PRESS AND CONGRESSIONAL RECORD RE: DEPLOYMENT OF ANTI-BALLISTIC-MISSILE SYSTEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00364R000300090003-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 17, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 4, 1969
• Content Type: OPEN

S 13642
By emphasizing flexibility and realism to knows full well that the only lasting settle-
serve our interests, a new policy of "Selective ment must be one to which Israel and the
Responsibility" will improve our ability to Arab states freely subscribe.
act in this complicated, multi-polar world. "The Arabs, the Russians and the French
Regarding Soviet-American relations, this have been talking about a political solution.
new approach will enable us better to die- We are not deceived by nice words. What
tinguish areas of convergence and divergence they mean by that is a Big Power settlement
of interests, to be imposed on. the Arabs and Israelis
In dealing with the Soviet Union, we have which will fall far short of a genuine peace
oscillated between attitudes of undue trust- and which, indeed, will be prejudicial to
fulness and of total suspicion. During periods peace and, perhaps, conducive to the resump-
of "thaw," we foster the illusion that the tion of war in the near future.
Soviet Union will act "reasonably" on all "The Russians and the Arabs have been
issues; during periods of "freeze" we harbor waging a war of nerves to achieve this ob-
the opposite fantasy. jective. It is argued that we may be on the
The truth is that there will be areas where verge of a Great Power confrontation?that
we can cooperate with the USSR. The Nu- we may be slipping into a Third World War.
clear Non-Proliferation Treaty is an obvi- It is argued that we cannot ask the Arabs
ous case in point. But there will equally be to make peace with Israel, that they are too
areas where we must firmly oppose the Soviet proud and we should not humiliate them. It
Union?as in the Mediterranean. We cannot is argued that Israel has been stubborn by
afford a policy which ignores these distinc- insisting on a negotiated peace.
tions."I suggest that we should not be swayed or
Congress?especially the Senate?has an stampeded by any kind of false hysteria
important role to play in implementing this which may intimidate American opinion. I
new policy of Selective Responsibility. It can suggest that we look at the Middle East
do so by conducting a continuing review of with calm and with reason. Let us reject
our foreign policy to see if it reflects the real the efforts of the Russians and the French
interests of America. to write U.S. policy. We are living in the
Congress can perform a particularly valu- 20th century. We cannot agree to a return
able function in helping to assure that our to 19th century imperialism which permitted
foreign policy is consistent with domestic Great Powers to impose their will on other
opinion and domestic social needs. peoples. Neither the French nor the Russians
Through their broad contacts with their have any right to dictate the future course
constituents, members of Congress can help of Middle East relationships. Surely, the
gauge the impact of our foreign policy at Arabs have memories of their past experience
home. This function is vital to assure with French rule when France had mandates
that we no longer attempt ambitious foreign in the area. And surely the Arabs must be
commitments?especially military commit- aware of the Soviet Union's record in
ments?which lack the support of a consen- Czechoslovakia.
sus in America. "Let us not be deceived by propaganda
But to perform this function, Congress fakery which would lead us to believe that
must be informed. One minimum measure is the Arabs states mean peace when they talk
that the President should undertake fully to of political solution. Bear in mind that Syria,
Inform Congress in advance of any new coin- Iraq and the Arab terrorists have all rejected
mitment of American troops abroad, unless the November 22 UN resolution and the Jar-
a clear emergency prevents him from doing
so. If possible, he should request a joint res-
olution of Congress for this purpose.
No one approach to foreign affairs can be
guaranteed to work. Too much depends upon
the incalculable factors of good or bad luck;
the skill and judgment of our leaders; the
rationality and predictableness of those Who
oppose us. Nevertheless, I am hopeful that
the approach I have outlined will be of some
assistance in charting constructive new di-
rections in America's foreign policy.
-rr.171061499/2ttary 4,, 1969
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9NOTtiatlEpf__'7ggia364
DEPLOYMENT OF ANTI-BALLISTIC-
MISSILE SYSTEM
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, a group
of Senatoers had planned to discuss to-
day the implications of deployment of
the anti-ballistic-missile system. There
has been a long debate over the recom-
mendation to increase salaries. It is very
late in the evening. At least 14 Senators
indicated a desire to speak and enter into
a discussion of the problems the system
will cause for our country and give their
reasons for desiring a reversal of the
decision made last year to support its
deployment.
I am very ?ad that the Senator from
Michigan (Mr. HART) is not here, because
he was a principal figure in last year's
effort to strike funds for the deployment
of the system. He is away, but he will re-
turn and he will take an active part in
the movement this year to halt this dan-
gerous and costly system.
My statement is brief. I know some of
my colleagues have engagements, and if
they want me to yield to them during my
statement, I shall be glad to do so. I am
glad to see here also the distinguished
chairman of the Armed Services Com-
mittee (Mr. STENNIS) , and- I shall be
happy to have his comment.
Mr. President, during the last session
of the Congress, the Senate debated and
voted upon one of the most important
issues that face this country?the de-
ployment of the Sentinel anti-ballistic-
missile system. Its awesome strategic and
policy implications, its great cost, the
questions that many outstanding scien-
ring mission which it created. tists and technicians have raised about
"A picture is worth many columns of its feasibility, and, above all, the concern
that it will not provide security to our
newsprint and that front-page picture show-
ing the lynchings in Baghdad last week con- country, but will only launch another
veys a graphic message. The brutal and bar- nuclear arms race of vast proportions,
barons hangings in Iraq have again exposed challenge the initial decision made in the
the virulent hostility of Arab terrorism which last Congress to deploy the system.
prevails in Syria and Iraq and among the Last year the Congress authorized and
Arab terrorists. appropriated over $1 billion for the initial
"As of this moment, I have not heard of deployment of a so-called "thin" system:
any Soviet condemnation of the brutal ex-
ecution of Jews in Iraq. If the Soviet Union a total of $700.3 million was appropriated
were honestly committed to a real settle- in the military procurement bill; $227.3
ment in the Middle East, it would long ago million in the military construction bill;
have joinedevith other nations in censuring and the Atomic Energy Commission bill
terrorism in the Middle East and in sum- included $324.5 million for Sentinel corn-
moning the Arab states to a recognition of ponents. In previous years, something on
their obligation to live at peace with their the order of $3 billion have been appro-
neighbors. priated for research.
"A real Arab-Israel peace must be a major
tiated by Israel, Arabs." objective of American policy. This means that Prior to Secretary McNamara's speech
There being no objection, the speech Arabs and Israelis must reach agreement on in San Francisco in September 1967, de-
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, future boundaries. There is nothing sacred ployment had not been recommended by
as follows:- or eternal about the present temporary armi- the executive branch. But on January 22,
SENATOR SCOTT SAYS MIDEAST PEACE MUST BE
stice or cease-fire lines. The boundaries of 1967, the administration of President
the future must be based on realistic agree-
NEGOTIATED BY ISRAEL, ARABS Johnson, speaking through the posture
PHILADELPHIA
, PA.?U.S. Senator Hugh Scott derstandn ing and negotiations will become statement of former Secretary of De-
ments, ad.such boundaries reached by un- s
fense Robert McNamara, recommended
(R.-Pa.) said last night that "President Nixon bridges and not walls.
has taken the initiative to encourage a
fairly-negotiated Arab-Israel peace settle- "The UN has a role to play in this, but its approval of the so-called "thin" system,
major function must be to encourage Arabs designed to defend against the suggested
ment." and Israelis to meet together. The UN will nuclear threat of Communist China.
Speaking before the Cardozo Lodge at the
MIDEAST PEACE
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in
the RECORD a speech by Senator SCOTT
entitled "Mideast Peace Must Be Nego-
not serve the best interests of peace if it con- Senator RICHARD RUSSELL, then chair-
Marriott Motor Inn, where he received the
tinues to keep the parties apart and if it man of the Senate Armed Services Corn-
Scott said: mittee, said during the debate that he
Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo Award, Senator
seeks to restore demarcation lines and ma-
"President Nixon has taken the initiative considered its true purpose to be a
chinery which proved feeble and futile when
to encourage a fairly-negotiated Arab-Israel "building block" in the construction of
they were tested by renewed aggression in
"The announcement that there will be an "The Great Powers have a role to play. It - - - - nuclear t-
peace settlement. 1967. a "heavy" system against n a
effort to bring the parties together should is to encourage all the peoples in the Middle tack by the Soviet Union. No one can
not be interpreted as an effort to impose a East to join together in mutual respect, in estimate its cost accurately?$5.5 billion
settlement on the contending parties in the cooperation and in the preservation of peace. for the "thin" system and $40 billion for
Middle East. "I am pleased that President Nixon has the "heavy" system is one estimate pro-
"I am confident that President Nixon taken the first step in that direction." - vided by the Department of Defense,
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AL 'RECORD ? SENATE S I-361
ment of Agriculture has been used by Editors on February 3, 1969, be printed
the Florida tomato growers to play a cruel in the RECORD.
trick on one of their most perishable in-
dustries. They state flatly that Florida
growers are attempting to force the
American consumer to eat large and
highly priced tomatoes. They also make
a considerable point of the fact that most
Mexican growers spend about half of
their cost of growing tomatoes in the
United States on items such as ma-
chinery, seed and other equipment.
Mr. President, when this entbargo was
first levied by Mr. Freeman, I telegraphed
him urging that his order be suspended
pending more hearings and further con-
sideration. He replied that lie had no
choice; that his action was mandatory
under a 1937 law which was invoked on
behalf of the Florida tomato growers. I
wish to point out that there is consider-
able doubt about whether this law makes
the restrictive actions of the Secretary of
Agriculture mandatory or discretionary.
I submit that if it is mandatory and if it
can be invoked by a group of domestic
growers in a fashion that proves detri-
mental to domestic economic interests of
another section, then that law should be
changed. But I firmly believe that
thorough investigation will show that
this is a statute which permits the em-
bargoing of a foreign product rather
than requiring it.
Albert Conrad, secretary-manager of
the West Mexico Vegetable Distributors
Association with headquarters in Nogales,
claims the embargo was imposed as a
purely protective measure to insure a
larger Florida tomato crop. Says Mr.
Conrad:
The ultimate victim in all of this will be
the American consumer who will have to pay
higher prices because of the lack of Mexican
competition. The Florida growers cannot
possibly fill the gap in the market oaused
by this embargo. Mexico usually supplies
about 50% of the U.S. winter tomato con-
sumption.
Mr. President, this is an extremely in-
volved question. I have been told that
the late Judge Learned Hand is com-
menting on the 1937 law Involved in
this case once described it as a "veritable
verbal thicket of monstrous proportions."
For this reason it is impossible for me
here today to go into each and every facet
of this problem. However, I claim that its
very complexity argues against the kind
of sudden action that was engaged in by
Mr. Freeman.
In all events, I am informed that the
new Agriculture Secretary, Mr. Clifford
M. Hardin, is paying close attention to
the developments in the tomato contro-
versy along the American-Mexican bor-
der. I sincerely hope that the-wisdom of
rescinding this embargo will soon be-
come apparent to him and that the Nixon
administration will quickly issue the
necessary order to right a grave wrong.
"U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: 'SELECTIVE
RESPONSIBILITY' "?SPEECH BY
SENATOR GOODELL
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that a thoughtful ad-
dress by my colleague, Senator GOODELL,
entitled "U.S. oreign Policy: 'Selective
Responsibility,' " delivered before the
New York State Society of tieWSpaper
There being no objection, the speech
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD
as follows:
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: "SELECTIVE
RESPONSIMLITY"
For the 'United States, this is a time of both
charisma in space and catharsis on earth. I
Apollo is " our charisma, Vietnam is our ca-
tharsis. -And we agonize in earnest efforts to
find better ways here on earth, both nation-
ally and internationally.
The New Year has opened auspiciously
with the agreement in Paris to proceed with
substantive talks on Vietnam. This is the
most hopeful sign yet that we may be on the
road to resolving the tragic Vietnam conflict,
which has divided our people and diverted
Our resources for so long. The negotiations
will be long, difficult and tortuous. But with
skill, good fortune, and some reasonableness
on all sides, I am hopeful that the Nixon Ad-
ministration will be able to achieve an hon-
orable settlement of the war.
In foreign policy, we know that Vietnam
has narrowed our vision. And we sense the
one tree butthat v
not etthneamd
forestonae
perspective o
iisWhileo ur vision,
it-As also true that it has led to an outlook
? ting that there be no more Vietnams.
Ah,stake, now, is not the past, but the fu-
ture. hat principle should guide our inter-
nation commitments, our involvement, its
degree a kind? What principle can serve
at once the terest of Our country and that
of humanity in the common cause of in-
ternational pea with justice?
"Containment" as been used to justify
our country's invol ment in Vietnam. This
principle, first anno ced in 1947, has led
the United States to id logical commitments
around the world.
During the years of th Cold War, there
developed a broad consen s in support of
"containment" and against n international
communist movement which was viewed as
monolithic. This consensus 1 the United
States to establish a network military al-
liances from Europe to Asia. d it led to
U.S. anti-communist interventi n in coun-
tries throughout the world.
While "containment" has appl?ed to for-
eign policy needs of the past, wepaave now
employed it to such an extent, thktt we are,
in the eyes of the world, fully comfnitted.
Committed to what? we are asked. To
peace, when there is war? To stability when
there is instability? To security, when there
is insecurity?
"Containment" does not seem to give us
answers. In addition, there is Vietnam,
whioh has eroded the "containment con-
sensus" of the past,
We have learned that our resources can-
not be used with equal effectiveness every-
where in the world. We have learned?the
hard way?that we cannot be the world's
policeman.
Since "containment" can no longer guide
us, we must develop a new approach to for-
eign affairs.
The new approach I am suggesting today
Is "Selective Responsibility." It would use a
much greater selectivity in the involvement
of ou
an intelligent Middle course between a rigid
"containment" policy and an obviously un-
acceptable return to isolationism.
Isolation could only close our opportuni-
ties in the world to the reciprocal benefits
made possible by the exchanges among peo-
ple of Ideas and economic benefits.
A principle of "Selective Responsibility"
requires us to 'bear the following points in
f mind when we decide whether and to what
extent we commit our economic or military
resources in any part of the world.
1. We must look at our interests through-
out the globe in real terms, and not in ro-
mantic or ideotwica/ terms. In deciding how
we should respond to a crisis abroad, we must
focus on the actual economic, strategic or
other benefits we could obtain by our actions.
The world is far too complicated to permit us
to be obsessed With our prestlie, we must be
concerned mainly with our real interests.
2. We must stop thinking of foreign policy
as something quite separate from domestic
Issues. Every major commitment abroad af-
fects our domestic scene, and affects our
ability to deal with the great social problems
within our borders.
In deciding how much resources to com-
mit to a crisis abroad, it is essential to
assess how such a commitment would af-
fect opinion at home, and how it would
affect the great domestic programs for im-
proving our cities and meeting the needs
of our poor.
We failed to judge the domestic impact of
our Vietnam policy?upon the consciences
of millions of Americans, upon the families
Whose sons were dying, upon the youth in
our colleges, and upon our social programs.
These failures, among others, have made the
war so deeply divisive for our nation.
Our overall military spending must be con-
sidered in the context of domestic needs.
There must be a reassessment of defense
policy with serious examination of what has
been called the "military spending sponge."
It is presently estimated that expenditures
for Vietnam will decline by $3.5 billion due to
the bombing halt, but non-Vietnam defense
spending will rise by $5 billion. These fig-
ures are a startling blow to those of us who
would like to see savings from Vietnam trans-
ferred to pressing needs at home, not auto-
matically siphoned off for more military
hardware.
3. We must make a realistic assessment of
how receptive the people of any foreign na-
tion are to our assistance, before embarking
on a commitment of our economic or military
resources there. Where the local population
welcomes our presence, we can accomplish
a great deal of good with a relatively small
investment. Where the local population repu-
diates us, even a very large investment tends
to be wasted.
4. We cannot and will not attempt to do
the things which the other nations of the
world can do for themselves either individ-
ually or by indigenous regional arrangements.
Countries, using their own resources, must
help themselves through involvement of their
own people in effective community action
programs.
5. Finally, and most important we must
avoid open-ended commitments. If we are
deciding whether to involve our men, our
arms, or our money in a foreign crisis, we
must have some clear idea--even though we
do not choose to announce it?of the maxi-
mum we are willing to commit. And we must
have adequate contingency plans which pre-
pare us for the eventuality that our proposed
course of action fails to work as intend-ed.
In particular, we must recognize that any
decision to commit American troops to a
foreign conflict tends to become "irreversi-
ble. If the troops we send do not achieve
their immediate military objective, we be-
come subject to great pressures to add more
troops?i.e. to escalate the conflict. This is
what happened in Vietnam.
.It would avoid the
automatic and rigid responses that too often
have marred our past policies. It would rec-
ognize that the world is no longer simply
bi-polar, but has added dimensions of a po-
litical multi-polar world. It would accept
the fact that threats to our security and in-
terests can come from a variety of sources,
not just the Soviet Union.
"Selective responsibility" would give full
recognition to America's vital role in pro-
moting peace and justice abroad. But it ac-
cepts the fact that we cannot?and should
not?attempt to preserve the status quo in
every nation throughout the globe faced
with internal revolution.
In short, such a new approach should steer
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February 4, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL !Mint
while others believe the cost could total
$70 billion or more.
On three occasions during the last
session, the senior Senator from Michi-
gan, PHILIP A. HART, and I, joined by
other Members of the Senate, including
Senator SYMINGTON, of Missouri, intro-
duced amendments to strike from vari-
ous bills the authorization, or appropria-
tions for deployment of the system. Our
amendments did not eliminate or reduce
funds for research and development.
While the amendments were defeated by
votes of 28 to 31, 34 to 52 and 25 to 45,
respectively, the number of Senators vot-
ing favorably upon the amendments
totaled over 40. Other amendments to
strike all funds for the ABM system were
offered by Senator NELSON of Wisconsin,
Senator YOUNG of Ohio, and the former
Senator from Pennsylvania, Joseph
Clark.
Although the amendments were de-
feated, we were successful in bringing
this issue before the Senate for debate,
and to the attention of the people of the
United States. Further, it was developed
clearly in the closed-door session of the
Senate, held upon my motion, that the
Armed Services Committee had not
availed itself of the expert opinions of
scientists and authorities outside the
Government, at least in its hearings.
Distinguished scientists, such as the for-
mer presidential scientific advisers, Nobel
Prize winners in nuclear physics, and
distinguished authorities in international
affairs oppose deployment of Sentinel
ABM system. Many believe that the ABM
system is not yet technically advanced
for effective deployment; that deploy-
ment would only lead to the production
of new offensive weaponry of a more
dangerous nature, than now exists, and
to a new arms race.
Today, I shall not detail the argu-
ments made last year against the deploy-
ment of the Sentinel system. My purpose
today and that of my colleagues who so
vigorously opposed appropriations for
deployment is to give notice to the Sen-
ate and the country that we shall con-
tinue to contest and oppose the appro-
priation of funds for deployment. We
shall do our best to bring before the
Senate and the country the available
facts which question its feasibility and
effectiveness for security. We shall
present political and humane arguments
against its deployment. While I cannot
speak for the administration, I am con-
fident that President Nixon will, as he
reviews the defense policies which affect
security of our Nation; will review and
weigh carefully this most important
question. We are hopeful that full debate
in the Senate and the opinion of the
country will be of value to the President
in this most important decision.
The reasons which led Senator HART
and me to submit our amendments last
year, among others who submitted
amendments, and the support of so many
Members of the Senate, including Sena-
tor MANSFIELD, the majority leader, Sen-
ator SYMINGTON, the distinguished mem-
ber of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, Senator FULBRIGHT, chair-
man of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Senators AIKEN, JAMS, CASE,
PERCY, BROOKE, SCOTT, GEORGE MC-
GOVERN, EDWARD KENNEDY, and many
others; particularly Senators NELSON
and YOUNG, who introduced resolutions,
are still valid.
The Chinese have made little, if any,
progress toward the development of a
nuclear missile system and if it were used
it would as Senator RUSSELL said last
year in the debate bring upon Commu-
nist China its certain destruction.
The Soviet Union has not proceeded to
install a substantial and effective sys-
tem. The United States and the Soviet
Union continue to maintain the capabil-
ity of destroying each other, no matter
which country makes the first strike. If
one deploys an ABM system the other
will do so, and will develop concurrently
more effective and powerful offensive nu-
clear weapons, with such devices as
MIRV, increasing over and over the num-
ber of warheads that can be targeted
on their cities and peoples.
For myself, I cannot see that the in-
stallation of an ineffective system will
provide any strength for negotiations
with the Soviet Union on the reduction
of the arms race. The critical situation
in the Middle East, the tension in Europe
following the invasion of Czechoslovakia,
the war in Vietnam and other sources of
danger to the United States and to the
world call for a time of negotiations of
which the President has spoken. I argue
that these delicate balances?including
the nuclear deterrent?should not be up-
set by the commencement of another
kind of nuclear arms race. At least, we
should not take this step until President
Nixon and the new administration have
every opportunity to search out the So-
viet Union if there are ways to reduce,
rather than accelerate, the arms race
and to bring some hope of stability and
true security to this endangered world.
Mr. President, a number of articles dis-
cussing the ABM have appeared recently.
I ask unanimous consent that this article
be included in the RECORD at the conclu-
sion of my remarks.
There being no objections, the articles
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the New York Times, Feb. 2, 1969]
FOES OF ANTIMISSILE NET INCREASE IN SENATE
ATTACKS ON PENTAGON?KENNEDY JOINS
SENTINEL SYSTEM CRITICS AS OTHERS PLAN
INQUIRY INTO INFLUENCE OF THE MILITARY-
INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
(By John W. Finney)
WASHINGTON, February I.?The Defense
Department is being caught in a pincer move-
ment in the Senate. A bipartisan coalition
threatening to block the deployment of a
ballistic missile defense system and to in-
vestigate the influence of what former Presi-
dent Dwight D. Eisenhower called the "mili-
tary-industrial complex."
Not since World War H has the Pentagon
been so placed on the defensive on Capitol
Hill.
It now appears that close to a majority of
the Senate is opposed to the Sentinel anti-
ballistic missile system, a five-year nation-
wide project designed to provide a "thin"
shield against Chinese weapons by detecting
approaching missiles with radar and inter-
cepting them with nuclear-armed anti-
missile missiles. With the opposed to the
Sentinel antiorganized, it is likely that the
Senate will refuse later this year to vote fur-
ther funds for the $5-billion network.
S 1363
POLITICAL FOLLY SEEN
Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachu-
setts, the Senate Democratic whip, openly
joined the battle today with a letter to De-
fense Secretary Melvin R. Laird protesting
that it would be political "folly" and a serious
technical mistake for the United States to
commit billions of dollars to build a yet
unproved missile defense system.
In his first public statement on the issue,
Senator Kennedy proposed that the Admin-
istration impose a freeze on the construction
of sentinel sites while it conducts a National
Security Council review into the desirability
of deploying a missile defense system.
"Such a freeze," he said in a four-page let-
ter, "would make a definite contribution to
the cause of world peace, would reassure the
nation that our national defense programs
are sound and rational, and would heighten
the possibility that we will be able to deal
more effectively with our domestic needs."
Meanwhile, the Pentagon faces a broader
attack on another flank by the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, which provided
the hard core of resistance to the Sentinel
system.
With considerable secrecy so as not to
arouse the jurisdictional jealousies of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, the For-
eign Relations Committee is proposing to set
up a special subcommittee to investigate the
global and domestic activities of the Defense
Department.
FOREIGN POLICY IMPACT
Ostensibly the subcommittee would look
into the nation's global commitments and
their impact upon foreign policy. But this
mandate would be but a vehicle for investi-
gating the impact and influence of the mili-
tary establishment.
Thus the investigation would probably go
into such issues as the command and control
being exercised over military units, such as
the Pueblo intelligence ship, indoctrination
programs conducted by the Pentagon to edu-
cate the public on foreign policy issues, the
political use made of military aid programs
in underdeveloped countries, as in Latin
American, and Pentagon sponsorship of non-
military social science research.
The subcommittee probably would be
headed by Senator Stuart Symington, Demo-
crat of Missouri, a choice that illustrates the
changing attitude in the Senate -toward the
Defense Department.
By seniority rights, Senator Symington, a
former Secretary of the Air Force, should
take over the chairmanship of the Senate
Preparedness subcommittee, which is the
principal defender of military programs.
But Senator John Stennis of Mississippi,
chairman of the parent Armed Services Com-
mittee, will retain the helm over the influen-
tial subcommittee. So Senator Symington is
likely to become chairman of a rival subcom-
mittee that should develop into the principal
critic of the Pentagon.
That Senate attitudes toward the Pentagon
were changing became apparent last year
when Senator John Sherman Cooper, Repub-
lican of Kentucky, led what amounted to a
one-man battle against the Sentinel system.
While the battle is still being led by Senator
Cooper, the opposition this year is much bet-
ter organized and has recruited such young
activists as Senator Kennedy and Senator
Charles H. Percy, Republican of Illinois.
FUTILE ASSAULTS
In his letter, Senator Kennedy argued that
" technically there was "no conclusive evi-
dence" that the Sentinel system would work,
he said that from a political standpoint the
Sentinel system would "vitiate an unparal-
leled opportunity to lessen world tensions"
through an economic standpoint such a sys-
tem would be so costly as to cause "a dis-
tortion of Federal funding priorities."
Noting that there has been considerable
discussion of the "peace dividend" that would
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S 1364 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE February 4, 1969
be made available with the end of the Viet-
nam war, he said:
"It is my opinion that we would do more
to divide the country than unite it should
we apply this dividend, whatever it may be,
to deployment of an ABM system rather than
to our domestic housing, ernpleement, health,
education, conservation and other needs."
In a series of futile assaults last year on
the initial $647-million Installment for the
Sentinel, Senator Cooper surprised the mili-
tary establishment in the Senate by corral-
ing 42 Senators to his side.
This year the Defense Department is re-
questing $1.4-billion in deployment funds. As
the request has grown, so also in the opinion
of such Senators as Mike Marieiield of Mon-
tana, the majority leader, has the opposition
mounted to the Sentinel.
Opponents of the Sentinel con now count
on about 45 votes in the Senate, and with a
few switches and recruits among freshman
Senators they can command a majority.
Whether the opposition can win over the
crucial few votes depends in large measure
upon how emphatically the Nixon Adminis-
tration comes out in favor of the Sentinel.
During his confirmation hearings earlier
this month, Defense Secretary Melvin R.
Laird said he had "some questions whether
we should push forward simply with a sys-
tem that defends against the Chinese threat
only."
But then at a news conference this week,
Mr. Laird, echoing the arguments of his
predecessor, Clark M. Clifford, said the United
States should proceed with the Sentinel sys-
tem to strengthen its bargaining position in
any missile-control negotiations with the
Soviet Union.
THE LAIRD LOGIC
As far as the Sentinel opponeuts are con-
cerned, this Laird logic plays into their
hands, for it questions how the United States
can improve its bargaining posi lion against
the Soviet Union by building a system whose
effectiveness has not been estiblished and
which is designed against the Chinese, not
the Russians.
Even for defense against Chinese missiles,
the opposition has obtained intelligence, in-
formation challenging the value of the Sen-
tinel. Thus, in intelligence briefings, Senator
Cooper has obtained estimates that Com-
munist China would be capable of producing
In small quantity relatively sophisticated
nuclear warheads, which, with the assistance
of such penetration aids aal decoys, would
be capable of overcoming the Sentinel sys-
tem.
As a result of last year's battle, the oppo-
sition has already won one important con-
cession from the Senate military establish-
ment which should help it prepare a case
against the Sentinel.
Last year the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee held routine hearings on the Sentinel,
with only Pentagon officials izetifying. This
year, at the request of Senator Cooper, the
committee has agreed to hear independent
experts, giving the opposition the opportu-
nity to present, for example, the testimony
of former Presidential science edvisers who
have opposed deployment of an ABM system.
RESISTANCE eturentee
The opposition should also be aided by
another political ..factor, namely the local re-
sistance building up in some communities
that have been selected for Sentinel bases.
Until the Army started buying and clear-
ing Sentinel sites, the debate Was fought out
on largely abstract terms. But now the de-
bate is acquiring apolitical backlash as the
Senators hear from constituents opposed to
the location of a Sentinel base in their com-
munities.
Senator Percy, for example, II receiving 750
to 1,000 letters a week from censtituents op-
posed to a Sentinel site in tht Chicago area.
If Senator Percy is feeling ?such political
pressure, so presumably is Senator Everett
McKinley Dirksen of Illinois, who as Senate
Republican leader probably holds the key to
the outcome of the Senate debate on the
Sentinel system.
A question being asked in Senate circles
Is whether Senator Henry M. Jackson, Dem-
ocrat of Washington, who is up for re-elec-
tion in 1970, will be so ready to stand up
as the principal Senate champion of the
Sentinel system now that opposition is de-
veloping in Seattle to a proposed Sentinel
site outside the city.
