CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE AND PRESS ITEMS RE: THE ARMS TRADE - PART VIII

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00364R000300040001-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
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• Document Page Count: 62
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 29, 1969
• Content Type: OPEN

Octotarit 196pproved Ftftvtgfil9N9N3REEMID_EMB9004R000300040001-0 H10271
the dirt farmer and the tenement dweller
looked to the New Deal and, its successors for
economic salvation. The basis for the new
coalition must be not only the common good
but also conscience, including not only the
poor but also those too recently poor to have
forgotten and those too secure to feel threat-
ened?not only realistic black and Spanish-
speaking Americans but also idealistic white
Americans?not only the old-time New
Dealers, interested in public power and So-
cial Security, but also their children and
grandchildren, interested in black power,
Vietnam and urban blight. Those in the so-
called white upper middle class including
suburbanites arid the well-educated and
their voting-age children?once largely writ-
ten off as traditional Republicans?now hold
the balance of political power in the big
states. Largely unorganized and uncommit-
ted, unwilling to vote by party label only, un-
interested in the old-time economic issues
and party history, these voters will more
easily find comfort and safety in generally
following the lead of their Republican fa-
thers, employers and neighbors unless Demo-
cratic candidates can appeal to their con-
sciences as well as their pocketbooks.
A new coalition of conscience can bring
the old Democrats and new Democrats to-
gether, combining the manpower of youth-
ful activists and part-time housewives with
that of regular precinct workers, who know
what it takes to keep the party functioning.
It can use the energies and skills of count-
less numbers of young lawyers and business-
men who have expressed to me their desire
to take part in elevating American politics
and who have the time, money and talent to
help bring that about. Nothing would be
more self-defeating than to discourage their
participation by surrounding the new coali-
tion with an ideological wall so high that
only the inflexible purists of the so-called
New Left would be eligible for entry, Humor-
less militants and narrow-minded nihilist,
who want freedom for the indulgence of
their own moral tastes but not for the ma-
jority of Americans (whom they denounce),
do not represent the coming wave of New
Politics.
On the contrary, the most important of
all Democratic party traditions?the one
historic trait distinguishing It through his-
tory from other partes?is its role as a broad-
based, multi-interest, internally divided po-
litical party, too diverse to be doctrinaire,
too big to be unanimous.
The key word in the lexicon of the New
Politics is "participation." Real political
power in both parties has too often rested
disproportionately in the hands of a few
party officials and contributors, nearly all
of them white, male, affluent. Establishment-
oriented and over 50, many of them more
concerned about keeping their places on the
political ladder than solving the national and
urban crises surrounding them.
Until we change that picture, we can
hardly preach to other peoples about self-
determination.
Having been in power nationally for nearly
all of the last 36 years, Democrats have be-
come too accustomed to accepting leadership
from the top down and changing it too in-
frequently. Southern dissent inside the
party was expected, but liberal dissent was
considered heresy. One of the brighter spots
of the dreary 1968 convention in bloody
Chicago was the willingness of 40 percent of
the delegates to oppose the party Establish-
ment in voting for the minority "peace"
plank. That same convention terminated
most concessions to the Old South, encour-
aged as never before the participation of
black, young and grass-roots Democrats,
ended the unit-rule device byv,>hich minor-
ity voices were stilled, established one com-
mission to modernize convention rules and
established still another to insist hereafter
on the democratic selection of all delegates.
These developments must continue. The
frustrating sense of powerlessness that many
Americans feel toward remote, impersonal in-
stitutions applies to political parties as well.
I am constantly asked by dissatisfied Demo-
crats: "What can I do?" If our party is to
be responsive to its members?and we can-
not otherwise succeed?it is not enough that
they be "involved" stuffing envelopes or ring-
ing doorbells, important as such activities
may he.
We must formulate procedures to redis-
tribute political power to achieve the broad-
est possible participation in the exercising
of that power. Precinct meetings open to
all must have an effective voice in the for-
mulation of policy and in the selection of
both party leaders and candidates. The no-
tion that a few men should successfully
choose the party nominee for any important
office regardless of whether he reflects the
will of the voters is shocking.
Through direct primaries, periodic surveys
and more frequent state and national plat-
form conventions, through more open chan-
nels of communication between party mem-
bers, leaders and public officials, through in-
creased party informational and educational
activities, and through a far broader finan-
cial base of small contributions, rank-and-
file Democrats can obtain new confidence in
party decisions, and that kind of direct par-
ticipation can produce the enthusiasm and
momentum that lead to victory.
A national presidential primary would be
chaotic and exorbitantly expensive without
assuring as representative a choice as an
overhauled convention system. It would make
even more difficult the prospects of an in-
surgent candidate. But every presidential
and every senatorial or gubernatorial nom-
inee of our party will have greater voter
confidence (and surely more workers) if his
policies and appeal have first been fairly
tested in a contested open primary.
All this will be to no avail, however, with-
out high-caliber candidates at every
level. We need men and women we are able
to appeal to all elements in the Democratic
party and to independents as well, willing
to campaign hard at the grass-roots level,
and more inclined to explain on TV the
new and current issues than to engage in
blindly partisan exaggeration. Young people
and intellectuals must be involved in those
campaigns, their imaginative contributions
welcomed regardless of their refusal to sup-
port every Democrat or every plank in their
own candidate's platform. Storefront head-
quarters will be more important than smoke-
filled hotel rooms. A candidate's convictions,
commitment and ability to inspire a ma-
jority of the voters will be more important
than his acceptability to a few party lead-
ers and donors.
Increased citizen participation does not
deny the need for strong leadership. On
the contrary, the very turbulence and di-
versity that have consistently characterized
the history of the Democratic party have
also made it responsive to those strong per-
sonalities who survived spirited intraparty
debates and led all factions to victory.
But above all, the Democratic party must
not stand still. It must not be the party
of the status quo. Its leadership must not
be confined to the old and the established.
As Edmund Burke cried out long ago: "Ap-
plauds us when we run, console us when
we fall, cheer us when we recover, but let
us [press] on?for God's sake, let us [press]
on.,,
THE ARMS TRADE?PART VIII
(Mr. COUGHLIN asked and was given
permission to address the House for 1
minute, to revise and extend his remarks
and to include extraneous matter.)
Mr. COUGHLIN. Mr. Speaker, last
Saturday the President announced that
the long-awaited strategic arms limita-
tion talks?SALT?between the United
States and the Soviet Union would com-
mence in Helsinki on November 17, 1969.
The time was never more opportune to
urge the Soviet Union to join us in dis-
cussing limitation on the international
trade in conventional weapons of war.
There is no doubt that the Soviet
Union's aggressive arms sales policy has
been primarily 'responsible for the cur-
rent political, military, social, and eco-
nomic instability in the Middle East. The
size, scope, and objectives of the Soviet
arms sales effort in the area, however,
are seldom appreciated fully in the West.
Therefore, I thought my colleagues
might be interested in certain back-
ground information, charts and statistics
which I have compiled that illustrate
what I believe to be the true nature of
the Soviet military involvement with the
Arab States.
Since 1955, the Soviet Union has
shipped an estimated $7 billion worth of
military equipment to non-Iron Curtain
countries. This averages approximately
$500 million in arms sales yearly. Of
that $7 billion in sales, $5 billion has gone
to 10 Arab States. Egypt alone has re-
ceived nearly $2 billion in Soviet arms,
and the remaining $3 billion has gone,
in varying amounts, to Afghanistan, Al-
geria, Cyprus, Iran, Iraq, Morocco, Pak-
istan, Syria, and the Yemeni Repub-
licans.
There are many reasons why the So-
viets are selling arms so vigorously in the
Middle East, but all are predicated?as
elsewhere in the world?on the desire to
destroy Western influence and to replace
it with their own. In pursuit of this over-
all objective, the Soviets will, for in-
stance, support "wars of liberation" such
as those in Algeria and the Yemen.
Moscow will also sell arms to dilute
or destroy the effectiveness of a Western
military alliance?such as CENTO. Arms
also are sold to protect Soviet frontiers,
trade routes, and 'forward facilities" in
foreign countries. Sometimes, In. its war
for ideological supremacy, the Soviet
Union sells arms to undercut Red China;
on other occasions, it sells arms because
it wants"the money.
With few exceptions, the Soviets have
never given away anything of significant
value. Usually, they sell arms at low?
by Western commercial standards?in-
terest rates, from 2 to 2.5 percent payable
over a 10- to 12-year period. Occasion-
ally, they will barter arms in exchange
for commodities. One result has been
that Egypt, .for instance, has been forced
to hock many of its cotton crops to pay
for the fancy Soviet hardware.
Selling arms, the Soviets realize, satis-
fies the touchy pride of a poor nation;
limited foreign exchange reserves are also
tied up in the Soviet Union, thus restrict-
ing a poor country's trade relations with
the West.
From what sources are available, it ap-
pears that all arms sales decisions come
from the Politburo, and that the opera-
tive control of the Soviet arms aid pro-
gram rests with the KGB, the Soviet's
foreign intelligence apparatus.
In order to hide their activities, the
Soviets will sometimes use their satellites
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US Intermediaries. Thus, many arms sales
of Soviet origin often encrdp in the record
books as Czech, Polish, gest German or
Bulgarian sales since it *as these coun-
tries that actually hand,W the transac-
tion. We in the West shote not be fooled:
all arms sales, no matte; which country
initiated the transactions are first
cleared in Moscow.
Red Chinese arms aid to the Middle
East, as in other parts Of the world, is
currently small in volume; it is designed
primarily to undercut the West and the
Soviet Union and to ordinate worldwide
revolution. While smallnhe future po-
tential for a large-scaleinfnsion of Red
Chinese arms into the area is always
present, and may beconit a reality once
the Peking regime shiftsits primary con-
cern from domestic to feign affairs.
The Soviet infusion of weaponry into
Egypt and the other Arab States repre-
sents the classic exam??in terms of
World peace and stability ?of the con-
ventional arms trade at its worst.
Emboldened by the huge arms sup-
plies, Nasser provoked the 1956 war that
gave the first frightening glimpse of
what a major power codrontation could
portend. Eleven years later, Nasser dared
again to plunge the Middle East into
war.
Nasser's Egypt?overacted and under-
developed?used the S*Iet weapons to
invoke war as an instrument of national
policy. Moscow found it e0uld not control
Cairo once it had oterarmed Egypt
Which, in reality, faced no military
threat other than that iiiscd by its own
reckless policies directed at Israel and
the West.
The Israelis were coinkelled to engage
in a terrifying game of Military catchup
on which their very exl4tence depended.
vote an exces-
a tonal prodUct
Even now Israel must
sive portion of its grass
to defense.
It is obvious that
of the Arab
States intend to use ieir Soviet and
Chinese arms to d jeostraotIsrael. There is
at
no question, for , that Nasser
has twice gone to war with Israel be-
cause, with all that SoVlet weaponry, he
saw no need to settle: his differences
peaceably. Each time -the Communist
nations have pumped_ an additional
quantity of arms into an Arab country,
the Israelis, in self dense,
rhave been
forced to increase bothiteizs e of their
military and the quartz of their weap-
ons. This process hasi- continued un-
checked for over 14 yes- rs and has so
swollen military estOlishments, so
weakened economies, and so destabilized
political and military flActors, that the
threat of widespread vie ence of a very
high order is quite possible at any
moment. It is clear at the Soviet
Union, far more than ariy other nation,
provoked this situation,to
oustAariansb
it, with its massive armsaiddill
States.
In order to give my colleagues some
idea of the volume of Cianmunist weap-
ons currently deployed in the Middle
East, I submit the following chart show-
ing a breakdown ofa rms delivered by
country. Also included e footnotes and
short comments on eachy 'ill
coun-
try which, hopefull Will both clarify
and put into proper perspective certain
aspects of the Soviet and Chinese arms
aid programs not evident in the chart.
I hope that ths chart will also encour-
age the President of the United States
to take whatever steps are necessary to
initiate multilateral discussions among
the United States, the Soviet Union,
Great Britain, France, West Germany,
Italy, and other arms-producing coun-
tries on control of the arms trade in gen-
eral and in the Middle East in particular;
to take whatever other 'steps are neces-
sary to begin a general debate on the
subject in the United Nations; and in
particular to seek to include the inter-
national trade in conventinnal weapons
of war on the agenda for the strategic
arms limitation talks.
The material follows:
MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM
COUNTRIES DEPLOYED IN THE
AS OF 1968-591
AFGHANISTAN'
Army
Six divisions, equipped mostly with Soviet
arms.
At least 100 Soviet T-54 and PT-76 tanks.'
Soviet artillery.
COMMUNIST
MIDDLE EAST
Air Force
4-5 squadrons Soviet MIG-17's.
1-2 squadrons Soviet 11-28 bombers.
Some Soviet helicopters.
Navy
Afghanistan has no Navy.
ALGERIA
Army
200 Soviet T-34, T-54 and T-55 tanks."
Soviet 140mm and 240mm rocket launch-
ers.
Soviet 85mm, 122mm and 152nam howitz-
ers.'
50 Soviet SU-100 self-propelled guns.
Some Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missiles.
Air Force
110 Soviet MiG-15's, -17's and -21's.
30 Soviet 11-28 bombers.
8 Soviet AN-12 transports.
4 Soviet 11-18 transports.
50 Soviet Mi-4 helicopters.
Navy
6 Soviet subchasers.
2 coastal minesweepers."
9 Komar- and Osa-elass missile patrol
boats.
8 Soviet motor torpedo boats.
CYPRUS
Army
30 Soviet T-34 tanks.=
Some Soviet trucks.'
Some SA-2 surface-to-air missiles.,
Soviet anti-aircraft guns.'
Soviet and Czech small arms."
Navy
6 Komar-class motor torpedo boats."
/RAN
Army
Some Soviet trucks.
Soviet 57ram and 85mm anti-aircraft guns.
IRAQ
Army
300 Soviet T-54 and T-55 tanks.
100 Soviet T-34 tanks.
Some Soviet S17-100 self-propelled guns.'
Some Soviet armored personnel carriers"
5 batteries Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air rals-
siles.1?
Mr force
60 Soviet MiG-21's.
45 Soviet MiG-17's and -19's.
20 Soviet SU-7 fighter-bombers.
Footnotes at end of article.
8 Soviet TU-16 jet bombers.
10 Soviet IL-28 jet bombers.
About 20 Soviet transport planes.
Navy '
Some Soviet river gunboats.'
Some Soviet Komar-class motor
boats.'
torpedo
MOROCCO
Army
35 Soviet T-54 tanks."
Some Soviet SU-100 tank destroyers.
Air Force
16 Soviet MiG-17's (in storage).
Some Soviet Yak-9 trainers."
Some Soviet helicopters.*
PAKISTAN
Army
80 Red Chinese T-59 tanks."
Air Force
40 Red Chinese MIG-19's.
28 Red Chinese 1L-28 jet bombers.'
SYRIA
Army
150 Soviet T-34 tanks.
250 Soviet T-54, T-55 tanks.
60 Soviet SU-100 tank destroyers.
500 Soviet BTR-152 armored personnel
carriers.
Soviet artilfery up to 155mm.
Some SA-2 surface-to-air missiles.
Air Force
(10 Soviet MiG-21's.
70 Soviet MiG-15's and -17's.
20 Soviet SU-7 lighter-bombers.
8 Soviet IL-14 transports.
14 Soviet helicopters.
Navy
2 Soviet minesweepers.
6 Soviet motor torpedo boats
missiles.
17 Soviet motor torpedo boats (less than
100 tons) .
with Styx
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC
Army
500 Soviet T-54 and T-55 tanks.
100 Soviet T-34 tanks.
50 Soviet PT-76 tanks.
20 Soviet JS 3 tanks.
150-250 Soviet SU-100, JSU-152 and ZSU-
157 self-propelled guns:"
600 Soviet heavy caliber field guns and
truck-mounted rocket launchers.
800 Soviet armored personnel carriers.
100 Czech amphibious armored personnel
carriers."
15 Soviet Frog-3 surface-to-air missiles
20 Soviet Samlet surface-to-air missiles.
180 SA-2 surface-to-air missiles (30 batter-
ies).
Air Force
110 Soviet MiG-21's.
80 Soviet MiG-19's.
10 Soviet TU-16 jet bombers.
40 Soviet 11-28 jet bombers.
90 Soviet Su-7 fighter-bombers."
120 Soviet M1G-15's and -17's.
40 Soviet 11-14 transports.
20 Soviet An-12 transports.
50 Soviet Mi-4, Mi-6 and Mi-8 helicopters.
150 Soviet and Czech trainers.
Navy
4 Soviet destroyers.
8 Soviet minesweepers.
18 Soviet missile patrol boats.
40 Soviet and Yugoslav motor torpedo
boats.
18 Soviet submarines.
1 Soviet tank landing ship.
Some small Soviet craft.
yrsecErr CREPUBLICANSPA'
Army
30 Soviet T-34 tanks.
50 Soviet 81.7-100 assault guns.
70 Soviet armored personnel carriers.
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50 Soviet light guns.
100 Soviet anti-aircraft guns.
Air Force
30 Soviet Yak fighters (flown by foreign
mercenaries).
24 Soviet MiG-19's.17
Some Soviet II-10 bombers.,
FOOTNOTES
1 Figures taken from "The Military Balance
1968-1969" (Institute for Strategic Studies,
London, 1969), unless otherwise noted.
, "The Middle East and The Arab World,
The Military Context," by David Wood,
Adelphi Paper No. 20, Institute for Strategic
Studies, July 1965, except as noted.
s "Arms to Developing Countries 1945-
1965", by John L. Sutton and Geoffrey Kemp.
Adelphi Paper No. 28, October 1966. P. 26.
Ibid., p. 23. New York Times, February 10,
1967 reports 600 tanks.
May be Red Chinese in origin.
6 Probably Soviet.
New York Times March 30, 1965.
8 Ibid., December 22, 1966.
"The Soviet Military Aid Program As A
Reflection of Soviet Objectives", Georgetown
Research Project, Atlantic Research Corpo-
ration, June 24, 1965. Table I, pp. 83-4.
Mimeograph document issued by the In-
stitute for Strategic Studies at the outbreak
of the Six Day War of 1967 listing equipment
of countries involved in the war.
11 Sutton and Kemp, op. cit. '
1, "The Armed Forces of African States," by
David Wood, Adelphi Paper No. 27, April 1966,
p.6.
18 "The Diffusion of Combat Aircraft, Mis-
siles and Their Supporting Technologies," by
John H. Hoagland, Jr., and Erastus Corning
1.11, et al. Browne & Shaw Research Corpora..
tion, Waltham, Massachusetts, 1966. P. A-14.
14 (London) Sunday Times, August 31, 1969.
18 New York Times, May 8, 1969.
11 "The Middle East and the Arab World,
The Military Context", op. cit. Most of the
equipment came via Egypt.
17New York Times, December 15, 1967.
COMMENTS ON RECIPIENT COUNTRIES
, AFGHANISTAN
The Soviet Union is the major arms sup-
plier. Afghanistan first received Soviet arms
in 1956; much of the equipment delivered
since has been routed through Czechoslo-
vakia, East Germany, Poland and Hungary.
A permanent Soviet military mission is
stationed in the country, but its members are
not allowed to accompany Afghan troops on
maneuvers.
Soviet aid has been given to ensure that
Afghanistan maintains its historical role as
buffer state between the Soviet Union and
Western interests to the south and west.
ALGERIA
The Soviet Union is the major arms sup-
plier. Small quantities of arms were received
from Czechoslovakia, Red China and Egypt
during its war for independence. Some post-
independence arms came from Cuba. Algeria
was used by the Soviet Union as an arms aid
transit point during the Congo violence of
1960-65.
Many Algerian army and air force officers
are trained in the Soviet Union. At least ten
communist countries offer political and mili-
tary training courses to Algerian students.
Communist' arms have been supplied to
Algeria primarily to displace French influence
In the area, and to acquire refueling and re-
pair bases for Soviet planes and ships in the
Mediterranean area.
CYPRUS
Great Britain and Greece are the major
arms suppliers. Most of the small arms and
crew-served weapons are of Swiss, Swedish
and Belgian origin. Some arms were acquired
from Egypt, Yugoslavia and private dealers
during the troubles.
The 1964 militarY aid agreement with the
Soviet Union reportedly states that no bloc
personnel will be stationed in Cyprus.
The Soviet military aid program to Cyprus,
while relatively small, is designed primarily
to displace British influence, to antagonize
two NATO allies (Greece and Turkey) and
to enhance the Soviet political and military
position in the Mediterranean and Middle
East areas.
IRAN
The United States has been Iran's major
arms supplier since the end of World War II.
The value of U.S. military aid to Iran since
1950 exceeds half a billion dollars.
In January, 1967, the Soviet Union agreed
to sell Iran $110 million worth of arms. Iran
was the first Western ally to buy weapons
from the Soviets. This move was made by the
Shah reportedly to erase the "U.S. client
only" tag, and to encourage Washington to
supply Iran with the latest military equip-
ment (which subsequently has, been done.)
On at least one occasion Iran has acted as
a secret arms purchasing agent for Pakistan,
who was suffering under an arms embargo
Imposed in 1965.
IRAQ
The Soviet Union has been Iraq's principal
arms supplier since 1956. Iraqi officers and
technicians have attended training courses
In the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and East
Germany. In 1963, approximately 500 Soviet
technicians were stationed in Iraq. In 1966,
it was reported that 58 Soviet 11-28 bombers
had been transferred from Egypt to Iraq.
Soviet reasons for selling arms to Iraq are
essentially the same as those for Syria and
Egypt.
MOROCCO
The United States and France have been
Morocco's major arms suppliers.
Morocco first received Soviet aid in 1961
when a quantity of Mig fighter planes and
other advanced equipment were delivered.
The only other instance of Soviet aid oc-
curred in 1967 when spares and replacements
for the above eguipment were delivered.
Soviet military aid is designed to help
Morocco in its border disptues with Mauri-
tania and Algeria, and to increase the pres-
sure on the Rabat government to end the
U.S. presence in the country.
PAKISTAN
The United States is Pakistan's major
arms supplier. Since 1947, the U.S. has either
given or sold to Pakistan military equipment
valued at an estimated $750 million.
Following the 1965 war with Indian, Pakis-
tan began to buy its arms from other sources
than the United States, since a general
American embargo was in force. (On at least
two occasions Washington has covertly
broken its own embargo by allowing several
NATO allies to supply U.S. arms to Pakistan.)
Red China has supplied CENTO-ally Pakis-
tan with a small amount of combat weapons.
The aid was designed both to diminish
Western influence in the country and to
counter Soviet aid to India.
Pakistan recently offered to send troops
to its Moslem allies in their fight against
SYRIA
The Soviet Union has been Syria's major
arms supplier since 1956; however, Moscow's
interest in the country seems to have waned
temporarily. As far back as 1957 there were
as many as 300 Soviet military and technical
advisors in the country, although there are
probably less today.
Despite all the Soviet aid, the Syrian mili-
tary is considered ineffectual. Much of its
better equipment was diverted to Egypt dur-
ing the Egyptian-Syrian union.
Soviet aid to Syria was designed to destroy
French, British and American influence in
the country.
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC
The Soviet Union has been the major arms
supplier to the U.A.R., or Egypt, since 1955
when $200-225 million worth of weapons were
delivered via Czechoslovakia. The presence of
these arms alone were sufficient to provoke
war the following year. Between 1955 and
1967 the Soviet Union delivered an estimated
$1 billion worth of arms to Egypt. To pay for
each new succeeding generation of Soviet
arms, Egypt has become an exporter of its
second-hand arms.
During the Six Day War of 1967, Egypt lost
approximately one-half of its Soviet equip-
ment. Within a year, Moscow had completely
re-quipped Egypt with even more advanced
weaponry, valued at an additional $1 billion.
It is estimated that there are currently 3,000
Soviet military advisors in Egypt.
Soviet military aid to Egypt is designed to
undercut Western influence in the Middle
East, to protect Soviet trade routes to the
Far East, to provide refueling and repair
bases for Soviet planes and ships, and to
provide a strategic transit point for Soviet
economic, military and political aid going to
other nations in the area.
YEMEN (REPUBLICANS)
The Soviet Union, using Egypt as its inter-
mediary, has been the major arms supplier
to the Republicans since 1965, possibly ear-
lier. Soviet arms have been supplied to the
Yemen as far back as 1928, although post-war
interest dates from 1956 when a small quan-
tity of arms was delivered.
Soviet and Syrian mercenaries reportedly
have been flying combat missions for the Re-
publicans. Czech guerrilla instructors are ac-
tive in the army. Poison and blister gases of
Egyptian origin are reported to have been
used against the Royalists. Egypt denies using
such weapons although the evidence is strong
that the Egyptians used some type of toxic
gas bomb.
Soviet interest in the Yemen complements
its reasons for' providing arms to Egypt.
TYPICAL COMMUNIST TERROR TAC-
TICS CONTINUE IN KOREA AS
WELL AS IN VIETNAM AND CZECH-
OSLOVAKIA
(Mr. TALCOTT asked and was given
permission to address the House for 1
minute, to revise and extend his remarks
and include extraneous matter.)
Mr. TALCOTT. Mr. Speaker, the offi-
cial attitude of Communist governments
toward neighbors whose lands they covet
was clearly brought home to us when
the North Koreans ambused and mur-
dered a patrol of U.S. servicemen south
of the demilitarized zone. One of the
soldiers, Bill Grimes, was a native and
resident of Salinas, Calif.?a young
friend of mine.
Contemporary conduct as well as his-
tory continues to remind us that neither -
agreements nor human life are respected
by the Communists.
The geographical and political divi-
sions of Germany, Berlin, Korea, and
Vietnam were designed to purchase
peace for the citizens of those places who
wished to determine their own livelihoods
and destinies. The Communists, however,
will not relent in their aggression or ter-
ror until they dominate all of these
places.
I suppose I should be tolerant and
meekly excuse this preplanned terrorist
murder in South Korea as just another
natural nationalistic exuberance. No of-
fense intended. Planned Communist ter-
ror and aggression is somehow, and for
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --- HOUSE October 24) 1969
some unknown reason, supposed to be
played pianissimo.
I believe the Congre4, particularly
some Members of the o r body, and
most citizens of this counlry would look
upon preplanned terror a,Ad murder dif-
ferently if one of the victene. was one of
their young friends.
We need to remember these victims
and these incidents when we negotiate
the Communist control of South Viet-
nam.
DELAY ON THE PAIV OF CON-
GRESS WILL HAMP THE CAM-
PAIGN TO MAKE 0E0 A BETTER
AGENCY
(Mr. STEIGER of Wiscops' n asked and
was given permission to addre?the-
House for 1 minute and -to ree and
-
extend his remarks.)
Mr. STEIGER of Wg?sin. Mr.
Speaker, one of the mosf serious criti-
cisms which has been lev cl. at the Office
of Economic Opportuni in the past is
the lack of State involv 'inent in its pro-
grams.
In his February 19 m ssage on the Eco-
nomic Opportunity A Peesident Nixon
recognized the proble over the rela-
tionship of State, cou ty, and local gov-
ernments to the pro anis edministered
by 0E0.
Again, in the heari gs before the Ed-
ucation and Labor omMittee it was
pointed out that the s rtnership between
the State and Feder 1 Govt.] nments in
the poverty program as a nominal one
at best. I -
Now, however, this p lic7 has changed.
The concept of a new idefalism has be-
come a part of the OE and efforts are
being made to involve tbe States in a
meaningful relationship With this pro-
gram.
A number of major s s have been
taken to heighten State ivo1vement in
antipoverty efforts. A n division of
State and local governennit has been
created to promote effettive relation-
ships between State goverei ents and
field operations. An incnease
30 percent in the basic furling
the State Economic Officee has b
chided in the fiscal year 1970 b
A complete revision in tree' 0E0
tive on the role of the State Econo
Opportunity Offices is being circulate
for review and comment by Governors.
It will dramatically increase the role of
the State in the planning -and coordina-
tion of programs under the Economic
Opportunity Act.
I believe that this example of 0E0's
willingness to deal effectively with a seri-
ous problem within its piogram shows
that the Nixon administration have made
a serious commitment to;the improve-
ment of the poverty program. Delay on
the part of Congress will only hamper
the campaign to make 0E0 a better
agency.
for 1 minute and to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. MeCULLOCH. Mr. Speaker, I have
today introduced an administration bill
which would correct two basic flaws in
section 3731, title 18, United States Code,
which delineates the Government's
right to appeal in criminal cases.
Section 3731 divides appeals by the
United States into two categories?those
which may be taken only directly to the
Supreme Court of the United States and
those which may be taken directly to the
court of appeals. The problem is this:
too many cases of less than landmark
significance are appealable only to the
Supreme Court. A typical case might be
one where the defendant moves to dis-
miss the indictment because he has not
'been accorded his constitutional right to
a speedy trial. The resolution of that
claim may very well involve nothing
more than a question ef fact. That is
hardly a matter for an expedited review
by the Supreme Court. Thus the Su-
preme Court will dismiss such an appeal
because it presents no substantial Fed-
eral or constitutional question. The result
is that the Government has neither a
trial nor an appeal. In view of the
mounting crime problem, such a result is
not in the best interests of an effective
administration of justice.
In addition to granting the often illu-
sory right of appeal directly to the Su-
preme Court, section 3731 in some cases
fails to authorize any appeal at all. The
statute does not presently authorize any
appeal to the court of appeals in all
cases where the double jeopafdy clause
would permit it and where there is no
direct appeal to the SuPreme Court. It
should. It would if jffie proposed legis-
lation were adopt d'. However, if an in-
dictment is dis ssed for technical rea-
sons after the ury is sworn, hut before
the verdict, he courts have held that
no appeal s authorized.
It is i ? ?rtant to note that those court
decisio are not based on constitutional
groune. but on statutory grounds only.
Thus this flaw can be, must be, and
sho d be corrected by the Congress.
I nd no inconsistency between grant-
ins the United States the right to one
t 1 on the merits and the double jeop-
dy clause.
The leniency of trial judges in per-
mitting the defendant to raise an objec-
tion to an indictment at any time should
not deprive the Government of its appel-
late rights. Such a result completely sub-
verts traditional notions of fair play and
established rights. It, frankly, encou-
rages defense counsel to delay in making
motions which could have been made
before trial. The continued practice of
such dilatory tactics could only lead to
restrictive measures for defense counsel,
such as automatic waiver of rights not
pressed before trial.
The proposed legislation is therefore
both constitutional and wise. I urge its
prompt consideration and adoption.
LEGISLATION INTRODUCED TO
DELINEATE THE GOVERNMENT'S
'RIGHT TO APPEAL rikt CRIMINAL
CASES
(Mr. MeCULLOCH asked and was
given permission to address the House
The SPEAKER. Under a previous order
of the House the gentleman from Iowa
(Mr. GROSS) is recognized for 30 min-
utes.
[Mr. GROSS addressed the House. His
remarks will appear hereafter in the Ex-
tensions of Remarks.]
THE TRAGIC CONSEQUENCES OF
UNCONDITIONAL IMMEDIATE
WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM
The SPEAKER. Under a previous order
of the House. the gentleman from
Oregon (Mr. WYATT) is recognized for 15
minutes.
Mr. WYATT. Mr. Speaker, for more
than 4 years now the Gallup poll has
shown the issue of Vietnam to be the
most urgent question of public policy,
foreign or domestic, in the minds of
the American people.
During these 4 years there has been a
dramatic shift in public opinion about
the wisdom of the policy begun in 1965
of committing large American forces to
combat in Vietnam. According to the
Gallup poll of August 1965, 61 percent of
the people approved of sending American
troops to fight in Vietnam, whereas 24
percent opposed this step. The most re-
cent Gallup poll on this subject indi-
cates that only 32 percent now approve
of the action while 58 precent call it a
mistake.
During the Korean war, public opinion
shifted in the same way from approval
in tl initial stages of the war to disap-
prove n the later stages. The 65 per-
cent o the public who approved the
commit4ent of American fighting forces
to Korerj in August 1950 dwindled to 37
percent y October 1952.
In th,?egotiations that brought the
Korean1 war to an end, President Eisen-
hower 'faced a problem not unlike that
which' confronts the Nixon administra-
tion today?an impatient public opinion
demanding swift termination of the war.
Eisenhower did succeed in achieving an
honorable settlement in Korea ending
the war 6 months after taking office. In
reaching this settlement, he was aided
by the fact that the public, however dis-
illusioned about the Nation's military
involvement in Korea, appeared to place
its trust in the President as he strove
to restore the peace. Had there been
widespread public demonstrations of
dissatisfaction with the course the
President was purstling to achieve peace
in 1953, the end of the Korean war might
not have come so speedily.
So, to millions of Americans who to-
day are impatient for an end to the
war in Vietnam, I would raise the ques-
tion of whether the methods of protest
currently practiced advance or retard
the coming of the peace which the over-
whelming majority of our countrymen
ardently desire. Sincere and concerned
Americans should ponder the words of
the respected British journalist, Victor
Zorza:
The main obstacle to a peaceful settle-
ment now is the belief ... that the pressure
of American public opinion will in the end
give the Communists all they want.
No one wants peace more earnestly
than President Nixon, and he has em-
barked on a course of policy that leads
to peace.
What the Nation needs now is a clear
understanding of the President's policy
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October 29,
the "achievement of representative gov-
ernment."
If we do not manifest in decisive policy
statements our intention to encourage
freedom and representative government
in Greece we will not only betray those
who signed this moving letter, but the
very basic traditions and ideals of the
United State.
AN APPEAL FOR A MUTUAL MORA-
TORIUM ON ARMS TESTING
(Mr. BIAGGI asked and was given per-
mission to address the House for 1 min-
ute and to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Speaker, we are ap-
proaching a date that could be a historic
turning point for a world living under
the threat of nuclear warfare. On Nov.
17, the United States and the Soviet
Union begin preliminary nuclear arms
limitation talks at Helsinki. While I have
constantly urged that such talks get un-
derway, I have no illusions about any
shortcuts for ending the arms race.
But I do believe that as a first order
of business at Helsinki we must strive
for a mutual moratorium on all arms
testing pending the formulation of com-
prehensive agreements with extensive
safeguards that can come only from pro-
longed negotiations. I think this Con-
gress and the President should express a
sense of willingness to accomplish this
objective.
We have pondered too long while the
world has been living under what the
late John Fitzgerald Kennedy described
as "a nuclear sword of Damocles." More
than a year ago, our Nation and the So-
viet Union pledged in the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty to begin arms con-
trol talks promptly. Now, at last, we are
on our way to the conference table. But
the luxury of time has been lost.
Therefore, America and the Soviet
Union must display a more urgent de-
termination to reverse the arms race
than either has exhibited thus far.
Both sides are continuing the develop-
ment of multiple independently target-
able reentry vehicles--MIRV's. This
new type of multiple warhead will
greatly expand the striking power of
strategic missiles and further endanger
all mankind.
It has been evident for too long that
weapons systems have become more
sophisticated and more destructive?
and America and the Soviet Union are
still locked in the arms race. We have
reached the point where it is not enough
to limit the buildup of strategic arms.
We must instead reverse it.
I have often thought about the bil-
lions spent by the two superpowers for
weapons from which there can be no
survival. When I reflect upon this and
then consider that we are spending bil-
lions more to sustain the arms race, I
find myself deeply distressed and wonder
whether the, powers of the world have
lost their senses.
Yes, I agreq,a2at we must be able to
defend our:NW' on from attack. I am
sure that this is the principal reason why
we are moving ahead with the anti-
ballistic-missile?ABM?system.
But when I think of our already over-
burdened taxpayers and America's grave
urban problems?the ghettos and the
crime and the underprivileged?I pray
for an end to the arms race. Just think
what we could do here in America to
achieve tax relief, model cities, and equal
opportunity for all if the Federal Govern-
ment did not have to expend time, effort,
and a fantastic amount of money to
engage in an arms race with the Soviet
Union. So much could be done for so
many if we were able to divert some of
the resources that are now required to
sustain the arms race.
Take, for example, just one item: The
cost of the anti-ballistic-missile system.
Consider what America could do with
that money alone at home if we did not
have to spend it in the arms race.
I ask, therefore, that Congress help
build the foundation for meaningful and
effective talks at Helsinki. As a first and
very important step, I urge expressions of
support for a mutual moratorium on
arms testing pending the outcome of an
agreement with proper safeguards be-
tween the United States and the Soviet
Union.
Such action would be an invitation to
the Soviet Union to joinus immediately
in moving away from the shadows of war
for the benefit of all mankind. It would
also be a vivid demonstration of our good
faith at the conference table on Novem-
ber 17.
REPRESENTATIVE WAGGONNER'S
EFFORTS TO SAVE OUR FRATER-
NITIES AND SORORITIES
(Mr. LONG of Louisiana asked and
was given permission to address the
House for 1 minute, to revise and ex-
tend his remarks, and to include extrane-
ous material.)
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Speaker,
an article appears in a fraternity mag-
azine, the Shield, of Phi Kappa Psi?
volume 89, No. 4, summer 1969, pages
253-262?which goes into considerable
detail about the efforts of my colleague,
Representative JOE D. WAGGONNER, to
protect the Nation's fraternities and
sororities from the meddling of HEW into
their membership practices. This discus-
sion of what has transpired in recent
months is well worth the time and at-
tention of any reader who feels as I do,
that it is high time to put whatever
brakes are necessary on the extralegal,
sociological meddling of this Department.
With unanimous consent, I insert this
article in today's RECORD, as follows:
CONGRESS, FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION, AND
FRATERNITY DISCRIMINATION
(By Tom Charles Huston, assistant attorney
general, Phi Kappa Psi Fraternity)
(Norm?This is an analysis of the legisla-
tive history of the Waggoner Amendment and
an assessment of the protection it provides
for the fraternity system and for universities,
through the 1965 Higher Education Act.)
On June 28, 1958, President John E. Homer
of Hanover College wrote to the executive
secretaries of national fraternities which had
chapters on his campus that he had been re-
quested by the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights "to file with the agency an extensive
questionnaire relating to policies in the civil
rights area." According to Dr. Homer, "the
questionnaire makes specific reference to the
policies of fraternities relating to the admis-
sion to the fraternities of Negro, Jewish, and
non-Caucasian students in principle? How
many actually have Negro, Jewish, an non-
Caucasian students as members?
President Homer requested the national
fraternities to provide him with the infor-
mation necessary to answer these questions.
In addition "to a complete statement" from
them on these matters, he asked that they
send him a copy of their constitution for use
in the event that he received similar in-
quiries in the future.
The announcement that the Civil Rights
Commission had begun -an investigation into
the affairs of college fraternities and sorori-
ties created a stir among fraternity leaders.
On July 12, Louis F. Fetterly, a California
attorney and leader in national interfrater-
nity circles, wrote to the Commission about
Its activities. He asked for a copy of the ques-
tionnaire and an explanation of the use to
which the information elicited would be put.
A week Later he received a reply from Cor-
nelius P. Cotter, Assistant Staff Director for
Programs, who declared that "The Commis-
sion is not at this time conducting a study
related to fraternities or their admission
policies." If such a questionnaire is being
distributed among fraternities, he asserted,
"it comes from a source other than this Com-
mission." However, he added, "If you have
reason to believe that a questionnaire is
being distributed and represented as coming
from this Commission, we should appreciate
your help in securing additional information
concerning it."
On August 12, Mr. Fetterly wrote Dr. Cot-
ter advising him that the letterheads, return
envelopes, and title on the questionnaire all
indicated they came from the United States
Commission on Civil Rights, Washington 25,
D.C. Mr. Fetterly reported that the question-
naire was being represented as part of a
nationwide survey, and the covering letter
and questionnaire were apparently sent by
Mr. Will Erwin, Co-Chairman of the Sub-
committee on Education for the Indiana
Advisory Committee to the U.S. Civil Rights
Commission.
On the basis of this new information, the
Commission ascertained that indeed there
was a questionnaire. It had been developed
by the Indiana Advisory Committee in co-
operation with the Civil Rights Commission
of the State of Indiana and, "due to a mis-
understanding," had been mailed without
prior clearance by the Washington staff of
the Commission. Mr. Peter M. Sussman, As-
sistant Staff Director for State Advisory Com-
mittees, to whom the ball had been bounced
by Dr. Cotter, explained that since this ac-
tion was "contrary to established Commis-
sion procedures," he had requested the In-
diana Advisory Committee to suspend any
further use of the questionnaire. He went on
to point out that the reference in the letter
accompanying the questionnaire to a "na-
tionwide survey" was in error: "Neither the
United States Commission on Civil Rights
itself nor any of its Advisory Committees
outside the State of Indiana is conducting
such a survey."
Less than two months later, however, fra-
ternity chapter presidents at campuses
throughout the State of Utah received a
letter from Adam M. Duncan, Chairman of
the Utah Advisory Committee of the Civil
Rights Commission. Mr. Duncan explained
that his committee had been "commissioned
by Congress to make factual findings and
recommendations" on problems of racial dis-
crimination. The "function" of his commit-
tee, he went on, was to serve as a "sounding
board" and "clearing house" for civil rights
problems.
