HEARINGS BEFORE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEES OF THE COMMITTEES ON APPROPRIATIONS RE: SAFEGUARD ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00364R000300090001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 96
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 17, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 11, 1969
• Content Type: REQ

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a
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SUBCOMMITTEES OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
GEORGE H. MAHON, Texas, Chairman
ROBERT L. F. SIXES, Florida GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB, California
JAMIE L. WHITTEN, Mississippi WILLIAM E. MINSHALL, Ohio
GEORGE W. ANDREWS, Alabama JOHN J. RHODES, Arizona
DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania GLENN R. DAVIS, Wisconsin
JOHN M. SLACK, West Virginia
JOSEPH P. ADDABBO, New York
R. L. MICHAELS, RALPH PRESTON, JOHN GARIIITY, PETER J. MIIRPHY, ROBERT NICHOLAS,
and ROBERT B. FOSTER, Staff Assistants
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
ROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida, Chairman
JOHN J. McFALL, California ELFORD A. CEDERBERG, Michigan
EDWARD J. PATTEN, New Jersey CHARLES R. JONAS, North Carolina
CLARENCE D. LONG, Maryland BURT L. TALCOTT, California
Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
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HEARINGS
 AppSW,"&A leWR ffiA fflff f CI?j{ j7g B@WW0300090001-5
HEARINGS
SUBCOMMITTEES OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
GEORGE H. MAHON, Texas, Chairman
ROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB, California
JAMIE L. WHITTEN, Mississippi WILLIAM E. MINSIIA.LL, Ohio
GEORGE W. ANDREWS, Alabama JOIIN J. RHODES, Arizona
DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania GLENN It. DAVIS, Wisconsin
JOHN M. SLACK, West Virginia
JOSEPH P. ADDABBO, New York
It. L. MICHAELS, RALPH PRESTON, .10IIN GARRITY, PETER J. MURPHY, ROBERT NICHOLAS,
and ROBERT B. FOSTER, Staff Assi8tants
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
ROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida, Chairman
.JOHN J. McFALL, California ELFORD A. CEDERBERG, Michigan
EDWARD J. PATTEN, New Jersey CHARLES It. JONAS, North Carolina
CLARENCE, D. LONG, Maryland BURT L. TALCOTT, California
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
29-948 WASHINGTON : 1969
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(:IIAI1'1'TE1? ON APl'ROI'RIAT10NS
(-I';OIiGI? IT. 1 IAITON, Texas, ('/,airman
) IICIIAI:T, J. KIRWAN. Ohio
1.AAIIE L. WIIITTEN. Alississippi
1)ElIRGI) W. ANDREWS. Alabama
.1 MIN .1. ROONEY. New York
U)1)I:RT I. F. SIKP)S, Florida
OTTO P:. 1. 'ASSVIAN, Louisimnt
301? L. I VINS. 'T'enn'sure
1:1)WARD 1'. T:OLANI), AL?)asaclnisetts
'.CI I,L1A'Tl H. NAT('ITh1R, Kcntnck ,
)A N IEL .1. FLOOD. 1'enusch^roia.
TO-Al "TEED, Oklahoma
4,1,,ORGI$ 1:. SIIIPTd,IY, Illinois
JOHN M. SLACK, West Virginia
MIN J. FLYN'1', .1R., Georgia
'''HA , SAII'rH. lows.
riOl)ERT N. GIAIINO, Connecticol
I FLI.A RP'I'LER HANSEN, Washington
CHARLES S. JOELSON. New Jersey
I(IS!)P11 I', ADDAI;IiO, New York
_il IIN J. M('FALL. California
W. It. HULL, Jit? Missouri
P)FFLRY COIIIILAN, California
i:DWARI) J. PATTEN, New Jersey
1'LAIt EN('I) D. LONG, Maryland
.!(IIIN 0. AIARSII, ,1a., Virginia
t, IDNEY It. YATES, Illinois
1'(IIi CASEY, Yews
r:\ \' 11) PRYOIi, Arkansas
PRANK L. EVANS, Colorado
PRANK 'I' I1OVV. Ohio
I'HARLI:S H. JONAS, North Carolina
I;LPORD A_ ('I:DP)RP,IRG, ATiehigan
GLI)NAIII) I'_ 1,1I'SCO\D3, ('alifornii)
,IOTIN J ItllollI S, Arizona
WILLIAM I1. MINSIIALL, Ohio
ROBERT IL AIICTII:L. Illino[s
SILVIO 0. C( IN'I'1';, 11;tssaehusetls
ODIN I,.1NGI:N. Mini-sofa
MEN RI:l1 1)1.. South Dakota
GLENN It. I).AV'IS. Wisconsin
HOWARD W. ROBISON. New York
GARNER 1?_ ;BART VKIl. Kansas
.11151?I'II AI. AIrl)AT)E, I'r?nnylvania
AI.ARl' ANIJRPIVYS, North Dakota
LOFTS C. VSYV1,\N, New Hampshire
BURT L. 'I`.AI ('(Yr'r, ('nlifornla
('H:A111,1) 11'E 11. MIND, Illinois
DONALD VV'. RTI:GI.I), .IIt., Michigan
VVI)N1) 1:1,1. ACV".ATT. Oregon
,1,\('K I:I (Vi'ARDS, Alabama
KIeN OT11 5n'u A x"1,I;, Clcrk and Staff i)irrrfo
I'AUi, A1. AV'1!.5,,N..I -',s/ant Clerk void Sfalf INrc,,for
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IN- I) III I
Page
Accidental dconation------------------------------------------------ 81
Alternatives to the deployment of ABMI----------------------------- 14, 7;8, 83
yN'it defense, concept of----------------------------------------- 35
Arms control. (Sec Disarmam(,nt.)
Authorization of Safeguard system----- ------------------------ 42
P
Basic elements of Safeguard system---------------------- 24
t,s
Bomber force of United States, Soviet reaction to ---------------------
C
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, statement of------------------------ 2
Chinese Communist ICRN- threat. ------------ ---------- 11,57,59
Complexity of Safeguard systeni---------------------------------------- 63
('ost of Safeguard system--------------------- ----- 69, 79, 81, 85
Costs incurred, antiballistic missile--__ ------------------------------------- 79
D
Data processing function----------------- ---------------------- 86
Decoys, effect on Safeguard system----------------------------------- 62
Delay in adopting Safeguard caucept-------------------------- 40, 53, 50, 84
Continuation of research and development-------------------- 53, 56
Deployment, alternativessto---------------------------------------- 14,78,83
Continuation of research and developWWent__________________________ 53,56
Agreement prohibiting-------------------------------------------- 86
Disarmament -------------- ------------------------ 52,76,78,87
hard-rock silo program-------------------------------------------
I eployment of All M's, possibility of agreement prohibiting-- - 86
Deployment of system, modified--------------- ------------ 39
Deterrent offered by Safeguard system------------------------------- 42
Support of strategic retaliatory capability------------------------ 44
Development of military systemns, history of_- 57
Disarmament, effect of ABAI deployment on--------------------- 52, 7[i, 78, 87
Effectiveness of Safeguard in event of all-out attack-_ `Of, 79
---------- -
hinlargemcnt of Safeguard system---------------------------------- 44, 185
Escalation of arms race----------------------------------------------- 6,48
Explosion of missiles, danger to population -------------- .._____-_------ 70
Fallout shelters, relationship of ABMI system to __________
Forward-based AIIM system--------------------- ------
82
55
II
hard-rock silo program---------------- ------------------------ 47
I
Intelligence information--- -----------------------------------
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agr
74
1i
lliuuternau sites, defense of---- __.------------- - 82
:Minuteman, use as an AB11---------- ____________ 87
Missile site radar -------------- -------------------------- --_------- ----_ 26
N
cued for Safeguard system------------------------------------- ------ 72
Minuteman missiles, early launch of----------- 77
V`aurnuclear ABM system--------------------------
r,5
Nonproliferation treaty, effect of ABM deployment on __-_-------- 49
U
(absolescence of Safeguard system- _______________ __-----_- 57.67,70
P.
Perimeter acquisition radar------------------------------ - Protection offered by Safeguard system -------------------------------- 44,85
Cities -------------------- -------------------- ----- 43
Minuteman ------ ------------------------ 15,46
Missile sites versus cities -..__-______________ 40
Purchases of Safeguard missiles in fiscal year 1970_ ____.---_68
Purposes served by ABM -__-_------_---- 16
It
Hadar blackout.---------------------- ---------- (i1.66
;.caction time to missile attack ------------------------- - ---------- 73
I.eliability of ABM system- --------- 54, 63
. i feguard system :
Authorization ------------------ -------------- 42
Basic elements------------------------------- __- --- ----- - 24
Complexity ---------------------------------- ----------------------- 63
Cost --------------------------- - --- -- - -. - _ -- 69, 79, 81, 85
Decoys, effect of -------------- ----------------- ------------ --- 62
Delay in adopting, effect of -------------------------- 40, 53, 56, 84
Deterrent offered------------------------------------------------- 42
Effectiveness ------------------------- ..-__---------------------- 29,79
Enlargement ---------------------------------------- _--------- 44,85
Need for----------------------------- -------------- - --------- 72
Obsolescence ------------------ ------- 57, Protection offered------------------------------- 44. bS
Cities ------------------------------------------
Minuteman ----------------------------- --------- -- __ 15,46
Missile sites versus cities ------------------- --_ ----- --- 40
Purchase of missiles in 1970----------------
Testing ---------------------------------------- 514,63,70
Vulnerability of radar------------------------------ 66
Si i-ond-strike capability of United States--------------------------------- 68, 85
Secretary of Defense, statement.
Summary and conclusions--.--------------------------------------- ,
;leutircel costs ------------------------------------------ .--------- -- 79
54'ntineI program, relationship to------------------------------------- 42
watinel sites, disposition of----------------------- ___ so
Sentinel system, multipurpose design of------------------------------- 76
significance of ABM system ---------------------- ------
Sites, acquisition of-------------------- ----------- -- - ----- 86
Location of----------------------------- 46
S oviet ABM deployment------------------------ _Tv 54, 67, 77
Soviet deployment o f ABM against China - - - - - ___ __ _ lid
-
8.o iet ICIIM's threat to Minuteman sites ------ y.
--------
,4oviet production of Polaris-type submarines ----------- 117
:soviet SS-9 missiles, deployment of_________-- _ 11
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Soviet strategic offensive capability------------------------------------
84
Soviet threat to U.S. cities and population-----------------------------
7
Soviet threat to U.S. strategic offensive forces--_- --------------
8
Status of ABM defense system ---------------------------------------
17
-
Storage of nuclear weapons, safety implications of --_ ----- ----
)
7-1,7.
Strategic and foreign policy considerations---__ ---------------
29
11,
Terminal defense, concept of-----------------------------------------
3`'
--__ --- -- - -- ---- - )4=
1 csting of Safeguard system --------------------------------------
03, 70
Threat to the security of the United States, analysis of------------- 7,
59, 84
Threat to Minutem'an---------------------------------------- 34,
4:i, 83
V
Vulnerability of Safeguard radar-------------------------------------
66
W
Warhead costs-------------------------------------------------------
81
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SAFEGUARD ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM
I' 11UP,SnAY. MAY 22, 1969.