[From the New York Times, Jan. 30, 1965]
EXPERT FINDS UNITED STATES AND SOVIET IN
ARMS SUFFICIENCY
(By Thomas P. Ronan)
Dr. George W. Rathjens, former director of
the Systems Evaluation Division of the Insti-
tute for Defense Analysis, asserted in a re-
port made public yesterday that the present
strategic balance between the United States
and the Soviet Union might be described
as one of sufficiency in strategic forces.
He said he used the term in the sense that
"each side can inflict unacceptable damage
on the other, regardless of the conditions
under which nucleear war might develop."
"Thus, further increases in strategic force
levels are not likely to offer either country
new political options," he added. "Yet on
both sides there have been vigorous research
and development programs that now make
probable the deployment of new strategic
systems."
FUTURE OF THE ARMS RACE
Dr. Rathjens, now visiting professor of po-
litical science at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, gave his views in "The Future
of the Strategic Arms Race: Options for the
1970's," a report prepared for the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace.
President Nixon, responding to a questioner
who used the word "sufficiency" at his news
conference Monday, said it applied to his
Administration's approach to military pre-
paredness.
He said his Administration's objective was
"to be sure the United States has sufficient
military power to defend our interests and
to maintain the commitments which this
Administration determines are in the inter-
ests of the United States around the world."
"I think sufficiency is a better term, ac-
tually, than either superiority or parity,"
Mr. Nixon added.
Dr. Rathjens, who has also served as spe-
cial assistant to the director of the United
States Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, said United States strategic forces
had been built up rapidly during the early
nineteen-sixties but their level had been al-
most constant during the last two years.
He said that Soviet strategic forces had
recently been growing at a fast rate but that
according to most measures of strategic
strength, the United States continued to
have superiority.
"Despite some uncertainty about the ab-
solute levels of damage that each aide might
experience and about the recuperative ability
of such damaged societies, there seems little
reason to doubt that in a full-scale nuclear
exchange at this time, the United States and
the Soviet Union would suffer about equally
and grievously," Dr. Rathjens asserted.
"The foundations of society in each coun-
try would certainly be destroyed."
[From the Washington Post, Feb. 2, 19691
KENNEDY URGES FREEZE ON SITES roe ANTI-
MISS/LES
(By Morton Mintz)
Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) has
urged the Nixon Administration to freeze
construction of sites for the "thin" Sentinel
anti-ballistic missile system?the controver-
sial project proposed as a deterrent against
China.
The Assistant Senate Majority Leader said
that a freeze would "make definite contri-
bution to the cause of world peace," reassure
the Nation that its defense programs are
"sound and rational" and expand the possi-
bility of dealing "more effectively with our
domestic needs."
Kennedy's plea was voiced in a letter
mailed Friday to Defense Secretary Melvin
R. Laird, who has said the ABM system is
needed as a bargaining tool for possible dis-
armament talks with the Soviet Union.
In the meantime, Laird has ordered a re-
view of the system and of the decisions to
proceed with deployment. The review prb-
vides, Kennedy said, "yet another reason" for
freezing site construction.
Kennedy's letter holds to his previously
expressed position?against construction of
the ABM system but in favor of research and
development for it.
Last April 18, for example, Kennedy was
paired in support of an amendment of Sen.
John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) to delay de-
ployment of the Sentinel. The amendment
was defeated, 28 to 31. Last Oct. 2, Kennedy
was in the minority again when a similar
Cooper amendment was rejected, 25 to 45.
Kennedy's letter to Laird included thee?
arguments for a freeze on Sentinel site con-
struction:
Technical: There is "no conclusive evi-
dence" the system will work in combat condi-
tions:
Relations with the Russians: The choice
might be a freeze and "an unparalleled op-
portunity to leasenes world tensions," or the
possible "folly" of forcing the Soviets to con-
tinue with an ABM system of their own.
Site location: In IVIassachusetts and else-
where, populated areas will be exposed to ac-
cidental ABM explosions and made "a prime
target."
Cost: Although the Defense Department
has estimated a "thin" system will cost $5
billion, "all of us with experience in esti-
mates for military systems expect this . . .
figure to be low."
[From the Washington Post, Nov. 22, 1988]
FOES PICTURE ABM RISK TO DEFENDED CITY
(By George C. Wilson)
The specter of a defending missile blowing
up the city it is supposed to protect has been
raised by scientists and law-makers trying to
stop the construction of an American anti-
ballistic-missile system.
This new tack in the campaign against the
$5 billion Sentinel ABM (anti-ballistic-mis-
sile) program showed up in Chicago yesterday
and in the censored transcript of the secret
Senate debate on the issue.
Five nuclear physicists from the Argonne
National Laboratories southwest of Chicago
have formed the West Suburban Concerted
Scientists, committed to stop ABM construe-
tion in that city or its suburbs.
John Erskine, Argonne laboratory physicist,
contends that if the long-range Spartan mis-
sile should accidentally explode, its one-
megaton nuclear warhead would make "a
crater 400 feet deep and three-fourths of a
mile across."
The blast, he asserted, would send radio.,
active debris all around Chicago, killing "a,
large fraction of the population within 24
hours.
The Army is investigating five sites in the
Chicago area for an ABM base as part of the
"thin" missile defense President Johnson de-
cided to build for the United States. Congress
this year voted money for to start construe-,
tion of the system, defeating several amend-
ments to cut ABM funds out of military
Besides the accidental explosion argument,
Dr. David R. Inglis, senior physicist at Ar-
gonne and former chairman of the Federa-
tion of American Scientists, esaid the ABM
site in Chicago would make the city a mili-
tary target for Soviet ICBMs. He is another
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of the five physicists who have banded to-
gether in the stop the ABM effort.
Col. William Wray, chief of site operations
for the Army's Sentinel command, told a
briefing session in Chicago yesterday that
there was little if any danger of an accidental
explosion.
"Over the last 20 years of storage and han-
dling of nuclear weapons," Wray said, "we
have never had an accident."
Here in Washington, Sen. John Sherman
Cooper (R-Ky.) has posed the accidental ex-
plosion question to the Pentagon in these
words: "in view of public hesitation to accept
nuclear reactors in cities, what assurance can
be given that there is less hazard from acci-
dental detonation of ABMs stationed in or on
the edge of cities? In case of accident, how
does the damage in the two cities compare?"
Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) , another op-
ponent of the ABM, submitted that question
on behalf of Cooper during the secret Senate
debate Oct. 14. A sanitized transcript of that
debate was published in the Congressional
Record of Nov. 1.
Cooper hopes to pursue the danger of put-
ting nuclear-tipped defensive missiles in or
near cities in special Senate hearings early
next year.
Chairman Richard B. Russell (D-Cal.) of
the Senate Armed Services Committee, dur-
ing the secret debate, contradicted the John-
son Administration's insistence that the thin
ABM is to guard against an irrational attack
by the Chinese.
"I am frank to say I consider" the missile
defense now under construction "primarily
the beginning of a system to protect the
people of this country against a Soviet mis-
sile atomic attack."
Former Defense Secretary Robert S. Mc-
Namara, in announcing the go-ahead on Sen-
tinel Sept. 18, 1967, said it would be foolish
to go beyond' the "thin" anti-Chinese defense
by trying to protect the U.S. from Soviet
missiles.
But the opposition to the ABM decision
has insisted all along that Sentinel is just a
building block.
Russell argued the ABM was worth buying
for the lives it might save in a nuclear
war between the superpowers.
Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) , another
advocate of the ABM, said the defense now
under construction "will complicate any So-
viet attack on the United States and thereby
contribute to the deterrent."
Chairman J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) said
during the secret debate that Russell's com-
mittee only listened to Administration wit-
nesses on the ABM and did not call in scien-
tists who opposed building the system.
Russell retorted that none of the scientists
asked to testify before his Armed Services
Committee nor did any Senators request
them to appear.
[From the Washington Post. Jan. 26, 19691
WEAPONS SYSTEMS: A STORY OF FAILURE
(By Bernard D. Nossiter)
The complex electronic gadgetry at the
heart of new warplanes and missiles gener-
ally works only a fraction of the time that
its builders had promised.
The performance of the multi-billion-
dollar weapons systems started in the 1950s
was bad; those of the 1960s are worse.
The Pentagon appears to be giving the
highest profits to the poorer performers in
the aerospace industry.
These are the conclusions of an abstruse
41-page paper now circulating in Govern-
ment and academic circles. The document,
a copy of which has been made available to
The Washington Post, is believed to be the
first systematic effort to measure how well
or ill the Pentagon's expensive weapons
perform.
Its author is a key Government official
with access to secret_ data and responsibility
for examining the costs of the Pentagon's
complex ventures. He and his agency cannot
be identified here.
His paper, entitled "Improving the Acqui-
sition Process for High Risk Military Elec-
tronics Systems," aims at bringing down the
costs and bettering the dismal performance
of weapons. It does not discuss a question
that might occur to others: if these weapons
behave so badly, why is the money being
spent at all?
For security reasons, many of the planes
and missiles examined are not identified by
name.
The paper first examined 13 major air-
craft and missile programs, all with "sophis-
ticated" electronic systems, built for the Air
Force and the Navy beginning in 1955, at a
cost of $40 billion.
Of the 13, only four, costing $5 billion,
could be relied upon to perform at more than
75 per cent of their specifications. Five oth-
ers, costing $13 billion, were rated as "poor"
performers, breaking down 25 per cent more
often than promised or worse. Two more sys-
tems, costing $10 billion, were dropped with-
in three years because of "low reliability."
The last two, the B-70 bomber and the Sky-
bolt missile, worked so badly they were can-
celed outright after an outlay of $2 billion.
LOSES FURTHER LUSTER
The paper sums up: "Less than 40 per
cent of the effort produced systems with ac-
ceptable electronic performance?an unin-
spiring record that loses further luster when
cost overruns and schedule delays are also
evaluated."
The paper measures "reliability" in this
context: The electronic core of a modern
plane or missile consists essentially of three
devices. One is a computer that is supposed
to improve the navigation and automatically
control the fire of the vehicle's weapons and
explosives. Another is a radar that spots
enemy planes and tarkets. The third is a
gyroscope that keeps the plane or missile on
a steady course.
When the Pentagon buys a new gadget, its
contract with the aerospace company calls
for a specified "mean time between failure of
the electronic system." In lay language, this
is the average number of continuous hours
that the systems will work.
In a hypothetical contract for a new jet
bomber, Universal Avionics will sell the Air
Force on its new de-* * * * * by promising
that the three crucial electronic elements
will operate continuously for at least 50
hours without a breakdown. In the reliability
measures used in the paper described here,
the plane is said to meet 100 per cent of the
performance standards, if, in, fact, its
gadgetry did run 50 consecutive hours. How-
ever, if a key element breaks down every
twelve and a half hours, it gets a rating of
25 per cent; every 25 hours, 50 per cent and
so on. Should a system operate with a break-
down interval of 62.5 hours?a phenomenon
that happens rarely?its reliability is rated
at 125 per cent.
TEST FOR THE PILOT
Quite obviously, the more frequent the
breakdown, the more the pilot of a plane has
to rely on his wit and imagination, to navi-
gate, find targets and fly a steady course.
Over-frequent breakdowns in a missile can
render it worthless as an instrument of de-
struction.
Curiously enough, as the paper demon-
strates the Pentagon and the aerospace in-
dustry apparently learned little * * * sys-
tems of the 1960s are even worse.
The document first looks at the perform-
ance record of the electronic systems in 12
important programs begun in the 1950s. As
the accompanying chart shows, all but four
missiles can be identified by name without
breaching security.
Of the 12, only five perform up to standard
or better; one breaks down 25 per cent more
frequently than promised; four fail twice as
000300090003-3
S 1365
often and two break down four times as fre-
quently as the specifications allow.
The document discusses some of the good
and bad performers in this group. It observes
that the F-102, the Delta wing interceptor
for the Air Defense Command, was bedev-
iled by an unsatisfactory fire control system.
Its first had to be replaced; the next was
also unsatisfactory, and an extensive, two-
year program to modify the device was then
undertaken.
SIDEWINDER DID WELL
In contrast, the Sidewinder, a heat sens-
ing missile, performed very well. The study
attributes this to the fact that the missile
was developed in a leisurely fashion, without
a "crash" schedule, and that several con-
tractors were brought in to compete for key
components.
The paper next examines eleven principal
systems of the 19605. These cannot be iden-
tified beyond a letter designation.
Thus, in the chart, Al is the first version
of a plane or missile; A2 is the second ver-
sion, possibly one for a sister service; AS
is the third version and so on, B1 is the
first version of an entirely different system;
so are Cl, D1 and El.
To make the best possible case for the
Pentagon and its contractors, this survey
does not include two systems costing $2 bil-
lion that performed so badly they were killed
off. The eleven systems of the 1960s evalu-
ated here account for more than half of
those begun in the most recent decade and
their electronic hearts cost well in excess of
$100 million each.
Of the eleven systems, only two perform to
standard. One breaks down 25 per cent more
rapidly than promised; two break down twice
as fast and six, four times as fast.
As a group, the eleven average a break-
down more than twice as fast as the speci-
fications demand. Oddly enough, the first
version of the system designated as "A" met
the standard. But the same unidentified
contractor produced three succeeding ver-
sions that ? fail on the average more than
three times as often as they should. All these
successors, the papers observes, were ordered
on a "pressure cooker" basis, on crash
schedules.
HIGHEST REWARDS
The paper also examines the relationship
between contractors' profits and perform-
ance, and suggests that, contrary to what
might be expected, some of the most ineffi-
cient firms doing business with the Pentagon
earn the highest rewards.
The second chart looks at profits, after-tax
returns as a percentage of investment, the
only valid basis for determining profitability,
for the ten years from 1957 through 1966.
During the decade, the aerospace firms man-
aged' to earn consistently more than Ameri-
can industry as a whole, piling up nine
dollars (or billions of dollars) in profits for
every eight garnered by companies not doing
business with the Pentagon.
Even more peculiar is the brilliant earnings
record of two of the biggest contractors,
North American and General Dynamics.
Both, except for a brief period when General
Dynamics tried its hand at some civilian
business, made profits far above the indus-
trial average and generally in excess of their
colleagues in aerospace.
During the ten years, North American did
all but two per cent of its business with the
Government. The study reports that it pro-
duced one highly successful plane in the
mid-50S, another system that met perform-
ance specifications, one that was canceled
and four that broke down four times as fre-
quently as promised. Nevertheless, the com-
pany's profits were 40 per cent above those of
the aerospace industry and 50 per cent above
the average for all industries.
NONE MEASURES UP
General Dynamics had, as the chart shows,
a much more uneven profits record. But its
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years of disaster and even loSses were those [From the Detroit News, Feb. 1, 19691
When it ventured into the economically colder
climate of the civilian world to produce a
commercial Jet airliner. Having learned its
lesson, it retreated to the warmer regions of
defense procurement and, in recent years, has
netted more than the industry average. It has
compiled this happy earnings snore, the study
observes, despite the fact that none of the
seven weapons systems it built for the Penta-
gon "measured up to expectations." Its most
notorious failure is the F-111 swing-wing
fighter-bomber.
As a final touch, the study rietcs that com-
plex electronic systems typically cost 200 to
300 per cent more than the Pentagon expects
and generally are turned out two years later
than promised. But both of these phenomena
have been examined so frequently by spe-
cialists in the field that the paper does not
dwell on them.
HOW MUCH PROTECTION
These findings raise some serious questions.
Perhaps the most important is how much
protection the United States is getting for the
tens of billions of dollars invested in expen-
sive weaponry. Another is whether the whole
process should be turned off and improve-
ments made in the existing devices. Secre-
taries of Defense have repeatedly assured the
Nation that present weaponry guarantees the
destruction of any Nation that attacks the
United States.
The document under study here, however,
takes a different line, one aimed at getting
less costly weapons that measure up to the
promised performance.
It blames the dismal record on several fac-
tors. One is the relentless search for newer
and more complicated electronic "systems."
The aerospace contractor has an obvious
vested interest in promoting "breakthrough"
gadgetry. This is the way he gets new, and
clearly profitable business.
CLOSE CORRELATION SHOWN
But the study asks, do the services need it?
Since the Air Force and the Navy almost al-
OAKLAND MISSILE SITES VERY MUCH
Rusn-Hustr
(By Leonard Levitt)
The Army is shrouding its plan to con-
struct two antiballistic missile sites in Oak-
land County in secrecy.
All outsiders were barred as top Army brass
met behind closed doors, yesterday with the
seven-member Oakland County Board of Su-
pervisors planning, building and zoning com-
mittee.
Four sheriff's deputies patrolled the halls
during the meeting.
Supervisor Niles E. Olson of Pontiac, de-
scribed the meeting as "a briefing session
over possible sites." Six sites have been pro-
posed. Two will be chosen.
Olson, who had first been contacted about
the meeting Wednesday night at his home,
was informed only shortly before the session
Friday afternoon that the press would be
barred.
According to Olson, one of the three Army
officers, Col. William Wray, of the Huntsville,
Ala., missile center, said he was "under or-
ders from his superiors in Washington not
to speak to the press."
"He just won't continue the hearings if
the press comes in," Olson said.
Asked why he was prevented from talking
with the press, Wray merely smiled and shook
his head.
Carl O'Brien, another Oakland Supervisor,
complained after the meeting, "Anytime I
asked them something important about the
sites, they said it was classified."
The sites are part of a $5.7 billion Sentinel
antiballistic missile system to be constructed
at 15 cities throughout the country.
Senator Philip Hart, Michigan Democrat,
declared tha the program must be stopped
now "before it achieves a momentum of its
own the way Vietnam did."
Hart made his charge Thursday night at
Oakland Community College to a group of
200 women opposed to the missile sites.
ways accept a plane or a missile that performs ? "Huge military ventures, once underway,
are very hard to shut down?even if it be-
at a fraction of its promised standard, it
would appear from an exclusively military
standpoint that a device of a much lower
order of performance fits the Nation's defense
needs.
The document also shows a close correla-
tion between "crash" programs and poor per-
formance. Thus, it proposes more realistic
schedules. If a weapon is wanted in short
order, five years or less, the study recom-
mends that its electronic gadgetry be limited
to familiar items.
If the Pentagon wants something that
makes a "technical breakthrough," it should
allow a minimum development period of five
to seven years, it is pointed out.
Another factor in poor performance, the
study says, is the absence of coMpetition for
new systems after the initial designs are ac-
cepted. Typically, the Pentagon requires five
or so aerospace firms to bid on its original
proposal. But typically, it selects one winner
on the basis of blueprint papers. The study
says that the military could save more money
and get a better product if it financed two
competitors to build prototypes after the
design stage. Such a technique was followed,
it recals1, with the F-4, a supersonic Navy
interceptor. Even though the F-4 employed
both a new radar and a new computer, it per-
formed up to the promised standard.
At first glance, such a technique might
seem like throwing good money after dubious
dollars. But the study contends that if two
aerospace competitors are forced to build and
fly prototypes before they win the big prize?
the contract to produce a series of planes or
missiles?they will be under a genuine incen-
tive to be efficient, hold costs clanTh, and make
things that work.
comes apparent in midcourse that they are of
questionable value," Hart said.
U.S. Rep. William S. Broomfield, a Repub-
lican whose Oakland County district con-
tains the six sites, has opposed the plan be-
cause he says the sites would disrupt a
rapidly growing area.
The decision on sites location was put off
until mid-February by Clark Clifford, secre-
tary of defense in the Johnson administra-
tion.
Broomfield and Rep. John Conyers Jr., De-
troit Democrat, who also opposes the plan,
had asked the Defense Department last De-
cember to defer the decision 60 days.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. COOPER. I yteld to the Senator
from Missouri.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, un-
fortunately I cannot stay for this full
discussion, but, as the able Senator from
Kentucky will remember, at one time I
stated that the figure could reach $100
billion, if we went to a full system, a
"thick" system, as it is called.
It is my understanding that already
the estimated cost of the thin system has
increased from $5 billion to $9.4 billion.
Because of figures presented in a recent
hearing before the Joint Economic Com-
mittee as to the average increase in cost
of a number of weapons systems, I am
not surprised.
May I ask the Senator if the thin sys-
tem can double in cost within a few
months, is it not possible that the cost
of the thick system could double within
a few years?
Mr. COOPER. I think it is absolutely
certain. The Senator has a great oppor-
tunity to study deeply these matters, and
I am sure what he says is absolutely cor-
rect, that the cost will be twice as much
as has been estimated within the last
year. In addition, there are many state-
ments in the defense budget presented
this year which differ from those made
last year about both the thin system and
the heavy system, and about the prog-
ress of an ICBM system in China and an
ABM system in Russia.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
thank the able Senator, and would make
these additional observations:
Some people question this system on
moral grounds. I do not.
Some people question it on the basis
that it could start an additional arms
race, and therefore increase our taxes.
If the Federal budget increases in the
next 6 years, at the rate it has over the
past 6 years, the annual cost to the tax-
payer of the Federal Government--not
counting the tremendous additions in
State and local government taxes?will
be $325 billion a year.
The basic reason I question this sys-
tem is because I do not believe?and I
have studied it to the best of my ability?
that this system is yet ready for deploy-
ment.
The able Senator from Kentucky and
I have never advocated throwing out the
system. All we have asked is that it be
further engineered before being cut into
production. Based on the record, I still
believe that was, and is, a wise suggestion.
I thank the Senator for yielding.
Mr. COOPER. I thank the Senator for
the fight he has made to delay deploy-
ment. As he knows, many eminent au-
thorities have said it is not yet techno-
logically ready for deployment.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. COOPER. I yield to the Senator
from Arkansas.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I associate myself
with the comments of the Senator from
Missouri. Last year, in the debate on this
matter, I agreed with the Senator from
Kentucky and supported his move to de-
lay deployment of the system.
I ask him, has anything, so far as he
knows, developed since that time to in-
crease the effectiveness of the system?
Have there been any hearings, or any
facts developed, or has any knowledge
come to the attention of the Senator from
Kentucky that would suggest the system
has become more effective? If not, I agree
with the Senator from Missouri that
there is great doubt about its effective-
ness.
Mr. COOPER. Nothing has come to my
knowledge that would reinforce the idea
that it has become more effective.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Irave there been any
outside scientists, that is, scientists not
connected with or in the direct employ
of the Pentagon, who have testified or
given any indication that it is feasible?
Mr. COOPER. No, but many of them
are making statements in writing that,
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first, they do not believe it is a system
adequate to meet the threat from the
U.S.S.R., and, second, they believe it
would result in an arms race which would
be very dangerous to the security of the
United States.
I recall that last year during the debate
the distinguished Senator from Arkansas,
the chairman of the Committee on For-
eign Relations, addressed a question to
the distinguished Senator from Georgia
(Mr. RUSSELL) the chairman of the
Armed Services Committee, asking him if
certain distinguished scientists, Nobel
Prize winners in nuclear physics among
them, had been called before the com-
mittee to give their judgment, which I
would think would be independent judg-
ment, about the feasibility of this system,
and also about the consequenecs it might
have as to deployment of a similar sys-
tem by the Soviet Union.
I recall that Senator RUSSELL said
they had not called such witnesses. I re-
member the Senator from Arkansas
pressed both Senator RUSSELL and the
Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) ,
who is present, as to whether or not such
witnesses could be called at the next
hearings; and I believe I am correct in
saying that both our distinguished col-
leagues, Senator RUSSELL and Senator
STENNIS, agreed that such witnesses
would be called, and suggested that Sen-
ators who opposed the deployment of the
system suggest names of witnesses, and
that they would be called. I think the
Senator recalls that.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes, I do.
Mr. COOPER. That was the substance
of the colloquy, and the record of that
closed session was subsequently made
public, so we can speak of it. It was the
Senator's inquiry that produced the an-
swer that those witnesses would be called.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I might say that a
further effect of that was that I had a
letter from the president, I believe, of an
association of scientists, the technical
name of which I do not recall?I think
the Senator is familiar with it?who
stated that they would be willing and
would like to be called to testify on this
matter, that they did have very definite
views about the feasibility of it.
May I ask the Senator what his infor-
mation is as to how far the deployment
of this system has progressed as of this
time?
Mr. COOPER. I do not have any firm,
recent information. I have read in the
newspapers accounts of land acquisition
activities in several parts of our country.
I believe there are Senators who would
know more about that than I. I am sure,
If he can appropriately answer the ques-
tion, that the chairman of the Armed
Services Committee could reply to that
question.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield for a response to the ques-
tion?
Mr. COOPER. I yield.
Mr. BROOKE. The first such acquisi-
tion was in the Boston, Mass., vicinity,
in the Lynnfield-Reading area. There
has been protest locally, but construc-
tion is underway at this time.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think I read that
there was some protest around the Chi-
cago area about such acquisition, too.
Mr. COOPER. Yes; also in the State
of Washington and the State of Hawaii.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I ask one further
question: Has the Senator any sugges-
tion as to what might be done now, as-
suming that the sentiment of this body
is more in favor of his position? Is there
any resolution, or any means that the
Senator has in mind, that would give us
an opportunity, once again, to express
our views about the matter?
Mr. COOPER. Well, of course, the most
direct way would be, when hearings are
held by the Armed Services Committee,
to invite Senators to testify, and, to
bring before that committee witnesses
we can jointly suggest who were not
heard before, such as the scientific ad-
visers of former Presidents Eisenhower,
Kennedy, and Johnson, and other dis-
tinguished scientists.
Another way we could reach the mat-
ter directly would be, when the bill or
bills come before the Senate?I believe
there are three?in which there will be
funds itemized for deployment, then we
could attack it by amendments on the
floor.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. There is no fur-
ther authorization necessary, as I under-
stand it.
Mr. COOPER. Yes, authorization is re-
quired.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. What I should like
to suggest to the Senator?
Mr. COOPER. I would be happy to
have the distinguished Senator's sugges-
tion.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I suggest, in view of
the fact that we have a new administra-
tion and we all, I am sure, wish to see it
succeed, that I think it might be wise in
view of the great differences of opinion
on this matter, to suggest to the Presi-
dent that deployment, or actual con-
struction, at least, be held up until there
is an opportunity to test the present sen-
timent, as the Senator has suggested. As
I understand him, he feels that there is
no practical way for us to express our-
selves except on an appropriation bill for
further funds; is that correct?
Mr. COOPER. Well, that would be a
direct way.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Is there any other
way?
Mr. COOPER. I would assume, if de-
bate continues, that we can convey to
President Nixon, our desires and belief
that in connection with his review of
policy, both defense and general policy, it
would be wise to hold up the deployment
of this system until he has had full in-
formation and, as I shall mention later,
until he has found out whether it is pos-
sible to enter into negotiations with the
Soviet Union on the questioning of the
limitation of nuclear weapons?offensive
and defensive. Some may suggest a res-
olution.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I had hoped the
Senator might suggest a resolution and
had obtained sponsors for it. I had hoped
to do it myself.
Mr. COOPER. We will discuss it. If
the group that feels very strongly that
it is the best route, we can do it.
I yield to the distinguished Senator
from Mississippi, the chairman of the
Armed Services Committee.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank
S 1367
the Senator for yielding. I am not going
to engage in a general debate or make
a long statement.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I am not
going to go into details today,
Mr. STENNIS. I think it is time that
I say something about procedures. There
does have to be further authorization be-
yond the amount that was contained in
last year's budget, which carries over into
the selection of sites and some work, be-
fore the program can proceed.
There will be hearings on this matter
before any appreciable amount of physi-
cal work is done on the site. A great deal
of the money contained in last year's
budget was for a continuation of devel-
opment, which is the stage that precedes
deployment.
I might give Or information the figures
that I looked up. The budget, as sub-
mitted by the retiring President, carries
a request for this year, fiscal year 1970,
of $1.7 billion for the Sentinel alone and
something in the neighborhood of $2
billion for the entire ABM Program.
Even though this is the forum in which
to discuss these matters?and everyone
is certainly within his rights and priv-
ileges to do so?I point out that we have
a new President of the United States, We
have a new Secretary of the Department
of Defense and a new Deputy Secretary of
the Department of Defense. We have a
new Director of the Budget.
I know that all of those people, with
the exception of the President, are now
delving into this matter with all the
speed they can employ with the facilities
they have at hand. When they complete
their work, the President will then be pre-
sented with their findings. The PPesi-
dent will then make a decision. That
would be the new budget.
Here are the very top men in the ex-
ecutive branch of the Government. They
carry the primary responsibility of tak-
ing the first step. We have a responsi-
bility just as important, if not more so.
That is the initial step.
These men will proceed with their
preparation and will try to grasp all the
major parts of the program. I know that
to be a fact. They have got to weigh?,
and I will not take much time?the com-
plexities of the military threat. They
have got to weigh the technological
question of whether any effective sys-
tern can be built.
I do not know whether it can be built.
I said here on the floor of the Senate last
year that we should not put all of our
money in this endeavor. I do not know
whether it will be effective or not. This
is a delicate matter, as we all know. It
Involves our relations with the Soviet
Union and the possibility of further con-
structive talks on arms limitations.
I happen to believe that we will not
strengthen our position by pulling back
here at this point merely because of the
talks.
