever 2 to 6 Nil Nil.'
Dengue fever 5 to 8 do Do.
Venezuelan equine 2 to 5 do Do.
encephalitis.
Q-fever 10 to 21 Good Low.
Brucellosis 7 to 21 Moderate Nil.
7 to 21 Poor Do.
I Unless mosquito vector present.
Possible bacteriological (biological) agents
168. Victims of an attack by bacteriological
(biological) weapons would, in effect, have
contracted an infectious disease. The diseases
would probably be known, but their symp-
toms might be clinically modified. For ex-
ample, apart from the deliberate genetic
modification of the organism, the portals of
Infection might be different from the natural
routes, and the disease might be foreign to
the geographical area in which it was de-
liber6tely spread. Possible bacteriological
(biological) agents representing diseases
caused by the main groups of relevant micro-
organisms are:
169. Anthrax: Under natural conditions,
anthrax is a disease of animals, the main
source of infection for man being cattle and
sheep. Its vernacular synonym "wool sorter's
disease" indicates one way men used to con-
tract the disease. Depending on the mecha-
nism of transmission, a cutaneous (skin)
form (contact infection), an intestinal form
(alimentary infection), or pulmonary form
(airborne infection) may develop. The lung
or respiratory form is most severe, and un-
less early treatment with antibiotics is re-
sorted to, death ensues within two-three
days in nearly every case.
170. Antibiotic prophylaxis is possible, but
would have to be prolonged for weeks, since
it has been shown that monkeys exposed to
anthrax aerosol die if antibiotic treatment is
discontinued after ten days. In certain coun-
tries, several types of vaccines are employed,
but their value has not been fully evaluated.
of the illness, and can be significant for
proper diagnosis. Treatment presents great
difficulties.
174. Plague: Under natural conditions,
small rodents, from which the disease is
transmitted by fleas, are the main source of
human infection with plague. This is hoW
"bubonic" plague develops. If the plague
microbes are inhaled, pneumonic plague de-
velops after a three-to-five-day incubation
period. The patient suffers from severe gen-
eral symptoms and if untreated, normally
dies within two to three days. A patient with
pneumonic plague is extremely contagious
to contacts.
175. Preventive vaccination is moderately
effective against bubonic, but not pneu-
monic, plague. If administered early, strep-
tomycin treatment may be successful.
176. In a study of experimental pulmonary
plague in monkeys, it was found that an
average dose of only 100 bacteria caused fatal
disease in half the animals tested. Animal
experiments have also show that particles of
1 micrometre diameter (1.25,000 of an inch) ,
containing single microbial cells, can cause
primary pneumonia, with a rapid and fatal
outcome. If the aerosol is formed by larger
particles (5-10 micrometres diameter) micro-
bial cells are deposited in the nose and other
regions of the upper respiratory tract, and
primary foci of the disease develop in the
corresponding lymphatic nodes. A fatal gen-
eralized infection may then follow.
177. A large mass of plague bacteria could
be grown, and probably lyophilized (freeze-
dried) and kept in storage. The agent is
highly infectious by the aerosol route and
most populations are completely susceptible.
An effective vaccine against this type of dis-
ease is not known. Infection might also be
transmitted to urban and/or field rodents
and natural foci of plague may be treated.
178. Q-/ever: Under natural conditions, Q-
fever is a disease a animals, the main sources
of infection to man being sheep, goats and
cattle. The infection is transmitted most fre-
quently by the air route.
179. An incubation period of two to three
weeks follows the inhalation of the infectious
material. A severe attack of influenza-like ill-
ness follows, with high fever, malaise, joint
and muscle pains, which may be followed in
five to six days by pneumonia. In untreated
cases, the illness lasts two to three weeks;
the patient feels exhausted and is unable to
do normal work for everal weeks. But the
disease can be successfully treated with broad
spectrum antibiotics (tetracyclines). Prophy-
lactic vaccines have been prepared in some
countries, but have not yet been proved suit-
able for large-scale use.
180. The agent causing the disease is a
rickettsia, and is extremely infectious for
man. An epidemic of Q-fever once occurred
due to contaminated dust which was carried
by the wind from a rendering plant some ten
kilometers away. Q-fever is also a coinmon
and significant laboratory hazard, even
though it is only rarely transmitted from
man to man. The high susceptibility of hu-
mans to this agent has been demonstrated in
volunteers.
181. Q-fever rickettsiae are extraordinarily
resistant to environmental factors such as
temperature and humidity. Very large
amounts can be produced in embryonated
chicken eggs (20,000 million mirco-organisms
par millilitre) and can be stored for a lung
period of time. A Q-fever aerosol could pro-
duce an incapacitating effect in a large pro-
portion of the population of an attacked area.
The infective agent could persist in the en-
vironment for months and infect animals,
possibly creating atural foci of infection.
182. Tularaemia: Under natural conditions,
tularaemia is a disease of wild animals, the
source of human infection being rodents,
especially rabbits and hares. When it occurs
naturally in human beings, who are very
susceptible to the disease, skin lesions with
swelling of the lymph nodes are its usual
171. The anthrax bacillus forms very re-
sistant spores, which live for many years in
contaminated areas, and which constitute
the most dangerous risk the disease presents.
From epidemiological observations, the in-
halation, infectious dose for man is estimated
at 20,000 spores. Experiments on animals
show that anthrax can be combined with in-
fluenza infection or with some noxious
chemical agent, and that the susceptibility of
the animal to airborne anthrax infection is
then markedly enhanced.
172. With suitable expertise and equip-
ment large masses of anthrax bacilli can be
easily grown, and heavy concentrations of
resistant anthrax spore aerosols can be made.
Such aerosols could result in a high propor-
tion of deaths in a heavily exposed popula-
tion. Immunization could not be expected to
protect against a heavy aerosol attack. The
soil would remain contaminated for a very
long time, and so threaten live-stock farm-
ing.
173. Coccidioidomycosis: This disease,
which is also called desert fever, is caused
by a fungus found in the soil of deserts in
the United States, South America and the
USSR. The spores of the fungus are very
stable, and can easily be disseminated as an
aerosol. If they are inhaled, pneumonia with
fever, cough, ague and night-sweatinig, and
muscle pains follow after an incubation
period of one-three weeks. In most cases,
recovery from the disease occurs after some
weeks of illness. An allergic rash sometimes
breaks out during the first or second week
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manifestation (infection by contact with sick
and dead animals, or by way of ticks and
other vectors). Infection can also occur
through the eye and the gastro-intestinal
tract. The pulmonary form (airborne infec-
tion) is the more serious. Pulmonary tula-
raemia is associated with general pain, irri-
tant cough, general malaise, etc., but in
Europe and Japan mortality due to this form
of the disease was never higher than 1 per-
cent even before antibiotics became avail-
able. American tularaemia strains in the
other epidemics have been associated with a
mortality rate as high as 20 )ercent despite
antibiotic treatment. Usually treatment with
streptomycin or tetracycline is highly effec-
tive. A tularaemia vaccine developed in the
Soviet Union is also highly effactive.
183. The agent causing the disease is a
microbe which is very sensitive to common
disinfectants, but which is able to survive
for as long as a few weeks in contaminated
dust, water, etc.
184. Aerosols of tularaemia have been
tested on volunteers. The inhalation infec-
tious dose for man is about ten to twenty-
five microbes, and the incubation period five
days. By increasing the inhaled dose a hun-
dred times, the incubation period shortens
to two to three days. Owing to its easy aerosol
transmission, tularaemia has often infected
laboratory workers.
185. The microbiological characteristics are
similar to those of the plague bacillie (al-
though antibiotic treatment and vaccination
prophylaxis are effective). Both lethal and
incapacitating effects are to be expected. The
disease is not transferred front man to
man, but long-lasting natural foci might be
created.
186. Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus
(VEE): In nature, VEE ia an infection of
animals (equines, rodents, birds) transmitted
to man through mosquitos Which have fed on
infected animals.
187. The disease has sudden onset, with
headache, chills and fever, nausea and vomit-
ing, muscle and bone pains, with encephalitis
occurring ha a very small proportion of cases.
The mortality rate is very low and recovery
Is usually rapid after a week, with reSidual
weakness often persisting for three weeks.
No specific therapy is available. The vaccine
Is still in the experimental stage.
188. NUMerOUS laboratory Infections in hu-
mans have been reported, most of them air-
borne. In laboratory experiments, monkeys
were infected with aerosolized virus at rela-
tively low concentrations (about 1,000 guinea
pig infectious doses).
189. Since the virus can be produced in
large amounts in tissue culture or embryo-
nated eggs, and since airborne infection read-
ily occurs in laboratory workers, concentrated
aerosols could be expected to incapacitate a
very high percentage of the population ex-
posed. In some areas, persistent endemic in-
fection in wild animals would be established.
190. Yellow fever: In nature, yellow fever
is primarily a virus diseaat of monkeys,
transmitted to man by variety of mosquitos
(Aedes rtegypti, Aedes simpsoni, Hamagogus
species, etc.). After an incubation period of
three-six days, influenza-like aymptoras ap-
pear with high fever, restlessness and nausea.
Later the liver and the kidneys may be seri-
ously affected, with jaundice and diminished
urinary excretion supervening. The very se-
vere forms end in black vomitus and death.
In a non-immune population. mortality rates
for yelloW fever may be as high as 30-40 per
cent. There is no specific treatment, but pro-
phylactic vaccination, being highly effective
is widely used in yellow fever endemic areas.
2. Effects on Populations
191. Other than for sabotage, the use of
aerosol clouds of an agent is the most likely
form of attack in bacteriological (biological)
warfare. For example, material can be pro-
duced containing infective Micro-organisms
at a concentration of 10,000 million per gram.
Let us suppose that an aircraft were to spray
such material so as to produce an aeronsol
line source 100 kilometres in length across
a 10 kilometre per hour wind. Then, assum-
ing that 10 per cent of organisms survived
aerosolization, and that subsequent environ-
mental stresses caused them to die at a rate
of 5 per cent per minute, about 5,000 square
kilometres would be covered at a concentra-
tion such that 50 per cent of the unprotected
people in the area would have inhaled a dose
sufficient to infect them, assuming that the
infective dose is about 100 micro-organisms
per person, This particular calculation is
valid for agents such as those which cause
tularaemia, plague, as well as for some vir-
uses. The decay rate of the causative agents
of Q-fever, anthrax and some other infections
is much lower and the expected effect would
be still greater.
192. The effects of bacteriological (biologi-
cal) attacks would obviously vary according
to circumstances. Military personnel equip-
ped with adequate protective measures, well
trained In their use and provided with good
medical services could, if warned of an at-
tack, be able to protect themselves to a
considerable degree. But effective early warn-
ing and detection systems do not yet exist.
On the other hand, attacks on civil popula-
tions are likely to be covert and by surprise
and, at present no civilian populations are
protected. Unprotected military or civilian
personnel would be at complete risk, and
panic and irrational behaviour would com-
plicate the effects of the attack. The heavy
burden which would be imposed on the med-
ical services of the attacked region would
compound disorganization, and there would
be a major risk of the total disruption of
all administrative services.
193. In view of the extensive anti-person-
nel effects associated with agents of the
kind with which this report is concerned, it
is useful to view them against the area of
effect of a one-megaton nuclear explosion,
which as is well redognized, would be suffi-
cient to destroy utterly a town with a popu-
lation of a million. It should of course be
emphasized that direct comparisons of the
effects of different classes of weapons are,
at best, hypothetical exercises. From the
military point of view, effectiveness of a
weapon cannot be measured just in terms of
areas of devastation or numbers of casualties.
The final criterion will always be whether a
specific military objective can be achieVed
better with one than another set of weapons.
The basic hypotheses chosen for the com-
parison are rather artificial; and in particu-
lar, environmental factors are ignored. But
despite this limitation, table 4 gives data
that help to place chemical, bacteriological
(biological) and nuclear weapons in sorne
perspective as to size of target area, numbers
of casualties inflicted, and cost estimates for
development and production of each type of
weapon. The figures speak for themselves.
TABLE 4.?COMPARATIVE ESTIMATES OF DISABLING EFFECTS OF HYPOTHETICAL ATTACKS ON TOTALLY UNPROTECTED
POPULATIONS USING A NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, OR BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPON THAT COULD BE CARRIED
BY A SINGLE STRATEGIC BOMBER
Criterion for estimate
Type of weapon
Nuclear (1 megaton)
Chemical (15 tons of
nerve agent)
Bacteriological (biological)
(10 tons a)
Area affected Up to 300 km 2
Time delay before onset of Seconds -
effect.
Damage to structures Destruction over an area of
100 km.2
Other effects Radioactive contamination in an
area of 2,500 km.2 for 3-6
months.
Possibility of later normal 3-6 months after attack
use of affected area after
attack.
Maximum effect on man____ 90 percent deaths
Multiyear investment in $5,000-10,000 million
substantial research and
development production
capability.2
UP to 60 km2
Minutes
None
Contamination by persistence
of agent from a few days to
weeks.
Limited during period of con-
tamination.
50 percent deaths
$1,000-5,000 million
UP to 100,000 km I.
Days.
None.
Possible epidemic or estab-
lishment of new endemic foci
of disease.
After end of incubation period
or subsidence of epidemic.
50 percent morbidity; 25 percent
deaths If no medical
intervention.
$1,000-5,000 million.
It is assumed that mortality from the disease caused by the agent would be 50 percent if no medical treatment were available.
2 it is assumed that indicated cumulative investments in research and development and production plants have been made to
achieve a substantial independent capability. Individual weapons could be fabricated without making this total investment.
3. Effects on Animals
194. The way bacteriological (biological)
weapons might be used against stocks of
domestic animals would probably be the same
as that used in attacks against man. Rep-
resentative diseases and their characteris-
tics are shown in table 5.
195. Viral infections probably cause the
most important diseases of domestic animals
and could have more devastating effects than
diseases produced by other types of patho-
gens. Since many of the organisms which
cause infectious diseases in domestic animals
are also pathogenic for man, and since some
of them may also be readily transmitted from
animals to man, either directly or by vectors,
such attacks might also affect the human
population directly. Attacks upon livestock
would not only result in the immediate death
of animals, but also might call for compul-
sory slaughter as a means of preventing the
spread of infection.
196. Covert bacteriological (biological) at-
tack during peacetime directed against do-
mestic animals could give rise to serious
political and economic repercussions if large
numbers of stock were affected. For example,
African swine fever occurs endemically on the
African continent as a subclinical disease of
warthogs. In 1957 it was accidentally brought
from Angola to Portugal, and then in 1960
to Spain. Despite strict and extensive veteri-
nary measures that were enforced, losses in
pig breeds were estimated to amount within
a single year to more than 89,000,000.
197. Isolated attacks against stocks of do-
mestic animals during wartime would have
only a nuisance value. However, if a highly
infectious agent (e.g,, foot-and-mouth dis-
ease) were used, even a local attack could
have very widespread effects because of
spread by the normal commercial movement
of animals, particularly in highly developed
countries. Extensive attacks with travelling
clouds could, however, lead to a disastrous
state of affairs. The history of myxamatosis
(a rabbit disease) in Europe provides a par-
allel. Not only did it drastically reduce the
rabbit population in France, into which it
was first introduced; it immediately spread to
other countries of Europe, including the
United Kingdom. The risk of the uncon-
trolled spread of infection to a number of
countries is an important consideration in
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August 11, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
the use of some bacteriological (biological)
weapons.
198. The possibilities of protecting domes-
tic animal stocks against bacteriological (bio-
logical) attacks are so remote that they are
not worth discussing.
of protection. Advanced countries might, as
a precautionary measure exchange suscep-
tible plants by more resistant strains. This
would be difficult for countries whose agri-
cultural standards were not high, and which
would be the most vulnerable to bacterio-
logical (biological) attacks on their crops.
TABLE S.?EXAMPLES OF DISEASES THAT MIGHT BE USED
TO ATTACK DOMESTIC ANIMALS 7ABLE6.?EXAMPLES OF DISEASES THAT MIGHT BE USED TO
ATTACK PLANTS
DISEASE ANIMALS ATTACKED
Viruses:
African swine fever
Equine encephalitis
Foot-and-mouth disease_ _ _
Fowl plague
Hog cholera
Newcastle disease
Rift Valley fever
Rinderpest
Vesicular stomatitis
Ricksettsiae:
Veldt disease
Q-fever
Bacteria:
Anthrax
Brucellosis
Glanders
Fungi:
Lumpy jaw
Aspergillosis
Hogs.
Horses.
Cattle sheep, hogs.
Chickens, turkeys,
Hogs.
Chickens, turkeys.
Cattle, goats, sheep.
Cattle, sheep, oxen, goats,
water buffaloes.
Cattle, horses, mules, hogs.
Cattle, sheep, goats.
Do.
Cattle, sheep, horses, mules.
Cattle sheep, goats, hogs,
horses.
Horses, mules.
Cattle, horses, hogs.
Poultry, cattle.
4. Effects on Plants
199. Living micro-organisms could also be
used to generate diseases in crops which are
economically important either as food or as
raw material (e.g., cotton and rubber). Sig-
nificant food crops in this respect include
potatoes, sugar-beet, garden vegetables, soya
beans, sorghum, rice, corn, wheat and other
cereals and fruits. Obviously the selection
of the target for a biological attack would
be determined by the relative importance of
the crop in the national diet and economy.
Deliberately induced epiphytoties (plants dis-
ease epidemics) could in theory have serious
national and International consequences.
200. The fungal, bacterial, or viral agents
which could be used against plants are shown
in table 6.
201. With a few minor exceptions, the plant
viruses could be cultured only in living plant
systems, the causal agent being found only
in the plant tissues and juices. Virus diseases
are transmitted principally by insect vectors
and to some extent by mechanical means.
202. Bacterial agents which attack plants
can persist for months on or in the plants.
All of them can be cultured on artificial
media. Normally, plant bacteria are not dis-
seminated to any great extent by winds; the
principal methods for spread in nature are
insects, animals (including man) and water.
Rain can spread bacteria locally, while in-
sects and animals are responsible for their
more extensive spread. It is conceivable that
bacterial plant pathogens could be adapted
for deliberate aerial dissemination.
203. Plant fungi, which cause some of the
most devastating diseases of important agri-
cultural crops, are disseminated mainly by
winds, but also by insects, animals, waterand
man. Many fungal pathogens produce and
liberate into the air countless numbers of
small, hardy spores which are able to with-
stand adverse climatic conditions. The epi-
demic potential of a number of fungal patho-
gens is considerable.
204. In theory there are measures which
could protect crops against bacteriological
(biological) attacks; but at present their po-
tential cost rules them out in practice. There
is no essential difference between the coun-
ter-measures which would have to be intro-
duced to counter bacteriological (biological)
weapons and those employed normally to con-
trol plant diseases in peacetime. But the use
of bacteriological (biological) weapons to de-
stroy crops on a large scale would imply that
the attacker would choose agents capable of
overcoming any known, economical method
Diseases
Liklihood
of spread
Viruses Corn stunt High.
Ho)a blanca (rice) Do.
Fiji disease (sugar cane) Do.
Sugar beet curly top Do.
Potato yellow dwarf Do.
Bacteria Leaf blight (rice) Do.
Blight of corn Do.
Gummosis of sugarcane Low.
Fungi Late blight (potato) Very high.
Cereal rusts Do.
Rice blast Do.
Corn rust High.
Coffee rust Very high.
5. Factors Influencing the Effects of Bacteri-
ological (Biological) Attacks
Exotic diseases
205. Any country which resorted to bac-
teriological (biological) warfare would pre-
sumably try to infect, with a single blow, a
large proportion of an enemy population with
an exotic agent to which they had not be-
come immune through previous exposure.
Such exotic agents would lead to the appear-
ance of diseases which normally had not oc-
curred before in a given geographical area,
either becauSe of the absence of the organism
involved (e.g., foot-and mouth disease in
North America or Japan), and/or of natural
vectors (e.g., Japanese or Venezuelan ence-
phalitis in Europe, Rocky Mountain spotted
fever in many countries). In addition, a dis-
ease which had been controlled or eradicated
from an area (e.g., urban or classical yellow
fever from many tropical and sub-tropical
countries, epidemic typhus from developed
countries) might be reintroduced as a result
of bacteriological (biological) warfare.
Altered or new diseases
206. Deliberate genetic steps might also be
taken to change the properties of infectious
agents, especially in antigenic composition
and drug resistance. Apart from genetic
changes that could be induced in known
organisms, it is to be expected that new in-
fectious diseases will appear naturally from
time to time and that their causative agents
might be used in war. However, it could not
therefore be assumed that every outbreak
of an exotic or new disease could necessarily
be a consequence of a bacteriological (bio-
logical) attack. The Marburg disease, which
broke out suddenly In 1967 in Marburg,
Frankfurt and Belgrade, was a good example.
It was acquired by laboratory workers who
had handled blood or other tissues of vervet
monkeys which had been recently caught in
the wild, and by others who came into con-
tact with them. Because the outbreak oc-
curred in medical laboratories it was very
skillfully handled. In other circumstances, it
might have spread widely before it was con-
trolled.
Epidemic spread
207. As already emphasized, a wide variety
of agents can infect by the inhalation route,
so that in a bacteriological (biological) at-
tack a large number of persons could be in-
fected within a short time. From the epi-
demiological point of view, the consequences
would differ depending on whether the re-
sultant disease was or was not transmissible
from man to man. In the latter case the
result would be a once-for-all disaster, vary-
ing in scale and lethality according to the
nature of the organism used and the num-
bers of people affected. The attack would
S 9539
undoubtedly have a strong demoralizing ef-
fect on the unaffected as well as the affected
population, and it would be in the nature
of things that were would be a breakdown
of medical services.
208. If the induced disease were easily
transmissible from man to man, and if it was
one against which the population had not
been effectively immunized, it is possible to
imagine what could happen by recalling say,
the Periodical appearance of new varieties
of influenza virus, e.g. the 1957 influenza
pandemic. In Czechoslovakia (population
about 14 million), 1,500,000 influenza pa-
tients were actually reported; the probable
total number was 2,500,000. About 50 per
cent of the sick were people in employment
and their average period away from work was
six days. Complications necessitating further
treatment developed in 5-6 per thousand of
the cases, and about 0.2 per thousand died.
Those who axe old enough to remember the
1918 influenza pandemic, which swept over
most of the world, will judge the 1957 out-
break as a mild affair.
Susceptibility of population
209. A very important factor in the effec-
tiveness of an aerosol attack is the state of
immunity of the target population. Where
the population is completely lacking in spe-
cific immunity to the agent which is dis-
seminated, the incidence and severity of dis-
ease are likely to be exceptionally high. Nat-
urally occurring examples of very severe epi-
demics in virgin populations are well known
(e.g. measles in Fiji, poliomyelitis and in-
fluenza in the Arctic). A similar result fol-
lows the introduction of a suspectible popu-
lation (often a military force) into an al-
ready infected area. Thus there was a high
prevalence of dengue fever in military forces
operating in the Pacific in World War II?
sometimes affecting as many as 25 per cent
of the operational strength of a unit. The
local population suffered relatively little from
the disease because they had usually been
infected early in life, and were subsequently
immune.
Populations of increased vulnerability
210. Malnutrition: Recent statistical
studies reveal a clear association between
malnutrition and the incidence of infectious
diseases. FAO, WHO and UNICEF have
pointed out that in developing countries, a
shortage of nutritious food is a major factor
in the high mortality rate due to infectious
diseases, particularly in children.
211. Housing and clothing: Primitive hous-
ing and inadequate clothing would lead to
an increased vulnerability to bacteriological
(biological) and more particularly chemical
weapons. Millions of people live in houses
which are permeable to any sort of airborne
infection or poison, and millions are inade-
quately clothed and walk farefooted.
212. Other conditions which characterize
poor populations have a definite influence
on the spread of infections. Large families
increase the opportunities for contagious
contact. Inadequate housing, lack of potable
water and, in general, bad sanitation, a low
educational level, numerous vectors of in-
fectious disease (e.g. insects), and, of course,
lack of medical services are factors which
also favour the spread of disease. The agents
used might also persist in the soil, on crops,
grasses, etc., so that delayed action might
need to be taken into account.
Social effects and public health measures
213. A basic factor which influences the
risk of epidemic situation during every war
is a rapid impairment of standards of hy-
giene. Widespread destruction of housing and
of sanitary facilities (water works, water
piping, waste disposal, etc.), the Inevitable
decline in personal hygiene, and other diffi-
culties, create exceptionally favourable con-
ditions for the spread of intestinal infec-
tions, or louse-transmitted disease, etc.
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214. The importance a adequate public
health services is well illustrated by an ex-
plosive water-borne epidemic of infectious
hepatitis in Delhi in 1955-1956, which af-
fected some 30,000 persons, and which oc-
curred because routine water treatment was
ineffective. This epidemic was caused by the
penetration into the water supply of waste
waters heavily contaminated with hepatitis
virus. However, there was no concurrent in-
crease in the incidence of bacillary dysentery
and typhoid fever, showing that the routine
treatment of the water had been adequate to
prevent bacterial but not viral infections.
215. Air streams, migrating animals and
running water may transport agents from
one country to the other. Refugees with con-
tagious diseases pose legal and epidemiologi-
cal problems. In areas with multinational
economies, losses in livestock and crops may
occur in neighbouring countries by the
spread of the disease through regional
commerce.
216. The experiences from fairly recent
smallpox epidemics can also be used to illu-
strate the social effects of an accidentally in-
troduced, highly dangerous airborne infec-
tion. In New York (1947) one patient started
ANNEX A.-CHEMICAL PROPERTIES, FORMULATIONS AND TOXICITIES OF LETHAL CHEMICAL AGENTS (EXCERPT FROM MATERIAL SUPPLIED BY WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION)
-10? C., (b) at 20? C.; (6) approximate duration
sunny, light breeze, (c) -10? C., sunny, no wind,
: breathing rate ca. 15 liters /min.); (9) estimated
an epidemic, in which twelve persons became
ill and two died. Within a month more than
5 million persons were revaccinated. Similarly
in Moscow, in January 1960, a smallpox epi-
demic of forty-six cases (of whom three died)
developed, caused by a single patient. At that
time 5,500 vaccination teams were set up and
vaccinated 6,372,376 persons within a week.
Several hundreds of other health workers
searched a large area of the country for con-
tacts (9,000 persons were kept under medical
supervision, of these 662 had to be hospital-.
ized as smallpox suspects).
Key to table:(1) Trivial name; (2) messy classification; (3) approximate solubility in water at 20? C.; (4) volatility at 20? C; (5) physical state (a) at
of hazard (contact, or airborne foflowing evaporation) to be expected from ground contamination (a) 10? C., rainy, moderate wind, (b) 15? C.,
settled snow; (7) casualty producing dosages (lethal or significant incapacitating effects); (8) estimated human respiratory LC40 (n.C1c1 activity
human percutaneous toxicity.'
(1) Sarin
(2) Lethal agent (nerve gas). Lethal agent (nerve gas). Lethal agent (blood gas). Lethal agent (blood gas). Lethal agent (lung
(f53)) 100 percent 1 to 5 percent
(a) Liquid 3 to 18 mg/m3
Liquid 873, 000 mg/ms 3, 300, 000 mg/m3 6, 370, 000 mg/m3
_ irritant).
4) 12,100 mg/m8 100 percent 6 to 7 percent Hydrolysed
(b) do do Liquid Solid Liquid_
do
(0 (aVapour
(b) )1. to 1 boor._ _ 1 to 12 hours Few minutes Few minutes
34 to 4 hours ?_ 3 to 21 days do
(c) Ito 2 days 1 to 16 weeks 1 to 4 hours
>5 mg.-min./m.1 >0.5 ma-minim 0 >2,000 ma-minim
100 mg.-min./m.8 _ 10 mg.-min./m.1 5,000 mg.-min./m , 11,000 mg -min /rn 1 3 200
(9) 1,500 mg./man _ 6 mg./man
vx
Hydrogen cyanide Cyanogen chloride Phosgene
Mustard gas
Lethal agent (vesicant)._ Lethal agent.
Botulinal toxin -A
0.05 percent Soluble.
630 mg/ma _ Negligible.
Solid Solid.
Vapour
Liquid Do.
Few minutes 12 to 48 hours__
do do 2 to 7 days
3,4' to 4 hours to 1 hour 2 to 8 weeks
.3 >7,000 mg.-min./m.3 >1,600 mg.-min./m.3 >100 mg.-min./me
0.001 mg. (oral).
. _ , mg.-min./m.3 1,500 mg.-min./m.3 0.02 mg.-min./
m.s
(7)
(8)
4,500 mg./man
'A drop of mustard weighing a few milligrams can produce a sedans blister which will be incapacitating if it interferes with the normal activities of an individual.
_
ANNEX B?TEAR AND 110.ASSING GASES
Three parameters will be used to qualify
the effects of tear gases. These are defined as
follows:
Threshold of irritation is the atmospheric
concentration of the substance (in mg per
ma), which, in one minute of exposure, causes Tear ass Lethal index
irritation.
(mg.min/m9
Tolerance limit is the highest atmospheric
-
Adamside (DM)
concentration (in mg per 01?) which a test Ethyl bromacetate_ 0. I 2-5 15, 000-30, 000
subject can tolerate during one minute of Bromacetone 5 5-50 25, 000
exposure. Omega-chloracetophenone (ON) 1.5 10 30, COO
Lethal index Is a dosage, and thus the .05-. I 1-5 40, 000- 75, 000
0-chlorbenzylidene malononitrile (CS) O. 3 -1. 5 5-15 8, 500-25, 000
product of the concentration in the air (in
ANNEX C.-SOME BIOLOGICAL AGENTS THAT MAY BE USED TO ATTACK MAN
mg per ni,) and the time of exposure (in The data given under "Lethal index" are
minutes), which causes mortality. Data for from animal experiments with various
various tear gases are given in the following species.
table.
T reshold of Tolerance
irritation limit
(mg/m8) (maims)
Disease
Viral:
Chikungrinyna fever Probably high_ None R to 6 days_ 2 weeks tea few Very low (less than 1 percent)._ None None.
months.
Dengue fever .iiiah do 5 to 8 days... A few days to weeks do
Eastern equine encephalitis do do do Do.
5 to 15 days__ 1 to 3 weeks
. High (greater than 60 do Under development.
Tick-borne encephalitis do dopercent).
Venezuelan equine encephalitis do do Ito 2 weeks_ 1 week to a few months.. Variable up to 30 percent do_. Do.
Influenza do do 2 to 5 days... 3 to 10 days Low less than 1 percent) do Do.
1 to 3 days... 3 to 10 days Usually low, except for de Available.
Yellow fever complicated cases.
Smallpox ..... do
do High do 3 to 6 days... Ito weeks High (up to 40 percent) do Do.
7 to 16 days 12 to 24 days Variable but usually high (up do Do.
to 30 percent).
Transmis- Incubation
- Infectivity I sibilitys period,
Duration of illness 5 Mortality3 Antibiotic therapy Vaccination
Ricksettsial:
Q-fever do None or
10 to 21 days Ito 3 weeks Low (usually less than 1 Effective Under development
negligible. (sometimes
percent.)
shorter).
Psittacosis to Moderately 4 to 15 days_ 1 to several weeks
high Moderately high do None.
Rocky Mountain spotted fever do None 3 to 10 days 2 weeks to several
months. Usually high (up to 80 percent.) do Under development.
Epidemic typhus do chi_ 6 to 15 days_ A few weeks to months Variable but usually high (up do Available.
to 70 percent).
Bacterial:
Anthrax (pulmonary) Moderately Negligible_ _ __ 1 to 5 days... 3 to 5 days Almost invariably fatal Effective if given very Do.
high. -
Brucellosis We None early.
Cholera High 1 to 3 weeks . Several weeks to months_ Low (less than 5 percent) Moderately effective Under development
Glanders h None 1 to 5 days_ _ Ito several weeks Usually high (up to 80 percent) do Available.
Melioidosis do dO 2 to 14 days_ 4 to 6 weeks Almost invariably fatal Little effective. None.
Plague (pneumonic) do High 1 to 5 days._ 4 to 20 days Almost 100 percent fatal Moderately effective Do.
2 to 5 days__ 1 to 2 days do Moderately effective if Available.
Tularemia .... do given early.
Negligible_ 1 to NI days 2 to several weeks Uusually low sometimes high Effective Do.
Typhoid fever f up to 60 percent).
Moderately Moderately 1103 weeks A few to several weeks_ Moderately high up to (10
high. high. Moderately effective Do.
percent).
Dysentery
Nigh High 1 to 3 days A few days to weeks Low to moderately high de- Effective None.
Fungal: Coccidioido mycosis pending on strain.
-. do None__ 1 to 3 weeks.. A few weeks to months_ Low. None Do.
. Infectivity: indicates the potency of the parasite to penetrate and multiply in the host's orge- agent, resistance of the host and many other factors. It also should be noted that if the agents
_
nism, regardless of the clinical manifestation of illness. In fact, there are several agents by which concerned would be deliberately spread in massiVe concentrations as agents of warfare, the in.
great majorityof the exposed population will be infected without developing clinica symptoms. cubation,periods might be shorter and the resulting symptoms more serious. As to mortality, this
of any arthropod vector.
8 Transmissibility: This refers to direct transmission from man to man without the intervention refers to the ratio between the number of fatalities to the number of diseased (not to that of in-
5 The figures listed under incubation period, duration of disease, and mortality are based on 4 The availability of vaccines is no indication of their degree of effectiveness.
fected) individuals, if no treatment is given.
epidemiological data. They vary, according to variations in virulence and dose of the infecting
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 9541
CHAPTER III. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS AFFECT-
ING THE USE OF CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGI-
CAL (BIOLOGICAL) CONSIDERATIONS
A. General considerations
217. Extraneous factors influence the be-
haviour of chemical and bacteriological (bio-
logical) weapons to a far greater extent than
they do any other kind of armament. Some,
such as wind and rain, relate to the state of
the physical environment, and to a certain
eitent can be evaluated quantitatively.
Others, which reflect the general ecological
situation, and the living conditions and
physiological state of the populations ex-
posed to the effects of the weapons, are more
difficult to define; their influence?though
they could be considerable?cannot be quan-
tified.
218. This limitation applies particularly to
bacteriological (biological) weapons. The
natural course of infectious diseases?for
example in influenza epidemics?shows that
they are governed by so many uncontrollable
factors that the way they develop cannot as
a rule be foreseen. This would also be prob-
ably true of pathogenic agents which were
deliberately dispersed. On the other hand,
the knowledge gained through the study of
epidemiology, and in the study of artificial
dispersions of bacteriological (biological)
agents, both in the laboratory and the field,
has shed some light on some of the factors
concerned.
219. The ecological problem is the main
theme of chapter IV. The factors which con-
cern the variability of the human target, e.g.
physiological and living conditions, and levels
of protection, have already been described
in chapters I and II. This chapter is con-
cerned with physical environment (climate,
terrain).
1. Phenomena Associated With the Dispersal
of Chemical and Bacteriological (Biologi-
cal) Agents
220. It has already been pointed out that
chemical substances and living organisms
capable of being used as weapons are ex-
tremely varied in their nature and in their
effects. On the other hand, regarded solely
from the standpoint of their physical state
after dispersion in the atmosphere, they can
clearly be placed in one or the other of the
following categories:
Liquid drops and droplets of varying size;
(diameters greater than about 10 Microns).
More or less finely divided liquid and solid
aerosols; (diameters less than about 10 Mi-
cron.$).
Vapours.
221. Almost always, moreover, especially in
the case of liquid chemical agents, the result
of dispersion is a mixture of these different
phases; thus, a liquid dispersed by an ex-
plosive charge gives rise to a mixture of
aerosol and vapour, while aerial spraying
may produce a mixture of droplets and aero-
sols. Solid chemical substances will be in
aerosol form, and this will also be true, as
has already been pointed out, of bacterio-
logical (biological) agents.
222. Thus, chemical attacks would usually
take effect simultaneously in two forms:
Contamination of the ground at, and in
the immediate vicinity of, the target by di-
rect deposition of the agent at the time of
dispersion, and by subsequent settling of
large particles;
Formation of a toxic cloud consisting of
fine particles or droplets, of aerosol, and
possibly of vapour.
223. Most bacteriological (biological) at-
tacks would be designed primarily to create
an infectious aerosol as an inhalation haz-
ard. Some ground contamination might,
however, also result when infectious par-
ticles settled on the ground.
224. Both ground contamination and toxic
or infectious clouds would be immediately
subject to the physical action of the atmos-
phere.
225. If the soil contaminants are liquid
chemical agents, they would either evapo-
rate, producing a sustained secondary cloud,
or be absorbed by the ground, or diluted or
destroyed by atmospherical precipitation. If
they were solid agents, whether chemical or
biological, they might be returned to a state
of suspension by air currents, and perhaps
carried out of the initially contaminated
zone.
226. As it becomes formed, the toxic or
infectious cloud is immediately exposed to
atmospheric factors, and is straightaway
carried along by air currents. At the same
time, the particles within it are deposited at
different rates according to their mass, and
reach the ground at varying distances from
the point of emission, depending on wind
velocity (up to several kilometres in -the case
of particles less than a few tens of microns
in diameter) . The mechanically stable frac-
tion of the aerosol (particles under 5 mi-
crons in diameter) remains in suspension,
and may be carried along for considerable
distances.
B. The influence of atmospheric factors on
clouds of aerosols or vapours
227. The movement of a toxic or infectious
cloud after its formation depends chiefly on
the combined effects of wind and 8,t1n0S-
pheric conditions. The cloud is carried a
longer or shorter distance by the wind; at the
same time it is dispersed and diluted at a
faster or slower rate by turbulence of the
atmosphere and by local disturbances of
mechanical origin resulting from the rough-
ness of the ground.
228. The cloud may rise rapidly in the at-
mosphere or remain in the immediate vicin-
ity of the ground, thus retaining its de-
structive power for a greater or lesser time
depending on whether the air layer in which
it is released is in a stable or unstable state.
1. State of the Atmosphere
229. The state of the atmosphere plays
such an important role in the behaviour
of aerosol clouds that one might almost say
that it is the predominant factor in de-
termining the outcome of an attack, the ef-
fect of which could be considerably reduced,
or almost nullified, were the atmosphere
very unstable, or very serious if it was in a
state of pronounced and prolonged stability.
For this reason the mechanisms governing
the turbulent movements of air, caused by
differences in temperatures between super-
imposed air layers require some explanation
(see fig. 2) .
230. Disregarding the frictional layer of
air close to the ground, where mechanical
turbulence resulting from friction between
the air and the rough ground over which
it moves creates special conditions, air tem-
perature in the troposphere decreases on
average at the rate of 0.64? C for every 100
metres of altitude. Very frequently, how-
ever, as a result of thermal exchange between
the air and the ground, a cooler air layer
may be formed beneath a mass of hot light
air; in such conditions, the lower air layer,
with its greater density, does not tend to rise
and the atmosphere is said to be in "stable
equilibrium".
231. The situation, in which the vertical
temperature gradient becomes inverted, is
known as "temperature inversion", while the
air layer affected by the phenomenon is
termed as "inversion layer". When present it
is eminently favourable to the persistence
of toxic clouds.
232. After a day of sunshine, the surface
of the ground cools rapidly, with the result
that the layer of air close to the ground
cools more rapidly than those above it. Both
the intensity of the inversion and the thick-
ness of the air layer involved increase to a
maximum towards 4 a.m., and then decrease
again, finally disappearing shortly after
sunrise. This variation is very marked when
the sky is clear, and in favourable conditions
the inversion may last from fourteen to
eighteen hours a day, depending on the
season.
233. Very often, however, especially in
winter or in overcast weather, when the rays
of the sun are not sufficiently intense to
heat the surface of the ground, the temper-
ature inversion may last' for several days.
This condition has characterized all the dis-
asters caused by industrial pollution; for
example, the smog which claimed 4,000 vic-
tims in London in 1952 took its toll during a
period of atmospheric stability which lasted
for seven days.
234. Figure 2 shows the evolution of a toxic
cloud depending on the state of the atmos-
phere. (Fig. 2 not printed.)
235. Apart from this kind of low-altitude
inversion, which is most important in the
context of this report since it governs the
behaviour of toxic clouds released close to
the ground, similar process may take place
on a large scale at higher altitudes (hundreds
of thousands of metres) whenever a cool
air layer is formed beneath a hot air mass.
This may take place over large, cold expanses
(i.e. large expanses of land or sea, cloud or
fog masses, etc.). Because of the high alti-
tude at which they form, these inversion
layers have little effect on toxic clouds
released at ground level; but in the case
of the long-distance transfer of spores they
may act as a screen or reflector.
236. The configuration of the surface of
the earth in a particular area, which alters
the thermal exchange pattern, may also be
conducive to the formation of an inversion.
For example, inversions are a customary
phenomenon in winter in deep valleys sur-
rounded by high peaks, and occur more fre-
quently in the neighbourhood of slopes fac-
ing the north than on southern slopes. This
? also occurs whenever hills of any size en-
close a plain or basin, interrupting the gen-
eral flow of air and preventing mixing from
taking place. It is interesting to note that
apart from the periodic appearance of smog
in London, all the other major accidents re-
sulting from air pollution have occurred in
regions where the land configuration fits this
description. For example, the small town of
Donora, in the United States, lies in a rela-
tively narrow plain bordered by high hills.
In 1948 air pollution in the course of an
inversion lasting five days led to twenty
deaths and 6,000 cases of illness among the
town's 14,000 inhabitants.
2. Urban Areas
237. The case of urban built-up areas is
more complex, and it may even be said that
each one possesses its own micro-climate,
depending on its geographical situation, its
topography and the layout and nature of its
buildings.
238. Because the materials from which
they are constructed are better conductors,
and because their surfaces face in very varied
directions, buildings Usually capture and
reflect solar radiation better than does the
natural ground. Urban complexes therefore
heat up more quickly than does the sur-
rounding countryside, and the higher tem-
perature is still further augmented by do-
mestic and industrial heating plants. The re-
sults in a. flow of cool air from the neigh-
bouring countryside towards the hot centre
of the town, beginning shortly after sunrise,
decreasing at the beginning of the afternoon
and then rising again to a maximum shortly
before sunset. This general flow, which is of
low velocity, is disturbed and fragmented at
ground level by the buildings, forming local
currents flowing in all directions.
239. This constant mechanical turbulence,
to which is added the thermal turbulence
caused by numerous heat-generating
sources, should prevent the establishment in
towns of a temperature inversion at low al-
titude. In fact, however, inversions do occur,
when conditions are otherwise favourable,
but the inversion layer is situated at a higher
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S 9542 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE August 11, 1969
altitude than over the surrounding country-
side (30 to 150 metres).
240. At night, local inversions may be gen-
erated at low altitude as a result of rapid
radiation from the roofs of houses; thus in
a narrow street lined with buildings of equal
height, an inversion layer may be created
at roof-top level which will persist until
dawn.
241. Fog is more frequent over towns than
over open country (+30 per cent in summer
and +100 per cent in winter). The process
of fog formation is accelerated by the parti-
cles, dust and smoke which form a dome
over the town. At night these particles act
as nuclei around which the fog oondenses,
the fog contributing in its turn to the re-
tention of the particles in the dome. Fog
will obviously have the same concentrating
effect on particles originating in toxic clouds.
242. One final point which should be noted
is that toxic aerosols and Vapours may take
some time to penetrate enolbised spaces. Once
they have done so, they niWy continue as a
hazard for very long unless adequate ventila-
tion is provided.
3. Effect of Wind and Topography
243. The wind carries and apreads the toxic
or infectious cloud, which is simultaneously
diluted by turbulence. The distance which
the cloud travels before its concentration has
fallen to a level below which it is no longer
harmful depends on the velocity of the wind
and the state of the atmciaphere. Since to-
pography also produces changes in the nor-
mal wind pattern, it too plays an important
part in determining the direction of travel
of toxic clouds, sometimes focusing their ef-
fects in individual areas. Local winds may
also be established as a result of differences
In the heat absorbed by, and radiated from,
different ground surfaces.
244. These local, surface winds, which af-
fect the air layer nearest the ground up to
300 metres, are frequent and widespreati in
mountain ranges and near sea coasts. There
are slope breezes, valley breezes, sea breezes
and land breezes; and they could shift a toxic
cloud in directions which cann.ot be pre-
dicted from a study of the general meteo-
rology of the area. The breezes develop ac-
cording to a regular cycles Luring the day,
under the influence of solar-radiation, the air
moves up the valleys and slopes, and moves
from the see, towards the land; at night these
currents are reversed. In temperate climates
land and sea breezes are predominant during
the summer; but they are masked by the
general wind pattern during the other sea-
sons of the year. They are predominant in
subtropical and tropical regions through-
out the year.
4. Example of Combined Effects of Wind and
the State of the Atmosphere on a Cloud
245. There is some similarity between the
evolution of toxic blonds Which could be
produced by chemical and bacteriological
(biological) attacks and that of clouds con-
taining industrial pollutants, so much so
that the mathematical models developed for
forecasting atmospheric pollution can be ap-
plied, with a few modifications, to toxic
clouds. But the initial characteristics of the
two are as a rule different. Characteristic
features of chemical or bacteriological (bio-
logical) attacks are the multiplicity and high
yield of the sources of emission and their very
short emission time, all of which are factors
making for a greater initial concentration
in the cloud than the concEntration of pol-
lutants in industrial clouds.
246. Figure 4 indicates the order of magni-
tude of these phenomena, and demonstrates
the schematic form, and for different at-
mospheric conditions, the size of area which
would be covered by toxic clouds originat-
ing from a chemical attack using Sarin, with
an intensity arbitrarily chosen at 500 kg/km.
It shows that the theoretical distance of
travel by the cloud, determined for bare and
unobstructed ground, may exceed 100 km.
In practice the atmosphere must remain
stable for more than ten hours in order
to enable the cloud to travel such distances,
a condition which, although certainly not ex-
ceptional, is fairly uncommon. (Figure 4 not
printed.)
247. This figure illustrates the effect of
atmospheric conditions on the distance a
toxic cloud can be carried by the wind.
248. The example chosen is that of a
medium-intensity (500 kg) attack with
Sarin on a circular objective 1 km in diam-
eter. The wind velocity is 7 km/h.
249. Each of the lines represents a con-
tour of the hazard zone, i.e. the zone in
which any unprotected person would be ex-
posed to the effects of the agent.
250. Under highly unstable conditions (for
example, on a very sunny day), this hazard
zone is no greater than the area of objective
aimed at (the circle at the left end of the
figure). On the other hand, in any other
situation?(1) slightly unstable, (2) neutral,
(3) slightly stable, (4) moderately stable or
(5) highly stable?the distance traveled will
be greater, and it may extend almost 100 km
if conditions remain highly stable for a suf-
ficiently long time. It must be noted, how-
ever, that the distance of 100 km could be
reached only if a very marked inversion
persisted for about fourteen hours (100+7) ;
such a situation is quite rare.
251. Corresponding evaluations cannot be
made for an urban area, since the parameters
Involved are too numerous and too little
understood. But it may be presumed that
most of the characteristics of the urban
micro-climate would tend to increase the
persistence of chemical clouds. This is seri-
ous cause for concern, when it is remembered
that in highly industrialized countries 50 to
90 per cent of the population live in urban
areas
252. To sum up, a stable or neutral atmos-
phere in equilibrium might cause a toxic
cloud produced by a chemical or bacterio-
logical (biological) attack to persist for hours
after it had exercised its military effect,
which could generally be expected to mate-
rialize in the first few minutes following the
attack. These conditions could obtain not
only at night, but also during long winter
periods over vast continental expanses. If a
neutral atmosphere in equilibrium were as-
sociated with a light wind irregular in direc-
tion, then the area affected could be rela-
tively large, and, assuming an adequately
heavy initial attack, the concentrations
Would be high.
5. Special Features of Bacteriological
(Biological) Aerosols
253. So far as physical phenomena are
concerned (horizontal and vertical move-
ments, sedimentation, dilution, etc.), bacter-
iological (biological) aerosols would be
generally affected in the same way as chem-
ical clouds of aerosol and vapour, but not
necessarily to the same extent. But since
the effective minimum does for bacteriologi-
cal (biological) agents are considerably
smaller than for chemical agents, bacterio-
logical (biological) aerosols would be ex-
pected to remain effective even in a very
dilute state and, consequently, that they
could contaminate much larger areas than
could chemical clouds. An example is given
In chapter II.
254. There would be no limit to the hori-
zontal transport of micro-organisms, if there
were none to the capacity of the organisms
to survive in the atmosphere. Thus if the
microbial aerosol particles were so small that
their speed of fall remained close to the
speed of the vertical air movements in the
frictional layer (under average conditions
this is on the order of 10 cm/s), the agents,
whether alive or dead, would remain sus-
pended and travel very considerable dis-
tances. Even if bacteriological (biological)
clouds were to move only in the air layer
nearest the ground, they could cover very
large areas. For example, in one experiment
600 litres of Bacillus globigii (a harmless
spore-forming bacterium which is highly re-
sistant to aerosolization and environmental
stresses) were released off shore; bacteria
were found more than 30 km inland. Organ-
isms were found over 250 kin, which was
the entire area within which there were
monitoring stations during the trial. The ac-
tual area covered was much more extensive.
255. On the other hand, most pathogenic
agents are highly vulnerable when outside
the organism in which they normally repro-
duce, and are liable to biological inactiva-
tion, which is sometimes rapid, in the aerosol
state. This inactivation process is governed
by several factors (such as temperature,
humidity, solar radiation, etc.) which are
now the subject of aerobiological research.
256. The size of the infective particles in
a bacteriological (biological) aerosol is
highly significant to their ability to initiate
disease as a result of inhalation. It has been
established that the terminal parts of the
respiratory tract are the most susceptible
sites for infection by inhalation. As with
chemical agents, the penetration and reten-
tion of inhaled bacteriological (biological)
particles in the lungs is very dependent on
particle size, which is primarily determined
by the composition of the basic material
and the procedure of aerosolization, as
pointed out in chapter I.
257. The influence of particle size of aero-
sol infectivity is illustrated in table 1, which
shows that there is a direct relationship be-
tween the LD5, and particle diameter of an
aerosol of Franciscella tularensis.
TABLE 1.?NUMBERS OF BACTERIA OF FRAN-
CISCELLA TilLARENSIS REQUIRED TO
KILL 50 PERCENT OF EXPOSED ANIMALS
? ?
Numbers of bacterial
cells LDg,
Diameter of particles Guinea Rhesus
(microns) pigs monkeys
3 17
7 6,500 240
12 20,000 540
22 170, 000 3,000
C. Influence of atmospheric factors on
chemical agents
1. Influence of Temperature
258. An attack with a liquid chemical
agent, as already pointed out, would be as
a rule result. in the formation of a cloud of
small droplets, aerosol and vapour in vary-
ing proportions, as well as in ground con-
tamination, all of which would be affected
by air temperature.
259. Influence on. droplet and aerosol
clouds: Only particles having dimensions
within certain limits penetrate and are re-
tained by the lungs. The larger ones are
trapped in the upper part of the respiratory
tract (e.g. nose and trachea), whereas the
smaller ones are exhaled. Penetration and
retention have maximum values in the sive
range of 0.5 to 3 microns.
260. Liquid chemical agents exercise their
effects both by penetrating the skin and by
inhalation. The material absorbed by the
lungs acts immediately, whereas there is a
delay before the effects become manifest
from an agent absorbed through the skin or
the mucous membrane of the upper air pas-
sages.
261. A high temperature favours the evap-
oration of particles which will decrease in
size and thus reach the lungs, contributing
to the immediate effect; an additional quan-
tity of vapour is produced which contributes
to the same effect.
262. Effect on ground contamination: The
temperature of the air, and even more that
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of the ground, have a marked effect on the
way ground contamination develops and
persists. The temperature of the ground,
which depends on the thermal characteris-
tics of its constituent materials and on the
degree of its exposure to the sun, either in-
creases or reduces evaporation, and conse-
quently decreases or increases the duration
of contamination. The surface temperature
Is extremely variable from point to point,
depending on the type and colour of the
soil; a temperature difference of 20? has
been noted between the asphalt surface of
a road and the surrounding fields. The tem-
perature gradient also varies during the
course of the day; in clear weather the dif-
ferences may range from 15 to 30? C. in a
temperate climate, and up to 50? C. in a
desert climate. High temperatures of both
air and ground favour the rate of evapora-
tion, thus reducing the persistence of sur-
face contamination; wind, because of the
mechanical and thermal turbulence it
creates, has a similar effect.
263. To illustrate the effect of these vari-
able factors, it is worth noting that the con-
tamination of bare ground by unpurifled
mustard, at a mean rate of 30 g/m2, will
persist for several days or even weeks at
temperatures below 10? C at medium wind
velocities, whereas it lasts for only a day and
a half at 25? C. Furthermore, because of ac-
celerated evaporation at high temperatures,
the cloud produced is more concentrated, and
the danger of vapour inhalation in, and
downwind of, the contaminated area becomes
greater.
2. Influence of Humidity
264. In contrast to high temperature, high
relative humidity may lead to the enlarge-
ment of aerosol particles owing to the con-
densation of water vapour around the nuclei
which they constitute. The quantity of in-
halable aerosol would thus diminish, with a
consequent reduction in the immediate ef-
fects of the attack.
265. On the other hand, a combination of
high temperature and high relative humidity
causes the human body to perspire pro-
fusely. This intensifies the action of mustard-
type vesicants, and also accelerates the trans-
fer through the skin of percutaneous nerve
agents.
3. Influence of Atmospheric Precipitation
266, Light rain disperses and spreads the
chemical agent which thus presents a larger
surface for evaporation, and its rate of evap-
oration rises. Conversely a heavy rain dilutes
and displaces the contaminating product,
facilitates its penetration into the ground,
and may also accelerate the destruction of
certain water-sensitive compounds (e.g.
lewisite, a powerful blistering agent).
267. Snow increases the persistence of con-
tamination by slowing down the evaporation
of liquid contaminants. In the particular
case of mustard gas, the compound is con-
verted into a pasty mass which may persist
until the snow melts.
268. Soil humidity, atmospheric precipita-
tion and temperature also exercise a powerful
influence on the activity of herbicides, which
are much more effective at higher humidities
and temperatures, than in dry weather and
at low temperatures. This applies equally to
preparations applied to plants and to those
introduced into the soil.
4. Influence of Wind
269. As vapors emanating from ground
contaminated by liquid chemical agents be-
gin to rise, the wind comes into play. The
distance the vaport will be carried depends
on the wind velocity and the evaporation
rate of the chemical, which will itself change
with variations in ground and air tempera-
tures. The distance is maximal (several kilometres) when there is a combination of
the conditions promoting evaporation (high
soil temperature) persistence of the cloud
(stable atmosphere) and dispersal of the
cloud (gentle winds). These conditions exist
in combination at the end of a sunny day, at
the time when a temperature inversion
exists.
5. Influence of Soil?Dependent Factors
270. Nature of the soil. The soil itself,
through its texture and the porosity of its
constituent materials, plays an important
role in. the persistence of liquid chemical
contaminants, which may penetrate to a
greater or lesser extent, or remain on the
surface. In the former case the risk of con-
tamination by contact is reduced in the
short term, but persistence will be increased
to the extent that factors favourable to
evaporation (temperature, wind) are pre-
vented from acting. In the latter case, when
the contaminant remains on the surface, the
danger of contact contamination remains
considerable, but persistence is reduced. Thus
persistence in sandy soils may be three times
as long as in clay.
271. Vegetation. Vegetation prevents a
liquid contaminant from reaching the soil
and also breaks it up, thus encouraging
evaporation. But at the same time the short-
term danger is enhanced because of the
widespread dispersibn of the contaminant
on foliage, and the consequently increased
risk of contact contamination.
272. The canopy of foliage in dense forests
(e.g., conifers, tropical jungle), traps and
holds a considerable portion of a dispersed
chemical agent, but the fraction which none
the less reaches the soil remains there for a
long time, since the atmospheric factors in-
volved in the process of evaporation (tem-
perature, wind, over the soil, turbulence)
are hardly significant in such an environ-
ment as compared with open spaces.
273. Too little is known about the absorp-
tion and retention of toxic substances by
plants to make it possible to assess the re-
sulting danger to the living creatures whose
food supply they may constitute. Like cer-
tain organic pesticides, it is probable that
other toxic chemicals may penetrate into
plant systems via the leaves and roots. Cases
could then arise where all trace of contami-
nant had disappeared from the soil but with
the toxic substance presisting in vegetation,
274. Urban areas. It can also be assumed
that, in spite of a surface temperature which
is on the average higher, contaminants might
persist longer in built-up areas than over
open ground. There are two reasons for this.
Structural, finishing and other building ma-
terials are frequently porous, and by absorb-
ing and retaining liquid chemical agents
more readily, they increase the duration of
contamination. Equally the factors which, in
open country, tend to reduce persistence
(sunshine, wind over ground) play a less
important part in a built-up city.
275. Climate, in general, may exercise an
Indirect influence on the effect of percutane-
ous chemical agents, simply because of the
fact that in hot climates the lightly clad
inhabitants are very vulnerable to attacks
through the skin.
276. The predominating influence of cli-
matic factors and terrain on the persistence
of contamination Indicates that the a priori
classification of chemical agents as persistent
or non-persistent, solely on the basis of dif-
ferent degrees of volatility, is somewhat ar-
bitrary since, depending on circumstances,
the same material might persist for periods
ranging from a few hours to several weeks,
or even months.
D. Influence of atmospheric factors on bac-
teriological (biological) agents
277. Infectious agents, when used to infect
by way of food and water, or by means of
animal vectors are, of course, hardly subject
to the influence of climatic factors. But any
large-scale attack by bacteriological (bio-
logical) agents would probably be carried
S 9543
out by aerosols, in which the agents would
be more susceptible to environmental influ-
ences than chemical agents.
278. Physioo-chemical atanospheric factors
have a destructive effect on aerosol-borne
micro-organisms. Their viability decreases
gradually over a period of hours or days at a
progressively diminishing rate. Some decay
very rapidly: for example, certain bio-aerosols
used for pest control in temperate climates,
and dispersed under average conditions in the
cold and transitional seasons, show a rate of
decay of 5 per cent per minute.
279. This apparent vulnerability of micro-
organism in aerosols might cast some doubt
on the possible effectiveness of bacteriological
(biological) attacks. However there are var-
ious means by which the rate of decay in the
aerosol can be considerably reduced. For ex-
ample: the use of very high concentrations
of agent; the use of suitably "modeled" path-
ogenic strains; or the protection of aerosol
particles by encapsulating them in certain
organic compounds.
280. These procedures, which prolong the
survival of micro-organisms in air, could pre-
sumably also be applied to potential agents
of bacteriological (biological) warfare. Means
are also available for prolonging the survival
of micro-organisms in water, soil, etc.
1. Influence of Temperature
281. The effect of temperature on the sur-
vival of micro-organisms in bacteriological
(biological) aerosols is not highly significant
in the temperature ranges generally encoun-
tered. As a general rule, aerosol-borne bio-
logical agents will be destroyed more rapidly
the more the temperature rises. On the other
hand, in some circumstances high tempera-
tures may act on bacteriological (biological)
aerosols in the same way as on chemical aero-
sols, that is to say, particle size will be di-
minished by evaporation, and thus their rate
of entry into the lungs will be enhanced.
2. Influence of Humidity
282. Relative humidity is the most impor-
tant of the atmospheric conditions which af-
fect the rate of decrease of viability of micro-
organisms in the air. The extent of its effect
varies with different micro-organisms, with
the nature of the suspending fluid from
which the aerosol is disseminated, with the
manner of its dissemination (as a spray or as
a dry powder). As a general rule, the rate of
inactivation is greater at lower relative hu-
midity although with some organisms maxi-
mum inactivation occurs in the middle range
of relative humidity (30-70 per cent). The
rate of inactivation will, however, tend to
decrease with time, and may become ex-
tremely low when a state of equilibrium (sta-
bilization) between the particles and their
environment has been established. This im-
plies that irrespective of relative humidity
values, the final infective concentration of a
stabilized aerosol may still be above the
threshold minimum dose for infection by in-
halation. Even SO, microbial survival in a
stabilized aerosol may be further reduced by
sudden variations in atmospheric humidity.
283. The effectiveness of aerosol-borne
bacteriological (biological) agents depends
not only on their capacity to survive in the
air. Also important is their low rate of sedi-
mentation, combined with the capacity of
the micro-organisms to spread and penetrate
into buildings, so contaminating surfaces
and materials indoors as well as outdoors.
The possibility that some infective agents
can survive for a long time in such condi-
tions, and the fact that environmental duet
particles may exercise a protective influence
on organisms have been demonstrated on
many occasions. Studies made in hospitals
have shown that surviving micro-organisms
can be dispersed from sites which have come
to be called "secondary reservoirs", and that
they may become sources of new infections,
carried either through the air or by contact.
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3. Influence of Solar Radiation
284. The ultra-violet part of the solar
spectrum has a powerful germicidal effect.
Bacterial spores are much less sensitive to
this radiation than are -either viruses or
vegetative bacteria, and fungal spores are
even less sensitive than baoterial spores. The
destructive effect of solar radiation on micro-
organisms is reduced whensrelative humidity
is high (over 70 per cent). Air pollution
including a high proportign of atmospheric
dust, also provides some erotection.
285. Ultra-violet light exercises its destruc-
tive effects on micro-orgastisms through the
structural degradation of Vie nucleic acids
which carry the genetic Informations Most
research on this subject hale been carried out
on microbes in liquid suspeissions, but the
results of studies of aerosOl-borne microbes
seem to lead to similar conclusions.
286. The germicidal effeeit of ultra-violet
radiation has been known foe a long time and
used in combating airborAe infections in
schools, military builclinge and hospitals.
The problem of proper radiation dosage, and
proper techniques, owever, still remain to
be salved.
287. The lethal effect of sainlight on micro-
organisms is less marked, although still ap-
parent, in diffuse light. This is why a bac-
teriological (biological) attack, if one ever
materialized, would be more probably under-
taken in darkness:
4. Influence of Atmospheric Precipitatidn
288. Rain and snow have relatively little
effect on bacteriological (biological) aerosols.
5. Influence of the Chemical Composition
of the Atmosphere
289. Little is known about the influence on
the viability of mirco-organienis of the chem-
ical compounds present in the atmosphere.
Oxygen promotes the inactivation of aerosol-
borne agents, particularly in conditions of
low humidity, and recent studies have also
demonstrated that an unstable bactericidal
factor (formed by combination between
ozone and gaseous combustion products of
petroleum) is present in the air, particularly
downwind of heavily populated areas.
6. General Effects of climate
290. Climate may also have a general and
considerable influence on the development of
epidemics and epizootics, in so far as the pro-
liferation of vectors which spread disease
may be encouraged, given the right condi-
tions. This is indicated by the way myxoma-
tosis developed in Australia. Although several
attempts in 1927, and then from 1936 to 1943,
to impart the disease to Australian rabbits
failed, the epizootic spread rapidly from 1950
onwards, apparently for the sole reason that
the summer, which was particularly rainy
that year, was associated with an exceptional
proliferation in the flooded Murray River
valley of the mosquitoes which carry the
disease.
291. Atmospheric humidity and tempera-
ture also have a strong influence on micro-
organisms acting upon vegetation.
CHAPTER IV. POSSIBLE Loisc-resier EFFECTS OF
CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGIdAI, (BIOLOGICAL)
WARFARE ON HUMAN HEALTH AND ECOLOGY
A. Introduction.
292. So far this report has dealt essentially
with the potential short-torm effects of
chemical and bacteriological (biological) war-
fare. The possible long-term effects of the
agents concerned need to be considered
against the background of thetrends whereby
man's environment is being constantly modi-
fied, as it becomes transformed to meet his
ever-increasing needs. Some Of the changes
that have occurred have been unwittingly
adverse. The destruction of forests has
created deserts, while grasslands have been
destroyed by over-grazing. The air we breathe
and our rivers become polluted, and chemical
pesticides, despite the good they do, also
threaten with undesirable secondary effects
The long-term impact of possible chemical
and bacteriological (biological) warier
clearly needs to be considered within an
adequate ecological framework.
293. Ecology may be defined as the study
of the interrelationships of organisms on
the one hand and of their interactions with
the physical environment in which they are
*found an the other. The whole complex of
plants and animals within a specific type
of environment?a forest, a marsh, a savan-
nah?forms a community comprising all the
plant life and all the living creatures?from
the microorganisms and worms in the soil, to
the insects, birds and mammals above the
ground?within that environment, and the
understanding of their interrelationships also
necessitates a knowledge of the physical
characteristics of the environment which
bear on the living complex. Ecological com-
munities are normally in dynamic equilib-
rium, which is regulated by the interaction of
population density, available food, natural
epidemics, seasonal changes and the compe-
tition of species for food and space.
294. Man has his special ecological prob-
lems. His numbers are multiplying fast, and
increasing population requires commensurate
increases in food production. The production
and distribution of adequate food for the
population which is predicted for the latter
part of this century, and which will go on
increasing through the next, will allow no
relaxation in the effort which has already
proved so successful. Food production has
increased phenomenally in the past fifty
years, primarily because of (1) improved agri-
cultural practices, and particularly because
of a marked increase in the use of chemical
fertilizers and pesticides; (2) the develop-
ment of genetically improved plants, herbs
and flocks; and (3) increased industrializa-
tion of food-producing processes. There is
hope that steps such as these will continue to
bear fruit.
295. But while the use of fertilizers, herbi-
cides and pesticides has brought about a
massive increase in food production, it has
a.sio added to the pollution of soil and water,
and as a result has altered our ecological
environment in an enduring way. So too
have other features of our industrial civili-
zation. The motor car has been a very potent
factor in increasing air pollution in towns
and cities. The increasing population of the
world creates unprecedented wastes, and the
methods used to dispose of it?burying it,
burning it, or discharging it into streams
or lakes?have further polluted the environ-
ment. The remarkable development of syn-
thetic and plastic materials in recent years
has also added a new factor to the short-
and long-term biological effects on man.
Every new advance on our technological civ-
ization helps to transform the ecological
framework within Which we evolved. From
this point of view the existence and possible
use of chemicals and bactriological (biologi-
cal) agent in warfare have to be regarded
as an additional threat, and as a threat
which might have enduring consequences, to
our already changing environment.
B. Consequences to man of upsetting the
ecological equilibrium
. tilizers and more productive hybrid seeds
came widespread, the increase was eleven
e quintals. This is characteristic of What has
happened everywhere where fertilizers have
been used on a large scale.
297. The beneficial effect of the use of
modern chemical pesticides also does not
need spelling out. It is estimated that the
present annual world loss in production due
to weeds and parasites is still approximately
460 million quintals of wheat and 360 mil-
lion quintals of maize, and that to eliminate
this waste will mean the use of even more
pesticides than are now being consumed,
298. What has to be realized about modern
agricultural practices is that without them
the increases in the output of food which the
world needs could never be achieved. Unless
production mounts everywhere, those who
have not yet cast off the burdens of living in
a primitive agricultural world will never
reach the level of civilization to which all
aspire.
299. But, as already indicated, the grew'
increase in the use of fertilizers, pesticides
and herbicides does have deleterious side
effects. For example, in Switzerland, sur-
face waters and springs have been contam-
inated in times of high rainfall by excessive
amounts of fertilizers corresponding to 0,3-
0.5 kg of phosphorous and 45 kg of nitro-
gen per hectare per year. This kind of thing
occurs elsewhere as well, and it cannot but
help transform -for all we know adversely..
theenvironment in which living matter in-
cluding fish otherwise thrive.
300. The dangers of the side effects of
modern pesticides are also beginning to be
appreciated, and are already beginning to
be guarded against in advanced countries.
Except in high dosage, these substances act
only on lower organisms, although some
organophosphorous compounds are toxic to
man and other vertebrates. Less selective
agents may be toxic to soil bacteria, plank-
ton, snails and fish. Chlorinated hydrocar-
bons, such as DDT, are toxic only in un-
usually high dosages, but accumulate in
fat, and deposit in the liver and the central
nervous system. Following surface applica-
tion, pesticides enter the soil and seep into
underground waters; or become washed by
rain into rivers, lakes and reservoirs. It is
theoretically possible that in some situa-
tions, in which non-selective chemical pesti-
cides are used, disruption of the ecological
equilibrium could lead to the long-term sup-
pression of useful animals and plants. These
are dangers which only constant vigilance
will avert.
301. Detergents are another modern chem-
ical development whose use has had to be
regulated, since they have a direct short-
term effect on certain types of natural food
such as daphniae and the algae which are
eaten by fish. The first detergents which
came on the market led to enormous quanti-
ties of foam on river, and this in turn re-
duced the supply of oxygen for organisms
living in the water. They also damage the
earth by affecting soil bacteria. Such de-
tergents, which resist destruction even by
the most modern water treatment Methods,
have all but disappeared from use and have
been replaced by others, which can be al-
most completely destroyed by waste water
treatment.
302. In the context of the possible long-
term effects of chemical and bacteriological
(biological) weapons, we have finally to note
that towns and cities are growing all over
the world, and that in the developed coun-
tries, conurbations (fusion a cities with
loss of suburbs) have reached population
levels approaching 50 million. Such great
concentrations of people require very com-
plicated arrangements for supply of food,
water and other materials, transport and
general administration. The use of chemical
or bacteriological (biological) weapons
against cities would undoubtedly have an ex-
296. The chemical industry doubled its
output between 1953 and 1960 and it is still
growing fast but the useful results of its
continued development are none the less of
the utmost importance to man's future. The
good effects on food production of the use of
artificial fertilizers alone far outweigh any
secondary deleterious consequences of their
use. The facts are too well known to need
spelling out. It is enough to point out, as one
example, that maize production in the United
States increased between 1923 and 1953, a
thirty-year period, by barely four quintals
per hectare, but that in the ten years be-
tween 1953 and 1964, when the use of fer-
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ceptionally severe disorganizing effect, and
the full re-establishment of the services
necessary for health, efficient government,
and the smooth operation of industry might
take a very long time,
C. Possible long-term effects of chemical and
bacteriological (biological) means of war-
fare on man and his environment
303. Chemical weapons, in addition to their
highly toxic short-term effects, may also
have a long-term effect on the environment
in which they are disseminated. If used in
very high- concentration they might cause
damage by polluting the air, by pointing the
water supplies and by poisoning the soil.
304. Bacteriological (biological) weapons
could be directed against man's sources of
food through the spread of peraistent plant
diseases or of infectious animal diseases.
There is also the possibility that new epi-
demic diseases could be introduced, or old
ones reintroduced, which could result in
deaths on the scale which characterized the
medieval plagues.
1. Chemical Weapons
305. There is no evidence that the chemical
agents used in World War I?chlorine, mus-
tard, phosgene, and tear-gas?had any un-
toward ecological consequences. As already
observed, over 120,000 tons of these agents
were used during that war, and in some areas
which were attacked, concentrations must
have added up to hundreds of kilograms per
hectare. Theae regions have long since re-
turned to normal and fully productive use.
306. The organophosphorous, or nerve,
agents have never been used in war, and no
corresponding experience is available to help
form a judgment about their possible long-
term effects. But since these agents are toxic
to all forms of animal life, it is to be expected
that if high concentrations were dissemi-
nated over large areas, and if certain species
were virtually exterminated, the dynamic
ecological equilibrium of the region might
be changed.
307. On the other hand there is no evi-
dence to suggest that nerve agents affect
food chains in the way DDT and other pesti-
cides of the chlorinated hydrocarbon type do.
They hydrolyze in water, some of them
slowly, so there could be no long-term con-
tamination of natural or artificial bodies of
water.
308. The use of herbicides during the
course of the Viet-Nam conflict has been re-
ported extensively in news media, and to a
lesaer extent in technical publications. The
materials which have been used are 2,4-
dichlorophenoxyacetic acid, 2,4,5-trichloro-
phenoxyacetic acid, eacodylic acid and
picloram.
309. Between 1963 and 1968 these herbicides
were used to clear forested areas for mili-
tary purposes over some 9,100 km2. This may
be divided by forest type as shown in the
following table.
TABLE 1.?TYPE OF FOREST AND EXTENT AND AREA
TREATED WITH HERBICIDES IN SOUTH VIETNAM, 1963-68
Type of forest
Extent Area treated
kilometers 2 kilometers 2
Open forest (sem ideciduous)___
Mangrove and other aquatic__
Coniferous
50, 150
4, 800
1,250
8, 140
960
0
Total 56, 200 9,100
310. South Viet-Nani is about 172,000 km2
in area, of which about one-third is forested.
The area treated with herbicides up to the
end of 1968 thus amounts to abput 16 per
cent of the forested area, or a little over 6
per cent of the total.
311. There is as yet no scientific evalua-
tion of the extent of the long-term ecological
changes resulting .fram these attacks. One
estimate is that some mangrove forests may
need twenty years to regenerate, and fears
have been expressed about the future of the
animal population they contain. Certain
species of bird are known to have migrated
from areas that have been attacked. On the
other hand, there has been no decline in
fish catches, and as fish are well up in the
food chain, no serious damage would seem
to have been done to the aquatic environ-
ment.
312. When a forest in a state of ecological
equilibrium is destroyed by cutting, secon-
dary forest regenerates, which contains fewer
species of plants and animals than were
there originally, but larger numbers of those
species which survive. If secondary forest is
replaced by grassland, these changes are even
more mraked. If one or more of the animal
species which increases in number is the host
of an infection dangerous to man (a zoon-
oats) , then the risk of human infection is
greatly increased. This is exemplified by the
history of scrub typhus in South-East Asia,
where the species of rat which maintains the
Infection and the vector mite are much more
numerous in secondary forest, and even more
no in grassland, 50 increasing the risk of
the disease being transmitted to people as
forest is cleared.
313. In high rainfall areas, deforestation
may also lead to serious erosion, and so to
considerable agricultural losses. Deserts have
been created in this way.
2. Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons
Against man
314. New natural foci, in which infection
may persist for many years, may be estab-
lished after an arosol or other type of bac-
teriological (biological) attack. This possible
danger can be appreciated when one recalls
the epidemiological consequences of the acci-
dent introduction of rabies and other veter-
inary infections (blue-tongue, African swine
fever) into a number of countries. The spred
of rabies in Europe following World IT, as a
consequence of the disorganization caused by
the war, shows how an epidemiologically
complicated and medically dangerous situa-
tion can emerge even with an infection which
had long been successfully controlled, In
1945 there were only three major foci of
infection in Czchoslovakia. In the following
years, foxes multiplied excessively because
farms were left unworked, because of the
increased number of many kinds of wild
creatures, and also because of the dis-
continuation of systematic control. Foxes
also came in from across frontiers,
and the epizootic gradually worsened. In the
period 1952/1966 a total of 888 foci were re-
ported, 197 new ones in 1965 alone. Bringing
the situation under control demand extra-
ordinary and prolonged efforts by the health
service: in 1966 alone, 775,000 domestic ani-
mals were vaccinated in affected areas of the
country. Non the less, the disease has not
yet been stamped out. Natural foci cannot be
eliminated without organized and long-term
International co-operation.
315. Arthropods (insects, ticks) also play
an important part, along with other crea-
tures, in the maintenance of pathogenic
agents in natural foci. A man exposed to a
natural focus risks infection, particularly
from arthropods, which feed on more than
one species of host. A bacteriological (bio-
logical) attack might lead to the creation of
multiple and densely distributed foci of in-
fection from which, if ecological conditions
were favourable, natural foci might develop
in regions where they had previously never
existed, or in areas from which they had been
eliminated by effective public health meas-
ures. ?
316. On the other hand, the large-scale use
of bacterological (biological) weapons might
reduce populations of suscepitibIe wild spec-
ies below the level at which they could
continue to exist. The elimination of a species
or group of species from an area would create
in the ecological community an empty niche
S 9545
which might seriously disturb its equili-
brium, or which might be filled by another
species more dangerous to man because it
carried a zoonosls infection acquired either
'naturally or as a result of the attack. This
would result in the establishment of a new
natural focus of disease.
317. The gravity of these risks would de-
pend on the extent to which the community
of species in the country attacked contained
animals which were not only susceptible to
the infection, but were living in so close a
relationship to each other that the infection
could become established. For example, not
all mosquito species can be infected with
yellow fever virus, and if the disease is to
become established, those which can become
vectors must feed frequently on mammals,
such as monkeys, which are also sufficiently
susceptible to the infection. A natural focus
of yellow fever is therefore very unlikely to
become established in any area lacking an
adequate population of suitable mosquitos
and monkeys.
318. Endemics or enzootics of diseases (i.e.
infections spreading at a low rate, but in-
definitely, in a human or animal population)
could conceivably follow a large-scale at-
tack, or might be started by a small-scale
sabotage attack, for which purpose the
range of possible agents would be much
wider, and might even Include such chronic
infections as malaria.
319. Malaria is a serious epidemic disease
In a susceptible population, but it is difficult
to envisage its possible employment as a
bacteriological (biological) weapon, because
of the complex life cycle of the parasite.
Drug-resistant strains of malaria exist in,
for example, areas of Asia and South Amer-
ica, and their possible extension to areas
where mosquitos capable of transmitting
the disease already exist, would greatly com-
plicate public health measures, and cause
a more serious disease problem because of
the difficulties of treatment.
320, Yellow fever is still enzootic in the
tropical regions of Africa and America.
Monkeys and other forest-dwelling primates,
together with mosquitos which transmit the
virus, constitute natural foci and ensure
survival of the virus between epidemics.
321, Importation of this disease is possible
wherever a suitable environment and sus-
ceptible animal and mosquito hosts exist.
This occurred naturally in 1960 when a pre-
viously uninfested area of Ethiopia was in-
vaded by yellow fever and an epidemic re-
sulted in about 15,000 deaths. Because of the
inaccessibility of the area, some 8,000-9,000
people had died before the epidemic was
recognized. The epidemic was extinguished
but it is likely that a permanent focus of
yellow fever infection has been established
in this area, previosuly free of the disease.
It might be extremely serious if the virus
were introduced into Asia or the Pacific Is-
lands where the disease appears never to
have occurred, but where local species of
mosquito are crown to be able to transmit
it. Serious problems could, also arise if the
virus were Introduced into the area of the
United States where vector mosquitos still
exist, and where millions of people live in
an area of a few square kilometers.
322. Another consideration is the possible
Introduction of a new species of animal to
an area to cause either *long-term disease
or economic problems. For example, mon-
gooses were introduced many years -ago to
some Caribbean islands, and in one at least
they have become a serious economic pest of
the sugar crop, and an important cause of
rabies. The very large economic effect on the
introduction of rabbits to Australia is well
known. Certain mosquito species (a yellow
fever mosquto, Aedes aegypti, and a malaria
mosquito, Anopheles gambiae) have natu-
rally spread to many areas of the world from
their original home in Africa, and have been
responsible for serious disease problems in
the areas that have been invaded. It is con-
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ceivable that in the war the introduction of
such insects on a small (ital.? might be tried
for offensive purposes.
323. In addition to the development of
new natural foci, another long-term hazard,
but one which is very much more speculative
than some of the possibilities mentioned
above, is that of the establishment of new
strains of organisms of altered immunolo-
gical characteristics or increased virulence.
This might occur if large numbers of people
or other susceptible animal species became
infected in an area through a bacteriological
(biological) attack, thus providing oppor-
tunities for new organisms to arise naturally.
The appearance from time 1.0 time of immu-
nologically different forms of influenza shows
the type of thing which might happen. Such
altered forms of agents might cause More
severe and perhaps more widespread epi-
demics than the original attack.
Against domestic animals
324. Foot-and-mouth disease is a highly
Infectious but largely nen-fatal disease of
cattle, swine and other cloven-footed animals
It is rarely transmitted front a diseased ani-
mal to man, and when it is, the order is a
trivial one.
325. The milk yield of diseased cows de-
creases sharply and does not reach its normal
yield even after complete recovery. Losses
range from 9 to 30 per cent of milk yield. In
swine, loss from foot-and-mouth are esti-
mated at 60-80 per cent among suckling pigs.
Foot-and-mouth is endemic in many coun-
tries and breaks out frouCtime to time even
In countries which are normally free of the
disease. Some countries let it run its course
without taking any steps to control it; others
try to control it by the use of vaccines; and
some pursue a slaughter policy in which all
affected animals and contacts are killed.
326. It is obvious that a large epizootic
could constitute a very serious economic bur-
den, for example, by bringing about a serious
reduction in the supply of milk. It is in this
context that foot-and-mouth disease could
conceivably serve as a bacteriological (bio-
logical) weapon, especially since war condi-
tions would greatly promote its spread. Effi-
cient prevention is possible through active
immunization, but the immunity is rather
short-lived and annual vaccination is re-
quired.
327. Bruce/Zosis is an example of chronic
disease which could possibly result from
bacteriological (biological) weapon attacks.
There are three forms known, which attaffic
cattle, swine and goats respectively. Any of
these may be transmitted to man, in whom it
causes a debilitating but rarely fatal disease
lasting for four to six mon he or even longer.
It is enzootic in most countries of the world,
and an increased incidence of the disease re-
sulting from its use as a Weapon could be
dealt with, after the initial blow, In the
same way as is the natural disease. But the
cost of eliminating disease suela as brucellosis
from domestic animals is very high.
328. Anthrax was described in chapter II
and what concerns us here as that if large
quantities of anthrax spores were dis-
seminated in bacteriological (biological)
weapons, thus contaminating the soil of
large regions, danger to domestic animals and
man might persist for a very long time. There
is no known way by which areas could be
rendered safe. The use of large quantities of
anthrax as a weapon might therefore cause
long-term environmental hazards,
Against crops
329. The rust fungus, as already noted, is
one of the most damaging of natural path-
ogens which affects wheat crops. Each rust
pustule produces 20,000 uredospores a day
for two weeks, and there may be more than
100 pustules on a single infected leaf. The
ripe uredospores are easily detached from the
plant even by very weak air currents. The
spores are then carried by the wind over die-
tances of many hundreds of kilometres. It is
estimated that the annual total world loss
of wheat from rust is equivalent to about
43500 million.
330. Weather plays a decisive role in the
epiphytotic spreading of rust. Temperature
influences the incubation period and the
rate of uredospore germination. Germination
and infection occur only when there is a
water-saturated atmosphere for three to four
hours. Thus, epiphytotic spread occurs when
there are heavy dews and when the tem-
perature is between 10? and 30* C. The prin-
cipal means of prevention is to destroy the
pathogen and to breed resistant species.
Recently, ionizing radiation has been em-
ployed to develop resistant strains.
331. The cereal rusts die out during winter
unless some other susceptible plant host,
such as barberry, is present, and therefore
their effect on crops would be limited to a
single season. As they are capable of reducing
man's food reserves considerably, rust spores
could be extremely dangerous and efficient
bacteriological (biological) weapons, especi-
ally if deployed selectively with due regard
to climatic conditions. Artificial spreading
of an epiphytotic would be difficult to recog-
nize and delivery of the pathogen to the
target would be relatively simple.
332. Rust epiphytotics might have a very
serious effect in densely populated develop-
ing countries, where the food supply might
be reduced to such an extent that a human
population already suffering from malnu-
trition might be driven to starvation, which,
depending on the particular circumstances,
might last a long time.
333. Another conceivable biological wea-
pon, although neither a practical nor a
bacteriological one, is the potato beetle.
To use it for this purpose, the beetle would
have to be produced in large numbers, and
Introduced, presumably clandestinely, into
potato growing regions at the correct time
during maturation of the crop. In the course
of spread the beetle first lives in small foci,
which grow and increase until it becomes
established over large territories. The beetle
is capable of astonishing propagation: the
progeny of a single beetle may amount to
about 8,000 million in one-and-a-half years.
334. Since beetles prefer to feed and lay
their eggs in plants suffering from some viral
disease, they and their larvae may help
transmit the virus thereby increasing the
damage they cause. The economic damage
caused by the beetle varies with the season
and the country affected, but it can destroy
up to 80 per cent of the crop. Protection is
difficult because it has not been possible to
breed resistant potato species and the only
means available at present is chemical pro-
tection.
335. Were the beetle ever to be used suc-
cessfully for offensive purposes, it could
clearly help bring about long-term damage
because of the difficulty of control.
3. Genetic and Carcinogenic Changes
336. The possibility also exists that chem-
ical and bacteriological (biological) weapons
might cause genetic changes. Some chemicals
are known to do this. LSD, for example, is
known to cause genetic changes an human
cells. Such genetic changes, whether induced
by chemicals or viruses, might conceivably
have a bearing on the development of cancer.
A significantly increased incidence of cancer
In the respiratory tract (mainly lung) has
been reported recently among workers em-
ployed in the manufacture of mustard gas
during World War IL No increased preva-
lence of cancer has been reported among
mustard gas casualties of World War I al-
though it is doubtful if available records
would reveal it. However, most of these cas-
ualties were exposed for only short periods
to the gas whereas the workers were con-
tinuously exposed to small doges for months
or years.
CHAPTER V. ECONOMIC AND SECURITY IMPLICA-
TIONS OF THE DEVELOPMENT, ACQUISITION AND
POSSIBLE USE OF CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGr-
CAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS AND SYSTEMS OF
THEIR DELIVERY
A. Introduction
337. Previous chapters have revealed the
extent to which developments in chemical
and biological science have magnified the
potential risks associated with the concept of
chemical or bacteriological (biological) war-
fare. These risks derive not only from the
variety of possible agents which might be
used, but also from the variety of their effects.
The doubt that a chemical or bacteriological
(biological) attack could be restricted to a
given area means that casualties could occur
well outside the target zone. Were these
weapons used to blanket large areas and
cities, they would cause massive loss of hu-
man life, affecting non-combatants in the
same way as combatants, and in this respect,
they must clearly be classified as weapons of
mass destruction. The report has also empha-
sized the great problems and cost which
would be entailed in the provision of pro-
tection against chenaical and bacteriological
(biological) warfare. It is the purpose of this
final chapter to explore in greater depth the
economic and security implications of mat-
ters such as these.
B. Production
1. Chemical Weapons
338. It has been estimated that during the
course of the First World War, at a time when
the chemical Industry Was in a relatively
early stage of development, about 180,000
tons of chemical agents were produced, of
which more than 120,000 tons were used in
battle. With the rapid development of the
industry since then, there has been an
enormous growth in the potential capacity to
produce chemical agents.
339. The scale, nature, and cost of any
progamme for producing chemical weapons,
and the time needed to implement it, would
clearly be largely dependent on the scientific,
technical and industrial potential of the
country concerned. It would depend not only
on the nature of the chemical industry itself,
and on the availability of suitably trained
egnineers and: chemists, but also on the level
of development of the chemical engineering
Industry and of the means of automating
chemical processes, especially where the pro-
duction of highly toxic chemical compounds
is involved. Whatever the cost of developing
a chemical or bacteriological (biological)
capability, it needs to be realized that it
would be a cost additional to, and not a sub-
stitute for, that of acquiring an armoury of
conventional weapons. An army could be
equipped with the latter without having any
chemical or bacteriological (biological) weap-
ons. But it could never rely on chemical or
bacteriological (biological) weapons alone.
340. Today a large number of industrialized
countries have the potential to produce a
variety of chemical agents. Many of the in-
termediates required in their manufacture,
and in some cases even the agents themselves,
are widely used in peace time. Such sub-
stances include, for example, phosgene,
which some highly developed countries pro-
duce at the rate of more than 100,000 tons
a year and which is commonly used as an in-
termediate in the manufacture of synthetic
plastics, herbicides, insecticides, paints and
pharmaceuticals. Another chemical agent,
hydrocyanic acid, is a valuable intermediate
in the manufacture of a variety of synthetic
organic products and is produced in even
greater quantities. Ethylene-oxide, which is
used in the manufacture of mustard gases,
Is also produced on a large scale in various
countries. It is a valuable starting material
In the production of a large number of im-
portant substances, such as detergents, dis-
infectants and wetting agents. The world
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production of ethylene-oxide and propy-
lene-oxide is now well in excess of 2 million
tons per year. Mustard gas and nitrogen
mustard gases can be produced from ethy-
lene-oxide by a relatively simple process.
Two hundred and fifty thousand tons of
ethylene-oxide would yield about 500,000
tons of mustard gas.
341. The production of highly toxic nerve
agents, including organophosphorus com-
pounds, presents problems which, because
they are relatively difficult, could be very
costly to overcome. To a certain extent this
is because of the specialized safety precau-
tions which would be needed to protect work-
ers against these very poisonous substances,
a need which, of course, applies to all chem-
ical agents, especially to mustard gas. How-
ever, many intermediates used in the man-
ufacture of nerve agents have a peacetime
application: for example, dimethylphosphite,
necessary for the production of Sarin, is used
in the production of certain pesticides. But
even leaving operating expenses aside, the
approximate cost of acquiring one plant
complex to produce munitions containing
up to 10,000 tons of Sarin a year would be
about $150 million. The cost would, of course,
be considerably less if existing munitions
could be charged with chemical agents.
342. A country which possesses a well-
developed chemical industry could clearly
adapt it to produce chemical agents. But
were it to embark on such a step, it would
be only the beginning. The establishment of
a comprehensive chemical warfare capability
would also involve special research centres,
experimental test grounds, bases, storage
depots and arsenals. The development of so-
phisticated and comprehensive weapons sys-
tems for chemical or bacteriological (biolog-
ical) warfare would be a very costly part of
the whole process. None the less, the possi-
bility that a peacetime chemical industry
could be converted to work for military pur-
poses, and of chemical products being used
as weapons, increases the responsibility bf
Governments which are concerned to pre-
vent chemical warfare from ever breaking
out.
2. Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons
343. The microbiological expertise neces-
sary to grow agents of bacteriological (bio-
logical) warfare exists to a large extent in
many countries, since the requirements are
similar to those of a vaccine industry and,
to a lesser extent, a fermentation industry.
Apart from the combination of the highly
developed technologies of these two indus-
tries, there remains only a need for some
specialized knowledge, expertise and equip-
ment to permit the safe handling of large
quantities of bacteriological (biological)
agents. Consequently, existing facilities in
the fermentation, pharmaceutical and vac-
cine industries could be adapted for the
production of bacteriological (biological)
agents. But the technological complexities
of producing bacteriological (biological)
agents in dry powder form are very much
greater than for wet spray systems. More-
over, it would be desirable to provide an ef-
fective vaccine with which to protect pro-
duction staff. The technical difficulties would
increase with the scale and complexity of
the weapons systems that were being devel-
oped. But the fact remains that any indus-
trially advanced country could acquire what-
ever capability it set out to achieve in this
field.
344. The difficulty and cost of providing for
the transport and storage of bacteriological
(biological) weapons are considerable, since
special storage conditions, e.g., refrigeration,
and stringent safety and security precau-
tions are essential. In addition, testing to
determine the potential effectiveness of the
material produced would require consider-
able and costly testing facilities both in the
laboratory and in the field.
345. Despite the fact that the development
and acquisition of a sophisticated armoury
of chemical and bacteriological (biological)
weapons systems would prove very costly in
resources, and would be dependent on a
sound industrial base and a body of well-
trained scientists, any developing country
could in fact acquire, in one way or an-
other, a limited capability in this type of
warfare?either a rudimentary capability
which it developed itself, or a more sophisti-
cated one which it acquired from another
country. Hence, the danger of the prolifera-
tion of this class of weapons applies as much
to developing as it does to developed coun-
tries.
C. Delivery systems
346. Practically all types of explosive mu-
nitions (artillery shells, mines, guided and
unguided rockets, serial bombs, landmines,
grenades, etc.) can be adapted for the de-
livery of chemical agents. A modern bomber,
for example, can carry about fifteen tons of
toxic chemical agents, and it is estimated
that only 250 tons of V-gas, an amount
which could be delivered by no more than
fifteen or sixteen aircraft, is enough to con-
taminate a great city with an area of 1,000
square kilometres and a population of 7 to
10 million. Were such a population mainly
in the open and unprotected, fatal casual-
ties might reach the level of 50 per cent.
347. Existing armaments which (with
some modification) could be used to deliver
agents in order to generate local outbreaks
of disease, could also contaminate large
areas with pathogens. For example, a single
aircraft could cover with a bacteriological
(biological) agent an area of up to 100,000
square kilometres, although the area of ef-
fective dosage might be much smaller due
to loss of the infectivity of the airborne
agent.
348. While the development and produc-
tion costs of chemical and bacteriological
(biological) agents might well be high, the
cost of the complete weapons system (see
chapter I) would be even greater. The cost
of developing, procuring and operating a
squadron of modern bombers far outweighs
the cost of the bombs it could carry. How-
ever, for some purposes, an existing weapon
system or a far less sophisticated means of
disseminating might be used.
? D. Protection
349. The measures which would be re-
quired to protect a population, its livestock
and plants against chemical or bacteriological,
(biological) attack are immensely costly and
complex (chapter I). At present, warning
systems for the detection of aerosol clouds
are fairly rudimentary. Systems for the de-
tection of specific chemical and bacterio-
logical (biological) agents might be devised,
but again they are likely to prove very ex-
pensive, if indeed they are feasible.
350. With certain agents, contamination
of the environment, for example of buildings
and soil, could persist for several days or
weeks. Throughout this period people would
be exposed to the risk of contamination by
contact and by inhalation. Protective cloth-
ing, even if adequately prefabricated and
distributed or improvised, would make it
difficult to carry on with normal work. The
prolonged wearing of respirators causes
physiological difficulties, and it would prove
necessary to provide communal shelters with
air filtration and ventilations systems for
civil populations. Shelters would be extremely
costly to build and operate, and a programme
for their construction would constitute a
heavy burden on the economy.
351. Even if protective measures were pro-
vided against known agents, it is conceivable
that new ones might be developed whose
physical or chemical properties would dictate
a need for new individual and communal
protective equipment. This could constitute
an even greater economic burden.
352. Defensive measures, especially against
chemical agents, would also have to include
the extremely laborious and expensive task
of decontaminating large numbers of people,
as well as equipment, weapons and other
materials. This would mean setting up de-
contamination centres and training of people
in their use. Stocks of decontaminating
agents and replacement clothing would also
1?e required.
353. A very important part of a defence
system against chemical or bacteriological
(biological) weapons would be the means of
very rapidly detecting an attack and iden-
tifying the specific agent used in an attack.
Methods for doing this rapidly and accu-
rately are still inadequate. Specific protec-
tion against bacteriological (biological)
agents would necessitate the use of vac-
cines and perhaps antibiotics (see annex C
of chapter II). Vaccines vary in their effec-
tiveness, even against naturally-occurring in-
fections, and even those which are highly
effective in natural circumstances may not
protect against bacteriological (biological)
agents deliberately disseminated into the air
and inhaled into the lunge. Antibiotics used
prophylactically are a possible means of pro-
tection against bacteria and rickettsiae but
not against viruses. But the large and com-
plex problems of their use in large popula-
tions would be all but insuperable.
354. It would be extremely difficult to ar-
range for the medical treatment of a civil-
ian population which had been attacked with
chemical or bacteriological (biological)
weapons. Mobile groups of specialists in in-
fectious disease, of microbiologists, and of
well-trained epidemologists, would have to
be organized to provide for early diagnosis
and treatment, while a network of reserve
hospitals and a massive supply of drugs
would have to be prepared in advance. The
maintenance of a stockpile of medical sup-
plies is extremely costly. Many drugs, espec-
ially antibiotics, deteriorate in storage. Huge
amounts would have to be discarded as use-
less from time to time, and the stock would
have to be replenished periodically.
E. Cost to society
355. The extent to which the acquisition,
storage, transport and testing of chemical
and bacteriological (biological) munitions
would constitute an economic burden, would
depend on the level of a country's industrial
and military capability, although compared
to nuclear weapons and advanced weapons
systems in general, it might not seem ex-
cessive. But the task of organizing delivery
systems and deployment on a large or sophis-
ticated scale could well be economically dis-
astrous for many countries. Moreover the
preparation of an armoury of chemical and
bacteriological (biological) weapons would
constitute a possible danger to people in the
vicinity of production, storage and testing
facilities.
356. Chemical and bacteriological (biologi-
cal) attacks could be particularly dangerous
In towns and densely populated areas, be-
cause of the close contacts between individ-
uals, and because of the centralized provision
of services for every day necessities and
supply (services, urban transport networks,
trade, etc.). The consequences might also be
particularly serious in regions with a warm,
moist climate, in low lying areas, and in areas
with poorly developed medical facilities.
357. The technical and organizational com-
plexity, as well as the great financial cost,
of providing adequate protection for a popu-
lation against attack by chemical and bac-
teriological (biological) agents have already
been emphasized. The costs would be for-
midable by any standards. The construction
of a system of fall-out shelters to protect
only part of the population of one large and
highly developed country against nuclear
weapons has been estimated at no less than
$5,000?$10,000 million. Such shelters could be
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modified, at a relatively modest additional
cost, to provide protection against chemical
and bacteriological (biological) weapons. TO
construct communal shelters for a corre-
sponding part of the population against
chemical and bacteriologieal (biological)
weapons alone would cost much the same as
protection against nuclear fall-out. If all
other necessary related expenditures are con-
sidered?such as detection and warning sys-
tems, communications, and medical aid?the
total coats of civil defence against chemical
and bacteriological (biological) agents would
be greater than $15,000-$25,000 million for a
developed country of 100-200 million people.
But even if such a programme were ever
planned and implemented, there could be
no assurance that full protection could be
achieved.
358. For whatever its cost, no shelter pro-
gramme could provide absolute protection
against attack by chemical or bacteriologi-
cal (biological) agents. Protective measures
would be effective only if there were adequate
warning of an attack, and if civil defence
plans were brought into operation immedi-
ately and efficiently. However, many shelters
were available, the likelihood would be that
large numbers of people would be affected to
varying degrees, and would be in urgent need
of medical attention, and once hostilities had
ceased, that there would be large numbers
of chronic sick and invalids, requiring care,
support and treatment, and imposing a heavy
burden on a society already disorganized by
war.
359. It is almost impossible to conceive of
the complexity of the arrangements which
would be necessary to control the conse-
quences of a large-scale bacteriological (bio-
logical) attack. Even in peacetime, the de-
velopment of an epidemic of a highly con-
tagious disease started by a few individual
cases, introduced from abroad, necessitates
enormous material expenditure and the di-
version of large numbers of medical person-
nel. Examples of widespread disruption due
to a few smallpox contacts are given in chap-
ter II. No estimates are given of the actual
costs involved in dealing with these events,
but in some cases they must have run into
millions of dollars. Large-scale bacteriologi-
cal (biological) attacks could thus have
serious impact on the entire economy of the
target country and, as is observed in chapter
II, depending on the type of agent used, the
disease might well spread to neighbouring
countries.
360. Whatever might be done to try to save
human beings, nothing significant could be
done to protect crops, livestock, fodder and
food-stuffs from a chemical and bacterio-
logical (biological) weapons attack. Persist-
ent chemical agents could constitute a par-
ticular danger to livestock.
361. Water in open reservoirs could be
polluted as a result of deliberate attack, or
perhaps accidentally, with chemical or bac-
teriological (biological) weapons. The water
supply of large towns could become unusable,
and rivers, lakes and streams might be tem-
porarily contaminated.
362. Enormous damage could be done to the
economy of a country whose agricultural
crops were attacked with herbicides. For ex-
ample, only ten to 10 grammes per hectare
of 2, 413 could render a cotton crop com-
pletely unporductive (see annex A). Fruit
trees, grape vines and many other plants
could also be destroyed. Mixtures of 2, 413,
of 2, 4, 5T and piclomm are particularly po-
tent. The chemical known as paraquate can
destroy virtually all annual plants, includ-
ing leguminous plants, rice, wheat and other
cereals. Arsenic compounds clessicate the
leaves of many crops and make them unusa-
ble as food. There are no means known at
present of regenerating some of the plants
which are affected by herbicides. Experience
has shown, however, that in the case of some
species, either natural or artificial seeding
can easily produce normal growth in the next
growing season. But the destruction of fruit
trees, vines and other plants, if achieved
could not be overcome for many years. For
most practical purposes, it would be impos-
sible to prevent the destruction of cultivated
plants on which herbicides have been used,
and depending on a country's circumstances,
widespread famine might follow.
363. If the induced disease were to spread,
bacteriological (biological) weapons could af-
fect even more extensive agricultural areas.
The effect would however be more delayed
and more specific to the corps affected. An-
nex A gives examples of the extent of the
decrease in a wheat harvest and in a rice
harvest affected by blast. The uredospores of
the rust are easily transported by air cur-
rents so that down-wind sections would be
affected by rust to a considerable distance,
with a corresponding sharp reduction in the
crop, while the upwind sections gave a good
yield.
364. Over and above all these possible ef-
fects of chemical and bacteriological (bio-
logical) warfare on farm animals and crops
is the possibility discussed in the previous
chapter, of widespread ecological changes due
to deleterious changes brought about in wild
fauna and flora,
F. The relevance of chemical and bacterio-
logical (biological) weapons to military
and civil security
365. The comparison of the relative effec-
tiveness of different classes of weapons is a
hazardous and often futile exercise. The ma-
jor difficulty is that from the military point
of view, effectiveness cannot be measured
just in terms of areas of devastation or of
numbers of casualties. The final criterion
would always be whether a specific military
purpose had been more easily achieved with
one rather than another set of weapons.
366. Clearly, from what has been said in
the earlier chapters of this report, chemical
weapons could be more effective than equiva-
lent weights of high explosive when directed
against densely populated targets. Similarly,
so far as mass casualties are concerned, bac-
teriological (biological) weapons could, in
some circumstances, have far more devastat-
ing effects than chemical weapons, and ef-
fects which might extend well beyond the
zone of military operations.
367. From the military point of view, one
essential difference between anti-personnel
chemical and bacteriological (biological)
weapons on the one hand,, and a conven-
tional high explosive weapon on the other
(including small arms and the whole range
of projectiles), is that the area of the effects
of the latter is more predictable. There are,
of course, circumstances where, from the
point of view of the individuals attacked, an
incapacitating gas would be less damaging
than high explosives. On the other hand,
whereas military forces can, and do, rely en-
tirely upon conventional weapons, no coun-
try, as already observed, could entrust its
military security to an armoury of chemical
and bacteriological (biological) weapons
alone. The latter constitute only one band
in the spectrum of weapons.
368. As previous chapters have also shown,
neither the effectiveness nor the effects of
chemical and bacteriological (biological)
weapons can be predicted with assurance.
Whatever military reasons might be advanced
for the use of these weapons, and whatever
their nature, whether incapacitating or
lethal, there would be significant risk of
escalation, not only in the use of the same
type of weapon but also of other categories
of weapons systems, once their use had been
initiated. Thus, chemical and bacteriological
(biological) warfare could open the door to
hostilities which could become less con-
trolled, and less controllable, than any war
In the past. Uncontrollable hostilities can-
not be reconciled with the concept of mili-
tary security.
369. Since some chemical and bacteriologi-
cal (biological) weapons constitute a major
threat to civilian populations and their food
and water supplies, their use cannot be rec-
onciled with general national and interna-
tional security. Further, because of the scale
and intensity of the potential effects of their
use, they are considered as weapons of mass
destruction. Their very existence thus con-
tributes to international tension without
compensating military advantages. They gen-
erate a sense of insecurity not only in coun-
tries which might be potentially belligerent,
but also in those which are not. Neutral
countries could be involved through the use
of chemical and bacteriological (biological)
weapons, especially those whose territories
bordered on countries involved in conflict
in the course of which chemical and bac-
teriological (biological) casualties had been
suffered by garrisons and civilians close to
frontiers. The effects of certain bacteriolo-
gical (biological) weapons used on a large
scale might be particularly difficult to con-
fine to the territory of a small country. Large-
scale chemical and bacteriological (biologi-
cal) agents and chemical agents might be
used for acts of sabotage. Such events might
occur as isolated acts, even carried out in
defiance of the wishes of national leaders
and military commanders. The continued
existence and manufadture of chemical weap-
ons anywhere may make such occurrences
more likely.
370. Obviously any extensive use of chem-
ical weapons would be known to the country
attacked. The source of the attack would
probably also be known. On the other hand,
it would be extremely difficult to detect iso-
lated acts of sabotage in which bacteriolo-
gical (biological) weapons were used, espe-
cially if the causative organism were already
present in the attacked country. Because of
the suspicions they would generate, acts of
sabotage could thus provoke a conflict in-
volving the widespread use of chemical and
bacteriological (biological) weapons.
ANNEX A
ECONOMIC LOSS FROM POSSIBLE USE OF CHEMICAL AND
BACTERIOLOGICAL(BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS AGAINST CROPS
TABLE 1.?ECONOMIC LOSS WHICH COULD RESULT FROM
THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS DUE TO THE DESTRUC-
TION OF CROPS PER HECTARE OF LAND
Type of
plant
Average
harvest
On tons
per hectare)
Price of
1 ton in
U.S. dollars
Sum total of
losses in U.S.
dollars per
hectare
Cotton 3 600 1,800
Rice 5 84 420
Wheat 3 69 207
Apple tree 30 '140 I 8, 400
'Will not produce apples for 2 years.
TABLE 2.?ECONOMIC LOSS DUE TO THE USE OF
BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS AGAINST CROPS
Plant Type of agent
Loss in
Losses U.S.
dollars
Per- Tons per
cent hectare hectare
re
Wheat Cereal rust (Puccinla 80 24 165
graminis)
Rice Rice blast (Piricu- 70 35 294
!aria drizae).
CONCLUSION
371. All weapons of war are destructive of
human life, but chemical and bacteriological
(biological) weapons stand in a class of their
own as armaments which exercise their ef-
fects solely on living matter. The idea that
bacteriological (biological) weapons could
deliberately be used to spread disease gen-
erates a sense of horror. The fact that cer-
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August 11, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
tabs chemical and bacteriological (biological)
agents are potentially unconfined in their
effects, both in space and time, and that
their large-scale use could conceivably have
deleterious and irreversible effects on the
balance of nature adds to the sense of insecu-
rity and tension which the existence of this
class of weapons engenders. Considerations
such as these set them into a category of their
own in relation to the continuing arms race.
372. The present inquiry has shown that
the potential for developing an armoury of
chemical and bacteriological (biological)
weapons has grown considerably in recent
years, not only in terms of the number of
agents, but also in their toxicity and in the
diversity of their effects. At one extreme,
chemical agents exist and are being developed
for use in the control of civil disorders; and
others have been developed in order to in-
crease the productivity of agriculture. But
even though these substances may be less
toxic than most other chemical agents, their
ill-considered civil use, or use for military
purposes could turn out to be highly dan-
gerous. At the other extreme, some potential
chemical agents whieh could be used in
weapons are among the moat lethal poisons
known. In certain circumstances the area
over which some of them might exercise their
effects could be strictly confined geographi-
cally. In other conditions some chemical and
bacteriological (biological) weapons might
spread their effects well beyond the target
zone. No one could predict how long the
effects of certain agents, particularly bac-
teriological (biological) weapons might en-
dure and spread and what changes they could
generate.
373. Moreover, chemical and bacteriological
(biological) weapons are not a cheap sub-
stitute for other kinds of weapon. They rep-
resent an additional drain on the national
resources of those countries by which they
are developed, produced and stockpiled. The
cost cannot of course be estimated with pre-
cision; this would depend on the potential of
a country's industry. To some the cost might
be tolerable; to others it would be crippling,
particularly, as has already been shown, when
account is taken of the resources which
would have to be diverted to the develop-
ment of testing and delivery systems. And
no system of defence, even for the richest
countries in the world, and whatever its
cost, could be completely secure.
374. Because chemical and bacteriological
(biological) weapons are unpredictable, in
varying degree, either in the scale or dura-
tion of their effects, and because no certain
defence can be planned against them, their
universal elimination would not detract from
any nation's security. Once any chemical or
bacteriological (biological) weapon had been
used in warfare, there would be a serious
risk of escalation, both in the use of more
dangerous weapons belonging to the same
class, and of other weapons of mass destruc-
tion. In short, the development of a chemical
or bacteriological (biological) armoury, and
a defence. Implies an economic burden with-
out necessarily imparting any proportionate
compensatory advantage to security. And at
the same time it imposes a new and con-
tinuing threat to future international
security.
375. The general conclusion of the report
can thus be summed up in a few lines. Were
these weapons ever to be used on a large
scale in war, no one could predict how en-
during the effects would be, and how they
would affect the structure of society and the
environment in which we live. This over-
riding danger would apply as much to the
country which initiated the use of these
weapons as to the one which had been at-
tacked, regardless of what protective meas-
ures it might have taken in parallel with its
development of an offensive capability. A par-
ticular danger also derives from the fact that
any country could develop or acquire, in one
way or another, a capability in this type of
warfare, despite the Riot that this could prove
costly. The danger of the proliferation of
this class of weapons applies as much to the
developing as it does to developed countries.
376, The momentum of the arms race
would clearly decrease if the production at
these weapons were effectively and uncon-
ditionally banned. Their use, which could
?ante an enormous loss of human life, has
already been condemned and prohibited by
international agreements, in particular the
Geneva Protocol of 1925, and, more recently,
in resolutions of the General Assembly of
the United Nations. The prospects for gen-
eral and complete disarmament under effec-
tive international control, and hence for
peace throughout the world, would brighten
significantly if the development, production
and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriologi-
cal (biological) agents intended for purposes
of war were to end and if they were elimi-
nated from all military arsenals.
377. If this were to happen, there would
be a general lessening of international fear
and tension. It la the hope of the authors
that this report will contribute to public
awareness of the profoundly dangerous re-
sults if these weapons were ever used, and
that an aroused public will demand and re-
ceive assurances that Governments are work-
ing for the earliest effective elimination of
chemical and bacteriological (biological)
weapons.
APPENDIXES
Protocol for the prohibition of the use in
war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other
gases, and of bacteriological methods of
warfare, signed at Geneva, 17 June 1925
The undersigned plenipotentiaries, in the
name of their respective Governments:
Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating,
poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous
liquids, materials or devices, has been justly
condemned by the general opinion of the
civilized world;
Whereas the prohibition of such use has
been declared in Treaties to which the ma-
jority of Powers of the world are Parties;
and
To the end that this prohibition shall be
universally accepted as a part of Interna-
tional Law, binding alike the conscience and
the practice of nations; ?
Declare:
That the High Contracting Parties, so far
as they are not already Parties to Treaties
prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition,
agree to extend this prohibition to the use
of bacteriological methods of warfare and
agree to be bound as between themselves
according to the terms of this declaration,
The High Contracting Parties will exert
every effort to induce other States to accede
to the present Protocol. Such accession will
be notified to the Government of the French
Republic, and by the latter to all signatory
and acceding Powers, and will take effect on
the date of the notification by the Govern-
ment of the French Republic.
The present Protocol, of which the French
and English texts are both authentic, shall
be ratified as soon as possible. It shall bear
today's date.
The ratifications of the present Protocol
shall be addressed to the Government of the
French Republic; which will at once notify
the deposit of such ratification to each of
the signatory and acceding Powers.
The instruments of ratification of and ac-
cession to the present Protocol will remain
deposited in the archives of the Government
of the French Republic.
The present Protocol will come into force
for each signatory Power as from the date of
deposit of its ratification, and, from that
moment, each Power will be bound as re-
gards other Powers which have already de-
posited their ratifications.
In witness whereof the Plenipotentiaries
have signed the present Protocol,
S 9549
Done at Geneva in a single copy, the
seventeenth day of June, One Thousand Mile
Hundred and Twenty-Five.
RESOLUTION 2162 13 (am)
(1484th plenary meeting, December 5,1966)
The General Assembly,
Guided by the principles of the Charter
of the United Nations and of international
law.
Considering that weapons of mass destruc-
tion constitute a danger to all mankind and
are incompatible with the accepted norms
of civilization,
Affirming that the strict observance of the
rules of international law on the conduct of
warfare is in the interest of maintaining
these standards of civilization,
Recalling that the Geneva Protocol for
the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxi-
ating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bac-
teriological Methods of Warfare, of 17 June
1925, has been signed and and adopted and
is recognized by many States,
Noting that the Conference of the Eight-
een-Nation Committee on Disarment has the
task of seeking an agreement on the cessa-
tion of the development and production of
chemical and bacteriological weapons and
other weapons of mass destruction, and on
the elimination of all such weapons from
national arsenals, as called for in the draft
proposals on general and complete disarma-
ment now before the Conference.