Mr. Duncan enclosed a questionnaire which
he requested be promptly returned "in the
enclosed, self-addressed and franked enve-
lope." The questionnaire concerned the
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE October 29, 1969
membership practices and internal opera-
tions of the fraternity., It requested infor-
mation on whether members of minority
groups were accepted as merabens by the
local chapter and, if not, whether this was
due to a prohibition in either the local or
national governing document, It also re-
quested that copies of these documents be
attached, or if this was not possible, that a
place be indicated where the Committee
could examine them.
This intrusion into the affairs of a private
organization by a government agency, coming
as it did upon the heels of the Indiana case,
aroused protests not only front fraternity
leaders, but also from members of Congress.
During debate on the proposed Civil Rights
Act In the House of Representatives on Feb-
ruary 6, 1964, Congressman Edward E. Willis
of Louisiana, citing these inaidents, moved
to amend the bill by denying to the Com-
mission the power to "authorise any investi-
gation or study of the membership practices
of any bona fide fraternal, religious or civic
organization which selects its taembership.",
Congressman Emanuel Cellar, Chairman of
the House Judiciary Committee and floor
manager for the bill, accepted the amend-
ment., He told the House that on behalf of
the Judiciary Committee he had complained
to the Commission that it had gone too far
and exceeded its authority. Ca January 29,
he had received a letter from Howard W.
Rogerson, Acting Chairman of the Commis-
sion, explaining that the action of the Utah
Advisory Committee "was a very Minted in-
quiry . . . into the racial practices of fra-
ternities and sororities located at the State
University." 5 "The Utah committee," Mr.
Rogerson reported, "was not interested in
the practices of fraternities of sororities at
private colleges. NOT was the committee in-
terested in the practices of adult fraternal
organizations,' such as the Masons, which
are unconnected with public inatitutions of
higher education." The Commission was
not, however, planning to putsue "even the
limited Utah inquiry into the racial practices
and sororities at the State university." 6
Mr. Rogerson enclosed with his letter a
memorandum outlining the legal basis for
the inquiry which the Utah cotrimittee made.
The final paragraph of this memorandum
stated:
"We do not recommend that the Commis-
sion add a survey of practicee at the State
universities to its present program, but all of
the factors discussed above idleate not only
that there was a legal base for the Utah ques-
tionnaire, but that the OcanIttiasion would
have ample authority to inquire further into
this matter if it chose to do at)."
Congressman Geller was not satisfied by
Mr. Rogerson's letter and, arently, not
impressed by the reasoning of e legal mem-
orandums He contacted Mr. Rogerson and re-
quested a specific answer to the question of
whether the Commission intended to pursue
this sort of inquiry further. Mr. 1?.ogerson re-
plied in a letter dated January 30, that the
Commission did not have any plans to do so.
He indicated that the Utah connnittee had no
authority to take any action if the question-
naires were not answered, and it did not plan
to seek further information from fraternities
and sororities. He concluded with the assur-
ance that no other questionnaires were being
sent by any of the Commission's advisory
committees to fraternities or acwial organi-
zations.,
Aware that similar assurance had been fol-
lowed by more questionnaires, Congressman
Cellar advised the House of Representatives
that it was essential to get "embedded-in the
statute, not correspondence or promises but
some definite prohibitions against some of
these activities which have been complained
of with reference to the Civil Rights Com-
mission?, He felt the Willis Amendment ac-
Footnotes at end of article.
complished this purpose and he Was happy to
accept it.
Congressman Meader of Michigan, however,
had doubts that the Willis proposal Was ex-
plboit enough. He offered a substitute amend-
ment whbola read that "nothing in this or
any other Act shall be construed as authoriz-
ing the Commission, its Advisory Committees,
or any person under its stiafervisien or con-
trol to inquire into or investigate any mem-
bership practices or internal operations of any
'fraternal organization, any college or uni-
versity fraternity or sorority, any private
club, any religious organization, or any other
private organization." 11
Congressman Meader argued that the
Commission believed, as expressed in the
legal memorandum sent to Congressman
Celler, that it had every right to conduct
inquiries into discriminatory membership
practices by private associations, and to pre-
clude such activity it was necessary to spell
out in the most precise terms the limitations
which Congress wished to place upon the
Commission in this area?, Congressman
Roosevelt of California raised a question re-
garding the definition of' "private organize-
Mons." 13 This phrase had not been included
in the original Willis proposal, and Roosevelt
feared that it would be construed so broadly
as to limit the power of the Commission to
investigate discrimination in labor unions,
corporations, and other organizations not
generally included in the concept of volun-
tary associations." On the basis of' this objec-
tion, Congressman Meader agreed to the
deletion of the phrase.15
Congressman Meader had also added an-
other dimension to the Willis proposal by
including the phrase "internal operations"
in his amendment. Not only would the Com-
mission be prohibited from investigating into
membership practices of private groups, but
also would be prescribed from conducting an
inquiry into their "internal operations."
Congressman Celler was worried that this
inclusion would unduly limit the authority
of the Commission." It was one thing, he
argued, to investigate membership practices,
but quite another to look into internal oper-
ations. The latter, he reasoned, might be of
legitimate Interest to the Commission where
they involved the denial of rights granted to
members of minority groups by other pro-
visions of the Civil Rights Act. Congressman
Meader was asked what he had in mind when
he referred to "internal operations." "I will
tell you what 'internal operations' was in-
tended to get at," he answered. "The Masonic
Order, Knights of Columbus, and many fra-
ternal organizations like the Eagles, Elks, or
secret clubs. It is not only their membership
practices which should be protected but all
of their internal operations?,
"Would you," asked Meader of Congress-
man Celler, "permit a Civil Rights Commis-
sion to demand a document of the ritual of
a secret society or fraternity or sorority or
Masonic order?" 18 "No," the Judiciary Com-
mittee Chairman replieda,
Congressman Roman Pucinski of Illinois
introduced a subject Into the debate which
would be hotly debated in the Senate a year
later." He objected to the amendment on
the grounds that fraternities and sororities,
as an integral part of a State university
which received federal financial assistance,
should not be permitted to discriminate on
the basis of race, and therefore the Commis-
sion should be authorized to investigate their
membership practices, "I know from my own
experience on the Committee on Education
and Labor," he told the House, "that the Fed-
eral Government is perhaps the greatest con-
tributor to many of these universities and
colleges. But we say under this amendment
that while the Federal Government can
spend millions of dollars in these institu-
tions, the Civil Rights Commission cannot
investigate discrimination in these fraterni-
ties." It
Congressman Celler replied that "In the
first place, sororities and fraternities are not
supported by the Government. They receive
no loans or funds directly from the Govern-
ment." al Puciiaski agreed with the thrust
of this argument, but maintained that
"being on the campus of the university bene-
fiting from these taxes, they are a part of
the university and indirectly benefit from
Federal assistance.", Congressman Oehler
countered with the simple assertion that "I
do not believe that is correct," 24 and the
House proceeded to adopt the substitute
amendment."
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
signed into law by President Johnson, it con-
tained the Meader Amendment," which pro-
vided that:
"Nothing in this or any Other Act shall
be construed as authorizing the Commission,
Its Advisory Committees, or any person un-
der its supervision or control to inquire into
or investigate any membership practices or
Internal operations of any fraternal orga-
nization, any college Or university fraternity
or sorority, any private club or any religious
organization."
This section made it explicitly clear that
the Civil Rights Commission could not under
the color of Federal law investigate the ac-
tivities of carnpus fraternities. The private
acts of discrimination by voluntary student
groups were beyond the realm of Federal con-
cern or, at least, beyond the realm of the
Commission's concern.
Congress, in various Titles of the Civil
Rights Act, empowered specific Federal agen-
cies to eliminate discrimination in the fields
of educationa, employment,,, voting," and
public accommodations." A key provision was
Title VI, see. 601, which declared that -No
person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving-Fed-
eral financial assistance." " This policy
clearly applied in the area of education where
millions of Federal dollars were being ex-
pended annually in aid to colleges and uni-
versities, both public and private. The imple-
mentation of Section 601 of Title VI was to
be effectuated through the issuance of reg-
ulations by the Federal departments em-
powered to extend Federal financial assist-
ance." These regulations were to be "of gen-
eral applicability", and "consistent with
achievement of the objectives of the statute
authorizing the financial assistance in con-
nection with which the action is taken." 35
On December 31, 1964, Francis Keppel, U.S
Commissioner of Education, senta memo-
randum to the presidents of all institutions
of higher education in the United States ad-
vising them that the regulation of the De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare
authorized under Section 602 of Title VT had
been approved by the President and promul-
gated by the Department to become effective
on January 8, 1965.35 Each college or univer-
sity which received Federal funds was re-
quired under Section 80.4 of the Department
Regulation to file an Assurance of Compli-
ance with the non-discrimination require-
ments of Title VI. Unless the Assurance
(HEW Form No. 441) Was flied with the De-
partment, the institution would not be eligi-
ble for Federal assistance.
Mr. Keppel enclosed with his memorandum
an Explanation of HEW Form No. 441, which
presented examples of the type of discrim-
inatory practices which were prohibited
Under the Department Regulation." Of in-
terest to educators were questions 8 and 9
which explained the effect of the Assurance
of Compliance upon their administrative
practices:
"8. What effect will theatigulation have
on a college or university's admission prac-
tices or other practices related to the treat-
ment of students?
"A. An institution of higher education
which applies for any Federal financial as-
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Every year he has come in with a sched-
ule or agenda of bills from his com-
mittee. He has followed it, I believe, as
religiously as any committee in the House
has been able to follow an agenda, and
he has done an outstanding job. He has
been thwarted time and time again by
the lack of authorizations and by mat-
ters beyond his control, and I believe be-
yond the control of the leadership in the
House.
But again, Mr. Speaker, I would like
to go back to the subject of my request,
and I want to emphasize to the gentle-
man that as far as I am concerned I
will be glad to meet every day of the
week, every night of the week, to get au-
thorization bills and appropriation bills
through the House.
I would also like to say to the gentle-
man that I conferred some time ago with
most of the committee chairmen about
the possibility of adjourning at a fairly
early date. We received reasonable as-
surances, but there are two Houses of the
Congress, and I was not able to get the
same degree of assurance in some places
as I was in others.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I would like
to make the further observation that as
we approach the 11th month of the year,
the House has not done anything at
authorizing the antipoverty program.
That is another item on which the Com-
mittee on Appropriations is stymied, and
I am looking forward to some cold day
in December when somebody may come
racing in with his shirttail flying, want-
ing us to bring in an appropriation bill
for that.
Let it be said that if those concerned
do not get these authorization bills
processed, we may not be able to take
care of the appropriations for them.
Mr. ALBERT. I have no argument with
the gentleman, and I recognize the gen-
tleman's position, and unless he wants to
go to the Committee on Rules for a spe-
cial rule he is of necessity bound by ac-
tion on the part of the authorizing com-
mittees.
I believe the distinguished chairman
of the Committee on Education and La-
bor commented on the subject of the
0E0 authorization during some of the
colloquy yesterday.
Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman
from Illinois.
Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, I want to
compliment the gentleman from Texas
for bringing this matter up on the floor
of the House, and for this rather lengthy
debate on the matter, because I think
that right now we have got not only a
deadline, but there is a serious question
as to what is going to happen in the
next 6 weeks, or by the end of the year.
I would also like to say this: that al-
ready the discussion is being held by vari-
ous Members that from now on they
would object to going over from now on,
going over from one day to another, and
I would even suggest that we might very
well figure on starting working Fridays,
and perhaps we should start working on
Saturdays.
I would like to ask the majority leader
if he would tell us what he contemplates
in the way of the legislative program for
Monday and Tuesday in view of the re-
quest that he has just made.
Mr. ALBERT. We have the Private
Calendar and the Consent Calendar.
There is another bill or two out of the
Committee on Rules that might be pro-
gramed if the chairman of the commit-
tee wishes to do so, and I will of course
discuss this matter with the chairman.
May I say just one other thing because
I want the House to have full knowledge
of what is before us. So far as I know, as
of now there are only 3 days left
in this year prior to Christmas which
are recognized and accepted as days of
national importance or national holidays
and they are?election day on next Tues-
day, Veterans Day on the following Tues-
day, and Thanksgiving Day.
We would be doing no more, insofar
as I know on those days than just to
accommodate Members on the Mondays
before those two days, and on the Friday
after Thanksgiving Day, and we are not
contemplating any extended vacations.
But we do think, being in session as long
as we have been, that Members might be
entitled to go home for Thanksgiving.
Mr. ARENDS. Might I express the
hope that the majority leader will also
tell the "Tuesday to Thursday Club" that
they may well expect to be here on Friday
from now on?
Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, if the gen-
tleman will yield further, we have an-
nounced repeatedly, during recent an-
nouncements of the legislative programs
that if it is necessary to clear the deck
of bills that the chairmen are ready to
bring to the floor that we will meet on
Friday and if necessary on Saturday.
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker,
will the gentleman yield?
Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman
from Michigan.
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speak-
er, I would like to make one further
observation.
Having served as a member of the
Committee on Appropriations for 14
years, I have an understanding of the
problems of the committee. I also know
that their problems have been multiplied
because of the proliferation of authori-
zation bills. A proposal has been made,
and I joined in cosponsoring it, that if an
authorization bill is not a law by the
30th of June of a particular year, the
Committee on Appropriations may there-
after bring the appropriation bill to the
floor of the House without the problem
of a point of order being made against
it. I think that proposal ought to be
approved. It would be helpful for two
reasons: First, in getting the authori-
zation proposals through before June 30
and second, in helping the Committee on
Appropriations to get its work done prior
to June 30 or shortly thereafter.
Mr. MAHON. I would pose the ques-
tion, what kind of buzz saw might we
encounter, for example, on defense if we,
should bring up without authorization
the defense appropriation bill, which, as
the gentleman knows, has no enacted
authorization this year because the com-
mittees have not been able to finalize it
for us in the last 10 months? I do riot
know whether that would work or not.
Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, if the gen-
tleman will yield for just one further
comment. I appreciate what the gentle-
man has said. I hope his optimistic out-
look of what he calls the optimism of the
majority leader is not overly optimistic.
We do want to finish just as fast as we
possibly can.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the
gentleman and withdraw my reservation
of objection.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from Okla-
homa (Mr. ALBERT) ?
There was no o 'ecti .
DISCUSSIONS, IF NOTHING MORE,
MAY BE HELPFUL
(Mr. SIKES asked and was given per-
mission to address the House for 1 min-
ute and to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, it is en-
couraging that American and Soviet ne-
gotiators are at long last prepared to be-
gin discussions during November on arms
limitations. The negotiations are a step
toward world sanity in the arms race.
But let us not place too much signifi-
cance on what is happening. We should
not assume that the negotiations would
automatically insure progress. At this
point they will show only that both sides
are interested in finding out whether
there is common ground to make further
and more meaningfUl talks worthwhile.
Previous history of negotiations with
the Soviets would indicate that there is
a long and difficult road ahead before
any genuine rollback in strategic stock-
piles can be accomplished. In the mean-
time, it is important that the United
States not indulge in the deadly luxury
of unilateral disarmament. As a matter
of fact, U.S. disarmament would prob-
ably have eliminated any possibility of
accomplishment toward arms limitations
at the conference table. The Soviets are
much too clever to give up anything
without a quid pro quo.
While we are effecting economies in
defense expenditures we should also en-
deavor to modernize and to strengthen
our fighting forces. This the Soviets will
understand, for this is exactly what they
will be doing.
The people of the world can draw some
assurance from the fact that both we and
the Soviets recognize the dangers of nu-
clear war and the cost of an arms race.
Both countries should be willing to seek
relief from the growing economic bur-
den which accompanies military pre-
paredness. Hopefully, the talks can pro-
vide the proverbial single step that
marks the beginning of a long and im-
portant journey.
HIGHER PRICES? YOU CAN BE
SURE IF ITS WESTINGHOUSE
(Mr. PODELL asked and was given
permisssion to address the House for 1
minute and to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. PODELL. Mr. Speaker, periodi-
cally a corporation shows true public
spirit and tender consideration for con-
sumers and their already devastated buy-
ing power. Yesterday such a case came
to light when Westinghouse Electric
Corp. announced plans to raise prices on
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proved Fo ttetakg.sommotipofeFEIRA4R000300040001-0 H 10185
Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman
from Oklahoma.
Mr. ALBERT. I am just as sensitive
to the further need for getting authoriza-
tion and appropriation bills out of the
way as is the gentleman. I think that the
gentleman's committee has had before
it and has passed through the House all
the appropriation bills, with the possible
exception of one, for which there are
existing authorizations. We have urged
as the gentleman well knows, that au-
thorizing committees complete action on
the authorization bills as quickly as pos-
sible. I cannot answer exactly whether
the fact that we will not be programing
suspensions on Monday will have any-/
thing to do with what the committe
can do on Monday. I cannot answer t t.
Mr. MAHON. We are on the thre old
of the 11th month of the year an well
over half of the President's approp4iation
budget?some $81 billion, irk fact?has
not been processed by the Hous " because
of the lack of significant auth rizations.
With only 2 months of the y r left, this
is a most disturbing situation The Com-
mittee on Appropriations h acted in
every instance where we ought we
could. But time is running, d is now
short. I think we have to do mething
In self-defense, and I do rise" self-
defense.
I now yield to the gentleman
Michigan, who on yesterday seemed t
attack the committee and the Congress
for not having gotten more of-the appro-
priation bills to the President We have
virtually come to a grinding halt in our
ability to bring out the appropriation
bills within the rules. I repeat, we have
tens of billions of dollars of appropria-
tions bottled up because we do not have
authorizations for them. What can the
Committee on Appropriations do about
it and what can the minorit,t. leader do
about this situation, and does this request
have any adverse impact on the unfor-
tunate situation in which we find our-
selves with respect to appropriations?
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker,
would my good friend and former chair-
man yield at this point?
Mr. MAHON. I am glad to yield to the
gentleman.
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I want to re-
assure the gentleman that I did not at-
tack the Committee on Appropriations
and I did not attack the Congress but
simply said that we are in this position?
and the record shows that we arc -where
only two appropriation bills for fiscal
1970 have reached the desk of the Pres-
ident. I deplore this, and I am sure that
the distinguished chairman ofi the Com-
mittee on Appropriations deplores it. I
would like to make an inquiry because
I think what may come to the House
Monday or Tuesday could give the green
light to one of the appropriation bills
still in the Committee on Appropriations.
I understand that the conferees on
the District of Columbia revenue bill
have agreed, and it is my under-landing
that the Committee on Appropriations
has not acted on the District of Colum-
bia appropriation bill pending this con-
ference report from the legislative com-
mittee. Is there any reason Why, if the
conference report is ready, it cannot be
considered Monday or Tuesday so that
we could get the green light for this
particular appropriation bill?
Mr. MAHON. I would like to yield to
the majority leader for a response to
this question. Let me first say that if
we bring out an appropriation bprior
to the time that the legisla;the com-
mittee has fully actepaatt -processed the
related authorization, the legislative
committee t s to be somewhat dis-
turbed be?se they feel we are moving
too fas nd getting the cart before the
hors , so to speak. In any event, we have
tcfiave a reasonable time for markup,
jetting the printing done, and the report
'down. It takes about a week or 10 days
or more to do that. We cannot be ex-
pected to bring in our appropriation bill
30 minutes after the House has passed
the related authorization measure.
Mr. ALBERT. The leadership insofar
as I know has not been advised what day
the conferees on the District of Columbia
revenue bill will call up that bill. I know
of no reason why it cannot be called
up on any day.
I would like to to say to the gentleman
that I would like to keep the discussion
within the confines of my request. I have
only asked that suspension bills be put
over from Monday until Wednesday. I
have not asked that any rollcalls be put
over or that any other matters not be
Programed on Monday or Tuesday.
I would say this to the gentleman:
s is not a matter which concerns just
flex eek. Continually committee chair-
men a the leadership to call up bills
on a cert day and the leadership can-
not ignore 'ese requests. In the same
manner we ye requests from com-
mittee chairmen sot to call up bills on
certain days. We ttempt to schedule
bills in accordance *th the request of
the chairmen or me ers in charge of
legislation reported fro ? their commit-
tees. We have habitually ried to do this
throughout the session an I think it can
be said in all candor that 'nsofar as re-
quests from committees re concerned
and insofar as rules gra ted are con-
cerned on bills on which co mittee chair-
men desire to take actio we have dis-
posed of such legislatio promptly. I
know that the chairme ? of committees
now considering autho zation and ap-
propriation bills woul ike to have them
disposed of as soon possible.
Mr. MAHON. Wo d the distinguished
majority leader us when we might
have the authori tions relating to mass
transportation, ? highway safety, and
airport aid in rder that we can properly
Incorporate ose in the transportation
stppropri on bill.
- Mr. ERT. Mr. Speaker, if the gen-
tlem will yield further, the leadership
is in no position to predict when a com-
mittee is going to vote or when a chair-
man is going to request a rule or when a
rule will be granted. I can only answer
the question in that way. I do not wish
to direct my remarks to any committee.
I think I can say in all candor that we
have discussed the matters with the
chairmen of the committees which have
jurisdiction over authorization bills not
only recently, but over the months.
Mr. MAHON. Referring again the fact
that we are on the threshold of the 11th
month'of the year and the fact that we
have had 14 bills and resolutions out of
the Appropriations Committee this ses-
sion, I wonder if the majority leader
could tell us when we might expect an
authorization on the foreign aiid bill.
Trerillbeekmmittee headed by the gentle-
man froths Louisiana (Mr. PAssmAN)
finished its hearings some time ago. We
want to bring in a bill. When can we ex-
pect action on the foreign aid authoriza-
tion bill?
Mr. ALBERT. The distinguished gen-
tleman from Ohio is present and is a
member of that committee and I am sure
can give the gentleman the most recent
information with reference to it.
Mr. HAYS." We voted the foreign aid
bill out this morning.
Let me say to the gentleman, however,
that we did not get the administration's
request an the foreign aid bill until the
beginning of the new fiscal year. We got
it in June. It has taken a long time for
the administration to line up the dueks
on their side and to line up the votes
in order to get it out. There have been
long hearings conducted on it.
However, insofar as I am concerned?
and I think I can speak for the chair-
man of the Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs?we have our local elections next
Tuesday?he and I do?and I cannot ex-
pect folks to vote in congressional elec-
tions if I am not interested enough to
vote in the local election such as the
mayors elections, and so forth.
I have noticed that the President took
time out to do some campaigning in Vir-
ginia yesterday and plans to-do the same
thing in New Jersey today or tomorrow
although I hope he does not have any
success in either instance.
But I am going to take time out en
Tuesday to go home and vote. I could net
care less whether the foreign aid bill
comes up then or not, but it is not com-
ing up because of that, so it will come
up in a week or so, I think if the Com-
mittee on Rules gives us a rule.
And I might say to the gentleman that
I do not even care whether they do that,
but it is out of the committee.
Mr. MAHON. The Defense appropria-
tion bill involves a little over $75 billion
of the appropriation budget. We do not
yet have the enacted authorization for
that. The military construction appro-
priation budget is in the area of $1.9
billion, and there is no enacted authori-
zation.
Is the leadership able to tell the Com-
mittee an Appropriations what we can
do about those?
Mr. ALBERT. The gentleman knows
that the authorization bill has passed the
House. The gentleman knows that the
defense authorization bill was under
consideration for a long time, and I am
sure for the best of reasons, in the other
body.
All of these are matters we have dis-
cussed with the appropriate committee
chairmen. If the gentleman feels that by
putting suspensions over from Monday
to Wednesday would interfere with the
consideration of appropriation bills, or
If I did, I certainly would not make the
request.
Further, Mr. Speaker, I want to com-
pliment the gentleman from Texas.
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H 1?1711"'"' CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE October 28, 1969
than 100 other minerals intact, after the
House cut most of them by a quarter.
House depletion changes would have
raised an added $400 million annually in
taxes from extractive industries?mostly
oil and gas. This has now been scaled
down to $155 million, a cut of nearly
two-thirds. Again all Americans will be
forced to subsidize oil profits abroad and
at home. This winter we shall all be
made to pay double the going world price
for every oil product. It can only be
compared to picking the pocket of a per-
son who has just been run over by a
truck.
This, however, was still not enough. The
depletion allowance permits oil and gas
companies to deduct 2'71/2 percent of
gross income from earnings before com-
puting taxes. They cannot, however, de-
duct more than 50 percent of pre-tax
earnings. This provision was softened
by permitting firms or individuals with
gross oil or gas revenues of less than $3
million to use the depletion allowance
for up to 65 percent of their earnings.
This is public sanction of increased tax
evasion by the rich with a vengeance.
Almost all so-called independent pro-
ducers, who are not a part of worldwide
integrated oil companies, will slide neatly
under this new $3 million limitation.
Compared to a major oil company, the
individual who grosses up to $3 million
annually from oil or gas is small potatoes.
But compare him to the average tax-
payer, and he is massive privilege, in-
deed, this, then, is the added privileged
group aided by the Senate Finance Com-
mittee. These operators, many of whom
are already millionaries, do everything
from extracting oil from the ground to
marketing it at retail prices. In effect,
the public has been told to shut up or
else worse will follow. It makes as much
sense as Mrs. Mao Tse Tung applying
for D.A.R. membership.
The Senate even raised a similar 50
percent limitation to 70 percent for gold,
silver and copper producers, who now re-
ceive a 15 percent depletion allowance.
Under it poverty-stricken copper giants
like Anaconda, Kennecott, Phelps-Dodge
and American Smelting and Refining will
save $10 to $25 million annually in taxes.
Here then we have the spectacle of a
group of Senators, mainly from oil States,
ignoring the outspoken will of the mass
of our citizens. Our tax system is a
masterpiece of inequities. The country
has demanded reform, which the House
attempted to give it, in part. Now the
Senate Finance Committee has blatantly
attempted to strifie and suppress what
we have painfully managed to accom-
plish. I believe we are witnessing a de-
liberate attempt to destroy the entire tax
reform bill.
The only historical comparison that
can be drawn with this emerging abor-
tion of a measure is the Hawley-Smoot
Tariff. When need was greatest for swift
tariff reductions, a privilege-oriented
Congress produced the highest tariff
schedules in American history up to that
time. In this instance, demand for tax
relief and erosion of accumulated oil tax
privilege has been answered by a legis-
lative nose-thumbing unmatched in
modern times. The measure is becoming
as festooned with amendments as a
Christmas tree is with ornaments. A
meaningful House-Senate conference will
be impossible, almost guaranteeing no
bill at all. To call this tax justice or relief
is to try and pass off the Manhattan Tele-
phone Directory as the Revised Statutes.
Soon now, this legislative abortion will
be wrapped in shiny tinsel, passed by the
Senate and sent back to the House with
somber ceremony anti howls of self -
congratulation. It will be accompanied
by a 2-minute ovation and 50 empty
speeches, then sent to the House for
decent burial. Mr. Speaker, a hard-hit-
ting grocery advertisement would make
more sense than this deliberate warping
of the legislative process. This Congress,
if it affixes its seal of approval to such a
measure, will dissipate its diminishing
share of national faith at an unprece-
dented rate. I shall vote against any
compromise such as that already emerg-
ing from the Senate Finance Committee.
I hope the majority of my colleagues will
do the same. Yet this, of course, will ac-
complish the goals for which the oil and
gas industry has been so ardently and
expensively lobbying.
Nonetheless, in the moment of victory,
they have sown the seeds of their even-
tual defeat. A time of complete reform
and total reckoning with this industry
cannot be much longer delayed, even by
their massed billions. The public has at
last been enlightened as to the extent
and depth of how much the oil and gas
industry has been getting away with at
the expense of urall. No industry in the
land has abused its power more or shown
such corporate blindness. They can best
be compared to steel moguls of the last
century, or coal barons of Theodore
Roosevelt's day.
During the Pullman strike, Mark
Hanna was supposed to have said to
George Pullman:
Pullman, any man who won't meet his
workers at least part of the way is a damn
fool.
Any industry which enjoys as much
power and profits as the oil and gas in-
dustry does should have yielded to the
commonsense call for at least some re-
form. This the oil industry, in its col-
lective nonwisdom, has refused to do.
Mr. Speaker, dire fates are promised
looters, dissenters, radicals, and effete
intellectuals. Those who laugh at and
ridicule legitimate requests of the peo-
ple are presumably safe, and will be ren-
dered testimonial dinners by the oil and
gas industry.
(Mr. DEVINE asked and was given
permission to extend his remarks at
this point in the RECORD and include ex-
traneous matter.)
[Mr. DEVINE'S remarks will appear
hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]
THE NEWLY-CREATED GENERAL
SERVICES PUBLIC ADVISORY
COUNCIL
(Mr. BLACKBURN asked and was
given permission to extend his remarks at
this point in the RECORD.)
Mr. BLACKBURN. Mr. Speaker, the
newly-created General Services Public
Advisory Council met for the first time
late last week. This national panel was
created by Administrator Robert L. Kun-
zig to more fully involve the public in the
affairs of the General Services Adminis-
tration, the multibillion dollar agency
that acts as the business manager of the
Federal Government.
It pleases me greatly to note that one
of the 16 members of the council is from
Georgia. He is Mr. John T. Wiley of De-
catur. He is the assistant vice president
of Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph
Co.
Mr. Wiley is to be highly commended
for donating his valuable time to the
cause of good government. Of course,
public service is nothing new for this
gentleman. He is a member of the At-
lanta Chamber of Commerce and has
served as a director of Junior Achieve-
ment of Greater Atlanta, the United
Fund, March of Dimes, and the American
Heart Association. He is currently a di-
rector of the Georgia Agribusiness Coun-
cil and is vice chairman of Government-
al Department of the Georgia State
Chamber of Commerce. Wiley is a mem-
ber of the Atlanta Athletic Club, the
Commerce Club, and the Gridiron Secret
Society.
Mr. Wiley's vast experience will con-
tribute much to the Council.
Mr. Speaker, it should also be noted
that the creation of the General Services
Public Advisory Council is another step
in President Nixon's drive to make the
Federal Government more responsive to
the American people.
TALKS AND MIRV
(Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois asked and
was given permission to extend his re-
marks at this point in the RECORD, and
to include extraneous material.)
Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr.
Speaker, I am greatly encouraged by the
announcement that the Soviet Union has
finally accepted the American invitation
to begin talks on the limitation of strate-
gic weapons. It was announced this past
weekend that preliminary talks will be-
gin in Helsinski, Finland, on November
17, 1969.
This is especially good news to those
of us in the Congress who have expressed
grave concern over the delay in strategic
arms limitation talks?SALT?and the
growing possibility of a new escalation
in the arms race. The fact is that today
we and the Russians are roughly at parity
in terms of nuclear weapons and that we
are both capable of destroying each other
several times over. It would be sheer folly
for either country to devote huge sums to
the production of new and more horrible
weapons when these resources could in-
stead be devoted to peaceful purposes.
There is a real need in this country to-
day to divert these funds into domestic
programs?programs designed to meet
the crises of our cities, schools, and en-
vironment. And I understand that the
Soviet Union is faced with a very similar
problem.
As one of the principal sponsors of a
House resolution proposing a mutual
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October 28, 1969
I enclose an editorial from the Was
ington Post of October 27, 1969:
ME SALT TALKS: A Becrstrane
It is good news that the Unit States States an
the Soviet Union have at long laist agreed 0
a time and a place for the opening of th
talks on limiting offensive and defensive
strategic weapons. There was Mid news of
another kind, as well, in Secretary Rogers'
press conference remarks on the subject. l4_'or
in an international negotiation eit this kind,
there is much ongoing internal negotiation
to be accomplished too?negotiatien within
each government and among its fieparate
competitive parts, each of which tries, quite
naturally, to assert its particular Interest and
make that interest controlling in the govern-
ment position as a whole. We surely have
much to learn, in the prolong id and ex-
tremely difficult talks ahead, as to how the
weight falls within the Admirdsiration's
specially designated negotiating team and
how that reflects the larger reality within
the Administration itself. But for the mo-
ment there is much reassurance to be h
from the fact that Secretary Rogers nottjjy
appeared as the President's spoktciii on
this question, but that he spoke with emi-
nent good sense.
Mr. Rogers' remarks were lowAey, easy-
going, uncontentious, and aboveAfl practical.
Unlike those who have convefestly forgot-
ten the Administration's n six-month
postponement of the talks hf their e-eserness
to tax the Soviet Union witl unconscionable
delay, Secretary Rogers affaby observed, "I'm
not sure that it would helpto speculate
on the reason for the delay since
probably wonder why we delayed from the
time our Administration came into saTice un-
til June?and we did it because we waited to
review the situation carefully. I think that
they probably have problems of one kind or
another and they have now decided to have
the talks." He bashed no drums and clanged
no cymbals concerning either the_ hopes or
the fears that -must necessarily attend such
an exercise, pointing out that "we should not
confuse the beginning of talks pith suc-
cess," and stressing that what we aeught was
a "limitation agreement [that is] mutually
advantageous." His rationale for seeking such
an agreement cut through a lot of_mislead-
ing rhetoric on the alleged interooDuection
or "linkage" of this problem with all other
outstanding issues between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union:
"We are not talking about detente, or any-
thing else. We are talking about vitae ther it
makes- sense for the two of us to continue
to spend immense amounts of money for the
next five, or ten, or fifteen years on-atrategic
weapons and end up at the end of WI, time-
in the same relative position--or velsether it
would be wiser to use the money for some
other purpose. . . . I think they are ,ierious
about it. You can always be wrong_ but at
the moment I would say that their, attitude
is serious and that they intend to approach
it in the same attitude we do."
Tone apart, two particular points of sub-
stance deserve comment. One is that the de-
cision to hold a preliminary conference to
set things in motion, while remainbig, flex-
ible about its form and content, probebly was
wise; it would be good if whatever mutual
procedural wrangling and wrestling might
develop could be separated in some degree
from the substantive talks that follow. The
other is that, while declining to diselooe any
moves the U.S. might be expected to make
in Helsinski, Secretary Rogers showed him-
self not inhospitable to the idea of working
out a bilateral freeze or moratorium on
MIRV tests in these preliminary sessions.
Such an arrangement may or may nett come
to pass, but gaining control over the rapid
development of these destabilizing weapons
should surely rank high on the Administra-
tion's agenda. They are the weapons on which
the clock is ticking.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD HOUSE 11 10173
h- EDUCATION?THE KEY TO
SURVIVAL
(Mr. COHELAN asked and was given
permission to extend his remarks at this
point in the RECORD and to include
e t
er.)
Mr. COHRT.A.N. Mr. Speaker, today
this House will have the opportunity to
vote on a continuing resolution for the
Office of Education. I will offer an
amendment to allow the Office of Edu-
cation to expend funds at the previously
House-passed levels. The urgency- and
necessity of the full furitling for educa-
tion programs iswffiely recognized both
in this Cham and the Nation at large.
I was gra ed to see that the Washing-
ton P again took a strong editorial
position favoring the full funding for
cation. The editorial points out that
ucation has been treated as a pesky
Poor relation in the striving for limited
resources.
It is interesting to note that the Nation
which prides itself as being the most
Powerful and well endowed is now taking
second place to many of the nations of
Europe in education. The present admin-
istration is not unaware of the need for
more expenditures in education. Indeed,
a task force commissioned by the Presi-
dent himself recommended enormous in-
creases in education. It seems to me that
each Member should support the House-
evel as a modest but necessary
contributi a balanced and quality
education.
[From the Washingto ost, Oct, 28, 18691
Erescarrow?"Tne KEY"i,Q SURVIVAL"
-Jefferson knew that the des y of Amer-
ica was inseparable from educati ?that in
the fulfillment of the promise of his new
nation education would be the key . . Edu-
cation, long the key to opportunity a d ful-
fillment, is today also the key to sur -ival."
So said Richard Nixon just a year ago hen
he was a candidate for the presidency. And
he went on to pledge that "my adrnin tra-
tion will be second to none in its co ern
for education."
There has been no discernible move ent
to redeem that pledge. Indeed, in the erce
competition for attention and for f deral
funds in a period when economy is n ad-
ministration watchword, education s been
treated as a pesky poor relation. T e Presi-
dent has come forward with a dr atic new
welfare proposal; but he has . - .layed only
indifference to the urgent cational needs
set forth by a dig ed urban educa-
tion task force. He has proposed immense
expenditures for a new maritime program
designed to "replace the drift and neglect
of recent years and restore this country to a
proud position in the shipping lanes of the
world"; but when the House of Representa-
tives during the summer enlarged by a bil-
liou dollars the meager appropriation he re-
quested for federal aid to education, he op-
posed the increase and threatened not to
spend it if the Senate should endorse the
House action.
The President and his Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare persuaded one of the
ablest and most thoughtful educators in
the country, Dr. James E. Allen Jr., to leave
the New York State, superintendency of edu-
cation and come to Washington as U.S. Com-
missioner of Education. But Dr. Allen h
as
been accorded scant influence since he came
here, as though the administration desired
a symbol of excellence rather than a pro-
moter of it.
This country, a pioneer in mass public
education, is now second to many of the
countries of Europe in literacy, the most ele-
mentary index to educational attainment.
Calling last ro.onth for a campaign to eradi-
cate illiteracy in America, Commissioner Allen
pointed to the shameful fact that in large
city school systems in this country up to half
of the students read below expectation and
that about half of the unemployed youth
between the ages of 16 and 21 in this country
are functionally illiterate.
"Drift and neglect" have been much more-
and much more serioasly--the portion of the
public schools in this country than of the
merchant marine. For nearly half a century
on one pretext or another?two world wars,
two Asian interventions, a depression an
inflation?the public schools of this country
have been allowed to sink further and further
in arrears of the demands made upon them.
School construction has not kept pace with
a growing school population; the number and
the caliber of teachers?and of the counselors
and equipment required to complement the
teachers?have lagged increasingly behind
the known needs of school children.
The management of public schools is, and
should be, a local responsibility. But the long
neglect of the school systesn can be repaired
only through a dramatic program of federal
financial aid; the resources are simply mot
now available at the local leveL More im-
portant still, the drive and innovation and
planning for a revitalization of the public
schools must come on a nationwide basis.
With the need for federal aid saurgeat and
so great. It is a tragedy to hear from within
the administration phlegmatic talk about
concentrating on research instead of on ar,
tion. It is true, of course, that intensive
study of educational needs and aims =1St
continue constantly. But the schools them-
selves?and the children whose childhood op-
portunities for education can never recur?
cannot now wait upon research. There are
plenty of pressing and indubitably construc-
tive uses for the billion dollars of additional
money a concerned Congress wants to apply
to public education. There is plenty of knowl-
edge in the U.S. Commissioner's aloe to put
that money effectively to work at once.
AMERICA'S COAT OF ARMS?AN OIL
DERRICK RAMPANT ON A FIELD
OF CASH
(Mr. PODELL asked and was given
permission to extend his remarks at this
point in the RECORD.)
Mr. PODELL, Mr. Speaker, our hopes
for tax reform of a substantial nature
lie dead, done in by the Senate Finance
Committee, acting at the behest of
America's oil and gas industry. The
House had cut both foreign and do-
mestic depletion allowances from 271/2
percent to 20 percent, the absolute mini-
mum of reform. Many in this House, my-
self among them, grudgingly accepted
such partial tax relief. We hoped to at
least make a start in eroding accumu-
lated oil industry tax privileges, simul-
taneously affording some aid to the
average taxpayer. Now the Senate Fi-
nance Committee has voted to restore
much of what the House cut, leaving
both foreign and domestic depletion al-
lowances at 23 percent. Such an act is
unacceptable, I consider it a legislative
miscarriage, boldly offered and blatantly
delivered. Our attempts at tax reform
have been treated as a joke. Now they
are turned into a knife aimed at en-
larging oil industry preference at public
expense.
The Senate Finance Committee main-
tained depletion allowances for more
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October 969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? HOUSE
moratorium on multiple warhead missile
testing, I am hopeful that a mutual
MIRV test freeze will be one of the first
items of agreement at the preliminary
discussions. Secretary Rogers has pointed
out that the SALT talks could last for
several years. Unfortunately, we do not
have that kind of time if we are truly
interested in halting the deployment of
MIRV since our own test series will be
completed by mid=1970. And once MIRV
is deployable it will be virtually impos-
sible to control by agreement due to the
complex problems of inspection that
would be involved. We would thus be off
to the races again as we both embarked
on a costly and dangerous new arms
buildup. It has been variously estimated
that MIRVing our own land- and sea-
based missiles will cost between $10 and
$20 billion.
But I think people are deceiving them-
selves if they look on MIRV as only an
unnecessary expenditure that will ulti-
mately leave us where we now are?at a
plateau of relative balance and stability.