HON. MELVIN R. LAIRD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
GEN. EARLE G. WHEELER, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
JOHN S. FOSTER, JR., DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND
ENGINEERING
Mr. MAUOti. ]'lie committee will come to order.
Mr. Secretary Laird, we are very pleased to have you before us for
your first appearance in your important capacity as Secretary of
I )efense.
We want you to know of our interest in your success and our desire
to be as cooperative as possible as you bear the tremendous burdens of
the otlice which you 1101 d.
As a former member of the Committee on Appropriations for many
bears, you have sat through. many weeks and months of hearings on
defense programs and otherwise. I would like to report briefly for
the record that we began our hearings before the Defense Subcommittee
oil .January b) when Ave had a briefing in reg.ird to the -Navy plane
known as the, F-14. On March 5, we began hearings on the second sup-
plemental 1969, which you had a major part in proposing. On March 11
we started our regular hearings on the 1970 program.
The staff tells me we already have amassed over 6,500 pages of
transcript. We have finished our hearings insofar as we know on "mili-
tary personnel" appropriation estimates for the various services, and
also on the operation and maintenance estimates. We have also finished
our hearings on most procurement. proposals.
General AV, heeler, we are glad you are before us again as Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs.
General Wi i E r:r.Er Thank you, sir.
Mr. MAno-,, . We have. found your counsel and advice most helpful
in the past and we are glad that we shall have the continued benefit of
your assistance.
SPI:CL T, IIEABING ON SAFEGUARD ABM SYSTEM
.As I think you know, Air. Secretary, we had hearings before the
committee on May 5, 6, and 7 in regard to file "Procurement of Equip-
ment and Missiles, Army." We did not, inquire at that time as to fimd-
ing proposals for the antiballistic missile system, the so-called ABM,
because we wanted to have a special hearing with you and General
Wheeler and Dr. Foster in connection with this higlily controversial
and important matter.
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D)% Foster, we are pleased to have yon here and we want to ha ye
assistance as we proceed.
NIP. FOSTER. Thank you, Hr. Chairman.
Mr. W. [1oN. Arrangements have been made for the consideration in
special hearing of the antiballistic. missile system which is now
l:n(;wn as. SAFVGTJARI).
We propose that special hearing now. The record should show tlialt
j id, the purposes of this hearing the Military (onstrnctiorr Subconr-
itee of the Appropriations Committee, which has an important re-
)onsibility in connection with this weapons system, is sltt.injo? with
today.
SIGNIFICANCE OF ANT1111.1LT.1STJC VIiSSuLE Sl"s'1'r:11
i'hcre. are nlanv weapons systems for which funding is proposed in
he fiscal 1970 budget wlhu b are quite important and significant to our
litaly posture and strategy. The XB11I is probably one of the most
11I1porlant from this point of view of its effect on relative military
I e,n ~fh and strategy of the major powers. 'l'he system relates to the
I Ifealsive capability which it offers to the Tinted States. We need a
proper balance between offensive and defensive weapons if we :n'e to
:1a'1lieve optimum deterrence. It is clear that time proposed deployment
G the ABM system known as Safeguard is one of the most important
4 :estions to cone before the Government in years. It is important
i iilitarily, it is important economically, it is important from the
p= ditical standpoint.
We. do not have to tell on of the interest which has been generated
sr; this conntr'v in this important matter.
(Discussion off the record.)
1Ir. MAIroN. Ilow (10 yon propose, Mr. Secretary, that we proceed?
.secretary I,Anrn. Mr. Chairman, I have a classified statement which
ti;'rhaps is the most complete that has ever been put together on the
,I l'egnard system. Before I proceed with it, (Ieneral Wheeler has a
r,llor't statement which T would like him to proceed with first.
(Discussion off the record.)
lfr.:1l.crrox, On the record, proceed, General.
s'I'ATEMMENT OF THE CITATIr'rAI , JOINT ('IIlEES of STAFF
twei1eraI tit"Tnel:T I':l1. Mr. Chair-111,1u and members of the committee, it
i a pleasure to have the opportunity again to present the views of the
d int Chiefs of Staff on developments since T last appeared before yon
;11 we discussed an antiballistic missile system on February 10, 1)G,;.
Among the developments in the intervenimr period have been air
1 l:r?1'ease in Soviet ICBM and SLB11T calrllril ities with implications
t,: the survival of our land-based missile and bomber forces and a
M; I101* review of the Sentinel program within the Department of
I 'tense. In the light of these developments and after review by the
'i.rtio~!nal Security Council, the President :unrolmeed his decision to
IiE'ably the Sentinel and to denloy instead the phased Safeguard
-tern. At the outset, let me affirm that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
~~n-xrrt this decision because it will -add to the overall strategic
3:.;sture of the i'nited States and to our ability to deter nuclear war.
'l'he. Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that a foremost- require-
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meat for the defense of the United States is deployment of an effective
ballistic, missile defense against the Soviet threat. Toward this objec-
tive the Joint Chiefs of Staff had previously accepted the Sentinel as
a first step toward a level of ballistic missile defense that would pro
vide increased protection for the United States. The principal feature
of the Sentinel deployment upon which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had
reservations was its primary orientation against the CHICOM ICBM
threat. It. is important that the term. "orientation" be understood as
distinct from a level of capability. The Sentinel orientation provided
coverage against attacks from only a northerly direction and did not
defend against attacks from other azimuths by the use of either sub-
marine-launched missiles or a fractional orbit bombardment system
(FOBS). The requirement for the capability to defend against all
azimuths of attack has been. included in the Safeguard program and
accordingly is supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Sentinel was principally developed to protect the population of the
United States against CIIICOM ICBM attack. It would have provided
some very limited capability against a Soviet missile attack, but the
number of defensive missiles and lack of all-around coverage made it
vulnerable to a major attack. Despite these limitations, however, and
in addition to the, defense against a CHICOM threat, the Sentinel con-
tained an option for the defense of part of the Minuteman force. It is
the exercise of such an option and reorientation of the capabilities to
all azimuths of attack which are provided in the Safeguard system.
With regard to whether or not the system will work, the Safeguard
system consists of the components of the Sentinel system appropriately
modified. These components result from an intensive research and de-
velopment program initiated by the Army in 1.956. Through the early
Nike-Zeus development program and its testing against actual ICBM's
in the Pacific, and through the updated technology of the Nike-X sys-
tem, I have gained a high degree of confidence teat such a system can
be deployed to meet its stated objectives.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that in light of the rapidly expand-
ing Soviet. ICBM and SLBM capabilities, it is prudent now to provide
protection for a portion of the U.S. retaliatory force and that the
phased Safeguard deployment meets this requirement.
1 Ir. Chairman, I would like you and the committee to know that I
have ,.one over Secretary Laird's statement several times as it was
being developed. I find that, I agree with its contents. I consider it to
be a thorough and logical presentation of the case for the ABM. It
is for this reason my statement was deliberately made short and hit
oily two or three items which were of particular interest to the JCS.
Mr. NLyirox. General, I would say this: That we on this committee
consider the statement being presented by the Secretary not only as
his statement but also as your statement, and the statement of the Joint
Chiefs as being the statement of the Staff and really as the statement
of the executive br anch in regard to this matter.
General A ~` ~rr~:rrr.i . Mr?. Chairman, I am happy to know that you take
that view because that is the way I regard it.
Mr. tlINSirALL. Mr. Chairman, would you yield for a point of in-
quiry, please?
Mr. Marr0N. Yes.
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r)N.('1..1Ks1rI '_1'rl(!V" Or 1.1'l'.\ IN A'1'1111:"ti'r5
oil. ~tr,il.v,r,. This staleruent is marked top secret. W'helt we 2'et
to file printed hea ing:s who will decide just what and hove nrnch of
t hIe statement and test ilnonv c1nr be released to the general pnbli(. z
Secretary Lvnw. We will substitute an unclassified version of my
alernent for the printed henHfigs.
( Discussion otl' the record.)
tie(retar l.:nrtn. This st>iternent that is I>eillif pr?0 cared to this coln-
ittee will he the most complete We have tirade to date on the Safe-
4!11?(i prog'u' din.
I believe, and I tun 201112? to cheek this out, thal vv-e will tair a space booster) within 18 months. If they do, we will soon know
1E11lc1i more about the other questions.
it. AETERNATLVES TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF AN A10r DEFENSE
Lgaifst the ASorret I'breat to (Jer Ntrategu; O ffensire Forces
?1.'he alternatives to an ABM defense for our strategic offensive
f=aces fall under two general headings. First, we could increase the
,ze of our strategic offensive forces, i.e., the number of sea- or land-
h;osed missiles or of bombers-or all three. Second, we could improve
the survivability of our existing forces by placing our Minuteman
Missiles in harder silos and further dispersing our bomber force,
increasing the number on ground alert or placing a portion of the
1=o ree on continuous airborne alert.
1'[any of the alternatives in the first group might, as my predecessors
;vould have phrased it, be equally "cost/effective" in ensuring the sur-
f?ival of a sufficient force to inflict unacceptable damage to the Soviet
1 "nion. But all of these alternatives could be misconstrued by the
viets as an attempt to threaten their deterrent, and thereby stimu-
hto the arms race. In other words, the Soviets might interpret a major
r=,>_ pansion of our strategic offensive forces as an attempt on our part to
a eilieve a low-risk first strike capability against them.
The. second group of alternatives runs up aainst cost and physical
i n citations. We do intend to further disperse.- our bomber force, but
., we increase the proportion on ground alert the costs begin to mount.
'l 'ice alternative of maintaining a portion of our bomber force on con-
tnuous airborne alert has, as you know, been considered off and on
filrr a period of at. least 10 years. It has always been rejected because of
t1,e. very high cost and the wear and tear on both crews and aircraft.
Nevertheless, as I am sure you are aware, we still have on the statute
kooks, in the annual Appropriations Acts, a provision to do just that
+, an emergency and to pay for it on a deficiency basis.
Placing our Minuteman missiles in harder silos involves a somewhat
i iferent problem. As you know, we have requested fluids in the fiscal
=-.rr 1970 budget to continue with the development of hard rock silos.
! strt this increase in the hardness of the silo could be offset by a, reduc-
tion in the accuracy of the attacking missile. For example, an increase
ii, accuracy from 1 mile to 1/~ mile is equivalent. to an eight-fold
i rf crease in the warhead yield against a hard target.
Moreover, there appears to be a limit to how hard we can make a
Minuteman silo. While we can add concrete and steel to the top of the
si io, there is little we can do about the geology of the area in which
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the silo is emplaced. Where the limits of the geology lie, we just do
not know at this time. Nevertheless, we plan to proceed with our pro-
gram to develop hard rock silos. But we all must recognize that harden-
ing alone would not be enough to solve the problem of survivability
if the Soviet MIRVed SS-9 threat develops to the full extent I
described earlier.
2. Against the Chinese Threat to Our Cities
Given our present commitments in Asia and the Western Pacific,
and assuming the Chinese do indeed deploy an ICBM force in the
1970's, there is really only one alternative to an ABM defense against
that threat to our cities and population. That alternative is to rely
on the deterrent power of our strategic offensive forces, just as we
do against the far larger Soviet threat to our cities. However, in con-
sidering this alternative, we must keep clearly in mind a number of
interrelated factors-demographic, technical, economic, social, and
political.