1. Calls for strict observance by all States
of the principles and objectives of the Proto-
col for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed
at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and condemns
all actions contrary to those objectives;
2. Invites all States to accede to the Ge-
neva Protocol of 17 June 1925,
RESOLUTION 2454 A (XXIII)
(1750th plenary meeting, December 20,1968)
The General Assembly,
Reaffirming the recommendations of its
resolution 2162 B (MCI) calling for strict
observance by all States of the principles and
objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition
of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous
or other Oases, and of Bacteriological Meth-
ods of Warfare signed at Geneva on 17 June
1925, condemning all actions contrary to
those objectives and inviting all States to
accede to that Protocol,
Considering that the possibility of the use
of chemical and bacteriological weapons con-
stitutes a serious threat to mankind,
Believing that the People of the world
should be made aware of the consequences
of the use of chemical and bacteriological
weapons,
Having considered the report of the Eight-
een-Nation Disarmament Committee which
recommended that the Secretary-General ap-
point a group of experts to study the effects
of the possible use of such weapons,
Noting the interest in a report on various
aspects of the problem of chemical, bacterio-
logical and other biological weapons which
has been expressed by many Governments
and the welcome given to the recommenda-
tion of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament
Committee by the Secretary-General in his
Annual Reports for 1967-68,
Believing that such a study would provide
a valuable contribution to the consideration
in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Com-
mittee of the problems connected with chem-
ical and bacteriological weapons,
Recalling the value of the report of the
Secretary-General on the effects of the pos-
sible use of nuclear weapons,
1. Requests the Secretary-General to pre-
pare a concise report In accordance with the
proposal in Part II of his Introduction to
the Annual Report for 1967-68 and in ac-
cordance with the recommendation of the
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 11 1969
contained in paragraph 26 of its report (doc- Hilleman, M. R. "Toward Control of Viral fashion I have seen, the implications
uraent A/7189) ; Infections in. Man", Science, Volume 167, of engaging in this kind of warfare.
2. Recommends that the report be based on 1969, p. 3879.
accessible material and prepared with the Horsfall, F. L., Jr. and Tamm. I. Viral and The Secretary General, in his conclu-
assistance of qualified consultant experts by Rickettsial Infections of Man. Lippincott, mon, states that:
the Secretary-General, taking tnto account Philadelphia 1965 4th Edition, The generalconclusion of the report can
the views expressed and the suggestions Horafall, J. G. and Dimond, A. E. [Edi- thus be summed up in a few lines. Were
made during the discussion of this item at tors] Plant Pathology: An Advanced Treatise, these weapons ever to be used on a large
the twenty-third session of the General As- New York: Academic Press, 1959 and 1960, scale in war, no one could predict how en-
sembly;
3 volumes, during the effects would be, and how they
3. Calls upon Governments, national and Hull. T. G. Diseases Transmitted from Ani- would affect the structure of society and
international scientific institutions and or- mats to Man. Springfield, Illinois: C. C. the environment in which we live. This over-
ganizations to co-operate with the Secretary- Thomas, 1963, 5th Edition, riding danger would apply as much to the
General in the preparation of the report; Jacobs, Morris B. War Gases, New York: country which initiated the use of these
4. Rquests that the report be transmitted Interscience Publishers, Inc., 1942. weapons as to the one which had been at-
to the Eighteen-Nation Dial rtnantent Corn- Jackson, S. et al. BC Warfare Agents. Stock- tacked, regardless of what protective meas-
mittee, the Security Council and the Gen- holm: Research Institute of National De- ures it might have taken in parallel with
eral Assembly at an early dale, if possible by fence, 1969. its development of an offensive capability. A
/ July 1969, and to the Governments of pepper, M. If. and Wolfe, E. IC. [Editors] particular danger 9180 derives from the fact
Member States in time to permit its ?On- "Second International Conference on Aero- that any country could develop or acquire,
sideration at the twenty-fourth session of biology (Airborne Infection)", Bacteriological in one way or another, a capability in this
the General Assembly; Reviews, Volume 30, No. 3, 1986. pp. 487- type of warfare, despite the fact that this
5. Recommends that Governments give the 698. could prove costly. The danger of the prolif-
report wide distribution in their respective Liddell Hart, B. H. The Real War, 1914- eration of this class of weapons applies as
languages, through varioue media of corn- 1918. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., much to the developing as it does to de-
munication, so as to acquaint public opinion 1931. veloped countries.
with its contents; Lohs, K. Synthetische Gifts. Berlin: Verlag The momentum of the arms race would
6. Reiterates its call for strict observance det Ministeriums fur Nationale verteidigung, clearly decrease if the production of these
by all States of the principles and objec- 1958. 2/1 Edition, 1963. weapons Were effectively and unconditionally
lives of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 Lurey, W. P. "The Climate at Cities", Sci- banned. Their use, which could cause an
and invites all States to accede to that entitle American, No. 217, Aug. 1987. enormous loss of human life, has already
Protocol.
Matunovic,Co. N. Biological Agents in War, been condemned and prohibited by inter-
national agreements, in particular the Ca-
Belgrade: Military Publishing Bureau of the
Yugoslav People's Army, 1958. (Translated neva Protocol of 1925, and, more recently,
BIBLIOGRAPkri
Baroian, 0. V. [Russian Title.] by the U.S. Joint Publications Research Serv- in resolutions of the General Assembly of
Brown, F. J. Chemical Warfare: A. Study in ice 1118-N.) the United Nations.
Restraints, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton McDermott, W. [Editor] "Conference on The PRESIDING OkkICER. The time
University Press, 1968. Airborne Infection", Bacteriological Reviews, of the Senator has expired.
Bruner, D. W. and Gillespie,
Volume 25, No. 3, 1961, pp. 173-382.
II, Hagan's Th -
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, does the
ng-
fectious Diseases of Domestic Animals. Meteorology and Atomic Energy. Washing-
Senator from New Hampshire desire
ton, D.C.: US Atomic Energy Commission,
Ithaca, New York: Comstock Publishing As-
July 1965. more time?
sociataion. bah Edition.
Clarke, R. The Silent Weapons, New York: Mel'fljkov, N. N. [Russian title.] Mr. McINTYRE. Not at the present
McKay, 1968 Moulton, F. R. [Editor] 1942. Aerobiology. moment.
Davis, B. D., Dulbecco, R., Eisen, . N,
Washington: American Association for the Mr. NELSON. MT. President, I would
H
Ginsberg, II. s., and Wood, VV, B., Jr. Micro- Advancement of Science, 1942, Publication
No. 17. like to ask for 2 minutes to complete the
biology, New York: Reaper and Row, 1967.
reading of that statement.
Dubos, R. J. and Hirsh, 3, o. Bacterial and Nonmilitary Defense. Chemical and Bio-
Mycotic Infections of Man. Philadelphia: logical Defenses in Perspective. Washington
Mr. SS. Oh, I thought the Sen-
Lippincott, 1965. 4th Edition, D.C.: American Chemical Society. 1960, Ad-
ator had concluded.
Farrow, Edward S. Gas Warfare. New York: vances in Chemistry Series No. 26. Mr. NELSON. No.
E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1920, Prentiss, A. M. Chemicals in War. New Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 2
Fries, Amos A. and West, Clarence J. Chem- York: McGraw-Mill Book Co., Inc., 1937. minutes to the Senator from Wisconsin.
ical Warfare. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Rose, S. [Editor] (YEW: Chemical and Bio-
Co., 1921. ,
logical Warfare. Boston: Beacon Press, 1969. Mr. NELSON. I thank the Senator.
Fothergill, L. D. "The Biological Warfare Rosebury, T. Experimental Airborne Infec- I lust want to read the completion of
Threat", In Nonmilitary Defense: Chemical tion. Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1947, this summary:
and Biological Defenses in Perspective. Ad- Rosebury, T. Peace or Pestilence. New York:
vances in Chemistry Series 26, Washington: McGraw-Hill, 1949. The prospects for general and complete
disarmament under effective international
American Chemical Society, 1960, pp. 23-33. Rosebury, T. and Kabat, E. A. "Bacterial
Fothergill, L. D. "Biological Warfare: Na- Warfare", Journal of Immunology, Volume control, and hence for peace throughout the
world, would brighten significantly if the de-
ture and Consequences", Texas State Jour- 56, 1947, pp. 7-96.
rut/ of Medicine, Volume 60, 1964, pp. 8-14. Rosicky, B., "Natural Foci of Diseases" veloprnent, production and stockpiling of, In: chemical and bacteriological (biological)
Fox, Major L. A. "Bacterial Warfare: The A. Cockburn [Editor] Infectious Diseases, agents intended for purposes of war were to
Use of Biological Agents in Th
Warfare", The Springfield, Ill.: C. Thomas, 1967.
Military Surgeon, Volume 72, No. 3, 1933, Rothschild, J. H. Tcnnorrow's Weapons, end and if they were eliminated from all
military arsenals.
pp. 189-207.
New York: McGraw-1111i, 1954.
_
Franke, S. "Lehrbuch der Militarchemie". Barton,"If this were to happen, there would be aiMario. The War Gases. New York:
Deutsche Militar V general lessening of International fear and
erlag. Volume 1, 1,967. D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1939. tension. It is the hope of the authors that
Geiger, R. Das Klima do Bodernnahen
SOrbo, B. "Tear gases and tear gas weap- this report will contribute to public aware-
Sohn,
Brunswich: Fredrick-I Viewey and ons". Lakartidningen. Volume 66, 1969, p. ness of the profoundly dangerous results if
Green, H. L. and Lane, W. R. Particulate
Sohn, 1961.
448.
these weapons were ever used, and that an
Clouds: Dusts, Smokes and Mists. London: E.
Vedder, E. B. The Medical Aspects of Chem- aroused public will demand and receive as-
and F. N. Sporn, 1964. ical Warfare,. Baltimore, Md.: Williams and aurances that Governments are working for
Gregory, P. H. and Monteith., J. L. Air-
Wilkens Co., 1925. the earliest effective elimination of chemical
borne Microbes. London: Cambridge Univer- Waitt, A. E. Gas Warfare, New York: Duell, and bacteriological (biological) weapons."
sity Press, 1967. Sloan and Pearce, 1944. I have given the study prepared by the
Hatch, T. F. and Gross, P. pulmonary Dep- World Health Organization, Air Pollution, consultant experts my earnest consideration
osition and Retention of Inhaled Aerosols. Monograph Series. Geneva: 1961. and I have decided to accept their unanimous
. . .
New York and London: Academic Press,
report in its entirety,
1964. Mr. NELSON, Mr. President, it is the
Eeden, C. G. "Defences Against Biological most comprehensiveI simply say I wish to endorse that
document of this
Warfare", Annual Review of microbiologg, kind that has been called to my atten- statement of the Secretary General. I
Volume 21, 1967, pp. 639-676. tion. I think it is in the interest of the think the elimination of the production,
Herten, C. G. "The Infectious Dust Cloud" Congress and the public that it be distribution, and stockpiling of this kind
In Nigel Calder [Editor] Unless Peace Comes;
printed in. full in the RECORD. The United of weapon is our ultimate goal.
a Scientific Forecast of New Weapons, New
York: The Viking Press, 1968. Nations report was compiled by an in- I thank the Senator from Mississippi
Hersh, S. At Chemical and Biological War- ternationally distinguished group of sci- for yielding.
fare: America's Hidden Arsenal. New York: entists, representing many nations, and Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield
Bobbs-1krerrill, 1968. I think presents, in the most effective myself such time as I may take.
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The Senator from Indiana has indi-
cated that he may want some time.
Mr. HARTKE. Five minutes.
Mr. STENNIS. I yield the Senator from
Indiana 5 minutes.
Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, first, I
should like to thank the committee for
the action it has taken in concerning
itself with the very important question of
chemical and biological warfare, and also
to express my special thanks to the dis-
tinguished Senator from New Hamp-
shire (Mr. MCINTYRE) for the fine work
he has done with regard to this rather
complicated but at the same time very
important legislation dealing with a mat-
ter of general concern not alone to the
people of this country, but the whole
world.
In the statement of the Senator from
New Hampshire (Mr. MCINTYRE) , he also
made mention of the fact that we are
dealing with the shipment of such ma-
terials which are shipped by those other
than the Defense Department itself. I
think it is very important for us to recog-
nize that the shipment of any type of
material of this kind which is dangerous
to the public generally should be dealt
with; that it is not just the Pentagon
itself which is the one unit which is
shipping material which can be hazard-
ous to the public health.
It is my intention to support legisla-
tion by the Senator from New Hampshire
to prohibit the shipment of such mate-
rials by other agencies, including private
corporations, because we know that a
large number of potentially dangerous
biological agents which are shipped
through the country generally are not
under any real control. It has been a
matter of great concern to me, and the
committee has held hearings on surface
transportation.
Also, the whole question of chemical
and biological warfare is not a new issue
in the Senate. Many of us can recall the
intense publicity campaign waged by the
Army Chemical Corps nearly 10 years
ago?a campaign designed to inform the
Congress as to the supposed economy and
humanity of gas and germ warfare. At
that time we were told that chemicals
and biologicals were "Tomorrow's weap-
ons," and that they would some day
make it possible for Nations to wage a
"war without death."
This publicity campaign succeeded in
boosting the status of the chemical corps
and our CBW budget increased three-
fold between 1961 and 1963.
Also, as our involvement in Vietnam
deepened, R. & D. gradually gave way to
manufacturing, stockpiling, and combat
use. Procurement budgets, now shrouded
in wartime secrecy, have grown to dis-
turbing proportions. "Tomorrow's Weap-
ons" are now costing us more than $1
million a day. Our CBW program?once
an underfunded vision?has grown into
an uncontrolled nightmare. "Tomorrow's
Weapons" are with us today?but they
have brought with them fear, suffering,
and disaster. The use of tear gas in Viet-
nam to flush the enemy from cover, and
the use of herbicides to destroy Viet-
namese food supplies, is not the humane
"war without death" that we were prom-
ised. The Utah sheep-kill episode and
the nerve gas disposal issue have brought
the dangers of CBW closer to home. Ac-
cidents in Okinawa and open air testing
in Maryland have only served to in-
tensify public fears about lethal gases
and germs.
I recall one instance in which I was
rather severely criticized for complaining
about the utilization of this type of ma-
terial; and the man in charge of the
operation said, "Well, this is just killing
without a 'bang.'" I think killing is ef-
fective whether with a "bang" or not.
Predictably, as CBW budgets have
grown, the Army's craving for publicity
has disappeared. Today, the issue of
chemical and biological warfare is being
raised primarily by civilian opponents
rather than by Pentagon advocates.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
of the Senator has expired.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield
the Senator 2 minutes.
Mr. HARTKE. I thank the Senator.
The Senate action today has been
prompted by a profound public concern?
a concern that becomes harder to con-
trol the longer we delay. The American
people are demanding the Congress take
a hard look at our chemical and biologi-
cal warfare program?a hard, critical
look.
The amendment we are considering to-
day is a modest step in the right direc-
tion. It puts mild restrictions on cer-
tain kinds of testing, limits the develop-
ment of certain kinds of delivery sys-
tems, prohibits stockpiling of CB weap-
ons overseas, and provides greater safety
in transportation of lethal chemicals and
biologicals. But most important, in my
mind, it strips away some of the unnec-
essary secrecy which surrounds our CBW
program. My own contributions to the
amendment are embodied in the report
requirement, the prohibition on "back-
door" financing, and the rail shipment
notification restrictions. These provi-
sions, providing the Congress with basic
information on the scope and the pur-
pose of our CBW program, will make the
other restrictions easier to enforce, and
will prevent ungrounded public fears
from turning CBW into a dangerous and
emotional issue.
Mr. President, the CBW issue need
not grow into a symbolic attack on mili-
tary spending, or a ritualistic defense of
military preparedness. It can be judged
on its own terms, thanks to the collective
efforts of those who have brought this
widely accepted amendment to the floor.
This amendment provides the Senate
with an opportunity to answer its own
questions, to express its concern, and to
respond to public demands, without im-
pairing our military capabilities or com-
promising our Nation's security.
I thank the Senator from Mississippi
for yielding me this time.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Mississippi yield me
2 minutes to respond?
Mr. STENNIS.. Yes. Mr. President, I
yield the Senator from New Hampshire
2 minutes.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I
commend the Senator from Indiana
wholeheartedly for his interest in this
field, particularly in this year of 1969,
and I commend, too, the fact that his
staff, working together with my staff and
Pentagon personnel, have done a lot of
hard work. There was much give and
take in working out these compromises.
The Senator and his staff have displayed
great merit, and deserve our commenda-
tion.
The Senator made mention, in his re-
marks, about shipments of biological
agents throughout the United States, not
by the Department of Defense but by
others. The Senator may be aware of
what I am about to say. I think he has
made reference to the fact that his com-
mittee has oversight of the matter.
Mr. HARTKE. That is correct.
Mr. McINTYRE. The American Type
Culture Collection, which is a private
group in Washington, D.C., made ship-
ments of nearly 20,000 different cultures
of bacteria and viruses, many of them
deadly, in 196'7 and again in 1968.
During these same years Fort Detrick
made shipments totally about 400?about
200 a year.
Figures are not readily available for
the shipments of these bacteria and
viruses by the communicable disease lab
with headquarters in Atlanta, Ga., but I
understand that there is a heavy move-
ment of these agents by the laboratories.
Mr. HARTKE. I thank the Senator
from New Hampshire for this informa-
tion. We will certainly bring it up in com-
mittee, and I think we can come forward
with some legislation this year which will
be effective in making it possible for us
to provide greater protection for the
people generally in transporting these
agents, which are potentially so danger-
ous and so deadly.
Mr. McINTYRE. I think that will be
fine, because I think the whole group of
amendments sponsored by the Senator
from Indiana, the Senator from Wiscon-
sin, the Senator from New York, the
Senator from Texas, the Senator from
Rhode Island, and others, have demon-
strated that Congress feels the need for
more control over shipments of these
deadly germs and deadly gases, and not
only for more control, but for more
knowledge about them.
I thank the Senator.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield
myself 2 minutes.
As chairman of the committee, I high-
ly congratulate the Senator from New
Hampshire (Mr. McINTYRE) for the
splendid work he has done on this sub-
ject during our hearings. I also com-
mend him and the authors of the various
amendments for the work that they have
done in this highly important field, which
has developed to the point where it needs
such regulation as is reflected by these
amendments. I believe the Senators and
the staffs have done a splendid job; and
in fact I support the amendments. We
have not had a chance to have a com-
mittee meeting, and I cannot speak for
the committee, but I have discussed the
matter with the Senator from Maine
(Mrs. SMITH), and I am sure she will
have a word to say in their support.
I point out that the committee took
out the $16 million for research and
development of lethal offensive chemical
and biological items. This is follow-on to
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the work of the McIntyre subcommittee,
with the other Senators who authored
these amendments. I believe they have
done a splendid job.
I discussed this matter on the tele-
phone Saturday morning with Secretary
Laird, and he thinks some regulation is
desirable.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Ben-
ator's time has expired.
Mr. STENNIS. I yield myself 1 addi-
tional minute.
He expressed concern about the situ-
ation, and an inclination to support the
amendment; and later, at a press con-
ference, he did express support for it.
So I commend it to the Senate. As I
say, I think the Senator Crom Maine will
have a few words in its favor also. I
thank the Senator from Wisconsin, for
the committee, for his very generous
words with respect to our efforts on this
bill.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield to the Senator
from New Hampshire.
Mr. McENTYRE. I ask for the yeas and
nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if I have
any time left, I yield to the Senator from
Arizona.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I
merely wish to say that I believe the
chairman has made a ve2y wise move in
accepting this amendment. While, as he
said, I cannot speak for the whole com-
mittee, I want him to know that at least
he has the backing of the junior Sena-
tor from Arizona.
We did a good bit of work on this sub-
ject in committee. It Is a very touchy,
very sensitive field, that all of us be-
lieve should have regulation, or more
regulation, and I am very happy that
the distinguished Senator from New
Hampshire was able to work out the com-
promise that he did, with the large num-
ber of amendments with which he had
to work. He has done an oustanding job
all through the writing of this bill and
its defense on the floor. So, Mr. Presi-
dent, I am glad that the chairmanl has
indicated the position which he has with
respect to the action which is about to
be taken.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank
the Senator very much.
The PRESIDING OtetoICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I yield 1
minute to the Senator from Maine.
Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, I join the
very able chairman of the Committee
on Armed Services, and concur with
what he has said with respect to this
amendment. I also commend the several
sponsors of the various amendments for
getting together and bringing in what
seems to me to be an excellent compro-
mise, and I am glad to support it.
Mr. DIRKSEN. I yield 1 minute to
the Senator from California.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I as-
sociate myself with the remarks made by
the ranking minority member of the
Committee on Armed Services, and by
the chairman of the committee, and say
that I should like to join in congratulat-
ing the Senators who have agreed upon
this amendment. I think it is most help-
ful, most progressive, and certainly
would help bring back the control to
Congress, where it should be.
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I yield
myself such time as I may require.
Hideous as the words "chemical and
biological warfare" seem to be to the
sensitivities of people, yet there are other
countries which have had and do have
capabilities in the field. I recall very viv-
idly, for example, lying in a ditch with a
gas mask over my nose when the first
burst of chlorine came over from the en-
emy in World War I; and I remember
when I was a horse officer, how badly
those artillery horses were galled and
beaten by mustard gas.
That was one time when it was used.
The Italians used it in Ethiopia, and
the Egyptians used in it Yemen; and we
_know, from the Penkovsky papers,
that there is a capability on the part of
the Soviet Union, because he wrote,
among other things:
Many places in the country have experi-
mental centers for testing various chemical
and bacteriological devices.
He amplifies that, of course. So there
is a capability in this field; and it occurs
to me that we have to have some kind of
a retaliatory facility for the very pur-
pose of deterring others from ever using
it.
So I fully concur in what has been
fashioned here by way of a modified
amendment.
Mr. President, we have heard many
voices recently questioning the need for
chemical warfare and biological research
programs as a part of this country's de-
fense. I would like to go on record in
support of these two programs and at
the same time I encourage the increas-
ing interest of the Members of this body
in the why and wherefore of these pro-
grams.
First, we should recognize that the
President recently directed the executive
branch to undertake a detailed review
of our policies and posture in chemical
and biological warfare, including the
U.S. position on arms control and the
ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.
Second, I remind my colleagues that
the Defense Department has consistently
followed congressional advice in their
chemical and biological defense activi-
ties, and I do net believe they have at-
tempted to hide these activities, some of
which are necessarily classified, from
congressional inquiries made by the com-
mittees directly concerned.
A congressional committee in 1959
made several recommendations pertinent
to our considerations today. One of the
recommendations stated it is recognized
that in the present world situation, with
other countries pursuing vigorous pro-
grams of chemical and biological devel-
opment, the best immediate guarantee
the United States can possess to insure
that chemical and biological warfare is
not used anywhere against the free world
Is to have a strong capability in this
field, and this will only come with a
stronger program of research. Another
recommendation was that if chemical
and biological weapons are to be consid-
ered a deterrent force in the U.S. arSenal
of weapons, the program of research ad-
vocated here will have to be accompanied
by an adequate program of manufacture
and deployment of chemical and bio-
logical munitions.
The first recommendation alluded to
the threat as it existed in 1959. Has there
been any reduction in the threat since
then? We do not believe so. In 1967, the
then Deputy Secretary of Defense testi-
fied on chemical and biological warfare
before the Senate Subcommittee on Dis-
armament, saying:
At long as other nations, such as the
Soviet Union, maintain large programs, we
believe we must maintain our defensive and
retaliatory capability.
I am informed that the Soviets con-
duct chemical research that is related to
offensive and defensive chemical warfare
and that they have means which are
suitable to deliver them. Col. Oleg Pen-
kovsky, the former Soviet intelligence
agent, wrote in his "Penkovsky Papers"
about the chemical and biological pro-
grams of the U.S.S.R.:
Many places in the country have experi-
mental centers for testing various chemical
and bacteriological devices.
He further wrote:
Soviet artillery units all are regularly
equipped with chemical-warfare shells. They
are at the gun sites, and our artillery is
routinely trained in their use. And let there
be no doubt: if hostilities should erupt, the
Soviet Army would use chemical weapons
against its opponents. The political decision
has been made, and our strategic military
planners have developed a doctrine which
permits the commander in the field, to decide
whether to use chemical weapons, and when
and where.
The U.S.S.R.. has a capability in bio-
logical warfare; they have the tech-
nological capability to produce, store,
and deliver biological warfare agents.
On the defensive side, the Soviets are
believed to possess a chemical defensive
capability in terms of equipment and
training, superior to those of the Western
powers. Training in the use of defensive
equipment, reconnaissance measures, and
means for survival are taught and
practiced until individual and unit pro-
ficiency are attained.
You may raise the question why we
need such a program. I believe I have
just covered the major reason?the po-
tential threat posed to the United States
and her Allies. We must have a program
to deter enemy use of chemical weapons
by being able to retaliate in kind. To
place this statement in proper perspec-
tive, let us review some history. There
are three major occasions when chemi-
cals were used?World War I, first used
by the Germans; in the 1930's when the
Italians used chemicals in Ethiopia;
and more recently in 1967 when the
Egyptians used chemicals in Yemen. We
should note that the Italians and Egyp-
tians had been signators to the Geneva
Protocol of 1925 and yet subsequently
initiated the use of these weapons.
On these occasions, the other side did
not have a deterrent capability and did
not have a chemical weapon to use. Nei-
ther did they have a defensive or pro-
tective capability.
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However, during World War II with
many nations having a capability, chem-
icals were not used. Many experts be-
lieve that the U.S. policy that it would
not use chemical weapons unless an-
other nation used them first, and having
backed this up with a retaliatory capa-
bility, was the major deterrent to the
use of chemicals during World War II.
Some might say we do not need these
weapons today as deterrents when we
have nuclear weapons in our stockpile.
Personally, I do not want to have to rely
on nuclear weapons as a deterrent in
this area because it may engage the
United States in a much larger exchange.
Further, if a nation were to use chemical
weapons or biological weapons against
the United States or its Allies, and the
United States had no chemical or biolog-
ical capability, it would force us to re-
spond with nuclear weapons or accept
the alternative of possible defeat.
Thus, the United States has main-
tained a limited chemical and biological
offensive and defensive capability pri-
marily as a deterrent and because we
cannot permit ourselves to be techno-
logically and militarily surprised by the
advances other nations are bound to
make. We cannot by legislation or wish-
ful thinking stop the progress of science.
Any action which we take to deprive our
Nation of this capability without insur-
ing effective and well policed interna-
tional arms control constitutes unilateral
disarmament, and I for one do not be-
lieve thig to be prudent.
As we all know, the United States is
committed to exploring any proposals or
ideas that could contribute to effective
arms control.
For example we recently participated
in a United Nations study of chemical
and biological warfare to be used by the
18 Nation Disarmament Committee to
explore means of getting an effective dis-
armament agreement on chemical and
biological weapons. However, until we
achieve effective agreements with the re-
quired controls to eliminate all stockpiles
of these weapons, we should maintain a
chemical and biological program strong
enough to be credible and strong enough
to deter any aggressor from using these
weapons.
Mr. President, how much time do I
have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator has 91/2 minutes remaining.
Mr. DIRKSEN. I yield 3 minutes to the
Senator from Utah.
Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, because of
the widely publicized sheep incident last
year in Utah and more recently, because
of my successful fight to keep the Army
from shipping obsolete nerve gas weap-
ons from the Denver Rocky Mountain
Arsenal to Utah, I am very familiar with
the CBW controversy.
The amendment being proposed today
is basically in accord with my own posi-
tion on CBW. I do, however, have sev-
eral questions about the specific language
of the amendment and then some obser-
vations on the CBW problem generally.
I ask the Senator from Wisconsin, first,
whether the language in section (b)
which forbids the procurement of de-
livery systems specifically designed to
disseminate lethal chemical and biologi-
cal agents include devices that are being
used in the present testing of CBW, such
as the artillery shells that are now being
used?
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I suggest
that the Senator direct that question to
the subcommittee chairman.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, it does
go to prohibit any dissemination or dis-
tribution weapons that are specifically
designed for this purpose. Of course, it
would not include the 155 mm. howitzer.
That is a weapon we could use to dis-
pense the material, if the time ever
comes, God forbid, but it is not specifi-
cally designed for that purpose. This sec-
tion refers exclusively to disseminating
systems specifically designed to dispense
CBW agents.
We had to yield to the Defense De-
partment on this point because the orig-
inal language was so broad it could have
been armor, weaponry, and things we
purchase as part of our equipment to de-
liver normal military high explosives.
Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I think that
the suggestion is still much too restric-
tive. However, that is something that we
would have to deal with later.
Second, I might suggest that the lan-
guage in section d(1) and (2) which re-
stricts the transportation of lethal
chemical and biological agents be tight-
ened to avoid a possible loophole. Instead
of applying these restrictions just to ship-
ments to or from military installations,
I would broaden the language to include
any shipments anywhere within the
United States, its territories, or posses-
sions. This could be done by simply drop-
ping the words "to or from any military
installations" in sections d(1) and (2).
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, the
group working on the proposal felt that
if it was too restrictive, we might be-
come involved in the interplay between
the military.
What we did do was to try to restrict
it to moving and disposal.
Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, this would
merely say to or from military installa-
tions. If it was not going to or from mili-
tary installations, it would be included.
I think this ought to be tightened up at
this time.
Mr. McINTYRE. The Senator might
have a point.
Mr. MOSS. A final point, Mr. Presi-
dent. Too much of the public discussion
about CBW has become emotional and
speculative primarily because of the
Army's obsession with secrecy. Rightly or
wrongly, and I think rightly, the Gov-
ernment's credibility concerning CBW
is highly suspect. Even after the Dugway
incident it was some time before the
Army would admit that they were test-
ing nerve gas agents let alone responsible
for the death of the sheep.
To give the American people good rea-
son to believe what the Government tells
them and to provide the public with
much-needed information, I suggest that
the Surgeon General appoint a commit-
tee of three State public health officials
and three nonmilitary experts to assist
him in making the determination as to
whether CBW testing is a hazard to pub-
lic health. This determination should be
made in a public report and should in-
clude as much information as possible.
In my opinion much of the information
now classified need not be and would help
in creating a better public understanding
of CBW.
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I yield
3 minutes to the Senater from South
Carolina.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from South Carolina is recognized
for 3 minutes.
- Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the
management and control of our chemical
and biological warfare research programs
has become an emotional issue in recent
months, due to an unfortunate incident
in Utah.
Certainly, this is an area in which the
greater care must be taken as these
chemical agents and disease producing
biological micro-organisms and biolog-
ical toxins are deadly. Tighter controls
may well be in order, judging from the
accident in Utah.
While some restrictions would be use-
ful, the McIntyre amendment is broad in
its coverage, especially in that it pro-
hibits funds to procure delivery systems
or any components of delivery systems
for chemical and biological agents.
Such a restriction may be harmless at
this point, as the military does not de-
sire any funds in the current bill for of-
fensive delivery systems. However, if this
restriction is passed, it becomes law. It
would, therefore, tie the hands of those
charged with our defense if, in the fu-
ture, more sophisticated means of de-
livery for these agents are needed to
maintain our defense posture.
Presently, we use standard shells and
bombs to deliver these agents but this
requirement could change and valuable
time could be lost in removing this re-
striction to allow the Defense Depart-
ment to meet the needs of an emergency.
Mr. President, the history of the use of
these agents shows they have only been
used a few times in modern history and
in each instance their use was made when
the user knew his opponent did not have
the means to retaliate.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that Secretary Laird's statement be
printed in the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the state-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
MEMORANDUM FOR CORRESPONDENTS,
AUGUST 9, 1969
(Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird today
issued the following statement in response to
queries about the DOD position on the pend-
ing McIntyre amendment.)
On assuming the office of Secretary of De-
fense in January, I became concerned with
the management and control of our chemical
warfare and biological research programs. I
felt that improvements were needed in the
management and control of these programs.
That is why in April I requested and the
President ordered a National Security Coun-
cil study of these matters. This study is in
progress.
Pending the completion of the NSC study,
I believe it is prudent that we act Jointly with
Congress and take actions, wherever possible,
to improve the management and control of
chemical warfare and biological research
programs.
Members of my staff, principally Dr. John
S. Foster, Jr., Director of Research and Engi-
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neering, have been working in recent days
with Senator Thomas J. McIntyre of New
Hampshire, and with other members of the
Senate Armed Services Cornmittee, on a re-
vised amendment to the pending Defense
Authorization Bill.
I am in agreement with the goals of the
new amendment, which the Senate is sched-
uled to consider on Monday.
I believe this revised amendment will allow
us to maintain our chemical warfare deter-
rent and our biological research program
both of Which are essential to national
security.
The history of the use of lethal chemical
warfare agents has demonstrated on three
notable occasions in this century that the
only time military forces have used these
weapons is when the opposing forces had no
immediate capability to deter or to retaliate.
This was true early in World War I, later in
Ethiopia anti more recently in Yemen. Clearly,
failure to maintain an effective chemical war-
fare deterrent would endanger national
security.
Because it would not alvtays be possible to
determine the origin of attack by biological
agents, the deterrent aspects of biological re-
search are not as sharply defined. A continued
biological research program, however, is vital
on two other major counts.
First, we must strengthen our protective
capabilities in such areas as vaccines and
therapy.
Second, we must minimize the dangers of
technological surprise.
It is important that the American people
be informed of why we must continue to
maintain our chemical deterrent, conduct
biological research, and how we propose to
improve the management and control of
these programs.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr, President, in
view of this, I support this amendment
but with some reservation, and mainly
In the trust that the military will act
promptly and the Congress will respond
realistically if they see any indiCation a
change in this policy is required.
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I yield
1 minute to the Senator from New York.
The PRESIDING OPFICER (Mr.
GOODELL in the chair). The Senator from
New York is recognized for 1 minute.
Mr. GOODELL. Mr. President, the
high degree of amiability and unanimity
on this omnibus amendment at this point
belies the difficulty that many have had
in pushing this matter forward so that
we could have reasonable regulation of
chemical and biological weapons.
The amendment does not meet head on
the critical issue invorved that I hope
the McIntyre subcommittee will face in
the year ahead. That is whether our
country should continue to produce and
stockpile chemical and biological weap-
ons and the means of delivering them
as a deterrent, and whether we must
have a better deterrent in every area of
every kind of weapon if we are to pre-
serve our national security.
I trust that the Senator from New
Hampshire will explore this question in
depth so that we may have a decision
on the matter in the year ahead.
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President,
approximately $350 million of taxpayers'
money has been spent annually for
chemical and biological warfare agents.
For many years the Department of De-
fense has purchased and stockpiled enor-
mous amounts of toxic and infectious
chemical and biological agents.
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potential. The fact that we have nerve
gases in bases around the world raises
grave moral and public policy questions.
At least some of the secrecy ought to
be ripped away. No one reasonably would
ask that Pentagon officials make full dis-
closure of every last detail of research,
development, production? and storage of
its chemical and biological warfare
agents. At the same time, a thorough
ventilation of the nature of these fright-
ful weapons might well lead to stronger
treaties against their production and use.
Congress must act now to fulfill its re-
sponsibility in a program that has es-
caped careful congressional scrutiny for
too many years.
Unfortunately, some of these weapons
are presently being used in Vietnam. The
use of chemical defoliants in Vietnam
has been increasingly questioned by
those concerned over the longrun en-
vironmental dangers. Also, there is evi-
dence that the so-called riot control
gases used in Vietnam cin be fatal to the
weak, sick, and undernourished civilians
exposed to them.
On July 2, 1969, U.N. Secretary-Gen-
eral U Thant released an excellent re-
port on chemical and biological warfare
in which he strongly urged that all na-
tions ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925
banning first use of chemical and bio-
logical warfare. He also called for all
nations to reach agreement to halt the
development, production, and stockpiling
of all chemical and biological warfare
agents and to eliminate them from the
arsenal of weapons.
U Thant's report makes it clear that
the testing and use of biological warfare
agents pose health hazards to everyone?
that the deadly diseases that have been
stockpiled for use as weapons are just
as dangerous to the producer and po-
tential user as they are to the recipient.
The report emphasizes the need to
promptly reach agreement on a ban on
the production, stockpiling, and use of
biological weapons. A proposal that would
accomplish this is now before the 25-
Nation Disarmament Conference which
is meeting in Geneva. I am hopeful that
the administration will do all it can to
see that this resolution is adopted.
Mr. President, today a comparatively
few nations possess these lethal weap-
ons. However, any nation, large or small,
can develop contagious bacteria and
viruses. If and when they do, the danger
of an accident or purposeful use becomes
greater. The very survival of man is at
stake. The development and stockpiling
of these horrible chemicals and germs is
a pursuit after armaments far in excess
of those needed for our national security
and national defense.
I am utterly opposed to any further de-
velopment and stockpiling of such de-
vices. I urge the adoption of the pending
amendment to establish effective guide-
lines and controls over the storage, trans-
portation, disposal, and maintenance of
chemical and biological agents. Also, to
ban future open-air testing of lethal
chemical agents, disease producing bio-
logical micro-organisms or poisons ex-
cept on determination of the Secretary of
Defense that such tests are necessary for
the national security and only then after
the Surgeon General has determined
In fact, we are in the process of trying
to get rid of 27,000 tons of such chemical
weapons now obsolete, yet too dangerous
to remain stockpiled. During the past 16
years nearly 1,500,000 nerve gas bombs
containing a total of 4 million pounds of
such gas have been produced. Another
1,350,000 pounds of the same deadly gas
is contained in our M55 rockets. Our
chemical and biological warfare arsenal
now includes numerous and varied
agents for the spread of wholesale dis-
ease, starvation, choking or suffocating
of entire populations, and other such
deadly effects.
For the first time in many years, pos-
sibly since the days of World War I,
Americans are becoming uneasy and con-
cerned about the most grisly weapons in
contemporary arsenals?the weapons of
chemical and biological warfare. It is a
subject that cries out for sober discus-
sion.
The production of these weapons has
been shrouded in secrecy. Even we in the
Congress know very little about what is
occurring in experimentation, develop-
ment, stockpiling, and disposal of these
weapons. Most Senators and Representa-
tives were shocked at the recent disclos-
ure that 28 persons were injured in a
nerve gas accident in Okinawa, and of
the fact that the Pentagon has stored
nerve gases and other chemical-biologi-
cal warfare weapons in bases throughout
the world. That time we were lucky that
a more serious catastrophe did not occur
that could have taken the lives of mil-
lions of men, women and children. The
extent to which the Congress has been
uninformed on this vital issue was best
emphasized by a recent statement of the
distinguished senior Senator from Louisi-
ana (Mr. ELLENDER) , the ranking major-
ity member of the Committee on Appro-
priations, who said:
As far as the Continental U.S. is concerned,
evidence has recently been brought out that
tremendous stockpiles of various deadly com-
pounds are on hand at centers throughout
the country. Most of this work has been done
without the knowledge of the Congress. Dur-
ing my twenty years service on the sub-
committee of the Appropriations Committee
for Defense, I never have come across any
line item for the production of nerve gas.
This, despite the fact that almost $1
million a day is being spent by the Pen-
tagon on chemical-biological warfare
weapons.
Since 1964 it has not even been pos-
sible to determine how much money the
Government is spending on these weap-
ons. Estimates vary from $350 million
to $500 million per year. In the arsenal of
the Pentagon and of those in at least 13
other nations are chemical poisons so
toxic that one-fiftieth of a drop can be
lethal in minutes. Senators will recall the
death in 1968 of 6,400 sheep from nerve
gas in the Dugway Proving Ground in
Utah.
It is horrible to contemplate, but it is
a fact that today the Soviet Union and
,United States possess enough of these
chemicals and biological agents to de-
stroy every man, woman, and child on
earth.
It is clear that the time has come for
a full-scale congressional investigation
of our chemical and biological warfare
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August 11, 1969 Approved Fcce,M
that the proposed tests will not present
hazards to public health. The provisions
of the pending amendment form an im-
portant first step toward stemming and
controlling the proliferation of these
deadly weapons.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I was de-
lighted to read in the newspapers this
weekend that the Secretary of Defense,
Hon. Melvin Laird, approves of the
amendments that we have before us to
control the chemical and biological
weapons program.
I interpret Secretary Laird's approval
of my amendment regarding interna-
tional law to mean that the Secretary of
Defense recognizes a responsibility of the
Department of State for interpreting our
international obligations, and I assume
that the Secretary of Defense will pro-
vide for proper consultation with the
Department of State regarding the in-
ternational legal implications of the
movement of chemical and biological
materials outside of the United States in
the future.
Although I am happy that the chair-
man of the Armed Services Committee
and the Department of Defense has ap-
proved the amendments which we have
before us, I hope this does not mean
there will not be further debate on the
foreign policy questions involved in the
RSSR9gtKtlatCCtWERIDFSElrfM03Z4R000300100
Congress better informed on the pro- opment and use does not guarantee
gram and indicates the Senate's right- safety.
ful concern that testing, transportation, Americans have a right to expect their
disposal and storage of chemical and bio- Government to use great caution in ap-
logical warfare elements be done as safe- preaching such an awesome set of
ly as possible. With this understanding, I weapons. They have a right to expect
support the amendment. their Government to use more than or-
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, for more dinary care in handling such weapons.
than 50 years poison gas has been an in- They have a right to expect their Gov-
strument of warfare, and for all that ernment to develop considerable energy
time Americans have been repulsed by to eliminating the danger of such weap-
the thought of poison gas being used to ons being used in time of war.
kill and maim people. The packet of amendments we are
As a nation, America traditionally has considering now will enable us to meet
viewed the case of poisonous gases as in- their responsibility.
humane. We have sought to make gas The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time
an illegal weapon of war, and in two having expired, the question is on agree-
world wars we declined to use it to kill ing to the modified amendment (No. 131)
our enemies. of 'the Senator from New Hampshire. On
Despite our public stance, American this question, the yeas and nays have
military contracts have continued to be been ordered, and the clerk will call the
let and military personnel have been as- roll.
signed to the task of researching, devel- The assistant legislative clerk called
oping, manufacturing, and storing poison the roll.
gas and biological agents. Mr. KENNEDY. I announce that the
Until a year ago, gas and germ war- Senator from Tennessee (Mr. GORE) is
fare seemed a subject for science fiction, absent on official business.
Members of Congress were vaguely aware I also announce that the Senator from
of the research and development pro- Indiana (Mr. BAYH) , the Senator from
grams, but regarded them as contingency Nevada (Mr. BIBLE) , the Senator from
operations, first, to deter other nations Connecticut (Mr. Dona), the Senator
from using such weapons first; and sec- from New Mexico (Mr. MONTOYA) , the
ond, to aid in' research on counter- Senator from Georgia (Mr. RUSSELL),
blin of and the Senator from Texas (Mr. YAR-
001-3 S955
measures. The first
tion. I believe that the Senate should complaint came with the use of tear gas, BOROUGH) are necessarily absent.
chemical and biological warfare ques-
tion.
further announce that, if present
discuss the role that the Department of defoliants, and napalm in Vietnam. More I
Defense expects CBW to Play in the vigorous complaints erupted with news and voting, the Senator from Indiana
(Mr. BAYH) the Senator from Tennes-
world arms race, and I would hope tha
we would discuss the implications of Sec-
retary Laird's recent statement imply-
ing the chemical and biological weapons
are strategic weapons which might be
used in a second strike capacity.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I would
like to express my understanding of the
intent and effect of this amendment. This
amendment is not intended to prevent
the Department of Defense from under-
taking biological and chemical research
programs. Those programs have been
presented and justified to the Congress
as required in the interest of national incident and other threats from o
defense. The amendment recognizes, chemical and biological warfare program
however, that the public and members are being given to the Congress and to
of the Congress are concerned that the the public.
program be undertaken under conditions The second major incident?or near Aiken
of maximum safety and that the Con- incident?was the Army's plan to trans- anoetit
gress be fully aware of the actions that port 27,000 tons of poison gas containers Anderson
are taken. For this reason, the amend- by rail from Colorado to the east coast Baker
ment, while not restricting the types of where it would be loaded on barges and 1:iee ini nmert
activities that the Department of De- dumped in the ocean. That plan has Boggs
fense may undertake in pursuing the been shelved, temporarily, but additional Brooke
program it has presented and justified opposition to the chemical and biologi- 73uyrrcciii,ctit.
to us, imposes certain reporting and co- cal warfare program has been stirred up Byrd, W. Va.
ordinating requirements. Some of these by the fact that the Army was prepared Cannon
requirements may prove burdensome and to ship such dangerous materials across Carure ca
time-consuming. Perhaps with experi- the country through large cities without Cook
ence we will later decide to remove some major precautions against accidental dis- Cooper
of them. However, despite the burdens charge of the gases and without serious Coattonton
the amendment imposes, the Department attention to the environmental hazards Curtis
of Defense has recognized the concern posed by ocean disposal. Dirksen
of the public and members of the Con- In retrospect, the Dugway Proving nomleinica
gress in matters concerning chemical Ground accident and the ocean dumping Eagleton
warfare and biolokical research pro- proposal may have been blessings in dis- Eastland
grams, and has therefore indicated it guise. They have alerted the country to zrnveinnaer
will not oppose enactment of the amend- a clear and present danger from chem- Fannin
ment. ical and biological warfare operations, in Fong
As I understand this amendment, it in peace and in war. Goldwater
Fulbright
no way represents a criticism of the Materials containing anthrax, tulare-
CBW program or of the military officials mia and Q fever germs, nerve gas, and
who have administered it. It simply ex- other toxic materials are not minor Bible
presses the desire of the Senate to have weapons, and secrecy about their devel- DOcld
Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3
of dangers from testing and disposa
chemical and biological materials and see (Mr. GORE), the Senator from New
weapons in the United States. Mexico (Mr. MONTOYA) , the Senator
The first major incident came last from Texas (Mr. YARBOROUGH) , and the
year when more than 6,000 sheep died Senator from Connecticut (Mr. Doaa)
in Utah, near the Dugway Proving would each vote "yea."
Ground, where chemical and biological Mr. sear". I announce that the Sen-
warfare materials were tested. The sheep ator from Michigan (Mr. GRIFFIN) is de-
f all victims to a nerve gas released by a tamed on official business, and, if pres-
plane. For a long time military secrecy ent and voting, would vote "yea."
cloaked the cause of the deaths. Now, The Senator from Ohio (Mr. &am)
thanks in large part to the work of Rep- is necessarily absent; and if present and
resentative RICHARD D. MCCARTHY, Dem- voting, would vote "yea."
ocrat, of New York, the facts about that The result was announced?yeas 91,
nays 0, as follows:
[No. 74 Leg.]
YEAS-91
Goodell
Gravel
Gurney
Hansen
Harris
Hart
Hartke
Hatfield
Holland
Hollings
Hruska
Hughes
Inouye
Jackson
Javits
Jordan, N.C.
Jordan, Idaho
Kennedy
Long
Magnuson
Mansfield
Mathias
McCarthy
McClellan
McGee
McGovern
McIntyre
Metcalf
Miller
Mondale
Moss
NOT VOTING-9
Gore Russell
Griffin Saxbe
Montoya Yarborough
Mundt
Murphy
Muskie
Nelson
Packwood
Pastore
Pearson
Pell
Percy
Prouty
Proxmire
Randolph
Ribicoff
Schweiker
Scott
Smith
Sparkman
Spong
Stennis
Stevens
Symington
Talmadge
Thurmond
Tower
Tydings
Williams, N.J.
Williams, Del.
Young, N. Dak.
Young, Ohio
S9556 Approved For Reims'
So Mr. MCINTYRE'S amendment (No.
131), as modified, was-agreed to.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr_President, I move
to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. NELSON. I move to lay that mo-
tion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
Mr. STENNIS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Mississielpi is recognized.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I wish
to make a very brief
about the bill and con eration of addi-
tional amendments thereto.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I. President, may
we have order?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senate will be in order.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, what I
will say is nothing new, but I am Say-
ing it in an effort to promote our de-
bate in such a way that the issues will
be understood by Members of the Sen-
ate.
As an illustration, last Friday we had
about 31/2 hours of debate on an amend-
ment by the device of continuous yield-
ing by the author. This is a practice we
have fallen into. I do net blame anyone;
no one was out of order; and I do not
make these remarks critically. However,
the committee had no chance in all that
time to present our views and the situa-
tions as we saw it with reference to that
amendment. That is only an illustra-
tion.
I hope we can work out something to
avoid such a situation in the future. The
committee chairman has no control, ex-
cept as he may confer and reach under-
standings with Senators with respect to
which amendment is called up and when
it shall come up.
The main point I wish to talk about
now is that this bill represents a balanced
program.
Mr. President, will the Chair enforce
the rule so that we may have order?
The PRESIDING OrtelCeat. The Sen-
ate will be in order.
Mr. STENNIS. We have offensive nu-
clear weapons, and we have provided for
a defensive system against the offensive
nuclear weapons arrayed against us. We
know that we are not going to make a
first strike. There is nothing like that in
the minds of the people, Congress, or the
President. We know that we are not going
to start a nuclear war. I do not know, but
with the high development of these
weapons I doubt that Russia would in-
tentionally start a nuclear war. Perhaps
the time when that was probable is be-
hind us. However, no one really knows. So
we must be prepared in that field. I do
not believe we should say that we will riot
start one under any circumstances. I said
that years ago. I mention these matters
to get down to the real issue; namely,
the need for conventional forces.
At one time, we were getting away
from that. We went into the nuclear
field and neglected modernization of the
Army. We neglected a great many other
things because we put most of our money
Into nuclear weapons.
Certainly we are not about to reach a
millennium, when everyone will be at
WE4A163P1AFIW8ili3?(9W
00300100001-3.
August 11, 1969
peace, and the lion and the lamb will lie
down together, when there will be no
more boundary disputes and no more
aggression against one nation by an-
other. We do not believe that that mil-
lennium has arrived. We know that we
must have sufficient military strength to
protect our people, and I am talking
about 200 million citizens here at home.
We know that we must protect them
with sufficient conventional weapons. We
know that it must be our policy to pro-
tect those 200 million Americans. We
have assumed many commitments
around the world and may be forced to
go beyond our boundaries and protect
the perimeter.
We may want to reduce these com-
mitments, but no one is offering a resolu-
tion to do so. No Senator has proposed
a plan to change the situation. No com-
mittee of Congress is hearing any testi-
mony on the subject. There is no report
or statement of opinion of a committee
that is weighted in favor of any change.
We have not had any requests from a
President to that effect?from President
Nixon or any prior President.
Thus, our policy still is that we can
best protect ourselves by providing some
defense of the outer perimeter. That is
what a great deal of the hardware in the
bill is for.
Some Senators may think the bills
should be changed right here on the floor
of the Senate, piece by piece, so as to
take out the tanks, take out the car-
riers, take out this, or take out that. I
do not believe that is the way to proceed.
When the will of the majority is felt, we
will find out for sure.
I favored paring some items in the
bill, as I said in my opening talk, but
we had better know what we are doing
and have a committee consider the mat-
ter from all angles and submit a report
on a bill. This is what the Armed Serv-
ices Committee did.
At the same time, I should also like to
know what the President thinks about it.
This policy should be enunciated
clearly; then we can implement it. Let
us not place the cart before the horse.
We all remember that following World
War II we decided that Japan should
have no weapons, except to a very limited
degree. We said to Japan, "We will take
care of you."
I think we overdid it. We should
modify that.
But can we do that? Can we take pieces
out of the military bill on the flour of
the Senate, until the President, the
committees and others have spoken or
enunciated some kind of policy?
Look at our obligations around the
world. Take Korea. We must not tear
down everything we have built up there.
We guaranteed Korea's integrity when
no other nation joined with us. It was
just the United States of America and
Korea. We guaranteed Korea's protec-
tion. That requires credible military
forces and military deterrence. It does
not take a wise man to see that.
We all remember Formosa. We all re-
member Vietnam, where we are now. The
Lord only knows how or when we can get
out of there. We are members of SEATO
and NATO. All these obligations prove
conclusively that we need balanced con-
ventional forces, and that we must have
them. I want to have them with the
smallest number of dollars.
Let me mention something else. One
can go to a military service and some-
times get a large listing of the defects in
the weapons of a rival military service.
That is a part of the picture in the Pen-
tagon. The Navy which believes in its
weapons, and the Air Force also believes
in its weapons?and I am glad they do.
But sometimes, on the gide, they are quick
to point out defects, real or imaginary,
in the weapons of the other service.
Let me give an illustration. I was once
inside the matter of the Nike-Hercules
ground-to-air defense missile.
I thought we were going too fast and
too far, and before it had been perfected
enough. The bill provided hundreds of
millions of dollars.
I was handling the military construc-
tion bill. A general spoke on "Pace the
Nation" that Sunday afternoon. He was
a very fine general. The question was
put to him: If a city were properly de-
fended with enough Nike-Hercules, and a
hundred enemy bomber planes came in,
how many could they knock out? He
said, "A hundred out of a hundred."
The next morning I talked with an
outstanding admiral of that day, one of
the foremost we had. / said, "If a city
had the required number of Nike-Her-
cules and a hundred enemy bombers
were coming in to bomb the city, how
many Nike-Hercules could they knock
down out of that hundred?"
He said, "Not a darned one."
I think both of those gentlemen were
wrong. But that general remark of the
admiral, coming down the corridor of
the building, having no appointment, led
us to go further into the matter.
Mr. McNamara told me later that it
would save some money. But my point is
that we do not know enough about mis-
siles. My point is that there is interservice
rivalry, and that is seldom brought up in
debate. I am not saying this critically of
anyone. I know there is rivalry. Some-
times it is within a service.
All of us remember the old cavalry.
The cavalry has gone. But weapons
rivalry still exists within the services.
So we had better examine carefully
some of the information we are getting?
and getting in good faith?about these
matters. My point is that the bill pro-
vides a balanced program, something
that the Joint Chiefs have agreed to.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is
no ordinary man. Do not discount Gen-
eral Wheeler, unless you want to con-
demn all military men. If you do, let
General Wheeler go on down the drain
with the rest of them. But if you want
impartiality, do not discount General
Wheeler.
That is not all. We are looking for a
balanced program in Weaponry. This
program is largely one like that approved
by former Secretary McNamara. What-
ever one may think about him, he had
plenty of sense. I think he was one of the
most effective Secretaries of Defense we
have ever had. I do not think he was
right on all things, but he worked, and
he knew a lot about defense.
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Fe LblyamsaiN4/AnkccipfifiDPgtgRiA4R000300100001-3 S 9557
August 11, 1969Approved F
Former Secretary Clifford approved President of the United States. I will be
this program, although there were some
differences in details.
We squeezed a great deal of water out.
But Mr. Clifford is a man of high intelli-
gence and considers things seriously.
Secretary Laird approved this budget
just as recently as early March. Senators
who do not know Secretary Laird have
missed a gem. We who serve on the Com-
mittee on Appropriations have been con-
fronting his fine mind and ability for
years. I do not know of any Member of
Congress who rendered finer service in
this field than Representative Melvin
Laird. He was usually a jump ahead of
most of the rest of us. So the program
provided by the bill is his best judgment.
He believes the Nation needs this bill as a
balanced program. I do not mean that
every "i" must be dotted and every "t"
crossed, of course, but as an overall
proposition.
That is not all. President Nixon ap-
proved virtually all of this budget. Mr.
Nixon is not a newcomer. He is not one
who had been president of General
Motors or president of a university or
some other institution.
That man learned the hard way. I am
not complimenting him. We all know his
background and experience. I tell the
Senate that when he came back here in
8 years I was amazed, from the word
"go," at the fine knowledge he had of
the present situation and the present
need, here and there and everywhere, of
the military program. I know, because I
have talked with him over and over. He
did not have anything to offer me. I did
not have anything that I could give him,
except just loyalty to the country. I am
not espousing the Nixon program, or any-
thing like that. I am talking about na-
tional defense now. But he grasped this
problem. He had it in his mind. He was
as well versed as anyone outside the mili-
tary itself. Melvin Laird was there, and
so were others. They made hard decisions.
They may be planning more.
That is the case here. We are not living
in a millennium?oh, riot by a long shot.
We are not out of Vietnam?not by a
long shot. We will have to have the hard-
ware, the weapons, the manpower, the
know-how, the skills, and the judgment,
if we are to continue as a leader of the
free world.
I am no internationalist. I am no big
spender, either. I am no big spender?
my records shows it?for the military
department.
When we talk about such terms as
"military-industrial complex," and all
that, that does not mean anything to me,
and I do not think it means anything
to anyone in the show down. I think it
is a slander and a libel on a great mili-
tary profession and the membership of
the Senate for those things to be fed out
and fed out on the Senate floor, through
committee hearings, through television,
through radio, everywhere, all the time,
to create?and it does create?a pre-
judice. 'Whether that is the purpose or
not?I will let every man's motives be
decided by him or someone else, 'and
not by me?but it is leading this coun-
try into what I consider a dangerous
' state of mind?mistrust, distrust, down-
grading the military, and downgrading
the Senators who have responsibility for
d ho are falsely charged
our defense an w
with being "dominated by the miliary."
Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. Please let me finish with
just a few more words.
I give everyone credit for good faith,
and I think everyone wants to do what
he thinks then is best for the country.
But I warn you, we can slip back mighty
fast just because we are displeased with
a few things. I am displeased with many
things. We all wish we could stop the
war in Vietnam, for one thing. I am dis-
pleased with some contracts for military
supplies and material that have been en-
tered into. Incidentally, those contracts
came directly out of the brains of the
civilian authorities in the Pentagon. We
will get into that later.
But I told the military, "You do have
some responsibility in the field of spend-
ing." When General Ryan, now the
Chief of the Air Force, was before us
for confirmation, I said, 'General it
is not your primary responsibility, but
in the nature of things, you do have
responsibilities for the expenditures
of this money. In part you are re-
sponsible in the military area, and I
think you ought to train more and more
men in the field of management and
related fields, so that as you bring them
through the categories of promotion, you
will have more responsible men. I know
you have some who are outstanding, but
not enough." He agreed with me heartily.
I am going to write the other Chiefs and
make the same point. I think it is part of
our duty. But if we scuttle this whole
thing, if we cut the bone and the muscle
here by making too many unwise reduc-
tions, acting in the dark, we will rue the
day.
I favor reducing military manpower
as soon as the shooting stops at least to
the level it was before the war started.
I am not settling on that as the final
figure. But, by a quick calculation, in that
category alone there is a minimum of
$10 billion a year in savings. There are
other sayings we can make.
I want the military and the civilian
part of the department to do a better
job in getting a dollar's worth for every
single dollar they spend. But I tell you,
we will never do that by settling for sec-
ond rate weapons. We will never do that
? by giving the doughboy we send to the
front an old tank. We will never do that
by sending our aviators, whether they be
in the Navy, Air Force, or other service,
in a plane not as good as the one he is
up against. And so on down the line.
I speak with all deference to every-
one, but I tell you, right now we are
getting off into the wrong attitude. We
are getting off into an attitude of knock
down, drag out, regardless of conse-
quences, that can leave this Nation?not
immediately, but within a few years?
unprepared to defend its own people.
Let us get a balanced program of
weapons together. Let us reexamine our
foreign policy, and if we want to change
it, let competent Senators come in here
with a definite resommendation on their
resolution, on their report, on their testi-
mony, and on the recommendation of the
found somewhere, perhaps not up frbnt
but somewhere up near the front, plug-
ging in a proper way for some reasonable
modification.
But there are points beside honor in-
volved, in turning our backs upon our
commitments. There is involved, for ex-
ample, the safety and perhaps the sur-
vival of the American people.
So, Mr. President, while I welcome
debate on any phase of this bill to any
reasonable extent, I will approach it in
the way that I have outlined; and
frankly, I was talking more to the people
of the United States than to anyone else
in these last few minutes.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
Mr. STENNIS. I believe the Senator
from North Carolina had risen first, if
he wishes me to yield.
Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, I ask the
Senator from Mississippi if he does not
think that it is a fitting time for us to
meditate seriously upon this little verse:
God and the soldier we adore '
On the brink of ruin, not before;
When danger's past, and all things righted,
God is forgotten and the soldier slighted.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. I am happy to yield to
the Senator from Arkansas.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I certainly have
great sympathy with the position of the
Senator from Mississippi. He is, I think,
one of the most conscientious and dedi-
cated Members of this body, and not just
in his position as chairman of the Com-
mittee on Armed Services. He has served
with equal distinction as chairman of
other committees, and has performed
some very difficult functions.
I do not quarrel at all, certainly, with
his motives or what he is saying. But I
should like to comment in this sense: He
says he is interested primarily in a bal-
anced program. I take it he meant bal-
anced within the Military Establishment.
I think I, and those of my colleagues
? who share some of my views, are inter-
ested in a balanced program also, but we
feel that the balance should be between
the military program and the other pro-
grams of this Government.
Mr. STENNIS. If the Senator will ex-
cuse me a moment, I have an urgent
matter.
Very well.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. As a result of a
series of crises and wars, for which the
Senator from Mississippi, of course, is
not to blame, there has developed an im-
balance, not within the military so much,
but between the military and other pro-
grams of our Government. This entire
debate is about how to correct that im-
balance.
To ask the Senate to accept the pro-
posals of the Pentagon without thorough
debate and examination, it seems to me,
to have the Senate simply to abdicate
its real function. On many of these mat-
ters there have been hearings, as the
Senator mentioned. There have been
some extremely interesting hearings in
the Committee on Foreign Relations,
also, and in the Joint Economic Commit-
tee headed by the Senator from Wiscon-
sin (Mr. Paoxmifts).
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wiNGKESSIONAL RECORD ? SEN
Some of the witnesses before that
committee, such as Mr. Fitzgerald and
others, are certainly qualified, and as
good as we have in this Government.
They are right out of the Pentagon it-
self. Some have suffered personally be-
cause of their daring to do their duty, in
my opinion, as citizens.
The difference in view on this problem
arises because I think that, as Senators,
we should balance the military with oth-
er governmental programs. I submit that
when you calculate the amount of money
devoted to the military establishment
since World War II?well over a $1,000
billion?against other activities impor-
tant to the country, such as education
and the development of our natural re-
sources, I think our system of priorities
is out of balance. That, as I said, is real-
ly what this debate is about.
The Senator has mentioned rivalry
among the services. That is not news. We
know about that, and I do not complain
about it. But it is our duty to correct
some of the results of such rivalry.
We have been told, and I think there
is a degree of truth in it, that when we
give, we will say, a big program, to the
Army and the Air Force. About all that
can be done to balance things out is give
the Navy more aircraft carriers. That
way they will receive about as much as
the Air Force and the Army; and there-
fore, to retain a kind of balance. So we
continue to build aircraft carriers when
they are obsolete. No other country in
the world builds them. .
That in itself raises a serious question:
Why, if aircraft carriers are really useful
and not obsolete, is not Russia, or China,
or Germany, or somebody, out trying to
build aircraft carriers? It is rather odd
that we should be the only ones to put
so much faith in this kind of machine.
Carriers are extraordinarily costly. The
Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTOIV)
is a better spokesman than on this sub-
ject, but I recognize that, as a member
of the Committee on Armed Services, he
is a little bit embarrassed to take issue
with his colleagues. I would be, too. I am
always a little bit embarrassed to take
issue with my colleagues on a committee,
with whom I have shared many hear-
ings; but the Senator from Missouri has
said much about this subject on many
occasions.
It is, I submit, the balance of all over
national programs that should concern
us. I do not for a moment suggest that
the Senator from Mississippi is a spend-
thrift. We are not saying that he is ex-
travagant at all.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if the
Senator will yield to me, I do not have
to wait until he or anyone else accuses
me of something. I simply call attention
to my record. I do not have to wait for
the Senator or anyone else.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Of course, I think
there are some members of congressional
committees who, in the past, have shown
a disposition?and it is not the Senate&
from Mississippi to whom I refer?to urge
upon the Pentagon increatted appropria-
tions, even over what was requested.
Coining to the question af the military-
industrial complex, the Senator says it is
a slander that anyone should mention it.
ATE August 11, 1969
have been held. We have heard from
knowledgeable people.
In addition, on occasions when we have
requested information from the Defense
Establishment, we have been met with
the statement that it was classified or
too sensitive. They would not furnish it.
So, to the degree that we are operating
in the dark, I submit that it is not the
fault of the Senate committees. It is the
fault of the establishment itself in re-
fusing to make available what I believe
to be appropriate and relevant documents
and information.
I do not really believe the Senator has
a legitimate quarrel about the debate and
about the proposals to try to bring about
what I would call a better balance be-
tween the Military Establishment and
the rest of the Government of the United
States.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield briefly?
Mr. STENNIS. I will yield later. I be-
lieve the Senator from California had re-
quested that I yield to him. I yield to the
Senator from California.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from California is recognized.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, relative
to the Armed Services Committee, I must
say that my experience this year has been
a great revelation. I suggest that the
matter of balance of expenditures cer-
tainly must have been because of the
necessity created by world conditions.
If we did not have some of the world
problems that exist today, we would not
have the problem of making high expen-
ditures in order to achieve the balance
that the distinguished chairman of the
Armed Services Committee has spoken
of.
I think probably that, looking at the
past and finding where the fault lies,
certainly when we have called on the
military, wherever they have been per-
mitted to do so, they have done their job
very well insofar as I recall history back
beginning with World War I.
However, very often where we have
looked at the action of the Political
Establishment in international affairs
and their record, in my humble opinion,
has not been quite as good.
Therefore, I point out that the prob-
lems which have been created have
caused this difficulty in achieving the
balance about which the distinguished
chairman talks.
Referring to the remarks of the distin-
guished Senator from Arkansas concern-
ing the statement that we do not have
good planes, my experience is that we do
not now have them. We have been very
neglectful in certain tategories. Our
planes are good but old. We have not
kept up with our potential aggressors
and enemies.
We do have a good rifle. However,
strangely enough, for some reason, we
have only one manufacturer. We have
heard about the deficiencies of the South
Vietnamese. However, we find that when
they had a good rifle, they are pretty
good soldiers. They are brave. They are
eager to defend their country.
So, I think that the distinguished
chairman of the Armed Services Com-
mittee makes an excellent point. While
there are many other areas that need our
I have mentioned it, but I certainly, in
most of my formal speeches on the sub-
ject, have made it very clear that the
people in the Pentagon, by and large, do
not deserve that kind of criticism, nor
that it should be regarded as a slander.
I regard the criticism, if warranted any-
where, as warranted against Congress;
and I should share in it, in that, for 25
years, I have never before seriously en-
gaged in an effort to cut or change, in
any substantial way, the budget requests
of the military establishment; nor has
anyone else to speak of.
This is simply the first effort to restore
balance to the system. It is not a slander
upon the military. Nobody is slandering
the military. If there is any criticism at
all, I think it is primarily due to Con-
gress failure for too long to expose to
debate and serious examination these
programs.
I do not believe the Senator from Mis-
sissippi could say that we have really
seriously examined these programs in the
past. Not even the Bureau of the Budget
has done so. I ask Mr. Schultze, who was
then Director of the Budget, in open
hearing, about the research programs in
the Pentagon. He said frankly that they
did not go into them; they just accepted
the Pentagon's views.
We have on record a statement of Mr.
McNamara that he made, I think before
the Committee on Armed Services, that
in not one instance while he was Sec-
retary of Defense, where there was a dif-
ference of view between the Bureau of
the Budget and the Pentagon, was the
Pentagon ever overruled. He always pre-
vailed.
This, again, is most unusual, and at
least partly the fault of Congress, be-
cause nobody bothered to challenge it.
Therefore, I do not believe the Senator
has a legitimate complaint about the
way in which he or the Military Estab-
lishment has been treated. After all, they
have $80 billion available in round fig-
ures. An to say that our Military Estab-
lishment is obsolete and that our service-
men do not have good rifles and good
airplanes, is, it seems to me, a gross re-
flection upon the efficiency of American
industry. The money has certainly been
spent in large amounts for that purpose.
The Senator is saying that we have
given the money but that we do not know
how to produce a good airplane. It has
not been for the lack of money that we
do not have a good plane. If we do not
have one. I have been under the impres-
sion that we do have good planes and
good rifles. I have been under the im-
pression that we do have good ships and
other equipment. Never once have I
shared the idea or said that our people
are not properly equipped.
We have spent and are spending, as the
Senator knows, from the best estimates
of our intelligence community, substan-
tially more than the Russians have spent.
And they are the ones we seem to be so
concerned about.
When the Senator says that we are
cutting in the dark and slashing and cut-
ting without knowing what we are doing,
he is making a statement that I do not
subscribe to.
I think we know a good deal about the
normal programs. Many good hearings
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attention in this country, they have not
been neglected.
I have had the great privilege of serv-
ing on the Labor and Public Welfare
Committee and on the Education Sub-
committee. There has not been any great
neglect. However, we could do more.
I join with the distinguished Senator
from Arkansas in hoping for the day
when this sort of balance has been
achieved and we can proceed on all mat-
ters in progress, peace, and prosperity
not only in our country but also around
the world.
At the present time, I am afraid that
we must be realistic.
I am afraid that we cannot achieve all
of the theory on these programs. We have
to accept the situation as it exists today.
We have many plans for research and
development. We have very little hard-
ware.
We have to rebuild and reestablish our
military in order to carry out our com-
mitments and, hopefully, as the result of
the strategic arms limitation meetings
that are about to take place, we can look
for a day when we can deescalate the ex-
penditures on the military side and in-
crease them on the other side.
My colleagues know that I come from
a State where a great deal of these pro-
curement funds will be spent. I have had
no pressure, no calls, and no suggestions
from the so-called highly publicized mili-
tary-industrial complex which used to be
called the military-industrial-scientific
complex. There has been no pressure on
me.
My decisions in the committee have
been based on the information brought
out in the hearings and as a result of the
questioning of experts, both military and
nonmilitary and the studying and read-
ing I have done over years past in order
hopefully to equip myself properly for
my present position.
I associate myself with the remarks of
the distinguished chairman of the com-
mittee, the Senator from Mississippi, and
say that he hopes, as we all do, that this
balance will be much easier to establish
once we get world conditions in balance
the way they should be.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank
the Senator for his remarks.
I point out to the Senator from Ar-
kansas that my remarks and my plea
Is for this balance in conventional forces
within the military. However, if he will
bring in some more balance on our com-
mitments in a bill or a resolution, with
a report and other usual documents be-
hind the measure, things that ordinarily
go with it, he and I will be found to be
closer together. My point is that, until
we do that, we cannot simply turn our
backs on the commitments we have
made.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, we
are in the process of trying to do that
right now in reexamining our commit-
ments. We have a staff working on it
and we think we are making some prog-
ress.
I hope the Senator does not think we
are not doing our best to do exactly that.
In the meantime, other matters come up
and require our attention.
I am not being critical of the Senator
from Mississippi. He is doing his job as
is the military, I think. I think in all
honesty that I and the other Members of
the Senate have failed to do what we
should have been doing for 10 or 15 years
in being a little more attentive to this
kind of program. We have allowed our
priorities to get out of balance.
Does the Senator from Mississippi
agree that we have inferior planes and
that our planes are not as good as the
aircraft of other countries?
Mr. STENNIS. I do not agree. I hope
the very opposite is true. However, if we
do not build new planes, new types of
planes?and we have to make the deci-
sion 4 or 5 years in advance?we
could find ourselves second rate. We may
have already slept too long with refer-
ence to other weapons.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. We heard the state-
ment of a Senator from a State in which
more planes are built than in any other
State, to the effect that we have inferior
planes.
I never believed that to be true. I had
not heard that at all.
We have some that are inferior in some
fields. However, our best planes are as
good as the best planes of any other
country today.
Mr. STENNIS. I do not know that that
Is true right now. However, we have pro-
vision for some contained in the bill.
They are moving along and will be the
best.
I have referred to our many commit-
ments to other countries?commitments
which require us to defend them.
I mentioned Japan. There is a hard
one. Take that one on and get it modi-
fied, if the Senator believes it should be
modified, and bring us something defi-
nite on that problem if the Senator wants
to. I believe that we can consider some
other matters here in that immediate
field.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think there is a
great deal of merit in what the Senator
Is saying, and that is what we are try-
ing to do. We recently had the case of
the Spanish bases, and we tried to mod-
ify it. We did get it modified?not as
much as I would like, but we modified it
substantially.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield to the Senator
from Wisconsin. I do not mean to try to
retain the floor.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I will be brief.
I say to the distinguished Senator from
Mississippi that so far as cutting in the
dark is concerned, I think that this year,
for the first time in many years?cer-
tainly, in the years I have been in the
Senate?we are acting with far more in-
formation and understanding than ever
before, for a number of reasons.
First, the Senator from Mississippi has
done an excellent job in his committee
and in his hearings. I have had a chance
to go over the hearings, and I think he
and his committee not only have asked
the right questions but also have orga-
nized unsually well. As I understand it,
the Senator has delegated to some of the
members of the committee a great deal
of authority, and they have investigated
thoroughly and have come up with some
extremely useful information.
In addition?and I think this is most
unusual?this year a number of Sena-
tors?I am not one of them?organized a
group called Peace Through Law, and
they secured outside professional advice
on a number of weapons systems.
If the Senator from Mississippi has
had a chance to review the report?I
think the Senator from Oregon (Mr.
HATFIELD) is one of the principal movers
in this area?I believe he will be im-
pressed not only by the professionalism
involved but also by the moderation of
their recommendations. They did not
propose to cut deeply, but they did pro-
pose to make some moderate, thoughtful
cuts that were well documented.
I understand that the Senator from
Oregon will speak on this matter a little
later. I hope he speaks soon, because
the Senate should be aware of the very
comprehensive, painstaking, and thor-
ough examination which has been made
of this budget.
Also, the Joint Economic Committee
held hearings last November, January,
and June, in which we examined in con-
siderable detail, on the public record,
the military budget. We had some experts
on these weapons appear before us. We
have developed Boone substantial infor-
mation.
So I think this debate will not be cut-
ting in the dark and it will not be ir-
responsible from the standpoint of those
who are offering amendments to reduce
the military budget. I agree with the
Senator from Mississippi that we must
have a strong military force?strong
Army, Navy, and Air Force?and we must
be secure. I think our amendments are
going to be in the area of trying to
achieve this. If there is a difference of
opinion, it is simply a difference of judg-
ment as to precisely what is needed from
a technical standpoint, not a difference
in terms of value in judgment. We must
have a secure armed force, for our mili-
tary people certainly are serving this
country very well.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator
very much for his remarks. I think he
has done some excellent work.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I am
pleased that the Senator from Wisconsin
is present, because he has a great amount-
of knowledge about the economic aspects
of this matter.
The statement has been made by the
Senator from Arkansas that we should
have a balance in the broader sense of
the term rather than a balance with re-
spect to conventional and strategic
forces. I think both points of view are
proper. We should have a perspective in
both senses.
But I think the danger is that by talk-
ing about a balance in the broad sense,
much has been said about the military
being out of balance. I believe the Sena-
tor from Arkansas implied, when he
pointed out all the other commitments,
that we have in our own domestic respon-
sibilities.
I have been trying to make the point to
my colleagues?and this is the third
time?that one way of looking at balance
is to look at our gross national product.
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I believe that economists generally take a
look at a nation's gross national product
as an indication of its capabilities to meet
various commitments. While I recognize
that a $78 billion national defense budget
sounds like a great amount of money, I
think it should be put in the perspective
of what our gross national product is.
I have pointed out that for fiscal year
1970, the $78 billion defense budget will
comprise approximately 8.1 percent of
our gross national product, and that is
no larger than it was for fiscal 1969. I
thought we should go back in 5-year
periods for 15 years to see how it looks.
If one goes back to fiscal 1964, fiscal 1959,
and fiscal 1954, he will find that the pro-
posed defense budget for fiscal 1970 is
less in percentage of our gross national
product than 3 of those periods and equal
in one.
So I find myself a little unenthusiastic
about all this talk about balance when
I take a look at our ability, which is re-
flected in the gross national product.
One other thought on this matter is
that if you take from the $78 billion
national defense budget $28 billion for
the cost of the war in Vietnam, you get
down to $50 billion, which we might say
represents what could be a normal na-
tional defense commitment. The war is
an abnormal situation. That would put
us down to 5 percent of our gross na-
tional product.
I invite the attention of Senators to
this fact: Even though the 8.1 percent of
our gross national product is what our
national defense will come to for fiscal
1970, that includes $28 billion for the
war. When you go back to 1964, there is
practically nothing for the war; there
was nothing for a war in 1959; and there
was nothing for a war in 1954. Yet, the
percentage of the gross national prod-
uct devoted to military was greater than
the percentage we are going to have for
fiscal 1970.
My point is simply this: Before we start
talking too much and too enthusiasticsilY
about a balance, let us put things in
perspective. If we put things in perspec-
tive, then I think we might be able to
do a better job.
I thank the Senator for yielding,
Mr. STENNIS. 1 thank the Senator.
Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield.
Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, there
is no one in the Senate for whom I have
higher respect than the distinguished
Senator from Mississippi. I know that
he is doing a good job as chairman of
the Committee on Armed Services. He is
very conscientious.
Mr. STENNIS. I wish I could be as
good a Senator and as effective a Sen-
ator as the Senator from Louisiana.
Mr. ELLENDER. I have been trying for
the past 12 years to get most of our troops
removed from Western Europe. We have
had between four and one-half and six
divisions there for 20 years. The main
reason why they were sent there, Fla I
understand it, was to help contain the
Soviet Union, and to reassure our NATO
allies that they would be protected by
U.S. forces.
We built huge airfields in Japan, Oki-
nawa, the Philippines, and all over
Africa to isolate Russia, and in the proc-
ess we actually have been sustaining all
of Western Europe militarily. We have
also constructed many harbors and other
military installations. But, somehow, we
seem to be unable to get the countries
of Western Europe to assist us in our
efforts. They do not seem to sense the
danger as our military advisers see it,
and that should give us something to
think about.
The Senator stated that we are in
South Korea. We have been there vir-
tually alone for many, many years. And
this is supposedly a United Nations un-
dertaking.
It is not totally a U.S. action, as the
Senator knows but we have been carry-
ing most of the burden. It seems that
the executive department is unable to
obtain help or any kind of assistance
from the other members of the United
Nations. We have been carrying that load
alone, as I have stated, at a very substan-
tial cost to our taxpayers.
Now as to Western Europe, it seems to
me that it is up to the Chief Executive
and perhaps Congress to try to get as-
sistance from our erstwhile allies or with-
draw most of our manpower from that
area. We have been in Western Europe
now for 20 years, as I said. It has been
costing the taxpayers of this Nation over
$2 billion a year to sustain the five and
one-half divisions stationed there. To-
gether with their families that are and
have been in that area for the past 15
years, the total of roughly 600,000 Amer-
icans.
I cannot understand why we should
not obtain assistance. The Senator is on
the Subcommittee on Appropriations for
the Armed Services. He knows that I have
tried every time a new Secretary of De-
fense was named?beginning with Mr.
McElroy and then Mr. Wilson, and their
successors?to get help from Western
Europe. All I could obtain was, "We will
try." Try?that is all they have done and
with no results.
From the start the countries of West-
ern Europe were not carrying their just
load as they promised to do. On a visit
there in 1960, between the Republican
and Democratic National Conventions, I
found that our so-called allies had no di-
visions that were ready for action. In
Germany, Belgium, and other countries,
there were more or less paper divisions.
If the Russians had struck in 1960, there
would have been only five and a half di-
visions from our country ready to go,
and one brigade from Canada. As I have
stated, the rest of them were paper di-
visions and it would have required
months to bring them to our stanards.
Why that situation was permitted to
continue I cannot say, but somebody was
not on the job. When I visited SHAEF in
1960, even our military people there
stated to me that our allies were well
prepared and ready to go, but after an
investigation I found that they were
mere paper divisions, particularly in
Germany.
Now, to come to our local situation, I
have voted every dollar requested by the
Defense Department to maintain our de-
fenses. Five or six years ago it was my
feeling that since we were living in a mis-
sile age, we should spent much of our
time and money in developing more and
better missiles. It was obvious to me that
if a war were to occur between us and
Russia, it would be a war in which nu-
clear missiles would be used, and not
conventional weapons.
I stated at the time that it was my
feeling and my belief that our country
could not afford to carry on both a mis-
sile-age program and a conventional war
program. It would be simply impossible;
it would be too costly. But my advice was
not heeded, and we are making efforts
now to carry on preparation for both a
missile-age war and a conventional war-
fare program. I see no reason why we
should do that if the people from West-
ern Europe, who are now able to assist
us, do not joint in helping us. It is my
belief that as long as the U.S. Govern-
ment permits the French Germans, Bel-
gians, Danes ,and the British to lay their
heads on Uncle Sam's shoulder and to
carry them along, they will not do any-
thing to help us out.
Mr. President, It strikes me that every
effort should be made by the present
administration to obtain assistance, real
assistance, from the governments of
Western Europe; and, if they do not
agree, we should get out of Western Eu-
rope. That is what I advocate and that
is what I have been proposing for at least
10 years, with little or no success. They
seem not to see any danger and our mili-
tary people take the position that Europe
should be protected. I cannot agree.
I am not going to try to debate now
the many mistakes made by our policy
planners or by the managers of the Pen-
tagon's research and development pro-
gram. However, as the Senator from
Mississippi knows, it has been my belief
for a long time that we have been pro-
viding too large a reservoir of research
money for the Pentagon, and the plan-
ners have fallen over themselves to find
ways to spend the available funds. I
think this year the Defense was allowed
over $8 billion by the Bureau of the
Budget. Is that correct?
Mr. STENNIS. The exact figure was
$8.2 billion.
Mr. ELLENDER. And it was cut back
by how much?
Mr. STENNIS. About $1 billion in all.
Mr. ELLENDER. As I figure it there
is over $7 billion in the bill before us.
Mr. STENNIS. It is $7.179 billion.
Mr. ELLENDER. As long as we have
that much money for the Pentagon to
do research, ways will be found to spend
it. I am very hopeful that during this
session we will be able to cut back on
some of these research funds. Today we
are budgeting almost $17 billion for re-
search funds in all departments of Gov-
ernment. I cannot help but feel there is
much waste. Such a huge sum cannot be
frugally administered.
My good friend from Arkansas (Mr.
MCCLELLAN) is familiar with all the bil-
lions of dollars that we have spent for
the P-111, but we still have funds in the
pending bill for further research and
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ugust ,
S 9561
building more prototypes and some I am not absolving the military from listened with a good deal of interest to
planes for our Air Force. all the blame but this is one instance the statement of the Senator from Mis-
Mr. McCLELLAN. Will the Senator where there was a great overrun of the sissippi and the remarks which have
yield at that point? costs, where the Secretary of Defense been made in response. We appreciate
Mr. ELLENDER. I shall yield in a said he was taking the figures out of his his sincerity and the great amount of
moment. Also, we were presented with a head and overruled everyone else. Thus, work he has performed on the bill before
large sum to continue the MOL?the we cannot blame the military and the us. For myself, I do not find any fault
Manned Orbital Laboratory. It was only experts in the military field when they in his concept of balance.
after a good deal of coaxing that re- try to counsel, and their counsel is over- While the amendment which was of-
search for the MOL was discontinued, ruled in that fashion. I want to keep the fered by the Senator from Michigan
The Air Force is not spending any more record straight. I am sure the military (Mr. HART) and myself took a good deal
money in that direction. Over $1 billion have made many blunders, but the Sen- of time, I do not think it has been
was spent through the Air Force before ator mentioned that one plane, and I wasted. It has directed the attention of
the project was halted. have some knowledge about that. the Senate, the Congress, and the peo-
In a related area, I am chairman of the Mr. ELLENDER. I have named no one. pie to the defense budget, and naturally
subcommittee which goes over the funds Mr. McCLELLAN. I did. I named the debate led into the larger questions
requested by the Atomic Energy Com- someone. of security and the means of -attaining
mission. For years, we have been work- Mr. ELLENDER. I did not. I was talk- security.
Ing on a small atomic engine for the ing about the Defense Department gen- I have not been one who has criticized
space program. We have already spent erally. I know that there was quite a dif- the military. I have always recognized
$1,200,000,000 on this engine and up to ference of opinion between the Navy and that our military leaders have a particu-
now we have not satisfactorily con- the Air Force regarding the F-111 and lar responsibility, a responsibility to plan
structed a prototype. I asked how long it that the Navy took the position that and recommend those programs which
would take to complete the engine, and I they should have their own plane. they believe are necessary for the secur-
was told 7 more years would be needed Mr. McCLELLAN. The result was they ity of the country. The security of this
and that the cost would be about $1,100-
did not get any plane. If they had got- country is not limited only by its physi-
ten what was given to them, they would cal protection but, in my view, it compre-
heds protecting its institutions and our
000,000 more. So we will be spending
well over $2 billion in order to perfect this
machine. Yet at the same time, I am
proposing a small amount in that very
same bill to continue our public works
programs, to fight air pollution and water
pollution and, somehow, I have been un-
able to get amounts budgeted for those
worthy projects.
I am for a balanced military program,
for our own immediate protection, but
not for one to protect the whole world.
Most of the millions of dollars we have
spent on the military assistance advisory
groups and other missions throughout
the world have not been well spent. They
have brought us more grief and trouble
than anything else, in my opinion. They
have served to keep the pot boiling, and
have helped create fear and suspicion
among nations which should be good
friends and neighbors. They have helped
get us into arguments where we had no
good reason to be, and no real American
interest to protect.
So far as I am concerned, I should like
to see every American soldier now in
Europe come back, and let the Europeans
do more to protect themselves. They are
well able to take care of themselves by
this time.
Mr. McCLELLAN. The Senator from
Louisiana mentioned a while ago as one
illustration the F-111 airplane. In all
fairness, I am not absolving the military
from all the blame in connection with
that airplane, but I think the record
should be kept straight that the mili-
tary, from the very beginning, disap-
proved of that airplane, and from the be-
ginning, the military people warned that
the commonality of the concept would
not work, that the two planes would not
be able to perform the missions for which
they were designed. Thus, I simply want
to keep the record straight that the pri-
mary mistake and responsibility, and
then the compounding of that mistake, up some of the burden of defending the
lies primarily with the civilian head of free world. and backup costs, was $12 billion an-
the Department of Defense and not with Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the nually. This fact demands help from the
the military who repeatedly tried to get Senator from Mississippi yield? other countries.
that concept modified and the plane re- Mr. STENNLS. I yield. As Senators have said, we must relate
designed so as to make it work. Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I have our defense needs to our foreign policy
not nave.
Mr. ELLENDER. The point is that the free system of Government.
Department of Defense, in that area, Anyone who has been in the military
spent about $2.5 billion. Is that not cor- service, whether in a squad_platoon, com-
rect? pany, or regiment, knows that every
Mr. McCLELLAN. They spent nearly commander of a unit seeks all the ma-
$5 billion. teriel and arms he can to meet any con-
Mr. ELLENDER. Very well. That tingency. I have no doubt that this re-
makes it wose; $5 billion and they have sponsibility enters into the thinking and
no planes at present. concern of military leaders. But to secure
Mr. McCLELLAN. They will be get- balance, there are several things to be
ting 400 planes, instead of the 1700 orig- considered,
inally ordered. One consideration is the resources of
Mr. ELLENDER. As I said, I named our country and this demands the
no one. I was speaking of the Depart- amount be allocated for effective and
ment of Defense generally. I am certain reasonable purposes. As the Senator from
Mr. McNamara did not move alone. Louisiana pointed out a second con-
Mr. McCLELLAN. He overruled all the sideration involves the use of our re-
military, sources in assistance and defense of other
Mr. ELLENDER. Perhaps. countries, any inquiry as to the efforts
Mr. McCLELLAN. That is an undis- they are willing to make. I remember
puted fact. when the Senator from Mississippi and I
Mr. ELLENDER. The point I was try- attended the NATO assembly meeting,
ing to emphasize most is that we have after the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
made many promises to assist everyone
Then, the representatives of other
in the world. That has been the effect countries, were concerned, and the meet-
of the MAAG's I referred to earlier. That ing reflected great interest in the defense
is some of the programs I have been try- of Europe. It was my duty to file a report,
Ing to emphasize. That is why we have and on examination, and as a result of
spent so many billions of dollars to help comments from military leaders, I at
people who did not do enough to try and least, came to the conclusion that if
help themselves, there had been any balance between the
Mr. McCLELLAN. Let me say to the NATO forces and the Soviet forces, the
distinguished Senator from Louisiana
balance had been upset by the invasion
that I wanted to keep the record
of Czechoslovakia. Yet since that time,
straight with respect to the TFX air-
plane. our NATO allies, no matter how much
Now I want to say to the Senator that they are appealed to, have not increased
their contributions necessary for the ade-
I am in complete agreement with him
about Western Europe. We have
quate defense of their own countries.
sup-
ported them all these years, providing I had attempted to secure from the
defense for them, and I think it is high Department of Defense the cost of our
time they began to provide their own. total contribution to the security of
I agree completely with the Senator from Western Europe. I secured information
Louisiana about that. When we talk from the Department of Defense, which
about bringing our troops home, the I placed in my report. The total cost, not
Western European countries should take merely the cost of the troops in Europe,
f the 6th fleet weapons
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IoN-Ar, RE August 11 1969
? SENATE
commitments. What a good many of us
have tried to do is to insist that the
Executive branch be very careful about
conunitments. We do not want it to be
taken for granted that a commitment
exists to send troops to another country,
to engage in war, or to put our troops
on foreign soil in a position where we
could back into a war?which we have
done in Vietnam?unless a joint author-
ity is given by the Executive and by the
Congress of the United States.
We ought to establish what our com-
mitments are, and their relationship to
the security of this country. Otherwise,
we may be engaged in military spending,
and wars in areas throughout the world.
We should try to find agreement with
the Soviet Union upon the control of
nuclear arms. We hope that progress can
be made. Agreements could leduce mate-
rially the demand for spending, and even
more important, reduce the chance of
nuclear wax.
Now I would like to make a suggestion.
Mr. STENNIS. I will consider a sug-
gestion from the Senator from Kentucky
at any time.
Mr. COOPER. We have a bill before
us involving about $20 billion. It involves
expenditures for all of the branches of
the armed services, and it includes many
items with which those of us who do not
serve on the Armed Services Committee
are not familiar.
For a year I have found how difficult
it is to learn about one issue?anti-bal-
listic-missile systems. I believe it would
be very helpful if the Senathe from Mis-
sissippi would go through the bill, ex-
plain the provisions of the bill, the need
and relationship of the weapi ms systems,
which are very difficult for all of us, and
explain the reasons supporting the vari-
ous provisions and their funding. Give
us your views of the balance of the bill
of which the Senator spoke so well.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator
very much. I know there is a need in
that field or the Senator would not have
brought it up. I will do my best to fulfill
that need, to some degree. I will have
to arrange a time.
Mr. President, I do not want to hold
the floor any longer. I yield the floor.
Mr. McCLELLAN obtained the floor.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. McCLELT,AN. I yield to the Sena-
tor from Arizona, without losing my right
to the floor.
Mr. GOLDWATER. I thank the Sen-
ator from Arkansas for yielding.
Mr. President, this morning, under
controlled conditions, the senior Sena-
tor from Kansas (Mr. PlAssoN) ad-
dressed himself to the military -industrial
complex. Having forgotten that it was
under controlled conditions. I tried to
question the Senator at the finish of his
speech, but the Chair, properly, si-
lenced me. However, before I was seated,
I stated I thought the Senator had made
a good speech, but I did not agree with
it. I should like to correct what I think
may be a wrong impression.
I think the Senator made a fine speech,
in which he recommended to the Amer-
ican people that they realize that we
have a military-industrial complex, and
we should be proud and glad we have it,
and he made some very interesting sug-
gestions.
When I said I disagreed with it, it was
only as to a point or two in his thinking.
His use of the famous quotation by
General Eisenhower in his farewell
speech on the military-industrial com-
plex was put in the RECORD without what
I think is an equally important part, in
which President Eisenhower said:
We now stand 10 years past the midpoint
of a century that has witnessed four major
wars among great nations. Three of these
involved our own country. Despite these.
holocausts America is today the strongest,
the most influential and most productive
nation in the world. Understandably proud
of this preeminence, we yet realize that
America's leadership and prestige depend, not
merely upon our unmatched material prog-
ress, riches, and military strength, but on
how we use our power in the interests of
world peace and human betterment.
I merely wanted to get that point in
the RECORD, together with one other that
the Senator made. I have discussed this
matter with him, and I recognize why he
made it. If I did not serve on the Armed
Services Committee, I would feel myself
somewhat in agreement with him. He
comments in one sentence:
But nowhere is this weakness more glaring
than in defense matters.
I take personal offense at that, because
I have served on committees of the Sen-
ate for many, many years, and I have
never served on a committee that is so
thorough and so constant in its investi-
gations as is the Armed Services Com-
mittee, under the chairmanship of the
Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS).
The Senator went further, and this is
one other point I disagreed with, but it
does not mean I disagree with the entire
speech at all. He said:
I submit that under the present conditions
it is a simple physical impossibility for the
two _armed services committees and the two
military subcommittees of the appropriations
committees to effectively review and evaluate
e policy and budgetary requested of the
Department of Defense.
I wanted to make a statement on my
own behalf that this is not so; that I
think the two committees and the two
subcommittees involved do an excellent
job.
I also wanted my verification on the
record that the suggestion which he
made to return to a Truman type of com-
mittee that we knew back in World War
II is a good one, whether it means expan-
sion of the present committees or setting
up a new one.
I wanted merely to correct the record.
I thank the Senator from Arkansas
for yielding to me.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr . President, I
yield to the Senator from Connecticut
(Mr. Rnacorr) without losing my right
to the floor.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, dur-
ing the past several days, the Senate has
been deeply concerned about waste in the
defense budget. This concern has been
demonstrated by the number of amend-
ments introduced relating to the role of
the General Accounting Office in audit-
ing defense contracts.
Every Member of this body is dedicated
to efficient and effective government.
And so is the Committee on Government
Operations.
The Committee on Government Op-
erations is concerned about any waste,
excess spending, or inefficient practices in
the Federal Government, wherever they
exist. In particular, it is especially con-
cerned that the agency established and
charged with monitoring Federal spend-
Ing?GAO--he properly constituted and
staffed for this critical task.
As was repeatedly noted during last
week's debate, the Committee on Gov-
ernment Operations has legislative over-
sight over the operations and activities
of the General Accounting Office, The
following excerpts from Senate rule XXV
makes this very clear:
(j) (1) Committee on Government Opera-
tions . . . to which shall be referred all pro-
posed legislation, messages, petitions, me-
morials and other matters relating to the
following subjects:
(A) Budget and accounting measures, other
than appropriations.
(B) Reorganizations in the executive
branch of the Government.
(2) Such committee shall have the duty
of?
(A) receiving and examining reports of the
Comptroller General of the United States
and of submitting such reconunendations to
the Senate as it deems necessary or desirable
in connection with the subject matter of
such reports:
(B studying the operation of Government
activities at all levels with a view to deter-
mining its economy and efficiency.
Commenting on proposals to expand
the concept and funetions of the General
Accounting Office, the able and distin-
guished chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, Senator JOBN STEN-
NIS, placed in the RECORD of August 7,
1969, a letter he had received from Elmer
B. Staats, the Comptroller General,
which stated in part:
Before legislation of this type is enacted,
it would be our recorninendation that the
most careful consideration be given to it by
the Congress. The type of reviews made by
this office and the needs of the interested
committees of the Congress need further
develorunent and exploration.
This assessment should begin with the
committee that has statutory responsi-
bility for the activities of the General
Accounting Office.
I have been authorized by the chair-
man of the Committee on Government
Operations, Senator Joniv MCCLELLAN, to
say that the commiVee plans to hold
hearings on the General Accounting Of-
fice to determine its capacity to meet its
current?and proposed?obligations and
responsibilities.
The hearings would be a general
assessment of the GAO, its statutory au-
thority, budget and staff. We would also
seek to determine in what additional
ways the GAO could better fulfill its
obligations to the legislative branch. I
would also like-to note that these pro-
posed hearings have the full endorse-
ment and support of Senator KARL
MUNDT, ranking minority member of the
committee. The committee hopes to hear
testimony from the Comptroller Gen-
eral, from interested Senators, from the
Department of Defense, and others. We
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August 11, S 9563
would welcome any bills that would assist
the GAO in carrying out its responsibil-
ities in auditing the activities of the
Federal Government.
It would be my hope that the commit-
tee could then report out legislation that
would be responsive to the pressing prob-
lem of monitoring, assessing and con-
trolling?to the fullest possible extent?
the massive expenditures of the Depart-
ment of Defense, as well as all Federal
agencies.
I thank the distinguished Senator for
yielding me the opportunity to make this
statement.
YOUNG PEOPLE, ORGANIZED CRIME,
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, too
often those of us who are concerned
about the administration of criminal
justice tend to analyze the problems that
face us in terms of categories without
seeing inner relationships. We express
our concern about street crime and at-
tempt to respond to the rape, robbery,
and murder that occur in our streets. We
express our concern about organized
crime and attempt to respond to the de-
predations of criminal syndicates. It
was in this context, therefore, that I
found the testimony of Prof. Donald R.
Cressey, of the University of California
at Santa Barbara, before the House Se-
lect Committee on Crime, on August 5,
all that much more enlightening. A stu-
dent of Sutherland, whose "White Col-
lar Crime" did so much to destroy the
myth that poverty is a cause of crime,
Professor Cressey is a nationally recog-
nized authority in criminology, whose
most recent studies have been conducted
In the area of organized crime. Profes-
sor Cressey's testimony shows clearly the
relationship between our Nation's fail-
ure to respond to the challenge of or-
ganized crime and the increasing vio-
lence of our inner city youth. In showing
this connection, he demonstrates how
essential an attack on organized crime is
In any concerted effort to respond to
crime in the streets.
Mr. President, I submit that a society
that cannot bring to book the overlords
of La Cosa Nostra is a society which can-
not hold the allegiance of the young to
the traditional standards of moral re-
sponsibility. I commend Professor Cres-
sey's statement to each of my colleagues,
and I ask unanimous consent that it be
printed in the RECORD following my re-
marks.
There being no objection, the state-
ment was ordered to be printed in, the
RECORD, as follows:
ORGANIZED CRIME AND INNER-CITY YOUTH
(Testimony by Prof. Donald R. Cressey before
the Select Committee on Crime, House of
Representatives, Congress of the United
States, August 5, 1969)
American criminals have managed to put
together an organization which is at once a
nationwide illicit cartel and a nationwide
confederation. This organization is dedicated
to amassing millions of dollars by means of
extortion, and from usury, the illicit sale of
lottery tickets, chances on the outcome of
horse races and athletic events, narcotics, and
untaxed liquor. Its presence in our society is
morally reprehensible because any citizen
purchasing illicit goods and services from
organized criminals contributes to a culture
of fraud, corruption, violence, and murder.
But the real danger of organized crime arises
because the tremendous profits obtained
from the sale of illicit goods and services are
being invested in legitimate businesses and
in the political process. The game is mo-
nopoly, both the economic sphere and the po-
litical sphere.
Although organized crime touches every
American, the direct victims are the citizens
living in the deteriorated areas of our large
cities. The economic base of organized
crime's multi-billion investments in legiti-
mate business and in politics is the precious
money of the urban poor. The war on poverty
has not been a smashing success at least in
part because Government money poured into
ghettos goes immediately from the pockets
of the poor to the pockets of organized crimi-
nals. From there, the money goes to nullifi-
cation of the very economic and political
processes which make the war on poverty
possible in the first place.
Numbers lotteries and bookmaking busi-
nesses thrive on the dollars of unskilled Ne-
groes and other inner-city residents, not on
bets placed by the rich, the educated, the
well-housed, the well-employed. Similarly,
-the American drug addict is likely to be
poorly educated and unskilled, a resident of a
central-city area, and a member of a dis-
advantaged ethnic minority group. And it is
the factory worker, the marginal business-
man, and the urban welfare recipient, not
the suburbanite, who frequently is so desper-
ate for a loan that he seeks out a loanshark.
A membership group variously known as
"Cosa Nostra," "The Mafia," and "The
Syndicate" is the core of the organized crime
group that is feeding on the urban poor.
The structure and operations of this or-
ganization need not be described here, They
were sketched out by the McClellan Com-
mittee in 1963 1 and by the President's Com-
mission on Law Enforcement and Adminis-
tration of Justice in 1967.2 Three recent
books, including my own, fill in some of the
details.'
Cosa Nostra is a membership organization.
About 5,000 men who have been admitted
to membership now view themselves as mem-
bers and take special cognizance of other
members. But not all the persons making a
living from organized crime are members of
Cosa Nostra. For example, very few of the
public officials corrupted by Cosa Nostra are
members. Each of the twenty-four Cosa
Nostra "families" in the United States has
at least one position for a "corrupter," a man
whose job it is to secure immunity of "family"
members from the law-enforcement process.
For each "corrupter" position of this kind,
there is at least one "corruptee"?the person
receiving the bribe, the payoff, the contribu-
tion, or the "favor" the corrupter has to offer.
While the corruptee usually is not a Cosa
Nostra member, the services he performs are
essential to the continuing operations of Cosa
Nostra. Accordingly, he is part of organized
crime even if he is excluded from member-
ship in the core organization.
Similarly, the persons occupying the low-
est levels of the division of labor constitut-
ing organized crime ordinarily are not Cosa
Nostra members. These are the "street men"
involved in the retailing of Cosa Nostra's
illicit goods and services, such as narcotics
and bet-taking. They also fill the organiza-
tion's needs for personnel to provide low-
level services such as driving trucks and cars,
delivering messages, running errands, pick-
ing up illegal betting slips, and answering
the thousands of telephones utilized by bOok-
makers. In the ghetto areas of large cities,
much of the street work is done by Negroes.
These street-level workers are employed by
Cosa Nostra in much the way corruptees are
employed by Cosa Nostra. That is, they may
be part-time employees paid on a piece-work
Footnotes at end of article.
basis, or full-time salaried employees, or com-
mission agents.
Commission agents are the most affluent
street-level organized criminals. Some of
them solicit bets for centrally located book-
makers who have title to a neighborhood.
Others sell illegal lottery tickets. Still others
are considered the "owners" or "bankers" of
illegal numbers lotteries. These last men are
likely to be called "independents" because
they are not members of Cosa Nostra. But
they are not independent. Each of them must
give a percentage of his gross to a Cosa Nostra
member for the privilege of doing business
in his territory.
The street-level commission agents work-
ing in black ghettos ordinarily are black men.
All of them?and especially the "independ-
ent" numbers bankers have high status in
their neighborhoods. They are the "hustlers"
with the ready bank roll, the Cadillac, the
Omega watch, the $65 alligator shoes, and
other symbols of affluence. Despite the fact
that discriminatory practices prevent black
commission agents from moving up into the-
echelons of Cosa Nostra, when the real money
is, these organized criminals are the idols of
young ghetto residents. They are men who
have made it.
The National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders noted that poverty, violence,
and organized crime activities combine to
produce great synieism about the idea that
success is to be achieved by legitimate means.
The Commission succinctly stated what
many other persons and agencies have ob-
served:
"With the father absent and the mother
working, many ghetto children spend the
bulk of their time on the streets?tlae streets
of a crime-ridden, Violence-prone and pov-
erty-stricken world. The image of success in
this world is not that of the "solid citizen,"
the responsible husband and father, but ra-
ther that of the "hustler" who takes care of
himself by exploiting others. The dope sell-
ers and the numbers runners are the "suc-
cessful" men because their earnings far out-
strip those men who try to climb the eco-
nomic ladder in honest ways.
"Young people in the ghetto are acutely
conscious of a system which appears to offer
rewards to those who illegally exploit others,
and failure to those who struggle under tra-
ditional responsibilities. Under these circum-
stances, many adopt exploitation and the
'hustle' as a way of life, disclaiming both
work and marriage in favor of basual and
temporary liaisons. This pattern reinforces
itself from one generation to the next, cre-
ating a 'culture of poverty' and an ingrained
cynicism about society and its institu-
tions."
So far as urban ghettos are concerned,
Cosa Nostra is comparable to an invading
army. Its troops have conquered territory
and now these troops, with the assistance of
the local Quislings who serve them, have
made a certain peace with the residents, in-
cluding law-enforcement agents. The alli-
ances of organized criminals operating in
Inner-city areas contribute to more general
crime and delinquency rates in three inter-
related ways. First, by their opulence the
persons engaged in organized crime demon-
strates to the people, and especially to the
young, that crime does pay. Second, by their
very presence, organized criminals demon-
strate the existence of a rich vein of cor-
ruption in political and law-enforcement
organizations, making it difficult for parents
and others to convince children that people
get ahead in the world by good, hard, honest
labor in service of family, country, man, and
God. Third, the presence of organized crime
in a neighborhood lowers the status of the
people in the district, just as do conditions
of squalor, with the result that anti-criminal
admonitions lose their effectiveness?the
people have less to lose if convicted of crime.
Attraction. If an organization is to survive,
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August 1_1, 1969
it must have an institutional process for re-
cruiting new members and inculcating them
with organizational values and ways of be-
having. But the most successful recruitment
processes are those which do not appear to be
recruiting techniques at all. These are the
process by which membership becomes
highly desirable because of the rewards and
benefits prospective members believe it con-
fers on them. These, also, are the processes
which enable inner-city youth to find niches
in the world of crime.
Some boys grow up knowing that it is a
"good thing" to be a banker, to belong to a
certain club, to attend a certain university.
They know these are "good things" because
men they emulate have done them. Other
boys?those in the central areas of our large
cities?grow up knowing that it is a "good
thing" to be a street-level organized crimi-
nal, to have the respect of established orga-
nized criminals, and to be given the oppor-
tunity to learn the skills and attitudes
necessary to bookmaking or numbers selling.
Still other slum boys grow up knowing that
If they have the right qualifications and con-
nections they might be admitted to member-
ship in Cosa Nostra itself, thus becoming eli-
gible for a share of the billions of dollars Cosa
Nostra makes annually from the illegal bets
placed with the street-level workers who are
employed by Cosa Nostra.
Most slum boys grew up in social situations
In which the desire for participation in orga-
nized crime comes naturally and painlessly.
Raymond V. Martin, formerly Assistant Chief
of Brooklyn South Detectives, has reported
that in some Brooklyn neighborhoods, boys
grew up under two "flags." 5 One is the flag
of the United States, symbolizing middle-
class institutions, tradition, and culture. The
other is the flag of organized crime, symboliz-
ing criminal society. Stated in more general
terms, the principle is this: Persons growing
up in some geographic and seciil areas have
a better chance than do others to come into
contact with norms and values which support
legitimate activities, in contrast to criminal
activities, while in other areas the reverse is
true. In many areas, alternative educational
processes are in operation, so that a child may
be educated in either conventional or crim-
inal means of achieving success. In inner eity
areas, organized criminals efficiently and ef-
fectively provide youngsters With criminal-
istic norms, values, and ways of behaving.
Boys growing up in areas where the "syndi-
cate flag" is flying learn that success comes
to "real men," to "stand-up guys" who violate
the law with impunity. Accordingly, they
train themselves in skills and attitudes which
they believe will be as valuable to their suc-
cess as they have been in the careers of the
men they admire. A recent study by Irving
Spergel suggests that these include, espe-
cially, personal values about silence, honor,
and loyalty?values which make the boys
controllable by the adult criminals about
whom they are silent, to whom they behave
honorably, and to whom they are loyalS
Spergel studied juvenile delinquents in
three different neighborhoods of Chicago.
One of them was given the fleticious name
"Racketville" because organized-crime activi-
ties flourish there. In this neighborhood, like
many other American slum neighborhoods,
organized criminal activities such as lot-
teries, bookmaking, and usury employ a siz-
able proportion of the population. Some de-
linquents were observed participating in
lottery operations, primarily through family
connections. For example, one boy drove his
uncle's Cadillac to pick up the receipts from
a numbers writer. Another boy was elated
when a man he said was "big" in the num-
bers asked him to perform a minor errand.
He said this might be a "break" for him, that
this "big shot" might give him a job paying
"a couple hundred dollars a week for hardly
doing nothing," that he would be able to
Footnotes at end of article.
get up late in the morning, have girls, and go
to night clubs.
The boys viewed minor organized-crime
work assignment as opportunities to do small
favors for the racketeers, thus demonstrating
willingness and trustworthiness. Usurers
were viewed as respectable businessmen by
the boys, who emulated them. The boys
themselves participated in money-lending,
and during the course of the study two boys
were arrested for systematic loansharking
while still attending school.
Spergel concluded, however, is more
important for an organi crime aspirant
to display evidence t he is a "stand-up
guy" than to learn ecific criminal skills.
A "stand-up guy" owe courage and "heart."
He does not whi e or complain in the face
of adversity, in uding arrest interrogation
and purrishme . He has learned to rate crim-
inals higher t an noncriminals.
Racketeers placed a premium on smooth
and unobtr ive operation of their employees.
The undis iplined, trouble-making young
"punk" w not acceptable. The primary con-
dition for mission to the racket organiza-
tion was ot necessarily involvement in de-
linquent ts but training in attitudes and
beliefs w ich would facilitate the smooth
operation f the criminal organization. Prior
developme t of specific skills and experiences
seemed les necessary than the learning of an
underlying llegitimate orientation or point
of view con ive to the development of or-
ganized crim 7
The followl transcript of a bugged con-
versation betwe a New York Cosa Nostra
soldier and his Min indicates that this
"underlying illegit I' 'te orgentation" is
sought in neighborh... '- 'ther than Racket-
ville. The speaker is praisin the qualities of
his captain's regime by telling m his mem-
bers have the desired criminalis attitudes.
They are "stand-up kids." The co rsation
refers to an FBI investigation:
"They are telling them everything. ho's
Cosa Nostra. What's the picture here. ho
the bosses are. Who's the bosses? These e
kids that don't know nothing. They
schooling them. They are telling.them up a
down the line what everything is here. The
are actually exposing the whole . . . thing to
innocent kids. (Inaudible.) Innocent kids.
Exposing the whole thing. "He's a captain."
(Inaudible.) And so forth, I said. Good. Your
kids, now, you know, are stand-up kids. . . .
They are going to tell them not a word." 8
Spergel asked the delinquents in his study,
"What is the occupation of the adult in your
neighborhood whom you most want to be
like ten years from now?" Racketville boys
did not name bankers, or policemen, or Con-
gressmen, or teachers, or businessmen, or
skilled workers. Eight out of ten responded to
the question by naming some aspect of orga-
nized crime. Similarly, Racketville delin-
quents believed that the most important
quality in "getting ahead" is "connections,"
not ability, or good luck, or education.
There is an important lesson here for
ministrators of programs designed to
courage inner-City youth to remain in ool
and "get a good education" so they con-
tribute to their own welfare and t welfare
of the nation. This message is getting
across. It does not fit the r ty of daily
street ex riences in ghett y waching the
part o organized eri available for them
to se the street salons?inner-city boys
le that who take the illegitimate
ccess fare better than those taking
the legitimate route. The same experiences
also convince them that it is who you know,
not what you know, that counts, Seven out
of ten of Spergel's delinquents chose edu-
cation as the least important factor in
achieving success, perhaps indicating a be-
lief that "education" and "connections" are
antithetical.
Slum boys who think this way we are fac-
tually incorrect, even with reference to or-
ganized crime. The orientation sought by
inner-city boys?the attitudes of the "stand-
up guy" helps prepare them for street crime
like burglary and robbery, and for Street
level involvement in organiged crime. But
positions of leadership in organized crime,
like positions of leadership everyWhere in
this day and age, increasingly require skills
learned in colleges and universities, not on
the streets. Moreover, being a "stand-up
guy" might get a boy a position as a book-
maker or a numbers seller if he has good con-
to become a Cosa Nostra mem-
ber he must have better connections than
this. And if he is to advance in Cosa Nostra
he now must have the skills of a purchasing
agent, an accountant, a lawyer, an execu-
tive. Spergel found, in fact, /that significant
upper-echelon opportunities in organized
crime were not open even to the youth of
Racketville. Some delinquents, he says, even-
tuallk became racketeers "without neces-
sarily starting at the bottom."
Occasionally, even honest government offi-
cials inadvertently contribute to the glory of
organized criminals and, thus, to a more
general illegitimate orientation among slum
youth. For example, in the summer of 1966
the director of New York City's Youth Board
asked two Cosa Nostra soldiers, Albert and
Lawrence Gallo, to help halt racial violence
in the East NeW York section of Brooklyn.