I am not accusing them of any bad
faith. However, if we withhold this mat-
ter for a year or for 2 years?and I hear
the suggestion made that we withhold
everything for a year?we may then find
that they are not acting in good faith in
the talks, because they could talk for a
year or for 2 years and be building up
that much more.
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wan know as much as there is t
be known about the matter. Of coura
I want the Senator to fully share the
responsibility. However, I say with grea
deference, let us not rush. Let us hea
these men that have to pass on the mat
ter. With great deference I say to th
public, let us not reach definite conclu
siens now.
So far as the hearings are concerned
as we know, this is a subject that coul
be heard ad infinitum. However, certain
ly I do not want to have anythingto d
with bringing in a bill containing an
item as large as this until I have heard
more about the matter and until the
Senate has had a chance to know and
hear more about it. Of course, many of
these hearings have to be held in a closed
session. However, there au ways of get-
ting the information for the Senators.
We can make a skeleton report and that
report can be supplemented. I do not
want to say that I favor conducting hear-
ings ad infinitum. However, certainly I
want the viewpoints of the different
competent people in the Government and
out of the Government.
I have told the staff that I am not
going to pass on this matter, on my own
Part, solely on the testimony of Govern-
ment witnesses, even though they are
very fine, capable, and knowledgeable.
I think I have given the picture as I see
it and as most of the members of the
committee which has responsibility for
this matter see it.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I thank
the Senator. He has done exactly what
we believed and knew he would do. We
know the Senator. We are reassured when
the Senator says that the new President
and new Secretary of Defense are re-
viewing all of these 'policies.
This effort of ours will be continued.
Our effort is not designed to hurt the
new administration in any way. It is de-
signed ;,13 give to the new ?resident and
his administration such light as we may
shed on the matter by expressing our
opinions and viewpoints as Members of
the Senate, and sharing our information
with him and his administration.
I think that is part of the proper proc-
ess of the Senate. I know that the Sen-
ator will agree.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank
the Senator very much. I am conscious
of the financial implications and com-
plications of this matter. I am greatly
concerned about it. I am not overlooking
that factor.
Mr. F'ULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I am -
very glad that the Senator from Mis-
sissippi said what he did about the hear-
ings. I thought it was significant that
he said we want to get the whole picture
and hear from people who are not in the
Government and get a complete picture
on a matter of this importance. It will
certainly make all of us feel much better
about it, if that is done.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, all of us i
want to hear from those in and out of t
the Government and to hear what the
President has to say.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. COOPER. I yield. 8
Mr. PERCY, Mr. President, I thank "e
the Senator for yielding to me, as I must a
o address the Senate Youth Forum in a
e, few minutes.
t I do not know of any subject that will
t affect the future leaders of America?
r the young people who are studying the
- process of the government here?more
e than the decision Congress and this ad-
- ministration must make on this very
question.
, I commend the Senator from Missis-
d sippi who heads the Armed Services
- Committee for the very openminded ap-
o proach he has taken and for his willing-
ness to hear all sides of this issue and to
recognize that even with his own deep
knowledge of this subject?having stud-
ied it thoroughly?it is a highly com-
plex question. It is not merely a ques-
tion of making a judgment on a simple
matter. This matter affects our military
Posture, and it affects our Committee on
Foreign Relations, since one of the basic
questions we have to consider is whether
the Soviet Union wants to sit down and
negotiate now.
It would be foolhardy for us to pro-
ceed with the construction of this sys-
tem if there were a chance to negotiate
an agreement whereby both sides would
have a common interest in not proceed-
ing with this kind of expenditure.
We must ask ourselves if we can reach
an agreement in this field and find a way
to enforce that agreement so that we
may be absolutely certain that it will
be adhered to.
From my own study of the subject?
and I am putting as much time on this
subject as on any subject we will be con-
fronted with this year?I think it is pos-
sible to find a safeguard by which we
will have the possibility of protecting the
sanctity of an agreement made in this
area.
It is not possible to deploy these sys-
tems without being subject to detection
by satellite reconnaissance.
And we should ask ourselves what the
real cost of the construction would be.
If the cost has already escalated from $5
to $9.4 billion for the thin system, we
should ask ourselves what it will cost
to maintain the system.
Roughly, a system of this type would
require an expenditure of approximately
10 percent per year for maintenance
alone. Therefore, we are talking about
a cost of $1 billion every year just for
maintenance of the thin system. If we
proceed with a thick system, we are talk-
ing about saddling our young people,
even if we pay the whole hundred bil-
lion dollars in our generation, with a $10
billion maintenance cost per year.
Then, what do you do with an ob-
solete system of this magnitude and
size? If your aircraft become obsolete,
you can sell them; you can find some use
for them. But what is the spinoff used
for on an obsolete ABM system? Whom
could you get to buy it? What part of
t could you use? It would be almost en-
irely waste.
I can only ask, What does it really
dd to our national security, or does
t detract from our national security?
-What does it really require our adver-
aries to do? What is it going to do in
scalating the arms race? What actions
re we likely to precipitate? Are we go-
ing to strengthen the hand of the hawks
in the Kremlin and in the other captials
of the world by this action, by saying
"there is no answer but any eye for an
eye and a tooth for a tooth?"
I believe that the distinguished Sen-
ator from Kentucky, in his leadership
and we have excellent bipartisan leader-
ship?has opened that inquiry. The Com-
mittee on Armed Services is willing to
study it. I am certain the members of
the Committee on Foreign Relations will
give it earnest thought.
We are on the brink of a decision the
magnitude of which can only be com-
pared with, say, the Vietnam war, in
total dollar cost. Before we proceed with
this system, we had better know the con-
sequences of it, and what we are doing.
I commend the Senator from Ken-
tucky.
Mr. COOPER. I know the work that
the Senator from Illinois has been doing,
and he has expressed the chief concern
well.
Mr. President, several Senators are
waiting to speak, and I promised to yield
to them in this order: The Senator
from South Dakota (Mr. McGovsan),
the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr.
BaomEE), the Senator from Montana
(Mr. MANSFIELD) , the Senator from New
York (Mr. Javrrs), and the Senator from
Massachusetts (Mr. ICENNsay)
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield to me at this time?
Mr. COOPER. I yield.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I should
like to identify myself with the Sena-
tor's position and to say that the missing
link is the political and the diplomatic
aspect of this matter.
I join the Senator from Kentucky, and
I hope he will propose a resolution asking
the President now to put a freeze on this
matter and to take another hard look
at it. Let us do it in the Committee on
Foreign Relations and the Committee
on Armed Services. Let the President do
it, himself, and with the National Secu-
rity Council.
There is too much at stake and there is
all the more reason for taking another
hard look, even if it takes another 30 or
45 days. The world will not be Jost or
won in that period of time.
I hope the Senator will do that in
asking the President to take that
Position.
I commend my colleague, the Senator
from Kentucky, for his leadership and
his foresight in again bringing to the at-
tention of the Senate the grave issues
connected with the question of an ABM
defense system, and for the able way he
has marshalled the arguments against
proceeding with the deployment of the
Sentinel system. I share his view that it
would be a mistake to go ahead with the
Sentinel system. We all know that we
are talking about something much vaster
than a "thin" defense against a hypo-
thetical Chinese Communist nuclear
threat in the mid-1970's.
While President Nixon has demon-
strated an acute sensitivity to the grave,
complex, and far-reaching nature of the
whole issue of the nuclear arms race,
much confusion and discord surround the
whole question of the Sentinel ABM sys-
tem. Indeed, it has become the focal point
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February 4, S 1369
of a major national debate over the high-
est issues of national security and, even,
of the very nature of our society in the
decades ahead. Most recently, in his press
conference of January 27, President
Nixon did much to clear up the needless
semantic confusion and divisiveness
which had been generated around the
competing concepts of "superiority" and
"parity." His adoption of the concept of
"sufficiency" is, in my judgment, the
choice of the best frame of reference for
the historic debate now going on.
To be quite frank, it is far from clear
just what the Sentinel system is sup-
posed to do?and there is much dispute
as to whether it can do any of the various
things that have been suggested in dif-
fering quarters as to its mission. After
vigorously arguing against a system ori-
ented against any attack from the
U.S.S.R., former Secretary McNamara
originally justified deployment of the
Sentinel system as a defense against a
projected Chinese nuclear capability in
the mid-1970's. However, subsequent
statements by the distinguished former
and present chairmen of the Senate
Armed Services Committee?as well as
statements from Pentagon authorities?
have been to the effect that the Sentinel
ABM is now to be regarded as the first
building block in a "thick" ABM system
oriented against an attack from the
Soviet Union. Moreover, Secretary Laird
has indicated that the Sentinel is now
viewed as a major barganing factor in
the upcoming negotiations with the
Soviet Union over limitation of the stra-
tegic nuclear arms race.
President Nixon has made clear his
intention to review some of the major
policy decisions of the last administra-
tion, particularly where there is some
prima facie evidence to indicate that
there are substantial reasons against the
course decided upon. I urge the President
to consider ordering a halt to all further
actions directly connected with the
Sentinel deployment decision based on
his own review of the decision to deploy
the Sentinel ABM system pending the
outcome of a thorough review of the en-
tire issue by the National Security Coun-
cil. I have specifically limited my call
for a suspension of further activity with
respect to the Sentinel system to actions
directly connected with deployment. I
believe that research and development
activities in the ABM field should be
vigorously pursued.
To parallel a review of the whole com-
plex of issues surrounding the ABM
question by the National Security Coun-
cil, I believe that the Senate also should
conduct a thorough public investigation
and review of the entire question. While
the technical justifications in favor of
the deployment of the Sentinel, from
the viewpoint of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, has been well probed in hearings
held by the Armed Services Committee
and its Preparedness Investigating Sub-
committee, I do not think that the broad
political and diplomatic ramifications of
this whole issue have been investigated
as they need to be.
Major political and diplomatic ques-
tions involved in the ABM question are:
The whole complex of our relationships
With the Soviet Union; with Communist
?
China; with our NATO allies in Europe;
with Japan and our other Asian allies;
with Canada; and with our Latin neigh-
bors to the south. In addition, the rela-
tionship of the ABM question to the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, has
not, in my judgment, been satisfactorily
explored.
Finally, and by no means least, I be-
lieve it is essential for the Senate to take
a systematic and thorough look at the
whole question of projected costs for nu-
clear weapons systems in the next dec-
ade. The figures that have been project-
ed in this regard by various, informed
nonofficial sources truly boggle the mind.
If these projections have validity, it is
clear that the United States is going to
have to make some of the most excruci-
ating decisions on resources allocation in
the years just ahead. At stake, ulti-
mately, are the basic questions of just
what kind of society we wish to become
in the last third of the 20th century. It
is clear in my mind that we just will not
be able to finance all of the weapons
systems which our Military Establish-
ment feels it should have and still be
able to meet even the minimum needs of
our urban population in the explosive
decade ahead.
Very hard choices are going to have
to be made. The quality of life in Amer-
ica is the basic underlying issue and this
must be borne in mind as we face the
1970's. We can either stagger and lurch
from one ad hoc decision to another, or
we can take a coherent look at the whole
mix of competing demands and make
our decisions calmly and judiciously.
Above all, we must make our decisions
affecting the future with an eye toward
the nature and possibilities of the fu-
ture rather than upon backward-look-
ing decisions based wholly on our experi-
ences of the 1940's and 1950's.
The question of cost and resources al-
location, of course, is not merely one of
"defense spending" versus domestic
civilian needs. At issue is our posture in
the world?the effectiveness of our inter-
action with 3 billion non-Americans?
who will share this planet with us in the
next decades. Are we to be the Sparta of
the 1970's and 1980's? Is there not a
higher role for America?
Mr. COOPER. I certainly value the
Senator's advice, and we will consider
this.
I now yield to the Senator from South
Dakota.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I
shall not repeat the arguments that I
know the Senator from Kentucky will
make in calling for a delay in the deploy-
ment of this system. It seems to me that
one of the most confusing aspects of
the whole issue is the changing justifica-
tion for this system advanced by the pro-
ponents.
Before the Senator from Mississippi,
the distinguished chairman of the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, left the floor,
I raised a question with him, which he
said his committee would go into very
thoroughly. I am sure they will do so,
and I hope we can do it on the floor of
the Senate as this discussion continues
over the next few days.
The question is this, Are we proposing
to build this system primarily as a de-
fense against China, or as a bargaining
weapon with the Soviet Union, as enun-
ciated by the Secretary of Defense a few
days ago? The previous Secretary of De-
fense said that it was folly to try to de-
ploy a thin system against the Soviet
Union and that he would justify it only
on the ground that it would provide us
some temporary protection against the
Chinese. That being the case, why, then,
do we talk about backing away from this
system if we can get some kind of agree-
ment with the Soviet Union?
It does not make any sense at all to
argue that we need this system against
China, and then to say we would give it
away, provided the Russians will not
build one. Obviously, there is a very
clear contradiction and confusion of
justification for the system. Are we
building it against China, against Rus-
sia, or against both? What is our strat-
egy? What is the real rationalization for
this system? Or, is it just an exercise in
spending more money on military gadg-
ets that add nothing to our security
against either the Russians or the Chi-
nese, and which may, in fact, aggravate
our relations with those countries?
Those are the kinds of questions,
among others, that I hope will be ex-
plored on the floor of the Senate and
explored even more in depth by the Com-
mittee on Armed Services.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, will the Sen-
ator yield?
Mr. McGOVERN. I do not have the
floor.
Mr. COOPER. I promised to yield in
rotation, because Senators must leave,
but I will yield to the Senator from
Rhode Island.
Mr. PELL. I ask this question: Would
not the answer to the question of the
Senator from South Dakota be shown
by the projected site of a Sentinel missile
in Reading, Mass., which would indi-
cate they are more concerned with weap-
ons of the Soviet Union than of China,
just by looking at the globe?
Mr. McGOVERN. I do not know. The
chairman of the Committee on Armed
Services frankly said he was not pre-
pared to answer that question at this
Point, that he wanted more time to look
into it.
But it does seem to me one of the
real reasons why there is so much con-
fusion about it?we get a different ex-
planation for the reason for justifying
this system every time the argument
comes up.
I believe the proponents of the sys-
tem owe us a clear statiiment of why
they want this system built and against
whom it is to protect us.
Would we give it away if we could get
arms agreements with the Soviet Union,
or would we have to have some agree-
ment with the Chinese? If we do not
need any understanding with the Chi-
nese, what is the purpose of the deploy-
ment of the system?
I believe these questions should be
answered before we spend any more
money acquiring sites and deploying a
system that we may agree to give away
a little later, pending some arms agree-
ment with Moscow.
Mr. President, I am convinced that we
will someday rue the phrase "negotiate
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from strength" as one of the most dam-
aging and costly cliches in the American
vocabulary.
It has been employed heavily over the
past several years as a concentrated ex-
pression of the reasons why we had to
invest more lives in the thousands and
more treasures in the billions before
negotiations in Vietnam would be pos-
sible.
Now we are told that in order to "ne-
gotiate from strength" in -arms talks
with the Soviet Union, we have to begin
deploying a $50 or $100 billion security
illusion.
It is an encouraging development in
our discussions over the ABM that we
are beginning to face honestly the ra-
tionale behind the 1967 deployment de-
cision. The original suggestion that it
was oriented against China?requiring
that we envision the Chinese, with a
comparably tiny contingent of deliver-
able nuclear weapons, launching a futile
attack which would lead to the total
destruction of their society?was really
too tenuous to be taken seriously. Amer-
icans believe a lot of things about the
Chinese, but we do not equate them with
idiocy. Moreover, this line of reasoning
posed the difficulty of explaining why we
were wining to eliminate our ostensible
protection against the Chinese provided
the Russians would agree not to built an
ABM system.
So now we can see the Sentinel sys-
tem as it is?the beginning of a much
more elaborate and costly missile de-
fense directed against a Soviet attack.
And our debate can center on the ques-
tion whether it has any value in that
respect.
It seems quite appropriate to recall in
this connection the warning issued by
Secretary of Defense McNamara when
he announced the "marginal" reasons
for deploying a China-oriented system.
He said in September of 1967 that?
The danger in deploying this relatively
light and reliable Chinese-oriented ABM sys-
tem is going to be that pressures will develop
to expand it into a heavy Soviet-oriented
system.
We must resist that temptation
firmly?
not because we can for a moment afford to
relax our vigilance against a possible Soviet
first strike?but precisely because our great-
est deterrent against such a strike is not a
massive, costly but highly penetrable ABM
shield, but rather a fully credible offensive
assured destruction capability.
The so-called heavy ABM shield ?at the
present state of technology?would in effect
be no adequate shield at all against Soviet
attack, but- rather a strong Inducement for
the Soviets to vastly increase their own of-
fensive forces. That, as I have pointed out,
Would make it necessary for us to respond in
turn?and so the arms race Would rush
hopelessly on to no sensible purpose on
either side.
Secretary McNamara referred in that
statement to the ease of developing pene-
tration aids?decoys and other devices?
which an adversary with a relatively
high degree of technical sophistication
could employ to fool the Sentinel system.
He also referred to the most simple
method of neutralizing it; sending more
offensive missiles than there are defen-
sive missiles to intercept theta. It is im-
portant to note in this reset that if
Only one offeniive Missile gets through
the defensive shield it has been a failure
in terms of that target.
We have heard the argument, however,
that even if that target is destroyed the
defensive system will have succeeded in
one respect because it will have diverted
offensive missiles from other potential
targets. Such reasoning ignores the fact
that since 1958, when the Soviets devel-
-oped ICBM's, we have been engaged in
a weapons race in which each side seeks
to maintain an "assured destruction ca-
pability" sufficient to deter the other
from launching a first strike. Both the
United States and the Soviet Union have
sought to accumulate enough weapons to
survive a first strike and still inflict an
unacceptable level of damage on the
other side. The assumption that this ac-
tion-reaction cycle will cease with our
deployment of the ABM is totally un-
warranted. In fact, I can conceive of no
rationale for assuming anything but that
the ABM will have exactly the opposite
effect.
It will stimulate the Soviet Union to in-
crease its offensive capability enough to
overcome the Sentinel and still destroy
the targets it deems important.
But the discussion is made even more
complex, and it is infused with additional
risk, by the fact that these strategic con-
siderations operate on the assumption
that the Sentinel will work with a sub-
stantial degree of efficiency, an assurance
which simply cannot be given.
It is, in fact, quite probable that dur-
ing a heavy attack the effectiveness of an
ABM system would drop to near zero.
The Sentinel is, to be sure, a substantial
improvement over the Nike-Zeus, with
strengthened ability to discern between
trash and nuclear warheads, higher-
powered radars, and a significant change
from neutron heating to X-ray kill which
Will make the defensive explosion effec-
tive at greater distances from the in-
coming warhead.
But we have not overcome, and I do
not believe that we can overcome with a
System in which some missiles intercept
others, the problem posed by ionization
of the atmosphere resulting from a nu-
clear explosion. In a heavy attack, if we
were able to intercept a portion of the
first wave of missiles, the explosions
would upset the gas in the air and would
create a shield impenetrable by radar.
The tracking systems on which the ABM
relies so heavily would be rendered use-
less.
This and other problems severely chal-
lenge the premise that the Sentinel
would, in fact, save a significant number
of American lives, even if we could as-
sume that the Soviet Union would not
respond by sending more offensive mis-
siles. The Maginot line analogy is not at
all unreasonable.
But our knowledge of the technical
problems associated with the Sentinel
adds another critical element to this dis-
cussion, for while we can operate with
some fair understanding of its weak-
nesses our adversaries are likely to be
overly generous in their assessment.
Working from the inherent tendency to
'underrate your own weapons and to
'overrate those of the opposition, they
are likely to overrespond, and to deploy
.enough offensive missiles to penetrate a
100 percent effective ABM. As a conse-
quence, after we have reached the next
plateau in the arms race, the probability
Is that more Americans, instead of less,
would be destroyed in a nuclear exchange
than is presently the case.
In light of these considerations I be-
lieve we can draw two conclusions about
the ABM. The first is that its deploy-
ment would be a serious waste of our
resources, akin to the waste which the
Soviet Union committed?and is appar-
ently recognizing now?when it began
to deploy the limited Galosh defensive
system around Moscow.
The second is that the Sentinel would
further aggravate the anew race cycle
which both we and the Soviet Union are
seeking to escape, in the mutual realiza-
tion that rational human beings ought
to avoid both its dangers and its terrific
costs.
Mr. President, the new administra-
tion has an'opPortunity to set a new and
much more hopeful course. It will have
made a highly significant contribution
If it will but delay deployment of the
ABM while two possibilities are explored
?the prospects for reaching agreements
with the Soviet Union on mutual limita-
tions, and the potential of developing an
anti-ballistic-missile system which would
be effective and useful.
We have had discouraging signals that
the administration may move in the op-
posite ,direction. Secretary Laird indi-
cated at his press conference last week
that he views the Sentinel as a bargain-
ing tool, and that he believes it should
be deployed as seeh?so we can "nego-
tiate from strength."
I firmly challenge that assertion. I sug-
gest that all we will prove by deploy-
ment is that we are willing to waste $5 to
$10 billion or more on an unworkable
device, and I fail to see how that can
help us in negotiations.
Moreover, even if we concede that the
Sentinel may have some value as a bar-
gaining tool, what possible sense can
there be in deploying it when we are
seeking an agreement not to deploy?
If the negotiations were successful, we
would be left with a useless system which
would have to be torn Out to comply with
an agreement. Secretary Laird's assess-
ment would, as I see it, have us in a posi-
tion similar to that of a bargainer who
offers to stop pinching himself so his
cries of pain will stop disturbing the
other party.
But certainly much more than cost is
involved here. I am convinced that mov-
ing ahead with the ABM will greatly re-
duce the likelihood that an arms control
agreement which is acceptable to both
the United States and the Soviet Union
can be found. I think it is time we recog-
nize that they are not going to accept
stabilization in a situation where we can
inflict unacceptable damage upon them
in a second strike but they cannot do the
same.
Soviet leaders have made their inter-
est in arms control talks quite clear,
beginning with an invitation on inaugu-
ration day. And Peking has also indi-
cated its desire to renew talks with us at
Warsaw. Certainly we have no way of
knowing in detail what the-full inten-
tions are of either the Russians or the
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Chinese. But if we respond by provoking
another round in the arms race on the
premise of "negotiating from strength"
we will have committed a serious error
which may be impossible to reverse be-
fore we reach a higher level of weapons
and a higher level of risk. '
These are questions which I hope Pres-
ident Nixon and his advisers are eval-
uating with great care. The Congress,
whose responsibilities in the field of na-
tional security, defense and arms Con-
trol are no less weighty, should be con-
sidering them as well. The distinguished
chairman of the Armed Services Com-
mittee, Mr. STENNIS, is to be commended
for his willingness to broaden this year's
committee hearings on the subject, to
include a measure of the technical ex-
pertise which has alined in opposition
to the ABM and which we can only
allude to on the Senate floor. These will
be urgently important hearings.
Mr. President, Department of De-
fense appropriations for fiscal 1969 in-
cluded $614.7 million for deployment of
the Sentinel. If we can use former Sec-
retary Clifford's posture statement as a
guide the ante will more than double in
fiscal 1970, to about $1,453 million ex-
clusive of research and development.
- The opportunity to hold up deploy-
ment is to avoid wasting that amount.
For each year we go ahead the waste and
the danger will increase.
Let us get off this hopeless path now.
To stay on it is to pursue an illusion
which will forever elude our grasp.
Mr. COOPER. The Senator has asked
very searching questions.
We are all very pleased with the state-
ment of the chairman of the Committee
on Armed Services, the Senator from
Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), and it is one
we would expect from him. He intends
to see that this question is thoroughly
reviewed.
The questions of the Senator from
South Dakota do need to be answered.
Mr. President, I yield to the Senator
from Massachusetts.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I thank
the distinguished Senator from Ken-
tucky. I wish to asgociate myself with
the purpose of his remarks today. I was
privileged to support him in his attempts
to delay the deployment of this ABM
system in the last session of Congress.
This morning I was at the Pentagon,
and I asked about the cost of this thin
system. The figure that was given me,
as late as approximately 10 o'clock this
morning, was $5.8 billion. I was rather
surprised, then, to hear the distinguished
Senator from Missouri give a figure this
afternoon of $9.4 billion, which would be
an extraordinary increase in such a short
period of time.
I think there are certain questions
that must be carefully considered before
so costly a system is deployed. Of course,
one question is the effectiveness of the
system. I think that no evidence has
really been supplied by any scientists
which would indicate that this system
can be effective. The Pentagon itself said
the system is designed to defend against
the potential of Communist China in the,
next decade. They admit it will not give
us defense against the Soviet Union.
'The second question pertains to the
potential arms race with the Soviet
Union. I read the report of the Senator
from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL) and the
Senator from Tennessee (Mr. GORE),
when they returned from their mission
to the Soviet Union. One of the passages
in that report stated that in conversa-
tions with Premier Kosygin, the Premier
indicated he was anxious to enter into
talks for mutual disarmament.
I took great heart from that passage,
and I think many people took great heart
that perhaps we were entering a period
in which we could begin to talk about
mutual disarmament, and thereby avoid
another arms race with the Soviet Union.
So I explored the possibility that the
Soviet Union had responded to our thin
antiballistic-missile system and had be-
gun to build a more sophisticated system
themselves. I found there is no evidence
that the Soviets responded at all or that
Communist China responded at all. It
would seem to me the only reaction we
have had is a desire on their part to talk
about mutual disarmament.
Certainly we all want to bring about
peace in the world and we do not want
to do anything that would trigger an-
other arms race with the Soviet Union or
even Communist China for that matter.
We have had a very serious problem
in Reading and in Lynnfield in the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts. The resi-
dents of those areas have been up in
arms about the construction of a mis-
sile site right within their neighborhoods.
I have been deeply concerned about it
and after we failed in the last session
of Congress to delay the deployment of
this system, I hoped to have the site lo-
cated, for instance, at Westover Air Force
Base, which is in the western part of our
State. But the engineers said there were
too many mountains between the densely
populated area of Boston and Westover
Field. I pursued this matter this morning
in the Pentagon, with respect to the fact
that these sites will be built in densely
populated areas because they are de-
signed to protect densely populated
areas. Further interrogation indicated
they had made certain concessions in
some of these sites, perhaps at Lynnfield,
perhaps in Chicago, and other places
across the country, which might mean
there would be a buffer zone or landscap-
ing to make the sites as palatable as pos-
sible if the people knew they had no al-
ternative and that the installation could
be constructed.
I asked if the costs of these modifica-
tions were included in the projected costs
of the system. It would appear they are
not. We do not know how much the costs
will be. As the distinguished Senator
from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) indi-
cated on the floor of the Senate today
we do not even know what the costs are
likely to be in 1972 or 1974, when this
system is to be completed, because we
know that costs are ever rising. And,
worst of all, even when completed we do
not know that the system will not be
obsolete. As the Senator from Illinois
(Mr. PERCY) pointed out we might have
a system on our hands which will really
be of no value to the Government.
I think the Senator from Kentucky
has certainly raised an important ques-
tion. I serve now on the Committee on
Armed Services. I am sure the Senator
from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), OUT
chairman, will see to it that we do have
hearings. I think the purpose of this
colloquy, to bring this matter to the
attention of the new administration and
the Congress, is a laudable one. I think
it makes known to them that there are
Members of this body who feel very
strongly that there should be a reap-
praisal and an in-depth review, and that
there should be a possible reconsidera-
tion before we continue to vote more
money for the year 1969-70, as is pro-
posed. So there is a definite remedy which
is available to us and this is not just a
futile exercist in colloquy.
I think this colloquy can serve a very
useful purpose in perhaps delaying the
matter until we can explore the possi-
bility of mutual disarmament with the
Soviet Union. If we are to take the word
of the Senator from Tennessee (Mr.
GORE) and the Senator from Rhode
Island (Mr. PELL), as reported to us,
there is some possibility that an agree-
ment may be possible. But in the interim
period what are we really losing if we
admit the system will not protect us
against a Communist threat?
I think the Senator from Rhode (Mr.
PELL) raised a very serious question
when he asked: If we are saying this
system is designed to protect us against
Communist China, why did we first
choose Boston, Mass., to build the first
site of installation? Communist China
is not in that direction. Why did we not
build it out in Seattle, Wash., or some
other place on the west coast? Why did
we choose the Northeast as the site of the
first installation?
Of course, we are happy that the peo-
ple of Massachusetts and the Northeast
are being protected, but we are also con-
cerned about the people on the west
coast. I suggest that this installation
might be pointed in the wrong direction
If, in fact, our primary purpose is a
defense against the Communist Chinese
capability.
In conclusion I must add, upon inter-
rogation also, was the purpose merely to
build this thin system to protect us
against the Communist Chinese, or was
this system designed as the first phase of
a larger and more sophisticated system
that is to come in the future? The an-
swer would appear to be that it is still
designed as a defense against the Chinese
capability, but it is designed so it can
be broadened into a more sophisticated
system which ultimately would give us a
defense against the Soviet capability.