Two factors are being overlooked in such
an assessment. First, during the buildup
there are bound to be asymmetrical mo-
ments when the balance of power will be
upset and the risks of a nuclear exchange
will, therefore, be greatly increased. And
second, when both sides have MIRVed
their missile force will still not have the
stability which we enjoy today because
there will be a distinct incentive for a
nation to strike first with its MIRV force:
since each MIRVed missile will in theory
be capable of knocking out several missile
silos, in time of crisis the edge will ob-
viously be with the side which attacks
first. While I realize that our own MIRV
is not intended as a counterforce weapon,
the fact remains that, with increased ac-
curacy and yield, it has such a potential.
And the Russians will be basing their
judgments not on our intentions, but on
our capabilities.
For these reasons, I think it would be
mutually advantageous for both us and
the Russians to call a halt to MIRV de-
velopment while there is still time. A
mutual MIRV test freeze, based on na-
tional means of verification, should be
agreed to at the earliest possible date,
and a formal agreement involving other
means of inspection should be placed at
the top of the SALT agenda. This pro-
posal has the support of one-fourth of
the House membership and nearly half
of the Senate membership. It has been
termed by President Nixon as "a very
constructive proposal."
I think President Nixon has been wise
in rejecting calls for a unilateral Amer-
ican halt in MIRV testing. Not only
would this have been dangerous, but it
would have encouraged the Russians
to delay even further the commencement
of SALT talks' while they continued
to develop their own MIRV system. The
subject of arms limitation must be ap-
proached in a spirit of mutuality. Uni-
lateral actions based on blind faith and
trust would only generate distrust, fear
and suspicion in the longrun and jeop-
ardize the chances for a meaningful and
mutual arms control agreement.
I am sure I am joined by many of
my colleagues in this body in hoping that
the administration will seek to halt the
development of MIRV by proposing to
the Russians that we both discontinue
our testing immediately and work for an
agreement to stop the "mad momentum"
of the arms race.
At this point in the RECORD I include
an editorial appearing in yesterday
morning's Washington Post, entitled,
"The SALT Talks: A Beginning." I am
also including the transcript of the press
conference with Secretary of State
Rogers on the subject of SALT talks.
The materials follow:
[From the Washington Post, Oct. 27, 1969]
THE SALT TAKES: A BEGINNING
It is good news that the United States and
the Soviet Union have at long last agreed
on a time and a place for the opening of
the talks on limiting offensive and defensive
strategic weapons. There was good news of
another kind, as well, in Secretary Rogers'
press conference remarks on the subject. For
in an international negotiation of this kind,
there is much ongoing internal negotiation
to be accomplished too?negotiation within
each government and among its separate
competitive parts, each of which tries, quite
naturally, to assert its particular interest
and make that interest controlling in the
government position as a whole. We surely
have much to learn, in the prolonged and
extremely difficult talks ahead, as to how
the weight falls within the Administration's
specially designated negotiating team and
how that reflects the larger reality within
the Administration itself. But for the mo-
ment there is much reassurance to be had
from the fact that Secretary Rogers not
only appeared as the President's spokesman
on this question, but that he spoke with em-
inent good sense.
Mr. Rogers' remarks were low-key, easy-
going, uncontentious, and above all practical.
Unlike those who have conveniently for-
gotten the Administration's own six-month
postponement of the talks in their eagerness
to tax the Soviet Union with unconscion-
able delay, Secretary Rogers affably observed,
"I'm not sure that it would help any to
speculate on the reason for the delay since
June. They probably wonder why we de-
layed from the time our Administration came
into office until June?and we did it be-
cause we wanted to review the situation
carefully. I think that they probably have
problems of one kind or another and they
have now decided to have the talks." He
bashed no drums and clanged no cymbals
concerning either the hopes or the fears
that must necessarily attend such an ex-
ercise. pointing out the "we should not con-
fuse the beginning of talks with success,"
and stressing that what we sought was a
"limitation agreement [that is] mutually ad-
vantageous," His rationale for seeking such
an agreement cut through a lot of mislead-
ing rhetoric on the alleged interconnecting
or "linkage" of this problem with all other
outstanding issues between the U.S. and
the Soviet Union:
"We are not talking about detente, or any-
thing else. We are talking about whether it
makes sense for the two of us to continue
to spend immense amounts of money for the
next five, or ten, or fifteen years on strategic
weapons and end up at the end of that time
in the same relative position?or whether it
would be wiser to use the money for some
other purpose. . . . I think they are serious
about it. You can always be wrong but at
the moment I would say that their attitude
is serious and that they intend to approach
it in the same attitude we do."
Tone apart, two particular points of sub-
stance deserve comment. One is that the de-
cision to hold a preliminary conference to
set things in motion, while remaining flexible
about its form and content, probably was
wise; it would be good if whatever mutual
1110175
procedural wrangling and wrestling might
develop could be separated in some degree
from the substantive talks that follow. The
other is that, while declining to disclose any
moves the U.S. might be expected to make in
Helsinki, Secretary Rogers showed himself
not inhospitable to the idea of working out
a bilateral freeze or moratorium on MIRY
tests in these preliminary sessions. Such an
arrangement may or may not come to pass
but gaining control over the rapid develop-
ment of these destabilizing weapons should
surely rank high on the Administration's
agenda. They are, the weapons on which the
clock is ticking.
SECRETARY ROGERS' NEWS CONFERENCE OF
OCTOBER 26, 1969
Following is the State Department's release
of Secretary of State William P. Rogers News
Conference, which is authorized for direct
quotation:
Secretary ROGERS. Ladies and gentlemen, I
thought that it might be helpful to get to-
gether with you in view of the announce-
ment that was made in the White House at
11:00 o'clock, because I thought you might
have some questions on this subject. I will
do my best to give you the information that
you would like to have.
Q. Mr. Secretary, could you amplify a little
bit on what will be treated at the preliminary
discussions?
And secondly, will you tell us if there's a
possibility that President Nixon and the
Soviet Premier, Mr. Kosygin, might formally
open the second phase of serious negotiations
on the substantive issues?
A. On the second part of the question, I
think the answer is no, there is no present
intention of any procedure of that kind, and
I don't believe that it will happen.
As far as the preliminary talks themselves
are concerned, we expect that they will be
exploratory in nature. The purpose of the
preliminary talks is to have a free discussion
about how the negotiations can be con-
ducted.
Now, we are approaching these talks very
seriously. Certainly, it's as serious a matter
as we have in our nation today, and I think
that the Soviet Union's attitude is the same.
Certainly they say that they are very serious
about these talks.
So we want to discuss how we can best
approach the talks in a serious, businesslike
way that will be produtive.
Q. Mr. Secretary.
A. Yes.
TheseQ. talks have been put off time and
time again. What do you think is different
now about this time? Why did the Russians
agree now?
A. Well, I don't know?and I'm not sure
that it would help any to speculate on the
reason for the delay since June. They prob-
ably wonder why we delayed from the time
our Administration came into office until
June?and we did it because we wanted to
review the situation carefully.
I think that they probably have problems
of one kind or another and they have now
decided to have the talks.
Q. Mr. Secretary, on the question of MIRV,
is it the intention of this Government to
propose a freeze, a moratorium, or some other'
device to halt MIRY testing at the beginning
of this conference so that substantive issues
can be dealt with through a moratorium or
a freeze?
A. Well, as President Nixon said in June,
we are obviously considering the whole ques-
tion of MIRY tests and possible moratorium
on the tests; and that will be one of the sub-
jects that will be considered when we start
these talks.
I think that it's a complex situation. Now
that the talks are scheduled to start on the
17th, why we will consider how we approach
that subject.
We certainly don't intend to have any pub-
lic discussion as we go along on each one of
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? HOUSE Octooer ,e8, 1969
these issues. It's too serious a hiciness. We're
going to try as much as possible to conduct
these negotiations in private.
Now, obviously, we'll keep our NATO Allies
informed of the progress, and weill keep
Congress informed. But as melee as possible,
we want to do this in private and the Soviet
Union indicates that that's their intention
too,
Q. Mr. Secretary, I don't understand what
you mean by saying you don't Intend to have
a public discussion because the issues are too
serious.
A. Well, I mean, at each step of the negotia-
tion, obviously, we will hate a discussion.
Eventually the public will budge, But while we
are talking we think it's bettor to do it in a
private session; and we would hope that with
some exceptions they will be "private sessions.
Do I make myself clear?
Q. Yes.
But could I ask one more tallow-up ques-
tion?
A. But let me say on that point, Mr. High-
tower, that as I said, we will keep Congress
advised, and we will keep the appropriate
committees fully advised of the general ap-
proach that our Government is taking. And
we'll keep our allies advised.
But we don't want to have each one of
these negotiating sessions * public seesion,
because it's a very complex subject, and we
think it's so serious that it should be con-
ducted in a businesslike atmosphere. And
when it's appropriate to advise the public,
we will.
Q. So you expect some eitabilc information
to come out from time to Univ. But the nego-
tiations, as such, are to beprivate.
A. That's correct.
Q. Yes.
At what level do you jean to open the
talks?
A. Well, we have our de:legation, that we
have already announced, that is prepared to
go to Helsinki on the 17th.. The Chairman of
that is Ambassador Gerard Smith, the Alter-
nate Chairman is Philip Parley, there's Paul
Nitze, and General Allison, Llewellyn Thorne-
son, and Dr. Harold Brawn,
Q. Mr. Secretary, I'm not quite clear on
whether there's going to be one meeting in
Helsinki, or a series of meetings in Helsinki,
that are ended by the ending of the prelimi-
nary talks?and then the- beginning of the
actual talks somewhere else? Or is It all go-
ing to run together?
A. Well, we can't predict it for certain.
But I think it will run slienething like this:
We would expect that preliminary discus-
sions in Helsinki will rift for several days,
maybe a few weeks, and at that time a deci-
sion will be made about a permanent site.
And also, decisions will he made about how
best to conduct the permanent negotia-
tions?how many should attend, how Many
should be private, and whether there should
be an agenda or not ha nie an agenda?those
things.
In other words, the purpose of the prelimi-
nary talks is to work it but so that we are
not arguing about details and we get right
dawn to the business of serious negotiations
when we get to the peratenent talks.
Q. Mr. Secretary, is there any thought on
our part of proposing some sort of limita-
tion on anti-ballistic missiles? CIT does it ap-
pear that the decision of both governments to
proceed with limited deployment precludes
this?
A. Mr. Scali, we are not going to discuss
in advance, and hopefully not while the
negotiations are being conducted, specific
proposals that we are gding to make.
I think I should say that the negotiations
will include both offensive and defensive
strategic weapons. And as you know, under
NPT Treaty, we have an obligation to do that,
and we are going to fulfill that obligation.
Chalmers?
Q. Could I clarify something?some of the
answers you have given?
You are going to Helsinki to have a pre-
liminary meeting of a few days to a few
weeks. Now that is essentially to work out the
techniques of how you have a longer range,
more permanent meeting.
Dees that mean that in the preliminary
meeting there will be no possibility of dis-
cussing a substantive question such as the
freeze of MIRV while we're having the per-
manent meeting?
A. No.
Q. That could happen at the Preliminary
Meeting?
A. Yes, yes.
We are not going to exclude any subject
from discussion at the preliminary meetings,
and I don't want to be in any rigid position
about how long these preliminary talks are
going to last, or how we're going to discuss
it. Our attitude is quite flexible.
And I think the Soviet Union's attitude
Is the same.
We're serious about this, and we want to
conduct the negotiations in a businesslike
manner, and we hope that we can avoid
long arguments about the agenda, and which
item will come first, and whether there's a
limitation on what we can talk about, and
so forth.
If we can have a more reasonable, flexible
approach to negotiations, and if we can talk
back and forth, and dot it with a serious in-
tention in mind?then it's possible that these
talks can be productive.
Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us an idea
?at least what you anticipate What the gen-
eral course of things is apt to be?whether
you want to?whether you prefer to start
with existing weapons systems and then pro-
ceed to----
A. No. I don't want to get involved in how
we're going to do it?which we're going to
take up first, and so forth.
Q. Mr. Secretary, I don't think that Hel-
sinki was our original preference, as far as
the site is concerned. Do you have another
preference for the permanent site of the
talks?
A. Well, I'm glad you raised that question,
because there has been some misunderstand-
ing about it. And let me tell you exactly
how it developed:
In my discussions with Ambassador Do-
brynin in June, I think it Was June 11th,
I said that we were ready to have talks, and
that we would be prepared to have talks
within a month. And I listed these places as
possible sites for the talks: Geneva, Vienna,
and Helsinki.
Now we did suggest Helsinki, and when
Ambassador Dobrynin responded the other
day, he selected Helsinki, and that was one
of the places that we had suggested.
We have left open the question of the final
site, and he was willing to do that, because
there are some problems of communication
and availability of space and other things.
It's possible that some other site would be
better.
We look with favor on Vienna, for ex-
ample, but we are not excluding the pos-
sibility of Helsinki as the final site.
But the reason I mentioned It that fully
is we didn't have any argument about the
site. Helsinki was a site that we proposed.
Later on, we indicated we thought maybe
Vienna would be better for the reasons I
mentioned, but eve had no dispute about
the site.
Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us a more
clear definition of the term "strategic arms?"
Does this include, for example, land based
intermediate ballistic missiles?
A. No, I think ru leave that to the nego-
tiators. That's a subject that they will have
to discuss when they get there.
Q. How does China's growing strategic
power lit in, long range, with these negotia-
tions with the Soviet Union? And the threat,
presumably, to both countries?
A. Well I don't think, at the moment, they
are relevant. They haven't progressed far
enough, and I think if we can work out
something that is constructive from the
standpoint of the two superpowers that we
can deal with China's problem later on.
Keep in mind that the word that was
used was "curbing" in this release--"Limita-
tion" or "curbing"?and even if we are suc-
cessful at working out an agreement, both
the Soviet Union and the United States are
going to be way ahead of China for many
years to come.
Q. Mr. Secretary, could you, for the bene-
fit of the public, estimate how long you
think these talks might take place?
A. No, I wouldn't want to do that.
I try to resist doing that. I noticed the other
day in "Meet the Press" I made a mistake '
and did indicate that I thought that the
answer that the Soviets would give us would
be within two or three months.
So far, I've been batting pretty well, and
I'm not going to make any further predic-
tions.
Q. Mr. Secretary, who do you expect will
lead the Soviet Delegation? And have you any
indication either from reading the Soviet
press, or in any other way, what their atti-
tude is toward things like a MIRV mora-
torium, or an ABM?
A. We do not know who is going to head
their Delegation. At one time it was thought
that Mr. Kuznetsov would be the Chairman,
but I think that he's in China now, in ne-
gotiations there, so we're not sure. And Am-
bassador Dobrynan did not tell me.
He did say that he thought their delega-
tion probably would be about the same size
as OUTS, five or six.
Q. What mechanism will be used for con-
sulting the NATO Allies? Will they be con-
tacted individually, or collectively?
A. Well, I think it depends, of course, upon
what the consultation oonsists of.
I would think, generally speaking, we'll do
it through the NATO organization in Brus-
sels, but not necessarily. I don't want to be
confined to that as a possibility.
In our discussions here?notification of our
NATO Allies that the talks were going to
start?we notified the Ambassadors in Wash-
ington.
Q. Mr. Secretary, there is bound to be
speculation that the beginning of these take
may have a larger meaning. Do you think
that this might be the beginning of an era of
negotiations?
A. Well, let me see if I can answer your
question: I think this is an important step
that is consistent with the President's policy
of an era of negotiation, and it could be a
very important negotiation. It's possible it's
one of the most important negotiations our
country has been involved in. And certainly,
it could be one of the most important that
we ever undertook with the Soviet Union.
On the other hand, we should not confine
the beginning of the talks with success of
the talks, necessarily?there is quite a dif=
ference.
These talks could be abortive, they could
be fruitless, or they could be highly succees-
ful in terms of mankind. And those things
will be determined by the talks, themselves.
So whereas we are pleased that the SoReet
Union has agreed to have these talks?we
think it is a good step?we also have to be
quite conscious of the fact that the mere
start of the talks, themselves, is not what
counts. What counts, is how successful they
are.
Q. Mr. Secretary, if these talks are success-
ful, could they lead to a form of nuclear
parity between the United States and the
Soviet Union?
A. Well, words like "parity" I think are apt
to be confusing.
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October"Mr1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE
What we hope that we can do is negotiate
an arms limitation agreement which will
keep us in the same relative position that
we are now?and which can be verified
Now in order to accomplish the first pant
of that formula, we have to be sure that the
limitation agreement is mutually advantage-
ous, that neither side gets an advantage
because of the agreement.
Secondly, we have to be sure that the
agreement can be verified, because if it can't
and one side can cheat, then it certainly is
not a viable agreement.
Now these things are very difficult matters
to handle, and I don't think anybody should
be confused about the fact that they are
difficult. They are complex, there's mutual
suspicion, the subject matter itself is very
involved, and so we have to proceed with
the hope that we can achieve some suc-
cess?but with the fun realization that it's
not going to be easy.
Q. Mr. Secretary, it's almost exactly a year
ago today, I believe, that Nixon, then a
candidate, gave a speech in which he said
he would approach such negotiations only
on the grounds that the United States would
be negotiating from a position of superiority.
Now, at this point does the Administration
feel that it's going into these talks in a posi-
tion of superiority, or rough equality, or
however you want to characterize it?with
the Soviet Union?
A. Well I don't, as you know, I think he's
used the term "sufficiency" and I think that
we feel now that this is an appropriate time
to enter these discussions and enter them
seriously, with the hope that we can arrive
at an agreement that will be mutually ad-
vantageous. And I don't want to characterize
what we think. We think this is the right
time to do it, and I think the Soviet Union
does, too.
Q. Will you take a question on Lebanon?
A. I'll take it?f Laughter.] No, I'm sorry,
I don't want to get involved in anything
_else this morning.
Q. By "agreement" as the objective, are
you speaking of the treaty that would be
submitted to the Senate for ratification?
A. Well, I think that if we have an. agree-
ment, a very confidential agreement, we are
thinking in terms of the treaty. Yes. And I
think that that is the most likely outcome,
assuming we reach an agreement.
On the other hand, I wouldn't want to be
frozen in that position, because it's possible
that we would want to have some kind of
an agreement of a limited nature, that would
not require a treaty.
But in any event, I want to make it clear
that if we did something other than by way
of treaty, that we would keep Congress con-
stantly advised, and consult with them, and
be sure that it met with their approval, and
we would keep our allies advised. ?
In other words, I think the chances are
that the agreement would be in treaty form;
but I wouldn't want to necessarily be frozen
In that position.
Q. Mr. Secretary, having talked with Am-
bassador Dobrynin, how do you characterize
the Russian attitude? They are willing to
talk, but are they enthusiastic, cautious,
what can you tell us about that?
A. Well, I had long talks with Mr. Gromyko
on this subject, in New York. We talked
three tidies for three or four hours' duration,
total; and I would characterize his attitude
as serious.
He gave me the impression that the Soviet
Union is serious about these talks. lie didn't
indicate that they were entering the talk
or about to enter the talks for purposes o
propaganda and that th
about the same as ours. It's a realistic atti
tude.
We are not talking about detente, or any
thing else. We are talking about whether i
makes sense for the two of us to continue to
spend immense ambunts of money for th
next 5, or 10, or 15 years on strategic weapons
and end up at the end of that time in th
same relative position?or whether it woul
be wiser to use the money for some othe
purposes.
Now that's just a Matter of hardware.
If we can work out that kind of an agree
ment so that each of us feel it's to our ad
vantage to enter that kind of an agreement
and we're satisfied that the agreement can
be verified so that neither side can cheat?.
then it makes sense to do it.
So, I think they are serious about it. You
always can be wrong but at the moment I
would say that their attitude is serious and
that they intend to approach it in the same
attitude that we do.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect, sir, that
the initiation of these talks will, itself, affect
the general pattern of East-West relations?
As these talks proceed, will they have, in
your judgment, a relationship to the conduct
of international affairs as a whole?in the
Middle East, for?
A. Well, let me say this: They are not con-
ditional in any sense of the word.
We haven't laid down any conditions for
these talks.
I suppose that when you're talking with
the representatives of the Soviet Union in
any field, it does tend to improve the rela-
tions somewhat?especially if the talks seem
to be succeeding.
Now, we are talking with them on NPT
for example. We hope that they will ratify
NPT.
We are talking with them in Geneva about
Seabeds Treaty?and those discussions have
gone rather well.
We are going to talk with them further
about chemical and biological warfare lim-
itations.
So I suppose that all of those things tend
to improve the atmosphere between the So-
viet Union and the United States.
But I don't think anybody should be mis-
led. The mere fact that those talks seem to
be going well doesn't necessarily mean other
things are going to go well. We would hope
that they will, but I think that the invasion
of Czechoslovakia demonstrated that point.
Just prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia,
there was a feeling of detente in Europe,
that things were going very well between the
United States and the Soviet Union?between
East and West?and unfortunately, that in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia changed that.
So to summarize, I think that it does tend,
slightly to improve the atmosphere, but we
shouldn't be euphoric about the fact that
we are having talks.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of that, the ques-
tion about Viet-Nam, which may relate to
this, has the fact that you have said we are
de-escalating in Viet-Nam had an effect on
the Soviet attitude toward these talks?
A. Well as I say, I don't know what's had
an effect on the Soviet attitude. There's no
way of knowing for sure. I can speculate, but
I don't think my speculation is worth any
more than anyone else's.
Q. Thank you.
Q. You could try, sir. [Laughter.]
H 10177
s, A. Well, I would rather read about it.
I [Laughter.]
as Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect the United
- States and the Soviet Union to enter these
preliminary discussions with formal, sub-
- stantive proposals on the 17th of November?
t A. Well, I wouldn't think that we would
start out that way, no. As I say, I think these
e talks will be exploratory.
I don't rule out, as Mr. Roberts asked,
e whether we rule out any discussion of sub-
d stantive matters,
r The answer to that is no.
But I wouldn't think that would be the
way the discussions would start.
- ? Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any indica-
- ton of what the Soviet position will be in
, terms of willingness, or lack of willingness,
to agree to things like a MIRV moratorium,
or some agreements on ABM?
A. No.
Q. Thank you, sir.
COAL DUST CAN BE SHARPLY
REDUCED
(Mr. HECHLER of West Virginia asked
and was given permission to extend his
remarks at this point in the RECORD and
to include extraneous matter.)
Mr. HECHLER of West Virginia. Mr.
Speaker, it is now possible, feasible, tech-
nologically, and economically within
reason to make a drastic reduction in the
amount of coal dust at the working face
of a coal mine. This fact is very dramati-
cally illustrated in the Bureau of Mines
Technical Progress Report entitled
"Studies on the Control of Respirable
Coal Mine Dust by Ventilation," to which
I referred earlier today an the floor.
The substance of this report reveals the
results of cooperative tests with industry
in five bituminous coal mines. In a re-
lease dated October 28, the Bureau of
Mines states that "improved ventilating
methods were used to reduce the con-
centration of respirable dust, the cause
of 'black lung' disease." A high-pressure
auxiliary fan in ventilating the working
face resulted in a very marked reduction
in the coal dust level after careful tests.
At an early date, I shall make available
the backup statistical data on which this
report was based.
I believe this report has great signi-
ficance in relation to our debate over the
proper dust standard to be included in
the pending coal mine health and safety
legislation. It is highly unfortunate that
certain unidentifiable sources within the
Nixon administration felt that this report
should be suppressed instead of made
publicly advailable. Only after I sent a
telegram to the President late Monday
urging that he direct the Department of
Interior to spring loose this report did it
see the light of day. I would certainly
hope, Mr. Speaker, that the administra-
tion would be more active in the future
suppressing coal dust rather than sup-
pressing reports.
The text of this report is so significant
that it should be available for the con-
sideration of all Members. It follows:
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H 10178 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? HOUSE Octooer z8, 1969
miner were used as a basis for comparison.
It would hare been desirable to use a per-
sonal sampler on the machine operator as
the reference point. However, in some mines
studied, the machine operators performed
multiple tasks, requiring several different op-
erators for each machine on a given shift.
Therefore, the operator's exposure could not
be used for obtaining representative data.
Baseline studies of respirable dust concen-
trations were made wherever possible in the
Pneumoconiosis, a respiratory disease Bureau's studies, to establish the effective-
which is caused by inhaling fine particles of ness of the ventilation system being tested.
coal mine dust, is recognized as a major oc- Figure 1 illustrates the system used
cupational health problem in underground throughout this investigation.
bituminous-coal mines. Consequently, the VENTILATION THEORY 8
Bureau of Mines has launched 3B63 effdrts?..... Following the introduction of continuous
mining equipment to the bituminous coal-
fields, increased production rates and rapid
face advance led to increased frequency of
methane ignitions from improper or poor
face ventilation. As a part of a program to
reduce this hazard, the Bureau of Mines ob-
tained information relative to airflow pat-
terns developed in the immediate face area
by various combinations of ventilation
methods and devices. Following these studies
basic systems of air control were devised for
dilution and removal of methane face emis-
sions without accumulations of high concen-
trations in the oceupied /ace region. Methane
control and dilution was in all cases achieved
lysing engineering studies by the by planned air circulation.
Ines and the industry, it became Although continuing progress has been
hat a method for achieving the made in face ventilation techniques, dust
velocity was by using a high-
loading in the face atmosphere clearly in-
Mary fan and by maintaining dicates that ventilation Systems now used are
e exhaust tubing about 5 feet often inadequate to Maintain respirable
dust concentrations within acceptable limits.
. This assertion was supported Settling rates of airborne particulates less
[Bureau of Mines Mineral leaustry Health of the mine, the hazard due to methane will
Program, Technical Progress Report 19, also be reduced.
October 19691 3. Because of the effects of concentrations
STUDIES ON THE CONTROL Or UESPIRABLE COAL of respirable dust in the incoming air the
MINE DUST BY VIM; , LATION system investigated, by itself, is not a corn-
(By D. S. Kingery,1 H. N. awns" E. J. Harris, te solution to the respirable dust prob-
lem For the system to be totally effective,
M. Jacobson,4 R. G. Peluso, J. B. ShutackS dust. controls must be applied at dust gen-
and D. P. Schlick 7) erating points in the incoming air passage-
[Figures and illustrations referred to in text ways.
cannot be reproduced in the RECORD]
ABSTRACT
Experiments initiated by the Bureau of
Mines on August 26, 1969, and recent work of
others, have demonstrated the effectiveness
of ventilation for controlling concentrations
of respirable coal mine dust. Substantial re-
ductions in dust concentrations have been
attained by increasing the volume and rate
of air movement across the race and by con-
trolling the airflow pattern
Ventilation experiments conducted by the
Bureau using high-pressilie fans as auxiliary
ventilation units showed th face-generated
dust could be effectively controlled in five
mines employing continuous mining ma-
chines. Additional data was obtained on in-
dustry installations in two mines using simi-
lar ventilation systems. Hy maintaining an
airflow approaching 100 fpin across the entry,
the experimental system reduced the concen-
tration of respirable dust by factors as great
as 6.4. In all mines wherethe system was used
the face-generated dust concentrations were
reduced to below 3 mg/ins Total respirable
dust in two cases was above the 3 nig/m"
value because of the dust content of the in-
INTRODUCTION
to find ways for controll
mine dust. Studies by til
mining research agenc
the efficient use of w
resent the fundam
tive dust control
mining machin
suppression m
current spray
on dust in t
Calculat1 o
ureau and other
have indicated that
r and ventilation rep-
tal approaches to effec-
Although water sprays on
have beneficial effect as a
ure for total airborne dust,
techniques have little effect
respirable range.
s based on the theory of small
particle berlavior and air motion indicated
to Bureau linvestigators that an airflow of
between 7r and 100 fpm across the entry
should res It in significantly lower dust con-
centration
After a
Bureau of
apparent
desired en
take air. In some mines, depending upon pressure a
type of coal being mined and other dust con- the end o
trol factors in use, it wa,s possible to obtain from the fac
concentrations of less than 2 mg/m". by the followi
Although the technology for the applica- 1. Adequate ai
tion of the dust control_ system investigated mine dust genera
is readily available, it Is evident that addi- and captures dust
tional engineering studies ;hould be made in be transported by the
each mine where the system is to be applied. into the return entry, wh
Conditions in some Mines may require a or collected.
modification of the system. On the basis of 2. Previous studies conduc
the Bureau's experience to date, further reau demonstrated the effec
th
studies will be made iso that the various tilation for the control of metha
engineering parameters encountered in un- at the working face. Similar techniq
derground coal mining can be evaluated, be effective for dust control.
CONCLUSIONS METHOD OF INVESTIGATION
The following conclusions can be made The Bureau's investigation Was center
from this investigation: upon the use of an auxiliary high-pressur
1. Controlled face ventilation employing axial-flow direct-driven fan with variable
a high-pressure auxiliary fan together with pitch blades. The original estimated power
other components of the system will sub- requirements were from 20 to 40 hp. An ap-
stantially reduce the concentration of re- proved fan with such requirements was not
spirable coal dust at the working face of available and could not be quickly supplied
underground coal mine*. By maintaining an by a manufacturer. Therefore, two fans, op-
airflow from 70 to 100 flan across the entry, erating in parallel, each with horsepower suf-
results showed in all instances that the aver- licient to produce 5,000 cfm, and a fan with
age respirable dust connentration at the con- a 10-hp motor capable of producing 9,900
tinuous miner was reduced to less than elm, where used in the first experiment. This
3 mg/m0. Total respirable dust in two cases series was conducted in a mine where coal was
was above the 3 mg/mli value because of the being extracted by a continuous miner, from
dust content of the intake air. In some in- the Pittsburgh coalbed, averaging about 6
stances, however, respirable dust concentra- feet in height.
tions were reduced to -lass than 2 mg/m". Although favorable results were=red
2. Through proper engineering design of in this initial study, the fans used not
the auxiliary and main ventilating, system produce the desired entry velocities origi-
nally specified by Bureau engineers. A sec-
ond study was conducted using a 60-hp aux-
ilitary fan from the Bureau's experimental
mine in order to obtain higher entry veloci-
ties. Because of the fan's size and power re-
quirement, it could only be used in mines
capable of accommodating it. In the second
mine studied, coal was extracted with a con-
tinuous miner from the Sewickley coalbed
averaging 50 to 54 inches in height. Subse-
quent studies were conducted in mines in the
Pocahontas No. 3 and No. 4, and Illinois No.
6 coalbeds.
Dust measurements were made according
to standard Bureau procedures. For the pur-
pose of this report, samples collected with
an MRE instrument contained in the instru-
ment package mounted ozi the continuous
concepts:
ow at the face confines coal
d ahead of the operator
tidos. Dust can then
tern and discharged
e it can be treated
by the Bu-
ess of ven-
released
s could
'Acting director: Haab if and Safety Tech-
nical Support Center, Bureau of Mines, Pitts-
burgh, Pa.
" Acting assistant direc tor?Mineral Indus-
try Health, Bureau of Mines, Washington,
D.C.
Chief, Ventilation Support Group, Health
and Safety Technical Support Center, Bu-
reau of Mines, Pittsburgh. Pa.
? Acting chief, Pittsburgh Field Health
Group, Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh, Pa.
0 Mining engineer, Pittsburgh Field Health
Group, Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh, Pa.
0 Mining engineer, Ptttbilrgh Field Health
Group, Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh, Pa.
Mining engineer, Mineral Industry Health,
Bureau of Mines, Washington, D.C.
than 10 microns in diameter show that dust
in the respirable size range may be trans-
ported for great distances by air currents.
Because respirable duat generated at the
face is transported by the air stream, venti-
lation techniques originally designed to con-
trol distribution and accumulation of meth-
ane face emissions can be used to confine,
capture, and remove airborne dust produced
at the face.
The theory for the control of coal mine
dust is that dust particles smaller in size
than 10 microns tend to behave in the same
manner as a gaseous contaminant such as
methane, Thus, the control of respirable
dust is a function of the volume and velocity
air moving across the coal face. Another
quirement is to maintain the zone of con-
t Mated air as close to the face as possible
to nimize the exposure of face workers.
eau studies on methane control meth-
ods ave revealed definitive airflow patterns.
The patterns are shown in figures 2 and 3.
At t e strat of the investigation, information
give on figure 2 was used to determine that
exh sting air from the face in sufficient vol-
assure a sustained velocity approach-
g 100 fpm across the entry, would result
n minimizing the concentration of respir-
able dust. Diagrams shown on figure 3 estab-
lished the need for maintaining the tubing
within 5 feet of the coal face.
Experiments performed at the Bureau's
experimental coal mine related horsepower
requirements to air velocity and air volume
under a variety of operating conditions as
shown in figure 4.
From the data incorporated in figure 4 it
was estimated that for entries having a 56
sq. feet area, a 15-hp, high-pressure, anxil-
Luxner, James V. Face Ventilation in
Underground Bituminous Coal Mines?Air-
flow and methane distribution patterns in
immediate face area-line brattice. BuMines
Rept. of Inv. 7223, 1969, 16 pp.
" Dalzell, R. W. Face Ventilation by Line
Brattice and by Auxiliary Fans. Oral presen-
tation at the National Safety Council, Chi-
cago, Illinois, October 27-30, 1969.
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H 10152
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE October 28, 1969
Because the Marshfield Clinic and St.
Joseph's Hospital are so impressive, I was
particularly eager to bring the nation's top
health officer, Bob Finch, the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare, here today
so that he might get a first-hand look at
these facilities and hear the success story di-
rectly from those responsible for its opera-
tion. I wanted him to see that what I've been
telling him about the Clinic is not an inflated
claim of a honletown booster.
Bob Finch and I are here because we feel
deeply the urgency of the problem of im-
proving health care throughout the nation.
Despite the miraculous advances that have
been made in conquering disease, despite the
fact that Americans enjoy a higher standard
of medical care than the people of any other
nation in the world, the nation faces serious
problems in the field of health?particularly
in the delivery of health services to people.
One of the greatest bottlenecks is the
shortage of skilled personnel. There are not
enough doctors, nurses, and other trained
personnel to take care of today's needs, and
the outlook for tomorrow is grimmer.
I feel the Defense Department can make an
important contribution toward easing this
problem. Some 30-35,000 military personnel
who are qualified medical technicians or
technologists?trained and experienced dur-
ing their period of military services?re-enter
civilian life each year. They include a vast
galaxy of talent in 40 different skill categories
as varied as a radio-isotope?technician to a
renal dialysis technician. By bringing to-
gether in some way these trained men and
the jobs in civilian life in the field of health
services for which they are qualified, I be-
lieve we can help to improve health care and
avoid a waste of skill and training.
Consequently, I have directed the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Roger
Kelley, to develop a plan that will maximize
the opportunities to utilize in civilian life
the valuable medical skills possessed by many
servicemen. I can assure you that we will
move promptly to devise and implement this
plan.
This is but one of several steps which the
Defense Department is taking to make more
widely available the special know-how that
it possesses in the field of health care. We
have a study under way called the New Gen-
eration of Military Hospitals which is de-
signed to improve service and reduce cost
in the operation of such institutions. The
results of this study will, I believe,' have an
important impact on hospitals of the future,
civilian as well as military, leading to better
health facilities in the future for the entire
nation.
We also plan to draw upon our battlefield
experience in the use of helicopters for the
speedy evacuation of the wounded to places
where-care is available. By use of the heli-
copter we have saved many from death and
from disability in Vietnam. The same means
of swift transfer of accident victims from the
scene of the accident to medical facilities
can reduce the accident toll here at home.
If present trends continue, more than
56,000 Americans are expected to be killed
and two million to be injured on our high-
ways this year. In remote and rural areas,
the death rate is four times greater than in
urban areas because of delay in administer-
ing emergency medical treatment and trans-
porting victims to medical facilities. Accord-
ing to one authority, at least 25 per cent of
the 170,000 Americans who will suffer perma-
nent disability this year in highway accidents
could escape disability if they had proper
care shortly after their accidents.
In order to reduce the frightful toll of
death and disability on the highway, we in
the Department of Defense have joined with
Bob Finch's Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare and other Federal agencies
to form a committee that is now studying
means of making the helicopter a flying am-
bulance here at home as it is in Vietnam. We
have great hopes for the potential benefits
we can obtain from arlying what we have
learned in Vietnam to the medical emer-
gency we face here at home.
Speaking of home, it is good to be back in
Marshfield again, I congratulate all asso-
ciated with the Marshfield Clinic and St.
Joseph's Hospital for what you have accom-
plished. I shall continue to watch?and en-
courage?your progress in the important
work you are doing.
REMARKS OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MELVIN
R. LAIRD BEFORE THE DEDICATION OF THE
MARATHON COUNTY WORKSHOP FOR THE
HANDICAPPED, WATJSAU,
Those of us who have watched the growth
of the Marathon County Workshop for the
Handicapped since its beginnings five years
ago have reason for special pride and satis-
faction today.
Five years ago the only home the Work-
shop had from which to operate was a sta-
tion wagon. Today we dedicate a building of
16,000 square feet as the new home in which
the greatly expanded activities of the Work-
shop are to be carried on.
The Marathon County Workshop for the
Handicapped has indeed come of age.
Physical facilities that men use for their ?
activities take on a symbolic character. They
become symbols of the qualities of mind and.
heart evidenced in the activities which take
place within their walls.
This building which we dedicate will be a
symbol of compassion, generosity, love, hope,
and determination. For these are the quali-
ties that will fill this structure as it is used
as a place to learn and to work.
This building also symbolizes a great
American tradition?the tradition of volun-
tary private action at the local level to help
our neighbors. There is Federal money in
these facilities?and I was happy to have
been able to play some part as a member of
Congress in securing the Federal funds that
were made available to provide this new
home for the Workshop. But what particu-
larly pleases me is that today's dedication is
one of the many concrete results of an
amendment I was able to attach to an Ap-
propriations bill back in 1964 which per-
mitted private donations to be mingled with
State funds in making up the State's share
of the program. Two-thirds of the money
that made this building possible was pri-
vately subscribed. That is a gratifying sta-
tistic to me because many people back in
1964 felt that the Laird Amendment would
not produce the kind of results that I am
proud today to see embodied in the Mara-
thon County Workshop for the Handicapped.
This Workshop was conceived, developed,
and is being operated by private individuals,
supported voluntarily by the people of this
County acting in the American spirit of
neighborliness.
One of the things that President Nixon is
trying to encourage and expand is problem-
solving by voluntary action at the local level.
The Workshop is an example of this type of
activity. We did not wait for Washington to
get around to providing this facility for us.
We did not leave the planning or its execu-
tion to an agency of the Federal Govern-
ment. We who live in this section of Wiscon-
sin saw some of our neighbors in need of
help, and we acted to provide this help.
The great social and economic problems
which plague our Nation will not be solved
by Government alone. They will be solved
only if the kind of privately-initiated and
privately-directed cooperative effort on the
local level, represented by the Marathon
County Workshop for the Handicapped, is
duplicated, magnified, and intensified from
one end of the Nation to the other.
I want to pay tribute to Peter DeSantis
an to all others who have made the Work-
shop the success it has become. I need not
recount this success story in detail, but let
me mention a fact that gives one measure of
the Workshop's accomplishments. This
Workshop has been the entrance chamber to
-productive lives for 160 people so far. The
earning power of these people has increased
from zero to 6500,000. There is no adequate
measure of the gain in confidence, satisfac-
tion, and self-respect that this transforma-
tion has brought to these individuals.
The past accomplishments of the Work-
shop are, I am sure, going to be exceeded
year after year. As we dedicate this building,
we wish for all who deserve credit for bring-
ing the Workshop from infancy to maturity
long years of fruitful service in the future.
EUROPEANS VIEW SALT TALKS
(Mr. FINDLEY astlecid was given
permission to address the House for 1
minute and to revise and extend his
remarks,)
Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, our allies
in Western Europe are not the least bit
nervous over the strategic arms limita-
tions talks scheduled to begin November
17 in Helsinki. They seem to be thorough-
ly confident their interests will be pro-
tected fully by U.S. negotiators.
The relaxed attitude was very evident
during the just concluded sessions in
Brussels of the North Atlantic Assembly,
and it was in marked contrast with con-
cern I had noted in sessions in earlier
years.
For the first time German, Italian,
and French parliamentarians seemed to
te completely at ease discussing privately
the forthcoming talks. In earlier years
they had shown anxiety about the course
of bilateral talks between the super
powers. This was especially evident in
the comments of German delegates who
said they felt their government had not
been treated with proper consideration
during the negotiations by the Johnson
administration leading to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty. Italian, French,
and British delegates had expressed sim-
ilar concern.
In the North Atlantic Assembly just
concluded a new confidence was clearly
present. In my view this restoration of
European confidence in U.S. negotiators
stands as a significant achievement of
the Nixon administration. It results from
two main factors:
First. A series of NATO-wide private
consultations held earlier this year in
Brussels in preparation for the SALT
talks. Our allies were impressed with the
thoroughness and candor of the three-
part series of day-long discussions which
were spaced over a period of several
weeks.