The implication, probably correct, was that
Cosa Nostra men could keep order where the
police and social workers could not. But an-
other implication, also correct, was that boys
who want to be neighborhood leaders should
go into organized crime. John J. Cassesse,
President of the New York Patrolmen's Be-
nevolent Association, commented that the
use of the two organized criminals by city
officials both sapped the morale of the police
force and made "tin Sleds" of the organized
criminals involved:
"I can just see what will happen. It's this
way. When a police officer goes up to some
juveniles who have been misbehaving and
tells them to quiet down and move along,
what will they say to him? "You're not the
boss around here, Mr. Gallo is." When you
single people like that out, you make them
tin gods in the neighborhood?people-known
for their habitual lawiessness."10 -
Corruption. The problem of organized
rime is clearly a problem of political cor-
ption. The American Bar Association's re-
st on organized crime concluded, "The
I gest single factor in the'breakdown of law
e forcement dealing with organized crime is
t corruption and connivance of many
p blic officials," 1-1 Similarly, at a 1967 con-
ence of law-enforcement officials, the then
C ief Justice of the United States, Earl War-
proved For eolftsfu2k0i8M3p iablif67
_iggpktip00300100001-3
August 11, 1A9 S9607
funds in a manner not contemplated by the
Congress. If, as stated in the Plan, discrimina-
tion in referral is prohibited by the National
Labor Relations Act and Title' VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is our opinion
that the remedies provided by the Congress
in those acts should be followed. See also
in this connection section 207 of Executive
Order 11246.
While, as indicated in the foregoing opin-
ions and in your Solicitor's memorandum, the
President is sworn to "preserve, protect and
defend the Constitution of the United
States," we question whether the executive
departments are required, in the absence of
a definitive and controlling opinion by the
Supreme Court of the United States, to as-
sess the relative merits of conflicting opin-
ions of the lower courts, and embark upon
a course of affirmative action, based upon the
results of such assessment, which appears
to be in conflict with the expressed intent
of the Congress in duly enacted legislation
on the same subject.
In this connection, it should be noted that,
while the phrase "affirmative action" was in-
cluded in the Executive order (10925) which
was in effect at the time Congress was de-
bating the bills which were subsequently en-
acted as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, no
specific affirmative action requirements of the
kind here involved had been imposed upon
contractors under authority of that Executive
order at that time, and we therefore do not
think it can be successfully contended that
Congress, in recognizing the existence of the
Executive order and in failing to specifically
legislate against it, was aproving or ratify-
ing e type or methods of affirmative action
which your Department now proposes to im-
pose upon contractors.
We recognize that both your Department
and the Department of Justice have found
the Plan to be legal and we have given most
serious consideration to their positions. How-
ever, until the authority for any agency to
impose or require conditions in invitations
for bids on Federal or federally assisted con-
struction which obligate bidders, contractors,
or subcontractors, to consider the race or
national origin of their employees or pro-
spective employees for such construction, is
clearly and firmly established by the weight
of judicial precedent, or by additional
statutes, we must conclude that conditions of
the type proposed by the revised Philadelphia
Plan are in conflict with the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, and we will necessarily have to
so construe and apply the act in passing upon
the legality of matters involving expenidtures
of appropriated funds for Federal or federally
assisted construction projects.
In this connection it is observed that by
section 705(d) of the act, Congress charges
the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission with the specific responsibility of
making reports to the Congress and to the
President on the cause of and means of
eliminating discrimination and making such
recommendations for further legislation as
may appear desirable. That provision, we be-
lieve, not only proscribes the procedure for
correcting any deficiencies in the Civil Rights
Act, but also shows the intent of Congress to
reserve for its own judgment the establish-
ment of any additional unlawful employment
practice categories or nondiscrimination re-
quirements, or the imposition upon employ-
brs of any additional requirements for as-
suring equal employment opportunities.
We realize that our conclusions as set out
above may disrupt the programs and objec-
tives of your Department, and may cause
concern among members of minority groups
who may believe that racial balance or equal
representation on Federal and federally as-
sisted construction projects is required under
the 1964 act, the Executive order, or the Con-
stitution. Desirable as these objectives may
be, we cannot agree to their attainment by
the imposition of requirements on contras-
tors, in their performance of Federal or fed-
erally-assisted contracts, which the Congress
has specifically indicated would be improper
or prohibited in carrying out the objectives
and purposes of the 1964 act.
Sincerely yours,
A74:5017 ELMER B. sTAATs.
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
TIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR
MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RE-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MIS-
SILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJ
ALEIN MISSILE RANGE AND RE-
SERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize appro-
priations during the fiscal year 1970 for
procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval
vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and
to authorize the the construction of test
facilities at Kwajalein Missile Range,
and to prescribe the authorized person-
nel strength of the Selected Reserve of
each reserve component of the Armed
Forces, and for other purposes.
Mr. TYDINGS. Mr President, what is
the pending business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pend-
ing business is the amendment of the
Senator from Maryland.
Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, I ask
for the yeas and nays on my amend-
ment.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I have
long made clear that I am committed to
firm oversight of our defense expendi-
tures. At the same time, however, I feel
an obligation to speak out when it ap-
pears that proposed economies may be
false ones. With this in mind, I feel I
should offer some comment on the pro-
posal by the Senator from Maryland
to reduce the Department of Defense's
emergency funds by one-half. I am well
aware that in recommending an emer-
gency fund of $100-million, the commit-
tee exceeded the previous amount au-
thorized for this purposes. But I also be-
lieve that a 50 percent reduction in this
amount is too great a cut.
My reasons for holding this position
may be stated quite simply. The Sub-
committee on Research and Develop-
ment, on which I was honored to serve,
recommended, and the full committee
has endorsed, major reductions in the
proposed Department of Defense budget
for Research and Development. Those
reductions amount to over $1 billion, the
most substantial cut in any sector of
the budget and one which will affect
many programs which the Department
of Defense considered vital. Having exer-
cised such a stringent review of this ele-
ment of the budget already, it is my be-
lief that the Department should have
somewhat greater latitude in regard to
the emergency fund. These funds will
permit the Department to manage more
sensibly the effective reduction of effort
which this legislation will provide.
I consider a reasonable degree of flex-
ibility very desirable, and in view of the
magnitude of the cuts already contem-
plated, I believe the emergency fund is
a prudent device for improved manage-
ment of the Department of Research and
Development programs in a period of
substantial reorientation.
For example the committee report in-
dicates the considerable uncertainties
which afflict the whole question of air
defense. Both with respect to the defense
of the continental United States and with
respect to forward defense of our men in
the field, should they be engaged against
an enemy with significant tactical air
capability, there are quite fundamental
questions about the size and nature of
air defenses which should be provided.
The committee directed a deferral of
work on the airborne warning and con-
trol system?AWACS?largely because of
the doubts about the likely bomber threat
to the United States.
Similarly, in the relatively brief time
we had to consider the matter in the
subcommittee and in the full body, the
necessity for the promising SAM-D sys-
tem remained unclear. So far as defense
of the field army and the continental
United States is concerned, it seems clear
that this system would provide both more
potent and less costly defense than the
present capabilities, namely, the Nike-
Hercules and Hawk missile forces. The
present weapons are extremely expensive
to maintain. If we are going to provide
extensive air defense in the future, we
may later wish to proceed with the SAM-
D technology.
Thus, the deletion of funds for SAM-
D was accomplished with some trepida-
tion on the part of many of us in the
committee and was written in primarily
beeause of the compulsion we felt to re-
duce the overall budget.
At the same time, however, the
committee has directed the Secretary of
Defense to review the bomber defense
requirement in detail and to submit find-
ings and recommendations in connec-
tion with the fiscal 1971 budget. Since
the Department has argued that SAM-D
is one of the most critical programs bear-
ing on future air defense efforts, it may
well choose to use a portion of the flex-
ible funding authority under section 202
to sustain a minimum level of effort on
SAM-D pending this full re-examina-
tion of the need for a more advanced
air defense capability.
This is but one example of how such
authority might be put to constructive
use. There are many occasions in a large
and fast moving technological effort, of
which the Department's total R. & D. pro-
gram is the principal example, when the
capacity to feed money into a critical
area can prove invaluable. Particularly
since the Department's R.D.T. & E. budg-
et has a large and pressing backlog of
projects competing for funds, I do not
consider this emergency authority exces-
sive.
Indeed my view is similar to that
voiced in the Senate the other day by the
distinguished junior Senator from Mary-
land (Mr. MATHIAS) . I tend to believe that
our defense effort should emphasize the
technological advantages we have ac-
crued, and that we should seek to control
our total defense expenditure princi-
pally by strict limits on premature com-
mitments to procurement of expensive
systems and by reducing our conven-
Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000300100001-3
S 9608 mkiggibm 1ampisq:A9 n9003001000Q
4ug1-3u8t 11, 1969
On page 3, line 2, strike out "$1,921,500,-
000" and insert in lieu thereof "$1,911,343,-
000".
On page 8, line 3, strike out "$3,051, 200,-
000" and Insert in lieu thereof "$3,041,211,-
000".
On page 3, line 4, strike out "$468,200,000"
and insert in lieu thereof "$454,625,000".
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield to the ma-
jority leader.
Approved For
tional forces with their costly manpower
levels to the extent feasible.
The other side of the coin is that, if
we are to stress technological advantages
in maintaining a strong national security
posture, we cannot skimp cm our R. & D.
effort. Considering the 12,7-percent cut
already imposed on the total R.D.T. & E.
authorization, I believe that ample emer-
gency funding is both important and de-
sirable. Accordingly, while I could not
support the $50-million recommended in
the original amendment, :I believe the
compromise which has been worked out
does allow for a sufficient de'n.ee of flex-
ibility in the program. The revised
amendment will therefore have my sup-
port.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is on agreeing Li the amend-
ment of the Senator from Maryland. On
this question, the yeas and nays have
been ordered, and the clerk will call the
roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. KENNEDY. I announce that the
Senator from Tennessee (Mr. GORE) is
absent on official business.
I also announce that the Senator from
Indiana (Mr. BAYH) , the Senator from
Nevada (Mr. BIBLE), the Senator from
Connecticut (Mr. Donn), and the Sen-
ator from Texas (Mr. YARBOROUGH) are
necessarily absent.
I further announce that, if nresent and
voting, the Senator from Tennessee (Mr.
GORE) , the Senator from Indiana, (Mr.
BATH), the Senator from Connecticut
(Mr. Donn), and the Senator f row Texas
(Mr. YARBOROUGH) would each vote
"yea."
Mr. SCOTT. I announce that the Sen-
ator from Ohio (Mr. SAXBE) is neces-
sarily absent and, if present and voting,
would vote "yea."
The result was announced?yeas 94,
nays 0, as follows:
[No. 75 Leg.]
YEAS-94
Aiken
Allen
Allott
Anderson
Baker
Bellmon
Bennett
Boggs
Brooke
Burdick
Byrd, Va.
Byrd, W. Va.
Cannon
Case
Church
Cook
Cooper
Cotton
Cranston
Curtis
Dirk.sen
Dole
Dominick
Eagleton
Eastland
Ellender
Ervin
Fannin
Fong
Fulbright
Goldwater
Goodell
Bayh
Bible
Gravel
Griffin
Gurney
Hansen
Harris
Hart
Hartke
Hatfield
Holland
Hollings
Hru.ska
Hughes
Inouye
Jackson
Javits
Jordan, N.C.
Jordan, Idaho
Kennedy
Long
Magnuson
Mansfield
Mathias
McCarthy
McClellan
McGee
McGovern
McIntyre
Metcalf
Miller
Mondale
Montoya
Moss
NAYS-0
NOT VOTING-6
Dodd Ss -the
Gore Yarborough
Miindt
Murphy
Muskie
sel son
Packwood
Pe :tore
Pearson
Pell
Percy
Prouty
Proxmire
Randolph
Ribicoff
Schweiker
Scott
Smith
Sparkman
Sung
St,,nnis
&ovens
Symington
Talmadge
Thiirmond
Tower
Tydings
N .J .
Williams,
-Young, N. Dak,
Young, Ohio
So Mr. Tynnros' amendment, as modi-
fied, was agreed to.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
move to reconsider the vote by which
the amendment was agreed to.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I move
to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
Mr. FULBRIGAT obtained the floor.
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield to the Sen-
ator from Illinois, with the understand-
ing that I will not lose my right to the
floor.
NOMINATION OF ASSOCIATE JUS-
TICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the name of
the new Associate Justice of the Su-
preme Court may be Bled during the
adjournment or recess of the Senate. I
ask this because it cannot be filed until
Thursday, and until it is filed, the chair-
man of the Committee on the Judiciary
cannot set the time for a hearing.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, re-
serving the right to object, I did not
hear his name.
Mr. DIRKSEN. I did not give his
name. [Laughter.]
Mr. President, I also request that the
name be referred to the Committee on
the Judiciary.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and it
is so Ordered.
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
TIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR
MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RE-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT,
AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF
MISSILE TEST FACILIT.LeS AT
KWAJALEIN MISSILE RANGE,
AND RESERVE COMPONENT
STRENGTH
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize appro-
priations during the fiscal year 1970 for
procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval
vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and
research, development, test, and evalua-
tion for the Armed Forces, and to au-
thorize the construction of test facilities
at Kwajalein Missile Range, and to pre-
scribe the authorized personnel strength
of the Selected Reserve of each reserve
component of the Armed Forces, and
for other purposes.
AMENDMENT NO. 110
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I call
up my amendment No. 110.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
The legislative clerk proceeded to read
the amendment.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that further reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered; and, without
objection, the amendment will be printed
in the RECORD.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 2, line 26, strike out "$1,638,600,-
000" and insert in lieu thereof "61,626,707,-
000".
AUTHORIZATION FOR THE COM-
MITTEE ON FINANCE TO NUTT
ON SEPTEMBER 4 OR 5
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that, on September
4 or 5, the Committee on Finance may be
allowed to meet during the session of the
Senate for the purpose of beginning
hearings and listening to witnesses on
tax reform legislation.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and it
is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. It is hoped that,
after that, we will be able to get authori-
zation for the Committee on Finance to
meet during the session of the Senate on
a week-by-week basis. But we will cross
that bridge when we come to it.
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
TIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR
MILITARY PROCUREIVIENT, RE-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MIS-
SILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJ-
ALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND
RESERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH
The Senate resumed the considera-
tion of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize ap-
propriations during the fiscal year 1970
for procurement of aircraft, missiles,
naval vessels, and tracked combat ve-
hicles, and research, development, test,
and evaluation for the Armed Forces,
and to authorize the construction of
test facilities at Kwajalein Missile
Range, and to prescribe the authorized
personnel strength of the Selected Re-
serve of each Reserve component of the
Armed Forces, and for other purposes.
- Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield for a question?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield for a ques-
tion.
Mr. STENNIS. I know that the Senator
has an amendment of some importance
and that he wishes to discuss it. I am
wondering if there could be a agreement
for controlled time at this point.
Mr. FITLBRIGHT. I say to the Senator
that I have agreed to yield to the Sen-
ator from Illinois (Mr. Palmy) . He has
a statement on a nongermane matter. My
speech will take a little time, and I had
agreed to accommodate him, to yield to
him. I am unable to determine how long
my speech will take, due to the inter-
ruptions. The Senator knows how it goes.
Sometimes it goes quickly and sometimes
not quickly. I would hesitate to make an
agreement at this time. Later on I might
do so, after I am through with my
speech. Perhaps the Senator will renew
his request after I have completed my
remarks.
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?
Approved FoEarsitainsi00,4/11/30,. ..,161119P7AEIRpAlritR000300100001-3
August 11, 196p proved .KE
We have it in our power to raise the
standard of living and the realizable
hopes of millions of our fellow citizens.
By providing an equal chance at the
starting line, we can reinforce the tra-
ditional American spirit of self-reliance
and self-respect.
RICHARD NIXON.
THE WHITE HOUSE, August 11, 1969.
EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED
As in executive session, the Presiding
Officer laid before the Senate messages
from the President of the United States
submitting sundry nominations, and
withdrawing the nomination of John G.
Hurd, of Texas, to be Ambassador Ex-
traordinary and Plenipotentiary to Ven-
ezuela, which nominating messages were
referred to the appropriate committees.
(For nominations this day received,
see the end of Senate proceedings.)
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
TIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR
MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RE-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND,
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF
MISSILE TEST FACILITIES AT
KWAJALEIN MISSILE RANGE,
AND RESERVE COMPONENT
STRENGTH
The Senate resumed the considera-
tion of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize ap-
propriations during the fiscal year 1970
for procurement of aircraft, missiles,
naval vessels, and tracked combat ve-
hicles, and to authorize the construction
of test facilities at Kwajalein Missile
Range, and to prescribe the authorized
personnel strength of the Selected Re-
serve of each Reserve component of the
Armed Forces, and for other purposes.
AMENDMENT NO. 113
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
BYRD of Virginia in the chair). The
Chair recognizes the Senator from Mary-
land.
Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, I call
up my amendment No. 113 and ask that
it be read.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
On page 3, line 9, strike out "$100,000,000"
and insert in lieu thereof "950,000,000".
ORDER OF BUSINESS
Mr. TYDDIGS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that I may yield 7
minutes to the Senator from Massachu-
setts (Mr. BROOKE) , without losing my
right to the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears no objec-
tion, and it is so ordered.
The Senator from Massachusetts Is
recognized.
Mr. BROOKE. I thank the Senator
from Maryland.
The PRESIDING OrrICER. The Sen-
ator is recognized for '7 minutes.
es`
P(Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, now that
IVHRV
the ABM decision has been taken, it be-
hooves the Senate and the President to
concentrate on the most urgent strategic
question now facing the Nation; namely
the looming prospect of new offensive
deployments. There has now been con-
siderable discussion of the so-called mul-
tiple independently targetable reentry
vehicles and more than a quarter of the
members of Congress, including almost
one-half the Senate, have cosponsored
resolutions calling for immediate efforts
to obtain a joint Soviet-American mora-
torium on testing of MIRV systems. Such
a moratorium, which enjoys much wider
support in the informed technical and
strategic community than the contro-
versial ABM plan, would be a highly de-
sirable means of buying time to explore
the MIRV problem in the forthcoming
strategic arms negotiations.
I wish to call the attention of the Sen-
ate to an important editorial in this
morning's Wall Street Journal. This edi-
torial makes clear the contradictory ar-
guments which have been advanced by
certain persons who are reluctant to en-
dorse a MIRV test moratorium, and also
sets forth the cogent reasons for pursu-
ing this critical matter on an urgent
basis.
The editorial alludes to one point in
particular which should not become con-
fused. It is quite misleading to suggest
that U.S. MIRV systems would be stall-
lizing and healthy, because of their smal-
ler size and relative accuracies, while the
kind of Soviet tests which have been ob-
served point toward systems which are
dangerous.
While initial versions of U.S. MIRV's
would not be accurate enough to threaten
the Soviet missile force, continued test-
ing and guidance modifications of those
weapons .could eventually improve their
capability against hard targets. Accura-
cies have improved by a factor of 10 in
recent years; a further improvement by
a factor of only 2 would be sufficient to
produce this result. And the Soviets
would have to base their long-range
planning on this expectation, not on du-
bious American assurances that our
MIRV is safe and good.
Furthermore, while the Soviet Union's
tests of the SS-9 multiple warheads ap-
pear to involve an intermediate tech-
nology somewhere between a simple
cluster weapon and the sophisticated and
flexible MIRV on which we are working,
it is not clear that the system could serve
exclusively a first-strike purpose. The
tests do seem incompatible with a re-
taliatory role only; that is, they do not
appear well suited to attacking cities. As
the President has publicly implied, the
footprints of the Soviet tests seem to
match the distribution and layout of por-
tions of the U.S. Minuteman force and
they may be designed for that purpose.
But in addition to a capacity for assured
retaliation, we ourselves have long
stressed the importance of a second-
strike damage-limiting capability?it is
one of the rationales the DOD applies in
seeking unnecessarily accurate guidance
for Poseidon and Minuteman III.
Thus, especially if the Soviet SS-9
force remains too small for an effective
first-strike against the Minuteman
fields, what we have seen may well turn
out to be an effort to acquire a damage-
limiting capability, that is, a weapon sys-
S 9585
tem which, in the event of war, would
give the Soviet Union a capability to re-
duce damage to itself by striking U.S.
missiles.
This is intricate and ambiguous anal-
ysis, and no one can be sure of the
Soviet Union's exact attitude on MIRV.
But it should be abundantly clear to both
sides, first, that neither side needs a
MIRV system unless the other deploys a
thick city defense that is years away and,
second, that perfection and deployment
of MIRV by either side will stimulate the
other to take countermeasures. If this
process is not arrested soon, and I doubt
that it can be arrested unless MIRV is
forestalled, the arms race is virtually
certain to soar upward to a higher and
more dangerous plateau.
The Journal's editorial stresses that
the United States could safely undertake
a MIRV test moratorium because:
American MIRV development is intended
to assure penetration of a large-scale Soviet
ABM, of which there is no firm evidence so
far. Dr. Poster has testified that if the Soviets
do build such a system, its initial operational
capability is five years off. MIRV evidently
could be deployed in a far shorter time. Don-
ald Brennan, a Hudson Institute strategic
specialist who agrees with the Administration
on most issues, put it well in seeing no need
for immediate MIRV deployment "on the
basis of any philosophy whatever."
And the Journal concludes:
Even if there were no other considerations,
we can see little justification for deploying
a weapon the nation does not yet need. In
this case, with arms limitations talks im-
pending, such deployment seems doubly ques-
tionable. A delay would give both the Soviets
and arms-control advocates at home assur-
ance that the Administration is deeply serious
about the talks. We would be opposed to such
gestures if they endanger U.S. security, but
all public indications suggest a MIRV delay
would not.
The Administration is far free t to respond
to all of these considerations now that it has
won the ABM fight. . . . In MIRV it now has
the opportunity to demonstrate even more
conclusively it has a firm hand on the stra-
tegic tiller, by proving it can also hold back
on arms development that seems the advis-
able course.
The central challenge to strategic sta-
bility comes from the current efforts to
perfect MIRV systems. Now that action
on the ABM question has been taken, the
focus of the debate on national security
should shift to the MIRV problem.
I ask unanimous consent that the com-
plete text of the Journal's editorial be
printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
BEYOND THE ABM VICTORY
Score one for the Administration in the
anti-ballistic missile fight, and perhaps more
importantly, also in the underlying fight
over who should control the nation's stra-
tegic posture. Now that it has won the big
light, perhaps the Administration can even
find new confidence to seriously consider a
delay in plans to deploy multiple warheads,
a strategic development far more question-
able than the ABM ever was.
The ABM decision was on its merits a prob-
lematical one, and there is something to be
said for resolving the close ones in favor of
the President. He is the one in charge of
negotiating any arms control agreement with
the Soviets, and his negotiating position
would not be exactly solidified if the other
side began to think a more acquiescent Sen-
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August 11, 1969
ate would actually have more to say than the
President about future strategic decisiona.
As long as the ABM test loomed, further,
we could sympathize with the Administra-
tion's hesitancy about a Mt-RV slowdown.
Before the vote, this would have looked like
an important concession to the dovish Sena-
tors, and thus would have left the President's
influence and decision-making powers loOk-
ing more nebulous than they have turned
out to be. Also, if the ABM were defeated, the
Administration would have wanted to pro-
ceed with MIRV to insure that something was
done to counteract the very rapid recent ad-
vances in Soviet strategic strength.
None of these factors any longer applies,
and the Administration can now consider
MIRV far more on its own Merits. Where the
ABM is a defensive weapon, MIRV is an of-
fensive one. MIRV is also far more destab-
ilizing in the strategic balance, being In-
timately related with the possibility of one
side launching a first strike to wipe out the
other's deterrent. It is not clear that a U.S.-
Soviet agreement to limit WIRV would be
feasible, but it does seem pretty clear that
MIRV depolyment can be delayed safely a
year or two to explore that possibility.
Pentagon research chief John Foster prob-
ably was correct in testifying recently that
the U.S. version of MIRV Is not a first-strike
weapon, unlike the Soviet version with far
larger warheads ideal for Uae against hard-
ened missile sites. But even this is not en-
tirely clear. Secretary of Defense Melvin
Laird has referred to the use of American
submarine-based MIRVs against "hard tar-
gets."
For that matter, Dr. Foster himself * ? *
rent land-based missiles and the projected
multiple-warhead version are "adequate with
respect to warhead yield and guidance ac-
curacy" when used for "a damage-limiting
mission." Unless we have fallen behind in our
Pentagonese, a damage-limiting mission
would be a strike against missile sites. Per-
haps the Pentagon's apparently contradic-
tory statements can soniellow be resolved,
but if not, even the 'U.S.-type MIRV seems
highly destabilizing.
Perhaps, of course, a U.S. MIRV may prove
necessary even so. The Soviets are develop-
ing their own, and inspection difficulties
both in the test stage and after deployment
may make any kind of agreement impracti-
cal. But at least some competent Witnesses
believe a limitation could be enforced so
long as the weapons are not deployed. Most
importantly, holding back U.S. deployment
long enough to explore both the inspection
difficulties and the Soviet attitude would
apparently not involve much risk.
American MIRV development is intended
to assure penetration of a large-scale Soviet
ABM, of which there is no firm evidence so
far. Dr. oFater has testified that if the Soviets
do build such a system, its initial operational
capability is five years off. MIRV evidently
could be deployed in a far shorter time.
Donald Brennan, a Hudson Institute stra-
tegic specialist who agrees with the Ad-
ministration on most issues, put it well in
seeing no need for immediate MIRV deploy-
ment "on the basis of any philosophy what-
ever."
Even if there were no other considerations,
we can see little justification for deploying
a weapon the nation does not yet need. In
this case, with arms limitations talks im-
pending, such deployment seems doubly
questionable. A delay would give both the
Soviets and arms-control advocates at home
assurance that the Administration is deeply
serious about the talks. We would be opposed
to such gestures if they endanger U.S. se-
curity, but all public indications suggest a
MIRV delay would not.
The Administration Is far freer to respond
to all of these considerations now that it has
won the ABM fight. It proved it can over-
come opposition and proceed with arms ad-
vances when it considers them necessary. In
MIRV it now has the opportunity to demon-
strate even more conclusively it has a firm
hand on the strategic tiller, by proving it can
also hold back on arms development that
seems the advisable course.
MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE
A message from the House of Repre-
sentatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its
reading clerks, announced that the House
had agreed to a concurrent resolution
(H. Con. Res. 315) providing for an ad-
journment of Congress from Wednesday,
August 13, 1969, until 12 o'clock noon on
Wednesday, September 3, 1969, in which
it requested the concurrence of the
Senate.
ENROLLED BILLS AND JOINT
RESOLUTION SIGNED
The message also announced that the
Speaker had affixed his signature to the
following enrolled bills, and they were
signed by the Acting President pro-
tempore:
S. 912. An act to provide for the establish-
ment of the Florissant Fossil Beds National
Monument in the State of Colorado;
S. 1611. An act to amend Public Law 85-905
to provide for a National Center on Educa-
tional Media and Materials for the Handi-
capped, and for other purposes; and
H.J. Res. 864. Joint resolution to provide
for a temporary extension of the authority
conferred by the E oiMiptrol Act of 1949.
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
TIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970
FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT,
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT,
AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION
OF MISSILE TEST FACILITIES AT
KWAJALEIN MISSILE RANGE,
AND RESERVE COMPONENT
STRENGTH
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize appro-
priations during the fiscal year 1970 for
procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval
vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and
to authorize the construction of test fa-
cilities at Kwajalein Missile Range, and
to prescribe the authorized personnel
strength of the Selected Reserve of each
Reserve component of the Armed Forces,
and for other purposes.
AMENDMENT No. 113
Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, I call
up my amendment No. 113 which is pro-
posed by myself and Mr. EAGLETON, Mr.
FITLBRIGHT, Mr. HARRIS, Mr. HART, Mr.
HATFIELD, Mr. JAVITS, Mr. MONDALE, Mr.
MOSS, Mr. PACKWOOD, and Mr. PRORMIRE.
I ask unanimous consent that the
name of the Senator from Texas (Mr.
YARBOROUGH) also be added as a cospon-
sor of this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment will be stated.
The BILL CLERK. On page 3, line 9,
strike out "$100,000,000" and insert in
lieu thereof "$50,000,000".
Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, the De-
partment of Defense has requested that
its emergency fund for research and de-
velopment be doubled from last year's
$50 million appropriation to $100 million
for fiscal year 1970. As I shall seek to
document in my remarks that follow,
there is no compelling case for doubling
this fund. To the contrary, the facts dic-
tate maintaining the emergency fund at
last year's $50 million level or reducing
it. No national security issues are in-
volved. This is strictly an economy mat-
ter in an inflationary setting that has
made superfluous government spending
Intolerable. Therefore, along with Sen-
ators EAGLETON, POLBRIGHT, HARRIS, HART,
HATFIELD, JAVITS, MONDALE, MOSS, PACK-
WOOD, PROXMIRE, and YARBOROUGH, I have
introduced an amendment to S. 2546 to
reduce the emergency fund authorization
from $100 million to the $50 million ap-
propriation figure of last year.
The emergency fund is one of the de-
vices available to the Department of De-
fense to provide the flexibility needed to
respond to unanticipated military prob-
lems and to pursue uneXpected techno-
logical breakthroughs. The fund may be
used at the discretion of the Secretary of
Defense, with the concurrence of the
Bureau of the Budget and upon notifica-
tion to the Congress, "for research, de-
velopment, test and evaluation, or pro-
curement or production related thereto."
As I stated earlier, the amount appro-
priated for the emergency fund last year,
in fiscal year 1969, was $50 million. This
is the same amount that was originally
requested in January by the Department
of Defense for fiscal year 1970. However,
2 months later, DOD revised its request
by asking for $100 million, the amount
contained in the authorization bill cur-
rently before us.
The argument offered by DOD in sup-
port of this request for an additional $50
million is that the extra money is needed
for sufficient flexibility in the manage-
ment of the Department's research and
development program. This argument
implies either that insufficient flexibility
existed last year with respect to the De-
partment's research and development ef-
forts or that R. & D. demands relative
to R. & D. resources are expected to in-
crease in fiscal year 1970. As the facts
will show, neither of these is the case.
Let us begin with an examination of
the adequacy of last year's $50 million
emergency fund. In fiscal year 1969, al-
most 82 percent of the emergency fund
was allocated for research and develop-
ment related to our operations in South-
east Asia?SEA. Therefore, the fund is
most meaningfullly viewed as a part of
PROVOST?the Department of Defense
code name under which are lumped all
of our Southeast Asia-related research
and development programs. So the ques-
tion we are really asking is: Was there
sufficient flexibility in the Defense De-
partment budget last year to meet all of
our PROVOST needs?bath the expected
and the unforeseen?
Mr. President, according to Dr. Fost-
er's testimony before the Armed Services
Committee in May of this year, and I re-
fer at this time to page 1802 of the hear-
ings, part II, and also to page 1854, where
according to Dr. Foster's testimony?and
this was the testimony in May of a fiscal
year that was going to end on June 30, a
month and a half later, fiscal year 1969?
$522 million was initially programed for
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August 11, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?
PROVOST research and development, last year, dated July 5, 1968, on page 10, million. This is in addition to the $150
exclusive of the emergency fund. This entitled "Emergency Fund." million authority which he has to trans-
$522 million was the amount initially Before I read what the report states, fer funds from one appropriation in the
Programed, before any utilization of let me say the House struck out the Defense Department, say, for aircraft
emergency fund in its entirety last year. carriers, submarines, or something like
S 9587
funds.
On that same day, in May of 1969, Dr. The Senate had arrived at a figure of
Foster predicted that by the end of fiscal $121 million. The House and Senate went
1969, PROVOST activities would require to conference, and out of the conference
$353 million in addition to the $522 mil- came the figure of $50 million. I merely
lion programed. In reality, his estimate ask to return to the $50 million figure
Was $53 million too high, but I will not which was agreed to in the conference
make a point of that. Nevertheless, that between the House and the Senate. But
was approximately $100 million less than last year the Armed Services Committee
the additional $406 million which was of the House knocked out all the author-
added to the PROVOST funds in fiscal ization.
year 1968. I read from page 10 of the report of the
Mr. President, let me try to explain Armed Services Committee of the House:
what this means. In 1968, the Depart- Under the Department of Defense Appro-
ment initially programed, for PROVOST, priation Act of 1968, the Secretary of Defense
$450 million. However, the final amount was given authority to transfer funds, not to
spent was $856 million. So how did they
exceed $350 million, from other appropria-
tions to the emergency fund,
make up the difference? They made up
the difference by reprograming $222 mil- Last year?fiscal year 1969?they had
lion from a total research and develop- $150 million of that transfer authority,
ment program of some $7.093 billion? but only used $78 million of it.
and they are permitted to reprogram In view of the transfer authority previously
however much they want, which I will granted to the Secretary of Defense and re-
show they have done each year and will quested for inclusion in -the fiscal year 1969
do next year. They had a supplemental Appropriation Act, the committee believes
that the amount requested for the emergency
appropriation of $96 million for which fund can be deleted in its entirety.
they came to the Congress, and they used
$88 million from the emergency fund. That was the position of the Armed
That was in fiscal year 1968. Services Committee last year when there
Last fiscal year?the fiscal year just was a conference with the Senate.
ended in June 1969?they had an original Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will
budgeted program for PROVOST of $522 the Senator yield on that point?
million. They reprogramed $263 million Mr. TYDINGS. I am delighted to yield.
from a total research and development Mr. PROXMIRE. Did the Senator say
budget of $7.155 billion? the House Armed Services Committee
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the knocked out the entire amount on the
Senator yield right there on these fig- ground that it was possible to transfer
urea? funds from one part of the total appro-
Mr. TYDINGS. I yield. priation to another?
Mr. STENNIS. For what year is the Mr. TYDINGS. Exactly. That is the
Senator talking about the PROVOST exact language found on page 10 of the
funds? report of the House Committee on Armed
Mr. TYDINGS. Fiscal 1969, the year we Services, July 5, 1968.
have just completed. Mr. PROXMIRE. If that is the case, it
Mr. STENNIS. The regular amount? seems to me there is no real argument for
Mr. TYDINGS. The initial amount flexibility at all. Is there? There is simply
budgeted was $522 million, an argument that we increase the overall
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator. funds by $100 million. That is really what
Mr. TYDINGS. However, they needed is being proposed this year; is it not?
an additional $304 million added to their Mr. TYDINGS. Exactly. The flexibility
program for fiscal 1969, which ended which is presently available for the Sec-
June 30 past. So they took only $41 mil-retary of Defense is, I think without
lion from the $50 million emergency fund
which had been authorized and appro-
priated last year. They also took $263
million through reprograming within
the total research and development
budget, and they came up with the $826
million that they needed. Now, Mr.
President, they did not touch the $150
million discretionary power which the
Secretary of Defense has to transfer
funds from one appropriation of the De-
partment of Defense to another. They
did not touch that. Nor did they touch
for this purpose, the special $10 million
contingency fund which the Secretary of
Defense has at his discretion. In other
words, PROVOST was able to raise the
full $826 million required to meet the de-
mands placed upon it without exhaust-
ing all of the funding flexibility within
the Defense Department.
Let me read from the report of the
Armed Services Committee of the House,
that, to another appropriation in the De-
fense Department such as research and
development.
Mr. PROXMIRE. He has that flexibil-
ity within the research and development
area; does he not?
Mr. TYDINGS. Yes.
Mr. PROXMIRE. And he can transfer
from one to the other?
Mr. TYDINGS. That is correct. In ad-
dition, as I just explained, he has an-
other $150 million worth of flexibility
through the transfer authority. This is
similar to the reprograming authority,
in that it permits money to be trans-
ferred from one budgetary slot to an-
other. The difference is that when the
slots between which money is transferred
are appropriations?that is, specific dol-
lar amounts that appear in the appro-
priations bill?the term used is not "re-
programing" but "transfer authority."
There is a $150 million limitation on
transfer authority.
Also, DOD has another $10 million
contingency fund.
Mr. PROXMIRE. How large is the re-
search and development budget?
Mr. TYDINGS. The research and de-
velopment budget reported by the Senate
Committee on Armed Services is $7.18
billion. For the fiscal year 1969, it was
$7.551 billion. For fiscal year 1968, it was
$7.093 billion.
Mr. PROXMIRE. In view of the size
of that budget, and the flexibility within
it, would it not be more logical to call
this a surplus fund instead of an emer-
gency contingency fund? That is all it is.
Any contingency can be met by tapping
the $7 billion available in the research
and development budget plus the addi-
tional resources available from the entire
$75 billion or $80 billion defense budget.
Mr. TYDINGS. Exactly. One other
thing that concerns me is that the Com-
mittee on Armed Services did an ex-
tremely thorough job on research and
development programs requested by the
Department of Defense this year. The
committee reduced the request by some
question, without precedent in the ex- 12 percent. They scrutinized the research
ecutive branch. He has the authority to items of the various projects point by
transfer funds from program to program point.
within each appropriation without limit. What this $100 million really allows
Thus, this reprograming authority allows the Secretary of Defense to do is to make
them to defer, for instance, non-SEA an end run around the Committee on
R. & D. programs undertaken by the Armed Services to avoid the congres-
Army and transfer the funds to a new sional right of scrutiny and to pick pro-
Army SEA R. & D. project. There is no grams, because congressional control of
limit to the amount of money that can emergency fund utilization is quite
be programed within any one appropri- limited.
ation. Of course, since we are talking Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?
about the research and development pro- Mr. TYDINGS. am delighted to yield.
gram, assuming the committee's author- Mr. MURPHY. Is it not the under-
ization is accepted, there would be for standing that the request for research '
this year some $7.1 billion from which to and development was based on specific
reprogram if PROVOST falls short. items, of which there are a great num-
Last year, in fiscal 1969, with a $7.055 ber in the bill: rifles; radar; research
billion research and development pro- and development in the use of laser
gram, the Secretary of Defense repro- beams; and the rest? So when we speak
gramed into PROVOST from other parts in round numbers, we are thinking of the
of research and development budget $263 spread over a great many items, and we
million. In 1968 he reprogramed $222 would assume that those who made the
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CO
NGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 11, 1969
Mr. MURPHY. Is it not true that when limit within a given appropriation. Since
he reprograms, he has to take from one appropriations are generally for large
in order to accommodate the other? and unspecified purposes, such as "Army
Mr. TYDINGS. Certainly, aircraft" er "Navy R.D.T. & E.," the re-
Mr. MURPHY. Is it not true that in programing authority enables the Dc..
the light of the cut which the committee fense Department to move around a
has already made, one might simply call great deal of money. The purpose of re-
this added fund simply "comfortable programing, to quote this year's Senate
money"? Armed Services Committee report on the
Mr. Ty.taINGS. I would call it luxury bill before us, is to provide DOD "con-
money. siderable flexibility should events require
Mr. MURPHY. I would hope there changes in program emphasis or re-
would not be any luxuries. As the Sena- source allocation."
tor knows, I have had some experience in The $263 million reprogramed into
private industry with research and de- PROVOST for fiscal year 1969 repre-
velopment. I am very conscious of the sented only 3 Y2 percent of the total
fact that they can go on indefinitely, Department of Defense R. & D. budget
and they sometimes spend much more for fiscal year 1969 of $7.55 billion.
than was anticipated. But I happen to Now, according to Leonard Sullivan,
have great confidence in the Secretary of the director of PROVOST and the etner-
Defense, and particularly in his assist- gency fund in the Pentagon, the total
ant, Mr. Packard, who made not just a PROVOST budget for fiscal year 1969
national but an international reputation enabled him to handle every important
not only a man of great talent, a great R. & D. request from Vietnam.
scientist, physicist, and electronic engi- I hope the Senator from California is
neer, but also a man with complete listening. This was a reduction from the
knowledge and wisdom with regard to the $121 million which the Senate Armed
use of funds. That is how he started in Services Committee requested; the House
a garage with $300, I think it was, or $600, of Representatives refused to agree with
in the public competition and wound up the request, and the $60 million was the
with an astronomical fortune. I am told eventual compromise. But, according to
he would be hired quickly and eagerly by Mr. Sullivan, he has never been forced
any industry in the country, or in the by lack of funds to turn down any request
world, because of his expertise in these from General Abrams, our field corn-
matters. mender in Vietnam. Furthermore, Mr.
These are the kinds of fellows that we Sullivan contends that no R. & D. pro-
are asked to have confidence in, and I, gram suggested in fiscal year 1969 to aid
for one, feel that after the cut the corn- our efforts in Vietnam which his office
mittee made, this would not be an extra- deemed meritorious was not undertaken
vagance. I would hope that unless it In short, according to its Director,
were necessary, these funds would not be PROVOST did everything it wanted in
used, but it would be nice to have them fiscal year 1969 and did it with great
in the event that, due to some unfore- success and did it with the $50 million
seen happening, the availability of the which was appropriated last year.
funds might make a tremendous differ- At this time I ask unanimous consent
ence to the safety of the Nation, or to have printed in the Rseose at the con-
enable us to cut costs elsewhere by mak- elusion of my remarks the statement to
Ing unnecessary other weapons that are me from Mr. Leonard Sullivan, Jr., in
now burgeoning, its entirety, together with certain ex-
Mr. TYDINGS. I thank the distin- hibits and attachments which he sub-
guished Senator from California. A little mitted to me.
farther on, I shall quote directly from There being no objection, the material
a statement given to me by Leonard was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
Sullivan, Jr., the Deputy Director for as follows:
Southeast Asia Matters of the Office of EMERGENCY FUND, DEFENSE
Defense Research and Engineering, Congress first important giant of financ-
where he points out that if the Senate ing flexibility to the Defense Department was
should adopt the same figure we did last made early in the Korean War in the First
year, $50 million, there would be no Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1951, ap-
PROVOST research and development proved on September 27, 1950, This Act es-
programs neglected; it would merely tablished for the first time an Emergency
mean that the Department of Defense Fund of $190,000,000 which would be avail-
would have to do a little dickering with able for transfer by the Secretary of Defense,
with the approval of the Bureau of the Budg-
the various services to get the additional et, to "any appropriation for military Sum-
moneys to meet certain priorities within tions of the Department of Defense available
the existing budget. I intend to put that for research and development or industrial
statement in the RECORD in its entirety, mobilization to provide additional flexibility
and read specific lines, a little farther on to the Secretary of Defense." In recommend-
in my remarks. ing this Emergency Fund, the House Appro-
Suffice it to say that in the last fiscal groinations2ndComsrlitstteeateRde:port (No. 2987, 81st
year, 1969, there was $304 million ad- g
The committee is well aware that emer-
ditionally needed, which was not initi- gencies may arise where it would be most de-
ally programed for Southeast Asia. This sirable to have readily available funds with
$304 million was obtained, as indicated, which to expedite basic research on a certain
in two ways: $41 million was taken from problem or to accelerate development on some
the $50 million emergency fund; and item that research had disclosed as practi-
$263 million was reprogramed into cable and desirable, or to accelerate and in-
PROVOSTfrom lower prioritYD. tensify preparedness in the industrial field."
The Second Supplemental Act of 1951, ap-
programs. "Reprograming" is an au- proved January 6, 1951, added $50,000,000
thority given the Defense Department by to this Emergency Fund, and the Congress
Congress to reallocate funds without continued in subsequent years to make ap-
requests had some knowledge of what
their needs would be.
As a member of the committee, this is
my understanding; and that after care-
ful scrutiny, we decided that we could
cut back the overall round figure by
some 12 percent.
Coming down to the question of the
emergency or justification for the new
fund, this is to cover a case where it
might well happen that unexpectedly,
some scientist comes up with an entirely
new concept that might be of great value,
and might in fact replace three or four
other weapons, and the Secretary might
want to permit him to proceed immedi-
ately. This fund has been created to be
used only at the discretion of the Secre-
tary of Defense, in order to provide for
such a new situation or advance that had
not been conceived or thought of previ-
ously.
At least that was mi understanding
of its purpose. It was not really just to
give the Secretary of Defense or the re-
search and development group another
bundle of money to go ahead and use in-
advertently, but for careful use within
the judgment of the Secretary of De-
fense.
After the argument made by those wit-
nesses from the Department, it was the
feeling of the committee that this was
a particularly important and needed sum
of money, if for no other reason strictly
in the light of the fact-that we had cut
back the overall figure that was men-
tioned by some 12 percent.
Although these figures, added up, are
tremendously large, when you divide
them up into the many areas in which
they have to be used?and I have to as-
sume that the experts know what they
are asking for; I have to assume that
they are not asking for more than they
actually hope to receive or expect to
need?is it not fair to assume that there
might just be the possibility that great
progress might be restrained, just for
the lack of having this extra or emer-
gency fund to be used at the disposal of
e Secretary of Defense?
Mr. TYDINGS. Let Mc say, with the
exception of the last sentence of the
statement Of the Senator from Califor-
nia, the Senator's understanding is the
same as mine.
My point is, however, that with a total
research and developraent budget of
$7.18 billion for the coniing year, there
would be sufficient flexibility, because of
the complete latitude in reprograming
permitted the Secretary of Defense, to
do the same type of reprograming in
fiscal year 1970 that he did in fiscal year
1968, when he had a smaller total for
research and development of $7.093 bil-
lion, and he reprogramed $222 million
for PROVOST. He was able to do the
same thing in 1969, when he repro-
gramed $263 million out of a total re-
search and development budget of only
$7.551 billion. On neither occasion did
he even have to touch, for PROVOST
purposes, the additional right to transfer
$150 million from one appropriation of
the defense budget to anOther.
So the question is, really, do we wish
to give him an extra $100 million on top
of what the research and development
budget already is?
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August 11, 1969 CJA7RDP704,0114R000300100001-3 s 9589
. CONGRESSIoNAL KtCutu) 3 4.1"
propriations in varying amounts for this pur-
pose. From FY 1952 onwards, the purposes of
the Fund were limited to research and devel-
opment and production related thereto.
The rationale for the Emergency Fund has
not changed over the years since the need for
such flexibility was ilaat recognized during
the Korean War. Indeed, the need is far
more urgent now, by virtue of the conflict in
Southeast Asia, than it was in the late 1950's
and early 1960's when the Congress regularly
appropriated $150 million per year. An ex-
amination of the use of the Fund during
the past two or three years and its direct
relationship to the conduct of the Vietnam
conflict attests convincingly to the impor-
tance of having this financing flexibility
during FY 1970.
A summary of the amounts appropriated
from FY 1951 on and the amounts trans-
ferred and used from FY 1960 on is shown
on the attached table.
STATEMENT OF LEONARD SULLIVAN, JR., DEPUTY
DIRECTOR, SOUTHEAST ASIAN MATTERS, AU-
GUST 8, 1969
The Emergency Fund provides a special
source of dollars at OSD level which can be
current PROVOST efforts account for almost
applied at the discretion of the Secretary
10% of the RDT&E budget. The size and
of Defense (with concurrence of the Bureau
distribution of funding by year is shown at
of the Budget and upon notification to the
Tab B (not printed in RECORD). It should be
Congress). It is used to: noted that the cumulative RDT&E expendi-
Exploit sudden unexpected breakthroughs
tures for the past six years are approximately
in technology which could have a significant
equal to the total costs of fighting the war for
impact on our defense posture: six weeks. An unclassified article on PRO-
Provide rapid and timely response to ur-
VOST is at Tab C.
gent requirements from operational forces
Tab B also shows the funding by source,
engaged in important cold or hot war situa- and I would like to explain this. Most of our
tions. developments are small in dollars ($.5 to
The history of the Emergency Fund is pro-
5.0M), and short in development time (12-
vided at Tab A. 24 months). To be responsive, they cannot
As a source of special dollars?not promised wait 12-18 months for initial funding. Hence
to the Services for established programs at they do not match well with the orderly,
the beginning of the fiscal year?it is an well-planned, long-debated, peacetime budg-
extremely valuable management asset to pro- et cycle. Yet the budget is too tight to allow
vide responsive development for critical items much "contingency funding", although this
not foreseen during the normal one year is the obvious management tool to use to
budget development cycle preceding the fiscal accommodate the urgent but unexpected. So
year. Besides its use for the current Vietnam we have adopted the following procedure:
war, it is primarily used for highly classified 1. We estimate our requirements in the
developments for our strategic forces?in Fali for the budget submission--which is why
intelligence gathering, command and control our PROVOST testimony tends to be general
problems, and weapon system component im- rather than specific.
provernents. I cannot provide a list of these 2. Before the new fiscal year begins the
items because of their high classification. next Summer, we update our needs at Ap-
At the $100M level, the Emergency Fund portionment time?increasing the PROVOST
represents only 1.25% of the total RDT&E portion at the expense of non-war programs,
budget. In recent years, the DOD budget sub- even though they often are not as glamorous
missions to the Congress have been about as ICBMs, ABMs, ASW, MBTs, AAFSS, etc.,
20% below that requested by the Services, and even though the approved RDT&E
Hence the budget is extremely tight; there budget is always smaller than we requested
is no "loose money" around; and reprogram- and had fully programmed. This becomes the
ming is a long ardous problem of debate, 44p, portion of the Tab B bar charts (not
oajolery, etc. reproduced).
With the onset of the large scale U.S. par- 3. As new requirements unfold during the
ticipation in the war in Vietnam, the Emer- year and can be quantified in terms of dol-
gency Fund has been largely devoted to ex- lars needed, we ask the Services to reprogram
pediting new capabilities for our forces in from lower priority programs, or from pro-
Southeast Asia, in response to requirements grams which have not progressed as planned.
stated by the operational forces. ? This is relatively easy at the beginning of
It is generally accepted that the U.S. force the Fiscal Year but increasingly difficult as
committed in SEA were not ideally equipped the year progresses and funds become corn-
for this new kind of war?hence our costs muted?and we must compete with other
have probably been somewhat higher in dol- high priority non-SEA programs whose addi-
lars and lives, the duration longer, and the tional needs are also unanticipated in the
"deterrent" offered against "future Viet- current budget process. This is the "B" por-
nams" somewhat less than if we had been tion of the Chart at Tab B (not reproduced).
fully equipped and "optimized" for this type 4. Next, when an item is urgent, represents
of low intensity, jungle, counterinsurgency, a "new start", or responds to an important
counterinfiltration warfare. Moreover, we known problem area, we tap the Emergency
have been ill-prepared to train and equip Fund for the required dollars, generally
our Asian Allies to take on more of the fight- providing less than half the amounts re-
ing burden themselves, quested by the Service. This is the "E" per-
We in R&D have been trying to re-equip tion of the Tab E charts. We readily admit
and tailor our committed forces to increase that some of these dollars have been put
our effectiveness in this kind of war by learn- on "high risk" items?where the "pay-off",
ing the combat lessons fast enough to pro- though not certain, would be quite signifl-
vide specially tailored equipment to our cant if our goals could be achieved.
forces within the time span of the war?us- At Tab D is a Summary Table of dollars
ually within 18-36 months. There are some provided from the Emergency Fund, SEA atm!
instances where we have been quite sue- non-SEA oriented, showing the increasing,
cessful?from individual soldier equipment peaking, and falling percentage tor the war-
and malaria preventatives to new anti-radar oriented projects. We would anticipate that
missiles and equipment for seeing at night. 80% of this year's Emergency Fund would
We have not, however, found any one magic go to the PROVOST items. Charts showing
solution: we are therefore attempting as the breakout by Service and Defense agen-
broad-scale an attack on the problems as cies, both requested and provided, are at
possible. Tab E.,That the Emergency Fund is mainly
I should like to note that many new de- spent about halfway through the fiscal year?
velopments have been fielded in useful quan- when reprograming has became far more
titles and more are on the way?some are difficult?is shown at Tab F (not included).
already being transferred to the Vietnamese. 5. Finally, in former years, when the war
However, almost all of these new equipments was still escalating and our RDT&E efforts
have operational utility beyond Southeast still expanding, it became obvious that the
Asia and will become part of our post-war reprograming and Emergency Funds to-
standard equipment. Hence our efforts con- gether would be inadequate. In these years
tribute not only to our combat capabilities ('66, '61, & '68) we asked the Congress for,
in SEA, but to the combat potential of our and received, Supplemental RDT&E appro-
future tactical forces, which have for many priations?indicated by the "S" portion of
years received lesser priority than our stra- the Tab B charts.
tegic forces. 6. Several other sources of possible fund-
All our Southeast Asia-related RDT&E ing have been considered at times but have
programs are lumped under an all-inclusive not been available for SEA needs. For in-
program code name of PROVOST?which is stance, SecDef transfer authority would
an OSD 'Management device to ensure ade- make it possible to "convert" production
quate attention during budget time (since monies to RDT&E up to a $150M annual
there are hundreds of individual small proj- limit. But as you know in recent years,
ects), special procurement priorities, etc. Our production budgets have also been inade-
quate to support the war (hence the
Supplemental requests in '66, '67, '68 and '
'69). Therefore the transfer authority could
not be fully used to support RDT&E prob-
lems. Actually, about 40% of the available
transfer authority has been used over the
past four years?but on direct transfers from
production to RDT&E within the same non-
SEA programs such as F-111, Minuteman II,
etc. This device has thus been used to
compensate for the Emergency Fund redirec-
tion to our wartime problems. A table of
transfer authority utilization is at Tab G.
At Tab H, we have also attempted to
rate the success of our Emergency Fund proj-
ects, by dividing all fund increments into
one of three categories: "success", "failure",
or "still in development". A success is one
that has been accepted for operational use
and is already in?or planned for?produc-
tion. Failures are ideas which simply did
not pan out either in development, test, or
operational evaluation. Many items?par-
ticularly in the last two years, are of course
still in development with their ultimate con-
tribution still indeterminate. However, we
are quite satisfied that for '65, '66, and '67,
our success rate is over 75%, based on dollars
spent, not on individual projects. We expect
the same for '68 and '69.
A detailed classified listing of projects
funded from Emergency Funds is included
in a separate Tab I (not included).
A long classified discussion of the RDT&E
"Lessons Learned" in Southeast Asia?and
what we have done about them?is in a
separate Tab J (not included) : an article
wrote recently for the Journal of Defense
Research.
Last year, the Congress authorized an
Emergency Fund of only $50M. Although a
few million remained until near the end
of the year, the preponderance of it was
spent, as usual, near the middle of the
fiscal year. The $50M was clearly inadequate
and was recognized to be so from the be-
ginning of the year. To compensate for the
Congressional action, we therefore deferred
an additional $90M (approx) of funds already
assigned to the Services and "earmarked" it
for augmentation of the Emergency Fund by
reprogramming if and when necessary.
Hence we knew from the beginning of the
year that we had an "equivalent Emergency
Fund" of about $140M (approx) ?and used
almost all of it.
If the Congress insists on restricting the
Emergency Fund for FY 70, we will again
be forced to use some equivalent device to
assume adequate funds to cover our unfore-
seen requirements. However, it would appear
to be a needless, time-consuming, and direct
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S 9590 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE August 11, 1969
approach to an otherwise straighforWard TAB A Final summery of peal year 1948 emergency
management tool. Additionally, if as now
fund- item approved-Continued
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we still have many problems without ade- Initial fund_
quate solutions-solutions that will be $50, 000, 000 Nuclear weapons effecta re-
needed as long as we are in. Vietnam-even In Total of items approved 50, 000, 000 search 2, 000, 000
redueed numbers. Solutions that could be Army: Defense Conununications
provided to the Vietnamese to make their Southeast Asia requirements Agency (DCA) :
tasks easier after we go. Solutions that
should be incorporated into our post-war (one Uncle group) 36, eeD, 000 Southeast Asia related item__ 3,000, 000
Acoustic recording system de-
General Purpose Forces as soon as we can per- Final summary of fiscal year 1967 emergency
velope
feet them-to reduce the chances of our inot 750, 000 fund items approved '
Evaluation of aircraft weapons
military might being belittled again, fire control 669,000 Initial fund e125, 000, 000
During the current "lull" for instance- Clearing of helicopter landing Total of items approved_ _ ___ 124, 997, 270
Which is an annual affair- our casualties zones with fuel air explo-
( deaths) are very high from enemy mines Army:
sives (FAS) 179, 000
and boobytraps, and from rockets and mor- Self-destructive device for as- Southeast Asia related items_ 16, 908, 000
tars (exact figures are classified) . We still Improved real time sensors
tillery ammunition 200, 000
have no adequate, practical, means for de- Classified project 995, 000 for OV-1 aircraft--- --------3,000, 000
terring either. We still frequently cannot Southeast Asia related item_ 500, 000
"find the enemy" in the j,Uneles before he Total Army Southeast Asia related item_ 5, 800, 000
39, 583, 000
finds us. We still cannot adequately monitor Southeast Asia related item_ 1, 860,000
and "track" infiltration across the borders Navy: Classified Project 300, 000
from Cambodia and Laos. We frequently ex- Classified Project $00,000
Sensor systems development
pend massive amounts of ordnance to kill (non-SEA) 5, 217, 000
a small target because we cannot find it ac- Total Army 28, 748, 000
Tactical electronic warfare de-
curately, or hit it the first time from an air- cepttan system 700, 000
craft even when we can see It. Navy :
Thousands of scientists and engineers in Radar site pinpointing im-
the Defense laboratories and industries are Total Navy 5,917, 000 provements (EELS) 3, 000, 000
working on these and other pressing prob- Southeast Asia related item_ 305, 000
lems which directly reflect _on our losses, on Mr Force: Southeast Asia re- Radar site pinpointing MI-
our overall costs, and on our apparent "ira- latestitem 500, 000 provements 2, 000, 000
potence" in. discouraging etre tinned North Southeast Asia related in, 776, 270
Vietnamese intervention. I think it is a Classified project_ ,.... 6, te)0, 000
Advanced Research Projects Classified project_ 3, 800, 000
matter of national urgency to continue to
Agency (ARPA):
work on these problems with the same vigor Southeast Asia related item_ 905, 000
Classified project
as we have in the past four years. 3,000, 000 River warfare boats_ - -_--__ 7, 050, 000
Southeast Asia related item 1, 000, 00() Advanced ceemmand data erys-
The Emergency Fund provides flexibility,
tern
responsiveness, and emphasis. It is the im- 2, 400, 000
portant one percent of the PDT&E budget Total ARPA 4, 000, 000 Southeast Asia related item_ 14, 000, 000
which provides an essential management TALOS ARM missile develop-
Final summary of fiscal year 1968 emergency ment
tool for expediting our contribution to end- 4, 500, 000
fund items approved
Fleet ballistic missile (FBM)
ing (or at least reducing our lie rticipatian in) Initial fund $100, 000, 000 command and control
that unfortunate war. It is essential to our Total of items approved 100, 000, 000
efforts, and provides the dee nest possible communications _ ... _ ____ _ 1, 450, 000
approach to the requisite "contingency Army: Southeast Asia related item_ 1, 972, 000
funding". Standard ARM missile devel-
TAB A Reduction of fire hazard to oprnent 14, 500, 000
aircraft 1, 500, 000 Classified project 3, 120,01)0
EMERGENCY FUND, DEFENSE SMMARY TOTAL EXPEND,- Southeast Asia related items_ 36, 963, 000 Classified project 500,000
TURES APPROVED Mortar locating system de-
[in million dollars]. velopment 1, 200, 000 Total Navy 66, 878, 270
Southeast Asia related item__ 3, 330, 000
Border sectuity/anti-infiltra- Air Force: - -- -
Amounts tion 8, 961, 000 Southeast Asia related Items,, 19, 151, 000
trans- Combat aircraft records and
Re- Appro- furred and
Fiscal year quested priated used Total Army data system (CARDS) _____ 400, 000
51, 954, 000
---
1951 I 240 Navy: Total Air Force_ 19, 551, 000
1952 90 Advanced marine biological
1953 35 systems Advanced Research Projects
1954 60 __ - Agency (ARPA) : Southeast
1, 050, 000
Footnotes at end of table. Southeast Asia related items_ 10, 677, 000 Asia related items 2, 630, 000
Classified project 6, 000, 000
-- - s -
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n. I think it is a Classified project_ ,.... _____ 6, te)0, 000
Advanced Research Projects Classified project_ 3, 800, 000
matter of national urgency to continue to
Agency (ARPA):
work on these problems with the same vigor Southeast Asia related item_ 905, 000
Classified project
as we have in the past four years. 3,000, 000 River warfare boats_ - -_--__ 7, 050, 000
Southeast Asia related item__ 1, 000, 00() Advanced ceemmand data erys-
The Emergency Fund provides flexibility,
tern
responsiveness, and emphasis. It is the im- 2, 400, 000
portant one percent of the PDT&E budget Total ARPA 4, 000, 000 Southeast Asia related item_ 14, 000, 000
which provides an essential management TALOS ARM missile develop-
Final summary of fiscal year 1968 emergency ment
tool for expediting our contribution to end- 4, 500, 000
fund items approved
Fleet ballistic missile (FBM)
ing (or at least reducing our lie rticipatian in) Initial fund $100, 000, 000 command and control
that unfortunate war. It is essential to our Total of items approved 100, 000, 000
efforts, and provides the dee nest possible communications _ ... _ ____ _ 1, 450, 000
approach to the requisite "contingency Army: Southeast Asia related item_ 1, 972, 000
funding". Standard ARM missile devel-
TAB A Reduction of fire hazard to oprnent 14, 500, 000
aircraft 1, 500, 000 Classified project 3, 120,01)0
EMERGENCY FUND, DEFENSE SMMARY TOTAL EXPEND,- Southeast Asia related items_ 36, 963, 000 Classified project 500,000
TURES APPROVED Mortar locating system de-
[in million dollars]. velopment 1, 200, 000 Total Navy 66, 878, 270
Southeast Asia related item__ 3, 330, 000
Border sectuity/anti-infiltra- Air Force: - -- -
Amounts tion 8, 961, 000 Southeast Asia related Items,, 19, 151, 000
trans- Combat aircraft records and
Re- Appro- furred and
Fiscal year quested priated used Total Army data system (CARDS) _____ 400, 000
51, 954, 000
---
1951 I 240 Navy: Total Air Force_ 19, 551, 000
1952 90 Advanced marine biological
1953 35 systems Advanced Research Projects
1954 60 __ - Agency (ARPA) : Southeast
1, 050, 000
Footnotes at end of table. Southeast Asia related items_ 10, 677, 000 Asia related items 2, 630, 000
Classified project 6, 000, 000
-- - s -
August 11, 19
proved For&MV0040.1/30 ? RDP71600364R000300100001-3
SION AL RECORD ? SENATE S 9591
Final summary of fiscal year 1967 emergency
fund items approved?Continued
Defense Communications Agen-
cy (DCA) : Southeast Asia
related items
$2,
190,
000
Defense Atomic Support Agen-
cy (DASA) : Nuclear weapons
tests
5,
000,
000
TAB C
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 'FOR VIETNAM
IN BRIEF.?The author heads the office in
the Pentagon whose specific purpose is to
expedite those R&D activities which hold
some promise of increasing the effectiveness
of our forces in Southeast Asia. From that
special position, he tells of the important role
of R&D in the war. Currently, the Depart-
ment of Defense is investing some $800 mil-
lion per year in this effort. Given the long
time required to bring ideas through the
R&D process and convert them to hardware,
is it reasonable to expect that today's ideas
can be developed in time to have an effect
on the battlefield? The Pentagon clearly be-
lieves so, citing the more than one hundred
new types of equipment that are added to our
operational inventory each year. Currently,
more than one thousand specific R&D pro-
jects are going on in support of the war.?
D.A.)
Some people wonder whether research and
development have a place in a war while
that war is going on. I believe strongly that
there is a place for such endeavors?just as
there was in previous wars. Indeed, my office
exists under the Director of Defense Re-
search and Engineering for the specific pur-
pose of expediting those research and de-
velopment activities which hold some promise
of increasing the effectiveness of our mili-
tary forces in Southeast Asia.
Most wars we fight will be different from
the ones we are anticipating. Every war will
have its own peculiarities and innovations.
Every war will introduce new tactics, new
equipment, and new objectives. So there will
always be a problein of remaking our mili-
tary forces, or reoptimizing them for the
particular type of war that comes along.
We know now that the war in Vietnam is
considerably different from any war we have
ever fought before. We entered this war fully
and beautifully equipped to fight either an
all-out nuclear conflict or World War II over
again. But then we found that Vietnam is
a new war?for many reasons. As I describe
these reasons, I believe you will see the im-
portance of a strong R&D activity linked to
our engagement in Southeast Asia.
MORE THAN ONE WAR
At the time we undertook to help the
South Vietnamese, I do not think we fully
realized how difficult it would be to fight an
enemy so closely interwoven with our allies
It is a war without front lines, a war where
you can seldom distinguish friend from foe?
except by the actions of the foe. Thus, we
have had to learn a great deal about how to
find small bands of enemy guerrillas dis-
persed over the countryside. In addition to
the insurgency, however, several other wars
have been superimposed, each with its own
characteristics. I will discuss each briefly.
The most advanced war, technologically,
Is the bombing of the North; it uses many
of our latest tactical aircraft in a strategic
role; we are up against enemy surface-to-air
missiles for the first time; we are in combat
against supersonic Soviet-designed aircraft,
firing air-to-air missiles?and we are doing
the same. The electronic warfare is quite
sophisticated on both sides. Less sophisti-
cated, but more important, we have had to
learn how to survive intense antiaircraft fire.
One frustrating aspect of this war is the
difficulty we find in really discouraging the
enemy, or killing his interest in fighting, by
bombing alone. We are also learning?or re-
learning?that when you run an air cam-
paign without ground follow-up, you fre-
quently cannot keep the targets destroyed.
It is one thing to bomb a bridge to slow some-
one's retreat on the ground, or to bomb a
convoy that is resupplying front line troops.
But it is quite another thing to try to stop
a country from going about its essential busi-
ness?like driving trucks, burying supplies
in the ground, or unloading ships?when
one has an intention of following up on the
ground. These are things which make it a
very expensive kind of war?and in many
respects, the results are difficult to quantify.
The second war is in trying to stop infiltra-
tion into South Vietnam. This is a relatively
new problem; we had soine experience along
the Korean demilitarized zone, but not dur-
ing a hot war.
Vietnam has about one thousand miles of
land boundary, and another thousand miles
of water boundary. We are trying to stop the
North Vietnamese from crossing these 2,000
miles of boundary and resupplying the guer-
rillas in the South. Actually, relative to the
length of the border, the supplies and rein-
forcements coming into the South are very
small. So the "flow rate" across any Unit
length of the total boundary is low. But the
boundaries are difficult to patrol; most of the
natural assets are on the side of the guerril-
la. For example, two-third of the land
boundary is covered by heavy jungle. Across
these boundaries, the North Vietnamese
either walk, carrying supplies on their backs,
or push bicycles. They do not ride the bi-
cycles; they use them as oriental wheelbar-
rows, carrying up to 500 pounds of supplies
in "saddlebags." Lately, they have begun
using trucks to cross. They have found that
we cannot destroy their roads as fast as they
can build them. They have had a very active
road-building campaign and are now building
roads into South Vietnam.
? Within South Vietnam, a third war involves
the dissipation of the main enemy units?
now mostly North Vietnamese manned.
These are the "search and destroy" actions
in which the U.S. forces have been mainly
employed in South Vietnam, In these actions,
we go out into the countryside to try to find
the enemy mainforce battalions and regi-
ments that move as units. We attempt to
locate and destroy them before they can
reach friendly targets. This is where our fire-
power has come into play, along with the
extreme mobility to fly our forces anywhere
in the country. Without that firepower and
mobility, we would need many more troops
to do the job from relatively static defensive
positions.
The fourth war is one we have paid fess
attention to than we might have. This is the
war to control the guerrilla. As a civilian,
I am in no position to determine where mili-
tary priority should be?and hence I shall
not try to put myself in a role of military
strategist. But the facts in the guerrilla war
are these: If all the smoke were cleared away,
if we stopped the bombing of the North, if
the North Vietnamese stopped infiltrating
into the South, if we stopped fighting main
unit actions in the jungles, we would still
have the problem of controlling the guerrilla.
ADJUSTING A THRESHOLD
Who is the guerrilla? He is simply the local
dissident or the local zealot. He is willing to
commit acts of violence in order to make
himself heard and in order to change his lot
and that of future generations. The threshold
of his violence is a fine balance between the
strength of his discontent and his view of the
consequences of his violence. We should be
able to change an insurgent's threshold of
violence by adjusting both sides of the
balance. We can lower his level of discontent
by peaceful action, and we can raise the
apparent deterrent by suitable military or
police presence?and technology can prob-
ably help on both sides. By "we" I mean the
U.S. as well as the South Vietnamese
government.
It is mainly in this "fourth war" that
social science research has been used to
advantage. Before we can undertake to ad-
vise another country--much less help and
train it?we must have a full understanding
of the differences in its culture, background,
aims, and motivations from those of our own
society. We cannot realistically hope to as-
sist in solving the problems of South Viet-
nam which have caused the dissatisfaction
and lawlessness until we understand in con-
siderable detail how and why those problems
arose.
The fifth and newest war with which we
have been confronted is the war of the
cities?a form of "escalation" or moderniza-
tion of the Maoist insurgency doctrine. The
enemy knows that by rocketing and shelling
from without and by sniping and arson from
within, it is possible to cause considerable
local and international consternation. Dam-
age to property is extensive, the innocent
populatino is caught in a cross fire they can-
not easily avoid, and the credibility of the
government is put to a severe test.
Although not solely a Vietnamese problem,
there is much still to be learned in minimiz-
ing the trauma of "urban insurgency." The
preparation of a city, its people, its govern-
ment, its civic agencies, and its public utili-
ties is not a simple matter. The conduct of
the urban counterinsurgency, once engaged,
demands special troops, special training,
special weapons, special vehicles, and special
tactics. And the reconstitution of the city in
the aftermath also requires special planning
and special techniques to minimize the dura-
tion and extent of the dislocation. All of these
problems are on the front burner in South
Vietnam today?and should be at least on the
back burner in many other parts of the world.
WHAT VALUE R. & D.?
With this background we begin to see a dy-
namic range of things in this war for which
our R. & D. activities are applicable. Indeed,
the range is enormous compared to that of
any war we have ever fought. It ranges all the
way from police techniques to electronic
warfare?and we are trying to modernize our
forces throughout the whole spectrum.
There are many people both in Defense
(including military and civilian) and in the
U.S. at large (including Congress and private
citizens) who believe that our efforts to make
this a war of technology are wasted. There
are others who would claim that we have
already forced the escalation of this wax to
one that we could conveniently fight with
our already highly sophisticated war ma-
chinery. I would dispute these points. Al-
though I would agree that we will find no
single device that will have the climactic
importance that the tank had in World War
I or the atom bomb had in World War II,
there are many, many opportunities to de-
velop better weapons and devices, skills and
understanding by which to lower our losses,
shorten the duration of the conflict, and
enhance both our own and our allied military
posture. In several discrete battles of this
war, brand-new technology has had a very
significant, if not decisive, effect on the out-
come. In other instances, technology could
have had a decisive effect if our experimental
equipment had been available in produc-
tion quantities, and if our military forces
could have been trained over-night to em-
brace new equipment (and adjust their
tactics accordingly).
Moreover, some of our more important con-
tributions are only new reaching the theater
in operational quantities. As individual
-
"gadgets," they cannot win the war by them-
selves, but taken in the aggregate, the effort
may become significant. We will "break even"
financially if our total effort shortens the
war by only one month?without assigning
any value to the lives saved thereby. And if
the sum total of these new capabilities can
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assist in deterring future conflicts of this as a rough average, we send about 100 new for this war. There are new artillery rounds,
type (by raising the threshold for violence types of equipment to the theater every year for instance, and new kinds of bombs, in-
elsewhere in the world) then I can only con- for operational tests and evaluation, to find eluding new kinds of delay bombs of various
chide that our efforts have been worthwhile, out whether they will in fact contribute to sorts?some td go after the flak sites in the
In the main, the inventory Of our general- our fighting capabilities. Another 100-150 are North, some to go after the truck traffic, some
purpose forces was outstanding when we also added to our operational inventory, to go after enemy eoldiers hidden under
went into Vietnam. The U.S. general-purpose These run the gamut, from a basically new jungle canopy. Most of our proudest accorn-
forces are designed to fight ane sort of Urn- type of helicopter, a new variety of jet air- plishments, however, will remain classified
ited nonnuclear war that might arise, any- craft, or a contraband detector, all the way until the war Is over, although some of our
where in the world---whether ,,1 an ice cap, down to a new type of tropical combat boot night-vision equipment and motion detec-
in a desert, in a jungle, in a marsh, any- which will make it easier for a soldier to tion radars have now been declassified, since
where. Because of the broad lenge of con- walk around, a modern transportable hos- they have either been lost to the enemy or
filets in which we might possibly become pital, or better medicines against the types have no reasonable countermeasure.
involved, a single general-purpese force can- of disease that are prevalent in Southeast In addition to our test agencies in Viet-
not be really optimum for any specific war Asia. nam and our organization here in the Pen-
except possibly in Europe. Therefore, there The actual research and development pro- tagon, we have scientific advisors with the
is a very necessary tailoring jeb that mukrt grams hate been carried out in all the usual major field commanders.
be done, having nothing to do with whether R&D centers of competence?the military Only the military men themselves can es-
or not we spent enough money for defense laboratories, private industry, and university tablish what We call a "faun requirement"
during peacetime. We will always have to research centers. I am frequently asked for a piece of equipment. Belt our people in
tailor our forces to a specific nennuelear war whether the widely divergent views within the field are free to tell us of needs. When we
once it comes along. the U.S. about the merits of war have had a are informed of these, we ask the scientific
ORGANIZATION FOR onrinneerime deleterious effect on our efforts. Naturally, community to work on possible solutions.
One of the lessons I hope we will learn any member of the U.S. Government is dis- When solutions appear practical we present
from the war in Vietnam is that we must appointed when he asks for help from a, them to the people in the field. Often they
always be prepared to opttmiee our forces
laboratory, a company, or a university and is then turn around and give us a "firm re-
after we get involved. This is why we have
told that they do not feel it appropriate for quirement." This may seem a somewhat un-
generated a special, highly responsive R&D
them to participate, that they have other wieldly operational chain, but we are pri-
team within the Department of Defense,
more pressing work to do, or that there is manly research and development people try-
How did we organize in the Department o insufficient profit in it for them. I also find ing to provide equipment for a military for-
Defense to do this? I shoOld remind you it personally embarrassing to find this non- ganization; ultimately, the operators must
that this war grew in an insidious fashion, constructive attitude within the engineer- make the decision as to whether or not the
from a very small war which had few people's Mg and scientific community of which I solution is resaistic.
attention, to a rather lam war with ord-
consider myself a part. Nonetheless, for every In additon, each of the Services has set up
nance delivery that matches Korea. The a
temporary setback I receive, I can provide a quick reaction capabilityWhereby the Ser-
Pentagon chose to manage tins various as-
at least ten examples of service and dedica- vice can reepond rapidly ta special demands
pects of the war, as much as pi esible,
tion "beyond the call of duty": Laboratory for improved equipments. Each Service main-
existing organizational management and vritlein
scientists who work on their own, virtually tains its own laboratory people in the field. In
without funding support, huge U.S. corpora- many instances these experienced engineers
budgeting procedures. R&D en the war is
performed in accordance with this same tions who essentially "donate" the services have found relatively simple, inexpensive
of some of their best talent without hope of things that have made tremendous differ-
principle: It is managed, essentially, by the ences. A typical example: Down in the Me-
sanie people who are also eintrolling the large profit return; tiny companies that
kong Delta region, where the fighting takes
R&D that is done for other military devices work around the clock to prove that they
can meet an almost impossible schedule; place on the rivers, and canals, we haake been
which are not involved in this war. However,
to add emphasis to the work that was ape- graduate students and professors who offer using small landing craft of World War II
elfically needed for Southeast Asia, Dr. John themselves without demanding recognition; vintage as patrol boats. Because they have
Foster, Jr., established my office about two people from all these groups who risk their flat bottoms, they are well suited for the
shaw
and a half years ago as an expediting office lives in Vietnam to help. I do not believe llo waters of the river and canals. The
within Defense Research and Engineering. It that any important development has been Navy wanted to be able to land helicopters
was charged only with creating and expedit- delayed by the vocal nonparticipation of a aboard these boats, which are only 40 or 50
feet long, either for medical evacuation, re-
disappear
R&D pertinent to the war: and it will few?though / personally believe that their
method of self-expression is insulting and supply of equipment, or various cernmand
disappear when the war is over. who was in the theater at the personnel
control functions. One of Navy's labors-
through the normal organizations, the prob- Because we chose to manage the w , ar demoralizing to our men in Vietnam.
WEAPONS MODIFIED AND NEW tory el time designed a suitable landing deck.
lems associated with streamlining our pro- Let me mention a few examples of the Within a few weeks, a prototype was built
cedures have been really those of personal kinds of developments I have been talking in Vietnam according to his design?with
contact?of individuals within the organise- about. We recently developed a new gunship- some help from his people back in the U.S.
tion getting together and eereeing to do
things; we work either face to face or we
aircraft configuration that happens to be Today, many of these "ratnicarriers" oper-
very good at killing trucks along the re- ate successfully in the Delta. This develop-
go through the standard procedures. We have hand-carry papers, rather t7a.ati letting them supply routes and in ptoviding close support ment has measurably increased the flexibility
formed a series of ad hoc steering groups and to our ground troops. This plane was de- and effectiveness of those forces, and for a
committees; in essence, these groups tie
veloped for the Air Force in a military labo- very small sum of money. The Army main-
to-
gether all the various agencies Invoivedlin ratory at Wright Field within a period of tains their Limited War -Laboratory which
about nine months. It involved new equip- does many of the same kinds of things, Mall
the pursuit of the war.
We use one code name for this whole op-
ment in an existing airframe. Wherever pos- jobs that are badly needed in a hurry. These
eration; PROVOST, for Priority Research
sible, we borrowed and adapted existing labs are allowed to bypass some of the nor-
jectives Vietnam Operational Support. Ob-
components. The plane was tested in the mal chains of approvals, when the money is
It is at this level where you find the people U.S. and it worked adequately; then it was small and quick reaction is urgently needed.
who are full time on R&D for Vietnam. Hare sent to Vietnam with its operational crew
p
we have a regular Senior PROVOST steering plus a number of test people who observed
million
It over a period of time. The plane operated II ik st
Group; this is the mechanism I use within
In combat and was judged to be sufficiently Total Southeast
defense,
the Pentagon to get practically everything
successful that the 7th Air Force submitted Asia,
done. It is comprised of a seiner military man R.D.T. & E. R.D.T. & E.
$67: 969357
(a general or flag officer) who reports to his a formal request for a production quantity.
Production is under way now.
military chief for R&D in each of the Serv-
The HUEY Cobra program is another ex-
7, 553 $100
ices. 1964
200
We also have part-time representation in ample. Here the Army took the original Bell gv, 370
the group from other government agencies HU-1 helicopter and redid virtually -the en- 1967
1: 9524 680
that have technical skills applicable to our tire aircraft to make it a better weapon plat 800
- 1968 780
specific problems. For inns floe, NASA has form. It was introduced in the early part of 1969 6:000? 800
people who are available to us for solving this year and we believe it may make a sig-
problems for which they have unique talents. nificant difference in the war. It has proven I cite these examples to show that the Serv-
The Atomic Energy Commission Is also repro- particularly useful in the urban insurgency ices have the technological capabiltiles and
sented?they have some of the finest engi- context, procedures available to respond to the de-
neers and "gadgeteers" in the business. We have introduced several weapons which mends for R&D in this war. My office in
Finally, of course, we work closely with the are brand new. Some were already in develop- ODDR&E has not taken over this role; the
Advanced Research Projects Agency, a sepa- ment before we became engaged in this con- military Services do it themselves; our job
rate part of Dr. Foster's office. filet, and hence it was simply a question each is to help them, to encourage them, and to
We have over one thousand specific R&D time of expediting or changing the weapon in assist in finding the funds needed for these
projects going on now in support of the war; some modest way to improve its effectiveness requirements.
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August 11, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 9593
GOOD GUYS AND BAD GUYS
The most difficult job in this war has been
to find the enemy. This may sound platitu-
dinous. After all, we have had to find the
enemy in every war we've ever been in. But
there are no front lines in this war. The
enemy operates primarily in small units, You
cannnot tell the "good guys" from the "bad
guys"?many aren't even wearing uniforms.
The big problem is to find out where the
enemy is at a particular time?and, in fact,
to determine whether or not he is the
enemy?and then to determine his inten-
tions. He is very good at camouflaging him-
self, his installations, and his equipment; and
he moves primarily at night. Over North
Vietnam, the problem is of a similar kind:
We try to knock out the bridges, vehicles, and
supply dumps, but these too are hard to find,
as are his radar installations and antiaircraft
defenses. The North Vietnamese do not have
a very advanced civilization, they don't have
large target complexes, and they have learned
that we have difficulty knocking out their
targets if they keep them small enough, or
if they hide them away during the day. For
every visible bridge, there may be three or
four alternate ways of crossing the same
stream.
In guerrilla and urban warfare, we must
find the man who is planting the mine along
the road, find the Vietcong who may come
into a village to cut the chief's throat during
the night, and find the teenage sapper team
bent on destroying a Saigon police station.
In all these cases, our biggest inadequacy is
being able to single out the target, or the
Individual that represents the enemy. Per-
haps a fourth of our total RDT&E expendi-
tures has been solely for the purpose of trying
to detect indications of enemy presence.
We are using virtually every type of indi-
cation that a human or vehicular target
provides in our attempts to develop better
means to find the real targets. These detec-
tion systems must work in real time?it does
no goad to find that 100 men walked or drove
down Trail X from Point A to Point B a week
ago. So realtime, nighttime intelligence
gathering has been one of our major prob-
lems. We are beginning to make significant
inroads in this area. Starlight scopes, for
instance, permit a soldier to see targets with
nothing more than starlight as illumination.
They are now widely used in the Southeast
Asian conflict with very impressive results.
I might interject here that the enemy has
shown extraordinary cleverness in counter-
ing some new things we have introduced.
It is seldom more than a few months after
we introduce something new before we cap-
ture some document that tells the enemy, in
essence, how to counter the new device. This
is one reason we have tried to be so very
security conscious during this war.
Where is the enemy's brainpower? Clearly,
some of it is in the field, and it is evident
that the enemy's allies have a certain
amount of scientifid advisory talent working
for them too. I suspect there is an office like
my own somewhere in the enemy structure,
and that my counterpart works with a
smaller budget and different emphasis. It is
not the American way to use a lot of man-
power and just a few devices that add to
their capability; to save lives, we tend to want
to minimize the number of men we use and
to replace their skills with more sophisticated
technology.
EYE FOR EYE, TANK FOR MORTAR
There are those who have a deep concern
that we may be compromising much of our
latest technology for tactical warfare with-
out benefiting from a similar disclosure of
Soviet and Chicom capability. To a certain
extent, this is true; the Communists have
committed North Vietnamese lives rather
than Soviet technology wherever possible.
The real questions, of course, are whether it
Is serious to have exposed our own capabili-
ties as a means of reducing our own dead and
crippled, and whether it will be difficult to
establish a new level of capability In those
areas where surprise is advantageous. I have
no doubts in either area; we have done the
right thing. After all, new technology be-
comes available faster than we convert it into
military hardware. And in many areas, we
have had the priceless advantage of finding
out just how well our newer equipment
works. We are thus in a position to make the
type of real-world improvements in our
forces that can only be derived from prac-
tical experience. There is very little good
that comes from any war?and we would be
negligent, indeed, if we did not profit from
the only real R&D "benefit" possible; a better
understanding of our own capabilities and
needs.
There is another thing that is coming out
of this war loud and clear: There are
dramatic asymmetries between what we do
and what the enemy can do to counter us. In
some wars, the participants reason: If the
other fellow has a tank, we must have a tank
with an extra inch of steel; if he has a Mach
2 airplane, we must have a Mach 2.1 airplane;
If he has a 150-mm artillery piece, we must
have a 175. But because occupation and
seizure of territory are not elements of this
war, such reasoning does not hold in Viet-
nam. The enemy can destroy a $6 million
airplane with a $100 mortar shell. Be can
shoot down a half-million-dollar helicopter
with a 250 bullet from a hand-held gun. He
can stop a tank with a hand-held antitank
weapon, because he just plain sneaks up to
it, stays under a bush for two or three days,
or submerges himself in a rice paddy and
waits for the tank to come along.
Such asymmetries are hard to live with.
Time and again, we are asked: Why do we
need a $2 million, two-seat twin-engine,
after-burning jet to destroy little bamboo
bridges? You could argue that we might be
able to get along with a somewhat cheaper
airplane, but the enemy has an air defense
system above that bamboo bridge, which em-
ploys MIG 21's. Thus, we must have a weap-
on that can take on both the bridge and the
MIG 21. The whole war has an enormous
"dynamic" range, from one extreme to the
other. But if we give up?if we say we cannot
stop such resupply movements, by which the
local insurgents are supported and bol-
stered?then we are saying that we cannot
stop this conflict. If we cannot do this, we
cannot stop wars of national liberation. If
this is true, the whole world may become
"liberated" piece by piece.
The mortar problem in Vietnam is another
example of asymmetry. We have never be-
fore been in a war where our cities, bases,
and depots have been exposed to mortar and
rocket fire?often from 360* around the
perimeter. A mortar shell can be carried in a
man's pocket; it can be hidden in a crate of
lettuce. The enemy is willing to take two
weeks, or two months, to set up a 50-round
attack. On the average, 50 rounds can destroy
$20 million worth of airplanes. A simple
weapon such as a mortar or rocket can raise
hell, and the counter system is quite complex.
The enemy's allies are doing a good job of
providing the North Vietnamese and the
South Vietnamese guerillas with these wea-
pons?and they are not simply old pieces of
pipe with home-made explosives in them;
they are all made somewhere in the Commu-
nist nations; they come in little canvas carry-
ing bags; they break down into pieces that
can easily be handled by a small man. This
is not accidental. This weaponry is carefully
tailored for their side of the job, just as we
try to tailor ours to counter it. It is a fas-
cinating game of technology against tech-
nology, but in one case with a minimum use
of manpower, and, in the other, a rather ex-
travagant use of manpower.
Between 1964 and today, much of the
equipment used by our forces has changed
at least once. This covers the gamut from
uniforms to aircraft and the weapons they
drop; for instance, the helicopters we use
for pilot rescue: We used one helicopter when
the war began, then another helicopter for
the next two years, and now we have begun
to replace the second helicopter with an even
more capable machine.
STRATEGY FOR A "PORCFT,TS" WAR
In the field of detection, I think the
changes are occurring even more rapidly.
You have probably read about the chemical
sniffers, that smell the presence of human
beings. This sounds rather sophisticated, but
is little more than normal laboratory instru-
mentation packaged in an olive drab box. We
put these boxes into helicopters and fly them
over the jungle. Four or five years ago, I
doubt that anybody would have given us a
plug nickel for this idea, and yet, they are
now being used in substantial quantity by
regular operational force's. Similarly, we are
learning to detect footsteps many yards
away?with another spin-off from labora-
tory instrumentation equipment.
These developments open up some very ex-
citing horizons as to what we can do five or
ten years from now: When one realizes that
we can detect anything that perspires, moves,
carries metal, makes a noise, or is hotter or
colder than its surroundings, one begins to
see the potential. This is the beginning of in-
strumentation of the entire battlefield. Even-
tually, we will be able to tell when anybody
shoots, what he is shooting at, and where
he was shooting from. You begin to get a
"Year 2000" vision of an electronic map with
little lights that flash for different kinds of
activity. This is what we require for this
"porous" war, where the friendly and the
enemy are all mixed together.
Much of the new sensor technology has
application at the other end of the battle
spectrum, in the security business. For ex-
ample, we must learn how to protect the road
from Saigon to the Mekong Delta, for this is
the economic lifeline for the country. Some
40% of the people live in the Delta; these
people are 95% agrarian, and their products
must get to Saigon. Keeping this road free
from ambush is a very serious problem.
One other problem in the Delta is that
most of the people are not for either side;
they want both sides to go away so they can
grow some rice and sell it to somebody for a
reasonable price. They give their allegiance
to no one. And this is the frustration: They
will tell you a week later that the Viet Oong
came in and took 20% of their rice. But they
will not tell you at the time it happens. They
know we cannot protect them adequately
against others who may sneak into the vil-
lage again next week. So our progress is
inhibited by not being able to provide an
adequate level of security. Consequently, a
small group of Viet Gong can keep the popu-
lation silent and uncooperative.
Indeed, throughout the country one of the
biggest problems stems from the fact that no-
body has a telephone. There is often no way
for a victimized community, or family, to call
for help. We sorely need a simple, primitive
substitute for our own phone system, I think
it would help to raise the people's confidence
if they could report to their officials in time
for law enforcement to respond.
NEW CONCEPTS or WAR
What are the lessons to be learned from
this wax? I believe the first is the fact that we
cannot separate the insurgent from his back-
ground. Next, when we do find a target?be it
a Viet Cong, a truck, or a bridge?often we
cannot kill it, and always the enemy can re-
place it. All the important enemy targets are
small, fleeting, hidden, moving, cheap, smart,
and reproducible. He knows how to use his
environment to advantage. The jungle, the
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rice paddies, the shallow streams and canals,
the firm clay earth itself, the long-suffering
people and their generations of discontent-
these are the environmental factors we Must
contend with. And let me add one more: We
must learn to fight extensively at night. We
must work within this environment to find
the enemy and to either catch him in the act
of being an enemy or somehow to deter him
from being an enemy again.
Over the past four years, the United States
has spent over $2 billion in R&D on these
other problems of the war. We are on the
verge of some very important new Military
capabilities. We may not perfect them all in
time for this war. Indeed, some may never
even reach the field in test quantities. But
these are the things that will keep this kind
of war from breaking out again, and we must
continue to develop them into weapons and
equipment that can be readily adopted by
the military, even after we reach a ceasefire
In Vietnam.-
From the work we have sponsored during
this war, I can see three revolutionary con-
cents coming into focus-end our research
and development programa have already be-
gun to demonstrate that these concepts can
be made practical:
One: We are getting cloger to being able to
provide complete realtime battlefield sur-
veillance around the clock, through suitable
instrumentation.
Two: Technology will soon permit the de-
1965
velopment of practical weapons that will dis-
cretely destroy the types of small, fleeting
targets characteristic of this type of war.
Three: It now appears that we may reach
the stage where there will be little difference
between fighting at night or during the day.
Clearly, this will be the toughest challenge;
fighting at night will require a new systems
approach, new training, new doctrine, and
new ways of committing one's manpower.
In all three of these revolutionary con-
cepts, we are hindered by two real-world
problems. First, the technology is so new that
it has not yet become an inherent part of our
weapons system designs. Second, and equally
important, the introduction of new concepts
is extremely difficult during the conduct of
the war. These are the problems that must
be solved if we are to compress the learning
and experience process so that the greatest
benefits of new technology can be felt in
South Vietnam.
Finally, we must learn to share this new
technology with our allies. It is not enough
to equip only the U.S. forces with new capa-
bilities that make our men more effective. We
must become more aggressive in training and
organizing the South Vietnamese to take on
the "residual war" themselves. It is my own
opinion, after nine visits throughout South
Vietnam, that the South Vietnamese can
handle more sophisticated equipment-even
if we have to maintain it for some time into
the future. It is only by transferring our new
capabilities to our allies that we can hope to
turn the counterinsurgency problem back
where it belongs, with a concurrent reduc-
tion in U.S. costs and loss. When that hap-
pens, then my office can probably go out of
operation.
EMERGENCY FUND ALLOCATION TO SOUTHEAST ASIA, FISCAL YEAR 1964 THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 1970
}Dollar amounts in millions}
R.D.T. & E. 1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
Emergency fund amount 125
125
125
100
50
1100
Emergency fund to Southeast Asia 21
73
101
88
41
Percent to Southeast Asia 16.5
58.1
80. I
. 88,0
81.7
Total Southeast Asia, ROT. & E 200
370
680
856
826
1' 593
1 Requested--not included in fiscal year 1970 Southeast Asia total.
2 Southeast Asia content at apportionment.
TABLE
R.D.T. & E. EMERGENCY FUND SUMMARY FISCAL YEAR 1965-69
SOUTHEAST ASIA PROJECTS ONLY
}Dollar amounts in millions]
1966 1967
1968
1969
Requested
Approved
Requested
Approved
Requested
Approved
Requested
Approved
Requested
Approved
Army
$16.4
$8.3
$97.7
$16, 7
$66.1
$28.1
$119.9
$52.2
$56.9
$38. 6
Navy
13.6
9.9
99.9
22. 7
93. 1
49.0
46.3
13.3
6.6
Air Force
1.3
1.3
95.8
31,4
92.2
19.2
44.1
17.6
43.2
.7
DCA (DCPG)
1.1
1.1
10.4
2.2
3.0
3.0
.5
A RPA
1.8
1.8
4.3
2.6
1.6
1.6
2.0
LI
DASA
DIA
Total
32.4
20. 6
295, 2
72. 6
265. I
101. 1
214.9
88. 0
108.7
40, 8
Total emergency funds
125.8
125. 0
125. 0
1011. 0
50. 0
SEA (percent)
16. 5
58. 1
80. I
86,0
81 7
ALL PROJECTS
Army
$42. 0
$33. 3
$120.0
$29.7DIA
$66. 7
$28. 7
$119.9
$52.0
$61.7
$39.6
Navy
84.8
38.8
121.0
30. 0
117.3
66.9
67.8
19.1
22.8
5.9
Air Force
26. 4
26. 4
153,7
61.5
118. 5
19.6
66.4
20.3
17.5
5
DCA (DCPG)
4. 1
4. 1
10.4
2.2
3.0
3.0
.
ARPA
6.3
1.8
7.5
3.8
4.3
2.6
3.6
3.6
5.0
4.0
DASA
9.0
9,0
10. 0
5. 0
4.0
2.0
. 2
Total
Total emergency funds
172,6
113.9
125.0
402.1
125.0
125,0
327.2
125.0
125.8
264.9
109.0
100.0 _
107.0
50.0
50.0
NON-SOUTHEAST ASIA PROJECTS ONLY
Army
25.5
25.5
22.3
12.9
.6
.6 .
4.8
1.0
Navy.
71.2
28.9
21.1
7.3
24.6
17.9
21. 5
6. 0
16.2
5.2
Air Force
25.1
25. 1
57, 8
33. 1
27.3
.4
22.3
2.0
17.0
DCA (DCPG)
3.0
3.0
ARPA
6.3
1.8
5.7
2.0
2.1
2.1
3.0
3.0
DASA.
9.0
9.0
10.0
5.0
4.0
2.0
DIA
.2
0
Total
Total emergency funds
133. 8
93.3
125. 0
106. 9
55.3
125,0 _
62.5
23.9
125. 0 _
50.1
12.1
000.0
41.0
9.2
50.0
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August 11, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE
TAB G
SUMMARY OF TRANSFER AUTHORITY, FISCAL YEAR 1965-69
[Dollar amounts in millions!
S 9595
Year Service
Appropriated
From
To
Item Amount Date
Fiscal year 1965
Nary RDT. & E. (A) ROT. & E. (N).._..._. Aircraft
R.D.T. & E. (AF) KELT. & E. r)_ do
R.D.T. & E. (Det Aq) R.D.T. & E. N) do
Air Force Other procurement (AF)_ R.D.T. & E. AF) do
Missile procurement(AF)_ RAT. & E. (AF) do
Total
Fiscal year 1966 Navy PAM (N) R.D.T. & E. (N) Aircraft
Air Force Missile procurement (AF)_ R.D.T. & E. (AF) Missile
12.0 October 1964.
2.0
2. 0
20.0 December 1964.
14.8 Do.
40. 8
Total
Fiscal year 1967
52. 0 December 1965.
24.2 January 1966.
76 2
Air Force Aircraft Procurement R.D.T. & E. (AF) .. Aircraft
(AF).
Navy PAM (N) R.D.T. & E. r) do
PAM (N) R.D.T. & E. N do
Air Force Military personnel (AF)_ R.D.T. & E. A ) Missile
Total
Fiscal year 1968
Fiscal year 1969 Air Force Other Procurement (AF). R.D.T. & E. (AF) A/C System
Other Procurement (AF)_ R.D.T. & E. (AF) Missile
Other Procurement (AF)_ RAT. & E. (AF) do
Not used
4.0 December 1966.
12. 0
46. 0
18.6
80. 6
Total
January 1967.
January 1967.
June 1967.
28. 5- October 1968.
41. 6
8. 4
78.0
EVALUATION OF SUCCESS OF EMERGENCY FUND EXPENDI-
TURES
Still in de-
Total Successfull velopment 2 Failures3
funds (percent) (percent) (percent)
1965____
20.6
91. 5
1966____
72.6
59. 0
37
1967
101. 1
73. 0
26
1968____
88. 0
38. 0
61
40. 8
14, 0
86
0. 5
4
.1
.1
.0
Accepted for production use or incorporated in already opera-
tional equipment or manuals.
s Still in development, or still undergoing tests with no decision
yet on operational potential, or stopped by change in scope of
war.
Not acceptable ass result of unsuccessful development, test,
or operational evaluation.
Mr. TYDINGS. But did the need to
use $41 million of the emergency fund
and $263 million in reprograming au-
thority for PROVOST exhaust the flex-
ibility of the Department of Defense's
research and development program?
Hardly.
In addition to reprograming author-
ity, the Secretary of Defense has $150
million in transfer authority which al-
lows funds to be transferred between
Defense appropriations, provided that
not more than 7 percent of any one ap-
propriation is transferred. Last year,
fiscal yea?. 1969, only $78 million of that
$150 million transfer authority was uti-
lized, and none of it directly for
PROVOST.
Finally, for use in "unforeseeable
emergencies and extraordinary expenses
of a confidential military nature," the
Secretary of Defense has a $10 million
contingency fund. That is over and above
all of the other items I have just cited.
Though there has never been occasion
In the past to use it for an emergency
in the area of research and develop-
ment, it could be. used for such a pur-
pose. Last year, the Secretary expended
less than $1.5 million of that $10 million
fund.
In other words, PROVOST-the cate-
gory of research and development in
which 82 percent of the emergency fund
was expended-was able to provide for
all of its needs, expected and unantici-
pated, in fiscal year 1969 without ex-
hausting all of the flexibility of the De-
partment of Defense research and
development program.
Mr. President, this leads us to a sec-
ond question. Since the $50 million emer-
gency fund was adequate according to
Mr. Sullivan, the representative of the
Department of Defense in 1969-
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. TYDINGS. I yield.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I under-
stand that Mr. Sullivan was in charge of
research and development for Southeast
Asia. Am I correct?
Mr. TYDINGS. Mr, Sullivan is a Dep-
uty Director of Southeast Asia Matters,
Office of Department of Defense Re-
search and Engineering.
Mr. MURPHY. In other words, his
area of activity was, I would assume
from his title, PROVOST.
Mr. TYDINGS. The Senator is cor-
rect. That is the department name and
label for all research and development
for Southeast Asia.
Mr. MURPHY. Southeast Asia.
Mr. TYDINGS. The Senator is correct.
In addition, he heads up the emergency
fund.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, the use
of the funds we are talking about, as I
understand, is not to be limited to South-
east Asia or to the problems relating to
Southeast Asia but are to be used for any
new emergency or any use that in the
consideration of the Secretary would
warrant the use of the funds. Am I cor-
rect in my understanding?
Mr. TYDINGS. No. The Senator is in-
correct in his understanding. The $100
million emergency fund is for research
and development, testing, and evaluation
for procurement or production related
thereto. It is not carte blanche over the
so-called waterfront. It is specially "for
research and development, testing, evalu-
ation, for procurement or production re-
lating thereto."
And as a practical matter, in the fiscal
year 1969, 82 percent of the emergency
funds went to PROVOST. This is approx-
imately the rate of emergency funds in
recent years that come into PROVOST,
research and development directly re-
lated to Southeast Asian matters.
Mr. MURPHY. But it is not restricted
to that.
Mr. TYDINGS. No, it is not restricted
to that, but it is restricted to research,
development, testing, evaluation, and re-
lated production and procurement.
Mr. MURPHY. But it is not restricted
to procurement relating to Southeast
Asia.
Mr. TYDINGS. No.
Mr. MURPHY. Not restricted in pro-
curement relating to Southeast Asia.
Mr. TYDINGS. No.
Mr. MURPHY. But refers to matters in
Europe, NATO, SEATO, Okinawa, Kwaj-
alein, or other of the other thousands
of places that are unfortunately inter-
ested in this matter around the globe.
That was my point, I just wanted to
establish Mr. Sullivan's area of operation,
as I was a little confused for a moment.
Mr. TYDINGS. I thank the Senator.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield? Has the Senator finished
his remarks?
Mr. TYDINGS. Not yet. If the Senator
will bear with me for another 10 minutes,
I will yield to him at that time.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I with-
hold that request.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, what
were the main reasons advanced by the
Department of Defense for doubling the
emergency funds?
Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, I take
this opportunity to respond to that
question by reading a quotation from a
statement of Mr. Leonard Sullivan, Jr.,
the Deputy Director of Research and
Development, Southeast Asia Matters.
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S9596 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August .11, 1969
I will read it first and then I will sum-
marize it. The Senator may then sum-
marize it for himself In case I unfairly
categorize his answer.
Let me give the answer of the Depart-
ment of Defense from page 7 of the
statement submitted to me and my staff
on the Emergency Fund,
It reads:
Last year, the Congress authorized an
Emergency Fund of only $50M. Although a
few million remained until near the end of
the year, the preponderance of it was spent,
as usual, near the middle of the fiscal year.
The $50M was clearly inadequate and was
recognized to be so from the beginning of
the year. To compensate for the Congres-
sional action?
That is, the reduction to $50 million.
I continue to read:
We therefore deferred an additional $90M
(approx) of funds already .issigned to the
Services and "earmarked" it for augmenta-
tion of the Emergency Fund by reprogram-
ming if and when necessary. Hence we knew
from the beginning of the year that we had
an "equivalent Emergency Fund" of about
$140M (approx)---and used almost all of it.
Mr. President, I shall comment here
and then will continue With the quota-
tion.
This is exactly what they did in 1966,
1967, and 1968. It is what they can do In
1970. Because of the greatnexibility with-
in the Department of Defense, in other
words, they can reprogram almost every-
thing when necessary.
I continue to read from Mr. Sullivan's
statement:
If the Congress insists on restricting the
Emergency Fund for FY wo will again be
forced to use some equivalent device to as-
sume adequate funds to diner our unfore-
seen requirements. However, it would appear
to be a needless, time-consmn, and indirect
approach to an otherwise si,raightforward
management tool. AdditionaAly, if as now ap-
pears possible, the overall EpT&E budget is
cut by 12%?making it 5%4 lower than lest
year's?the problem in establihning the de-
ferrals for reprogramming Will be substan-
tially more difficult, may ma counter to the
preferences, of the Congress, and will cause
additional sources of irritation and delay
between the Services and OSD
I shall comment here again. In other
words, Mr. Sullivan would much rather
have an additional $50 millian or an ad-
ditional $100 million or an additional
$150 million than require_ the Secretary
of Defense?the man wha should know
the most about it?ta determine where
the higher priorities are among the
various services and have to reprogram
because that might cause an additional
source of irritation between the services
and the Office of the Secretary of De-
fense.
I continue to read:
In either case? reprogramming or Emer-
gency Funds dispersal?the Congess is noti-
fied of all appropriation transfers and re-
programming actions above the established
$2M threshold, and is asked to give prior ap-
proval in instances of known Congressional
interest. In fact, two of our-important '69
Emergency Fund items have been delayed for
four months this year by such Congressional
concern. Hence Congressional control of our
activities is essentially the sone for repro-
gramming and Emergency Fund usage, but
the reprogramming represents the less at-
tractive alternative for internal Defense
Management.
Let me emphasize the last sentence I
read:
But the reprogramming represents the less
attractive alternative for internal defense
management.
Of course, I would much rather be able
to give my wife an additional $100 a week
than say, "You will have to make some
choices from what you have."
Certainly it is less desirable, but the
fact of the matter is, according to Mr.
Sullivan, that not one single item needed
for Vietnam or for provost research and
development was delayed or cut because
of lack of funds. They just repro-
grammed it within the $7.6 billion plus
for research and development program
and got what they needed.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. TYDINGS. I will yield in a mo-
ment.
Have I sufficiently responded to the
question of the junior Senator from Cali-
fornia?
Mr. CRANSTON. Yes. The response
has covered my question thoroughly, and
I am grateful to the Senator.
Mr. TYDINGS. I yield to the senior
Senator from California.
Mr. MURPHY. I say to the Senator
from Maryland that if I were to com-
pare my wife to the Defense Depart-
ment, I would be in trouble when I went
home.
Mr. TYDINGS. Perhaps the Senator
does not know where his Department of
Defense is.
Mr. MURPHY. The distinguished Sen-
ator from Maryland used the words
"least attractive," which I think is a
nice?
Mr. TYDINGS. "Less attractive." If I
said "least," I meant to say "less." I took
that word for word from the language of
Mr. Leonard Sullivan, Jr., on page 9 of
his statement.
Mr. MURPHY. Then Mr. Sullivan used
another term before that, when he said
they would be forced. I do not know Mr.
Sullivan. When he says they would be
forced, I do not know whether this is
what I would call a very bad disposition
of circumstances or whether this- would
be forcing a manner of procedure that
was unworkable or impractical.
Certainly, over the last years, there
has been much in the Defense Depart-
ment that I have considered impractical
and much that I have considered un-
workable.
I should like to make the Point again
that in the judgment of the committee,
we thought that perhaps by cutting the
request and trimming it back to what we
thought was a proper figure, and realiz-
ing that there are 'times when specific
extra funds are needed?and I have to
assume that they use the research and
development money properly and they
cannot just automatcially say, "Cut out
that program"?if they can do that and
the program is going to be cut in order
to accommodate the funds for another
program, it should not have been started
in the first place. With the way I hope
this committee will function in the fu-
ture, we will not have as much of that
as we have had in years past.
So I merely rise to make the point,
first, that Mr. Sullivan is talking only
about his responsibility, which is Viet-
nam, which is limited. Second, he is not
happy with the condition. We can assume
that he is an extravagant fellow who
just says, "I would like to have some
extra money." Or we can assume he is a
knowledgeable, reputable fellow, and I
assume that; otherwise, I know that the
distinguished Senator would not be quot-
ing him. That would involve using only
funds that are needed; therefore, when
he transfers funds from one program to
another, he may be doing some damage
to the program-from which the funds
are being taken.
Mr. TYDINGS, I thank the Senator.
Let me discuss the second question
raised by the position of the Departnient
of Defense.
Since the $50 million emergency fund
was adequate in fiscal year 1969, is there
any indication that research and devel-
opment demands relative to research and
development resources ha fiscal year 1970
will increase sufficiently to warrant
doubling the emergency fund to $100
million?
Since more than 80 percent of the
emergency fund is to be devoted to
PROVOST again In fiscal year 1970, and
since PROVOST represents the highest
priority research and development to
support our combat activities in Vietnam,
let us begin by looking at PROVOST for
the coming year.
In fiscal year 1970, initial programing
for PROVOST is $590 million, $68 million
more than was initially programed in
fiscal year 1969. At the same time, in
testimony before the Senate Armed Serv-
ices Committee in May, Doctor Foster
projected total PROVOST costs by the
end of fiscal year 19'70 at only $15 million
above his projected total PROVOST cost
for fiscal year 1969. In other words, to
cover an additional $15 million in pro-
jected total costs, the Defense Depart-
ment is increasing initial programed
funds for PROVOST in fiscal year 1970
by $68 million.
Furthermore, according to Mr. Sulli-
van:
We know we are "over the hump" In our
EDT & E expenditures for this war. We have
learned to predict our funding requirements
somewhat better.
In addition, Mr. Sullivan stated that
while we were not ideally equipped in
the past few years to fight in a Vietnam-
type war and thus encountered many
unexpected problems, as a result of past
PROVOST work "we are now much more
current."
In short, due to past experience, there
should be less unexpected-research and
development expenses in fiscal year
1970?less of the kind of expenses the
emergency fund was designed to meet.
For the coming year, the Secretary of
Defense will still possess his $150 million
transfer authority as well as his repro-,
gramming authority. It is true the total
DOD research and development budget
was cut in committee this year. However,
the cut amounts to only a 5 percent re-
duction in research and development as
compared with last year's appropriation.
Furthermore, 80 percent of the reduction
recommended by the Armed Services
Committee applies to specific programs
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August 11, 19proved S 9597
unrelated to the Vietnam war. Thus, the of Maryland. In my view, and the view
overall reprograming ability within the of so many of my colleagues who are co-
research and development sector of the sponsoring the amendment with me, we
Department of Defense budget will not do not believe this additional money is
be significantly affected. warranted. In the name of economy, I
It is also important to note in con- ask that the Senate support the measure
sidering Vietnam-related research .and reducing the amount to the $50 million
development in this year's budget that of last year's appropriation.
the end products of this research and de- Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the
velopment will not be available for use Senator yield?
in Vietnam until 1971 or 1972. According The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DOLE
to Mr. Sullivan, it takes between 18 to 36 in the chair. Does the Senator yield?
months from the inception of a project Mr. TYDINGS. I yield.
until it is ready for use by our troops Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I appre-
in the field. elate the Senator's yielding to me.
I think none of us, including the Presi- He has gone into this matter very
dent, expects the current level of thoroughly.
U.S. involvement in Vietnam to con- For the record, I have a statement
tinue for another 11/2 to 3 years. which Will show the amounts appropri-
As a matter of fact, the President ated for this emergency fund in the past.
on at least two occasions has indicated In the past, Congress has always recog-
that he is going to reduce troops in Viet- nixed the need for a limited emergency
nam. On one occasion, he ordered a fund which would allow the Secretary
25,000 troop reduction. So I do not see of Defense to apply the necessary re-
how we can expect the level of involve- sources to exploit sudden technological
ment to increase in Vietnam, in view of breakthroughs or satisfy unanticipated
the statements of the President of the research and development needs, and to
United States. do so without disrupting planned and on-
But, the question is asked, what if going programs.
there is a large, unexpected increase in In fiscal years 1962, 1963, and 1964,
our research and development demands? we appropriated $150 million for this
In addition to the $50 million Emergency purpose each year. In the fiscal years
Fund, the Secretary's $150 million trans- 1965, 1966, 1967 the approved fund was
fer authority, and his reprograming au- $125 million. In fiscal year 1968 it was
thority, there is still the Secretary's $10 reduced to $100 million. In 1969, al-
million contingency fund and the possi- though the Defense Department re-
bility of a supplemental appropriation quested $125 million, the emergency
from the Congress. fund was reduced by Congress to $50
In short, weighing the probable de- million. In each of these years the-fund
mantis on our research and development was augmented by authority to transfer
program for the coming year against the other appropriated funds in the amount
resources available to meet these de- of $150 million each year.
mantis, I can find no sound justification Mr. President, this matter is compli-
for doubling the emergency fund to $100 cated, as are so many other matters, by
million, the situation with reference to Vietnam.
In concluding, I want to make clear I know it has upset the budget, it has
that this debate does not involve our upset these accounts, it has upset the
national security. According to-Mr. Sul- transfer, and it has upset everything. For
livan, whether he receives the additional 2 years we had to insist on money being
$50 million for the emergency fund or put in for the expense of the war. There
not, his office will be able to meet all of was nothing in the appropriation bill.
the needs of our troops in Vietnam. I wish to point out that this matter
What is at issue is whether he will be deals with the matter of transfer. Just
forced to haggle with the various Services what does that mean? That is a matter
for low priority or superfluous funds if handled by the Committee on Appro-
PROVOST costs exceed his initial esti- Priations. They have the language provi-
mates. This is an exercise he has per- sions in their bill governing transfers
formed successfully for the past 4 years of funds. It really does not come within
with no apparent injury to our national this bill, but it is related.
security. Mr. TYDINGS. It is very related.
What we are talking about is an econ- Mr. STENNIS. Transfer means the
omy measure. We are in the midst of a transfer from one account to another,
serious inflation. We have just saddled such as a transfer from the research and
the American people with an extension development account to the 0. & M. ac-
of the 10-percent surtax. In return, we count?the operations and maintenance
have promised to cut all Government account. I am just making this state-
spending that is not absolutely essential ment for the record. To reprogram
to the Nation's well being, means to bring one item in the same ac-
Mr. President, I have devoted consid- count over to another item in the same
erable study to the Defense Department's account; transferring some item of re-
request for a doubling of the emergency search and development over to another
fund, research and development within that
I do not question the manner in which general account.
the past emergency fund have been I would rather have a definite and
used, nor do I doubt the sincere motiva- positive figure in here for the emergency
tion behind the desire of the Department use only in the breakthroughs that we
of Defense for an additional $50 million, are trying to reach, and require them to
If I were the Secretary of Defense I exhaust that money first before they
would probably be asking for that also, could have any transfers from another
But I am not the Secretary of Defense. account. As I have said, we do not con-
I am a Senator representing the people trol all of that. It is within the authority
of the provisions in the appropriation
bill.