So these are the important questions
I respectfully suggest have to be an-
swered. And they are questions that I am
sure will come out before the Committee
on Armed Services and perhaps the
Committee on Foreign Relations.
Those of us who have consistently op-
posed the installation of this complex
and dubious defensive system have done
so for a combination of reasons. They
can, I believe, be summed up in the single
conclusion that these costly facilities
would in fact contribute very little to
the security of the United States.
I would like to dwell briefly on the cen-
tral reason why I believe this conclusion
is justified. The -system which has been
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proposed and for which initial site ac-
quisition has begun is designed to pro-
tect the United States against a likely
Chinese nuclear capability in the coming
decade. No knowledgeable authority
claims that we could now construct a
really effective defense against the far
greater Soviet missile threat, although
the planned system would provide some
defense against an accidzattal launch-
ing by the Soviets and mtglit form the
basis for a more elaborate ABM at a later
date.
But we cannot focus exclusively on the
potential benefits this system might offer
vis-a-vis a Chinese threat, for that is
but a small part of our nalional security
problem. It is precisely in its likely im-
pact on the strategic relate, between
the Soviets and the Americans that the
so-called thin ABM is mare dangerous
than defensive. Why is that so?
I believe it is as certain as anything
can be in international politics that any
such deployment by either great power
will oblige the other to increase its offen-
sive forces, either quantitatively, quali-
tatively, or both. An American or a
Soviet ABM system surely will increase
the risks of a continued arms race with
unknowable consequences for strategic
stability and world peace. 4 is here that
the gravest long term dangers lie and,
if we are truly to serve our country's
interests, I believe we must never lose
sight of these concerns. the apparent
Soviet decision to slow down or abandon
their initial ABM deployment suggests?
that Moscow is also aware of these
considerations.
At the moment the Soviet Union has
renewed its expressions of interest in
bilateral talks about possible strategic
arms limitations. It would be tragic in-
deed if, at the very time when some pos-
sibility emerged of a serious negotiation
to curb the arms race, the United States
were to barge ahead with an ABM sys-
tem heedless of its implications for these
vital discussions. It has been argued that
we should proceed on this syStem in order
to gain leverage in the negotiations. It is
my opinion that a vigorous research and
development program, looking toward
possible deployment if the talks fail,
provide sufficient leverage at far less
cost and with substantially less provoca-
tion than a present deployMent.
In short I think our primary responsi-
bility is to attend to the central issues in
the strategic relationship between the
Soviet Union and the United States. I
would contend that we can serve this
goal best by prompt ratification of the
nonproliferation treaty and by immedi-
ate efforts to begin concrete negotiations
with the Soviets on limiting missile
forces.
This view is strengthened by the fact
that a new administration his now taken
office with fresh opportunities to explore
the possibilities of mutual lestraint by
the great powers. It is further strength-
ened by the fact that the Chinese stra-
tegic capability seems to have evolved
rather more slowly than initially project-
ed; this should provide additional time
for us to press forward with the arms
control effort before making a large and
possibly open-ended commit,cnt to anti-
ballistic-missile defense. We auld make _
exhaustive efforts in this direction, in-
cluding efforts to bring the Chinese into
a reasonable international security sys-
tem, before we fall back upon the primi-
tive and unreliable znechanism of com-
petition in deadly arms, a mechanism
which subsists only by fear and succeeds
only by chance.
These international considerations are,
of course, not the only ones we must take
into account. The fact is that, in the do-
mestic turbulence of our time, we have
gained a newasense of urgency about the
pressing needs here at home. The bil-
lions of dollars that would be required
for even a minimal ABM deployment
could doubtless find constructive and vi-
tal use for the well-being of our society.
Our cities, our schools, our disadvan-
taged youth and impoverished adults?
these have a paramount claim upon our
resources. We cannot fail to confront the
issue of whether the billions at (Stake can
rightly go to a questionable defensive sys-
tem when so many millions of our peo-
ple are in dire need. The question of
priority will not down?and I, for one,
would resolve it in favor of inyestrnent
in our critical domestic programs.
In arguing against the present invest-
ment in ABM, I feel it is incumbent upon
us to recognize that judgments in these
matters are rarely final and conclusive.
ABM technology may become more reli-
able and resolve the technical doubts
which persist about the system. The
political tensions and hostilities that
plague the search for peace may not
yield to even the most earnest negotia-
tions. The situation we now perceive
may change. tut that is hardly a reason
for plunging ahead in a premature in-
vestment in weapons with such far-
reaching implications for the future se-
curity of every human being on this
planet. Now is the time to give this deci-
sion the closest possible scrutiny, while
pursuing as diligently as possible the
diplomatic alternative. That is what we
propose and what we hope the Senate
will support.
I thank the Senator from Kentucky
who, as usual, has performed a great
service in giving us the opportunity to air
these views, discuss these matters, and
permit the American people to know
more about the matter because we could
fool the American people into a false
sense of security. They may be buying a
package that does not give them the se-
curity they think they are obtaining.
Mr. COOPER. I thank the Senator.
This is not to be a futile exercise, but
we do expect to bring to bear whatever
influence we can to prevent deployment
of this system, at least until it is proven
to be a system that will bring security
to the United States and not danger.
Mr. BROOKE. I thank the Senator.
Mr. COOPER. I yield to the Senator
from Montana.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The colloquy which
has taken place this afternoon has been
most enlightening. I was interested in so
many questions that I cannot remember
all of them.
The distinguished Senator from Mas-
sachusetts (Mr. Bacioxa) raised the ques-
tion as to whether or not this thin line
is directed against Peking or, in effect,
in the long run is to be directed_ against
the Soviet Union. I1 -I recall the debate
of last year, I believe that the manager
of the bill made no bones about the fact
that it would be directed against the
Soviet Union.
It comes to mind that the Soviet Un-
ion, indirectly but not formally, but
strongly, since the new administration
has come into power, has indicated* that
it would like to sit down with us to dis-
cuss such things as the missile race, the
ABM systems, the Mideast, and other
matters of mutual concern and mutual
worry.
I can understand why the present ad-
ministration as yet has not had an op-
portunity to react, but I feel quite cer-
tain that they are giving these feelers
from the Soviet Union?and I say this on
my own responsibility only?every con-
sideration, to see what, if anything, can
be done; because I recall the President
said, not once but several times, that now
is the time to move into negotiations and
away from confrontation. I believe him.
I think that he is trying to find a way
out of the impasse in which this country
and, as a matter of fact the world, finds
itself, because we cannot confine our-
selves to United States-Soviet Union re-
lations. Our interests encompass a far
wider range. There are a good many dif-
ficult areas which we have to face up to,
and we must try to find solutions to the
problems which confront us there.
Mr. President, I have been pleased
with the tone of the debate this after-
noon. I was very much pleased with the
statement made by the distinguished
chairman of the Armed Services Com-
mittee, the Senator from Mississippi (Mr.
STENNIS) , because he indicated an open
mind, that he was concerned, that he
had some questions, and that he was
going to see to it that all sides would be
heard.
I think that is good.
I think that what the distinguished
Senator from Kentucky and his col-
leagues on the floor of the Senate today
are doing will have a beneficial effect
not only so far as the hearings in the
Armed Services Committee are con-
cerned, but also in the Foreign Relations
Committee as well, of which we are both
members; as well as in the thinking of
the administration.
I was pleased to note that the Senator
from Mississippi indicated that the Sec-
retary of Defense and the Under Secre-
tary of Defense, the Director of the
Budget, and others, were aiving this
matter their closest attention; and that
he anticipated, when they got through
with their surveys, they would be pre-
sented to the President and then, of
course, he would make a decision.
I must say, frankly, that I have great
faith, on the basis of the President's
statement and activities so far, that he
will go into this matter thoroughly, rea-
sonably, and in depth. Let us hope that
on the basis of the findings made by the
Members who are in his administration,
on the basis of the testimony given by
witnesses otitside the Department of De-
fense and related agencies, as well as on
the basis of the consistent and continu-
ous colloquy on this subject which has
been going on in the Senate over the past
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3 years, a proper decision will be made
at the right time.
Mr. President, it is my belief that we
can go too far in this matter of a thin
lilac, which I think is, in effect, a "make
believe" line. I do not think it will have
any effect in its present stage, although,.
for the time being, the main activity
seems to be the purchase of real estate
in Massachusetts, Illinois, Montana,
Washington, and elsewhere. But we
should be very careful that we do not
get started on a project if it is not abso-
lutely feasible and necessary, because
this $5.8 billion figure which the Senator
from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE) has
mentioned, and the $9.4 billion figure
which the Senator from Missouri (Mr.
SYMINGTON) has mentioned, are sizable
increases from the $5 billion figure. How-
ever, it is my understanding that at a
minimum it will take at least $50 billion
to complete an ABM system, and it could
well cost $100 billion, or more?and very
likely more.
Let me say that the Soviet Union is
spending a similar amount of money to
build a similar number of ABM's.
Where would both countries be at the
end?
Right were they are today.
What would happen to the problems
In our own country, in the urban areas, in
the poverty-stricken parts of this Nation,
where money is needed and help is de-
sired, and where we have a potential
explosion which must be attended to?
Thus, I hope that, in the name of the
American people, and in the name of
mankind, we will not start on a mad race
which will accomplish nothing for either
country, but will merely increase danger
for the world.
The Russians have problems at home.
We have got enough in the way of prob-
lems at home, too.
Is there not some way that we can get
together to try to work out these differ-
ences over ABM's and missiles, and try to
work together to bring the Mideast into
some sort of economic stability, and
work together to build peace where pos-
sible throughout the world.
Instead of giving despair to mankind,
let us give mankind hope.
I thank the Senator from Kentucky
for yielding to me. [Applause].
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I deeply
appreciate the statement of the majority
leader.
He always speaks with wisdom. He
speaks with good sense. He speaks with
justice. He speaks with compassion.
He has made a speech today which the
whole country should hear.
Mr. MANSFIELD. It is a pleasure and
a privilege to work under the leadership
of the distinguished Senator from Ken-
tucky, as I have in the past 4 years in
this particular field?only one among
many.
I thank the Senator.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I now
yield to the Senator from Massachusetts
(Mr. KENNEDY) , who has waited SO long
and so patiently to speak.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I think
that the country, and certainly the Sen-
ate, has benefited greatly from the dis-
cussion here this afternoon, most par-
ticularly by the comments of two of the
most thoughtful spokesmen in this body;
namely, the distinguished Senator from
Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) and the distin-
guished Senator from Montana (Mr.
MANSFIELD) .
I know that each Member of this body
will benefit in the course of his own con-
siderations and deliberations by review.,
ing the comments and the questions
raised about this Sentinel ABM program
by these two very thoughtful, creative,
and sensitive men.
There is a steadily rising tide of doubt
In this country about the soundness, ne-
cessity and cost of some of our national
defense programs. Many of those Amer-
icans who have expressed these doubts
most articulately have done so here in
the Senate Chamber. Their ranks are
ever growing, and this reflects, I think,
the growing feeling in the country at
large.
? The Senate, charged with advising the
President on foreign policy matters, is
an entirely appropriate forum for a
thorough examination of the course our
national defense planners have charted.
And the Congress itself, charged with
examining and appropriating funds for
requests to carry out this course, must
bear the burden of insisting that these
national defense policies are rational and
sound.
Let me be entirely candid in expressing
my belief that we in the Congress?with
the notable exception of a few of our
colleagues--have been remiss in bearing
our responsibilities. We have not insisted
on full information, in many cases, where
national defense is at stake. We have
appropriated funds for programs which
have not proved workable, and which,
after the expenditure of tens of billions
of dollars, have been canceled. National
defense programs have somehow been
above the battle?it has always been
Implicit in many of our debates that it is
perhaps unpatriotic to question the rec-
ommendations of the Department of
Defense.
We are fortunate, I think, that this is
increasingly less so than in the immedi-
ate past. If we in the Congress?and
particularly in the Senate?take an ever
larger role in the deliberations and deci-
sions regarding the course our national
defense policies take, then it is my own
conviction that our country will be bet-
ter defended at less cost, than our com-
mon desire for world peace will be more
rapidly advanced, and that our division
of Federal budget expenditures will be
considerably more rational.
The particular concern which brings
me to make these remarks is the planned
deployment of the Sentinel anti-ballistic
missile system. Administration figures
indicate a cost of $5.5 billion for deploy-
ment of a "thin" system. Yet most ex-
perts readily acknowledge that the pres-
sures for deployment of a full Sentinel
ABM system will be severe?and that
this full system will cost upwards of $60
billion. When, we should ask, has there
been a full and candid national debate
over the wisdom and desirability of corn-
miting this vast sum to a system which
may well not work? Let me say that I do
not believe we have had such a debate,
but that we should.
We all remember the national debate
over medicare, a debate which raged for
years. And we remember the long debate
over the Elementary and Secondary Ed-
ucation Act. Each of these programs,
programs which were, incidentally, long
overdue, was enacted only after the most
complete and microscopic examination
of the pluses and the minuses. It is high
time that programs for national defense
no longer receive carte blanche treat-
ment In the Congress. Instead, they
should be subjected to the same scrutiny
as other programs. I share this view
with a large number of my colleagues,
and it is highly appropriate that as the
new Administration reviews the deci-
sions made two, three, and more years
ago relating to national defense and for-
eign policy, and examines the underly-
ing assumptions and rationale, we in the
Congress should, too, demand fuller and
more candid discussion.
The Sentinel ABM system is a case in
point.
It was put forward as a defense against
an unsophisticated Chinese ICBM threat.
Yet we have evidence that the Chinese
are developing weapons systems which
would make the Sentinel system obsolete.
It was put forward at a cost of $3.5
billion. Yet present estimates have risen
to $5.5 billion, and perhaps to $9.4 bil-
lion.
It was put forward when arms limita-
tion discussions with the Soviets were in
only preliminary stages. Yet we now
have hard evidence that the Soviets wish
to proceed immediately with disarma-
ment talks.
It was put forward as a means of sav-
ing American lives in a nuclear exchange.
Yet Defense Department figures indi-
cate this assumption to be in error. '
It was put forward on the argument
that Sentinel deployment would
strengthen our bargaining position vis-
a-vis the Soviets. Yet analysis of this
argument reveals its basic unsoundness.
These are only a few of the questions
which raise grave doubts about the wis-
dom of carrying the decision to deploy ?
Sentinel forward, and whether it creates
not true security, but instead a false
security.
I, for one, am against that decision.
I was when it was made. And I will
work with my colleagues here in the
Senate to see it reversed.
As background for that work, it may
be helpful to offer a review in some de-
tail of the major issues, as I see them,
which will be at stake in the Senate de-
bates this year.
In September of 1967, our Govern-
ment announced plans to deploy a limit-
ed antiballistic missile system at various
sites across the United States, The Sen-
tinel system relies upon coordinated use
of a battery of different components for
its effectiveness. It uses central comput-
ers, two types of radars, and two types
of missiles to seek out and destroy in-
coming enemy intercontinental ballistic
missiles before they reach the United
States.
The first type of radar is the perimeter
acqusition radar?PAR--used for long-
range tracking of incoming missiles. The
second is the missile site radar?MSR?
used both for shorter range tracking of
incoming missiles and for guiding our
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own defending U.S. missiles to their tar-
gets. The first missile type is the Spartan,
a three-stage solid propellant missile
launched from an underground silo. It
has a range of several hundred mileS,
carries a thermonuclear warhead, and
is designed for long-range interception
of incoming missiles. The second missile
type is the Sprint, a two-stage, solid
propellant missile, also nuclear tipped
and launched from an underground silo.
It is designed for short-range inter-
ception of the incoming missiles which
have penetrated the long-range Spartan
defense.
As presently planned, the "thin" Sen-
tinel system would include six PAR ra-
dars, ranged along the northern border
of the United States and in Hawaii and
Alaska, facing the polar routes of incom-
ing missiles. Each PAR site would be
about 300 acres in size, and the PAR
itself would be housed in a concrete
building 140 feet long and 330 feet wide.
Each PAR site would also be connected
to a number of "farms" of Spartan mis-
siles, and next to each Spartan farm
would be a farm of Sprint missiles to-
gether with a MSR site. The MSR sites
would be about 280 acres in size,
Site for Sentinel missile farms have
been announced near Boston; Cheyenne,
Wyo.; Chicago; Grand Forks, N. Dak.;
Great Falls, Mont.; Los Angeles; New
York City; Salt Lake City; Seattle; Al-
bany, Ga.; San Francisco; Sedalia, Mo.;
and Honolulu.
The scientists and engineers who de-
veloped the Sentinel system have quite
literally accomplished technological mir-
acles, devising equipment of immense
sophistication. Construction of the Sen-
tinel ABM system would be the single
most complicated engineering feat ever
undertaken in the world. There is, how-
ever, considerable and convincing evi-
dence that despite these technological
miracles, and despite our undoubted abil-
ity to complete this engineering feat, con-
struction of the Sentinel ABM system
would be a waste of money. Even worse,
construction of the system may set the
cause of world peace back immeasura-
bly.
Last week, I wrote to Secretary of De-
fense Laird and asked him to place an
immediate freeze on all Defense Depart-
ment activity relating to the construc-
tion of the Sentinel ABM..system sites. I
did so because of increasing evidence that
Pushing forward with the Sentinel sys-
tern would be a serious mistake. Many of
our Nation's most eminent scientists
some with experience at the highest pol-
icy levels of our Government, make what
appears to be an irrefutable case against
continuing deployment of the Sentinel
system. This case is not grounded merely
on technical, or on budgetary, or on
larger foreign policy considerations.
Rather, it encompasses all these con-
siderations, and more, and for this reason
is so compelling. It also raises serious
questions about the influence of the mili-
tary-industrial complex upon the Na-
tion's policymaking procedures.
The first of the Sentinel system sites is
planned for just outside Boston. A PAR
site is presently under construction in
North Andover, Mass.; and the notices or
invitation to bid on the 1ntial phases ot
an MSR site in the Lynnfield-Reading
area of Massachusetts, are scheduled to
go out on February 20, 1969. The Depart-
ment of the Army has conducted a series
of meetings in Massachusetts, in an
effort to explain to the residents of the
Boston area what the Sentinel system
facilities involve.
The most recent of these meetings was
held at the Reading High School last
Wednesday evening, and attended by
some 1,500 persons. Among those present
were a number of eminent scientists, and
the information they presented and the
arguments they made merit review, I
think, in the Congress. In sum, the case
they made questions the very soundness
of the decision to deploy the Sentinel
SBM system. Let me summarize the
points made at the meeting:
First, technical questions. We simply
do not have convincing evidence that the
Sentinel system will function under com-
bat conditions, against either a Chinese
threat or, particularly, against a Soviet
threat. The component missiles of the
Sentinel system?the Spartan and the
Sprint?have proven under test condi-
tions that they can intercept an incom-
ing ICBM, and that their warheads Can
neutralize an enemy missile. But we have
learned that our radars are blacked out
for some minutes after an atmospheric
nuclear explosion, because of the cloud of
ionized gas such an explosion creates.
While this cloud is dissipating, which
takes some minutes, the heart of the
Sentinel system?the sophisticated ra-
dars?are useless. This gives rise to the
prospect of an enemy deliberately hold-
ing back the bulk of a hypothetical salvo,
until our radars are blacked out, perhaps
from the explosion of our own defending
missiles. Then this enemy would loose
the bulk of his attacking missiles, which
would be undetected by our Sentinel and
hit their U.S. targets.
Then, too, there are other questions. In
response to reports of limited Soviet de-
ployment of an ABM system, the U.S. is
developing counter-measures?including
multiple independent re-entry vehicles
(MIRVs) , which will permit a single
missile to carry up to ten warheads. All
evidence indicates that the Soviets are
developing similar offensive counter-
measures to our Sentinel and other
weapons systems, such as orbital delivery
systems and low-flying missiles in frac-
tional orbits (FOBS), which would not be
detected by our radar defenses. There is
another, somewhat different, technical
question well worth repeating. By the
very fact of including the short-range
Sprint in the Sentinel system, our plan-
ners have indicated their belief that
some number of enemy missiles will
penetrate the long-range Spartan shield,
and thus must be intercepted at lower
altitudes by the Sprint. A determined
enemy might set his incoming missiles to
detonate at an altitude of 50,000 feet, or
about where a Sprint intercept might
take place. Yet the detonation of a large
nuclear warhead at 50,000 feet would
cause great devastation in a large area
beneath it?fire and radiation devasta-
tion. An enemy might also direct a war-
head with a high fallout yield into an
unpopulated area, not protected by a
point defense Sprint missile. The fallout
from this weapon could destroy the
United States just as well as could a
direct hit.
In sum, there are two threads to the
unresolved technical questions. In the
first place, as Dr. Jerome Wiesner,
Science Advisor to Presidents Kennedy
and Johnson, pointed out recently:
A few competent people .expect the ex-
tremely complex ABM system to work the
first time; yet It must to have any effect.
And in the second place, as former
Defense Secretary McNamara pointed
out recently in commenting on the re-
ported Soviet ABM deployment:
I do not think there is a senior civilian
or military official in the Defense Department
that does not believe that . . we have the
technical capability to react in such a way
as to assure our continued capability to
penetrate that Soviet ABM defence.
Since the Soviets have shown that they
have a technological capability which can
match ours, I am sure that the senior
Soviet officials believe they can penetrate
the Sentinel ABM defense we are de-
veloping, just as we believe we can pene-
trate any system they develop.
Second, our relations with the Soviet
Union. In his January 18, 1969, state-
ment on national defense posture, former
Defense Secretary Clifford said that we
stand "on the eve of a new round in the
armaments race with the Soviet Union,
a race which will contribute nothing to
the real security of either side, while in-
creasing substantially the already great
defense burdens of both." Secretary Clif-
ford then urged pursuit of an agreement
with the Soviets on a limitation of arma-
ments. For at least three years, our Gov-
ernment has sought to persuade the
Soviets to agree on such a limitation. A
number of our colleagues in the Senate
have recently visited with the Soviet
leadership, and reported to the Senate
that the Soviet are ready to begin dis-
cussions with the United States. One indi-
cation of this readiness may be the report
of Secretary Clifford, also in his defense
posture statement, that the Soviets have
curtailed construction of a Moscow-area
ABM system.
So much, of such large importance to
the future of mankind, hangs in the bal-
ance of agreeing to limit armaments, that
we must not follow any course?no mat-
ter when or by whom set?which leads
to an intensification of the arms race. As
Secretary Clifford pointed out, our best
intelligence tells us that the Soviets are
slowing construction of their limited
ABM system. Should we provoke them
into speeding up construction, by build-
ing our own, and thus exacerbate the
tensions which lie between us? I think
not. We should raise the prospects for
world peace by seeking to phase the arm-
aments race down, not be escalating it.
Third, site location. In Massachusetts,
the two Sentinel system site locations are
in the greater Boston metropolitan area.
The sites near Seattle and Chicago are
likewise situated in populated areas. This
site placement raises three immediate
and important questions, one relating to
safety from accidental explosions, one to
enemy targeting considerations, and the
last to the rationale for constructing a
"thin" Sentinel system. While the exact
figures are classified, the best estimates
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S 1375
are that an accidental explosion in the
silo of a Spartan warhead would cause
total devastation in an area 5 miles in
diameter, and serious destruction over a
far greater area. Although the risk of
accidental explosion is very low, it is not
zero?and for this reason, it would seem
reasonable to ask why at least the Spar-
tan missiles are not placed in unpopu-
lated areas, just as our ICBM's are. This
is particularly so in the light of expert
testimony that should the missiles be 50,
or a 100 miles distant from the Boston
area, the quality of protection accorded
Boston would not differ. Since, with in-
coming ICBM's we are dealing in dis-
tances of many thousands of miles, it
would hardly be different were the Sen-
tinel missiles located more remotely from
Boston and other populated areas, where
safety would be much higher.
Another factor related to site location
Is enemy targeting. We must assume that
our Sentinel ABM sites?certainly the
PAR radars?would be 'Prime enemy tar-
gets in the event of attack. On this basis
also, they should be placed in remote
areas, as the most rudimentary safe-
guard. And this is so whether or not we
assume that a hypothetical enemy would
consider population centers as the prime
target.
Finally, one must draw the reluctant
conclusion that the Sentinel sites are
cose to population centers because our
planners envisage not a "thin" ABM
system, but instead a full one. For if we
planned only a "thin" system, there
would be no need to place the sites close
to the cities. Instead, they could be put
In remote countryside areas.
Fourth, cost. When first discussed in
early 1967, the costs of this "thin" Sen-
tinel ABM system were estimated to be
$3.5 billion. By September, 1967, when the
deployment decision was announced by
the Government, the cost had risen to
$5 billion. The most recent estimates
are $5.5 billion. Previous experience with
weapons systems of this type make it a
near certainty that these estimates will
be far too low?that we may eventually
spend $10 or $15 billion on just this
"thin" system before it is completed. We
must not, either, ignore what will be
strong pressures to expand the "thin"
Sentinel system into a full-blown, ex-
tensive ABM system, at cost estimates
which run upwards of $60 billion.
Before we get too far along in commit-
ing ourselves to a project with this price
tag, we should be certain we are buying a
system which will work, and which will
not be obsolete in 5 or 10 years. Obso-
lescence is an unfortunate hallmark of
many of our military defense programs,
largely because of long leadtimes and
unexpected technological advances. For-
mer Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus
Vance testified 2 years ago that?
Because of the very rapid rate at which
the technology changes, to maintain an effec-
tive (ABM) system one would essentially
have to turn over the whole system every few
years. ?
If, by 1975, the Sentinel system is ob-
solete, can we say that the funds spent to
construct it were wisely spent? Our sec-
ond-strike missile capability is now uni-
versally acknowledged to be sufficient to
destroy Russia and China; would they be
less willing to attack us because we have
a "thin" ABM system which we cannot
even be sure will work under combat con-
ditions? I do not think so, and con-
sequently think whatever funds we do
spend on Sentinel deployment will be
spent unwisely.
Fifth, bargaining posture. Supporters
of the Sentinel ABM system often make
the argument that construction of the
system will strengthen the bargaining
position of the United States vis-a-vis the
Soviets, in any disarmament talks.
This argument seems particularly fal-
lacious to me, on a number of counts. In
the first place, since even Sentinel pro-
ponents concede that the "thin" Sentinel
system would be ineffective against a So-
viet attack, and ineffective against what-
ever sophisticated missiles the Chinese
possess, I can see no advantage at all, in
talks with the Soviets, in having an ABM
system which has virtually no impact on
their offensive missile capability.
In the second place, by the middle of
this year the Soviets will be on a parity
with the United States in the number of
deployed ICBMs. In any disarmament
talks, it is inconceivable that they would
agree to an arms moratorium requiring
them to come out at a disadvantage vis-
a-vis ,the United States, a disadvantage
from which they did not suffer when the
talks began. The same argument applies
to an ABM system. It is inconceivable
that the Soviets would agree to a mora-
torium permitting the United States to
maintain an ABM system, while they?
the Soviets?did not have an effective
one. Consequently, construction of the
Sentinel system will have no relevance
whatever upon our bargaining posture.
And in the third place, assuming that
we did complete the "thin" Sentinel sys-
tem, and that the Soviets did corre-
spondingly, and then we reached a dis-
armament agreement?we would then,
presumably, dismantle the Sentinel sys-
tem which would have gained us nothing
in the negotiations and cost us billions
of dollars. Only if we viewed the ABM
system as important vis-a-vis a Chinese
threat, would it make sense to maintain
an ABM system. In this regard, it is in-
teresting to note that the Soviets?who
may have reason to fear Chinese inter-
mediate range missiles?have curtailed
their own ABM construction activity.
In sum, I see no validity to the. argu-
ment that we need a Sentinel system to
strengthen our hand with the Soviets?
the "thin" Sentinel cannot make us any
stronger than we now are.
Sixth, distortion of Federal funding
priorities. The costs of the Vietnam war
have seriously threatened the stability of
our economy, and have forced a severe
cutback._ in Federal expenditures for the
nonmilitary programs in education,
housing, health, employment, and con-
servation. This cutback is generally con-
ceded to be at least partly responsible
for the divisions and unrest with which
we have had to deal here at home in the
last 30 months.
One measure of how drastic the cut-
back has been is the differen6e between
the authorization and the appropriation
for any given program. Writing in
Agenda for the Nation, former Budget
Bureau Director Charles Schultze said
that?
A sample count of fifteen programs, all
dealing with relatively important social prob-
lems, indicated that actual program levels
in fiscal 1969 were about $5 billion below the
authorized amount.
This underfunding of our domestic
programs simply cannot be allowed to
continue. Many of us in the Congress
have long hoped that the "peace divi-
den," the funds which would be freed up
for purposes other than Vietnam when
the war there is phased down, could be
applied to these underfunded domestic
programs. This would be a major step
forward, in my opinion, in redressing the
present distortion in our budget priori-
ties. If, on the other hand, we are to see
the "peace dividend"?whatever may be
its size?diverted to the Sentinel and
similar projects, then we stand little
chance of reuniting the Nation.
Seventh, limitation of U.S. casualties.