This was a marked change from the
SALT talk consultation plans made by
the Johnson administration. I learned in
Brussels that only a single 3-hour discus-
sion had been tentatively scheduled.
Second. The caution with which the
Nixon administration has discussed both
publicly and privately the prospect of
SALT talks. The rhetoric has been re-
strained with notes of optimism care-
fully balanced with caution.
These factors give substance the pledge
President Nixon made during his Febru-
ary trip to Europe, during which he
promised close consultation with our
NATO allies on all matters vital to Euro-
pean security.
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October 28, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- HOUSE 1110151
tee?SMC. SMC is the student counter-
part of the New Mobilization Committee
Against the War in Vietnam?MOBE.
The New Mobilization Corrmiittee has
substantially the same membership as
the old mobilization comm1ttee which
was headed by Dellinger, Hayden, and
Davis. As would be expected, SMC is rep-
resented on the steering committee of
MOBE in at least two instances. And it
has apparently begun to fill the political
vacuum on college and Mali school
campuses this year left by the factional
breakup of he Students for a Democratic
Society.
An article entitled "Student Group
Backs All War Protests" whiab appeared
on page A-8 of the "Washington Post"
of October 21, 1969, contained comments
of SMC Executive Secretary Carol Lip-
man who estimated that more than 1,500
SMC chapters have already been estab-
lished on campuses in all 50 States. Ac-
cording to this article, Lynn Glixon,
SMC regional organizer, stated that SMC
chapters are active on most of the major
college campuses and at 45 high schools
and junior high schools in the Washing-
ton, D.C. area. She further stated that
organization has begun even in elemen-
tary schools and specifically mentioned
that a SMC chapter is in the process of
being formed at the Ben W. Church Ele-
mentary School in the District of Co-
lumbia.
The SMC has called for a "national
student strike" on November 14, 1969, to
"show there is massive student solidarity
against the war." This action is planned
as a buildup to a major antitiar demon-
stration planned for November 15, 1969,
in Washington, D.C. Local colleges, uni-
versities, and high schools are being sub-
jected to organizing campaigns and some
school administrators have _even pro-
vided time and space for meetings. These
campaigns are centered on "freedom of
speech and expression" and sold as an
extension of the "public discontent" with
the policies of the present administration
toward the war in Vietnam.
Many students and their parents ques-
tion the activities and motives of the
SMC but find it difficult to combat the
glib assertions of the organizers. Perhaps
a look at the background of sane of the
principal SMC activists appearing lo-
cally would prove helpful Carol Lipman
and Danny Rosenshine from New York
City and Don Gurewitz from Cleveland
are presently in the Washington, D.C.,
area specifically to organize SMC ac-
tivities.
Carol Lipman is national executive
secretary of the SMC, which has its na-
tional headquarters in New York City.
Local offices are maintained at 1029 Ver-
mont Avenue NW. During 1968 she
served as editor of Young Socialist, a
monthly publication of the Young Social-
ist Alliance?YSA. The YSA is the youth
affiliate of the Socialist Workers Party,
a Trotskyist Communist splinter group
which has been cited by the Attorney
General as subversive. She has worked
for YSA in Boston, Chicago, Detroit, and
New York City before coming to Wash-
ington, D.C. Having held national officer
positions with YSA, she would also be a
member of the parent Socialist Workers
Party?SWP. She is also a member of
the steering committee of MOBE.
Danny Rosenshine has likewise been
active for several years with YSA in
Detroit, Cleveland, and New York City
before coming to Washington, D.C. He
presently serves on a full-time basis as
YSA national organizer, having Previ-
ously been national field secretary. He
traveled to Cuba in 1960 with a group
sponsored by the Fair Play for Cuba
Committee. In 1962 he attended the
Soviet-dominated eighth World Youth
Festival in Helsinki, Finland, and subse-
quently toured the ' Union. In
early 1969 eturned from spe
several w s in Cuba. The Militant,
published by SWP, issue of March 21,
1969, carri d an article captioned "Forty
Campus Des Set for Speaker on Cuba,"
listing spea ing engagements arranged
for Rosenshi e. His speeches predictably
praised the C an brand of communism
as practiced u er Fidel Castro and at
the same time condemned the U.S. Gov-
ernment. In late 1'948 he was on a speak-
ing tour of New Jersey, New York, and
Connecticut, also 4vertised in The
Militant. His topic ak that tune was
"From Student RevoTht to Socialist
Revolution."
Don Burewitz grew up in e Washing-
ton, D.C., area but has beenvesiding in
the Cleveland area attendinek school in
recent years. He has been acti
antiwar movement, served as 1
the SMC in Cleveland, and also
pated in the affairs of the YS
SWP. In addition to serving as
tonal organizer for the SMC 1
cruiting campaign in the Washin
area, Gurewitz is also serving on
Washington Action Committee of
New Mobilization Committee
the War in Vietnam, which is coor
nating the demonstration sched
November 15, 1969, in Washingt
All prominent SMC leaders have
similar background of activities a
membership in the YSA and SWP.
Lipman, Rosenshine, and Cure
have all written articles for The M
tant and Young Socialist. Both
enshine and Lipman have served on the
editorial board of Young Socialist, The
September 1969 issue of "Young cial-
ist" contains a lengthy article titled
"YSA Program for the Camp evolt,"
proclaimed statement
Executive Com e National
YSA. A poster-
type counterfold contains a likeness of
"Che" Guevarra and the slogan "Smash
Capital Now." Other articles include
"Where Is America Going?" by Ernest
Mandel, a leading European Trotskyist
revolutionary who spoke at dozens of U.S.
college campuses on a tour last fall.
The June 27, 1969, issue of "The Mili-
tant" contains an article by Charles Bol-
duc, national chairman, YSA, entitled
"Why Revolutionaries Belong in YSA."
This article makes the point that YSA
supports the Cuban revolution;. the
struggle for socialist democracy in East-
ern Europe; the antiwar movement; the
black liberation struggle and the revolu-
tionary nature of revolution for social-
ism in the United States and other ad-
Vanced capitalist countries.
The Militant regularly carries re-
e in the
er of
rtici-
and
na-
re-
ton
the
he
To
1-
uled
on, D
a
md
tz
s-
cruiting ads for YSA under such head-
ings as "Fan the Flames of Discon-
tent?Join YSA."
Consideration of the foregoing devel-
opment raises several questions. Is SMC
promoting political dissent and protest,
or revolution? Is the action proposed and
organized by SMC an affirmation of the
political system of this Nation, or de-
signed to further the aims and objectives
of those who would destroy this Nation?
Should the activities be condoned as legi-
timate expression of the attitudes of the
youth of this country, or condemned as
the workings of a disciplined cadre of
revolutionaries seeking to deceive Amer-
youth? Is SMC, controlled as it ob-
vious is by YSA, seeking merely to
exercise 1eedorn of political expression,
or is SM actually seeking to destroy
the political system?
Students, parents, and faculty at our
local schools should answer for them-
selves the above questions before endors-
ing or countenancing the activities of
SMC.
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FINDS
TIME TO CONCERN HIMSELF WITH
HEALTH CARE PROBLEMS
(Mr. MICHEL asked and was given
permission to address the House for 1
minute, to revise and extend his remarks
and include extraneous matter.)
Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, all of us
In the Congress are well aware of the
tremendous contributions to the concept
of improved health care made by Secre-
tary of Defense Laird while he served
as the ranking Republican member of
the Subcommittee on Appropriations for
the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare.
While he has handled the awesome
burdens of the Office of Secretary of
Defense with the quality of excellence
that characterized his service in the
Congress, he still somehow finds time to
concern himself with health care prob-
lems, as evidenced by his remarks on
Sunday, October 26, at the Marshfield
Clinic in Marshfield, Wis., and on Mon-
day, October 27, at the dedication of the
Marathon County Workshop for the
Handicapped at Wausau, Wis.
In his address Secretary Laird pointed
out that the Department of Defense is
formulating a plan for opening up serv-
ice hospitals to maximize the opportuni-
ties to utilize in civilian life the valuable
medcal skills possessed by many servce-
men. He further states that the Depart-
ment of Defense is cooperating with
other agencies to make the helicopter a
flying ambulance here in the United
States as it is in Vietnam.
Mr. Speaker, the texts of Secretary
Laird's remarks on these two occasions
follow:
REMARKS OF HON. MELVIN Et. LA/RD, SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE, AT MARSHF/E'LD CLINIC, MARSH-
FIELD, Wis., OCTOBER 26, 1969
We who look on Marshfield as home are
proud of this Clinic. Its development to its
present size and scope gives eloquent testi-
mony to the devotion and skill of the many
people who have labored to make this clinic a
medical facility that ranks with the best in
the nation.
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October 27, 1969
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 13297
Justice REED. You can't get as much from
voluntary dollars as you can from dues?
Mr. Marx. Well, sir, a union man thinks
he has paid, when he has paid his dues, he
thinks he has paid for bargaining, for
legislation, and for political activity. He
doesn't feel he should pay a second time for
political activity. That is why it is so hard
to raise voluntary contributions.
Our constitution and the constitution of
all unions set this up as a purpose, po-
litical action. When he pays his dues, he
has paid for his political action. He may give
another dollar or two to some candidate for
an office, but he doesn't feel he is going to
give another some more money.
We have collected a little, but never any-
thing to do this job of making the public
know our views.
Justice FRANKFURTER. Was it only the other
day that unions went into politics? For
years we had a great leader of labor who
thought it was very bad to go into politics
for the union.
Mr. RAUH. There was such a leader, sir.
Justice FRANKFURTER. So if you say a hun-
dred years of history, there is a good deal
of history the other way.
Mr. RAUIL. There has been history the
other way, but political life has?there is
history back a hundred years. There was a
period, as you suggest, when this was the
view of some leading labor leaders. So what
does the Government suggest that is justi-
fied?
It was trying to minimize the influence?
these are the Solicitor General's commend-
able frankness?it was trying to minimize
the influence of unions at elections.
APPEND4X D
Justice BLACK. What is the relevancy of
the emphasis on the fact that it came out
of union dues?
Mr. faux. Well, sir, if it came out of vol-
untary funds then everyone agrees that it is
not a violation. There is nothing in the stat-
ute that says that.
For example, take COPE, that is the Com-
mittee on Political Education of the AFL-
010. They get voluntary funds paid sepa-
rately from union dues from a number of
members. Everybody agrees that an expendi-
ture or a contribution by COPE is legal. The
reason everybody agrees to that is that I
think the government is under some mis-
understanding about the statute on this
point but we agree as to the result.
They think the statute does not apply
because COPE is not a labor organization.
In my judgment COPE is clearly a labor or-
ganization under the statute but it does not
apply if Your Honors please because Senator
Taft made clear on the floor of the Senate
that voluntary funds not part of dues could
be used for any purpose and whatever you
use the government's interpretation or ours
the fact is that there has never been an in-
dictment for voluntary monies?
Justice FRANKFURTER. You don't need Sen-
ator Taft's statement to reach that conclu-
sion. If you will just read the statute, any
labor organization that makes a contribu-
tion?if you are just the conduit of other
people's money, then you are not making
the contribution.
Mr. RAUH. That would be another inter-
pretation to reach the same answer.
Justice BLACK. Is there any other fact
which attempts to regulate the way unions
shall spend their dues? I don't quite under-
stand the difference. It sounds as though the
theory is that union members are to be pro-
tected on how their dues are to be expended.
Mr. RAUH. The government is contending,
sir, that that is the justification for this stat-
ute, that it is a protection of the minority
members of the union.
Justice BLACK. Is there any statute which
has attempted to regulate the way the un-
ions must spend its money or dues?
Mr. Mull. No. When I come to this point
I would like to point out that this statute
is not directed to the minority but is to take
unions out of politics.
Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, I suggest
the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OF.VICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
THE STRATEGI
LIMITATION TALKS
Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, the ad-
ministration's decision to begin negotia-
tions with the Soviet Union on limiting
strategic armaments launches the hopes
of the world once again on the difficult
but redemptive road to peaceful coopera-
tion among men.
President Nixon and Secretary of State
William Rogers should be commended for
acting on their oft-expressed recognition
that the United States and the Soviet
Union have a mutual interest in restrict-
ing the arms race and reordering national
priorities. As an observer at the 18-
nation disarmament talks in Geneva,
however, I became aware of another
equally important consideration. Most
of the disarmament talks in the past
have chiefly affected the smaller nations.
The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, for ex-
ample, had little effect on the military
capabilities of the great powers, which
could test underground; but it virtually
precluded advanced nuclear development
by lesser powers. Similarly the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty in effect was de-
signed to preserve the nuclear oligopoly.
It is being signed by other nations at least
in part because it also pledges the major
powers to negotiate further disarmament
among themselves.
I believe nuclear proliferation poses
the greatest single threat of nuclear war
by accident or miscalculation. The great
powers have their nuclear forces under
effective control; they are experienced in
dealing with nuclear technology. But the
primitive nuclear contrivances of small
countries could become a new and un-
predictable catalyst of incalculable
dangers.
Yet the nuclear powers cannot expect
the nonnuclear countries to accept per-
manent nuclear privation in the face of
great power determination to steadily
expand their nuclear capability. The fact
is that unless the great powers move to
end the arms race the lesser powers will
move to join it. This Damoclean reality
will overshadow all the talk in Helsinki.
So I can only urge the administration
to act with the greatest sense of urgency.
I would, however, at the same time offer
a warning. Though the talks are urgent,
they will be frustrating; and though
agreement is imperative, it will not end
the arms race unless it is accompanied
by prudent strategic policies on the part
of both great powers. For no treaty can
be devised that can anticipate the ad-
vance of technology and channel it into
peaceful uses. In the end, the arms race
will be disciplined not because both sides
sign a piece of paper but because both
sides have previously decided they have
no interest in reopening the competition
at a higher and more dangerous level.
We should understand that the pres-
ent high level of defense spending?and
the resulting disorder of our national
priorities?is not caused only by our past
failures to negotiate an agreement with
the Soviet Union. The largest surge in
U.S. strategic spending?the surge that
precipitated the current Soviet increases
came at the very time that the Test Ban
Treaty was negotiated those who might
normally have opposed the enormous
unilateral expansion o our forces after
Eisenhower's year of sensible restraint
were completely diverted by the test ban.
Thus the importance of the treaty was
exaggerated and led to the spirit of eu-
phoria that was so rudely interrupted
by the Cuban missile crisis. Meanwhile,
our defense spending soared; the balance
maintained by Eisenhower was upset;
and the Russians massively responded
with spending of their own. That is our
position today. We should understand it
clearly.
I celebrate the new negotiations?the
SALT talks. I praise the administration's
decision and particularly the effective
role of the Secretary of State in achiev-
ing it. But we should understand that
the success or failure of the negotiations
will be decided not in Helsinki or Geneva
but in Washington and in the Pentagon
and on the floor of the Congress where
new systems will be debated. It will de-
pend on all our foreign and defense pol-
icies and on our resolution in the inter-
national quest for peace. It will take more
than a paper curtain to hem in the
holocaust.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence
of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OsVICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
VISIT TO WASHINGTON BY DELE-
GATION OF JAPANESE GOV-
ERNORS AND VICE GOVERNORS
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, it is my
pleasure today to announce the visit in
the Capital City of this great country of
ours a delegation of Japanese Governors
and Vice Governors.
As Members of the Senate are aware,
we have a Japanese-American Govern-
ors' Conference which has been going on
since 1961, I believe. Over that period
of time several delegations of American
Governors have visited our very friendly
neighbor Japan, where we have had joint
conferences and discussed mutual prob-
lems that exist within both of our very
friendly nations.
It was my honor in 1965, as Governor
of the great State of Iowa, to be a mem-
ber of the International Governors' Con-
ference held in Tokyo that year. As a
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE October 27,1949
result we visited a number of the pre-
fectures in the nation of Japan. In 1966
I had the pleasure of taking an Iowa
trade mission to the great nation of
Japan for the purpose of negotiating and
discussing possible trade potentials be-
tween the nation of Japan and my State
of Iowa.
I would like to call to the attention of
Members of the Senate that my State of
Iowa has a sister-State relationship with
the prefecture of Yamanashi, Japan; and
there is a sister-city relationship be-
tween the capital city of Des Moines,
Iowa, and the capital city of Kofu.
Many Members of the Senate are
former Governors of their States. As I
look around the Chamber, I see that a
vast majority of Senators now present
were Governors of their States.
They have, in the proceedings of those
years, as Governors of their States, par-
ticipated in the ongoing conference be-
tween our two great nations. The con-
ference in 1967 happened to be conducted
in the capital city of my State, Des
Moines, and was a beneficial and fulfill-
ing conference for both countries.
I might add, in the conference this
Year, our former colleagues in Japan
visited a number of American States, be-
ginning in Hawaii, and then coming to
California. I know they vt3ited Nebraska
and South Carolina. They held this
Year's annual conference hi the city of
Cincinnati in the great State of Ohio.
Mr. President, there are visiting in this
country today eight Governors and Vice
Governors and some of their ladies. We
have been pleased to have the oppor-
tunity to host them today at a luncheon
at which the Japanese Ambassador, the
majority and minority leaders of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House, and
many Senators and Representatives have
had the opportunity for friendly and
neighborly discussions between the Japa-
nese Governors and ourselves.
I merely want to announce that this
ongoing relationship between our two
great nations has cemented our friend-
ship further, as it has wasted us in the
Past. From this level of political leader-
ship, many times surfaces much of the
national leadership of both of our two
great nations and has resulted in friendly
relations being established on a personal
basis between the Governors of the pre-
fectures in Japan and the Governors of
the United States.
We have many ongoing and continu-
ing friendly relationships that enable us
not only in private and business gener-
ally, but in public affairs, further to ce-
ment the warmth and understanding be-
tween our two great nations.
I merely wanted to call to the atten-
tion of Members of the Senate that this
delegation of visitors from Japan is
among us, that they are among us in the
Capital City of Washington today, and
that we are deeply grateful to have the
opportunity once again to be their host
and bid them officially welcome to the
United States of America and to hope
that this relationship will continue in the
Years ahead.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD the
names of the members of the traveling
party of Japanese Governors now visit-
ing the United States.
There being no objection, the names
were ordered to beNprinted in the RECORD,
as follows:
MEMBERS OF TRAVELING PARTY, VISIT OF
GOVERNORS OF JAPAN TO UNITED STATES,
OCTOBER 1969
Japanese Governors and Vice Governors
(by order of precedence) , and prefecture:
Governor Ryozo Okuda (Vice President of
the National Clove
Leader of the D
Governor
Govern
Masse, e.
Gov
Govern
Sakae, K
Vice Go
Vice Gov
Vice Clover
Aides to Ja
lzuchi, Deputy
tional Governors'
Ogawa, Chief, Forel
tional Governors' Asso
News Media: Mr. Tak
sushin Press.
'United States Departme
Yukio Kawarnoto, Escort 0
Tamura, Aide; Mrs. Paul Tam
National Governors' Conferen
0 ? ,
a
ion) , Nara.
unkichi Takeuchi, Aomori.
Satoru Tanaka and daughter,
Gonichiro Nishizawa, Nagano.
Saburo Kanemaru and wife,
oshima.
rn.or Shigeichi Iwase, Aichl.
nor Tadashi Nakamura, Iwate.
r Maseru Taki, Oita.
nese Governors: Mr. Ryoji
ecutive Secretary of Na-
?elation; Mr. IVIasakichi
Affairs Division of Na-
tion.
Tagomori, Jijit-
? 0
of State: Mr.
er; Mr. Paul
a, Aide,
? Mr. Brev-
ard Crihfield, Secretary-TreasurerXr. Gene
Minogue, Travel Consultant; ss Lois
Murphy, Assistant to Mr. Crihfield.
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, in\con-
elusion, let me say that in the inteAten-
\
ing years since the beginning of e
Japanese-American Governors' Confe -
ence, as delegations of Governors hay
visited back and forth across the Pacific'
Ocean almost every year since the con-
ferences began, we have had the oppor-
tunity to discuss issues such as juvenile
delinquency in our respective countries,
land recovery in our respective countries,
air and water pollution, economic prob-
lems in our respective countries, as well
as trade relationships between Japan and
the United States.
I believe that such discussions are
needed all over the face of the earth. This
particular conference can serve as an ex-
ample of what can be accomplished be-
tween two great nations, if we merely set
about on a personal relationship basis be-
tween the executives of our States and
the prefectures in Japan, as well as the
congressional bodies of our two great ,,
countries, further continuing the warmth--
and sympathetic understanding efe6o
great peoples--.4apan_and?tbe--United
States of America.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I sug-
gest the absence of a quorum.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
Pore. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the
roll.
Mr, KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
ADJOURNMENT
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, if there
is no further business to come before the
Senate. I move1 under the or.-der pre-
viously entered, that the Senate stand in
adjournment until 12 o'clock noon to-
morrow.
The motion was agreed to; and (at 2
o'clock and 26 Minutes p.m.) the Senate
adjourned until tomorrow, Tuesday,
October 28, 1969. at 12 o'clock meridian.
NOMINATIONS
cutive nominations received by the
Senat -October 77, 1969:
IN TIM COAST GTJAILD
The following-named regular officers of the
Coast Guard for promotion to the grade of
lieutenant {junior grade):
David A. Potter George R. Perreault
Fred L. Ames Ronald S. Matthew
Walter F. Malec, Jr., Stephen R. Welch
William R. Hodges, Jr. Ernest R. Riutta
Normal V. Seurria, Jr. Edmund I. Kiley
Glenn J. Pruiksma John A. Magiera
Thomas H. Jenkins Peter M. L. Tennis
Larry V. Grant James W. Miles
Richard W. Schneider Glendon L. Moyer
James T. Ingham James L. Rested
Larry J. Olson Paul N. Fa.nolis
Richard J. Asaro Edward C Ramis
Terry R. Fondow John K. Kastorff, Jr.
Gecege H. Mercier
Richard L. Maguire
Walter R. Guest
James C. Haedt
Phillip J. Stager
James A. Smith
Juan T. Sales
Thomas E. Thompson
Paul Ibsen
Ronald L. Edmiston
Normal C. Edwards
Nicholas Strarnandi
Victor P. Primeaux
Michael J. Edwards
Joseph F. Oliva, Jr.
John T. Tozzi
Frank J. Scaraglino
Joseph E. Casaday
John H. Legwin, HI
Dennis P. Purges
Mont J. Smith Paul V. Gorman, Jr.
rthur W. McGrath, Robert B. Bower
Jr. John. D McDevitt
A?exander T. T. Richard R. Clark
rolasky James C. Clow
Ketkneth B. Allen Douglas A. Macadam
Ric rd B. Meyer Stephen L. Swann
Ralp W. Brown, Jr. Floyd W. Thomas
Michel E Tovcimak Victor E. Hipkiss
Ronalki P. Schafer Robert P. Bender
Jamesp. Boland Richard L. Swomley
Stanley M. Phillips Robert B. Vallesso
Fedriet V. Minson. Arthur F. Shires
John . Bastek Michael F. Herman
RobertJ. Lachowicz Kenneth R. Riordan
William F. Mueller Stanley C. Brobeck,
Kenneth 3. MePartlin
John J. Mulligan, Jr. Kevin V. Feeney
Lsighton T. Anderson Dennis M. Majerski
peter A. Poerschke Peter D. Lish
' William C. Hain II/ Lonnie E. Steverson
James M. MacDonald EdwaXd. C. Cooke
John R. Taylor Christopher F. John
Daniel J. Schatte Ronnie L. Sharp
Ronald F. Hough
Joel N. Karr
William J. Theroux
Graham .7, C'hyno-
Larry E. Parkin
Gregory T. Wilson
Brian P. M. Kelly
Dennis L. Bryant
Thomas S. Johnson, weal
iii Robert E. Gronberg
Ronald K. Losch. Dennis R. Srlandson
Clifton K. Vogelsberg, Roger V. Mowery
Jr. Anthony H. Schieck
James T. Paskewich Jeffrey S. Wagner
William R. Johanek Daniel A. Gary
David L. Powell Mark 3, Costello
Stephen J. Delaney James L. Lambert
Daniel B. McKinley 7rank P. Murray
John R. Ryland Roy C. Samuelson, Jr.
Theodore J Sampson Boger B. Streeter
Thomas H. *Collins Dennis L. MoCord
Richard W. HauechildtRich,ard L. Caslalollar
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE October 30, 1969
in Democratic times, or because they had
offended Senators, or because in other offices
they had followed objectionable policies. No
one amid read the record without conclud-
ing that Senators in those days felt quite
free to make their own appraisal of any man
chosen to say the last word in our constitu-
tional system.
Today, most Senators would be more so-
phisicated and more restrained in the use
of their confirmation power. Ironic excep-
tions are Senators Thurmond of South Car-
olina and Eastland of Mississippi, two of
Judge Haynsworth's principal backers, who
have not hesitated to oppose anyone sus-
pected of liberal tendencies. They voted
against the only three nominees to the War-
ren Court who were put to a record vote in
the Senate, Justices Harlan, Stewart and
Marshall.
The question for most members of the
Senate in 1969 is not one dimensional. For
example, the fact that a nominee is a so-
callpd strict constructionist in constitutional
matters would not necessarily make Senators
of a different outlook oppose him; it is easy to
think of judicial conservatives whose high
intellectual qualifications would have smoth-
ered the thought of opposition on philosophi-
cal grounds.
The point about Judge Haynsworth is that
he does not have such high intellectual or
legal qualifications. Few would call it a dis-
tinguished appointment.
POLICY AND ETHICS
Along with that basic ground for opposi-
tion are doubts about policy and ethics.
Those who feel the doubts might say that
Judge Haynsworth is a man from a narrow
background who has not altogether sur-
mounted it in his view of life and the law,
and that in his commercial dealings while
on the bench he has at best shown insensi-
tivity to the appearance demanded of judges.
In short, the argument against Clement
Haynsworth is not that he is an evil man, or
a corrupt one, or one consciously biased. It
is that he is an inadequate man for a life-
time position of immense power and respon-
sibility in our structure of government. And
any Senator who reaches that conclusion is
quite entitled, in precedent and in reason, to
oppose his configlizt
SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT OF
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION
NEGOTIATIONS IS OUR HOPE,
SAYS SENATOR RANDOLPH
Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, it is
encouraging news that the United States
and the Soviet Union have agreed to con-
duct preliminary discussions on the sub-
ject of strategic arms limitations.
No purpose is served by discussing the
long delay In coming to this important
decision, but there is no doubt in my
mind that it has taken much too long.
During the period prior to the agreement
to begin preliminary talks, one could be
excused for wondering if world powers
did not understand the horrifying nature
of the nuclear arms race.
General of the Army Douglas MacAr-
thur?a man associated with war who
probably witnessed the development of
armaments as intimately as any person
of our century?stated realistically and
eloquently the case for nuclear arniS lim-
itations:
Electronics and other processes of science
have raised the destructive potential to en-
compass millions. And with restless hands
we work feverishly in dark laboratories to
find the means to destroy all at one blow...
Global war has become a Frankenstein to
destroy both sides. No longer Is It a weapon of
adventure?the shortcut to International
power. If you lose, you are annihilated. If
you win, you stand only to lose. No longer
does It passess even the chance of the winner
of a duel. It contains now only the germs of
double suicide.
That our task in the development of
substantive arms control talks is only
beginning is understood. I think most of
our leaders and the people generally of
this Nation fully realize this. We harbor
no false hope?no illusions?no euphoric
optimism?that firm agreements will be
consummated in a day or a week or a
month. The task of negotiating effective
and acceptable limitations on the devel-
opment of strategic weapons will be ar-
duous and frustrating. But we must have
hope and, I emphasize, we must relent-
lessly strive to achieve this objective.
It is a frightening mistake to view our
agreements for talks with Russia as
merely another attempt to control the
ever-expanding arsenal of nuclear weap-
ons. This endeavor is possibly the most
critical undertaking in the history of our
Nation and of the world. The final out-
come will determine whether the United
States and the Soviet Union will be cast
into the depressing role of spending more
billions of dollars in the future on nu-
clear weapons; whether our world will
be confronted with the stark prospect of
nuclear weapons proliferation; whether
we will be sentenced to the terrible un-
certainty of possible nuclear holocaust;
and whether civilization as we know it
will live or die.
Mr. President, as a cosponsor of the
resolution expressing the need for a mu-
tual halt to the testing of the multiple
Independently targetable reentry ye-
hicle?MIRV?I am convinced that this
weapons system which possesses destruc-
tive capabilities defying imagination
must be a critical element in our discus-
sions with Russia. The reports that this
will be a focus in the first stages of pre-
liminary talks are encouraging. Control
of the development of MIRV must be
pressed with a sense of urgency. To ac-
cept the proposition that development of
MIRV is inevitable does violent damage
to the prospects for meaningful negotia-
tions.
Further, I caution?as I have in the
past?against falling into the historical
pattern of arms control negotiations. It
is imperative that the negotiators chart a
course away from the timeworn concept
of "negotiating from a position of
strength." Used by both sides, "negotiat-
ing from a position of strength" creates
a vicious circle. Every party to a discus-
sion adopting this policy would be ex-
pected to continue to escalate arma-
ments to strengthen its position. There is
no end to this. On the other hand it does
not follow that any country should en-
gage in unilateral disarmament. The
United States will not do this?neither
will Russia. But it does mean that the
time has come to question the assumption
that nations are adding to defense and
security by increasing more and more
the nuclear stockpiles which already con-
tain an overkill capacity.
Our negotiators are able. Their mission
Is awesome. We share the hope and offer
a prayer for their progress.
ONE YEAR OF THE BOMBING HALT
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, tomorrow,
October 31, marks the first anniversary
of the total cessation of bombing of
North Vietnam.
On tb,e occasion of this anniversary, it
might be useful to reexamine the argu-
ments that finally induced President
Johnson, despite grave personal misgiv-
ings, to call off the bombing of the north.
And it might be useful as well to take a
hard look at the record of negotiations
since we made this major concession, for
the purpose of deciding whether this de-
cision made a peaceful settlement of the
Vietnam war more likely or less likely.
The total cessation came about in two
stages.
On March 31, 1968, President Lyndon
B. Johnson anounced the suspension of
the bombing of North Vietnam, except
for a limited area immediately above the
DMZ.
This action was taken in response to
the growing clamor in this country that
we stop the bombing of North Vietnam
because only in this way could Hanoi
be induced to negotiate a reasonable set-
tlement of the Vietnam war.
It is true that Hanoi did come to the
conference table. But there has not been
a single iota of evidence to bear out the
contention that such a concession on our
part would induce Hanoi to negotiate in
good faith. On the contrary, the record
is clear that Hanoi only hardened its
stance subsequent to the partial suspen-
sion of bombing in March of last year.
Even the major curtailment of our bomb-
ing of North Vietnam was rejected as
trickery.
During the 1968 presidential campaign,
the same critics of American policy in
Vietnam again raised their voices, this
time to demand the total cessation of the
bombing of North Vietnam. Such a con-
cession on our part, they assured us,
would lead to peace.
There were even some skeptics who
went along with the demand for a, bomb-
ing halt because they felt it was worth
giving a try. If the bombing halt did not
work, they said, there was nothing to pre-
vent us from resuming the bombing and
increasing the military pressure on
North Vietnam.
In yielding to this clamor and an-
nouncing the total cessation of bombing
on October 31, 1968, President Johnson
once again called upon Hanoi to engage
in serious negotiations.
Once again the Communists respond-
ed as they have always responded, and
as they will always respond to every show
of weakness or conciliation.
Instead of becoming more reasonable,
they became more intransigent than
ever before.
It is interesting to note in this con-
nection that the Communists seem to
have foreknowledge of the fact that in-
ternal political pressures in this country
would compel the Johnson administra-
tion, despite its private statements, to
agree to the total cessation of bombing
without any reciprocal concession from
the Communist side.
There is in the Ries of American in-
telligence a captured Communist docu-
ment dated just prior to the bombing
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October 30, 1,969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ---- SENATE
antilabor or insufficiently receptive to the
civil rights cause. Others regardalas judicial
record as that of a mediocre, an careless,
roan. 8ta1.1 others feel he Inis devoted more
than a judicious share of his tame and ef-
forts to personal business.
Many others, however, stranigy back his
nomination.
Almost all the Senators with these objec-
tions are foment,- their public stettements on
the ethical matters, sidestepping the trouble-
some question of whether the Senate has the
right to disapprove a Presidentha nominee
just because it disagrees with his political
philosophy.
The statutory standard that the Senate
must apply to the various questions about
Judge Haynsworth is this: "Any justice or
judge of the United States shall disqualify
himself in any case in which beans a sub-
stantial interest . . or is so related to or
connected with any party or his Attorney as
to render it improper in his opinion, for him
to sit."
Judge Haynsworth's opponents have cited
at least eight canons of ethics tbot they be-
lieve the South Carolinian has vietlated. The
principal ones are these:
Canon 4: "A judge's official comilinct should
be free from impropriety and the opearance
of impropriety . . . and his pentonal be-
havior, not only upon the bench and in his
performance of judicial duties, bat also in
his everyday life, should be beyond re-
proach."
Canon 13: "A judge . . . should -riot suffer
his conduct to justify the impreeinien that
any person can improperly Minim= him or
unduly enjoy his favor."
Canon 24: "A judge should not neccpt in-
consistent duties . . . which will in any way
interfere or appear to interfere with his de-
votion to the expeditious and proper admin-
istration of his official functions."
Canon 25: "A judge should avoad giving
ground for any reasonable suspicion that he
Is utilizing the powers or prestige of his -of-
fice to persuade or coerce others to patronize
or contribute . . . to the success or private
business ventures."
Canon 26: "A judge should abstain from
making personal investment in enterprises
which are apt to be involved in litigation in
the court."
Canon 29: "A judge should abstain from
performing or taking part in any j4lenifal act
in which his personal interests are Involved,"
Canon 33: "lie La judge] should th pend-
ing or prospective litigation before tern be
particularly careful to avoid such Salon as
may reasonably tend to awaken the Manp10i=
that his. . . busin.eas relations . consti-
tute an element in influencing his4vidicial
conduct."
THE PURIM'S VIEW
The third standard, the public's thew of
how a judge should behave, cannot baao eas-
ily determined. Generally, however, meet Sen-
ators believe that public pressure dictates
that a judge should demonstrate judgment
In avoiding any appearance of unethical con-
duct.
The facts of the three ethical eniestiniss
that form the core of the Haynsworta case
end their interpretation by the judge's sup-
porters and critics are as follows:
Corporate subsidiary questions; In 1987
Judge Ilaynsworth sat on a case called Far-
row v. Grace Lines, Inc., while he heed 300
shares of stock in W. R. Grace & Oa., the
parent corporation of Grace Lines, Ina.
In 1966 the judge sat on a case called
Donohue v. Maryland Casualty Company
while he owned 200 shares of preferred stock
and 67 shares of common in American Gen-
eral Insurance Company, of which Maryland
Casualty was a subsidiary.
Opponents of Mr. Haynsworth's nomina-
tion contend that both these actions repre-
sented violations of the statutory ban on a
Federal judge sitting "in any case in width hs
has a substantial interest" and of Canon 26,
on personal investments, and Canon 29, on
self -Interest
Judge Haynsworth's supporters maintain
that the judge's interest in each instance was
not substantial and was not "in the case" but
In a corporation not involved directly.
In the Grade Line case, Senator Marlow W.
Cook, Republican of Kentucky, argued, Li the
full claim of $30,000 against the shipping
Line had been awarded and assessed against
the common stockholders, the value of Judge
Haynsworth's interest would have been re-
duced by 48 cents.
HOLDINGS ESTIMATED
In the Maryland Casualty ease, Senator
Cook called it "highly doubtful that an ad-
verse judgment would have any significant
effect" on Judge Haynsworth's holdings,
which he estimated at 0.0059 per cent of the
preferred stock and 0.0015 per cent of the
common stock.
Litigant business relation questions: In
1950 Mr. Haynsworth was an organizer and
founder of the Carolina Vend-A-Matic Com-
pany, which was to install automatic vend-
ing machines in industrial plants and other
sites. His investment was $2,400, and he be-
came vice president and a -director.
When he went on the Federal bench in
1957, Mr. Haynsworth resigned orally as vice
president of the company, he now says, but
company records show him continuing in
that office until 1963. In any event, be re-
mained as a director until 1963.
In September of 1963 he resigned his direc-
torship in Carolina Vend-A-Matic pursuant
to a new requirement for Federal judges
promulgated by the Judicial Conference.
Seven months later, he sold his stock for
about $430,000.
In 1961 and again in 1963 Judge Hayns-
worth sat on a case called Darlington Manu-
facturing Company v. the National Labor
Relations Board. At that time, Carolina
Vend-A-Matte had a $50,000-a-year contract
with the Derrin.g-Milliken. Corporation, par-
ent company of Darlington. While the litiga-
tion was pending, a new $100,000 contract was
signed.
Between 1959 and 1963 Judge Haynswarth
sat on five other came in which one of the
two litigants were companies that were do-
ing business with Carolina Vend-A-Matic,
-with the volume of that business ranging
from $16,000 to $174,000 a year.
DISQUALIFICATION ISSUE
Critics of Judge Haynsworth contend that
he Should have disqualified himself from sit-
ting in all these cases, under the Federal
statute involving "substantial interest." They
also argue that his participation in the de-
cisions and his continued activity in the
vending machine business violated all the
canons cited above.
Supporters of the judge maintain that he
had no duty to disqualify himself in any of
these cases because the Vend-A-Matte Com-
party was not itself involved. In fact, they
argue, he had a duty to sit.
In the Darlington ease, the judge's backers
sea, his personal interest in the business that
Vend-A-Matic did with Deering-Milliken was
only $390. In two of the five other cases tn-
volving Vend-A-Matte customers, he voted
against the customer; in two others, only
procedural questions were involved; in the
fifth he voted for the customer because the
other litigant was guilty of fraud.
Stock holding questions, in 1967 Judge
Haynewortla sat on a case called Brunswick
Corporation v. Long, which involved a dispute
over bowling equipment leased by the manu-
facturer to the operator of an alley.
The case was decided on Nov. 10; on Dec.
26, a month before the decision was to be
made public, Judge Heanasworth bought 1,000
shares of Brunswick stock for about $16,000.
Opponents ea Judge lanynsworth say this
action was clearly improper under both the
S 13521
Federal statute and the canons of ethics. The
judge admits that It was a mistake, some-
thing he would not repeat either on the Court
of Appeals or the Supreme Court.
CASE HE'LD UNIMPORTANT
But supporters of Judge Harnevrorth argue
that the Brunswick case is not significant.
The most the corporation could have bene-
fited from a favorable decision was $90,000,
and the judge had only bought 1,000 of its
18,480,000 shares. Thus his total maximum
profit would have been less than $5.
Attempting to apply the broad standard of
Public opinion to all these cases, the Hayns-
worth critics, led by Senator Birch Bayh,
Democrat of Indiana, maintain that, oollec-
tively they reveal a man not as sensitive to
the necessity of maintaining the appearance,
as well as the fact, of incorruptibility as a
Justice of the Supreme Court should be.
Senator Cook and his allies disagree.
"If we now analyze these cases upon which
Senator Bayh relies in terms of these com-
mon-sense principles," Mr. Cook said on the
floor last week, "I do not think that anyone
can seriously doubt that Judge Hayn.sworth
must be given a clean bill of health.
"He not only was not In fact influenced by
any personal interest in deciding the oases,
but no reasonable person could think thathe
was influenced by such interest."
[From the New York Timm, Oct. 19, 19891
THE SENATE AND THE SUPRE/VIE COURT
(By Anthony Lewis)
WASHINGTON.?III their Irritation at the
opponents of Clement Haynsworth, some
Administration officials are now saying that
the issue in the confirmation fight is nothing
less than the President's right to appoint
Supreme Court Justices. The Senate, they
argue, is trying to undermine that preroga-
tive; Senators should support a President's
choice for the Court unless he can be shown
to be corrupt or incompetent.
But history contradicts that narrow view
of the Senate's role. In fact., over the years,
the Senate in considering nominations to the
Supreme Court has rejected "a proportion far
higher than for any other Federal office." So
says a leading study, Joseph B. Hants's "The
Advice and Consent of the Senate."
In the nineteenth century, when senatorial
scrutiny was at its most rigorous, 72 men
were nominated to the Supreme Court and
eighteen of them?one quarter?falled ot
confirmation. The eighteen does not anelude a
few others who declined the honor.
Nominees were rejected for a variety of
reasons, because of their philosophy or poli-
tics or ability OT temperament. Some lost in
formal votes of the Senate; other llomina-
tions were withdrawn in the face of opposi-
tion.
President Madison, for example, nominated
a Connecticut Collector of Customs, Alexan-
der Wolcott, in 1811, Charles Warren, the
great Supreme Court historian, said the gen-
eral feeling was that Wolcott was a man of
"somewhat mediocre legal ability." For that
reason a Senate overwhelmingly of Madison's
party rejected the nomination, 21 to P.