First, we insist recognize the major demographic differences be-
tween the Soviet Union and Communist China. As shown on the fol-
lowing table, the thousand largest Chinese cities account for only 11
percent of the total population, compared with 47 percent for the
Soviet Union and 63 percent for the United States. Thus, the thou-
sand largest Chinese cities contain considerably less than the one-
third, one-fourth, or one fifth of the population Mr. McNamara has
postulated at various times as the level required for "Assured Destruc-
tion" against the Soviet Union.
CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION AND INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY IN 1970
jNumber of cities in order of population rank]
United States
Soviet Union
Communist China
Number of cities
Population
Industrial
capacity
Population
Industrial
capacity
Population
Industrial
capacity
50
-------
25.1
33.1
55
0
8.3
20.0
25
40
3.7
6.8
30-35
50-60
10---------------------
42.0
.
65
0
25.0
50
8.6
65-75
200--------------------
48.0
55
0
.
75
0
34.0
62
9.0
80-90
90
5
400--------------------
.
.
82
0
40.0
72
10.0
8
-
400 ------------------
60.0
3
0
.
0
86
47.0
82
11.0
1,000--
------------?-
6
.
.
The fact that a large proportion of Chinese industrial capacity is
concentrated in a relatively small number of cities does have a bear-
ing on the problem of deterrence. But, China is predominantly a rural
society where the great majority of the people live off the land and
are dependent only to a limited extent on urban industry for their
survival. Furthermore, as Mao Tse-tung is reported to have said,
China with its huge population (now estimated at 800 million) could
survive (i.e., as a people but not as a 20th century nation) even with
a loss of hundreds of millions from a nuclear attack. And we know
from past experience that the Asian Communists are tenacious op-
ponents and are willing to take great losses of life in achieving their
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objectives. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that our ability to
deter Communist China with our strategic offensive forces is con-
iderably less certain than in the case of the Soviet Union.
Second, because our population is heavily concentrated in a rela-
L ively few large cities (42 percent in the largest 50 cities compared
with 6.8 percent for Communist China), we would be highly vulner-
able to an attack by even a relatively few ICBM's-if we had no de-
fense against them. If deterrence should not work, our only recourse
would be retaliation. However, we would have to withhold a large part
o' our strategic offensive forces as a deterrent to the Soviet Union, and
the fatalities that we could inflict on Communist China would be
relatively small in proportion to its total population. We could, how-
ever, destroy most of their urban industry and population with a
relatively small number of weapons.
Third, given the character of the present regime in China, their
ambitions in Asia, and their implacable hostility towards the United
States, it would seem extremely foolhardy on our part to rely on
deterrence only-if we had any better alternative. The President of
th United States, no matter who he may be at the time, could find
himself in an extremely difficult position in a serious confrontation
with a Communist China armed with a force of even 25 relatively
primitive ICBM's. Our cities would be hostage to the Chinese ICBM
force, and the President would have no other alternative but to back
down or risk the destruction of several major U.S. cities and the death
of millions of Americans.
Thus, the issue resolves itself into a matter of judgment. If one
believes that a Communist China armed with a force of ICBM's could
still be deterred by our overwhelmingly greater strategic offensive
forces, then an ABM defense need not be deployed against that threat.
If, however, one believes as I do that the Chinese leaders might not
be deterred, then the, Safeguard system would be well worth its cost
for that purpose alone.
ii may be useful, at this point, to review briefly the various pur-
poses which an ABM system could serve, given the nature of the ac-
tual and potential threats. There are at least three major purposes
and two minor ones.
Major purposes :
1. Protection of our population and cities against the kind of
heavy, sophisticated missile attack the Soviets could launch in
the 1970's.
2. Defense of our strategic offensive forces and their command
and control (e..g., bomber bases, Minuteman silos, the National
Command Authorities, etc.) as a substitute in whole or in part
For the further expansion of those forces in the event a Soviet
threat to their survival clearly emerges in the next few venrs.
3. Protection of our population and cities against the kind of
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limited, unsophisticated ICBM attack the Chinese Communists
might be able to launch in the 1970's.
Minor purposes :
1. Protection against the improbable, but possible, accidental
launching of an ICBM toward the United States.
2. Protection against an unlikely, but possible, "demonstration
attack", i.e., one or two missiles launched against our homeland
as a sort of "shot across the bow."
The Sentinel system proposed by the preceding administration and
approved by the Congress was primarily intended to serve the third
major purpose-defense of our population against a Chinese ICBM
attack, and, to some extent, the second major purpose-defense of
our strategic offensive forces. In fact, a more comprehensive defense
of our Minuteman force was included in Sentinel as an option that
could be exercised at any time. Because of its nationwide coverage,
it would have also fully served the two minor purposes. Finally, given
the mode of deployment proposed (i.e., placing most of the radars
and missile launchers in or near the major urban areas) it could have
served as a foundation for a greatly expanded system for the defense
of our principal cities against a Soviet missile attack.
But, the important point to keep in mind is that the Sentinel system
,vas designed primarily to defend our population and cities against
a Chinese Communist ICBM attack in the 1970's, and not an all-out
Soviet attack. It would have had very little value against the hitter,
as the following table drawn from previous Posture Statements well
illustrates:
U.S. FATALITIES FROM A CHINESE OR SOVIET 1ST STRIKE IN THE MID-1970'S
]In millions]
With no defense --------------------------------------------------------------- 7-23 110-120
With Sentinel------------------------------------------------------------------- 0-1 100
Unfortunately, this point has been obscured by the fact that many
of the Sentinel sites (with Spartan missile launchers and the asso-
ciated radars) were to be located in or near the major urban areas.
We understand that this mode of deployment was selected so that in
the event a decision was made at a later time to provide a terminal
defense, the Sprint missiles could be installed at the same sites. Be-
cause the Sprint has a much shorter range (approximately 25 miles)
than the Spartan (several hundred miles) it must be installed in or
near the city to be defended.
I will have more to say about this matter of siting when I discuss
the deployment alternatives.
D. STATUS OF THE ABML DEFENSE SYSTEM
I would now like to turn to the status of the ABM defense system.
I know you are all familiar with the major components of this system,
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but I think it would be useful at this point to review briefly the
origins of the system, the
level.opment concept of operation, and the state of
.
1. Origins of the Safeguard System
Many people have lost sight of the fact that the Safeguard program
is the culmination of more than 13 years of research and development
effort and the expenditure of about $5 billion, including all the various
projects related to ballistic missile defense. During the entire period,
as this committee well knows, the ABM program has proceeded under
i he continuous scrutiny of the Congress. Much thought and study has
,one into its formulation since it was first presented to the Congress
and this Committee in 1955. You will recall, Mr. Chairman, that the
program did not move into full scale development until 1958, and that
by 1.959 there was already considerable sentiment in the Congress, not
to speak about the Department of the Army, to start the deployment
of the system then known as Nike-Zeus. In fact, the Congress added
5375 million to President Eisenhower's fiscal year 1960 budget request
for the acceleration of Nike-Zeus and/or the modernization of Army
i repower." President Eisenhower, as later events demonstrated, wise-
ly rejected this proposal in favor of continued development and test.
In fiscal year 1963, the Nike-Zeus system as such was abandoned be-
cause, with the mechanically steered radars which it employed, it
could not cope with the kind of attack the Soviets could mount in the
late 1960's. Accordingly, a new, improved system, known as the -Nike--
X, was placed in development. The Nike-X was to consist of a new
family of phased-array radars and a new high acceleration terminal
defense missile, the Sprint. This system promised to be much more ef-
fective against a sophisticated missile attack employing penetration
aids, and much less susceptible to saturation. However, even if the svs-
tem were deployed around all our major cities, a large part of the Na-
tion would still be left undefended. Moreover, the attacker would still
have the option of ground bursting his warheads outside of the de-
fended areas, thereby producing vast amounts of lethal fallout which
could be carried by the winds over the defended areas. While the see-
oud problem could be ameliorated by a nationwide system of fallout
shelters, something more would be needed to deal with the first prob-
lem. The solution adopted in December 1964 was the initiation of de-
velopment of a new, lo~ng-range interceptor with a high yield warhead
which kills by X-ray. With this missile, called the Spartan, the Nike-
X system offered the possibility of a defense in depth-an area de-
fense for the entire Nation, as well as a terminal defense for our major
cities with the Sprint missile.
Consequently, the Congress in the summer of 1966 appropriated
$168 million over and above the President's fiscal year 1967 budget
request to prepare for the production of the Nike-X system. This ac-
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tion, together with a number of other developments which occurred
during that year,a brought the Nike-X deployment issue to a head.
In response to these events, President Johnson, on January 24, 1967,
made the following recommendation to the Congress:
"Continue intensive development of Nike-X but take no action now
to deploy an antiballistic missile (ABM) defense; initiate discussions
with the Soviet Union on the limitation of ABM deployments; in the
event these discussions prove unsuccessful, we will reconsider our de-
ployment decision. To provide for actions that may be required at that
time, approximately $375 million has been included in the 1968 budget
for the production of Nike-X for such purposes as defense of our
offensive weapon systems."
However, later in that same year (in a speech in San Francisco on
September 18, 1967) Secretary of Defense McNamara announced the
Johnson administration's decision to move forward with the deploy-
ment of an antiballistic missile defense system against the potential
threat of a Chinese Communist ICBM attack in the mid-1970's. It is
pertinent to note the reasons given by Secretary McNamara for this
decision. He stated them as follows :
"There is evidence that the Chinese are devoting very substantial re-
source to the development of both nuclear warheads, and missile de-
livery systems * * * indications are that they will have medium-
range ballistic missiles within a year or so, an initial intercontinental
ballistic missile capability in the early 1970's, and a modest force in
the mid-1970's.
"Up to now, the leadtime factor has allowed us to postpone a deci-
sion on whether or not a light ABM deployment might be advan-
tageous as a countermeasure to Communist China's nuclear
development.
"But the time will shortly be right for us to initiate production if
we desire such a system."
"The system would be relatively inexpensive-preliminary esti-
mates place the cost at about $5 billion-and would have a much high-
er degree of reliability against a Chinese attack, than the much more
massive and complicated system that some have recommended against
a possible Soviet attack.
"Moreover, such an ABM deployment designed against a possible
Chinese attack would have a number of other advantages. It would
provide an additional indication to Asians that we intend to deter
China from nuclear blackmail, and thus would contribute toward our
goal of discouraging nuclear weapon proliferation among the present
nonnuclear countries.
? Among these developments were the following :
(1) The Soviet Union had accelerated the deployment of hard ICBM's beyond the rates
forecasted by the U.S. Intelligence community and had initiated the deployment of an anti-
ballistic missile defense system around Moscow.
ed medinm-
and demonstrated a rst two thermonuclear devices.
range baT l istici mi sileom dlt had detonlaunched
ated their fi
(3) The Nllce-X had reached a stage of development where the start of concurrent pro-
duction and deployment had become feasible.
(4) The Joint Chiefs of Staff had strongly urged a prompt decision to deploy the system.