The argument is generally made that de-
ployment of even a "thin" Sentinel sys-
tem will save American lives in the event
of a nuclear exchange. But based on offi-
cial, published Defense Department fig-
ures, this is simply not so. These figures
appear in former Secretary McNamara's
testimony last year before the Appropri-
ations Committees. In sum, they indi-
cate that a Soviet preemptive first
strike against U.S. military and city
targets would cause 120 million casual-
ties. The figures then indicate that de-
ployment of the "thin" Sentinel system
would reduce this casualty figure by 20
million, to 100 million?so long as the
Soviets did not respond to our ABM de-
ployment by installing penetration aids
on their offensive missile systems. If, on
the other hand, the Soviets did respond
by installing penetration aids, then the
casualty figure would again be 120 mil-
lion?precisely where we would be with-
out the Sentinel ABM system. Can there
be anyone who doubts the intention and
capability to respond to our initiatives. I,
for one, feel sure that Soviet scientists
and engineers are working to develop and
install penetration devices, just as we are.
There are many more arguments to
be put forward against deploying the
Sentinel ABM system, many of which
were aired in Senate debates last year.
In the main, they question using a missile
threat from China as the justification for
constructing a "thin" Sentinel ABM sys-
tem, pointing out that we will force the
Chinese to develop sophisticated ICBM
and submarine-launched missiles by de-
ploying an ABM system. This will in turn
force us to take other steps to counter the
Chinese steps, and so on, ad infinitum.
When the budget request for fiscal year
1970, for funds to continue deployment
of the Sentinel, comes before the Senate,
both on authorization and appropriation
requests, I am sure that the debates of
last year will be reopened. And there is
much new evidence and information
available now, which was not available
then, throwing open to even more serious
question the efficacy of the Sentinel ABM
system. It is my intention, working in
concert with other Senators, to ask the
Senate to deny any request for additional
funds to deploy the Sentinel system. I
shall also ask that no further construc-
tion work on deployment using funds al-
ready appropriated be carried out, and
that instead those funds be used for con-
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it 1969
tinued research and development of an
ABM system. For the sake of our national
preparedness, we must continue our re-
search and development effort; but for
the sake of domestic tranquility and Of
world peace, I think we must stop work
on deployment.
Pending resolution by the Congress of
this question, I would like to restate my
suggestion of last week to Secretary
Laird: that he put a freeze on any De-
partment of Defense activity actually re-
lated to deployment of the Sentinel ABM
system, while not changing the status of
research and development on ABM sys-
tems. Such a freeze would be strong evi-
dence of good faith in our pledge to limit
the arms race. It would permit time for
a review of Sentinel site placement near
populated areas. It would change the as-
sumption regarding the Sentinel system,
by forcing its proponents to convince the
policymakers that it is a wise expendi-
ture instead of forcing its opponents to
convince them that it is unwise. It would
be dramatic evidence to a troubled world
that the first concern of the United
States is world peace. And finally, it
would be a dramatic initiative on the part
of the United States toward arms ling-
tation discussions with the Soviets.
It is my understanding that Secretary
Laird and Undersecretary Packard are
presently reviewing the decision to deploy
the Sentinel ABM system?a decision
made 2 years ago. It is my hope that they
will present their review to the National
Security Council, for this decision should
not he made on military grounds alone.
It is, instead, inextricably wound up with
the most basic of our foreign policy con-
siderations, our budgetary concerns, and
our intelligence estimates.
President Nixon has asked that the Na-
tional Security Council recommend a
policy course to him on the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty. It is entirely appro-
priate that the Sentinel 413M system, and
its future, be treated similarly, and I
would hope that the National Security
Council be asked its view of the Defense
Department's recommendations.
We have too much at stake, in the de-
bate over the Sentinel ABM system, to
let past decisions control our present and
future course. Instead, we have the op-
portunity to think through the rationale
for deploying Sentinel. It is a rare op-
portunity, and we must grasp it for the
sake of our own children, and of theirs.
I must say, Mr. President, that I share
the pleasure of the distinguished Sena-
tor from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) , the
distinguished Senator from Montana
(Mr. MANSFIELD) , and the distinguished
Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER), in
the fact that there will be open hearings
on the Sentinel this year, and that in
them we will have the benefit of the tes-
timony of non-Government experts who
have experience and background in this
area. I know they can add to the knowl-
edge and understanding of all of us in
this body. 11.
So I think the distinguished Senator
from Kentucky has performed a very im-
portant service, as have my other col-
leagues as well, in addressing themselves
to this matter in the early part of this
session. We know the President is giv-
ing the imitter serious thought. When he
is aware Of the very deep feeling of the
Members of this body, who cover a very
wide spectrum of political experience
arid understanding, coming from differ-
ent parts of the country, and when he
understands the very serious reserva-
tions that have been expressed in this
body for a whole host of reasons, I think
it is entirely appropriate that a hold or
freeze be put on this program and that
further expenditures be halted until the
Senate and the House and the President
have a chance to review this grogram.
So I, too, want to congratulate the
Senator from Kentucky. The hour is late.
I think the fact that there were as many
Senators here to speak on this, and the
fact that other Senators have filed state-
ments in the RECORD and have indicated
that they will continue to speak about it,
really demonstrates, as clearly as it is
possible to demonstrate, the extraordi-
nary importance that many of us place
upon this problem. It demonstrates as
well our very deep-seated belief that
there needs to be a total review, and that
we should take no further steps in this
program without that total review.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I think
the questions which the Senator from
Massachusetts addressed to the Secre-
tary of Defense are of vast importance. I
appreciate also the cooperative and ra-
tional approach that he takes toward the
efforts of the administration and its nec-
essary review of the ABM problem. I
appreciate the wisdom of his views.
We have been in session a long time.-
I am going to close. I will simply say
again that it is our purpose to continue
to seek information, to debate this ques-
tion, to do our best to influence the ad-
ministration, and if necessary to defeat
the proposed appropriation of funds for
further deployment of the ABM sys-
tem.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, the
issue of the "thin" anti-ballistic-missile
system has been brought to the floor on
two prior occasions and, as then, I now
oppose the construction of an ABM sys-
tem. Consistent with my desire to see the
Vietnam war brought to an end and the
need for the world's major powers to
seek peace and tranquility throughout
the world, it is my contention that an
end to the construction of the ABM sys-
tems is an essential step.
My position should not be construed to
be an oversight of the fact that con-
tinued research and development work
on an antimissile system must not cease
because of its necessity for our national
preparedness. In retrospect, it seems
quite clear that we undertook the con-
struction program without thoroughly
evaluating the worth or merit of the sys-
tem, therefore we find ourselves seeking
to freeze another project that we were ill
advised to undertake initially.
Furthermore, there have been certain
technical problems raised which leave
serious doubts as to whether the ABM's
could, in fact, do the job under emer-
gency conditions. Several other argu-
ments have been presented in opposition
to the ABM system, many of which are
tenable; however, my strongest misgiv-
ings of the system lie in the fact that we
should not continue to finance a system
that offers such a small degree of cer-
tainty that it can do the job. Also, a U.S.
commitment to freeze the construction
of the ABM system will be a major effort
to reduce world tensions. Therefore, I
join my colleagues in Urging the admin-
istration to freeze all activities related
to the construction of Sentinel sites.
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, a fresh
attack is being levied against the Sen-
tinel antiballistic-missile system. Res-
idents near the areas in which these
missile sites are going to be Wilt are
greatly disturbed, and are expressing
their dissatisfactien in increasing num-
bers.
As a case in point, in the Chicago area,
public hostility and resistance to the
army's site selection has been consider-
able. Recently, three North Chicago
municipalities adopted resolutions stat-
ing their opposition to the construction
of ABM's near their communities.
Apparently, these people are apprehen-
sive over the prospect of having anti-
ballistic missiles right in their own back-
yard. Certainly, the fears of these
residents that an accidental explosion
could wipe out their whole community
may be legitimate.
But while these concerns may be justi-
fied, there are other equally as persua-
sive reasons for halting construction of
the Sentinel ABM.
First based upon the present state of
missile technology, the Sentinel system
would not be effective against an allout
enemy missile attack. In addition, ini-
tiating construction of the ABM could
hamper prospects for a United States-
Soviet arms control agreement. Also, at
this critical stage of our economy, when
Federal funds are desperately needed
to meet the crisis of our environment and
of our cities, allocating billions of dol-
lars to a project that has never been
proven to be effective seems unwise to
me.
The battle over the ABM is intensify-
ing and I am hopeful that when the Con-
gress reconsiders this project, it will
decide to delay it until adequate research
and development proves it effective.
So that my colleagues may become
more familiar with the sentiments of
the concerned citizens of the Chicago
area, I ask unanimous consent that an
article appearing in the January 23,1969,
edition of the Chicago Tribune be re-
printed in the RECORD.
In addition, I ask unanimous consent
that the excellent article entitled "H-
Bombs in the Back Yard," also be re-
printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Chicago (Ill.) Tribune,
Jan, 23,1969]
THREE SUBURBS' RESOLUTIONS DISAPPROVE OF
NIKE MISSILE SITE
(By Patricia Stemper)
Three north Chicago municipalities last
week adopted resolutions stating their disap-
proval of the site for the planned Sentinel
anti-ballistic missile base south of 'Liberty-
ville.
They are the Highland Park city council,
and the Lincolnshire and Northbrook village
boards.
More than 100 Highland Park residents,
some of whom are members of the Northern
Illinois Citizens Against Anti-Ballistic Mis-
sile fisTICAABMI, attendUel last week's city
council meeting to Alrge the council to adopt
a resolution opposing the missile site.
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February .4, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SIAN
NO ONE IS INFALLIBLE
"No man in the world is infallible," said
Dr. Benjamin Ziedman, a nuclear physicist
at Argonne National Laboratory who ad-
dressed the council. "We know an accident is
possible. In the event of an accident, High-
land Park ceases to exist," he said.
"Based on the information we have, all we
can do is to ask that the site be reconsidered
rather than opposed," said Raymond Geraci,
councilman. "Otherwise we are preempting
the government," he said.
At first, the council unanimously adopted
an unwritten resolution recommending to the
defense department that it reconsider in-
stalling the missile site in Libertyville.
RESIDENTS OBJECT
However, after receiving objections from
residents who said they wanted a stronger
resolution?one that stated that "the city of
Highland Park is opposed to the Liberty-
ville site as a missile base or any site near
a densely populated area"?the council later
in the week drafted a written resolution.
Altho the final draft does not state its op-
position to the missile site, it "strongly
urges" the defense department to reconsider
its designation of Libertyville as a Sentinel
antiballistic missile site "in the interest of
safety to adjacent communities," and to re-
locate the site to an "area of less dense popu-
lation."
When the final draft was written, the resi-
dents were represented by Jerome Man, a
Highland Park resident who is running for
councilman in the forthcoming election. The
council asked that the residents choose a
representative to meet with the council when
the resolution was drafted. Man also was the
[NICAABM] spokesman at the council meet-
ing.
ARMY GAVE FACTS
In the events at the council meeting which
led to the drafting of the written resolution,
the residents said they could take action
based on the information they have been
given by the army. "We have that right,"
said a resident. "The burden should be on
the government to supply the last bit of
Information."
The council said that having a resolution
which recommends that the defense depart-
ment change the planned missile site "is
opposing the site in a different form."
The Lincolnshire village board last week
adopted a resolution which opposes the Lib-
ertyville site for an antiballistic missile sys-
tem bccause of the dense population in the
area, said Dave Soulak, village adminis-
trator.
VILLAGE IS NEAR SITE
He said the board adopted the resolution
because Lincolnshire's northwest boundary
is 11/2 miles from the planned missile site.
The resolution also asks the defense de-
partment to change the site to a less popu-
lated area 25 to 50 miles northwest of the
planned site.
At the board meeting, the board received
a petition signed by 125 to 135 residents ask-
ing that the site not be located at the aban-
doned 180-acre Nike missile base north of
United States highway 45, 11/2 miles north-
west of Half Day, Soulak said.
STRONG RESOLUTION
"The resolution is the strongest one we
could possibly make," he said.
The Northbrook village board's retolution
also "strongly opposes" the installation of
the missile system near Libertyville or in
any part of the Chicago metropolitan area.
The vote on the resolution was 4 yes and
2 pass.
GLENVIEW ACTED
In December, the Glenview village board
adopted a similar resolution by a unanimous
vote.
Construction of the 70-million-dollar site
is expected to begin in July. It is being de-
veloped as a possible deterrent of enemy
atomic capability which experts believe will
be developed by the mid-1970's. .
H-BOMBS IN THE BACK YARD
(By David R. Inglis)
A reporter for a small suburban newspaper
recently visited a drilling rig on the edge of
Clarendon Hills, a western suburb of Chi-
cago, and inquired what was up. He learned
that the Army was exploring for a suitable
site for anti-ballistic missiles. A scientist from
the suburban Argonne National Laboratory
noticed the story; subsequent luncheon-table
discussions aroused concern among scientists
which soon spread to the Chicago news media.
Insidious are the ways of military public rela-
tions, and this is how Chicago happened to
learn that, if all goes as planned, it is to
have H-bomb-tipped missiles installed in its
own back yard, on the edge of Cook County
upward from the Loop.
When one of the scientists went to talk
to the colonel in charge of the drilling oper-
ation, he was astounded to learn that the
Sentinel installation was to include long-
range Spartan missiles, in addition to the
short-range Sprints. Only the Sprints might
conceivably have some reason to be near a
city if Congress should in the future opt for
an attempt at city defense and authorize
something much larger than the 0-billion
Sentinel system. Later word from Lieut. Gen.
A. D. Starbird, after a secret briefing in Chi-
cago on November 29, is still more surprising:
The site will have only long-range Spartans,
no Sprints. Some other sites may get Sprints.
The capability claimed for the Sentinel
system is that its Spartan missiles can stoP
a small attack by a few missiles?such as the
Chinese might have in the mid-Seventies?if
they are as primitive as our first ICBMs in
lacking penetration aids. The Sprints of the
system are mainly to protect its Spartans
and the accompanying radar. An optional
"kicker" in the system, as was explained
by its promoters, is that its short-range
Sprints might be used to provide some pro-
tection for our ICBMs in their underground
silos, and thus slightly blunt a Soviet coun-
terforce attack.
There are, of course, far-reaching implica-
tions of the decisions to deploy an ABM
system, implications for the stability of the
nuclear deterrent, for the future of the en-
tire arms race and for the possibility of
diplomatic initiatives that might reduce the_
likelihood of nuclear war. But there are, in
addition, two purely local objections. First is
the possibility that, in a limited nuclear war
with the Soviet Union, local Spartans might
draw enemy fire to the city. The Army's reply
is that the population centers are prime
targets in any event. But who knows? There
has been long and vacillating argument
about the "counterforce" and "counter-popu-
lation" options of nuclear attack. Should an
attacker spend his first salvos on the mis-
siles of the enemy in an attempt to mini-
mize retribution, or should he concentrate
on doing "unacceptable damage" to the
population and expect to take the brunt of a
counterattack on his own population?
The think-tank pendulum has swung be-
tween one and the other. Counter-popula-
tion is the current style on our side and that
is what the Army means by saying the cities
are prime targets in any event. But, who
knows, the Soviet high command might be-
lieve in counterforce ten years from now.
If they should follow this course, and on
some tense occasion attack, they might de-
cide to strike at the Spartans on the edge
of Cook County that could conceivably de-
fend some of our ICBM's. In the process
they would devastate Chicago and pulverize
some western suburbs. If, on the other hand,
they decide to attack both types of targets,
we will have helped them kill two birds with
one stone.
An objection based on the distinction be-
tween limited and all-out nuclear war may
S 1377
seem not very serious because any nuclear
war would, represent a disastrous failure of
policy, and it is hard to believe that it could
remain limited. However, there is also no
serious reason for the Spartans to be close to
cities, since their effectiveness must be nearly
uniform over the central part of the 600
to 1,000 mile-wide region they attempt to
defend. This is implied in various official
statements and in information given to Con-
gress during debates leading up to the initial
appropriations for the system. There was
very little discussion of where the sites
would be, but Congressman Sikes, floor
leader for the Sentinel appropriation, stated
in the House on July 29, 1968, that "these
sites will be some distance away from the
centers of population."
In reply to the sudden publicity, the Chi-
cago Sun-Times of November 16 quoted Col.
R. J. Bennett, information officer of the
Huntsville, Alabama, missile center, as say-
ing; "The Sentinel site near Chicago is nec-
essary to complete the Sentinel defense of
the entire United States. To make such a
defense most effective, considering the pro-
jection of future defense needs, this site
should be near the center of the greatest
population."
Here is the tip-off of the Army's inten-
tions. Congress has authorized the deploy-
ment of the Sentinel system and has funded
Its initial stages, particularly site acquisition.
In the Senate debates, the main motivations
for deployment given by the promoters of the
system were defense against a Chinese at-
tack and the protection it might afford
against an accidental launching of a Soviet
ICBM. There were a few Senators who frank-
ly argued for it as a step toward a much
larger anti-Soviet system, which is probably
the real reason the inherently expansive De-
partment of Defense supports it. The initial
Sentinel, it was said, might serve as a "build-
ing block" for the much larger system. Still,
it seems clear that most of the Senators who
voted for the deployment?and the votes
were fairly close?did so out of a feeling that,
being in doubt, they should now support
only the limited Sentinel system and either
oppose the larger system or put off the larger
decision. Thus in using a "projection of fu-
ture defense needs" to justify putting Spar-
tans near large populations, the Army seems
to be jumping the gun on a Congressional
decision and acquiring sites for the larger
anti-Soviet system, under the guise of lim-
ited Sentinel deployment.
A second local objection to these sites is
that there is some chance, probably very
small, that one of the cluster of H-bomb war-
heads installed on the edge of the city might
accidentally explode, and if it should, the
consequent loss of life could be catastrophic.
A surface burst or a shallow subsurface burst
in a silo produces much more fallout?from
vaporized and activated earth?than a nor-
mal explosion high in the air. The Spartan
warhead is said to be "in the megaton range."
This would indicate a weapon approximate-
ly a hundred times as powerful as the bomb
that destroyed Hiroshima from half a mile
in the air. Its local fallout from an acci-
dental subsurface burst would be highly
lethal throughout a large metropolitan area
and for many miles down-wind. There would
be less blast damage than from an air burst,
but it would still be widespread enough to
flatten several suburbs.
An accidental explosion of a Sprint would,
of course, be much less lethal. How much
less is hard to say because we are told only
that its warhead is much less powerful than
a Spartan?"In the kiloton range." Taken
literally, this could mean anywhere from one
kiloton, or perhaps even less, to a hundred
kilotons or more. Indications are, however,
that it is considerably less powerful than
the 20 kilotons of the Hiroshima bomb or
the first A-bomb tested 100 feet above the
New Mexico desert. Even so, it could pose a
serious hazard in the vicinity because of the
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S 1378 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE February 4, 069
high amount of fallout produced by a shal-
low subsurface detonation. Whatever the un-
certain magnitude of this Sprint hazard may
be, an accidental burst of the monstrously
powerful Spartan warhead would be calami-
tous indeed.
To this objection, Colonel Bennett was
quoted, by the Chicago Daily News of Novella-
bar 15, as saying: "There bas never been an
accidental nuclear exploeion. The control
devices are so good and soInaolved that an
accidental explosion Ls not a danger." This
sounds like a good, commonsense attitude.
the voice of experience. Many military per-
sonnel get accustomed to Heine' with dangers.
A soldier knows that the grenade he carries
could blow him to bits if the pin were acci-
dentally pulled, but after flying with it on
his belt for a year he forgetweaout the slight
danger. Even so, most civilian; would prefer
not to live on a power keg Without some very
good reason for doing so.
Designers have worked hard to make the
control devices as effective as humanly pos-
sible, and they must be good, for the record
is very good. It even happens to be perfect.
We don't hear much about the near-acci-
dents, but in the case of one-bomb dropped
accidentally in North Carolina in 1961, it was
reported that five of the idx safety devices
had failed. There were six, and the bomb Was
"unarmed" so there was MU detonation. An
H-bomb in the bay of an:airplane can be
carried "unarmed," with one vital part to be
inserted before dropping, because there is
plenty of time to "arm" it Ma the way to the
target. Thus it may be intrinsically easier
to make it safe than it is Me a missile such
as the Sprint, which must be ready to fire
within a few minutes of the first warning
and within a fraction of a second of identifi-
cation of its target. We haven't had experi-
ence with those yet. But ere]) ignoring this
distinction, the good record is not completely
convincing.
Experience with bomb accidents is the sort
of stuff that the study of statistical probabil-
ities is made of. Let us think a aout a variant
of the ghoulish game of "RaMelan Roulette."
A six-shooter has a cylinder with six bullet
slots. Suppose you are giventarie not knowing
whether it is loaded. You are permitted to
spin the cylinder ten times?or even a hun-
dred times?and pull the trigger. You do so-
anti it does not fire. You are then to point it
at your head and pull the trigger. Would you
feel sure that you would not kill yourself?
Fairly sure? Yes. But certain, No.
The armed forces have bean storing or
handling, let us say, 10,000 nuclear bombs
for perhaps ten years. They point to the fact
that none has exploded as proof that none
will explode accidentally. They propose to
store, at -a guess, a thousand nuclear war-
heads near American cities -tor the next ten
years. According to past experience the
probability that one of tnien will explode
accidentally is not more than 10 per cent.
Citizens of Chicago may take comfort that
that is divided among ten cities or so, so
locally there may be only about one chance
in a hundred of serious trouble in the next
ten years. That is about :all that can be
proved by Colonel Bennett's reference to the
good record. It may be good common sense to
ignore a small risk like one chance in a hun-
dred, even if the event would be catastrophic,
for one feels that life is full of dangers. But
let us look at the small chancai on the other
side of the coin.
Why are we Installing this Sentinel sys-
tem? The reasons are confused; they involve
China and Russia, they invinve military and
industrial pressures on Congre,.;s, and citizen
anxiety or apathy and many other factors.
So let us simplify again by cca)sidering only
the official reasons given for the Sentinel
deployment. Colonel Bennettsaid: "The Sen-
tinel system is designed to 0.!end the nation
against a possible delivered Inissile attack by
the Chinese Republic or anceiental launch
of a nuclear armed intercetifinental missile
by any foreign power."
The same Army spokesman who wants us
to ignore the small chance of an accidental
explosion at home by claiming that it does
not exist is inviting us to worry about the
chance that China, with a few missiles, will
attack a country with thousands of missiles
and to worry that an accidental launch of a
Russian missile will hit one of our cities!
There are few things of which one can be
absolutely sure, but common sense should
make us very nearly certain that the Chi-
nese, at a time when they will have only a
few intercontinental missiles, would not
make a completely suicidal attack against
the tremendous nuclear might of the United
States. Such an attack seems much less
certain than an accidental Sprint or Spartan
detonation.
More serious than the Chinese "threat" is
the technical possibility that an accidentally
launched Russian missile might come our
way. We have more than a thousand missiles
in underground silos, with their computers
and radars all adjusted to guide them to-
ward various Russian cities and missile sites,
and the Soviets likewise have several hun-
dred missiles aimed at us. The chance that a
Soviet missile would be launched accident-
ally may seem fairly remote. But what we
are considering is more unlikely than that.
We are considering the chance not only that
a Soviet missile will malfunction and be
launched, but that it will malfunction in
such a way that it functions perfectly and
alms directly at an American city 8,000
miles away. Although the likelihood of this
double feat seems very small indeed, it is
perhaps more probable than a Chinese at-
tack.
Which, then, seems the more likely: a few
hundred Soviet missiles being so perfectly
launched accidentally as to hit an Ameri-
can city, or one of several hundred Ameri-
can missiles simply exploding accidentally
where it sits on the edge of a city? The first
seems to require two accidents in succession,
the latter a single accident. Even if it is a
? fairly remote chance, it seems considerably
more likely that an American city would
suffer nuclear calamity from an accident at
home than from a Soviet accident.
Thus, if the Army persists in its plan to
put the Sentinel missile sites On the edge
of population centers, even from the limited
local point of view the cure is worse than the
disease. This situation could be remedied by
moving the missile sites out into open coun-
try, where the Spartans would be just as
ready to intercept an accidentally launched
missile.
Civilians can make such a change when
the Army submits its missile-site plans for
Congressional approval, starting with a hear-
ing before the normally cooperative Joint
Armed Services Committee, scheduled for
this month.
Introducing more danger than one is try-
ing to prevent is typical of the whole effort
to attain national safety through ABM de-
fense. This larger folly can be remedied only
by having the people and their Congress
learn, perhaps through these local mistakes,
that national safety is not to be sought by
pursuing the will-o'-the-wisp of ABM de-
fense. This defense would not be effective
against a massive Soviet attack, according
to those highly placed experts who have had
a thorough look at the military and techni-
cal factors involved, but who have no vested
interest in military empire-building?for-
mer Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara
and all of the science advisers of the last
three Presidents. People must learn that na-
tional safety in the precarious nuclear age
should be sought instead by more vigorous
pursuit of international agreements?which
the Soviet Union appears to be ready to pur-
sue to our mutual benefit?by cutting off
the deployment of offensive' and defensive
missiles of the nuclear giants, by avoiding
the spread of nuclear weapons to many na-
tions, and by otherwise "taming the atom"
so that we may turn our energies more fully
to improving the lot of Mankind and re-
moving the causes of war.
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, as the
Senate seeks ways to limit defense
spending?particularly to forestall the
tragic new cycle in the arms race which
the .ABM portends?we must take can-
did account of the nearly-automatic
forces in our own economy which foster
the production of ever more sophisti-
cated and costly weapons.
I invite the attention of the Senate
to a frank and thoughtful speech on this
subject by our new colleague from Mis-
souri (Mr. EAGLETON)
The Senator reminds us that when we
speak of the "military-i,ndustrial com-
plex," we are talking "not about a coterie
of skulking warmOngers, but a sizeable
portion of the American population"
whose bread and butter depend, in one
way or another, on defense production.
The Senator from Missouri does not
conclude that we are condemned forever
to build defense system on defense sys-
tem while we skimp on our domestic
needs, but he offers a timely warning
that this will happen unless we act now
to redress the balance between the fortes
in our society which favor more military
production and those which fairer do-
mestic development.
I ask unanimousl consent that Senator
EAGLETON'S speech, delivered in Wash-
ington, Mo., on February 1, be printed
in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the speech
was ordered to be printed in the REC-
ORD, as follows:
SPEECH By SENATOR THOMAS F. EAGLETON,
JUNIOR CHAMBER OF COMMERCE DINNER,
WASHINGTON, MO., FEBRVARY 1, 1969
Karl Marx and George Orwell, between
them, managed to convince a lot of people?
followers and critics alike?that war and
prosperity go together in a capitalist society.
Not so. The Vietnam wax, far from con-
tributing to the economic health of America,
has brought rapid inflation and stilted pri-
orities. Just read this week's headlines about
the biggest consumer price increase in 17
years . . . which has priced many American
goods out of the international market and
caused the smallest trade surplus in three
decades.
As the President's Cabinet Coordinating
Committee on Economic Planning for the
End of Vietnam Hostilities stated:
"Although the American economic system
demonstrated the strength and adaptability
necessary to carry the extra load without
major disruption and without jeopardizing
its fundamental health, the cost of war has-
been a load for the economy to carry?not
a supporting `prop.' Prosperity has not de-
pended on the defense buildup and will not
need high military spending to support it in
peacetime. On the contrary, peace will pro-
vide the Nation with welcome opportunities
to channel into civilian use manpower and
material resources now being devoted to
war." ,
With a flicker of hope for peace now evident
in Paris, I want to talk a little tonight about
those welcome opportunities . .. and to raise
a serious question as to whether we are in-
deed prepared to seize theiti.
The great challenge after past wars has
been to keep our economy moving when de-
fense spending and defense production sud-
denly let up. And we have usually failed to
meet that challenge.
The end of the Korean War in 1953 Saw
the beginning of a major recession. By mid-
1954 the gross national product had fallen
by 3.7 per cent and industrial production
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February 4, ififf
had dropped off sharply by 9 per cent Un-
employment, after remaining at an excep-
tionally low level for two years, nearly
trebled?from 2.4 per cent in August of 1953
to 6.4 per cent in March of 1954.
The economic outlook for the post-Viet-
nam period is much more hopeful.
For one thing, we have learned some les-
sons about the need to plan in advance for
reconversion. The Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency has prepared 26 major
planning documents on aspects of economic
reconversion. Moreover, while the impact of
the war has been substantial, the economic
drain of Vietnam still represents only three
per cent of our GNP. And this impact has
been widely diffused among all states and
most industries. As the President's Coordi-
nating Committee states: "Only a relatively
small number of areas and industries are
likely to be specially affected by the demo-
bilization or to encounter significant transi-
tional problems."
So I believe that our dynamic free enter-
prise economy can and will make a prompt
and healthy adjustment to peace. As a na-
tion, we will be richer.
But this brings me to a much more pro-
found question: Do we have the ability and
foresight not only to keep our great economic
engine running, but to redirect it to serve the
urgent needs of peace?