GRANT'S NOMINATIONS
Grant tried three times before he could get
a Chief Justice cionfirnied. His first choice?
George H. Williams, his Attorney General?
was criticized as a "second-rate" lawyer. His
second, Caleb Oue.hing, a fanner Judge of the
Supreme Judicial Court of line.ssachusetts,
was eminently qualified. But Senators were
uneasy at the fact that he had been succes-
sively a Whig, Democrat and Republican.
The opposition eventually found that he had
written an innocent letter to Jefferson Davis
during the Civil War and used that to rally
opinion against him. Both nominations were
withdrawn.
Other nominees in the last century were
defeated because they were partisan Whigs
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE November 7, 1969
of their large number of surface-to-air mis-
siles, or SAMs, be surreptitiously upgraded for
attacking ballistic missiles?"
Or, again, "Once MIRVs have been suc-
cessfully tested, is there any way to monitocr
a ban on their deployment without taking
missiles apart at operational silos?"
WHAT ARE MOSCOW'S VIEWS
Another question [is] . . .: How do the
Soviets view SALT?
One obvious assumption is that the USSR
has enhancement of its own national security
as its primary objective. The USSR has,
from time to time, expressed an interest in
discussions and in doing so has noted that
an agreement should apply to both offensive
and defensive strategic delivery vehicles, and
that the first step should be a limitation and
not a reduction of armaments. But little or
nothing is really known of Soviet views
regarding the details of a possible agreement.
The inter-action of negotiations is almost
certain to affect the way we and the Soviets
answer some of the questions I've cited.
This, of course, raises the question as to
what constitutes success. Certainly, a solid
arrangement to limit strategic weapons sys-
tems would be a great success, and that will
be our objective.
Not to achieve a specific agreement in our
first efforts, however, need not signal failure.
The talks could be of great value if we can
establish a mechanism for contact with the
USSR on strategic force matters and main-
tain a dialogue, which hopefully would reduce
uncertainty on both sides.
BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY
I feel sure that all of you here would agree
that the road ahead_ for SALT negotiations
will be long and difficult. We will be under-
taking serious negotiations in a field that is
extremely complex, full of difficulties in both
political and military matters, and is so basic
in nature that it involves the very essence
of our national security.
We are ready, willing and able to start the
talks at any time and, as I have said before,
are hopeful that at minimum, they will lead
to a lessening of uncertainty on both sides
and, at maximum, they will lead to substan-
tive agreements to limit or even reduce
strategic weapons.
THE WORKINGS OF THE MODERN
ECONOMY
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the
difficulties of managing a high-employ-
ment economy, most particularly of
keeping the Federal budget both fiscally
responsible and socially adequate, have
become familiar subjects today. Our the-
oretical understanding of the workings
of the modern economy has increased
during the 23 years since the goal of
"maximum employment, production, and
purchasing power" was explicitly set
forth in the Employment Act of 1946, but
so has our awareness of the difficulties
of putting theory into practice. We have
learned how a flexible fiscal policy can
be much more difficult to practice than
to preach. We have become familiar with
the difficult dilemma presented by the
independent pricing power of big busi-
ness and organized labor. And we have
recently begun to face up to the seem-
ingly intractable problem of allocating
our budget resources in line with ra-
tional priorities.
One of the most knowledgeable and
perceptive observers of our progress and
Our setbacks since 1946 is Edwin G.
Nourse, the distinguished first chairman
of the Council of Economic Advisers.
In a scholarly but highly readable ar-
ticle, Dr. Nourse has recently summarized
what he believes to be the basic tenets
which have guided economic policy dur-
ing the 1960's. He concludes that the
practitioners of this version of the "New
Economics," in their emphasis on the
need to cut taxes and thus avoid a "fiscal
drag," gave too little attenion to the dif-
ficulties of controlling Federal expendi-
ture and of allocating our budget re-
sources wisely. Now, it has become im-
perative that we shift more of our atten-
tion to the problem of Federal expendi-
tures.
I should like to read Dr. Nourse's con-
cluding remarks:
Leaders and people will have to be re-
educated to the duties of citizenship, the
enormous social needs of the impending
years, the difficulties of curbing the arms
race, the space race, and the power of the
industrial-military complex. They will need
to be rededicated to the basic democratic
principle that the burdens of military de-
fense and civil advancement must be shared
by all.
These two dilemmas of Employment Act
fulfillment are not mere mechanical malad-
justments, easily corrected with tools readily
at hand. They run to the very fundament of
human nature and the democratic way of
life. They will not resolve themselves, nor
will they go away just because we elaborately
ignore them. They need to be faced?now?
courageously?and as objectively as possible.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that Dr. Nourse's article, entitled
"The Employment Act and the 'New Eco-
nomics,'" published in the autumn is-
sue of the Virginia Quarterly Review, be
printed in the RECORD.
[From the Virginia Quarterly Review,
Autumn 1969]
THE EMPLOYMENT ACT AND THE "NEW
ECONOMICS"
(By Edwin G. Nourse)
Alvin Hansen, more than any other one
individual the father of the Employment
Act of 1946, has called it the "Magna Carta
of American economic planning." That is a
striking metaphor, but Magna Carta was a
barons' revolt against an autocratic king,
whereas the Employment Act declared the
intention of an already free people to use
their democratic government more actively
and with greater economic sophistication to
advance their common interest.
Arthur Burns, easily one of the ten most
wanted economists in the country, when
Hansen one better by calling the Employ-
ment Act our new economic Constitution. It
does make new declarations of political pur-
pose and establishes some new structures for
economic operation. But a written constitu-
tion is, after all, only a piece of paper, how-
ever noble or shrewd the perception and in-
tent of its drafters. It simply sets in motion
an on-going process of interpretation and
application that will reveal the new charter's
potentialities and shape its operations to
ever-changing circumstances.
For a little more than twenty-two years
prior to the inauguration of Richard Nixon,
such an experimental process went forward
under four successive Presidents, a series of
seven chairmen and twenty-three members
of the Council of Economic Advisers, and the
rotating chairmen and changing membership
of the Joint Economic Committee of the
Congress. That experience falls naturally into
three periods: the shake-down cruise of the
Truman regime, disturbed by the storm of
the Korean War; the re-examination period
under President Eisenhower; and the period
of dashing economic and political innova-
tion under the Kennedy-Johnson succession,
with Walter Heller as its presiding genius.
The intellectual, material, and political
legacy which the third period left to Mr.
Nixon and his fellow-Americans is described,
fondly by some and caustically by others,
as "the New Economics."
II
It has been remarked, quite fairly, that the
New Economics is what any up-to-date eco-
nomist says it is. Nor is that altogether a
criticism. Economics, as a social science,
must not be limited to highly generalized
truths formulated from long-past experience
but must also be continually advancing to
the understanding of new circumstances and
conditions and to the proposal of intelligent
ways of dealing with them.
Probably a poll of economists and in-
formed laymen would put "Keynesian eco-
nomics" at the top of the list of explanatory
labels. "Macroeconomics" might very likely
come second, that is, the economics of the
whole economy rather than of individual and
group enterprises. Many would identify the
New Economics with welfare economics or
with the economics of planning. Some would
see it as the economics of "deficit financing"
and others more broadly as the economics of
fiscal and monetary controls as a dependable
apparatus of national growth and stability.
Whatever the labels, one fact is clear. The
New Economics is not merely an attempt to
explain?and verify its explanation of?
the basic forces of the economic process
after the manner of a natural science. It
is social and hence normative science of
ends to be achieved and optimum means of
reaching or consistently moving toward those
objectives.
For our present purposes, the essence of the
New Economics theory may be put in the
form of six major propositions, with several
subdivisions. The first is really an axiom:
For full use of national resources maximum
production and employment?"aggregate
purchasing power" or total spendings of
consumers, business, noncommercial entities,
foreign buyers, and government must be
equivalent to the productive capabilities of
the economy. If the ability or willingness to
consume and/or invest falls below this level,
there will be economic slack; if it rises ma-
terially above it, there will be inflation of
prices and "overheating" of the economy.
The second proposition of the New Eco-
nomics is that these capabilities are now so
technologically great and growing that, at
full employment of national resources, there
would be a surplus of goods and services
above the buying power of the private sector
at existing rates of taxation and government
spending. These tax rates, therefore, will
act as a "fiscal drag" on the economy and
must be lowered (or government spending
expanded) if it is to attain that full pro-
ductive potential.
Third, today's econometric methods and
computer facilities make it possible to pro-
ject these productivity and revenue trends
for several years in advance with enough
accuracy so that the New Economists can pre-
scribe both the dosage and the timing of
tax (and public spending) adjustments so
as to alleviate "fiscal drag" and facilitate a
full-employment balance of maximum pro-
duction and purchasing power.
Fourth, concern about budget deficits and
the size of the national debt is relegated to
the limbo of "the Puritan ethic." Removal of
fiscal drag (as postulated) will so unleash
productive potential that lower tax rates ap-
plied to an expanded national income will
soon change deficit into surplus and call for
another cut in tax ratec or facilitate the
funding of larger social programs.
Fifth, this activist fiscal policy must be
kept flexible. Techniques of measurement
and projection and of mechanistic and psy-
chological analysis, though impressive, are
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November 7, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 13929
ning Star of November 6, be printed in
the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
GENERAL WOOD DIES AT 90, RETIRED HEAD
OF SEARS
CHICAGO.?Gen. Robert E. Wood, retired
chairman of the board of Sears, Roebuck &
Co., died today. He was 90 years old.
Gen. Wood, who was generally credited
as the builder of the modern-Tay Sears, the
world's largest merchandising firm, died in
his Lake Forest home.
Gen. Wood, a retired Army officer, joined
Sears in 1924 as a vice president and went
on to become president and board chairman.
He also founded Allstate Insurance Co.,
a Sears subsidiary.
Gen. Wood was regarded throughout the
world as a great leader in the Merchandis-
ing field.
In 1924, the year he joined the firm, he
proposed that Sears enter into the retail
store field. He led the company from a strict-
ly mail order house to a combined retail store
and catalogue distribution system of inter-
national scope.
KANSAS CITY NATIVE
The first Sears retail store opened in 1925
when the firm's mail order -wiles totaled
about $200 million a year. Now It has more
than 800 retail outlets, and the company's
over-all sales total more than-37 billion a
year.
Gen. Wood became president of Sears in
1928 and chairman in 1939. He retired from
active management in 1954 but continued as
a director until May, 1968, when he was
named the first honorary chairman of the
board.
His long career was distinguished by out-
standing success in both military and busi-
ness fields.
Born in Kansas city, Mo., June 13, 1879,
Gen. Wood was graduated from the U.S.
Military Academy at West Point in 1900 and
later served 10 years in Panama during the
building of the Panama Canal. There he rose
to chief quartermaster in charge of all pur-
chasing and distribution of siipplies.
During World War I he was in charge
of the Army Transport Service in France and
England. At 39, he was recalled to Washing-
ton, promoted to brigadier general and
named acting quartermaster general and di-
rector of purchases and storage for the entire
United States Army.
Gen. Wood returned to civilian life in 1919
and spent five years as a vice president of
Montgomery Ward & Co., where he started
his career, as a mass merchandiser, before
joining Sears.
FOUNDED ALLSTATE IN 1531
In 1931, after he became president of Sears,
Gen. Wood founded Allstate Insurance. All-
state now is the world's largest stock com-
pany automobile insurer and a leader in
other insurance fields. Gen. Wood guided
Sears through the difficult depression and
World War II years, continuing an aggres-
sive expansion program. Under his direc-
tion, stores were opened in Cuba and Latin
America. Gen. Wood was the oldest of five
children of Robert W. and Lillie Collins Wood.
Both his maternal grandfather and his fa-
ther served as captains in the Union Army
during the Civil War. Survivors include his
wife, the former Mary Butler Hardwick of
Augusta, Ga., and five children, Robert W., of
Palestine, Tex.; Mrs. Hugo V. Neuhaus of
Houston, Tex.; and Mrs. William H. Mitchell,
Mrs. Calvin Fentress and Mrs. A. Watson
Arm ur III, all of Lake Forest.
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMTTATION
TALKS
Mr. SCOTT, Mr. President, on Novem-
ber 17, the long-awaited strategic arms
limitation talks between the United
States and the U.S.S.R. will begin in
Helsinki, Finland. Secretary of State
William P. Rogers has described SALT
action as "one of the most important that
we ever undertook with the Soviet
Union." On October 17, the Fourth In-
ternational Arms Control Symposium
met in Philadelphia. At that time Lt.
Gen, John J. Davis, Assistant Director,
Weapons Evaluation and Control
Bureau, U.S. Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency, spoke on the subject
"Arms Talks With Russia." His lucid and
perceptive account deserves the atten-
-tion of the Members of this body. It is
refreshing to read such a well-considered
account by a military man. I recom-
mend the article to the Senate and ask
unanimous consent that it be printed in
the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Commanders Digest, Nov. 1, 19691
SALT AGREEMENT REACHED: ARMS TALKS
WITH RUSSIA
The control of nuclear weapons is one of
the most serious challenges, if not the most
serious challenge of our tim.e. Yet the chal-
lenge has really been faced up to only
recently.
The United States, with the Baruch Plan,
took the lead in trying to bring this powerful
new force under international control, but
not until the current decade has there been
any meaningful progress.
The Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Outer
Space Treaty were the initial steps, although
they skirted the basic problem. Then came
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which is
directly aimed at one important aspect of
stemming the arms race?that is, helping to
prevent the spread of nuclear weapon.s to
Countries which do not now have them. . .
As you know, the Seabeds Treaty, which is
now in the throes of multilateral negotia-
tions, would forestall another possible form
of proliferation.
But to limit or reduce nuclear weapons is
clearly more difficult.
The real forerunner of our current Stra-
tegic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) efforts,
however, was the U.S. offer in 1964 to the
USSR to explore the possibility of a "freeze"
on the number and characteristics of both
offensive and defensive strategic nuclear de-
livery vehicles, including bombers, missiles,
and ABM's.
The USSR, although it did not categori-
cally reject the idea, showed little interest.
It asserted that the proposal was a scheme
for inspecting without disarming and for
perpetuating U.S. strategic superiority.
President Johnson reopened the subject in
January 1967 when he proposed, in a letter
to Premier Kosygin, discussions on an un-
derstanding to limit the further deployment
of "strategic offensive and defensive missile
launchers." When he received an encour-
aging reply some weeks later, we provided
Moscow with broad indications of the kind of
agreement we had in mind.
It would, we suggested, involve a levelling
Off, not an outright freeze or reduction, of
strategic nuclear delivery systems, offensive
and defensive. We noted that reductions
could be considered at a later stage. An agree-
ment would apply to launchers, not missiles,
for purposes of simplifying verification.
Agreement was about to be reached on the
date and place for the talks when the Soviet
Union invaded Czechoslovakia. That event
disrupted the prospect of a meeting last
autumn, and the change of administration
in Washington necessitated further delay.
The United States stated months ago that
it is ready to start the talks , . . Meanwhile,
we are persisting with our study of the very
complex problems associated with strategic
arms limitations.
ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES
We believe that there are three prime ob-
jectives:
1. To maintain and, if possible, improve
U.S. security;
2. To maintain deterrence, and reduce the
risk of outbreak Of nuclear war; and
3. To limit the upward spiral of strategic
arms competition and reduce arms costs.
We have been fairly secure-over the last
decade in the sense that a relatively stable
strategic relationship between the U.S. and
USSR has prevailed?insofar as the use of nu-
clear weapons has been concerned. At a mini-
mum, then, limitations on strategic arma-
ments should maintain the existing stabil-
ity?stable in the sense of making the initia-
tion of nuclear war unattractive and in the
sense of controlling the arms competition.
Many people believe that the action-reac-
tion responses in strategic hardware devel-
opment and deployment of both the U.S.
and the USSR have resulted from the uncer-
tainties involved?uncertainty due to lack of
complete intelligence on both sides, and re-
sulting uncertainties as to both capabilities
and intentions. This has resulted in alter-
nating policies of "keep ahead" and catch up.
They further believe that if the uncertain-
ties could be eliminated, then there would
be good prospects for substantial strategic
arms control agreements. Both sides would, of
course, have to be assured that their own
strategic posture was satisfactory and that
their own security and that Of their allies
would be adequately maintained on a con-
tinuing basis.
Needless to say, that is a large order.
ESTABLISHING GUIDELINES
Having worked out basic objectives, the
next step in developing arms control options
for consideration was to establish some prin-
ciples or guidelines.
It is generally acknowledged that an agree-
ment should impose limitations on both of-
fensive and defensive missile systems. This
has been a basic principle of the U.S. posi-
tion since 1964, and it is one which the
USSR has recently emphasized.
Another principle is that any agreement
or reductions in strategic arms should be
preceded by an agreement curtailing further
build-ups. This, too, has been a fundamental
U.S. view for some years.
A third guideline is that any proposal for
limitations, to be negotiable, would have to
be considered by each side to be in its net
security interest and compatible with its na-
tional objectives. It was also agreed that any
agreement would have to be subject to ade-
quate verification.
A CRUCIAL ISSUE : VERIFICATION
A moment ago I alluded to one of the cru-
cial issues, namely, the matter of verification.
The basic question is whether we can rely
solely on national means to verify an agree-
ment or will have to insist on some means of
on-site inspection?at least in some cases.
We all realize, of course, from the nego-
tiating history on other arms control pro-
posals that insistence on on-site inspection
could pose a major obstacle to an agreement.
The U.S. Is not contemplating an arms con-
trol agreement based on faith; on the other
hand, it does not insist that "adequate" veri-
fication necessarily means 100 per cent veri-
fication. The risks involved must be thor-
oughly understood.
To mention weapons systems is to call to
mind one of the most difficult issues con-
fronting us; that is, the critkal interrela-
tionships of various weapons systems. Here,
one gets into such matters ea MIRVs and
ABMs.
A recent news article highlighted some of
the problems by asking:
"If the Russians agree to deploy only a
thin anti-ballistie missile system, can some
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S 13830 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE November 5, 1969
He urged that Congress wait for its Com-
mission on Obscenity and Pornography,
which has been conducting studies since it
began operations last year, to report next
July on what legislation is needed, how best
to meet all constitutional questions, how
pornography affects adults and minors and
whether it causes antisocial behavior.
But as letters from indignant constituents
pour in?usually accompanied by choice ex-
amples of eroticism received in the mail?
Congressmen and other politicians pay less
attention to cautionary advice.
"Where is there any freedom of speech
issue in that?" Representative Foreman
shouted last week waving his copy of Screw.
Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz of
New York wrote the subcommittee that he
was receiving many letters from parents who
"justly complain" that the contents of lurid
mail fall into the hands of their children.
The Federal Government should do more
to curb the spread of unsolicited smut mail,"
he declared.
Each of the Congressmen who have testi-
fied so far agreed. Most said they did not
care whose bill was adopted so long as it
would stand the scrutiny of court review.
ELECTION DAY, 1969
Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, I wish
to congratulate the voters of two great
States on the results of yesterday's
elections.
With Bill Cahill's landslide win in
New Jersey, our Republican Party is now
in control of the statehouses of all the
large, northeastern industrial States. It
is essentially in the statehouses where a
larger, more comprehensive base must
be built for our national Republican
Party, and we now number 32 of the 50 in
the Republican column.
I am particularly proud of the voters
of the Commonwealth of Virginia, where
I spent a large part of my early life.
With their election of Republican Lin-
wood Holton to be their next Governor,
we have certainly seen history, in the
making. There is no doubt that the two-
Party system, which has been growing
steadily but surely in Virginia since 1952,
is now an accomplished fact. Just two
short decades ago, it was a difficult and
lonely thing to be a Republican in Vir-
ginia. What a change a relatively few
short years can make. Not only will Vir-
ginia have a Republican Governor for
the first time since Reconstruction Days
come next January; in last year's elec-
tion five of Virginia's 10 seats in the
U.S. House of Representatives went to
the Republicans.
My heartiest congratulations to the
people of the State of New Jersey and
the Commonwealth of Virginia for their
choices on election day 1969.
NEW OPTIMISM IN VIETNAM
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, optimism
inside Vietnam has seen a recent revival,
as reported in the pages of the Wash-
ington Post in recent days by Robert G.
Kaiser in his series entitled "The New
Optimists." In two installments, Mr.
Kaiser reported on the success of today's
pacification program, which his sources
were more apt to attribute to the weak-
ening position of the Vietcong in South
Vietnam and the relative improvement
of the Saigon Government's position in
the countryside.
The Vietcong's high-water mark was
reached in the 1968 Tet offensive, Mr.
Kaiser reports, and its influence in the
countryside has been declining since. All
this is not to say that the war in Vietnam
is near to what we would call a success-
ful conclusion or a victory. What Mr.
Kaiser's "new optimists" are saying is
that things are better and that an in-
dependent Saigon Government can pre-
vail with continued U.S. support.
I ask unanimous consent that the sec-
ond and third installments of Mr.
Kaiser's series from the Washington Post
be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the articles
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Washington Post, Oct, 30, 1969]
THE NEW OPTIMISTS?II: PACIFICATION, 1969
STYLE, SEEMS To BE WORKING
(By Robert G. Kaiser)
VINH LONG, SOUTH VIETNAM.?The French
tried to "pacify" Vietnam, but they failed.
So did Ngo Dinh Diem, and so have the many
regimes that succeeded Diem's?all with
enormous American aid. One year's progress
in pacification has become the next year's
disaster so often that the whole idea has an
unshakably bad reputation with many Viet-
namese. Many have stopped listening to the
boasts.
This year's progress has a new set of pro-
moters, a group of new optimists?includ-
ing many former pessimists?who believe
that the Vietcong's revolution in South Viet-
nam may have been defeated.
The impending defeat of the local Viet-
cong, which many Americans now claim to
foresee, is usually not attributed to the spe-
cific successes of current pacification pro-
grams. Many believe that the paoffication
programs have worked this year primarily
because the Vietcong have lost the ability
(or the will) to fight back.
In the past pacification always failed be-
cause the National Liberation Front (or the
Vietminh before it) eventually proved strong-
er than the regime in Saigon. Now the new
optimists are predicting?privately, and not
for attribution?that the Vietcong will not
be able to come back, at least for many years,
and never if the government can consolidate
its apparent new strength.
American officials have talked about the
demise of the Vietcong before. But old hands
here say the new optimism differs from its
predecessors, if only because its adherents
include many who were always pessimists or
cynics before. The revival of optimism in
the last few months has come after a long
period of caution and doubt that followed the
1968 Tet offensive.
The current pacification program is more
than a copy of its predecessors. It is simpler
and more radical. It has provided the first
meaningful decentralization of government
functions in the history of independent
South Vietnam. And it appears more suc-
cessful at the moment than any of its pred-
ecessors. But it is also clumsy, often self
deluding, and often ineffective, according to
many of the men trying to make it work in
the countryside.
The pacification campaign is aimed at
specific goals that seem little more than
commonsense objectives. They are to pro-
vide security, reduce the Vietcong's military
and political strength, stimulate the econ-
omy, resetttle war refugees, propagandize the
government's cause and establish local
government.
The Vietnamese and their American ad-
visors have agreed on a process for achieving
these goals. Ideally, the process works like
this:
Government troops enter a contested area,
establish outposts and force the enemy's
military forces out of the area. Then teams
of "revolutionary development cadre"
(known less dramatically in Vietnames_ as
Rural Development workers) come into the
village. They undertake small public works
projects, then a census of the population,
conduct a flamboyant if elementary public
relations campaign for the government and
generally establish what is called the GVN's
presence. They are followed or sometimes
accompanied by appointed hamlet and vil-
lage chiefs. (A village in Vietnam is a geo-
graphic area of perhaps several square miles
composed of, on the average, seven hamlets.)
Once sonic security has been established,
provincial officials and the new local ap-
pointees begin to institute the government's
basic program. The RD cadre, perhaps helped
by American advisers, may try to open a
new school. Representatives of the Open
Arms (Chieu Hol) campaign will begin prop-
agandizing for Vietcong to rally to the
government side. The "Phoenix" program will
begin to gather intelligence and track down
Vietcong operatives.
The government may provide financial or
material aid to refugees who decide to move
back to their old homes in a newly entered
area. The government will organize a Peo-
ples' Self Defense Force, give its members
rudimentary training and arms. After a fc
months elections will be organized to choose
hamlet and village councils. The elected
council is then supposed to select a new
village chief to replace the government's
appointee.
In many parts of the country, some of these
things are happening as planned. Elsewhere,
some happen and some don't. Almost every-
where the government's (and their U.S. ad-
visers) performance is erratic, but on balance
there is progress.
On the ground, the ideal procedure is
tempered by Vietnamese realities. Perhaps
the harshest of these is the shortage of
talented, and honest men to fill a growing
number of government posts. At their worst,
local officials can be appalling.
CORRUPTION INEVITABLE
A district chief only recently removed from
his job, for example, was maintaining 10
ladies in 10 different houses, giving them
about $80 a month pin money?financing the
whole operation out of government funds.
A certain amount of corruption is both
expected and inevitable. Salaries of local
officials are not big enough to support a man
and his family. But the government is trying
to apply?or says it is?new standards to the
behavior of its officials. Village and hamlet
chiefs are going to a special school to learn
both good administration and honesty.
The 7,800 Americans working on pacifica-
tion are not all suited for the work. Some
experienced Americans here bemoan the low
caliber of U.S. advisers. "We've got a bunch
of police advisers around here that are noth-
ing but small town misfits and failures,"
said one senior adviser recently. All, but a
few of the 6,200 soldiers assigned to pacifica-
tion are in Vietnam on one year tours (which
civilians often contend is too short a time
to be useful).
Vietnamese realities also mean that pro-
grams described in glowing terms at head-
quarters briefings occasionally can look dis-
couragingly ineffective in the field. Someone'
looking for weaknesses can find them.
"My PP (popular force) platoons were sup4
posed to go on a joint night operation," a
boyish American second lieutenant in the
Delta explained to a recent visitor, "but they
hadn't moved out, so I went down to the out-
post to see why. It turned out that they were
drunk?rice wine."
STATISTICS IMPROVE
The regional and popular forces have al-
ways been the weak sisters of the Vietnamese
armed forces, though American. and Viet-
namese officials now regard them as crucial
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November 5, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
There being no objection, the excerpt
was ordered to be printed in the REcoae,
as follows:
From Docigson, Lewis Carroll, book, p. 223,
copyright 19311
"THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS"
"What sort of things do you remember
best?" Alice ventured to ask.
"Oh, things that happened the week after
next," the Queen replied in a careless tone.
"For instance, now," she went on, sticking a
large piece of plaster on her Anger es she
spoke, "there's the King's Messenger. He's in
prison now, being punished: and the trial
doesn't even begin till next Wednesday: and
of course the crime comes last -of all."
"Suppose he never commits tile crime?"
said Alice.
"That would be all the better, wouldn't
it?" the Queen said, as she bound the plaster
round her finger with a bit of ribbon.
Alice felt there was no denying that. "Of
course it would be all the better,!' she said:
"but it wouldn't be all the better his being
punished?"
"You're wrong there, at any rate," said the
Queen: "were you ever punished'
"Only for faults," said Alice. _
"And you were all the better for it, I
anow!" the Queen said triannphantly,
"Yes, but then I had done the things I
was punished for," said Alice: "that makes
all the difference."
"But if you hadn't done them," the
Queen said, "that would have been better
still; better, and better, and better!" Her
voice went higher with each "better," till it
got quite to a squeak at last.
Alice was just beginning to say, 'There's a
mistake somewhere?," when the Queen
povters are as important as men have ever
proposed. The survival of the human race
may be at stake, and both sides are well
aware of what is involved.
CONTROL OF PORNOGRAPHY
Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in
the RECORD an article entitled, "Growing
Public Outrage Over Pornography Stirs
Congressional Response," published in
the New York Times of Monday, No-
vember 3, 1969. It seems to me that the
time is long overdue for us to take af-
&motive action to rid the mails of sala-
cious and pornographic materials and
literature, particularly that which is di-
rected to young children. We now have
before the Judiciary Committee proposed
legislation dealing with this problem
which I and a number of other Senators
have cosponsored. President Nixon in his
October 11, 1969, message on the admin-
istration's legislative program has urged
us to give high priority to legislation to
control pornography. I urge bipartisan
action on this most serious matter at the
earliest possible moment.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[Prom the New York Times, Nov. 3, 19691
GROWING PUBLK OUTRAGE OYER PORNOGRAPHY
STIRS CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
(By Donald Janson)
began screaming, SO loud that she ha to WASHINGTON.?"The enclosed printed ma
makes me speechless and aghast to think
it can be circulated through the mail."
leave the sentence unfinished.
THE BEGINNING OF SA _
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, at
times an editorial is written which ex-
presses accurately one's thinking on a
particular subject. Such is the case with
respect to an editorial entitled "The Be-
ginning of SALT," published in the St.
Louis Post-Dispatch.
I ask 'unanimous consent that the log-
ical and constructive comments ctintain-
ed therein be printed in the RECOO.
There being no objection, the eaterial
was ordered to be printed in the RitORD,
as follows:
From the St. Louis Post Dispatch, Oct. 20-
26, 1969]
THE BEGINNING OF SALT
News that the United States and the Soviet
Union will begin Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks three weeks hence in Helsinki comes
none too soon, and the world will hope that
agreements on ending the nuclear arms race
can be reached before it is too late. ato one
knows how long the conferences will con-
tinue, but the fact that they are in progress
will of itself be a deterrent of sorts.
The Nixon Administration has been Iness-
ing for the meetings since early in June, but
the Russians have delayed a response, The
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in Angust
upset whatever plans may have been in the
making, though it was in essence irrelevant.
A likely reason for Soviet delay is the Hns-
sian quarrel with China. With the recent
start of Sino-Soviet talks this may be on the
way to a solution, leaving Moscow free to turn
it attention to SALT.
In the course of time the conferences magi.
to cover the whole range of nuclear weapon-
ry?hydrogen bombs and delivery systems.,
multiwarhead missiles (MIRV) and anthills-
sile defense systems. It goes without series
that the meetings between the two super-
The remark, from a doctor in Prospect,
Conn., is from one of thousands of letters re-
cently added to the bulging files of Congres-
sional committees considering legislation to
curb the country's increasingly aggressive
pornographers.
Representative L. H. Fountain, Democrat
of North Carolina, testified before a House
Judiciary subcommittee last week that he
was receiving more mail from outraged con-
stituents on the growth of pornography than
on any subject in his 16 years in Congress.
"OUTPOUR/NG OF FILTH"
"People in my district are furious and
can't understand why we can't put a stop
to this outpouring of filth," he said.
"If this Congress accomplishes nothing
else, it should provide relief for the vast
majority of our citizens who are demanding
help in ridding their homes of this obscen-
ity," said Representative Ed Foreman, Re-
publican of New Mexico, as he waved a copy
of the newsprint magazine Screw, with a
two-page photograph of a nude matt and
woman on the centerfold, in front of the
committee.
A staff member of a Senate Judiciary sub-
committee investigating pornography said
that subcommittee members were receiving
more protests on pornography than on the
Vietnam war.
President Nixon noted in May, in asking
Congress for three new laws to stop the
flood, that "American homes are being born-
barded with. the largest volume of sex-
oriented mail in history." He reminded Con-
gress OM weeks ago that none of his pro-
posals had been passed and urged prompt
action. There is little likelihood that lie will
get it.
Part of the reason is that Congressmen are
so eager-to testify at subcommittee hearings
In person rather than by submitting state-
ments that additional hearings are being
scheduled to meet the demand. Since early
August, the Congressmen have been among
witnesses before two House subcommittees.
S 13829
Their interest is directly related to the spurt
in the volume of mail they are receiving from
back home.
Five more Congressmen testified last week.
They are among 175 who have introduced
more than 200 anti-obscenity bills, including
the Administration's proposals.
HIGH COURT GU/DEL/NES
Shaping final legislation from this tangle
is not expected until next year, not just be-
cause of the stampede to get into the act
but also because of the difficult task of meet-
ing tests of constitutionality required by Su-
preme Court decisions of recent years.
Under Supreme Court rulings, material
cannot be banned unless it panders to a
"prurient interest in sex," affronts "eontem-
porary community standards" and is "utterly
without redeeming social importance."
But about 50 million pieces of lurid mate-
rial are being mailed annually, including
millions of unsolicited advertiallinents for
books and films. New approaches are being
sought to keep this third-class mail from
reaching homes and offices.
The President, declaring that the Adminis-
tration had carefully studied "the legal ter-
rain" of the problem, proposed the following
curbs;
Prohibiting use of the media to send to
minors "material dealing with a sexual sub-
ject in a manner unsuitable for young
people."
Barring use of the mails or other inter-
state facilities for sending advertising in-
tended to appeal to a "prurient interest in
sex."
Prohibiting, as an invasion of privacy, use
of the mails to send sexually oriented adver-
tising?even if it is not legally olascene?to
any who says he does not want it.
Protection specifically for minors has not
been tried before on a Federal level. This ap-
proach was prompted by a Supreme Court
decision last year upholding a New York state
law prohibiting the sale to minors of any-
thing the law defined, using a separate stand-
ard for children, as obscene for minors.
The effort to bar "prurient" advertising
rests on 1942 and 1951 Supreme Court de-
sions that commercial advertising does not
have the same constitutional protection as
noncommercial speech.
The invasion-of-privacy proposal would
complement a law passed in 1967. It allowed
anyone who received sex-oriented advertis-
ing to cut off the flow by listing his objection
with the Post Office.
Bait the receiver had to initiate action
against each publisher of smut who solicited
him. The new proposal would let household-
ers bar all such advertising from any source
with a single protest in advance of receiving
any smut. Advertisers would have to buy a
Post Office master list of objectors and keep
It current or risk heavy fines and long jail
terms.
These measures?the 1967 layS and the pro-
posed expansion?were inspired in large part
by a 1966 Supreme Court decision against
Ralph Ginsberg, holding that, whether or
not his magazine Eros was obscene, his man-
ner of advertising it pandered to prurient
interests.
Last week, the Supreme Court said it would
rule on the constitutionality of the 1967 law.
The complementary proposal will probably
stand or fall on that ruling. Publishers of
Erotic wares contend that the first law vio-
lates their right of free speech by restricting
distribution of ideas.
The other Nixon proposals, if adopted,
would also face constitutional challenges.
"The theory that the First Amendment
does not protect commercial advertising is a
very shaky one," Lawrence Speiser, director
of the Washington office of the American
Civil Liberties 'Union, testified before the
House Subcommittee on Postal Operations
recently.
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1,
tors in the consideration of the future of
that country.
DowNs. Is there any danger that the hard-
liners will consider moving in that direction
a defeat, even though it might fulfill the
stated policy aim?
MANSFIELD. No, quite the contrary. The
President has made his declaration. It has
met with unanimous approval as far as I
know. And I agree with him one hundred
percent.
DOWNS. Thanks again, Senator Mansfield,
for being our guest this mor ng.
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION
TALKS
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, on Monday
the United States and the Soviet Union
will open very crucial talks in Helsinki
on ways to scale down the strategic arms
race. We cannot now tell what the out-
come will be, but we are all hopeful that
these talks will lead to a slowdown in the
buildup of strategic nuclear weapons.
Last night Secretary of State Rogers
delivered a talk before the Diplomatic
and Consular Officers Retired which I
feel sets the tone for the talks in Hel-
sinki. The Secretary, of course, could not
and did not detail the specific proposals
which would be discussed at this first
meeting in Helsinki. But he did broadly
outline the desire of the United States to
come to an agreement with the U.S.S.R.
The Secretary's talk was filled with
hope?a hope that sane men from the
two most powerful countries on earth can
curb what has been an unending com-
petition in the strategic arms race. We
have made some progress in limiting nu-
clear weapons. More needs to be done.
I feel all of us can agree with Secre-
tary Rogers when he says that there is
reason for hope because both superpow-
ers are willing at least to discuss ways to
limit the growing nuclear arsenal and in-
creasing threat to world peace.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD the
full text of the Secretary's remarks.
There being no objection, the remarks
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE WILLIAM P.
ROGERS, SECRETARY OF STATE
Next Monday in Helsinki the United States
and the Soviet Union will open preliminary
talks leading to what could be the most criti-
cal negotiations on disarmament ever under-
taken. The two most powerful nations on
earth will be seeking a way to curb what to
date has been an unending competition in
the strategic arms race.
The Government of the United States will
enter these negotiations with serious purpose
and with the hope that we can achieve
balanced understandings that will benefit the
cause of world peace and security. Yet we
begin these negotiations knowing that they
are likely to be long and complicated and with
the full realization that they may not
succeed.
While I will not be able to discuss specific
proposals tonight, I thought it might be
helpful to outline the general approach of
our government in these talks.
Nearly a quarter of a century ago, when we
alone possessed nuclear power, the United
States proposed the formation of a United
Nations Atomic Development Authority with
a world monopoly over all dangerous aspects
of nuclear energy. This proposal might well
have eliminated for all nations the dangers
and burdens of atomic weapons. Unhappily,
as we all know, it was rejected.
The implications were obvious. Others in-
tended to develop nuclear weapons on a na-
tional basis. The United States then would
have to continue its own nuclear program.
It would have to look to its own security in
a nuclear-armed world. Thus we established
a national policy of maintaining nuclear
weapon strength adequate to deter nuclear
war by any other nation or nations. It was
our hope then, as it is now, to make certain
that nuclear weapons would never again be
used.
The intervening decades have seen
enormous resources devoted to the develop-
ment of nuclear weapons systems. As both
sides expanded their force levels an action/re-
action pattern was established. This pattern
was fed by rapid progress in the technology
of nuclear weapons and advanced delivery
systems. The mere availability of such
sophisticated technology made it difficult for
either side by itself to refrain from trans-
lating that technology into offensive and de-
fensive strategic armaments.
Meanwhile, strategic planners, operating
in an atmosphere of secrecy, were obliged
to make conservative assumptions, includ-
ing calculations on what became known as
the "worst case." The people responsible
for planning our strategic security had to
take account of the worst assumptions about
the other's intentions, the maximum plausi-
ble estimate of the other's capabilities and
performance, and the lowest plausible per-
formance of our own forces. The Soviets no
doubt did the same.
Under these circumstances it was difficult
during these many years for either side to
conclude that it had sufficient levels of de-
structive power.
II
Yet that point in time has now clearly
been reached. As absolute levels of nuclear
power and delivery capability increased, a
situation developed in which both the
United States and the Soviet Union could
effectively destroy the society of the other,
regardless of which one struck first.
There are helpful mutual restraints in
such a situation. Sane national leaders do
not initiate strategic nuclear war and thus
commit their people to national suicide.
Also they must be careful not to precipitate
a conflict that could easily escalate into nu-
clear war. They have to take elaborate pre-
cautions against accidental release of a nu-
clear weapon which might bring on a nuclear
holocaust.
In brief the nuclear deterrent, dangerous
though it is, has worked.
The present situation?in which both the
United States and the Soviet Union could
effectively destroy the other regardless of
which struck first?radically weakens the
rationale for continuing the arms race.
Competitive accumulation of more sophis-
ticated weapons would not add to the basic
security of either side. Militarily it probably
would produce little or no net advantage.
Economically it would divert resources
needed elsewhere. Politically it would per-
petuate the tensions and fears that are the
social fallout of the nuclear arms race.
So a capacity for mutual destruction leads
to a mutual interest in putting a stop to
the strategic nuclear arms race.
Nonetheless technology advances remorse-
lessly. It offers new opportunities to both
sides to add to their offensive and defensive
strategic systems. Both sides find it difficult
to reject these opportunities in an atmos-
phere of rivalry and in the absence of a
verifiable agreement. It raises temptations
to seek strategic advantages. Yet now such
advantages cannot be hidden for long, and
both sides will certainly take whatever
counter-measures are necessary to preserve
their retaliatory capability.
S 14359
This is the situation in which the two
sides now find themselves. Where national
security interests may have operated in the
past to stimulate the strategic arms race,
those same national security interests may
now operate to stop or slow down the race.
The question to be faced in the strategic
arms talks is whether societies with the ad-
vanced intellect to develop these awesome
weapons of mass destruction have the com-
bined wisdom to control and curtail them.
III
In point of fact, we have already had some
successes in preliminary limitations.
We have a treaty banning military activi-
ties in Antarctia.
We have a treaty banning the orbiting of
weapons of mass destruction in outer space
and prohibiting the establishment of mili-
tary installations on the moon or other ce-
lestial bodies.
We have reached agreement with the So-
viet Union on the text of a treaty forbidding
the emplacement of weapons of mass des-
truction on the ocean floors, about to be con-
sidered at the United Nations General As-
sembly.
These are agreements not to arm environ-
ments previously inaccessible to weapons.
Manifestly there are fewer obstacles to such
agreements than there are to agreements
controlling weapons already deployed or un-
der development.