The reasoning with respect to the $100
million was simply this. We have a re-
duction here, as Senators know, from the
$8.222 billion requested in the budget
of April 15. The committee made a re-
duction to $7.170 million, using round
numbers. That is well over $1 billion.
In making such a vast reduction, which
is more than at any time recently, we
were trying to cover the proposition of
a real breakthrough and a possible emer-
gency of some kind. Our thinking was
merely commonsense; that it might
prove that the knife was in too deep in
some items; and there ought to be more
than a nominal sum that could be used.
The Senator traced the history of all
this matter. I have mentioned the trans-
fer authority. I think, frankly, it is noth-
ing to argue over a great deal. I do not
think it is necessary to have a rollcall
vote or anything of that nature.
If the Senator feels as if he can ac-
cept it for $75 million and let it go at that
figure, we will put something in our re-
port or in a letter to the Department of
Defense, and particularly Dr. Foster, that
we think this was allowed for that pur-
pose; not to go into the transfer of funds
until he has at least exhausted this
money. If they are going to use a lot of
transfer money first, we will take this out
altogether next year.
I respond to the Senator in that way.
If he would be willing to make it $75
million, I think we could accept such an
amount.
Mr. COOK. Mr. President, will the Sen-
ator yield?
Mr. TYDINGS. I yield.
Mr. COOK. Mr. President, I would like
to substantiate the $75 million figure of
the Senator from Mississippi on this
basis. Referring to the report of the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, I might sug-
gest that the committee was told that of
the $50 million it had expended $47.002
million, which left $2.998 million.
Mr. TYDINGS. That was May 22, a
month and a half before the end of the
fiscal year.
Mr. COOK. The Senator is correct. But
at the same time, Dr. Foster indicated
there were $25 million in programs that
were then pending; that they had to de-
cide what should be done, but they only
had $2.998 million and felt it should run
until the end of the year.
The point I am trying to make to the
Senator from Maryland is that if he
would consider $75 million, I think we
can get it by reason of the fact that they
had expended almost the $50 million and
had $25 million-plus of programs that
were in existence for R. & D. for which
funds were not available.
I agree with most of what the Senator
from Maryland has said with respect to
the transfer of funds, but I would sug-
gest, as one who is econmoy minded, that
for me to suggest raising the amount
from $50 million to $75 million is only on
the basis that the committee itself has
already deleted from the budget more
than $900 million of research and devel-
opment funds, and there is not the abil-
ity to transfer back and forth. Even the
ability to transfer in the $150 million
float account is of such a nature that it
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olio? SENATE August 11, 1969
may not be as easy in the future for Mr.
Sullivan or anyone else to be able to shift
those funds one way or the other as he
saw fit.
I think there is ample authority. As
a matter of fact, if I may speak for a
minute longer, the distinguished Senator
from Maine (Mrs. Swum) brought up
this very subject with Dr. Foster in the
testimony and asked him about the addi-
tional $25 million of programs waiting
that could not be funded. She asked
whether he did not feel, perh,:ps, that he
should raise the $50 million figure. So I
can only say that I think there is ample
precedent for the Senator to consider an
increase from $50 million to $75 million.
I hope that he will give the proposal
serious consideration.
Mr. TYDINGS. I thank the distin-
guished Senator from Kentucky for his
contribution. Pie is also persuasive. I
might point out that of the almost $1 bil-
lion reduction in research and develop-
ment made by the Committee on Armed
Services, only 20 percent of the $1 billion
was not for specific items deleted by the
committee itself. But I certainly think
that the Senator is very persuasive.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. TYDINGS. I yield.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I am wondering
whether there should be an increase from
$50 million to $75 million. Was that the
suggestion?
Mr. TYDINGS. That is correct.
Mr. PROXMIRE. When the situation,
as I understand, deals primarily with
Vietnam and related projects.
Mr. TYDINGS. Last year; as I recall, 82
percent of the fund was applied to Viet-
nam and related items.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I think one of the
most persuasive aspects of the Senator's
excellent speech was his emphasis on the
fact that everything we are told is that
the war in Vietnam is being deescalated.
The President has already announced his
plan to withdraw 25,000 troops, and we
accept that. Certainly it is irreversible, in
the view of most of us.
As the Senator said, within a year and
a half to 3 years, it should be possible to
withdraw very largely from Vietnam?
not entirely but largely?under these cir-
cumstances, the increase in the conting-
ency fund for Vietnam for certain things
in Vietnam does not seem to be logical.
What is the answer?
Mr. TYDINGS. Let me say to the Sen-
ator from Wisconsin, that is a difficult
question in light of the Preddent's state-
ments about reduction of American in-
volvement, de-Americanization of the
Vietnam war, and bringing home our
troops. The increase in the Emergency
Fund, say 80 percent of it, can be reason-
ably expected to be used in defense-re-
lated research and development for
Southeast Asia which by the testimony
of Mr. Sullivan will not be cornoleted for
18 to 36 months.
Mr. PROXMIRE. What was the cost of
that last year when the situation was far
more complicated than every indication
is it will be this year? Last year, when we
had 550,000 American troops in Vietnam,
we did not exhaust the fund last year;
is that not right?
Mr. TYDINGS. That is correct. I think
for the RECORD, just to make it abso-
lutely clear, we should put the colloquy
between the Senator from Maine (Mrs.
SMITH), the ranking Republican minor-
ity member of the Armed Services Com-
mittee, and Dr. Foster, together with his
response to her when she questioned him
about the emergency fund, which ap-
pears on page 1854 of the authorization
for military procurement research and
development hearings before the Armed
Services Committee, part 2 of two parts.
We should include this colloquy just to
complete the record in this matter.
Mr. DO/VI/NICK. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Maryland yield?
Mr. TYDINGS. I yield.
Mr. DOMINICK. I should like to make
the record clear that this research con-
tingency fUnd is not just for Vietnam
but covers all research. Maybe it was 80
percent that was spent on it the last
time. We may well spend another 80 per-
cent of it for research and development
on a Middle East situation the next time.
We cannot tell where the need for these
funds will arise. We cannot equate the
withdrawal of troops from Vietnam with
our need for this research contingency
fund.
With all respect to the Senator from
Wisconsin, I think he is clouding the
record. It should be made crystal clear.
Mr. TYDINGS. I think it is clear. In
fiscal 1965, 88 percent of the total went
to Vietnam. In 1969, 81.7 percent went
to Vietnam. I might say that if, we were
not in Vietnam I do not think this would
even be an issue before the Senate today,
for were there no war, I think it would
be up to the Armed Services Committee
to specify what research and develop-
ment was going to take place. Unantici-
pated R. & D. costs would not constitute
a serious consideration.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Furthermore, $40
million to $45 million has been for Viet-
nam. There will be less activity for Viet-
nam now. It is prudent, wise, econom-
ical, and logical for us not to increase
the fund, which is all the modest amend-
ment of the Senator from Maryland
would do. So that I wonder, would not
the distinguished Senator from Missis-
sippi accept a compromise and go to $75
million from the $50 million. I wonder
about the wisdom of that review of the
whole history of this, in view of the ex-
pectations about Vietnam.
Furthermore, I should like to ask the
Senator from Maryland, Is it not true
that the original Defense Department's
request was for only $52 million? That is
what they wanted.
Mr. TYDINGS. In January of this
Year, Secretary of Defense Clifford re-
quested $50 million in the original budget.
Two months later, the request was in-
creased to $100 million by Secretary of
Defense Laird.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Is it not also true
that not one single request of need by
Southeast Asia forces for research and
development was denied?
Mr. TYDINGS. The Senator is correct.
The fact was that the considerable flexi-
bility which exists within the Depart-
ment of Defense made it possible to pro-
vide for every research development
project which they felt was of high
priority.
Mr. PROXMIRE. In the event that
this is not enough, there Is ample flexi-
bility, $7 billion in research and develop-
ment, that can be used at the discretion
of the Secretary of Defense in this area
if he wants to; is that not correct?
Mr. TYDINGS. That is correct; and
there is an additional $150 million in
transfer authority to transfer funds be-
tween one section of the appropriation
bill and another.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the Senator
very much.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Maryland yield to me
briefly again?
Mr. TYDINGS. I yield.
Mr. STENNIS. The Senator has given
a fine list of figures here as to what has
happened; but so far as the budget is
concerned, as of now, we do not know
what transfer authority, if any, the
Appropriations Committee and Congress
are going to put in the appropriation bill.
A transfer has to be authorized in the
bill. Then it is passed on by the com-
mittee. We do not know what language
they will have, on what the Congress will
approve with reference to reprograming.
Certainly, until those things are known,
If those gates should be closed or partly
closed, we certainly should not reduce
the emergency fund too low.
This is a discretionary 'matter for Dr.
Foster anyway, and for Congress. So I
had understood that the Senator from
Maryland had weighed this thing con-
siderably in that light.
Mr. TYDINGS. I have. If the Senator
from Mississippi offers an amendment
to my amendment which, in effect, would
reduce the recommendations of the
Armed Services Committee from $100
million to $75 million?my proposal re-
duces it to $50 million?I would accept
that.
Mr. STENNIS. Would that be agree-
able generally here to thaw of us who
have worked on this matter? I refer to
the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PRox-
snar) and the Senator from Kentucky
(Mr. Cooxs) who have already expressed
themselves. The Senator from Kentucky
has expressed himself as being in favor
of such a figure, if I understood him
correctly.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Maryland yield?
Mr. TYDINGS. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. As I understand it,
this bill has not been passed by the
House?
Mr. STENNIS. No.
Mr. FULBR/GHT. Therefore this goes
In the House bill, and if it follows past
custom, will it not, the House will make
it considerably larger, I expect.
Mr. TYDINGS. No.
Mr. STENNIS. No.
Mr. TYDINGS. Last year the House
Armed Services Committee struck out
the emergency fund In its entirely. The
Senate authorized $121 million.
In conference, the Senate receded, the
House acceded, and the sum of $50 mil-
lion was arrived at. But the House had
struck it out in its entirety. So I would
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hope that for this year that the result
would be that?
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I think
there is no reason in the world why we
should not be able to settle this matter
to and the final amount to the satisfac-
tion of all parties concerned in the bill
arrived at in the conference.
Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent, then, that my
amendment be modified on line 2 by
striking out the figure "50,000,000", and
inserting in lieu thereof the figure "$75,-
000,000."
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, the modification is made.
Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, I ask
for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
a sufficient second?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, we
had better have a quorum call.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, were the
yeas and nays ordered?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. No. There was not
a sufficient second.
Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, I sug-
gest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11246 "EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY"
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, one
of the most alarming and dangerous
trends in Government in recent years is
the increasing tendency of the executive
and judiciary branches of the Federal
Government to usurp the lawmaking
functions of the Congress. And it is in
the area of civil rights that this tendency
has been most evident.
A recent and flagrant example of this
tendency is the attempt of the executive
branch to force racial quotas on Gov-
ernment contractors by executive order.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 dealt in detail with the subject of
equal employment opportunity, but
much of private industry, especially
ir. the construction field, has been
confronted with a far more exten-
sive and burdensome system of regula-
tion in this area under the color of Ex-
ecutive Order 11246 on Nondiscrimina-
tion. That order, together with its im-
plementing rules, regulations, and re-
quirements goes far beyond the legisla-
tion enacted by the Congress on this
subject; indeed, the order is in direct
conflict with the policy, purpose, and in-
tent expressed in the 1964 Civil Rights
Act.
The clear purpose and intent of that
act was to make discrimination in em-
ployment on the basis of race, color, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin, an unlaw-
ful employment practice, whether en-
gaged in by employers, labor organiza-
tions, or employment agencies. Congress
made it equally clear, however, that merit
and capability, as determined by the
employer, should continue to be the de-
termining factors in respect to job qual-
ification and employment.
It was the further intent of Congress
that the law was not to be interpreted
as requiring the intrciduction of quotas
or other representatives or preferential
systems into the employment process.
Section 703(j) of title VII, expressly dis-
allowed the granting of preferential
treatment to any individual or group in
order to correct any imbalance that
might exist with respect to the total
number or percentage of persons of any
race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin, employed as compared with the
total number of such persons in any
community, State, or other area, or in
the available work force in any com-
munity, State, or other area.
Nothing in title VII imposed?or au-
thorized the imposition upon?private
industry of any duty or obligation to in-
stitute or finance any training, appren-
ticeship, recruitment, advertising, or
other affirmative programs designed to
enhance the employment opportunities
or job qualifications of any employee,
applicant for employment, or other per-
son. Nor did Congress intend to outlaw or
interfere with bona fide seniority or
merit systems. See section 703(h) . And
it is highly significant that Congress,
when it enacted title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, entitled "Nondis-
crimination in Federally Assisted Pro-
grams," expressly provided that it shall
not "be construed to authorize action
under this title by any department or
agency with respect to any employment
practice by any employer, employment
agency, or labor organization, except
where a primary objective of the Federal
financial assistance is to provide em-
ployment."?Section 604.
Despite this express declaration of
congressional intent, however, preaward
procedures, including elaborate require-
ments for "affirmative action" programs
designed to impose quota and minority
representation systems, have been in-
corporated in regulations by the execu-
tive branch.
Recently the Department of Labor
issued an order known as the Revised
Philadelphia Plan for Compliance with
Equal Opportunity Requirements of Ex-
ecutive Order 11246, regarding Federal
construction contracts.
This plan was directed to all Govern-
ment agencies, and while limited initially
to the Philadelphia area, it was to be ap-
plied nationally at some later date, to
be determined by the Department of
Labor.
The plan purported to set up a pro-
gram of equal employment opportunity
for Federal contractors. Pursuant to its
terms bidders on Federal construction
contracts would be required to submit
goals of manpower utilization. Racial
employment quotas are plainly required
by the language of the plan.
Mr. President, I have received many
complaints about the obligations imposed
upon Government contractors by Execu-
tive Order 11246 and the requirements
imposed thereunder by the Office of Con-
tract Compliance of the Department of
Labor and various other executive de-
S 9599
partments of our Government. Those
complaints stem from the wide variance
and apparent conflict between the policy
and burdens imposed by this Executive
order and the congressional policy and
intent as manifested in titles VI and VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Because the obvious conflicts between
those two programs give rise to serious
questions of statutory and constitutional
law, I wrote to the Comptroller General
of the United' States on May 19, 1969,
requesting his opinion regarding the va-
lidity of Executive Order 11246 and the
regulations, rules, procedures, and re-
quirements issued pursuant thereto and
being applied by the Office of Contract
Compliance and other Federal agencies
in the awarding of Federal and Federal-
aid contracts. On August 5, I received a
reply from the Comptroller General with
which he enclosed a copy of his deci-
sion?B-16306?addressed to the Secre-
tary of Labor relative to the revised Phil-
adelphia plan.
The Comptroller General's decision
confirms my concern in this matter. The
so-called Philadelphia plan violates the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and it cannot be
supported on the tenuous grounds of any
implied, inherent, or derivative authority.
And it most assuredly cannot be main-
tained simply because some'Federal social
innovator desires it to be so. The Comp-
troller's analysis of the Philadelphia plan,
and its requirements, clearly shows its
conflict with and contravention of titles
VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Mr. President, this is the second time
that the Federal bureaucracy has tried to
initiate a "Philadelphia plan," to impose
racial quota systems on Government con-
tractors. The Federal procurement pro-
cedures are complex and costly enough
without adding this complicating and
harassing burden. The Congress has act-
ed in this area; its action is clear, and it
is high time that the executive branch
takes heed of the laws of this Nation.
It is a well-established principle of con-
stitutional law that the President's power
to issue an Executive order must stem
either from an act of Congress or from
the Constitution itself?Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co., et al. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 585.
It is an equally well-established prin-
ciple of constitutional law that although
the President's general direction power
is constitutional in its source, it is by no
means absolute. On the contrary, its exer-
cise is subject to important limitations.
Foremost among these is the well-settled
rule that an Executive order or any other
Executive action, whether by formal
order or by regulation, cannot contravene
an act of Congress which is constitu-
tional. Thus, when an Executive order
collides with a statute enacted pursuant
to the constitutional authority of the
Congress, the statute will prevail?Ken-
dall v. U.S., 12 Peters 524. Neither the
President nor a department head at the
President's direction or with his approval,
has authority to act at variance with
valid statutory provisions,-United States
v. Symonds, 120 U.S. 46.
As Justice Frankfurter said in the
Youngstown Sheet and Tube case,
"Where Congress has acted the President
is bound by the enactment." And as Jus-
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S 9600 st
tice Holmes declared in Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 177?
The duty of the President to see that the
laws be faithfully executed is a duty that
does not go beyond the laws or require him
to do more than Congress sees fit to leave
within his power.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that a copy of Executive Order 11246,
together, with my letter to the Comp-
troller General, dated May 19, 1969, and
his reply together with his decision rela-
tive to the Philadelphia plan, be printed
in the RECORD immediately following the
conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. McCLELLAN. In this connection
it is pertinent to quote the f (allowing ex-
cerpts from the Comptroller's decision:
Whether the provisions of the Plan requir-
ing a bidder to commit himself to hire?or
make every good faith effort to hire?at least
the minimum number of minority group
employees specified in the ranges established
for the designated trades is in fact, a
"quota" system (and therefore admittedly
contrary to the Civil Rights Act) or is a
"goal" system, is in our view largely a matter
of semantics, and tends to divert attention
from the end result of the Plan -that con-
tractors commit themselves to making race
or national origin a factor for consideration
in obtaining their employees.
We view the imposition of sueh a require-
ment on employers engaged in Federal or
federally assisted construction to be in con-
flict with the intent as well as the letter
of the above provisions of the act which
make it an unlawful employment practice to
use race or national origin as a basis for
employment. Further, we believe that re-
quiring an employer to abandon his cus-
tomary practice of hiring through local un-
ion because of a racial or national origin
imbalance in the local unions and, under
the threat of sanctions, to make "every good
faith effort" to employ the iromber of mi-
nority group tradesmen specified in his bid
from sources outside the union if the work-
ers referred by the union do not include a
sufficient number of minority group person-
nel, are in conflict with section 703(j) of the
act.
And finally:
We recognize that both your Department
(Labor) and the Department of Justice have
found the Plan to be legal and we have given
most serious consideration to their positions.
However, until the authority for any agency
to impose or require conditions in invitations
for bids on Federal or federally assisted con-
struction which obligate bidders, contrac-
tors, or subcontractors, to consider the race
or national origin of their employees or pros-
pective employees for such construction, is
clearly and firmly established by the weight
of judicial precedent, or by additional sta-
tutes, we must conclude that conditions of
the type proposed by the revised Philadelphia
Plan are in conflict with the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, and we will necessarily have to
so construe and apply the act in passing
upon the legality of matters involving ex-
penditures of appropriated funds for Federal
or federally assisted construction projects.
Mr. President, I am not quarreling with
the objective of equal employment op-
portunities for all persons based on merit
and capability to do the ,Work, without
regard to race, color, religion, or national
origin. But I do not believe that dis-
crimination, where it exists, can be
remedied by imposing solutions which
are inherently and equally discrimina-
tory. The quota and other requirements
imposed by the Philadelphia revised plan
seek to remove inequities of one kind by
imposing others in their stead, a situa-
tion underscored in the following ex-
cerpt from the Comptroller's decision:
The recital in section 61:0.2 of the order
(arid in the prescribed form of notice to be
included in the invitation) that the contrac-
tor's commitment "is not intended and shall
not be used to discriminate against any qual-
ified applicant or employee" is in our opinion
the statement of a practical impossibility.
If, for example, a contractor requires 20
plumbers and is committed to a goal of em-
ployment of at least five from minority
groups, every nonminority applicant for em-
ployment in excess of 15 would, solely by
reason of his race or national origin, be
prejudiced in his opportunity for emp
ment, because the contractor is committed
to make every e it to employ five appli-
rity groups.
cants from m
Mr. Pr
Depar
the F
natio
of t
Au
th
dfv
dent, I trust that the Labor
nt, and all other agencies of
eral Government will take due
and appropriate action as a result
e Comptroller General's opinion of
St 5, 1969, and begin implementing
laws as enacted and not as some in-
iduals or officials may desire.
EXHIBIT 1
XECUTIVE ORDER 11246?EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY
Under and by virtue of the authority vested
me as President of the United States by
t e Constitution and statutes of the United
S tes, it is ordered as follows:
PART I?NONDISCRIMINATION IN
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT
SECTS. 101. It is the policy of the Govern-
ment of t United States to provide equal
opportunity Federal employment for all
qualified persons, ? prohibit discrimination
in employment beca of race, creed, color,
or national origin, an. promote the full
realization of equal emplo' 'ent opportunity
through a positive, continui program in
each executive department and ency, The
policy of equal opportunity appli to every
aspect of Federal employment po and
practice.
Sus. 102. The head of each executive e-
partment and agency shall establish
maintain a positive program of equal ern\
ployment opportunity for all civilian em-
ployees and applicants for employment with-
in his jurisdiction in accordance with the
policy set forth in Section 101.
SEC. 103. The Civil Service Commission
shall supervise and provide leadership and
guidance in the conduct of equal employ-
ment opportunity programs for the civilian
employees of and applications for employ-
ment within the executive departments and
agencies and shall review agency program
accomplishments periodically. In order to
facilitate the achievement of a model pr
gram for equal .employment in the Fe ? al
service, the Co ission may cons from
time to time with uch individ groups,
or organizations as assistance in
improving the Federal program and realizing
the objectives of this Part.
SEC. 104. The Civil Service Commission
shall provide for the prompt, fair, and im-
partial consideration of all complaints of
discrimination in Federal employment on
the basis of race, creed, color, or national
origin. Procedures for the consideration of
complaints shall include at least one im-
partial review within the executive depart-
ment or agency and shall provide for appeal
to the Civil Service Commission.
SEC. 105. The Civil Service Commission
shall issue such regulations, orders, and in-
structions as it deems necessary and appro-
priate to carry out its responalbilities under
this Part, and the head of each executive
department and agency shall comply with
the regulations, orders, and instructions is-
sued by the Commission under this Part.
PART II?NONDISCRIMINATION ER EMPLOYMENT
BY GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS AND SUBCON-
TRACTORS
Subpart A?Duties of the Secretary of Labor
SEC. 201. The Secretary of Labor shall be re-
sponsible for the administration of Parts II
and III of this Order and shall adopt such
rules and regulations and Jamie such orders
as he deems necessary and appropriate to
achieve the purposes thereof.
Subpart B?Contractors' Agreements
sEc. 202. Except in contracts exempted in
accordance with Section 204 of this Order, all
Government contracting agencies shall in-
clude in every Government contract here-
fter entered into the following provisions:
uring the performance of this contract,
the co rector agrees as follosts:
"(1) The contractor will not discriminate
against any employee or applicant for em-
ployment because of race, creed, color, or na-
tional origin. The contractor will tate affirm-
ative action to ensure that applicants are
employed, and that employees are treated
during employment, without regard to their
race, creed, color, or national origin. Such
action shall include, but not be limited to
the following: Employment, upgrading, de-
motion, or transfer; recruitment or recruit-
ment advertising; layoff or termination; rates
of pay or other forms of compensation; and
selection for training, including apprentice-
ship. The contractor agrees to post in con-
spicuous places, available to employees and
applicants for employment, notices to be
provided by the contracting officer setting
forth the provisions of this nondiscrimina-
tion clause.
"(2) The contractor will, in all solicita-
tions or advertisements for employees placed
by or on behalf of the contractor, state that
all qualified applicants will receive con-
sideration for employment Without regard
to race, cre?d, color, or national origin.
"(3) The contractor will send to each
labor union or representative of workers with
which he has a collective bargaining agree-
ment or other contract or understanding,
a notice to be provided by the agency con-
tracting officer, advising the labor union or
workers' representative of the contractor's
commitments under Section 202 of Execu-
tive Order No. 11246 of September 24, 1965,
and shall post copies of the notice in con-
spicuous places available to employees and
pplicants for employment.
"(4) The contractor will comply with all
rovisions of Elecutive Order No. 11246 of
pt. 24, 1965, and of the rules, regulations,
d relevant orders of the Secretary of Labor.
"(5) The contractor will furnish all In-
rmation and reports required by Execu-
lye Order No. 11248 of September 24, 1965,
and by the rules, regulations, and orders of
the Secretary of Labor, or pursuant thereto,
and will permit access to hiabooks, records,
and accounts by the contracting agency and
the Secretary Of Labor for purposes of in-
vestigation to ascertain compliance with such
rules, regulations, and order&
"(6) In the event of the contractor's non-
compliance with the nondiscrimination
clauses of this contraet or with any of such
rules, regulations, or orders, this contract
may be cancelled, terminated or suspended
in whole or in part and the contractor may
be declared ineligible for further Government
contracts in accordance with procedures
authorized in executive Order No. 11246 of
Sep. 24, 1965, and such other sanctions may
be imposed and remedies Involved as pro-
vided in Executive Order No. 11246 of Sep-
tember 24, 1968, or by rule. regulation, or
order of the Secretary of Labor, or as other-
wise provided by law.
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August 19%9
does ,not actually make a change in the of private transactions. I have since expressed
law which would provide the President opposition to extension of the tax, and voted
with the authority to have a lower tax in favor of amendments which would have
rate on outstanding issues from those
restricted its effect. I continue to have con-
siderable doubts whether extension of the
which pertain to new borrowing? LET would be in the best interests of our
Mr. LONG. No, that authority is in the country, in the absence of a concrete pledge
House passed bill, which is still in the to begin dismantling this web of capital re-
committee. What we have here is a sim- strictions at the earliest possible time.
pie 30-day extension. I would therefore like to be appraised of:
MT, JAVITS. That will be dealt with (1) your intentions to use the powers
when the committee has its hearing? which will be given the President to vary the
Mr. LONG, The Senator is correct. tax rates, so that these rat --for both new
and outstanding iss ?will be",as low as
Mr. JAVITS. The committee will have possible consistenyWith monetary stability;
s and intentions which, in
hearings? (2) your act
Mr. LONG. The Senator is correct. your conti ng review of the nation's bal-
Mr. JAVITS. May I be heard? an.ce of p ments program, may result in the
Mr, LONG. Yes. gradu relaxation of the restrictions im-
Mr. JAVITS. This is important to me. pos ? by the Office of Foreign Direct Invest-
I have always fought against the interest t.
equalization tax on the ground it repre- Please be assured that I have pledged my
sents a protectionist device. However, w efforts to maintaining the strength of the
dollar both at home and abroad, and am
have a balance-of-payments probl willing to support any measure which will
which is now congealed around th in- effect this end and for which no reasonable
terest equalization tax.
I understand the difficulties of t
ministration in going along with
such as me.
Now, a certain background h been
built up in utilization of the ta based THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY,
on the fact I think it was unwis taxa- ? Washington, August 9, 1969.
tion and Unwise for our country Hon. JACOB K. JAVIT take U.S. Senate, s'
in view of the fact that this is the 1 d- Washington, D.C.
lag money capital of the world. DEAR SENATOR JAVITS: In your letter to me
I wrote a letter to the Secretary of ay on the Interest Equalization Tax, you
the Treasury on Saturday. He responded, hay- emphasized the desirability of dis-
not in terms of the 30-day extension, mantli our direct balance of payments
which is understandable, but the bill as controls as as possible.
it came from the House. He made the On April 4, President Nixon pur-
situation clear. posefully began j exactly this type of
process consistent wit ?ur balance of pay-
ments position. At that ? e he announced
that the exchange of correspondence I a relaxation of the capita estrictions on
had with the Secretary of the Treasury foreign direct investment and ? ding abroad
may be printed in the RECORD. by bank and non-bank financial titutions.
There being no objection, the letters In addition, he pledged and "we all find
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, our solutions (to our economic prob s) in
as follows: the framework of freer trade and pay ents".
AUGUST 9, 1969. The President also pointed out that "The
Re Interest Equalization Tax distortions created by more than three ears
Hon. DAVID M. KENNEDY, of inflation cannot be corrected over ight.
e ad-
eople
alternative exists.
With best wishes, believe me,
Sincerely,
JACOB K. JAVITS.
Secretary,
U.S. Treasury Department
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Interest Equaliza-
tion Tax extension has been slated for floor
consideration this coming week, and as you
know, I have been following with some con-
cern the reaction which this issue has had
in the country. In April of this year, the
Joint Economic Committee, on which I serve
as senior Minority member, recommended
that the IET be phased out as soon as prac-
ticable. The Majority noted that suspension.
of the IN T would do little or no injury to
the U.S. balance of payments, and that sus-
pension is an appropriate way to begin the
elimination of capital export restrictions
which "are a direct contradiction of the most
fundamental international economic policy
objectives pursued by the United States since
the end of World War II." The Minority noted
the strong and valid arguments which exist
for reconsidering the continuation of the IET,
and pointed out that significant changes in
the structure of capital markets in the United
States and abroad have reduced the danger
of the greatly increased outflows which the
IET was designed to prevent.
These views accord with my prior opposi-
tion to the IET. In 1964 when the tax was be-
ing introduced, I proposed a "capital issues
committee" for regulating foreign borrowings
in the United States on a voluntary basis,
which would have kept our capital outflows
within manageable levels and preserved the
traditional U.S. commitment to the freedom
9
Nor can the dislocations resulting f om a
decade of balance-of-payments de its be
corrected in a short time." It w against
the background of these actions, t is pledge
and an appreciation of the ti e it takes
to restore balance to the ec.on y that the
President announced his inte ion to seek an
extension of the Interest ?ualization Tax.
The extension legislati now before the
Senate has a new vision which would
provide to the Pr dent the authority to
have a lower ate on outstanding issues
from that which would pertain to new bor-
rowings. The purpose of this provision is to
provide that degree of flexibility which could
be useful in reducing the reliance upon this
tax as a selective restraint in our overall bal-
ance-of-payments program. For example, if
this authority is employed, a low or no tax
on new issues could permit greater access to
our markets for new projects without ac-
cording this benefit to outstanding issues.
The willingness of this Administration to
vary the IET tax rate so that it will be
when our reliance upon this tax can disap-
pear.
It Is also my intention t2 recommend as
soon as possible in the light of balance-of-
payments developments, additional steps in
the gradual relaxation of the capital restric-
tions imposed Under the foreign direct in-
vestment program.
I would emphasize the fundamental fact
that our efforts te further reduce reliance
upon selective restrains will be greatly fa-
cilitated by the evident effectiveness of our
program of general restraints in reducing in-
flation, restoring better balance to our econ-
omy, and creating the conditions that make
it possible to rebuild our trade position. As
inflation is so much the cause of our inter-
national payments problem, it is vital that
we pursue the fiscal-monetary restraint
which will foster our balance growth.
Sincerely,
DAVID M. KENNEDY.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, he made
it clear there were certain undertakings
which the Treasury was making with re-
spect to the extension of this case.
In his letter he stated that it would
provide the President the authority to
have a lower tax rate on outstanding
issues from that which would pertain to
new boriowings. He stated:
If this authority is employed, a low or no
tax on new issues could permit greater ac-
cess to our markets for new projects without
according this benefit to outstanding issues.
I would like to point out that the out-
standing issue question is complicated
because of the reaching out by American
banks and others to borrow, and that
Americans would flock to get those issues
if we took the interest equalization tax
off.
I sympathize with the Secretary and
what he is doing. I hope the committee
considers the matter to make a different
rate for new issues as contrasted with
other issues.
The letter also stated:
It is my intention to recommend to the
President further use of this authority as
circumstances permit, and in this regard I
will be specially mindful of the opportunity
to employ the additional flexibility we are
now seeking from Congress which hopefully
will advance the time when our reliance
upon this tax can disappear.
It is also my intention to recommend as
soon as possible in the light of balance-of-
payments developments, additional steps in
the gradual relaxation of the capital re-
strictions imposed under the foreign direct
investment program.
Mr. President, I have inserted this mat-
ter in the RECORD to call it to the atten-
tion of Senators so that it may be
helpful as they get to the stage of dis-
cussion and to prepare for my testifying,
which the Senator has consented to.
Otherwise, I have no objection.
Mr. LONG. I thank the Senator for his
cooperation. This is a matter which will
require the attention of the committee.
as low as possible consistent with monetary It will require some study.
stability Was demonstrated first on April 4
when President Nixon reduced the IET rate We feel there may be considerable out-
from approximately one-and-one-quarter flow of capital and there may be serious
percent p.a. to three-quarters percent p.a. problems if the interest equalization tax
on debt securities. It is my intention to rec- expires prior to the time we give the mat-
ommend to the President further use of this ter the consideration it deserves.
authority as circumstances permit, and in I thank the Senator.
this regard I will be specially mindful of
the opportunity to employ the additional The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
flexibility we are now seeking from Con- tion is on agreeing to the committee
gress which hopefully will advance the time amendment.
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gust 11, 1969
The committee amendment was agreed
to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill
is open to further amenctment.
If there be no further amendment to
be proposed, the question is on the en-
grossment of the amendment and the
third reading of the bill.
The amendment was ordered to be en-
grossed and the bill to be read a third
time.
The bill was read the third time and
passed.
The title was amended, so as to read:
"An act to continue for a temporary pe-
riod the existing suspension of duty on
certain istle and the existing interest
equalization tax."
Mr. LONG. Mr. President, I move that
the vote by which the bill, as amended,
was passed be reconsidered.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I move
that the Motion to reconsider be laid on
the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to. "?7?givi
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
TIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR
MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RE-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MIS-
SILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJ-
ALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RE-
SERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize ap-
propriations during the fiscal year 1970
for procurement of aircraft, missiles,
naval vessels, and tracked combat ve-
hicles, and research, development, test,
and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and
to authorize the construction of test
facilities at Kwajalein Missile Range,
and to prescribe the authorized person-
nel strength of the Selected Reserve of
each reserve component of the Armed
Forces, and for other purposes.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, a
parliamentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator will state it.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, was
the amendment which I offered printed
in the RECORD?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. It was.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The purpose of the
amendment I introduced is very simple.
It would reduce the authorization for re-
search development, test, and evaluation,
by a total of $45,614,000. This represents
a 7 percent reduction in Thuds for the
"military sciences" research category for
each of the three Services and the De-
partment of Defense, plus a 20-percent
reduction in the authorization for the
Defense Department's overseas research
program, Project Agile, which is funded
under a category labeled, "Other Equip-
ment." The proposed reductions, by Serv-
ice, are: Army $11,893,000; Navy $10,-
157,000; Air Force $9,989,000; and the
Department of Defense $13,575,000. The
purpose is to make a modest cutback in
the Department's funding of Federal
contract research centers?the so-called
think tanks?other social and be-
havioral science research, foreign re-
search, the Department's aid-to-educa-
tion program, project Themis, and
research on counterinsurgency matters.
The intent is to have the $45 million
reduction applied roughly as follows:
First, reduce the funding of the Fed-
eral Contract Research Centers by 10
percent, or $27 million;
Second, reduce research in foreign in-
stitutions?colleges and universities, pri-
marily?by $2 million, or approximately
one-third the program proposed;
Third, reduce counterinsurgency re-
search, Project Agile, by 20 percent, or
$5 million;
Fourth, cut other social science re-
search, performed by organizations such
as the Hudson Institute by the remaining
$3 million; and
Fifth, hold the line on new starts un-
der Project Themis by reducing the re-
quest by $8 million?a 25-percent reduc-
tion.
Let me discuss each of these items
briefly.
Last year the Committee on Foreign
Relations began an inquiry into research
activities of the Department of Defense
that relate to foreign policy matters.
That study, and followup inquiries, have
convinced me that there is a great waste
of the taxpayers' money in this field, that
the Federal contract research centers are
not under effective control by the Con-
gress, that the Department of Defense
is financing activities which are not
properly its responsibility, and that the
thinking permeating much of this re-
search is likely to lead to a larger and
larger military establishment and more
Vietnams.
The basic problem was put very well
by Adm. Hyman G. Rickover in testi-
mony before my committee last year.
He said:
There seems to me to be no effective check
within the DOD on selection of research
projects. I would suggest that only Con-
gress can exert such a check on the DOD.
The DOD has been able to involve itself
in research having only the remotest rele-
vance to the problems encountered by the
armed services?matters at no previous time,
nor anywhere else in the world deemed to
lie within the province of the defense func-
tion?just because it has the money; it has
more money than any other public agency.
It gets more money because the word "de-
fense" has in itself an element of urgency.
Whatever is asked in its name somehow
acquires the connotation of a life and death
matter for the Nation.
I believe that Congress should exert
the "check on the DOD" Admiral Rick-
over suggested, by putting the brakes
on this research.
There are 16 Federal contract research
centers, or "think tanks," which, in fiscal
year 1969, received $263 million from the
Department of Defense?a 4 percent in-
crease over the previous year. Accord-
ing to information furnished our com-
mittee by the Department of Defense,
these organizations, as a group, received
94 percent of their revenues from the
Department of Defense last year; nine
received 100 percent of their support
from the Department of Defense. Only
1 percent of their revenues came from
private sources. They are truly creatures
of the Government, existing at the tax-
payers' sufferance.
The committee's hearing record re-
veals little about the activities of these
establishments and the Senate is, in ef-
fect, being asked to provide $277 milliOn
on faith for their operations?a 5-per-
cent increase over last year. There is,
in fact, no listing in the hearings of the
amounts to be allocated to each.
Upon completion earlier this year of
an investigation of certain aspects of re-
search work by nonprofit institutions,
the General Accounting Office was suf-
ficiently disturbed by what it found to
recommend a Presidential study of the
entire subject. The lack of real control
over the "think tanks" is evident from
this exchange between the Senator from
Missouri and Mr. Charles Poor, Acting
Assistant Secretary of the Army, during
the hearings on this bill:
Senator SYMINGTON. That simply means
you give a company so much money.
Mr. POOR. That is correct.
Senator SYMINGTON. But, of research, they
don't know what they are going to find out.
You give them so much money, and they do
as much for that money as they say they can;
is that right?
Mr. POOR.. That is essentially correct.
(p. 525, Armed Services Committee hearings)
Under such an arrangement, we now
have a situation typified by a cartoon in
a recent issue of New Yorker Magazine:
Two strange looking natives are sitting
on the ledge of a mountain peak and a
bright-eyed American type, with brief-
case and coat in hand, is eagerly climb-
ing up to their perch. One native is say-
ing to the other, "Don't look now, but
here comes that pest from the Rand
Corp. again."
Let us look at some of the projects
being carried out by these Defense re-
search organizations:
Here are a few planned by the Rand
Corp., which last year received 93-per-
cent of its total revenues from the Gov-
ernment, and in fiscal 19'70 is slated to
receive $24 million from the Defense De-
partment:
1. "Military Representation in U.S. Mis-
sions": $40,000.
Official Description: Examine better meth-
ods of military representation in handling
military aid in foreign countries, specifically
India, Indonesia, Brazil, and Iran.
2. "Capabilities and Interests Study:"
$150,000.
Official Description: An examination pi
U.S. interests, commitments, and capabilities
required to meet future contingencies that
threaten those interests.
Of course, one can easily see from these
official statements that they are utterly
meaningless, as that one is. One must get
into these descriptions a little further.
Here is another:
3. "Project Management, Project Formula-
tion, and Special Requests": $165,000.
Official Description: RAND management of
ISA-sponsored research formulation, and ex-
ploration of research relevant to ISA inter-
ests, and special studies that may be required
on short notice.
Let us look at the Center for Research
In Social Systems?the originator of the
infamous Project Camelot. Last year 100
percent of its revenue came from the De-
fense Department and it is to receive
$2,100,000 next year for a payroll of 150
employees to carry out projects like
these:
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1. "Cultural Information and Analysis
Center (CINFAC) ": $750,000.
Official Description: An information stor-
age retrieval, analysis facility providing in-
formation services concerning foreign areas
and cultures to qualified requestors.
2. "Internal Security": $80,000.
Official Description: "Research on civil,
paramilitary and military police operations
related to overseas internal defense and de-
velopment."
3. "U.S. Army Psychological Operations Re-
quirements Worldwide": $25,000.
Official Description: "Estimation of world-
wide requirements for U.S. Army PSYOPS in
time frame 1970-1977."
I might point out that CRESS, of
American University, and the Human
Resources Research Office, of George
Washington University, either have
severed, or are in the process of severing,
their university affiliations, as a result of
student protests over their activities.
Here are examples of the research pro-
posed for the human resources research
Office, which is slated to receive $4,300,-
000 from the Army in fiscal 1970:
1. "Development and Evaluation of a
Southeast Asian Cultural Assimulator":
$23,000.
Official Description: "Compile assimuIator
and evaluate advantages and disadvantages
of using this as a principal teaching vehicle."
2, "Program for the Development of Cul-
tural Self-Awareness (COPE) ": $115,000.
Official Description: Design, production,
and evaluation of program of audio-visual
instruction for development of cultural self-
awareness.
That sounds very good and it may be
a fine project for the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, or some-
one else, but I submit this type of activity
is scarcely relevant to the mission, or
function, as it is called, of the Military
EstablishMent or the military forces of
this country.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield on that point?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes; I yield.
Mr. PROXMIRE. The Senator is re-
ferring to the design, production, and
evaluation of a program of audiovisual
instruction for the development of cul-
tural self-awareness, for which $113,000
has already been initiated and $115,000
Is planned for the coming fiscal year. Is
that correct?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is right.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I did not hear the
remarks of the Senator from Arkansas,
but I wonder if this is a program which
should be carried on by the Defense De-
partment; and if so, why? How can the
Defense Department use this for defend-
ing this country?
Mr. F'ULBRIGHT. The remarks I made
are exactly to that effect. Perhaps the
Senator did not hear them. I said that
while the project may be justified for
some other agency of the Government, I
cannot, for the life of me, see its rele-
vance to what I believe the mission of
the Defense Department to be.
I have a further comment on that proj-
ect, if the Senator would like to hear it.
This is the Defense Department explana-
tion. It is dated July 31, 1969:
The objective of this Human Resources
Research Office research effort is to design,
produce, and evaluate a program of audio-
visual instruction for the development of
cultural pelf-awareness, (i.e., awareness of
how a person's own thought processes and
actions are influenced by his cultural back-
ground) . COPE?
COPE is the code name for this proj-
ect?
attempts to make Army personnel under-
stand the influence of the American way of
life on their own attitudes and actions In
order to gain deeper insight into those of
their foreign counterparts, thereby increas-
ing the effectiveness of officers serving in
U.S. military missions.
That may be a good project for some
purpose, but it does seem to me to go
very far afl4ld from the objectives of a
military establishment, which I thought
was created to provide for the defenses
of this country. This seems to me to be
a form of rather sophisticated psycho-
logical instruction that would be worthy
of Harvard or some other university.
Personally, I have great interest in the
psychology of all of us. I am only ques-
tioning, with respect to most of these
projects, whether it is a proper activity
for the Department of Defense. I think
It is an improper activity.
- Mr. PROXMIRE. As I understand it,
this program would not provide funds for
assisting military officers in securing a
greater cultural understanding, but
would be a study as to how this would
best be done. Is that correct?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think that is cor-
rect.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Would it be an at-
tempt to study American culture, as to
how one can best inculcate values into
the hearts and minds of American of-
ficers?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. It would seem so;
how they can be influenced. Then there
would be other activities to attempt to
apply what had been learned in research
projects. The military, as the Senator
knows, conducts very large operations in
the exchange of officers with foreign
countries, for example. That program is
far larger than the civilian exchange
program. It involves, I think, some $70-
odd million. The last time I looked at it,
It was more than twice the size of the
civilian exchange program under the
Department of State.
In that military program, I would as-
sume they would attempt to apply what-
ever they had learned of the psychologi-
cal aspects of the effect of one's environ-
ment upon one's attitude. That may help
. influence their attitude.
I simply question very seriously that
this is the kind of activity our Military
Establishment ought to be engaged in.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I am wondering just
how and when this information could be
used. Could it be used in officers' candi-
date school? Is it to be used in officers'
refresher courses? In what way would
that information be used in inculcate a
better cultural understanding on the part
of our military officers?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. We have educa-
tional programs of that kind, of course.
The Army War College is a quite sophis-
ticated and highly developed educational
institution. It brings every type of officer
there. If anything were learned, I can
imagine the War College might utilize
this information, but it does not strike
me as quite within the realm of the De-
S 9613
partment of Defense to engage in this
type of research.
If this is proper research, on that
theory, I can think of hardly anything
that is not within the scope of their ac-
tivity. There are a number of educational
projects which I do not say are not in
themselves justifiable, under proper
sponsorship; but I think the amount of
money that is spent on this kind of re-
search by the Defense Department is
way out of proportion, and is not rele-
vant to their mission.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I agree with the dis-
tinguished senator. As he says, there are
endless things they can do; and any
amount of money could be justified if
there were no limit to our resources and
our funds.
But it would seem to me that to pro-
ceed on this kind of program, and some
of the others that the Senator has listed
and that are listed in the hearings, would
be extremely hard to justify, in view of
the limitation on funds with which we
are all familiar. If we had to justify
this in any other budget, the Senator can
see how difficult or impossible to justify
they would be.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator took
the words out of my mouth. If these
projects had been presented in some
other agency's budget, they would have
been gone over with a fine toothed comb;
but because they are in the Defense De-
partment and the word "defense" has
a certain aura of urgency as well as an.
implication that our survival depends
on it, anything goes.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Or practically any-
thing goes, in this research area. Yes; I
yield to the distinguished chairman.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, there is
no record of any request that the Sena-
tor's commitee ever made to take over
these matters. If the Senator will look
at the bottom of page 47?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Of the hearings?
Mr. STENNIS. Of the report. The Sen-
ate was forewarned. The report reads
as follows:
The Committee believes measures should be
taken to transfer a number of these efforts
to other agencies for future fiscal years and
that during the coming fiscal year the man-
agement of certain projects of interest to
the Department of State, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, the National Science
Foundation, and other agencies should be
taken over by those agencies particularly
the Department of State.
If the Senator has an application list
he wants to prepare, we would be glad
to have him take any and all of them
that he might wish. Then they would be
scrutinized, and we would have the bene-
fit of his opinion about them.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. As the Senator from
Wisconsin pointed out, the trouble about
that is getting the money. The only place
you can get the money for these projects
is in the Defense budget.
Mr. STENNIS. That would be up to
the Senator.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. What I am trying
to accomplish by this amendment?the
Senator says it is up to me, and I hope
he will support it?is that, if we can cut
this money out of this bill, the money
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gust 11, 1969
will not be spent under Defense Depart-
ment auspices, but would then be avail-
able for other justifiable activities. My
guess is that much of this work is prob-
ably duplicated by other research in pri-
vate institutions, but I have not looked
into that question.
Mr. STENNIS. We cannot settle it on
guesses. We have something definite
here to recommend; if the Senate does
not want it, that is all right.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. All right.
Mr. STENNIS. But after the hearing
and the proof, we decided it would not
be well just to throw it all out; so that
is why it is here, and we hope next year
it will be elsewhere.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. As I said to the
Senator, we are not proposing to throw
it all out, either, but I believe the Sen-
ator's committee is proposing increases,
on same of these matters, increases over
the amount budgeted.
Mr. STENNIS. Well, the Senator from
New Hampshire will speak on that.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Basically, I object
to the Defense Department going be-
yond its proper activities siir ly because
it has such appeal and such effective
representation in both Houses of Con-
gress that its officials can eet all the
money they want for whatever they
propose. That has been true up to now.
I admire the Senator from Mississippi
for his effectiveness, as well as his pred-
ecessor, the Senator from Georgia, and
the Representative from South Caro-
lina (Mr. RIVERS). They have been able
to get the money for these projects. That
is as great a compliment as I can pay
the Senator in this particelar area. /
know of no other committee that has
been so successful.
All we are trying to do is to review
these projects and prograini in a way
similar to the way we look at others, and
bring them into balance, usine the words
the Senator from Mississippi used ear-
lier. But the effort should be to balance
our national program, rather than just
to reach a balance within the Pentagon.,
as if that were the only program we
had in our Government.
The Military Establishmene as I said
this morning?is able to jsrt a lot of
money because we have beau in one war
after another, and we have had crisis
after crisis. It is easy to creete the im-
pression that we are about to be over-
whelmed by either the Chin( so, the Rus-
sians, or perhaps the Biafrans, or Nigeri-
ans, or perhaps the le afrans or
Nigerians.
I do not think that is a ericel enough
reason, but that is the only reason.
think the fact that the ccaniaittee itself
recommends some activities be trans-
ferred is good; but they do not recom-
mend that we take the money along with
it.
However, even if they do transfer them
I still think there is a grave question
whether, in times like the present, we
ought to be engaging in a proliferation of
research activities that have no immedi-
ate usefulness. Research ieefine, and pure
research is fine in certain circumstances,
but we are in such difficult and straitened
financial circumstances at the moment
that I think we ought to cut back on
same of these things.
I yield to the Senator from New Jersey.
Mr. CASE. Mr. President, the point of
limited resources is a very Important
point I think of equal importance, if
the facts justify it, is the criticism of this
practice based upon its tendency to give
the Defense Department and the Defense
Department planners a monopoly on in-
tellectual opinion in the country, or at
least an important segment of it?for
example, the behavioral sciences, just as
one, a field in which there are not enor-
mous numbers of people, and in which
it might be very possible to set a trend in
research, in opinion, and then in opinion
forming.
I am not suggesting a conscious effort
to mold American opinion in this fashion,
but the effect, it seems to me, is very
likely to be the lessening of independent
scrutiny by independent academicians,
because there are not any more, or at
least not sufficient numbers, because so
many of them are tied in with the re-
search sponsored by the Defense De-
partment into many things which are
probably in themselves very useful, but
have very little bearing on the direct
needs of the Department, properly con-
ceived, and which have this insidious
long-term effect.
Is that a possibility?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I agree with the
Senator. He has expressed very well, I
think, one of the major considerations.
We do not wish to turn this country into
a militaristic state. We still believe it
should be primarily a civilian state, with
the Military Establishment supporting it.
Continuing year after year with this sort
of project will, I believe, have the ten-
dency the Senator has mentioned.
I may say, in addition, that there has
been considerable protest about this
tendency during the past year. A delega-
tion of students and professors from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
called upon me for advice about what
their proper attitude should be with re-
lation to the military activities in their
university. This is a complicated matter.
They were very proud of their university.
They did not wish to have it known sim-
ply as a military agency, as a military
department. That does not mean that
they do not appreciate the work of the
military or that they do not respect the
uniform or are in some way critical of
the military as such is quite wrung. That
is not so.
As has often been pointed out, the
Director of Research of the Defense De-
partment and the men who are in that
group and who really developed these
projects, are not military men. Mr. John
Foster is not a military man. He is a sci-
entist. He is an energetic man, a physi-
cist, whose training was in the labora-
tory. He has unlimited imagination, and
he thinks of these things.
But the secret of proliferation is the
availability of money. What we can do
is to help to restrain that aspect.
Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Sen-
ator further yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. CASE. The Senator has put his
finger on the key point. I agree that this
is our responSibility. If we do not as-
sume it, as Mall the other major policy
matters breuglat up by the bill, nobody
else will.
Mr. FULBRIGHT_Nobode.
Mr. CASE. This IS not a criticism of
the standing committees of the Senate,
specifically not of the Committee on
Armed Services. The Committee on.
Armed Services cannot do this kind of
job. No single committee of Congress can.
This is the kind of thing that happens
once every 6, 8, or 10 years. It happens
More or less spontaneously because we
sense the need to do it. The whole Senate
is invovled and the Senator from Arkan-
sas is performing a most useful function
in his talk on this particular subject.
Coming back to ins specific amend-
ment, it is a most undesirable situation
In which a man of the caliber of Dr. Fos-
ter?and I am sure he is an excellent
man--shouldbe the person to whom one
goes if he needs money for research. This
in itself?the hope of this kind of thing,
as well as its actual culmination or real-
ization?has an inhibiting effect upon the
academic community of the country it
seems to me.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct.
Mr. lefeINTYRE. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. FlTLBRIGHT. Yes, I yield to the
distinguished Senator from New Hamp-
shire.
Mr. McINTYRE. When the Senator
first digressed to talk about the project
he had in mind, I did not quite under-
stand him. Is it the audiovisual project
that he is belaboring?
Mr. FlJLBRIGHT. Mr. President, I am
not belaboring it. I am discussing it. It
is called the Program for the Develop-
ment of Cultural Self-Awareness.
Mr. Mc/NTYRE. Mr. President, I will
be very brief. When the Armed Services
Committee got into the projects con-
cerning three very important areas?
human performance, manpower selection
and training, and the human factors in-
volved?we found a great deal of sense
In the projects and the plans. And,
strange as it may seem, in many in-
stances the decisions that were reached
on these projects and the applications
of the lessons learned were great money
savers.
When we consider that we have 3.5
million Americans in uniform, when we
conceive of dee fact that there is a turn-
over of some 29 percent, when we con-
sider the complexity of modern weapons,
and when we think of what we can
achieve when we are trying to come up
with 100 or 1,000 radar operators, by giv-
ing the people who are applying for the
Positions a raederate -test we can make
certain that the ones undergoing the
training would be more likely to be suc-
cessful than if there were a hit-and-miss
program.
I point out that we do have some areas
that have been cut. However, when we
came to the area of human performance
and the areas of training and manpower
selection, we found these progranis to
make a lot of sense.
We will be able to go abeng with some
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of the others that the committee has al-
ready agreed to tone down. However, in
this area it was agreed that it was good
work and should be continued. That is
funded at the level, I believe, of $35
million.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I can
understand that if it is the only oppor-
tunity that a country has. Maybe even-
tually, if we consider the present policy,
the only opportunity for a decent edu-
cation will be in the armed services. But
I had always assumed, and still hope,
that in our country, which professes to be
a democratic, constitutional, republican
system, the best training of people is to
be obtained in public or private schools.
Most of the 3.5 million men that the
Senator mentioned are not professional
soldiers. Most of them are nonprofes-
sional soldiers, and I did not assume it
was the function of the Army and the
military to take these raw recruits and
give them all kinds of education. They
are assumed to have obtained a basic
education in civilian life.
If we are going to go all the way to a
military state, the Senator is correct.
They ought to have the best possible
educational opportunities, audio, visual,
and every kind of education, and the
military should take over the schools.
My point, and I think the point of the
Senator from New Jersey, is that we think
the Army and military affairs have a
rather limited function?to defend the
country with the manpower available,
plus the professionals who are trained in
West Point.
We are not saying that it may not be
proper to have a program of psychologi-
cal indoctrination at West Point or
Annapolis for the officers. However, this
is a research project. It is one that I
would call pure resea.rch. It does not
seem to be an example of what the Mili-
tary Establishment should be doing un-
less we have a Military Establishment as
the dominant influence within the coun-
try.
Mr. MeINTYRE. Mr. President, I
think the Senator from Arkansas has
made it very plain already in his remarks
that there should be a reduction of
spending by the military in general. I
think that across the board the Sena-
tors share this feeling. The committee is
going to come in with a reduction of very
nearly $2 billion.
Mr. President, I agree with the Sena-
tor. We do not want America to become
a military state. I do not think it ever
will become a military state. However,
I would not want overlooked the fact
that one of the greatest services the
armed services perform is giving occu-
pational training to high school drop-
outs who have come into the service and
sending them back after 3 years into his
community. This does not apply just to
the. present time, in the Vietnamese
situation. The armed services send the
men back into their communities able to
win gainful occupation.
I agree that we do not want the mili-
tary to take over the education field.
However, the military has done a fine
job in training and educating many of
our youngsters today.
Mr. FULBRMHT. Mr. President, I
have heard that said. If they cannot get
the education in any other way, I suppose
that is a good way to get it.
I am not sure?and only time will
tell?whether that training is associated
with other training which will, in effect,
mean that our country will continue to
follow policies of which I disapprove?
policies of intervention around the world
and the policy with which I often asso-
ciate the former Secretary of State: that
it is our duty to intervene and keep the
peace around the world all by ourselves.
In my view, that is contrary to what I
thought our policy was. We get into very
deep foreign policy matters there.
I know that one of the fallouts of much
of the military training will be a sense
of discipline and, as the Senator said, the
education of some of the dropouts. How-
ever, the great mass of the soldiers are
not dropouts.
I would assume that the great mass of
them, by far the majority of them, are
the normal, best young men of our coun-
try who have gone to the best schools we
have. And they have had what we will
call a normal and successful education
in their schools. They go to serve in the
armed services for a limited period of
time.
Nobody is complaining about that now.
My complaint has never been leveled at
the Army or the military as such. My
complaint has always gone to the policies
of the civilian policymakers of our Gov-
ernment in creating a situation like
Vietnam.
However, that is all we hear. I think we
are trying, as the Senator said, to bring
some restraint into the military budget-
ary matters.
This is a relative matter. No one wants
to cut out our armed services. We spend
a lot more money now an the military
than does any other country in the world,
including Russia. And we spend a very
high percentage of our national budget,
perhaps 40 or 50 percent.
It goes up so fast that I cannot follow
it .However, $80 billion is what is pro-
posed to be spent. This amounts to about
60 percent of the total budget when so-
cial security and all the other trust funds
are not included.
Mr. MeINTYRE. I thank the Senator
from Arkansas for yielding to me.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Another research
center is the Research and Analysis Cor-
poration, budgeted to receive $10,800,000
to support 587 employees. Here is a sam-
ple of its projects to be paid for under
this authorization bill:
1. "Strategic Analysis of Europe-1969":
$128,000.
Official Description: Includes studies of
French foreign policy, European trade pros-
pects, development of Siberia, and Soviet-
Japanese trade.
2, "Strategic Analyses of Subsaharan
Africa-1969": $74,000.
Official Description: Includes studies of
U.S. strategic interests, environmental
trends, and U.S. policies and programs.
A study of French foreign policy, Eu-
ropean trade prospects, development of
Siberia, and Soviet-Japanese trade?it
would strike me that if this is justified at
all, or if we need it, this certainly would
be for the Department of State and/or
the Department of Commerce. Why is
this in the Department of Defense?
Studies of French foreign policy?well,
perhaps it can be argued that the officers
in the Department of Defense should
have knowledge of French foreign poli-
cy. But studies or analyses of French for-
eign policy would necessarily, I would
think, take place in the Department of
State?unless the Department of State
has gone so far that it is nothing but a
small bureau within the Department of
Defense.
I confess that the revelation to me
just recently that the agreement signed
by the prime minister of Thailand was
not in the custody of the Department
of State but in the Department of De-
fense did shock me a bit, as to the rela-
tive significance of the Department of
State and the Department of Defense.
But I submit that this kind of study
is not appropriate for the Department
of Defense.
The list could go on indefinitely. Con-
gress should make a start toward bring-
ing the operations of these organiza-
tions under more effective control. The
Committee on Armed Services is to be
commended for putting a limit of $45,000
on salaries for research center officers.
It is a step in the right direction, but
much more needs to be done. And a re-
duction in funds, I propose, is the best
way to go about it. The salary of the
head of one of these research centers was
$90,000 last year, when we discussed
this matter on the floor of the Senate.
All Defense-financed foreign affairs
research is not done by the "think
tanks," by any means. The "think tanks"
I mentioned are the research centers, of
which I believe there are 16. Much of it
is carried out by universities, other pri-
vate research organizations, and even by
military hardware manufacturers. The
Hudson Institute, for example, received
some 80 percent of its funds from the
Defense Department in the last 2 years,
according to testimony before the For-
eign Relations Committee by a former
institute president, Dr. Donald G. Bren-
nan. Yet, it is not classified as a Federal
contract research center. This is the
organization which the General Ac-
counting Office last year found had
charged the Defense Department
$45,000 to $52,000 per man-year for three
research projects which turned out to be
virtually worthless. Recent news reports
indicate that the institute's latest con-
tribution to the debate over Vietnam
strategy is a plan which involves build-
ing a moat around Saigon. I ask unani-
mous consent that an article on this
plan, published in the June 27 issue of
the New York Times be printed in the
RECORD at the end of my remarks.
That reminds me, I think they also
had a plan not long ago to create a great
lake in the middle of South America in
order to provide communication between
all the countries of South America. They
were going to dam up the Amazon and
have a lake that, I presume, would cover
a large part of Latin America. I under-
stand that it did not appeal to the Latin
Americans.
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Not long ago, Douglas Aircraft Corp.
was paid $89,500 to do a staidy for the
Army, called "Pax Americana," which
concluded, among other things, that
While the 'UnitedStates is not an imperial-
istic nation she exhibits many of the dhar-
acteristies of past imperiums and in fact
ba3 acquired imperial responsibilities.
After trying, without success, to get the
Defense Department to deelaseify the
study, it developed that Douglas has
printed the same study in unclassified
form, for its own promotional purposes.
It has gone on to do other research of
this nature and recently completed a
study for the Air Force, laying out sce-
narios for several possible conflict situa-
tions in which the United States might
become involved, and spelling out the Air
Force role in the peacekeeping eras that
would follow these wars.
The principal Defense Department
program of overseas research is project
Agile, a series of highly classified proj-
ects relating to Vietnam and potential
Vietnams. Over $25 millon is being re-
quested for this program in 1970. I do
not question the projects relating to
Vietnam, no matter how farfetched they
may appear. If they help save one Amer-
ican life, well and good. But I do ques-
tion the millions to be spent on projects
involving other countries where the re-
search is more likely to lead to Aineri-
can involvement in disputes which are
none of our business. Unfortunately, the
Senate cannot debate these projects on
their merits since all informs tion con-
cerning this program is classified.
All too many of the studies listed in
the justification data for project Agile
and similar research indicate that the
Pentagon planners have not learned any
lessons from Vietnam, but that they are
busily engaged in blueprinting strate-
gies where our military will play the key
role in trying to maintain order in a
disorderly world. Lt. Gen. Betts, Chief of
Army Research and Development, when
asked about the Army's research involv-
ing foreign areas said:
We have a continuing need to build up a
library of information that can be available
to our military planners for any country in
the world into which we might have to go.
That, I submit, is very reminiscent of
statements which we used to hear from
the Department of State.
So far, the Army has paid $541,000 Ior
27 of these guides to countries where it
"might have to go." Some of those coun-
tries are Afghanistan, Brazil, Colombia,
Congo, Ghana, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan,
Syria, and Venezuela; a varied list of
possible involvements.
I may say that in the hearing the other
day on foreign aid, I requested a repre-
sentative of the Defense Department to
supply the committee with any of these
secret agreements which might involve
our having to go into any of these coun-
tries or any other country. So far, I have
not received any; but they have been put
on notice that we are Interested in them.
In May, I asked the Department of De-
fense for a number of a research reports,
selected from the list of projects submit-
ted to the Committee on Armed Services
as justification for the 1970 budget re-
quest. I want to assure my colleagues that
the titles listed on pages 2209 to 2219 of
the committee hearings, although often
intriguing, do not give the full flavor of
this research program. Only a reading of
the actual reports filed reveals the type
of information the Defense Department
is getting for its money. For example, a
project entitled simply "Ideology and Be-
havior," had this official description:
To provide empirically derived conclusions
about ideological movements which support
insurgency.
But the report filed on this project?
furnished to me by the Defense Depart-
ment?bear the following titles:
First. "The Attaturk Revolution in
Turkey."
Second. "Gandhi, Non-Violence, and
the Struggle for Indian Independence."
Third. "The Sinhalese Buddhist Revo-
lution of Ceylon."
Fourth. "The Egyptian Revolution,
Nasserism, and Islam."
Fifth. "Militant Hindu Nationalism:
The Early Phase."
I must submit, Mr. President, it is in-
credible that we would spend money
at this late date in the military depart-
ment in studying the revolution in Tur-
key, which took place a long time ago.
Mr. Attaturk was a very great patriot
for his country. However, members of the
Armed Services do not have to have
benefits?
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. McIRTYRE. I heard the Senator
enumerate a number of studies. Is the
Senator contending those are studies that
are going to be performed with money
authorized for fiscal year 1970, or is the
Senator going back 4 or 5 years to dig
up horrible examples? Is this for the
fiscal year 1970 authorization?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. No. One cannot find
out about 1970. We can only deal with
reports that have been completed. This
is a recent one. The study is not that old.
Mr. McINTYRE. It is not in fiscal year
1970.
Mr. =BRIGHT. That is correct.
They have us over a barrel, to begin
with. So much is classified, such as the
FAX Americana report. It was declassi-
fied by the Douglas Co.
I am talking now about activities in
recent years, but not necessarily projects
for 1970.
Mr. McINTYRE. The Senator spoke
on the subject of military research in
foreign institutions, colleges, and uni-
versities. Is that correct? Is that the area
the Senator was talking about?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes. In part.
Mr. McINTYRE. That is a part of the
Senator's amendment?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes. This is only
a part of the purpose of my amendment.
Mr. McINTYRE. This is what?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I have been talking
primarily about the 16 research centers
until now. The work I just listed is done
in universities. The one I mentioned a
moment ago, "Militant Hindu Nation-
alism," is an example of this research.
The project started in 1966. It is supposed
to run until the year ending 1971.
I started this particular passage by re-
ferring to Universities and private insti-
tutions. We have already covered the
think tanks.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will
the Senator frosn Arkansasnield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I should like to sun-
port the distinguished Senator from
Arkansas and nail the attention of the
Senate to the difference between the
amounts provided for many years to the
National Science Foundation on the one
hand for this kind of research, and the
amounts provided for the Department of
Defense.
I hold in my hand a table which shows
Federal obligations for research, total
Defense Department end National Sci-
ence Foundation, fiscal years 1956
through 1959, 'which shows, for example.
in the latest year, 1909, that the Depart-
ment of Defense had $1,658,000,000 for
research in these areas and the National
Science Foundation had only $280 mil-
lion.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Will the Senator
say that again, please/
Mr. PROXMIRE. The Department of
Defense had, in 1969, $1,058,000,000 as
compared to only $280 million for the
National Science Fotindation.
Mr. FULBRICrHT. For that purpose?
Mr. PROXMIRE. For obligations for
basic applied research. I think that this
makes the case clear. The peoblem is that
whereas we have established a Science
Foundation for the purpeee of making
the inquiries and making this research
on a scientific basis, in the interest of
science, on behalf of all agencies of
Government, we provide the Defense
Department with sit to seven times as
much as we provide for the National
Science Foundation.
Mr. McINTYRE. M. President, will the
Senator from Arkansas yiebil without los-
ing his right to the floor, so that I
may ask a question of the Senator from
Wisconsin?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield, with that
understanding.
Mr. McINTYRE. The figures the Sena-
tor from Wisconsin has .bist stated, I
assume correctly, were about $1.4 billion,
in fiscal year 1969, Was it?
Mr. PROXMIRE. 11.658 billion.
Mr. McINTYVE. The Senator says this
was for research and applied, what?
Mr. PROXMIRE. .Basic and applied
research.
Mr. McINTYRE. I want to point out
that iii the Department of Defense when
research is done, it covers testing and
evaluation deaelopment as well as ex-
ploratory development, engineering de-
velopment, and advance development:
It all comes under the broad category of
testing and evaluation.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Testing and evalu-
ation development is not included in this
figure. This is inforrnatism which was
procured from the Department of De-
fense itself, with the clear understanding,
expressly on their part, that testing and
evaluate:a would not be included.
Mr. McIN'eatiE. I hasten to say that
something must be wrong with the Sena-
tor's figures because fiscal year 19'70
shows a figure for research, so far as the
Department of Defense is concerned, of
$600 million. It seems hardly likely that
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in the last year, fiscal 1969; Department
of Defense research, applied or otherwise,
as the Senator says, went to a figure of
$1,658 million.
I think the comparison should be re-
search.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I have three other
tables?the second category of Federal
obligations and for basic research
alone?total Defense and National Sci-
ence Foundation. For Defense, $320 mil-
lion; for National Science Foundation,
$274 million. Again Defense had more,
not so disproportionate but substantially
more for basic requirements than the Na-
tional Science Foundation had.
The third table shows Federal obliga-
tions for research by agency and per-
former. Total Defense and National Sci-
ence Foundation. This includes univer-
sities and colleges. It includes FFRDS,
administration by universities and col-
leges that are administered by nonprofit
foundations. It shows in every category
that the Department of Defense had sub-
stantially more than the National Sci-
ence Foundation.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Arkansas yield to me, so
that I may be permitted to ask a ques-
tion of the Senator from Wisconsin?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. MURPHY. It is my understanding
that the National Science Foundation
reaches out into all areas of science where
research and development is being car-
ried on, keeps current on all of these
matters and brings them together. It
makes studies but is not involved to the
same degree as is the Department of De-
fense in research and development on
particular, or exact systems, let us say,
that they believe they need.
Mr. PROXMIRE. May I say to the dis-
tinguished Senator from California that
what I am talking about here is the fact
that the National Science Foundation
would not itself engage in this research,
but would commission universities and
nonprofit institutions to do it. The Sen-
ator knows that in California, Wisconsin,
and most States the National Science
Foundation has such programs.
Mr. MURPHY. I was merely attempt-
ing to point out that the need and condi-
tions under which the Department of
Defense operates I do not think would be
similar to those under which the Na-
tional Science Foundation operates,
which might very well be a proper re-
flection of the difference in the amounts
of money needed or provided. It is a case
of comparing apples and oranges again.
Mr. PROXMIRE. With regard to non-
profit institutions, the National Science
Foundation was funded only $244,000
last year, as compared with $26,886,000
for the Department of Defense. So here
is a discrepancy of more than 100 to 1?
$26,886,000 for the Department of De-
fense as compared with $244,000 for the
National Science Foundation.
Mr. MURPHY. Here again an entirely
different game is going on. I expect to-
morrow to make extended remarks on
some of the nonprofit foundations, the
reasons for their existence, their objec-
tives, the way they operate. We have a
couple of them in my State, and over the
years I have had the good fortune to go
to them and watch their operations and
learn what they are doing. I think there
is a reason for that great difference.
I thank the Senator for yielding.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the distin-
guished Senator from California.
Mr. President, I conclude by saying
that tables 4, 5, and 6 bear out in detail
and document the point the Senator
made.
I ask unanimous consent that, at the
end of the remarks of the distinguished
Senator from Arkansas, the tables may
be inserted in the RECORD.
The PRESIDING OrrICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield to me?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. PASTORE. We have just conclud-
ed hearings on the National Science
Foundation for this year. The Founda-
tion is asking for $500 million. The
House cut that amount considerably.
The Foundation is asking for a restora-
tion of the amount cut. I would hope in
the development tomorrow the fact as to
whether there is any duplication here
could be brought out. Is the Senator from
Wisconsin intimating that possibly the
Department of Defense is duplicating
what the National Science Foundation is
doing?
Mr. PROXMIRE. No. I appreciate the
statement of the Senator from Rhode
Island. I am trying to point out the dis-
proportion between the amount that the
Federal Government provides the Na-
tional Science Foundation and the much
greater amount it provides the Depart-
ment of Defense for research. I do not
contend there is any duplication.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
want to take up the point raised by the
Senator from New Hampshire about this
particular project, how it was obsolete
or out of date. Let me read the descrip-
tion. The description is:
Provide empirically derived conclusions
about ideological movements which support
insurgency. It started in fiscal 1966 and is to
end in 1971.
So it is not an obsolete project. That
project is called "Ideology and Behavior."
There are the subtitles which I read. I
think there were five of them. One of
them I particularly mentioned dealt with
Ataturk. The University of Massachu-
setts is in charge of it. It is called
"Religion and Revolution: A Study in
Comparative Politics and Religion, Tech-
nical Report No. 6, August 3, 1968."
That is just 1 year ago. That is the
subhead, with the overall project?
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Let me finish it
first.
It says:
Research supported by the advanced Re-
search Projects Agency under order No. 883
and monitored by the Office of Naval Re-
search, Group Psychology Branch, under
contract NONR 3357(08), NR 177-907.
That is an example of what I mean
when I say how far afield they go.
Mr. President, I yield to the distin-
guished majority leader with the under-
standing that the request he will make
will come after this exchange and that I
do not lose the floor.
AMENDMENT OF HIGHER EDUCA-
TION ACT OF 1956?UNANIMOUS-
CONSENT AGR EMENT
Mr. MANSFIEL I. Mr. President, there
seems to be some nterest in the bill (S.
2721) to amend he Higher Education
Act of 1965 to a horize Federal incen-
tive payments to lenders with respect to
insured student loans when necessary
In the light of onomic conditions, in
order to assure hat students will have
reasonable acct- . to such loans for fi-
nancing their ed cation.
After discussi g this matter with the
most interested people, I think, I ask
unanimous con nt that, at the conclu-
sion of the pra er tomorrow?and the
Senate will cony ne at 10 o'clock tomor-
row morning?ti ere be a time limitation
of 1 hour on th banking amendment to
be offered by t distinguished Senator
from Colorado Mr. Dommicx).
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, may I
identify it?
Mr. MANSFI a; D. Yes.
Mr. JAVITS. The amendment deals
with section 2(a (6) of the bill, appear-
ing on page 7, toes 11 through 17 in-
clusive.
Mr. MANSF LD. I ask unanimous
consent that th e be a limitation of 1
hour on that am ndment, the time to be
equally divided tween the majority and
minority leaders, or whomever they may
designate; one alf hour on other
amendments, an 1 hour on the bill.
Mr. FULBRIG T. Mr. President, re-
serving the righ to object, earlier in
the day I was 1 armed that the Sena-
tor from Oregon I r. HATFIELD) wanted
to speak. Has thi request been cleared
with the Senator rom Oregon?
Mr. PROXMIR a If the Senator will
yield, it was cleare en with him.
Mr. FULBRIGH The Senator from
Wisconsin or ,somec e else told me he
wanted to speak in t morning. We were
negotiating whethe I was going to
speak or whether he was today.
Mr. DIRKSEN. M President, there
was no order.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. raised this ques-
tion because he discus d it with me. He
did not delegate me ti speak for him,
although I thought to was owed that
courtesy.
Mr. PROXMIRE. M. President, the
Senator from Oregon e pected to speak.
He had a speech on pe e through law,
which relates directly a the bill, but I
am quite sure he will b: willing to speak
directly after the vote.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I does not make
any difference to me.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. resident, reserv-
ing the right to objec and I do not
object?let me ask the enator from Ar-
kansas if we can ha e an agreement
now on a limitation o time with refer-
ence to his amendment. Would the Sen-
ator now entertain a u animous-consent
request along that line?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Not until I finish
my speech. I should have been through
long before this. We passed three bills.
Perhaps I should not yield so readily. I
azte_IL,
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am too easy. I have not got through my
speech and it is not a long one, only 20
pages. I could have finished it in 80
minutes if I had not been interrupted.
The chairman of the Finance Committee
interrupted me, and now there is this re-
quest, and there were two others. When
I finish I shall be glad to talk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the unanimous-consent re-
quest of the majority leader? Without ob-
jection, the order is entered.
The unanimous-consent agreement, re-
duced to writing, is as follows:
Ordered, That, immediately after approval
of the Journal on Tuesday, August 12, 1969.
the Senate shall proceed to the consideration
of the bill (S. 2721) to amend the Higher
Educaiton Act of 1965 to authorize Federal
incentive payments to lenders with respect
to insured student loans When necessary, in
the light of economic conditions, in order to
assure that students will have reasonable ac-
cess to such lonas for financing their educa-
tion, and that debate on the amendment to
be proposed by the Senator from Colorado
(Mr. Domtrucx) to Section 2 (a) (6) , on page
7, beginning with line 11, shall be limited to
one hour, to be equally divided and con-
trolled by the majority and the minority
leaders.
Provided further, That debate on all other
amendments shall be limited to 1/2 hour, to
be equally divided and controlled by the pro-
ponent of the amendment and the manager
of the bill, or someone designated by him.
Ordered further, That debate on the bill
shall be limited to one hour, to be equally
divided and eontrod by the majority and
minority leaders.
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
TIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR
MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RE-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MIS-
SILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJ-
ALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RE-
SERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize appro-
priations during the fiseal year 1970 for
procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval
vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and
to authorize the construction of test fa-
cilities at Kwajalein Missile Range, and
to prescribe the authorized personnel
strength of the Selected Reserve of each
reserve component of the Armed Forces,
and for other purposes.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, with-
out interruption, I woad like to finish
my speech. The Attaturk study is a fas-
cinating one. I want to read some of the
Attaturk study. This is the efficial sum-
mary:
SUMMARY
The Turkish Revolution led by Ataturk
can be divided into two phases. During the
first stage that began with Kemal's arrival
in Anatolia in May 1919, religion and nation-
alism combined to provide the fervor and
elan for a successful war of independence.
The sovereignty of the Turkish nation was
secured against foreign enemies and their
domestic collaborators, and in October 1923
the Turkish republic was formally pro-
claimed. The second phase of this revolu-
tionary upheaval lasted until Kernal's death
In 1938 and involved a series of far-reaching
political, legal and social reforms aimed at
achieving the Westernization of Turkey. This
program of radical reform deprived Islam of
its political role and resulted in the construc-
tion and consolidation of a secular Turkish
state. Both phases of this revolution had
roots in the Ottoman period; in some ways
the revolution of Ataturk was the cuhnina-
tion of a process of gradual reform that had
begun well over one hundred years before the
collapse of the Ottoman empire.
ABSTRACT
Beginning with a brief discussion of the
decline and fall of the Ottoman Empire, the
report analyzes the interplay between Ata-
turk and the forces of religious traditional-
ism in the Turkish revolution. Special at-
tention is given to the role of religion in the
struggle for national sovereignty that ended
in 1923. The report concludes with a brief
discussion of the position of Islam in con-
temporary Turkish society.
That is a current study, as current as
any of them can be. It is a part of an
ongoing project called "Ideology and
Behavior."
This may be perfectly proper for the
Union Theological Seminary, but I say
it has no place in a defense-supported
research project, which taxpayers pay
for, usually at three times the amount it
could be done for at Harvard, Yale, or
the University of Arkansas. I think it is
nonsense, frankly.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield? -
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. McINTYRE. All these programs
seem to begin in fiscal year 1966 and
terminate either in 1970 or 1971.
Mr. FLTLBRIGHT. This particular
group does.
Mr. McINTYRE. The group the Sen-
ator has mentioned.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is right.
Mr. McINTYRE. He says they are
current. I say we are here considering
the fiscal year 1970 budget. It is also very
difficult for me to know in what area of
the social behavioral science research
field he is involved, but I assume it must
be policy planning. I have to take a wild
guess at that. All he would say is, this
includes your FCRC's and your univer-
sities.
The first thing I wish to point out is
that what I was concerned with on the
committee was the amount of programs
and projects we have in effect during
fiscal 1970 programs and projects that
we are initiating and have underway.
For the Senator's information, we took
$700,000 out of their $6.4 Million request.
We cut this budget 11 percent. The Sen-
ator's amendment, as I understand, pro-
poses a cut of some $3 million.
This, as far as I can see, after a pro-
gram has been as well scrubbed down
as this one, would be so devastating as
to bring it practically to a point of ces-
sation.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Programs of this
kind ought to be ceased. That is the
point I am making. I am not saying,
"let us dispense with half of these." I
have not read all of them, but I shall put
the list in the RECORD at the conclusion
of my remarks. They are descriptions of
projects, and they ought to be ceased as
a function of the Defense Department.
Mr. McINTYRE. What the Senator
has done, of course, is pick out four or
five, talking about Ataturk and Turkey,
or some other things that had fancy
names.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. No, those five are
in one project.
Mr. McINTYRE. If the Senator will
allow me to respond-
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Certainly.
Mr. McINTYRE. What he is doing is
picking out four or five programs, sin-
gling them out for attention, and trying
to cast innuendos about this very im-
portant part of the Defense Establish-
ment.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I certainly did not
intend any innuendo. I intended to make
a direct, at statement that this is
unjustified, unrelated, end ought to be
stopped, as far as the Defense Depart-
ment is concerned. What is the innuendo
about that?
Mr. McINTYRE. The innuendo is that
the Senator is going to put in the RECORD
the list of the rest of the programs, but
he is not going to read them out here.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I will read them all,
if the Senator prefers.
Mr. McINTYRE. I am ready to listen
to them.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is?
Mr. McINTYRE. Yes.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Nobody else is. It
will take a while to read them.
Mr. McINTYRE. We have heard about
Ataturk. What else does the Senator
have?
Mr. HART. Mr. President, will the Sen-
ator yield at that point?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes, I am happy to
Yield.
Mr. HART. I ask the Senator from New
Hampshire, why should we get the last
chapter on Ataturk? Why do we not stop
where we are?
Mr. McINTYRE. I think the simple
reason is that the vastness of this pro-
gram of research gets to the point where,
If we are not on the subcommittee which
is looking into the matter, we do not have
time to sit down and have the definitive
story told us on every one of these pro-
grams. Is it all right for the Senator to
come in and say, "Let us cut them all
out?"
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is quite
correct, and that is why I say he certainly
should not take this as a criticism, at all.
Mr. McINTYRE. I do not.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. He certainly does
not have time to look into these. These
are activities that have no business being
before the Committee on Armed Services.
Nobody in the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices has ever taken the time to look into
them. Neither has the Bureau of the
Budget. I asked Mr. Schultze, the Direc-
tor of the Budget, whether he had looked
over these projects. He said, "No." This
was when he was the Director, last year.
I asked him in open session, before the
Committee on Finance, and that is what
he told us.
If the Senator would like, I will read
a few more.
Mr. McINTYRE. I think the Senator
should read a few more. I do not know
what he is talking about.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield to me at that point?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. SYMINGTON. First, Mr. Presi-
dent, I commend the able Senator from
New Hampshire for the superb work he
did as chairman of the subcommittee,
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this year. I mean that with great sin-
cerity. His subcommittee's effort and the
report by the distinguished junior Sena-
tor from Nevada on technical airpower
probably represent the finest work that
has been done by this committee in a
long time.
As I remember it, as a result of the
work that was done by the able Senator
from New Hampshire, in the taxpayers'
Interest, he has cut this budget by about
$1 billion; is that not correct?
Mr. McINTYRE. That is correct; and
on this particular program we have Cut
it back 11 percent.
Mr. SYMINGTON. As I understand
it, What the Senator from Arkansas is
saying, after his investigation, is that
he would like to take an additional $45
million of this total budget, roughly; is
that correct?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct.
Spread over the various items. I stated
it precisely in my opening comments.
Mr. SYMINGTON. So, therefore, what
he is asking to take out of the research
and development budget, after his study,
is much less than one-half of 1 percent
of what the able Senator from New
Hampshire thought could be taken out,
without affecting our national security.
I only mention that because I, too,
was interested, a couple of years ago, in
some of these problems. I believe they
came up in a hearing of the Appropria-
tions Committee, where there was a
question about a considerable amount of
money that was spent on a study of
women divers in Korea. I questioned it,
if the Senator remembers, and we were
Investigating why they did it. It turned
out there was a pretty good reason: they
dive in colder waters than divers in any
other part of the world when they dive,
I believe, for pearls.
I have not been present for most of
this debate, but I think the Senator from
New Hampshire has done a superb job
in saving a billion dollars. We have been
looking at these social sciences for a long
time. If the Senator from Arkansas
thinks he can add $45 million to that $1
billion, I would hope, the facts could be
dealt with on their merits, and not
through any impingement on an already
superb accomplishment.
Mr. McINTYRE. The difficulty is that
the Senator from Arkansas comes in with
some of these choice ones. All of a sud-
den, somebody asks, "Why are we study-
ing why South Korean women can dive
In cold water?"
The reason we studied this was because
it apparently had little effect on their
hearing. The actual facts support the
study, but the question itself casts asper-
sions on all the rest of the program.
The committee on which the Senator
from Missouri serves, as he knows, cut
$700,000 out of this $6.4 million, and
brought it down to $5.7 million. On top
of that, the amendment of the Senator
from Arkansas requests that we go fur-
ther, and cut out another $3 million,
bringing it down to $2.7 million. That
is much too drastic, particularly in the
face of the hard look we took at it.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, it de-
pends on whether it is justified. If it is
a big program that was proliferated
without attention from anyone, then it
ought to take a hard look.
Let me point out that this is not new
with me. A year ago when the bill was
being considered, I raised the question on
the floor with the Senator from Missis-
sippi.
The Senator from Mississippi will re-
call that we discussed the matter. And he
said that he was going to look into it and
have a study made. I congratulate him
because he did so. All I say now is that
I do not think it went far enough, in view
of all of the overall circumstances of the
government and the nature of the studies
and the fact that the studies have no
relevance whatever to military respon-
sibility. That to me is the determining
thing. I do not actually believe that any-
one at this late date should be spending
much money on looking into Attaturk's
experience.
This has been studied from A to Z.
Everyone knows about it.
The Senator said this is a peculiar one.
I do not see the relevance of the "Sin-
halese Buddhism Revolution of Ceylon",
which is part of the same project.
It seems to me unrelated to military
function.
Mr. McINTYRE. Is that part of it?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. This is one of the
flye parts of the "Ideology and Behavior"
study.
If the Senator wants a different one,
here is "Changing Roles of the Military
in Developing Nations."
This is a completely different project.
The contractor here is CRESS, which is
the research center associated with
American UniversitSi. This one is dated
February. 1969. That is about as late as
we can have.
It is entitled "The Chinese Warload
System: 1916 to 1928.
The author is Hsi-hseng Chi, assistant
professor of political science at the Uni-
versity of North Carolina.
I will not read all of this just the
foreword:
FOREWORD
This study was conducted under a pro-
gram designed to encourage university in-
terest in basic research in social science
fields related to the responsibilities of the
U.S. Army. The program is conducted under
contract by The American University's Cen-
ter for Research in Social Systems (CRESS),
and CRESS in turn has entered into subcon-
tracts supporting basic research in a num-
ber of major universities having a marked
interest in one or more of these research
fields.
The research program was formulated by
CRESS in terms of broad subject areas within
which research would be supported, with the
scholars themselves selecting specific topics
and research design and utilizing informa-
tion normally available to academic and pri-
vate individuals. Under the terms of the sub-
contract the authors are free to publish in-
dependently the results of such research.
In this study Hsi-sheng Chi describes the
military aspects of the political contest for
control of the central government in the con-
text of the disorganized sociopolitical struc-
ture of China from 1916 to 1928. It was pre-
pared at the University of Chicago's Center
for Social Organization Studies under the
supervision of Professor Morris Janowitz,
principal social scientist for research con-
ducted under subcontract between CRESS
and the university.
The report is a useful corrective to the
popular image of the Chinese warlords dur-
ing this period of their greatest activity. The
study points out that the warlords were not
merely military men exploiting China's con--
dition for private gain in their various do-
mains, nor were they seeking to destroy or
replace the central government in the classic
pattern under which many Chinese dynas-
ties have historically emerged.
To keep his study focused on the theme of
the warlord system, the author chose not to
deal with the activities of the incipient Chi-
nese Communist Party during the 1916-
1938 period.
I submit that kind of activity is unre-
lated to the Department of Defense. It
is a kind of good will offering to various
universities. I suppose, of course, that
they would be appreciative of the De-
partment of Defense and its good judg-
ment.
That, as I say, is a different one. I
have a lot of them. I do not think the
Senator is interested in my reading them
all.
The Senator will remember that my
point is that these are not military-
related investigations. They have noth-
ing to do with the responsibility of the
Department of Defense, so far as I am
able to see.
I have not read all of the summaries.
Here is a long one in that same project
on "Gandhi, Nonviolence and the Strug-
gle for Indian Independence." It is a
very interesting subject, but it has noth-
ing to do, in my opinion, with the mili-
tary department. And that is true of
most of these.
I have a great variety of them here.
I will have them printed in the RECORD
at the conclusion of My remarks for peo-
ple to read and determine their rele-
vance to military responsibility.
I point out that I hope the Senator
from New Hampshire does not take any
of this as a reflection upon him or his
case.
This has grown up over the past 25
years, just as a lot of this has, without
any supervision. This is not the respon-
sibility of the Senator from New Hamp-
shire or of anyone else in particular.
It grew like Topsy. They had the
money. There was a period during which
we were so rich that we thought we could
afford anything,
I confess to being a party to the dis-
tortion of our priorities. However, I now
think that influence of the military in
our Government has gone beyond all
reason.
The Senator says that they cut this 11
percent. Is it not a fact that the budget
had been increased over the past year's
program by 5 percent?
Mr. McINTYRE. It was reduced by
$500,000.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Under what figure?
Mr. McINTYRE. In the policy plans,
$6.9 million.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think for the last
2 preceding years the budget request at
least had been increased.
I am interested in an exchange pro-
gram. It has been cut 67 percent in West-
ern Europe. It has been practically
eliminated. It was only $56 million. And
then it was $46 million. It is now $31
million. It is practically nothing.
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S 9620 Approved For ReigONCARVIAPALC*EWRIELOWROM300100001-3
But Department of Defense programs appropriations he may have approved that budgeted expenditures for that fiscal
have gotten so big that they juggle in an authorization bill. That will get to year be reduced by, I think, $6 billion.
around sums of $700 million or $500 mil- the heart of the matter. It is the best way At that thne, the report of the Committee
lion just as if it were a pittance to have it properly considered. on Armed. Services accompanying the
Our Government loses its sense of per- I urge the Senator to consider the pro- authorization bill reminded us that the
spective on military programs. posal seriously. I am satisfied that our Department of Defense had to share the
All I am trying to do is to bring this committee will not be able fully to satisfy burden of disciplining itself with respect
back into perspective. One way is to dis- the viewpoint of the Senator from to expenditures.
associate the Defense Department from Arkansas. I say that with all deference I recall sitting in the Chamber. The
sociological and ideological studies. They to him, but here is a chance, really, to Senate had just acted as I recall on an
have nothing to do with it. satisfy him with respect to items that re- agriculture bill to which a number of us
We could not do anything about the late to the State Department, had sought to attach some money to feed
ABM, which we all grant to be defective, Mr. FULBRIGHT. I appreciate the children during the summer, when
but it is at least a military program. Senator's comments, schools were closed but stomachs still
These programs are not even military. First, I may say that a number of these functioned.
Mr. McINTYRE, Mr. President, will I do not think should be transferred any- Leafing through the report of this
the Senator from Arkansas yield, so that where, if they are to be done at all. If committee, a year ago in April, to the
I may answer his question? they have any validity, they would be caption "Research, Development, Test,
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield to the Sena- done by places such as Columbia, Har- and Evaluation," we discovered that there
tor from New Hampshire. yard, and so forth. They have nothing to was not any disciplining of the Pentagon
Mr. McINTYRE. In fiscal 1969, the do with the State Department or the De- on research and development proposed
amount was $6.9 million. This was re- fense Department. But since we are talk- last year; rather, they proposed to in-
duced to $6.41 million for fiscal year 1970. ing about a particular bill?well, I have crease it some $750 million, to close to
As I have said, that amount has already described them as best I can. I do not a total of $8 billion,
been reduced by the committee some see why there is any need for the State I recall asking the able Senator from
$500,000, to make the amount about $5.9 Department to pay money for research MississippL who was handling the bill,
million. involving Attaturk government; I really why the increase. He said, "Well, some of
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is talk- do not, it was bookkeeping adjustment." The
ing about two categories. Mr. STENNIS. I see that. actual increase proposed to be authorized
Mr. McINTYRE. I am talking about Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not think that was only $508 million,
policy planning studies. I am trying to is valid. Mr. FULBRIGHT. A pittance.
keep the Senator in one Avenue without I certainly will take under considera- Mr. HART. I offered an amendment at
going to others, tion the suggestion of the Senator from that time to hold the research and devel-
Mr. FULBRIGHT. My bill relates to the Mississippi. I think he genuinely would opment figure at the then current level,
total for 1970. In the total of the items like to see this reform. Last year he told which was somewhere between $7 and
for social and behavioral sciences and re- me that he would. I sense that he is $8 billion. I am not sure precisely where
search studies there was an increase, sympathetic to the objective. Of course, I it was.
But the point I make is that we do not realize that once these things become im- The Senate?this indicates how far we
want to go off on the assumption that bedded in a great program, it is not easy have come?discussed that amendment
we are dealing only with a slight cut in to get them out. It is very difficult, hi- for perhaps a couple of hours. I doubt
that it was any longer. The Senator from
a perfectly valid program. I am actually deed.
raising a question as to the justification Mr. HART. Mr. President, will the Sen- Arkansas expressed a concern; others
for practically all of this program. I ator yield? did. On a rollcall, the Senate rejected
should like to have gone further than I Mr. FULBRIGHT. We are dealing with that amendment by three votes. So last
did, but I comprised MY Principles in such vast sums when we get into the year we were not able to hold the De-
the hope that I could get something done Pentagon and this appropriation, com- fense Department to the then level of
toward redirecting the research activi- pared with all the others, that it is hard research and development spending au-
ties of the Defense Department to de- to get back a sense of perspective. thorized.
fense matters and taking it out of un- We voted, a moment ago, $75 million How far have we come? This year?
related matters, just for what in political terms they call and this goes to the contribution that the
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the a slush fund, for no certain purpose; just Senator from New Hampshire has
Senator yield? a contingency fund. But the $31 million made?the Committee on Armed Services
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield to the chair.. I mentioned a moment ago is for a pro- itself has recommended a reduction of
man of the committee, gram that has been going on 20 years, for more than a billion dollars in research
Mr. STENNIS. I appreciate the Sena- 41 countries; and the cutback imposed and development. That is progress in
tor's concern about this subject. I have means the death of about half of those anybody's book.
already stated that our report suggests programs. Mr. FULBRIGIIT. It certainly is.
that we are going to undertake to trans- I yield to the Senator from Michigan. Mr. HART. And it is largely a reflec-
fer many of these items next year. In all Mr. HART, Mr. President, I am sorry tion of the leadership of the Sen-
sincerity, I propose to the Senator that that the able chairman of the Committee ator from New Hampshire took to try
he go through the hearings and pick out on Armed Services temporarily has had to get hold of this massive, surging?I
the items that he thinks should not be to leave the Chamber, guess that is a good way to describe
in the military section, and then of that Mr. FULBRIGHT. He said he had a seven and a half billion dollars that is
group pick out the ones he thinks should telephone call, running around the country for research
come under the DepartMent of State. If Mr. HART. But while the Senator from purposes?area. He has done, indeed, a
he will then join in an amendment taking New Hampshire is in the Chamber, per- magnificent job.
them out of this bill, and if an authori- mit me to make a comment that rein- Mr. FULBRIGHT. I agree with the
zation bill is required, he will have time forces the Senator from Arkansas' ex- Senator.
in the Committee on Foreign Relations to pression of appreciation to the Senator Mr. HART. He is able to cut a billion
hold hearings and purify the whole at- from New Hampshire which he voiced a dollars where the Senate itself last year
mosphere. He can throw out the ones few minutes ago, would nOt support our effort to maintain
he does not want in this bill and then To get this matter into perspective to the then level.
submit a definite report recommending figure out where we are and how far we So, first, we should understand the
an authorization. have _come, and then to take up the progress that has been made. I am think-
Supplemental appropriation bills are problem of how much further we have ing about the ABM vote, comparing it
coming along all the time. It is my privi- yet to go, I turn our minds back more with the vote a year ago on research and
lege to be a member of the Committee on than a year ago to the day when this development, which we lost by three
Appropriations. I will guarantee the Sen- bill was before the Senate in 1968. It votes. Even-Steven a few days ago on
ator that I will fight to place in one of was in April of 1968. The Senate had just ABM. These defeats nonetheless have
the supplemental appropriation bills any enacted the surtax, with its direction their long-term purpose.
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1. "Institutional Obstacles to Industrial
Development in Peru"
2. "Peruvian Managers Opinions on Prob-
lems of Industrialization"
3. "Some Advantages and Disadvantages
of Small Scale Industry in a Highly Indus-
trialized Economy"
4. "The Decline in Paternalism Among Pe-
ruvian and Japanese Laborers"
5. "Mutual Obligations Between Manage-
meneand Workers in Peru"
6. "Some Organizational Adaptations to
Labor Problems in Peru"
With respect to Peru it was no more
than a couple of months ago, I believe,
that the Peruvian Government invited
our representatives to leave the coun-
try. Senators will recall the furor in Chile
in connection with Camelot. I believe
believe these activities contributed to the
deterioration of our relations with these
countries. These studies may have some
intellectual value. I doubt that they are
relevant to anything. We know that in
Peru our relations recently hit an all-
time low. Certainly research activities
like this do not help the situation.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. McINTYRE. That is an excellent
study that the State Department might
be interested in. It was in the area the
chairman said he would like to transfer
many of these programs. It might do the
State Department good.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not know what
they have relevance to. I do not know
what use the State Department would
have of it, outside of a scholar writing
a thesis for a Ph. D. Anything can have
relevance to that.
After receiving a vast number of these
completed research reports, I asked the
Department of Defense to tell me how
much each cost. After a month and a
half of deliberation, the Department, in
a letter of July 24 from Dr. Foster, fi-
nally told me that it did not know.
Any effort to isolate a cost figure for a
given report would be arbitrary and probably
would not represent the actual costs in-
volved?
Dr. Foster's letter said, adding?
nor would a Cost estimate represent a
measure of the payoffs from the research.
I can well understand the Depart-
ment's reluctance to put a price tag on,
or try to assess the military benefits of,
a report like "The Attaturk Revolution in
Turkey." How can the Senate, or the
public, be expected to assess the value of
this research when neither we nor the
Department of Defense knows how much
it costs? I ask unanimous consent to have
the letter printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the letter
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
Back to research and development:
What is wrong with the effort now being
made by the Senator from Arkansas, if
in fact we can spot additional research
and development which appropriately
should not be charged to the Defense
Department? An argument can be made
as to whether somebody else should get
the final chapter on Ataturk's govern-
ment, not the Department of Defense.
Why, if we can highlight the remaining
research efforts which seem imprudent
to authorize, should we not go ahead and
do it? It, indeed, will be a very minor
addition to the magnificent work of the
Senator from New Hampshire, but it
nonetheless will be some additional prog-
ress.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think the Senator
has put it very well. I have said time and
again that I do not mean any criticism
of the Senator from New Hampshire?
and the Senator from Mississippi, also.
Last year when I raised this matter?
I confess that it was the first time I
raised it?the Senator from Mississippi
said, "I am going to look into it and
make an effort." He did look into it. And
he, with the Senator from New Hamp-
shire, made a good effort.
I am trying to go further than that.
Of course, we want to save the money,
but I feel that to go into this area, for
the military to do so, gives a wrong di-
rection to our life. It gives a wrong im-
pression to our university people, to our
young people, and to other people of
the militarization of the life of this coun-
try.
The Senator from Mississippi made a
very moving statement this morning
about our security.
I do not disagree with him about se-
curity. I only state that there is a lot
more to security than simply military
hardware. The health of our internal
educational system, the health of our in-
ternal social system in all its aspects, our
economy, all of it, are a part of it. A
strong security stance cannot be main-
tained if justice is not done to the rest
of our society. It is one entire ball of wax.
It is not only defense. I think we have
gone so far because of these recurrent
crises in the foreign field involving mili-
tary action that we have gotten our sense
? of perspective a little out of focus.
Here is one aspect of it that I do not
think for a moment would harm our de-
fense posture. I do not think the projects
we have studied add one iota to the de-
fense of this country. I think that is
wrong.
I have said I have been guilty in the
past of taking the attitude that our col-
leges and universities have been starved
and needed to get money for the vast
number of new students; that if the only
way they could get it would be to take a
handout from the Pentagon I would not
complain too much. I have always sup-
ported Federal aid to education.
However, I have come to reconsider
that approach for a variety of reasons.
One of the main reasons is to get away
from this attitude that the military has
an undue influence in our universities.
I have told about the visit of the students
from MIT. Senators know about the riots.
One aspect has been the fear on the part
of students that the military dominated
our society. I realize that the war has
contributed to the situation. This is only
one little segment of Defense activities
I am talking about. It is not much we are
asking.
As the Senator from Michigan said,
"You have done a good job, but I think
you can go further in these restricted
areas." The amount is small. I hesitate
when we deal with big sums.
I feel I am nit-picking when I ask for
a cut of $45 million. On the other hand,
the Senator from South Dakota and I
would love to pick up $5 or $10 million
to keep the exchange program alive. In
that context it is a lot of money. To con-
template you could get that amount here
for that program is beyond anyone's
dream. Forty-five million dollars is a
large sum of money, except with respect
to the Pentagon, there it seems small.
I suppose people think I am nit-picking
to save $45 million. But in addition to
that I would like to get the Pentagon
out of the business of subsidizing our
liberal arts institutions. I used to think
it would be a good idea because they were
so poor they could use some help from
the Defense Department. However, I feel
the military has become too powerful in
our entire society.
I am not trying to engage in commer-
cialism, but I picked up Look magazine
this week and most of it is devoted to
the subject.
I would like to make a small contribu-
tion toward the rehabilitation of this
country, and of returning to a humane
society where the military has a place?
but not the dominant place?in the
Government.
I think this research program is an
important area because much of it is in
the academic field. What we do on pro-
grams like this will have much to do
with the attitudes of this and future
generations. That is the best explanation
I can give.
Under the leadership of the Senator
from New Hampshire we have made
progress and I think we can make more
progress.
I shall complete this part of my speech
and insert in the RECORD the remainder
of these projects. I might mention a few
others in case anyone thinks that is the
only one I have.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. McINTYRE. Regarding the $700,-
000 cut that the committee recommended
in this area against the $6.4 billion re-
quest, is it not possible that all those
horrible examples may be the ones to go
under the knife that the Department of
Defense will cut out?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I hope so.
I will describe a few of the others.
Another project, entitled "Social
Change as a Result of Modernization,"
was designed, the description stated:
To determine most effective uses of DOD
aid to developing nations so that conflict
between traditional cultural values and pres-
sures toward modernization are minimized.
The completed reports on this project
are entitled:
S9621
? DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH
AND ENGINEERING,
Washington, D.C., July 24, 1969.
Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Forcign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This letter is in re-
sponse to your request of June 10, 1969,
for the costs of the individual research re-
ports sent to you on 4 June 1969.
The reports which you received were pro-
duced. from projects designed to provide a
number of outputs of significance to DoD
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August 11, 1969
including: (1) a variety of technical reports
and papers, in addition to-ft major final re-
port covering the research and .5tudies under-
taken; (2) interchange between DoD officials
and technical personnel in a pssition to lend
an outside perspective to DoD problems; and
(3) continued development of research re-
sults and capabilities relevant to DOD
responsibilities. Funding of these proj-
ects is based on a total project cost, Nvith
such multiple outputs andel; .ted. Any ef-
fort to isolate a cost figure for a given re-
port would be arbitrary and Iobably would
not represent the actual oasts involved. Nor
would such a cost estimate represent a meas-
ure of the payoffs from the re--arch.
In the case of projects net yet completed
and for which only interim rep)rts are avail-
able, significant results can he expected in
the future. /n the case of completed projects,
the final report represents only a portion of
the total output. For example, in one project
funded over a period of 9 ye ,rs, a total of
29 technical reports, 12 Sffientific journal
publications, and significant o .1tributions to
a book were produced in additi ai to the final
report which you received.
The total funding to date I the projects
represented by the reports you requested was
$11,530,408, covering a period i,f more than
15 years.
If you desire any further clarification on
this matter, please let me know.
Sincerely,
0. L. TUCKER.
(For John S Faster, Jr.)
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the
proliferation of Defense-aruported re-
search in foreign areas is f lustrated by
what has taken place in Tleiland. The
research bibliography for 7, giland is 63
pages long and lists 500 -parate re-
ports. Much of this research was really
foreign aid and should have been
charged as such. The Genei Al Account-
ing Office recently found th,t in a coun-
try in South Asia, whose no ete I cannot
use because of the security classification
put on by the Defense Department, the
Department had undertakee to spend
$4.2 million an nine social cience re-
search projects which the Cle0 believes
should have been charged deainst for-
eign aid. I do not believe that the De-
partment of Defense should dispense
foreign aid through a researeh program.
Mr. McINTYRE. Is not flue Senator
talking about some past histely? Are not
these programs which were e ears ago?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. There i no way for
me to foresee the future. All I can talk
about is past history and what has been
done. If I were a prophet and could tell
the Senator what is going to happett
next year, I would talk about it but the
Senator knows I can talk about only that
which has happened.
Mr. McINTYRE. The Sen: l tor is talk-
ing in a foreign area, regarding security.
This area is less than a $1 million figure.
There is also less than a $1 million figure
for Korea and Thailand. That is for
fiscal 1970. What the Senator is talking
about happened a year or two ago.
Mr. PIILBRIGHT. I have a list in my
hand right now. I am glad to show it to
the Senator. It is secret. it concerns
Project Agile. If the Senator will come
over here, I can show it to him because it
is against the law for me to read it into
the record. It is a research project. ISM
not at liberty to talk about it,
Mr. McINTYRE. Not the Agile Pro-
gram.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is a current Pro-
gram. It is not past history. Here it is.
Mr. McINTYRE. The Agile program
is a counterinsurgency study.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is Galled that.
The GAO, as I told the Senator, says it
looks like foreign aid. We can make a
play on the words about it. If it were
actually foreign aid?and that is what
it is, at least the GAO thinks it is, and
it strikes me that way too.
Mr. McINTYRE. If the funds are cut,
this program will have to bear the brunt
of that cut.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am glad to hear
that, but if the Senator wishes to look
at this specific thing I am questioning,
it is right here. It is secret. It tells the
situation and some of the things that
we cannot mention the precise name of.
I can assure the Senator that this is
not dreamed up. As to the statement
about Thailand, the Senator does not
question that, I believe.
In the next fiscal year the Department
of Defense proposes to spend $7,547,000
on research about foreign areas. Yet
only $125,000 is budgeted for external
research by the agency responsible for
our Nation's foreign affairs, the Depart-
ment of State. The entire budget for
the State Department's Bureau of In-
telligence and Research is only two-
thirds the $6.2 million budgeted by the
Defense Department for foreign policy
research. It is obvious that the Depart-
ment of Defense is involved in many re-
search activities simply because it, and
not the Federal agency with proper ju-
risdiction, has the money available. Al-
though the Armed Services Committee
has recommended that -efforts be made
to transfer some of this research to other
agencies, particularly the Department
of State, I believe it will find that much
of this work is of no interest to other
agencies when they must foot the bill.
Another aspect of the military research
program which merits a drastic reduc-
tion is research carried out by foreign
institutions, primarily colleges and uni-
versities. According to the Defense De-
partment, 440 research projects are now
underway in 44 foreign countries
throughout the non-Communist world
The sum of $5.7 million is budgeted for
foreign research in 1970 and a staff of
100 Defense Department employees is
stationed abroad just to look after the
program. There is trouble aplenty over
military research being carried out in
no need to ask for the same kind of
trouble in e4 other countries. A com-
pelling need in our foreign affairs today
is to make the American presence
our
oedadulceasstionvisaiblline;swtiteudtioonnostandnothepriish
e is
that by linking foreign universities to
our Military Establishment,
Finally, I wish to mention a specific
aspect of Defense Department research
arrangements with American univer-
sities. Of the top 500 defense research
contractors, 99 are educational institu-
tions and the Defense Department's 1970
budget for university research would be
increased by 20 percent over last year, to
a total of $306 million. But I wish to
discuss only one small part of that ef-
fort Project th
program to build up the -Science depart-
ments, physical and social, of universities
around the country which do not now do
much research for the military. The
budget request for Thernis is $33 million,
up 12 percent over 1969, and will support
continuation of 92 projects at 52 uni-
versities and colleges, Plus allowing
initiation of an additional 25 projects.
Admiral Rickover, dismissing this pro-
ject last year said:
Now it seems to be the most farfetched
reasoning to conclude that it is the Depart-
ment of Defense that must help develop these
sciences and train these scientists. The result
of a project like Thamis is that there will
be university professors who get additional
money besides their university salaries?
money given them by the Department of De-
fense and therefore to some extent beholden
to the military. This strikes me as most
undesirable.
Project Themis could be cut back dras-
tically with no ill effects to the Nation's
defense posture. The Department of De-
fense is not the proper agency to pre-
vide Federal aid to education.
Mr. President, our constituents are
growing increasingly bitter over con-
tinued increases in taxes, waste in de-
fense spending, and the lack of funds for
urgent social needs. We have just passed
a bill to extend the 10-percent war tax.
I believe that we owe it te the taxpayers
to eliminate all unnecessary spending
and that these Department of Defense
research activities shouki receive the
same critical auestioning they would re-
ceive if they were being financed by other
Government agencies.
The committee has recommended 9 n 8-
percent cut in the military sciences item,
the funding source for meet of the pro-
grams I have discussed. This is but a
slap on the wrist ancl I think that the
circumstances call for a more meaningful
reduction in nonessential research activ-
ities. I propose that the &nate cut this
category by an additional 7 percent to,
in effect, impose a 15-percent surtax on
these programs, with the cuts to be al-
located between the Federal contract
research centers, particularly the non-
physical science activities of these orga-
nizations; other social and behavioral
science work; foreign research; and
Project Themis. My amendment would
also reduce by $5 million the funds for
Project Agile, the overseas research
which is funded under the "Other equip-
ment" category.
It cannot be said that the amendment
ties the hands of the Defense Depart-
ment since each Service Will be left with
considerable flexibility to distribute the
cutback within these general areas. I
might add that, under provisions of this
bill, the Department of Defense will still
have a $75 million emergency fund to
play with, if the Senate's action todayis held up in conference. This is still
half again as much as was voted last
year.
It is time that the Senate took a hard
look at what the taxpayers' money is
being spent for in the Defense research
prograin. This amendment is but a small
step?but it is a step In the right
direction.
Themis, e Department s I urge the Senate to adopt it.
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August 11, 1969 Approved tivaft-Isassamiti ranconoRBFKIVATs4R000300100001-3 S 9623
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that an article in the June 27 issue
Of the New York Times,-entitled "Think
Tank Offers Modified Policy For Viet-
nam," to which I referred in my com-
ments, be printed in the RECORD: and in
addition the summaries of a number of
other recent research projects of the
type I have been discussing.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
"THINK TANK" OFFERS MODIFIED POLICY FOR
VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, June 26?A proposal for a
modified strategy in Vietnam, conceived by
a "think tank," is circulating at high levels in
the Nixon Administration.
The authors of the plan, at the Hudson In-
stitute in Westchester County, N.Y., are said
to maintain that it Could cut American cas-
ualties to a handful, make the war "accept-
able" in the United States and either in-
crease chances for a peace settlement or offer
a long-term chance of "winning" the war.
The proposal includes a reduction of Amer-
ican forces to 100,000 or 200,000 men by the
middle of 1971, reliance only on volunteers,
extension of the tour of duty to two years
for each- soldier and construction of new types
of "death-belt barriers" around Saigon and
along the Cambodian border to block infiltra-
tion. It also calls for new combat tactics. of Saigon.
Officials said that the institute's proposal The earth dredged from the canals would
had grown out of a series of studies in Viet- form a bank 50 yards high. Two chainlink
nam financed by the Defense Department. fences would be built, one on the canal side
The principal architect of the new approach of the slope, the other along the top of the
is Herman Kahn, a witty, rotund physicist bank. The fax bank of the canal would be
who made his reputation as a nuclear-war fortified with barbed wire, minefields and
strategist. electronic sensors. Heavy air strikes and ar-
BROAD RANGE OF STAFF tillery barrages would be brought down at
The Hudson Institute, situated at Croton- any point where an attempt was made to
on-Hudson, is a small, independent organi- breach the barrier.
zation that makes analytical studies for Gov-
ernment departments and private industry. SoCIAL CHANGE AS A RESULT OF MODERNIZATION
Its staff includes physicists, economists, so- Description: To determine most effective
dal scientists, mathematicians and former uses of DOD aid to developing nations so that
members of the diplomatic, intelligence and conflict between traditional cultural values
military services, and pressures toward modernization are mm-
Administration officials who have attended imized Transfer to non-DOD agency under
briefings on the plan in recent weeks at the discussion.
Pentagon. The State Department and the Contractor: Kalamazoo College.
American Special Forces units in Vietnam conflict between traditional cultural values
to build larger units of irregular Montag- and pressures toward modernization are
nard tribesmen to roam the desolate bor- minimized. Transfer to non-DOD agency un-
der regions of the country, harassing enemy der discussion.
troops. At present, the Administration is cut- Contractor: Kalamazoo College.
ting down on Special Forces as more and Fiscal Year: Start, 1966; End, 1970.
more of the irregular units are turned over Cost: Unknown.
to South Vietnamese leadership. SOME ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF
The Hudson plan would deemphasize SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRY IN A HIGHLY INDUS-
large-unit sweeps through enemy base TRIALIZED ECONOMY
camps, substituting many very small patrol (By Stillman Bradfield, Kalamazoo College,
actions lasting several days'each. When a pa- and Anibal Del Aguila, Peru-Kalamazoo
trol found an enemy force or camp, it would Project, 1967)
call in air strikes and artillery fire.