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"Further, the Chinese-oriented ABM deployment would enable us
to add-as a concurrent benefit-a further defense of our Minuteman
sites against Soviet attack, which means that at modest cost we would,
in, fact, be adding even greater effectiveness to our offensive missile
force and avoiding a much more costly expansion of that force.
"Finally, such a reasonably reliable ABM system would add pro-
tection of our population against the improbable but possible acciden-
tal launch of an intercontinental missile by any one of the nuclear
powers."
As you know, this Chinese-oriented ABM system was called the
Sentinel. By January 1969, production of many of the components of
that system was already underway, and the acquisition of operational
sites had been started. Indeed, the Johnson administration's fiscal year
1970 budget included $1.8 billion to carry forward the full-scale de-
ployment of the system, with an initial equipment readiness date of
October 1972 for the first site at Boston and completion of the entire
system by January 1975.
Thus, the Nixon administration was confronted with a going pro-
gram, and not just a proposal. A choice had to made. The alternatives
open to the new administration from this point of view can be sum-
marized as follows:
1. Permit the Sentinel program to move forward as planned
by the preceding administration.
2. Halt production and deployment and continue research and
development only.
3. Terminate all work on the Sentinel system as such, and con-
tinue only research and development on more advanced ABM
technology.
4. Reorient and rephase the entire Sentinel program.
For reasons which I discussed earlier, the fourth alternative was
chosen.
2. Concept of Operation and Status of Development
Mr. Chairman, there are two basic concepts involved in the kind of
ballistic missile defense systems we are discussing here today-area
defense and terminal defense. Area defense involves the detection and
tracking of the incoming reentry vehicles with long-range radars, and
th interception of those vehicles with long-range defense missiles
wli ile they are still high above the atmosphere. Terminal defense in-
volves the interception of enemy reentry vehicles with short-range,
high-acceleration defense missiles, after these vehicles have reentered
the atmosphere and after they have been sorted out by the atmosphere
from decoys, chaff, and other confusion devices. By using both con-
cepts in combination, a defense in depth can be provided. The area de-
fense concept is portrayed on chart 2, and the terminal concept on
chart 3.
Both the Sentinel and Safeguard systems involves the same basic
technology and utilize the same major components : Perimeter >> c-
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quisition Radars (PAR'S), Missile Site Radars (MSR's), Spartan
missiles, Sprint missiles, and a data processing center associated with
each of the radars. These components serve the following basic func-
tions : The PAR is the long-range radar which first acquires and
tracks the target, while the MSR is the shorter range radar which con-
tinues to track the target and also guides the interceptor missiles. The
Spartan is the long-range area defense missile; and the Sprint is the
high-acceleration terminal defense missile. The data processing cen-
ters provide the necessary calculations for the entire intercept
operation.
The Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR), shown on chart 4, is a
relatively low-frequency, phased-array radar which is capable of si-
multaneously detecting and tracking a large number of objects at a
range greater than a thousand miles. The PAR provides information
to the data processing center which computes the track of the incom-
ing missile and the probable point of intercept. (When the target
missile conies within range of the MSR, the MSR tracks it and pro-
vides the guidance for the Spartan interceptor missile.) The PAR
radar must be large in order to provide the long range and high reso-
lution required for the system. It will be housed in a building about
200 feet square, 130 feet high, and will have an antenna with a di-
ameter of 116 feet.
The principles, functions, power level, and frequency of the PAR are
quite similar to existing operational space and air defense radars.
Hence, there is no need to build a complete R. & D. PAR, and the first
PAR can be assembled directly at an operational site. The status of
the work on this radar is as follows: The equipment configuration has
been chosen, the design and performance specifications have been pre-
pared, a partial prototype test model has been started and is now 40
percent complete, the design for the PAR structure has been finished,
and the P A.R computer is 25 percent complete. In short, work on the
PAR is well along and no major problems are anticipated.
The Missile Site Radar, shown on chart 5, is also a phased-array
radar which controls the Sprint and Spartan interceptor missiles dur-
ing an engagement. It has a range of several hundred miles and can
simultaneously track multiple incoming objects and guide missiles to
intercept them. After the MSR has been alerted to the incoming target
by the PAR, it and its associated computers provide the capability to
ready interceptors for launch, launch them, guide them to intercept,
arm their warheads, and fire them.
Because the functions of the MSR are more complex than those of
the PAR, a prototype system has been installed at Meek Island in the
Kwajalein Missile Range, where its operational capabilities are being
tested. The installation was completed in May 1968 as scheduled, and
the radar was successfully brought up to full power in November 1968.
Work on the data processing center associated with this MSR, includ-
ing the programing, is now progressing well. The first MSR-directed
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Spartan intercept of a single ICBM is expected to take place in the
spring or summer of 1970, and an intercept with a Sprint later in that
year. The first intercept of multiple targets at Kwajalein is scheduled
for early 1971.
The data processing function, which I just mentioned, is an ex-
trenwly important element in the ABM defense system. Powerful
computers and sophisticated "programs" are needed to control the ra-
dar-. compute trajectories, differentiate the incoming warheads from
other objects, guide the defense missiles, and so forth. Moreover, the
"programs" must be designed in advance to reflect every conceivable
eventuality the system may confront, and this represents a very com-
plex problem. While each of the PAR'S and MSR's has a data process-
ing center associated with it. the entire system will be tied into a bal-
listic missile defense center located at the underground headquarters
of the Continental Air Defense Command.
The MSR computer has the more difficult data processing require-
ment, since it must not only track the target but, also guide the inter-
ceptor missile. It utilizes a multi.-processor shown on chart 6, with
several units which can operate in parallel on different tasks or dif-
ferent parts of the same tasks. Two processors out of an eventual total
of four have been installed and are now operating with the MSR at
ialein. (Installation of the third is now underway.) The two op-
erat Tonal processors have been integrated with the radar and are being
used to test the radar "hardware" and to develop the "software" coin.-
putter programs. The data processing system, including the computer
programs, should be ready for use in the first live intercept scheduled
for 1970.
The 3-stage Spartan missile, shown on chart 7, is used for area de-
fense and can intercept objects at a range of several hundred miles and
at a ltitudes high above the atmosphere. This missile is a scaled-up
version of the Nike-Zeus. The latter was fired 154 times, and it made 10
successful interceptions out of 14 attempts against. ICBM's fired from
the v, est coast in 1962 and 1963. during its system test a~hase.
't'he first Spartan was fired in March 1968, and there hove now been
a. total of eight. firings. Six were completely successful, and two only
partially successful. However, the deficiencies in the latter two have
bean identified and corrections have been made. Additional test firings
will go on at a rate of about one per month.
The Spartan multi-megaton warhead is being developed and tested
by 1 he. Atomic Energy -Commission. X successful scaled-down develon-
mental shot was fired underground in Nevada in December 1968. It
should be noted that this Spartan warhead is being designed so that
i* r.,nnot detonate below a certain minimum safe altitude. and because
of the. high altitudes where the interceptions will take place, there will
l,r ,.? significant effects on people or property on the ground.
The. very fast, Sprint missile, shown on chart 8, makes its intercept
in the atmosphere. It is used for terminal defense where the incoming
enea-fav warhead is not destroyed by the Spartan missile. either because
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of a miss or malfunction, or a failure of the radars to discriminate be-
tween an armed warhead and a decoy or other confusion device. Once
the actual warhead has emerged from its accompanying confusion
devices as they enter the atmosphere, the high speed of the Sprint
enables it to make the intercept before the warhead descends to its
detonation altitude.
Test firings of the Sprint began in 1965. Out of a total of 29 launches,
there have been 14 successes, 7 partial successes, and 8 failures. How-
ever, eight out of the last 10 firings have been fully successful. More-
over, the exact causes of the two failures have been identified and cor-
rective action has been taken. On the basis of these recent flight tests,
we believe the Sprint will meet its performance specifications.
The Sprint's warhead is designed to use two kinds of phenomena to
kill an incoming reentry vehicle-an air blast which destroys the ve-
hicle, and neutrons which penetrate the vehicle. The warhead will be
provided with a safety device which will prevent it from detonating
below a minimum safe altitude. At this altitude there should be no
adverse effects on people or property on the ground. Testing of the de-
velopment warhead by the AEC has indicated that the proposed
design can meet the requirements. Design and fabrication of the op-
erational warhead is proceeding as planned.
Mr. Chairman, I believe it is clear from my discussion of the status
of the major components, that the system as a whole is ready for pro-
duction and deployment. In fact, as I noted earlier, some of the corn-
ponents are already being manufactured, and a total of about $434 mil-
lion has been obligated for procurement alone. Included in this total
is about $70 million for the first PAR ; about $120 million for data
processors; $59 million for advance procurement of an MSR; about
$146 million for production facilities, production engineering, at
cetera, for various major components of the Safeguard system. As of
March 30, 1969, about $103 million in procurement funds has already
been expended. We estimate that a total of about 15,000 employees in
the prime and major subcontractor plants, alone, are engaged in this
ABM development and production effort.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I must tell you very
frankly that if the Congress, this year, does not approve the deploy-
ment of Phase 1 of this system, we would not only have to terminate
production, but also drastically revise the R. & D. effort uniquely re-
lated to the deployment of this particular system. We have been ad-
vised by very knowledgeable people in the business that we have
probably gone as far as we can in the development of some of the
components of this system. In any event, we would, of course, con-
tinue R. & D. work associated with the Kwajalein test program and
on more advanced ABM defense technology.
Nevertheless, a large portion of the work force presently engaged in
this effort would have to be disbanded, and if we should later decide to
go ahead' with the Safeguard program in fiscal year 1971, it would
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tale not just one more year, but at least 2 more years to complete the
fi i I1 deployment. In other words, the system would not be fully opera-
turnal until the spring of 1978 instead of 1976. This is so because the
work force would have to be rebuilt and all of the production processes
restarted, and this would take at least an additional year. To delay
this program for another 2 years would, in my judgment, be gambling
w i th the Nation's survival-unless we adopt some of the other alterna-
t.ives (e.g., increasing our strategic offensive forces) which I dis-
cussed earlier. And I want to make it perfectly clear that those meas-
ures would have little effect on the situation which would prevail if
the Chinese ICBM threat were to emerge in the mid-1970's.
* * * * * s
I would now like to turn to the Safeguard program specifically
proposed by President Nixon.
E. BASIC ELEMENTS OP THE SAFEGUARD PROGRAM
Before I discuss the Safeguard program, I believe it would be useful
to review briefly the main characteristics of the ABM program pro-
posed by the preceding administration and the reasons why we felt
it should be reoriented.
The Sentinel system, as I noted earlier, was oriented primarily
against, the Chinese ICBM threat. It involved the deployment of 1`r
sites; 15 in the 48 contiguous States and one each in Alaska and
Hawaii. The plan called for the deployment, of six PAAR's (with one
face each) along the northern border of the United States facing the
Chinese ICBM threat corridors. Each site was to be equipped with in
MSR, some with more than one face each, for a total of 38 faces. (The
four sites in the Minuteman fields and' the one in Washington, D.C.,
would each have had a four-face MSR to give them an all-around
defense capability.) All of the sites except Hawaii were to have
Spartan missiles. The Hawaiian site was to be equipped with Sprint's
only because of the small area to be protected. All sites at which the
P:R's were to be located were to be equipped with Sprint's for
defense of the radars.