But even in already "contaminated" en-
vironments there have been two important
control agreements:
We have negotiated and ratified a Test Ban
Treaty prohibiting the testing of nuclear
weapons in the atmosphere, under water, and
in outer space.
We have negotiated and are prepared at
any time to ratify simultaneously with the
Soviet Union, a Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
It should be pointed out, though, that the
main objective of a Nuclear Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty is to prevent non-nuclear powers
from acquiring atomic weapons. The treaty
does not restrain any of the present nuclear
powers from further development of their
capabilities. The non-nuclear countries there-
fore tend to look upon the treaty essen-
tially as a self-denying ordinance.
Accordingly, during the negotiations they
insisted upon assurances that the nuclear
powers would seriously pursue strategic arms
negotiations. We concurred and incorporated
a paragraph in the treaty which would re-
quire us to do so.
I mention this to underscore two points.
First, that the disarmament agreements pre-
viously concluded have widely been re-
garded as confidence building, preliminary
steps which hopefully might lead to more
meaningful agreements on strategic arms.
Second, when the United States and the
Soviet Union ratify the NPT, they will agree
to undertake negotiations in good faith for
a cessation of the nuclear arms race.
IV
However, given the complexity of the stra-
tegic situation, the vital national interests
involved, and the traditional impulses to
seek protection in military strength it is
easy to be cynical about the prospects for
the talks into which we are about to enter.
Nonetheless some basis for hope exists.
First is the fact that the talks are being
held at all. The diplomatic exchanges lead-
ing up to these talks were responsible in na-
ture. And the talks themselves will require
discussion of military matters by both sides
in which the veil of secrecy will have to
be, if not lifted, at least refashioned. These
factors lead us to the hope that the talks
are being entered into seriously.
Second is the matter of timing. Previous
disparity in nuclear strength has been suc-
ceeded by the situation of sufficiency of
which I have already spoken. And because
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e ber 14, 1969
larization is dangeroUs. We do not need
more intense rhetoric now. Rather we
need a return to reasonable discourse
and common sense.
Mr. President, I believe that an edi-
torial published in the Wort Gateway
Guide of Waynesville, Mo., goes a long
way toward bringing both reason and
commonsense to bear on criticism of
the military, I ask unanimous consent
that it be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
NATION CANNOT AFFOIID CIVILIAN-MILITARY
Maar
Even the most hawkish supporters of
America's involvement in Vietnam seem to
have come to the conclusion that the war,
as it has been fought, is not worth the can-
dle. Its objectives, important as they were
and are, have simply become outweighed by
its immense costs in wealth, blood and do-
mestic turmoil.
In this sense, at least, there is a kind of
unity in America, though the controversy
rages over how to cut the costs of the war
while not abandoning utterly whatever
achievements may still be salvaged from it.
Yet in our universal desire to end the war
and our alarm at its divisive and inflationary
effects at home, we are in danger of ignoring
other, even more pernicious consequences of
too precipitate and too complete a reversal
of the policies and beliefs which led us into
the conflict in the first place.
One of these consequences is a growing
antimilitarism, which la shared both by those
who view the war as immoral from start to
finish and by those who once favored it but
now feel that the military has let us down.
A recent news report told of widespread
disillusionment among veteran career
officers.
"Many of my contemporaries with 15 and
16 years of service are packing it in," an
Army liuetenant colonel was quoted as say-
ing, "Pride of profession has kept them
going, but that pride is taking a terrible
battering these days."
Air Force officer resignations jumped nearly
50 per cent in fiscal 1969 over fiscal 1968. Army
resignations were up about 14 per cent. The
climb was smaller in the Marine Corps while
Navy figures remained the eame.
The outlook for attracting new officers is
dismal. ROTC recruitment on college cam-
puses is expected to be noticeably affected by
antimilitarism this year.
Americans seem to have forgotten, or no
longer believe, that in this country the mili-
tary is controlled by civilians. It was net a
general but a civilian president who com-
mitted hundreds of thousands of American
soldiers to a land war in Asia, against the
long-standing warnings of some of our most
eminent military men?Generals Gavin,
Shoup and Ridgway, for example.
Once in the war, the armed forces fought
it as well as they could with the restrictions
placed upon them?restrictions that were
necessary to prevent the conflict from es-
calating into World War III but which any
armchair strategist OEM now see doomed it
to the indecisive, endless struggle it became.
The military may be accused of deceiving
three or four administrations with constant
promises of a turning point or the reaching
of that elusive light at the end of the tunnel.
But the responsibility ultiMately rests on
those who gave them an impossible job to do.
"It is unjust and unwise to attack the
military because they have done their best
to execute directions given them by the
political leadership," Writes Anthony Hartley,
editor of Interplay Magazine. "Unjust be-
cause they are not responsible for initiating
policy. Unwise because too constant and
this condition will continue for the fore-
seeable future the time then seems to be
propitious for considering hew to curb the
race in which neither side in all likelihood
can gain meaningful advantage.
Third is a mutuality of interest, Under
Present circumstances an equitable limita-
tion on strategic nuclear 'weapons would
strengthen the national security of both
sides. If this is mutually perceived?if both
sides conduct these talks in the light of
that perception?the talks may accomplish
an historic breakthrough in the pattern of
confrontation that has characterized the
postwar world.
May I pause to point out again that I
do not wish to predict that the talks will
be easy or that progress is imminent or
for that matter likely. Mutuality of in-
terest for states accustomed to rivalry is
difficult to perceive. Traditions are power-
ful. Temptations to seek advantage run
strong. Developments in other areas are
bound to have an impact on these dis-
cussions.
Both parties will approach the talks with
great caution and pursue them with immac-
ulate care, The United States and the So-
viet Union are entirely capable of protect-
ing ther vital interests and can be counted
upon to do so. So there is little chance
that either side would accept an outcome
that leads to its net national disadvantage.
In our case also we would not agree to any-
thing adversely affecting the national in-
terests of our allies, who will continue to
be consulted as the talks develop.
On the other hand we must also recognize
that a prime technique of international
politics?as of other politics?is talk. If these
talks are serious they can teed to better
understanding on both aides of the rationales
behind strategic weapons decisions. This in
itself might provide a climate in which to
avoid compulsive decisions.
Talks need not necessarily call for an
explicit agreement at any particular stage.
Whether we can slow down, atop Or eventu-
ally throw the arms race into reverse, re-
mains to be seen. It also remains to be seen
whether this be by a formal treaty or treaties,
by a series of agreements, by parallel action,
or by a convergence of viewpoints resulting
from a better undestanding of respective
positions.
What counts at this point is that a dialogue
Is beginning about the management of the
strategic relations at the two superpowers
on a better, safer, cheaper basis than un-
controlled acquisition of still more weapons.
The United States approaches the talks as
an opportunity to rest our seourity on what
I would call a balanced strategy.
In pursuit of this balanced strategy of
security we will enter the Helsinki talks with
three objectives:
To enhance international security by
maintaining a stable U.S.-Saviet strategic
relationship through limitations on the
deployment of strategic armaments;
To halt the upward spiral at slrategic arms
and avoid the tensions, uncertainties, and
costs of an unrestrained continuation of the
strategic arms race;
To reduce the risk of an outbreak of
nuclear war through a dialogue about issues
arising from the strategic situation.
Some say that there will be risks in such a
process. But it is easy to focus too much on
the risks that would accompany such a new
environment and too little on the risks of the
one in which we now live. Certainly, such
risks are minimal compared to the benefits
for mankind which would flow from success.
I am confident that this country will not let
down its guard, lose its alertness, or fail to
maintain adequate programs to protect
against a collapse or evasion of any strategic
arms agreement. No delegation to any dis-
armament negotiation has ever been better
prepared or better qualified then the United
States delegation. The risks in seeking an
agreement seem to be manageable, insurable,
and reasonable ones to rim. They seem less
dangerous than the risks of open-ended arms
ocaapetition--riaks about which we perhaps
have become somewhat callous.
I have mentioned the rewards of progress
in terms of international security, world or-
der, and improved opportunities for replac-
ing a stalemated confrontation with a process
of negotiations.
But there are also other stakes in these
talks that come closer to home. On both sides
of this strategic race there are urgent needs
for resources to meet pressing domestic needs.
Strategic weapons cannot solve the problems
of how we live at home, or how we live in the
world in this last third of the Twentieth
Century. The Soviet Union, which devotes a
much larger proportion of its national re-
sources to armaments than do we, must see
this as well.
Who knows the rewards if we succeed in
diverting the energy, time and attention?
the manpower and brainpower?devoted to
ever more sophisticated weapons to other and
more worthwhile purposes?
Speaking before the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly two months ago, President
Nixon said that he hoped the strategic arms
talks would begin soon because "there is no
more important task before us." And he
added that we must "make a determined ef-
fort not only to limit the build-up of stra-
tegic arms, but to reverse it."
Just last week President Podgorny of the
Soviet Union said: "A positive outcome of the
talks would undoubtedly help improve So-
viet-American relations and preserve and
strengthen the peace." To that I say "Amen."
He added that: "The Soviet Union is striv-
ing to achieve precisely such results.' Well,
so are we; and in this we have the support
of the military services, of the Congress, and
of the American people.
To that end this Government approaches
the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks in sober
and serious determination to do our full part
to bring a halt to this unproductive and
costly competition in strategic nuclear arma-
ments.
NATION CANNOT AFFORD CIVIL-
IAN-MILITARY RIFT
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, it has
become all too fashionable in this coun-
try to criticize blindly those with whom
we disagree. Overstated rhetoric and
oversimplified conclusions serve to po-
larize our politics and divide our society
when polarization and divisiveness are
already too prevalent.
The military establishment has been
a prime target of this counterproductive
criticism.
Some criticize the military because it
is fighting the war in Vietnam or has not
yet won it, while others complain that
its needs devour too much of our na-
tional budget.
However, it is well to remember that
civilian decisions have shaped our policy
in Vietnam and the ground rules under
which it is pursued; and Congress in the
past abdicated its responsibility to judge
Military spending.
I do not wish to imply that the mili-
tary is without fault. Overoptimistic
military reports contributed heavily to
the disastrous policy in Vietnam and
often fearsome threats were found to
justify military expenditures which later
proved ludicrously wasteful.
But who is at fault is not at issue.
What is at issue is that continuing pa-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE November 13, 1969
per column which appeared locally yes-
terday in the Washington Post. In the
column, Messrs. Novak and Evans
warned:
The tens of thousands of well-meaning war
protesters set to converge on Washington Sat-
urday will be joining a demonstration
planned since last summer by advocates of
violent revolution In the U.S. who openly sup-
port Communist forces in Vietnam.
- Accordingly, whatever happens here Sat-
urday, the Nov. 15 march on Washington will
mark a postwar highwater mark for the
American far left.
Responsible liberals have been enlisted as
foot soldiers in an operation mapped out
mainly by extremists?testimony to the
present ineffectiveness of nonviolent, liberal
elements in the peace movement.
After explaining the planning role for
the moratorium which has been played
by the Communist Party, U.S.A., and by
the newly-invigorated Communist Trot-
skyite movement, Evans and Novak
stated that extremists in the antiwar
movement have prepared "wild scenarios
for storming the White House, the Jus-
tice Department, and the South Viet-
namese Embassy."
As best I have been able to learn, Mr.
President, the Justice Department and
the South Vietnamese Embassy are still
likely targets of the extremists.
A coalition of 30 radical groups, calling
Itself the Revolutionary Contingent, re-
portedly plans to rally at Dupont Circle
tomorrow evening and then march on the
South Vietnamese chancery at 2251 R
Street N'W., to serve an "eviction" notice
on the occupants.
There have been reports that one revo-
lutionary group from New York City
would like to blow up the embassy. That
might have sounded a little farfetched a
couple of weeks ago, but after the four
serious bombings of buildings in New
York City yesterday, we can believe that
there are people who might go to such
extremes.
It is not clear as to just what Is in
store for the Justice Department on Sat-
urday evening following the mass rally
on the Ellipse.
On October 30, 1969, the Liberation
News Service?which provides news for
the underground press?reported that
plans are being made for an attack on
the Justice Department. I should like to
quote a few paragraphs from the Liber-
ation News Service story:
NEW Yosx.?Get your red flags ready arid
come to Washington, 13.0. on November 15.
Plans are being forged for a militant "red
flag" contingent to participate in the massive
anti-war demonstration in Washington and
to add an additional action: an attack on
the headquarters of the Department of
"Justice." . .
The SDSers in Newark expect to organize
an anti-imperialist presence within the main
march on Saturday, November 15. This con-
tingent will march together in a disciplined
way, bearing red flags, NLF flags and other
banners showing solidarity with the Viet-
namese people . . .
During the big rally, the Red Flag con-
tingent will constitute an agit prop (agita-
tion-propaganda turn-an) unit to work to
bring people to the Justice Department.
Mr. President, I understand that
many citizens have deep convictions con-
cerning the war. I, too, would like to see
It come to an end.
The moratorium, however, will not
stop the fighting. It may even prolong
it because the antiwar demonstrations
give direct encouragement to the Com-
munist forces in Vietnam. This encour-
agement was summed up in a nutshell
on October 22, 1969, in a broadcast of
the National Liberation Front's clandes-
tine radio station in South Vietnam. The
NLF said:
The American people's brilliant success of
the 15 October movement is a source of strong
encouragement to our troops and people.
The fact of giving encouragement to
the enemy should, in itself, deter Ameri-
cans from participating in the mora-
torium, Mr. President.
I should also think that well-meaning
citizens would want to stay out of Wash-
ington so as not to further the destruc-
tive goals of many of the moratorium
planners.
There is the real possibility of violence.
The Federal Government did not invent
Weatherman or the Yippies. It did not
conjure up the Revolutionary Contin-
gent. Such groups are inherently vicious
and existed for no good purpose. Their
primary goal is destruction and violence,
and, while moratorium leaders may wish
to disavow them, they are very much a
part of the moratorium.
Mr. President, I do not wish to predict
violence during the moratorium. I hope
that it will pass peacefully. But I be-
lieve that the record and the published
statements of certain extremist groups
in the antiwar movement give us clear
warning that we need to take every pre-
caution against the possibility of trouble.
Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield.
Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, it was
with interest that I listened to that part,
of the statement of the Senator from
West Virginia pertaining to violence and,
at least, the natural appearing setup that
Is being created by the perpetration of
violence and our concern for it.
It was with some curiosity that I lis-
tened to a former Attorney General of
the United States of America on the tele-
vision, I believe it was last night, in
which he deplored the idea of saying that
violence is going to come out of this
meeting.
Apparently it was the thought of this
former Attorney General that because
It was the honest opinion of a present
Deputy Attorney General of the United
States that such violence will come about,
and he says so and takes the precautions
that he believes are necessary to deal
with that situation, that that kind of
talk will result in violence rather than
avoiding and preventing it.
My thoughts went back to October
1967, when the Department of Justice
under a different administration was in
charge of things and plans that were sub-
mitted for the march on the Pentagon.
And assurances were given that there
would be no violence, that ground rules
were established, that there were things
that they would do and would not do,
and that they would not go beyond cer-
tain lines of demarcation, and .so forth.
However, notwithstanding those assur-
ances, violence did occur. And this Nation
was submitted to the shame of the world
because it was not able even to protect
the sanctity of peace and order around
its military headquarters in the Nation's
Capital.
I wonder if that is not the same type
of thing that the Senator from West
Virginia exercised or is certainly, at
least, concerned about now, that it is
nice to think in terms of coming events
in a Pollyanna way, but at the same time
it is well to have a little dry powder on
hand and a little flint to insert in the
powder horn just in case.
Would that be in line with the think-
ing the Senator from West Virginia has
in mind with respect to the present
situation?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, the Senator is correct. It would be.
I heard the same former Attorney
General last night on television. My
thoughts went back to Resurrection City
which was set up during his tenure of
office as Attorney General.
Mr, HRUSKA. Mr. President, I think
we should have every sympathy for
those who honestly, lawfully, and peace-
fully demonstrate and petition their
government and make their feelings and
sentiments known. However, we ought
to be a little realistic about it and not
criticize those in charge now who are
trying to be realistic and trying to do
the things that they are entitled to do
under the circumstances.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, I yield the floor.
CONSULTATION WITH SENATE
ASKED ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIM-
ITATION TALKS
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, there seems
to me a contradiction between the action
of the White House of yesterday, pre-
venting the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions from being consulted or briefed
concerning the Helsinki Strategic Arms
Limitation talks, and the President's
statement to us of today that he intends
to set up a procedure to consult with
the Senate concerning the conclusion of
international agreements.
I would hope today's view would pre-
vail and steps would be taken to insure
that the Senate is consulted and briefed
concerning SA
In this coWiection, it certainly seems
incongruous that 14 NATO nations are to
be briefed tomorrow by our negotiators,
although we in the Senate, who will
eventually have the responsibility of con-
senting to whatever may be the eventual
treaty, are not being briefed.
NEW MOBILIZATION MARCH IN
WASHINGTON
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, during the
Vietnam moratorium last month, mil-
lions of Americans took part in peace-
ful, orderly rallies and meetings to ex-
press their strong desire for an early
end to the war in Vietnam.
I supported the goals of the October
moratorium, and I support now the goals
of the moratorium activities planned for
today and tomorrow. If the activities
planned for this week by the Vietnam
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99 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE
Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I particul-
arly thank my good friend from Nebraska
at this time for his courtesy:
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, the Senate
has begun debate on the confirmation of
Circuit Judge Clement Haynsworth to be
an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States. It may seem
odd that the debate has just begun since
it has been raging for several weeks, vir-
tually since the President's announce-
ment of the nomination. But formal
debate began on November 1_3.
The Committee on the Judiciary, by a
vote of 10 to 7, has recomMended the
confirmation of Judge Haynsworth's
nomination. It is now the duty of the
full Senate to advise and cons( tit or to
withhold its advice and consent to the
nomination. The vote will be wry close,
In all likelihood. The outcome may turn
on one or two votes.
I hope, and I think, that Judge Hayns-
worth's nomination will be confirmed.
He is an outstanding jurist and will bring
balance and judgment to the Court.
MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE
As in legislative session, a message
from the House of Representatives by
Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks,
announced that the House had agreed
to the report of the committee of con-
ference on the disagreeing vote., of the
two Houses on the amendmeht of the
Senate to the bill (H.R. 474) to establish
a Commission on Government Procure-
ment.
The message also announced that the
House had agreed to the amendment of
the Senate to the joint resolution (H.J.
Res. 966) making further continuing ap-
propriations for the fiscal year 1970, and
for other purposes.
ENROLLED JOINT RESOLUTION
SIGNED
The message further announced that
the Speaker had affixed his signature to
the enrolled joint resolution (H.J. Res.
966) making further continuing appro-
priations for the fiscal year IWO, and
for other purposes, and it was signed by
the Acting President pro tempore.
(By order of the Senate, the following
proceedings were conducted as in legisla-
tive session:)
APPOINTMENT OF ELLIS L. ARM-
STRONG AS COMMANDER OF REC-
LAMATION
Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, the Bu-
reau of Reclamation now has on the job
a new Commissioner, Ellis L. Armstrong,
who was appointed by President Nixon
to succeed my fellow Nebraskan, Floyd
E. Dominy, who retired from the Federal
service on October 31, after 36 years of
service.
Mr. Armstrong is a native of Mali but
he has worked for the Bureau of Rec-
lamation in Nebraska, and I have noted
an editorial from the people who know
him best, down in the southwest cor-
ner of the State. The McCook Daily
Gazette, whose editor is Allen D. Strunk,
Js the voice of the Republican River Val-
ley and it was particularly gratifying to
me to read an editorial in the paper's
edition of October 24.
The headline is, "Ellis L. Armstrong
Appointment Pleasing," and I want to
say it is pleasing to me as well. I have
full confidence that he will carry on in
the best tradition of the Bureau of Rec-
lamation in developing theh uzat.e?e-
sources of Nebraska and.,alf-OT the West.
I ask unanimoion-sent that the edi-
torial be print in the RECORD
?
There g no objection, the editorial
was o -red to be printed in the RECORD,
as OWS :
is L. ARMSTRONG APPOINTMENT PLEASING
Southwest Nebraska and Northwest Kansa
s pleased and fortunate in the appointmen
of Ellis L. Armstrong as Commissioner of th
ureau of Reclamation.
The appointment of this man is gratify
I ? to this part of the country because of his
fin, character and ability but particularly be-
can we consider him a Nebraskan even
thou his native state is Utah.
From 1948 to 1954 Mr. Armstrong was
project e ineer at Trenton Dam. During that
time man persons in the McCook and
Trenton area rew to know, respect and ad-
mire Mr. Arms ?ng and his family.
With the co letion of the Trenton
project, he went on Wer accomplishments
and became Deputy P ect Manager for con-
sultants working for tht\Power Authority of
New York State on the Lawrence Power
ned to Utah in
ghways, Utah
ld this
and Seaway Seaway project. He ret
1957 to become director of
State Road Commission, and
'on until he was named Com issioner of
Public Roads, U.S. Department of 'commerce.
Since May 1968 he has been ',assistant
regional director of Region Iv including
parts of Utah, Nevada. Wyoming, COlorado
and Arizona with headquarters in Salt Lake
City.
Among his honors is being the 29th per-
son ever elected and elevated to national
honorary membership in Chi Epsilon, na-
donal civil engineering fraternity.
Mr. Armstrong fills the seat held by Floyd-,
E. Dominy, formerly of Hastings, h
o likes
Armstrong has had a warm spot in his heart \
for the reclamation interests of Nebraska and , 1
Kansas.
t
Mr. Armstrong's appointment is indeed ip
pleasing to this area and puts two former /
Nebraskans in key positions, the other bein
former University of Nebraska Ch
ancel
Clifford Hardin now Secretary of Agricult
We are confident both will continue
outstanding jobs in serving the natio
this area.
S 14345
fort by the Government to scare people
away from Washington. Spook was
quoted in the Washington Post on No-
vember 9, 1969, assaying:
The government is trying in every way to
Intimidate people who are coining here to
protest against the war.
Dr. Spook is totally wrong. The rumors
ve persisted, not because the Govern-
t is trying to scare anyone, but be-
cause of the extremely violent nature of
some of the groups which are planning
to participate in the moratorium.
These groups run the gamut of lef t-
wing extremism, and the well organized
and disciplined to fairly new brands of
revolutionaries who have hastily gath-
ered together and asstuned catchy names
for the convenience of identification in
the press.
They are all planning to come, Mr.
President?the Trotskyite Young Social-
ist Alliance, Weatherman, the Crazies,
the Mad Dogs, the Yippes, the Anarch-
ists, the W. E. Dubois Clubs, and Youth
Against War and F'acism.
I am not talking about earnest young
people or older persons who believe that,
by their participation, they are fulfilling
their constitutional obligation as citi-
zens. I have reference, instead, to those
for whom the politics of confrontation is
an end in itself and for whom violence
is an instrument to be used in reach-
ing their goal? a goal nothing less than
the destruction of an orderly society and
constitutional government.
These factions and certain others seek
only to exploit the emotional issue of
the war. While their ideological beliefs
may differ, they are united in the cause
of destroying our established institutions
and replacing them with anarchy or a
totalitarian regime.
They are, of course, going, as it were,
fter an elephant with a peashooter.
ad they will not, of course, succeed in
eir effort. But, as these radicals of the
unatic fringe go about their business,
hey may succeed in causing innocent
eople to be hurt.
I note that the so-called "reS t bl "
a
A
.....??????????????=????..
e r
ng
and la
sh
a
lements behind the moratorium are al-
eady trying to disassocate themselves
rom any violence which may break out
ere either during or after the main
emonstration. Pontius Pilate set a prec-
dent for this kind of hand washing, Mr.
resident, and as we all know, he was
ot absolved for his actions. The New
robe and anyone else who played a
art in organizing the demonstration
ould be held to account for attracting
nd supporting these dregs of the New
eft.
COMMITTEE MEETIN DURING
SENATE SESSION ? MORROW
Mr. BYRD of
Virginia. Mr. Pres-
id islative session, I ask
unanimous consent that all committees
be permitted to meet during the session
of the Senate tomorrow.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
THE PROSPECT FOR VIOLENCE IN
THE ANTIWAR DEMONSTRA-
TIONS
Mr. BYRD of West Virgin,a, Mr. Presi-
dent, there have been persistent rumors
that violence will accompany the 3 days
of antiwar demonstrations which are
scheduled to begin here this evening.
These rumors were attributed by Dr.
Benjamin Spook on November 8 to an ef-
Spokesmen for Weatherman and the
Yippes are being quoted now as saying
that they intend to refrain from violence
during the moratorium. But neither of
these groups has displayed one iota of
sanity or sincere conviction over any
issue in the past and all of their activi-
ties heretofore have been marked by ir-
rationality and violence. So, I think it
will be quite out of character if neither
organization is capable of containing it-
self during the 3 or more days of demon-
strations which lie ahead.
I would like to call attention to the
widely-circulated Evans-Novak newspa-
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The United Kingdom sets quotas on vari-
ous wool and man-made fiber products from
Japan. Italy restricts imports of various wool
and man-made fiber products from Japan_
Prance has similar restrictions on Japanese
imports, but restricts imports from Hong
Kong as well. West Germany has restrictions
against Japan, Hong Kong, India and Pakis-
tan. Austria has restrictions on Japanese
textiles but also has an "anti-dumping and
market disruption law" which permits auto-
matic action when prices of specified textiles
are considered too low. The Benelux coun-
tries have a bilateral agreement setting
quotas on Japanese textiles and apparel,
while the Japanese-Canadian agreement im-
poses quotas on some synthetics. Canada
has similar agreements with Korea and Hong
Kong. Denmark uses licenses to regulate tex-
tile imports from Japan, Korea and Taiwan.
Switzerland employs a "price certificate sys-
tem" for textile iMports under which textile
Imports are kept out if prices are too low.
This is administered through a system of
import licenses for all textiles at the fabric
stage and beyond, regardless of origin. How-
ever, the licenses have been granted auto-
matically to high-cost countries. Norway and
Sweden have restrictions on imports from
several Asian countries. Even Japan has a
global quota on imports of woven woolen
fabrics under which Japan sets quotas for
France, Italy and the U.S.
Mr. President, these facts amply illus-
trate the dilemma with which this coun-
try is faced. It is my hope this adminis-
tration can reach a negotiated solution,
but if our friends abroad think we lack
the determination to pass a unilateral
arrangement in the Congress, then they
are sadly mistaken. Hopefully, such a
solution will not be necessary, but let it
be understood we stand ready to act if
the present deadlock is not soon broken.
SALT?GIANT STEP IN THE LONG
'"-----JOURNEY TOWARD PEACE
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President,
November 17, 1969, the day set for
preliminary discussions at Helsinki, Fin-
land, on strategic arms limitation talks,
commonly referred to as SALT, could
mark a historic turning point in history.
Since the first atomic bomb was ex-
ploded in August 1945, mankind has lived
precariously under what the late, great
President John F. Kennedy described as
"a nuclear sword of Damocles."
In urging Senate ratification of the
Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Presi-
dent Kennedy, quoting an ancient Chi-
nese proverb said, "A journey of a thou-
sand miles must begin with a" single
step." Since then additional meaningful
steps have been taken toward permanent
peace?the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty and the treaty banning the use
of nuclear weapons in outer space. Now,
with the SALT negotiations, the oppor-
tunity presents itself for a giant step
forward on that long journey toward
permanent peace.
The armaments race between the ma-
jor powers continues unabated. The in-
sane nuclear arms and missile race be-
tween the United States and the Soviet
Union has brought all mankind nearer
the possibility of total destruction. Many
of these armaments systems are ob-
solete before they even reach comple-
tion. The emphasis may change from
bombs to missiles, from missiles to anti-
missile missiles, to anti-missile missiles,
but the armaments race continues. Hun-
dreds of billions of dollars and rubles
are wasted on the seemingly insatiable
demands of militarists of both nations
for more and more weapons.
After years of this dangerous rivalry,
neither our Nation nor the Soviet Union
is any more secure than it was at the be-
ginning of this decade. Every effort to
develop and stockpile new superweapons
has only resulted in a similar action by
the other side. After each nation has de-
veloped a new one, the race starts all
over again to produce new, more expen-
sive and more sophisticated weapons.
Despite assurances to the lesser pow-
ers, the Soviet Union and the United
States have used the 15 months since
the signing of the Nuclear Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty not to curb the armaments
race but to proceed with the testing of
new weapons systems.
The first order of business at Helsinki
must be to seek a mutual moratorium
on all testing. Then, efforts may proceed
toward more comprehensive arms agree-
ment that can only be arrived at after
years of difficult and painstaking nego-
tiations. Senators will recall that it took
years of such tedious and often discour-
aging negotiations to arrive at the Lim-
ited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
It is of utmost importance that none
of the superweapons be excluded from
the discussions?the ABM, the multiple
independently targetable reentry vehi-
cles, commonly referred to as MIRV's,
and others. The continuing development
by the Soviet Union and the United
States of the testing and deployment
of MIRV systems and further deploy-
ment of ABM systems must be halted.
MIRV is the major factor that could
cause a tragic spiral in the arms race
and preclude for many years the oppor-
tunity for meaningful arms limitation
negotiations. Unless MIRV flight testing
is halted soon, we may reach the point
of no return toward being able to halt
the mad momentum of the arms race.
We may never have a better oppor-
tunity to do so. Administration leaders
and leaders in the Kremlin both ap-
pear willing to negotiate seriously. More
important, it appears that both sides
can negotiate from a position of ap-
proximate nuclear equality. The fact is
that there is no such thing as nuclear
superiority when each side has it with-
in its capability to totally destroy the
other.
The President's decision to enter into
SALT negotiations is, without a doubt,
his most significant act since assuming
office. These negotiations are only the
beginning. We harbor no false hopes that
firm agreements will be arrived at in a
week, a month, or even a year. The ne-
gotiations will be long, arduous, and frus-
trating. However, the outcome will de-
termine whether the United States and
the Soviet Union will be forced to con-
tinue to expend vast amounts of their re-
sources and energy on nuclear weapons;
whether mankind will be confronted with
the bleak prospect of nuclear weapons
proliferation; whether the horrible un-
certainty of a horrible nuclear war will
continue to hover over mankind; and
possibly Whether civilization as we know
It will live or die.
Mr. President, I am proud to be a co-
sponsor along with 41 of my colleagues of
the resolution introduced by the distin-
guished junior Senator from Massachu-
setts (Mr. BROOKE), calling for a halt in
the testing of all multiple-warhead mis-
siles by the United States and the Soviet
Union. I can think of no better way of
expressing the good faith of our Nation
in the SALT negotiations than by prompt
approval by the Senate of that resolu-
tion.
Mr. President, in announcing that I
would not be a candidate for reelection
in 1970, I stated "the most important
vote of my senatorial career to date was
mat in support of the Limited Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty." In 14 months I shall
retire from the Senate. It is my hope
that before those 14 months have ended,
I shall have the opportunity to cast an
even more important vote?a vote for a
meaningful Strategic Arms Limitation
Treaty.
BILLS INTRODUCED
Bills were introduced, read the first
time and, by unanimous consent, the
second time, and referred as follows:
By Mr. CASE:
S. 3138. A bill for the relief of Ruth E.
Calvert; to the Committee on the Judiciary.
By Mr. MONDALE:
S. 3139. A bill for the relief of Grant J.
Merritt and Mary Merritt Bergson; to the
Committee on the Judiciary.
ADDITIONAL COSPONSOR OF A BILL
S. 2168
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that, at its next
printing, the name of the Senator from
Pennsylvania (Mr. Score) be added as
a cosponsor of S. 2168, the mink quota
bill.
The PRESIDING OrriCER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
DEPARTMENTS OF LABOR, AND
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WEL-
FARE, AND RELATED AGENCIES
APPROPRIATION BILL, 1970?
AMENDMENT
AMENDMENT NO. 27.5
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, today
there are approximately 20 million
Americans aged 65 or over in this coun-
try. Of these Americans, 3.2 million are
restricted in their movements or con-
fined to bed; 3 million are classified as
illiterate or functionally illiterate; 4.4
million live alone, many divorced from
community life; and 1.2 million are con-
fined to hospitals or other institutions.
These people need more than a social
security or welfare check to make their
lives meaningful or comfortable. They
need programs designed to meet their
specific needs and to help them con-
tribute to the development of their com-
munities despite their advanced years.
Title III of the Older Americans Act
provides them with these programs by
allocating money for training, planning,
and service projects for the elderly.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
PRISONER EXCHANGE DOI:IL CRC
WASHINGTON, October 22?State Depart-
ment officials expressed doubt today whether
North Vietnam had any interest in exchang-
ing American prisoners of war for Black
Panthers in the United States and said it
had no information about such a proposed
exchange.
The report that Eldridge Cleaver, a Panther
leader in self-imopsed exile, has e gun dis-
cussion on an exchange with the enemy in
Vietnam was issued in Chicago yeAerclay by
Rennie Davis, one of the defendants in the
Chicago Eight trial.
A State Department spokesman said that
"we have no information about this re-
port." Later, other officials said privately
they doubted that the enemy would be, in-
terested in the proposed exchange.
"Chtoramwomt" ,FREPARED
SAN FRANCISCO, October 22?The Black '
Panther party said today that "the ground-
work has been ser/for the relase of Ameri-
can prisoners of w(r if jailed Panther leaders
are freed.
At a newsconfe nce this morning, David
Hilliard, the party national chief of staff,
said that the Panth s are seeking the free-
dom of Huey P. New n and Bobby G. Seale,
the party's co-founder
In exchange for their lease, he said, the
Government of North Vietn would free an
unspecified number of Ame prisoners.
Mr. Hilliard added that the " details"
of the proposed exchange are being orked
out by Eldridge Cleaver, the Panther's e ed
minister of information.
Mr. Hilliard said that the Vietnamese would
ask that Rennie Davis and David Dellinger,
two of the defendants in the Cbie.igo eight
trial, along with Mr. Seale, act as Ike go-
betweens in the proposed swap.
The proposal could become active "as soon
as Davis and Dellinger are cleared to go and
meet with Eldridge," Mr. Dellinger a, id.
CONSPIRACY TRIAL
(By Tom Hayden)
CIIICAGO.?The Conspiracy trial no longer
seems to be the carnival it was in the first
week.
We no longer humorously refer to federal
judge Julius Hoffman as "Magoo" (a refer-
ence to a comic character the judge is said
to resemble) but as "Adolph Hitler Herrman."
The first 21 government witnesses have
been from the Chicago police department
and the FBI. Their testimony has unfolded
as an attack on the movement, political ideas,
language and style rather than on concrete
crimes. The most concrete action charged a
of the defendants so far was letting al
out of police oar tires, throwin aaters at
undercover agents and o riVia which
defense attorney William Kuristler asserts be-
long in a municipal police court, not before
the federal bench.
Occasionally there is a fantastic claim such
as the one that Rennie Davis arranged for
live television coverage in front of the Conrad
Hilton hotel Aug. 27 and then ordered Mobi-
lization marshalls to kick the line of police-
men in the shins so demonstrators would be
clubbed before the TV audience. On this par-
ticular charge as on many others, gross-ex-
amination revealed no shins were kicked.
The heavy emphasis in the police testi-
mony has been on the provocative language
and identity of the defendants. With a pre-
tense at embarrassment officer after officer
tells the jury that the defendants shouted,
LBJ," "Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh" and
other chants.
When defense attorneys ask police if any
obscenities were used by them while clubbing
demonstrators, they are given pious denials.
The most any police witness has acknowl-
edged is that he heard one officer say to an-
other, "These little are really
tough . , ."
The Conspiracy is attempting to pinpoint
the blame for the Chicago melee on authori-
ties at the highest level and show that the
trial is an integral part of a national policy
to institute a legalized fascism. The Nixon
administration, according to the defendants,
Is rigging the Supreme Court and Justice De-
partment with reactionary political figures
prepared to go beyond present Constitutional
standards towards a new policy of reaction.
As examples of a move toward fascism,
there are the proceedings of the Conspiracy
trial itself. For example, the government has
admitted illegal wiretapping of defendants
but asks the court to uphold wiretapping in
the overriding interest of national security.
Furthermore, the prosecution ease cites as
-"evidence" of crime speeches given before
and during the convention to public meet-
ings where there was no evidence whatsoever
of a "clear and present danger to the peace."
The Conspiracy is waging a struggle co-
ordinating the defense inside the courtroom
With a political campaign on the outside LO
stop the trial. The defense case will try to
re-enact what happened in Chicago and bring
political figures such as Lyndon Johnson and
Mayor Richard Daley to explain their policies.
Leaders of the civil rights, academic and lib-
eral communities are expected to testify
about what happened in Chicago as well as
ordinary people who were beaten or gassed
in the streets.
The Conspiracy hopes to make part of its
defense a "people's case" and encourages all
witnesses to return to testify.
Since the trial has sparked widespread in-
ternational concern, the Conspiracy hopes
to turn it into a political showdown.
Dave Dellinger, at the request of the Black
nther party, announced the possibility of
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November 12, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 14169
been enlisted as foot soldiers in an opera-
tion mapped out mainly by extremists?
testimony to the present ineffectiveness of
nonviolent, liberal elements in the peace
movement.
Moreover, heavy-handed Nixon administra-
tion reaetion by Deputy Attorney General
Richard G. Kleindienst assures that any vio-
lence on Saturday will be blamed by liberals
on the government, and the avoidance of
violence will be credited by these same lib-
erals to the self-restraint of the far left.
Although liberals belatedly spent this week
in frantic eleventh-hour efforts to co-apt
Saturday's march, they had plenty of ad-
vance warning. The New Mobilization Com-
mittee to End the War in Vietnam (New
Mobe), sponsors of the march, was formed
last July in Cleveland with an executive
committee dominated by supporters of the
Vietcong.
The executive committe is moderate when
compared with the 60-member steering com-
mittee, studded with past and present Com-
munist Party members (including veteran
party functionary Arnold Johnson) . Far more
important than representation by the largely
moribund American Communist Party, how-
ever, is inclusion on the steering committee
of leaders in its newly invigorated Trotskyite
movement.
The steering committee began eclipsing
the executive committee in recent weeks
under the leadership of the Trotskyite So-
cialist Workers Party and its fast growing
youth arm, the Young Socialist Alliance.
Fred Halstead of the Socialist Workers Party
took over planning for a march calculated
to end in violent confrontation.
Participating in planning sessions were
elements even more violence-prone than the
Trotskyites: extreme SDS factions calling
themselves the revolutionary brigade. Wild
scenarios for storming the White House, the
Justice Department, and the South Viet-
namese Embassy Were prepared.
Furthermore, the New Mobe was in closer
contact with Communist Vietnamese official
circles than is generally realized. Ron Young,
a member of the New Mobe steering commit-
tee, journeyed to Stockholm Oct. 11-12 for a
meeting attended by representatives of the
North Vietnam government and the Viet-
cong. Reporting on plans for Nov. 15, Young
urged a worldwide propaganda campaign to
boost the demonstration.
The link between Hanoi and elements of
the New Mobe was again demonstrated Oct. 14
when Premier Pham Van Dong of North
Vietnam sent greetings to American antiwar
demonstrators. Halstead, the Trotskyite
leader, drafted a friendly reply to Hanoi ap-
proved by a majority of the New Mobe's
steering committee. Its transmission was
blocked only by the intervention of Stewart
Meachem of the American Friends Service
Committee, one of the New Mobe's moderates.
Thus far-left orientation of the New Mobe
for weeks has worried liberal doves, including
the youthful leaders of the peaceful Oct. 15
Moratorium. Sen. Charles Goodell of New
York, emerging as a leading congressional foe
of the war, attempted?without success?to
reduce extremist influence inside the New
Mobe and argued against including far left-
ists on the steering committee.
But the liberals, having forgotten the fate
of popular front movements a generation ago
and unwilling to repudiate any antiwar
forces, would not actually break with the
New Mobe. Any chance of that was eliminated
by President Nixon's relatively hardline
speech Nov. 3 and government strategy laid
down at the Justice Department by Klein-
dienst.
Goodell and Sen. George McGovern of
South Dakota, after much deliberation, ac-
cepted invitations to address the demonstra-
tion in hopes of moderating it. Similarly,
moratorium leaders this week have tried to
- insinuate themselves into control of the
march. But the march remains essentially a
project of the far left, constituting a tragic
failure of leadership by liberal foes of the
war.
THE MEANING OF PEACE
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, the news
media tell us that on this coming Satur-
day, there will be a mass demonstration
in Washington against the war in Viet-
nam.
According to what we read the demon-
stration will focus upon a demand for
immediate withdrawal of American
forces in Vietnam. I am sure that many
of those who make such a demand sin-
cerely believe they are advancing the
cause of peace.
Now, Mr. President, I do not question
in any way the right of Americans to
protest and dissent peacefully?a right
which is not enjoyed by those who live
under Communist domination.