Most large South Vietnamese military This work was carried out under financial
units would be drawn back toward the pop- support from the Advanced Research Projects
ulous coastal plain. There they would pro- Agency, Department of Defense. The contract
vide a screen behind which local troops and with Kalamazoo College is administered by
much enlarged police force would provide the Group Psychology Branch of the Office of
greater security by setting up thousands of
night ambush positions to catch enemy guer-
rillas and agents trying to slip in or out of
the populated regions and to root out the
Vietcong's undercover agents in the villages.
Mobile reaction forces would be put on
call around the clock to reinforce any posi-
tion that was attacked by a sizable enemy
force.
A novel part of the plan. calls for con-
struction of two deep fortified canals. One
would run along the Cambodian border from
the Gulf of Siam to a point west of Saigon
where it would veer eastward and connect
with a similar canal around the periphery
White House say it combine old and ne
Ideas in a wide-ranging package that has
"considerable appeal."
One official said that while is was unlikely
the whole package would be carried out, some
of the ideas were "being woven into the fabric
of our strategy." He declined to say which
ones.
Reached by telephone today, Mr. Kahn
said it would be "inappropriate" for him to
discuss the plan. But others who have heard
his briefings filled in some details.
The Hudson plan would cut the present
force of 540,000 American seXvicemen in
Vietnam over the next two years to a strength
of 100,000 to 200,000. Half of these would
form a strategic reserve force of two to three
combat divisions that would be pulled back
to the coast. It would be available primarily
to reinforce South Vietnamese troops if
North Vietnam suddenly moved a large new
Invasion force into the country.
MORE SPECIAL FORCES URGED
The rest would be in tactical fighter squad-
rons, helicopter companies, long-range artil-
lery batteries and logistics units. Their job
would be to support the South Vietnamese
military units that would take over the
principal burden of fighting the war.
This breakdown is similar to the concept
already tentatively accepted by the Admin-
istration in its long-range planning, officials
say.
But the Hudson plan differs in some de-
tails. For example, it would double or triple
Naval Research.
Abstract
The survival of many of the small scale
manufacturers in Kalamazoe is explained in
terms of the special fiexibilities and oppor-
tunities they possess which enable them to
isolate themselves from the competition of
larger producers, and occupy a special niche
in the market. Close, personal contact be-
tween the owner-manager of a small manu-
facturing plant and his employees, suppliers
and customers enable him to give special at-
tention when required, and also to be able
to obtain good technical advice when needed.
Inefficiencies resulting from a lack of spe-
cialization of personnel are in part com-
pensated for by the costs avoided when the
manager fulfills all of these functions him-
self.
SOCIAL CHANGE AS A RESISLT OF MODERNIZATION
Description: To determine most effective
uses of DOD aid to developing nations so
that conflict between traditional cultural
values and pressures toward modernization
are minimized. Transfer to non-DOD agency
under discussion.
Contractor: Kalamazoo College.
Fiscal Year: Start, 1966; End, 1970.
Cost: Unknown.
THE DECLINE IN PATERNALISM AMONG PERUVIAN
AND JAPANESE LABORERS
(By Stillman Bradfield, Kalamazoo College,
1968)
Fiscal Year: Start 1966; end 1970.
Cost: Unknown. This work was carried out with financial
PERUVIAN MANAGERS' OPINIONS ON PROBLEMS OF support from the Advanced Research Proj-
INDUSTRIALIZATION ects Agency and The Wenner-Oren Founda-
tion. The Contract with Kalamazoo College
(By Stillman Bradfield, Kalamazoo College is administered by the Group Psychology
and Anibal Del Aguila Peru-Kalamazoo Branch of the Office of Naval Research.
Project, 1967) Abstract
Abstract
This paper contains a brief analysis of part This study compares questionnaire re-
of a questionnaire administered to 100 grad- spouses of Peruvian and Japanese laborers
uates of an executive development program with respect to their opinions of their duties
in Lima, Peru. They were employed in many to their companies and their companies' ob-
different sectors of the economy, and half ligations to them.
were at least .part owners of the company Workers in both countries see manage-
where they worked. It focusses on managers' meat as obliged to continue employment of
opinions as to the major problems they face workers regardless of the economic situation.
on their jobs, and their opinions as to the Similarly, workers in both countries expect
major obstacles to industrial development in paternalistic treatment by the company
Peru. The most important single on-the-job where this is to their economic benefit, in
problem they identified was in the area of such areas as recreation, vacation, savings,
finance, followed by production and sales, housing, etc. However, Peruvians were gen-
In general, they did not perceive accounting, erally more willing to return traditional
industrial relations, administration and orga- loyalties to the company than were the
nization, or government regulations and con- Japanese.
trols, as important problem areas in their In both countries the trend seems to be
companies as compared with the first three away from paternalism, especially on work
mentioned. A closer examination of the prob- issues. Workers of both countries are willing
lems within these areas indicated that they to continue recognizing traditional status
felt that most of them were outside their obligations in off-job areas where there are
area of control, and most commonly outside no economic costs. Where the costs fall to
the influence of the company. the company, paternalistic treatment is still
? favored. Workers in both countries, but more
Soma CHANGE AS A RESULT OF MODERNIZATION SO in Peru, are pressing for more participation
Description: To determine most effective in the decisions that affect how they carry
uses of DOD aid to developing nations so that out their jobs.
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SOCIAL CHANGE AS A RESULT 07
Momatenntemei
Description: To determine most effective
uses of DOD aid to developing nations so
that conflict between traditional cultural
values and pressures toward modernization
are minimized. Transfer to non-DOD agency
under discussion.
Contractor: Kalamazoo College.
Fiscal Year: Start, 1866; end, 1970.
Cost: Unknown
SOME ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATIONS TO LABOR
PROBLEMS IN PERU
(By Stillman Bradfield, Kalamazoo College,
1969)
This woek was carried out with financial
support from the Advanced Research Proj-
ects Agency and the Wenner-Gren Founda-
tion. The contract with Kalamazoo College
is administered by the Group Psychology
Branch of the Office of Navel Research.
Abstract
Owing primarily to rieadities in labor-
management relations, a number of Peruvian
Industries are moving toward a system of
subcontracting for major services. This passes
on many of the labor relations headaches
to smaller companies, and -leaves the prin-
cipal company in a more flexible position,
viz a viz changes in market demand for its
product. The system also provides advantages
for the subcontracting companies and quite
possibly for the country as a whole. It pro-
vides a mechanism-by whical capital can be
attracted into industry, the maximization
of managerial resources in tbe country, and
the development of new entrepreneurial
talent.
SOCIAL CHANGE AS A RI'4ULT OF
MODERNIZATION-
Description: To determine most effective
uses of DOD aid to developeag nations so
that conflict between traditional cultural
values and pressures toward modernization
are minimized. Transfer to nee-DOD agency
under discussion.
Contractor: Kalamazoo Colleen,
Fiscal Year: Start, 1966; end, 1970.
Coat: Unknown,
INSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES TO INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT IN .PE,tU
(By Stillman Bradfield, Anibal Del, Aguila,
September 1966
Introduction
The Peru-Kalamazoo Projeet is a two-year
project doing a comparative study between
similar industries producing the same prod-
uct, on the same scale, with the same tech-
nology in both Peru and in Kalamazoo,
Michigan to specify as nearly as poesible the
institutional obstacles to inches trial develop-
ment in Peru. We will be concerned with the
following queetions:
(1) To what extent do the ,ea me technol-
ogy and scale of operation require the same
work organization and behavies in two dif-
ferent countries at different stages of
development?
(2) To what extent are work organization
and behavior in industry affected by differ-
ent sets of institutionai conditions operating
in the society at large?
(3) In what ways do these sen of institu-
tional influences either promote or Impede
the industrial development of Peru?
This report is concerned with giving some
of the results of our first two and a half
months of field work. This has been an ex-
ploratory stage in which we have been con-
cerned with visiting 25 industnal plants in
20 different industries, and talking with
businessmen, engineers, and labor leaders as
to the problems they face in carrying out
their jobs. We also attended a number of
conferences NMI meetings with engineers,
businesienen? government officials, and labor
leaders.
SOCIAL CHANGE AS A RESULTS OF
MODERNIZATION
Description: To determine most effective
twee of DOD aid to developing nations so
that conflict between traditional cultural
values and pressures toward modernization
are mininaized. Transfer to non-DOD agency
under discussion.
Contractor: Kalamazoo College.
Fiscal Year: Start, 1966; end. 1970.
Cost: Unknown,
MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN MANAGEMENT
AND WORKERS /N PERU
(By Stillman Bradfield, Kalamazoo
College, 1968)
This work was carried out with financial
support incen the Advanced Research Proj-
ects Agency and the Wenner-Gren Founda-
tion. The contract with Kalamazoo College is
administered by the Group Psychology
Branch of the Office of Naval Research.
Abstract
This paper compares questionnaire re-
sponse of management and labor sectors in
Peru on their opinions as to the duties of
the worker and the company's obligation to
the workers. There is surprising agreement
between the management and labor groups
Interviewed on important issues, such as:
that the incompetent worker should be fired;
that impersonal, objective criteria should be
used in *electing new workers; that reason-
able working rules should be strictly en-
forced; that .high quality norms should be
insisted upon; and, that supervisors should
try to settle the problems of workers if at
all possible rather than pass them all on
to higher management. Generally there was
also agreement between both sectors that
ability, rather than seniority, should be the
determining criteria for wage increases.
IDEOLOGY AND BEHAVIOR
Description:
.ovide empirically derived
conclusions about ideological movements
whech support insurgency. (Terminating; In cc,
final report Stage.)
wh
Contractor,: University of _Massachusetts. an
Fiscal Year: Start, 1966; end, 1971.
Cost: Unknown_
THE ATATURII REVOLUTION IN TURKEY
(By Guenter Lewy, Department of Govern-
ment, University of Massachusetts, Ann
gwooloo001-3
Augusi 11, 19
69
had begun well over one hundred years be-
ore he collapse of the Ottoman empire,"
Abstract
Beginning with a brief discussion of the
decline and fa.11 of the to litimire, the
report amidazes the interplay between
Ataturk and the forees of neigiou,s tradition-
alism In the Turkiah revoitition. Special at-
tention is given to -die role of religion in the
struggle for nationall sovereignty that ended
in 1923. The report concludes with a brief
discussion of the pi:wait:at of Islam in con-
temporary Turkish society.
IDEOLOGY AND BEHAVIOR
Description: Provide empirically derived
conclusions about ideological movements
Which support insumency. (Terminating; in
final report stage.)
Contractor: University of Massachusetts
Fiscal Year: Start, 1966; end, 1971.
Cost: Unknown,
THE SINHALESE BUDDHIST REVOLUTION OF
CEYLON 1956-4959
(By Guenter Lewy, Department of Govern-
ment, University of Massachusetts, Am-
herst, technical report No. 1, January 1967)
Abstract
Research sponsored by the Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency under Order number
883 and monitored by the Office of Naval Re-
search, ChoupPsychetogy Branch under con-
tract Nonr-3367(08), NR 117-907.
The origins of the resurgence of Buddhism
in Ceylon following -the election victory of
the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, beaded by
BandaranaAke, in 1956 are ana-
lyzed. Bandaranaike failed to control the
Buddhist elements. who had helped him to
obtain political power and he was assas-
sinated by a Buddhist monk in September
1959. The report concludes with a discussion
of the future of organized Buddhism as a po-
litical force in Ceylon.
IDEOLOGY MID BEDLAWOR
Description: Provide empirically derived
riclusions about ideological movernenta
ich support insurgency, (Terminating; in
al report stage.)
Contractor: University of Massachusetts.
Fiscal year, start 1966; end 1971.
Cost: 'Unknown.
MIL/TANT HITZDIT NATIONALISM: THE EARLY
herst; Religion and Revolution, a study in (B
oomparative politics and religion, techni-
cal report No. 6, August 1968)
(Research supported by the Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency under Order number c
883 and monitored by the Office of Naval B
Research, Group Psychology Branch, under
contract Nonr-3357(08), NR 177-907.) sea
ber
'The Turkish Revolution led by Ataturk can con
PHASE
y Guenter Lewy, Department of Cioverri-
merit, University ce Massachusetts, Am-
herst Religion and Revolution; A Study in
Comparative Politica and Religion, technl-
al report No. 2, April 1967)
esearch sponsored by the Advanced Re-
rob Projects Agency under Order nem-
883 and nemaitored by the Office of Naval
arch, Groim Psychology Branch under
tract Nein-8357(0a), NR 177-907.
Abstract
ollowing a brief discussion of the Indian
Meal tradition, the report analyses the
gins and significance of militant Hindu
ionalism. in the period 1880-1916. The
as of several representateve nationalist
era?B. G. Aurobindo Ghose,
pat Rai, B. P. Pal?are examined and their
uenee on the terrorist movement 1G CiiS.
d. The report cOnclucles with some
ughts on eontenmorary Hindu corn-
nalism.
Summary
Rese
be divided into two phases. During the first
stage that began with Kernars arrival in An-
atolia in May 1919, religion and nationalism
combined to provide the fervor and elan for
a successful war of independence. The on
sovereignty of the Turkish nation was nat
secured against foreign enemies and theiride
domestic collaborators, and in October 1923 lead
the Turkish republic was formally pro-
claimed,
claimed. The second phase of this revolution- ?
ary upheaval lasted until Kemal's death in eusse
1938 and involved a series of far-reaching
political, legal and social reforms aimed at
achieving the Westernization of Turkey.
This program of radical reform deprived D
Islam of its political role and resulted in the con
construction and consolidation of a secular whi
Turkish state. Both phases of this revolution fins
had roots in the Ottoman period; In some C
ways the revolution of Ataturk was the P
mination of a process of gradual reform that C
IDEOLOGY AND BEHAVIOR
escription: Provides empirically derived
elusions about ideological movements
ch support insurgency. (Terminating; In
1 report stage.)
ontractor: University of Massachusetts,
iscal year start, 1966; end 1971.
ost: UnknoWn.
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August 11, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? StiN S 9625
GANDHI, NON-VIOLENCE, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
INDIAN INDEPENDENCE
(By Guenter Lewy, Department of Govern-
ment, University of Massachusetts, Am-
herst, Religion and Revolution; A Study
In Comparative Politics and Religion tech-
nical report No. 4, November 1967)
Research sponsored by the Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency under Order number
883 and monitored by the Office of Naval Re-
search, Group Psychology Branch under con-
tract No. NR-3357(08). NR 177-907.
Abstract
The report begins with an analysis of
the character and the intellectual origins of
the Gandhian doctrine of Satyagraha. The
dominant force in Gandhi's life, it is con-
cluded, was Hinduism. His appeal to the In-
dian masses rested upon his standing as a
Hindu holy man. Gandhi's role in the Con-
gress' struggle for independence is discussed.
The tension between Gandhi's functioning
as a prophetic figure, following what he con-
sidered to be the voice of God within him,
and his role as a national leader paying heed
to political realities, accounts for many of
the mistakes committed by the Congress; it
probably delayed the achievement of Indian
independence.
IDEOLOGY AND BEHAVIOR
Description: Provide empirically derived
conclusions about ideological movements
which support insurgency. (Terminating; in
final report stage.)
Contractor: University of Massachusetts.
Fiscal year start, 1966; end, 1971.
Cost: Unknown.
THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION:
NASSERISM AND ISLAM
(By Guenter Lewy, Department of Govern-
ment, University of Massachusetts, Am-
herst; Religion and Revolution, A Study in
Comparative Politics and Religion; techni-
cal report No. 5, March 1968)
Research supported by the Advanced Re-
search Project Agency under Order number
883 and monitored by the Office of Naval
Research, Group Psychology Branch, under
contract Nonr-3357 (08) , NR 177-907.
Abstract
Following an introductory discussion of
the Islamic political tradition, the report
examines the events leading up to the seizure
of power by the Free Officers, led by Nasser,
in July 1952.- Relations with the Muslim
Brotherhood are traced and the role of Islam
in the ideology of Nasserism as well as in
Egyptian foreign policy, domestic reform,
education, law and the court system are dis-
cussed. The report concludes with an analy-
sis of the interaction between the Islamic
religion, modernization and legitimacy.
IDEOLOGY AND BEHAVIOR
Description: Provide empirically derived
conclusions about ideological movements
which support insurgency. (Terminating;
in final rePort stage.)
Contractor: University of Massachusetts.
Fiscal year start, 1966; end, 1971.
Cost: Unknown.
MILITANT BUDDHIST NATIONALISM: THE CASE OF
BURMA
(By Guenter Lewy, Department of Govern-
ment, University of Massachusetts, Am-
herst; Religion and Revolution, A Study
in Comparative Politics and Religion, tech-
nical report No. 3, August 1967)
Research sponsored by the Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency under Order number
883 and monitored by the Office of Naval
Research, Group Psychology Branch, under
contract Nonr-3357 (08) , NR 177-907.
Abstract
Following a brief discussion of the inter-
action of Buddhism and government in tra-
ditional Burma until 1885, the report ana-
lyzes the emergency of the political monks
as the main force in the militant nationalist
movement for Burmese independence. Bud-
dhist monks played an important role in
the violent agitation of the 1920's and in the
Says San Rebellion of 1930-31. In the 1930's
the monks are gradually overtaken by secu-
lar-minded nationalists. The report con-
cludes with a brief examination of the place
of Buddhism in post-independence Burma.
CHANGING ROLES OF THE MILITARY IN
DEVELOPING NATIONS
Description: Subcontracted studies of
changing roles of military establishments.
Contractor: CRESS.
Fiscal year: Start, 1964; end, 1969.
Cost: Unknown.
THE CHINESE WARLORDS SYSTEM: 1916 TO 1928
(By Hsi-hseng Chi, February 1969; the Amer-
ican University Center for Research in
Social Systems, 5010 Wisconsin Avenue,
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20016)
The author
Hsi-sheng Chi is an Assistant Professor of
Political Science at the University of North
Carolina. He received a BA. in literature
from Tunghai University, Taiwan, and is at
present a Ph.D. candidate at the University
of Chicago.
A substantially revised and enlarged ver-
sion of this report has been submitted by
the author to the University of Chicago a,s
a doctoral dissertation.
Foreword
This study was conducted under a pro-
gram designed to encourage university in-
terest in basic research in social science
fields related to the responsibilities of the
U.S. Army. The program is conducted under
contract by The American University's Cen-
ter for Research in Social Systems (CRESS),
and CRESS in turn has entered into subcon-
tracts supporting basic research in a number
of major universities having a marked in-
terest in one or more of these research fields.
The research program was formulated by
CRESS in terms of broad subject areas with-
in which research would be supported, with
the scholars themselves selecting specific
topics and research design and utilizing in-
formation normally available to academic
and private individuals. Under the terms of
the subcontract the authors are free to pub-
lish independently the results of such re-
search.
In this study Hsi-sheng Chi describes the
military aspects of the political contest for
control of the central government in the
context of the disorganized sociopolitical
structure of China from 1916 to 1928. It was
prepared at the University of Chicago's Cen-
ter for Social Organization Studies under the
supervision of Professor Morris Janowitz,
principal social scientist for research con-
ducted under subcontract between CRESS
and the university.
The report is a useful corrective to the
popular image of the Chinese warlords dur-
ing this period of their greatest activity. The
study points out that the warlords were not
merely military men exploiting China's con-
dition for private gain in their various do-
mains, nor were they seeking to destroy or re-
place the central government in the classic
- pattern under which many Chinese dynas-
ties have historically emerged.
To keep his study focused on the theme
of the warlord system, the author chose not
to deal with the activities of the incipient
Chinese Communist Party during the 1916-
1938 period.
ABSTRACT
The steady weakening of the Manchus in
the China of the early twentieth century
and the expanding military strength of the
warlords created a climate for civil war. The
warlords were unable to unite the country
In spite of their dominance in both military
and political spheres. The eventual rise to
power of Chiaing Kai-shek and the Kuomin-
tang brought about the decline in the war-
lords' widespread domination. (Extinction of
the warlords was not accomplished until
the Communist takeover in 1949.)
CHANGING ROLES OF THE MILITARY IN
DEVELOPING NATIONS
Description: Subcontracted studies of
changing roles of military establishments.
Contractor: CRESS.
Fiscal year: Start, 1964; end 1969.
Cost: Unknown.
A SURVEY OF ELITE STUDIES
(By Carl Beck, James M. Malloy, and William
R. Campbell, assisted by Jerry L. Weaver,
March 1965; the American University Cen-
ter for Research in Social Systems, 5010
Wisconsin Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.
20016)
Foreword
This survey was conducted, as a part of
SORO's Basic Studies research program,
under sub-contract to the University of Pitts-
burgh with Dr. Carl Beck of the Department
of Political Science as principal investigator.
The Basic Studies Division was formed to en-
courage, promote, and conduct research on
fundamental social and behavioral processes
that influence the U.S. Army's special warfare
mission in developing nations and remote
areas. One such fundamental area of interest
Is leadership structure, interaction, and
processes.
Leadership in the emerging nations is
widely recognized as a crucial factor in the
insurgency situations that many of these
countries face. It follows that success of the
U.S. counterinsurgent mission is dependent
upon knowledge that will be helpful in deal-
ing with indigenous civilian and military
leadership groups. An understanding of
leadership structure and interaction is re-
quired. The knowledge needed is to be found
in answers to the following types of ques-
tions:
What leadership techniques are common to
most of the Political systems found in emerg-
ing nations?
What techniques are unique to particular
kinds of political systems?
Are there identifiable patterns of change
for leadership groups in these contexts?
Do patterns vary according to different
types of political systems? Only with this
kind of background knowledge is it possible
to assess adequately the significance, to a
counterinsurgent situation, of specific types
of changes in leadership groups, or the use
of particular kinds of leadership techniques.
The problems presently being faced in Viet
Nam are a dramatic demonstration of this
need.
In planning and developing research pro-
grams in new areas of interest to the U.S.
Army, the essential first step is a survey of
past literature and research to indicate gaps
in existing knowledge as well as the need for
future work. Dr Beck's paper was designed
to serve this purpose for both the military
and academic communities. It as decided to
assess current understanding of the role and
functions of leadership groups in different
types of political systems. In so doing, Dr.
Beck supplies us with a conceptual essay on
"the study of political elites" that considers
the problems of identifying elites, describing
elite structure, etiquette, and techniques of
control, conceptualizes idealized elite sys-
tems, and analyses ploitical elite change. This
essay should be of special interest to military
users, since it provides a systematic approach
to leadership groups and leadership interac-
tion, It should also be of value to researhers
who require a brief state-of-knowledge as-
sessment as a basis for planning. Dr. Beck also
Includes a bibliography of over 290 references
-for those who wish to delve further into par-
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S 9626 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 11, 1969
ticular problems or examine special areas of
the world in more detail.
In addition to the materials contained in
this report, Dr. Beck prepared abstracts of
the studies listed in the bibliography and an
inventory of major propositions and state-
ments about elite structure and interaction.
These are available on loan from the SORO
Library as source materials for researchers
and military personnel who may wish to con-
duct further work in this important problem
area,
Rrrcnis P. LOWRY,
Acting Chairman, Basic Studies Division.
CHANGING ROLES OF THE MILITARY IN
DEVELOPING NATIONS
Description: Subcontracted studies of
changing roles of military establishments.
Contractor: CRESS.
Fiscal year: Start 1964; end, 1969.
Cost: Unknown.
SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND REVOLUTION
(By Jack Bloom, August 1968; prepared un-
der subcontract by the University of Chi-
cago, Center for Research in Social Sys-
tems, The American University, 5010 Wis-
consin Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.
20016)
Abstract
Few researchers have studied revolutions
from the standpoint of purely social struc-
tural analysis. This paper adopts that per-
spective and looks at revolution as a special
case of social change, as a part of a develop-
mental process. In particular, three countries
in the middle 19th century (Germany,
France, and Great Britain) are compared and
contrasted to determine whether or not
changing relationships between social status
groupings can become the basis for predict-
ing revolutionary outcomes.
Six "classes" are identified; aristocracy,
bourgeoisie, petite bourgeoisie, artisans, in-
dustrial workers, and peasantry. France and
Germany offer examples of revolutionary de-
velopment which resulted in failures in their
own separate ways. Britain offers an example
of a country with similar cultural precon-
ditions but which had no complete revolu-
tionary development. Comparisons of class
structure and interaction in these cases dis-
close important relationships. For example,
in the development of revolutionary processes
key roles are played by (1) the petite bour-
geoisie and artisans who can act as deter-
mining swing groups, (2) a viable and power-
ful aristocracy who can determine the ulti-
mate outcome of revolutions particularly
as other groups relate to or alien with them,
(3) the relationship between the aristocracy
and the peasantry especially as this deter-
mines the attitude of the peasantry toward
revolution, and (4) all classes as internecine
conflict and antagonism may redirect and
diffuse hostilities. Schematic depictions are
provided for these types of relationships. Fur-
ther research can be conducted by broad-
ening the case base to test the applicability
of these ideas for predicting the development
of revolutionary processes in a society,
CHANGING ROLES OF THE MILITARY DI
DEVELOPING NATIONS
Description: Subcontracted studies of
changing roles of military establishments.
Contractor: CRESS.
Fiscal year: Start, 1964; End 1969.
Cost: Unknown.
PROBLEMS OF STUDYING MILITARY ROLES IN
OTHER CULTURES: A WORKING CONFERENCE
(By Ritchie P. Lowry, editor, September
1967)
Abstract
On 26, 27, and 28, May 1965 a conference
was convened by what was then the Special
Operations Research Office (now the Center
for Research in Social Systems) of The
American University in Washington, D.C.
The purpose of the conference was to discuss
research experience and strategies in the
study of changing military roles in develop-
ing areas. Some 15 scholars from major uni-
versities and selected representatives of
SORO (CRESS) who were identified as hav-
ing conducted significant research in the
subject of discussion were invited to par-
ticipate. Some types of problems covered
in the 10 major papers and comments in-
clude problems of analyzing field research
experience, problems of questionnaire ex-
perience, problems of achieving clarity in
studying military roles, and the problems of
the influence of political and sensitivity
bias. Individual presentations were grouped
within three sessions of the conference: An
Introduction to the Topic, Problems of
Studying Military Roles in Latin America,
and Problems of Studying Military Roles in
the Near and Far East.
CHANGING ROLES OF THE MILITARY IN
DEVELOPING NATIONS
Description: Subcontracted studies of
changing roles of military establishments.
Contractor: CRESS:
Fiscal year: Start, 1964; end, 1969.
Cost: Unknown.
CROSS-NATIONAL STUDIES OF CIVIL VIOLENCE
(By Ted Gurr with Charles Ruttenberg, May
1969)
Foreword
This report was produced under a program
designed to increase university research in-
terest in fields related to the U.S. Army mis-
sion and to support basic research. The pro-
gram is conducted by the Center for Research
in Social Systems (CRESS), and for it CRESS
has negotiated subcontracts with a number
of major universities that have a marked
interest in one or more of the appropriate
subject fields. This report was prepared at
Princeton University under such a subcon-
tract.
The paper summarizes the first phases of
research designed to evaluate a multivariate
theory of "the genesis of civil violence," us-
ing cross-national aggregate data for a large
number of policies. Some of the methods and
data developed, the results of initial multiple
correlation analyses, and a new coding in-
strument for collecting systematic informa-
tion on characteristics of civil strife are re-
ported on here. The initial phase of research
is completed; the larger comparative study of
Which it is part is still in process. Much
additional research, using a variety of tech-
niques, will be required before any substan-
tial proportion of the questions raised by the
theoretical model and by the results reported
here can be answered.
SOCIAL PROCESSES RELEVANT TO MILITARY
PLANNING FOR STABILITY STUDIES OF
AFRICAN GROUPS
Description: Study of African sociopolitical
structures, dynamics, and leadership re-
sources and attitudes.
Contractor: CRESS.
Fiscal year: Start, 1967; end, 1989.
Cost: Unknown,
URBAN DYNAMICS AND BLACK AFRICA
(By William J., Hanna, Judith L. Hanna,
June 1968; the American University Center
for Research in Social Systems, 5010 Wis-
consin Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.
20016)
Authors' preface
From Dakar to Mombasa, and from Fort
Lamy to Lusaka, Black Africa's land and peo-
ple display great diversity. Yet using Black
Africa as the geographic unit of analysis is
a viable research strategy because of the
area's marked similarities in colonial past,
revolutionary change, and contemporary
dynamics. In addition, there is virtual unity
in race?although not all indigenous Africans
nor Negroid?and, at least according to some
Africans, there is considerable cultural uni-
formity.
We have chosen to study the towns of
independent Black Africa for reasons of
policy, science, and personal experience.
Towns are keys to understanding the coun-
tries in which they are locabed, because they
are centers of Africah cultural, social, eoo-
nomic, and political innovation and diffusion.
The rapidity of change in some spheres, illus-
trated by the independence surge in the late
1950's and early 1960's as well as by the recent
spate of military coups d'etat, makes analyses
of the contemporary dynamics of towns a
prerequisite for policy decisions which are
relevant to current realities. Implicit
throughout the study is our assumption that
the policymaker's choices among alternatives
of action and inaction are improved by in-
creased understanding and that science and
government should be mutually supportive.
Social science may also be served. After
reading more than one thousand papers,
articles, and books concerned with towns in
Black Africa, we concluded that the available
information had not yet been well inte-
grated and that its theoretical relevance had
not yet been fully extracted. Thus, the
scientific justification for this study is what-
ever progress it makes toward such integra-
tion and theoretical development, as well as
toward the identification of critical knowl-
edge gaps.
At the personal level, it is our hope that
reports such ea this may lissome small way
repay the people of Africa for the hospitality
and friendship they have shown us here and
abroad. Repayment might come from more
informed policymaking by those outside
Africa who are concerned with the continent.
Or, it might come by helping to bring
African data into the mainstream of world
social science, through our efforts directly
or by whatever catalyzing effect we have
upon others.
FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS AND DEFENSE
Description: Describe communication
mechanisms of China and Soviet Union and
develop computer simulation of message
flow so as to predict spread of information
and news in future. (Expires 9/69)
Contractor: MIT/Dr. Ithiel Pool.
Fiscal year: 'Start, 1,963; end, 1970.
Cost: Unknown.
THE USE OF FREE TIME BY YOUNG PEOPLE IN
SOVIET SOCIETY
(By P. Gayle Durham, Research Program on
Problems of International Communication
and Security, Center for International
Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology, Cambridge, Mass., January 1966)
Preface
The use of an individual's free time, and
its quantity, are very relevant to this com-
munications behavior. The activities avail-
able to him for use during his free hours to
a great extent involve mass media and con-
versation with friends. Much of the infor-
mation he gleans from his environment is
accumulated during his free time use of these
sources, although his working hours and
so-called "self-maintenance" time are also
by no means devoid of information-gather-
ing activity.
The study of the use of free time in Soviet
society is particularly interesting, since it
both provides the reader unfamiliar with the
daily life of the Soviet citizen some insight
into the influences on those leisure and in-
formative activities, and allows an assess-
ment of the effectuality of the efforts of the
regime to mutate the character of its citizens
through means of mass influence during
those activities.
*
In order to survey the use of free time, we
have chosen one sub-group of the population
for preliminary investigation. This group
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may be termed young people, and inclUdes
specifically those between the ages of sixteen
and thirty. Our reasons for this choice stem
from various considerations. Inasmuch as
our Underlying concern is to learn more
about how Soviet citizens use cornmunica-
tions media, we chose a group which we be-
lieve to be more or less homogeneous in its
patterns a daily life.
The research was sponsored by the Ad-
vanced Projects Agency of the Department
of Defense (ARPA) under contract #920E-
9717 and monitored by the Air Force Office
of Scientific Research (AFOSR) under con-
tract AF 49(638)-1237.
METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYSIS OF IN TERNAL
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
Description: Providing predictive base for
forecasting social movements in selected
countries.
Contractor: University of Pittsburgh/Holz-
ner and Yang.
Fiscal year: Start, 1966; end, 1970.
Cost: Unknown.
Conducted under AFOSR grant No. AF-
AFOSR-1304-67.
Report period: July 1, 1967-June 30, 1968.
Final report: Not for publication.
METHODOLOGY FOR THE ANALYSIS OF INTERNAL
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND
SOCIAL SYSTEM CHANGE)
(By Burkart Holzner and Ching-Kun Yang,
August 1968, Department of Sociology,
University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa.)
Abstract
This project develops methods and theory
for the study of incidents of violent social
protest and broad social movements in the
context of social system change. The method
of building computer based inventories of in-
cidents of protest and conflict permits the
quantitative description of large numbers of
such events, based on easily accessible public
records and historical documents. Critical in-
stance case studies supplement the quantita-
tive data through detailed qualitative in-
vestigation. The project's frame of reference
emphasizes event sequence analysis in con-
flict and mobilization. In order to assess
flexibility and power of the procedure, long
time series, -the entire 19th century, were
chosen for incident inventories on two so-
cieties of widely different characteristics. An
Oriental society (China) and a Western so-
ciety (Germany) were selected. The data
gathering phase for China (31,000 incidents)
has been completed, for Germany it is pres-
ently underway.
FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS AND DEFENSE
Description: Describe communications
mechanisms of China and Soviet Union and
develop computer simulation of message flow
so as to predict spread of information and
news in future. (Expires 9/69)
Contractor: MIT/Dr. Ithiel Pool.
Fiscal Year: Start, 1963; end, 1970.
Cost: Unknown.
THE FILM INDUSTRY IN COMMUNIST CHINA
(By Alan P. L. lAu, research program on prob-
lems of international communications and
security, Center for International Studies,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Introduction
This is a study of the film industry in Com-
munist China. It is part of a research pro-
gram on international communication con-
ducted by the Center for International
Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology. The research for this paper was spon-
sored by the Advanced Research Projects
Agency of the Department of Defense
(ARPA) under contract #920E-9717 and
monitored by the Air Force Office of Scien-
tific Research (AFOSR) under contract AF
49 ( 638) -1237.
This report seeks to update the data on
the subject and to understand the dynamics
of the Chinese Communist film industry. In
order to put the present film industry into
Its proper socio-historical context, we also
deal briefly with the Chinese films in pre-
Communist era.
The report is based almost exclusively on
Chinese publications. They include mainly
Chinese Communist press reports and trans-
lated Chinese materials. Only three non-
Communist books (Chinese) could be found
on Chinese films and our brief discussion on
the pre-Communist period was based on
them. We were particularly interested in sta-
tistical information on the present Chinese
film industry. Yet propaganda-free statisti-
cal reports from Communist China were
hard to come by. After 1959 even publica-
tions of propagandistic statistical informa-
tion from Communist China stopped. Since
1964 there have been some signs of the avail-
ability of such statistics but systematic sta-
tistical reports such as those published be-
fore 1957 have not yet appeared. We have
practically exhausted all the major sources
on this subject in Chinese which are pub-
licly available abroad. We have combed the
holdings in such major libraries as the Chi-
nese-Japanese Library and the East Asian
Research Center at Harvard University, The
Library of Congress and the Hoover Insti-
tute at Stanford University. As our research
continues, new information will be acquired.
This report, representing research done so
far, will be enlarged and updated in the
future.
BEHAVIOR NORMS: JAPANESE AND AMERICAN
YOUTH
Description: Comparison of attitudes and
behavior of the youth of two countries for
military assistance and manpower resources
purposes.
Contractor: University of Maryland/Dr. E.
McGinnies.
Fiscal Year: Start, 1967; end, 1969.
Cost: Unknown.
A cross-cultural study of normative behavidr
among Japanese and American girls in the
11 to 18-year age range, by Satoru Inomata?
Litt D., Department of Psychology, Shiga
University; Elliott McGinnies, Ph.D., De-
partment of Psychology, University of
Maryland)
Since 1945, the Japanese people have
adopted many of the precepts and practices
of American democracy. Adolescent boys and
girls in Japan are now growing up in this
new social climate. How are Japanese young
people reacting to the dramatic changes that
have taken place in their country? Are they
coming increasingly to resemble their Amer-
ican counterparts, or have they taken on the
form rather than the substance of Western
political and social values? In order to ap-
proach some answers to these questions, we
undertook a cross-cultural study of social
attitudes among the youth of Japan, pat-
terning our survey after one conducted with
American teenagers a few years previously.
In this way we hoped to be able to make com-
parisons between the social attitudes of teen-
agers in Japan and in the USA. We adopted
the same questionnaire materials and
methods of sampling used in a nation-wide
survey of American youth by the Institute
for Social Research at the University of Mich-
igan.
ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH TO ASSIST NAVY
STRATEGICAL PLANNING
Description: Investigator will combine
anthropological variables with econometric
techniques in order to conceptualize and pre-
dict mobility in foreign military hierarchies.
Contractor: University of Texas.
Fiscal year: Start, 1908; end, 1970.
Cost: Unknown.
S 9627
MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMING AND ECONOMIC
ANTHROPOLOGY
(By Ira R. Buehler, J. R. McGoodwin, Depart-
ment of Anthropology, University of
Texas)
Presented at a conference on Mathematical
Approaches to Cultural Evolution.
Technical Report 1: Comparative Econ-
ometrics Project.
Reproduction in whole or part is permitted
for any purpose of the United States Govern-
ment April 24, 1968.
This research was sponsored by the Group
Psychology Branch, Office of Naval Research
(Contract No. N00014-67-A-0126-0005; NR
170-717/1-5-68 Code 452) as the initial tech-
nical report of the Comparative Econometrics
Project?Ira R. Buehler, Director.
Introductory comments
The general purpose of this paper is (1)
to provide a partial and preliminary survey
of several related mathematical decision-
making models?in particular, mathematical
(or linear) programming?(2) to consider
their relevance for a wide class of optimiza-
tion problems in economic anthropology,
and (3) to assess some of their implications
for various theoretical issues in evolutionary
studies?the related notions of "cultural in-
tensity" and "evolutionary potential." This
essay is the initial (and therefore tentative)
report in a series of studies that will dem-
onstrate the underlying mathematical re-
latedness of Military and economic program-
ming and logistic problems on the one hand
and aspects of economic anthropology, eco-
nomic development, social organization and
the prediction of mobility processes in polit-
ical systems on the other. This discussion is
consequently directly relevant to the formal-
ist/substantivist opposition, in economic an-
thropology, a theoretical bifurcation that is
due to a considerable extent to the sub-
stantivist magnum opus Trade and Market
in the Early Empires (Polanyi et. al., 1957).
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A METHOD FOR FORE-
CASTING DECISIONS AND ACTIONS FOR MILI-
TARY GROUPS
Description: Make cross-national data base
analysis of the effects of different military
postures and strategies on the decision-mak-
ing of foreign military groups; research will
also be conducted on the predicted responses
of these groups to perceive politico-military
threats.
Contractor: Western Behavioral Seience
Institute.
Fiscal year: Start, 1966; end, 1970.
Cost: Unknown.
VALUES, ATTITUDES, AND MULTINATIONAL
DECISIONMAK/NG
(Introduction by John R. Reser, Western
Behavioral Soiences Institute, principal
investigator, September 30, 1968)
The research reported in these papers was
supported in part by the Office of Naval
Research, Contract No. N00014-66--0O279,
NR 170-704 (Group Psychology).
Introduction
There is a close analogy between the world-
wide problems of poverty and war at the
International level and the problems of
poverty and civil disorder on the national
level. In both cases an understanding of the
aspirations, values, and opinions of all
parties involved is of fundamental im-
portance, both for the successful imple-
mentation of programs to even out the dif-
ferences creating tension and conflict and
for the avoidance of escalation of smaller
conflicts into disastrous ones. This project
is oriented towards the study of the values
and opinions about interpersonal, social and
international relations of future elites in a
representative number of nations of the
world.
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One premise underlying the study is that
"A more complete understanding of others'
values, attitudes, and ways of thinking in-
creases one's ability to communicate effec-
tively with them." Such communication may
be across the conference table, through the
medium of a strategy which One pursues, or
simply that one behaves in a certain way
due to his expectations ablnit how others
will respond in the long or abort run. From
this point of view information on the basic
values and attitudes of future decision-
makers in all nations will be of immeasurable
value in helping them to Mal more effec-
tively with military, diplomatTc, and political
decision-makers of other countries as they
pursue their careers, adding to the possibility
that mankind's common interest in survival
may override misunderstanding and mis-
perception of the goals and values of others,
by providing a common framework within
which national differences in real interests
may be seen.
The Conflicts of the world today are, how-
ever, only partly based on misperceptions
and lack of mutual understanding of the
values of others; the conflicts are themselves
indicators of the large differences found in
the international system. The aim is there-
fore also to understand some of the factors
which create the antagonism and lack of
common interest at the international level.
The focus of the project is on the impact of
the nation-state on the values and opinions
of its citizens in nations differing markedly
? in political system, level of industrialization,
investment in military and police forces, and
size. Finally, it is a major aim of the project
to provide some insight into the background
of the student unrest which today, and prob-
ably more so in the future, is an important
source of political change.
ROLE DIFFERENTIATION IN THAI SOCIAL
STRCUTURE IN TERMS OF A SEMANTIC ANAL-
YSIS OF THAI PRONOUNS AND ROLES
(By W. Wichiarajote and Marilyn Wilkins,
Institute of Communications Research,
University of Illinois, Technical Report No.
57 (68-2), June, 1968; COmmunication,
Cooperation, and Negotiation, in Culturally
Heterogenous Groups)
(Project Supported by the Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency, ARPA Order No. 454
Under Office of Naval Research Contract NR
177-472, Nonr 1834 (1936) , Fred E. Fiedler and
Harry C. Triandis, Principal Investigators.)
Abstract
Fourteen Thai first-person pronouns and
sixty Thai social roles were scored on a com-
mon set of eleven features. Following a model
of semantic feature analysis developed by
Osgood, usage of the various pronouns within
the various roles was predicted: appropriate
(+), permissible (0), or ineongrous ( - ).
These predictions were obtained by multiply-
ing feature codings on the pronouns with
corresponding codings on the roles; the alge-
braic sum of these products yielded a ?, 0,
or - outcome for each pronoun-role com-
bination.
Validity of the model was evaluated in
terms of: the percentage of predictions which
were accurate; correspondence of the semen-
tice features with factors obtained through
factor analysis; and the information revealed
concerning the structure of Thai role differ-
entation.
Fifty-three Thai high school students were
asked to judge the appropriateness of the 14
x 60 pronoun-role combinations. This data
constituted the criteria for evaluating suc-
cess of the semantic features and also pro-
vided material for the factor analysis.
Six factors were found to describe 94'a of
the variance. They appeared to incorporate
nine of the eleven semantic features. These,
in turn, accurately predicted 85% of the Ss'
specific judgments. The semantic features
further revealed a hierarchic, tree-like struc-
ture within the semantic patterns of Thai
pronouns and social roles.
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER MILITARY
AUSPICES
Description: Cooperation with foreign mil-
itary assistance and training programs.
Contractor: Howard University, Dr. D.
Spencer.
Fiscal Year: Start, 1964; end, 1970.
Cost: Unknown.
MILITARY TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY?INTER-
NATIONAL TECHNO..ECONOMIC TRANSFERS VIA
MILITARY BY-PRODUCTS AND INITIATIVE BASED
ON CASES FROM JAPAN AND OTHER PACIFIC
COUNTRIES
(By Daniel L. Spencer, Chairman, Depart-
ment of Economics, Howard University,
Washington, D.C.)
ABSTRACT
Transfer of technology through military
and related channels. Case studies drawn
from Japan, Taiwan, and Korea. The mate-
rials constitute a first attempt to bulldoze
through a new dimension in cost/benefit as-
sessments of military activity overseas. Con-
cludes that a dollar spent on military assist-
ance may produce as much benefit as, or
more than, a dollar spent on economic assist-
ance.
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER MILITARY
AUSPICES
Description: Cooperation with foreign mil-
itary assistance and training programs.
Contractor: Howard University, Dr. D.
Spencer,
Fiscal Year: Start, 1964; end, 1970.
Cost: Unknown.
THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES?PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF A
CONFERENCE HELD AT AIRLIE HOUSE, WAR-
RENTON, VA., APRIL 28-30, 1966
(Edited with an introduction and summary
by Daniel L. Spencer and Alexander Woro-
niak, Department of Economics, Howard
University, Washington, D.C.; prepared un-
der Grant No. AF-AFOSR 533-66 from the
Air Force Office of Scientific Research, Of-
fice of Aerospace Research, U.S. Air Force)
FOREWORD
"The United States and the West must
either lead in the process of modernizing the
underdeveloped area, or by default, contrib-
ute to a kind of world in which our institu-
tions and values cannot survive." This state-
ment by Gabriel Almond echos the thinking
of a generation of American leaders who have
invested substantial resources and other ef-
forts to improve the conditions of life in def-
icit areas in the hope that economic advance
would contribuLe to political stabilization
and create the soil in which democratic in-
stitutions might take root.
The easy optimism that flourished after
World War II has been jarred by the experi-
ence gained in two decades of foreign aid
and technical assistance to backward and
stagnant areas. We have learned that neither
economic advance nor political stabilization
can be automatically initiated by the invest-
ment of U.S. resources. Dr. Carlos Chagas,
President of the National Academy of Sci-
ences of Brazil, insists that the technological
gap separating the advanced nations from
the so-called developing nations has grown
wider rather than narrower during the last
decade, despite extensive international co-
operation. On a more hopeful note, Walt
W. Rostow has postulated a theory of eco-
nomic evolution which includes a "take-off"
stage where rapid industrialization can be
expected.
The papers that follow were prepared by a
group of scholars who are too sophisticated
to believe that rapid economic development
is a necessary consequence of programs of
material aid and technical assistance. While
they are fully capable as interpreters of
economic history and could develop attrac-
tive hypotheses relating to the development
of economic institutions, for the purposes of
the present conference they have directed
their attention to a narrower field of eco-
nomic theory in an attempt to elucidate the
processes of technological transfer and struc-
tural change which are basic to economic ad-
vancement in backward areas.
Dr. Daniel L. Spencer was encouraged by
the Air Force Office of Scientific Research
to conduct a conference on technological
transfer, because it was felt that further use-
ful work in this field might be stimulated by
summing up the current state of knowledge,
and focusing attention on problems of a
methodological and theoretical nature that
are obstacles to further understanding of
these important processes.
Our interest in problems of the kind ad-
dressed at the conference stems from the fact
that the mission of AFOSR is to sponsor basic
research in areas of potential applicability
to the military. The present effort is part of a
research program devoted to those scientific
and technical fields which might serve to im-
prove the manner in which U.S. military per-
sonnel, skills, equipment, and procurement
policies can be exploited to the greatest bene-
fit for the host country and to realize the
U.S. national objectives to aid our friends
and strengthen our allies. There are many
channels within the military services for the
use of information derived from research on
foreign economic development. Military as-
sistance programs, mobile training teams,
technical training, and advanced education
provided by the U.S. services for foreign mil-
itary personnel are some of the bridges to the
field of application.
It is a source of gratification to the Air
Force Office of Scientific Research that our
expectations with regard to the conference
on technological transfer and structural
change have been fully realized. This Last
exemplifies the objective of the organization
to sponsor basic research in fields relevant to
future plans and activities.
CHARLES- E. HUTCHINSON,
Air Force Office of Scientific Research.
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EXHIBIT 1
TABLE I.-FEDERAL OBLIGATI ONS FOR RESEARCH; TOTAL,
DEFENSE, AND NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION FISCAL
YEARS 1956-1969
[In millions of dollars/
Year
Total DOD NSF
TABLE II. FEDERAL OBLIGATIONS FOR BASIC RESEARCH
TOTAL, DEFENSE, AND NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDA-
TION FISCAL YEARS 1952-69
_. /Millions of dollars]
1952
1953
1956 852 482 16 1954
1957 925 445 30 1955
1958 1 1,079 489 33 1956
1959 1,403 523 54 1957
1960 1,941 861 68 1958
1961 2,620 1,113 77 1959
1962 3,273 1,311 104 1960
1963 4,041 1,605 141 1961
1964 4,464 1,672 156 1962
1965 4,854 1,751 172 1963
1966 5,271 1,849 224 1964
1967 5,273 1,591 241 1965
19602 5,406 1,425 255 1966
1969? 5,990 1,658 280 1967
1968
1969
1 The U.S.S.R. ?ofted Sputnik on Oct. 4, 1957.
2 Estimates by the NSF.
Source: "Federal Funds for Research, Development, and
Other Scientific Activities, Fiscal Years 1967, 1968 and 1969."
vol. XVIII. National Science Foundation Report NSF 68 -27,
table C 91.
Department/agency
Total DOD NSF
162
154
148
162
206
262
335
517
610
825
1,106
1,389
1,567
1,690
1,844
2,015
2, 093
2, 354
72
65
52
53
78
84
111
137
168
173
204
231
241
263
262
284
246
320
1
2
5
10
15
30
'33
54
68
77
104
141
155
171
223
239
o 251
2 27 4
'The U.S.S.R, lofted Sputnik on Oct. 4,1957,
2 Estimated by the NSF.
Source: "Federal Funds for Research, Development and other
Scientific Activities, Fiscal Years 1967, 1968, and 1969", vol.
XVII, op. cit., table C-92.
TABLE I I I .-FEDERAL OBLIGATIONS FOR RESEARCH
BY AGENCY AND PERFORMER TOTAL, DEFENSE AND
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
[In thousands of dollars]
Department/
Agency
Ii niversi-
ties and
Total colleges
FFRDCS I
adminis-
tered by
Univs.
and
colleges
FROGS 1
adminis-
tered by
nonprofit
in
Fiscal year 1967:
Total' 5, 273, 021 1, 348, 469
DOD 1, 591, 331 246,507
NSF 241, 164 198, 458
427,497 47,577
81,681 36,545
16,907
Fiscal year 1968:
Total 5, 405, 590
DOD 1, 424, 590
NSF 255, 464
1,396,754
226, 537
210, 483
447,180 39,706
90,630 25,743
17, 798 532
Fiscal year 1969:
Total , 5,989, 550 1, 555, 509
DOD 1,658, 142 277, 365
NSF 279, 882 230, 377
466,903
98,303
19,652
41,224
26,886
244
TABLE IV. FEDERAL OBLIGATIONS FOR RESEARCH BY AGENCY AND FIELD OF SCIENCE,
[In thousands of dollars]
Life Psychological
Total sciences sciences
Fiscal year 1967:'
Total 5, 273, 021 1, 451, 386
DOD 1, 591, 331 106, 245
NSF 241,164 57,570
Fiscal year 1968:2
Total 5, 405, 590 1,580 090
DOD 1, 424, 590 93, 638
NSF 255,464 60,148
Fiscal year 1969: 3
Total 5, 989, 550 1, 765, 306
DOD 1,656, 142 III, 060
NSF 279, 882 63, 720
108, 042
23, 438
8,040
112,753
24, 196
8,014
130,642
28, 690
8, 176
I Federally funded research and development centers.
2 "Federal Funds tor Research, Development, and Other
Scientific Activities, Fiscal Years 1967, 1968, and 1969." vol. XVII,
op. cit,. table
3 Ibid., table C-11.
4 Ibid., table C-12.
FISCAL YEARS 1967 69
Physical Environmental
sciences science
1, 074, 416
327, 479
69, 550
1,136,553
312,634
71,587
1,289,778
352, 895
80,099
1 "Federal Funds for Research, Development, and Other Scientilic Activities, Fiscal Years
1967, 1968, and 1969," vol. XVII, op. cit., table C-14.
Engineering
Mathematics sciences
670, 101
148,783
42, 938
649,549
127,631
48,284
611,671
130, 463
51,948
130, 021
89,903
18, 887
107, 086
68, 227
19, 582
144,661
102,205
22,212
2 ibid., table C-15.
.1 Ibid., table C-16.
1, 555, 014
804,060
24, 273
1, 524, 161
722, 460
26,965
1,695, 361
841, 468
28, 342
TABLE V. -FEDERAL OBLIGATIONS FOR BASIC RESEARCH BY AGENCY ,AND FIELD OF SCIENCE, FISCAL YEARS 1967 69
[In thousands of dollars/
Department/agency
Fiscal year 1967:'
Total
DOD
NSF
Fiscal year 1968:
Total
DOD
NSF
Fiscal year 1969:3
Total
DOD
NSF
Total
Life Psychological
sciences sciences
2, 015, 182
284, 316
238, 562
2, 092, 766
246, 428
251, 375
2, 353, 665
320, 250
274, 253
612,041
32,656
57,570
652,869
28,336
59,137
716,981
37,644
62,606
60, 044
9, 234
8, 040
64, 876
7,721
8, 014
74,665
12, 035
8, 176
Physical Environmental
sciences sciences
Engineering
Mathematics sciences
712,929
99,925
69,550
726,171
76,781
71,587
828, 147
92,035
89,899
321, 034
49,364
42,938
340,436
47, 863
48,113
382, 233
56, 027
51,569
64,639
31,191
18,887 .
57,238
25, 004
19, 582
76, 255
41,010
22,212
183,998
57,394
24,273
179,573
50,938
26, 698
191,443
66,769
27,517
1 "Federal Funds for Research, Development, and Other Scientific Activities, Fiscal Years 1967,
1968, and 1969," vol. XVII, op. cit., table C-33.
2 Ibid., table C-34.
3 Ibid., table C-35.
TABLE IV.-FEDERAL OBLIGATIONS FOR BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE RESEARCH, 1960 AND 1968 .
[In thousands of dollars]
Social
sciences
188, 687
8, 912
16, 060
207,504
8,178
17,100
250, 524
8,242
19,451
Social
sciences
56,869
3,450
14,869
61,796
2,485
15,744
69,300
3,730
17,605
Other
science]
Agency
1960 (obligations)
1968 (estimate)
Psycho-
logical Social
sciences sciences
Psycho-
logical Social
Total sciences sciences Total
Department of Agriculture. -16, 760 16, 760 32, 873 32, 873
Departmental Commerce__ _ 113 2,929 3,042 402 7,434 7,836
Department of Defense
(total) 17,959 504 18,463 25,747 8,684 34,431
Army 5,215 400 5,615
Navy 8,209 8,209
Air Force 4,535 104 4,639
Defense agencies
Defensewide funds
8, 856
7, 151
5, 830
2,850
0,060
2,278
1,938
3, 055
1,413
11, 134
7, 151
7,768
5,995
2,473
Footnotes at end of table.
Agency
1960 (obligations)
1968 (estimate)
95,354
82,511
3,845
81, 898
67, 626
3, 784
101, 607
93, 119
5, 134
Other
sciences
3,628
1,102
2,435
9,867
7,300
2,500
14,651
11,000
3,579
Psycho-
logical Social
sciences sciences
Psycho-
logical Social
Total sciences sciences Total
Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare
(total)
16,308 7,103 23,411 79,462 87,716 167,178
Administration on Aging
Food and Drug
Administration
- Office of Education
Office of Vocational
Rehabilitation
447 592 1,039
1,800 200 1,200
4,779 1,540 6,319 24,444 26,991 51,435
3,500 14,921 18,421
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Agency
TARIF IV.
1960 (obligations)
FEDERAL OBLIGATIONS
1968
Psycho-
logical
Total sciences-
15, 623 49, 655
(14, 788) (14, 352)
1,469 200
216_
1,107 587
1,S62
122
FOR BEHAVIORAL
tin thousands
(estimate)
Social
sciences Total
28, 895 78, 550
(3,850) (18, 382)
5, 267 5, 467
10,050 10,050
216
10, 665 10665
6, 244 6, 831
8,988 9, 988
1,025 1,025
125 125
900 900
SCIENCE RESEARCH, 1960 AND
of dollars'
Agency
1968 '--Continued
1960 (obligations)
1968 (estimate)
Total
4,279
27, 765
8,528
11,000
2, 273
3,658
7,304
Psycho-
logical
sciences
Social
sciences
4,090
(3, 132)
3.109
_
_L, 061
'1, 562
' - 122
Psycho-
logical
sciences
Socia'
sciences
Total
Psycho-
logical
sciences
Social
sciences
HEW-Continued
Public Health Service__
National Institutes
of Health
Social security
Administration
Welfare Administration
St. Elizabeths Hospital
Department of Housing and
Urban Development
Department of Interior _ _ __
Department of Labor.
Department of State (total)
11,529
(II, 506)
46
Department of Transporta-
tion
National Science Foundation_
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Office of Economic
Opportunity
U.S Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
Veterans' Administration _ _ _
Other agencies
Total
2, 597
1,005
213
1, 823
430
2,560
4, 420
430
1,005
2,/73
8, 953
5,073
190
3,654
319
4,279
18, 812
1,455
11, 000
2, 083
7,069
38,241
34,854
73,095
124,387
209,323
333,710
Departmental funds
International Coopera-
tion Administration
Agency for Inter-
national Development
r 112
122
Source: "The Behavioral Sciences and the Federal Government," a report of the Advisory National Academy of Sciences, 1968, p. 39.
Committee on Government Programs in the Behavioral Sciences, National Research Council,
Fiscal year 1966 t
Fiscal year 1967
Fiscal year 1968
Fiscal year 1969
TABLE V11.---FEOLRAL OBLIGATIONS FOR BASIC
Social
psychology
$5, 259
4, 763
4, 076
7, 376
RESEARCH IN PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES, FISCAL YEARS 1966--69
'Dollar amounts in thousands] ,
Department or Defense
Anthropology
$271
40
85
125
Economics Sociology
Federal funds for research, development _ant other scientific activities, Fiscal years 1966, 1967,
1968 (vol. XVI) p._155.
2 Federal funds for research, development and other scientific: activities, fiscal years 1967, 1968,
1369 (vol. XVII) p. 159.
Fiscal year 1966 1
Fiscal year 1967 2
Fiscal year 1968'
Fiscal year 19694
$150
25
19
32
3 !bid, p. 160.
!bid, P. 161.
$810
268
300
412
Other
$1, 404
3, 117
2, 081
3, 161
Total Total
DOD Federal
$7, 954 $65, 819
8,213 79,969
6, 561 86, 651
11,106 180,772
TABLE VIII FEIN RAL OBLIGATIONS FOR APPLIED RESEARCH IN PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCf AL SCIENCES, FISCAL YEARS 1966-69
Social
psychology
$7, 835
8,201
6,905
7,297
[Dollar amounts in thousands]
Department of Defense
Anthropology Economics Sociology Other
4;324
578
789
660
Federal funds for research, development and other scientific activities, fiscal years 1966, 1967,
1968, (vol. XVI) p. 178.
[r Federal funds for research, development and other scientific activities, fiscal years 1967, 1968,
1969, (vol. XVII) p. 190.
$6'12
I, 009
796
835
3 I b id. p.191.
'bid, p. 192.
$2, 155
1,715
974
1,067
$2,631
2, 160
3, 134
1.900
Total
DOD
$13, 577
13, 663
12, 678
11, 809
Total
Federal
$156, 706
168, 973
179, 611
222, 502
TABLE IX.-FEDERAL OBLIGATIONS FOR RESEARCH (BASIC AND APPLI ED) IN THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL SCI ENCES, FISCAL YEARS 1968 E9
[Dollar amounts in thousands]
Department at Defense
Socml
psychology Anthropology
1 scal year 1966 $13. 094
Fiscal year 1967 12, 974
Fiscal year 1968 11,061
Fiscal year 1969 14,6/3
Source: Tables VII and VIII.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, if
here is nothing further on that subject,
I have an item on an unrelated subject
to discuss.
Does the Senator wish me to yield?
Mr. STENNIS. Just 1 minute: not over
2 minutes.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr STENNIS. The Senator has com-
pleted his remarks. The committee has
$595
618
874
725
Economics Sociology
$732
1,034
815
917
$2, 965
1,983
1-, 274
1, 479
not used any time. Nevertheless, we
might agree now on a limit applicable
tomorrow, if the Senator is inclined at
all to do so. Would an hour to a side be
satisfactory?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. There are a num-
ber of Senators-the Senator from
Michigan is one-who wish to speak on
the subject. I think I ought to consult
them before I agree. I personally have
Other
$4, 095
5, 277
5,215
5.061
Total
DOD
$21, 531
21, 876
19, 239
22, 915
Percent
DOD/Federal
12.1
10. 2
7. 6
11.1
Percent
DOD/Federal
8. 7
8. I
7. 1
5. 3
Total Percent
Federal DOD/Federal
$222, 525
248, 892
266, 2412
323, 274
9. 7
8.8
7. 2
7. 1
completed my remarks. We should give
notice to Senators interested in the sub-
ject.
Mr. STENNIS. If we could have a
quorum call-
Mr. FULBRIGHT. There is one Sen-
ator in particular who should be con-
sulted. Outside of the ABM subject, the
Senator from Wisconsin has been the
"clearance" in this. The Senator knows
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that. I have coordinated this effort with
him. I would not wish to enter into any
kind of an agreement without a quorum
call and without his having notice, be-
cause he feels a special responsibility in
this matter. The Senator is aware of
that.
Mr. STENNIS. Very good. I thought,
though, if we could give that notice and
have a quorum call?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. We had better do
it tomorrow.
Mr. STENNIS. Tomorrow there will be
so many other Senators competing for
time.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I may make this
suggestion. I am committed to make the
statement I am about to make. I must
get it in the RECORD. While I am doing
that, perhaps the Senator or someone
for him could get in touch with the Sena-
tor from Wisconsin, and also, I would
hope, the Senator from Michigan, whom
I mentioned a moment ago, and see what
their views are. While lam making this
address, perhaps the Senator could get
in touch with the Senator from Wis-
consin.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, will
Senator yield me 2 minutes?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, in view
of the fact that the Senator has had his
say here about what these policy plan-
ning projects are, I thought I might
read into the RECORD some that my sub-
committee was concerned with:
Japanese rearmament, nuclear, and
space programs: A study of factors and
developments affecting the Japanese mil-
itary contribution to the U.S. effort in
Asia, including the security pact.
Chinese military and foreign policy:
A continuing analysis of the background
and fundamental characteristics of Chi-
nese foreign and military policies to elu-
cidate their implications for U.S. re-
search provides background for consul-
tations with air staff officials and for in-
puts to interdepartmental studies, such
as work on strategic posture toward
China.
European security issues a continuing
examination of trends in the political
and military relations of European
states: including possible changes in
European security arrangements and na-
tional developments affecting the overall
European military posture.
Soviet military and foreign policy: A
continuing study of Soviet military doc-
trine, use of military strength for politi-
cal purposes, foreign policy, and politi-
cal institutions in the Soviet Union and
East European states.
Military representation in U.S. mis-
sions: Examines better method of mili-
tary representation in handling military
aid in foreign countries, specifically
India, Indonesia, Brazil, and Iran.
That is just naming five. This year
these will cost about $580,000. In com-
parison with those that our distinguished
friend from Arkansas has been referring
to, Ataturk and others, it makes a lot
of sense to me that we should keep on
studying these issues on a continuing
basis.
Mr. STENNIS. Until a few years ago,
the authorization bill for the military
program did not require that the re-
search and development items be in-
cluded in it, but we learned that we were
not getting a major part of a certain
weapons system before us?in other
words, we just picked it up when it was
ready to come off the assembly line, and
we had to go back to get all the research
and development, the tests, and the en-
gineering. That was when we invented
the law to require the research and de-
velopment. What we were after was to
get all the information on the weapons?
the hardware, was the way we referred
to it?before the Armed Services Com-
mittee.
But when we got the research and
development required by law, we got a
great many other things that we were
not particular interested in. They were
related, to a degree, and their number
seems to have increased greatly year
by year. There are so many of them, and
many of them are so disassociated, that
it is very difficult properly to evaluate
all of them.
As I recommended to the Senator from
Arkansas?and his response was very
logical?we would be glad for anyone to
go through and pick out a list that per-
tained more to the functions of other
committees. I suppose almost any kind
of list of subjects for research and devel-
opment might pertain remotely to the
work of any committee.
But if Senators will bring out lists of
those that belong more properly in the
State Department, perhaps some in the
Department of Commerce and other
departments, they can go to their respec-
tive logical places. But this year, after we
got into this matter?and the subcom-
mittee did a remarkable job?we could
not just turn the file upside down, pour
them out on the table, sweep them out
with the afternoon trash, and leave them
there with nothing done about them and
no one to pass on them. We could not
summarily reject the whole thing.
So we performed a selective process,
here, the best we could, and I hope that
when this bill is finally completed we can
obtain a further review of it, with the
help of the Department of Defense and
others, and make specific recommenda-
tions as to where these projects should
go. But in the meantime, this is just an
alternative to cutting them all off.
I hope the Senate will see fit, with the
leadership of the Senator from Arkansas
and other interested Senators, to find a
way to adjust it for this year, and then
we will take an approach next year that
will be perhaps more satisfactory.
I make these remarks to show clearly
what the purpose is, and what the com-
mittee is trying to do.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I wish to say that
the Senator from Mississippi has been
most reasonable in his reaction, both last
year when this matter first came up, and
now. I appreciate what he has said to-
day. I believe the Senator; and I cer-
tainly want to reemphasize that I mean
no criticism of him.
As I told the Senator, I asked the Di-
rector of the Budget, Mr. Schultze, in
open session, whether he had looked at
it at all. He said he had not.
This is an enormous and complicated
program, and there dre many more im-
portant things, that cost money and are
more important to our security. There-
fore, I think the Senator from Missis-
sippi would probably be derelict in his
duty if he did spend a lot of time on these
projects, because I do not think they are
really that important.
But I would like to get our informa-
tion in order, so to speak, to try to get
back on the track.
I think there was a period a few years
ago when many of us were interested in
universities. I live in a university town,
and it is always publicized that "we got
a research project of $15,000," and so on.
At the time, it seemed all right. But I
think it has got out of hand, and I would
like to get it back on the track. I think
the Senator from Mississippi has shown
every indication that he shares that view,
and all we have to do now is find out a
way to do it. I thank the Senator very
much for his remarks.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator
from Arkansas for his kind remarks.
LET'S PUT SPACE TO EARTHLY USES
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I do
not think any other Senator wishes to
pursue this subject. I want to make some
remarks about another subject which has
been much in the public eye and which is
not, unfortunately, relevant to the pend-
ing business but is relevant to something
the public is interested in. I feel com-
pelled to Make these comments before we
recess. I had hoped to have a more ap-
propriate time to make them, but I must
do it now.
Like it or not?and I am not at all sure
I do?there is no greater spur to human
exertion than competition. From the
chariot races of ancient Rome to the
major league baseball of modern Amer-
ica, contests of courage and skill have
provided people with thrills and enter-
tainment. Competition is also one of the
powerful engines of economic growth
and technological innovation. The rivalry
of merchants and manufacturers was a
powerful force in setting off the indus-
trial revolution and is still a, major?if
somewhat dogmatized?factor in our
modern economy. The competitive in-
stinct broke the 4-minute mile and sent
astronauts to the moon; it also sent tens
of millions of people to premature deaths
in the two world wars.
Competition between nations differs
from the rivalry of individuals in that it
is conducted on a far greater scale, brings
to bear vastly greater resources, affects
the lives of many more people, and is
more likely than other rivalries to be
conducted without rules or restraints
to assure the survival of the participants.
In other respects I perceive no important
differences between the rivalries of in-
dividuals, teams, corporations, armies,
and nations. All are engaged in a contest
for self-maximization, not just to excel
but to exceed, not just to do something
well but to do it better than somebody
else.
Competition is not the only spur to
human exertion. At least in Western
cultures the challenge of overcoming
natural obstacles has fired the adventur-
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ous spirit in man: The mountain chal-
lenges the climber, the ave the surf
rider, the sea the mariner, the jungle the
explorer, the universe the astronaut.
By paradoxical contrast, unnatural?
by which I mean manmade?obstacles
have no such motivating magic. For
most of us such unnatural obstacles as
decaying cities and polluted water and
air are a tolerated nuisance rather than
a motivating challenge.?We accepted
price of something called "progress."
Western man, it seems, has come close
to reversing the ancient stoicism of the
East: Restless and insatia ble in chal-
lenging nature's creations, he is becom-
ing passive and fatalistic about his own.
He will leap to the stars and yet squat
miserably in his own fouled nest. Were
it not so paradoxical and n debilitating,
one might even take this for a new form
of spirituality.
Be all that as it may, the competitive
instinct is probably the inost reliable
tool of human creativity. But it has cer-
tain risks about it, one being the con-
stant danger that a zealous competitor
will compete too well and so put an end to
the competition. In sports, in business,
and in politics it is essential to confine
the contest within rules which will pre-
vent anyone from succeeding too com-
pletely, thereupon putting an end to
the game and robbing mankind of the
creative benefits of the competitive
process.
The genius of the Ameri, an Constitu-
tion is that, at least up to now, it has
kept the game going and the competi-
tors in competition. The division of gov-
ernmental powers among three branches
and 50 States puts the various con-
tenders for power in the position of hav-
ing little chance of victory but an ex-
cellent chance of survival in the continu-
ing struggle for power. The system works
tolerably well largely because it does not
depend too heavily on human conscience
and voluntary restraints, which, admir-
able through these are, must be counted
among the less reliable of human attri-
butes. Instead, with unsentimental real-
ism, the framers of our Constitution
faced up to the universality of the hu-
man drive to self-aggrandizement,
recognized it for the creative but dan-
gerous force that it is, and harnessed it
into a system of regulated ivalries, free
enough to generate political energy, re-
strained enough to protect the people
from despotism.
Difficult as it is to control, the com-
petitive instinct is even more difficult
to acknowledge. Only in sports are com-
petitions conducted in their own name;
the game is for its own sake, for the
fun of playing and the hope of winning.
But in politics we feel a_ compulsion to
dress up our contentious impulses in the
vocabulary of ideals and ideology. No
matter what the fight and who is in-
volved in it, we suppose, almost in-
variably, that some great principle is at
stake, some noble and unselfish purpose,
such as realizing our own great ideals
or, more commonly, saving people from
the wicked designs of our rivals.
To hear the Soviet and American lead-
ers talk about the cold war, nothing could
be further from their pristine thoughts
than any notion of self-aggrandizement
or getting one up on the other. Heaven
forbid. By their own accounting of it the
Russian leaders sit up nights in the
Kremlin thinking up ways to lift the yoke
of oppression from the downtrodden of
the earth. President Nixon, for his part,
recalled in a recent speech that the
United States had suffered over a mil-
lion casualties in four wars in this cen-
tury, and then claimed that it had all
be done out of saintly altruism. He de-
.--
closed:
Whatever faults we may have_as nation
we have asked nothing for ptreselves in re-
turn for those sacrifices. ,W have been gen-
erous toward those wirdm we have fought.
We've helped our fopther foes as well as our
friends in the taskabf reconstruction. We are
proud of this record and we bring the same
attitude in oar search for a settlement in
Vietnam.,
I do n
insincer
fere
d
an ac
mea
Mos
fait
tici
thei
MO
spe
wha
No
ideal
g
I sug
trollin
often th
is not pri
tion; that t
tionalizing is
tion; and that, i
suggest that Mr. Nixon was
in asserting that we had suf-
million casualties in four wars as
of pure altruism. Undoubtedly he
it, but that doss not make it true.
of us have a deep and touching
in our own virtue, and most poll-
ns have an equally tender regard for
own rhetoric. Few people are more
d by a moving speech than the
er himself?but that does not make
he says true.
do I suggest that there are no
or generous impulses in politics.
St only that they are far less con-
han we like to believe; that more
not what we take for principle
iple at all but rationalize-
thing we are usually ra-
instinct for competi-
nything approaches
a controlling influen on our behavior,
it is this appetite for c. 'test. I further
suggest that there would be s uch to gain
from a candid acknowledgem t of our
own political, nature. Indeed, i 's only
by recognizing the fragility of our eals,
the limited role they play in guidin ur
behavior, and their susceptibility to c
ruption by rationalization that we c
have any hope of translating them in
reality. The Founding Fathers had n
illusions about the behavior of their fel
low men and, because of their realism
they were able to discipline the struggl
for power so as to protect the people fr
despotism.
That brings me to the space race
to its possible uses for earthly purpos s.
The landing of Mr. Armstrong and .1-
onel Aldrin on the moon called for a
great deal of poeticizing about th hu-
man spirit bursting its earthly 'finds,
about the nobility_ of in: endless
search for knowledge, an. about the
boundless but unspecified benefits for
mankind certain to derive from the set-
ting of human feet upon the surface of
the moon.
In all this I perceive not humbug pure
and simple but rather more sententious-
ness than plain hard truth. Americans
went to the moon for a number of rea-
sons, of which, I am convinced, the most
important by far was our desire to beat
the Russians. The kick was not just in
Speech of May 14, 1969.
getting there but in getthig their first, A
football team doos not celebrate the
number of points it got if the other team
got more points. Similarly, when
Khrushchev cavorted over his sputnik
back in 1957, it was not so much in de-
light over what the Russians had done
as in delight over what they had done
that we had not done. Then in early 1961
Yuri Gagarip made his flight around the
earth, the United States was em-
barre:Srert at the Bay of Pigs, and the
American people in general and the Ken-
nedy' adm,i1ilstratin in paitieular were
plunged i to depths of gloom and self-
flagellation. These events stoked the fires
Of American competitiveness. It was then
that the Apollo program was approved
and we set off on the $30 billion crash
program that put Mr. Armstrong and
Colonel Aldrin on the moon last week.
I do not wish to belittle the achieve-
ment in identifying the driving force be-
hind it. But-neither do I see any point
in glorifying the motive out of apprecia-
tion for the achievement. In the space
race thus far both Russians and Ameri-
cans have accomplished technological
prodigies and have done so for the most
part because of the desire of each to sur-
pass the other. Although some of us have
thought the space contest hasty and ex-
travagant in cost, it has certainly been
a more constructive contest than the
deadly race in armaments. It has, how-
ever, been wasteful: Efforts have been
duplicated, priorities distorted, and re-
sources diverted from more urgent needs.
The competition bids fair to get out of
hand, to pass beyond creativity to prod-
igality of worse.
I would not eliminate the competition.
People like it much too much, and if
through some miracle the Russians and
Americans could bring themselves to get
together, drop the space race and proceed
to explore the universe all cooperative
and lovey-dovey, it would spoil every-
body's fun and likely rob the project of
its creative drive. What we might try to
do is to devise a way of putting limits on
the competition, keeping It within finan-
cial bounds, and generally regulating the
rivalry in such a way as to have the con-
test without being consumed by it.
Until now the Soviet-American space
rivalry has been a contest without rules,
and contests without rules are full of
hazard for the participants. There is a
latent militarism about the space race.
As Prof. George Wald commented on the
moon landing:
What should have been a great flight of
the human spirit conies to us heavy with
threat. Those almost miraculous guidance
systems that SO uncannily and their targets,
will they one day be guiding missiles to find
us?.
Spurred by an overly intense desire to
"win," the contest has broken the bounds
of "true science," Which the great 19th
century French physiologist Claude Ber-
nard said, "teaches us to doubt and in
ignorance to refrain."
Oblivious in our haste to such caution-
ary warnings, we have scarcely thought
2 "Intellectuals Deeply Divided Over Tin-
plications of Peat," The Washington Post,
July 22, 1969.
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August 11, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 9671
tions by dealers each and every time they
purchase sporting ammunition.
And most important of all, this bill
will in no way impair the objectives of
the Gun Control Act?namely to keep
the firearms out of the hands of the
wrong people; and to reduce misuse and
criminal use of firearms.
Mr. President, S. 2718 is a good bill.
I urge prompt consideration and early
favorable action.
THE VOTE AND ARMS
LIMITATION
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I be-
lieve that the long debate on the Safe-
guard ABM system was an extremely
healthy experience for us all. I feel
strongly that, in the end, the vote
dramatically reflected our deep con-
cern for the continuing security of our
great Nation. This was not a partisan vic-
tory, nor was it a partisan loss. Senators
of both parties rallied to the President's
banner in this cause and, I am sure,
greatly strengthened his hand in our
quest for peace.
An editorial entitled "ABM Vote and
Arms Limits," published in the Los An-
geles Times of August 8, is a concise and
thought-provoking summary of this is-
sue. I ask unanimous consent that it be
printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
ABM VOTE AND ARMS LIMITS
Issue: Now that the Safeguard ABM has
won Senate approval, how have prospects for
arms control been helped or hindered?
By voting to authorize first-phase deploy-
ment of the Safeguard ABM system, the U.S.
Senate has enhanced the prospects for an
eventual arms control agreement with the
Soviet Union. The development is one, there-
fore, of historic importance.
The margin of victory for the ABM was
slim-51 to 50 on one key amendment and
51 to 49 on another?but this is a case where
the proverbial inch is probably as good as
a mile.
Opponents vow to continue the fight, but
most observers share the judgment of Senate
Democratic Leader Mike Mansfield that the
anti-ABM forces reached their "high water
mark" in the voting this week.
The House is expected to approve deploy-
ment of Safeguard by a much larger margin
than did the Senate. Opponents will make
another fight when appropriations for the
project come up in separate legislation, but
their cause is generally regarded as lost.
It is important, at this point, to cut
through the confusion which has been left
by many weeks of wordy and acrimonious de-
bate and get straight just what is involved.
The Safeguard ABM, which is a system
for defense against missile attack on this
country, marks a realistic and laudable at-
tempt by the Nixon Administration to set the
stage for an end to the nuclear arms race.
It would offer a "thin" system of protec-
tion for the American people against a small-
scale Chinese missile attack or an acciden-
tal launching from any quarter.
The overriding Purpose of Safeguard, how-
ever, is to preserve the credibility of our
nuclear deterrent in the minds of the Krem-
lin leaders at a time when the latter are
working hard to overcome the U.S. lead in
missile striking power.
The premise is that the Russians will never
be tempted to launch a surprise missile at-
tack on this country if we keep them con-
vinced that enough of our missiles will sur-
vive to destroy the Soviet Union in return.
This could be accomplished, as some ABM
critics suggest, by increasing our own force
of offensive missiles. But such a move would
be far more provocative?and more injurious
to the chances of arms control?than deploy-
ment of an ABM system which is strictly de-
fensive in nature.
The Safeguard system, if built in total,
will cost over $10 billion, including warheads.
But if arms limitation talks with the Soviets
produce an agreement to limit ABM deploy-
ment, the whole system will not be built.
The Nixon Administration this year is ask-
ing only for a $759 million authorization
to go ahead with deployment of two prototype
installations.
Congressional approval improves President
Nixon's bargaining position for the upcoming
arms limitation talks with the Russians?
who already have a limited ABM system of
their own, and show no inclination to aban-
don it.
Meanwhile, the closeness of the Senate vote
on Safeguard dramatizes the fact that the
Pentagon can no longer count on unques-
tioned congressional approval of expensive
new military programs and weapons sys-
tems. Military spending will be closely and
critically scrutinized.
Even many ABM proponents will agree that
the new skepticism is not a bad thing.
NETWORK CIGARETTE ADVERTIS-
ING LETTERS
Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, in separate
letters to me as chairman of the Con-
sumer Subcommittee, the heads of the
three major television networks have
responded to my plea that the broadcast-
ers relieve cigarette manufacturers of
their contractual commitments so as to
enable the cigarette industry to with-
draw from all broadcast advertising by
January 1, 1970. CBS said yes. NBC and
ABC said no.
On July 31, 1969 I sent the following
letter to the heads of each of the three
major television networks:
As you know, the cigarette manufacturers
have now indicated to the Commerce Com-
mittee their willingness to withdraw from the
broadcast advertising of cigarettes after
December 31, 1969, "if the broadcast indus-
try will simultaneously terminate all con-
tractual arrangements for the broadcast of
cigarette advertising."
I am not unmindful of the economic dis-
ruption which would be caused by such
abrupt termination of cigarette advertising.
But weighing the public health imperatives
in the light of your strong traditions of social
responsibility, I would hope that you would
find it possible to accommodate the time
table adopted by the cigarette manufacturers.
I would very much appreciate hearing from
you about your intentions with respect to
enforcement of advertising contracts with
the cigarette companies after January 1, 1970.
Ithave now heard from each network.
Mr. Stanton's letter on behalf of CBS
is temperate, rational, and in the highest
traditions of broadcaster responsibility.
Mr. Goodman's letter for NBC is disap-
pointing. Mr. Goldenson's letter on be-
half of ABC is unresponsive, shallow, and
insensitive.
Mr. Stanton says that if Congress will
grant the tobacco industry antitrust im-
munity for its agreement to withdraw
from the broadcast advertising of ciga-
rettes, "CBS will release the cigarette
advertisers from their commitments." He
points out that responsibility for grant-
ing such exemption properly rests with
Congress. We agree and we intend to
carry out that responsibility as soon as
possible.
Mr. Stanton also raises valid questions
which merit response.
He questions the legislative soundness
of the tobacco industry's proposal of a
"congressional prohibition of any Fed-
eral Trade Commission action which
would require health warnings in print
media." I agree. I, too, oppose any such
prohibition, and I see no inclination on
the part of the Senate to grant such pro-
hibition. I might add, however, that the
National Association of Broadcasters
warmly supported such prohibition in
the House.
He fears the "transfer of existing ex-
penditures for broadcast cigarette ad-
vertising to print media." So do I, as I
indicated at the time the tobacco in-
dustry made its proposal. This must not
be allowed to happen. And if it can be
prevented only by FTC action to require
a warning in every cigarette ad, the FC
must be left free to require such warn-
ings.
Mr. Goldenson takes the position that
even if the termination of cigarette ad-
vertising "would greatly reduce cigarette
consumption," he would consider that
ABC had no responsibility to terminate
cigarette advertising unless it were term-
inated in all news media. In fact, he is
shocked by such "discrimination" as con-
trary to "fair competition."
"Discrimination," and "Fair Compe-
tition" are serviceable slogans. But we
are not talking about slogans. We are
talking about the direct and unparalleled
impact of the broadcast media upon the
American home. Ever since television be-
came an advertising medium, its sales-
men have been contemptuously derid-
ing newspapers and magazines as sec-
ond-class media. Television with its
animated, visual-audial impact upon
nonselective viewers, has been heralded
as the most powerful sales medium in
history. Now Mr. Goldenson claims to
be the victim of discrimination.
The unpleasant fact is that television
and radio cigarette advertising have been
singled out as abominations by every
major public health organization con-
cerned with the hazards of cigarette
smoking, because they have a direct and
inescapable impact upon young people.
As the broadcasting critic of the Wash-
ington Post put it this morning, research
has demonstrated that "no way exists
for avoiding the young viewer of TV."
There are few 4-, 5-, or 6-year-old
children in this country who cannot
recite by rote a half dozen cigarette
jingles and catch phrases. They did not
learn them by reading magazines and
newspapers. The broadcasters them-
selves have recognized their unique im-
pact by agreeing to a 4-year phaseout of
broadcast cigarette advertising.
Moreover?and the broadcasters con-
veniently suppress this fact?broad-
casters alone enjoy a public monopoly
conferred by Congress of broadcast
frequencies. Congress has asked in re-
turn, only that broadcasters serve the
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S 9672 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 11, 1969
"public interest." Magazines and news-
papers carry no such burden.
Now, let us look at the shamelessly
self-serving argument that until Con-
gress bans the sale of cigarettes, the
freedom of unrestrained advertising in
all media remains a sacred right.
Of course, if cigarettes were a new
product about to be marketed with full
knowledge that their consumption would
kill hundreds of thousands, their sale
would be banned without hesitation or
quibble.
But no responsible public -health
official, to my knowledge, is recommend-
ing a ban despite the proven hazards of
smoking. Why? Because millions of
Americans are addicted or, at least,
heavily habituated to smoking. The in-
evitable consequence of a cigarette ban
in terms of a black market and the
attendant law-enforcement chaos and
social misery would make the bitter
experience of prohibition pale by com-
parison. That is why cigarsttes are not
banned and the broadcasters know it,.
It does not follow as the night the day
that the failure of Congress to ban
smoking, by law, forces us to permit
the unrestricted promotion of cigarettes.
Neither logic nor humanity dictates that
we leave our young people thus exposed
and unprotected.
As I indicated in my letter to the net-
works, I am not unmindful of the eco-
nomic dislocation which would be caused
by the loss of cigarette revenues. That
loss, however, should be viewed only in
the perspective of the human and eco-
nomic loss which accompanies the pre-
mature death and disease which strike
thousands of Americans each year.
Cigarette advertising on television and
radio was certainly not the only factor
influencing the decision of 70 million
Americans to smoke. But I find it hard
to believe that the more than $2 bil-
lion of cigarette advertising revenues en-
joyed by broadcasters since 1952 were
not instrumental in persuading hundreds
of thousands to smoke and hundreds of
thousands not to quit.
We are told that experience in other
countries proves that the end of televi-
sion advertising will have DO impact on
cigarette consumption. But no country
in the world has approached the inaS-
sive exposure of citizens through televi-
sion to cigarette commeteiels. There is
no comparable experience.
Mr. Goldenson's threat to curtail pub-
lic-interest broadcasting if cigarette
vertising revenues drop is simple bloc
mail and not worthy of further comment:
While refusing to release cigarette
manufacturers from their commitments,
NBC expresses its willingness to allow
cigarette companies to substitute its non-
cigarette brand advertising. Fairness re-
quires that the cigarette manufacturers
be able to utilize the maximum feasible
time for the advertising of noncigarette
products. The committee will explore
this possibility with the cisarette com-
panies.
NBC's recommendation for institu-
tional, public service sponsorship by the
cigarette companies is also worth ex-
ploring further.
But cigarette manufacturers should
not be forced, by commerical considera-
tions, to continue to advertise cigarettes
on radio and television.
I am today asking the FCC to take
note of the discrepancies among the net-
work responses and to inform me if the
FCC's mandate from Congress to see that
broadcasters operate in the public in-
terest affords them any opportunity to
influence NBC's or ABC's decision.
On our part we in Co
least make certain
vertising on rad'
September 19
I have a
to prepa
would f
of ciga
TV by
guage
will
indus
well '
-scan at
cigarette ad-
and TV will cease by
ed the Justice Department
legislative language which
cilitate the agreed withdrawal
ette advertising from radio and
the cigarette industry. The lan-
will not be "discriminatory," but
broad enough to permit tobacco
ry withdrawal from print media as
that later becomes feasible.
GAS
PL
IMP
INE RETAILERS WANT DE-
ION ALLOWANCE AND OIL
RT QUOTAS ABOLISHED
Mr. P
often we
composed
These smal
giant major
have the bene
lowance or oil a
these small inde
not have the gigan
meat subsidies of t
panies, they must comp
Mr. President on. June
Retail Gasoline Dealers
Wisconsin, Inc., held their co
?
OXMIRE. Mr. President, all too
ergot that the oil industry is
f many small businessmen.
usinessmen are not like the
'1 companies; they do not
t of the oil depletion al-
port quotas. Although
dent businessmen do
profits or Govern-
major oil com-
e against them.
3 and 24 the
ociation of
vention in
'on they
Eau Claire. At that conven
aodpted the following resolutio
OIL DEPLETION ALLOWANCE
Whereas, it is apparent that pair leum
producers have been favored by way of ed-
eral Government oil depletion allow nce
against income tax to the extent of 27
annually; and
Whereas, the importing petroleum 11 11
ducers has further been granted fav. ed
treatment on foreign crude oil imports; d
Whereas, such special allowances ave
been conducive to the promotion the in-
ous price wars; and
Whereas, such results have caus grave
economic hardship and in some c com-
plete economic disaster to the re e ;- Now,
therefore,
Resolved, that the Retail G. - ne Dealers
Association of Wisconsin, In , in convention
assembled, urges the Co ess of the United
States and our Wise n Senators and Con-
gressmen to t :ppropriate action to ter-
oil depletion allowance to
oil producers and to terminate favored treat-
ment on foreign crude oil imports.
I think this resolution is eloquent tes-
timony to the need to change our tax
laws and the oil import program which
give the major oil companies all these
subsidies to the detriment of the con-
sumers and small businessmen. I, for
one, shall do all that I can to implement
this resolution.
2 %
WALKER W. BROWN, PRINCIPAL,
JOHN A. SUTTER, JUNIOR HIGH
SCHOOL, CANOGA PARK, CALIF.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I should
like to give what I feel is much deserved
recognition to a distinguished educator
from the State of California, Mr. Walker
W. Brown, principal of John A. Sutter
Junior High School in Canoga Park,
Calif. Mr. Brown has earned the highest
esteem of all who have worked with him
during the 20 years he has worked with
our young people.
In his years as a teacher and adminis-
trator, Mr. Brown has always strived to
teach his students the American
Through his work with student govern-
ment, the meaning of democracy and a
deep appreciation of it have been brought
firsthand to his students, and at the
same time, he has been educating and
training the responsible leaders of
tomorrow.
Under his direction, programs dealing
with Americanism and our American
heritage have been held and have con-
tinued for the entire school year. Due
largely to the leadership of Mr. Brown.
Sutter Junior High School was named a
recipient of the n68 Principal Award
and George Washington Honor Medal
from Freedom's Foundation of Valley
Forge.
M. Brown has shown not only to his
students, but also to all the teachers who
work with him as well as all of his as-
sociates, that no matter what their own
personal political leanings, they can still
take pride in the great history of our
free people and in just being Americans,
Mr. President, I am proud that Cali-
fornia has an educator of Mr. Brown's
caliber. I am sure that he and his col-
leagues fully realize that he can best
mold responsible citizens of the future at
this early age. This is the time when
young people are in their formative years,
a time when their feelings toward things
of great value like democracy and our
American way of life are being molded--
feelings they will hold for the rest of
their lives. And under Mr. Brown's
guidance, a giant step is being taken to-
ward ending future campus disruptions
and toward providing the responsible
leadership that will be so badly needed in
the tumultuous years ahead.
Mr. President, I salute Mr. Walker
Brown, principal of Sutter Junior High
School, for the outstanding work he has
done with our young people, and I pray
that his sincere efforts may continue for
many years to come with even greater
success than he has had thus far.
EMERGENCY INSURED STUDENT
LOAN ACT OP 1969
Mr. SPONG. Mr. President, on July
24, 1969, at 12:50 p.m., three Americans
returned from a trip into space which
took two of them to the surface of the
moon. Behind the trip lay hours of re-
search and development, billions of dol-
lars, and the dreams of millions of per-
sons through the United States and the
world. Preparation for the trip not only
produced a rnaminouth scientific and
technological success but also resulted in
various spin-off deVelopments which will
advance many fields.
All of this would however, been im-
possible without educated men and wo-
men. Education is the /tingle most im-
portant element responsible for the re-
cent space feat. It is single most im-
portant factor in enabling us to continue
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On The Floor - 11
of other weapons systems. "This does not mean that if
Safeguard has a transistor that we cannot deal with that
transistor in another system, or a weapon, or a Sprint, or
a PAR (perimeter acquisition radar), or anything else that
happens to be in the Safeguard system." What it did do,
he added, was "to reject Safeguard as the system upon
which the research and development will be focused."
Richard B. Russell (D Ga.), President Pro Tempore of
the Senate, said that backers of the Cooper-Hart amend-
ment had been arguing for additional research and devel-
opment instead of deployment.
The Smith language, he said, "will kill all the research
and all the development of the so-called Safeguard sys-
tem after Senators have stood here on the floor day after
day and stated they were in favor of research and devel-
opment, but not deployment. This strangles it in the crib."
Another ABM supporter, Howard H. Baker Jr. (R
Tenn.), said that the Smith amendment would prevent
"evolutionary development" to improve the Safeguard sys-
tem. "I do not believe we intend to scrap what we have
done so far and require out scientists to start over from
scratch with some other system," he added, but that was
"the inevitable effect" of Mrs. Smith's proposal.
Stennis called the new amendment "a legislative
monstrosity, when there is not time to analyze, to find the
meaning of words, to check and doublecheck....It is leg-
islating in the dark where we do not know what these
words mean."
When the voting ended, Mrs. Smith had joined the
backers of the Cooper-Hart amendment but the two Sen-
ators whose positions were not known, Anderson and Wil-
liams of Delaware, lined up with the Administration.
Under Senate rules an amendment needs a clear ma-
jority to carry, and although Vice President Agnew cast a
"nay" vote to break the tie, this was not necessary to de-
feat it. The final vote on the second Smith amendment
was 50-51, with 36 Democrats and 14 Republicans in sup-
port of it, and 21 Democrats and 29 Republicans plus
Agnew against it. Of the 21 Democrats who opposed the
amendment, all but five were Southerners. All but seven
Northern Democrats supported it.
Cooper-Hart Amendment. Voting on the Cooper-Hart
amendment followed immediately after the defeat of the
Smith provision. There was a rush of murmurs when Mrs.
Smith changed her previous position to vote against the
anti-ABM measure. Hers was the only switch, setting the
tally at 49-51.
McIntyre Amendment. The next day, McIntyre tried
to rally the anti-ABM forces to support his limited deploy-
ment compromise. The amendment would allow installa-
tion of radars, computers and electronic equipment at two
Air Force bases in North Dakota and Montana, but would
prevent deployment of operational missiles or acquisition
of other sites.
He called the Aug. 6 votes "a hollow victory indeed"
for the Nixon Administration. Since "the Senate is in great
disagreement among itself" over the Safeguard, he said,
the bill should spell out what Defense officials could do
rather than give them latitude to act.
Stennis objected to the McIntyre amendment. "Just
a few hours ago 51 Senators put their stamp of approval
on phase one (of the Safeguard system)." The McIntyre
atnendment "cuts some pieces out of phase one," he said,
Fulbright said he did not understand how McIntyre's
Another Memorable Vote
Sen. Clinton P. Anderson (D N.M.) cast another
crucial vote in the field of national defense Aug. 6.
It was reminiscent of his vote as a House Member on
the 203-202 roll-call that extended the draft Aug. 12,
1941.
Anderson had not announced his ABM position
before the Senate showdown on the Safeguard sys-
tem. Only his stand and that of Sen. John J. Wil-
liams (R Del.) were unknown to the public. Williams,
typically closemouthed about his vote both before
and immediately after the roll-call, would not discuss
his views. Anderson's decision and thoughts were
made know in an interview with Congressional
Quarterly.
Anderson was subjected to a steady barrage of
phone calls on the morning of the Aug. 6 vote.
Shortly before 11:30 a.m., President Nixon called
and spoke briefly with Anderson. An aide said former
Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, an opponent of
the Safeguard system, had called Anderson earlier in
the morning.
"I have not had five minutes free this morning
because of the telephone," Anderson told Congres-
sional Quarterly shortly after 11:30 a.m. that morn-
ing. An aide said Anderson had received about six ex-
tended calls from other Senators and estimated that
the New Mexico Senator had made several other
calls himself.
Anderson said he had made up his mind "prob-
ably during the end of last week or the beginning of
this week." Referring to his support for ABM in 1968,
he said that he didn't really "have to make up his
mind much."
Anderson said that he was influenced in reach.
ing his decision by a speech of Hans A. Bethe of
Cornell University. Bethe supported a thin ABM
system around U.S. missile sites. Anderson also said,
"Scoop Jackson's presentation was excellent." Sen.
Henry M. Jackson (D Wash.) was one of the major
supporters of the Safeguard system.
While saying "I tried my very best to find out
what the facts were," Anderson admitted, "I haven't
followed the debate in the Senate as closely as I
might. There are no new ideas being expressed; the
positions have been established for months."
Anderson recalled, "The first vote I cast in Con-
gress in 1941 was to extend the draft. The memory of
that has stayed with me for a long time."
He likened that bill, which he said was widely
attacked by isolationists, with the Senate vote on
the ABM. "The same circumstances exist today," he
said. "There were very heavy pressures on me then
from the so-called liberal bloc. But I had to vote for
the bill."
"Averell Harriman came by yesterday," Ander-
son added. He described Harriman, an opponent of
the ABM, as a "real old friend from the days when
we were in the Truman Cabinet together." But, the
Senator added, "I couldn't promise everyone every-
thing," (Anderson is n former Secretory of Agri?
cu ture. )
amendment wo7413 limit the_ Pen h
tagon. T e o_nleorit
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Longest Military Debate
The Senate debate on the Antiballistic Missile
System, which lasted 29 days, was the sixth longest
debate in the Senate since 1945. It was the longest
debate since that year on any military authorization
bill.
The debate on the Open Housing Act of 1968
lasted 53 days.
The 1964 debate on the Civil Rights Act, lasted
82 days. It was the longest debate in the history of
the Senate. The debate on the Foreign Assistance
Act of the same year lasted 31 days. In 1960, debate
on the Civil Rights bill lasted 39 days, and there
were 35 days of debate in 1953 on the bill giving the
coastal states title to the tidelands.
"affirmatively authorizes two bases.. .which are intended
to be operative bases," he said. He said he would support
it "if I could be convinced it is truly restrictive in a mean-
ingful way."
The vote, the last on the Safeguard ABM during con-
sideration of S 2546, was 27-70. Five Republicans and two
Southern Democrats voted for it.
Following the votes, President Nixon was reported by
White House spokesman Ronald L. Ziegler as "pleased...
and gratified by the results and the bipartisan voting
that was apparent in the outcome."
In another reaction the vote was interpreted by the
Soviet newspaper Izvestia as a victory for the antimilitary
forces in the United States.
Future Controversy. However, continued attempts to
block the ABM system were certain later in the session in
the Senate where the opposition is centered. Some oppo-
nents vowed an attack when the annual defense appropria-
tions bill with funds for the plan is considered later in the
session.
In addition, many who opposed the ABM also plan to
attack other programs authorized in the bill. The ABM
funds authorized in the bill amounted to $759.1 million
Out of a total of $20 billion contained in S 2546. The re-
maining funds were designated for numerous research and
procurement programs by all military services and the De-
fense Department. Many of these programs had become
centers of controversy and criticism during the growing
debate over defense spending and contracting and nation-
al priorities.
About 20 amendments were either already offered or
were being considered on the bill assuring that debate
would continue for several weeks. Senate Majority Leader
Mike Mansfield (D Mont.) Aug. 6 indicated that debate
On the measure would probably continue past the three-
week Congressional recess beginning Aug. 13.
The controversial development of chemical-biological
warfare weapons was the subject of seven amendments to
curtail, oversee or cut back such operations. (For story on
chemical-biological warfare, see Weekly Report p. 1313.)
William Proxmire (D Wis.), an ardent critic of defense
spending, introduced several amendments to oversee job
changes of executives bet ween defense contractors and the
Pentagon and of contracts and profits. (For story on de-
fense contractirApisremic
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On The Floor - 12
ABM Vote-Switchers
Ten Senators who were in the Senate in both
1968 and 1969 changed their votes on similar amend-
ments offered by Sens. Cooper and Hart to delay an
ABM defense in both sessions.
A June 24, 1968, amendment to the military con-
struction authorization bill by Cooper and Hart was
proposed to delay a $227.3 million authorization for
the Johnson Administration ABM system. Their 1969
amendment barred deployment of the Safeguard
system but permitted research.
Six Senators who voted against the 1968 amend-
ment voted for the amendment in 1969. They were:
Birch Bayh (D Ind.), Howard W. Cannon (D Nev.),
Fred R. Harris (D Okla.), Daniel K. Inouye (D Ha-
waii), Warren G. Magnuson (D Wash.) and James
R. Pearson (R Kan.). Four Senators, Winston L.
Prouty (R Vt.), Hugh Scott (R Pa.), Margaret Chase
Smith (R Maine), and John J. Williams (R Del.)
voted for the 1968 amendment and against the 1969
proposal. (For 1968 vote, see vote 154, 1968 Almanac
p. 34-S.)
In addition Sens. J. Caleb Boggs (R Del.) and Len
B. Jordan (R Idaho) voted against the ABM on at
least one of the other occasions in 1968 and for it in
1969. Thomas J. McIntyre (D N.H.) and Joseph M.
Montoya (D N.M.) voted for the ABM on all 1968
occasions but against it in 1969.
Proxmire also offered an amendment to tighten spend-
ing on the Air Force's controversial C-5A transport plane,
for which costs had increased significantly during its con-
struction.
Other amendments were offered to curtail or end
spending on the Army main battle tank program, defense
research programs, the defense contingency fund and to
limit troops strengths. Still others would require reports
from the Pentagon on contract progress and release of
studies by Defense "think tanks."
Tie Votes Not Uncommon
Although the 50-50 vote on the Smith amend-
ment was the first tie vote in this session of Congress,
ties are not unusual. Since 1952 there have been
only three years-1954, 1957 and 1962?in which no
votes were tied in the Senate.
Article 1, section 3 of the Constitution provides
that the Vice President may cast a vote to break
a tie in the Senate. Since a tie vote defeats the
measure being voted upon, the Vice President usual-
ly votes to break the tie only if he favors passage
of the measure. The last such occurrence was on
March 11, 1968, when Vice President Hubert H.
Humphrey voted "yea" to break a 42-42 deadlock
on an amendment to provide funds for the Office
of Economic Opportunity's Head Start Program.
(See vote 32, p. 10-S, 1968 Almanac.)
RDP71B00164 R000300100001-3
COPYRIGHT 1969 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC.
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August 8, 1969?PAGE 1435
?August 8, 19
?
proved For ICOMD-I?Miggf8NA9,:latalWalWAVR00300100001-3
S 9457
One such moment arose recently when the
Attorney General and I took different posi-
tions on the issue of voting rights legislation.
The 1965 Voting Rights Act expires next
year. I have urged its simple extension. When
the Attorney General offered a different pro-
posal, which I opposed, some people asked me
why I disagreed with the country's chief
legal officer, a member of my own party.
I have the highest personal regard for the
Attorney General and I consider him one
of the ablest men in public life. He and I
are lawyers who disagree on the timeliness
and certain provisions of proposed legisla-
tion. It is not unusual for lawyers to disagree.
I co-sponsored and fought for passage of
the Voting Rights Act in 1965. I believed this
landmark legislation was the least we could
do to prevent the exclusion of Negroes from
the voting rolls in the South. The Act was
specifically designed to pinpoint conspiracies
that serve to maintain "whites-only" regis-
tration. Literacy tests, for example, are pro-
hibited when they are used for the purpose
of discriminating. If the effect of the law has
been regional, that is only because the pat-
tern of discrimination has been regional.
The Attorney General, however, hes pro-
posed new legislation which, among other
provisions, would abolish literacy tests in all
states and do away with state residency bans.
I approve of those features and will vote for
them if they are considered as separate leg-
islation after the Voting Rights Act is ex-
tended. My present opposition to these pro-
visions is a matter of timing.
There is a danger that the present Voting
Rights Act could expire by default. Twenty
states now have literacy tests?many of
them for nondiscriminatory reasons. Only
in the deep Smith have they been used to ex-
clude Negroes. But any attempt to change
the laws of all twenty states would provoke
extended debate in Congress and it might
prove impossible to get the new law passed
before the Voting Rights Act expires. All the
progress we have made would go down the
drain, as non-complying areas would hasten
to exploit the expiration of the Act.
However, there are also other parts of the
proposed new law which I would have to op-
pose, no matter what the timing.
Under the 1965 Voting Rights Act county
officials in the South can no longer resort to
the kind of tricks which used to keep Negroes
from voting. Some areas, for example, had
laws which required would-be voters to
"interpret the Constitution." Of course, such
tests seldom kept whites out of the voting
booth. The present Act suspends such de-
vices until the offending counties can prove
that they have not been used to discriminate
for five full years. We put "teeth" into the
law so that no state could get around the
Fifteenth Amendment's mandate that the
right to vote shall not be denied because of
"race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude."
Unfortunately, the proposed new law
would scrap the system under which states
now affected must clear with Washington
changes in state and local election laws. This
would take the heat off states which discrim-
inate by giving the Federal Government a
much heavier burden of proof. The Justice
Department might have to rush lawyers into
every suspect county just before election day
trying to protect black voters' rights.
Besides the obvious waste of tax dollars,
this procedure would allow county officials to
stall the Government with legal maneuvers
until the elections were over. That is a step
backward. I do not Want to endanger what
Lord Coke called the "knowne certaintie of
the law" when that law has worked extremely
well. Therefore, I expect to do whatever is
necessary to lead the fight, if I am asked to do
it, for the extension of the 1965 Voting
Rights Act.
My position is influenced heavily by a deep
personal commitment which has been con-
k
sistent throughout my years in Congress. The
extension of the 1965 Voting Rights Act is
quite simply a matter of human rights. That
guarantees my strongest efforts on the floor
of the United States Senate.
CONCLUSION OF MORNING
BUSINESS
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, is
there further morning business?
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is
there further morning business? If not,
morning business>100
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
TIONS FOR FICSAL YEAR 1970 FOR
MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RE-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MIS-
SILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJA-
LEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RE-
SERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senate pro-
ceed to the consideration of the un-
finished business.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill
will be stated by title for the information
of the Senate.
The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK, A
bill (S. 2546) to authorize appropriations
during the fiscal year 1970 for procure-
ment of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels,
and tracked combat vehicles, and to au-
thorize the construction of test facilities
at Kwajalein Missile Range, and to pre-
scribe the authorized personnel strength
of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve
component of the Armed Forces, and for
other purposes.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there
objection to the present consideration of
the bill?
There being no objection, the Senate
proceeded to consider the bill.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The
junior Senator from Missouri (Mr.
EAGLETON) is recognized.
THE MDT-70-1VI5I5 BATTLE TANK
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, Sen-
ator HATFIELD and I, joined by Senators
MCGOVERN, MONDALE, MOSS, PROXMIRE,
and YARBOROUGH, have introduced an
amendment to S. 2546 which would tem-
porarily delay the further development
of the Main Battle Tank until the Comp-
troller General has an opportunity to
report to the Congress on the practicabil-
ity and cost-effectiveness of this highly
complex defense system.
This is a modest amendment in terms
of the dollars it would strike out of the
bill?$30 million for research and de-
velopment and $24.5 million for produc-
tion base support.
I do not pretend to have the technical
competence to judge the ultimate ef-
fectiveness of the MBT-70. Nor do I
question in any way the sincerity and
competence of those military officers
and contractors who have brought the
system to its present state.
But when the research and develop-
ment costs of a military system con-
ceived in 1963 have risen 528 percent in
just 6 years, when the tank's projected
operation date has slipped back from
1969, which was its originally estimated
operational date, to 1974 or 1975; and
when the strategic assumptions of a land
war in Europe have necessarily changed
during the extended period this tank has
been on the drawing board; when we
consider all these things, and others, I
feel that Congress is obliged to know
precisely what it is buying before it votes
further funds for this project.
Mr. President, the MBT-70 project is
a joint undertaking by the United States
and the Federal Republic of Germany.
It began as a quest for a dream tank,
rather than as a weapon designed to ful-
fill a specific mission or a specific threat.
Indeed, the Army had no clear idea
of what the configuration of the MBT-70
would be until research, development,
testing and evaluation was well under-
way.
Mr. President, General Burba, who
formerly was in charge of this project,
was interviewed in September of 1967,
and in that interview appearing in the
Armed Forces magazine he said this:
For the first time in the history of modern
tank design, the designers of the MIST were
given carte blanche to optimize basic design
configurations into which they put the best
scientific engineering know-how.
I might add that the designers, as re-
ferred to by General Burba, according to
the Defense Department, are the con-
tractors on both sides plus the joint engi-
neering agency. As the quotation reflects,
they were given carte blanche to come
up with almost anything they could
conjure.
General Betts, Army Director of Re-
search and Development, explained the
spectacular rise in R. & D. costs in these
terms :
For the first estimate we did not have a
design. We did not have any really detailed
idea of what would go into the tanks so the
early estimates were very summary in nature.
The most summary kind of cost esti-
mates have become the hallmark of the
MBT-70.
The initial 1963 estimate for joint re-
search and development, training, and
evaluation was somewhere between $80
million and $86 million. In 1965, the ante
was raised to $138 milion. Now it is $303
million.
Those are the estimates for research,
development, training, and evaluation
originally brought in at $80 million to
$86 million. That has now now sky-
rocketed, with its first stop at $138 mil-
lion, and now the current estimate is
$303 million.
Mr. President, I have had prepared a
chart which is on the easel in the rear of
the Chamber. I must confess that my
original inclination to make up a chart
stemmed from the fact that in discuss-
ing military matters, it seems indispen-
sable to have some kind of chart, whether
secret or nonsecret, whether classified or
nonclassified.
I assure you, Mr. President, that this
is the most nonclassified chart in exist-
ence.
Having had it prepared, I believe its
illustrative purpose will bear out in
graphic terms that which I have just
verbalized; namely, as to the continued
escalation of the estimated costs of re-
search, development, training, and evalu-
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S948 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE August 8, 1.969
ation with the program as it began in
1963.
The difference between the red and
green lines on the chart is that when the
program was originally conceived in 1963,
there was a partnership agreement be-
tween the United States and the Federal
Republic of Germany, a 50-50 partner-
ship at that time, with $80 million being
the total estimated cost, one-half to be
borne by the United States ttrld the other
half to be borne?$40 million?by the
Federal Republic of Germany.
That continued in 1965. As to 1966,
196'7, and 1968, the costs had risen so
much by that time, to $138 million, but
it was still a 50-50 arrangement, one-half
German, one-half American, in terms of
cost.
It was in 1968 when the greatest escala-
tion in costs took place and the 50-50
Partnership arrangement just completely
evaporated and it became pretty close to
a 75 percent American endeavor--close
to $230 million, and about $70 million on
the German side.
Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Missouri yield?
The PRESIDING OFFICEn (Mr. AL-
LEN in the chair). Does the Senator from
Missouri yield to the Senator from
Louisiana?
Mr. EAGLETON. I yield.
Mr. LONG. Would the Senator tell me
whether those who negotiated that
agreement ever heard of the balance-of-
payments problems? The fact that the
Germans had a good surplus and we had
a big deficit, did we know about that in
negotiating the agreement
Mr. EAGLETON. Frankly, in answer
to the Senator from Louisiana, I Just
do not know as to whether the balance-
of-payments question was considered or
taken into the equation at the time the
determination was made. The main
thrust of my argument, Senator, is, and
I do not wish to becloud the issue or to
avoid answering the Senator's question,
but the escalation of the cost, the ancil-
lary or subsidiary questions as to the di-
vergence away from the previous 50-50
agreement to what it is now, is loosely a
75-to-25 arrangement.
Mr. LONG. The point is that the chart
shows it is "heavying" up on the costs
and departing from the 50-50 arange-
ment where we now do about 75 percent
of it, I would assume.
Mr. EAGLETON. That is right.
Mr. LONG. During this same period
we were negotiating a treaty that the
Germans pay for more of their own ex-
penses of doing business because we could
not carry them any longer, with this Na-
tion carrying the cost of this develop-
ment: Here is an agreement that was
apparently negotiated, diami trically op-
posite, by apparently some enthusiast
over in the Pentagon who thought his
program was so great that we ought to
depart from the 50-to-50 ratio and go to
an 80-to-20 ratio, perhaps, at the very
time this Government was Pressing the
German Government to carry more of
the burden.
Mr. EAGLETON. I think the Senator
is eminently correct. I take it that today,
near the latter part of 1969, it is still
the pious hope?and I eauphasize the
word "pious"?that the German Federal
Republic and other governments that
constitute our NATO partners will carry
a greater burden of defense costs. I em-
phasize the words "pious hope" because
there has been no manifestation, whether
it be in the way of troops or anything
else, that gives substance to that pious
hope. Here in 1968 was an agreement
which went into the very teeth of our
desire to get out of the dilemma with re-
spect to the twofold problem?for them
to carry a greater burden of the defense
costs and to some extent relieve our bal-
ance-of-payments problem.
Mr. LONG. Here is someone who did
not want to be forced by pressure or cir-
cumstances; who was being required to
dress in a Santa Claus costume and put
on a pair of overhauls and go to work.;
and here is an agreement which was ne-
gotiated apparently completely against
the current, swimming upstream, while
the Whole trend was to go in favor of
helping us balance our payments. Here
was a situation where there was an 80-20
arrangement, when we could not pay and
the other fellow could pay, which would
require us to move away from the 80-20
arrangement to a 50-50 arrangement,
and yet we were moving away from the
50-50 arrangement toward an 80-20 ar-
rangement.
Mr. EAGLETON. I agree with the Sen-
ator. If there was any merit, from the
international monetary point of view or
the balance of payments point of view,
in deviating from the original concept of
that agreement?to wit, 50-50?the mer-
itorious argument would be for the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany to take up 80
percent of the burden and leave us, for
a change, on the short end of the stick,
and assume 20 percent of the burden.