There were several elements of this plan which we felt could be
considerably improved. First, the plan was too heavily oriented to
the Chinese ICBM threat. For example, all of the PAR's faced north
only, providing no warning or tracking capability against the SLBM
threat, from the sea. Many MSR's had no terminal defense, and no
Sprint's were specifically provided for the defense of the Minuteman
force. This last requirement was simply held open as an option, to
be exercised if needed. Yet the Soviet threat to our land-based ICBM's
and bombers was growing more rapidly than was forecast only a
year or two ago, while the Chinese ICBM threat was evolving more
slowly.
Second, 10 of the 15 Sentinel sites in the contiguous 48 States were
to he located in or near major metropolitan areas. This particular
pattern of deployment could well appear to the Soviets as a threat
to their deterrent, since it could serve as the foundation for a thick
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ABM defense of our cities. We would, of course, all wish to defend our
cities if that were technically feasible, which it is not. Thus, placing
the Sentinel sites in or near the major metropolitan areas might
have simply resulted in an increase in the Soviet ballistic missile threat
to our cities.
Furthermore, since the public is well aware that Spartan will be
equipped with a large, inegaf;on-class warhead, many people became
gravely concerned as to their safety in the event of an accidental
detonation. We cannot, from a strictly technical point of view, ab-
solutely preclude that very remote possibility, but the control tech-
niques employed heretofore clearly show that the chance of an ac-
cidental detonation is virtually nil. We can point with great confidence
to our record on nuclear safety, which includes the safe deployment
of Nike-Hercules air defense missiles around our major cities for
more than a decade.
Third, the entire Sentinel system was to be deployed on a fixed,
predetermined schedule, instead of on a step-by-step basis which would
allow for a periodic reassessment of the international situation and
the need to continue the deployment.
The Safeguard program, in contrast, is based on a different con-
cept. It is to be deployed in a manner which will make its defensive
intent unmistakable. All of the sites will be located well outside the
major urban areas, except for Washington, D.C., which is the control
center of the National Command Authorities. This site will be pro-
vided a heavier defense than was planned in the Sentinel program.
since protection of the NCA is essential if we wish command and
control of our nuclear weapons to continue to reside in the hands of
the constituted authority.
By properly locating the 12 sites, we can provide reasonable cover-
acre, for our manned bombers against the SLBM threat from the sea.
'To provide the all-around radar coverage required, 7 PAR's with 11
faces would be installed, instead of 6 PAR's with 6 faces. Six of these
11 PAR faces would cover the seaward approaches, including the Gulf
of Mexico. And, even though the Safeguard sites would be located away
from the cities, a good area defense of virtually the entire country
against the kind of threat the Chinese Communists might pose in the
1970's could be provided with 12 instead of 15 sites (excluding in both
cases, Alaska and Hawaii).
The Safeguard system, if all Phase 2 options are exercised, would
require somewhat fewer Spartan's but more than twice as many
Sprint's on launchers than the Sentinel system. The increased number
of Sprint's is principally for the protection of the Minuteman fields,
and the four Safeguard sites planned for these fields would account
for almost two-thirds of the Sprint's. More than half of these Sprint's
would be deployed at so-called remote sites around the MSR to pro-
vide better coverage of the Minuteman force.
Another important feature of the Safeguard proposal is that the
deployment would be implemented in stages in a manner clearly re-
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fated to the actual development of the threat and the international
situation generally. All we are asking the Congress to approve this
year is Phase 1 of the program, which includes only the first two
sites in the Minuteman fields-Grand Forks Air Force Base in North
Dakota and Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana. As shown on
chart 9, each of these sites would be equipped, initially, with a 1-face
11AR, a 4-face MSR, and Spartan and Sprint missiles, plus the re-
quired data processors, communication facilities and so forth. How
no would propose to proceed from there would cl'epend upon the out-
(,()me of the forthcoming talks with the Soviet Union on strategic
A rms limitations and, ultimately, on how the threats, both from the
soviet Union and Communist China, actually evolve.
't'here are several reasons why we feel it is extremely important
that we move ahead with Phase 1 at this time. First, as I already noted,
if Ave do not proceed with production and deployment of the ABM
ro1 nponents In fiscal year 1970, we would probably have to put the
entire project on the shelf for the time being, thus delaying the avail-
, )ility of an operational system for at least 2 years. Second, although
"ve plan to install an R. & D. prototype system (except for the PAR)
.~~ Kwajalein, that system would still not be the one we would install
..t an operational base. We feel it is absolutely essential to deploy at
a i operational site in order to check out the entire system under
realistic conditions and work out the problems that inevitably arise
in t.lie deployment, of any new major weapon system. This work must
be done in any event if we ever want to deploy this system. If we
tiu n't do it now, we will have to do it later, thus depriving the Presi-
dent of the option to move forward rapidly with the Phase 2 options
should the, need arise within the next few years.
I'lie reason we have proposed two sites instead of one is that they
would be mutually supporting in an area defense role since the PAR
and the Spartan coverage would overlap to some extent. Furthermore,
we have to begin somewhere, and these two sites would provide protec-
t uin for at least a limited portion of the Minuteman force. According-
ly, even. if we don't, go beyond Phase 1, we would still get some value
out of the deploment of the first two sites. To protect our population
against the Chinese ICBM threat, in contrast, would require the de-
plotiment of all 12 sites.
I Because most of the startup costs must be incurred in the beginning
of the production program, the DOD investment cost (procurement,
construction, and installation) of Phase I is estimated at $2.1 billion.
_1laout $800 million of these funds are already available; another $360
million is included in the revised fiscal year 1970 budget request, mak-
ing a total of about $1,160 million. The balance of the $2.1 billion
1)01) investment cost for Phase 1 would have to be financed in sub-
sequent years.
t'iv initial equipment readiness date of the first site at Grand Forks
is estimated to be January 1974, and the second site at Malmstrom,
Jul ly 1974. It is pertinent to note that the initial equipment readiness
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date of the first site in the Sentinel plan discussed in Mr. Clifford's
fiscal year 1970 Posture Statement was October 1972. Thus, we have al-
ready slipped the ABM deployment program by more than 1 year.
That is how we have been able to reduce the total fiscal year 1970
budget request for ABM deployment-including R.D.T. & E., and so
forth-by almost $1 billion.
I want to make it clear at this point that these cost figures pertain
only to the Defense Department budget; they do not include the nu-
clear warhead costs which, as you well know, are financed in the
Atomic Energy Commission's budget. This has always been the case
insofar as DOD weapon system costs are concerned. For example,
the fiscal year 1970 Sentinel budget request figures cited in Mr. Clif-
ford's statement also exclude warhead costs, as do the figures cited
in Mr. McNamara's last statement.
I should also caution that the term "DOD investment cost" excludes
R.D.T. & E. Although I think it is more logical to include R.D.T. & E.
in investment costs, and I have taken action to see that this is done
in the future, the practice in the Defense Department in the past
has been to include only procurement and military construction. In
order to maintain comparability with the Sentinel costs used in the
past, we have continued to apply this more narrow-definition of invest-
ment costs to the Safeguard program. As a result, the cost figures I
am using with regard to Safeguard are directly comparable to the
figures used for Sentinel.
Shown on chart 10 are the Phase 2 options. If the Soviet ICBM
threat to our Minuteman force evolves in the manner I described
earlier, but the Chinese ICBM threat does not develop, then we might
propose to proceed with option 2A. This would involve adding two
more sites in the Minuteman fields-Whiteman Air Force Base in
Missouri and Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming. It would also
involve a substantial increase in the number of Sprints in the Minute-
man fields (plus more Spartans) and the installation of a Safeguard
site at Washington, D.C. (with one four-face MSR. Spartans and
Sprints) for the protection of the National Command Authorities.
The exercise of option 2A would bring the total DOD investment cost
for Safeguard up to $3.4 billion (including Phase 1).
The relative effectiveness of Safeguard option 2A in defending our
Minuteman force can be measured in terms of the threat I mentioned
earlier; namely, the large Soviet SS-9 type missile equipped with three
independently targetable 5-megaton warheads with an accuracy of
one-quarter of a mile. With a force of 420 of these missiles on launch-
ers and an assumed failure rate of 20 percent, the Soviets could place
over the Minuteman fields about 1,000 warheads. Without any ABM
defense, it is possible that only about 50 Minutemen would survive.
(A mixed force made up of fewer large missiles but including a number
of highly accurate small missiles could produce similar results.) With
Safeguard Phase 1, perhaps two or three times as many Minutemen
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would survive and with Safeguard option 2A perhaps five or six times
as many. (The actual number surviving would vary, depending upon
both the offensive and defensive tactics employed.)
I cannot state as a fact that the Soviets will actually develop a
MII.Ved missile of this type or deploy it force of 420 of them. But T
think you willagree, in the light of the information already in hand,
that. it is well within the realm of the possible. And if they should do
so, our Minuteman force as presently deployed could be virtually
wiped out-unless we provide some ABM defense.
Safeguard option 2B is designed to meet the growing Soviet SLBM
threat, to our bomber force. This option would involve the installation
of all 12 sites and the deployment of the improved Spartan. The total
DOt) investment cost would amount to $6.3 billion (including Phase
1). Without an ABM defense, only a relatively small portion of our
bombers and tankers would survive if the Soviets could place as many
as l :i Y-class submarines off our coasts, especially if the Soviet SLBMPs
are fired on a depressed trajectory. With the option 2B deployment,
most of our alert bomber force could be expected to survive. Thus, the
expected payoff from an option 2B deployment would be very sub-
stantial under these particular circumstances.
Option 2C is designed specifically against the Chinese ICBM threat,
and assumes that the Soviet threat to our strategic offensive forces
falls short of the levels postulated under options 2A and 2B. In this
case, we would install all 12 sites and deploy the improved Spartan.
Bun. we could probably omit the PAR'S Planned for Florida and
southern California, since we would not have to defend against the
Soviet SLBM threat, to our bomber force. Moreover, some of the mul-
tiple MSR faces could probably also be omitted, since we would not
have to defend against the Soviet ICBM threat to our Minuteman
force. The DOD investment cost of this option would be $6 billion
(including Phase 1).
The effectiveness of option 2C against the Chinese TCBM threat is
expected to be very high. If the Chinese deploy a force of only 30
ICBM's on launchers by mid-1976, they could inflict about 15 million
fatalities on us-if we had no ABM defense. With option 2C deployed,
fatalities could be held to less than 1 million. And, even if they were
to deploy as many as 75 ICBM's on launchers by the end of the
de(-ade, fatalities could still be held to less than 1 million, particularly
if the improved Spartan is deployed. Here again, the deployment of
Sn leguard would have a very large payoff, if the Chinese ICBM
threat should, in fact, emerge.
If we fully deploy the Safeguard system against all three. of the
threats I have discussed, the total DOT) investment cost would be $6.6
billion, about $600 million more than currently estimated for the
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Sentinel system. Adding the estimated $2.5 billion of R.D.T. & E.
costs specifically associated with the Safeguard program, the total
DOD cost would amount to $9.1 billion. This leaves the warhead costs
to be considered. According to the AEC, these costs would amount to
about $1.2 billion, including the costs of all of the facilities required
for development and test. The incremental. investment cost incident
to the deployment of the system, i.e., the cost of producing the war-
heads alone, would only amount to about $0.2 billion. What propor-
tion of the remaining costs should properly be charged to the Safe-
guard program is problematical. Some of the new AEC facilities
being constructed for the Safeguard program can be used for other
development and test programs. Moreover, the special nuclear mate-
rials involved are recoverable. But, even if we charge off the entire
$1.2 billion of AEC costs to the Safeguard program, the total would
amount to $10.3 billion.