But I believe it would be well if those
who are about to demonstrate were also
aware of another important difference
between the free world and the Com-
munists. I refer to the meaning and
purpose of "peace."
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD an
article written by Keyes Beech, the dis-
tinguished foreign correspondent of the
Chicago Daily News, which was pub-
lished in the Philadelphia Enquirer of
November 4, 1969.
There being no objection, the ?article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
HANOI DEFECTORS WARNED UNITED STATES OF
DUPLICITY, "PEACE" BLOODBATH
(By Keyes Beech)
Smcow.?One year ago four senior Com-
munist defcetors from North Vietnam with
a total of 89 years as loyal party members
were interviewed on what they thought of the
U.S. bombing halt over North Vietnam.
In the light of what has happened since
then their comments make interesting read-
ing. Here are excerpts:
Lt. Col. Phan Viet Dung, former Commu-
nist regimental commander: "Hanoi wants
this bombing stop and the apparent peace it
will bring only so that she can better prepare
to gain her ends . . . Even after the bombing
is halted the Paris talks will yield nothing
for the U.S. because Hanoi will then claim
the halt proves the Americans were guilty.
This will be just what they need to boost
morale in the north."
Lt. Col. Huynh Cu, 23 years a party mem-
ber: "You must take a lesson from what hap-
pened in Laos in 1962. When our North Viet-
namese forces attacked we could easily have
taken Vientiane. Then Ho (Chi Minh) or-
dered the troops to pull back rather than risk
any real military intervention by the U.S.
"Now, if North Vietnam moves some troops
out of the South in an apparent move to de-
escalate, the South must not be fooled but
must go and take back the land regardless of
what Hanoi or anybody else says.
"But I don't really understand what the
Americans hope to gain. This is like any
other kind of trading. If you give something,
you must get something. But what are you
going to get in exchange? Nothing but
words . . .
"I want to remind you what an important
Japanese Communist has said. The Westerner
believes war and peace are two different
things. The Westerner thinks It is right to
deceive people in wartime but not in peace-
time.
"The Communist believes that it is also
right to deceive people in peacetime when
making agreements with the enemy because
the Communist believes war and peace are
the same thing.
"Mao (Tse-tung) said the closer to peace,
the greater the danger. Now is the time to be
most alert. The idea of peace may blind
you."
Lt. Col. Le Xuan Chuyen, 21 years a party
member:
"Stopping the bombing is only going to
lengthen the war and eventually you will
suffer greater, not lesser casualties. Also you
will see the antiwar movement in the U.S.
become greater. You will encourage the dem-
onstrators by convincing them they are right.
"When I first heard of the bombing halt
I thought it must be a joke and I laughed.
But when I realized the U.S. was serious I was
dumfounded by their stupidity.
"Of course your people want peace, but
if a cease-fire comes don't be happy. There
will be really nothing to be happy about, for
it will be sure to lead to great suffering
here and many, many deaths * *
"You will see, the deaths here in the South
will be at least one thousand times greater.
But by that time your Western press will
have believed that peace is here and they will
have gone home and won't be around to see
it happen.
"Only the Vietnamese will be left for there
is nowhere for them to go this time. There
are 3 million people on the blood list and
you will have condemned them."
Col. Tran Van Dec, 24 years a party mem-
ber, who led 8000 men in an attack on Saigon
during the 1968 Tet offensive:
"It will be impossible to get Hanoi to keep
her promises. The only promise they will keep
is the one they have made to themselves that
nothing can keep them from eventually con-
quering South Vietnam.
"If there is a cease-fire many people will
think that peace has really come and let
their guard down. Then the Communists will
act suddenly. You must be warned that when
it seems like peace has come, then it will be
the most dangerous time of all."
BRIEFING OF SENATORS ON SALT
NEGOTIATIONS --
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I ask unani-
mous consent that a memorandum to
the Foreign Relations Committee from
my Subcommittee on International Or-
ganization and Disarmament Affairs be
printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the memo-
randum was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
November 12, 1969.
Memorandum to: All Members of Foreign Re-
lations Committee.
From: Albert Gore, Chairman, Subcommittee
on International Organization and Dis-
armament Affairs.
The meeting in Executive Session of the
Subcommittee on Disarmament, which was
to be held at 4 o'clock this afternoon, is can-
celled. As the notice sent to all members of
the Committee yesterday inviting them to
attend the meeting stated, the purpose of
the Executive Session was to receive a brief-
ing from the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency on the forthcoming SALT talks.
An authorized official of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency informed a mem-
ber of the. Committee Staff yesterday after-
noon that the Agency had been instructed
to refer all requests for briefings on the SALT
talks, and all congressional liaison matters
relating to the talks to the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs or to
the Congressional Liaison office of the White
House as the Agency had been directed not
to conduct such briefings itself.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE November 12, 1.969
No one from the Office of the Assistant to
the President for National Seenrity Affairs,
the Congressional Liaison office of the White
House, or the Department cg State (which
has statutory responsibility in this field) has
responded to the aforedescribed Subcommit-
tee request for a briefing on the talks to
begin on November 17th.
This is the first time to my nnowledge that
an Agency charged with a responsibility in
the field of foreign affairs has not been will-
ing, or, as in this case, free, tO meet with the
Disarmament Subcommittee lin a subject on
which the Subcommittee hail had jurisdic-
tion.
The reason for the prohibitien upon the
Agency's freedom to meet With and brief
the Disarmament Subcommittee is beyond
my understanding. It is partinularly mystify-
ing and disturbing in this aine since mem-
bers of the Subcommittee have been in the
forefront in not only urging the necessity
of this conference but have been in the fore-
front in both cooperation with previous Ad-
ministrations and in securing approval of
treaties and agreements in this held of arma-
ment limitation and control.
Inasmuch as the SALT talks will hopefully
produce an agreement for EOM? limitations
regarding nuclear weapons, it is regrettable
that officials charged with ccffiducting these
negotiations are prohibited from briefing re-
sponsible Members of the Senate so that the
Senate will be in a position conscientiously
to discharge its Constitutional responsibili-
ties.
THE ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY
Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, the St.
Lawrence Seaway system is without
doubt a major engineerine accomplish-
ment and has stimulated the economic
development and prosperity of the Great
Lakes region. Although at present unable
to support regularly scheduled U.S.-flag
vessel service, the seaway is indeed en-
titled to its description as the "fourth
coast" of the United States,
At the present time the Ilea way is $148
million in debt. This inclades $129 mil-
lion of outstanding 50-year bonds and
$19 million of accrued Interest debt.
Lately, however, some Proposals have
been advanced stating that the seaway's
debt should be assumed by the Federal
Government. Proponents of seaway re-
financing contend that it IS the only fed-
erally supported waterway that is re-
quired to be self-supporting. They feel
that this is discriminatory.
Such a position was recently stated in
the Senate. The question was posed: "If
the Great Lakes are free and open to all,
why should the seaway linking the lakes
even have toll charges?"
This is an important question. The
answer is quite simple: the legislation
authorizing the St. Lawrence Seaway De-
velopment Corporation was accepted by
the Senate in 1954 on the 'basis that the
seaway would pay its own way. Let me
for a moment refresh tbe memory of
Senators and point out a statement made
on the floor some 15 years ago by the
late Senator Alexander Wiley. On Jan-
uary 13, 1954, Senator 'Wiley, one of
the seaway's most forceful advooates,
upon calling up the seaway legislation
summarized the five reasons why he felt
it should be passed. The No. 3 reason was
that "the project would pay for itself,
and the pending bill would not put an
additional burden on the Treasury."
Senator Wiley no doubt felt then, as
I do now, that the U.S. Treasury already
has enough burdens without imposing
additional and unnecessary ones.
The basic point to stress is that the
Senate authorized the St. Lawrence Sea-
way on the condition and with the un-
derstanding that the seaway would pay
for itself. Any proposal to have the Fed-
eral Government assume all or a part of
the $178 million debt, thus permitting
the seaway to forfeit its obligation,
would constitute a breach of terms and
have very serious implications indeed.
OIL POLLUTION SE i LEMENT
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, as the
conference between the Senate and the
House approaches on the Water Quality
Improvement Act of 1969 (S. 7 and H.R.
4148), I invite the attention of Members
of both Houses of Congress to an article
published today concerning the settle-
ment of oil pollution claims arising from
the Torrey Canyon disaster in 1967.
Although the Governments of France
and England brought suits against the
owners of the tanker for $22 million,
the settlement was made in the amount
of $7.2 million. As the article points out,
Britain alone was estimated to have
spent more than the amount of the set-
tlement in clean up eosts, and no esti-
mate was available from France.
This settlement comes at an auspicious
time, as our conference approaches and
as the International Maritime Consulta-
tive Organization meets in Brussels to
consider changes in international mari-
time law. I hope that both of these bod-
ies will accept the principle which the
Senate approved in passing S. 7 last
month; that is, that the responsibility
for cleanup of oil spill should not be
borne by the public, but must instead be
considered to be a risk of doing busi-
ness.
I ask unanimous consent that the ar-
ticle, published in the Washington Post,
be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
FIRM PAYS Two NATIONS $7.2 MILLION FOR
TORREY CANYON'S OIL DAMAGE
LONDON, November 11.?The American own-
ers of the oil tanker Torrey Canyon paid
$7.2 million today to Britain and France
in an out-of-court settlement for oil pollu-
tion claims filed after the giant ship ran
aground off southwest England in March,
1967.
The payment, 'split evenly between the
two nations, came from the Barracuda Tank-
er Corp. in Bermuda, a subsidiary of the
Union Oil of California. The 119,000-ton ves-
sel was under charter to Union Oil when it
broke apart and spilled about 35 million
gallons of crude oil.
The joint government announcement also
said the owners had agreed to set aside an-
other $60,000 to compensate any claims from
persons not already reimbursed by the gov-
ernments for their losses.
BIGGEST SETTLEMENT
British Attorney General Sir Elwyn Jones
told the House of Commons it was "full and
final settlement of the claims of the two
governments." Lloyd's insurance brokers
said they believed it was the biggest settle-
ment in marine history for oil claims.
Britain virtually assured itself of legal
satisfaction recently when it taught the Tor-
rey Canyons sister ship, the Lake Palourde,
in Singapore harbor -when its captain put
in for some minor supplies.
In order to gain the ship's release, the
Barracuda firm was required to post a bond
of $7.2 million?the precise amount of to-
day's settlement.
$22 MILLION SOUGHT
In the aftermath of the Torrey Canyon
spillage, the two governments sued the tank-
er owner for $22 million. But the owners
claimed that under maritime law they were
liable only for a certain value per ton of the
ship's weight, which Would have been $4.2
million.
In addition, there was a jurisdictional
problem: the ship ran aground on the
Seven Stones rocks off Land's End, which is
British. But its cargo damaged 40 miles of
French beach as well as 120 miles of English
coastline.
In view of the "uncertainties, inevitable
delays and expense of litigation, complex and
unique points of law involved in proving
liability, and finally the difficulty in quali-
fying and proving damages," Sir Elwyn told
Parliament -this settlement is eminently fair
and satisfactory to all parties."
Britain was estimated to have spent more
than $7.2 million in 1967 to save beaches and
wildlife from the oil. An estimated 50,000 sea
birds perished and more than 25 million
gallons of detergent Were used to emulsify
the crude oil so the beacheaand birds eould
be cleaned. No French estimate was available.
The British also wanted the payment to
cover the cost of the Royal Air Force bomb-
ing runs that finally destroyed the ship and
sent it to the bottom. The _ship reportedly
was insured for $14 million.
Because the ship was registered in Liberia,
a Liberian Board of Inquiry investigated and
found Capt. Pastrengo Rugiati of Genoa,
Italy, guilty of "a high degree of negligence."
He is reportedly a broken man, his career
and health shattered.
The Settlement came while international
lawyers are meeting in Brussels to consider
revisions to maritime law covering oil tanker
accidents.
The Union Oil Co. also faces claims involv-
ing an offshore rig in the Santa Barbara
channel of California that leaked in January,
creating an 800-square-mile oil slick that
polluted more than 25 miles of coastline.
LEROY G. AUGENSTEIN
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I invite
attention to the unfortunate death of
Dr. Leroy G. Augenstein, a personal
friend and the distinguidhed chairman
of the Biophysics Department at Mich-
igan State University. He was killed
Saturday, November 8, 1989, in the crash
of his private plane.
Dr. Augenstein served ably and with
imagination as a member of the State
board of education.
His interests and pursuits were wide
and varied. He was considered an expert
in several fields of scientific endeavor.
Regarded as a national authority in the
field of genetics, he authored a book on
the science of genetic manipulation en-
titled "Come Let Us Play God."
He had served as a research admin-
istrator for the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion. He was a national lecturer for the
AEC, and was a consultant to the Amer-
ican Institute of Biological Sciences. He
had served as science coordinator for the
Seattle World's Fair.
Dr. Augenstein was also a theologian,
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..,.?
MIRV, Beipg
By JOHN W. FINNEY
special to The New York Ttmes
HELSINKI, Finland, Nov. 16
?Probably no issue will domi
nate the American-Soviet talks
on limiting strategic arms
which begin here tomorrow,
more than a weapon that both
sides are testing with an ur-
gent secrecy over their missile
ranges in the Atlantic and Pa-
cific Oceans.
The weapon is known by
one of those forbidding' acro-
nyms of the missile age?
MIRV, which stands for "mul-
tiple independently targetable
re-entry vehicle."
Not since the hydrogen
bomb was developed 15 years
ago and then combined with
an intercontinental missile has
any weapon so threatened to
accelerate and expand the
atomic arms race as MIRV
promises to do unless its de-
velopment can be checked
while it is still in the test
stage.
Huge Increase in Warheads
With MIRV's each side will
be able to increase greatly the
number of thermonuclear war-
heads it can launch without
Increasing its number of mis-
siles. Instead of just one war-
head to a missile, there will be
several up to a dozen on the
United States Polaris missile,
for example?that can be
guided to widely separated tar-
gets.
Under current plans for
"MIRVing" the Polaris and
Minuteman missiles, the Unit-
ed States would increase its
strategic warheads from the
current level of 2,400 to some
8,000. Similarly, if the Soviet
Union places MIRV's on its
large SS-9 intercontinental
missile,, as predicted by the
Pentagon, the Soviet stockpile
of strategic warheads will mul-
tiply from 1,000 to more than
5,000.
With the seemingly inexor-
able pace of weapons tech-
nology, MIRV is placing
deadline, still unacknowledged,
on the outcome of the talks
between the United States and
the Soviet Union.
Halfway Through Tests
The United States is about
halfway through a program of
MIRV test flights that began in
September, 1968, and by late
next year it plans to start de-
ploying the warheads atop
Minuteman III intercontinental
missiles and on the new
Poseidon missile for the Polaris
missile submarines.
Over the last year the So-
viet 'Union has been testing
triplet warheads for its SS-9
missile, and the stated presump-
tion of the Pentagon is that
m?s 0
Tested by Both Sides, Is a Key issue at Arms Talks
will begin ,to deployed "in the
latter half of next year."
.Whether the Soviet tiplet
represents-anew oener f
? till
r of consider
S.
The nrnnonderant o ? inior_of
analysts is
goviet triolet a .less 'ad-
vanced generation knowrrs
I' v;or - multiple re-efiltry
v? ? " ke MI* v's,
ono be weed to me rv ? ual
Contradictor Testimony
Nevertheless, in the course
of arguing for the safeguard
missile defense system, Penta-
gon officials asserted that the
Soviet multiple warheads
seemed to be falling in an in-
dividual and uniform pattern
corresponding to the displace-
ment of the United States'
Minuteman missile silos. And in
testimony in August before the
House Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee, Dr. John S. Foster, direc-
tor of defense research and
engineering, offered the judg-
ment that "the Soviet triplet
probably is a MIRV."
As is being emphasized by
Soviet as well as American
scientists, if MIRV develop-
ment is to be stopped, it will
have to be in the flight test
stage. Once MIRrs are' de-
ployed, aerial photography can-
not detect multiple warheads,
and there is no way to check
on them as part of an arms-
control agreement except
through on-site inspection of
individual missiles?a step that
neither the United States nor
the Soviet Union is likely to
accept.
A crucial issue in the forth-
coming talks, therefore, is
whether either side is prepared
to offer or accept a moratorium
on MIRV tests.
? From all advance indications,
the United States delegation is
neither prepared nor authorized
to propose a moratorium, al-
though in a noncommittal fash-
ion it may raise the idea to
test Soviet reaction.
Resistance Rises in Pentagon
Even if the Soviet reaction
is favorable, there is consider-
able question whether the
Nixon Administration, in the
ensuing negotiations, would be
prepared to propose a mora-
torium. Considerable resistance
to it is beginning to build up in
the Pentagon, which in recent
weeks has begun to emphasize
the problems of effectively
monitoring Soviet MIRV tests
and to insist that no mora-
torium should be entered into
without an accompanying limi-
tation on Sovielmialiqq.ywit p
antiballistiC missWe, or M's._
Lit.P
SW.
4
IV/ Irs.
salt
The New York Times Nov. 17, 1469
MIRV missiles may carry varying numbers Of warheads
ment specialists inside and out-
side the Government, the MIRV
program illustrates how weap-
ons are developed because they
are technically feasible and
then acquire a life and momen-
tum of th6r own that cannot
be stopped even though? their
original justification has
changed or disappeared.
The MIRV program of the Air
Force and the Navy had its con-
ception in 1960-61 when the
Pentagon first begin to pick up
intelligence information that the
Soviet Union might be prepar-
ing to deploy antimissile de-
fenses around its principal
cities.
To counter such a move,
which threatened to nullify the
United States retaliatory threat
against Soviet cities, the Penta-
gon began research on "pene-
tration aids" to overwhelm any
Soviet antimissile defenses.
Decoys First Considered
Initially the Pentagon thought
in terms of unarmed decoys to
confuse and overwhelm the
Soviet defenses, permitting
some of the actual warheads to
get through to their targets. But
according to well-informed of-
ficials it was soon acknowl-
edged that the decoys would
have to be so heavy that it
would be preferable to make
"penetration aids" into actual
warheads.
The first step, therefore, was
to develop multiple, or MRV,
warheads, such as those now
carried by the A-3 Polaris mis-
siles.
This approach was cast aside
in 1964 when it was discovered
that the Soviet Union was de-
veloping the large Galosh mis-
sile for its defenses, at least
around Moscow. The Galosh
missile?the name originated by
NATO specialists ?could carry
a large enough warhead to de-
stroy simultaneously several
closely grouped MRV warheads.
As an alternate, therefore,
the Pentagon began work on
MIRV warheads, which had be-
come feasible because of im-
heads. The MIRV warheads,
planners feel, would be too
widely dispersed to be shot
down by a single Galosh mis-
sile.
To avoid provoking the Soviet
Union into a counterreaction,
the MIRV prograni was carried
forward with considerable se-
crecy until 1967.
Then, however, to combat
military and Congressional pres-
sures for more offensive and
defensive weapons to offset the
Soviet antimissile system, the
Pentagon, by a decision of
Robert S. McNamara, then Sec-
retary of Defense, decided to
publicize the MIRV program.
At that point, the MIRV pro-
gram acquired a new impetus
and justification. As one former
high-ranking official put it:
MIRV's became the brainchild
of the McNamara whiz kids.
Aside from all the military ar-
guments, the MIRV program
now had a "cost effectiveness"
justification: the McNamara ci-
vilian analysts could advertise
it as cheaper than building more
offensive missiles to counter fbe
Soviet antimissile threat.
Only belatedly, as officials
now acknowledge, did either the
Defense Department or the dis-
armament agency begin to con-
sider the arms control implica-
tions of the program and the
way in which it was threatening
to accelerate the nuclear arms
race.
Example of Key Cycle
MIRV's represent an example
of the "action-reaction" cycle
thas has stimulated the arms
race. One side builds an anti-
missile system and the other
starts developing multiple war-
heads to penetrate the defense.
But as one side acquires
MIRV's, the other side begins
to worry that its cities and its
retaliatory forces will be de-
stroyed by the new multitude of
warheads so it begins building
more defenses or increasing its
number of offensive retaliatory
missiles.
Tril rqUIPIPPPelfin
for example, was justified psi-
materials to protect the _w_ar-
madly on the premise that the
Soviet Union was developing
multiple warheads to destroy
the retaliatory force of Minute-
man missiles. But the Soviet in-
tention may have ben different.
Some former Pentagon scien-
tists feel the Soviet purpose
may have beeen to offset the
American superiority in missile
warheads.
Nevertheless, for several
years, according to Officials
then in positions of authotity,
the 'MIRV program continued
on its own technological and
military momentum without
questions being raised as to
what effect it was likely to
have on the arms race.
This oversight, as the offi-
cials describe it, is attributed
in part to the very secrecy of
the MIRV program as well as
to its espousal by the Mc-
Namara group, which thought
that with MIRV's it was keep-
ing the military in check. But
it also occurred partly because
the Defense Department's Bu-
reau of International Security
Affairs -- then the Pentagon's
disarmament faction ? was
preoccupied with the antimis-
sile issue and the Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency
with negotiation of the treaty
to stop the spread of nuclear
weapons.
The arms control issue was
finally joined in June and July
of 1968 when a decision had
to be made on whether, to au-
thorize a two-year MIRV tspt
flight program, beginning in
September, 1968.
At that point the Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency
made what former officials
now contend was a crucial mis-
take. The Johnson Administra-
tion was preparing for the talks
on limiting strategic arms,
which were expected to begin
in September. Rather than raise
the issue of a halt in MIRV
testing and thus cause a policy
division with the military, the
disarmament agency decided to
present no objections to the
MIRV test series.
Instead, the agency decided
to enter the talks with the
hope that the moratorium Issue
would be quickly raised, end-
ing the Pentagon's test-flight
series.
Accuracy Is Doubted
Because of the Soviet-led in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia in
August, 1968, the start of the
talks was postponed for 14
months. Meanwhile the MIRV
test program has proceeded
to the point where even with
a moratorium the Russians
might wonder whether the
United States was ready to de-
ploy multiple warheads.
If one technical hope re-
040 01-0
mains for a moratorium, in the
opinion of disarmament offi-
cials, it is that neither side
has yet developed multiple
warheads with sufficient accu-
racy to attack enemy missiles,
thus presenting what is called
a first-strike threat. Such a de-
velopment would upset the
present balance, which is based
on mutual deterrence ? the
principle that either side could
destroy the other no matter
which attacked first.
? So long as MIRV's are capa-
ble only of hitting cities, pre-
sumably each side would be
willing to enter into an agree-
ment to freeze missile devel-
opment because of a realiza-
tion that even with multiple
warheads a country would not
be able to prevent a retalia-
tory strike.
In arguing against a mora-
torium on MIRV testing, Dr.
Foster, the defense research di-
rector, has stressed that the
possibility that the Soviet Un-
ion could develop high-accu-
racy warheads through clan-
destine means, such as guid-
ance tests with single warheads
that could not be monitored
by the United States. Similar-
ly, the Soviet Union could ar-
gue that the United States
could improve the accuracy of
its Warheads, even with a mor-
atorium.
With its larger warheads, the
Soviet Union does not need
as much accuracy for the mul-
tiple warheads of the SS-9, a
point stressed by Dr. Foster.
But Dr. Herbert F. York, a
former director of defense re-
search, pointed out in recent
testimony before the House
Foreign Affairs Committee that
the United States in the last
10 years had achieved a ten-
fold improvement in the accu-
racy of its missiles.
With only an additional two-
fold improvement, he said, the
smaller United States MIRV
warheads probably Could be
made accurate enough to at-
tack Soviet missile sites?an I
assertion presumably not over-
looked by Soviet officials as
they contemplate the desirabil-
ity of a moratorium.
November 17,Appgved For ItefteREM
compromise agreed to by the House-
Senate conferees.
Enforcement experience has proven
the wisdom of the House position. Both
the Departments of Justice and Treasury
feel that these recordkeeping require-
ments are of little law enforcement value.
These provisions are an unnecessary
hindrance to legitimate sportsmen and
provide a tremendous bookkeeping bur-
den to the operators of small stores.
Further, they are practically impossible
to enforce.
To alleviate this situation, I intro-
duced, earlier this year, a bill that would
exempt sporting ammunition from the
law. This legislation has been passed by
the Senate as an amendment to the bill
to extend the interest equalization tax.
When the House is asked to act upon
the Senate amendments to the interest
equalization tax bill, I understand that a
motion will be made to instruct the man-
agers on behalf of the House to accept
the Senate amendment?I intend to
support th:-.t motion.
WHAT DO MOBILIZATION MARCH-
ERS WANT HANOI TO DO?
(Mr. WAGGONNER asked and was giv-
en permission to address the House for
1 minute and to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. WAGGONNER. Mr. Speaker, over
the weekend the news media, especially
the newspapers reported extensively the
events surrounding the mobilization
march in Washington., I like everybody
else, have an opinion about the mobiliza-
tion march. Each individual is entitled to
his or her opinion. I admit readily that
there were any number of people?how
many, I do not know, and neither does
anyone else?who participated, who hon-
estly thought they were doing what they
ought to 'do to serve the best interests of
this country to achieve peace.
But, Mr. Speaker, for the life of me, I
do not see how anybody can classify any
individual who participated in that
march who carried a Vietcong or a Com-
munist flag as being friendly toward
peace or us while chanting that Ho Chi
Minh would win. Mr. Speaker, they are
on the other side. For this group the
mobilization march was a rally around
the flag, but it was a rally around the
Vietcong and Communist flag.
The news media, including the news-
papers and other sectors of the media,
have reported their demands. They want
the President to quit and 'bring the boys
home now without concern for the con-
sequences. They want peace, they say. I
do not know an American who does not
want peace. It must, however, be an hon-
orable peace.
I have done it before, but again I am
going to ask, and I am going to keep ask-
ing until somebody who supports this
movement gives me an answer: What do
you or they want the Vietcong to do?
What do you or they want Hanoi to do?
What are they being asked to do? As yet
no demands have been made of the Viet-
cong. I ask why? Do the supporters of the
movement want Hanoi to go on and win,
or do they just want us to quit? It is time
to spehk up and rally around our flag.
JA7RDP71B00364R000300040001-0
ILORD? HOUSE
SECURITY OF UN ED STATES MUST
NOT BE SACRIFICED BY ARMS
LIMITATION AGREEMENT
(Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama asked
and was given permission to address the
House for 1 minute and to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Mr.
Speaker, the first of the preliminary talks
between the United States and the
U.S.S.R. on arms limitations begins to-
day. Off and on for the last 20 years
such discussions were planned, or
thought about, or nearly begun, but they
never really got meaningfully underway.
In the United Nations disarmament talks
are a perennial matter for useless ora-
tory because nobody ever really gets
down to serious discussion.
Now, perhaps, meaningful negotiations
dealing with the limitation of defense
armaments can be taken up between the
world's two superpowers. Talks, though,
do not mean surrender. The U.S. defenses
are the best in the world, a fact that is
undeniable. What the talks hope to ac-
complish, however, is a halt in further
escalation of the arms race. It would be
nice to be able to stop the useless stock-
piling and duplication of first-strike and
second-strike weapons.
One strong word of caution is neces-
sary though. The security of the United
States cannot and must not be sacri-
ficed in any agreement. For years, the
Soviet Union has adamantly dismissed
the proposal for an adequate system of
checks. Unless we can be absolutely cer-
tain that the other side is keeping its
half of any arms limitation bargain, we
cannot enter into such an agreemt and
still feel secure as a nation against out-
side aggression. History only too clearly
shows that the Soviets say one thing and
do another. An inadvertent weakening of
our defense posture by any means is the
one mistake that is only made once.
THIRTEENTH ANkUAL REPORT OF
SURGEON GENERAL OF PUBLIC
HEALTH SERVICE?MESSAGE
FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE
? UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO.
91-193)
The SPEAKER laid before the House
the following message from the President
of the United States; which was read,
and, together with the accompanying
papers, referred to the Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce and
ordered to be printed with illustrations:
To the Congress of the United States:
Pursuant to the provisions of title VII
of the Public Health Service Act, as
amended, I transmit herewith, for the
'Information of the Congress, the
thirteenth annual report of the Surgeon
General of the Public Health Service
summarizing the activities of the Health
Research Facilities Construction Pro-
gram for fiscal year 1968.
RICHARD NIXON.
THE WHITE HOUSE, November 1, 1969,
CONSENT CALENDAR
The SPEAKER. This is Consent Cal-
endar day. The Clerk will call the first
bill on the Consent Calendar.
1110897
PROVIDING FOR THE CONVEYANCE
OF CERTAIN REAL PROPERTY OF
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO
THE BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUC-
TION, OKALOOSA COUNTY, FLA.
The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 7618) to
provide for the conveyance of certain
real property of the Federal Government
to the Board of Public Instruction, Oka-
loosa County, Fla.
The SPEAKER. Is there , objection to
the present consideration of the bill?
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, reserving
the right to object, since the majority
leadership has seen fit to schedule this
bill under a suspension of the rules, I
withdraw my reservation of objection
and ask unanimous consent that the bill
be passed over without prejudice.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from Iowa?
There was no objection.
CONNECTICUT-NEW YORK RAIL-
ROAD PASSENGER TRANSPORTA-
TION COMPACT
The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 14646)
granting the consent of Congress to the
Connecticut-New York Railroad pas-
senger transportation compact.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the present consideration of the bill?
Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania. Mr.
Speaker, reserving the right to object, I
would like to have something in the
as the record states it is going to cost
if this compact is signed. I would first
of all like to pose a question. Inasmuch
as the RECORD states it is going to cost
huge sums of money, I would like to know
what it is going to cost for these two au-
thorities to acquire the New York, New
Haven & Hartford Railroad.
Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Speaker, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania. First,
I am interested in what the total cost
will be to acquire this system by these
authorities.
Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Speaker, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania. I
yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.
Mr. ICASTENMEIER. I must advise the
gentleman that it is not really the pre-
rogative of the subcommittee of the Ju-
diciary Committee to make inquiries into
the actual financing itself. We merely
grant consent for the entities, the Con-
necticut and New. York entities, to act in
concert with respect to their transporta-
tion problems.
One may note from the letter of the.
Governor of New York how he hopes to
acquire financing, but this is not up to
the Judiciary Committee to verify. That
is exclusively a problem for the entities
of the two States, and they themselves
will have to deal with it in due course.
Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania. Mr.
Speaker, the reason I am asking the ques-
tion as to what the total cost will be is
that the record before us indicates they
are very proud they have already ar-
ranged for some $58 million in State and
Federal financing and hope it will go to
$80 million.
I wonder if this compact is agreed to
today it will pave the way for a good
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iv-uv-enruer 17, 1969
many hundreds of millions of dollars of
Federal funds to do this, rather than for
the authorities to go out and sell bonds
and do it in a good, busineeilike way.
Will the gentleman answer that
question?
Mr. KASTENMEIER. If the gentle-
man will yield further, we do not tell the
entities involved how they may do busi-
ness in this connection, how they may
finance their transportation authority.
As the gentleman will note from the
report, there are several activities which
are authorized under the compact;
namely, the acquisition of assets of the
existing railroad, the repair and rehabili-
tation of these assets, the disposition of
these assets, and the operation of the
service or contract for its operation.
We do understand that there will be
in connection with this an application for
financing. This presumably will be Fed-
eral, State, or other financing, but we are
not in a position to dictate to the States
or to these entities what mode they will
use for financing of this particular
authority.
Indeed, if it is their intention to do so,
they must come to the Federal Govern-
ment in due course, or the State govern-
ment or other entities, and make appli-
cation for financing and obtain approval,
from the Department of Transportation
or other agencies.
This was not within the purview of the
Judiciary Committee in terms of making
a judgment as to how they should
proceed.
Mr. MESKILL. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania. I
yield to the gentleman from Connecticut.
(Mr. MESKILL asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. MESKILL. Mr. Speaker, HR.
14646 is a bill to grant congressional con-
sent to an interstate railroad passenger
transportation compact between Con-
necticut and New York to improve com-
muter transportation between the two
States. The bill is cosponsored by all the
members of the Connecticut delegation.
It is cosponsored by members of the New
York delegation representing areas in-
terested in the improvement of commuter
transportation. Similar legislation has
been introduced on the Senate side and
is sponsored by Senator Doan, Senator
RIBICOFF, Senator JAVITS, and Senator
GOODELL. This legislation has the support
of both parties; it has the support of
transportation-conscious Members of
both States.
As you are all aware, under provisions
of article I, section 10, of the Constitu-
tion of the United States,approval of the
Congress is required for all interstate
compacts. The legislation,nassed by the
Legislatures of New York-and Connecti-
cut require Congress to grant its approval
before December 31, 19694 for the inter-
state compact to become effective.
The interstate compact itself is de-
signed to allow New York and Connecti-
cut to enter into an agreement to im-
prove passenger railroad Bet vice between
the two States. Commuter railroad serv-
ice between New York and Connecticu
is sorely deficient at the present. The
service is undependable, unpleasant, in
efficient, and unsafe.
If Congress gives its approval to this
interstate compact, New York and Con-
necticut can 'begin to modernize their
ailing commuter service. HR. 14646 will
permit the two States to lease or acquire
the assets of the old New Haven Railroad
and contract wth the Penn Central Sys-
tem to operate a modern, efficient com-
muter service.
As a result of the two-State agree-
ment, $56 million would be made avail-
able to improve service. The amount of
$28 million will come from a grant from
the Department of Transportation. In
addition each State is pledged to put up
$14 million of its own to buy new cars and
upgrade the service.
The Department of Transportation
has given its approval to the compact.
So has the Bureau of the Budget. The
Judiciary Committee has recommended
that Congress grant its assent to the
compact.
Mr. Speaker, improved railroad pas-
senger service between these two States
is essential. We need to diversify our sys-
tems of ground transportation. Auto-
mobile traffic clogs or highways. I am
afraid it will worsen before it improves.
We must act now to modernize this im-
portant part of our transportation net-
work. We must strive for a balanced sys-
tem of transportation. This interstate
compact is the main hope that something
can and will be done to help the long-
suffering commuter who would prefer to
ride the rails than to sit in long lines
of automobile traffic.
Mr. Speaker, I ask the Congress to give
its assent to this interstate compact. H.R.
14646 is vitally important to both Con-
necticut and New York.
Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania. Mr.
Speaker, of course the gentleman has
not really been able to answer the ques-
tion as to how much money this propo-
sal will cost and whether the major fi-
nancing is going to be by the Federal
Government. I have a suspicion that the
Federal Government is the one which
is going to buy this railroad and which
is going to pay for operating it.
It does not seem to me that anybody
has made that point, as far as I know,
that they are going to be privately fi-
nanced by New York brokers and invest-
ment people in New York.
Mr. MESKILL. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania. I yield
to the gentleman from Connecticut.
Mr. MESKILL. All we are being asked
to do_ today is to confirm an agreement
which has been entered into between the
respective transportation authorities of
the two States. This in no way com-
mits the Federal Government to the ex-
penditure of any funds. All we are doing,
really, is giving our blessing to a legal
entity which could then turn around and
make application for funds. If this legal
authority is not given, then there will
be no legal entity to make this applica-
tion. The House is not being asked in
advance to commit itself to make an ex-
penditure of funds. The only legislative
bodies that have committed themselves
t are those of the States of New York and
Connecticut.
Mr. PICKLE. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield further?
Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania. Yes.
I yield to the gentleman.
Mr. PICKLE. I want to ask the gen-
tleman from Connecticut if it is con-
templated that you will ask the Federal
Government for funds for the operation
of this compact.
Mr. MESKILL. Yes. The answer to the
gentleman would be in the affirmative.
It is contemplated that one-half of the
$56 million would be applied for from the
DOT. The DOT has already indicated its
approval with knowledge of this, and
the Bureau of the Budget has also in-
dicated its approval. What has hap-
pened here, I would tell the gentleman
from Texas, is that the New York, New
Haven & Hartford Railroad has been de-
func?, and operating in the red and is
at the point of bankruptcy. In order to
continue the passenger services to the
people of Connecticut, the Penn Central
Railroad finally agreed to merge with
and take over the New Haven Railroad,
but it was only interested in taking over
their freight services and not interested
in their passenger services because they
were not profitable. -Finally approval for
the takeover was given provided that the
passenger services were retained. In
order to retain and improve the serv-
ices it would be necessary for a sub-
stantial expenditure of funds for the
acquisition of rights-of-way, improve-
ment of personal property and real es-
tate, and also for the disposition of some
property which was no longer needed. It
was for the reason that the legislatures
of the two States agreed to this compact,
which, of course, needs the ratification
of the Congress. I Would also point out
we are not here emitting ourselves to
the expenditure of funds, although we
must state that there will be an ap-
plication made for Federal funds of ap-
proximately $28 millionAn amount. I
would say further that time is of the
essence here, because if this compact
is not approved by the Congress by De-
cember 31 of this year by this and the
other body, then the actions of both
legislative bodies of the States will be
void.
Mr. PICKLE. I notice that in the stip-
ulation in the report action will be ex-
pected by the end of this year, but this
further complicates the -matter as far
as I am concerned. Our Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the
House has been holding extensive hear-
ings on this type of matter. How can we
say what is the best approach to this
railroad without having looked into it
extensively? Over the years the Fed-
eral Government has not involved itself
in the operation Of any of these lines.
Federal assistance in this area has been
carefully avoided. If we try to find an
approach to train and passenger service,
I question the wisdom of comitting the
Federal Government to amatter of help-
ing individual rail lines at this point.
It seems to me the entire question of
passenger train service in this country
ought to be tied together. I know that
the New Haven is in trouble. I know
many of the passenger -carriers of our
country are in trottble. nut if we say to-
day that we are giving a grant to this
particular railroad and not to others, we
might be indulging in an inconsistency.
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The Metropolitan's loans include an ala-
baster fragment of a relief of the crucifixion
that the museum purchased in 1936 but has
never got around to exhibiting.
Bret Waller, the director of the University
of Kansas Art Museum, and J. L. Schrader,
who with Waller arranged the exhibition and
has written an excellent catalogue, found the
fragment when they were allowed to go
through the Metropolitan's storage rooms in
their search for appropriate material.
This doesn't mean that the show is made
up of leftovers. Rather the reverse. It is an
exhibition in which each piece is selected for
its effectiveness in the development of a
theme as well as for its esthetic quality.
Asked how he negotiated so many impor-
tant loans, Waller said that while "nobody
wants to lend something beautiful to a mu-
seum out in Kansas just so people can come
and gawk at it," museums and collectors will
go out of their way for an exhibition with a
subject both imaginative and scholarly and
with a serious educational reason for being.
It is good to know that while the Metro-
politan Museum subjects this city to an ex-
hibition as vicious as the current "New York
Painting and Sculpture," it is justifying its
existence in another direction.
Looking at this exhibition I kept thinking
how much it would have meant to me as a
student. Huizinga's book was required
reading and I found it a combination of fas-
cinating and far-removed. It took years of
museum-going and travel to make it come
alive, but a couple of hours in Lawrence
made me want to read it again.
This is the kind of thing museums should
be doing, whether they are dealing with an-
tiquity, the middle ages, or the 20th century.
A SURVEY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE UNITED STATES
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the
President's Commission for the Observ-
ance of Human Rights Year 1968 com-
pleted its activities on January 30, 1969,
1 year after its establishment by Ex-
ecutive order. The purpose of this Com-
mission had been to give the American
people a greater understanding of the
principles of human rights, as found in
the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly in December of 1948,
and the Constitution and in the laws of
the United States.
The President's Commission issued a
publication entitled "For Free Men in a
Free World" which has as its purpose to
survey human rights in the United
States. The Commission's most distin-
guished Chairman, W. Averell Harriman,
stated:
This publication aims to advance the
President's purpose in establishing this Com-
mission, and to fulfill the request of the
General Assembly for a review of our domes-
tic laws and practices against the standards
set in the Universal Declaration. If this pub-
lication can contribute to a pride in the past,
and to an awareness of future needs, and a
national determination to deal with the
problems of human rights that confront us,
it will have advanced the cause of freedom.
I applaud the fine work by the Presi-
dent's Commission in bringing together
in a single publication such a fine com-
mentary on human rights in the United
States. During the next few days, I will
offer a number of illustrations from this
fine work to substantiate my continuing
efforts to see the Senate ratify the Hu-
man Rights Conventions on Political
Rights for Women, on Forced Labor, and
on Genocide. Certainly if the Senate will
face these issues head on and meet our
moral obligations to ratify them, then
we will be able to say in Ambassador
Harriman's word's, we will have "ad-
vanced the cause of freedom."
SALT TALXS
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, today, the
United States and the Soviet Union begin
what Secretary of State William P.
Rogers described last week as "the most
critical negotiations on disarmament
ever undertaken." Leaders from both
countries have expressed the hope that
for the first time since World War II, the
two major nuclear powers can enter seri-
ous negotiations on an agreement to
control offensive and defensive strategic
nuclear weapons.
Beginning with the first American
proposal for the international control of
atomic energy presented by Bernard M.