The logical result would have been that
result rather than the end result re-
flected in that chart.
Mr. LONG. If we look at the condi-
tions between 1965 and 1968 and the
pressures on our monetary situation, of
course, it will be seen that we should
have been moving toward a 50-50 ar-
rangement rather than in the other di-
rection.
Mr. EAGLETON. That is right. I thank
the Senator from Louisiana.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr EAGLETON. I am glad to yield to
the senior Senator from Missouri.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I congratulate my
colleague on a typically thorough de-
velopment of a group of pertinent facts,
and was most interested in the com-
ments made by the distinguished chair-
man of the Finance Committee, who
knows, as do we all, of the increasing
problems incident to our continuing un-
favorable balance of payments. I be-
lieve the last quarter was the worst we
have had in our history.
I would ask the able Senator where
this research and development work was
done?
Mr. EAGLETON. The physical site or
the physical location?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Both.
Mr. EAGLETON. In both countries it
was in terms of the engine, which is
Research was being done in the Federal
Republic of Germany, and in the United
States, by the General Motors Corp., and
the Lycoming Corp. in the State of Con-
necticut is doing some work in terms of
researching a turbine engine that may
conceivably some day go into the
MBT-70.
Mr. SYMINGTON. When the increased
cost developed, as this illuminating chart
shows, was the increased cost on work
done primarily in this country? How was
that divided? In other words, was there
any additional direct negative effect on
our balance of payments?
Mr. EAGLETON. The backup figures
on some of this material are not publicly
available, as I am sure the Senator must
know, based on his long experience on
the Armed Services Committee. The
amount of work being done, though, will
be reflected at the present time in terms
of the amounts here and in the Republic
of Germany. It is close to 80-20; 80
American, 20 German.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Has any adequate
explanation been given the Senator as
to why there was such a sudden sharp
increase in the money expended by the
United States as against the money ex-
pended by Germany?
Mr. EAGLETON. I am sure that per-
haps later on the Senator from Missis-
sippi can clarify any erroneous miscon-
ception I may have, but the original con-
tract in 1963 was based an $80 million
and a 50-50 coequal partnership, which
was estimated on production levels look-
ing down the road. The cost of research
went up. The target for production was
enhanced and went up. It was assumed
that the greatest production would be
done in the United States and, hence, the
United States should share a greater
burden than originally was estimated.
That is my impression.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Sena-
tor.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. EAGLETON. I am glad to yield
to the Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. STKNNLS. I thank the Senator for
yielding to me. On these cost figures,
Members of the Senate, the figures I
have here come directly from the Army.
They are the ones charged with the re-
sponsibility. They say that the total pro-
gram cost before production?that is,
real production of the tank, ready to roll
out and go out in the field?will be, in
round numbers, the United States, $173
million; Germany, $130 million.
I will repeat that figure because I
think it is important to be heard. Total
cost prior to actual production for use,
United States $173 million; Germany,
$130 million.
That is not exactly 50-50, but it is in
the neighborhood of it.
My source for that is the Army, and
their source is their books. If that is in
error, we certainly need to know now.
Mr. EAGLETON. May I respond?
Mr. STENNIS. Yes. The Senator
yielded to me.
Mr. EAGLETON. It ill behooves the
junior Senator from Missouri to dispute
the Senator from Mississippi on any
still being worked on and not agreed to. military figures.
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Mr. STENNIS. These are not my fig-
ures; they are the Army's figures.
Mr. EAGLETON. Here are the figures
that were given to us by the Department
of Defense on the development concept,
as projected: The R. & D. cost to the
United States alone was projected at
$227 million, which is an increase of $184
million, which, as I said in my talk, was
528 percent over the original estimate
for our part of the cost, our part origi-
nally being $40 million.
The gentleman who supplied us with
this information, if the Senator would
like to have his name, was Colonel
Petrenko.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator. I
am inclined to believe that the figures
I have here are approximately correct,
but I will call on them for further
verification.
I notice the Senator said projected
cost. That was conceived when? Projec-
tion means over into the years. When
was that cost conceived?
Mr. EAGLETON. There have been
different conceptions, as it were, the
original one being in 1963, $80 million;
and that was apparently an adequate es-
timate of projection for the first 2 years
of the program. Then it went up to $138
million. Now, according to my chart, it
is $303 million, to be precise.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield to me for a comment?
Mr. EAGLETON. I wield.
Mr. SYMINGTON': - Respecting the
colloquy between the distinguished
chairman and the Senator from Mis-
souri, it is a bit comparable to what was
going on on the floor yesterday with
respect to the number of troops in Viet-
nam. I know the chairman's figures are.,
given with complete sincerity, and I
know my colleague's figures are given
with complete sincerity. Therefore, I
would hope that this matter can be
checked for the record, and that what-
ever the facts are, the record will then
so show.
We are having problems of this char-
acter in other fields. It is possible that
one person in the Pentagon gave a cer-
tain set of figures, and another person,
in all good faith, gave a different set of
figures.
Mr. EAGLETON. If I may comment on
the remarks of my senior colleague, I
think that is a very apt and adequate
summary of the situation. I would be
the first to desire to have the accurate
figures, and I know the Senator from
Mississippi desires the same thing.
Mr. STENNIS. Oh, yes. If the Senator
will yield further on that point, the
whole answer is just to run back, for
verification, our figures. I was stating
figures here from a factsheet supplied
to me by the Army.
I thank the Senator for yielding. Let
me make one further point about the
year 1963, that seems so pertinent here.
Mr. EAGLETON. Yes.
Mr. STENNIS. In the year 1963, this
tank we are talking about today was
merely an idea that Mr. McNamara
finally approved?a joint undertaking
for a supertank for the 1970's, looking
forward into the 1970's, and, frankly,
primarily looking to Western Europe as
a possible use for a part of that arsenal.
That required the cooperation of the
two governments; it involved the State
Department at diplomatic levels, and
everything else; and it was 2 years be-
fore they really got moving. In 1963, they
did not even have a full concept of what
the tank would be. They had to get a
green light to really go to thinking and
putting things down on paper, and draw-
ing lines and rubbing them out.
This time looked long to me, too; but
when I got into it, and saw where those
2 years went, it was a little different.
I thank the Senator for yielding.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield to me?
Mr. EAGLETON. I am glad to yield to
the Senator from Arkansas.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. With regard to the
point made by the Senator from Mis-
souri, it reminds me of the difficulty I
have had on an amendment I have pro-
posed with regard to research projects.
I have had one of the best men we have
on the staff working as closely as he
could with Mr. Foster and his staff in
the Pentagon, trying to ascertain the
cost of each project?not the overall
cost?and they finally just came back
and said they could not identify those
costs. I shall not present my amendment
on those projects until Monday; but I
can state now that they just are unable
to give me the cost of individual projects
carried in their programs. The Depart-
ment will give us the name of a project,
describe what it is about, and where it
Is done, and so on, but they are unwill-
ing or unable?they said they could not?
give me what they called a realistic es-
timate or price on many individual proj-
ects.
So I can well imagine?these are proj-
ects many of which run from $50,000
to $500,000?that on a project like a
tank, they have a very difficult time.
They have become accustomed to loose
practices. This only emphasizes how very
important it was to adopt the Schweiker
amendment yesterday. If the Defense
people cannot do this kind of job.
GAO has got to go in and help them de-
velop a way to keep better track of their
accounting methods and estimates on
costs.
Mr. President, I wanted to ask a ques-
tion. I had a committee meeting this
morning, and did not hear the first part
of the presentation of the Senator from
Missouri. Did he discuss the origin of
this project? It was 6 years ago, was it
not?
Mr. EAGLETON. That is correct.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. There have been
changes and developments in the field of
missilery and antitank weapons, since
the project began which suggests to me
that ideas which had great validity then
may not be valid today. It may be ques-
tionable whether the concept of the su-
pertank is really valid now, in view of
the great developments, for example in
antitank weapons. In this bill itself, I
think, there are some 14 or 18 different
kinds of missiles, many of which are
missiles of a nature that could be used
against tanks; is that not correct?
Mr. EAGLETON. That is. absolutely
correct. In answering the Senator's ques-
tion, I should like to put it this way: I
shall dismiss this matter later in my re-
marks, but I am pleased that the Senator
brought it up now, because I think it is
currently germane.
Drawing on the very words of the Sen-
ator from Mississippi, when this program
was conceived in 1963, as the Senator
from Mississippi said, it was just an idea,
apparently, kicking around the Penta-
gon, that it would be good to have a
dream tank; just as there are a lot of
other dream ideas that kick around.
There are a lot of dreams that Americans
have in the domestic sector of life, and
as far as our cities are concerned, as
well; we are a dreamy country. But be
that as it may, this was a loose, amor-
phous dream idea that somebody had,
that we ought to build a better tank, a
better mousetrap, a super deluxe model,
and they started off on this 50-50 basis.
I think the Senator is eminently cor-
rect in his assessment of the change from
what may have been the conditions in
the world at that time. As the Senator
from Mississippi points out, this was con-
ceived as a tank primarily needed in
Western Europe. Certainly the condi-
tions that existed in 1945, at the end of
the war, or in 1950, or in the latter part of
the 1950's, and conceivably even up until
1963, are not necessarily the same as the
conditions of the world, or the nature of
possible warfare, or the nature of the
threat we face, or the severity of it, in
1969.
This is the dream, or the idea, or the
concept of 1963. Perhaps, without admit-
ting that it was relevant at that time, it
may be?and, indeed, in my judgment
is?irrelevant in the latter part of 1969,
so quick and swift are the changes in the
nature of the threat we face and the
changes in the nature of warfare.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I notice the Senator
says the cost is 21/2 to 3 1/2 times as much
as that of our most advanced present
tank, the M60A1. We had some hearings
in the Committee on Armed Services, I
think last year, which revealed that at
that time there were-6,000 is the figure
that rests in my mind?American tanks
for sale in Europe?tanks that were
obsolescent to the point of being obsolete.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. For sale by whom?
Mr. SYMINGTON. That is a good
question, and I would ask the Senator
not to press it. There were 6,000 Ameri-
can tanks available, let us put it that
way, available in Europe because they
did not meet the standards of European
potential warfare, although apparently
they did meet the standards of potential
warfare in other places.
With that premise, if the modern new
tank is a good tank, and we have another
better one close to production, what is
the reason we need this third even more
expensive and even newer tank?
Mr. EAGLETON. If I may answer the
Senator, I think his question goes to
the very heart of this issue. His premise,
which I know is not his own personal
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ugust 19d.9
belief, but is offered to get at this issue.
Our present tank force, with our prin-
cipal and most modern tank being the
1V160A1, is far from obsolescent; indeed,
according to the Stratton subcommittee
of the House Armed Services Commit-
tee?which just completed a few weeks
ago the most exhaustive analysis of
tanks, including the Sheridan, and what
has happened to them, why they work
and why they do not work?the M60A1,
currently deployed in Western Europe,
is equal to, or, in their judgment, supe-
rior to any tank that the Soviet Union
has deployed under the Warsaw Pact or
otherwise.
Let me quote, if I may, just briefly,
that part of the report.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Does that have to
do with the M60A1?
Mr. EAGLETON. Yes. it reads as
follows:
Since 1959 the M60A1 main battle tank
has been the mainstay of the Army armored
units in Europe and the Army currently
considers this tank equal to ,r superior to
Soviet-designed tanks . . .
The Stratton committee goes on to
point out the dilemma we eurrently face:
Not only did the Army fail to maintain an
adequate production rate of N160A1's during
the 1960's, but they slowed down the produc-
tion line and even closed it in 1,167 to produce
the M60A1E2, which still cannot be deployed
because of deficiencies.
U.S. armored capability vra; further de-
graded by the sale of /1/160A1's to countries
other than NATO allies between fiscal year
1964 and fiscal year 1969.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, at
one point fairly recently a decision was
agreed to between our Government and
the Government of West Germany, not
to pay for the location of our several
hundred thousand troops in Europe
through the purchase of military equip-
ment, rather to do so as the result of an
agreement between the two Governments
for the German Government to purchase
bonds of the United States.
Could it be that the difference in the
amount of research and engineering
work done on this particular military
development, the cost increase was be-
cause of that particular change of
policy?
Mr. EAGLETON. I am ready to confess
the Senator is getting into a rather
sophisticated industrial-military-Mone-
tary field that is a bit over my head.
However, I surmise that it could be quite
possible.
Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator sees
my point?
Mr. EAGLETON. Yes, I do.
Mr. SYMINGTON. It might be that
that would have something to do with it.
Otherwise, it would seem hard to under-
stand. But in any case, again my con-
gratulations to the Senator for this de-
tailed clear and thoughtful presentation.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. EAGLETON. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, con-
cerning the great changes being realized
in other areas, we were reminded the
other day during the ABM debate of the
great accomplishment of our astronauts
and scientists in getting to the moon.
I think there might be comparable
changes in areas of weapons develop-
ment.
I am under the impression, for ex-
ample, that the whole concept of the tank
may be incorrect. Tanks may be usable
to El Salvador or Peru. However, for the
kind of conflict in which this country
is likely to become involved, I raise the
question of whether the idea of the tank
is really appropriate considering the
sophistication of the military in other
types of weapons.
I am reminded of what the distin-
guished senior Senator from Missouri has
stated on other occasions about the air-
craft carrier. He has said that it is very
hard to understand why we are the only
country that seems still to be bemused
with building aircraft carriers. No other
cotintry seems to think they are impor-
tant enough to have even a small one
under construction. We have 15 major
aircraft carriers. Another one is pro-
posed.
The aircraft carriers are very vulner-
able, as I have heard the distinguished
senior Senator from Missouri say, to
modern weapons and various kinds of
missiles including air-to-ground
A ship armed with the missiles can stand
quite a ways off from an aircraft carrier
and hit it. An aircraft carrier is rather
big and a relatively easy target. It is pos-
sible to sink one $500 million ship with a
missile that costs $500,000.
The trouble seems to me to be the
great lagtime between the technological
dream the Senator spoke about and the
actual technological advances that come
about daily in fields such as missiles.
I looked at the very great number of
missiles described briefly in the report
on the pending bill. They involve an
enormous amount of money. I ask just
how seriously and how much in depth
we have considered the appropriateness
of the tank under modern conditions. In
what depth has that question been ex-
amined and by whom?
This is one of the weaknesses of these
programs as I see it. Once they get
started, they develop a momentum and
a kind of constituency of their own.
Everyone forgets about what the real
original purpose was. No one asks
whether the program is still appropriate
and whether it will serve a very useful
purpose when completed.
I wonder what the Senator thinks
about that aspect of the matter.
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I have
given the very question that has been
so articulately stated by the Senator
from Arkansas a great deal of thought.
And it seems to me that while dreams
continue to be dreamt by those who
would design new weapons systems,
sometimes the dreaming continues but
is unrelated to changes in facts and con-
ditions and situations that go on on
earth and not in the ethereal clouds. As
the Senator points out, not that it is in
the pending amendment, but presum-
ably it will be in some other measure
later, with respect to the concept of the
aircraft carrier, the Senator pointed out
that we had 15 aircraft carriers. Back in
the days of President Harding, when
they had the 5-5-3 conference between
the United States and Japan, they agreed
on some kind of a ratio, feeling that with
the 5-5-3 concept they would have 15.
They had them then, they have them
now. Presumably they will have them
30 years from now.
I am informed that the Soviet Union
has not built one aircraft carrier. We
have 15, and some people think we ought
to have more.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. There is provision
for another carrier in the pending bill,
and at a great cost.
Mr. EAGLETON. The Senator is cor-
rect.
Getting back to the specific issue with
respect to tanks, I perhaps would not
have questioned even this dream in 1945
at the conclusion of the war. Perhaps I
would not have questioned the dream or
idea in 1950. I think I would have been a
little concerned with the matter in 1963.
Obviously, I am questioning it here
today because the very nature, as the
Senator points out, of tank warfare
might have changed.
I call to the attention of the Senator
the 6-day Arab-Israeli war in 1367, in
which there were some tank engage-
ments. However, there was also air su-
periority on the side of the Israelis.
I am sure that the memory of the Sen-
ator is filled with pictures published in
the periodicals at the time of burnt-out
Egyptian or Arab tanks, dozens and
maybe hundreds of them.
It points out how vulnerable the tanks
are when air superiority exists.
I am told we have air superiority in
western Europe, and I hope that we do.
What are we dreaming about at this
time in 1969?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is my point.
Unless this has to do with possible fu-
ture engagements of this country?un-
less it gets into what Secretary McNa-
mara, Secretary Clifford and, I think to
a smaller or lesser extent, Secretary
Laird, have called posture statements?
unless we intend to intervene and try to
control by force smaller countries around
the world, it is hard for me to believe
that there is any use at all for this type
of weapon.
If we were to have a war with Russia,
which is the danger that concerns us,
what would we do with the tanks?
Would we ship tanks overseas for a war
with Ru.s.sia? The Senator knows such
a war would be a nuclear war and that
tanks would be utterly useless.
Mr. EAGLETON. That happens to be
my assumption.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Unless we continue
to follow the policy of the last adminis-
tration by intervening in places like the
Dominican Republic and Vietnam. How-
ever, our President has said that there
will be no more Vietnams, as I interpret
his statement made on his recent trip.
He said he had no intention of having
any more Vietnams, if he had a choice
and could avoid it, in small places like
Vietnam. He said that we would be of
help to them but would not intervene.
Perhaps a case could be made that if it
was going to help them, we ought to
make tanks for use in Cambodia and
other countries.
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If that is true, it may be that a very
much less sophisticated tank would be
more appropriate. I do not know
whether they could operate a dream
tank. It would take a super-duper
graduate of MIT to operate a tank as
complicated as this.
Mr. EAGLETON. This is the epitome
of tanks. It would be meritorious in the
Indianapolis speed race and would re-
quire a sophisticated wheelman.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I raise the ques-
tion, and it has been raised before?I
think the distinguished Senator from
Arizona raised it?that one missing link
in this whole program?and Congress is
partly at fault?is a real reevaluation of
what we call the mission of the Defense
Department. They have had missions, as
described, I believe, by Secretary Mc-
Namara, of a war in Asia, a war in Eu-
rope?full fledged, I presume?and a
semi-war in Latin America, all at the
same time. If we are going to agree that
their mission is that broad then we are
called upon to make available almost
every conceivable kind of weapon.
What the Senator is doing, and what
I am trying to do, is to raise the ques-
tion whether we should not reevaluate
what the mission is, especially in view
of these requests, which are now so
enormous.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. EAGLETON. I yield.
Mr. GOLDWATER. We were discuss-
ing on the floor one day what I believe
must be done before we can intelligently
talk about force structure or whether
we are going to have to be prepared for
the two-and-a-half-war theory?that is,
what we are going to do relative to our
responsibility, say, with the NATO
Treaty. Every one of these treaties?I
think there are 15 or 17?specifically
calls for us to go to war. If we decide
that we are not going to pay any atten-
tion to those treaties, we can forget all
about most of our major weaponry. But
if we are going to do as we have always
done and respect our treaties, then we
are going to need, for an interim period
at least, weapons like tanks.
The Russians are not downgrading
tanks. They have two with which they
are proceeding. I do not know how they
compare with this one. I have to say that
this tank has not had a happy history.
The development of it has not been as
rapid or successful as we would like
to have it.
But I add another thought that I think
will help the Senator in his thinking in
foreign relations. The Army had to drop
the new helicopter, the Cheyenne. The
tank people in the Army tell me that
when they get the Cheyenne, they can
forget all about tanks. It is going to
be the antitank weapon. Knowing what
I do about it, I can assure the Senators
that it will be the most effective anti-
tank weapon we have ever developed and
will serve the purpose of the tank.
As bad a record as this one has had,
and as expensive as it has been, it is
all we have.
I return to my opening remarks: If
we are going to respect our treaties?
and the major ones are on the continent
of Europe?I do not think the tech-
nology of war has developed yet to the
point that we can fight a land war there
without tanks. I do not think they are
worth a darn in Vietnam, for example.
On hard ground over there they can
operate.
I am glad of the opportunity once
again to urge upon the Senator from
Arkansas that his committee really take
a look into this matter.
Before I leave, I have the figures that
I told the Senator I would supply him
with; and as soon as I return, I will give
them to him.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. EAGLETON. I yield.
Mr. STENNIS. I think the Senator
should have a reasonable chance to finish
his statement, if he wishes.
On the question of mission, our pres-
ent obligation is along the lines of NATO,
of course. But a tank is a basic, funda-
mental weapon?NATO or no NATO. So
this would not just be thrown to the
wind if we should terminate NATO.
This is a doughboy's weapon. It is out
there where the man is fighting, in the
grime and in the mud. Our other tanks
are not faring too well. Soma are old,
and there are other complicated matters.
I do not think we can just charge this
off by saying we ought to change the
mission. Our present mission, anyway,
until changed, is along these lines; and
we are not going to run out of the use of
a tank now, although tanks of any kind
are not used much in Vietnam.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. EAGLETON. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not think this
is inconsistent. I raised this question, and
the Senator from Arizona has somewhat
confirmed it by saying that if the Chey-
enne can be made effective, it will make
the tanks obsolete.
What made the battleship obsolete?
We have many battleships, with a lot
of money in them, and they are con-
sidered obsolete. They used to be the very
backbone of the Navy, not too long ago.
That is all I am trying to say.
I raise this question: When it takes
6 years to develop a weapon, and in the
meantime technological changes are so
rapid, the original concept may well be
obsolete.
I was impressed by the arguments
made about Minuteman. It had not oc-
curred to me that the advance being
made in the accuracy of strategic missiles
is so great that it may be that a static,
in-the-ground, missile is becoming obso-
lete and it will have to be made mobile.
It may be that a mobile one is much
better than continuing to protect one
that is in the ground, if they do make
accurate weapons. It is just a matter of
technological advance. That is all I am
saying.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. EAGLETON. First, I should like to
comment briefly on some of the obser-
vations made by the Senator from Ari-
zona and the Senator from Mississippi
and to join, basically, in the sentiments
of the Senator from Arkansas.
I am not recommending?and I do not
think any other Member of the Senate
recommends?that we abdicate or abro-
gate our NATO commitments. Also, I do
not believe that the continuation of the
MBT-70 is the sole basis of survival of
NATO, any more than I think NATO
would crumble when the Pentagon uni-
laterally?and I praise them for it?
dropped the Cheyenne, unilaterally
dropped other weapons systems?the
MOL and others?and has disallowed
certain other dream concepts that have
not even been submitted to Congress but
have been vetoed in the Pentagon. NATO
did not crumble. It is not a question of
NATO going down the drain if we do not
have an MBT-70.
I recall and repeat what the Stratton
subcommittee of the House Armed Serv-
ices Committee said, and these are not
people who are either unknowledgeable
of or immune to the sensitivity of mod-
ern warfare. Their report on the tank
situation was that the M60A1, employed
in the NATO area, was superior to or
equal to any Russian tank under the
Warsaw Pact.
So this is not saying that we are going
to keep doughboys from having a helmet
or a gun or a hand grenade or even a
tank. We have plenty M60-A1's. The
problem is that if there was a mistake
in the efficacy of tank warfare, which, I
agree with the Senator from Arkansas,
is highly dubious, to say the least, in the
year of 1969?if there is a problem about
the efficacy and viability of tank war-
fare, it relates back to the decision made
earlier in the sixties when we had an
M60A1, when it was known to be a good
tank and an efficient tank and, with re-
spect to cost and production, to be a
proper utilization of public moneys. We
purposely slowed down on it and even
discontinued the production of it in 1967
for awhile, in a fantastic effort, a frenetic
effort, to try to develop a new tank. Then
the M60-A1-E2?I am not trying to daz-
zle anybody by a recitation of numbers
and statistics?was to be the dream tank
of that era.
Where is that? Perhaps the Senator
from Arkansas would be interested to
know. There are 300 chassis of M-60A2
tanks, like the chassis of cars, stripped
down somewhere on a parking lot in De-
troit, Mich. It is a boo-boo, it does not
work, and there it is. I have a lingering
doubt and certain expectation that may-
be 5 years from now, or 8 years from
now, if this bill is passed as it is, there
will be 800 chassis of the MBT-70. Per-
haps it will not be Detroit but maybe
Pittsburgh or Cleveland.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield on that point?
Mr. EAGLETON. I yield to the Sen-
ator from Mississippi.
Mr. STENNIS. Does the Senator know
the reason for the defect in those tanks?
Mr. EAGLETON. The Shillelagh sys-
tem is part of it, according to the Strat-
ton report.
Mr. STENNIS. But overall they tried
to move that vehicle too fast.
Mr. EAGLETON. The Senator is cor-
rect.
Mr. STENNIS. But now the Senator
complains about this one because it is
moving too slowly. I think it is one of
the points in favor of the tank that they
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August' 8, 1969
did not rim the red lights; they are per-
fecting this thing as they g 0. If it is ever
completed, it will be the hcst tank that
we or anyone else ever had.
I thank the Senator for yielding.
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, with
all due respect, my quarrel is not that the
MBT is moving slow. I want it to move
even slower; in fact, I want to put the
brakes on it; not wipe it out and not
completely do away with what has been
done so ineptly and put, it away and for-
get about it. All I am asking is that a
sober, reflective, dispassionate second
look be taken now in 1989 relating to a
decision made in 1963, bearing in mind
the enormous headaches developed in
this system and the enormous escala-
tion of costs that ensuetrin that period.
All this amendment ,pks is that the
GAO, the agency which the Senate voted
yesterday to assist it, mak c determina-
tion of workability of the defense sys-
tems and its analysis thereof, and that
the GAO be' given a chance for 6 months
to look into this matter. If A is given the
green light and they share the optimism
of others?and they are legitimate in
their optimism; I do not fault them for
it?they could go ahead.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HoL-
LiNos in the chair) . Doer the Senator
yield?
Mr. EAGLETON. I yield to the Sena-
tor from Oregon.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I would
like to inquire as to the preference of
the Senator from Missouri as to whether
he would like to discuss-these points as
we come to them in his fine presentation
or whether he would with to complete
his presentation at this lime before be-
coming involved in further colloquy.
Mr. EAGLETON. I ha' enjoyed so
much this exchange I had forgotten my
prepared speech.
Mr. HATFIELD. The Senator is only
on page 1.
Mr. EAGLETON. I would be glad to
yield to the Senator if the Senator
wishes.
Mr. HATFIELD. I would rather hear
the Senator finish his fine speech, which
I have had a chance to 'read, and then
ask the Senator a number of questions,
all of which bear on the information the
Senator has in his prettentation. After
the Senator has completed his presenta-
tion we could then engage in colloquy.
Mr. EAGLETON. I thank the Senator.
Mr. President, I belieVe that in My
prepared text I was at the point where
I began an analysis of the chart which
is still in the rear of the Chamber, and
I pointed out the escalated costs in terms
of research, development, and engineer-
ing. That is when the Senator from Mis-
sissippi and I had our brief exchange as
to the figures. I presume ue will have a
way to verify them later.
I shall now continue with my prepared
text.
Nor do these figures include enormous
expenditures for many of the MBT-70's
subsystems.
The figures on the board thus far re-
late solely to the MBT--10 itself, but it
has elaborate, complicated, and sophisti-
cated subsystems, including the Shil-
lelagh 152-millimeter gun system begun
under a 1959 authorization; over $30
million to Lycoming Corp. for research
and development on a turbine engine
not yet close to production; and addi-
tional expenditures for the acquisition
of a scavenger system needed to blow
burning residue left by combustible am-
munition from the weapons system.
In addition to R.D.T. & E., approxi-
mately $200 million is programed for
production engineering.
Mr. President, what this all boils down
to is that the unit cost of the tank is now
expected to be between $520,000 and
$750,000-21;2 to 31/2 times as much as
our most advanced present tank, the
M-60A-1. I believe these escalating cost
figures alone justify the study we pro-
pose.
Next, Mr. President, there is the
question of the tank's strategic rationale.
This is generally a part of the area dis-
cussed in the exchange with the Senator
from Arkansas, the chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Relations.
The MBT-70 was approved on the
basis of expenditure projections far be-
low those which have occurred, and time
schedules far better than those met.
Once approved, the project gained
momentum. It achieved a sort of self-
perpetuating justification as the Army
deemphasized alternative systems, thus
creating a greater need and urgency for
a new system than would otherwise have
existed.
The Army now justifies the MBT-70
because of the quantitative superiority of
tank forces in the Warsaw Pact as com-
pared with NATO. And yet this year's
House Armed Services subcommittee's
report briefly referred to in the Stratton
report, indicates that the M-60A-1 tank,
which is recognized to be equal or
superior to the Soviet tank, is not being
produced in quantity. That is, our best
current tank deployed, the M-60A-1
which is equal or superior to anything
Warsaw Pact countries have. We are not
producing it anywhere near close to its
potential. In fact, at the opposite end of
the spectrum, it is currently being-pro-
duced at a very minimal level. The result
is fewer tanks at a higher cost?about
$222,000 per unit.
The report states in part:
Since 1959 the M-60A-1 main battle tank
has been the mainstay of the Army armored
units in Europe and the Army currently
considers this tank equal to Ce superior to
Soviet-designed tanks.
Not only did the Army fail to maintain an
adequate production rate of M-60A-1's during
the 1960's, but they slowed down the pro-
duction line and even closed it in 1967 to
produce the M-60A1-E2, which still cannot
be deployed because of deficiencies.
U.S. armored capability was further
degraded by the sale of M-60A-1's to coun-
tries other than NATO allies?
Made reference to somewhat briefly
In the exchange between the Senator
from Arkansas (Mr. PULBRIGHT) and the
Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYM/NG-
TON) ?
between fiscal year 1964 and fiscal year
1969.
I should like at this point to quote an-
other portion of the Stratton report
which will put in precise words that
which I summarized in my answer, I
think it was, to the Senator from Arizona
(Mr. GOLDWATER) :
In its rush to develop the Sheridan and the
M60A1E2?
That is the one with all the unused
chassis in Detroit?
equipped with a Shillelagh guided missile,
the Army ordered mass production of these
weapons and their related equipment before
there was adequate assurance that the de-
signs were suitable and, in some cases, even
before production of fund requests had been
officially approved. The fear of loss of pro-
gram funds appears to be the principal ma-
son why the Army top management level
urged this mass production against the ad-
vice of qualified users and testing agencies
and personnel who had persistently at-
tempted to portray the true facts of their
sadly lagging development effort.
The Senator from Mississippi pointed
this out, and I am not suggesting or criti-
cizing past development of the Shillelagh
or the M-60A1-E2 tank because it was
too fast. But, yes, I do join the findings
of the Stratton committee. But I am not
saying now that we must go headlong,
full speed ahead, and emulate by repeti-
tion that which has already been proved
to be so tremendously expensive, if not a
financially catastrophic blunder, which
constituted the genesis of the Stratton
report.
Thus, the caution I am advocating in
this amendment is not to throw the whole
thing out, to abandon it, to ignore it or to
forget it. The caution I am recommend-
ing is for a 6-month analysis by the GAO,
which the Senator from Missouri (Mr.
SYMINGTON) pointed out on yesterday is
the watchdog for Congress, that the
GAO be given 6 months to take a look at
this item which has proved to be so
burdensome and difficult to cope with
since 1963.
Similarly, antitank weapons, which
are presumably an important part of our
response to the Soviet tank threat, have
apparently been given low priority. This
from the Department of Defense itself.
The MBT-70 is pushed, advocated,
urged, and given high priority, but the
antitank weapons, for reasons, frankly, I
am unable to understand, are given low
priority. Yet in the fiscal year 1969 De-
fense appropriations hearing, General
Miley, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for
Logistics, Programs and Budget, stated:
The Secretary of the Army postponed the
fiscal year 1968 procurement of TOW anti-
tank weapon for higher priority items The
$11 million for fiscal year 1968 provided a
minimum engineering service effort to insure
the availability of a production capability
for TOW in fiscal year 1969.
The sum of $11 zillion for fiscal 1968,
providing for a minimum engineering
service effort to insure the availability of
TOW, thus testified General Miley.
There is another antitank concept,
worked upon and researched, called the
Dragon. According to testimony before
the Defense Appropriations Committee in
the 90th Congress, it was stated that
there are no funds in that bill for the
development of Dragon. The main part of
the funds for the research and develop-
ment, training and evaluation?that was
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$141/2 million, in that instance?came
over from the fiscal 1968 appropriations
the year prior. Originally the appropria-
tion was $20 million but $5.5 million was
reprogramed to "higher priority items."
Mr. President, as a layman, and a
nonsophisticate in the art of warfare but,
hopefully, endowed with a modicum of
commonsense, I find it difficult to un-
derstand how it is that a vague idea of
a dream tank with highly complicated
and terribly sophisticated weaponry, with
ventilation systems, special superstruc-
tures, and the like, became such a high
priority item; and yet the anti-tank
weapons, those which can be mass-pro-
duced in larger quantities, with greater
deployability in terms of the man in the
field, or as he was referred to by the
Senator from Mississippi as the "dough-
boy," why those weapons that could be
given to the doughboy were given low
priority. It just seems to me it defies
commonsense. Perhaps there is a military
explanation for it.
So while the Army failed to produce
enough M-60-A--l's, it also failed to push
for antitank weapons?a curious pattern
of priorities which could lead one to ques-
tion the seriousness of the Soviet tank
threat.
After all, what this debate thus far has
been about, as the Senator from Arizona
(Mr. GOLDWATER) points out, has been
that we have our NATO commitments,
and we have to keep those commitments.
The Russians have tanks; we have to
have tanks. The Russians possess a seri-
ous-threat tank; we will respond by
building a bigger and better tank. If we
are concerned about Russian tanks in
the Russian pact, why is it that we put
a low priority on these weapons sys-
tems, the TOW and the Dragon, the anti-
tank weapons system that could be de-
ployed in the greatest abundance for
the men in the field. They would be a
combatant and retaliatory response to
the Soviet tank threat, if the Soviet tank
threat indeed be that enormous.
In any case, it is entirely pertinent to
ask whether the MBT-70, as it is now
conceived, is truly a necessary and effec-
tive means of countering the tank threat
in Europe?the point I think well made
by the chairman of the Committee on
Foreign Relations (Mr. FULBRIEBT).
This brings me, perhaps, to the core of
my argument?cost and effectiveness.
That is what the study we propose would
help both Congress and the Pentagon to
determine.
If we had unlimited resources, I guess
we could take a gamble on the MBT-70,
even if the stakes kept going up. But, as
every Senator knows?and it is driven
home more and more every day as the
session grinds on?we do not have un-
limited resources. We have lots of things
we would like to do but cannot do be-
cause our funds are limited.
We have a Projected yearly price rise
rate of 6.4 percent, the highest in 18
years. We know that inflation has driven
prime interest rates to a high of 81/2
percent. Therefore, we must exercise
prudence in Government spending of
public moneys, especially the least eco-
nomically productive type?military
spending.
Is the MBT-70 cost-effective? Mr.
Charles L. Poor, Acting Assistant Secre-
tary of the Army for Research and De-
velopment, testified before the Senate
Committee on Armed Services that it is
cost-effective. I will read what Mr. Poor
said:
There have been a large number of studies
conducted by the Army to determine the
cost effectiveness of the MBT-70, and I think
I can say without hesitation that all of these
studies indicate that the MBT-70 is a more
cost effective solution to the large number
of Warsaw Pact tanks facing us than any
other tank design that we have been able to
consider.
That is what Mr. Poor says on behalf
of his case. Let me say this about it in
response. The most recent computer
study of antitank warfare came to the
same conclusion. But the cost-effective-
ness calculation for the MBT-70, com-
pared with the proven M-60A-1 and
other weapons, was based on an ex-
tremely low and now out-of-date esti-
mate of the MBT-70's cost. The
M-60A-1, by contrast, was priced at a
high figure, apparently based on the
limited production policy now being pur-
sued. The fewer M-60A-1's produced, the
higher the cost per unit, the lower the
cost-effectiveness, and therefore the less
effective they are. So if we translate the
cost of the M-60A-1 per unit, we will
have a higher cost; but it is a poor com-
parison in contrasting it with the MET-
70.
It is my understanding that a very
small increment in the price of the MBT-
70 would make it no longer cost-effec-
tive. It would become less economical to
produce and use than other systems. I
am awaiting a report of the exact cost
figure at which the MBT-70 goes over
that line.
In this cost-effectiveness business,
there is a sort of magical line beyond
which an item becomes, costwise, inef-
fective and inefficient. It is my under-
standing that the MBT-70 is close to
that line. A small increment in its cost
and it would be over. I have asked for a
report on that and have not received it
yet. With the increased costs, delays, and
problems, perhaps it already has gone
over the line.
? We can surely build a better tank. I
do not dispute that, with our scientific,
technological, and generally creative
genius, given the money in unlimited
abundance, we could build a better tank.
I guess, when you get right down to it,
Apollo 11 proves that, under the most
optimum of circumstances, without the
intervention of other countries, or with-
out trying to thwart or stop it or resist
it or fool with it or foul it, the United
States has adequate?indeed, abun-
dant?creative potential to come up with
almost anything scientific, except a cure
for the common cold.
But the point is we do not have un-
limited funds, and for what purpose are
we going to build the MBT-70? For what
purpose will it be utilitarian in 1974 or
1975 or 1976, whenever it is produced?
We keep moving the date back. Originally
it was supposed to be in production in
1969. Now it is the mid-1970's. And at
what price?
The truth in answer to these questions
Is that the Senate does not know the
purpose or the need or the price.
Mr. President, our proposal is not en-
tirely original. The many problems and
doubts regarding the MBT-70 led the
Special Investigating Subcommittee of
the House Armed Services Committee?
that is the Stratton committee?to rec-
ommend recently:
The MBT-70 program should be reap-
praised and a report of finding made to
Congress prior to any further steps in com-
mitting funds to the production of these
tanks.
Representative MENDEL RIVERS' office?
and Representative RIVERS is chairman
of the House Armed Services Commit-
tee?issued this release on July 10, 1969,
in connection with the Stratton Army
tank report. Here is what Representative
RIVERS' office said in releasing this
report:
It is also recommended that no additional
Sheridans be sent to Vietnam until after all
major defects have been eliminated and that
the Main Battle Tank (the MBT-70) pro-
gram be reappraised before further funds are
committed.
That is the summary statement issued
by the office of the chairman of the
House Armed Services Committee, a man
intimately knowledgeable of military
matters, who says the main battle tank,
the MBT-70, program should be reap-
praised before further funds are com-
mitted.
Secretary Laird himself listed the
MBT among the problems inherited in
the Pentagon on January 20, 1969. Sec-
retary Laird said:
Many problems, large and small, have al-
ready been identified. They range from ob-
vious ones such as those connected with the
Pueblo, the TFX, and the Main Battle Tank,
to less visible ones such as?
Then he went on to recite some less
visible ones. Here is the Secretary of De-
fense, again one who came into this Posi-
tion not unsophisticated in terms of tile
operations of the Department, considered
to be one of the most knowledgeable
Members of Congress in Defense and De-
fense appropriation matters, and he said
three of the biggest problems he inherited
when he became Secretary of Defense
were the Pueblo, the TFX, and the MBT.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield for a question?
Mr. EAGLETON. I yield.
My. STENNIS. The Senator remem-
bers, does he not, that the same Secre-
tary he is talking about asked for $44.9
million in the last budget to continue
this research and development? That is
the same man the Senator is talking
about.
Mr. EAGLETON. The Senator is emi-
nently correct. The Secretary asked for
more than the Senate Armed Services
Committee recommended and the item
was reduced by $15 million.
Mr. STENNIS. We reduced it $15 mil-
lion.
Mr. EAGLETON. How do I explain it?
Mr. STENNIS. Yes.
Mr. EAGLETON. I have difficulty ex-
plaining?without using it in the sense of
derogation?what I classify as the po-
litical schizophrenia that is inherent in
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the Secretary's making a recommenda-
tion that we expend another $45 million
for R. 8z D., $24.5 million for production,
and so forth.
In his explanation that we ought to
do that?or his request that Congress
do that?he says that three of the great-
est headaches?problems?I do not want
to misquote him?he inherited were the
Pueblo, the TFX, and the MBT.
Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Sen-
ator yield?
Mr. EAGLETON. In a moment, after
concluding my response to the present
question.
I cannot understand it. I would like to
have the opportunity but it is not mine?
and I am not quarreling about that?
to specifically question the Secretary as
how he can justify these three incidents.
The Pueblo certainly was notour shining
hour. The TFX was considered to be the
calamity of this era, the millstone around
McNamara's neck; and then he includes,
gratuitously or not, the main battle
tank. How he then can recommend we
go ahead with it, without any second
look, I cannot understand: Perhaps some-
one can explain it to me.
I yield to the Senator from New Jersey.
Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I do not
know that I have an answer, but it does
seem to me there is something of a paral-
lel between the circumstances that the
Senator from Mississippi has raised with
the Senator from Missouri with regard
to Secretary Laird's position and the time
in, I think September or October of 1967,
when, after a magnificent speech point-
ing out how ineffective an anti-ballistic-
missile system would be, and giving all
the arguments against it, former Secre-
tary McNamara came up with a recom-
mendation for a so-called thin ABM sys-
tem?a nonsequitur, it seems to me,
comparable in many ways with the non-
sequitur which has been posed to the
Senator from Missouri here.
Perhaps the same explanations are
applicable broadly to each. They may
include political pressure, and perhaps
pressure from perfectly well-intentioned
industrial interests or professional in-
terests within the Pentagon; but in any
event, I do not think the Senator needs
to be, and I am not myself, embarrassed
by this inconsistency, because we have
seen it before.
Mr. EAGLETON. I thank the Senator
from New Jersey for that very appro-
priate and apt observation.
I would not speculate; it serves no
purpose to speculate whether conceiv-
ably, in my judgment, there could be
pressure from a contractor or political
pressure. Perhaps it could be this?and
this may well happen: We have many
systems and weapons; the Army Wants
Nos. 1 through 200, the Navy wants
Nos. 201 through 400, and the Air Force
wants Nos. 401 through 000. They each
want 200 items. So they have this give-
and-take process: "Well, I will give in
to you on this one, and let you go ahead
with this one, but I am going to put the
brakes on the Cheyenne. I will let you
go ahead with the C-5A, but I have to
call a halt on the MOL. Thus, by this
process of you give me a little and I will
give you a little, we will work out a pack-
age, and perhaps we can put on a har-
monious, smiling face and a unanimous
front in terms of making a considered
presentation to Congress."
There is give and take, I readily admit
to the Senator from New Jersey, in all
of life, and it is not being critical of
the military when I say that this kind
of horse trading or log rolling is perhaps
part of their existence. It is part of ours,
as it is apart of every human being.
Mr. CASE. There is no question about
it, and there is no bitterness or any at-
tack on motives or anything else involved
in the Senator's position or mine, or any
Senator's position, in regard to the mili-
tary. They are great people, doing an un-
imaginably difficult job, and we want to
be helpful in terms of protecting them
from their own inner stresses and ex-
cesses.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. EAGLETON. I am happy to yield
to the Senator from California.
Mr. MURPHY. Unfortunately, because
of an executive meeting, I have not had
the chance to hear the entire presenta-
tion of the distinguished Senator, but
as to the part I have heard, I might point
out, as a member of the Armed Services
Committee, that we did not approach our
duties on that committee, or at least I
did not see any evidence of it, on the
basis of any political considerations
whatsoever.
We were sent a list of weapons and
equipment that, in the judgment of the
military experts, was needed for the best
balanced defense of the United States,
and for the protection of its security.
There were many items that we ques-
tioned as to whether they were neces-
sary. We went into it very carefully, and
there were long discussions, for instance,
as to some of the different missiles. The
experts were there to point out the rea-
sons for the difference. We would ask,
"Why would not this missile do the
same job that the other one would do?"
We spent long hours going over such mat-
ters very carefully.
There are certain items that certainly
I, for one, was not completely happy
with. I was one of the earliest critics of
the TFX, which the Senator mentioned.
But unfortunately, through a series of
circumstances over the years, we have
not had too many new weapons models.
We have had lots of research and devel-
opment, but not very much building, and
we had to take what was in existence. It
was not always,' in my judgment, the
finest choice; it was, you might say, the
only game in town. That was what there
was; this was the choice, and you had to
develop it further, improve it, and hope-
fully finally get it around to doing the
operational jobs that the military felt
was important.
So this is the circumstance. I have the
greatest sympathy for the Secretary of
Defense, in dealing with some of the
conditions and some of the complexi-
ties that he found. Certainly he was
knowledgeable; he had served on the
committee of the House of Representa-
tives, but he was not in charge, and when
he assumed the job, along with the new
administration, he had to accept what
was there, just as our committee, when
we sat down to go over the requests and to
look at this bill, Which is the authori-
zation for military procurement, had to
accept the conditions that existed, and
there are many areas where there could
have been criticism.
But there are always two ways to make
an approach, negative or positive. We
could find fault forever; but I hope MY
distinguished colleague?who does not
seem to be extremely interested in what
I am saying; I hope I am not conduct-
ing an exercise in futility here, trying
to make an explanation.
Mr. EAGLETON. Oh, no.
Mr. MURPHY. As a member of the
committee, having spent many hours, I
feel that there was not any political con-
sideration. I have been in and around
the military, directly or indirectly, for
many years; and I think sometimes un-
fortunately they are given the blame for
things that are not their fault. I should
like to make the point that I am in com-
plete sympathy with the Secretary of De-
fense in the tremendous job that he in-
herited, with the conditions that he in-
herited, and I say, in the best judgment
of this committee, nonpolitically, with
full consideration of the absolute neces-
sity for the protection of this country,
this is the way, as far as I was able to
ascertain, the committee as well as the
military experts that appeared before
us honestly felt. I did not see any evi-
dence of a fellow saying, "Well, I have
a factory in my State which is going to
make some roller skates; therefore we
ought to buy them for the Navy." I did
not find any of that. I have found a lot
of it suggested. I have found a lot of it
suggested by innuendo, from time to
time. As with so many things in these
complex times in which we live, the im-
pulse is to dissent rather than try to put
together, and to put the emphasis in the
wrong place.
That was my purpose in rising. I
thank my distinguished colleague for
his courtesy in yield.
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I cer-
tainly thank the senior Senator from
California. I hope that by nothing I said,
either by spoken word or by inference or
innuendo connected therewith, did I im-
ply that there was any politics played
in Senate Armed Services Committee.
The Senator from New Jersey com-
mented on how the Secretary of Defense
could on one occasion identify the main
battle tank in the ignominious trium-
virate of the Pueblo, the TFX, and the
MBT70.
Mr. MURPHY. I think the Pueblo is no
longer relevant. I think that through the
judgment of the Secretary of the Navy
that was finalized.
I think there was a problem under the
new Secretary of the Air Force. I hope
that some of the things referred to when
talking about the main battle tank have
been very drastically changed and that
many of these elements that constituted
a problem 2 or 3 or 4 years ago are no
longer a problem. There has been a pass-
age of time and what he said on a cer-
tain day may no longer apply.
Mr. EAGLETON. I thank the Senator
from California. What the Secretary of
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Defense may have said a few months
earlier in 1969 may admittedly no longer
apply, so fluctuating are the justifica-
tions for programs, whether it be the
quick justification that we debated for
3 months as between the Sentinel thin
shield defense of the big cities as against
the mad Chinese to a couple of weeks
later?that was January 20?to March
14 when the President made his speech
on the thin protection of the land-based
ICBM's as against an attack by the not
so mad Russians.
Justifications change very quickly. I
think the point the Senator makes is an
important one. Justifications can change.
Conditions can change. Events can
change. However, the dream never does.
The dream is still the 1963 dream.
It was a dream they had lurking
around the Pentagon where someone had
said, "We want to have a better tank.
Maybe somehow, somewhere, we might
want one of those good old tanks.
So, in 1963 they were dreaming. And
they are still dreaming and dreaming an
evermore expensive dream?$303 mil-
lion now. God knows what it will be a
year from now.
They are still dreaming. As the Sena-
tor from California said, times change,
and what Secretary Laird meant when
he said that the three greatest headaches
were the Pueblo, the TFX, and the main
battle tanks may have changed.
How would the Senator like tc be in
that company? As little as I think of the
MBT-70, nothing I have said before or
will say in these remarks would dispar-
age it as much as the Secretary of De-
fense himself did by associating it with
the Pueblo and the TFX.
The Senator from California now says
that things have changed and that what
the Secretary said about the Pueblo is
no longer in effect. The bumper stickers
are off the cars. The TFX is all straight-
ened out, and the MBT-70 is all straight-
ened out. That is a pious hope which, in
my judgment, will never be realized.
I revert to my text.
In an exclusive interview with George
Wilson, of the Washington Post, the
Secretary expressed dismay at the
amount of gadgetry which has resulted
in expensive breakdowns and repairs on
the MBT-70. This was an interview with
Mr. Wilson. It was later than the one
previously quoted. I am sorry that the
Senator from California had to leave
the Chamber.
He may think that the MBT-70 is
hunky-dory today. However, he did not
think it was good when he put it with
the Pueblo and the TFX, and when he
was talking with Mr. Wilson of the Wash-
ington Post. He wondered if we need all
these extravagant MBT-70 devices when
the Russians get along well with simpler
equipment.
That is not the Senator from Missouri
talking or the Senator from Oregon or
anyone else who is advocating the pend-
ing amendment. This is an interview with
the Secretary of Defense who, as has
been pointed out by the Senator from
Mississippi, recommends going ahead
with the MBT-70 despite the fact that
he associates it with the Pueblo and the
TFX.
In July, 1969, issue of Government
Executive, General Betts, the man in
charge of this from a programing point
of view, stated:
The most important problem is that we
have given it a great deal of . capability and
that means a very expensive vehicle. The
problem is whether we have put more in this
vehicle than we require. The toughtest ques-
tion is whether we really need everything
that's in this tank.
This is not the proponent of the
amendment talking, but the general in
charge of the program. He wondered, as
I wonder, whether we need everything
that is in it. Is it programed properly?
Do we need it at all? I ask.
General Betts went on to say:
While we continue to test'it, we will also
continue to analyze whether to give up
some of the things that are in it. It doesn't
have to have a combination of several weap-
ons systems as it does now. It doesn't have to
have all of the integrated computer-con-
trolled fire control that it does now.
Of course, we cannot have our cake
and eat it, too, as someone once said. We
cannot justify the MBT-70 by dream-
ing about it and saying we will have all
of this sophisticated gadgetry, this dual
fire system, the Shillelagh, the 152 mm.,
and the fire control where, if there is a
nuclear explosion, the hatch can be
closed and we will live in isolation, some-
what analogous to the astronauts, but
not quite so roomy.
We cannot have all that gadgetry and
find out it is too expensive, and then ask
a rhetorical question, as the general does,
and say we have to strip some of this out.
We will be back to where we started with
the M60A1.
We cannot propse this tank as the ulti-
mate, as the desired objective with its
great sophistication and its great com-
plexity and then strip it of that which
makes it different and makes it pre-
sumably utilitarian and then go forward
with it. When you leave it, it will be
little better than the existing tank ex-
cept that the costs productionwise are
infinitely more expensive.
The Battelle Memorial Institute is
making astudy for the Defense Depart-
ment of MBT-70 components in an at-
tempt to make the system more cost
effective. There may well be some
changes in components and design, de-
pending on the findings and DOD's will-
ingness to adopt them.
I want to make this clear. I am getting
close to the end of my remarks and to
the end of my voice.
The amendment we offer today would
not in any way prejudge the fate of the
MBT-70. It would strike out $30 million
under research and development and
$24.5 million under production-based
support which would be used for manu-
facture of prototypes. That is my under-
standing of what the item basically con-
sists. It would prohibit further author-
ization until after a full investigation by
the auditing arm of Congress, the Gov-
ernment Accounting Office.
These are our auditors. As the senior
Senator from Missouri pointed out, this
is the one agency of Government that is
sort of ours. We cannot be suspicious of
them or fear them or be resistent to
them. They are our creatures. They are
not under the control of the President.
The Comptroller General is appointed
for a term of 15 years. He is immune ex-
cept for malfeasance or nonfeasance. He
is immune from the pressure of the Ex-
ecutive. All we ask in the amendment is
that our auditors, our watchdogs, be
given a chance to examine this item
afresh, to examine it from a point of
view to which perhaps it has never been
subjected since its inception in 1963.
Let me add at this point that to do this
would not be turning this system over to
a bunch of nonknowing, philosophical
eggheads. The GAO already has worked
in analyzing this system. Their efforts
and their endeavors were instrumental
to the Stratton subcommittee, which, as
has been quoted so often, went into the
basic question of tanks, more specifically,
the Sheridan, the Shillelagh, and what-
have-you, with passing reference to the
MBT-70. But the GAO is a well-trained
and experienced professional and com-
petent group which has systems analysts
who not only would do this study ob-
jectively, but also, based on the past per-
formance they rendered to the Stratton
subcommittee, are, by actual fact and by
case example, equipped to do the job.
So we ask in this amendment to have
four questions answered by the Comp-
troller General. We ask for 6 months in
which to have the questions answered.
First, why research and development
costs estimates have had to be revised
steadily upward since 1965?again re-
ferring to the chart in the rear of the
Chamber.
Second, whether the MBT-70, consid-
ering its revised estimated production
costs, will be the most effective weapon
to meet the contingency for which it was
originally planned.
Third, whether the strategic projec-
tions made in 1963 with regard to the use
of the MBT will still be valid when it.
finally becomes available for use. That is,
will it be obsolete as the result of ad-
vanced technology and new strategy?
Again, this has reference to the questions
and the comments of the Senator from
Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT) .
Fourth, whether there are more feas-
ible and less expensive alternatives to the
development of the MBT-70.
The amendment requires the Comp-
troller General of the United States to
submit the results of his study and in-
vestigation, together with such recom-
mendations as he deems appropriate, to
Congress not more than 6 months after
the date of the enactment of this act.
Mr. President, we do not ask that the
MBT-70 be completely and summarily
canceled. This we do not ask. In 1963,
when it was conceived, the production
date was geared to be 1969. We are in
1969. The production date is now esti-
mated to be some time in the mid-seven-
ties, 5 years or more away. We ask only
that, in view of this 5-year delay in pro-
duction, in. view of the increase in the
research and developnient costs, in view
of the extremely high projected per unit
cost, in view of the improvement in mo-
bile, cheap, and effective antitank weap-
ons, and in view of the changing role of
the tank in modern warfare?in view of
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all these things, which, to mc at least, are
legitimate questions, but in the aggre-
gate make an abundant case?that the
Comptroller General make a complete
and thorough 6-month study to see
whether a course that was charted in
1963, under dreams and ideas perhaps
appropriate at that time, is justifiable,
either scientifically, technologically, mil-
itarily, or economically, in 1969.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. EAGLETON. I am pleased to yield
to the junior Senator from California.
Mr. CRANSTON. I thank my fellow
junior Senator, the Senator from Mis-
souri, for initiating a prohine examina-
tion of one aspect of the military au-
thorization measure before the Senate.
This sort of careful study Is essential to
the well-being of this country, to insure
that we have the defense- apparatus we
need and that we do not spend money on
a defense apparatus we may not need.
Frankly, I have not made up my mind
as to this amendment and the value of
this tank. Some cynical citizens think
that nothing is ever deterinined by fact
and logic in the course of a debate in the
Senate. I bear witness to the fact that it
Is, because my vote will be determined by
what I learn, in the course of the debate
In the Senate, from those who support
this amendment and from those who do
not.
I am concerned about the inflationary
aspects of the defense lancleet. We are
being asked to support an extension of
the surtax not only for the remainder
of this year but also for a further period
of time to deal with inflation. One way
to deal with inflation is to have the
tightest possible defense budget; and I
am not convinced at the present time
that all items, including this one, in the
defense budget are necessary. I should
like to ask the Senator a few questions
that relate in part to this aspect.
First, are we contaibutine at present
one-half of the cost of maintaining the
NATO defenses in Europe?
Mr. EAGLETON. I wish I had at my
fingertips, or based on immediate re-
search, all the answer to the legitimate
and probing questions of the Senator
from California.
I do not know, in terms of dollars ex-
pended, whether we are maintaining half
the cost of NATO. It would be my guess
that we are, but I do not avant to attest
to it.
Mr. CRANSTON. At any rate, it is a
very high percentage.
Mr. EAGLETON. It is a very high per-
centage, I think we are safe in saying.
Mr. CRANSTON. One fact I do know
is that the cost of U.S. troops in Ger-
many is running, for us, to the tune of
$850 million a year. There is that much
drain on the balance of payments in this
period of inflation.
This leads me to question whether we
should build tanks for a type of war that
is unlikely ever to occur. I want to hear
the case for this tank and. the threat of
that kind of war from the chairman of
the committee when he 'impends to the
Senator's amendment.
I wonder whether the Senator has any
comment on the validity of the threat
that we might find ourselves involved in
a conventional or a tactical nuclear war
in Europe, whether that threat is so grave
that we need this sort of tank?
Mr. EAGLETON. I consider that to be,
again, a very wholesome question. I am
aware that the Senator from California
was away from the Chamber, attending a
hearing of the Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare on an educational bill
that is of vital importance to the Nation.
While he was at the committee meeting,
an exchange took place between the
chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations (Mr. FULBRIGHT), the Senator
from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER), and my-
self, and, in part, also the Senator from
Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) ?and perhaps
other Senators?on this point, on this
fundamental question.
I asked, at the end of my sp.ssch,
Whither goest the tank? The Senator
from Aranksas (Mr. FULBRIGHT) pointed
out that tanks may well be the bell-
weather of success ih El Salvador and
Honduras; they may be indispensably
necessary in Haiti, where Dr, Duvalier
may well need them, to stay in power.
They may well be needed in other areas,
too.
But, at best, I can only pose the ques-
tion. It is one of the questions that I, as
a freshman Senator?just as fresh as the
junior Senator from California?want
the General Accounting Office to answer.
I do not pretend to be endowed with
all the innate wisdom and experience
that are necessary to make a highly so-
phisticated answer to the question; but I
think the question is legitimate. When
one who is as experienced as the Chair-
man of the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, who has been a Member of the
Senate for many years and has seen dif-
ferent wars come and go and different
threats come and evaporate?when he,
based on that experience, wonders
whether the tank is a viable force of
modern weaponry in Western Europe
under conditions that obtain in the year
1969, at least I have to wonder, at least
I have to ask the question and search for
the answer. I need the assistance of the
Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS),
I need the assistance of the senior Sen-
ator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON),
men who have devoted their lives to the
effort of providing an adequate, proper
defense.
I need the assistance of the General
Accounting Office and of the Battelle
Institute, which have made studies.
These are questions that ought to be
a..sked. That is all I am asking in my
amendment. I can only ask the question.
It is easy to ask questions. It is the easi-
est thing in the world to cross-question
oneself. But when an item has been im-
bued with delay; is perhaps not of timely
essence; is not a make-or-break propo-
sition, that we have to have tomorrow,
I should like to have an answer to the
question.
I was against the ABM and opposed
to those who said we could not wait be-
cause it was important that we have it
in connection with forthcoming talks on
limitations of armaments. That may be
so. But no one can say that this item
is of immediate essence. It has been de-
layed 5 years now. It was supposed to be
produced in 1969, but it will not be pro-
duced until 1974 or 1975. I hope that will
not be the case.
These are the questions we ask. We
ask that we be given 6 months to permit
our investigators, our accountants, in
the General Accounting Office, an arm
of Congress, to take a look at this
proposal.
Give us 6 months. I ask that of the
Senator from California who is not com-
mitted on this vote, and who approaches
the matter, as much as any other Sena-
tor, on a factual basis without a knee-
jerk reaction. Because of his experience
as a comptroller, he has an analytical
and precise approach. That is the na-
ture of his thinking. He served in Cali-
fornia, and it was part of his job to
analyze the pros and cons of proposals,
although, of course, not weapons systems
in a State organization. He did deal with
other systems and methodology, and he
was able to make a dispassionate, in-
formed, unemotional judgment based on
known facts, worthy assumptions, and
the like. All I am asking of the Senator
from California and other Senators is
that the entirety of Congress, all 100
Senators and 435 Representatives, be
given the benefit of the kind of dispas-
sionate analysis that the Senator from
California would give a system. I ask
the Senator from California to make the
kind of judgment that he would make
back in California or the kind of judg-
ment of this system he would now like
to have given by the Comptroller Gen-
eral, Mr. Staats, and his staff.
If we were saying in this amendment,
"Knack out all the money?period," I
would not support it. I could not have
enough knowledge, as a lawyer from the
State of Missouri, to know if this is the
right thing to do. I am frank to admit
I am not that knowledgeable on this sub-
ject. But I do ask that we net spend any
more for a moment on this painstaking
and tortoise-like tank. All I ask is 6
months. I ask that the Senator from
California join with me; nothing more.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. EAGLETON. I yield to the Senator
from Mississippi.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the Sen-
ator has been very generous in yielding.
I understood the Senator to say that he
would not favor knocking out all the
money for this item from the bill.
Mr. EAGLETON. No. I said if the bill
contained lines 1, 2, 3, and 4, the money
items, and did not contain the rest of the
items that call for study by the GAO, I
would not support the bill.
Mr. STENNIS. The amendment of the
Senator does take the money, all of it out
of the bill, for this tank.
Mr. EAGLETON. The Senator is cor-
rect, and for this limited purpose, for this
limited period of time.
Mr. STENNIS. For 6 months. Is that
correct?
Mr. EAGLETON. That would be the
length of the study.
Mr. STENNIS. The Senator knows he
would be taking the money out until
there is another authorization bill and
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appropriation bill, which is ordinarily 1
year.
Mr. EAGLETON, The Senator is cor-
rect.
Mr. STENNIS. That is correct.
Mr. EAGLETON. But there are excep-
tions, I understand, to the appropriation
process, whereby a supplemental appro-
priation could come in.
Mr. STENNIS. That is not ordinarily
done, and there could not be money
transferred for this purpose, because
when the appropriation is cut out, the
artery is cut that gives it life.
Does the Senator know that this oper-
ation would close down and stop by Sep-
tember 30, and that the people who are
there would no longer be employed, cer-
tainly not in that project? To start it up
is not like lighting a fire. You would have
to get men who are qualified and get
them back on the job and get it fired up
in that way.
I am told by people who have experi-
ence that taking this money out, as pro-
vided in the Senator's amendment, would
cost about 2 years' time. So, when the
Senator said he would not be for it if we
just took the money out, I wanted to
question him on that point because it
does take the money out and there is no
life left in it until there is a recommenda-
tion or congressional action, signed by
the President.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. EAGLETON. I shall yield, but first
I wish to respond to the Senator from
Missisippi because, I think his point is
an interesting one and goes to the heart
of this matter. The amendment would
strike from the bill $30 million and
another $24.5 million. The Senator is
correct that during that period there
would be a discontinuation of expendi-
tures on these projects.
The Senator is correct when he
states?I take his word for it, and it
makes commonsense to me?that by
September 30 the money would run out
from previous appropriations and many
persons would be reassigned and some
would lose their jobs. It is quite possible.
The GAO study would take 6 months,
if it were the kind of green light the
Senator from Mississippi would want to
see. I know he has some lingering mis-
givings about this program, and he so
stated. I think on the day he made his
initial presentation on this measure, the
manager of the bill said, "I have about
lost patience with this situation." That
is what he said in referring to the MBT-
70. So I know he has some misgivings
and would like to see a greater certainty
In this situation,
Perhaps it would be less than 6 months
because perhaps someone either at GAO
or elsewhere with previous experience
with tanks such as the Sheridan or the
MBT-70 or with the Shillelagh weapon
system could do it sooner. I would be
glad to make it 3 months or 2 months. If
they come back and give the green light,
I would then join with the Senator form
Mississippi and say I would support a
new authorization and new appropria-
tion.
I am not a perfectionist, nor do I be-
long to that group which is experienced
in the craftsmanship of legislation. Per-
haps it might be wise to leave some
money in, putting the brakes on it, until
the GAO study comes in and perhaps
gives it a green light and opens it up to
let the money flow. I am not that good at
drafting legislation. Maybe there is a way
to draft it based on the experience of
others.
I guess it was curious happenstance
that this amendment came on the
heels of the amendment agreed to
Yesterday, which had been introduced
by the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr.
SCHWEIKER) .
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Missouri yield?
Mr. EAGLETON. I have a great train
of thought going and I do not want to
get off it for the moment.
It was perhaps a curious happenstance
that the sequence of events occurred that
way, but to me this could be a magni-
ficent sort of test case as to whether the
amendment adopted yesterday was pru-
dent. I know that the Senator from Mis-
sissippi had serious misgivings about it.
My senior colleague, for whom I have
the highest personal respect and who
perhaps knows more about military mat-
ters than any man I? have been privi-
leged to know, also had serious misgiv-
ings about the Schweiker amendment.
To me, this could be an important and
impressive test case as to whether what
was done yesterday by the Senate in
agreeing to the Schweiker amendment
calling upon the GAO to give Congress
assistance, analysis, and recommenda-
tions, will work.
Perhaps the Senate made a mistake
yesterday. I was paired in support of the
Schweiker amendment because it made
sense to me, although to Senators like
Mr. STENNIS and Mr. SYMINGTON, and
others?the amendment was adopted by
a margin of only one vote?it did not
make sense.
Let us test it out. Here is the best way
I know to test it out. This is a case in
point. This is a nonvital case in point.
Time is not of the essence. Time is with
us. This is one weapons system where
3 months, if the GAO can do it that
quickly, or up to 6 months, it will not
make us, break us, or defeat us.
I am now happy to yield to the Sena-
tor from California.
Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the Senator
from Missouri for yielding to me. He
referred to the amendment adopted yes-
terday relating to the GAO and I wanted
to ask one or two questions in relation to
it. Part of my concern about that amend-
ment was its relationship to the need
for the GAO to be independent and ob-
jective in evaluating the programs. I
was convinced that the GAO might be-
come too deeply involved in these pro-
grams and I wondered how objective its
reports would be, and whether we would
be able to rely upon them for the advice
and counsel and the expertise that we
want in relation to costs.
This leads me to wonder about another
aspect of the Senator's amendment. He
spoke in a very kindly way about my
own background as a State comptroller.
My background as a State comptroller,
and that of most State comptrollers, 1
am sure, deals with costs, with analyses
of those costs, but not necessarily with
the value of specific programs. Such
judgments are left at least in California
and elsewhere, I am sure, usually, to ex-
ecutive experts in those fields, where
there is a legislative body, to the experts
among the general membership in that
legislative body. In relationship to the
four things the Senator asks the GAO
to do in his amendment, and specifically
to item 1, "Why research and develop-
ment cost estimates have had to be re-
vised steadily upward since 1965," Am I
correct in assuming that this relates
specifically to the cost estimates relating
to tanks?
Mr. EAGLETON. Relating not just to
tanks, let me say to the Senator from
California, but specifically, I mean, to
the MBT-70?that particular and spe-
cific program.
Mr. CRANSTON. This tank?
Mr. EAGLETON. Yes.
Mr. CRANSTON. It seems to me that
is obviously an appropriate task for the
GAO to perform. I want to ask why, in
the second, third, and fourth items,
which the Senator wants the GAO to
perform in his proposed amendment,
why the GAO would be particularly
qualified to report to us on the effective-
ness of any particular weapon and on
relating this to strategic projections and
new strategies and to alternatives not in
terms of cost but in terms of perform-
ance of the MBT-70?
Mr. EAGLETON. Again, to me, that is
a very profound question. Perhaps it
could only emanate from one who has
had the experience of the Senator from
California serving as a State comp-
troller. I think in his definition of duties
and responsibilities in California he of
course relates the facts as they apply
to his office, and I dare say the vast ma-
jority of State comptrollers would as well.
But I think he too narrowly assume or
Identifies his prior experience and the
nature of the duties of his office pre-
cisely with that of the Comptroller Gen-
eral of the United States. He circum-
scribes the capability and performance
potential of the Comptroller General.
The office of the Comptroller General,
as I would understand it, is not one made
up of personnel who are adroit only at
figures and can balance a ledger, can
tally a sheet with assets and liabilities
and see whether something is in the black
or in the red. That takes talent. That
Is not the limit of their talents, however.
The best proof I can give to the Sen-
ator from California as to the capability
of the GAO to work in this area, and spe-
cifically to work on tanks, and even more
specifically to work on the MBT-70, is
that they have already been doing that
work. They did it for the Stratton Com-
mittee. They were a major portion of the
investigative arm that supplied the
Stratton Committee with its most per-
suasive and compelling findings of the
$1 billion in waste in connection with the
operation and deployment of the Sheri-
dan and Shillelagh systems. Proof of
the pudding is that they have done it.
If it is unwise for them to do it?yet this
they did, and it was not done yesterday,
It was passed on with authorization of
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S 9468
the Senate, they have clone this before?
it would be the subject of new remedial
legislation to circumscribe and prohibit
the Comptroller General of the United
States. I for one, would not support that.
I think the Comptroller General can ren-
der to us and should render unto us that
which the Bureau of the Budget renders
unto the President of the United States
and the executive branch.
Mr. Mayo is not just a bookkeeper. He
is not there just with pencil and paper
with lines on it and columns, adding up
figures. He and his analysts go to the
Pentagon?not enough, in my opinion,
and in the opinion of the Senator from
Ohio?to try to examine the efficacy and
the legitimacy needed for weapons sys-
tems. They do that. The Budget Bureau
does that for the executive. The Comp-
troller General has been doing that for
the legislative branch?to wit, the Strat-
ton report; and, in my jud.,ment, should
continue to do it. I know they are
equipped to do it on the 1VIBT-70 because
they have already done part of the work
on it.
Mr. CRANSTON. Did the Senator con-
sult with or get the views of the GAO in
regard to its ability to perform these
particular functions?
Mr. EAGLETON. I will turn that ques-
tion over to the Senator from Wisconsin
to answer. That is in his specific area of
expertise.
Mr. PROXMIRE. The Senator from
California has asked the Senator from
Missouri whether the GAO indicated its
position on whether it could make this
investigation?
Mr. CRANSTON. Yea, whether these
particular duties, particularly 2, 3, and 4,
In the amendment, are duties which the
GAO is equipped to perform and is pre-
pared to perform.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I will certainly find
out the answer to that. I have staff or
the Joint Economic Committee looking
into that. They have not told me specif-
ically whether the GAO feels it is quali-
fied to do this, but I would be surprised, if
they were not able to provide data on
which Congress could decide. I think the
record of the GAO indicates that they
can do this kind of thing and that they
have done this before.
Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the Senator
from Wisconsin. I have two more ques-
tions I should like to ask the Senator
from Missouri. Was one of the reasons for
trying to alleviate the friction between
the United States and Germany the bal-
ance of payments problem we face, due
to our troops being in Germany and the
desire to develop a cooperative project
relating to NATO that could possibly
contribute toward alleviation of those
frictions?
Mr. EAGLETON. That would be rather
speculative on my part. I do not know
that the origin of the agreement back
in 1963?the $80 million., 50-50 agree-
ment?has ever been pinned down pre-
cisely. I did ask, in an unclassified hear-
ing, about this matter. I do not want to
put words in the mouth of any particular
officer. There were three or four officers
present, a general, a colonel, a major,
and a civilian. One of theinen in uniform
put it this way: Back in 1963, the Federal
Republic of Germany had shown tech-
nological expertise. They are talented
people. It was a two-heads-are-better-
than-one approach. This was a novel
idea. As one man put it?and I have
nothing better to say on in?let Ger-
many, with its scientists and contrac-
tors and its people, go full steam ahead
on the engine work, especially, and other-
wise, and let our people go full steam
ahead. Two heads are better than one
and perhaps we will come up with some-
thing better than if we did it all by our-
selves or Germany did it all by herself.
That is what I recall being said to me
in that unclassified portion of the
briefing.
Mr. CRANSTON. If this tank is some-
thing that some experts believe is needed
to defend Western Europe, would it not
be the better course for the Europeans
to build it and pay for it?
Mr. EAGLETON. Earlier this day the
Senator from Louisiana, chairman of the
Senate Finance Committee (Mr. Loam),
and I had a brief exchange on the agree-
ment with respect to the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, and he was at least on
the border of answering the question
asked by the Senator from California.
If it can be shown that it is an effec-
tive tank, the details of who will build
it and the question of the importance of
our balance of payments, have to be de-
cided by other people. But we have to get
over the hurdle of whether it is needed.
I know I for one, and I know the Sen-
ator from Louisiana, would be tremen-
dously happy if West Germany or Bel-
gium, of any of our other NATO al-
lies would show greater Interest in
developing and beefing up and expanding
their weaponry, whether it be land, sea,
or air, and could take a greater burden
of their own defense and thereby relieve
us of the expenditures and the balance
of payment problems that are caused
by the maintaining of over 200,000 of
our troops in Western Europe. I for one
would applaud that. I would love to see it.
I would like to see our troops brought
home, and to let our allies take care of
themselves. We would continue to pledge
our aid to the NATO countries. When, as,
and if needed, we would send help, under
our NATO obligations.
Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the Senator
from Missouri for his detailed and help-
ful and careful work on this matter.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield on the point the Sen-
ator from California has raised with the
Senator from Missouri?
Mr. EAGLETON. I yield.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I first want to say
that we recognize that the General Ac-
counting Office has over 2,900 profes-
sional auditors and accountants and
staff people who have devoted their lives
to inquiring into Government agency
practices. Second, 42 percent of them,
according to Mr. Staats, have been work-
ing on defense analysis.
So these are the experts, these are the
qualified professionals, in the best posi-
tion to give us the kinds of answers the
Senator from Missouri's amendment
Calls for.
As far as conclusions are concerned,
however, we have to make them, and we
should. I do not think it would be proper,
I do not think the GAO would presume,
to tell us whether the MBT-70 is the
most effective weapon to meet the con-
tingency for which it was planned. That
is not their job. Again and again they
have been reluctant to do that. But they
will give us facts and information and
cost effectiveness, and we make up our
own minds, as the Senator knows.
In all these questions there may be
value judgments or strategic judgments
of this kind. They cannot make up our
minds for us, any more than the mili-
tary men can make up our minds for
us. The military men can give their rec-
ommendations in this area, but nobody
pretends that they should make the final
decision.
The distinguished Senator from Cali-
fornia is a former comptroller of the
State of California. He knows all an
auditor or accountant can do is give us
the facts and the data and the informa-
tion; but that is not available now, and
the Senator's amendment would make it
so.
Mr. CRARSTON. I thank the Senator.
Mr. EAGLETON. Before yielding to
other Senators, I wish to make this point
to the Senator from California. I shall
be brief. I know he must leave. I have
some data, dated July 9, from the Comp-
troller General of the United States, ad-
dressed to "Dear Senator EAGLETON." It
is a report prepared by the U.S. General
Accounting Office, the statement of
Harold H. Rubin, Associate Director, De-
fense Division, and so forth. And there
is a brief report that that agency has al-
ready made what is admittedly a sketchy
report on the MBT-70, the main bat-
tle tank.
I ask unanimous consent to have
printed in the RECORD the last 2 pages,
labeled B-1, and B-2 from the report of
the Comptroller General of the United
States.
There being no objection, the ex-
cerpts were ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, RS follows:
MAIN BATTLE TANK (MBT-70)
The Main Battle Tank (14:13T-70) , currently
being developed under a Cooperative Tank
Development Program between the United
States and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, is designed to utilize the Shillelagh
missile and the 152mm combustible cartridge
case ammunition. Development of the MBT-
70 was initiated under this program by an
Executive Agreement signed between the
governments on August 1, 1983. This agree-
ment provides that the total costs of the
program will be shared equally. In view of
the development status of the MBT-70, and
the considerable degree of slippage it has ex-
perienced, we considered It prudent to con-
centrate our efforts on the Sheridan and the
M60A1E2 tank, deployment of which was
more imminent.
RESPONSIBILITIES
The Office of the U.S. Program Manager
and Project Manager, US/FRG Main Battle
Tank, was established by Army Material
Command General Order No. 52, effective Au-
gust 15, 1983. As Project Manager, he re-
ports to the Commanding General, AMC. As
U.S. Program Manager, he is the U.S. mem-
ber of the international US/FRG Main Bat-
tle Tank Program Management Board, and
as such, reports to the Chief of Staff, United
States Army, and is governed by policy and
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progPam guidance issued by Headquarters,
Department of the Army.
1VIBT-7 0 OBJECTIVES
The MBT-70, which is intended to replace
the M60 and the M48 as the standard main
battle tank, will be employed against armored
f :rmations and all other types of land war-
fare targets including infantry elements of
a modern army. It is intended to provide a
night firing capability with improved relia-
bility and durability, reduced maintenance
requirements, improved weapons, and a sig-
nificant increase in ballistic protection.
MBT-7 0 COMMONALITY
The MBT-70 is designed to be armed with
the Shillelagh missile and the 152mm com-
bustible cartridge case ammunition common
to the Sheridan and M60A1E2 tank, and is
intended to use an automatic loading device
which is the key to a three-man crew con-
cept. However, the automatic loader is de-
pendent upon the acceptability of the am-
munition combustible cartridge case which
will be discussed in detail subsequently.
CONCLUSION
Unless deficiencies in the combustible car-
tridge case ammunition are corrected, it is
reasonable to assume that the MBT-70 will
experience difficulties similar to those of the
Sheridan and M60A1E2 tank.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. EAGLETON, I yield.
Mr. STENNIS. I appreciate the Sen-
ator's yielding to me. I want to make a
very brief statement on this subject. I
think the Senator is making a fine pres-
entation. My remarks are not directed
at him at all.
Mr. President, the question arises here
about keeping the bill moving. I am a
great believer in the proponent of a bill
or of an amendment having a full chance
to present his case. I want to go on rec-
ord every day as being among those who
want this bill to move along. I know tre-
mendous amounts are contained in it.
The bill involves our men in Vietnam
and our future military program. It is
highly important that this bill move be-
yond the Senate as soon as possible. The
House will have to pass a bill. It will have
to go to conference. All those matters
take time. It has to come back here be-
fore the Appropriations Committee can
move on it.
Sc, I am ready to agree to a time lim-
itation on this matter. Let us let other
Senators who want to speak come in and
say what they want to say and, if pos-
sible, get a vote on the amendment this
afternoon. I hear a rumor going around
that there is not going to be a vote this
afternoon. This is an important matter,
but, still, it is just one matter in the
bill, and if we cannot get to a vote on it
in a day, I think it is just tragic. I im-
agine the Senator would be willing to
agree to something along that line.
Just one other thing. I appreciate the
Senator's yielding to me. He yielded
largely for questions. We just cannot go
on and on letting any Senator who
wants to walk in and make a speech on
the matter by getting the Senator who
has the floor to yield to him. The rules
of the Senate provide that the Senator
can yield only for a question. This is not
directed to the Senator from Missouri.
So, to make the bill move, the day may
come when I shall have to object to
yielding except for real emergencies or
for questions.
I thank the Senator for yielding to
me. When he has finished, I will propose
an agreement.
Mr. EAGLETON. In response to the
distinguished Senator from Mississippi,
may I say I am not prepared at this
time-.and I am not trying to foot-drag--
to agree to any time limit. In addition to
myself, there are cosponsors, the Sena-
tor from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD) , and five
other cosponsors, who are mentioned on
the amendment, including Senator
MCGOVERN, Senator Moss, and Senator
YARBOROUGH. I OD not want to unilater-
ally, on my own, foreclose them from the
fullness of any participation they would
like.
Mr. STENNIS. The Senator should not,
and I would not quickly agree, either. I
shall have to consult with other Senators.
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. EAGLETON. I yield to the Senator
from Ohio.
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President,
first, I desire to congratulate the distin-
guished junior Senator from Missouri on
his excellent speech in support of the
amendment he has offered, cosponsored
by other Senators.
In answer to the question from the dis-
tinguished junior Senator from Califor-
nia, the Senator from Missouri adverted
to the NATO Alliance and to our troops
in Western Europe. Is it not a fact that of
all the NATO powers, the United States
is the only one which has entirely ful-
filled its NATO commitments?
Mr. EAGELTON. I thank the Senator
from Ohio. He has never been accused
of being prone to understatements, but I
must say with all deference that that is
an understatement. We have not only
fulfilled all our commitments, we have
overfulfilled them. NATO is U.S.A.-
NATO.
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. That is correct.
Now, regarding the MET-70, that is sup-
posedly a joint United States-West Ger-
man project for a heavy tank, designed
to operate sometime in the 1970's, in
the event of a tactical nuclear war in
Europe.
Supposedly, there is built-in protec-
tion for the crew against the contami-
nants of nuclear war. However, testimony
has revealed that beyond limited protec-
tion against the hazards of nuclear radi-
ation, the design is certainly not accept-
able for operations in any nuclear war.
We are in agreement on that, I am sure.
Mr. EAGLETON. I concur fully with
the Senator from Ohio.
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. The Armed
Services Committee, as I recall, wisely
recommended a reduction of $14.9 mil-
lion on that item, and I voted for that
reduction in the committee, as I am cer-
tain did the distinguished senior Senator
from Missouri, the colleague of the Sen-
ator who now has the floor.
Mr. EAGLETON. May I respond to the
Senator's statement at that point?
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Yes.
Mr. EAGLETON. The Committee on
Armed Services cut out that $14.9 mil-
lion with this comment, as the Senator
will recall, referring to the MBT-70. It
said:
This program has been experiencing dif-
ficulty for some years, and the committee
now believes that a reorientation of the pro-
gram is in order.
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Yes.
Mr. EAGLETON. What I am trying to
do is to help with that reorientation, to
get our expert advisers in the GAO to
help us with that reorientation.
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. I an certain that
the senior Senator from Missouri, the
Senator's colleague, who is one of the
senior members of the Committee on
Armed Services and one of the most
highly respected and most knowledge-
able members of that committee, concur-
red in that reduction, and I know the
junior Senator from Missouri is voicing
the views of his distinguished senior
colleague on that subject.
We did not feel, in the committee, that
the results of early research and de-
velopment justified the Pentagon's bud-
get request. Nevertheless, more than $54
million remains in the bill we are now
considering for research and develop-
ment, and for production base support,
for this Main battle tank.
The fact is that the engine, the trans-
mission, the suspension, and auxiliary
equipment are being manufactured by
West German companies. That is a fact,
Is it not?
Mr. EAGLETON. Significant numbers
of the components, especially with re-
spect to the engine, and I presume other
components as well.
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. This is almost
a quarter of a century following the end
of World War II, and still at this time,
300,000 men of our Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Marines are stationed in
Europe, and along with them are 255,000
dependents. Of course, as the Senator
knows, those officers there, at least field
grade officers and general officers, never
had it as good as they have it now, with
their dependents, their servants, their
automobiles, and their travel throughout
Europe. That is all a great expense to our
taxpayers, and we are trying to curtail it.
Since April 1963, I have spoken out
here in this Chamber urging withdrawal
of most of our troops from Western
Europe. If there is any real danger of
aggression from the Soviet Union in
Western Europe, it would be far better
for our taxpayers if we would have our
young draftees, say on a 13-month tour
of duty, in Western Europe, instead of all
those divisions made up mostly of profes-
sional soldiers stationed in Europe, living
like squaw men with their families.
Would it not be far better if those di-
visions were brought home, or sent on to
the Pacific? If we have to be involved in
a civil war in Vietnam, why should they
not be sent there instead of draftees with
only four months of training?
I am sure the Senator agrees with me
that the threat of military aggression by
the Communists against Western Europe
is not as it was in the time of Stalin, and
has in fact all but vanished. The present
rulers of the Soviet Union are no longer
rattling their missiles toward West Ger-
many. The Soviet Union is no longer a
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1969
have-not nation; its leaders now appear
principally dedicated to the objective of
raising the standard of living of their
own people.
It is the nuclear umbrella of the United
.States that provides the real protection
for Western Europe and West Germany,
and not our ground troops there, cer-
tainly. Does not the Senator agree with
me that it is not the large number of our
ground troops in Western Europe, or the
MBT-70s, that are protecting Western
Europe?
Mr. EAGLETON. I think that is cor-
rect.
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Of course, we
have the capability of airlifting, as the
Senator knows, a combat-ready divi-
sion from the United Sates and having
them in the field in Western Europe
within 24 to 48 hours ready for action.
We know that.
Mr. EAGLETON. Absolutely; and that
would save vast amounts of money; and,
as the Senator well knows many learned
observers on the military scene, both
professional and civilian, seriously ques-
tion our massive military presence In
Western Europe?by massive I mean in
terms of the enormity of the number of
troops with, as the Senator says, their
dependents, et cetera, and the great fi-
nancial drain. They question, first,
whether militarily it is needed; and
economically, we know the drain it im-
poses upon us, not only taxwise but bal-
ance-of-payments wise.
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. And does not
the Senator from Missouri agree with
me that having them there is nothing
more than foreign aid to West Germany
in disguise?
Mr. EAGLETON. It is foreign aid
through the back door.
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Yes. And the
West German Government and the West
German people do not need that foreign
aid from us, because they are prosperous
now as never before; is Tflot that a fact
also?
Mr. EAGLETON. One of the most
prosperous nations on Garth, with the
most solvent economy and the strongest
monetary system.
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Is not the con-
tinued production in West Germany of
the MBP-70, simply another form of
foreign aid in disguise from the tax-
payers of America?
Mr. EAGLETON. I perhaps would not
adopt the full phraseolotv of the Sena-
tor; but it is certainly an economic shot
in the arm to West Germs ny that they
can do some work on this tank. The
Daimler-Benz people and the others are
certainly not going to be losing any
money on it, and it is certainly highly
questionable whether this country will
get anything out of it that will be useful
or needed.
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. And it is only
maintaining and building up their mili-
tary-industrial complex?
Mr. EAGLETON. It is tertainly help-
ing their industrial complex.
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. -Should we not
not delay the further development of the
main battle tank until the Comptroller
General of the United States has an op-
portunity to report to Congress on the
parcticability and cost effectiveness of
this mighty complex system?
Mr. EAGLETON. I could not have
Put it better myself. Those are words
from Heaven.
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Well, I sort of
stuttered on that "cost effectiveness" and
"practicability"; but we are in agree-
ment, are we not?
Mr. EAGLETON. Completely, on that
point.
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, I
have a final question to ask of the dis-
tinguished Senator from Missouri. I ask
whether the Senator agrees with me that
there is only the most remote possibility
that there would ever be a limited nu-
clear war long enough in duration, or
any nuclear war long enough in dura-
tion, for these main battle tanks to be
of any use whatever?
Mr. EAGLETON. It is highly ques-
tionable. If there were a limited nuclear
war, I think the tanks would be among
the first to go, and then next would be
the aircraft carriers. I do not know how
limited "limited" is in a nuclear war. I
think it would be a matter of a few sec-
onds, minutes, or hours. It would be a
terribly short period of time with a lim-
ited nuclear exchange, if the Senator is
talking about an exchange between the
United States and the Soviet Union. The
very essence of the situation escalates
and is something horrendously gigantic.
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. It would be a
matter of moments.
Mr. EAGLETON. The Senator is cor-
rect.
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, I
again compliment the distinguished Sen-
ator from Missouri.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that I may yield to
the distinguished Senator froth Arizona
for a few moments without losing my
right to the floor.
Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, reserv-
ing the right to object, and I certainly
shall not object, the custom of having
someone hold the floor and farm it out
for speeches when other Senators are
waiting to get the floor has gone about
far enough,. I am certainly not going to
object at this time.
I want to serve notice that I shall be
objecting and very sharply to any of
these arrangements, and I shall call for
the regular order. However, I would like
to say while I am on my feet that some of
us expected we were going to work last
night and today. It was even intimated
that we would work Saturday.
The people back home are not going to
view with very much enthusiasm the
Senate's recessing for 3 weeks in the
middle of this crucial defense bill.
We were going to work. Nothing hap-
pened. Nothing will happen today. Quite
obviously, we are not going to work Sat-
urday. Everyone knows that on Wednes-
day half of the Senators will be going to
Los Angeles to welcome the astronauts.
When is the Senate going to work?
Mr. President, I do not object.
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I yield
5 minutes to the distinguished Senator
from Arizona without losing my right to
the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
CRANSTON in the chair). The Senator
from Arizona is recognized.
Mr. (X)LDWA Mr. President, yes-
terday evening figures were inserted in
the RECORD by the distinguished Sena-
tor from Tennessee (Mr. GORE) and the
distinguished Senator from Arkansas
(Mr. FULBRIGHT) Which I questioned and
for which I promised I would have an
answer today. I am sorry that neither
gentleman Is here. It is difficult to know
when one can get the floor. So, one can-
not make dates.
Mr. President, efforts are being made
in some quarters to convince the Ameri-
can people that President Nixon is pot
living up to his commitment to bring
25,009 American fighting men home from
Vietnam by August 31.
In doing so, those involved in this at-
tack are deliberately mixing apples and
oranges.
They are comparing current figures of
manpower totals in Vietnam to those of
last January, even though the President
did not commit himself to troop reduc-
tion until June 8 at Midway. Let me read
just what the President said on Midway
regarding the withdrawal of American
troops:
As a consequence of the recommendation
by the President?
President Thieu, that is?
and the assessment of our own Commander
in the field, I have decided to order the im-
mediate redeployment from Vietnam of a
division, equivalent of approximately 25,000
men.
This troop replacement will begin within
the next 30 days and will be completed by
the end of August.
Mr. President, my colleagues should
note that the President was talking about
about 25,000 men, not exactly 25,000.
I made some inquiries into that figure
because I recognized it as being substan-
tally more in number than the average
American division.
So that my colleagues might have a
better understanding, I point out that a
figure of approximately 16,000 is gener-
ally used for an infantry division in
Vietnam. However, a division force,
which is a division plus supporting forces,
is approximately 40,000. So, the 25,000
figure is more than a division, but less
than a division force.
Mr. President, President Nixon was
talking not about early August but about
end of August. These are the facts.
But supposing the President were talk-
ing about troop figures of last January,
there is still a valid explanation that
applies.
The Pentagon uses two figures on
troop strength in Vietnam. Actual
strength and programed strength. Both
are valid.
Programed strength is an absolute. It
is the number of men the services can
put into Vietnam. Actual strength is the
number of men actually there. This
varies as troops are rotated.
By the end of August the Defense De-
partment expects to have a programed
strength in Vietnam of 524,500 compared
with the previous programed strength of
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549,500. This is a reduction of 25,000 in I doubt the wisdom, I might say to the Senator from Pennsylvania did a mar-
programed troop strength. Senator, of picking out system by system velous job on his amendment, under
Of course, actual troop numbers will by system and seeking to correct it. I difficult circumstances, with strong op-
fluctuate under this reduction in pro- think perhaps the approach of the dis- position, as we all know. Today, we have
gramed strength just as it has before. tinguished Senator from Pennsylvania a followup by another new, young Sen-
But the approximate number will be yesterday was a better way to get at this ator. In the first case it was a Republi-
around 515,000 by the end of August, problem. can Senator and in this case a new,
compared to an average strength during Mr. EAGLETON. I agree somewhat young, Democratic Senator who is also
fiscal 1969 of 540,500, again this is a de- with what the Senator says. By my indicating his remarkable ability. The
cline of about 25,000 just as President amendment and that of the Senator common thread here, of course, is that
Nixon promised. from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD) we are not they are both aiming at the same thing,
Mr. President, in their eagerness to trying to superimpose our judgment, our and that is to make the military ac-
expertise, because I think both of us countable, to make it possible for us, as
would be candidly to say that we are Senators, to know when we vote on
the
not as scientifically or militarily trained on that as are the Pentagon or Members military budget what we are voting on.
I ask the distinguished Senator from
of the Senate who have made their life
the study of these matters, such as the Missouri if it is true that costs since
1963 on this tank have risen over 500
distinguished Senator from Mississippi.
percent.
The very thing we are asking for in
Mr. EAGLETON. According to the
this amendment is what the Senator figures
pointed out. We are asking for the first we have, that is the case-500-
test case of the Schweiker amendment. plus percent.
I must say that prior to the Senator
What better way can we prove whether
Cham-
what was done here yesterday, by a from Wisconsin coming into the Cham-
narrow vote, over the strong objection ber, the chairman of the Committee on
of some very able people?including my
own senior colleague, Senator SYMING of
Services, the Senator from Mis-
sissippi, had figures supplied to him by
ToN?was a wise move, than by saying the Defense Department that might be
different. We are trying to verify it. My
to the GAO, "We give you 6 months."
find
came from the Defense Depart-
I am willing to cut that, if I can ment through a colonel whose name I
out from the GAO that they can do it
quicker-2 or 3 months. "Take a look at supplied. We are trying to reconcile it.
According to the figures in the chart, the
this thing, as you already have done in
part for the Stratton committee, when Senator is correct.
looked at the Sheridan and the Mr. PROXMIRE. The chart shows the
you l
Shillelagh, and you gave a look on the increase in Cost, which began at $40 mil-
s lion, a total of $80 million?$40 million
side at the MBT-70. Take a look at this
for the United States and $40 million for
thing and report back to us."
I think it was happy coincidence that Germany. Now they have gone to about
$230 million for the United States.
the Eagleton-Hatfield amendment came
i Mr. EAGLETON. It is $227 million for
n the wake of the Schweiker amend-
the United States and $80 million for
ment, because this gives us a wonderful
Germany, or thereabouts.
opportunity to test out the wisdom. of
Mr. PROXMIRE. Is it true that the
that which was done yesterday.
We may find in a 2- or 3-month , purposes for which this tank was origi-
period, based on what the GAO does?if nally designed, originally conceived,
have changed
I would say to the Senator from Kan- they do it sloppily or ineptly?that what
Mr. EAGLETON. They have changed
sas that if tanks are needed, if there is was done here yesterday was a mistake?
a massive threat of being outtanked by a mistake that is rectifiable either on immeasurably.
the Warsaw Pact, we have and are pro- the House side or in conference. Forty- The chairman of the Committee on
ducing at a painfully slow pace, at a very six Senators yesterday thought it was a Armed Services, the Senator from Mis-
minimal rate, the M60A1. mistake; 47 did not. Perhaps the 46 were sissippi, pointed out that the purpose of
As I stated earlier in the debate, ac- right. We have a perfect way to find the tank was unidentifiable almost at
cording to the Stratton subcommittee of out?a laboratory case. I keep heark- the beginning. It was an idea in 1963. I
the House Armed Services Committee, it ening back, because I think it is vital, to call it a dream. He calls it sort of an
is equal to or superior to any Russian this one weapons system whose history idea, a vague idea that was kicking
around the Pentagon. So I do not know
tank that is part of the Warsaw group. proves that time is not of the essence.
that in 1963 it had any purpose except to
So I have a general doubt, and I know
It is 5 year overdue now, and another
the Senator from Arkansas does, asbuild a dream tank.
2 or 3 months, unlike the arguments
others do, about tanks in general. How- advanced in the ABM debate, are not Mr. PROXMIRE. When the Senator
ever, quite frankly I have not had the ex- vital or potentially catastrophic. says "a dream," does he mean the idea
perience the Senator from Kansas has Mr. PEARSON. I thank the Senator. was to build a faster, stronger tank, with
had in military matters. But I have very Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will a lower silhouette, a tank that would be
technologically superior to the tanks now
little doubt about the MBT-70. It is an
Edsel. Mr. EAGLETON. I yield.
the Senator yield? but with no new strategic mission?
Mr. PEARSON. I should like to re-
spond to the Senator in this manner. Mr. PROXMIRE. I have some ques- Mr. EAGLETON. If the Senator will
tions for the Senator, but first I should bear with me, I should like to get a pre-
I am not sure that I have any competency
like to commend him on a remarkably cise quotation from my speech. Either
to make a judgment or a statement as
to the necessity of this particular tank, fine speech. I especially commend him General Betts or General' Burba, or
but I have a conviction as to the neces- on his responses to the questions that somebody who had something to do with
sity of tanks themselves, have been asked him. He has been ask ed this tank in its growing stage and in-
This is a fairly sad and sorry story questions that have tested him from ception stage, said?I have it here. It
in relation to this particular tank system. every angle, and I think his responses was General Betts, the Army Director of
Research and Development. He said:
The Senator seeks to correct it and seeks have been most convincing.
For the first estimate we did not have a
to attack it. We have a multiplicity of I think the Senate and the country design. We did not have any really detailed
illustrations we can bring out from the are - fortunate that in the last 2 days idea of what would go into the tanks so
Senator's mention of today in his very we have had a vision of the future. Yes- the early estimates were very summary in
excellent presentation. terday, the distinguished, young, new
make hay out of any possible mistakes,
or variances or changes, too many per-
sons who should know better, are shoot-
ing from the hip.
I suggest that they at least wait until
the end of August before they begin
blasting away at those who are trying
so desperately to rectify the costly errors
of the last 8 years.
Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. EAGLETON. I yield.
Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, I voted
against the anti-ballistic-missile system.
I did so because of the questions of the
reliability costs, and the arms race, to-
gether with the question of necessity.
The question I put to my distinguished
colleague and neighbor from Missouri
today is whether he is convinced?I
might say that I am?of the necessity
for the construction and deployment of
the main battle tanks, the necessity of
the system, the necessity of a tank as part
of the overall symmetry of power we
need, measured together with the nu-
clear umbrella and the conventional
forces and our guerrilla trainees.
Mr. EAGLETON. I have lingering,
gnawing agonies and general doubt as
to the need or necessity of tanks in gen-
eral.
I do not have much doubt personally
as to the need for the MBT-70. Ido not
think we need it.
?
nature.
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That is what he said, and I take him
at his word.
Let me add to that, on the same line
and consistent therewith, Maj. Gen. Ed-
ward J. Burba, who was formerly the
head of the MBT-70, said in 1967 in the
Armed Forces Management magazine:
For the first time in the history of modern
tank design, the designers of the MBT were
given carte blanche to optimize basic design
configurations into which :hey put the best
scientific engineering know-how.
They were given carte blanche to "go
out boys and build us something, some-
thing dreamy." That is about the way I
understand it.
Mr. PROXMIRE. What has been the
expressed need for this tank? What has
been the expressed put pose for it? What
is it supposed to do?
Mr. EAGLETON. It-is supposed to off-
set the growing tank threat of the Soviet
Union and the Warsaw powers in West-
ern Europe. That is the alleged purpose
of it.
' Mr. PROXMIRE. It is to be used in
what kind of warfare?
Mr. EAGLETON. Ina limited warfare.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Nonnuclear?
Mr. EAGLETON. Nonnuclear warfare.
It presumably can be used in nuclear
warfare. It might lend itself to that type
of warfare. It is much faster, much more
maneuverable. That is, if it would work,
it would be all these things. But, basical-
ly, it would be used in a limited warfare;
and if we got into a limited nuclear
war?which is a concept with which I
have always had difficulty. I do not feel
that it would remain lhnited very long?
I am talking about a matter of hours.
Mr. PROXMIRE. What evidence does
the Senator have that tanks may be-
coming less useful and perhaps obsolete
because they can be hit? What is the cost
difference between an offense and de-
fense on tanks? In other words, what
would be the cost to develop weapons
that could knock out tanks?
Mr. EAGLETON. The cost effectiveness
of this particular MET-70 is priced-be-
tween $520,000 and $750,000. per tank.
That is not the cost for the entire group
of them, but for one bulk. The range de-
pends on how many are produced. If
mcire are produced, of course, the cost
goes down.
The cost effectivenessl of this particular
item, I understand, is very close to the
breaking point, and perhaps going over
that point, where it will-not be cost effec-
tive because of the development of other
weaponry, including antitank weapons.
Here is a quotation from General
Miley, talking about the Tow, which is
an antitank weapon:
This is our new Tow antitank weapon. You
can see the wires that guide it coming out
the tubes and they will kM any known tank
in the enemy inventory.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Does the Senator
have the cost of that wetpon?
Mr. EAGLETON. I donut have it, and
I believe it has not been publicly dis-
closed. I shall try to get the information.
Mr. GOLDWATER, Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. EAGLETON. I yield.
Mr. GOLDWATER. It runs in the na-
ture of $7,000 to $9,000.
Mr. EAGLETON. The Tow. The Sen-
ator from Arizona has said that the cost
is $7,000 to $9,000 per weapon. I thank
the Senator.
Mr. PROXMIRE. The Senator from
Arizona is very helpful.
This means that a $7,000 to $9,000
weapon could knock out this one-half
million dollar tank. Is that correct?
Mr. EAGLETON. That is my under-
standing.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I would like to ask
the Senator another question.
Mr. EAGLETON. I wish to add there
is another weapon called the Dragon. It
is designed to fill the Army need for a
certain type weapon. It is launched from
a tube without recoil. This is a system
which can be operated by one foot sol-
dier. That system is not operable.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Is it not true there
has been an investigation of this tank
by a special investigating subcommittee
of the House of Representatives; that
the study recommended the MBT-70
program should be reappraised and a re-
port finding made to Congress prior to
any future steps being taken? Was not
this recommendation made by the sub-
committee of the Committee on Armed
Services in the other body? Is this not
what the amendment of the Senator
would accomplish?
Mr. EAGLETON. Absolutely. And that
is precisely a quotation from the report.
I quoted earlier from the statement of
Representative MENDEL Rrverts, of the
House Armed Services Committee, in
which he pointed out it was his recom-
mendation that we stop on this thing
now and take a long hard look at it. This
comes from a man who obviously has
enormous experience in weaponry.
Mr. PROXMIRE. A man who certainly
has not been soft on providing adequate
armed forces.
Mr. EAGLETON. Precisely.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Is it not true that
Secretary of Defense Laird has raised
some very serious questions about this
particular tank and has classified it along
with the Pueblo and the TFX as an area
in which we may have dismally failed?
ing for us. They are people we can trust.
They are ours. If we cannot trust the
GAO to do the kind of job we want
we are in terrible shape. They are be-
holden to no one but us. I would not be
afraid to let them help make this de-
cision. We hurt ourselves when we deny
ourselves that opinion.
Mr. PROXMIRE. This impressed me
more than any other quotation. General
Betts is the head of Army Research and
Development. Is that correct?
Mr. EAGLETON. The Senator is cor-
rect.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Is it true that Gen-
eral Betts said the problem is whether
we put more into this vehicle than we
require? The toughest question is wheth-
er we need everything that went into this
tank.
Is it not true that this argument made
by the most expert man we have in the
Department of Defense in this area would
suggest an investigation, a 6-month in-
vestigation by the General Accounting
Office would be extremely helpful to us
in resolving whether we should go ahead?
We have the Secretary of Defense, the
people from the House Armed Services
Committee, we have General Betts, all of
whom raise very serious questions about
this tank. Under these circumstances it
seems to me logical that the amend-
ment of the Senator from Missouri is
sound, sensible, and necessary if we are
going to really insist We know what we
are doing when we authorize these large
SUMS.
Mr. EAGLETON. We have not only
General Betts, who is not certain what
gadgetry should go into this, but we also
have these other opinions. The GAO re-
port would not only help us to decide
but it might help General Betts. It would
give him an analysis and help him de-
cide as to the coat-effectiveness for some
of these things, such as whether there
is ventilation and whether then can close
the lid on the Shillelagh, and all of these
gadgetry items.
Not only do we have Representative
RIVERS expressing misgivings, and the
report linking it with the Pueblo and the
Mr. EAGLETON. The Secretary, to my TFX?and I am not trying to embarrass
knowledge, on two occasions publicly, the distinguished Senator from Missis-
and maybe on other occasions, has so sippi?but I go back to his statement,
classified the MBT-'70. In one case he for when he presented this bill he said, "I
compared it with the Pueblo and the have about lost patience with this situ-
TFX as being an inherent millstone. ation," referring to the MBT-70.
Later on, in an interview with the We all know the Senator from Missis-
Washington Post, he expressed the opin- sippi to be a patient man. Maybe he
ion that delay in gadgetry would result would like to have the report of the
in delay of the MBT-70. He wondered if General Accounting Office to determine
we need all the MET-70 devices when the whether his patience has been warranted
Russians get along with simpler weapons, and justified or whether the continuing
I shall quote at this time from Repre- faith he has had in this program has
sentative RIVERS' office when he released been overextended.
the Stratton report. Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will
It also recommended that no additional the Senator yield for one further point?
Sheridans be sent to Vietnam until all major Mr. EAGLETON. I yield.
defects had been eliminated and that the Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I
Main Battle Tank 70 program be reappraised would like to say to the Senator from
before further funds are committed.
New Hampshire (Mr. COTTON.) and the
That statement comes from the chair- Senator from Mississippi (Mr. Sezrons)
man of the House Armed Services Corn- that I agree wholeheartedly with them
mittee. That is a pretty impressive sign that we should move this bill along as
to stop, look, and listen; not to discon- fast as we can. At the same time I feel
tinue or throw away or scrap but to take very strongly it is imperative that we
a look for a limited period of time with discuss this question in detail. I think
the GAO doing the looking and listen- Senators must agree that this debate has
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been completely germane discussion. I
have been around here a long time and
I have heard a great deal of irrelevant,
nongermane debate on many issues. In
colloquy with the Senator from Missouri
and other Senators, they have not been
talking about irrelevant matters, even
though it would be easy to tie other
things in with this problem on tanks but,
by and large, during the entire discus-
sion, when other Senators were interro-
gating the Senator from Missouri, the
subject has been germane and pertinent.
Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, in view
of the fact that the Senator referred to
the Senator from New Hampshire, will
he yield to me?
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
SPONG in the chair) . Does the Senator
from Missouri yield to the Senator from
New Hampshire?
Mr. EAGLETON. I am pleased to yield
to the Senator from New Hampshire.
Mr. COTTON. I wish to agree em-
phatically with the distinguished Senator
from Wisconsin that the discussion to
which we have been listening has been
not only germane but also most enlisten-
ing and most helpful.
I wish to compliment the distinguished
Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON)
for the very able presentation he has
made on an important subject, a sub-
ject on which he is well informed and
about which he feels most deeply. I
agree wholeheartedly that any point in
this bill upon which the defense of this
country depends should be explored and
should be handled with care.
But, Mr. President, at some time, on
my own time, I shall have a few observa-
tions to make and I would like to make
them on my own time. They could not
possibly take more than 8 minutes. I
should like to inquire?and this is not
in the way of being sarcastic?whether
the distinguished Senator from Missouri
could give us a general idea as to when
the floor will again be open for Senators
to address the Chair to seek recognition.
Will it be 4 o'clock, 5 o'clock, 6 o'clock,
or will it be on Monday? Or when?
Mr. EAGLETON. Relating to the
pending amendment?
Mr. COTTON. I mean relating to the
bill?again, this is not any reflection
upon anyone.
Mr. EAGLETON. I understand.
Mr. COTTON. I am talking about the
control of the floor by the Senator from
Missouri. Does the Senator from Mis-
souri have a general idea when he will
be prepared to surrender the floor so
that another Senator can seek
recognition?
Mr. EAGLETON. I do not have a
precise idea as to my time limitation.
The Senator did indeed ask for a general
idea of my limitation, but based on the
fact that I have not yet given an op-
portunity today to yield to the distin-
guished cosponsor of the amendment, the
Senator _from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD)
who, I am sure, has some observations to
make on this matter i cannot give him a
precise idea. There are five other cospon-
sors, and I do not know whether any or
all of them wish to speak. Besides, other
Senators may wish to address themselves
to the question and address me on the
matter.
Mr. COTTON. May I say that under
the rule?we all want to hear from every
one of these Senators?but under the
rule, they have no special privilege to
address the Chair. Any Senator, when
the floor is open, can address the Chair
and if he is the first to address the Chair,
he will be recognized and has a right to
be heard.
The mere fact is, under the rule as I
understand it, we cannot toss the ball
from one cosponsor to another cosponsor,
to another cosponsor and onto another
cosponsor, and close the floor to Senators
who have something to say.
The Senator from New Hampshire does
have something to say and he would like
to say it on his own time. I do not care
whether it is 6 o'clock or 8 o'clock to-
night, or whether it is Monday at 11
o'clock.
For the past 8 weeks, we have been
talking about the ABM. Everything that
could possibly be said about the ABM, pro
and con, has been said not once, not
twice, but 10 or even 15 times by every
Senator on this floor.
If the Senator from Missouri will be
patient for one moment longer, we have a
tax bill coming up from the House. We
are now in the month of August and
talking about a recess next week. I do
not expect that those who control the
votes in the Senate are particularly
solicitous about the present administra-
tion; but if Congress does not begin to
get down to brass tacks?and I think
the pending bill should be thoroughly
explored?but if we do not get down to
brass tacks, we will find ourselves here at
Christmastime; and I feel great appre-
hension about that, because I do not
believe that we can continue the first
session of Congress simultaneously with
the second session of Congress and draw
double pay.
Personally, the Senator from New
Hampshire wants to say right now that
he does not believe the Senate has a right
to recess at this time. I think that these
matters that the Senator from Missouri
and others are discussing, and other
questions coming up on the pending bill,
are of paramount importance. I do not
want to see that discussion throttled. I
also do not want to see it go into another
marathon.
I want to say right here and now that
If the Senate pursues its announced
course of going home, or going some-
where else, next Wednesday night,
or next Thursday, with this bill still in
the midst of being considered and dis-
cussed, with the tax bill still to come,
with appropriations bills way behind,
and with the President going on the air
tonight to talk about his major domestic
program, I think that the people of this
country are not going to feel that the
Senate is doing its duty.
Mr. President, this is the speech I was
going to make. The Senator from Mis-
souri has been very kind. I have made my
speech. Now the Senator can have the
floor, so far as I am concerned, and
I thank him very much for his courtesy.
Mr. EAGLETON. I thank the Senator
from New Hampshire, with whom I am
pleased to share a hall on the fourth
floor. I am glad that the Senator from
New Hampshire did have the opportu-
nity to make his 8-minute talk, so he has
not been delayed.
Let me say this: As he well pointed
out, the subject of the ABM was before
the Senate for 8 weeks. I quit counting
a long time ago. However, I have been
in this Chamber today for 3 hours and
15 minutes, which is infinitely less than
the 8 weeks we discussed the ABM. I
admit that this matter is of less moment
than the ABM. I am not here to say that
it is of the same significance as the ABM.
However, it is a $55 million item, which
I suppose is petty cash to the Pentagon.
But, conceptually, in terms of future
warfare?and we are planning for future
warfare?I think it is very important,
as it relates to the Schweiker amend-
ment which the Senate adopted yester-
day, for the GAO to help us. I strongly
believe that it should. This will be a per-
fect test case for them.
So I, for one, if the Senate took 8
weeks to get to this hour, am not pre-
pared in 3 hours and 15 minutes to stop
consideration of the pending amend-
ment. I do not know what the time price
tag will be. I think it will be more than
3 hours.
Mr. COTTON. ;The Senator from New
Hampshire was not reproaching the dis-
tinguished Senator from Missouri. The
Senator from New Hampshire was not
even insinuating that the Senator from
Missouri was taking more time than he
should. I was simply seeking to try to
find out when I might be in the Chamber
and have an opportunity to address the
Chair to seek recognition. I think the 2
or 3 minutes that I used just now per-
haps takes care of the situation, because
I wanted to get my statement in, that
I think we should stay here until this
bill is disposed of, and not go home until
It is disposed of.
Outside of that, I compliment the dis-
tinguished Senator from Missouri on his
presentation, and that 8 weeks he
referred to.
Mr. EAGLETON. I may well be subject
to correction. It was an estimate. I think
it was longer than that. I know it was
a terribly long period of time, so long
that I lost track.
I thank the Senator from New Hamp-
shire.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Missouri yield?
Mr. EAGLETON. I yield to the Senator
from Mississippi.
Mr. STENNIS. Let me make it clear
that that my remarks are not addressed
to the Senator from Missouri except to
compliment him again on his very fine
presentation here on the floor of the Sen-
ate. He is fulfilling an obligation to his
sense of duty when he makes these ex-
planations.
But I say to all Members of the Senate
now, we all know this is an important
bill. We want everything to be discussed
freely and fully, but we all know it is a
bill that must pass. It is not a question of
having a bill or not having a bill. This
bill must pass with something in it. I
think we all want it to move along rea-
sonably fast and with proper dispatch.
If there is going to be a disposition
here for one Senator to just get the
floor?the Senator from Missouri is en-
titled to all the time he has taken, and
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August 8, LO GO
some more?or if there is going to he a
disposition just to delay matters and not
get to a vote, the Senator from Missis-
sippi feels he has a duty to other Mem-
bers of the Senate. I believe all Sena-
tors stand here on an even level. The
floor is even here, as far as I am con-
cerned, but, in legislative parlance and
practice, the Senator who is handling
the bill, as we use that term, has some
obligation to other Members here to do
what he can to push it along.