If we should later decide to extend the Safeguard system to Alaska
and Hawaii, another $450 to $500 million would have to be added to
this total.
The annual operating cost of the fully deployed system is estimated
to be about $350 million a year. The deployment locations are shown
on Chart 11.
F. STRATEGIC AND FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
For many years, and over several administrations, this Nation's
strategic nuclear war policies have been squarely based on the proposi-
tion that the other great nuclear power in the world, the Soviet Union,
must under all foreseeable conditions be deterred from ever attempting
a first strike on the United States. The terminology employed in de-
scribing this policy has varied over the years, but its essence has re-
mained unchanged : we must always be in a position where we can in-
flict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union, even after absorbing
the first blow. In more recent times, this capability has been labeled
"Assured Destruction," and I am sure that the members of this Com-
mittee understand the meaning of that term; it was certainly pounded
home to us often enough by my distinguished predecessor, Robert
McNamara.
The issue that now confronts the Nation is how best to ensure that
deterrent (or "Assured Destruction") power through the 1970s. If the
Soviets continue on the course they are now following, and I am
speaking here of what they are actually doing and not what we think
they intend to do, the survival of two of the three major elements of
our strategic offensive forces, namely, the bombers and the land-based
ICBMs, could be gravely endangered, To rely on only one of the three
major elements would, in my considered judgment, be far too risky,
considering the stake involved, which is the very survival of our Na-
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lion. It is perfectly apparent, therefore, that something more must
be done, and in view of the leadtimes involved, done fairly soon.
One possibility, of course, is an agreement with the Soviet Union on
1he limitation of strategic armaments. I wholeheartedly support that
objective, and we should do everything in our power to achieve a
~~mtable agreement. But we must recognize that the issues involved
are extremely complex and, even with the best of good will on both
sides, it will he very difficult to work out an arrangement which truly
safeguards the security of our respective nations.
Meanwhile, we have to deal with the world as it is today. Until an
;a.r,ceptable arrangement is achieved, we must continue to ensure the
,nifficiency of our deterrent. As I noted earlier, we can do this by in-
cr?easing our strategic offensive forces. But we feel that this course
would simply accelerate the arms race with the Soviet Union. And, it
would not solve the problem of the other threat looming on the hori-
zon; namely, the prospect that, the Chinese Communists will deploy
an ICBM force. Nor would it provide protection against the pos-
sibility of an accidental ICBM launch against the United States, or
a,n intimidation attack with a few missiles.
The only single program which can cope with all of these contin-
1`9111cies is Safeguard. It can ensure the survival of the minimum re-
gnired number of land-based ICBM's and bombers; it can provide a
very high degree of protection for our population against the kind of
4aHack the Chinese Communists may be capable of launching in the
1970's; and it can defend the Nation against an accidental ICBM
launch. or an intimidation atta.ck. While there might be some question
a to whether it would be worth $10 billion to place ourselves in a posi-
tion to defend against any one of these potential threats, there can
be no question but that it would be well worth that amount of money
for be able to defend ourselves against all of these threats.
WWe see no reason why a decision to move forward with Phase 1 of the
Safeguard program should in any way impede the forthcoming talks
WItli the Soviet Union on strategic armaments limitation. Let me re-
nr ind you that only a few days after the Senate had approved the Sen-
tinel program last year, following many dire warnings that such an
approval would wreck the chances for strategic arms talks, the Soviets
announced their readiness to start such talks. And, they have displayed
no loss of interest in the ratification of the Nonproliferatiton Treaty.
Furthermore, as I noted earlier, the Soviet Union has been deploying
an :kBM system around Moscow, and they are continuing their work
on more advanced ABM's. I think it is entirely possible, therefore, that
the Soviet Union may want to provide for some minimum .ABM de-
fense in any agreement they reach with us on the limitation of strategic
armaments. The Soviet leaders have traditionally laid great stress on
defense, particularly the defense of Moscow, and I doubt very much
that, they would be willing to dismantle the existing Galosh AIM sys-
tein around that city.
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Thus, it is entirely possible that a Soviet-United States agreement on
strategic arms limitations might provide for a limited ABM defense
on both sides. I myself can see no objection to such an arrangement,
especially in the face of a situation where our cities could become
hostage to the Chinese Communists. I recognize that we plan to con-
tinue to rely on our deterrent to protect our cities against a Soviet
attack in the 1970's, but that is because we have no better alternative.
Against the Chinese Communist ICBM threat, however, we do have a
better alternative, and that is the deployment of the Safeguard sys-
tem. I think we would be foolhardy not to employ it, if that threat
does indeed, begin to emerge.
With regard to other foreign policy implications of a decision to
deploy Safeguard, we believe that "on balance" the advantages far
exceed the disadvantages. This would be particularly true with respect
to the free world position in Asia. Once Communist China acquires
a force of medium range bombers and/or ballistic missiles, all of her
neighbors would be open to nuclear blackmail. Should Communist
China then also acquire an ICBM force with which it can threaten our
cities, and we have no defense against it, the President of the United
States would have no alterative but to back down or risk the destruc-
tion of several of our major cities in any serious confrontation with
Communist China.
Furthermore, as former Secretary of Defense McNamara pointed
out last year in his discussion of the Sentinel program, "It would pro-
vide an additional indication to the people of Asia that we intend to
support them against nuclear blackmail from China, and thus help to
convince the nonnuclear countries that acquisition of their own nuclear
weapons is not required for their security."
With regard to our allies in Europe, the Johnson administration's
decision to deploy the Sentinel system did not have any important
repercussions one way or the other. The issue of an ABM defense for
Western Europen was discussed with our allies and it was concluded
that the threat was so great and varied that even an extensive deploy-
ment might not be able to prevent great damage from the kind of
attack the Soviets could mount over the next several years.
However, some of our NATO allies have expressed concern about
the impact of such a, decision on the prospects for a detente in Europe.
But, as I just pointed out, the decision of the U.S. Congress last year
to support the Sentinel program did not have any perceptible adverse
effect on the Soviet Union's attitude toward the Nonproliferation
Treaty or the strategic arms limitation talks. I doubt that a decision to
proceed with Safeguard will have any bearing on their attitude toward
a detente in Europe.
Canada, on the military level, has shown great interest in our ABM
defense program, although it is not considered a part of the United
States-Canadian NOPAD system. But at the political level the interest
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32
is less pronounced. It is my impression that the Canadian Government
hay decided to adopt a noncommittal position on this issue. We do have
an obligation to keep the Canadian Government, and our other NAl'o)
allies, informed of our ABM defense plans, and we are meeting that
obi igation.
Tons, from a foreign policy point of view, we see no adverse implica-
tions in a decision to go forward with the deployment of Safeguard.
Aiid, certainly, this is true with respect to Phase 1, the deployment of
w-liich would simply place us in a better position to move forward
promptly if it should later become necessary to deploy the whole
system.
G. st`MMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I have outlined here
today the reasons why the Nixon administration has reached the con-
clnsion that we should move forward at this time with the deployment
of at least Phase 1 of the Safeguard system. I have presented to you
the facts and the analyses upon which that conclusion was based. The
choices now open to you are the same ones which President Nixon had
to confront in reaching his decision in March :
1. Continue the Sentinel program proposed by the preceding
administration 2 years ago and approved by the Congress last
year.
2. Cancel that program and revert to R. & 1). only.
3. Modify that program to bring it into better balance with the
threats as they now appear to be developing.
The President rejected the first choice because the Sentinel program
watt not geared to the threats as they were actually evolving. He re-
jected the second choice because he was convinced that the Soviet threat
to our bombers and land-based missiles was more imminent than pre-
viottsly assumed, and that the Chinese threat to our cities would ulti-
mately emerge, albeit later than originally estimated. He adopted the
third choice because the deployment of an ABM defense at this time
woidd be the best response to both of these threats, and, in addition,
would provide protection against an accidental ICBM launch or an
ini imidation attack on the United States. Because neither of these
threats might develop as fast or to the full extent presently estimated,
he decided to pace the deployment of the Safeguard system to the
in nal emergence of these threats and request the Congress to approve
only Phase 1 of the system at this time.
I can assure this Committee that we have carefully considered the
feasibility of delaying the deployment of Phase 1. In fact, initiation
of* deployment has already been delayed by more than a year compared
with the Sentinel schedule. I have, on my own initiative, held up all
construction work on ABM sites and any further acquisition of land
for these sites, pending a. Congressional decision on this program. But
production had already been started by the time the Nixon adminis-
tration took office. Had we terminated production, we would, in effect,
hive preempted the Congressional decision on deployment. The labor
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force would have had to be laid off and the contractors reimbursed for
costs already incurred. As a result, we would not now be in a position
to start deployment promptly, even if the Congress approves the pro-
gram in the current session. Aside from the waste of public funds
involved, this course of action would have delayed the program by at
least one extra year.
If we put off the deployment decision until next year, we would
delay the completion of the program by at least two years, from the
spring of 1976 to the spring of 1978. This choice appears to us to be
far too risky since both the Chinese threat to our population and par-
t icularly the Soviet threat to our bomber and land-based missile forces
are likely to emerge considerably before that time, perhaps as early
as 1974-75. Furthermore, it would entail all of the waste and delays
involved in terminating production.
It has also been suggested by some people that we complete the test
program at Kwaj alein before we initiate deployyment. The thought here
is that we would know much more about the effectiveness of the system,
and thus be in. a much better position to decide whether it is worth
deploying. Aside from the fact that we would have to cut back dras-
tically the Safeguard R. & D. effort as well as terminate production,
it would delay completion of deployment until the end of the 1970's,
far too late in relation to our current estimates of the threat.
Moreover, the Kwajalein tests will not answer all the questions
involved in the actual deployment of an operational system. Only a
prototype operational site can answer those questions. So, to those who
are concerned about whether the Safeguard system will work, I would
say let us deploy Phase 1 and find out. Only in this way can we be
sure to uncover all of the operating problems that are bound to arise
when a new major weapon system is first deployed. Since it will take
5 years to deploy the first two sites, we will have ample time to find
the solutions through our continuing R. & D. effort to any operational
problem which may arise. And only then will we be in a position to
move forward promptly, and with confidence, in the event the threat
develops to a point where deployment of the entire system becomes
necessary.
With regard to technological obsolescence, let me assure you that we
have carefully explored all of the various systems which have been
proposed by the Navy and Air Force as well as the Army. The radar
guided intercept concept, which the Safeguard system employs, is the
latest and best technology presently available. No other technology on
the horizon promises any better system. With improved terminal guid-
ance, we might be able to substitute nonnuclear for nuclear warheads.
We are pursuing this path, but there is it great deal of work yet to be
done to prove the feasibility of this concept. We have also looked at the
lasers, but they are still quite it way off in the future. Even then, we
would still need the Perimeter Acquisition Radars. A number of other
advanced technological concepts have been explored, but none of them
lie within the required time frame.