Believe me, there will be nothing automatic
about transferring military expenditures to
peaceful uses, at home or abroad, when the
war in Vietnam is over.
The pressure will be enormous to keep
those defense plants humming . . to keep
those workers on the job and doing pretty
much what they are doing today . . ? to pre-
vent a reduction in our 89 billion dollar de-
fense budget.
Plans for super new defense systems will
be ripped off the Pentagon drawing boards
and taken to the Congressional Defense and
Appropriations Committees before the first
troop ship reaches San Francisco.
And there will be plenty of contractors
and workers, legitimately concerned about
their economic future, who will be ready to
testify for them.
When the industries and businesses that
fill military orders are the largest producers
of goods and services in the United States
today . . . when their activities pour about
45 billion dollars into over 5,000 cities and
towns . . . when they employ more than one
American worker out of ten?the economic
momentum of war production will not easily
be deflected.
In addition, there is the raw political fact
that there are 991 separate defense industry
installations in 363 of the country's 435 con-
gressional districts?and these plants are full
of worried constituents.
Call this the "military-industrial com-
plex" if you will. But remember that you
are talking not about a coterie of skulking
warmongers, but a sizeable portion of the
American population whose legitimate per-
sonal interests will make them want to keep
on doing what comes naturally in defense
production when the war ends. It will take
nothing short of a national act of will to
shift a meaningful share of our resources
from war-making to peace-building?at home
and in the world.
"It is an unfortunate fact," said John F.
Kennedy, "that we can secure peace only
by preparing for war." And it is quite obvious
that major cuts in defense spending will be
impossible for the foreseeable future.
But the fact remains that since 1945 the
United States of America has spent 936 bil-
lion federal dollars on the military?and only
115 billion dollars on education, health, wel-
fare, housing and community development
combined.
These domestic challenges are no less
grave than threats from foreign enemies.
NC/ is mee,ting them less critical for Amer-
ica's future.
But even though there is profit in
peace . . . even though a civilian worker
produces more, earns more and buys more
than a man in uniform .. . there is no "edu-
cation-industrial complex" . . . or "housing-
industrial complex" . . . or "urban-develop-
ment-industrial complex" presenting a
meaningful counter-claim for public funds.
There are a variety of things we can do
to avoid losing our post-war peace dividend
by default.
Congress can and must begin to scrutinize
the military budget. Senator Richard Rus-
sell, Chairman of the Senate Appropriations
Committee, characterized our present ten-
dency last year in these rich words:
"There is something about preparing for
destruction that causes men to be more
careless in spending money than they would
be if they were building for constructive
purposes. Why that is, I do not know; but
I have observed, over a period of almost
thirty years in the Senate, that there is
something about buying arms with which
to kill, to destroy, to wipe out cities, and to
obliterate great transportation systems
which causes men not to reckon the dollar
cost as closely as they do when they think
about proper housing and the care of the
health of human beings."
The Administration can move forward
now to seek Congressional approval of the
nuclear non-proliferation treaty and speed
up its timetable for meeting with the So-
viet Union on general arms reductions.
But most important of all, the American
public has to get angry about poor schools ...
about congested cities .. . about filthy air . . .
about not enjoying the quality of life their
prosperity should assure them. Somebody
has to make an effective case for peace-
building; and nobody but an aroused Ameri-
can public?you?can do it.
OUR 20TH CENTURY FOLLY
Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mr.
President, on September 18, 1967, over
my objection, we capitulated to the in-
terest of a few self-imposed guardians of
our destiny by accepting the decision to
deploy the limited ballistic missile de-
fense system against the possibility of an
attack by Chinese ballistic missiles. Dur-
ing the previous 8 years, two adminis-
trations considered and rejected sugges-
tions that ongoing development programs
for missile defense be followed by pro-
curement of one system or another. At
first it was a primitive Nike-Zeus missile.
Such a system could have been built by
1963, but would have been obsolete by
the time it became operational, accord-
ing to the evaluation by no less than the
Defense Department itself. A more ad-
vanced system, Nike X, could have been
ordered in 1963 and built by this time,
but even that system would have been
obsolete by 1966.
These wise decisions have saved us at
least $20 to $30 billion, the estimated cost
for the implementation of these ABM
proposals. And I do not see any reason
to believe that the Sentinel system will
not be obsolete 5 years from now?with
a comparable waste of at least $5 billion.
Mr. President, this is the beginning of
our 20th century folly. I greatly fear that
the decision to build this "light" ABM
system is only paving the way for those
who advocate a greatly expanded anti-
missile defense at an estimated cost ex-
ceeding $40 billion.
This course of action is as irresponsible
on fiscal grounds as it is pointless on mil-
itary grounds. When the decision was
made, the Defense Department admitted
that it would be ineffective against the
Soviet Union, but said the decision was
motivated instead by a fear of Chinese
attack. What folly. We all know the basic
technical fact is that this system can be
easily neutralized by the Chinese by us-
ing relatively simple and cheap penetra-
tion aids or by developing different
means of weapons delivery.
The logical conclusion of this develop-
ment will be an accelerated arms race be-
tween the East and the West. Both sides
place their defensive hopes on an offen-
sive deterrent. If either side becomes
convinced its offensive deterrent is no
longer an adequate defense, that nation
or nations will immediately accelerate
its development of offensive weapons.
The uncertainty involved in the nature
of this reaction, and the likelihood of
overreaction on both sides, pose great
dangers to the stability of the nuclear
balance?a danger too great to risk.
One of the biggest disappointments to
me in the 90th Congress was our failure
to ratify the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty. The indication is quite clear that
the decision to build this Sentinel system
was, in part, calculated to stimulate fur-
ther discussion with the Soviet Union on
the arms race. To this end, President
Johnson persuaded the Soviet Union to
agree to negotiate a treaty to ban such
systems. The tool is available?now let
us use it.
Mr. President, the implications and
repercussions from this major policy de-
cision are incalculable. Yet the average
citizen is hardly aware of the problems
involved, and the public debate, at least
prior to the decision, was limited to a
relatively small number of decision-
makers. With few exceptions, even that
debate rarely progressed beyond the
technical and strategic realms. Our con-
cern today is to assure this debate.
If this were a social program where
one-hundredth of the cost were involved,
there are those who would guarantee an
endless debate. But, it is not?it is only
a decision which perpetuates the tend-
ency of our Government to be un-
restrained and unreflective in expendi-
tures of human and economic resources
on defense. Why are we so unwilling to
gamble with this kind of money where
people are involved? Where is our equal
enthusiasm for model cities, education,
health, and other social and domestic
problems? What has happened to our
priorities?
Mr. President, the people of New Jer-
sey are distressed and concerned about
the possibility of locating part of this
monster in two of their communities?
Caven Point in Jersey City and Tenafly.
We do not want them there; we do not
have room for them there; and we want
to be heard. If we can't stop this folly,
at least we should be heard, for history
should not judge us all by the decision of
a select few.
Mr. FELL. Mr. President, I whole-
heartedly associate myself with the views
of the Senator from Kentucky as he has
expressed them, as well as with those of
the majority leader and the assistant
majority leader.
I wish also to revert to the point raised
by the Senator from Massachusetts
(Mr. BaooKE) when he mentioned that
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he had read the published report the
Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Gosz) and
I made after our fairly long trip to
The Prague and Moscow, when we hada
fairly long conversation 'with Premier
Kosygin, and the conclusions he drew
from that report.
There is no question but that the Soviet
leadership indicated, in every way they
could, that they did want to get on with
the discussion of disarmament. It woukl
appear that they are a bit ahead of us
when it comes to defensive weapons, arid
we are ahead of them with offensive
weapons for that reason, they would like
to get on to a discussion of the whole Of
both offensive and defensive missiles.
The point was also made in our dis-
cussion, which has not been particu-
larly brought out publicly since, that
Premier Kosygin emphasized he hoped
that any negotiations would take plafe
from positions of reasonable parity.
I think this was quite significant, in
view of the context of the times. Perhaps
just by remembering, that through-modi-
fication in the use of the English lan-
guage, we have seen "superiority" beconie
"sufficiency," so, perhaps, "sufficiency"
can, in turn, come to be considered a
synonym for "reasonable parity."
In that case, there would be no reason
why discussions could not move ahead
more quickly than we have hoped this
far.
I think it is also striking, in that
discussion, on which Senator BROOKE
touched, that the Premier referred, in
positive, direct, and friendly terms, to
our then President-elect Mr. Nixon. The
ground could certainly be paved for dis-
armament discussions, from the view-
point of us who spent almost 2 hours
talking with Mr. Kosygin in his office.
Included in the general subject of
the ABM is its development in the fu-
ture. We are now dealing with a thin
ABM, but the next stage beyond that
would be a full scale ABM, and then the
next stage beyond that, Which we hare
not even thought about, would be the
development of anti-ballistic-missile
systems on the ocean floor, in the sea-
bed, perhaps on the mid-Atlantic ridge.
Thus we see the possibility of a whole
new generation of weapons systems be-
ing developed; and it is to that point that
I should like to address myself now, on a
similar or parallel subject.
TREATY TO GOVERN THE ACTIVITHS OF NATIONS
IN OCEAN SPACE
Mr. President, on January 21 of this
year, I introduced Senate Resolution 33,
containing a detailed set of legal prin-
ciples for the governing of activities in
the international marine environment,
and urging the President of the United
States to have these principles placed
before the newly established United Na-
tions Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
the Seabed. Wishing to preqs this issue
further, and hoping that the process be-
tween the adoption of a U.N. resolution
on this matter and the formulation of
an acceptable international agreement
on ocean space can be accelerated, I have
fomulated my own set of legal principles
into an actual draft treaty. I have in-
corporated this treaty proposal in a reso-
lution, and I ask unankrious consent
that it be printed in the RI:Goitre
The PRESIDING Ore iCER. The reso-
lution will be received and appropriately
referred; and, under the rule, the reso-
lution will be printed in the RECORD.
The resolution (S. Res. 92) was re-
ferred to the Committee on Foreign Re-
lations, as follows:
S. Res. 92
Whereas the threat of anarchy is imminent
in the field of scientific exploration and
commercial exploitation of the deep sea and
Its resources; and
Whereas international agreement on a
rule of law governing the activities of nations
In the exploration and exploitation of the
deep sea and its resources is in the common
interest of all mankind: Now, therefore, be
it
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Sen-
ate that the President should take all neces-
sary steps, through the Secretary of State,
the United States delegation to the United
Nations, or any other appropriate agency or
officer of the United States, to enter into
negotiations with representatives of the gov-
ernments of the major coastal and maritime
nations and all other interested nations of
the world to the end that there shall be con-
cluded, with as widespread acceptance as is
possible, a treaty on the peaceful exploration
and exploitation of ocean space as follows:
"TREATY ON PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ACTIV-
ITIES OF STATES IN THE EXPLORATION AND
EXPLOITATION OF OCEAN SPACE
"PREAMBLE
"The States Parties to this Treaty,
"Inspired by the great prospects opening
up before mankind as a result of man's ever-
deepening probe of ocean space?the waters
of the high seas, including the superjacent
waters above the continental shelf and out-
side the territorial sea of each nation, and
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine
areas of the high seas outside the area of
the territorial sea and continental shelf of
each nation,
"Recognfting the common heritage of
mankind in ocean space and the common
interest of all mankind in the exploration of
ocean space and the exploitation of its re-
sources for peaceful purposes,
"Believing that the threat Of anarchy
exists in the exploration and exploitation of
ocean space and its resources, _
"Desiring to contribute to broad interna-
tional cooperation in the scientific as well
as the legal aspects of the exploration and
exploitation of ocean space and its resources
for peaceful purposes,
"Recalling the four conventions on the
Law of the Sea and an optional protocol of
signature concerning the compulsory settle-
ment of disputes, which agreements were
formulated at the United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea, held at Geneva
from 24 February to 27 April 1958, and were
adopted by the Conference at Geneva on 29
April 1958,
"Recalling the Treaty on Principles Gover-
erning the Activities of States in the Explo-
ration and Use of Outer Space, Including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which was
unanimously endorsed by United Nations
General Assefribly resolution 2222_ (MCI) of
19 December 1966 and signed by sixty na-
tions at Washington, London, and Moscow
on 27 January 1967, and considering that
progress towards international cooperation
in the exploration and exploitation of ocean
space and its resources and the development
of the rule of law in this area of human en-
deavor is of comparable importance to that
achieved in the field of outer space,
"Recalling United Nations General Assem-
bly resolution 2467A of 21 December 1968,
which provided for the establishment of a
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-
bed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of
National Zurisciiction, and the uses of their
resources in the interests of mankind.
":Recognizing that the problems resulting
from the commercial exploitation of ocean
space are imminent,
"Believing that the living and mineral
resources-in suspensam in the high seas, and
in the seabed and subsoil of ocean space,
are free for the use of all nations, subject
to international treaty obligations and the
conservation provisions of the four conven-
tions on the Law of the Sea,
"Convinced that a Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Ex-
ploration and Exploitation of Ocean Space
will further the welfare and prosperity of
mankind and- benefit their national States,
"Have agreed as follows:
"PART I
"GENERAL PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO OCEAN
ACE
"Article
"The exploration and use of ocean space
and the resources in ocean space shall be
carried out for the benefit and in the inter-
ests of all mankind, and shall be the prov-
ince of all mankind.
"Article 2
"Ocean space and the resources in ocean
space shall be free for exploration and exploi-
tation by all nations without discrimination
of any kind, on a basis of equality of op-
portunity, and in accordance with interna-
tional law, and there shall be free access
to all areas of ocean space.
"Article 3
"Ocean space is not subject to national
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by
means of use of occupation, or by any other
means.
"Article 4
"There shall be freedom of scientific in-
vestigation in ocean Space and States Parties
to the Treaty shall facilitate and encourage
international cooperation in such investiga-
tion, but no acts or activities taking place
pursuant to such investigation shall consti-
tute a basis for asserting or creating any
right to exploration or exploitation of ocean
space and its resources.
"Article 5
"States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on
activities in the exploration and exploitation
of ocean space and its resources in accord-
ance with international law, including the
Charter of the United Nations, and the pro-
visions contained in these articles, in the
interest of maintaining international peace
and security and promoting international co-
operation and understanding.
"Article 6_
"States Parties to the Treaty shall bear
international responsibility for national ac-
tivities in ocean space, whether carried on
by governmental agencies or non-govern-
mental entities or nationals of such States,
and for assuring that national activities are
carried on in conformity with the provi-
sions set forth in this Treaty. The activities
of non-governmental entities and nationals
of States in ocean space shall require au-
thorization and continuing supervision by
the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.
When activities are carried On in ocean space
by an international organization, responsibil-
ity for compliance with this Treaty shall be
borne by the International organization
itself.
"Article 7
"In the exploration of ocean space and the
exploitation of its resources, States Parties
to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle
of cooperation and mutual assistance and
shall conduct all their activities in ocean
space with due regard for the corresponding
interests of all other States Parties.
"Article 8
"States Parties to the Treaty shall render
all possible assistance to any person, vessel,
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vehicle, or facility found in ocean space in
danger of being lost or otherwise in distress.
"Article 9
"States Parties to the Treaty engaged in
activities of exploration or exploitation in
ocean space shall immediately inform the
other States Parties or the Secretary General
of the United Nations of any phenomena they
discover in ocean space which could consti-
tute a danger to the life or health of persons
exploring or working in ocean space.
"PART II
"USE OF OCEAN SPACE EXCEPT SEABED AND SUB-
SOIL
"Article 10
"All States Parties to the Treaty shall have
the right for their nationals to engage in fish-
ing, aquaculture, insolutdon mining, trans-
portation, and telecommunication in the
waters of ocean space beyond the territorial
seas of any State.
"Article .11
"The right declared in Article 10 shall be
subject to the treaty obligations of each
State Party to the Treaty and to the interests
and rights of coastal States and shall be
conditioned upon fulfillment of the conser-
vation measures required in the agreement
entitled "Convention on Fishing and Con-
servation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas', adopted by the United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea at Geneva on
29 April 1958.
"Article 12
"Any disputes which may arise between
States Parties to the Treaty with respect to
fishing, aquaculture, in-solution mining,
conservation, and transportation activities in
the high seas shall be settled in accordance
with all the provisions of the convention re-
ferred to in Article 11 setting forth a com-
pulsory method for the settlement of such
questions. The provisions of Article 27 and
Annex 4 of the International Telecommuni-
cation Convention, signed at Geneva on De-
cember 21, 1959, shall be applicable to any
disputes which may arise between States
Parties with respect to telecommunication
activities in the high seas.
"PART III
"USE OF SEABED AND SUBSOIL OF OCEAN SPACE
"Article 13
"In order to promote and maintain inter-
national cooperation in the peaceful and
orderly exploration, and exploitation of the
natural resources, of the seabed and subsoil
of submarine areas of ocean space, 'each State
Party to the Treaty undertakes to engage in
such exploration or exploitation only under
licenses issued by a technically competent
licensing authority to be designated by the
United Nations and to be independent of any
State.
"Article 14
-"The natural resources referred to in this
Part consist of the mineral and other non-
living resources of the seabed and subsoil
together with living organisms belonging to
sedentary species, that is to say, organisms
which, at the harvestable stage, ?either are
immobile on or under the seabed or are un-
able to move except in constant physical
contact with the seabed or the subsoil.
"Article 15
"The activities of nationals and non-gov-
ernmental entities in the exploration of sub-
marine areas of ocean space and the exploita-
tion of the natural resources of such areas
shall require authorization and continuing
supervision by the appropriate State Party
to the Treaty, and shall be conducted under
licenses issued to States Parties to the Treaty
making application on behalf of their na-
tionals and non-governmental entities.
When such activities are to be carried on
by an international organization, a license
may be issued to such organization as if it
were a State.
"Article 16
"It shall be the duty of the licensing au-
thority referred to in Article 13 to act as
promptly as possible on each application for
a license made to it. In issuing licenses and
prescribing regulations, the licensing au-
thority shall apply all relevant provisions set
forth in this Treaty, shall give due consider-
ation to the potential impact on the world
market for each resource to be extracted or
produced under such license, and shall apply
the following criteria:
"(a) The license issued by the licensing
authority shall (i) cover an area of such
size and dimensions as the licensing au-
thority may determine, with due regard given
to providing for a satisfactory return of
investment, (ii) be for a period of not more
than fifty years, with the option of renewal,
provided that operations are conducted with
the approval of the licensing authority, MO
require the payment to the licensing au-
thority of such fee or royalty as may be
Specified in the lease, (iv) require that such
lease will terminate within a period of not
more than ten years in the absence of op-
erations thereunder unless the licensing au-
thority approves an extension of the period
of such license, and (v) contains such other
reasonable requirements as the licensing
authority may deem necessary to implement
the provisions of this Treaty and to provide
for the most efficient exploitation of re-
sources possible, consistent with the conser-
vation of and prevention of the waste of the
natural resources of the seabed and subsoil of
ocean space.
"(b) If two or more States Parties to
the Treaty apply for licenses to engage in
the exploration of the seabed and subsoil
of ocean space or the exploitation of its nat-
ural resources in the same area or areas
of ocean space, the licensing authority shall,
to the geratest extent feasible and practi-
cable, encourage cooperative or joint working
relations between such States and be guided
by the principle that ocean space shall be
free for use by all States, without discrimi-
nation of any kind, on a basis of equality of
opportunity. But, if it proves impractical for
the license to be shared, the licensing au-
thority shall determine which State Pasty
to the Treaty shall receive the license with
due regard given to the encouragement of
the development of the technologically de-
veloping States.
"(c) A coastal State has a special interest
in the conservation of the natural resources
of the seabed and subsoil of ocean space ad-
jacent to its territorial sea and continental
shelf and this interest shall be taken into
account by the licensing authority.
"(d) A coastal State is entitled to take
part on an equal footing in any system of
research and regulation for purposes of con-
servation of the natural resources of the sea-
bed and subsoil of ocean space in that area,
even though its agencies or nationals do not
engage in exploration there or exploitation
of its natural resources.
"(e) The exploration of the seabed and
subsoil of ocean space and the exploitation
of its natural resources must not result in
any unjustifiable interference with naviga-
tion, fishing, or the conservation of the liv-
ing resources of the sea, nor result in any
Interference with fundamental oceanographic
or other scientific research carried out with
the intention of open publication.
"(f) A State or international organization
holding a license is obliged to undertake, in
the area covered by such license, all appro-
priate measures for the protection of the liv-
ing resources of the sea from harmful agents
and shall pursue its actiivties so as to avoid
the harmful contamination of the environ-
ment of such area.
"Article 17
"1. Subject to appropriate regulations
prescribed by the licensing authority re-
ferred to in Article 13 and to the following
S 1381
provisions, a State or international orga-
nization holding a license shall be entitled
to construct and maintain or operate on
the seabed and subsoil of ocean space in-
stallations and other devices necessary for
its exploration and the exploitation of its
natural resources, and to establish safety
zones around such installations and devices
and to take in those zones measures necessary
for their protection.
"2. The safety zones referred to in this
Article may extend to a distance of 500
metres radius around the installations and
other devices which have been erected,
measured from each point of their outer
edge. Ships of all nationalities must respect
these safety zones.
"3. Such installations and devices do not
possess the status of islands and have no
territorial sea of their own.
"4. Due notice must be given of the con-
struction of any such installations, and
permanent means for giving warning of their
presence must be maintained. Any installa-
tions which are abandoned or disused must be
entirely removed by the State or interna-
tional organization responsible for its con-
strUction.
"5. Neither the installations or devices, nor
the safety zones around them, may be estab-
lished where interference may be caused to
the use of recognized sea lanes essential to
international commerce and navigation.
"Article 18
"To the greatest extent feasible and prac-
ticable, the licensing authority referred to in
Article 13 shall disseminate immediately and
effectively information and data received by
It from license owners regarding their activi-
ties in ocean space.
"Article 19
"If a State Party to the Treaty has reason
to believe that an activity or experiment
planned by it or its nationals or non-govern-
mental entities under a license issued pur-
suant to this Part would cause potentially
harmful interference with activities of other
States Parties in the peaceful exploration and
exploitation of ocean space, it shall under-
take appropriate international consultations
and obtain the consent of the licensing au-
thority referred to in Article 13 before.
proceeding with such activity or experiment.
A State Party to the Treaty which has rea-
son to believe that an activity or experiment
planned by another State Party would cause
potentially harmful interference with activi-
ties in the peaceful exploration and exploita-
tion of submarine areas of ocean space may
request consultation concerning the activity
or experiment and submit a request for con-
sideration of its complaint to the licensing
authority, which may order that the activity
or experiment shall be suspended, modified,
or prohibited. Review of any such order shall
be allowed in accordance with the provisions
of Article 24.
"Article 20
"All stations, installations, equipment, and
sea vehicles, machines, and capsules used on
the seabed or in the subsoil of ocean space,
whether manned or unmanned, shall be open
to representatives of the licensing authority
referred to in Article 13, except that if there
is objection to this procedure by the licensee,
such facilities shall be open only to the Sea
Guard of the United Nations as set forth in
Article 27 of this Treaty.
"Article 21
"Whenever a State Party to the Treaty or
an international organization fails to com-
ply with any of the provisions of a license
issued to It under this Part, such license
may be canceled by the licensing authority
referred to in Article 13, upon thirty days
notice to the State or international orga-
nization concerned, but subject to the right
of the license owner to correct any failure
of compliance within a reasonable period of
time to be specified by the licensing author-
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ity, and, in any event, to request review of
the decision of the licensing authority as
set forth in Article 24.
"Article 22
"Any dispute which may arise under this
Part between States or international orga-
nizations holding licenses, or between license
owners and the licensing authority referred
to in Article 13, shall first be submitted for
settlement by the licensing authority which
shall determine its own procedure, assuring
each party a full opportunity to be heard
and to present its case.
"Article 23
"In all cases of disputes under this Part,
whether among license owners or between
license owners and the licensing authority
referred to in Article 13, the licensing au-
thority shall be empowered to make awards.
"Article 24
not primarily designed or intended for use
or stationing on the seabed or subsoil of
ocean space; or
"(C) the use or stationing of any device
on or in the seabed or subsoil of ocean space
which is designed and intended for purposes
of submarine or weapons detection, identi-
fication, or tracking.
"Article 26
"1. Each of the States Parties to this
Treaty undertakes to refrain from the im-
placement or installation on or in the seabed
or subsoil of ocean space of any objects con-
taining nuclear weapons or any kinds of
weapons of mass destruction, or the sta-
tioning of such weapons on or in the seabed
or subsoil of ocean space in any other
manner.
"2. Each of the States Pasties to this
Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain
from causing, encouraging, or in any way
"1. In the case of any dispute under this participating in the conduct of the activities
Part, if the licensing anthority shall not described in paragraph 1 of this Article.
have rendered its decision within a reason- "Article 27
able period of time or if any party to a dis-
pute under this Part desires review of the
decision of the licensing authority, such dis-
pute shall, at the request of any of the
parties, be submitted to a standing review
panel which shall consist of not more than
three members to be appointed by the Inter-
national Court of Justice, The decision of
the licensing authority Shall be final and
binding upon all parties to a proceeding be-
fore it unless a request for a review of such
decision is made under this Article within
a period of thirty days from receipt by alien
parties of notice of such decision.
"2. No two members of the panel may be
nationals of the same State No member may
participate in the decision of any case if he
has previously taken part in such case in
any capacity or if he is a national of any
party involved in the case.
"3, Members of the panel shall serve at
the pleasure of the International Court of
Justice, The Court shall fix the salarias,
allowances, and compensation of members
of the panel. The expenses of the panel shell
be borne by each party to proceedings be-
fore the panel in such a Manner as shall be
decided by the Court.
"4. The panel shall determine its own
procedure, assuring each party to the pro-
ceeding a full opportunity to be heard ar d
to present its case.
"5. The panel shall hear and determine
each case within a period of ninety days
from receipt of a request for review of such
case, unless it decides, in ease of necessity,
to extend the time limit for a period not ex-
ceeding thirty additional clays. The decision
of the panel shall be by majority vote and
shall be final and binding upon the parties
to the proceeding; except that if any party
to the proceeding desires review of the de-
cision, or if the panel ban failed to render
its decision within the period prescribed in
the preceding sentence, the case shall be
within the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice as contem-
plated by paragraph 1 of Article 36 of the
"All stations, installations, equipment, and
sea vehicles, machines, and capsules, whether
manned or unmanned on the seabed or in
the subsoil of ocean space shall be open to
representatives of other States Parties to the
Treaty on a basis of reciprocity, but only
with the consent of the State concerned.
Such representatives shall give reasonable
advance notice of a projected visit in order
that appropriate consultations may be held
and that maximum precautions may be
taken to assure safety and to avoid inter-
ference with normal operations in the facil-
ity to be visited. All such facilities shall be
open at any time to the Sea Guard of the
United Nations referred to in Part VII of
this Treaty, subject to the control of the
Security Council as set forth in such Part.
'TART V
"REGULATIONS ON THE DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE
WASTE MATERIAL IN OCEAN SPACE
"Article 28
"The disposal of radioactive waste material
in ocean space shall be subject to safety regu-
lations to be prescribed by the International
Atomic Energy Agency, in consultation with
the licensing authority referred to in Article
13 of this Treaty.
"Article 29
"In the event of the conclusion of any
other international agreements concerning
the use of nuclear energy, including the dis-
posal of radioactive waste material, to which
all of the States Parties to the Treaty are
parties, the rules established under such
agreements shall apply in ocean space.
"PART VI
to accept any agreements which may be
reached in the event a conference is con-
vened to consider such questions as provided
for in Article 13 of the Convention on the
Continental Shelf, adopted at Geneva on 29
April 1958; and any agreement so reached
shall become effective for purposes of this
Treaty when approved by the conference.
"PART VII
"SEA GUARD
"Article 31
."In order to promote the objectives and
ensure the observance of the provisions set
forth in this Treaty, States Parties to the
Treaty agree that there shall be established
as a permanent force a Bea Guard of the
United Nations which may take such action
as may be necessary to maintain and enforce
International compliance with these prin-
ciples.
"Article 32
"The Sea Guard shall be under the con-
trol of the Security Council of the United
Nations, in consultation with the licensing
authority referred to in Article 13 of this
Treaty. Paragraph 3 of Article 27 of the
Charter of the United Nations shall be ap-
plicable to decisions of the Security Council
made with respect to the Sea Guard. The
licensing authority shall be responsible un-
der the Security Council for the supervision
of the Sea Guard in connection with the
performance by the Sea Guard of such duties
as the licensing authority may deem appro-
priate to assign or delegate to the Sea Guard
for purposes of the implementation of Part
III of this Treaty.
"Article 33
"States Parties to the Treaty are encour-
aged to provide to the Sea Guard such per-
sonnel and suitable scientific and sea patrol
vessels as are necessary for the establishment
and maintenance of the Sea Guard.