I do not ordinarily make a request
when the leaders are abisent?I am sure
neither one would disagree, as far as I
know; perhaps we could have a quorum
call?but I would want them to propose
or I will propose that on this amendment
we have controlled time. We could have,
say, 1 hour and a half to the side, or
2 hours to the side; and if that is not
enough, 21/2 hours to the side; and if
that is not enough, 3 hours to the side.
Then we will have some certainty, and
then things will move along.
I think if we are just going to kill time,
we ought to just come out and say- so
and let the public understand and let
the membership understand so they can
make other plans. But Ito not want any
Senator to agree to what he honestly
thinks is too short a time.
I wish those in this Chamber will ask
the majority and minority leaders to
come to the Chamber, so we can get
their advice and counsel after the Sen-
ator from Missouri has finished.
Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. May I just finish? I
am not trying to grab the floor. I told
the Senator from Oregon this morning
that if he wanted to follow the Senator
from Missouri, I would not ask for the
floor. But certainly the membership is
entitled to some kind of statement from
the committee that has passed on this
measure. The membership is entitled to
some kind of statement from us as to
how it looks to those who had the re-
sponsibility of going into this subject
and filing a report.
So I hope somewhere along the line I
will have the chance in my own right,
when I may have the floor, sometime this
afternoon.
Mr. COTTON. Mr. President will the
Senator from Missouri yield so that I can
ask the Senator from Mississippi a ques-
tion?
Mr. EAGLETON. I am pleased to yield.
Mr. COTTON. I would like to ask the
Senator from Mississippi?I know that
he does not wish to assume the preroga-
tives of the leadership--
Mr. STENNIS. That is correct.
Mr. COTTON. But I would like to ask
the Senator from Missialdpoi if he does
not feel very strongly that the Senate
ought to stay here until this bill is dts-
posed of before we recess.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if the
Senator will yield to me to respond?
Mr. EAGLETON. I yield to the Senaka.
from Mississippi.
Mr. STENNIS. I think we ought to
drive hard to finish this bill, working
day and night and Saturday, before there
is any recess. I know many Senators have
made plans for the recess, involving their
families and their children, and I would
bow to those plans; but if we are not go-
ing to try to finsh, I think we forfeit
those considerations.
Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Missouri has the floor.
Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield to me for one more ques-
tion?
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I yield
for the limited purpose of this interroga-
tion, without giving up my right to the
floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair
wishes to inform the Senator from Mis-
souri that he has a right to do that.
The Chair made the observation he did
for the benefit of other Senators who
seem to be seeking the floor from the
Senator from Mississippi.
The Senator from Missouri.
Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, I dis-
tinctly asked the Senator from Missouri
to yield to me.
Mr. EAGLETON. I nodded and yielded.
I was chatting with another Senator.
It is my fault.
Mr. COTTON. The Senator from New
Hampshire understands that many of us
have plans. The Senator from New
Hampshire has plans. It would be most
unfortunate if those plans, which have
been mentioned for many months now,
should be frustrated. On the other hand,
the Senator from Mississippi has been
here a considerable length of time, and
so has the Senator from New Hampshire,
and human nature being what it is, if
the Senator resolved to say to the peo-
ple of the United States, "Here is a bill
that must be taken care of for the de-
fense of this country and we are going
to stay here until we do it," I think it
would be amazing how succinct and to
the point the debate would suddenly be-
come, and I think we would have ade-
quate debate and we could dispose of
this bill.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator for
his suggestion. I am certainly willing to
stay.
I thank the Senator for yielding.
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I may
say to the Senator from Mississippi that
perhaps within this hour I shall be in a
position, after conferring with Senators
who are interested parties in this amend-
ment, to discuss some potential agree-
ment. It is not my desire, nor certainly
that of the Senator from Oregon (Mr.
HATFIELD) or other Senators, to engage in
foot-dragging, slow-down tactics.
Mr. STENNIS. If the procedure is go-
ing to continue on the pattern of yielding
5 or 10 or 15 minutes to various Senators,
I am going to request to come 14 on that
pattern for 12 or 15 minutes, for the
committee.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I have
had a request from the Senator from
Vermont. I am going to make a unani-
mous-consent request that I may yield 2
minutes to the Senator from Vermont
(Mr. PROUTY) without giving up my right
to the floor, on a matter apparently ex-
traneous to that under debate.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, reserving
the right to object?and I shall not ob-
ject in this one instance?I believe that
hereafter, unless the Senator from Mis-
souri yields only for the limited purpose
of a question, I shall be inclined to object
I have plans, as do other Senators, and
I would like to get to a vote as soon as
possible. I shall not object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the unanimous consent re-
quest of the Senator from Missouri? The
Chair hears none, and the Senator from
Vermont is recognized.
S. 2806?INTRODUCTION OF A BILL
TO PROMOTE EQUAL EMPLOY-
MENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR
AMERICAN WORKERS
Mr. PROUTY. Mr. President, on be-
half of myself, the distinguished senior
Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCOTT) ,
the distinguished junior Senator from
Michigan (Mr. GRIFFIN), the distin-
guished junior Senator from Oklahoma
(Mr. BELLiaox), and the distinguished
senior Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr.
SCHWEIEER) , I send to the desk a bill en-
titled the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Act of 1969 and ask that it be ap-
propriately referred.
Mr. PROUTY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the bill be print-
ed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my
remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill
will be received and appropriately re-
ferred; and, without objection, the bill
will be printed in the RECORD.
Mr. PROUTY. Mr. President, this is
the administration's bill proposed by the
President to amend title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 pertaining to discrim-
ination in employment by employers,
labor organizations, and employment
agencies.
Five years ago title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 ordained a national
commitment to eliminate discrimination
in all aspects of employment. Unfortu-
nately, as a result of compromises neces-
sitated by political considerations, Con-
gress did not see fit to provide realistic
enforcement procedures to support title
WI's guarantees.
This bill corrects that deficiency, and
does so in a way that breaks new ground
in the continuing development of Ameri-
can law. Under the President's proposal,
the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission will continue to seek volun-
tary compliance with title VII but if con-
ciliatory efforts prove unsuccessful, it
may bring lawsuits against recalcitrant
violators.
The main thrust of this bill, Mr. Presi-
dent, is to provide for the trial of cases
in the U.S. district courts where the
Equal Opportunity Commission has
found reasonable cause to believe that a-
violation has occurred.
Traditionally, advocates of fair em-
ployment legislation have sought en-
forcement by regulatory agencies
through administrative processes. This
proposal preserves the most attractive
features of that approach?expertise and
independence from shifting political
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winds?while contemplating a vigorous
policy of enforcement in the courts,
where speedy redress can be obtained
through due process. In addition, it has
the advantage of being capable of easy
accommodation within EEOC's existing
structure.
Proceedings under this measure will
be able to be commenced shortly after
enactment. On the other hand, if we
should instead enact legislation provid-
ing the EEOC with decisionmaking and
enforcement authority through admin-
istrative processes, it will require 2 to
3 years of gearing up before results
can begin to be realized, a further delay
difficult to accept.
Under the administration's bill, Mr.
President, charges of unlawful or dis-
criminatory employment practices will
continue to be filed with the EEOC. This
agency will conduct investigations of
these charges and, where the evidence
establishes reasonable cause to believe a
violation has occurred, the EEOC will
attempt to conciliate the dispute as it
does at present.
Should conciliation attempts fail, how-
ever, the EEOC will have complete free-
dom to file a complaint in an appropri-
ate Federal district court, which will be
the trial tribunal to hear the case on
the merits.
Similarly, where the Commission dis-
misses a charge after investigation, the
aggrieved person shall have the right
to commence an action in Federal dis-
trict court as he does under present law.
Decisions of the Federal district courts
are appealable to the appropriate U.S.
court of appeals and the U.S. Supreme
Court in the usual manner, with one
modification. This involves the situation
where the EEOC loses a case in whole or
in part in Federal district court litiga-
tion. In such circumstances, the Civil
Rights Divison of the Justce Depart-
ment, after receiving recommendations
from the Commission, will decide which
cases to appeal to the court of appeals.
The alt/ernative proposal to the pro-
cedures in the administration's bill, Mr.
President, is to provide for administra-
tive litigation in the first instance before
a Federal trial examiner subject to the
provisions of the Administrative Pro-
cedures Act. The trial examiner's find-
ings and recommended order would then
be subject to review by the Commission
with ultimate judicial review in the U.S.
court of appeals either as the result of
an enforcement proceeding brought by
the EEOC or by a petition for review filed
by any party to the proceeding.
I have previously taken the position
that the Commission should have the
same decision making authority and au-
thority to enforce its orders in the courts
of appeals as do other independent Fed-
eral agencies such as the Federal Trade
Commission and the National Labor
Relations Board.
I have taken this position in the past,
however, in the context of either grant-
ing the EEOC decision making and en-
forcement powers or leaving the law in
its present posture. This latter alterna-
tive is completely unacceptable, as both
the law and the Commission need to be
strengthened and given additional tools
with which to accomplish the objectives
set by Congress.
The bill which I introduce today, Mr.
President, does contain the teeth of en-
forcement which are so badly needed.
Enforcement comes much more quickly
here, from the Federal district court
initially, than it would under an ad-
ministrative hearing type of bill.
In this regard, the entire proceeding
will probably be substantially shortened
by direct appeal to the court of appeals
from the trial in Federal district court,
rather than following the more circuitous
route of administrative hearing before a
trial examiner whose findings and order
are appealable to the Commission before
access to the courts of appeals may be
obtained .
Furthermore, as I review this bill, I
find no way in which it will hinder or
tie the hands of the EEOC in performing
its duties.
Thus, the Commission is free upon its
own determination to litigate any or all
cases it desires to in Federal district
court with no person or agency being
given the right to veto or reverse such
EEOC action.
Moreover, in the exercise of its own
expertise in this particular area, the
Commission may urge upon the courts
any proposed remedies which it might
have ordered in its own right if it re-
tained decisionmaking authority.
The propriety in granting, modifying,
or denying such remedies will finally be
determined by the court of appeals, and
possibly the Supreme Court, under this
bill in the same manner as would be the
case if the Commission were granted the
authority to issue its own orders subject
to court review.
There is also the question of whether
this bill will result in a backlog of cases
awaiting trial in Federal district courts.
This is a matter we must study closely,
but my present feeling is that it will
not approach the backlog which would
be faced by the Commission if it were
required to review every litigated case in
the country before enforcement in the
courts of appeals could be sought.
Moreover, as Federal court precedents
are established under this bill, I envision
a substantial number of respondents
complying with court decisions or enter-
ing into meaningful conciliation agree-
ments with the Commission, rather than
appealing, after they lose cases in Fed-
eral district court. Not to mention the
Increase in pretrial conciliations by re-
spondents who would take their chances
In drawn out administrative proceedings
before a Federal trial examiner and the
Conimission, but who would hesitate to
go to trial directly in Federal district
court when the precedents are clear.
I want to note, however, that I reserve
the right to offer amendments in our
committee which in my judgment can
make this piece of legislation stronger
and even more effective in removing the
blot of discrimination in hiring and em-
ployment practices and to insure true
equality of opportunity for all qualified
persons in seeking, obtaining and retain-
ing employment in both the public and
private sectors of our economy.
Mr. President, laws protecting human
rights are as deserving of adequate im-
plementation as any other declaration
of national policy, and indeed, deserve
priority. Congress has declared that cer-
tain discriminatory acts are unlawful
and it is overdue in adding substance to
its words. We must act now, to finally
demonstrate that the law?all laws?
apply to everyone equally, and that the
comfortable as well as the disadvantaged
are subject to its rule.
The bill (S. 2806) to further promote
equal employment opportunities for
American workers, introduced by Mr.
PROUTY, for himself and other Senators,
was received, read twice by its title, re-
ferred to the Committee on the Judici-
ary, and ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
S. 2806
Be it enacted by the Senate and House
of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That this
Act may be cited EL the "Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1969."
SEC. 2. Subsections (g) and (h) of Section
705 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (78 Stat.
253; 42 U.S.C. 2000e-4) are amended to read
as follows:
"(g) The Commission shall have power . . .
(6) to refer matters to the Attorney General
with recommendations for intervention in a
civil action brought by an aggrieved party
under Section 706, or for the institution of
a civil action by the Attorney General under
Section '707, and to recommend institution
of appellate proceedings in accordance with
subsection (h) of this section, when in the
opinion of the CommisMon such proceedings
would be in the public interest, and to ad-
vise, consult, and assist the Attorney Gen-
eral in such matters."
"(h) Attorneys appointed under this sec-
tion may, at the direction of the Commission,
appear for and represent the Commission in
any case In court, provided that the Attorney
General shall conduct all litigation to which
the Commission is a party in the Supreme
Court or in the Courts of Appeals of the
United States pursuant to this Title. All other
litigation affecting the Commission, or to
which it is a party, shall be conducted by the
Commission."
SEC. 3. (a) Subsection (e) of Section '706
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (78 Stat. 259;
42 U.S.C. 2000e-5) is amended to read as
follows:
"(e) If within thirty days after a charge is
filed with the Commission or within thirty
- days after expiration of any period of refer-
ence under subsection (a), the Commission ?
has been unable to obtain voluntary com-
pliance with this Act, the Commission may
bring a civil action against the respondent
named in the charge: Provided, that if the
Commission fails to obtain voluntary com-
pliance and fails or refuses to institute a civil
action against the. respondent named in the
charge within one hundred and eighty days
from the date of the filing of the charge, a
civil action may be brought after such failure
or refusal within ninety days against the
respondent named in the charge (1) by the
person claiming to be aggrieved, or (2) if
such charge was filed by a member of the
Commission, by any person whom the charge
alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful
employment practice. Upon application by
the complainant and in such circumstances
,as the court may deem just, the court may
appoint an. attorney for such complainant
and may authorize the commencement of the
action without the payment of fees, costs, or
security. Upon timely applicatinn, the court
may, in its discretion, permits the Attorney
General to intervene in such civil action if he
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S 9476 Approved For ReleacantAIMAIgliWINVADOSInfla
certifies that the case is of general, public
Importance. Upon request, the court may, in
its discretion, stay further proceedings for
not more than sixty days pending the ter-
mination of State or local proceedings de-
scribed in subsection (b) or further efforts
of the Commission to obtain voluntary oorn-
pliance."
(b) Subsections (f) through (k) of Sec-
tion 706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (78
Stat. 259; 42 U.S.C. 2000e4) are redesignated
as subsections (g) through (1) respectively,
and the following new subsection is added:
"(f) Whenever a charge is filed with the
Commission and the Commission concludes
on the basis of a preliminary investigation
that prompt judicial action is necessary to
carry out the purposes of this Act, the Com-
mission may bring an action for appropriate
temporary or preliminary relief pending final
disposition of such charge.. It shall be the
duty of a court having jurisdiction over pro-
ceedings under this section to assign cases
for hearing at the earliest practicable date
and to cause such cases to be in every way
expedited."
(c) Subsection (h) of Section 706 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (73 Stat. 259; 42
U.S.C. 2000e-5), as redesignated by this sec-
tion is amended to read as follows:
"(h) If the court finds that the respondent
has engaged in or is engaging in an unlaw-
ful employment practice, the court may en-
join the respondent from engaging in such
unlawful employment practice, and order
affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include, but is not limited to,
reinstatement or hiring of employees, with
or without back pay (payable by the em-
ployer, employment agency, or labor organiza-
tion, as the case may be, responsible for the
unlawful employment practice), or any
other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate. Interim earnings or amounts
earnable with reasonable diligence by the
person or persons discriminated against shall
operate to reduce the back pay otherwise
allowable. No order of the Court shall require
the admission or reinstatement of an individ-
ual as a member of a union or the hiring,
reinstatement, or promotion of an individual
as an employee, or the payment to him of any
back pay, if such individual was refused
admission, suspended, or expelled or was
refused employment or advancement or was
suspended or discharged for any reason
other than discrimination on account of race,
Color, religion, sex or national origin or in
violation of Section 704(a)."
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President I am
pleased to join with the Senator from
Vermont (Mr. Paourv) as a sponsor of
this bill entitled the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1969.
I believe that the introduction of this
legislation and the ensuing consideration
given to it will greatly strengthen title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 per-
taining to discrimination in employment
by employers.
While I personally favor the cease-
and-desist approach, this well-reasoned
alternative is woilAyififonsideration.
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
TIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR
MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RE-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MIS-
SILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJ-
ALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RE-
SERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH
The Senate resumed the considera-
tion of the bill (S. 2548) to authorize
appropriations during the fiscal year
1970 for procurement of aircraft, mis-
siles, naval vessels, and tracked combat
vehicles and to authorize the construc-
tion of test facilities at Kwajalein Missile
Range, and to prescribe the authorized
Personnel strength of the Selected Re-
serve of each Reserve component of the
Armed Forces, and for other purposes.
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I yield
to the distinguished Senator from Mon-
tana.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if I
may have the attention of the Senate,
and with the permission of the distin-
guished Senator from Missouri, who has
the floor, and without him losing his
right to the floor, I suggest the absence
of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
SPONG in the chair). The clerk will call
the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I
yield for interrogation to the Senator
from Oregon.
The PRESIDING 010FICER. The Sen-
ator from Oregon is recognized.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I have
some questions to ask of the Senator from
Missouri. First, however, I would like to
make one or two brief comments.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Regular order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The reg-
ular order is that the Senator from Mis-
souri has the floor and has yielded to
the Senator from Oregon for the pur-
pose of asking questions.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, we
were talking awhile ago about the ques-
tions that have been raised by various
People as to the dependability of the re-
search and the experiments we have had
thus far on the tank.
I ask the Senator from Missouri if he
has information which would support
the reports we have read in the press
about the growing concern of the Ger-
mans.
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, may
? we have order? I am having difficulty
hearing the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
-ate will be in order.
Mr. HATFIELD. The questions relate
to the attitudes of our partners, the Ger-
mans. According to the chart, we started
out with the idea that we would share
the cost 50-50 of research and develop-
ment. That now has shifted to about an
80 to 20 percent differential. We support
80 percent and the Germans support 20
percent.
I have some information here that
was reported in the New York Times of
October 9 and 10,1967, to the effect that
there has been growing concern on the
part of our partner about the tank, and
dates back to October 1967.
It says:
Some military experts here?
Meaning in the German capital of
Bonn?
have raised some very serious questions about
the continuation of the joint program.
opp00100001-3Augicht 83 1969
So, as I restate the question, does the
Senator have information concerning
the attitude and the thinking on the part
of our so-called partner?
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I have
no really precise or quotable informa-
tion. I have rumors and speculation. I
have been casting about for some accu-
rate information as to the posture of
the Federal Republic of Germany as to
their desire to continue even at the ad-
vantageous 80-20 formula that is now the
rule rather than the original 50-50 for-
mula that obtained at the inception.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, why
was the formula shifted from 50-50 down
to 20 percent for the German contribu-
tion and up to 80 percent for the Ameri-
can contribution?
Mr. EAGLETON. This gets into the
realm of the imprecise, but the original
production estimates for the MBT-70
were such that in 1963 and in 1968 the
Germans were willing to go along on the
50-50 basis. However, when the produc-
tion estimates accelerated and more
tanks were to be produced, apparently
they did not want to sink so much of
their public treasury into the production
of more tanks than they had anticipated.
So they wanted to hold it to a certain
limit.
I call to the attention of the Senator
from Oregon a report with which I know
he is very familiar since he was the
chairman of the committee that pre-
pared the report on military spending,
dated July 2, 1969,
The report had a chapter, so to speak,
on the main battle tank. It had chapters,
I might add, on many other items which
will be the subject of other amendments
that will be before the Senate. It refers
to bacteriological warfare, CBW, and
also to a study made on the manned orbi-
tal laboratory. However, the Pentagon
beat them to the punch and withdrew
it before Congress could get to it.
Be that as it may, it had a chapter on
the main battle tank, and I will read
this small portion thereof, which relates
directly to the question of the Senator
from Oregon:
Under the latest agreement?
Meaning the agreement between the
United States and the Federal Republic
of Germany?
the United States and Germany split evenly
the first $138 million--
That takes us to about 1968 on that
chart?
with the cost above that to be prorated on
the quantity of tanks purchased by each
country.
Returning to what I said earlier, the
Federal Republic of Germany apparently
does not want to buy too many tanks,
looking down the road. It is dubious as
to why they want to buy any, based on
what is now known about this item.
Mr. HATFIELD I should like to ask a
further question, also concerning the
fundamental point of cost effectiveness
and the involvements of our country
along with Germany in the development
of this tank.
When we talk about the cost effec-
tiveness of a weapon which is developed
by the Pentagon, supposedly the cost ef-
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fectiveness is a criterion upon which we
are to make judgment on whether we
should move ahead or accept the pro-
posals for such development. Can the
Senator tell us what some of the com-
ponents of that criterion might be? In
other words, what is the definition of
cost effectiveness as it relates to the
MBT or any other weaponry, but partic-
ularly as it relates to the MET. This
knowledge would help us decide where
we escalate, or where we move ahead,
or where we cut off work on such a pro-
posal?
Mr. EAGLETON. rt is a very fine ques-
tion, completely appropriate, and does
not lend itself to a precise, computerized
answer. There is no magical computer,
totally self-sufficient, into which various
indicia can be pumped and a "yea" or
"nay" answer come out.
There is an element of subjectiveness
In this cost-effectiveness business. As I
gather it?and others who are more
learned in this can certainly clarify any
misconception I have?it goes something
like this. No weapon system exists in a
vacuum. No man is an island. Each
weapon system or weapon interrelates
with other systems and human beings
who operate. But as costs escalate?in
this instance, the enormous 500-plus per-
cent on R. & D. alone, and now the per
unit cost of the MBT-70 is between
$520,000 and $750,000?you get to a
breaking point, a point of no return,
meaning' that it is an imprudent and
wasteful expenditure of public money to
go ahead with it, because some other
item, albeit another tank, an antitank
weapon, aircraft, or what have you, can
do the same job more cheaply. It is our
information that, so far as the M13T-70
Is concerned, it has just about reached
the point of inefficiency, the point of no
return, at which if it escalates much
further, it is no longer cost effective;
and other items, including the M60A1?
anyway, the tank that we have now func-
tioning and operational in Western Eu-
rope?and other configurations and other
antitanke weapons, including the Tow,
the Dragon, and so forth, would better
be able to do the job per dollar ex-
pended than would going ahead with the
then expensive MBT-70, once it crosses
that line.
Mr. HATFIELD. Would the cost effec-
tiveness, then, he analogous to what we
have as a cost-benefit ratio formula for
the development of water and other such
reclamation programs?
For example, we have in such pro-
grams the requirement to develop a cost-
benefit ratio which often includes rec-
reation benefits, flood control benefits,
power benefits, wildlife, fisheries, con-
servation, and so forth. In the com-
putation of these various components,
a certain cost-benefit ratio develops to
justify the building of the project. Would
the cost-effectiveness ratio be analo-
gous to this cost-benefit ratio, not only
in terms of having the components
that are cranked into this cost-effective-
ness program in order to justify the
building a such a tank in the original
instance, but also that at times along
the way, it could be reviewed and re-
computed?
Mr. EAGLETON. Emphasizing the
word "analogy," I think the analogy is
indeed an apt one.
As the Senator knows, we have that
in terms of some of our public works
projects, perhaps all of them. The dis-
tinguished chairman of the Committee
on Public Works is in the Chamber, and
it is my pleasure to serve with him on
that committee.
The Corps of Engineers, for example,
studies a particular flood control proj-
ect, from the standpoint of its conserva-
tion, water, power, and other criteria,
and determines what the benefit-cost
ratio is. If it meets the accepted criteria
in terms of benefit-cost ratio, it can well
meet with the approval of the Corps of
Engineers and subsequently the Commit-
tee on Public Works and the entire Con-
gress. If it falls short of that?despite
the fact that it would be a desirable
thing to have, despite the fact that peo-
ple of a given area might like to have
the dam and might like to have more
water, despite the fact that the people
might like to have more recreational
facilities?if it does not reach this bene-
fit-cost ratio, it is considered to be an
imprudent and unwise expenditure of
public money.
Thus, I think the analogy in the in-
stant situation is apt. I do not fault, nor
do I believe the Senator from Oregon
faults, the right of people, whether they
be in the Pentagon, on the floor of Con-
gress, or in the ghetto, to dream. It is
perfectly ethical, and it is a process of
our orientation that we dream. We
dream great dreams. Part of our trouble
as human beings is that so often we
leave those dreams unfulfilled and un-
met.
So I quarrel not with the privilege of
the Defense Department to dream up
this tank when they dreamt it back in
1963.
In the words of the Senator from Mis-
sissippi, they dream an Idea. They say,
"We are going to build a tank," and they
call in the contractors and say, "Go to it,
boys. Build the greatest tank you fellows
can guess might be made available." So
then they dream and dream and dream
and dream. Unfortunately, the dream
gets more expensive. First it was an $80
million dream; then $183 million, then
$303 million. Up and away. Then the
point of the benefit-cost ratio is
reached, such as in public works projects.
In military projects, it is the cost-effec-
tiveness. The luxury of dreaming is one
that this country can ill afford at the
very time there are those with unmet
dreams, those whom the Senator from
South Dakota (Mr. McGovsatr) has re-
ferred to as individuals who dream of a
decent meal, those who are left behind in
the war on poverty. We talk about jobs,
we talk about schools, we talk about
neighborhood corps, we talk about neigh-
borhood centers, but we leave out a
pretty important dream, the dream of
being able to eat.
So if we let the Pentagon keep dream-
ing the eternal dream, in this manner,
of preserving the MBT-70, there will be
some people in Portland, in St. Louis, in
New York, and in Chicago who are still
going to have their dream unfulfilled.
We cannot do it all. Yes, there was a
time?I said this earlier?when, with our
enormous wealth, the urgencies and ex-
igencies of the age were not nearly ?so
heavily upon us, and we could afford the
luxury of this kind of project. We could
let the Pentagon fool around with it,
change it. They could put the Shillelagh
in or take the Shillelagh out. They could
put the environmental control unit in the
tank, or take it out. They could install
dual firepower or not. We could afford
that kind of dream in a bygone day. For
better or for worse, but realistically, that
day has gone, and the dreams of the
military and the dreams of Congress
have to be realistic, attainable, predict-
able, and fulfillable dreams, or we will
not be doing what we must do in terms
of the desires of other Senators with re-
spect to our economy. They will be short-
changed.
It is not the $54 million for the proto-
type that will feed all the hungry peo-
ple. The $54 million will not balance the
budget, a budget which has long been
out of balance. But it is symbolic. We
cannot continue to condone a continu-
ously haphazard, ill-performing weap-
ons system that year after year is
brought back to Congress. The Pentagon
says, "Last year was a good year for us.
We admit that, Members of Congress.
The Shillelagh was not going too good.
The Scavenger system is a little too
goofy. We have not quite mastered the
environmental control unit. We have 300
unused chassis sitting on a lot in Michi-
gan and do not know what to do with
them. Give us another year."
It has been that way since the begin-
ning-1963?and has continued through
1964, 1965, and on until 1969. Not only
patience, but human endurance is being
exhausted. Still the gentlemen say, "One
more year." It is like a broken record.
We have had enough.
Although $54 million will not make us
or break us, it is important in terms of
what it symbolizes. We say at this time?
when the needs are so heavy upon us?
we are not going to fritter ft:way another
$54 million or 54 cents if vie can help it.
Mr. HATFIELD. Are we to assume
that each time we have seen an incre-
ment in the cost of this tank there has
been a new cost-effectiveness study, or
for that matter, as to the overall tank
itself?
Mr. EAGLETON. Frankly, I must say
to the Senator that I do not have the
precise date when the last cost-effective-
ness study was made by the Pentagon. I
am not trying to play the old game of,
"I know something you do not know."
I have had a couple of classified briefings
on this matter and I do not want to
transgress because I am not as familiar
in this area as many other Senators who
have dealt with armed services-type
matters for a long time. In order that
I may stay on the side of conservatism,
I will not directly answer the Senator's
question. However, I will say what I have
said again and again. It is my under-
standing that cost effectively, the MBT-
70 is pretty close?and I shall leave it at
that?to the point of no return in the
sense of being imprudently cost effective.
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lingltSe 8, 1969
I wish to add to and amplify the con-
tinued optimism of the Army in its
presentation of this program year by
year. Here is what General Burba stated
in March of 1968, and that is about a
Year and a half ago. He was then in
charge of the program. IlbelieVe General
Betts is now in charge of the program.
In March 1968 he said about this tank:
Skeptics and advocates alike have been
Impressed with the smoothness which has
characterizd the program's progress since its
inception.
I do not know him. I know he is a
fine career man. I think he has a bad
ghost writer because as of March 1968
this project was floundering and it had
been floundering from its first halting
start. It is a dream, and it has floundered
and stumbled since its inception.
I do not know how he could say in
March 1968 that "smooth-m.3s which has
characterized the program's progress
since its inception". And then, when he
takes over the Department of Defense,
tells-us the three millstones he inherited
were the Pueblo, the TFX, and the BMT-
70, the main battle tank. Is that not a
delightful association? Here is a Secre-
tary of Defense in 1969, after General
Burba had said all is well, who said that
his three millstones were the Pueblo, the
TFX, and the MBT-70.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield for a furthei question?
Mr. EAGLETON. I yield.
Mr. HATFIELD. What kind of judg-
ment would we be making, if we could
not base it on some sort of cost effec-
tiveness? In other words, do we have
enough data on cost effectiveness, or are
we merely being asked to continue this
project on the basis of these generalized
remarks on the part of the gentlemen
the Senator has quoted.
Mr. EAGLETON. To rue it is entirely,
and I will say exclusively, the latter.
We are asked to buy another year in a
long stream of years, with all these bug-
aboos and unworkable components.
"Maybe we will make them better next
time. Let it go a little longer, and so
forth. It is a broken record upon which
time has expired.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. Pt esident, will
the Senator yield further?
Mr. EAGLETON. I yield.
Mr. HATFIELD. We have the report
before us. I am talking about the report
No. 91-290 of the Armed Services Com-
mittee, in which the only reference I can
find to this tank is a statenlent which is
rather general. It appears on page 53:
The committee also recommends a reduc-
tion of $1.1.9 million in the joint US/FRG
main battle tank program. This program has
been experiencing difficulty for some years
and the committee now believes that a re-
orientation of the program is in order.
I would like to ask the distinguished
Senator from Missouri if he knows what
the Armed Services Committee means or
what they have in mind when 'they talk
about a "reorientation" of the program.
Does not the committee action in itself
confirm what the Senator has been say-
ing today on the floor of the Senate
about the questionability and the unreli-
ability of the program thus far? Is not
the Senator merely asking for a post-
ponement on this tank project until the
GAO can make some sort of evaluation?
It is not to vote the tank up or down.
It asks Members of Congress to take a
hard look at a project that has cost
millions of dollars and which the Sen-
ator eloquently has stated has created
doubt in the minds of generals in the
Pentagon, the Secretary of Defense, our
German partners who have been in-
volved in this project, members of the
Committee on Armed Services of the
Senate, and the House Armed Services
Committee, The Senator has quoted
many sources that indicate grave doubt.
Is it not true that all this amendment
asks is that we continue to look into this
matter through another set of eyes,
through a study by the GAO, and then
make a determination on the future of
this tank following that kind of report?
We ask this rather than going pellmell
down this pathway which has brought
little in the way of results with the ex-
penditure of millions of dollars.
Is that not what the Senator is asking
us today?
Mr. EAGLETON. In summary, that is
what I am asking through the medium
of this amendment. I am not sure what
the word "reorientation" means. I know
not if it is a word Of art in the military
field, or whether it means other than it
means in the nonmilitary area. But
when the Armed Services Committee
says, as I have quoted, that the commit-
tee now believes the reorientation pro-
gram is in order, to me, as a nonmember
of that committee, it means: Let us take
a look at it. Knowing that those who
have a greater knowledge of the history
of this subject, as I say, still stumble
and bumble along, and knowing that
they want to take a look at it, bear in
mind that the original request to the
Pentagon for research and development
on this item was $45 million. To be pre-
cise, it was $44.9 million. The Armed
Services Committee cut it $14.9 million.
So that means that the Armed Services
Committee was about two-thirds as sold
on it as was the Pentagon. The Penta-
gon wanted $45 million and the Armed
Services Committee said, "We will give
you $30 million."
Thus, in that frame of reference, in
percentages, they are about two-thirds
as happy with it as the Pentagon.
As to the Pentagon, I do not know who
is happiest with it over there. I know
that General Burba surely is. He says
it is the smoothest thing since raw silk.
He is happy with it. Secretary of De-
fense Laird is not happy with it. He said
it was comparable to the Pueblo and the
TFX.
Thus, I am asking for a reorientation.
The Senator is correct on that, if I inter-
pret that word correctly. I want someone
to look at the program. The someone I
want to look at it is the someone that the
Senate yesterday declared by its vote on
the Schweiker amendment should help
us look into various armed services pro-
grams; namely, the General Accounting
Office.
By a curious coincidence, today, I
want to implement that amendment with
my amendment. I want to implement it
under a microscope, so to speak, and
make it a laboratory case, as to whether
what the Senate did yesterday on the
Schweiker amendment was right and
proper.
In my amendment, we ask the GAO to
get us the report in 6 months. Knowing
what I know, and what the GAO knows
about tanks, since it has been working
on them for the Stratton committee, if
they can get that report to us much
quicker, it will serve two purposes and
will be well worth the time.
Purpose No. 1 will tell us something
about the tank. It will tell us a lot more
than we know now.
Purpose No. 2 will serve the commend-
able objective of proving whether the
Schweiker amendment was prudent.
Forty-seven Senators thought it was
prudent, and 46, including some of the
most knowledgeable members of the
Armed Services Committee, disagreed.
We will know in 2 months whether, by
this laboratory case, if we can get the
GAO to give us a report in substance,
in efficient form, with expertise, with
thoroughness, whether what the Senate
did yesterday was correct.
Maybe it was wrong, because the
Schweiker amendment was adopted by a
razor-thin majority. If it was wrong,
then perhaps someone will want to undo
it. It can be undone in the House, in
conference, or what have you.
Thus, what we are asking for in the
amendment are two commendable pur-
poses, at a time when time itself is not
of the essence. The MBT-70 cannot be
shrouded in the argument that engulfed
the ABM system, and apparently suc-
cessfully so, that we cannot wait, that the
survival of America is on the line if we
do not deploy the ABM and perhaps it
will be too late if we do not do so, and
we will lose 2 years. I am not going to
repeat the 8 weeks' argument. The die
has been cast. The votes have been
counted. The ABM will be deployed in
Montana and South Dakota. But, time is
not of the essence in this case. No one
has ever said it was. It began in 1963 as
a vague idea. The Senator from Missis-
sippi said himself that they took their
time trying to put some facts into the
idea and narrow it down?I am para-
phrasing here, and if I go beyond what
the Senator from Mississippi intended,
he can correct me?but it was a vague,
amorphous idea, indeed, but that it would
get less and less vague, and more iden-
tifiable and become a more precise idea.
So that time was never of the essence in
this program. It could net be.
At the outset, they said they would
have the tank with us, manned and run-
ning around, by 1969, I think it was. Here
it is 1969, and there is no tank. It is any-
one's guess whether it will be in the mid-
1970's, or 1974, 1975, 1976 perhaps, when
it will be produced.
Thus, I say to the Senator from Oregon
that this has the dual, double-faceted,
commendable purpose of being illustra-
tive of the Schweiker amendment, and
at the same time giving us illuminating
information that we all so desperately
need_ on this particular project.
Mr. HAT.toraLD. I have only one more
question in sequence. Is the Senator from
Missouri aware of what criteria the
Armed Services Committee used in re-
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ducing the Pentagon's request by
He told me this much ?if I am at lib-
erty to quote him on a hearsay basis?he
said, "They will fight like hell not to
try to give you a precise answer under
No. 2; that they do not like doing this
kind of evaluation." I will concede, per-
haps, to the Senator, that I may have
overdrawn a bit on subparagraph (2).
Mr. GOLDWATER. I am net trying to
be picayunish about this.
Mr. EAGLETON. No. It is an impor-
tant point.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Because I think we
need more information about contracts,
and so on; but I do not think the GAO is
competent to tell whether it is the most
effective weapon; or, going to paragraph
(3) , to answer whether the strategic pro-
jections made in 1963 with regard to the
use of the MBT-70 will still be valid
when it finally becomes available for
use; that is, will it be obsolete as a result
of advanced technology and new
strategy.
Does the Senator feel that that comes
within the proper purview of the GAO?
Mr. EAGLETON. That is getting a lit-
tle closer to what the Senator from Wis- Mr. GOLDWATER. The point I am
consin (Mr. PEOxmiRE) says may be a trying to make in these questions is that
shade overdrawn. the General Accounting Officer is not
If I may interrupt?it is right on the charged in any way with making stra-
point?I have in my hand a letter from tegic projections. They do not sit in the
the Comptroller General of the United meetings when they are made. They have
States to me, dated July 9, 1969. The no way of knowing whether a weapon
letter itself is not greatly revealing, but will become obsolete, because of projec-
it is a cover letter transmitting to me a tions, within 6 months or any time. In
report from the GAO, two pages of which fact, the conclusion the Senator just
I already put in the RECORD earlier on read is the conclusion written by the
this day. It is on the main battle tank. I Army on the weapon.
do not pretend, nor does the GAO, that We do not say this is a perfect weapon.
the two pages are an exhaustive analysis. We recognize that there are problems.
It is a very brief summary of a very corn- But what I am trying to get at is the
plex subject. General Accounting Office would want
Let me read a part of page 2. The re- to duck from something like that; that
port starts by discussing the Sheridan they would want to stay with their pur-
and the M60A1E2. Then it goes to, pose of accounting, looking into con-
"MBT-70 objectives." I found, and the tracts, and so forth.
Senator from Arizona especially will For example, going to paragraph (4)
find, that it is not terribly sophisticated; of the amendment, the GAO would have
it is cursory. It continues: to answer the question of whether there
The MBT-70, which is intended to replace are more feasible and less expensive al-
the M60 and the M48 as the standard main ternatives to the development of the
battle tank, will be employed against armored MBT-70. If the Senate adopts the
formations and all other types of land war- amendment, we will be getting into the
fare targets including infantry elements of
area of having another agency do the
job that the Defense Department, the
a modern army.
Skipping to? - strategic planners, are charged with do-
MBT-70 commonality. The MBT-70 is de- ing. Even though I know the GAO is a
signed to be armed with the Shillelagh mis- very competent group, and I have great
sile and the 152mm combustible cartridge respect for their judgments, I do not be-
ease ammunition common to the Sheridan lieve anyone in that group is equipped
and M60A1E2 tank? to make the kind of judgment the Sen-
Skipping the recitation of certain ator asks that- office to make, outside of
of the GAO? facts? what is contained in paragraph (1) on
Mr. EAGLETON. I think that the Sen- However, the automatic loader is depend- Cost.
ent upon the acceptability of the ammuni- I am afraid there might be a constitu-
ator from Arizona makes a valid point.
tion combustible cartridge case which will be
I have today discussed it with the Sen- discussed in detail subsequently. tional question here, although I am not
an expert enough to put my finger on it,
up the assets, add up the liabilities, and
million? strike a balance. It is composed of tal-
Mr. EAGLETON. I freely confess ented people who are analysts, who have
ignorance as to the precise rationale that the expertise and talents to go beyond
the committee employed in making that the printed word, beyond the diagrams,
reduction. beyond the schedules, beyond the fig
Mr. HATFIELD. So far as the phrase- ures, and to get into what we may call
ology is concerned of asking for a "re- the area of substance and the area of
orientation" of the program, the Senator theory.
has no further data as to what they What I am trying to do by my amend-
meant, or has the Senator discussed that ment is ask for the services which Mr.
with the Armed Services Committee Mayo renders now for some of the same
members? agencies, military as well as nonmili-
Mr. EAGLETON. No, sir; I have not. tary. I am willing to cut the period to
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will 6 months. I am asking that office to give
the Senator from Missouri yield for a us -the benefit of their talent, which I
question? know they have, because of the magnifi-
Mr. EAGLETON. I am pleased to yield cent work they did in assisting Represen- .
to the Senator from Arizona. tative STRATION in his report. The GAO is
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I mentioned particularly in that Stratton
want to ask the distinguished Senator report, specifically page 11, which I may
from Missouri some questions relative to put in the RECORD later. But we have
the language in his amendment that these talented people there, we have this
refers to the Comptroller General of the questionable program, and I do not see
United States. where it hurts a soul or a cause or in
First, the Senator has referred very any way jeopardizes us to use our people
often to the amendment adopted yes- in that way.
terday by the Senate, as introduced by
the distinguished junior Senator from
Pennsylvania (Mr. SCHWEIKER) . As I
read that amendment, I see in it a charge
that is in keeping with the general pur-
pose of the GAO and the Comptroller
General of the United States; namely,
they are to report on contract items, the ?
time they were entered into, subsequent
estimates of cost completion, and the
reason for any significant rise or decline
in prior cost estimates. I do not see how
that amendment compares with the lan-
guage in the Senator's amendment which
is now pending?if the Senator will give
me his attention
Mr. EAGLETON. I beg the Senator's
pardon.
Mr. GOLDWATER. For example, on
page 2 of the amendment, the Senator
charges the Comptroller General of the
United States, among other things to
consider, first, why research and devel-
opment cost estimates have had to be
revised steadily upward since 1965. I will
agree that that is a proper charge to give
to the Comptroller General, but does not
the Senator believe Itis within the pre-
rogative of the GAO to answer a question,
for example, as in paragraph (2)
whether the MBT-70, considering its re-
vised estimated production costs will be
the most effective weapon to meet the
contingency for which was originally
planned. Does the Senator feel that that
would come under the proper function
ator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE) ,
who is not now in the Chamber, but who, I now come to the conclusion: of mixing up the duties charged to the
in my judgment, is one of the Members of Conclusion. Unless deficiencies in the corn- executive branch and the legislative
this body most knowledgeable on the bustible cartridge case ammunition are cor- branch. I think there is a grave question
GAO?not the only one, but he has had rected, it is reasonable to assume that the there. Others better equipped than I can
a great deal of contact with that agency, MBT-70 will experience difficulties similar to
those of the Sheridan and M60A1E2 tank. discuss it.
as a result of his chairmanship of the I do not think it is wise to let the GAO
Joint Economic Committee. Although he That is not a terribly profound con- consider the question of effectiveness of
is cosponsor of my amendment, I think elusion. The point I am trying to make is weapons or whether they are obsolete in
he is a bit inclined to think that I have that the GAO is more than just a book- the strategic projections. I do not think
stretched paragraph (2) as to the general keeper's office. It is more than an office the GAO is equipped to do it any more
capability of the GAO. where people take a bunch of figures, add than the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be
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S 9480 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 8, 1969
equipped to go in and run an audit on
the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare.
The amendment is in no way compa-
rable to the Schweiper amendment,
which confined itself to money matters,
contracts and so forth.
Mr. EAGLETON. I thank the Senator
from Arizona. As I said in answer to the
previous question, I think at least in
terms of subparagraph (2), based on the
wise advice of the Senator from Wiscon-
sin (ME. PROXMIRE), some of that lan-
guage may be a bit overdieiwn. It is quite
possible that there could be some bit of
redrafting of the latter part of it.
We had an exchange earlier today with
the Senator from California, who is a
former Comptroller of his State. I do
not want to so narrowly circumscribe
that which I am requiring the GAO to do
that we would merely mike them book-
keepers, insofar as what I would ask
them to look into with reference to the
MBT-70.
I am not here to expound upon the
Schweiker amendment one way or the
other. It has had its day in the court of
the Senate. I am here to es pound on the
mBT-70 and how we can get the ulti-
mate information, advice, counsel, con-
sultation, and expertise that we have
not had as of now in trying to make the
"nitty-gritty" decision on a program that
has stumbled along, as I have said, for
6 years.
So far as the MBT-70 is concerned,
knowing the GAO has systems analysts.
knowing they have some personnel who
did the enormously successful work for
the Stratton committee, which went
way beyond bookkeeping and went into
the question of effectiveness, comparing
it with the Shillelagh--
Mr. GOLDWATER. If the Senator will
yield, he will find that this information
is available from the Army. Our commit-
tee knows of all these aspects. The GAO
or the Secretary of Transportation, ff
they want to, can call the Army and get
a detailed description of everything that
is wrong with the tank and the develop-
ment of it. The Army has never said, to
my knowledge, that it was a perfect and
a perfected weapon.
The problem is that by this amend-
ment we are setting up another agency
to do precisely what is being done by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, strategic planning,
and by the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee and by the House Armed Services
Committee.
I wish to recognize that the House of
Representatives has made an exhaustive
study of this question. The Senate com-
mittee has made a cursory study of the
matter. But all of the material is avail-
able now from the Army. So I think we
are getting into another situation where
we are going to have too many cooks in
the kitchen, and we are net going to get
out of that kitchen what we would like to
get, which is cost effectiveness, if that
word still has any meaning, contract
effectiveness, and so forth.
I think if the Senator would confine
his charges to the GAO to those fields,
he would be on very legitimate, safe
grounds. But if I were the GAO myself,
I would have to try to duck anything like
this, because I would not be equipped to
do it.
Mr. EAGLETON. Well, as I have stated
previously, the Senator from Wisconsin
(Mr. PROXMIRE), who is an expert on the
GAO function, doubts whether the GAO
would be overly anxious to assume at
least subparagraph (2), and perhaps it
will have to be redrafted. I am ready to
admit that.
The Senator from Arizona points out
that maybe this would be a situation of
too many cooks in the kitchen, therefore
just making a muddle of the thing, and
making a still greater muddle out of
that which has been muddled pretty far
already.
My answer to that, however inade-
quate, is that I do not know how anybody
could make a greater muddle out of this
MBT-70 program than has already
been made. It has been badly confused
thus far, and I think one further look at
it will not muddle it up or confuse it any
further.
I yield to the Senator from West
Mr. RANDOLPH. During the colloquy
this afternoon, the Senator from Mis-
souri has referred to a dream?the dream
of this tank. Would it be improper to
imply that perhaps that dream might
have become a nightmare?
Mr. EAGLETON. That is a very apt
observation. I may say to the Senator
from West Virginia that in some in-
stances, dreams turn out adventageouslY,
and bear fruit; but others turn 180 de-
grees into a nightmare, and this is of the
latter type.
Mr. RANDOLPH. And a dream can
destroy as well as build?
Mr. EAGLETON. Yes. And a dream can
not only destroy, a dream can divert our
attention and our interest from other
more profitable pursuits, even in tanks.
That is, the development of the M60A1
accelerated the development of the anti-
tank weapons, the Hawk, the Dragon,
and the Tow, which have been down-
graded in priority, and the like.
Mr. RANDOLPH. I thank the Senator
from Missouri. While listening this after-
noon, I have made an assessment of the
efficacy of the amendment proposed by
my colleague. I have followed the ques-
tions and answers and I am inclined to
support the amendment of the Senator
who has now very kindly yielded to me.
Mr. EAGLETON. I am very grateful
for the flattering comments of the Sena-
tor from West Virginia.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield the floor to me for
about 10 minutes, with the advice that
within that time, or at the end of it, he
will get it back?
Mr. EAGLETON. With that proviso, I
am happy to yield to the majority leader.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
yield 5 minutes to the Senator from West
Virginia.
THE FUNDING OF MASS
TRANSPORTATION
Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, the
President of the United States has for-
warded to Congress an important mes-
sage on public transportation. The mes-
sage quite appropriately focuses attention
on the real problems facing the people
and affecting the economy of our Nation.
We must carefully consider the needs of
our people for metility and provide the
transportation facilities which they re-
quire.
I have long realized, and have so
stated, that highvAlys, alone cannot pro-
vide the transportation needs of the
American people. This is true for the
metropolitan centers, with their great
populations, and to a lesser degree for
the smaller cities and communities of the
United States as well.
It was, I think, necessary that the
President forward such a message be-
cause it does lay dCwn, as it were, a plat-
form on which this Congress can con-
structively legislate. I do not think, how-
ever, that the recommendation of the
President will provide the tools to meet
the transportation needs of the next
generation.
Mr. President, in my 25 years in the
House of Representatives and in the
Senate, I have come to believe that we
cannot expect that the Congress will ap-
propriate out of general funds sufficient
amounts of money with which to con-
tinue to strengthen the highway system
of the United States, or the airport and
airway systems. Funds for airways fa-
cilities have not been forthcoming and
we are in an air safety crisis.
I am delighted that Senator WARREN
MAGNUSON, the very knowledgeable
chairman of the Senate Committee on
Commerce is present on the floor at this
time. I commend him and the members
of his committee who have joined to-
gether in exploring in detail the possi-
bility of a trust fund for airports and
airways, such as we have had for high-
way transportation in this country. The
highway trust fund has enabled us to de-
velop our system of highways to serve
the needs of interstate commerce and de-
fense. As our road system has pro-
gressed we realize that, in part, we are
meeting the transportation needs of the
Nation.
The message of the President of the
United States directs our attention to a
third major form of transport in this
country, mass transit. This third ele-
ment must definitely be given attention.
While I am delighted the President
has spoken out on the need for action,
I do not believe that general funds fi-
nancing will provide sufficient moneys
to do the job. The Uncertainties attached
to such funding prevents them from be-
ing a proper source of money for either
highway development, airport-airways
development, or now, as proposed, for
mass transit development. Experience
has shown that there will never be funds
appropriated in sufficient sums from gen-
eral revenues to do the job which must
be done, not so much for this generation
as for the next generation.
Mr. President, of course, the mem-
bers of the Banking and Currency Com-
mittee and the members of other com-
mittees are more familiar, than I, as to
the level of the authorization which
should be provided, it is my impression,
however, that the amount suggested by
the President of the United States and
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 8, 1969
McNamara explained the waste and in-
efficiency which took place under his re-
gime as the fault of the U.S. Congress.
Mr. McNamara could not find the time
to testify before the Proxmire Subcom-
mitte because of his busy schedule in
his present post as President of the
World Bank. However, he was not too
busy to 'grant an interview to a news-
paper reporter from Boston. As a result
of the interview, former Secretary Mc-
Namara is quoted as having said that
he spent much of his time as Secretary
of -Defense in?and I use his exact
words?"fighting a Congress that wanted
to spend too much on useless military
projects."
Mr. McNamara, at another point in
the interview, was quoted as saying "any
number of times I was ordered to begin
work on a project which was totally
wasteful."
Mr. President, when these remarks
appeared in the newspapers, I wrote to
Subcommittee Chairman PROXMIRE call-
ing the quotes to his attention and sug-
gesting that it had become even more
imperative that Mr. McNamara be asked
to testify in the defense spending in-
vestigation and to explain precisely what
he was forced to do by the members of
this body and our colleagues in the
House.
Of course, things may have been dif-
ferent during the four years I was away;
however, I do not recall any instances
of the Congress twisting Secretary Mc-
Namara's arm and forcing him to spend
money on useless projects. As it turned
out, ram sure we all can agree that the
TFX probably heads any and all lists
that might be compiled on useless pro-
jects in the Department of Defense. But
the arm twisting in this instance was all
done by Mr. McNamara. It will be re-
called that the TFX had its very be-
ginning in the highly vaunted concept of
"commonality" which was one of Mr.
McNamara's prize innovations. From
that point on, all the major decisions
having to do with the TFX were ap-
parently the work of Secretary Mc-
Namara and his immediate assistants in
the Defense Department.
These points have not been contra-
dicted or denied by the present critics
of defense spending, such as Senator
PROXMIRE. For example, in his July 29
remarks Senator PaoxursE made refer-
ence to trouble encountered by the Joint
Economic Committee in attempting to
obtain an analysis of the defense bud-
get and added "and frankly, this does
apply to the previous administration."
This, Mr. President, is one of the few
places where I have been able to find
acknowledgment of the fact that the
things which are being complained about
in connection with the military procure-
ment authorization did not occur in the
present administration under the lead-
ership of Secretary Laird.
As I say, the critics of military spend-
ing have not denied the responsibility
which is owned by former Secretary
McNamara. But by the same token, it
is not a matter that they very often
make clear. Consequently, it has been my
intention here today to clear up some of
the confusion and set the record
straight.
Thousands of words have been printed
In the RECORD and many thousands more
have been printed in newspapers and
magazines throughout the country since
the beginning of the year?and all of
them related directly to the high cost of
waste and inefficiency and favoritism and
cost-overruns in the Department of De-
fense. I merely want the record to show
that these words are a sad and dangerous
monument to previous national admin-
istrations and especially to the liberal
hero, Robert S. McNamara.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. GOLDWATER. I yield.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, unfor-
tunately; I was not in the Chamber when
the Senator was making his address. I
have just returned. I understood the Sen-
ator from Arizona to say we had not in-
vited former Secretary McNamara to ap-
pear before our committee. Is that
correct?
Mr. GOLDWATER. No; I did not say
the Senator did not invite him. I called
attention to the fact that he could not
appear. I gave the Senator full credit for
the good job he is doing. I said I hope he
would equally and as thoroughly go into
HEW and some domestic problems, which
I know he intends to do.
I know that on reading the RECORD the
Senator will find that this Republican
Senator has beei.e.doeiAkM
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
TIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR
MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RE-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MIS-
SILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJ-
ALEIN MISSILE RANGE AND RE-
SERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize appro-
priations during the fiscal year 1970 for
procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval
vessels, and tracked combat vehicles and
to authorize the construction of test fa-
cilities at Kwajalein Missile Range, and
to prescribe the authorized personnel
strength of the Selected Reserve of each
Reserve component of the Armed Forces,
and for other purposes.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if I
may have the attention of the distin-
guished Senator from Missouri (Mr. EA-
GLETON), the distinguished Senator from
Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD) , and the distin-
guished chairman of the committee, the
Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS),
who is the manager of the bill, I would
like most respectfully to suggest to my
colleagues, the Senators from Missouri
and Oregon, to consider the possibility of
withdrawing the amendment now pend-
ing, with the proviso that if the action
contemplated does not take place before
the third reading of the bill they would
be in a position to again reoffer the pend-
ing amendment.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield to me?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. The Senator
may have the floor.
Mr. STENNIS, Mr. President, and
Members of the Senate, the sponsors of
the amendment have urged greatly their
need for an additional study covering
certain points I will hereafter outline.
We have had an around-the-table gen-
tleman's understanding that the com-
mittee will ask the General Accounting
Office for a study on these two points
that I shall enumerate. If that study is
made available before this bill leaves the
floor of the Senate on final passage, then
the committee will pass on the contents
of the study. It is to be a study and not
just a recommendation. It is to be a study
on the points that I shall enumerate.
If the Committee on Armed Services
still recommends that the funds be in-
cluded in the bill as they are now, then
this amendment will be withdrawn al-
together and the funds will remain in
the bill.
I am speaking to the sponsors of the
amendment, the junior Senator from
Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON) and the senior
Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD). Do
the Senators have others with them on
this matter? I wish to ask the Senator
from Missouri whether these two Sen-
ators, the Senator from Missouri and the
Senator from Oregon, feel they represent
others that have a special interest in
this matter.
Mr. EAGLETON. The Senator is cor-
rect. There are five other cosponsors of
the amendment, but I am permitted to
represent them along with the Senator
from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD).
Mr. STENNIS. I wish to ask the Sen-
ator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD) , if he
feels that way, that he can speak for
them under this arrangement, which is
temporary.
Mr, HATFIELD. I think I can speak
for the others.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator.
Mr. President, continuing with the next
point, if. this study for any reason is not
available when the bill reaches final
passage or near thereto, then the spon-
sors will be free, under this agreement,
to recall their amendment or reassert
the amendment and push for its adop-
tion. That is all, except those two main
points in the letter tp the General Ac-
counting Office.
Mr. President, and Members of the
Senate, this report would be available
for Members of the Senate and not just
the Committee on Armed Services, but
our committee would pass on it.
The first point this study would cover
is why research and development cost
estimates have had to be revised steadily
upward since 1965; and, second, what
other feasible alternatives to the develop-
ment of the MBT-70 there are, if any,
and the cost feasibility of each.
I judge that the last item is a kind of
guideline the Senators mentioned want
the opinion on.
This is a legislative matter now and
continues to be a legislative matter and
the Committee on Armed Services could,
of course, confer with the Secretary of
Defense or anyone else that it saw fit in
considering this matter.
I hope I have stated the matter cor-
rectly.
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August 8, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE
fined beneficial ownership of 10 percent of the
voting securities to mean ownership of such
amount at the carrier's outstanding voting
securities as entitles the holder to cast 10
percent of the total number of votes which
the holders of all outstanding voting securi-
ties are entitled to cast.
The House amendment created a presump-
tion of control an the part of any person
owning beneficially 10 percent or more of any
class of the capital stock or cdpital of an
air carrier.
The substitute agreed to in conference
follows the Senate version. The managers on
the part of the House agreed to the Senate
language which had been worked out in
conjimction with the Securitica and Ex-
change Commission and the Cit il Aeronau-
tics Board.
EFFECTIVE DATE
The Senate bill had a retroactdve effective
date of March 7, 1969, but provided that no
criminal penalties shall be applicnble to any-
one who acquired control of an air carrier
between that date and the date of enactment
of the Senate bill.
The House amendment provided that it
take effect on the date of its enactment.
The substitute agreed to in conference
provides that the amendments ,o existing
law will take effect as of August 5, 1969, the
date of the conference agreement. The lan-
guage relating to retroactive Melina' pen-
alties was omitted as unnecessary.
lisairv 0. Srseckas,
SAMUEL N. FaND EL,
Jame' D. DINGELL ,
J. J. PICKLE,
WILLIAM L. Serawt.sa,
SAMUEL L. DEVIN
GLENN CUNNING SM,
Managers on the Part of the [louse.
The PRESIDING OaviCER.The ques-
tion is on the adoption of the conference
report.
The conference report was agreed to.
THE McNAMARA LEGACY
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, it
is my purpose today to discuss in a gen-
eral way many of the subjects the t have
been raised about this Nation's Defense
Establishment and military preparedness
during the prolonged debate on this
Military Procurement Authorizaten.
Now that the issue of the ABM is tem-
porarily out of the way, I believe it is time
to place into a little better perspective
many of the complaints about improvi-
dent military expenditures as well as the
overall charges of gross waste and in-
efficiency in the Defense Departne nt.
I believe it is well known in the; body
that I am a retired major general in the
U.S. Air Force Reserve, that I am now
and have been in previous sessions a
member of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, and that I have a great pride
in and an admiration for the !nee and
the record of our military services.
It is not my intention to here claim
that because of this pride and admiration
I am ready to blanket the entire Defense
Establishment of this Government with
a covering of total competence and effi-
ciency. Because of my interest over a
long period of years, I believe I am per-
haps better able than many Members of
Congress to understand the tremendous
complexities as well as the frailties and
deficiencies of our military system and
especially that part of it which is charged
with the procurement of new weapons
systems and items of military hardware.
Waste and inefficiency? Yes. Without
a doubt there is an enormous amount
of waste and inefficiency, not only in the
Department of Defense with its multi-
billion-dollar budget, but throughout the
entire Federal Government with its hun-
dreds of departments, bureaus, commis-
sions, boards, and agencies. Because of
the enormous size and the incredibly
complex nature of today's sophisticated
weaponry, it is only natured- that the
largest percentage o and over-
lapping should
In this
expres
ough
tig
rid in the Pentagon.
action I have repeatedly
my appreciation for the thor-
ng and exhaustive job of inves-
on performed by my colleague, the
ator from Wisconsin (Mr. PRoX-
r), and his Joint Subcommittee on
vernment Economy. I can find it in
my heart, however, to fault the Senator
from Wisconsin on a couple of grounds,
the most important of which has to do
ith the fact that this very needful task
s not undertaken years earlier.
could possibly object also to the se-
lec 'Or of the subcommittee's opera-
tions that they seem to be concen-
trated s y on one department of our
sprawling tional Government. How-
ever, I shall ?rgo this objection in the
earnest hope th Senator PROXliffRE and
his subcommittee ill next turn their
attention to the w te and inefficiency
which runs rampant t ough some of the
nondefense department of our Govern-
ment. I would hope that e would look
with particular emphasis ? a the multi-
billion-dollar expenditures if the De-
partment of Health, Educ tion, and
Welfare,
As I stated earlier, my main c plaint,
as an interested Member of th Senate
who has been away for 4 years, is that
this inquiry into abuses in the ) ense
Department was so late in cumin . I Say
that because long before I left t s body
to become the Republican no ee for
President, the fact was well es blished
that some things were Tadica and ex-
Pensively wrong in the se .artment of
Defense and especia the Depart-
ment's procurenten procedures?proce-
dures, for example, which enabled a for-
mer Secretary of Defense to overrule his
Department's evaluation boards and
military experts to award a multibillion-
dollar contract for the TteX fighter-
bomber plane to the highest bidder. As I
have pointed out previously, that fiasco
alone should have brought about a thor-
ough-going examination of the Defense
Department's handling of billions of dol-
lars of the taxpayers' hard-earned
money.-
Had a proper investigation, such as
Senator PROXMIRE has recently been en-
gaged in, been undertaken at the time of
the TFX controversy, I believe we could
have saved the taxpayers many billions
of dollars before such items as the ABM
were even proposed.
I nota that in Senator PROXMIRE'S re-
Melte on the Senate floor on July 29 that
he does acknowledge the point I have
just raised. He said:
The Unhappy fact is, however, that while
inefficiency and military policies are being
questioned today, they have been allowed to
develop in the past without serious challenge
from those outside the military establish-
ment.
A mimber of factors have enabled the mil-
itary planners and the military spenders to
claim their inordinate share of the public
purse.
Thus, while the good Senator from
Wisconsin acknowledges in one para-
graph that the policies of waste and in-
efficiency which he is today exposing
were allowed to develop in. the past, in
the next paragraph he leaves the im-
pression?and I believe unintentionally--
that these policies were the work of
military men rather than civilians. But
they were not. The fact is that the mili-
tary planners and the military spenders,
for 8 long, expensive years were former
Secretary McNamara and his cadre of
computer "whiz kids,"
Mr. President, I do not wish to un-
necessarily dwell on the tremendous
multibillion-dolear debt of waste and in-
efficiency in defense procurement which
we owe to former Secretary McNamara.
But so long as some critics are indulging
in an orgy af protest against any and all
things related to the defense of this Na-
tion and the defense of the free world, I,
for one, would like to have it known
and made crystal clear in the RECORD
that the major architect at the things
about which the liberals in this country
are now ranting was one of their very
own.
What I sin stating here is that the
man who cause all this money to be spent
was a political liberal by his own defini-
tion and by his own announcements.
What is more, I think it is important to
recall that the badge of membership in
the elite corps of the New Frontier's lib-
eral disarmament advocates was pinned
on former Secretary McNamara by none
other than Harvard's own Arthur M.
Schlesinger, .Ir.
Let me explain what I mean. As will be
recalled, Mr. Schlesinger was a brain-
truster and speech writer for the late
President John F. Kennedy who wrote
in great detail about his experiences at
the White House and in the Kennedy
administration in a book entitled "A
Thousand Days," which was published
in 1965. In his book, Mr. Schlesinger gives
this first-hand observation of the former
Secretary of Defense:
Next to the President, McNamara . .
probably did more than anyone else to sustain
the disarmament drive. With his sense of
the horror of nuclear conflict,. his understand-
ing of the adequacy of existing stoekpiles, his
fear of nuclear proliferation, his analytic
command of the weapons problem and his
managerial instinct to do something about an
irrational situation, he forever sought new
ways of controlling the arms race.
Mr. President, I find it nothing short of
fascinating that we have here a situation'
whereby an assault on the Defense Es-
tablishment is being fueled by the ex-
cesses of a former Secretary of Defense
who is described by his own friend as a
man dedicated to disarmament as a pol-
icy. I find it interesting, too, that Mr.
McNamara now?after all the damage
has been done, after the hundreds of
millions of dollars for the TFX?F-111?
have gone down the drain, after one
weapon system after another has been
abolished, after we have been left with
an inadequate nuclear powered Navy and
an Air Force which has no carry-on
manned bomber?that after all this. Mr_
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Augu r , 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE S 9485
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I wish
to say that I thoroughly approve what
the distinguished Senator has advocated
and stated. I think it fits in with the
spirit of the amendment which is now
pending, and I would hope that this mat-
ter could be adjudicated and settled on
this basis.
Mr. STENNIS. I have just one word
more. I have conferred with as many
members of the Committee on Armed
Services as I could, under the circum-
stances. I think we are all in substantial
agreement on this proposal. Other pro-
posals were respectfully declined.
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield.
Mr. DIRKSEN, As I understand, this
arrangement is pursuant to the colloquy
we had in the Marble Room earlier this
afternoon, and the Senator has outlined
it pretty much in the same fashion.
Mr. STENNIS. Yes. It does not go as
far as our discussion went, but the basis
is the same, and no harmful precedent
has been set, as I see it.
Mr. DIRKSEN. I am content to concur
if the amendment is withdrawn.
Mr. STENNIS. I think Senators should
have a chance to express themselves. I
yield now to the Senator from Oregon.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I
should like to reiterate, as one of the
sponsors of the amendment, what the
distinguished Senator from Montana and
the distinguished Senator from Missis-
sippi have outlined as the agreement.
It ought to be pointed out that in the
amendment as we presented it, we were
asking for the elimination of of approxi-
mately $54 million from both the item
of research and development and the
item of prototype production. In with-
drawing the amendment at this time, we
then agreed to the specific proposal for
a letter requesting a study which is em-
bodied, basically, in subsection (1) on
page 2, an additional subsection, which
has been agreed to, and alternatives to
the tank and other weapons, and that
upon the receipt of that particular re-
port, provided it is received before the
final passage, the committee will make
an evaluation of the report, and that
Senators who are not members of the
committee will also have access to the
same report. If the report is not received
before the final passage of the bill, we
will then have the privilege of reassert-
ing our amendment without prejudice.
I believe, further, so far as our dis-
cussion is concerned, that if the report is
not decisive?let us say it is a report
that can be interpreted pro- or anti-
tank?Senators of like mind with the
Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON)
and myself will not be foreclosed from
proposing an amendment to the appro-
priation bill which will come later; but
that that bridge will not be crossed until
we come to it.
Of course, I am only indicating this as
a part of the background of our dis-
cussion. It is our hope that the report
will be decisive, so that we can all agree
to it; and if it is negative, we hope that
we will then be able to reach some agree-
ment as to what our next action should
be; but it would not prejudice any of
the sponsors of the amendment from
taking future action on the appropria-
tion bill. But it will not prejudice any of
the sponsors of the amendment from
taking future action as it relates to the
appropriation bill; is that not correct?
Mr. STENNIS. Yes. The Senator is
correct in all his statements, as I under-
stand him. We will not undertake to
bind?and should not?the Appropria-
tions Committee. It is clear, though, that
whatever the study reveals, or whatever
the report is, so far as the bill now pend-
ing is concerned, the decision of the
Armed Services Committee on it will be
final, so far as the sponsors of the
amendment are concerned. Is that cor-
rect?
Mr. HATFIELD. That is correct. Ac-
tually, that is all the amendment pro-
poses to do, to ask for and receive a re-
port. It did not attempt to precommit
any Senators as to what that action
would be following the report. I would
accept the agreement as outlined, and
I thank the Senator from Mississippi and
the Senator from Montana for their as-
sistance in this agreement.
Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President?
Mr. STENNIS. Let me say this. I have
mentioned the two sponsors. I conferred
with the Senator from Maine and I yield
to her.
Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, I did not
hear all that the chairman of the Armed
Services Committee said with respect to
the agreement that was made. While I sat
in on the discussions, does the plan
agreed upon set the pattern for all other
amendments or any other amendments
to the bill?
Mr. STENNIS. Not at all, I say to the
Senator from Maine. This I read from
was the conference that we had in the
Marble Room, with the Senator from
Maine, the Senator from California, and
the Senator from Wisconsin. This is the
exact language that I used, otherwise I
would have come to the Senator from
Maine again. This does not set a prece-
dent of any kind in that field. It is not
agreeing to anything in the bill itself.
This is a mere procedural matter.
Mrs. SMITH. Would other sponsors of
amendments expect to call for the same
review by the GAO on other amend-
ments?
Mr. STENNIS. They might make that
request, but I do not think we could
agree. This is a peculiar case, in that
this has gone on for several years and
we are right down to the last mile, one
might say, on research and development.
I do not consider this to be a precedent.
I believe it fully carries out the sugges-
tion as made by the Senator from Maine.
That is certainly my intention.
Mrs. SMITH. I thank the Senator
from Mississippi very much.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Mississippi yield?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, as
I understand the arrangement, it does
not provide for any suspension of the
program.
Mr. STENNIS. That is correct.
Mr. THURMOND. There are 2,000
personnel working on this project. There
are more than 1,000 civilian Government
employees working on the project.
Mr. STENNIS. Yes.
Mr. THURMOND. The Army is deeply
concerned about it. The Army says that
a year's deferral in funding could delay
first production for as much as 3 to 4
years.
Mr. STENNIS. Yes.
Mr. THURMOND. I just want the
RECORD to be clear and show that there
is no delay, no deferral, and no suspen-
sion of this project.
Mr. STENNIS. That is right.
Mr. THURMOND. This is merely con-
sideration being shown the sponsors of
the amendment, to give the GAO an op-
portunity to make its study and then the
Armed Services Committee, from that
study, will determine whether funds
should be appropriated.
Mr. STENNIS. That is right.
Mr. THURMOND. And that action by
the Armed Services Committee will be
final.
Mr. STENNIS. Yes. The Senator is en-
tirely correct. I am certainly glad that
the Senator brought up that point to be
covered now. We have gone into that and
it will not disturb the assembly line or
the production line or the work going
on now. This agreement will not inter-
rupt it in any way. Things will proceed
as usual. There is an agreement, too, in
connection with the tank, with the Re-
public of Germany. What is happening
here now will not disturb that in any
way.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the
recent Warsaw Pact occupation of Czech-
oslovakia displayed to the world that
Communist military ground forces can
serve as effective instruments in the at-
tainment of Soviet political goals. Few
of us here in the Congress, and certainly
no one in Europe, will forget for many
years to come the photographs of Rus-
sian tanks rolling into that country and
hereby suppressing a Communist re-
gime which was becoming too liberal for
its masters in Moscow.
With this suppression of the Czech
people still fresh in mind it is surprising
to me that the distinguished junior Sen-
ator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON) has
introduced an amendment which would
halt the joint development program of
Germany and the United States to build
a main battle tank.
The Czech crisis showed indisputedly
that the Russians have not abandoned
their traditional reliance on large quan-
tities of main battle tanks. In fact, our
Intelligence indicates the Soviets have
already begun issuing to their a'rMored
units the T-62, a newer and much better
tank than in use by their armies in the
early 1960's. This move is contrasted by
the fact that the United States has not
developed a really new tank since the
Korean war when we first issued the
Mark 48 tank. Since that time we have
relied upon production improvements of
the M-48, the latest improvement known
as the M-60A1. The tank under discus-
sion today is not merely an increment
improvement of the old M-48, but rather
a totally new tank which is revolutionary
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S 9486 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE August 8, 1969
in nature and should serve our fighting
men well in the next few decades.
The MBT-70 amendment offered by
the Senator from MI-se:Mit according to
his press statement of July 18, 1969, is a
follow through to a study on the Main
Battle Tank done by himself and in-
cluded in the recently released report
by the Committee on Military Spending
of the Members of Congress for Peace
through Law. This, of course, is not a
committee of the Congress, but a group
formed by members of both House and
Senate to promote their ideas on defense
matters. The chairman of this committee
is the distinguished Senator from Ore-
gon (Mr. HATFIELD) WhO serves as a Co-
sponsor of the amendment by Senator
EAGLETON.
Now, there are other parts of these
reports which I wish to challenge. First
of all, it should be clear the initial de-
velopment cost -agreed upon by the
United States and German Governments
was $80 million. Further, it should be
stated right here that a reading of the
agreement indicates clearly neither Gov-
erment expected this $$0 million to be
sufficient to develop this tank but con-
sidered it merely the amount necessary
to begin a reasonable development. Both
Governments recognized the amount
would be more and the ase cement pro-
vided for these additional rests. It would
be next to impossible to accurately esti-
mate the development cost of a revolu-
tionary vehicle such as these two coun-
tries hoped to build. Hardly any part of
this tank compares with vehicles built
in the past. InnovatiOns have been
undertaken which invelve entire new
concepts in tank warfare. Thankfully,
the work is about done and we appar-
ently have a weapon system which will
serve our soldiers well for many, many
years.
Therefore, it seems rather unfair to
figure cost overruns based on this $80
million figure when both entintries estab-
lished it is not as a target development
cost but rather as a beginning point in
the development costs of this important
weapons system program.
Now, there is also this contention in
these two reports issued by my distin-
guished colleagues that the MBT-70 has
a nuclear capability as a part of its fire-
power. This is simply not so. The 1VIBT-
70 was not intended to have, does not
have, and will not have nuclear firepower
capability.
Perhaps my colleagues meant to say
the MBT-70 is designed to operate on
a nuclear battlefield. Now that is accur-
ate, but later in the sense paragraph of
the Peace Committee report it is stated
the MBT-70 does not provide any More
protection on a nuclear battlefield than
the M-60A1. This is an error. The
M-60A1 tank design did not include
particular features to overcome the haz-
ards of a nuclear battlefield. On the
other hand, the 1VIBT-70 does possess
specific features to reduce the hazards
expected to occur in a nuclear war. The
MBT-70 thus has a vahes hie increment
of advantage on such a battlefield as
compar91 to the M-60A1.
Let me proceed further to clarify an-
other claim made by these reports, that
this tank was to roll off production lines
In December 1969, but has been extended
4 years beyond that target date.
This Misstates the actual facts of the
agreement between the United States
and Germany. The agreement called for
a tank, and I quote: "ready for produc-
tion in 1970." This does not mean tanks
rolling out complete from a factory.
What this does mean, is that all required
development and a technical data pack-
age has been completed and ready for
publication to industry. The industry
must bid on it, a contract be negotiated,
and finally a plant tooled up for produc-
tion of the initial tank by about mid-1972
or later. Thus the target production date
has not been extended for over 4 years.
The present extension actually, covers
about 2 years.
Mr. President, sometimes it is puzsling
to me just what technique the military
should follow in trying to meet the ob-
jections of some Members of the Con-
gress in providing weapons development
at the lowest cost. Just recently the De-
fense Establishment was being sharply
criticized because they had built weapons
we needed and then had to abandon them
in brief periods since they had served
their usefulness and had been replaced
by more advanced technology. Here we
have a situation where a revolutionary
new tank is being developed, one with a
new turret, new suspension system, new
gun, and it appears the criticism is based
on a stretched out development program.
As badly as we need a new tank today,
is it not wise to spend a little extra
money and take a little extra time in
order to develop the best possible ma-
chine,. one which will do the job in the
next two decades as the M-48 has done in
the past two decades?
Frankly, this development program
has been going slow. We need this tank
in 1970 not 1974 or 1975, but we will never
get it if this amendment is approved
and another delay takes place. We should
not lose sight of the fact this tank, while
designed to fight in various environments
Is mainly NATO oriented. Thus, it is to
support our men in Europe who are eye-
ball to eyeball with the enemy. We must
give our men there the best tank we are
capable of building, and whenever we
leave Europe it will be comforting to me
to know the Germans have that same
tank facing that same enemy.
Returning to the reports' of my col-
leagues, through the Peace Committee
and individually, it is stated the Army
test and evaluations systems authorities
admit a problem with the 152-millimeter
ammunition. Such a problem did exist,
but the same report in which this com-
ment is made claims the ammunition and
its gun operate suitably. Further, we have
now passed through a period of testing
of this ammunition and gun in Vietnam
and hundreds of rounds have been fired
with excellent results. In fact, the soldiers
there have requested greater numbers of
these weapons be sent there for their use.
Mr. President, the MT-70 will not
be merely an incremental improvement
over a design first produced almost 20
years ago. In almost every feature, this
tank will have revolutionary major in-
crease in its capability. This will be true
in its engine, its suspension system, its
protection system, its battlefield silhou-
ette, its secondary; armor, and its main
armament. The main armament alone is
unique in the world. It will be a combi-
nation guided missile launcher, and a
conventional gun capable of firing a new
and improved variety of projectiles. The
Present stage of development has already
shown these revolutionary features to
have an excellent prospect of meeting
their intended design characteristics. The
total design of the tank has a most favor-
able prognosis of being a successful reeo-
lutionary design when it appears and
much more than, as the Hatfield report
would say, temporarily superior to Soviet
tanks. It should be superior for a goad
long time.
The Hatiield-Eagleton description
would have us believe that the technolog-
ical rationale for which this tank is de-
signed may be obsolete by the nuclear
battlefields if they occur in the mid-
1970's, saying it will be a victim of tech-
nology or a new strategy. They say this
is the central issue. This reasoning is in-
complete.
If this is a central issue, then the ques-
tion is raised whether we should have any
tank at all. If the most modern tank we
can make, including revolutionary fea-
tures, is thought to be obsolete and not
useful, then certainly the present tank,
product improvements of a 1950 design,
will be even more obsolete and less useful.
Those who kill off the MBT-70 because
of this issue should also be proposing that
we kill off all tanks for use on any pos-
sible nuclear battlefield.
If the Hatfield-Eagleton statements
are intended to question whether there
can ever be a nuclear tactical war, then
they clearly cannot be at the same time
arguing that a great improvement over
our present tanks would not be useful to
our forces, in Europe or anywhere else.
As I previously pointed out, if a non-nu-
clear war should suddenly become nu-
clear than the MBT-70 with specific
features designed for nuclear war will ob-
viously be of greater usefulness to our
troops in such combat.
The Hatfield-Eagleton statements
ratee the question of whether the stra-
tegic projections made in 1963 will be
valid in 1974. If they intend to convey the
Idea that they have conjured up a better
projection of the 1963 strategic consider-
ations than those which prevail now, they
should make them known. It is already
apparent that the tactical projections on
which the design of the tank is actually
based were quite valid.
The Army stated then that they would
need a much better tank if they were to
contend with the probable tank which
they might find on the battlefield of the
future. The Soviets have proved them
correct. They have begun issuing to their
units the T-62, a much newer and better
tank than their units had in 1963.
In other words, the best answer to the
question which is asked by Senators Hat-
field and Eagletonis provided by the Rus-
sians. They are now reequileleing their
armored and mechanized units?of which
they have far more than we do?with a
tank of much later design than our pres-
ent M-60A1. The Soviets clearly expect to
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S 9487
have a use for tanks on any future bat-
tlefield, nuclear or not.
The Hatfield-Eagleton discussion
makes much of the length of time in-
volved in developing the tank and get-
ting it ready for production, and of what
they described as the spiraling cost of
development.
These statements ignore the available
information pertaining to the sequence
in development of this tank. In 1963,
when the German-American agreement
was signed, there was not then in exist-
ence any agreed concept as to what the
tank would be, or what its specific fea-
tures would be like. The hard, difficult
discussions between the two countries'
tank commanders over these details was
not resolved until September 1965. These
details of actual construction became the
basis for the increase from the original
$80 million estimate of initial joint de-
velopment cost, to the later estimate of
$138 million development cost. These
estimates were in-house projections.
Later actual bids by potential contractors
for the various components intended to
be in the tank indicated that this in-
house estimate was too low and the de-
velopment time previously forecast was
too short.
The first prototypes, including in some
cases alternative design features, com-
menced delivery with .the first one in
July 1967. Since then the development
has proceeded in an orderly fashion, re-
solving the operational features of each
of several revolutionary designs of mech-
anisms never before put together. This
orderly, sequential, and severe testing of
each of the components follows the gen-
eral scheme of development which the
General Accounting Office has recom-
mended in such cases.
The statements of my colleagues are
said to be based upon a study of the
MBT-70 tank. The Armed Services Com-
mittee has recommended that the de-
velopment of the MBT-70 be continued.
This recommendation is based upon con-
siderable study on the part of its staff
which began shortly after the first pro-
totype was issued for testing in July
1967. Its study has included numerous
conferences with development officials
of the Army, visits by members of the
staff to observe the tank components in
operation, including visits to Aberdeen
Proving Ground, to test and production
facilities of the contractors, to the Army
Armored Center at Fort Knox, discus-
sions with the Armored Board and Ar-
mored Agency of the Combat Develop-
ment Command and the responsible ex-
perienced armor officers in the Armored
School at Fort Knox. The considerations
give here have been neither hasty nor
perfunctory. The committee did believe
that the orderly development procedure
being followed would not be harmed if
the requested funds for fiscal year 1970
were reduced from $44.9 million to $30
million in its overall consideration of
reducing current expenditures. It like-
wise believes that there is every possi-
bility that if there are no impediments
thrown in the works, that the United
States will succeed with putting in the
field, for use by its fighting men, a tank
that is far superior to any tank ever seen
before. It further believes that nothing
can be gained by throwing away the
money already spent in this orderly de-
velopment procedure, and condemning
our troops to the continued use of a tank
much older in design than that possessed
by the Soviets. Further, the arbitrary in-
terruption of a joint development in
which our partners, the Germans, are
faithfully fulfilling their part of the bar-
gain, is to place the United States in the
position of a defaulter on a contract.
To stop this development and begin
another is hardly likely to be any less
costly than the one on which we have
already spend considerable money in
getting close to the intended outcome.
The most sensible thing, the most hon-
orable thing to do in our agreement with
the Germans, and the most economical
thing to do, is to continue the main tank
program as the Armed Services Com-
mittee has recommended.
Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Mississippi yield?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield.
Mr. ALLOTT. I wish to ask about the
second point the Senator read from on
his list, which is closely allied with some
of the points in the amendment, par-
ticularly the second, third, and fourth.
As I understand the agreement, the deci-
sion of the Armed Services Committee
will be binding as to what is done in
this matter. But I should like to say, as
a member of the Defense Subcommittee
on Appropriations, that I believe, in these
areas, in asking the GAO to make deter-
minations, that we are going outside
their function. Frankly, I think those are
decisions which should be made by com-
mittees of the Senate and by the Senate
itself rather than by the GAO. They may
or may not have the expertise to make
such judgments. I doubt that they do,
not have ready availability and con-
stant availability to intelligence reports,
strategic services, and things of that
nature. But I did not want this to go by,
being in the Chamber, as in any way
placing my stamp of approval with re-
spect.to that second point because I think
it is a matter of determination in which
the GAO should not be involved.
Mr. STENNIS. If I may respond to that
quite briefly, I think the Senator is en-
tirely correct. I do not think they have
the capability, but we will soon find out.
Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr.
President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield to the Senator
from North Dakota, a member of our
committee.
Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr.
President, I want to associate myself with
the views expressed by the Senator from
Colorado. The General Accounting Of-
fice is a very efficient Office when it comes
to accounting, but in the past I have
found that whenever it delves into policy,
it can be terribly wrong. Certainly I
would not want to accept their views on
military matters and policy decisions.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if the
Senator will yield, that is not antici-
pated.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, Mem-
bers of the Senate, there has been a very
good debate on this matter. It all came
from the opposition to the tank. I hope
we can conclude this colloquy soon and
that someone on the committee who is
versed in this matter?I am not referring
to myself?will have an opportunity to
say a few words. Meanwhile, it would be
better to have quiet.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield to the Senator
from California.
Mr. CRANSTON. I just wanted very
briefly to comment on the point the Sen-
ator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER)
raised earlier and that the Senator from
Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT) and other Sena-
tors have raised. I referred to it earlier
today. It referred to some questions I had
about the pending amendment.
I think the proposal now made clears
the point, but I would like briefly to ex-
press my concern about expecting the
General Accounting Office to render
value judgments about whether a pro-
gram is good or bad. I think to get them
to express such judgments is offensive
to experts in that field, the specific field
involved?military for example. In the
same way, I would question their right
to judge the wisdom or lack of wisdom
of the war on poverty and other such
programs.
It should confine itself to the question
of cost effectiveness and leave decisions
on the wisdom and value of any program
to the House, the Senate, and the ad-
ministration.
I was comptroller of the State of Cali-
fornia for 8 years. Hence, I have
some feelings on what is the proper field
to assign to the Comptroller.
During this debate, I asked my staff to
call the General Accounting Office and
get their feelings on the four points, in
the pending amendment, providing ac-
tions by GAO. Very briefly, the feeling
on the four points referring to the GAO
is as follows:
As to point 1, which is now covered by
the agreement, subsection 1 is within the
scope of the GAO investigatory respon-
sibility.
As to point 2 under that subsection,
conversations with GAO indicate that
the Comptroller General could not make
any determination as to the most effec-
tive weapons. The most they could do is
present the pros and cons as developed
by the Department of Defense, and GAO
has no capability to conduct technical
studies of technical capability.
As to subsection 3, the GAO would be
limited to presenting the information
developed by the Department of Defense
or other agency engaged in technological
or strategic study. It could perform no
function before setting forth the con-
siderations which originally influence the
decision with respect to the MBT-70,
Finally, under section 4, the GAO in-
quiry would be limited to an analysis of
the decisions by which the Department
of Defense decided to develop the MDT-
70.
I think the compromise proposal now
offered is a wise one. I think it has nar-
rowed the scope of whatever the GAO
would report.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
would like to emphasize that sections 2
and 3 have been obliterated and section
4 has been changed, so I think what will
be done by the GAO is what it is capable
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sENATE August ,f-b=9
of doing, and it is not capable of going
into the military field or policy.
Mr. CRANSTON. Exactly.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I think
it would be a fair test of the GAO's posi-
tion. I think it will give them a chance to
express themselves, too, about their
capability.
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. Yes; I am glad to yield
to the Senator from Missouri.
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, first, I
thank the Senator from Mississippi. He
has been remarkably patient and indul-
gent throughout what to rue has been a
very long and tiring debate, and he has
many days such as this to endure. I want
to compliment him and thank him for his
patience with me and with the Senator
from Oregon on the subject.
Second, let me affirm in brevity the
thought which the Senator from Oregon
has suggested. The understanding spelled
out by the Senator from Mississippi
through the exchange with the Senator
from Oregon is precisely my understand-
ing.
Finally, let me say that, however in-
articulately our amendment was drawn,
as the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr.
PROXMIRE) pointed out, especially in sub-
clause 2, the main thrust of what we were
trying to achieve was a study and a re-
port from GAO; and I hope we will have
such a report. I think the whole Senate
and the Armed Services Committee will
benefit thereby.
Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, during
our hearings on the proposed defense
budget authorization, I seriously con-
sidered recommending to the committee
that which the proposed amendment
seeks to accomplish. I repeatedly ex-
pressed my concern on the Army's efforts
in tank development arid anyone who
doubts my concern can turn to page 364
and page 405 elsewhere in part one of
the printed hearings.
But, Mr. President, after consider-
able reflection I, along with my col-
leagues on the committee, faced up to the
stark realities of our NATO commit-
ment. I have always believed and I shall
continue to believe that if we are to dis-
patch our men in uniform anywhere
outside the continental limits to carry
out our national policies, the very least
we can do is provide theta the best and
most modern weapons possible.
Yes, I, too, have expreated my disap-
pointment in the numerous delays and
high costs associated with modernizing
our ground combat vehicles but let me
point out the effects of amendment No.
76.
First of all, the whole concept of logis-
tical support cooperation between the
United States and the Federal Republic
of Germany will be placed in serious
jeopardy. The main battle tank devel-
opment represents a binding contract
between the two governments in which
Germany has invested considerable
funds. It is a joint project that they
alone cannot complete and one which
the U.S. Government initiated. The pro-
posed amendment, if adopted, represents
a unilateral withdrawal from an inter-
national agreement without prior con-
sultation with one of our most depend-
able allies. I remind my colleagues that
this is one of our few allies that not only
believes in but does actually participate
on a cost-sharing basis.
Second, the monthly cost for the next
6 months is approximately $3 million to
maintain the main battle tank program
as a going program without procurement
of significant hardware. Current funds in
this program will permit it to continue at
most until September 30, 1969. Thus, the
effect of the amendment is to close down
the program for an undetermined time.
Development work will be suspended and
termination costs will approximate $9
million.
Third, should the amendment be
adopted the Federal Republic of Ger-
many may see fit to take a unilateral ac-
tion and cancel another contract with
the United States to purchase 88 F-4 air-
craft.
Our forces in Korea today and those in
Europe are now equipped with tanks
which embody the technology of the
1950's and I can assure you that these
will be obsolete by the mid-1970's.
Mr. President, if the U.S. Senate de-
cides to adopt the proposed amendment
which would have the effect of unilateral
withdrawal from a contract, I wonder if
we should entertain another amendment
to withdraw from the -North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO).
That treaty will have been in effect for
20 years in August 1969?this month. The
treaty provides that after 20 years any
member nation which desires to with-
draw may do so by giving the other
member nations 1 year's notice.
Mr. President, the principal weapon
systems contained in this bill are directly
associated with our foreign military
commitments. I strongly urge that before
we deprive our own forces of their weap-
ons, we should first withdraw from our
treaty military commitments.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I highly
commend the speech of the Senator from
Maine. It is realistic, I think it contains
some highly practical suggestions, and
this is a matter that has to be met by
something other than just talk, Mr. Pres-
ident.
We have had a lot of arguments here
on the floor of the Senate as to what
our foreign policy should be and what
it should not be as expreSsed in the mil-
itary bill.
This bill represents the Armed Serv-
ices Committee's judgment of what is
necessary to back up our foreign policy
as announced, and also directly protects
us. I do not know of any other foreign
policy there is. I do not think we have
formulated anything else. We talk about
these matters, but this is the real thing:
to protect ourselves directly first, and
then to be in some kind of position to
carry out at least our share of these
commitments. I hope that we can get
on into the meat of this bill now, and
consider this matter in that light.
I, too, would like to dwell in make-be-
lieve land, or wish-it-was land, but we
are up against the realities with this
amendment today. This is the first time
we have got into the real hardware of
the bill, outside the matter of the defen-
sive ABM and I think most of the other
amendments, at least the sizable ones,
will continue to deal with the necessary
hardware to implement our present pol-
icy.
Let us not fool ourselves, now, in talk-
ing about whether or not we need a tank
that will survive a nuclear war. I do not
think we can make such a tank. We are
talking about a ground war now, by con-
ventional methods, and with reference
to the tank, we are talking about the
weapon in which Soviet Russia has been
superior for a long time. The great Pre-
ponderance of the evidence is that they
still are superior.
So, if we do have this ground war?
which God forbid we do not have?we
could not plan a better way to be de-
ficient than not to have plenty of good,
effective tanks that would at least have
a chance to cope with those on the other
side.
I do not travel much, but last fall I
did spend a little time in Western
Europe, went right on over to the border
of Czechoslovakia, went out in that mud
and muck, and went up and over inside
one of these tanks. I talked with those
boys. I do not know anything about
tanks, but that one did not look very
much up to date to me.
I will tell you where that word "dream
tank" came from. This Is some of the
roughest, toughest soldering that one can
find anywhere, and the crew is a victim.
I shall not emphasize this too much, but
the crew, in a large way, is a victim of
the position it is in, and the inaction or
failure of that tank carries dire conse-
quences for them.
This is planned to be a tank that will
do so many things so effectively and effi-
ciently that it gives the crew a much
better chance. That is one reason they
call it a dream tank.
If we mean business, now, about be-
ing over there, and if there is any kind of
a threat, let this be the last weapon we
neglect, for fighting a ground war,
rather than the first. This is a doughboy
weapon.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I
wish to commend the distinguished Sen-
ator from Maine (Mrs. SMITH) for the
excellent remarks she has made con-
cerning the importance of the main bat-
tle tank. The Senator from Maine has
quite properly stressed that a break in
this joint development program with
West Germany would be a unilateral ac-
tion which could only have the most seri-
ous repercussions. My able colleague has
also pointed out the critical need of our
Army for a new tank since we have only
had production improvements for the
Past 20 years. The remarks of the
Senator from Maine should be heeded by
all of us in this Chamber and I wish to
associate myself with them.
Mr. PrfcINTYRE. Mr. President, the
amendment offered by the distinguished
Senator from Missouri would have the
effect of withholding all R. Sz D. funds
for fiscal year 1970 on the Main Battle
Tank and, in addition, would withhold
the funds for the procurement of 6 Pre-
production prototypes which were plan-
ned as the test vehicles to bring the tank
to the point where full production could
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august 8, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 9483
be initiated. Although the amendment
calls for an investigation and study by
the Comptroller General to be completed
in 6 months, the result of the amendment
would be a complete cessation of U.S.
participation in the joint project.
...In my judgment, this would so com-
pletely disrupt the contractual develop-
ment efforts being carried on, both in
the United States and Germany, as to
force either termination of the Main Bat-
tle Tank development completely or a
further delay which would probably
amount to several years.
Mr. President, this is a result which,
in my judgment, should not be taken
lightly. The Main Battle Tank is not in-
tended just as a nice thing to have, but
as an essential weapon system which
must be put in the hands of our troops
if they are to successfully cope with the
threat which they will face in the 1970's.
Our intelligence tells us that at the pres-
ent time the Russians have tanks in the
hands of their troops which are superior
in some aspects to the tanks the U.S.
Army has. It is estimated that the tanks
which the Soviet forces are operating
today reflect a technology which is ap-
proximately 10 years ahead of U.S. tech-
nology. In addition, the best Russian
tanks outnumber the best U.S. tanks by
more than 3 to 1. With a tank force that
is currently inferior, both in quality and
numbers, we should not take lightly any
action to disrupt the efforts to upgrade
our tank force. And, Mr. President, there
can be no question that this amendment,
if it becomes law, will seriously?perhaps
irreparably?disrupt the Main Battle
Tank program.
The main battle tank program has
been, criticized because the initial re-
search and development cost estimates
have been revised upward a number of
times. Mr. President, I am as concerned
as any Member of this body about the
rising cost of research and development
and about the consistent record of the
Defense Department in underestimating
the ultimate cost of weapon system de-
velopment. I recognize the difficulty of
making precise estimates when a weap-
on system is in the conceptual stage. It
is clearly too early to make any kind of
reliable estimate for an international
program before the two countries even
agree on the specific tank configuration,
and this was the case in 1963 when a pre-
liminary estimate of $80 million was
made by United States and German tech-
nical people. The 1965 estimates were
somewhat more realistic but even these
have grown?indeed, have doubled. I do
not condone this growth any more than
I condone the cost growth in the 0-5 or
other Defense programs, but in fairness
I think we should recognize that the
causes of this growth in development
costs have, in large part, reasonable ex-
planations. They do not necessarily re-
flect weaknesses in the program itself.
For example, the estimates now include
development of a joint heavy equipment
transporter, a joint advanced component
development program, and a gas turbine
engine program which were not contem-
plated in the 1965 development estimate.
In addition, technical difficulties have
contributed to the increased costs. Many
developments are simply product im-
provements in which existing designs are
Improved component by component, re-
sulting in evolutionary changes that do
not represent major breakthroughs.
However, the main battle tank is a revo-
lutionary development in which higher
development risks are accepted to pro-
duce an all new tank which capitalizes
on advanced engineering techniques and
results in a major increase in capability.
Again, I feel that the Defense De-
partment has been guilty of over-opti-
mistic planning is not allowing for addi-
tional costs and time to solve these
difficult technical problems which are
associated with the revolutionary design.
But it is this revolutionary design which
will insure that the MBT-70 not only
will not be obsolete when it is introduced
but will be superior to any tank then
existing on either side of the iron curtain.
Congress has repeatedly criticized the
Defense Department for rushing weap-
ons systems into production before the
development difficulties are completely
resolved thereby incurring expensive
retrofit after the production run has
started. The Army has sought to mini-
mize this kind of expense by applying
conservative controls to place the devel-
opment of the main battle tank, and this
has contributed to both the delays in the
development and to the increase in cost.
Mr. President, I think that although
the program has had problems, technical
difficulties, growth in development cost
beyond the original estimates, those
problems are not the vital question now.
What is vital is that our troops are
equipped with inferior armor, in inferior
numbers.
This is a dangerous condition which
decreases the deterrent value of our
NATO forces in Europe and increases
the possibility of a military adventure
by the Communists which could have
disastrous effects. The important thing
at this point, Mr. President, is that we
need a new tank. We need a new tank
in numbers, and we need it as soon as
it can become available. I think that the
effect of this amendment would be to
deny us the capability to produce an ad-
vanced tank before the late 1970's. In my
judgment, this is an unacceptable risk
which we must not take.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, on
June 13, 1969, Elmer Staats testified to
the Subcommittee on Economy in Gov-
ernment about the scope of GAO's in-
volvement in the defense area. Mr.
Staats stated that of the GAO's total op-
erating budget for fiscal year 1969, of
$59.6 million, over $30.1 million, or 50.5
percent is related to defense programs
and activities. He said that the alloca-
tion of GAO's resources in the account-
ing, auditing, legal and other related
functions in connection with defense
spending amounts to 43 percent. The
proposed GAO budget for fiscal year 1970
provides for a total professional audit
staff of 2,585. Mr. Staats said:
We continue to place heavy emphasis upon
the major functional areas of defense activi-
ties, including procurement, supply manage-
ment, manpower, research and development,
facilities and construction, support services,
and management control systems.
It is also well to remember that the
Congress created the GAO to be its in-
vestigative arm. The annual report of the
Comptroller General states:
The Congress established the General Ac-
counting Office in the Legislative Branch to
serve as an independent, nonpolitical and
reliable source of assistance in carrying out
its constitutional power over the public
purse.
The GAO periodically makes reports
to Congress on its audits, investigations
and evaluation requested by individual
Members or committees. It annually
issues literally hundreds of reports deal;
ing with expenditures by the executive
branch. These reports are designed to aid
the Congress with information helpful
in reviewing the annual budget requests.
It should, therefore, be clear that the
General Accounting Office was created
to perform the kind of functions out-
lined in this amendment, that it is em-
minently equipped to do so with a large
professional staff, and that it has the
experience in the area of defense analy-
sis that is called for.
The GAO is the appropriate agency to
undertake the study required by the
amendment rather than the Bureau of
the Budget or the Defense Department.
would note the following:
First. GAO is independent and re-
sponsible to Congress.
Second. GAO is building a systems
analytic capability and currently has at
least as much of this capability as BOB.
Third. Neither BOB nor DOD could be
expected to develop a report which would
offend the President or the Secretary of
Defense.
The main battle tank, MBT-70, was
conceived in 1963. It is being developed
jointly by the United States and West
Germany. Its purpose is to operate in
the environment of a tactical nuclear
war in Western Europe. The develop-
ment of the tank had been scheduled
for production by 1969, but it has now
been deferred until 1974. The R. & D.
costs of this weapon have risen from
$86 million to over $300 million since
1963. In the current military authoriza-
tion bill, there is a total of $55 million
recommended by the Senate Armed
Services Committee. This included $30
million for R. & D. and $24.5 million for
production engineering. The Senate
Armed Services Committee cut the R. &
D. budget request of the Pentagon from
$43.3 million.
The Army intends to replace all of
the M-60-A1 tanks which we now have
deployed in Europe with the MBT-70.
Currently, there are well over 1,000 Of
these tanks in Western Europe. At the
current estimated cost of producing the
MBT-70 of between $600,000 and $700,-
000, per unit, it is estimated that the
total cost of this program over the dec-
ade of the 1970's would be in the neigh-
borhood of $1.5 billion.
The following points enumerate some
of the circumstances surrounding the
MBT-'70 which are pertinent to a Con-
gressional decision to continue the
R. & D. on this weapon.
Developments in antitank warfare
have far outdistanced tank warfare de-
velopments. It is now possible for an ,
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S9490 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 8, 1969
infantryman to knock out a tank with
a guided missile which he carries with
him in bazooka style.
The MBT-70 is designed to be equipped
with a Shillelagh missile. In this system,
both the missile and 152-mm. cartridges
are fired through the same tube mounted
on the tank. This Shillelagh firing sys-
tem is enormously complicated and has
not yet been made to work. The Shil-
lelagh was supposed to be installed on
the Sheridan tank, but, because of in-
herent design defects, it cOuld not be
properly mounted. Even thetmh it was
Produced and sent to Vietnam, where it
became embroiled in a scandal because
of serious firing failures in-battle. The
same Shillelagh missile was Supposed to
be attached to the M-60 tank, but again
mounting problems as well as severe mis-
firing troubles occurred. Currently there
are hundreds of M-60 tanks waiting in
Detroit for the Shillelagh missile which,
according to the Stratton report, "still
cannot be deployed because of deficien-
cies."
Costs of the MBT-70 are nnw projected
to be about $600,000 to $700.000 for each
vehicle. This is two and a half to three
times as much as the M-60_tank, which
we now possess, and whose performance
is only marginally below that of the
MBT-70.
The Army intends to replace all of the
M-60's which are now deployed in West-
ern Europe with MBT-70's in the decade
of the 1970's. It is known that there are
currently well over 1,000 of the M-60
tanks now in Western Europe. If these
are replaced by MBT-70's during the
next decade, we are confronting a total
budget cost of $65 billion or, more. If the
Army receives the appropriation on the
tank this year, the Congress will be very
close to approving the production and
deployment of this weapon.
The M-60-A1 tank now, in Western
Europe is at least equal to any tank now
possessed by the Russians or in develop-
ment by the Soviet Government. A num-
ber of people with whom I-have spoken
state that the M-60-A1 is superior to
anything which the Soviets now have in
development.
While the Army has argued that there
is a potential tank threat from the So-
viets in the Western European theater,
it should be noted that in 1958, a decade
ago, their principal rationale for devel-
oping a guided-missile capability on
tanks was the alleged "possible superi-
ority" of the Communist-bloc countries.
In the recent report by the-Stratton sub-
committee of the House, it was noted
that that Soviet capability never devel-
oped and now, some 10 years later, the
M-60-A without the guided missile is
"equal to or superior to Soviet-designed
tanks."
The Army insists that we are out-
numbered in tank forces_ in Western
Europe. The Stratton Subcommittee
noted that the reason we are outnum-
bered is because the Army failed to main-
tain an adequate production rate of
M-60's during the 1960's and indeed,
"they slowed down the production line
and even closed it in 1967 to produce the
M-60 with Shillelagh missile, which still
cannot be deployed because of de-
ficiencies."
The MBT-70 is designed to fight a war
in Western Europe similar to World War
II, only with tactical nuclear weapons
instead of conventional weapons. Many
strategists believe that such a con-
tingency is no more than a remote pos-
sibility. Moreover, the Congress to date
has not fully considered the implications
of tactical nuclear war on the European
Continent.
The characteristic of the tank which
stands out in the minds of most of the
people, both in the Pentagon and out,
who are knowledgeable about this pro-
gram, is the highly sophisticated tech-
nology which is being built into it. I
understand that there is built into every
tank a computer for leveling and auto-
matic loading and firing. Among these
people, there is substantial skeptism con-
cerning the ability of existing tech-
nology to produce a workable vehicle. In
fact, there is some well-based expecta-
tion now that the Secretary of Defense
judges the weapon to be an ultimately
infeasible end and may well cancel it
himself, if the Congress does not cancel
it.
Many people knowledgeable in the de-
tails of this weapon have informed me
that a major share of the high cost of
this weapon is accounted for by the use
of a special steel which is neutron ab-
sorbing. In point of fact, if this is true,
the Nation is spending a substantial
amount of money?into the billions?to
provide covering for a limited number
of personnel who will be engaged in some
prospective tactical nuclear war in Ger-
many, France, the Netherlands, and so
on.
That there have been difficulties in de-
signing the sophisticated equipment in
this tank is evidenced by the cost growth
in R. & D. In 1963, it was estimated that
R. & D. would cost $86 million and that
the tank would roll off the production
line in 1969. Now the R. & D. cost has
escalated to well over $300 million, and
production target is now 1974.
So far, the U.S. Government has spent
over $30 million on the development of
the 1500 horsepower turbine engine
which, in the judgment of a number of
people, may well not be technically
feasible.
While the MBT-70 might have been
analyzed to be cost effective prior to
1965, it is now doubtful, given the esca-
lated R. & D. costs, and given the doubts
about technical feasibility, that it would
still be cost effective. It is essential that
this question be studied.
Finally, I would make a number of
other points which are pertinent to a
decision on the MBT-70.
If this weapon is produced and de-
ployed in Western Europe under a joint
agreement with West Germany, we will
be in the process of supplying tactical
nuclear weapons to Germany. I do not
believe that this fact is widely recognized
for, if it were, the same kind of opposi-
tion to it would develop as did develop
a few years ago on a similar issue.
By providing a tactical nuclear weapon
to NATO countries, it seems to me that
the United States is directly undermin-
ing its claims Concerning the effective-
ness of its nuclear deterrence. If we are
spending $10 billion to fight a tactical
nuclear war, it is difficult to convince our
NATO allies that our nuclear deterrence
is sufficiently potent to forestall any
potential Soviet attack.
I would emphasize a point that I made
earlier: namely, that Congress should
not vote approval of a program such
as MBT-70 without knowing the full
budgetary implications of the system.
This year, the Army requested $70 mil-
lion of funds. This was cut to about
$55 million by the Armed Services Com-
mittee. If this $55 million comes close
to committing the Nation to a $15 billion
expenditure, it should be known by all
participants to the decision prior to final
decision.
Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I have
been listening to 2 days of debate here.
I do not think it has been mentioned
that at the other end of the spectrum is
the Renegotiation Board, which has
been operating for a long time. Of
course, that Board passes on smaller
amounts, but it passes on whether some-
one has made an excess profit on a
military contract. The Senator from
Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT) and I have han-
dled the small appropriations for that
office for years. That Board is collecting
many millions of dollars, and it has re-
sponsibility over all military procure-
ment contracts over, I think, $25,000, or
whatever the figure is.
So despite the procedure we have been
talking about, at the other end of the
spectrum There is the Renegotiation
Board, which acts in a very nonpartisan
manner. The Board has done a very good
job.
Does the Senator from Colorado
agree?
Mr. ALLOTT. I certainly do.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator for
his comments.
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I with-
draw my amendment, without prejudice.
STUDENT LOANS
Mr. JAVITS, Mr. President, certainly,
sooner or later, the majority leader will
make a statement on the program for to-
day and next week. I would like to call
attention to the fact that the Committee
on Labor and .Public Welfare has just
reported a bill which deals with the abil-
ity of 200,000 college students to get
student loans, and if we do not deal
with that measure before we have a re-
cess, very likely a large number of them
may be denied the opportunity to spend
the next year in college. I know the exi-
gencies we are all under, and I only state
It to submit it to the majority and mi-
nority leaders. I would hope they might
find some way of accommodating the
serious situation. Thirty members of the
Senate are cosponsors of that bill. I MEV
add that the measure takes no money,
because the money has been appropri-
ated. It is just a matter d using it for
this particular purpose.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, may
I say that the joint leadership will do
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August 8, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE
"(b) None of the funds authorized to be
appropriated by this or any other Act may
be used for the procurement of delivery
systems specifically designed to disseminate
lethal chemical agents, disease-producing
biological micro-organisms, or biological
toxins, or for the procurement of any part
or component of such delivery system.
'(c) None of the funds authorized to be
appropriated by this or any other Act may
be uSed for future deployment and storage
of any lethal chemical agent or any disease-
producing biological microorganism or any
biological toxin at any place outside the
United States, or for the deployment at any
place outside the United States of delivery
systems designed to disseminate any such
agent or microorganism or toxin unless the
country exercising jurisdiction over such
place haS prior notice of such action. In the
case of any place outside the United States
which is under the jurisdiction or control of
the Government of the United States, no
such action may be taken unless prior notice ?
of such action has been given to the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appro-
priations and, when appropriate, the Com-
mittee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the
Senate, and the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
Committees on Appropriations and, when
appropriate, the Committee on Interior and
Insular AffairS of the House of Representa-
tives. As used in this section the term 'United
States' means the several States and the Dis-
trict of Columbia.
"(d) (1) None of the funds authorized to
be appropriated by this Act or any other Act
shall be used for the transportation of any
lethal chemical or biological agents to or
from any military installation in the United
States, its territorieS or possessions unless
the Surgeon General of the Public Health
Service has determined that such transporta-
tion will not present a hazard to the public
health.
"(d) (2) The Secretary of Defense, except
during a war declared by Congress or during
a national emergency declared by Congress
or the President after the enactment of this
legislation, shall provide written notification
to the Congress, to the Secretary of Trans-
portation, to the Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare and to the Interstate Com-
merce Commission at least thirty days in
advance of any operation involving the trans-
portation of lethal chemical or biological
agents to or from any military installation
in the United States, its territories, or posses-
sions. The Secretary of Defense shall provide
appropriate notification to the Governor of
any State through which such agents be
transported.
"(d) (3) The Department of Defense shall
detoxify all lethal chemical or biological
agents before their transportation for dis-
posal as provided for in subsection (e) (1)
and (e) (2) of this section whenever it is
practical to do so.
"(e) None of the funds authorized by this
or any other Act shall be used for the testing,
development, transportation, storage, or dis-
posal of any chemical or biological weapon
outside of the continental limits of the
United States unless the Secretary of State
determines that such testing, development,
transportation, storage, or disposal will not
violate international law and reports such
determination to the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Committee
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Represent-
atives, and to the appropriate international
organizations, or organs thereof, whenever
required by treaty or other international
agreement.
"(f) None of the funds authorized to be
appropriated by this or any other Act shall be
used for the open air testing of lethal chemi-
cal agents, disease-producing biological mi-
croorganisms, or biological toxins except upon
S 9491
what it can. It certainly will not consider
laying aside the present business un-
less we have the concurrence of the
Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS)
and the ranking Republican member,
the senior Senator from Maine (Mrs.
SMITH) ; but if something could be
worked out on the basis of a time limi-
tation, we would be glad to give it our
consideration. But if it is going to be
a "dog fight," as it could well develop
into, I think we would have to consider
that. But we will do what we can, with-
out being too definite.
Mr. FELL. Mr. President, I would like
to associate myself with the views ex-
pressed by the Senator from New York.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Probably it would
help get the Senator from New York
and the Senator from Rhode Island off
my back if we could agree to it.
AU RIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
TIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970
FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT,
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT,
AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF
MISSILE TEST FACILITIES AT
KWAJALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND
RESERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize appro-
priations during the fiscal year 1970
for procurement of aircraft, missiles,
naval vessels, and tracked combat ve-
hicles and to authorize the construction
of test facilities at Kwajalein Missile
Range, and to prescribe the authorized
personnel strength of the Selected Re-
serve of each Reserve component of the
Armed Forces, and for other purposes.
Mr. NELSON. iVfr. President, I call at-
tention to the absence of a quorum.
Mr. MANSFIELD A quorum call is
agreeable, provided that the Senator
does not lose his right to the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will
call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the
roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Wisconsin yield?
Mr. NELSON. I yield.
AMENDMENT NO. 131
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, at this
time I offer an amendment to S. 2546.
The amendment concerns chemical and
biological warfare.
Senators NELSON, GOODELL, HUGHES,
PROXMIRE, YARBOROTIGH, PELL, HARTKE,
MONDALE, STEVENS, and I are listed as co-
sponsors of the amendment.
Mr. President, the amendment repre-
sents an effort to deal with amendments
previously offered by these Senators.
Those amendments are numbered 114,
116, 117, 118, 120, and 121.
Mr. President, these amendments of-
fered by the Senators for the most part
are concerned with various rules and
regulations that they would like to see
incorporated into the law to serve as ef-
fective guidelines and controls over the
storage, transportation, disposal, and
maintenance of chemical and biological
agents?and includes also the Senator
from Wisconsin's and the Senator from
New York's amendment concerning
open-air testing of lethal agents.
The staff of my Subcommittee on Re-
search and Development of the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, together with
the staffs of the various Senators in-
volved, have worked to try to incorporate
into the amendment I have just pre-
sented the essentials of the various
amendments offered. I believe that has
been done with satisfaction. In sub-
stance, a great deal of the ideas and the
thrust of the amendments offered have
been taken.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the
Senator send his amendment to the desk,
so that it may be read?
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that reading of the
amendment be dispensed with at this
time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. ALLOTT addressed the chair.
Mr. NELSON. I yield to the Senator
from Colorado.
Mr. ALLOTT. I wish to reserve the
right to object to unanimous consent
concerning dispensing with the reading.
Does the Senator plan to read it at a
later time? I think the Senate should
be informed of the contents of the
amendment.
Mr. McINTYRE. I think the point the
Senator from Colorado raises is a good
one. The usual procedure, as the Sena-
tor knows, is to dispense with the read-
ing, in the interest of time.