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In conclusion, 1'Ir. Chairman, we have reviewed very carefully and
conscientiously all of the criticism that has been leveled against the
Safeguard program and I can assure you that all of the major points
raised have been considered at one time or another during the many
years this system has been in development. The deployment of
Phase 1 would involve a DOD investment cost of $2.1 billion, ex-
cluding R. & D. and AEC costs which would have to be incurred, for the
most part, even if we postpone deployment for another year. This
represents an average annual expenditure of about $400 million over
the next 5 years. I submit that in view of the great stakes involved,
this is a very modest insurance premium, roughly one-half of 1 per-
cent of the total Defense budget, and considerably less than one-
twentieth of 1 percent of our current gross national product. Notwith-
standing the severe budget stringencies under which the Government
will have to operate in the next fiscal year, President Nixon found it
necessary to recommend this program to the Congress.
Congressional approval of the Phase 1 deployment will give the
President the flexibility he needs at this critical juncture in our history.
It will strengthen his hand in the forthcoming negotiations with the
Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic armaments. If these negoti-
ations do not produce an acceptable agreement, he will be in a position
to move promptly to protect our strategic deterrent. In short, the de-
ployment of Phase 1 of the Safeguard program is the very least that
we should do at this time to ensure our security in the 1970's.
THREAT TO MINUTEMAN
PROBABILITY
OF MINUTEMAN
SILO BEING
DESTROYED
a. ?
W6
0,6
Oa
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\ $IATH
A R CQUII~
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H.,__ .TES
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:: 1 SET
D# ERs 4.5 FEE1
RAN APPROX. 2 MILES
! 4S ! OEPL YMEN1
SPARTAI
S R1NTS
ART CONSTRUCTION AHD;
TO (RSTALL SITES IN TWO
WINGS
CUREM
Grand Forks..
MSA4
Sp lii
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CHART 10
PHASES AND OPTIONS
PHASE A
SITES AT 2 MM WING
? GIVES LIMITED MM PROTECTION
? PROVIDES OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE
1 DOD INVESTMENT
ll COST $ 2.1 B
28$63 BDINV OPTION 2G$6.0B*INV
GREATER SOVIET SLBM
THREAT TO 500 BOMBER FORCE.
OPTION 2A$3.46DINV
INCREASED SOVIET ICBM THREAT
TO MINUTEMAN_-_
ADD 2 MORE SITES AT MM
WINGS.
DEFENSE OF NCA AT WASHING-
TON.
INCREASE SPRINTS IN MM FIELDS.
INCREASED SURVIVAL OF RETAL-
I` IATORY MM FORCE.
TIME FOR MCA DECISIONS.
BRING SITE TOTAL TO 12.
INCREASED SURVIVAL OF RRTAL--~,
IATORY 50MISER FORCE.
TIME FOR NCA DECISIONS.
CHINESE ICBM THREAT
CONTINUES TO INCREASE.
BRING SITE TOTAL TO 12.
AREA DEFENSE OF HEAVILY
POPULATED AREA.
TIME FOR NCA PE[ISIONS.
POSSIBLE ADDITIONS TO THE ABOVE FULL DEPLOYMENT-ALASKA. HAWAII
DEPLOYMENT (PHASE 2) DOD
*NOTE. FOR FULLY YNEQUIPPED
COST E IS 12 -SITE E 6D
MODIFIED DEPLOYMENT
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Ill?GAT INT ADI)P9'TNG SAFEGUARD CONCF:P'r`
ft% ll_IAIU,v. Mr. Secretary, why did the Department of Defense
dolay until early March 1969, in adopting the option to defend mis-
.-ile sites rather than adopting the other concept of defendin cities?
Did you to some extent make the ARM system more unpalatable be-
Wa use you are proposing to defend weapons systems rather than cities?
Would you comment on that?
Secretary Lime. Mr. Chairman, on taking office, the new admin istra-
I i+>n wanted a reasonable amount of time to review the entire question
o the Sentinel deployment, and to review the latest information,
i;~cluding the, threat, the ARM requirement and the ARM'S capability.
In this review the new administration considered the various options
heat were available to meet the possible threats, as those threats are
' oow recognized. Eased on this review, the decision was taken that we
liould proceed with a, modified deployment of the ARM system;
n;smely, the Safeguard system. This review was made under the direc-
ti:;n and. leadership of the. Department of Defense, more specifically
II:rv Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard.
I believe the tirn'vi that was taken was a reasonable amount of time.
1:, Secretary of Defense. I ordered a stop on site construction work.
We did not stop the procurement or the research and development
that had already been contracted for by the previous administration.
The only stop order we placed had to do with the acquisition and
jfnstruction of sites, which incidentally had been authorized by the
(';ngress. We felt, because of this review, we should stop the a(-
gm-sit ion and construction of sites, and that is all we stopped during the
review. That construction is still stopped.
MISSILE SITE VERSUS CITY PROTECTION
Mr. MATION. You have not answered that part of my question as
too why you went to missile site protection rather than city protection.
Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, first I believe that direct city pro-
teclion against the Soviet threat is almost an impossibility given the
present state of the ARM art. Even if you carried out the option,
w I ieh the Sentinel system had, of going to a, thick deployment around
orrr? cities, you would not be able to assure that every missile launched
by a potential enemy against those cities would be intercepted.
f.r. MAImN. Will you elaborate on that for the record?
(The information follows:)
The problem involved in defending our cities against a Soviet nuclear attack
is i I I astrated by the following table:
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NUMBERS OF FATALITIES IN AN ALL-OUT STRATEGIC EXCHANGE, MID-1970'Sr
[in millionsi
Soviets strike first against
military and city tar-
gets, United States re-
taliatos against cities
United states strikes first
at military targets, Sovi-
ets retaliate against
U.S. cities, United States
retaliates against Soviet
cities
U.S. program Soviet response
U.S.
fatalities
Soviet
fatalities
U.S.
fatalities
Soviet
fatalities
None
----------------------
BM
120
120
120
90
80
80
No A
----
----------------
Sentinel------------------ Norio-------------------------
100
120
120
120
110
8
Pen-Aids ____ -------------- ---
40
120
10
80
Posture A--------------- None----------------------------
110
120
60
80
MIRV, Pen-Aids- -----------------
+100 mobile ICBM's --------------
None --------------------------
re B
t
P
110
20
120
120
120
10
1
40
80
80
os
u
---------------
MIRV, Pen-Aids -------- __-_----__
-1-550 mobile ICBM's --------------
70
100
120
90
80
r At fatality levels approximating 100,000,000 or more, differences of 10 to 20,000,000 in the calculated results are less
than the margin of error in the estimates.
Source: Statement by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara on the fiscal year 1969-7J Defense I roprarb
and the 1969 Defense Budget, p. 64.
Several points become clear from an examination of the above table :
1. The Sentinel system proposed by the preceding administration would have
had little effect on the ultimate outcome of an all-out strategic exchange with
the Soviet Union in the mid-1970's. In fact, by simply deploying penetration
aids in their missiles they could have fully offset the benefits of the Sentinel
system, as far as the protection of our cities is concerned.
2. A light ABM defense, consisting of an area defense of the entire continental
L'uited States with Spartan and a terminal defense of 25 cities with Sprint
(Posture A), could be almost completely offset if the Soviets were to deploy
both MIRV's and penetration aids on their ICBM's. And, even if we move to a
heavy defense of 52 cities (Posture B), the Soviets could substantially offset it
by adding some 550 mobile ICBM's to their force.
Since the Soviet Union has the technical and economic capacity to do these
things, we must conclude that they can offset any advantage we might attempt
to gain by deploying an ABM defense around our cities. That is why the Defense
Department considers the defense f our cities against a Soviet
f the ABistic missile
attack almost an impossibility, given present art.
Mr. MA IION. General Wheeler, why did you recommend the protec-
tion of population
DIEI'LOY-'II;NT OF SOVnYC Ss-9 MISSILI~ S
Secretary LAIRD. May f make a second point there, Mr. Chairman?
It is a eery important point. It has to do With the change in the de-
ployment plan and the exercise of the option.
Mr. MATION. Very well.
Secretary LATIm. You know and I know sitting across the table
there, we were told about a year and a half ago that it looked as if
the Soviet Union was tapering off the deployment of the SS-9 large
missile. - which has the capability of carrying a weapon up to
25 megatons. In we picked Lip information that they
were going forward with the deployment of new SS-9 groups. Then
in --- information was developed that they were going forward
with still more SS-9's. We now know that other SS-9 sites
Were placed under construction within the Soviet Union.
This led me as the defense planner to look at the capability of the
SS-9 weapon. I could not assume that it was merely being deployed to
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42
destroy U.S. cities. I had to assume that the capability was
being developed by the Soviet Union to knock out our hardened Min-
utelnan sites. Why else would they need so many SS-9's on top of all
the ASS-11's and SS-13's they are deploying?
Iii the original Sentinel program there was an option for deploy-
ment of ABM's on these particular Minuteman bases that are pres-
ent] v in the Safeguard system. These two sites making up Phase 1
were in the Sentinel program, but on down the line. The city protec-
tion against the Chinese ICBM threat was first. With this new de-
velopment in the Soviet threat, we felt it was important to reorient
the 4leployment plan and to configure it so we would be protecting our
second strike capabilit against that threat, while at the same time
maintaining the capability to protect country-wide against the
Chinese threat.
1'UEDTBLE, BALANCED DETERRENT MAINTAINED BY SAFEGUARD ABM
J!i V. MAHON. Your object there apparently is to make sure that you
have a maximum deterrence of war with the Soviet Union.
Scoretary LATRD. Mr. Chairman, the way to prevent a nuclear ex-
between the Soviet Union and the United States is to maintain
a credible, balanced deterrent. The way to maintain peace, the way to
proteA t people, is to maintain the credibility of that deterrent force.
We have better people protection in the Safeguard system than we
had in the Sentinel system because we give that credibility to our
deterrent force, which is so vital and which is so necessary in order to
prevent nuclear war.
Mr. MAHON. I think that is a good point. Do you have any elabora-
tion on it or refinement of it, General? Do you fully agree with the
latest statement by the Secretary ?
Giiieral WHEnT,F]R. I agree with the Secretary's statement, sir. T
think this makes the case for the Safeguard system.
Mr. VEAFTON. It makes the case for the Safeguard?
Gem-ral WIiEET,ER. Yes, sir.
Mr. MAHON. At this point in the record I want you to explain ex-
plicitly with appropriate documentation the matter of congressional
authorization.
(The information follows:)
Authorization for procurement of Sentinel was first contained in Public Law
90-500, September 20, 1968. It was explained in House Report 1645, July 5, 19438,
at page 48. The Senate Report 1087, April 10, 1968, at page 12, also justified this
program.
Funds for this procurement authorization for fiscal year 1969 were contained
in Public Law 90-580, October 17, 1968. The program was explained on pages
16 and 42-43 of House Report 173 , July 18, 1968. The Senate committee out-
lined the program on pages 5 and 30 of Senate Report 1576, September 19, 196&
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Extensive debates and statements were contained in the Congressional Record
when the proposed DOD Appropriations Act for 1969 was presented to the Senate.