"Para VIII
"NATIONAL LAWS TO APPLY TO CRIMES IN OCEAN
SPACE PENDING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT
ON CODE OF CRIMINAL LAW
"Article 34
"Pending agreement upon an international
code of lave governing criminal activities in
ocean space and the institution of an appro-
priate tribunal with jurisdiction over viola-
tions of such code of law, personnel of States
Parties to the Treaty and nongovernmental
entities of State Parties and international
organizations engaged in activities of explor-
ation or exploitation in ocean space shall be
subject only to the jurisdiction of the State
-of which they are nationals or the State
which bears responsibility for their activities
in respect of all acts or omissions occurring
while they are in ocean space, unless other-
wise provided for by international law or in
this Treaty.
"LIMITS OF CONTINENTAL SHELF
"Article 30
"In order to assure freedom of the explo-
ration and exploitation of ocean space and
its resources as provided in this Treaty, there
is a clear necessity that fixed limits must be
set for defining the outer boundaries of the
continental shelf of coastal States. For the
Statute of the International Court of Jus- purpose of the provisions of this Treaty, the
tice, and may accordingly be brought before term 'continental shelf' is used as referring
the Court by an application made by auch (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the sub-
marine areas adjacent to the coast but oat-
side the area of the territorial sea to a depth
of 550 metres, or to a distance of 50 miles
from the baselines from which the breadth
of the territorial sea is Measured, whichever
results in the greatest area of continental
shelf, and (b) to the seabed and subsoil of
similar submarine areas adjacent to th
coasts of islands. In no case, however, shal
the continental shelf be considered for such
purpose to encompass an area greater than
the area (exclusive of territorial sea) of th
State or island to which it is adjacent. Recog
nizing the desirability of achieving agree
ment on unsettled questions relating to de
fining the boundaries of the continenta
shelf States Parties to the Treaty undertak
party.
"PART rv
"USE OF SEABED AND SUBSOIL OF OCEAN SPACE
FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES ONLY
"Article 25
"1. The seabed and enbsoil of submarine
areas of ocean space shall be used for peace-
ful purposes only.
"2. The prohibitions of this Part shall not
construed to prevent?
"(A) the use of military personnel or
equipment for scientific research or far any
cther peaceful purpose;
"(B) the temporary _use or stationing of
any mil.ttary submarine on the seabed or
subsoil Of ocean space irsuch submarines are
"PART IX
"FINAL ARTICLES
"Article 35
"1. The provisions of this Treaty shall ap-
ply to the activities of States Parties to the
Treaty in the exploration and exploitation of
ocean space, whether such activities are car-
ried on by a single State Party to the Treaty
or jointly with other States, including cases
where they are carried on within the frame-
work of international intergovernmental or-
ganizations.
"2. Any practical questions arising in con-
nection with activities carried on by inter-
national intergovernmental organizations in
the exploration and exploitation of ocean
space, shall be resolved by the States Parties
to the Treaty either with the appropriate
international organization or with one or
more States members of that international
organization, which are Parties to this
Treaty.
"Article 36
"1. This Treaty shall be open to all States
for signature. Any State which does not sign
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February 4, EbNeaVgSMAT S 1383
this Treaty before its entry into force in
accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article
may accede to it at any time.
"2, This Treaty shall be subject to ratifi-
cation by signatory States. Instruments of
ratification and instruments of accession
shall be deposited with the Government of
the United States of America, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics, which are hereby designated the
Depositary Governments.
"3. This Treaty shall enter into force upon
the deposit of instruments of ratification by
ten Governments including the Governments
designated as Depositary Governments under
this Treaty.
"4. For States whose instruments of ratifi-
cation or accession are deposited subsequent
to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall
enter into force on the date of the deposit
of their instruments of ratification or
accession.
"5. The Depositary Governments shall
promptly inform all signatory and acceding
States of the date of each' signature, the
date of deposit of each instrument of ratifi-
cation of and accession to this Treaty, the
date of its entry into force and other notices.
"6. This Treaty shall be registered by the
Depositary Governments pursuant to Article
102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
"Article 37
"Any State Party to the Treaty may pro-
pose amendments to this Treaty. Amend-
ments shall enter into force for each State
Party to the Treaty accepting the amend-
ments upon their acceptance by a majority
of the States Partiet to the Treaty and there-
after for each remaining State Party to the
Treaty on the date of acceptance by it.
"Article 38
"Any State Party to the Treaty may give
notice of its withdrawal from the Treaty one
year after its entry into force by written
notification to the Depositary Governments.
Such withdrawal shall take effect one year
from the date of receipt of this notification.
"Article 39
"This Treaty, of which the English, Rus-
sian, French, Spanish, Chinese, and Arabic
texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited
in the archives of the Depositary Govern-
ments. Duly certified copiek of this Treaty
shall be transmitted by the Depositary Gov-
ernments to the Governments of the signa-
tory and acceding States.
"In 'witness whereof the undersigned,
duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.
"Done in triplicate, at the capital cities
of the Depositary Governments at Washing-
ton, Moscow, and London, this day of
one thoukand nine hundred and ?.
"For the United States of America:
"For the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics:
"For the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland:"
Mr. PELL. In taking this course of ac-
tion with a view to expediting interna-
tional agreement on the use of the world
ocean, I have been criticized by those
who maintain that our present knowl-
edge of ocean space is inadequate in
terms of formulating sound legal prin-
ciples for the establishment of an effec-
tive international regime. In this regard,
some maintain that consideration of a
legal framework for the development of
ocean space must await further investi-
gation and study, if not the complete
findings of the proposed International
Decade of Ocean Exploration, scheduled
to begin in 1970.
In response to this view, I would like
to reiterate a point which I have tried
to make on several previous occasions:
Science and technology incorporate in-
terrelated processes which cannot be
legitimately divorced from the political
and diplomatic considerations to which
they give rise. With respect to ocean
space, it is clearly evident that diplo-
macy is being outpaced and international
relations are being dangerously strained
by the speed at which scientific and tech-
nological achievements are occurring.
Looking to recent events, I would in- -
quire, was it necessary to orbit the moon
before declaring, "The exploration and
use of outer space shall be carried out
for the benefit and in the interest of all
countries"? Or was it necessary to probe
Antarctica's storehouse of secrets before
agreeing that this area shall be used ex-
clusively for peaceful purposes?
While recognizing that the problems
of Antarctica and outer space differ con-
siderably from those of the oceans, I
would urge, nevertheless, that the anal-
ogy is compelling and the need is strik-
ingly similar.
At the risk of oversimplifying the
major political issues involved in the
ocean space question, I would offer two
as being of overriding concern: First,
how many nations will benefit from the
exploitation of ocean space? recognizing
the preponderant position of the United
States and the Soviet Union in the field
of applied marine technology, and, as a
result, the present inclination of several
coastal States to extend their national
jurisdiction seaward; and second, will
this new environment become a spawn-
ing ground for still another generation
of weapons of mass destruction? Com-
bining these two questions, and being
more direct, if not blunt, I would ask,
do the technologically advanced na-
tions?particularly the nuclear powers?
believe that a new colonial era cast in
cold war terms can be avoided without
the establishment of a meaningful inter-
national arrangement to guarantee the
orderly and peaceful development of this
last frontier??a frontier encompassing
71 percent of the globe?a portion of the
globe rich in resources, which will be
mined, farmed, and developed for all
mankind, and made the subject of nu-
merous quarrels and battles if we do
nothing about it.
At this point, Mr. President, I think it
Is important to make reference to former
Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford's
budget statement of January 15, 1969;
in that statement Mr. Clifford pointed
out:
We are requesting $20 million?
And $20 million is nothing compared
with the ABM we have been talking
about, but it is still an awful lot of
money in my State, or any other State?.
in the FY 1970 budget to prepare for pos-
sible engineering development in FY 1971
of a new Undersea Long-Range Missile Sys-
tem (ULMS).
This is another antonym we are going
to have to get used to using?ULMS.
(About $5 million was provided in FY 1969
to initiate a study of such a system.)
Along this same line, I do not think it
staggers the imagination to suggest that
the Soviet Union is at least contem-
plating similar developments.
In this regard, I might say that I am
strongly convinced that, unless action is
taken immediately to ensure against
such developments, the nuclear arms
race will be shifted to the marine en-
vironment. One particularly hopeful
sign is the recent placing of this issue on
the agenda of the 18-nation Disarma-
ment Committee; this committee is
scheduled to meet in early March, and
I would hope that President Nixon would
take advantage of this opportunity and
would pursue it with all of the intensity
and vigor which a new administration
has at its command. Hence, I would hope
that the real goal of halting the nuclear
arms race is not lost in empty concepts
reminiscent of Social Darwinism, such as
"survival of the fittest" or its modern
version, "survival of the superior."
Mr. President, in offering these in-
quiries and observations with a view to
the future development of ocean space,
I am suggesting only that knowledge
cannot be substituted for the will to de-
velop this frontier region in a peaceful
and orderly manner?one which will take
account of the responsibilities, the
needs, the aspirations, and the limita-
tions of all the nations of the world.
Thus, as we ponder the vast potential of
this last frontier, we would do well to
remind ourselves that, unless our will is
commensurate with our knowledge, in-
ternational cooperation and understand-
ing shall continue to be burdened with
suspicion and mistrust.
In offering a draft treaty on ocean
space, I have been guided by the prin-
ciple that the international marine en-
vironment must be recognized as the
legacy of all mankind. The principle was
first enunciated more than 2 years ago
by former President Johnson when he
declared:
We must ensure that the deep seas and the
ocean bottoms are, and remain, the legacy of
all human beings.
Official U.S. statements on this issue at
the United Nations have consistently en-
dorsed this principle.
Accordingly, my treaty proposal seeks
to guarantee that ocean space will be ex-
plored and exploited in the interests of
all mankind, that it will be free from na-
tional appropriation, that it will be de-
void of a new generation of weapons of
mass destruction; that it will be immune
from atomic wastes and other pollutants,
and that it will be developed in accord-
ance with and respect for existing inter-
national law and the Charter of the
United Nations. To give added meaning
to these principles, I have suggested in
my draft treaty the establishment of an
international authority to license all ex-
ploration and exploitation of the ocean
space environment; in addition, I have
recommended the creation of an inter-
national Sea Guard to insure compliance
with these principles and to work in con-
cert with licensing authority.
Mr. President, in proposing this treaty,
I have attempted to give solid meaning
to the conviction that, unless man is for-
ever to be a slave to his own technology,
his political and diplomatic successes
must march at least abreast of his tech-
nological achievements.
Critics of this thought have stated that
the national interest of the United States
in terms of the development of ocean
? space demands that our potential under-
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SIVIN AL K KI) ? SEN A.1 E February4 1969
sr,a, technological capability not be fet-
tered by international political consid-
erations. ?
In reply to this contention, I should
hke to recall some rather memorable
y.-ords of the late Dag lgammarskjold:
The question is not either the nation or
the world. It is, rather, how to serve the
world by service to our nation, and how to
serve the nation by servize to the world.
Thus, we must strive to understand
the national interest in terms of the
larger, more comprehensive interna-
tional interest; this is the democratic
imperative cast in a Worldwide setting,
and it is in this context that the develop-
ment of ocean space milst be charted.
In some respects, Mr. President, a
hopeful beginning has been made: The
last session of the General Assembly
witnessed the creation of the United Na-
tions Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
the Seabed; in our own country, the
President's Commission on Marine Sci-
ence, Engineering, and Resources has
issued its report, urging that the United
States take the initiative in trying to
reach worldwide agreement on a new
international regime for the marine -en-
vironment. In this regard, the Commis-
sion specifically cautions:
Unless a new international framework is
devised which removes the loge' uncertainty
from mineral resources exploration and ex-
ploitation in every area of the seabed and its
subsoil, some venturesome governments and
private entrepreneurs will act to create faits
accomplis that will be difficult to undo, even
though they adversely affect the interests of
the United States and the international
community.
In closing, Mr. President, let me ex-
press the belief that, as the major power
in undersea technology, the United States
has a special responsibility, one which
demands that its diplomatic posture be
as achievement oriented as that of its
military-industrial complex. Such a pos-
ture clearly requires an unrelenting de-
sire to establish an international frame-
work Which will guarantee the peaceful
and orderly development of the extra-
national marine environment.
I offer this resolution in the hope that
it may help to spark such a desire.
ADJOURNMENT UNTIL FRIDAY,
FEBRUARY 7, 1969
Mr, KENNEDY. Mr. President, if there
be no further business to come before
the Senate today, I move, in accordance
with the previous order, that the Senate
stand in adjournment until 12 o'clock
noon on Friday next.
The motion was agreed to; and (at 6
o'clock and 53 minutes p.m.) the Senate
adjourned until Friday, February 7, 1969,
at 12 o'clock meridian.
NOMINATIONS
Executive nominations received by the
Senate February 4, 1969:
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Martin J. Hillenbrand, of Illinois, a For-
eign Service officer of the class of career min-
ister, to be an Assistant Secretary of State.
FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION
DIRECTOR
James C. Counts, of California, to be Fed-
eral Mediation and Conciliation Director.
FARMERS HOME ADMINISTRATION
James V. Smith, of Oklahoma, to be Ad-
ministrator of the Farmers Home Adminis-
tration.
IN THE ARMY
The following-named officer to be placed
on the retired list in grade indicated under
the provisions of title 10, United States Code,
section 3962:
To be lieutenant general
Lt. Gen. William Frederick Cassidy, 018354,
Army of the United States (major general,
U.S. Army).
Maj. Gen. Frederick James Clarke, 020572,
U.S. Army, for appointment as Chief of En-
gineers, U.S. Army, under the provisions of
title 10, United States Code, section 3036.
The following-named officer under the pro-
visions of title 10, United States Code, sec-
tion 3066, to be assigned to a position of im-
portance and responsibility designated by the
President under subsection (a) of section
3066, in grade as follows:
Maj. Gen. Frederick James Clarke, 020572
U.S. Army, in the grade of lieutenant gen-
eral.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Joseph John Sisoo, of Maryland, a Foreign
Service officer of the class of career minister,
to be an Assistant Secretary of State.
Samuel De Palma, of Maryland, a Foreign
Service officer of class 1, to be an Assistant
Secretary of State.
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Missile Lead "We and on the eve of a building will be at work in
new rounfzi in the armaments several areas in fiscal 1970.
? ?
? race with the Soviet i Union," Some examples in the stra-
Ending n 6c-r, 401
ifford said in taking note of tegic weapons field:
the quickening pace of nuclear ? SCAD ? The U.S. with
By George C. Wilson aimsdevelopment on both
Washington Post Staff Writer sitles , ?
41e Said running the race
lin
A "large increase" in heav '-
]. contribute nothing to the
ily protected ICBMs was "the rtal security of either side,
, most significant development', ile increasing substantially
.of 1968 in Soviet strategic wea NV?
ponry, Defense Secretary
ate
already great defense bur-
rinnc nnb th "
money in the new budget will
start the development of a
Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy
(SCAD) a missile which
would be fired from a bomber
while the plane was out of
range of the defenses. The
SCAD would maneuver as it
, Clark M. Clifford said yester,
Vlifford urged his succes- flew to the target to confuse
day. sqrs instead to "move cau- the defense.
SCAD, if produced, would
present Russia with the 'prob-
lem of improving its missile
defenses around Moeow as
well as the Tallinn bomber
defense across the northeast-
ern aproaches to the country.
? Harder silos?Because So-
viet ICBMs are getting better,
the Pentagon 1970 budget can-
In his only "posture" state titusly forward with talks on
ment on the woTTEr-Filitary sit- strategic arms limitations"
. uation and Pentagon plans for wIth the Soviet Union and to
dealing with it, Clifford said "move forward promptly on
' the Soviet Union will catch up the ratification of the non-pro-
to the United States by the liferation treaty" pending in
end of this year in ICBMs,, titpL:, Senate.
, with each side having over, , Clifford said that such im-
. 1000 buried underground and 'i
pvements in Soviet wea-
1 ready to fire. 4sry as a change from liquid
1 While this closing of the fuel to high-energy solid fuel tains $58 million to make our
missile gap numerically come ...ICBMs do not represent underground silos for Minute-
as no surprise, the De,.0..tthe Itussian "shift in over-all man ICBMs harder to de-
Secretary makes clear tris-his- " Nevertheless, he stro3,-. The silos will also be
165-page valedictory thithe a missile treaty would enlarged for the new ICBM
Soviets are advancing i '
ity, too. Also, their ICB
duction is continuing
ours stopped at 1054 miss
President Nixon will h
decide what to do abo
with his main options be11 to_
match the Russians missile for
missile or to improve thetfle
trio
See WEAPONS, A6,
Je the threat to all man-
p1 a nuclear holocaust."
the U.S. has been working on.
There is $20 million in the
new budget for this advanced
ICBM still in the study stages.
Also, the Pentagon is consid-
ering ringing ICBM sites with
missiles to destroy the incom-
ing ones.
? ULMS?This is the acro-
nym for emplacing ICBMs in
the ocean: Underwater Long-
range Missile System. The
purpose would be to make
the ICBMs less vulnerable to
improved Soviet missiles. 820
million is in the budget for
ULMS--which could end up
as a super-sized Polaris sub-
marine filled with ICBMs.
ULMS is still in the study
, stage.
? Bomber
said that a
now appe
are buil
could reae
defense?Clifford
h it does not
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W ?WM ataj cicscrng sung-
range missiles in 1967, the
year the American ABM .was
started, Clifford said: .91ire
now believe that an initial 'op-
erating capacity with an ICBM
will not be achieved (by
China) until 1972 at the ear-
liest, and more likely later."
Despite this lag, Clifford
said "it is bath prudent and
feasible" to continue , lath
Sentinel. He said China "OuId
have a modest force of tDBMs
sometime after the mid-1971)s.'
He said an American ABM_
could save as many as 22
million of the 23 million who
would be lost in a stutrise
Chinese ICBM attack.
Also. Clifford said the Sen-
tinel "could serve as a base
for a larger, more extetisiye
system." Many critics claim
this was the Johnson Admini-
tration's real reason for start-
,
n.-; rife anti-Chinese ABM, a'
oat-in-the-door approach -fori
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Cliff ed by Rise
In Russian'issue Force
By WILLIAM BEECHER
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Jan. 18--Defense Secretary Clark M.
Clifford has expressed "increasing conce "
rapidly growing Soviet force of intercontin
missiles, which nearly quad-(
rupled in two years and whichl
to exceed that of I
ates this year or
Clifford, in what
a valedictory state-
eve of leaving of-
that the United
ed stronger than
adversary.
at his hopes for a
ful world had been en-
couraged by Soviet willingness
to discuss a halt in the arms
race and by the shift in Vietnam
?mphas's from the battlefield to
,he conference table.
The Secretary is credited by
many with having played the
central role in turning the John-
son Administration's strategy
from one based on gradual but
steady escalation of force to
one stressing de-escalation and
negotiation. In remarks released
today he said, "I think that we
have now set a true cotirse to-
ward peace in Vietnam."
Mr. Clifford's views were
contained in a detailed atalpis
ton Congress of the outopg
administration's final cieeiiSe'
budget.
The analysis, which explOres
the rationale behind the coun-
try's national security policy
and its weapons decisions,
covers 165 pages in the unclas-
sified verson and more than 300
pages in the secret version.
The latter was sent to the
armed services and military ap-
propriations panel in the House
and Senate today.
Mr. Clifford said the Russians
had surpassed American intelli-
gence estimate by moving from
250 ICBM's in mid-1966 to 900
by last September. Other sources
say the Soviets now possess
more than 1,000 ICBM's, having
&atm roughly eves with Amer--
ars Thrid - knelt '1,054
missiles.
Soviet antimissile
pears to resemble e- eps
system that the t,te'd states
"abandoned years ago'beaus
of limited effectiveness."
Edge Expected to Stay
Other, officials say that mul-
tiple warheads on Minut
3 missiles, which the U
States plans to start depl
daring the next fiscal
together with similar war
on ?Poseidon missiles tha
,,,deployed later on aUtZ
to give this natifi
the number of
eliverable warhea
e to come.
These officials insist th?-
sis
are lagging in multiple,
warhead technology, but by a
few years rather than by sev-
eral years.
Mr. Clifford repeated a theme
associated with his predecessor,
Robert S. McNamara. The num-
ber of warheads alone does not ,
assure security, he said. Under
Ut Thelloted with seeming
ralure -Mat Communist Chi-
nuclr weapons program
is 4tti- be lagging behind
ifthedule, as a result either of
technical problems or effects
of the cultural revolution. He
said he still foresaw a "mod-
ate force of Chinese ICBM's
1975.
ord of a slowdown?
nuclear missile'
'kely be used by C
opponents of t
1 missile defense sytL
t to block the
While the Defflse Seczet
said he expectdd The ussians
to continue to italtall" ?ex more
such missiles, he perdicte that
"the rate of increase will be
considerably smaller over the
next two or three years."
Solid Fuel Missiles
Mr. Clifford revealed that
the Soviet Union had begun to
deployits first solid-fuel
ICM s, similar to the early
;Minuteman missile of the
'United States. The bulk of the
Soviet missiles ar i uid
fueled.
He noted also th
was operating some,
powered missile sub
similar to Polaris $
with a missile range in
than 1,500 miles. But he cred-
ited the Russians with only 45
missiles on such submarines,
compared with 656 on this na-
tion's Polaris submarines.
Work on antimissile sites
around Moscow slowed do
last year, Mr. Clifford said, b
-esearch and developnt
work on antimissile mi es
ontinued "at a high rate of
A?Ipt
mis y, to deter an
a nation must have en
cure weapons so that ev
surprise a
-se-
.1)7
millions a people in the home-
nd of the attacker.
? >9
esidentiaF elfin-
pargn, Richard M. isliXon
rcharged that a dangerous "se-
Idety t at' was developing be-
cause of Soviet weapons ad-
vances in a number of BOAS,
strategic and conventional.
Mr. Clifford acknowledged
that the Russians were actively
attempting to catch up with
the number of land-based and
seas-based missiles in the
United States arsenal. But he
insisted, in effect, that the So-
viet suffered from a technology
gap The Russians are "still
Appro
Rather than see another Up-
ward spiral in the arms rac
which Mr. Clifford said
increase insecurity, he
for negotiation of a "verifia e
agreement with the Soviet Un-
ion tto limit strategic offensive
and defensive forces.
On Vietnam, Mr. Clifford is
known tto have told associates
in recent days that in his views,
"the die is cast."
He considers it unthinkable
that the Nixon Administration
would break off Paris talks and
consider either much larger
troop, levels or tough measures
against North Viettnam, both of
which were very much under
tOrigtderation when he (Mille
into the Defense post, lot
March.
Total Victory Ruled 04_
The Secretary put it thig Way
in his Congressional statement:
"While we now cannot lose
militarily, neither is total mili-
tary victory within our grasp.
That is why we are in Paris.
That is also why the enemy is
in Paris. Each side hopes to
ed
well behind us in advanced pursue its objectives at lower
missile technology," he said. costs.'
The new Soviet solid-fuel Mr. Clifford talked of two
missile is similar to the first disquieting developments last
Minuteman that was deployed year: The Soviet invasion of
about eight years ago, he said. Czechoslovakia and the "smol-
The Russians nuclear subma- dering conflict" in the Middle.
rinet compares to the first East, which he said the Soviet'
a decade ago, he said, and the
frsorliRelease1002/0NERs:akkiRDWIE0Q1164.E100300090003-3
ply of arms to Arab countries.
lictn,..in appropriations this year
for deployment of the systeln.
,The Sentinel plan is designed
primarily to guard the country
against the Chinese missile
threat.
Mr. Clifford said that an ad
verse balance of payments prob-
lem attributable largely to the
extensive foreign deployment of
American troops was forcing
Pentagon planners to contem-
plate cutbacks in administrative
ananwd as.upport troops in Western
Europe and in Japan and Oki-
There are plans to make
"substantial savings" by closing
post?exchanges and consolidat-
ebrtain headquarters in Eu-
he said, but he gave no
reat From Submarkteg-
'rowing Soviet sub:Merle
threat, Mr. Clifford said, W-1-
ing to a number of moves in the
antisubmarine warfare field.
Last year's plan to cut baa
from six to five anti-submarine
aircraft carriers has ?been
scrapped. So, too, was a plan
to phase down the number at
antisubmaripe patrol alma
Additional land-based patrol
aircraft will be bought_ust a
new carrier-based pa ,xlane
will be developed, he ,
Also, the Secretary ,t4igt this
Administration has decided to
rap Mr. 1V1c.Namara's old plan
o limit to 69 the number of
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nuclear-powered attack sub-
marines for the plannekt. ti
U boat force. He said that plans
were being made to buy a
number of new types of faster
and quiter nuclear-powered sub-
marines, the first four of which
are proposeed in the new bud-
get.
In two previous years the
Pentagon has requested funds
from the Congress for the first
of 30 new fast deployment lo-
gistics ships designed to rush
tanks and other heavy weapons
to distant trouble spots where
they would be used by air-lifted
troops.
Both times Congress refused,
partly because of fear that the
ships in peacetime would com-
pete with commercial cargo
vessels and partly for fear that
having such a capability might
tempt some future Administra-
tion to try to police most of
the world's crises.
A Clifford Compromise
As a compromise, Mr. Clif-
ford seeks authority to build
only 15 of these ships, relying
on military charter of 30 small-
er, specially built commercial
vessels to provide the balance
of the required capacity.
In other weapons decisions,
the Defense Secretary disclosed
that:
now early warning satel-
lite, destr6d to give instant
notice of the launching o an
enemy ICBM, was being devel-
oped.
tiThe Air Force was develop-
ing small, long-range decoys,
called SCAD, that on enemy
radar would look like big boMb-
ers and would thus draw the
fire of enemy air defense Mis-
siles. The SCAD would also
carry a nuclear warhead so
that if it were not downed?, it
could destroy enemy targets.
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March 4, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? St1N
Should we not bear in mind an in-
teresting closing line from a recent edi-
torial in the Charleston (W. Va.) Gazette
Mail:
History is littered with the corpses of em-
pires guilty of hubris and felled by its con-
sequences: the overexpansion of manpower
and resources.
REASONS WHY THE ABM COULD
WELL COST TENS OFISTMONS OF
DOLLARS MORE THAN CURRENT-
LY ESTIMATED
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent to proceed for 5
minutes.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
jection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, last
August, in debate on the Senate Floor
about funds for construction of the Sen-
tinel ABM system, there was the follow-
ing colloquy between the distinguished
majority leader and myself:
Mr. MANSFIELD. If what the Senator says
is correct and it is intended eventually to
spend in excess of $6 billion to build a 'thin'
ABM system, which we were told originally
by Secretary McNamara, and since by his
assistants, was for defense against China,
but which we were told when the authoriza-
tion bill was before the Senate some weeks
ago was in effect for defense against the
Soviet Union, does it not seem logical to as-
sume, if that is the case, that $6 billion-plus
is just the first installment on a program
which could eventually cost this country
somewhere in the vicinity of from $50 to $70
billion?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I think it would be more
than that. As but one example, take the F-
111 planes. The original price on that plane
was $2.8 million. I asked last spring what
100 of them would actually cost, and was
told $15 million apiece. That is five times
higher.
It is already admitted the thick line would
cost $40 to $50 billion. Following the same
character of extrapolation?and there are
other items I could mention?it could cost
at least $100 billion.
But, the most shocking, and inciden-
tally the most recent, study referred to
In said testimony, had to do with a
report published by the Brookings Insti-
tution. This report said in part:
During the 1950's, virtually all large mili-
tary contracts reflected an acceptance by the
military agencies of contractor estimates
which proved "highly optimistic." Such con-
tracts ultimately involved costs in excess of
original contractual estimates of from 300
to '700 percent.
Based on these studies, cited a few
weeks ago by the Department of Defense
itself in its logical defense of the rela-
tively small additional cost incident to
the production of the C-5A transport
plane, it is within the range of possibility
that the "thin" China system could con- yield to the distinguished Senator from
ceivably cost the American taxpayer over Massachusetts.
$40 billion; and the cost of the "thick" Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I want
Soviet system could be over $400 billion. to commend the distinguished Senator
Let us note in passing, especially to from Missouri for addressing the Senate
those prone to accept, without question, this afternoon, and for bringing to the
all new weapons systems proposed by the Members of this body his thoughtful pre-
military, that this latter figure is more
than the current national debt.
How can the American people now be
asked to bear such a gigantic additional
burden in order to finance the production
and development of a system whose oper-
ational capability its strongest propon-
ents admit may not be adequate to do
the job it is designed to do?
As I have often stated previously, I
believe in and support, without reserva-
tion, the continuance of research and
development on this new system, even
though during recent years many billions
of dollars have been expended on major
missile systems that were never even
placed into production; that is, were
abandoned as obsolete or unworkable be-
fore the development work on them had
been completed.