Mr. ALLOTT. All I am doing is in-
quiring whether the Senator intends to
read it or to make it available to us later.
If he does, I shall not object.
Mr. McINTYRE. I had not intended
to read it because of the lateness of the
hour, but I think the point is well taken.
I do not want to give the appearance of
rushing too fast on this important
amendment. We have been in consulta-
tion with the chairman of the Commit-
tee on Armed Services and the ranking
Republican member.
Mr. ALLOTT. If a copy is available to
us, I will not object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
CRANSTON in the chair). Without objec-
tion, reading of the amendment is dis-
pensed with; and, without objection, the
amendment will be printed in the
RECORD.
The amendment is as follows:
At the end of the bill add a new section
as follows:
"CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
"SEC. 402. (a) The Secretary of Defense
shall submit semiannual reports to the Con-
gress on or before January 31 and on or
before July 31 of each year setting forth the
purposes of and the amounts spent during
the preceding six-month period for research,
development, test, evaluation, and procure-
ment of lethal and nonlethal chemical and
biological agents. The Secretary shall in-
clude in such reports an explanation of such
expenditures including the necessity there-
for.
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S 9492 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 8, 1969
a determination by the Secretary of Defense, The third amendment sponsored by Mr. MANSFIELD The joint leadership
under guidelines provided by the President Senator GOODELL and myself, as part of will have no objection.
of the United States, that an open air test is
necessary for the nation.al security, and then the consolidated amendment, provides The PRESIDING OFFICE& How is
only after a separate determination y
b the that none of the funds appropriated by the time to be divided?
Surgeon General, within thirty days of the this act shall be used for the open-air UNANIMODS-CONSENT AGREEMENT
determination of the President, that the test testing of lethal chemical agents, disease Mr. MANSFIELD. First, I ask unani-
proposed will not present a hazard to the producing biological micro-organisms, or mous consent that the vote on the pend-
public health. The Secretary of Defense shall biological toxins except on determination ing amendment take place at 12 o'clock
report his determination and that of the by the Secretary of Defense, under noon on Monday next.
Surgeon General, to the Committee on Armed
Services, the Committee on Labor and Public guidelines provided by the President of The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
Welfare, and the Committee GU Appropria- the United States, that an open-air test objection, it is so ordered.
and Foreign Commerce and the Committee on is necessary for the national security; Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask unanimous
Armed Services, the Committee on Interstate and then only after a separate determi- consent that the time be equally
divided between the minority and Ma-
jority leaders or whomever they may
designate.
The PRESIDENT OFFICER. Without,
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFULLD, Mr. President, there
will be a rollcall vote at 12 o'clock noon
on Monday, if I did not state it.
The unanimous-consent agreement,
subsequently reduced to writing, is as
follows:
and Foreign Commerce and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representa-
tives at least 30 days prior to any actual teat.
The Secretary of Defense shall set forth in
his report the name of the agents, micro-
organisms, or toxins to be tested, the time
and place of any test, and the reasons there-
for."
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, as the
Senator from New Hampshire has stated,
this amendment consolidates several
amendments introduced by several Sen-
ators and was worked out with the staff
of Senator MCINTYRE'S subcommittee
and the staffs of Senators who are au-
thors of the various amendments.
The consolidated amendment, as I
have stated, contains aeveral amend-
ments by other Senators. I would be
happy to explain the three amendments
that were introduced by the Senator
from New York (Mr. GOODELL) and my-
self.
Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. NELSON. I yield.
Mr. ALLOTT. I assume the Senator is
speaking to me?at least he is looking
at me.
Mr. NELSON. No, Senator GOODELL co-
sponsored three amendments that are
now incorporated.
Mr. ALLOTT. I just want to say that
I now have a copy of the amendment.
Mr. NELSON. Then, instead of read-
ing the amendment, I might just sum-
marize the three for which the Senator
from New York and I were responsible.
I assume that the other authors of the
various parts of this consolidated
amendment will in their remarks ex-
plain that aspect of the consolidated
amendment which was introduced by
them.
The first of the amendments jointly
sponsored by the Senator from New
York (Mr. Gomm.) and myself simply
provides that none of the funds in this
bill shall be used for the procurement
of delivery systems to dissemieale lethal
chemical agents or disease-producing bi-
ological microorganisms.
The other amendment we jointly spon-
sored which is part of the consolidated
amendment provides that none of the
funds appropriated by this Act may be
used for deployment or storage of any
lethal chemical agent outside the United
States?I am trying to consolidate this;
I will not read all of it?without prior
notice to the country involved where it
is stored, and unless prior notice is given
to the Committee on Foreign Relations,
the Committee on Appropriations, the
Committee on Interior and Insular Af-
fairs, and the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices.
nation by the Surgeon General, within 30
days of the determination of the Presi-
dent, that the test proposed will not pre-
sent hazards to the public health. The
Secretary of Defense shall report this de-
termination and that of the Surgeon
General to the Committee on Armed
Services, the Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate, and to the
Committee on Armed Services, the Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, and the Committee on Appropria-
tions of the House of Representatives at
least 30 days prior to any actual test.
The Secretary of Defense, pursuant to
this amendment, shall set forth in his
report the name of the agents, micro-
organisms, or toxins to be tested, the
time and place of any test, and the rea-
sons therefor.
Mr. MANSriELD. Mr. President, is the
Senator through with his explanation?
Mr. NELSON. Of the three amend-
ments I have.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield to me briefly, before the
other cosponsors of these amendments
speak?
Mr. NELSON. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the
joint leadership has discussed the ques-
tion of a vote tonight on the amendment
which was offered by the distinguished
Senator from New Hampshire, the chair-
man of the subcommittee dealing with
this matter in the Committee on Armed
Services, and one of the authors of the
proposal now before the Senate. We think
we have reached agreement. We will find
out shortly.
I ask unanimous consent that the vote
on the pending amendment take place at
12 o'clock noon on Monday next.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Reserving the right
to object, what time is the Senate to
meet on Monday?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Ten a.m.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Has permission
been granted for a meeting of the com?
-
mittee? I ask that for this reason: We
would like very much the opportunity to
act upon particularly the Peace Corps
matter which is pending. There was an
amendment to it, and we could not act.
We did not have a quorum. All I want
is to have an opportunity to act if I can
get a quorum. Is that permissible?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the
Senator speak a little louder?
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator from
Arkansas wanted to know about com-
mittees meeting on Monday morning.
That will be all right.
Mr. F'ULBRIGHT. If we can get a
quorum, we would like to act on a matter.
Ordered, That the Senate proceed to vote
at 12 noon Monday, August 11, 1969, on the
amendment offered by Senator MCINTYRE
and others, relative to chemical and biolog-
ical warfare (No. 131).
Provided further, That debate on the
amendment, beginning at 11 o'clock be
equally divided and controlled by the ma-
jority and minority leaders, or someone des-
ignated by them.
Mr. MeINTYRE. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. NELSON. I yield.
Mr. MeINTYRE, Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that various amend-
ments, as originally introduced by the
Senators I have referred to in my re-
marks, be placed in the RECORD at this
time so there will be a comparison be-
tween these amendments and the amend-
ment I introduced on behalf of all of
them.
There being no objection, the amend-
ments were ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
AMENDMENT 114
At the end of the bill add a new section
as follows:
"SEC. 402. None of the funds authorized
to be appropriated by this or any other Act
may be used for open air tests of lethal chem-
ical agents or pathogenic biological micro-
organisms or biological toxins."
AMENDMENT 115
At the end of the bill add a new section as
follows:
"SEC. 402. None of the funds authorized
to be appropriated by this or any other Act
may be used for the procurement of de-
livery systems designed to disseminate lethal
chemical agents, pathogenic biological micro-
organisms, or biological toxins, or for the
procurement of any part or component of
such delivery systems."
AMENDMENT 116
At the end of the bill add a new section as
follows:
"SEC. 402. None of the funds authorized
to be appropriated by this or any other Act
may be used for the storage or deployment
of any lethal chemical agent or any patho-
genic biological micro-organism or any bio-
logical toxin at any place outside the United
States, or for the deployment at any place
outside the United States of delivery sys-
tems designed to disseminate any such agent
or micro-organism or toxin unless the coun-
try exercising jurisdiction over such place
has prior notice of such action. In the case of
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August 8, 1969
any place outside the United States which
is under the jurisdiction or control of the
Government of the United States, no such
action may be taken unless prior notice of
such action has been given to the Committee
on Armed Services, the Committee on For-
eign Relations, the Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate and the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representa-
tives. As used in this section the term `Unit-
ed States' means the several States, and the
District of Columbia."
AMENDMENT 117
At the end of the bill add a new section as
follows:
"SEc. 402. None of the funds authorized by
this or any other Act shall be used for the
testing, development, transportation, or dis-
posal of any chemical or biological weapon
unless the Surgeon General of the Public
Health Service determines that such testing,
development, transportation, or disposal w'
not present a hazard to the public health
AMENDMENT 118
At the end of the bill add a new se ion as
follows:
"SEC. 402. The Secretary of Defen, shall
submit semiannual reports to the C ngress
on or before January 31 and on or ?efore
July 31 of each year setting fort the
amounts expended during the precedin six-
month period for research, development, est,
evaluation, and procurement of lethal che t-
eal agents and for lethal biological agen s,
and amounts expended for such purpos
during such six-month period on other majo
categories of chemical and biological agents
of a nonlethal nature. The Secretary shall in-
clude in such reports an explanation of such
expenditures including the necessity there-
for."
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I ask for
the yeas and nays on the pending amend-
ment.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
AMENDMENT 120
At the end of the bill add a new section
as follows:
"SEC. 402. (a) The Secretary of Defense
shall provide written notification to the Con-
gress, to the Secretary of Transportation, to
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare, and to the Chairman of the Interstate
Commerce Commission at least thirty days
in advance of any operation involving the
transportation of any lethal chemical or bio-
logical agent to or from any military
installation.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I wish
to query the distinguished majority
leader for a moment about the business
of the Senate before the midsummer re-
cess, and that means Monday, Tuesday,
and Wednesday, because I believe we
agreed that the recess starts at the end
of business on Wednesday, August 13.
Therefore, we have until t
The question is wj,ot4rr Seantors will
be on hand. Thereare invitations out-
standing, such'as invitations for the din-
ner for ..the astronauts in Los Angeles,
and?..ether affairs which could possibly
t 'e Senators away. I believe the lead-
rship has to know. I would want to pre-
vail on Senators to remain here under
those circumstances if we are going to
work right up to the end of that day. I
would like to know if it is likely there
will be rollcall votes.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in re-
sponse to the question raised by the dis-
tinguished minority, leader, it is true that
a number of Senators have received in-
vitations to attend the state dinner for
the astronauts in Los Angeles on the
evening of Wednesday, August 13.
There will be votes on Monday, Tues-
day, and very likely Wednesday. I would
hope, though, that those who intend to
go to Los Angeles or those who have ac-
epted the invitation would not enter
eir declinations yet, but that they
w uld, if at all possible, be prepared to
go o honor these men and their achieve-
me ts.
T joint leadership will do its best
to t to enable an early departure. I
suppo the last plane would leave about
2 o'cloc , 3 o'clock, or 4 o'clock. We will
come in early on Wednesday to get as
much bu ness as possible out of the way.
It does not appear at this moment,
however, t at we would be able to finish
the bill b Wednesday. We will make
every effort to do so, but in view of state-
ments whic have been made and com-
ments whip I have heard as to the
length of t e to be spent on some of
these amen ents?and I know of 10
amendment at the moment and there
may be mor it seems to be only a very
long shot t t we could finish by Wed-
nesday.
Therefore, the best advice I can give is
that those who are going to Los Angeles
go at the last minute, and if events in-
dicate we could finish at the last min-
ute they might have to change their
minds.
It is not very good advice but it is the
best we have. My present guess is that
this measure will be the pending business
when we return on September 3, after
going into recess at the conclusion of
business on August 13.
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Wisconsin yield further?
Mr. NELSON. I yield.
? Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I would
like to ask the distinguished majority
leader one more question, and I assure
"(b) The Secretary of Defense shall givc
all due consideration to the public health
and safety in operations involving the trans-
portation of any lethal chemical or biological
agent to or from any military installation,
shall maintain strict adherence to all Federal
safety regulations in every case, and shall
detoxify lethal chemical and biological agents
before transportation for disposal when prac-
ticable to do so."
AMENDMENT 121
At the end of the bill add the following
new section:
"SEC. 402. None of the funds authorized by
this or any other Act shall be used for the
testing, development, transportation, storage,
or disposal of any chemical or biological
weapon outside of the continental limits of
the United States unless the Secretary of
State determines that such testing, develop-
ment, transportation, storage, or disposal will
not violate international law and reports such
. determination to the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Committee
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Represent-
atives, and to the appropriate international
organizations, or organs thereof, whenever
required by treaty or other international
agreement."
Approved For Rele
him it is asked in the utmost of good
faith and it is done only as a precaution
that I think I always have to exercise in
matters of this kind.
Is there, in the judgment of the ma-
jority leader, a likelihood that an
amendment in the nature of the Cooper-
Hart proposal, or a similar proposal, is
likely to be offered, and would such a
proposal be offered on Wednesday if we
just let Members go to this astronaut
dinner and they would not be here to
vote?
Mr. MANSFIELD. There is no such
proposal that I know of and I note that
the distinguished Senator from Ken-
cky (Mr. COOPER) ?and the distin-
gu1ied Senator from Michigan (Mr.
HAR are nodding in agreement with
me.
If anyone tried to do something like
that on Wednesday, with Members not
present, I would object most strenuously.
Mr. DIRKSEN. I am quite satisfied
with the assurances of the majority
leader on that point because if it were
done it would complicate the vote, and
there would have to be a rollcall vote,
and we would have to let it go until we
returned.
Mr. MANSFIELD. If it did happen, the
Senator from Montana would be pre-
pared to start reading the Bible from
the beginning. -
Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. NELSON. I yield.
Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, in view
of the fact that the Senator from New
Hampshire made some remarks on the
floor of the Senate this afternoon in the
absence of both the majority leader and
the minority leader, I feel that in fair-
ness I should repeat those remarks.
I think my record after 15 years in the
Senate bears out the statement that I
have never presumed to tell the leader-
ship of the Senate what to do or to offer
them unsolicited advice. But I did say
in the absence of both the majority
leader and the minority leader, and,
therefore, I feel in honor I should repeat
it while they are present, that I am com-
pelled to say that I feel it is a distinct
mistake on the part of the Senate to
start the recess until this bill is dis-
posed of.
We all know that when a matter is
put over until we come back, the ar-
guments and the contests start all over
again ad infinitum. We all know, I think,
that full expression and discussion of
these very vital questions, are not neces-
sarily promoted by extending them over
days and days, because we have all seen
lengthy arguments with only five Sen-
ators in this Chamber, go on hour after
hour for 2 or 3 days. I do not know how
many Senators faithfully read all those
arguments, but I have grave doubts that
they do. Actually, full consideration of a
vital matter is more likely to take place
if it is condensed to 2 or 3 hours than if
it continues over 2 or 3 days, because
that means there is going to be a vote,
and Senators are present to hear the ar-
guments on both sides.
I am one who has made plans and I
do want to get away, but I think the
Senate or the leadership should deter-
mine that this very important bill, which
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is so vital to the defense of the United
States, should be disposed of and should
be disposed of even if we have to return
on Thursday or Friday. I think everyone
would be pleasantly surprised and
amazed at how succinct and to the point
arguments would become, And that this
bill could be and would be disposed of
before midnight on Wednesday.
I know it is presumptious to make this
suggestion, but I feel that must register
this sentiment, because I Am convinced
that the people of this country are not
happy to see us go into recess with so
much coming along, such Ss the tax bill
and all the rest, without disposing of
this matter.
Because I said all this earlier, I felt
that I should say it now.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ap-
preciate the candor of the diAinguished
Senator from New Hampshire. As always,
he is frank and straightforward. But a
promise has been made to the member-
ship and that promise will be kept.
Fortunately, there is not a great deal
on the calendar at the present time. The
Senate is reasonably current with its
work. When we convene in September,
I anticipate that the NASA authoriza-
tion bill will be considered at the con-
clusion of the pending busine- s.
At that time also, the stypropriation
bill on the Interior Department will be
reported; and other meastues will be
passing out of committees. All commit-
tees, I might add, are working
assiduously.
It is therefore my belief that this break
will be a good thing for the Senate. It is
my impression that the business of the
Senate has become a 12-mouth opera-
tion. Unlike the judges of the Federal
courts, including the Supreeie Court,
Senators do not have 3 or 4 months off.
We have to go home to visit our con-
stituents and take time off only when
chance occurs. Especially is the
younger Members of the Senate who
would like to spend a little tirne with
their growing families during the year.
Accordingly, I have no compunction at
all?none at all?in stating that the
promise made will be kept.
At the same time, I rive nize the
frankness and the feeling on the part
of the distinguished Senator from New
Hampshire. It would be my le ye, and I
think it would be a sound one, that prac-
tically all the amendments which will
be offered to this bill are now at the desk,
or will be submitted in the net day or
so. So by the time we come ba'- in Sep-
tember, this matter will have b pretty
thoroughly discussed. The country will
have a good idea of what the senate has
done And I am not at all sure that the
people will be unappreciative of what
has been done in this body, even if it has
taken weeks where formerly It took only
days.
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, to amp-
lify and fortify what the distmguished
majority leader has just said, he and I
? at together the last week in January
and we agreed on the recess milted. They
were announced. Cards were printed and
delivered to every Member. Accordingly,
Members made their plans Months and
months ago as to what they would do
during this 3-week period.
It would therefore be something of a
breach of faith if we undertook now to
undo those plans in the interest of the
pending legislation.
Lacking the gift of prophecy, and not
having the divine power of piercing the
veil of the future, we could not tell last
January what was going to happen in
the course of the legislative session, or
know that at this time we would be
working on a matter for a period of 5
weeks.
I believe that the majority leader is so
eminently correct, that we should go
through with our plans in the interest
of our families.
I speak particularly of the younger
Members of the' Senate, who have sub-
stantial families of School age, who are
taken out in June and taken home, and
will be brought back here in September.
What an awkward situation for a Sen-
at,or that he cannot have some time to go
home and be with his children before
they have to go back to school.
Thus, that is the whole story. That is
the reason behind it. It is the fruit of
nearly 4 or 5 years of constant effort in
this field before it was consummated.
Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, I hope
I do not need to say that the remark,s of
the Senator from New Hampshire are
in no way in disrespect to the majority
and minority leaders. No Senator in this
body has a higher regard for, or has
enjoyed more kindness from them than
the Senator from New Hampshire. I ac-
cept their verdict. I certainly want to be
obedient and a good soldier.
I will say, however, that my opinion is
unchanged.
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
TIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR
MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RE-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MIS-
SILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJ-
ALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RE-
SERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize appro-
priations during the fiscal year 1970 for
procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval
vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and
to authorize the construction of test fa-
cilities at Kwajalein Missile Range, and
to prescribe the authorized personnel
strength of the Selected Reserve of each
reserve component of the Armed Forces,
and for other purposes.
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
WARFARE
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, in 1926,
just 8 years after World War I, General
of the Armies John J. Pershing sent a
letter to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee to warn of the dangers of
chemical warfare. Just 8 years before,
he had led American troops in the first
world war?the first war where deadly
gases were extensively used. The effects
of those gases so horrified him that the
famous general was moved to warn the
Senate:
Chemical warfare should be abolished
among nations as abhorrent to civilization.
It is a cruel, unfair, and improver use of
AYE August 8, iva
science. It is fraught with the gravest danger
to noncombatants and demoralizes the bet-
ter instincts of mankind.
Scientific research may discover a gas so
deadly that it will produce instant death--
I might say, as an aside, that that has
been accomplished--
To sanction the use of gas in any form would
be to open the way foe the Use of the most
deadly gases and the possibIe poisoning of
whole populations of noncombatant men,
women, and children. The contemplation of
such a result is shocking to the senses.
And then to add emphasis, the general,
who was the first and only general of
the armies, who had seen years of com-
bat and who was known for his tough-
ness and valor, argued:
It is unthinkable that civilization would
deliberately embark upon such a course.
Pershing's letter came nearly a year
after the nations of the world gathered
to draw up the "1925 Geneva Protocol
for the Prohibition of the Use in War
of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other
Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of
War."
The Geneva Conference had been
called because there was worldwide re-
vulsion over the use of poisonous gases
during the First World War, during
which gases, that caused 1.3 million cas-
ualties including 91,000 deaths on both
sides, were used. At that Conference, the
United States stood in the forefront in
moving to outlaw such gases. Although
the United States signed the treaty, the
Senate refused to ratify it. Eventually 42
nations ratified the agreement. The
United States was not among them and
Is still not among them.
By the 1930's it became known that
Russia, Japan, and Germany were ac-
tively researching and testing chemical
and biological warfare devices. Even
though there were accusations among
the major powers that chemical warfare
was being conducted, it was apparent
that none of these agents was ever au-
thorized for combat use during World
War II.
In the closing days of the war, Hitler
made a frightening decision to begin
sending the newly developed nerve gases
to his losing armies in the field as an-
other in the line of last-ditch attempts
to stop the Allied momentum.
In relating what happened after Hit-
ler made that decision, Albert Speer, Hit-
ler's Minister of Production, told a Nur-
emberg court in 1947 that rumors of the
possible use of the gases reached the
factories where the chemicals were being
produced.
Speer testified:
When rumors reached us that gas might
be used, I stopped its production in Novem-
ber 1944. All sensible army people turned
gas warfare down as being utterly insar c,
since, in view of (America's) superiority in
the air, it would not be long before it would
bring the most terrible catastrophe upon
German cities.
In the previous year, 1943, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt had come forward
with a major decision as the Commander
In Chief concerning chemical-biological
warfare. In unequivocal words he had
made a pledge that has carried to this
clay and has been described as making
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The Senate met at 10:30 o'clock a.m.,
on the expiration of the recess, and was
called to order by the Vice President.
Rabbi Chaim U. Lipschitz, D.D., man-
aging editor, the Jewish Press, Brooklyn,
N.Y., offered the following prayer:
Our G-d and the G-d of our fathers,
be Thou with the mouths of the deputies
of this worthy Senate of the United
States of America who stand in Thy
presence.
Teach them what they shall say. In-
struct them what they shall speak. Grant
their petitions and cause them to know
how to glorify Thee. May they walk in
the light of Thy countenance. May they
bend their knees unto Thee, and with
their mouths bless Thy people. Bless
them altogether with the blessings of
Thy mouth. Amen.
THE JOURNAL
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Journal of
the proceedings of Wednesday, August 6,
1969, be approved.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
jection, it is soot:50,04
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
TIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR
MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RE-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MIS-
SILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJ-
ALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RE-
SERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair
lays before the Senate the unfinished
business, which will be stated.
The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S.
2546) to authorize appropriations dur-
ing the fiscal year 1970 for procure-
ment of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels,
and tracked combat vehicles, and to au-
thorize the construction of test facilities
at Kwajalein Missile Range, and to pre-
scribe the authorized personnel strength
of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve
Component of the Armed Forces, and for
other purposes.
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill.
Mr. MoINTYRE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that, during the con-
sideration of the pending question,
which I believe to be my amendment,
the privilege of the floor may be granted
to my administrative assistant, Larry K.
Smith, and to my legislative assistant,
Alan Novins.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
jection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk
will call the roll.
Senate
THURSDAY, AUGUST 7, 1969
(Legislative day of Tuesday, August 5, 1969)
The legislative clerk proceeded te call
the roll.
Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
jection, it is so ordered.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
The VICE PRESIDENT. Under the
previous order, the Chair recognizes the
Senator from Indiana for a period of 30
minutes.
SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 145?
APOLLO SUCCESS ILLUMINATES
EARTHY FAILURES?INTRODUC-
TION. OF A JOINT RESOLUTION
Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, the suc-
cessful flight of Apollo 11 ranks among
the greatest technological achievements
of all time. We are grateful to Almighty
God that the astronauts have returned
safely to us. The spirit of their dazzling
adventure has touched all of us, reviving
our own spirit, and restoring our own
capacity for adventure. Adding to our
sense of amazement and wonder is the
almost equally spectacular achievement
of our Mars probe?Mariner 6?with its
closer-than-ever television pictures of
that legendary planet.
In the exhilaration of this moment,
Mr. President, it is instructive to re-
member that the Apollo project has not
always been a cause for cheer and ac-
claim. Eight years have passed since a
trip to the Moon in this decade became
our national goal. We must never forget
that those 8 years are marked with fail-
ure and tragedy as well as with success
and reward. When President John F.
Kennedy made the Apollo program a na-
tional priority in April 1961, few were
prepared to look beyond the remote
promise of his words?few were pre-
pared to test themselves against the task
at hand.
But vigorous leadership in Govern-
ment helped to convince the American
people that the goal could and should
be met. The organization of NASA, the
development of new, more powerful
rocket boosters, the training of men: and
building of machines, the development
of sophisticated computers, the millions
of man-hours, the three lives lost, and
the billions of dollars spent?none of
this would have been possible without a
profound sense of national dedication.
Only the tireless efforts of business,
labor, education, science, and technology
could have made a trip to the moon pos-
sible. And only leadership in Govern-
ment?provided by three successive ad-
ministrations with the support and en-
couragement of the Congress?could
have guided and coordinated these efforts
with the efficiency needed to reach our
goal on schedule.
But the Moon shot is behind us, and
our euphoria has already been inter-
rupted by the urgent need to establish
a new set of national goals. In our
thoughts about the future, however, we
will do well to learn from the success of
our space program?that program was
a success because the goal had been set
with care. Some goals are better than
others, and we must make our choice
with strict standards in mind.
The best kind of national goal is some-
thing like a valuable prize dangling in
front of us from the end of a stick. If the
stick is too short, we will not have to
move forward to reach the prize, and we
will make no progress. If the stick is too
long, we will not be able to see the prize,
and we will make no effort to reach it.
Only when the stick is just the right
length will we move forward. Psychol-
ogists have an expression for the proper
length of the stick?they call it "op-
timal stress." If the goals we set for our-
selves place an optimal stress on our
capabilities, we will make progress as a
nation at the fastest rate possible. In
1961, the Moon was far enough away to
inspire our imagination, but close
enough to keep our spirit alive.
In addition to being just the right
length, of course, the stick has to point
us in the proper direction. Some national
goals inspire dedication for the wrong
purposes. The pyramids of Egypt, the
Colosseum in Rome, the palace at Ver-
sailles?all mark the ruin of great na-
tions which wasted vast resources on
vanity and self-indulgence.
I do not believe that the space pro-
gram represents such a waste. Contrary
to what some appear' to believe, the re-
sources expended in the Apollo program
could not have been simply transferred
to other worthy endeavors. Like any goal
that points us in the right direction, the
Apollo program generated its own re-
sources?the inspiration and the dedi-
cation that grew out of the Apollo pro-
gram were not "taken" from any other
project; they were unique to the goal
they served so well.
But this is not to say that other goals
cannot inspire similar dedication. Just
as space exploration held a deserved pri-
ority in the 1960's, so should human
needs on Earth be given special atten-
tion in the 1970's.
This need on Earth has been drama-
tized by our exploits in space. While the
astronauts walked on the Moon, men
on Earth felt unsafe walking on city
streets. While the astronauts took special
precautions to protect themselves in the
vacuum of space, men on Earth sought
better protection from a dangerously
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S 9330 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 7, 1969
polluted atmosphere. While the astro-
nauts looked for signs of water on the
Moon, men on Earth were discovering
that their own clean water supply was
jeopardized by contamination and care-
less disposal of industrial waste. As mil-
lions of dollars were being spent to
develop and supply the astronauts with
a perfect "space diet," men on Earth con-
tinued to suffer needlessly from mal-
nutrition.
Clearly, the time has come to turn our
attention to these human needs in some
systematic fashion.
In his column of July 18, 1969, the dis-
tinguished journalist, James 1 leston, ob-
served:
The American mind and the American
political system seem to need great chal-
lenges and clear goals to work at their best.
Mr. Reston went on to suggest that an
attempt to achieve "certain definite social
and economic objectives" by the year
1976?the bicentennial of the Declara-
tion of Independence?could provide just
the kind of challenge that moves us as a
people to our noblest and most creative
efforts.
Reston did not try to elaborate the
details of those objectives, but I think
that any of us here could compose a list
that would win general approval through-
out the Nation. Taken together, it would
depict an America in which at least
these things would be possible:
Every man, woman, and child would
have an adequate diet, decent housing,
and essential health care;
Every young person would receive all
the education and job training he can
usefully absorb;
All of us could walk the streets of our
cities, day or night, without fear;
The appalling pollution of our air and
waters would be eliminated;
Economically gainful, socially useful
employment would be available to all
who want to work;
Dependable, high-speed public trans-
portation would move people to their
jobs and then home again in comfort and
safety;
The ugly stain of racism would be well
on its way to the status of an uncom-
fortable memory;
Our older citizens would be able to re-
tire with the dignity and security to
which they are entitled.
Our youth would once again see in
America "the last, best hope of man-
kind," and see themselves as participants
in their Nation's dreams, not commenta-
tors on a nation's failures.
Mr. President, this is one list of ob-
jectives we might set for ourselves to
achieve within the next 7 years. It
is neither definitive nor exhaustive.
Others may wish to add to it or to ar-
range its items in some order or pri-
ority. But its most important features
are obvious to all: it deals with human
needs, it is specific, and it is attainable.
In other words, the stick is just the
right length, and it points us in the right
direction.
Five years ago?perhaps even 5
months ago?such an ambitious Pro-
grain may have seemed visionary. But
the flight of Apollo 11 has transformed
us into a nation of visionaries?hard-
headed, practical visionaries of the kind
(cur Founding Fathers must surely have
been, when, to quote James Reston
again,
The whole idea of America was to create
a society nobody had ever created before.
The flight of Apollo 11 has
that the gift of vision is simply ap-
propriate in setting 9.5E meeting na-
tional goals?it is Jaolutely necessary.
We have been own how men can
transform visioy into reality through a
combination of resources uniquely
abundant in is uniquely blessed land?
technology, 4vealth, and skilled labor.
Add to hese the less tangible, but
equally n cessary, resources of imagina-
tion an will and you have the sum to-
tal of t e ingredients needed to accom-
plish t e objectives I have outlined here
today.
Sur y no one doubts that we have
the i agination. But imagination by
itself i not enough. Shall our children
be fore d to stand before the bar of his-
tory a confess that we, their fore-
bears, 1 ked the will?only the will?
to trans rm the dreams of 1776 into
the realit of 1976?
Rhetoric an set goals, but only con-
centrated, ? urposeful action can
achieve them, he rhetoric of President
John F. Kenne set the goal of landing
men on the moo and bringing them
home safely by 1971. The concentrated,
purposeful action of s of thousands
of Americans?scienti , engineers,
businessmen and working en, the in-
comparably gallant astron ts them-
selves, and, yes, even Member of Con-
gress and of the Executive?the ctions
of these tens of thousands of m and
women made that extraordinary on-
quest of space a reality.
Mr. President, I should like now
urge the Congress to undertake one es
sential first step toward fulfilling the%
dreams of 1776 within the next '7 years. Ix
I introduce today a Senate joint resolu-
tion establishing a joint committee of
the Congress to define specific national
goals and to recommend means to im-
plement them by not later than 1976.
The Joint Committee on National Goals,
as I suggest it be Called, would be com-
posed of 10 Members from the Senate
and 10 from the House, appointed by
the Presiding Officers of the two Cham-
bers. It would be directed to prepare a
interim report for submission to
-
gress not later than March 1, 19 , and
to have its final report ready prepa-
ration to the 92d Con s not later
. That final re-
than January 15
port would include a statement of real-
istic, attainable national goals and rec-
ommendations as to the legislative and
administrative means for achieving
them by 1976.
The problems that American society
faces are immense, but they can be
solved. That is the greatest lesson we
can learn from the saga of Apollo 11.
Not only can we solve difficult problems;
we can do so in a limited period of time.
It is appropriate that future national
goals be set by the guiding, beckoning
star of our Nation's 200th birthday.
I say again, Mr. President, we possess
every material and intellectual resource
we need to set and to achieve our na-
tional goals. Absent only is a clear and
realistic definition of those goals, and
the will to dedicate ourselves to their
realization.
Let us here, today, in the Congress of
he United States, show that we do in-
have the determination and the will
to re-dagicate ourselves, through action,
to the an-tient, eternally youthful promise
of America.
I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Presi-
dent, that the text of the joint resolution
be printed in the RECORD immediately
following my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
PACKWOOD in the chair) . The joint reso-
lution will be received and appropriately
referred, and, without objection, the
joint resolution will be printed in the
RECORD in accordance with the Senator's
request.
The joint resolution (S.J, Res. 145) to
establish a joint congressional committee
to define national goals and to recom-
mend means to implement such goals not
later than the bicentennial of the United
States in 1976, introduced by Mr. HARTKE,
was received, read twice by its title, re-
ferred to the Committee on Government
Operations, and ordered to be printed in
the RECORD, as follows:
S.J. Has. 145
Resolved by the Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives of the United States of Anterica
in Congress assembled, That (a) in recog-
nition of the approaching bicentennial of
the founding Of this Sation and the chal-
lenge to translate the vision of our founding
fathers into specific national goals to be
achieved by 1976, there is established a joint
congressional committee to be known as the
Joint Committee on National Goals (here-
after referred to as the "Committee"). The
Commmittee shall be composed of ten Mem-
bers of the Senate appointed by the Presi-
dent of the Senate, six of whom shall be
members of the majority party and four of
whom shall be members of the minority
party, and ten Members of the House of
\ Representatives appointed by the Speaker of
\the House of Representatives, six of whom
*hall be members of the majority party and
four of whom shall be members of the min-
drity party. No chairman of a joint, stand-
ihg, special, or select committee of either
4ouse, or ranking minority member of any
s ch committee, may serve on the Committee
tablished by this joint resolution.
(b) The Committee shall select a chair-
man and vice chairman from among its
members.
SEC. 2 (a) It shall be the duty of the
Committee to make a complete study and
determination of specific national goals for
the United States and the means to achieve
such goals by 1976.
(b) The Committee shall make an interim
report to the Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives not later than March 1, 1970.
(c) Not later than January 15, 1971, the
Committee shall make its final report to
the Senate and House of Representatives.
The report shall include a statement of
national goals and such recommendations,
including proposed legislation and adminis-
trative measures, as the Committee con-
siders appropriate in order to achieve such
goals by 1976.
(d) The Committee shall cease to exist
February 19, 1971.
SEC. a. (a) In carrying out its duties Under
this joint resolution, the Committee, or any
duly authorized subcommittee thereof, Is au-
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S9333
ESTIMATED REDUCTION IN TAX LIABILITY FROM APPLICATION OF PRESENT LAW JOINT RETURN TAX SCHEDULE TO
SINGLE PERSON AND HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD RETURNS?WITHOUT TAX SURCHARGE, AT 1969 LEVELS OF INCOME
Adjusted gross income Claus-of
(thousands)(thousands)
Single persons
Head of household
Total
Number
returns
Reduction
lotus liability
(millions)
Number
of returns
(thousands)
Reduction
in tax liability
(millions)
Number
of returns
(thousands)
Reduction
In tax liability
(millions)
0 to $3
$3 to $5
85 to $7 ,
$7 to $10
$10 to $15
$15 to $20
$2000 $50
$50 to $100
$100 and over
4, 827
5,086
3,211
2,258
696
183
148
18
8
$38.7
203.7
260. 4
344. 5
246. 5
146.5
334. 8
94.6
71.9
69
462
555
402
166
37
25
7
1
$0.3
7. 0
20.9
22. 8
22.3
11.5
32. 2
17.0
6.6
4, 896
5, 548
3,766
2,660
862
220
173
25
9
$39. 0
210.7
281. 3
367. 3
268. 8
158.0
367. 0
III. 6
78.5
Total
16, 435
1,741. 6
1, 724
140. 6
18, 159
1,882. 2
Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that there also be
printed in the RECORD a brief review and
evaluation of the income-splitting provi-
sion in U.S. income tax law, by Joseph
Pechman of the Brookings Institution.
The excerpts are taken from his book,
"Federal Tax Policy," published in 1966'
by the Brookings Institution.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
FEDERAL TAX POLICY
During most of the history of the income
tax, differentiation for family responsibilities
was made among taxpayers through the per-
sonal 'exemptions. More recently, there has
been a trend toward different tax rates to
provide additional differentiation, particu-
larly in the middle and higher tax brackets.
In the United States and West Germany this
has been accomplished by adoption of the
principle of "income splitting" between hus-
band and wife. In France, income splitting
is permitted among all family members.
Other countries achieve a similar objective
by providing separate rate schedules for fam-
ilies of different size.
The adoption of income splitting in the
United States arose out of the historical ac-
cident that eight states had community
property laws which treated income as if di-
vided equally between husband and wife. By
virtue of several Supreme Court decisions,
married couples residing in these eight states
had been splitting their incomes and filing
separate federal returns. Shortly after World
War II, a number of other states enacted
community property laws for the express
purpose of obtaining the same advantage for
their residents, and other states were threat-
ening to follow suit. In an effort to restore
geographic tax equality and to prevent
wholesale disruption of local property laws
and procedures, the Congress universalized
income splitting in 1948.
The effect of income splitting is to reduce
progression for married couples. The tax
rates nominally begin at 14, 15, 16, and 17
percent on the first four $500 segments of
taxable incomes and rise to 70 percent on the
portion of taxable incomes above $100,000. A
married couple with taxable income of $2,000
splits this income and applies the first two
rates to each half; without income splitting,
the first _four rates would apply to this in-
come. Thus, whereas the nominal rate
brackets cover taxable in-comes up to $100,-
000, the actual rates for married couples
extend to $200,000. The tax advantage rises
from $5 for married couples with taxable
income of $1,000 to $14,510 for couples with
taxable incomes of $200,000 or more. In per-
centage terms, the tax advantage reaches a
maximum of almost 30 percent at the
$24,000 level.
The classic argument in favor of income
splitting is that husbands and wives usually
share their combined income equally. The
largest portion of the family budget goes for
consumption, and savings are ordinarily set
aside for the children or for the enjoyment
of all members of the family. Two conclu-
sions follow from this view. First, married
couples with the same combined income
should pay the same tax irrespective of the
legal division of income between them; sec-
ond, the tax liabilities of married couples
should be computed as if they were two
single persons with their total income divided
equally between them. The first conclusion
is now firmly rooted in our tax law and
seems to be almost universally accepted. It
is the second conclusion on which opinions
still differ.
The case for the sharing argument is most
applicable to the economic circumstances of
taxpayers in the lower income classes, where
incomes are used almost entirely for the
consumption of the family unit. At the top
of the income scale, the major rationale of
income taxation is to cut down on the eco-
nomic power of the family unit, and the use
made of income in these levels for family
purposes is irrelevant for this purpose. Ob-
viously, these objectives cannot be reconciled
if income splitting is extended to all income
brackets.
The practical effect of income splitting is
to produce large differences in the tax bur-
dens of single persons and married couples,
differences which depend on the rate of grad-
uation and not on the level of rates. Such
differences are difficult to rationalize on any
theoretical grounds. Moreover, it is difficult
to justify treating single persons with fam-
ilies more harshly than married persons in
similar circumstances. As a remedy, widows
and widowers are permitted to continue to
split their incomes for two years after the
death of the spouse, and half the advantage
of income splitting is given (through a sep-
arate rate schedule) to single persons who
maintain a household for children or other
dependents or who maintain a separate
household for their parents. This is, of
course, a makeshift arrangement which
hardly deals with the problem satisfactorily.
For example, a single taxpayer who supports
an aunt in a different household receives no
income splitting benefit; if he supports an
aged mother he receives these benefits. There
are growing pressures on the Congress to
treat single persons more liberally?by lib-
eralizing the head of household provision,
increasing their exemptions, and other de-
vices.
One of the major reasons for acceptance
of the consequences of income splitting may
well be the fact that personal exemptions
do not provide enough differentiation among
taxpayers in the middle and top brackets.
Single persons, it is felt, should be taxed
more heavily than married couples because
they do not bear the costs and responsibili-
ties of raising children. But income splitting
for husband and wife clearly does not differ-
entiate among taxpayers in this respect since
the benefit is the same whether or not there
are children.
The source of the difficulty in the income
splitting approach is that differentiation of
family size is made through the rate struc-
ture rather than through the personal ex-
emptions. It would be possible to differenti-
ate among taxpayer units by varying the per-
sonal exemptions with the size of income as
well as the number of persons in the unit,
with both a minimum and maximum. This
procedure could be used to achieve almost
any desired degree of differentiation among
families, while avoiding most of the problems
and anomalies produced by income splitting.
Excerpts taken from Chapter 4, The Indi-
vidual Income Tax Structural Problems, The
Family?pages 81-84.
Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I am
certain the Committee on Finance will
give careful consideration to this meas-
ure and I hope, in view of commitments
made in the past in connection with the
"Head of household" provision, will be
prepared to support this most important
modification of the present income tax
code.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield to the Sena-
tor from Connecticut.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I wish
to commend the distinguished Senator
from Minnesota for taking up the fight
in behalf of one of my constituents, Miss
Vivien Kellems. The Senator from Min-
nesota has been in the forefront of this
fight for many, many years. He has been
a lone voice, receiving very little support
from anyone else in the executive branch
or in the legislative branch.
I will certainly be pleased, as a member
of the Committee on Finance, to support
the Senator's efforts to bring justice in
this important field.
Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the Senator.
I might note that Mr. Cohen, Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for fiscal policy
showed interest in--not the bill I am
introducing today?but in the other pro-
visions we talked about relative to the
tax burden on single persons. I hope he
Will support this measure. The Ways
and Means Committee responded and I
hope the Commi tee Finance will
respond.
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
TIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR
MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RE-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MIS-
SILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJ-
ALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RE-
SERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize appro-
priations during the fiscal year 1970 for
procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval
vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and
to authorize the construction of test fa- -
cilities at Kwajalein Missile Range, and
to prescribe the authorized personnel
strength of the Selected Reserve of each
reserve component of the Armed Forces,
and for other purposes,
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, the
rejection of the Cooper-Hart amendment
to the military authorization bill is a
hollow victory, indeed, for the adminis-
tration.
The closeness of the vote reflects a
widespread disenchantment, not only
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --- SENATE August 7, 1969
with the Safeguard ABM system itself,
but also with the unwillingness of the
administration to move to a common
ground that could accommodate a great
many more Members of this body.
1, too, pride myself on hiding a team
player, and there is much to be said for
supporting your own President when he
needs that support.
But, my colleagues from across the
aisle, your President, our President,
should have received much more sup-
port than he got here yesterday.
And he would have had the support,
if this body had not been forced to choose
between two extremes in this highly con-
troversial issue.
For more than 2 months now, I have
urged the administration and the sepa-
rate factions in this body to move to a
middle ground, a middle ground that
would not ask the comprising of prin-
ciple, a middle ground that would meet
the basic concerns of both sides.
I have not had much success. In-
deed, I have not had much encourage-
ment at all.
But I am still determined to try to
bring about some degree of unanimity,
as opposed to the 51-to-46 division vote
yesterday. I should like to see more
unanimity in this body on this subject.
Accordingly, I am proposing my own
amendment for consideration at this
time.
My amendment, like the Cooper-Hart
amendment, withholds authority to de-
ploy interceptor missiles and limits work
to research, development, testing, and
evaluation.
My amendment also precludes expendi-
ture of the $600,000 earmarked for long-
lead-time items for operational missiles,
that is actually for the guidance system,
holds back expenditure of some $15 mil-
lion already appropriated for ABM mis-
sile silo and launch construction, and
freezes money already authorized for
land acquisition and construction under
the Sentinel ABM proposal and previous
authorization acts.
Mr. President, I want to emphasize the
point that my amendment a ould specif-
ically say to the Pentagon, "You shall not
dig any hole. You shall not pour any con-
crete in those silos." Congress says, "You
shall not." That $15 million is hiding in
the pipeline from a previous authoriza-
tion act.
On these points, then, there should be
little disagreement on the part 'tif pro-
ponents of the Cooper-Hart amendment,
who obviously feel that any move toward
actual deployment of interceptor missiles
could escalate the arms race, jeopardize
strategic arms limitation talks, and com-
mit us to massive expenditures for an un-
tried system of questionable feasibility.
My amendment sharply differs from
the Cooper-Hart amendment in one
crucial aspect, and that crucial aspect
is where the research and development
is to take place.
The Cooper-Hart amendment specifi-
cally prohibits research and develop-
ment "at any proposed anti-ballistic-
missile site."
My amendment, on the other hand,
calls for research and development of
radar and computer protOtyPes at the
first two designated anti-ballistic-mis-
sile system sites?Grand Forks, N. Dak.,
and Malmstrom, Mont.
FurthermOre, my amendment's call
for R. & D. on. site takes into considera-
tion two Other important factors in this
issue?timelag in possible deployment,
and ultimate cost.
By doing the research and develop-
ment in place, we minimize loss of time
in deployment of the system?if and
when that deployment ever becomes
necessary.
I have been assured by Defense De-
partment spokesmen that my proposal
for R. & D. in place would cost us no
more than 5 months, and perhaps as
little as 3 months, in deployment lag-
time, whereas the Cooper-Hart amend-
ment would cost froth 12 to 18 months.
This feature of my amendment, it
seems to me, should offer real assurance
to those Senators who fear that the
longer the deployment timelag the
greater the danger to our national
security.
This feature, I might point out, should
not be considered as either hawkish or
dovish. I would hope that it is consid-
ered simply prudent.
It has other practical aspects.
My proposal promises additional sav-
ings by precluding future duplication.
If research and development are to be
conducted elsewhere than at designated
ABM missile sites, it follows that should
deployment at some time become neces-
sary, much of the work already done
would have to be duplicated on site.
By doing R. & D. in place, we auto-
matically avoid duplication in time, in
effort, and in money.
Moreover, R. & D. on site offers the
military an opportunity to gain experi-
ence in handling the radar and compu-
ter equipment under field conditions,
again saving time, effort and money.
Everything considered, Mr. President,
I still feel as I did July 28 when I stood
here and expressed my belief that the
McIntyre amendment provided the
common ground we needed to close the
national chasm over the Safeguard anti-
ballistic-missile system.
Let me repeat what I said then:
I am not asking either faction to com-
promise principles on this issue. I am merely
asking them to seek areas of agreement, and
I sincerely believe there is a common ground
which satisfies the basic concerns of both
sides..,
On the one hand, my amendment makes
it absolutely clear that Congress is with-
holding authority to deploy the system, and
it therefore prohibts construction of any op-
erational ABM missiles or parts thereof. And
it freezes money and authority which the
Pentagon now has to build missile sites and
to acquire land other than the two locations
needed to conduct research and development
in place.
And on the other hand, it authorizes
research and development in place at Grand
Forks, N. Dak., and Malmstrom, Mont. By
so doing, it retains the option of deploying
the system with minimal delay and at min-
imal cost should Congress later decide to
deploy on the strength of new evidence of
a clear threat to our deterrent.
Mr. President, one of the principal
reasons why I have been sold on this
point is that I do not believe, from the
evidence submitted to me as a member
of the Armed Serviced Committee, that
the deterrent which Secretary Laird and
those who are for the system say is
threatened, is really anywhere near in as
Much danger MS they make it out to be.
And so, Mr. President, again I say,
there is common ground waiting for
those who seek practical resolution?for
those who want to avciid a direct rebuff to
the President?for these who want unity
instead of division?the division we saw
here yesterday on the floor Of the Senate.
That common ground is to be found in
my amendment. I ask my colleagues to
support it.
Now, Mr. President, there may be
those who say, in view of the defeat of
all amendments offered yesterday, why
bother? Why try yet another amend-
ment?
I have already pointed out why I be-
lieve that the President, who is about to
embark on talks with the Soviet Union
on arms limitations needs more than a
two-vote margin of support in the
Senate. This morning's Washington Post
carries a lead editorial entitled "The
ABM: Winners and Losers." I ask unani-
mous consent that the editorial be
printed in the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
THE ABM: WINNERS AND LOSERS
Yesterday's series of votes in the Senate on
the authorization for the Safeguard ABM had
something for everyone, but not nearly
enough. For each side made its point in a
way so limited as to render it useless. The
President "won" with a show of weakness (a
two-vote margin); his opponents "lost" with
a show of strength?but nonetheless they
lost. Despite all the last minute drama and
legislative high-jinks, it had been evident
for a couple of weeks now that the crucial
vote on the Hart-Cooper amendment (per-
mitting Safeguard research and development,
but forbidding deployment in the current
fiscal year) would be inconclusive. That is
not only because yesterday's action was just
the first in a series of votes yet to come.
Should the President get to the end of the
line in the Senate with such "victories" as
this all the way, the result would still be in-
conclusive. For he will not have won what he
wants or even what he needs.
That this would be so was foreseen by
Senator Aiken a few weeks back, when he
announced that he was opposed to the Safe-
guard authorization in its present dorm
(though not yet committeed to the Hart-
Cooper approach) and when. he offered to bp
the agent of some reasonable compromise. His
vote projection may have missed the mark
slightly, but his argument was sound:
"May I point out that if the United States
enters into a conference with Russia looking
to the control of armament and aimed at
developing a less tense relationship between
the two countries, that even though the leg-
islation as written could be approved by as
many as 51 or 52 votes in this Senate, which
I doubt, we would be in an extremely WE'lle
bargaining position.'I believe it is absolutely
necessary for President Nixon to have a much
larger vote of this Senate supporting him
when we enter into such a conference."
Although we considered the provisions of
the Hart-Cooper amendment?to which Sen-
ator Aiken finally repaired?too sweeping
In their restriction, we believed he was right
in urging an accommodation. We still do.
There was plenty of room in the alternative
language put forth by Sen. Thomas McIntyre
for an accommodation to have been worked
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.Augiwt 7, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE S 9335
out?one that would not deprive the Presi-
dent of his option to proceed with the ABM
(which was what he originally asked for)
and yet which also would not have incor-
porated so firm and hard-to-reverse a com-
mitment to the deployment of the system
for the future. At that time, it was esti-
mated on the Hill that Mr. Nixon might pick
up between a dozen and twenty votes in
this fashion, while relinquishing little that
was of genuine importance. But the efforts
of Senator Aiken, Senator Brooke and other
ABM opponents to help bring about this re-
sult were rebuffed. The Administration de-
termined to go for a close, rough victory
in the Senate.
It could do worse than to ponder the small
benefits it has gained. Even with a consider-
ably larger favorable vote in the House, the
Administration will not have achieved its
principal aims. A sharply and closely split
Senate vote on a question that has been
made?as this one has been?a test of sup-
port of the President on a national security
matter, can hardly be of much value in the
international bargaining arena; it is not a
lot to take to the arms talks. And its prac-
tical benefits are as limited as its diplomatic
value. Mr. Nixon will continue to have the
opposition of a huge portion of the Senate
to this weapons system, and those legisla-
tors can be counted on to fight the Safe-
guard every step of the way via appropria-
tions and other measures. So it is still by
no means clear that his prevailing in the
Senate on these early votes guarantees him
the deployment option he so emphatically
wants.
Now Senator McIntyre's measure is be-
fore the Senate. It is likely to enjoy the sup-
port of some Senators who voted for the
Hart-Cooper amendment and who now are
prepared to take this next step up toward the
President's position. If Mr. Nixon could at
this late date bring himself to endorse some
version of this modified language and en-
courage his supporters to follow suit he could
conceivably transform his narrow squeak
Into something more like a victory. Such
a step could provide him the degree of Senate
support he so evidently needs to move with
confidence in the field of arms control?
not to mention the field of national security
and defense.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, there
is yet another reason why I believe this
effort to amend the bill before us should
be made, and to those who yesterday
supported the Cooper-Hart amendment,
it is an important reason. It deals with
the responsibilities of the Senate, and the
Congress, under the Constitution.
Mr. President, section 8 of article 1
of the Constitution of the United States
clean]. yand explicitly states where in the
Government of the United States the re-
sponsibility is laid for raising and sup-
porting armies, providing and maintain-
ing navies, and making rules for the Gov-
ernment and regulation of the land and
naval forces.
Section 8 places these responsibilities
exclusively in the Congress.
One of the issues which has been raised
in the consideration of the authorization
for an anti-ballistic-missile system is
how the constitutional responsibilities of
section 8 should best be carried out.
Some Members of the Senate, with
whom I respectfully disagree, believe that
the Congress can meet its responsibilities
under the Constitution by holding com-
mittee hearings, arriving at understand-
ings covering broad, general areas with
the Department of Defense, and enacting
authorization bills under broad headings
which are specific only in the dollar
amounts involved.
It is my opinion that this procedure,
while possibly appropriate in wholly non-
controversial areas, falls far short of the
minimum constitutional requirements in
those areas where controversy in the
Senate would seem to require that con-
gressional action be precise and specific.
Clearly, the voting which has taken
place so far indicates that there is wide-
spread disagreement in the Senate over
the policy to be pursued by the military
regarding any anti-ballistic-missile sys-
tem. The Congress must exercise its con-
trol over this proposal.
I do not wish to get into a semantics
argument about control. Certainly there
Is a measure of congressional control
over the activities of the executive
branch of the Federal Government in
the setting of limits on the amount of
money they spend, through guidelines
contained in committee reports, and
from legislative history as the legisla-
tion progresses through the Congress.
However, is this really control in the
strictest meaning of the word? The Con-
gress gives a great deal of latitude in
what the various departments and agen-
cies can do. The Congress allows, in most
cases, the transfer of funds within the
various departments and agencies at the
discretion of the secretaries, administra-
tors, and other agency heads. Of course,
in most such cases, the transfers require
either notification to or approval from
the appropriate congressional commit-
tees. But even in such cases, the Congress
as an institution is not required to make
a decision.
Mr. President, the pending legislation
in the Senate, the authorization bill for
procurement and research and develop-
ment for the Defense Department, con-
tains authorizations amounting to more
than $20 billion. The bill is four pages
in length.
At the same time, a typical housing
authorization contains authorization for
about $4 billion, yet runs 65 pages in
length. It spells out in great detail what
can and cannot be done on housing.
So we in the Congress are quite famil-
iar with the idea of exercising our con-
stitutional controls through detailed
legislation.
Mr. President, what I propose is that,
particularly in this area where so much
controversy exists, the Senate be more
precise about its authorization than we
are in the bill before us. I propose that
we spell out, so that all of the American
people can know, just what we are and
are not permitting the Department of
Defense to do.
The close vote by which the Cooper-
Hart amendment was disposed of has
implications in this regard which should
be carefully noted. The fact is that the
Senate is in great disagreement among
itself about precisely what our policy
should be. In such a case we have a
greater responsibility than usual to spell
out in detail just precisely what it is that
we are approving.
Certainly the legislative history of this
proposal is now unclear. Officials of the
Department of Defense have stated that
they are asking for little more than an
intensified research and development
program. The Secretary, I believe, has
said that approval of this bill means the
decision has been made to proceed with
the full Safeguard program. And various
views in between have been stated.
What my amendment intends to do
and what I propose is that the Congress
tell the Department of Defense, in the
explicit language of legislation, just what
our decision is.
My proposal for congressional decision
Is to permit the research and develop-
ment of the Safeguard system's radars
and computers in place in the first two
designated ABM sites, and at the same
time, clearly and explicitly prohibit the
Department of Defense from taking any
steps to deploy an ABM system.
In short, I propose that we exercise
our constitutional responsibility of con-
trol fully, and not exercise it in the
typical manner?year after year I have
seen it?of handling military authoriza-
tions, where all of the basic decisions are
left to the military departments.
I reserve so much time as I may have
left.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask the
attention of all Senators here. I am go-
ing to make a brief outline of what I
think is the issue. First, however, I want
to say that the Senator from New Hamp-
shire has rendered a truly wonderful
service on this bill as a whole. He has
been to the very heart of the research
and development program, which is the
largest item in one category in the entire
bill, and has done an outstanding job,
as reflected by the report and by the bill,
and as will be shown in further argu-
ments and debates on items in the bill.
I not only cimpliment him, but I thank
him for that.
Mr. President, this matter is relatively
simple. One word, though, about what
the Senator said about the form of the
bill, the few pages in it. There is a long
legislative pattern behind that. With ref-
erence to the military construction bill?
and that is the bill in the House the
Senator referred to--they spell out and
we spell out what we call line items; even
a runway being extended a few hundred
feet would appear as a line item, with a
definite authorization for that purpose.
That is all right. That is the way they
keep up with it.
Over here our system is nonetheless
complete and nonetheless specific. The
same rule applies in the House; and in
the Senate, with reference to these pro-
curement items, which are so numerous,
and the research items, which are so
numerous; we have the bill with a lump
sum for each category before us now, and
the appropriation bill carries on in the
same way. Many of the items in this bill
will still be in the abbreviated bill. This
is important, Mr. President. Back in the
hearings, the testimony, the exhibits,
the files, there is a minute history and
a specification of all these dollars, item
by item.
That is brought forward in summary
in the report, and it is just as definite,
as specific as it can be made. That is
true of the House bills on authorizations
and appropriations, and I have never
known of an instance where the Defense
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S 9336 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 7f119 69
Department, under any Secretary, has
violated that reported record, the legis-
lative history, the reports, in any way.
So Congress is being just as specific
under one System as it is under the other.
There is no doubt about it now; we know
exactly what is authorized here in phase
I. The Department of Defense cannot
be misled. They cannot be in error. They
cannot avoid knowing, and we know it;
Your committees know it, and we keep
a surveillance over these things. That is
more or less the law of necessity that
we follow here, in having the bill abbre-
viated; but the record Is totally complete.
The Senator from New Hampshire, as
I have stated, has done fine work on this
measure. He mentioned the fact that
in his mind, the threat has not been
proven to be so great, and that he did
not have as strong a conviction on that
as some of us do, and therefore did not
feel this urgency for the deterrent which
is believed necessary by some Senators.
That is a clear-cut statement, and I com-
mend him for bringing out exactly how
he feels. But I think that explains why
he wants to put these limitations on this
program.
If I may have the attention of Sena-
tors, I have a key point here: Just a few
hours ago, 51 Senators put their stamp
of approval on phase I. That was the
effect of the vote. Phase I is what is in
the bill with reference to the ABM.
All the way through, ray position and
my belief has been?and it is shared by
a majority of the committee?that we
will stand on phase I, that that is what
is needed. That is why there was no com-
mittee amendment to the House bill, and
why no amendment by the committee
was offered from the floor,.We have stood
on phase I; and that is the very thing
that was approved yesterday in writing
by the recorded vote of the Senate.
Phase I is limited, just as low as it
can be limited if we are_going to move
at all beyond pure research and devel-
opment. The McIntyre amendment
comes along, though, and goes back be-
hind what was done yesterday, and cuts
some pieces out of phase I. That is a
quick summary of what it does. It goes
back into the matter and takes out a
part. The main thing is no silos, under
the McIntyre amendment, even for the
two missile sites in phase L
No silos for missiles in phase I; that is
the major point involved in this amend-
ment, as I see it. We had a very fine
debate on this issue, with everyone stat-
ing his sincere convictions, and amend-
ments in varying degrees proposed; and
then the vote was taken, and the decision
was made. My point is, let us not go back
into the phase I. I stand on phase I and
on phase I alone. That has been my
position.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS, Yes; I yield to the Sen-
ator.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Just to clarify for
my information a little bit more the dis-
tinction, what is the difference between
what the Senator calls phase I and what
is allowed by the McIntyre amendment.,
or, to put it another wale how does the
McIntyre amendment restrict or alter
phase I? Is it only as to the silos, did I
understand the Senator to say?
Mr. STENNIS. Well, there may be
other restrictions.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am very much In-
terested as to what the distinction is.
Mr. STENNIS. I said that was the
major one. According to my notes, the
McIntyre amendment leaves in all the
money except $2 million. That $345.5
million, it cuts down $2 million, in round
figures, but it leaves in $343.5 million,
which, by the way, the Cooper-Hart
amendment would have taken out.
As to how that $2 million would be
spent, that is the $600,000 that we have
referred to here in the base about the
long leadtime items with reference to
the missile itself, which is a very small
item, and the $1.4 million to make up the
remainder of that $2 million was for the
launch facilities. So that is the differ-
ence with reference to the money: the
launch facilities and the $600,000 item.
Leaving out the silos for the missiles
for phase I, it seems to me that that is
the most important item that could be
affected.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. This is what con-
fused me; perhaps I do not understand
it: the missiles the Senator means are
additional silos for Minuteman?
Mr. STENNIS. No, no.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. What are the silos
for, that the Senator says will be pro-
hibited?
Mr. STENNIS. These silos are for the
Spartan missiles.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Oh.
Mr. STENNIS. The Spantan missiles
themselves. If I used the word "Minute-
man," that was in error. I do not think
I did.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is Spantan mis-
siles?
Mr. STENNIS. It is Spantan missiles,
yes. I said silos, but it is for the Spartan
missiles.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Then the restric-
tion that the Senator objects to in the
McIntyre amendment is no provision for
silos for Sprint missiles or Spartan mis-
siles, or both?
Mr. STENNIS. Yes, both of them.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Both?
Mr. STENNIS. Some of both of them,
yes.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Otherwise, you get
everythinge else phase 1 provides for?
Mr. STENNIS. It is the money I have
talked about
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Is that money to
buy land, sites, and so on, build roads,
and all that?
Mr. STENNIS. No, this money that I
refer to is not to buy land or anything
like that,
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Is there any money
to buy land in the bill?
Mr. STENNIS. No, there is not any
money in this bill to buy land. Not any.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Well, then, I do not
see any great difference between the Mc-
Intyre proposal and phase I of the ad-
ministration's bill.
Mr. STENNIS. Well, there is a great
big difference here with reference to these
silos for the Spartan and Sprint missiles.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator thinks
it is a very substantial difference?
Mr. STENNIS. Yes, I do. I think it is a
tremendous difference.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. If it is that big a
difference, I might be inclined to vote for
the McIntyre amendment. I was not sure
there was any difference. I was under the
impression that it was about the sante as
what is in the bill. That is what I wanted
to tie down.
Mr. STENNIS. I think there is an ap-
preciable difference.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I see. A big differ-
ence? '
Mr. STENNIS. And I think the matter
has really been passed On by the vote
yesterday.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. It was hard for me
to see what the difference is, but if it is a
real restriction, I think I shall be inclined
to vote for it.
Mr. ERVIN. Mr, President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield to the Senator
from North Carolina.
Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, the McIn-
tyre amendment, as I understand it,
would allow us to proceed with thetlevel-
opment and testing of the ABM and
would allow us to acquire sites for the
ABM. However, it says, "You cannot in-
stall them so they can be used."
It is like the old story of the colloquy
between the mother and the daughter.
The daughter said, "Mother, may I go
swimming?"
The mother said, "Yes, my darling
daughter. Hang your clothes on the hick-
ory limb, but do not go near the water"
That is what the McIntyre amendment
proposes.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I think
that the matter has been fully covered
and that the items are very clear in the
report and the analysis of the Senator's
amendment.
I think the whole matter is before the
Senate. If anyone wants some time, I will
be glad to yield to him at this time.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 5
minutes to the Senator from South Caro-
lina.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from South Carolina is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. THLTRMOND. Mr. President, I
have great respect for the distinguished
Senator from New Hampshire. However,
I think it would be a great mistake if the
Senate were to adapt his amendment.
The approach adopted in the pro-
posed amendment is such that it will cast
a cloud of ambiguity over the entire Safe-
guard developmental effort. The body of
the authorization bill authorizes certain
expenditures for the Safeguard system in
general terms; the proposed amendment
purports to redefine and limit this au-
thority by an enumeration of activities
for which funds may be used. By tin-
Plication, therefore, expenditure for any-
thing that does not appear on the list of
enumerated activities is unauthorized.
The list contained, and the language
used, in the amendment appears, on ex-
amination, to be so incomplete and
ambiguous as to raise serious difficulties
with implementation and to cast doubt
on the authority to conduct certain nee-
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.August 7, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 9337
essary developmental and preproduction Senate, we have delayed now for longer amendment is trying to control. But the
activities, than we should have, experience we have had in the last 3 or
The following are examples of the The Soviets are at least 5 years ahead 4 years indicates that once the Pentagon
practical problems of interpretation and of us. They have an ABM system already has hold of such a mammoth project as
ambiguity that would arise under the built, developed, tested, evaluated, and this anything can happen?as our dis-
amendment : deployed. Their system is in operation tinguished chairman knows, we face
First. S. 2546 in its title states that the now. overruns in the C-5A of over $2 billion.
authorization of test facilities at Kwaj- Mr. President, again I repeat that this If Secretary Laird meant what he said
alein is a specific purpose of the bill and is a purely defensive weapon. If we build when he said that a vote for the bill
this is implemented by section 203. Yet the ABM weapon and the enemy never is a commitment to build this system,
the absence of language in subsection (a) sends a missile over here, we shall not goodness, gracious, what may be the
of the amendment specifically authoriz- have to use it. This would be well and overrun on the ABM system.
ing funds to be spent for such facilities good. We shall have protected our peo- So I am surely like the mother who
and R.D.T. & E. effort on radar and pie. However, if we build the ABM mis- says to her daughter: .
missiles at Kwajalein, coupled with the sue and the enemy does send missiles Hang your clothes on a hickory limb.
further limitation in subsection (b) for- here to destroy our people and our coun-
bidding the installation of "equipment try, we shall then be most thankful and My amendment is intended to be re-
described" in subsection (a) (1) ?that is, the people of America will be most grate- strictive , by specifically mentioning in
the amendment what can and cannot be
radars, computers and related electronic ful, that the United States had the fore-
done.
equipment?at "any proposed anti-bal- sight to build an ABM system.
Mr. FLTLBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
listic-missile site" other than Grand Mr. President, I hope that the Senate
the Senator yield?
Forks and Malmstrom, could lead to the will not delay longer moving forward to Mr. McINTYRE. I yield.
conclusion that construction and instal- deploy this important weapon which will
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator has
lation of facilities at Kwajalein is un- mean so much to the national security of raised a very critical point. From one
authorized. These additional facilities at our Nation, point of view, as the Senator. from MIs-
Kwajalein are required for essential sys- Mr. McINTYRE. Mn President, I yield sissippi and the Senator from New
tern tests with radars and missiles. myself 5 minutes. Hampshire have said, it is restrictive.
Second. Likewise, the provision in sub- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- From the other point of view, it au-
section (b) limiting the installation of ator from New Hampshire is recognized thorizes two bases. I came to the Cham-
"equipment described" to two specified for 5 minutes. her expecting to vote against it, on the
sites may preclude the establishment of Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, first I ground that I do not wish to be respon-
essential modifications to training facil- thank the distinguished chairman of the sible for authorizing, specifically and af-
ities; it may also prohibit the modifica- committee, the Senator from Mississippi firmatively, two bases which are in-
tion of existing command and control fa- (Mr. STENNIS) for the kind remarks he terlided to be operative bases, evidently;
cilities and the production and installa- has made concerning my efforts on this otherwise, they would not be at these
tion of the tactical software control site particular authorization bill. particular points. So I did not want to
at Whippany, N.J., which is essential to It is no news to Members of the Senate be responsible for someone saying to
the developmental testing program, that working with the Senator from Mis- me next year, "Look, you voted for this
Third. Subsection (a) (2) raises even sissippi is an experience that helps any silly system that is obsolete, and you
more serious ambiguities. This is the only man become a better Senator. And it is wasted $10 billion." Insofar as I can, I
portion of the amendment dealing with an experience in which one always finds do not want to have to say, "Yes, I did."
what is permitted in the way of prepro- himself being handled fairly and I have made enough mistakes without
duction and production type activity. It squarely. knowing it. Here is one that I know is a
permits "preproduction expenses"?an I find it a great honor to serve on his mistake?to throw $6, $10, or $20 billion
ambiguous term?but only for missiles, committee. on two, five, or 10 bases. This is the point
Considering that subsection (a) (1) per- With reference to the remarks of the at issue.
mits funds to be used only for research, distinguished Senator from South Caro- If I could be convinced that the
development, testing, and evaluation of lina, I feel that he has made a rather amendment truly is restrictive in a
system components such as radars, corn- tortured criticism of the amendment as meaningful way, and I could justify that
puters, and related electronic equipment, offered. in the future, as I have said to the Sen-
but not for production of these items, it On page 2 of the amendment where we ator from Mississippi, I would be in-
is unclear how funds, particularly talk about restricting the use of anti-bal- dined to support the Senator, because
PEMA?procurement equipment missiles, listic-missile sites, we are talking about that is what I want to do. I tried that
Army?funds, can be used to procure the fact that the overall ABM proposal yesterday. We tried to restrict this whole
these items for the Grand Forks and has many proposed antiballistic missile system. Now the Senator has fallen back ?
Malmstrom tactical sites. The amend- sites. into a fallback position, and the Sena-
ment is silent with respect to production The amendment restricts the use of tor says he really restricts.
engineering and preparation for manu- these sites specifically. And it says so I wish the Senator would elaborate on
facture of nonmissile items such as ra- clearly and unequivocally on page 2 that that. What could I say 5 years from now,
dars and computer. Absence of such au- the equipment described in the first sub- when this thing perhaps will have been
thority would have a serious impact on section?the radars and the computers? proved to be a wholly ineffectual system
timely future deployability of the system. that eventually will be moved in there and a waste of money? How could I then
Fourth. There is no specific authoriza- are restricted to only two proposed anti- defend myself against the charge that
tion for funds to be used for develop- ballistic missile sites at which they may I voted for the deployment in two bases
ment or procurement of necessary and be installed?one at Grand Forks Air and wasted $5 billion?
ancillary supporting facilities that are Force Base, N. flak., and the other at Mr. McINTYRE. Let me respond to
not "related electronic equipment." the Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont. the Senator from Arkansas by saying
Fifth. This amendment could be in- There are no restrictions on the use of that the amendment is in the nature of
terpreted as preventing the accomplish- sites such as Kwajalein for research and a compromise. It tries to give to those
ment in fiscal year 1970 of survey, ad- development, sites which are not in- who feel as deeply as the Senator from
vanced engineering and site selection for tended to be part of a deployed system. Arkansas some of the restrictions they
phase II sites. If this site selection ac- In his remarks, the distinguished Sen- would like to see applied on this system,
tivity is not carried out in fiscal year ator from North Carolina referred to a what we might consider the future mam-
1970 on several of the phase II sites, young lady who wanted to go swimming, moth sophisticated defensive weapon. At
there will be several months of delay in and her mother advised her that she the same time, it turns to the proponents
proceeding with these sites if their later could hang her clothes on a hickory limb, and says: "We recognize that you may
deployment is approved, but that she should not go near the be right about a threat we may have to
Mr. President, I am convinced that water. meet in 1975. So"?if I may speak met-
there should be no further delay. As I I suppose his criticism is that my aphorically?"while we, Congress, take
have stated heretofore in debate in the amendment is restraining, that my the reins on this ABM?we give you a
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S 9338 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 7 190
little leadtime now. Go ahead and in-
stall"?I prefer the word "install" rather
than "deploy"?"at two sites"?and I
prefer "sites" rather than "bases."
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Cor-
TON in the chair). The time of the Sen-
ator has expired.
Mr. McINTYRE. I yield myself 5 ad-
ditional minutes.
We say: "All right, go ahead. You say
you have the technological base; you
know what you are going to do to the
MSR and R. & D. Start to put your foot-
ings in and start to plan, but keep it
completely at computers and radars.
Do not talk about any missilery or any
weapons."
This resolves two things that bothered
me with respect to this issue. The first
is that I could not quite accept the sever-
ity of the threat. It gives me another year
to examine the hard facts of what those
SS-9's are all about. The second is that
it gives us a chance to see if, somehow,
the Soviet Union can sit down at Geneva
with us and we can begin to talk sense
about missile limitation.
So in the bill, in this amendment, we
have tried to say?and I think we say
it succinctly and explicitly?what the
Pentagon can do.
As the Senator from Mississippi point-
ed out, there is a substantial difference so
fax as the proponents are concerned, be-
cause they do not like this control, and
there is this $15.6 million- -it is a small
saving in this day.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is very small In
this bill.
Mr. McINTYRE, But if we examine
the practical effects of this amendment
In view of our experience this year, what
do we see? If we examine where the op-
ponents of the ABM were 2 or 3 months
ago, with 20 or 30 votes, and where they
crested yesterday at 49 or 50, my amend-
ment gives those who oppose this main-
moth system the opportunity to reaffirm,
1 year from today, when the same au-
thorization bill is before the Senate
again, that, No. 1, they nave broken the
precedent. We no longer have four
pages with big numbers. We have
in here specific language prohibiting
deployment. It gives the opponents an
opportunity to say: "Let us look again
at the picture. Our intelligence says that
the threat is no longer so obvious. The
SALT talks are going well."
Why should not this area of the com-
promise be attractive to those who want
to restrict, who want to hold back on
this ABM system? I think it is illogical
for those who do not want to see the
ABM deployed, to turn around and vote
"nay" on this amendment, when such a
vote would in effect, approve of deploy-
ment, and give the Pentagon its usual
ability to run the show.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. On the question of
reevaluation next year, is there any way
we can get an evaluation by anyone other
than people who are directly interested
in this deployment?
The Senator from New Hampshire will
recall the suggestion made by Dr. Killian
in one of our hearings, that there should
be an independent, non-Pentagon board
of scientists and qualified people to
evaluate- the effectiveness of this kind
of system. Does the Senator recall that?
Mr. McINTYRE, Yes; I recall.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Is there anything
in the bill, or would it be inconsistent
with the Senator's amendment, that,
after this year, somebody other than Dr.
Foster, for example--who is intimately
concerned and committed to this?could
evaluate whether or not this business is
practicable?
Mr. McINTYRE. The Senator has in
mind a forward-looking commission. I
could not agree that we stop everything
now and have a commission decide what
we should do on this bill.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is say-
ing then that We should hold up nothing
except what he specifies for a year, and
take another look a year from now?
Mr. McINTYRE. That is what I pro-
pose.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Will the same peo-
ple be looking at it this time as have
been looking for the past 25 years and
have spent over a thousand billion dol-
lars, or will it be some independent
board of qualified people, such as Dr.
Killian and his associates, people who are
not in the employ of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff? That kind of review would reas-
sure me that we would at least have
some kind of objective judgment upon
this kind of system.
Mr. McINTYRE. I have no opposition
to the use of a board of experts?per
haps a blue ribbon board?that could be
an adjunct to our Defense Department.
I do not have the misgivings about our
Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Senator
does. I have found them, over the years,
to be extremely able and capable. But
that is really irrelevant to the amend-
ment.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not want to be
misunderstood. In their performance of
their functions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
are very able. I make no criticism what-
ever of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
of the Senator has expired.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I was directing my
remarks to the judgment on this missile
system, which I do not think is the pri-
mary baby of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
It is primarily the baby of certain scien-
tists, led by Dr. Foster, and they are
people who are inordinately interested
in research of all kinds. There are 12 dif-
ferent kinds of missiles in this bill aside
from the ABM?perhaps more, but at
least 12. Perhaps there are 24. There are
four pages dealing with it. These are
gimmicks in which they are interested.
It is similar to when I first flew a kite.
An extremely interesting concept of
aerodynamics is involved in what makes
a kite fly.
I never did understand it. Maybe I do
not understand it yet, but it was
interesting.
Dr. Teller expressed it best of all in
connection with the nuclear test ban
treaty when he said that nothing should
stand in the way of research and the
pursuit of knowledge, not even 100 or 200
million Americans or anybody else. He
was against any kind of restraint upon
research and the pursuit of knowledge,
and this is understandable.
I am not criticizing them for that. We
should recognize that is their attitude;
that they are not responsible for the
solvency of the United States or they are
not responsible for judging this activity
or the other. They have their respon-
sibility and do it. I am not criticizing
them. Our responsibility is different. The
Senate should exercise its responsibility
and make this kind of policy judgment.
If the Senator's amendment is a sub-
stantial restriction upon the deployment
of a system which is very dubious, I am
inclined to support it.
Mr. McINTYRE. The Senator should
support it because, as the Senator from
Mississippi said, there is a difference.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. This is where I came
in. I thought the Senator was affirming
this program and I was going to vote
against the amendment. Now I am
puzzled.
Mr. McINTYRE. This amendment
moves in the direction/ the Senator is
talking about, in the direction of restric-
tions; giving time for a blue ribbon com-
mitte or board to overlook the matter
and give us advice.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I wish that were
possible.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
of the Senator has expired.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, how
much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from New Hampshire has 29
minutes remaining.
Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield for a question?
Mr. McINTYRE. lam happy to yield to
the distinguished Senator from North
Carolina.
Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, I would
like to ask the distinguished Senator
from New Hampshire if the American
people, acting under their Constitution,
do not elect Members of the Senate and
the House of Representatives to make
decisions of the kind the Senator from
Arkansas mentioned?not Dr. Killian or
blue-ribbon commissions?
Mr. McINTYRE. I think that is an
interesting question although, of course,
the Constitution does so provide. How-
ever, I have to admit regarding questions
which involve technology and scientific
work, such as the ABM, that I need all
the technical help and advice I can get.
I have heard that same thought echoed
in the discussions in this Chamber by
others.
Mr. ERVIN. Cannot congressional
committees obtain the testimony of Dr.
Killian and others?
Mr. McINTYRE. That has been sug-
gested.
Mr. ERVIN. I understood the Senator
from Arkansas to suggest that the Sen-
ator from New Hampshire should amend
his amendment to create a commission
to safeguard the people of the United
States against the Pentagon.
Mr. McINTYRE. If that is what the
Senator from Arkansas meant I would
have to disagree. I thought he was talk-
ing a about ai blue-ribbon committee that
would be scientifically trained, which
could objectively appraise this matter
and report. I did not mean and I do not
think the Senator from Arkansas meant
to toss the decisionrnaking process over
to this blue-ribbon committee.
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S 9339
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is cor-
rect. During the hearings, Dr. Killian,
who was an adviser in the Eisenhower
administration, suggested this matter IS
dubious and questionable?and he took
not nearly as strong a position as others.
He said that certain aspects of this pro-
posal, particularly the computers and
radars, are not completed or designed
and that before a decision is made it
should be subjected to at least a year's
study by qualified scientists as to feasi-
bility, practicability, and operability.
This appealed to me as a very sound
thing to do, but it has not been followed.
The Senator will remember that last
year I asked the chairman of the com-
mittee if his committee had hearings
with any outside scientists before the
committee. The only people brought be-
fore the committee last year were scien-
tists on the payroll of the Pentagon,
either direct or indirect. I say they can-
not have an objective judgment. We were
all looking for objectivity as to work-
ability.
Mr. McINTYRE. I do want to say that
this year in committee hearings, both
public sessions and executive sessions, I
really appreciated the appearance of the
various experts in this field who testified
pro and con. It was helpful to me in try-
ing to decide this difficult question.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I understand. The
chairman of the committee said last
year he was going to do it. I think this
is a great step forward and it is much
better to have a variety of opinion and
not just opinions of employees of any
organization, whether it be the Pentagon
or any other organization.
Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Sen-
ator yield?
Mr. McINTYRE. I yield 2 minutes to
the Senator from New Jersey.
Mr. CASE. I thank the Senator. I
wish to approach the matter from a
slightly different angle. I am impressed
with the distinguished Senator from
New Hampshire, and, to some extent, I
think he has been joined by the Sena-
tor from Massachusetts in trying to work
out something that more closely meets
the feelings on all sides on this impor-
tant matter.
But when the Senator put the em-
phasis on the radars and computers, and
excluded the deployment of the missiles
In this coming fiscal year, many of us
got a uniformly adverse reaction on the
ground that putting these computers and
radars in place at a very great cost
would be a deterrent to the kind of re-
search for the design of a system which
would be likely to work better than the
Safeguard for the purpose of defending
missile sites. The Senator from New
Jersey has found that argument a very
persuasive one, and up to now at least
is disposed to vote against the amend-
ment of the Senator.
I would be glad to have the Senator
respond.
Mr. McINTYRE, Mr. President, I yield
myself 2 minutes to respond.
I think the Senator has put his finger
on a key point as far as my amendment
is concerned. I recognize the difficulty
many Senators had with what I would
call the credibility of the radars, MSR
and PAR. But I had to weigh in my mind
the threat, the possibility of facing some-
thing in the mid-1970's which America
would have to react to, something the
Soviets could do. I said to myself?and
the Senator knows how much time Is
consumed on these projects?let them in-
stall the radars. It can't be completed
this year. There will only be footings in
there nine months from now. But give
them authority to install radars and in
the meantime carry on the research. I
am trying to accommodate the possi-
bility of a threat along with trying to
restrict the unleashing of another gigan-
tic weapon.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. McINTYRE. I yield 1 minute to
the Senator from Arkansas.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The best authority,
even the one recommended by the Under
Secretary of Defense, Dr. Panovsky, said
that the present radar, the radar as
now designed, was designed for the old
Sentinel and is utterly useless for the
Safeguard. I think I am not overstating
what he said. He said that it would be
foolish to install the present MSR. He
thought this was to be purely an experi-
mental installation to see if a workable
MSR could be designed, and that it was
not intended to install one until it was
developed.
Mr. McINTYRE. Actually, the one
being developed is subject to change day
by day as improvements are made. MSR's
or radars are going to do this job. One
is under test in Kwajalein.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. They were for the
Sentinel. They were not designed for
Safeguard. Is not that correct?
Mr. McINTYRE. The Senator is saying
that there should not be any installation.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is purely a re-
designing proposition. They should not be
installed until they are redesigned.
Mr. McINTYRE. I understand. But this
amendment is in the nature of a com-
promise. It tries to reach a common
ground and tries to impose some of the
restrictions the Senator would like to
have.
Mr. President, does the Senator from
Massachusetts desire to have me yield
time to him?
Mr. BROOKE. Yes.
Mr. McINTYRE. I am happy to yield to
the distinguished Senator from Massa-
chusetts.
Mr. President, how much time remains
tome?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from New Hampshire has 19 min-
utes remaining.
Mr. McINTYRE. I yield 10 minutes to
the distinguished Senator from Massa-
chusetts.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, we have
now reached the near-deadlock on the
ABM issue which many have foreseen for
weeks. So far as this issue itself is con-
cerned, yesterday's decisions may well
prove to be a pyrrhic victory for the pro-
ponents and a futile effort for the oppo-
ants of ABM. But however one describes
the outcome, no one can feel satisfied
that so grave a question, of such immense
implications to this Nation and the world,
has become the focus of such serious di-
vision in our ranks.
From the days of the Founding Fathers
on, a cardinal rule of American politics
has stressed the importance of a strong
domestic consensus on issues affecting
the national security and foreign policy of
the United States. The need to develop
such a consensus has been well under-
stood by virtually every generation of
Americans. We all have known that the
capacity of representative government to
deal with other governments, particu-
larly totalitarian regimes, may be badly
impaired by internal dissension. We now
have laid bare the full extent of disagree-
ment within the Senate over the proposed
deployment of the Safeguard system.
But, as I argued in yesterday's debate,
there is neither necessity nor wisdom in
leaving the issue where it now stands.
The narrow verdict rendered yesterday
should not be allowed to stand. It serves
neither the administration's nor the Na-
tion's interest to leave the issue at the
point of maximum tension. Such an out-
come can only damage the administra-
tion's authority and capacity to pursue a
vigorous diplomacy in this realm. It is
likely to portend repeated conflict and
disagreement on successive issues related
to the ABM. It has already been made
clear that the struggle will continue
through the appropriations process.
The lean majority that held sway in
this body yesterday faces a dismal and
draining prospect indeed: it will always
have to have its troops at the ready for
any later vote bearing on the ABM, for
three is always the prospect that, if ill-
ness or absenteeism strikes their ranks,
the balance will shift abruptly and de-
cisively against the ABM. I ask the Mem-
bers of the Senate who prevailed yester-
day if that is really their preferred
course.
If the present decision on the ABM is
left inta;ct and becomes the sole meas-
ure of Senate sentiment on this ques-
tion, the entire tenor of legislative-execu-
tive relations may be adversely affected.
A bloody, protracted, and maiming bat-
tle on the ABM cannot serve the goal
of healing the domestic divisions which
have so impaired our ability to meet our
responsibilities at home and abroad.
In short, as Senator AIKEN and others
have tried to make clear, there is a com-
pelling need to seek a new basis on which
the Senate can work its will by a sub-
stantial majority. To do this will re-
quire that the question before the Senate
be altered. It will have to take account of
the deep concern of those of us who urge
restraint in order to explore further the
possibility of meaningful strategic arms
limitations, and the equally deep-seated
concern of those of us who feel that a
beginning on ABM deployment should be
made now, either as a presumed spur to
the negotiations or as a hedge against
their failure.
Viewed in these terms, the question
would become: How can we keep open the
option of timely deployment of an ABM
system without a premature commitment
to deployment and without stimulating
the arms race? That is the question that
would chart the path to consensus; it is
that question which outlines the poten-
tial accommodation which so many dili-
gent Members of this body have sought
for months. There can be no accom-
modation unless both sides display the
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S 9340 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 70 1969
flexibility essential to democratic de-
cisionmaking.
That is the question which the dis-
tinguished Senator from New Hamp-
shire is putting to the Senate. For many
weeks, beginning in the Armed Services
Subcommittee on Research and Develop-
ment, Senator MCINTYRE and I have ex-
plored the possibilities of devising a rea-
sonable middle ground. likty staff and I,
as well as Senator Mei/geese and his
staff, have conducted innumerable con-
versations with responsible authorities
in the administration as well as Mem-
bers of the Senate. The McIntyre for-
mula is the only proposal yet advanced
that meets the fundamental require-
ments of both sides to this intense
dispute.
For the opponents of Al3M it would
explicitly reserve a decision on authoriz-
ing actual deployment of ABM weapons
and would delay a decision on acquir-
ing all the sites for the proposed Safe-
guard system. Thus, this fermula would
provide by statute that Congress is com-
mitting the Nation only to a test and
evaluation of the radars, computers, and
associated electronics. It would lay the
groundwork for resolving or confirming
many of the technological questions
which have been raised against the sys-
tem. At the same time it Would go far t1-
ward meeting the political objectives of
those who are worried that a start on
Safeguard at this time could jeopardize
or complicate the SALT talks on which
many of us have placed so much hope.
With this language in the bill the Soviet
Union would have a clear sienal that the
United States is exercising restraint,
that it prefers to await developments in
the arms negotiations before proceeding
beyond a test program for the ABM, and
that Congress is definitely retaining its
authority for subsequent decisions in this
matter.
For the proponents of the Safeguard
system, this proposal provides =pie
authority to take every necessary step
the President has proposed for fiscal
1970. It would not disrupt the schedule
he has proposed. Secretary Packard
acknowledged after one Armed Services
Committee meeting that the program
could tolerate a delay in acquiring addi-
tional sites. Further conversations with
Dr. John Foster have made clear that,
so far as those other sites are concerned,
the only authority required for fisael
1970 is to do advance surveys.
The only argument for actually acquir-
ing those additional sites is one of
economy; it may be cheaper and more
convenient to do so now rather than
later, if need be. But if those sites are
purchased in fiscal 1970, it significantly
undermines the President's strong as-
surances that he contemplates a phased
program, with a review every year in
light of technological, political, and stra-
tegic developments. We should not erode
the President's important political
standards for this program by allowing
relatively trivial economic considerations
to cast doubt on the phased plan for the
program.
It is also clear, as Dr. Foster has con-
firmed, that there is no necessity to
decide now whether an actual deploy-
ment of missiles should be undertaken.
Thus this proposal would meet every
central concern on both sides of this
great dividing line. It would make clear
that Congress would decide later whether
actually to deploy the weapons for the
first phase of Safeguard.
But by leaving intact the President's
authority to begin a full-scale test and
evaluation of the radars, oomputers, and
associated electronics at the first two
proposed sites, it would keep open the
option of having the Safeguard system
deployed, if it proves necessary, on pre-
cisely the schedule proposed by the ad-
ministration. Mr. Packard, Dr. Foster,
and every knowledgeable proponent of
the system will acknowledge that what
they are in fact seeking is the right to
test and evaluate the main elements of
this system. If they do not prove out, the
President would presumably not proceed
further with it.
Surely it should be clear to both sides
that this redefinition of the decision we
are taking is a commonsense resolution
of the great dispute we have seen de-
velop on this issue. It would help remove
for the coming months a point of the
most severe contention in the Senate and
the Nation. It would lubricate the rela-
tions between Congress and the admin-
istration. It would come closest to the
maximum feasible consensus presently
achievable in this body and would pro-
vide the basis for an active diplomacy
in the impending arms negotiations.
Let us not blindly reject the resolution
of our differences which Senator Mc-
INTYRE'S recommendation offers us. Let
us recognize the wisdom of his healing
suggestion. Let us all?yesterday's losers
and winners?move on to a greater vic-
tory for the Senate and the country by
forging a consensus on this promising
middle ground.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I thank
and commend the distinguished Senator
from Massachusetts for his remarks. I
may say that the Senator from Massa-
chusetts and I have served on an ad hoc
subcommittee named by our distin-
guished chairman to look into the re-
search and development portions of the
authorization bill. I believe that as a
good share of our efforts and time were
spent on this question, we came to think
in terms of finding a compromise that
might somehow heal what we felt to be
a sharp division in the Senate. I have
found the Sentaor from Massachusetts
to be a great help and adviser and a
mountain of strength as we tried, quietly,
in our own way, to bring the two sides
together.
I now yield 3 or 4 minutes to the dis-
tinguished Senator from South Dakota
(Mr. MCGOVERN) .
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from South Dakota is recognized
for 4 minutes.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I
intend to vote in favor of the amend-
ment offered by the Senator from New
Hampshire (Mr. McIerree).
The vote yesterday cannot be con-
strued as a convincing decision on this
important issue. The Congress and the
country remain deeply divided over the
wisdom of moving ahead now with de-
ployment of an antiballistic-missile sys-
tem. There has been no resolution of the
very serious questions raised during this
debate over Safeguard's technical effec-
tiveness, its vulnerability to any serious
effort the Soviets might mount to neu-
tralize our Minuteman force, and its po-
tential for mischief in connection with
the arms race and the forthcoming stra-
tegic arms limitation talks. For these
reasons those who have supported de-
ployment will, if they are prudent, sup-
port this modest congressional limita-
tion suggested by Senator Mclierree.
Those of us who supported the Hart-
Cooper amendment should certainly sup-
port the Senator from New Hampshire
who voted with us yesterday.
None of us has altered his views. I
still regard the Safeguard system as a
major national blunder, and I intend to
continue fighting it at every opportunity.
But if we cannot eliminate the authority
to begin deployment of phase I, the next
best step is to narrow that authority.
The McIntyre amendment is in line
with this purpose. It is carefully drawn
to allow only preparation of sites and
deployment of long lead-time items, in-
'eluding missile site radars and perimeter
acquisition radars. It specifically pro-
hibits construction of any operational
ABM missiles and it freezes existing au-
thority to build missile sites and to ac-
quire land other than at the two loca-
tions in North Dakota and Montana.
I regard that as significant. In the con-
text of the arms talks, it assures the So-
viet Union that this country will not have
an operational anti-ballistic-missile sys-
tem of any kind until the Congress au-
thorizes it. We retain, during the critical
period when discussions will be getting
underway, the right to exercise our judg-
ment again. It should convince both the
Soviet Union and the Nixon administra-
tion that we are serious about turning
another corner on the dangerous, arid
enormously expensive arms race of the
past 25 years.
In addition it provides additional time
for the technical problems to become ap-
parent and for the case against deploy-
ment to be made again. I am fully con-
fident that the growth in opposition to
the ABM which has occurred during the
past year will continue. The vote yester-
day does not mean that Safeguard will
be deployed; it means that more months
must pass while we continue our critical
examination.
I urge my colleagues an both sides of
this issue to join in supporting Senator
MCINTYRE'S amendment.
Mr. McINTYRE. I thank the the dis-
tinguished Senator from South Dakota.
I know how deeply he has felt about the
ABM and its possible deployment, and I
am especially pleased that he can see his
way clear to vote for what I consider to
be a sound compromise on this impor-
tant issue.
Mr. President, I am informed that the
distinguished Senator from Mississippi is
about ready to yield back his time. I be-
lieve I have about 3 or 4 minutes left. Is
that correct?
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Auguat 7, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE S 9341
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator has 31/2 minutes left.
Mr. McINTYRE. I would like to reserve
those 31/2 minutes at this time, and sug-
gest the absence of a quorum, reserving
those 31/2 minutes for a final summation.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. From
whose time would the time for the quo-
rum call come?
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the time for the
quorum call not be charged to either
side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
abjection?
Mr. TOWER. I object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection
Is heard.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I do not
understand the purpose of a call for a
quorum.
Mr. McINTYRE. A call for a quorum
just before the vote. I have about 3
minutes left. I am about ready to yield
my time back after a brief summary,
just as the Senator from Mississippi is.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Chair is informed that, under the prece-
dents of the Senate, the Senator has not
time enough left to have a quorum call
on his time.
Mr. McINTYRE. What about time on
the bill?
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, frankly,
I think it is in order to have a quorum
call before the vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. After all
time is yielded back, there will be a
quorum call.
Mr. STENNIS. I am ready, then?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I think the Senator
from New Hampshire was under a mis-
understanding, perhaps due to what I
told him, but if the Senator will be kind
enough to allow a 2-minute quorum call,
it would clear the situation and give a
few Senators an opportunity to get here
and the Senator can complete his re-
marks.
Mr. McINTYRE. Is that agreeable?
Mr. STENNIS. Yes. Does the Senator
want to use a little more time?
Mr. McINTYRE. Yes. I would like to
address a few more Senators than we
have present.
Mr. STENNIS. Yes; I agree to take a
few minutes for a quorum call.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Just so
the Chair may understand, the Senator
from Mississippi is yielding 2 minutes
out of his time in order that there may
be a quorum call?
Mr. STENNIS. The Chair is correct.
I yield 2 minutes for the purpose of a
quorum call the beginning of a quorum
call?so the Senator from New Hamp-
shire may have the advantage of it in
using the rest of his time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, how
much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from New Hampshire has 3 minutes.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, is my
understanding correct that the Senator
from Mississippi is about ready to yield
back the remainder of his time, after a
short closing summation?
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I would
not yield back my time as long as the
Senator from New Hampshire is using
his remaining time. If he wants to yield
back his remaining time now, I will yield
mine back now.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I have
presented this amendment for the con-
sideration of the Senate primarily, and
from the very beginning, in order that
both sides on this sharply divided issue
might have a chance to come together
and give the President of the United
States the sort of backing and authority
that he needs in these critical times.
My amendment does restrict the De-
partment of Defense in what they can do
as they undertake to put together this
highly sophisticated ABM system. It re-
stricts them in such a fashion that those
who tried so mightily yesterday to keep
the matter entirely in research and de-
velopment should find it possible to vote
for my amendment.
However, my amendment also and very
importantly recognizes the possible
threat of the mid-1970's, and permits,
under a restrained hand, the beginning
of installation ef the radars and com-
puters at the two sites, Grand Forks and
Malmstrom.
This amendment should meet the re-
quirements of common ground on both
sides, and do it without violating any of
the principles that are in the minds of
those who fought so valiantly yesterday.
Mr. President, a "no" vote on this
amendment is a vote for deployment.
It is a negative vote for deployment. It
Is giving up the fight. In its essence, a
"no" vote is for taking away strict con-
gressional supervision and control of this
gigantic new weapon, and leaving it in
the hands of the Pentagon.
I reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator has used all of his time.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I ask
for the yeas and nays on my amendment.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. MONTOYA. Mr. President, most
observers have been stating that today
marks the ends of a historic unprece-
dented debate on American defense pol-
icy. It is my opinion that this marks only
the beginning of the debate. Whatever
the outcome of the vote on ABM yester-
day and today, and all subsequent votes
on defense programs, what we are deli-
berating is whether or not we take the
historic step as the first nuclear power
to have the wisdom and courage?to de-
escalate the nuclear arms race.
What intelligent person would advo-
cate an escalation of the arms race, fur-
ther provoking the proliferation of nu-
clear weapons throughout the world? I
know in my heart there is no one Sen-
ator who advocates this.
Secretary McNamara said the corner-
stone of our strategic policy is assured
destruction. Is there any doubt in any-
one's mind we have that assured destruc-
tion capability? Could the Soviet Union
attack us and be assured we would not
inflict a devastating retaliatory blow to
their country? The answer is an un-
equivical "No." Our immense offensive
power, which is capable of retaliation
despite a nuclear surprise attack, is the
factor that has prevented a nuclear war
from occurring. This power has not di-
minished and it promises to increase
within the next few years.
In the next few years the intensity of
debate will increase, not diminish. Gone
are the days when defense programs re-
ceived a carte blanche OK from Con-
gress, Now we must work toward a posi-
tive world peace policy of conciliation
and negotiation.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I think
the issues are drawn on this amendment
and that its substance and what it would
do are well understood. I believe that to
adopt this amendment would be contrary
to the clear-cut vote that was taken yes-
terday, and would be in derogation of
the position that the Senate took a few
hours ago. I believe those matters are
clear.
I yield back the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time
having been yielded back, the question
is on agreeing to the amendment offered
by the Senator from New Hampshire.
On this question, the yeas and nays have
been ordered, and the clerk will call the
roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. FULBRIGHT (when his name was
called). On this vote I have a pair with
the senior Senator from Tennessee (Mr.
GORE) . If he were present, he would vote
"yea." If I were at liberty to vote, I
would vote "nay." I withhold my vote.
Mr. KENNEDY. I announce that the
Senator from Tennessee (Mr. GORE),
and the Senator from Louisiana (Mr.
LONG) are necessarily absent.
The result was announced?yeas 27,
nays 70, as follows:
[No. 68 Leg.]
Aiken
Bayh
Brooke
Church
Cranston
Goodell
Gravel
Harris
Hartke
Allen
Allott
Anderson
Baker
Bellmon
Bennett
Bible
Boggs
? Burdick
Byrd, Va.
Byrd, W. Va.
Cannon
Case
Cook
Cooper
Cotton
Curtis
Dirksen
Dodd
Dole
Dominick
Eagleton
Eastland
Ellender
YEAS-27
Hughes
Inouye
Javits
McCarthy
McGovern.
McIntyre
Metcalf
Mondale
Montoya
NAYS-70
Ervin
Fannin
Fong
Goldwater
Griffin
Gurney
Hansen
Hart
Hatfield
Holland
Hollings
Hruska
Jackson
Jordan, N.C.
Jordan, Idaho
Kennedy
Magnuson
Mansfield
Mathias
McClellan
McGee
Miller
Mundt
Murphy
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Moss
Pell
Proxmire
Ribicoff
Schweiker
Tidings
Williams, N.J.
Yarborough
Young, Ohio
Muskie
Nelson
Packwood
Pastore
Pearson
Percy
Prouty
Randolph
Russell
Saxbe
Scott
Smith
Sparkman
Spong
Stennis
Stevens
Symington
Talmadge
Thurmond
Tower
William, Del,
Young, N. Da,
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S 9342 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 7, 196k
PRESENT AND GIVING A LIVE PAIR
Fulbright, against.
NOT VOTING-2
Gore Long
So Mr. MCINTYRE'S arnendment Was
rejected.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I move
to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was rejected.
Mr. DIRKSEN. I move to lay that
motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
PROGRAM
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I should
like to ask the distinguished majority
leader about the prograii. for the re-
mainder of the day and perhaps tomor-
row, and also on Saturday, inasmuch as
it was said that there could be a session
on Saturday.
AUTHORIZATION FOR COMMTTTEE
TO MEET
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in
reply to my distinguished colleague, the
minority leader, may I first ask unani-
mous consent that the Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs be al-
lowed to meet during the session of the
Senate today. I do that because I under-
stand that the Governor of Alaska and
many Alaskans are in Washington, and
it is a pretty expensive proposition for
them. In view of that circumstance, I
hope it will be allowed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Coos
In the chair). Without objection, it is
so ordered.
ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL
11 A.M. TOMORROW
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that when the Sen-
ate completes its business today, it stand
in adjournment until 11 San. tomorrow.
The PRESIDING OlvrICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT FROM
TOMORROW, FRIDAY, UNTIL MON-
DAY, AUGUST 11, 1969
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it is
my understanding that there is a certain
amount of opposition?legitimate oppo-
sition, may I say?to a Saturday session;
and on that basis, I think it should be
announced, with the concurrence of the
minority leader, that, unfortunately?
from our point of view, in an effort to
speed up consideration of the pending
bill?there will not be a Saturday session.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that when the Senate completes its
business on Friday, it adjourn until
10:30 on Monday morning next.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. There are difficul-
ties which preclude our meeting on Bat-
urday, and those difficulties are not the
fault of the majority leader or the mi-
nority leader.
ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF
SENATOR PEARSON ON MONDAY
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that, at the conclu-
sion of the prayer on Monday morning
next, the distinguished Senator from
Kansas (Mr. PEARSON) be recognized for
not to exceed 30 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is soAr d.
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
TIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR
MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RE-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MIS-
SILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJ-
ALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RE-
SERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize appro-
priations during the fiscal year 1970 for
procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval
vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and
to authorize the construction of test fa-
cilities at Kwajalein Missile Range, and
to prescribe the authorized personnel
strength of the Selected Reserve of each
Reserve component of the Armed Forces,
and for other purposes.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Presidents it is
my understanding that 15, 18, or 20
amendments are yet to be considered. I
would hope for the continued coopera-
tion of the Senators on both sides, to
the end that, if at all possible, we might
be able to complete action on this bill no
later than Wednesday next, or sooner.
Mr. MAGNUSON. If we meet on Sat-
urday, we can do it sooner.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the ABM
Is just one item of many major items that
are in the pending bill, as is well known.
Some major items in the bill have not
been spoken about on the floor since Jan-
uary. Some of these amendments?I re-
spect -them all?go to the very vitals of
our national defense program and can-
not be discussed briefly. They go into
fundamental policies over a period of
years.
All members of the committee are
willing to agree as early as we can to
some reasonable limitation of time with
reference to the disposition of these
amendments. But at this time we could
not make agreements on all of them. As
soon as we can, we will make an agree-
ment on all those that have been filed,
when we know what they contain.
There will be considerable debate on
these matters, and it is highly important
that all Senators be present. We are pre-
pared, and .I am sure the proponents are,
as are many members of the committee,
to discuss the subject matter.
Mr. President, I certainly hope that we
will work out a plan to pass this bill be-
fore the August recess. Many things de-
pend upon the final version of this au-
thorization bill. It is a detriment to the
Defense Department and to Secretary
Laird to string the matter out so long
into the calendar year. Of course, the
appropriations cannot move on these
matters.
I hope, and I believe, we will have the
cooperation of all to drive through and
finish this bill before the August recess.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I
should like to back up what the distin-
guished chairman has said and to appeal,
once again, for a Saturday session.
Seven amendments aimed at major
portions of this bill already have been
announced. All of them involve two or
three times the amount of money about
which we have debated 5 weeks. It will
take time on the floor to answer the
questions that will arise about the detail
in highly technical military equipment.
Frankly, I do not see a chance of com-
pleting action on this bill by next
Wednesday, when we are supposed to
start a vacation, unless we do work on
next Saturday.
I like Saturdays off as well as any-
one else. It gives me a chance to get
home. But I think that disposing of this
bill by the time we take a recess is more
important than a day off on Saturday.
Some of these items, such as AMSA,
are expensive and will require a great
deal of explanation. When we get into
the matter of the tank, that will take a
great deal of explanation. Also to be
contested is the F-14 of the Navy, a very
expensive two-place interceptor, which
will take a great deal of explanation be-
fore we hope we can convince Members
of the Senate that it is worthwhile. We
have the whole field of academic spend-
ing on research and development, in
which the Senator from Arkansas (Mr.
FULBRIGHT) and I are in complete agree-
ment. It involves a vast amount of money,
a field in which we can save hundreds of
millions of dollars, but it cannot be done
overnight nor in a half-hour's time.
With all due respect to what some of
the Members may have to do on Satur-
day, I think we could better spend the
time here, so that we make sure we will
get the recess about which we have
spoken.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I
agree with the Senator from Mississippi
and the Senator from Arizona that this
bill will take a long, long time. The Sen-
ator from Arizona has just given us some
of the reasons, and there are many other
reasons that will delay us.
I think we all agree that this bill de-
serves debate and should get debate in
detail. I cannot see any possibility of our
finishing by Wednesday. Perhaps there
is, but I cannot see it, even if we come
In Saturday and Sunday, because we have
so much to discuss. The C-5A has not
been mentioned, nor has the aircraft
carrier. All these things are extraordi-
narily complicated and require real dis-
cussion and debate. Many questions will
require detailed answers. Some of them
have not been answered satisfactorily in
the hearings.
Under these circumstances, Mr. Presi-
dent, although I would agree with the
Senator from Mississippi that it is im-
portant that we get the bill through as
quickly as possible, we have a responsi-
bility to discuss the bill in detail. This is
only a 5-page bill covering $20
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?Au g u4t 7, 1969CONG1,ESSIONAL RECORD? AR S9343
Many of these matters cover complex out on numerous occasions the fact that to say that that is a matter covered by
matters which are not clear in the bill, we have 15 and no other country has the amendment not in the bill. There
We would not really know what is in the them. And he raised a fundamental have been no hearings on it. There has
bill if we were to discuss it for 3 or 4 question of policy as to whether there been some discussion by the committee.
days. Although none of us would like it, should be one. This is so important that For that reason, I could not agree now.
I feel strongly we will have to be working it should not be voted upon under a Mr. MANSFIELD. That is all right.
on this bill in September. time limitation of 1 hour or whatever Mr. President, I would appreciate it
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, let me it is. We should have an opportunity to if the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. NEL-
say first of all, out of experience?and understand this matter, because ? it soli) , the Senator from Texas (Mr. YAR-
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the majority leader has had the same ex- amounts to so much n
moey.
CIA-RDP7 WR000300100001-3
BOROUGH), the Senator from Indiana
perience?keeping Members in the I think the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. HARTKE), and the Senator from
Chamber on Saturdays invites many is probably correct, although I rather Rhode Island (Mr. PELL) would meet
quorum calls, including live quorum welcome the idea of running late tonight with the distinguished chairman of the
calls, and there is a lot of time lost. I and tomorrow night, as long as we give Subcommittee on Scientific Research
would much rather respectfully suggest Senators notice. We object to coming up (Mr. MCINTYRE), and if possible, the
to the distinguished majority leader that to 6 o'clock in the evening and then be- manager of the bill, to discuss a number
we run late tonight and tomorrow night, ing told. I welcome the idea of running of amendments covering the same sub-
because we will do better that way than late. ject to see if some sort of agreement
if we were to come in on Saturday. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the could not be reached as to what could
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ap- Senator yield? or could not be done with respect to con-
preciate what the distinguished minority ---- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is' there solidation or coordination. If we could
leader said. I believe the distinguished objection to the unanimous-consent re- meet in the rear of the Chamber so that
Senator from Illinois has the answer to quest? we might discuss the matter, I would
the question as to a Saturday session. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I appreciate it.
Solt is with reluctance that I emphasize withdraw the request. AMENDMENT NO 85
there will be no Saturday seSsion. This The PRESIDING OFFICER. The The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair
is t my personal wish but we will be in unanimous-consent request is with- recognizes the Senator from .Pennsyl-
late tonight and we will be in late tomor-
row. I hope it will be possible to get a
continued degree of cooperation among
Senators as amendments are called up.
I understand the Senator from Penn-
sylvania (Mr. SCHWEIKER) is quite recep-
tive to the possibility of a time limita-
tion which would be in the best interests
of all concerned. The Senator from
Pennsylvania will shortly offer an
amendment, and I would like to ask, with
his approval?that there be a time limi-
tation of 1 hour on the amendment of
the distinguished Senator from Penn-
sylvania, the time to be equally dividerl
between the author/ of the amendment
(Mr. SCHWEIKER) and the manager of
the bill, the Senator from Mississippi
(Mr. STENNIS).
Mr. CASE. Mr. President, reserving the
right to object, I wish to ask the majority
leader if we could have a gentlemen's
agreement that as far as a time limita-
tion on other amendments is concerned,
there would not be a request made, at
least without some notice, except on the
basis of successive amendments, and an
agreement relating an individual amend-
ment.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, of course; Itijeinse
thought it was perfectly proper to ask at standing with the Senator from New
, contract as to--
this time, because of the attendance. Hampshire who dealt with this in great "(1) the estimates at the time the con-
Mr. CASE. Yes. detail in the hearings. It might be we tract was entered into of the contractor and
Mr. MANSFIELD. The amendment re- could get together. It might be it would the procuring agency as to the cost of the
quires a new Department of Defense re- not take a long debate; otherwise, it contract, with separate estimates for (a) re-
search, development, testing, and engineer-
porting system for major contractors would take a long debate.
to ing, and for (b) production;
and increases GAO responsibility as the Mr. President, that is all I have to say "(2) the contractor's and agency's sub-
watchdog. at this time. sequent estimates of cost for completion of
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, re- Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I the contract up to the time of the review;
serving the right to object?and I shall have withdrawn the unanimous-consent "(3) the reasons for any significant rise or
'
not object?first, I agree with what the request. decline from prior cost estimates;
majority leader said about running late The PRESIDING OFFICER. The "(4) the options available for additional
at night. This has proved to be very unanimous-consent request has been exercise such options, and the expected cost
procurement, whether the agency intends to
effective in the past. I also wish to agree withdrawn, of exercising such options;
with the Senator from Wisconsin. If I Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I "(5) the estimates of the contractor and
understand some of the major items the do not know when it will be offered again the procuring agency, at the time the con-
Senator froth. Mississippi is talking about, or whether it will be offered again. It tract was entered into, of the time for com-
I do not think we would be warranted was made in an attempt to expedite con- pletfm of the contract, any subsequent es-
to pass on items without understanding sideration of the proposed legislation. timates of both as to the time for comple-
tion, and the reasons for any significant
them. I thought that was the desire of the
increases therein;
The Senator from Missouri is not here chairman of the Committee on Armed "(6) the estimates of the contractor and
at this moment, but he had much to Services, procuring agency as to performance cepa-
say about an aircraft carrier. He pointed Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I wish billties of the subject matter of the contract,
drawn. vania.
Mr. MANSFIELD. There will be no The amendment offered by the Senator
time limitation. from Pennsylvania will be stated.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, with re- The assistant legislative clerk pro-
spect to the amendment which is coming ceeded to read the amendment.
up, I do not think it will take long for Mr. SCHWEIKER. Mr. President, I ask
debate. That amendment came up in unanimous consent that further reading
committee and was explained by the au- of the amendment be dispensed with.
thor. Then, he did not ask for a vote on The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
the amendment. I have not really gotten objection, it is so ordered, and the
into it much since then. So I would have amendment will be printed in the
to get some material here and look into RECORD.
it. Then, I would be amenable to a limita- The amendment, ordered to be printed
tion. in the RECORD, is as follows:
Mr. President, I wish to make a fur- At the end of the bill, insert the follow-
ther observation. I want the bill to move ing new title:
along and I will make any reasonable "TITLE V?QUARTERLY CONTRACT
agreement as far as the time is con- REPORTING AND GAO AUDITS
cerned. However, on these far-reaching "SEC. 501. (a) The Secretary ,of Defense,
policy matters that are complicated, it in cooperation with the Comptroller General,
would be unreasonable to go into a time shall develop a reporting system for major
limitation. For instance, I refer to the contracts entered into by the Department of
matter mentioned by the Senator from Defense, any department or agency thereof,
Arknasas. Then, there is the matter or any armed service of the United States, for
dealing with biological warfare. We must the development or procurement of any
get into that. weapons system or other need of the United
States.
I would like to suggest informally "(b) The Secretary of Defense shall cause
that those who have amendments on a review to be made of each major contract
biological and chemical warfare get to as specified in subsection (a) during each
gether and agree on something among period of three calendar months and shall
1 and then have an under- make a finding with respect to each such
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 7,1969,
and the reasons for any significant actual or Mr. SCHWEIKER. Mr. President, I ask vision lights in publicized hearings, when no
estimated shortcomings therein compared to for the yeas and nays on the amend- amount of talk could return the waste of
the performance capabilities called for under
ment. money.
the original contract or ?subsequent esti-
mates; and The yeas and nays were ordered. The purpoee of this amendment is to
(7) such other information as the secre-
Mr. SCHWEIKER, Mr. President, I ask attempt to avoid such situations. It will
"
tary of Defense shall determine to be pert- unanimous consent that the names of put into statutory reform a requirement
nent in the evaluation of