(See Congressional Records for April 17, 18, and 19, 1968.)
B. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
Construction for Sentinel, later called Safeguard, was first authorized by
Public Law 90-1.10, dated October 21, 1967, under the heading "U.S. Army Air
Defense Command-Cbnus-Various locations, operational facilities, and utili-
ties, $64,846,000."
House Report 512, July 26, 1967, at page 18, and Senate Report 570, September
21, 1967, at page 23, refers to this program as "classified tactical facilities."
Included in the military construction program for fiscal year 1968 was $64 mil-
lion (Public Law 90-180, Dec. 8, 1967) for Sentinel which was fully explained on
pages 9 and 10 of House Report 799, October 19, 1967. Congressman Sikes ex-
plained the program on the floor of the House when presenting the construction
program for fiscal year 1968 (see p. 13881 of Congressional Record, Oct. 24,
1967).
For fiscal year 1969 an additional $227,460,000 line item, including Sentinel, was
included in Public Law 90-408, July 21, 1968, under the same heading as that for
fiscal year 1968. The House committee explained its position on Sentinel on pages
5 and 6 of House Report No. 1296, April 23, 1968. Senate Report No. 1232, June 13,
1968, page 14, contained a similar statement on Sentinel.
Funds were provided for fiscal year 1969 in Public Law 90-513, September 26,
1968. Both House and Senate committee reports explained the allowance of in
excess of $200 million for this program. (See II. Rept. 1754, July 19, 1968, p. 11, and
S. Rept.1486, p. 5.) Congressman Sikes again explained the committee position re:
Sentinel when presenting the proposed appropriation act for fiscal year 1969 on
the floor of the House and it was extensively debated. (See pp. 117712 through
H7734 of Congressional Record, July 29,1968. )
Senator Bible likewise explained the funding of Sentinel when he took the
fiscal year 1969 proposed appropriation act to the floor. (See pp. S9922 and S9923
of Congressional Record, July 31, 1968.)
PROTECTION FOR CITIES
Mr. MARION. You have explained the fact that it took some time for
the new administration to make a decision on some. of these matters..
You have explained the reconfiguration of our ABM system. I would
like to ask this question. How do we justify deploying a thin system
against the possible threat of the U.S.S.R. when it has been stated that
even a heavy deployment would not protect our cities.
Secretary LAIRD. What we have said, Mr. Chairman, is that Nye can-
not build a defense which can prevent unacceptable damage against a
massive Soviet ICBM attack on our cities. I believe that is what we
have said.
In the case of our strategic offensive forces, even if some missiles
penetrate the defense around our strategic offensive weapons systems,
this defense can still be considered useful and effective, because it will
add to the survivability of our deterrent force.
Mr. MARION. Mr. Secretary, are the Soviets still deploying their
smaller ICBM's which have always been thought of as a threat to our
cities? Then this question: Should we be planning to defend both
cities and missile sites at this time?
Secretary LAIRD. To the first part of your question the answer is yes.
The Soviet Union is going forward with the deployment of what we
call the SS-11 and SS-13. The Soviets will surpass the United States in
total operational ICBM's this year. They have more under construction
and operational than the United States does today.
The second part of your question dealt with protection for the cities..
29 94R-FA-F
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\Tr. Chairr;oai, 1 would like to restate what I said earlier-I think it
r almost irnlro-~sible, given the present state of the AllM technoiogy,
(1) =Five assuivd protection ebgainat a massive Soviet attark On our cities.
\Tr. MA iron., You may elaborate For our record.
"oeretary I,Aln!). We can give a very high degree of protection
vainst a (h;rese ICBM attack, at least through the 11)70's and prob-
ri,(v well intr, the 1b)S0's, with the kind of area protection that is pro-
i-led in the Sai'egnard 4vstem. I think the best way to protect our
ai-ies against ir. Soviet attack is to protect our deterrent force, and the
rd.ibdit.y of that deterrent force, so that we can survive the first blow,
;r+ari the Soviets know we can, and know that we will still have enough
ir. t. to deliver a devastating retaliatory attach. That will keep the peace
a id prevent nnc,lear war.
OPTION OF GOrNG TO A TCUICK SYSTEM
\ir. MArrOx. T would like to ask this question : We all have dis-
c(ossed the matter of protection against a possible Red Chinese attack
and how this relates to a thicker, more adequate system against the
Soviet, Union. To what. de~zree is the Safetnrard system a stepping
st r r i r e or build i r rg bl ock to a heavier system ?
Secretary LAIRD. The Safeguard system does not have the option
that the Sentinel system had to go forward with a thick coverage
around our large metropolitan areas because, except for Washington,
U.C., the Safeguard sites will nat be placed in or near those areas, as
was the case with the Sentinel system. I think Safeguard does have
certain other features. Personally, I think one advantage that it gives
us in protecting our strategic offensive forces- not only our missiles,
but, our bombers as well-against the Soviet. SS-0, SS-11 and other
missile systems such as the sub-launched missile and the FOBS, is
efitremely valuable. We have changed the deployment pattern and the
configuration of the radars, as I pointed out in my opening statement,
to give us 360 degree coverage. This kind of coverage was not avail-
able in the Sentinel system. I believe these changes give the Safe-
gnard system a significantly greater capability and make it a better
system than the Sentinel against the strategic threats as we see them
nn w.
HOW SAFEGUARD SUPPORTS OUR STRATEGIC DETERRENT
Mr. M uroN. T :think you have already commented on this, but I
would like to ask this question for the record and you can respond for
the record later.
Make clear how the Safeguard system supports our strategic
deterrent.
"Tecretary LAIRD. T would like to put in a few charts there for the
classified record, too, if I may, Mr. Chairman, and some actual
dia,rraans.
M V. MAITON. Very well.
(The information follows:)
r'6OTECTION RY SAFF,OUARD OF THE STRATEGIC RETALIATORY CApARIr.rrY
0111-strategic retaliatory capability is composed of three types of forces : Snb-
marino-launched ballistic missiles, ICBM's and long-range bombers. These forces,
in emahination, provide uS with r high confidence second-strike capability which
(l tens a nuclear war. However, an increasing Soviet offensive force threatens
to erode this deterrent force:
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(1) The Soviets are testing a multiple warhead system of their large SS-0
ICBM that could lead to a force which could destroy our Minuteman n i- R) s.
(2) They are serially producing a new nuclear class submarine, much like
our Polaris, that could destroy U.S. strategic bombers in a surprise attack.
(3) They are moving ahead with various weapons apparently designed to
threaten our Polaris/Poseidon force.
ABM defen,c can provide added protection of our land-based strategic deterrent
forces and hedge against the possible vulnerability of our Polaris/Poseidon
force. However, we must have more than just a strong second-strike force-
we must maintain control of our deterrent forces in a crisis or war. An ABM
defense of our National Command Anthority (NCA) and command and control
system will increase the time available for decision and will increase the chances
of survival of the NCA against a moderately heavy attack.
A. PROTECTION OF MINUTEMAN
Although we can maintain a high level of retaliatory destruction of the Soviet
Union even following high levels of destruction of the Minuteman force, we are
concerned about our ability to maintain an essential minimum number of these
increasingly vulnerable forces. Vulnerable forces, in a period of extreme crisis,
may invite an attack rather than deter one if the enemy knows he can probably
destroy the force. Therefore, we should protect the Minuteman.
Even though the Soviets are not expected to have an adequate force (in-
cluding an accurate MIIIV) to destroy an unacceptably high number of Minute-
man for several years, we must maintain options against the possibility that
they could. Therefore, Phase I of Safeguard provides a base which could be
augmented and would allow us to make follow-on decisions at an appropriate
time (Phase 11) if we saw the threat developing.
We have investigated several alternatives for protecting Minuteman against
a growing Soviet offensive threat. The near term and relative costs to keep an
adequate ABM defense of Minuteman will be less expensive in the initial years
and probably less expensive overall than other options. However, we would not
want to rely exclusively on ABM defense of Minuteman. We will also add to
Minuteman hardening.
B. PROTECTION OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS
ABM defense can provide an effective means of preventing Our bomber force
from becoming vulnerable to a surprise Soviet submarine-launched missile
(SLBM) attack. Our strategic bombers are a major component in our retalia-
tory force because (a) they hedge against the unexpected failure of missile
forces, (b) they are useful for non-nuclear conflicts, (c) they allow us to quickly
increase our force size by simply increasing the alert rate, and (d) they force
the Soviets to pay large costs for a balanced defense against bombers and mis-
siles. Bombers are vulnerable to a surprise Soviet SLBM or FOBS (orbital
bomb) attack since they rely almost exclusively on tactical warning for sur-
vival. We have adequate warning of Soviet ICBM's and FOBS through current
radar systems and are taking steps to improve this warning with new surveil-
lance systems. Against a surprise SLBM attack, however, even if we get warn-
ing at nearly the time of launch, the missile flight time is so short to some bases
that a significant portion of our bombers and tankers may be destroyed before
they can take off.
In addition to improved warning, there are four alternatives to decrease the
vulnerability of the strategic bomber force against SLBM's: (1) dispersal, (2)
airborne alert, (3) improved ASW forces and (4) active defense of the bases.
We can disperse the bomber force to reduce the takeoff time by putting bombers
and tankers on each of many airfields (all would not be on alert). However, this
would cost $200 to $400 million per year and depressed SLBM trajectories would
still make the takeoff time marginal.
Aiiiborne alert is difficult to maintain over a long period of time since addi-
tional crews and increased aircraft maintenance is required. We estimate air-
borne alert for a significant portion of our bombers would cost almost $1 billion
per year and we would not be sure how long we could maintain this posture.
We have, therefore, initiated three steps to increase bomber survivability. The
first step includes a limited bomber dispersal plan which increases the number
of targets required for the SLBM. The second is a new early warning system
which gives tactical warning at nearly the time of missile launch to increase
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the warning time. With these new plans, it significant portion of the strategic
bombers can survive until the SLBIJ force expands to that projected' for about
1973-74.
:' IlM defense of the bomber bases against new long-range SLBM's with a good
warning system can provide additional time to launch the bombers by Intercept-
ing the initial portion of the SLBM attack. In the years after 1973, this defense,
with the new warning system and limited dispersal, would significantly increase
the bomber survivability and reduce the dependency of the bombers on tactical.
warning for survival.
PROTECTION Or ]IINUTE1IAN SITES, PHASE I
Nil-. MAIION. Is it true that only a very small percentage of our
Mi:u.teman will be protected by Phase I, probably less than 3 percent
of : 0111 total deterrent ? How is Phase I justified ?
c cretary L1uii . Mr. Chairman, that is not correct. Phase I of the
Safeguard program would give us a thin coverage over about 85-i)0
percent of our Minuteman force with the two sites that are con-
templated in North Dakota and in Montana. We would have heavier
prof ection for at least 10-20 percent of our Minuteman force. I want
to make it clear that when you talk about heavy protection you are
talking about area defense with the Spartan plus terminal defense
with the Sprint. We have six wings of Minuteman and two of these
wings have protection with a fairly thick cover, and most of the rest
with a thin cover, about 85-90 percent with a thin cover.
LOCATION OF SAFEGUARD SITES
31r. MAHON. What criteria will be used in locating Safeguard sites?
Se