Let us note also that, according to
Defense Department testimony given the
Congress months ago, $4.7 billion had
at that time been spent in research and
development effort on ground-to-air nu-
port the production and deployment of Some of those who continue to sup- clear systems, including the Sentinel.
this unprecedentedly complicated ABM This heavy expenditure of our increas-
system have challenged any possibility ingly limited resources on missile sys-
that the ultimate cost if extended to pro- tems that never advanced beyond the de-
tect the United States against Soviet velopment stage is unfortunate; and in
Russia as well as China, could be $100 my opinion is but additional proof of
billion; but reasons outlined below show the growing tendency in recent years
clearly that, based on the record, this for military research and development
"thick" Soviet system could cost tens of
efforts to be directed toward solving the-
billions of dollars more than $100 billion. oretical problems rather than producing
The estimated cost for the "thin" badly needed modern defense hardware.
China system has already jumped from
That in itself is one of the chief rea-
an original 1967 estimate of $3.5 billion to sons why the Soviet Union is currently
$5 billion in 1968; and is now closer to so far ahead of the United States in so
$10 billion,
many categories of modern conventional Recent testimony by a high official of weapons.
the Department of Defense before the Equally unfortunate is the fact that
Joint Economic Committee confirms that over $15 billion of the taxpayers' money
this escalation in the cost of the ABM has been invested in missile systems once
11 4,,1' t th be inning a a Produced and deployed, but now aban-
S 2243
In summary, even if the price was not
so high, even if deployment of the Senti-
nel would not promote a new escalation
in the arms race, I cannot support the
deployment of this weapons system with-
out further research and development
because I do not believe, in its present
form, it will work. This conviction is sup-
ported by many years of practical ex-
perience in the electronics industry
prior to my coming into Government.
To produce and deploy this defense
system now could be a nuclear-space age
"followup" to the tragedy that was the
maginot line.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Missouri yield?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I am happy to
sentation.
The Senator from Missouri brings an
extraordinary background to this whole
debate on the question of the Sentinel
ABM system.
He is a member of the Committee on
Armed Services. He has particular re-
sponsibility given him by the Senate in
the field of national security. He is also
a member of the Committee on Foreign
Relations and is very much aware of the
latest thinking by that committee, and
by responsible members of our Govern-
ment concerning our relations with our
adversaries?and our friends?beyond
our borders.
Because of his long background and
experience in the whole private sector,
there are few Members of this body who
can speak about the cost of such a weap-
ons system with his background and
experience.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of
the Senator has expired.
. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have 3 more
minutes.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
jection, it is so ordered.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, the
Senator from Missouri has addressed
this body at many different times on
our fiscal and monetary position in the
world, and is an authority on that prob-
lem. I think he really brings a great
wealth of experience, which is extremely
Important and that the Members of this
body should consider the comments he
has made with great attention.
I should like to ask the Senator two
very brief questions. The first is whether,
in reaching the figure of some $400 bil-
lion which he has suggested this after-
noon, he has included in that figure any
expenditures for fallout shelters. I think
any kind of presentation which is made
continuing series of upward revisions. doned, in many cases because in due in support of a thin, or even a thick,
This testimony reported the fact that course it was found they did not work. ABM system relates to and is concerned
12 major systems which were developed Let us hope the above facts will be with questions about fallout shelters. I
during the 1950's exceeded their original given careful consideration by those who, was wondering whether an estimate for
estimated cost by an average of 220 along with the multimillion-dollar pub- the cost of fallout shelters would be in-
percent. And if the increase in the esti_ lic relations program apparently orga- eluded in the $400 billion or whether
mated cost of this highly complicated nized by the Defense Department to pro- such expenditures for fallout shelters, if
Sentinel thick system was nevertheless mote the Sentinel, currently support the we were to agree to a thick system, would
no more than this average, its cost would deployment and production, now, of this be an add-on to the $400 billion figure
be $160 billion. ABM system. the Senator from Missouri has suggested.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE March 4, 1969
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, first,
I would thank the distinguished assist-
ant majority leader for his kind but un-
deserved remarks, and add that in this
field it is a privilege to follow his lead-
ership and that of others in questioning
a system, the expense of whic,h will make
it very difficult to handle, problems we
have in other international fields, as well
as growing problems in the domestic
field. Nevertheless, regardless of cost, if
I believed this Sentinel system was vital
to our security I would be for deploying
it now. I do not so believe.
In reply to the distinguished Senator,
I reached this possible figure by taking
the high additional percentage of the
Brookings Institution report; namely,
700 percent. It does not include shelters.
Perhaps the most informative lay arti-
cles written on the Sentinel subject
were those put into the RECORD by the
distinguished senior Senator from Mas-
sachusetts on February 19, consisting of
12 articles, in which the estimated east
of the shelters was stated as being $38
billion in total, as I remember. Based on
all records of the past I would be sur-
prised if the ultimate cost was not a
good deal more than $38 billion. My an-
swer, therefore, is that I did not include
shelter cost, and that would a,dd heavily
to the cost.
Mr. KENNEDY. My Second question,
Mr. President, relates to the probability
of increased defense budgets that would
result from a new round in the arms
race, as former Defense Secretary indi-
cated would be the case in his January
defense posture statement. It is my opin-
ion that the deployment of either a thick
or a thin ABM system would signal such a
new round in the arms race, but let us say
it is a thick system.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of
the Senator has expired.
Mr. KENNEDY. I ask unanimous con-
sent for 2-additional minutes.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
jection, it is so ordered.
Mr. KENNEDY. I refer to the devel-
opment of MIRV's-, the hardening of IBM
sites, the development of a new genera-
tion of ICBM's, and so forth. Does the
Senator agree with me that this would
run into additional expenditures as well
because once we move into an escala-
tion in the arms race, In elms of a thick
system, obviously it is going to take addi-
tional expenditures of at least hundreds
of millions of dollars, and probably many
billions of dollars, to make any kind of
meaningful progress in terms of our de-
fensive posture as well as offensive
posture?
Mr. SYMINGTON. The able assistant
majority leader is correct, although lam
not opposed to all improvements in our
offensive missile systems until we reach
proper agreement. But I was a Member
of the Senate during the so-called
bomber gap of the early 1950's and dur-
ing the so-called missile gap of the late
1950's. They just did not pan out. So this
time I think this Congress should look
carefully before deploying this new
weapons system. It could mean the ex-
penditure of tens, if not hundreds, of bil-
lions of dollars of additional money re-
sulting from mutual esealation of the
arms race.
In a statement I intend to put into
the RECORD I present that the cost of
running this Government today, the an-
nual cost, is running tens of billions of
dollars more than the gross national
product of any other country of the free
world.
Mr. COOPER, Mr. President Senator
SYMINGTON'S statement on the enormous
burden of costs that a decision to deploy
an ABM system would bring to the peo-
ple of the United States is very important
to the Congress and the American peo-
ple. His experience of over 30 years as an
executive in the electronics industry, as
Secretary of the Air Force, and as a
ranking member of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, gives him an expert
knowledge of technological matters
which few in the Senate can approach.
I know that Senator SYMINGTON would
agree with me, that If deployment of an
ABM system would bring genuine secu-
rity to this country, he would support its
installation no matter how great the cost.
But what is at issue in this ABM debate
is whether the United States will be made
more secure as its proponents contend
by deployment, or whether the deploy-
ment of the ABM will lead only to a more
dangerous nuclear escalation and less
security. Senator SYMINGTON'S contribu-
tion on this important issue is of the
greatest value.
DEPLOYMENT OF AN ABM SYSTEM
Mr. HART. Mr. President, normally
we leave until the end of our remarks
the request that there be printed in the
RECORD an editorial, an article, or a let-
ter. Today, I should like to switch the
batting order, and ask unanimous con-
sent that there be printed in the RECORD
at this point a letter dated February 25,
1969, from 39 members of the University
of Michigan Physics Department, bear-
ing on the subject of the anti-ballistic-
missile system..
There being no objection, the letter
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
FEBRUARY 25, 1969.
Senator ROBERT GRIFFIN,
Senator PHILIP HART,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATORS GRIFFIN AND HART: Our
government is presently reviewing its plans
for the deployment of an anti-ballistic mis-
sile (ABM) system, and further argument
undoubtedly will be made in the House and
the Senate concerning this matter. We are
convinced that the deployment of an ABM
system would be a grave mistake either as a I
"thin" system for defense against the Chi-
nese or as part of a more extensive system
designed to withstand any form of nuclear
attack. We would like you to consider the
following arguments on which our case is
based.
1. The so-called "thin" system was origi-
nally approved by Congress to provide a de-
fense in the 1970's against a light attack by
a relatively small nuclear power such as
China might be at that time. We do not be-
lieve that the proposed system could provide
us with this defense. It is relatively easy for
the attacker to build penetration aids to fool
the defense system. Such aids include multi- r
ple warheads, decoys, clouds of metal wire e
(chaff) to fog the defense's radar, etc. These p
and other methods are discussed in an ar- s
tide by H. A. Bethe and R. L. Garwin in
Scientific American of March 1968. (Copy en-
closed.) It would be quite feasible and rela-
tively inexpensive for the Chinese who are
developing their offensive ICBM system as
this time to incorporate such penetration
aids into their system, and surely they would
do so, knowing as they do the nature of the
defense system they must overcome. For al-
though it is conceivable (barely) that they
might be sialliciently unreasonable to attack
us with loam's (in spite of the full knowl-
edge that we could and would eliminate them
as a viable country if they (lid) it is in-
conceivable that they would do so without
taking the relatively simple and inexpensive
steps necessary to make sure such an attack
would be effective.
2. Another argument put forward by pro-
ponents of a thin ABM system is that it
would provide protection against the acci-
dental firing of an ICBM by the Russians.
It is argued that $,5 to $10 billion is a rela-
tively small price to pay for such protection.
Those who argue in this way overlook one
very important point. If the United States
deploys an ABM system, then the Russians,
or for that matter any other nation which
considers us a threat, must modify their
offensive missiles so as to give them a good
chance of penetrating our defense. As we have
said, such modifications are relatively easy.
The technical advantage is always with the
attacker. When such modifications were Made
(and they would undoubtedly proceed in
parallel with our deployment of an ABM
system) we would have to contend with
the accidental launching of a missile
equipped with multiple warheads, decoys,
chaff, or whatever It takes to penetrate our
ABM system, Thus in the end our cities
would not be significantly better protected
than they are at present.
It is important to note that the likelihood
of an madden/Lai lattlach by the Russians due
to technical malfunction is comparable to
the likelihood of an accidental explosion of
one of our own missiles. Thus by surround-
ing our cities with nuclear tipped ABM's we
are, if anything, increasing the probability
of technical accident, either due to one of
our own missiles or due to one of theirs.
Presumably, the chance of an accident on
our part is very small. However, the damage
It could cause is so great that we would have
to consider _Ourselves in very great danger
to want to take such a risk, particularly with
a system that is not likely to be effective
against the danger for which it is designed.
3. A third argument that we have heard
in defense of an ABU system is that it would
improve Our over-all defense posture. This
argument is put forward ,by those who see
the thin system as the forerunner of a more
extensive system costing Many tens of bil-
lions of dollars. Tha trouble with this argu-
ment is that the cost of constructing any
ABM system Is very great compared to the
cost of potential enemy must incur to re-
design his offensive system to penetrate our
defenses. Thus building an ABM system is a
very inefficient way of improving our defense
posture. It is too easily rendered useless by
mprovements in offensive weapons. Thus
extensive expenditures by both sides lead to
no relative improvement in either's position.
Our country Can ill afford to waste even $5-
10 billion on a thin system, let alone 450-loo
billion on the thick system which would be
likely to follow.
4. In addition to these arguments, we have
great doubts, of a purely technical nature,
about the performance of any ABM system.
It seems unlikely that a system of this com-
plexity, if ever called upon, will perform
with any high degree of success. The tech-
nical demands on a defensive system are
much greater than those on an offensive or
etaliatory system such as we have at pre-s-
-nt. Moreover, the necessary testing of the
roposea system under realistic conditions
eems impossible and therefore we have very
grave doubts about ftg successful perform-
ance.
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March 4, .1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
We hope you are in agreement with us on
these matters. We would appreciate any
opportunity to discuss this further with you
at your convenience. If we can be of any
service to you in this matter we would be
glad to cooperate.
A copy of this was signed by the follow-
ing members of the Physics Department fa-
culty, University of Michigan.
C. W. Akerlof, Asst. Prof. of Physics, J.
Bardwick, Asst. Prof. of Physics, J. W. Chap-
man, Asst. Prof. of Physics, C. T. Coffin, As-
soc. Prof. of Physics, D. M. Dennison, Prof.
of Physics, H. A. Gould, Asst. Prof. of Physics,
W. R. Gray, Asst. Prof. of Physics, W. E.
Hazen, Prof. of Physics, K. T. Hecht, Prof. of
Physics, A. Z. Hendel, Assoc. Prof. of Physics.
L. W. Jones, Prof. of Physics, G. L. Kane,
Assoc. Prof. of Physics, S. Krimm, Prof. of
Physics, A. D. Krisch, Prof. of Physics, 0. La-
porte, Prof. of Physics, R. R. Lewis, Prof. of
Physics, M. J. Longo, Prof. of Physics, D. I.
Meyer, Prof. of Physics, 0. E. Overseth, erof.
of Physics, J. J. Reidy, Asst. Prof. of Physics.
A, L. Read, Assoc. Prof. of Physics, A. Rich,
Asst. Prof. of Physics, R. T. Robiscoe, Asst.
Prof. of Physics, B. P. Roe, Assoc. Prof. of
Physics, M. H. Ross, Prof. of Physics, R. Roth,
Lecturer in Physics, T. M. Sanders, Jr., Prof.
of Physics, R. H. Sands, Prof. of Physics, D. A.
Sinclair, Prof. of Physics, K. M. Terwilliger,
Prof. of Physics.
R. S. Tickle, Prof. of Physics, J. C. Vander
Velcie, Prof. of Physics, G. Weinreich, Prof.
of Physics, M. L. Wiedenbeck, Prof. of Physics,
D. N. Williams, Asst. Prof. of Physics, W. L.
Williams, Asst. Prof, of Physics, J. Ward, As-
soc. Prof. of Physics, V. Wong, Lecturer in
Physics, J. C. Zorn, Assoc. Prof. of Physics.
Mr. HART. Mr. President, the logic of
this letter, to me, is irrefutable.
I share the physicists' view that it
would be both feasible and inexpensive
for either China or Russia to develop
penetration aids for missiles which
would negate any possible effectiveness
of ABM missiles.
I share their view that if the Chinese
were foolish enough to launch an ICBM
attack on this country they would first
develop such aids to make the attack
more devastating.
I suspect neither the Chinese nor the
Russians are unreasonable enough to
launch missiles which would have little
chance of reaching targets.
I share the view that the same logic
reduces the system's effectiveness against
an accidentally launched missile. I am
sure that if Russia has missiles that can
be accidentally launched, those missiles
will be equipped with devices to increase
their chances of penetrating an ABM
system.
I further share the thought that con-
cern about accidental launching of Rus-
sian missiles must be balanced with con-
cern about damage resulting from acci-
dental explosion of any of our missiles,
whether they be located near cities or in
rural areas.
Moreover, I have the same misgivings
as the physicists do about the ability of
the system to perform its mission.
I believe there is a military maxim
that if the attacker is willing to pay the
price, any defense can be beaten. In the
case of the ABM system, the price to de-
feat the defense is minuscule in com-
parison to the cost of building the
defense.
The logic is clear. No ABM system
without more research, and probably, not
even then.
I urge all citizens opposed to deploying
the ABM system to make their views
known publicly.
While it may be easy to fool an ABM
system with decoys and clouds of metal
wire to fog the system's radar, it is not
so easy to cut through the decoys and fog
put forth by some supporters of the ABM
system. Only the support of concerned
citizens will insure that logic will pierce
the wall of fog and confusion now sur-
rounding this proposal.
Finally, Mr. President, I am asking
the Secretary of Defense to comment on
this letter. It is a document that I be-
lieve should be read thoughtfully by all
of us who share responsibility for the
decision as to whether we go ahead with
the deployment of this system.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator's
time has expired.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent for 2 additional
minutes.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I
would have to object. My remarks are
very brief.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Objection is
heard.
EMBARGO ON MEXICAN TOMATOES
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, a
few days ago I referred to the fact that
the Secretary of Agriculture placed an
embargo on tomatoes grown in Sonora,
Mexico. At times there is reason for an
embargo, but not in this case. Now we
find that the American housewife is the
victim. One housewife wrote that the
embargo has raised the price of tomatoes
to 111/2 cents each and that they just sit
in the grocery stores getting too ripe;
that the housewives will not pay such
high prices for a tomato as big as a bil-
lard ball.
I ask unanimous consent that an ar-
ticle which appeared in the Wall Street
Journal on the whole subject may appear
at this point in my remarks, with the
hope that the Secretary of Agriculture
and the Secretary of State will read it
and realize the damage being done to
Mexican-American relations.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
CURBS ON TOMATOES FROM MEXICO CAITSE U.S.
PRICES To RISE: MEXICAN FARMERS ARE EN-
RAGED AS THEIR CROPS RoT?FroinnA GROW-
ERS HAD URGED RESTRAINTS
(By Norman Pearlstine)
NOGALES, MEXIC0.?U.S. housewives and
Mexican tomato farmers have a common
complaint these days.
Neither is happy with the supply of fresh
tomatoes in U.S. supermarkets. And they can
both look to a common "villain"?the U.S.
Department of Agriculture.
The reason: On Jan. 8, at the urging of
Florida growers who compete with Mexico
to supply winter tomatoes to U.S. markets,
the Agriculture Department slapped a set
of minimum-size restrictions on all tomatoes
sold in the U.S. The chief effect of the com-
plicated restrictions was to cut sharply the
imports of Mexican tomatoes?and to drive
U.S. prices as much as 30% higher than a
year ago.
While U.S. housewives are irked with the
S 2245
price increases, Mexican tomato farmers are
enraged as they watch tons of their tomatoes
being devoured by cattle or simply rotting
in heaps along highways. "The whole of Mex-
ico feels stabbed in the back," says Raul
Batiz, a farmer from Culiacan and president
of the 20,000-member Confederation of Agri-
culture Associations of Sinaloa.
For many Mexicans, the tomato situation
has begun to assume the proportions of a
major international incident Mexican gov-
ernment officials and newspapers have re-
acted angrily. Mexico's ambassador to the
U.S., Hugo B. Margain, filed a formal protest
with the State Department, and newspaper
editorials depict the tomato regulations as
an example of how the big Yankee likes to
push around his diminutive neighbor. One
- cartoon depicts a large Uncle Sam stabbing a
small Mexican farmer in the back. The Mex-
ican bleeds catsup.
GOOD FOR EVERYBODY?
The Florida growers who called for the size
restrictions say they can't understand the
furor. "If the restrictions were removed, we
would have a demoralized, chaotic market in
the U.S. within a week," says Jack Peters,
manager of the Florida Tomato Committee, a
grower group that has authority under Fed-
eral law to draw up tomato size, maturity
and grade requirements for the Agriculture
Department. "What we're doing is good for
the entire industry, in Florida and in
Mexico,"
The disputed regulations provide that ma-
ture green tomatoes (those that ripen after
they are picked) can't be sold unless they are
more than two and 9-32 inches in diameter.
Vine-ripened tomatoes must be at least two
and 17-32 inches in diameter.
Florida growers contend the regulations
aren't discriminatory because they're applied
equally to both foreign and domestic toma-
toes. But Mexican farmers point out that the
regulations are more lenient on green toma-
toes?which comprise almost 85% of the
Florida crop and only about 10% of Mexico's.
Mexican growers say the size restrictions
have barred at least 30% of their crop from
U.S. markets this winter, and the figure will
rise to about 50% in coming months. Florida
growers, meantime, acknowledge that only
15% to 20% of the Florida crop is affected.
SHARP RISE IN PRICES
The effect' on U.S. prices is evident. Food
stores in the New York area 'recently have
been selling tomatoes for as much as 65 cents,
a pound, and in Washington and other cities
the price runs around 49 cents. A year ago,
when bad weather and blight in Mexico had
driven prices to what were then considered
unusually high levels, the average price was
42.8 cents a pound. Two years ago It was
34.2 cents. (During the summer months,
prices are considerably lower because U.S.
domestic production increases sharply.)
Albert Conard, secretary-manager of the
West Mexico Vegetable Distributors Associa-
tion at Nogales, Ariz., just across the border
from here, warns that if the regulations aren't
lifted, tomatoes will soon be selling generally
for as much as 69 cents a pound.
The operators of 'U.S. supermarkets are also
unhappy over the size restrictions because
they fear they will lose customers as prices
rise. "Many women are already leaving to-
matoes out of their salads," says the pro-
ducer supervisor of one big supermarket in
Dallas.
Some tomato connoisseurs say rising prices
aren't the only reason housewives are re-
luctant to buy tomatoes. They contend that
the artificially ripened tomatoes now making
up the bulk of the market aren't as tasty as
the vine-ripened Mexican tomatoes that have
suffered most from the ban. Kroger Co.,
operator of one of the largest U.S. super-
market chains, says: "It has been conclu-
sively shown in many marketing areas that
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S 2246 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
consumers prefer the vine ripe type. They
have consistently better flavor."
In Mexico, farmers say the ban on small to-
matoes has begun to have serious economic
impact. Mr. Betz says almost 15,000 of the
100,000 workers who cultivate tomato fields
have been laid off in Sinaloa and Sonora.
These two "salad boyar states produce most
of Mexico's tomatoes/or export, which in re-
cent years have brought in about $80 million
a year. More layoffs are likely, he says.
Many farmers say they fear it will be hard
to find financing for next year's planting, and
some growers talk bitterly of shifting their
purchases of machinery, seed and fertilizer
from the U.S. to other nations next year.
"The U.S. encouraged us to grow a big crop,
using machinery bought in the U.S., and
now they're trying to keep us from selling
it," says Mr. Batiz.
The U.S. had indeed encouraged expansion
of the Mexican tomato indust a,. Agriculture
experts from the U.S. have made periodic vis-
its to the area to offer advice on increasing
production, and U.S. funds helped finance an
irrigation project that opened up additional
hundreds of acres to tomato arowing in Si-
naloa last year. Exports of Mexican tomatoes
to the U.S. have risen sharply from 103 mil-
lion pounds in the 1956-57 season to a peak
of 386 million pounds two seasons ago. Mexi-
can growers had expected, prior to the size
restrictions, to ship a record crop this sea-
son.
For many citizens of this border city, which
is a shopping mecca for U.S. tourists as well
as a major gateway for export of Mexican
produce, the size restrictions on tomatoes
appear to be just another step in a U.S.
"plan' to discriminate against Mexico. The
tightening last year of restrictions on the
amounts of liquor and duty-free merchan-
dise Americans can take home from foreign
countries already has caused considerable
economic strain here.
"What are you gringos trying to do to us?"
complains a waiter in a doWatown Nogales
restaurant, "You let the Japanese sell all
kinds of stuff, but you won't take our toma-
toes."
Mario de la Puente, owner or the Nogales
bull ring and a long-time promoter of im-
proved Mexican-American relations, says:
:We've been working hard to build good
relations down here, and no some jerk in
Florida comes along and tells us not to sell
our tomatoes. What's next? If this keeps up,
in another 10 years we'll be shooting across
the line at each other."
ARIZONA'S NEW NATIONAL AIR
ACADEMY
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, last
week I introduced an amendment for
Senator FANNIN and myself which would
provide recognition for the role colleges
and universities might have in the over-
all efforts to solve air traffic control
problems.
Everyone knows that the air traffic
crisis has reached the urgency stage.
Speaking as a friend of aviation with a
love for being in the cockpit, I believe we
need to look hard at all the different
approaches which human ingenuity can
devise to solve the logjam in our skies
and insure the safety of the public.
This is why Senator FAN a IN and I
joined as cosponsors of the bill S. 1070,
proposed by Senator Bitooxs, to establish
the Commission on Air Traffic Control.
This body will be composed of experts
from the aviation field with a duty to
study and report back within 1 year on
all aspects of air traffic control problems.
_ One important phase of these problems
is the need to increase the numbers of
qualified- persons who can enter the
aviation field as controllers. The plain
fact is that while air traffic has been in-
creasing at about 20 percent a year, the
professional controller force has re-
mained nearly at the same level. It is
here?in solving the education gap?
where colleges and universities can make
a major contribution.
In order to focus on this means of
helping to solve the shortage of qualified
personnel in the field of air traffic con-
trol and in the entire field of aviation,
Senator FANNIN and I have offered an
amendment to S. 1070 to provide specific
authority for the Commission to study
the feasibty of a program of unre-
stricted Federal incentives to encourage
colleges to develop and provide courses in
the field of air traffic control and to add
two members to the Commission repre-
senting the academie world. In this con-
nection, the Commission should certainly
give alclose look at existing authority in
this atea such as the possibility that the
Federal Aviation Administration could
begin awarding scholarships to help fill
our entergency needs.
That, there can be useful courses in this
field at the college level is proven, I am
happy ho say, by an example happening
in my own State of Arizona. Mr. Presi-
dent, there is an entire aviation center
now taking shape in the Gila River In-
dian Reskation asea of central Arizona.
The proposed name of this academy is
the "NatioN1 Center for Research and
Developmen in Aviation Education and
Training"?or to slim it down, the Na-
tional Air Academy.
This is a fantastic venture, the likes
of which has long been needed by avia-
tion. The original idea for the academy
came from offinials and instructors at
Arizona State University, with particular
credit for organization due to Mr. Victor
Rothe.
The center has been the subject of a
U.S. feasibility study by the Economic
Development Administration and has
been found to be eligible for funding by
that agency.
As it now stands, this project will be
established and operated as a coopera-
tive effort between the aviation industry,
Arizona State University, and the Fed-
eral Government. Pursuant to this goal,
a nonprofit corporation, the Aviation Re-
search and Education Foundation, has
already been established0,n Arizona.
By 1972-this center is ;expected to be
turning out 2,000 aviation students, with
facilities for 1,000 students planned to
be ready by late in 1970. At present stu-
dents in this field are quartered at Ari-
zona State University, where right now
they can obtain a degree in aeronautical
technology including at least six courses
on air traffic control.
Thus, Mr. President, formalized pro-
grams on air traffic contrel can be made
available by colleges. Controllers of the
future can Require a solid background
for their vocation in a rounded aviation
program offered at the university level.
For this reason, I believe that our amend-
ment, if adopted, will lead to a practical
March 4, 1969
remedy for helping to solve one major
area of the air traffic crisis.
In order to present a complete descrip-
tion of the national center under devel-
opment in Arizona, I ask unanimous con-
sent that there be printed in the RELL'ORD
at the conclusion of my remarks an ar-
ticle which appeared in the January-
February 1969 issue of the PATCO Jour-
nal, by Mr. Victor Rothe, entitled "Ari-
zona's New National Air Academy."
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
ARIZONA'S NEW NATIONAL AIR ACADEMY
Revolutionary educational approach, and
proper recognition of aviation skills, are the
basis for two and four-year curriculums for
air traffic controllers now being worked out),
pilots, aviation technologists and aviation
mechanics. Parallel transfer from one spe-
cialty to another may be possible.
Recent studies of aviation problems made
for the Aviatien Center indirectly unearthed
a solution for getting new controllers quickly-.
The FAA could immediately begin to award
scholarships in sufficient quantities to fill oar
emergency needs. It Could request proposals
from interested junior colleges and universi-
ties for a 2-year instruction alrogram for air
traffic controllers. FAA could then provide
scholarships, where training facilities were
acceptable. This would pia:Wide a stop-gap
measure for more controllers, until more
formalized programs in colleges and other
teaching areas are avOaable.
At first, it can saeA.1 like some dastardly
plot. Air traffic is increasing around 20 per-
cent a year, while the professional controller
force for the past five years, has remained
fairly static. However, the resultant inevita-
ble, yet unforgivable squeeze on controllera
is but one serious symptom of an overall
ill?a shortage of qualified personnel across
the board in aviation.
Each year, not only are there greater de-
mands for more controllers, pilots, aviation
mechanics, and technicians of all types, but
they have to be more on the ball. Aviation
technology is barreling along at supersonic
speeds. Transportation air needs are ac-
celerating too. Yet the techniques by which
aviation people are 'trained for their job
creak along at a Model T pace, in many ways.
The old pipelines at military trained per-
sonnel are drying up. They can't produce the
quantity of people needed nor can they train
them adequately for the unique demands of
modern civil aviation, Various courses for
aviation skills have emerged, Spurred in part
by the GI bill, it is tree. But they have not
represented a nationally coordinated look at
a basic group of problems we face.
WHAT WE DON'T KNOW
In brief, we don't know fully the qualities
that make for a good controller, pilot, or
aviation man. We don't know fully what the
best means are for training them for given
positions. And we lack a link-up between
aviation industry and the academic world so
that what is happening today?not last year
or last week?is incorporated into the train-
ing in a classroom or in a cockpit.
One solution to the education 'gap" in
aviation is taking shape nowin the Gila River
Indian Reservation area of central Arizona.
That may seem like an unusual place to lo-
cate a "National Center for Research and
Development in Aviation Education and
Training." But there are no geographical
limits to where schools are located today.
Here the climate and area is ideal for avia-
tion and flying. Here t(aa the fact that the
Reservation represents a depressed area has
allowed funding for the academy by the U.S.
Economic Development Administration.
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