Baruch at the United Nations Atomic
Energy Commission in 1945, there have
been repeated attempts to negotiate an
arms control agreement. Our success has
largely been in a number of peripheral
pacts, including the most recent agree-
ment to insure that the world's seabeds
are reserved for peaceful purposes only
and the nonproliferation treaty. Only by
strenuous and often frustrating negotia-
tions have we taken these initial steps.
But these agreements provide a basis for
today's negotiations, negotiations which
will undoubtedly be strenuous and frus-
trating. The American people must real-
ize that there are no quick answers in
these negotiations. They may proceed for
months with little evidence of agreement,
but a start must be made. Throughout
the negotiations in Helsinki and
thereafter, the United States must be
patient and resourceful, as the United
States and the Soviet Union move into
a new phase of the arms race, more
deadly and more expensive with the de-
velopment of multiple-warhead systems
for intercontinental ballistic missiles and
by the creation of an anti-ballistic-mis-
sile defense system.
President Nixon stated the challenge
in his inaugural address:
After a period of confrontation, we are
enterng an era of negotiation. Let all nations
know that during this administration our
lines of communication will be open. . . .
I know that peace does not come through
wishing for it?that there is no substitute
for days and even years of patient and pro-
longed diplomacy.
Negotiation and even signing of an
agreement to control strategic weapons
will not bring peace to a troubled world.
But this is a major step and one that we
all hope will be successful.
BIAFRA : A TRAGEDY FOR
HUMANITY
Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President,
Biafra continues to be a great tragedy
for all humanity, a grim exhibit of hun-
ger and starvation. It is important to
remember that while tragedy only
touches us periodically, Biafra's suffer-
ing continues every day.
This month's Harper's magazine con-
tains an article entitled "My Summer
Vacation in Biafra," written by Mr. Her-
bert Gold. It serves as a reminder of the
conditions that are destroying a genera-
tion of Biafrans. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that this article be
printed in tylie RECORD at the conclusion
of my remarks.
Another noteworthy article on the sub-
ject of Biafra was published in the Wash-
ington Post of November 14, 1969. The
article, written by Jim Hoagland, of the
Washington Post Foreign Service is en-
titled "How Many Children Dying in
Biafra? No one Can Say?" I ask unani-
mous consent that this article also be
printed in the RECORD at the conclusion
of my remarks.
The article in the Post contains some
shocking revelations. 'It is there stated:
How can I tell you how many children are
dying a day? Dr. Aaron Ofekwunigwe, Biafra's
leading child specialist, asked with exaspera-
tion. "Pick any number you like and I'll say
it. The point is they are dying."
He spoke after walking through the grim
last hope ward at the Santana Hospital,
which houses 600 children suffering from
Kwashiokor, the killing protein deficiency
disease.
Mr. President, I know the effort to feed
the hungry in Biafra is being complicated
and frustrated by the Nigerian blockade
and Nigerian-Biafran relations. The
shooting down of the Red Cross plane by
the Nigerians on June 5, 1969, has pro-
duced the worst crisis yet. As Father
Byrne, a Catholic priest on Sao Tome?
the jumping off point for relief flights?
stated:
We have the food; we just cannot get it to
them. These children know nothing about
secession, economic blockade, political in-
volvement. They only know they are starving.
Mr. President, this Nation and all other
nations everywhere must take every
means, seek every opportunity, and go to
any reasonable length to bring about a
resumption of a full contingent of relief
flights immediately. Two months from
now it may be too late.
There being no objection, the items
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
MY SUMMER VACATION IN BIAFRA
(By Herbert Gold)
I am invited by telephone by a Committee
for Biafran Writers and Artists and I accept
at once. The lady at the other end of the
wire in New York tells me about shots and
preparations and then begins to giggle. "You
mean you're really going? You're not going
to think about it and call back and say you
can't? Do you know there isn't any place to
sleep and you may not eat for a week?"
It's odd to hear her laughter across the
continent.
Thinking to get some information, I tele-
phoned a Biafran relief organization in San
Francisco. The reverend in charge was in
conference, but I spoke to an assistant. "I'm
going to Biafra on Monday," I said.
"You're going to be off on Monday?" he
asked.
"Biafra!" I said.
"Oh, Biafra," he said. "Yeah, man. Cool.
Why?"
Next I called an editor to whom I sug-
gested writing about this trip. "Oh Jesus,
we're up to our in Biafran babies." I
agree. I skip those articles, too. I have an
image of the swollen belly and the mournful
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eyes, and it's classified like the Vietnam war:
a horror with which I continue to live, like
everyone else.
GETTING THERE
Biafra makes bad dreams for people who-
refuse to dream.
While the moon rocket splashee down, and
all over the front pages, the red-haired
babies are buried in the News of the Week in
Review. I'd heard about kwashiorkor, "the-
red-man's disease." But the hair looks more
likea crispy grayish-red, and it doesn't look
like hair?more like something weakly ex-
truded by a disoriented body, and it looks-
as if it would break if you bent it.
"Hunger is a legitimate weapon of war,"
says one of the Nigerian generals. The
Nigerians use it to destroy the Biafrans. Th
Biafrans use it to try to arouse the atrocity-
drugged conscience of the world. The chil-
dren die to these purposes.
These abstractions are not the truth of it.
The truth here is suffering and the sufferers
cannot tell it and I am trying to write my
way out of shock. Floating through the suf-
fering, immune and shaken, sleepless and
immune, full of rage and immune.
Our party: Leslie Fiedler, literary critic.
Miriam Reik, Professor of English ("Just call
me Dr. Reik"). Diana Davies, who calls her-
self "The Pack-horse," photographer and
black-belt judoka. H. Gold, who wonders
what the devil he is doing here
Jews and Ibos. "The Ibos should go home
To their region."?Alhaji Usman Liman.
"These people know how to make money."?
Menem Muhammadu Mustapha Mande
Gyari. "There are too many of them in the
north. They were just like sardines"?
spawned in some estaminet? as T. S. Eliot
said?"and just too dangeroes."?Mallam
Mukhter Bello. (These quotations are from at.
address by Colonel Ojukwu to the African
Unity Consultative Committee meeting, Ad-
dis Ababa: August 5, 1968.)
Fourteen million people in. Biafra! Hardly
a tribe. We don't call the Irish or the JewS
a tribe, not without some Malice in there
someplace.
I wouldn't have chosen this trip, but nei-
ther could I refuse it. I can. only bear wits
ness, and it's all I can do. Who is the med-
dler described as having lost some fine
opportunities to remain silent?
"Captain Genocide" is the bomber pilot
who boasts on the radio of killing children.
He flies an Ilyushin, but they think he's a
Belgian. About 40 per cent of the children
are dead from starvation, so Captain G. IS
not a major producer and packager of child
mortality. He relieves the protein shortage
by reducing the demand. "Stever to be born
would be best for mortal man, but this hap-
pens only to a very few." The melancholy
joke has another meaning in. Biafra. Babies
are born who are not born. Babies are born
with death as their only and their immedi-
ate future.
Biafra was an ancient African kingdom of
which little memory but the name endures.
Howeeer, the name is magic and its history
is becoming real again at the command of
modern war.
From the Guardian, May 28, 1969, an edie
tonal urging freedom for Woie Soyinka, the
Nigerian playwright held in prison beca,uee
of his sympathy for the Biafraris: "In order
to improve Nigeria's public relations, Gen-
eral Gowon has lately made commendable
efforts to scale down the bombing of Biafran
civilians. He could win more sympathy by
releasing an artist who is regarded abroad
San Francisco-New York-Lisbon-Luanda-
Sao Tome-Biafra. The crashing through tittle
zones, confusion of nerves in day and night,
is an appropriate prelude to mass murder
and desperate hope in an African rain forest.
THE PORTUGUESE ISLAND OF sAo TOME
May 29: The Biafran official has a habit I
recognize?the Haitian one of grabbing hie
balls at odd moments when he needs re-
assurance. I don't think it's merely the heat
and tight underwear. "I went to law school
at Tufts," he beams.
We wait at the Geronimo Hotel for per-
mission to fly in one of the relief planes,
Caritas or World Council of Churches, Cath-
olic or Protestant. We get drunk with the
fliers. The pilots are (a) Steve McQueen, (b)
Steve McQueen's Best Friend, the Crazy Kid,
(c) The Old Boy Who Prinks Too Much But
Give Me One More Chance, Steve. There are
also the British flying officer who got into
some unmentionable trouble with a guards-
man, a smiling Japanese, a deformed Texan
whom I think of as the Forceps Baby, and
subsidiary do-gooders, ironic intellectuals,
machined Canadians on leave from their air-
lines?the full cast of an outmoded flick.
They are idealists in it for the ideal of
money: they can make up to $3,000 a week.
I especially like one whose real name is
Johnny Cash (he showed me his driver's li-
cense to prove it) and another called Jack
Frost from South of the Equator, Jack for
short. When Jack heard Leslie and I are
writers, he began to tell us about the Biafran
children to whom he transports Formula 2,
rice, and beans through the blacked-out,
Mig-haunted sky.
A crowd of us hangs around the airport,
trying to catch on to a flight. "The Princess"
flirts with a Biafran official; she looks like
Princess Radziwill, but she's a real princess.
Like stop-action photography of growing
vegetables, first you see her in Pucci pajamas
and then one frame later she's in starched
combat suit and then in a sweet limpid little
frock. We drink cokes with the pilots and
nervously visit toilets overflowing 4 la portu-
gaise. The weepy American who Wanted to
rejoin his lbo wife, the Italian reported who
has been turned away day after day, the
Swedish team, the Swiss boy journalist, and
the four of us with our letters, invitations,
passes, and Dr. Reik to speak for us. Three
of the six planes which went out returned
without landing in Biafra. "Intruder" was
back.
The ground crews in shorts, stained T-
shirts, with the frazzled faces of old softball
coaches. "Jello and a coke!" one mechanic
was yelling at the waiter. "No ice for the coke
on this job."
Jack Frost: "Now you just stick close to
me if you want to know all about the war?
what paper you say you write for?"
Johnny Cash: "Now, here's my wife and
here're my four kids in Glendale, . . ."
Jack Frost (as we climbed on a Super Con-
stellation) : "So you're playing Bet Your Life
today, are you?" We signed the No Harm
agreement. He told us the Joint Church Aid
flights are called Airlines. He
has a whole repertory like that.
We lumbered off the runway on a Super-
Connie called Snoopy with nineteen tons of
rice and dried milk. We stretched out on the
sacks. "You'll get rice mites if you sit on the
rice," the pilot said amiably, "or milk worms
if you sit on the milk."
The radio man said, " , the Bomber
used to fly with one of our pilots.-lie'd radio
in and say, 'Man, I'll get you tonight.'" He
was a South African.
"What about the Migs? Don't you have any
trouble with them?"
He grinned. "Egyptians. Six Day War," he
said.
I fell asleep, rice mites and milk worms,
as we droned through the sky over tropical
sea and Nigeria into Biafra and Uli Airport.
He wakened me with a grin to see the flak
below?pretty tangerine flashes following the
sound of the aircraft.
T.ILI AIRPORT COMING
We arrived in a pandemonium of blacked-
out airfield. Planes unloading food, pilots
screaming?they have to get out before
dawn; they don't want to be bombed down
here, either?trucks grinding and backing,
officials greeting us and smiling. "welcome
to Biafra. Welcome to Enugu." Though
Enugu has long been in the possession of the
Federals, they still carry on the fiction that
the Uli airstrips are really Enugu Airport.
Nearby, in a blacked-out building, I heard,
no kidding, a band playing, "I Ain't Got No
Satisfaction"?celebrating two years of free-
dom.
' We wandered about helplessly, looking for
our contacts, nameless officials in the face-
less dark. Diana asked to take a flash photo-
graph and immediately an eager-beaver sol-
dier boy arrested us. While he went to get
an officer. I wandered off toward the music'
"I Ain't Got No Sat-is-fac-tion, unh, unh,
UNIT!" Vaguely I understood we were under
arrest, but at four in the morning in the
tropics, in a strange land fighting a strange
war, the music seemed realer to me than a
red-tape misunderstanding.
The soldier caught me at the door to the
dance. "You move very fast," he said, and in
his voice was hatred, suspicion, stupidity,
and bucking for stripes. We Were passed from
bureaucrat to bureaucrat. Finally we reached
the commander of the base. The sly foolish
soldier said, "She took a picture."
"She did not. She asked if she could take
a picture," I said.
, the Committee ..for Biafran
Writers and Artists is hereby dissolved!"
Miriam cried.
"In my opinion, sah." said the soldier, "she
was ready to take a picture."
The Commander said, "Tut-tut." lie had
been a former school principal. He explained
to us that they were fighting a war for sur-
vival, to the soldier that we were friends of
Biafra, and wrote out an official piece of
paper declaring everyone innocent?us, sol-
dier, officers, himself. We need this man in
Berkeley.
Somehow in the mess of being arrested,
soaked in the rain, shuttled about, we lost
our contact. We slept on chairs in the cus-
toms house. Someone brought us cold corn
and coconut far breakfast, and then coffee.
A man from the Ministry of Information
came to get us, carrying his copy of Le Grand
Sommeil, par Raymond Chandler.
He drove like a madman down roads
blocked with stumps so the Nigerians could
not use them at landing strips. At the check-
points the guards said, "Welcome," as they
pointed their antique weapons at us. Le
Grand Sommeil? Is he putting us on?
A DAY OR TWO LATER
A blood vessel in my right eye has broken.
Days without sleep, much heat, much strain.
Our clothes aren't dry since the soaking of
a few nights ago. Every official says, "This
war, these conditions, things are rather dif-
ficult, really. We are decentarilzed, you
know."
"Decentralization" is the ephemism for
the capture of the capital, Umuahia, and all
other cities. Though the Biafrans have re-
captured Owerri and are moving services
back into it, it is burned out, wrecked, nearly
deserted, with a few stunned and starving
people squatting beneath the riddled Pepsi
billboard.
Stopped by the side of the road, waiting
for a pass, which we needed in order to get
to the place where we could get a pass which
would, in turn, enable us to get a pass, I
handed out protein tablets which I had car-
ried with me. They are compressed lumps
of fishy dust which had turned my stomach
When I sampled them in the States. They
were delicious. Diana had water in her can-
teen, a mouthful for each of us. The driver
looked as if he were eating birthday cake
and I gave him another handful, He was
very thin and I asked him if he had lost
weight since the war. "No, no, oh no, I was
always like this."
Ibo pride, ebullience, and optimism, Plus
a bit of fibbing.
We got gas at a military Camp. The Biaf-
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?used of an indisposition to detect a Red
peril, backed up his deputy.
President Nixon, in his Latin address Oct.
31, barely-touched on the threat of commu-
nism or subversion, saying just that the ex-
port of revolution could not be condoned
and "a nation like Cuba which seeks to prac-
tice it can hardly expect to share in the bene-
fits of this inter-American community."
In sum, the Nixon administration, to judge
by the public record, is taking a rather calm
approach to the vital question of whether
Latin America needs to be more heavily mili-
tarized for a crucial crunch ahead. The offi-
cial Washington consensus, to say nothing
of the liberal-academic-congressional con-
sensus, is that Latin governments do not face
a serious subversive challenge, Governor
Rockefeller so far has failed to make a con-
vincing case for strengthening military pro-
grams and catering to military regimes. Presi-
dent Nixon would make a gratuitous and
costly error if he accepted Rockefeller's mili-
tary advice.
SALT?REACHING PEACEFUL
PARITY
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, mil-
lions of Americans are now vitally con-
cerned and openly debate the relative
merit of our military weapons systems.
The era of unchallenged military spend-
ing is ending. This is all to the good.
But military spending all over the world
races ahead; and unless positive actions
are taken, such as arms-control agree-
ments and a Soviet-United States de-
tente in the arms race, this growth will
continue to burden and depress us while
reducing our security.
With the hope and best wishes of
peaceable men everywhere, United States
and Russian negotiators this week meet
in Helsinki. They are coming to the Fin-
nish capital to start talks on the most
vital and sensitive disarmament issue
ever negotiated. The object of the Stra-
tegic Arms Limitation Talks?SALT?is
to find a way for both sides to agree on a
plan that will limit, and perhaps some
day reduce their vast nuclear arsenals.
Until now the two superpowers have not
touched upon the most fundamental nu-
clear threat: their own armories. This
time the common stake In getting off the
nuclear escalator is vastly large. The two
powers possess something close to mili-
tary parity. Each, as Secretary Rogers
said last week, "could effectively destroy
the other regardless of which struck
first." Both nations are distracted by se-
vere foreign problems?Russia with
China and Eastern Europe, the United
States with Vietnam. Both may be losing
their taste for continuing the arms race.
We have reached the critical point where
we must talk before it is too late.
In the escalation of the arms race, our
general policy has been to react to our
estimates of what the Soviet Union's in-
tentions would be. If we continue in this
pattern, without agreement, there is
nothing we can do to contain this in-
evitable spiraling arms race. It is impera-
tive that the United States take the ini-
tiative. Neither the United States nor the
Soviet Union has offered to suspend the
development and testing of new weapons
during the talks; and the precarious
technological balance that helped to
make the negotiations possible in the first
place cannot be expected to last indefi-
nitely.
This country has more than 1,000 land-
based intercontinental missiles. It has
650 nuclear armed strategic Air Force
bombers. It has 41 Polaris submarines
with 656 submarine-launched ballistic
missiles. With 16 missiles each and with
each missile soon to be armed with three
to 10 warheads, our submarine fleet alone
could destroy the world.
In addition to this, we have tactical
nuclear weapons in place in various spots
throughout the world.
Medium-range bombers and missile
sites encircle the frontiers of our poten-
tial enemies.
From public sources it is known that
the United States has more than 6,500
nuclear warheads.
We have a military budget, including
related space and AEC military require-
ments, of almost $80 billion. There are
3.4 million men and women under arms;
1,300,000 civilians work for the Defense
Department. And 100,000 companies, em-
ploying 3.8 million civilians, fill defense
orders.
The military and civilian personnel not
only work at home, but also, many are
stationed at the 429 major and 2,972
minor bases scattered throughout 30
countries of the world.
These are the military credentials we
bring to the arms talks at Helsinki.
An international research team fi-
nanced by the Swedish Government pub-
lished recently a bleak analysis of what
was described as a runaway arms race.
It found that the world was spending
more for military purposes now than its
total production of goods and services
at the start of the century, that arms
outlays were doubling every 15 years and
that efforts to control them were mar-
ginal if not illusory so far.
The study illustrates the point that
since the 1963 treaty prohibiting nu-
clear tests in the atmosphere or under
water, that nuclear testing had been
stepped up. The report warns that time
was short for the current talks on limit-
ing strategic weapons because United
States progress on the development of
multiple warheads would reach "a point
of no return" in 3 to 6 months.
Mr. President, I would like to call to
the attention of my colleagues the arti-
cle written by John Hess for the New
York Times on this subject, entitled
"World Study Finds Runaway Arms
Race, With Outlays Soaring".
In conclusion, I would like to say that
"imperative" is a small word to use to
emphasize the importance of the SALT
talks and the need for United States' in-
itiative to bring a halt to the arms race.
I strongly endorse the importance of a
Soviet Union-United States mutual sus-
pension on the development and testing
of new weapons during the SALT talks.
Our best defense is peace. And we must
make every attempt to bring peace to
the world to give credence to our na-
tional dialog and to leave not only
dreams for our children?but ominous
as it may sound, a world of our children.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the article by John Hess be
printed in the RECORD, and I also ask
that an encouraging, optimistic column
on the Helsinki talks, written by Tom
Wicker, also published in this morning's
Times, be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the articles
were ordered to be printed in the REC-
ORD, as follows:
[From the New York Times, Nov. 20, 1969]
WORLD STUDY FINDS RUNAWAY ARMS RACE,
WITH OUTLAYS SOARING
(By John L. Hess)
PARIS, November 19.?An international re-
search team financed by the Swedish Gov-
ernment published today a bleak analysis
of what was described as a runaway arm,s
race.
It found that the world was spending more
for military purposes now than its total
production of goods and services at the start
of the century, that arms outlays were
doubling every 15 years and that efforts
to control them were marginal if not illusory
so far.
The study demonstrated, for example, that
nuclear testing had been stepped up since
the 1965 treaty prohibiting nuclear tests in
the atmosphere or under water.
The report warned that time was short for
the current talks on limiting strategic weap-
ons because United States progress on the
development of multiple warheads would
reach "a point of no retufn" in three to
six months.
The authors of the report believe that
once that is achieved, the Soviet Union will
be unwilling to halt development of com-
parable weapons and counterweapons. Such
weapons they hold, cannot become reliable
from a military viewpoint without testing,
Including the explosion of the hydrogen war-
heads.
BRITON HEADED TEAM
A sharp rise in military spending set fri
about 1965 and seems likely to continue; at
present rates, arms outlays in the early years
of the next century will exceed present world
production of goods and services.
Not only is spending on arms rising faster
than total production of goods and services,
the gap is wider for the poor countries than
the rich.
The study was sponsored by the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, of
which Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish econo-
mist, is chairman, and Robert Neild, a Brit-
ish economist and editor, is director. Another
British economist, Frank Blackaby, headed
the team that assembled the 440 pages of
data comprising what is to be an annual
yearbook on armaments and disarmament.
The work is a scholarly compendium of
the world's troubles-120 armed conflicts ,
since World War H?an analysis of arma-
ments and the arms trade, and a history of
the effort to control them. It is not opti-
mistic.
Allowing a wide margin of error for data
concerning the Communist countries, the
team found that the world spent $159.3-bil-
lion for military purposes last year, using
official Communist exchange rates, or $173.4-
billion at rates adjusted for real buying
power.
The United States spent $79.3-billion of
this, the Soviet Union $39.8-billion (at the
adjusted rate) and Communist China?a
hazardous estimate?$7-billion.
From 1949 through 1968, the study found,
world military spending rose at an average
rate of 5.9 per cent a year, after allowing for
inflation. But the rate in the last three years
averaged 8.9 per cent?an acceleration of 50
per cent.
SHARPEST RISE IN MIDEAST
The acceleration was far from even around
the world. The sharpest rise came in the
Middle East-19.9 per cent annually over the
last three years. It was notable that both the
victor and the vanquished in the lightning
war of June, 1967, have sharply increased
arms spending.
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alliance among many other alb rices that
they had always accepted. They did not
realise, as we more aged Parliamentarians
realise, that what the NATO Alliance really
represents in the world to-day is the greatest
step of any that has been taken in the last
twenty years. I also felt that. there was a
lack of understanding in the young of the
policies that we were trying to pursue. There
was a failure of communication with the age
group with whom we were talking, or who _
were talking to us?because we all owed them
free range to talk to us?and tile lines of
communication were really not good. I will _
not say they were blocked; they were not; .
but they were not good and we were not
speaking the same language as they were _
speaking. It seemed to me most important _
that we should, somehow or Other, try to
bring the young people of Europe to an un-
derstanding of the importance of the NATO
Alliance in any way that we possibly can.
This leads me to ask the Government
whether they will urge the recognition of
the North Atlantic Assembly as an official
body like the Council of Europe or W.E.U.,
able to speak to the NATO Council and give -
their recommendations for discussion and
advice. To-day the North Atlantic Assembly
Is 15 years old, and it is still an unofficial
body. If it became an official body it would
strengthen the Alliance through the Parlia-
mentarians as well as through the military
men. I would urge the Government to ex
amine this possibility, as I think it would n
require a very great alteration in the v w
they take of the North Atlantic Asse ly.
My other comment on the gracious Sp ech
must be on the United Nations and t r
policies there. I should like to congratu
the noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell, and t
thank her very much indeed for her splendid
work in New York. It is an extremely interest-
ing assignment to be a delegate. as I myself
know, having been for three years a delegate
at three General Assemblies. It is also ex-
tremely frustrating and, at times, irritating
to a great degree. Year after year the same
resolutions appear, and one would often
think, looking at the agenda papers, that
nothing ever changed. Nevertheless, it does;
and things are done. And although often one
gets despairing about the United Nations it
is the one and only place where people can
talk and discuss, and where things do hap-7-
pen very often, and very often of great
importance.
There is only one subject that I want to
mention to-day, and that is the Middle East
and the Israel-Arab problem. The noble Lord,
Lord Gore-Booth, has just made a very wise
analysis of the position of the Four Powers
in the Security Council, and the question of
the Israel and Arab problem. I should like
just to add my own thoughts on this matter.
Israel is a State recognised by the United -
Nations and by nearly all the nations, with,
of course, the exception of the Arab States.
I believe that even some of these would be
prepared to accept the fact of Israel, given
the help of European nations and the United
States. By "help" I do not mean military
help; I mean by world opinion simply stating
the obvious, that Israel is there and will
remain there for all time.
Israel has said that negotiations with Arab
States would enable both sides to talk peace,
instead of carrying on war, whether guerrilla
war or otherwise. I should like to ask: Cannot
our Government use all its Influence direct
to bring about a meeting between Israel and
the Arabs? Instead, they support resolutions
on this question which are sometimes toler-
able and sometimes intolerable. The other
day at the United Nations a resolution was
put forward accusing the Israelis of responsi-
bility for burning down the mosque of Al
Aksa. There is no evidence at all that any
Israeli would have been so foolish as to burn
down any mosque. When I was in Israel after
the Six-Day War I visited many mosques, one
in Hebron, on a day reserved for Moslems,
and the Israeli guard would not allow me to
go and see it without the permission of the
Moslem in charge on that day. Ong of the in-
teresting results of the Israeli administration
is the way in which all the Holy Places,
_ whether Moslem, Christian, or Jewish, are
carefully looked after and freely accessible to
those who want to visit them. Surely in the
interests of peace our delegate at the United
Nations should have abstained in a vote
which, at its simplest, is a case which we
would consider sub judice, since the trial of a
person is taking place at the moment and the
question of who committed this tragic act
is unknown. In my opinion, it is most un-
likely that it would have had anything to do
with the Israeli Government. For us to vote
for so biased a resolution is, in my opinion,
wrong, and I must say so
Foreign affairs are newer static; changes
come every day. I think that to-day we have
?the opportunity ott new Government in Ger-
many, and a nolcmaratively new Government
in France. I"have hopes that their policies
may lead ))15 a d?nte in East/West relations,
and ale /to a change in the policies towards
us inrblation to the E.E.C. I also hope?and
I a encouraged by what I have heard in this
de ate?that a new look may come into
Efirope, and that we shall not lose the op-
ortunity of seeing that that new look leads
us in further steps towards world peace.
THE DARK MILITARY SIDE OF THE
ROCKEFELLER REPORT
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, the long-
awaited Rockefeller report on Latin
merles, generates two wholly different
proposa s t-
im
ments in trade and economic aid ar
fresh, creative, and promising. At the
same time, however, the report advances
a remarkably stale view of the military
security needs of Latin America. Ignor-
ing plentiful evidence that the chief po-
litical trend in Latin America is toward
militaristic nationalism, the report
stresses development of U.S. military aid
programs to strengthen Latin Amerian
governments against Communist subver-
sion.
In a recent Washington Post column,
Stephen S. Rosenfeld commented most
perceptively on the anomalies in the
Rockefeller military aid recommends:
tions. I ask unanimous consent that his
column be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Washington Post, Nov. 14, 1969]
THE MILITARY SIDE OF ROCKY'S REPORT
(By Stephen S. Rosenfeld)
Nelson Rockefeller in effect gave the Presi-
dent two reports on Latin America; they
were released this week. One centered on the
hemisphere's economic requirements and on
how the United States should cooperate in
fulfilling them. The other concerned what
Rockefeller believes to be ever-expanding
menace of Castroism, and the measures
needed to meet that. So divergent in percep-
tion and policy implications are these two
elements?the one heading toward economic
growth in peaceful circumstances and the
other heading toward vigilence and possible
military confrontation?that it is hard to see
how they can coexist in a single statement.
Yet there they are.
To be sure, this kind of double vision is
not new. Since the World War II period,
when Axis penetration of the hemisphere
was feared, Washington has divided its efforts
between supporting Latin military establish-
ments and helping Latin political oomniuni-
ties. More recently, as John Plank of Brook-
ings has written: "One strand of policy has
run from the era of the `good neighbor' and
the inter-American system . . . The other
strand, which is not really compatible with
the former one, derives from our conception
of Latin America as an active theater in the
cold war, one of the battlegrounds on which
we engage those whom we have identified as
our mortal enemies, the Communists."
Thus in the 1940s and later, our military
policy was directed at preparing the Latin
military for a mission of heinispherie de-
fense. In this period, the United States
opened up the Inter-American Defense Col-
lege and Defense Board, the military assist-
ance programs, sales of destroyers and sub-
marines, and so on. The rationale for or-
ganizing the Latin military to repel a con-
ventional foreign invasion has long since
evaporated, but these programs limp on.
Many Latinists believe the programs con-
tribute heavily to Washington's militaristic
reputation in the hemisphere.
In the 1960s, chiefly because of fear of
Cuba, the rationale (though not always the
substance) of American military policy was
shifted from hemispheric defense to "in-
ternal security." Subversion, supported by
or oriented toward Castro, was defined as
the main enemy. The offiical view was that
the Latin military constituted a "shield
against insurgency"; behind that shield, the
process of development?understood as a dis-
ruptive one?would go on.
This is Governor Rockefeller's view still
"All the American nations are a tempting
target for Comemmist subversion," his re-
port says. "In fact, it is plainly evident that
such subversion is al reality today with
alarming potential ....f growing intensity."
Predicting more Castros, he declares: "A
'''Sastro on the mainland, supported militarily
anconomically by the Communist world,
woul& resent the gravest kind of threat to
the sec ity of the Western Hemisphere and
pose an tremely difficult problem for the
U.S."
This dia:-.4 osis led Rockefeller to recom-
mend major increases in military programs,
both on the emispheric-defense and inter-
nal-security vels. Urban terrorism, an ac-
tivity so far efying control, is his special
concern. Aga t the claim that some Latin
military me serve a conservative status
quo, he arg s that there is "a new type of
military m . . coming to the fore and
often beco ng a major force for constructive
social cha ge." Is not the military anti-
democrat ? Rockefeller believes that few
Latin c ntries have the sufficiently ad-
vanced economic and social systems re-
quire to support a consistently democratic
syst ." Anyway, "the common heritage of
r" 'ect for human dignity is evidenced in
erent ways in different nations."
As might be expected, many academics and
liberals and U.S. legislators question Rocke-
feller's judgments in the military sphere. Po-
litically the most important questions, how-
ever, come from the Nixon administration.
The State Department's Latin chief,
Charles A. Meyer, said last July that "Com-
munist insurgencies are currently at a rela-
tively low ebb." Che Guevara's Bolivian fi-
asco "made the Cuban regime more cautious
about initiating new areas of insurgency,"
he said. Meanwhile, Latin counter-insur-
gency capabilities have improved, and the
appeal of Cuban-style revolutions has de-
clined.
William E. Lang, deputy to Assistant Sec-
retary of Defense G. Warren Nutter, scanned
the hemisphere last ligay, found no insur-
gencies of consequence anywhere, and re-
ported that "we have not seen external evi-
dence of Cuban support for insurgency in
Latin America for some months . . . 12 to 18
months." Nutter, who cannot easily be ac-
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With an aSsist from the Vietnam war, the
United States provided the largest portion
of the increase. Its long-term trend was an
annual rise of 7.7 per cent; the recent trend
was 12 per cent. With a lag of a year or two,
the Soviet Union and its allies followed this
stepup?but the allies of the United States
in Europe did not, except for Portugal, en-
gaged in colonial wars, and Greece.
The increases work like compound inter-
est, so that both the United States and the
Soviet Union Show cumulative gains of about
40 per cent since 1965, now accounting to-
gether for 70 per cent of the world total. The
share of the poor countries is small but is
rising faster than average.
The study confirmed that arms were swal-
lowing a sharply rising share of world income.
Before World War I and between the two
World Wars, it estimated, the military spent
3 to 3.5 per cent of the world's resourceS;
since then the share has risen to 7 to 8 per
cent.
The change for the United States was more
dramatic: from 1.5 per cent of the national
product in 1913 to 2.5 per cent in the thirties
and 10 per cent in the postwar period.
viz 7.5 PCT. RISE IN POORER LANDS
In the so-called developing countries arms
spending has been rising at a rate of 7.5 per
cent, as against a world average of 6 per cent,
while output for both groups haS been ris-
ing at no better than 5 per cent.
Put another way, world production is found
to have multiplied about five times in the
last 50 years, while arms spending has multi-
plied about 10 times.
On the other hand, the study reports that
armed manpower has not increased signifi-
cantly. The Paradox is explained by the
enormous rise in the cost of weapons: the
technological armS race.
Among the large Western powers, at least,
it was found, the cost of military research
far outshadows that of civilian research. For
the United States, $62.20 of each $100 of mili-
tary procurement is assigned to research and
development, but they take only $7.50 of each
$100 of manufacturing output.
Smaller countries can hardly compete. To
the extent that they try, they find that they
must market their weapons abroad to remain
competitive, but the United States and the
Soviet Union dominate exports.
In the race to supply the third world with
weapons, the report concluded, the Soviet
Union has caught up with the United States,
owning largely to aid to the Arab countries.
This estimate excluded shipments to North
and South Vietnam.
The study represents the testimony of
Robert S. McNamara, former Secretary of
Defense, on how United States spending was
sharply increased on an erroneous estimate of
a Soviet buildup, and follows that with testi-
mony by the present Secretary, Melvin R.
Laird, on a new Soviet threat.
The authors, limiting themselves to nu-
clear tests reported by the Atomic Energy
Commission for the United States and by a
Swedish defense agency for the Soviet Union
produce the following comparison of the
average annual rate of testing before and
after the ban:
U.S. 'U.S.S.R. World
Before 24.4 12.8 39.6
After 82.0 9.2 46.2
The study cites evidence that many un-
reported tests have been conducted by the
United States and the Soviet Union, and pos-
sibly by Britain and France. Most of the tests,
reported or otherwise, have, of course, been
underground, but the authors observe that
the power and military value of underground
testing have been far greater than had been
expected.
[From the New York Times, Nov. 20, 1969]
IN THE NATION: A GOOD START IN HELSINKI
(By Tom Wicker)
WASHINGTON, November 19.?Since it took
so long to get strategic arms limitations talks
under way, it may be a hopeful sign that
reports from Helsinki suggest a cordial be-
ginning. Neither Soviets nor Americans yield-
ed to propaganda temptations in their open-
ing statements, both sides seemed to be
addressing themselves to the same general
objectives, and Mr. Nixon's message used the
reassuring word "sufficiency" instead of "su-
periority" to describe the kind of nuclear
arsenal he had in mind.
Opening-day goodwill does not, of course,
guarantee long-range results, but in this case
It seems particularly important. The military-
minded, and hawk circles generally; in Mos-
cow apparently fear that the talks are simply
an American fishing expedition for intelli-
gence data; while high military reluctance
in Washington caused American negotiators
to arrive in Helsinki without any specific pro-
posals.
AVOIDING STALEMATE
Thus, it is extremely important just to get
things going in an atmosphere of reason and
goodwill. Once both sides become convinced?
if they ever do?that the other genuinely
wants an agreement, its scope and details
should not be impossibly difficult. Taking
counsel either of political fears and technical
complexities, on the other hand, can produce
nothing but stalemate and a continuing arms
spiral.
That is why the use of the word "suffi-
ciency" was important. "Sufficiency" is what
both sides now appear to have in their nu-
clear strike capacities. That is to say, neither
can launch a nuclear strike at the other with
any hope of so completely destroying the
other's retaliatory capacity that it will not
be able to deliver a devastating return strike.
ELIMINATING NUMBERS GAME
If that is in fact the case, if neither side
can attack the other with reasonable im-
punity, then each has a sufficiency of nuclear
weapons to guarantee its national security,
to the extent that it can be guaranteed. And
this would be the case even if one or the other
claimed more missiles, more warheads or more
nuclear-armed submarines?as in fact the
United States does claim.
If some general understanding can be
established that there is nuclear sufficiency
on both sides, a difficult numbers question
can be eliminated from the arms limitation
problem. The Soviet Union would hardly ne-
gotiate second place for itself, in numbers
of weapons or total firepower, nor would the
United States give up first place; but if it
Is established that first and second place
don't really exist, that enough is enough and
there is a sufficiency on both sides, then at
the least a freeze on the existing nuclear
balance becomes possible.
That much is crucial because the more the
two sides go on with the nuclear arms race,
either developing new and more awful weap-
ons like MIRV, or tinkering with control
and delivery and warning systems, the more
it becomes likely that at some point one side
or the other will score either an offensive or
a defensive breakthrough. The danger in that
is not just that a power that did so might
launch a strike while it had the opportunity
to do so; but also that both powers would
be in constant fear of just such a break-
through by the other, and would redouble
their own spending, research and deploy-
ment?an endless cycle.
Moreover, it is hard to believe that any
ultimate reduction in levels of armaments
could be achieved before a period transpired
in which both sides maintained, by agree-
ment, an existing balance, during which not
only the good faith of each but the best
methods of policing and verifying the ar-
rangement could be tested.
THE COST ADVANTAGE
From that kind of an achievement, it
would become possible at least to have dis-
cussions, on the basis of proven intentions,
about mutual nuclear arms reductions. And
another advantage of an initial nuclear arms
freeze is that both sides could save substan-
tial sums each needs for domestic purposes?.
in the estimate of Jerome Wiesner, about
$100 billion apiece in the next five years.
Of course there would be risk but if the
aim is to eliminate risk, neither an arms
limitation agreement nor a continuing arms
race will achieve it. And as Gen. James
Gavin has observed: "We're extremely ven-
turesome in war and we ought to be as
venturesome in peace. The rewards are
greater."
RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION IN THE
SOVIET UNION
Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in
the RECORD an article entitled, "Israeli
Knesset Appeals to World's Parliament
To Help Soviet Jews Emigrate," pub-
lished in the New York Times of Novem-
ber 20, 1969. The article details the
latest manifestation of religious persecu-
tion in the Soviet Union's long and in:
famous history of persecution of its
Jewish citizens.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the New York Times, Nov. 20, 1969]
ISRAELI KNESSET APPEALS TO WORLD'S PARLIA-
MENTS To HELP SOVIET JEWS EMIGRATE
(By James Feeron)
JERUSALEM, November 19.?Israel's Knesset
called today on parliaments around the
world to "employ the full weight of their
Influence" in assisting Soviet Jews to emi-
grate to Israel,
In a move confirming a major change in
Israeli policy toward the Soviet Union, the
Knesset (parliament) indicated that per-
suasion would be replaced by pressure in
seeking free emigration for Soviet Jews.
Premier Golda Meir, in a major address
opening the seventh Knesset, said a 50-year
campaign by the Kremlin to silence Jewish
voices in the Soviet Union had failed.
Moscow should have the courage to realize
this failure, Mrs. Meir said, "and allow every
Jew who wants to leave the country to come
here to us."
Mrs. Meir followed the disclosure earlier
this month of the names of 18 Georgian Jews
who wanted to leave with a new list of Soviet
Jews whose requests to come to Israel also
had been turned down.
The publicity surrounding the earlier an-
nouncement had indicated a dramatic break
in the long years of secret negotiations with
the Soviet Union to open the doors for as
many of the nation's 3 million Jews who
wanted to come to Israel.
In her speech to a packed Knesset cham-
ber, Mrs. Meir indicated that the days of
"quiet talks and quiet diplomacy" were over.
She said "we shall see to it that every
person possessed of a conscience, Jew and
non-Jew, everybody to whom freedom is dear,
will surely raise his voice for the freedom
of others as well."
laser Harel, former head of Israel's Secret
Service and a new member of Parliament
suggested during the general debate that dis-
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1U.LNAJ.: RECORD? SENATE November 20, titht--1"
quiet among Soviet Jews might eventually
"brccome a malady that could spread to other
elements in the Soviet Union."
"When that day comes," he continued, "and
when the Kremlin's concern over the stabil-
ity of its internal regime otittveighs Russia's
interests abroad, they'll want to get rid of
their Jews and they'll waa to get rid Of
them fast."
Taken with Mrs. Meir's speech, the impli-
cation was that Israel, possibly with the help
of other governments, would be seeking to
generate the internal presaure that might
lead to a change in Soviet policy barring free
emigration for all citizens.
There are Israeli officials who are aware
of the risk entailed in the new Israeli pol-
icy. Some have expressed concern over pos-
sible recriminations against Soviet Jews who
have given their names to the publicity com-
ing from Jerusalem.
CENSORSHIP BARS DET AILS
Censorship in Israel has long prevented
references to immigration of Soviet Jews to
Israel and even today bars speculation on
the hearing this may now have on Israel's
decision to apply public pressure on Moscow
Mr. Ilarel's comment on Soviet interes
abroad was an apparent allusion to Mft-
cow's ties with Arab governments, wh
leaders oppose any form of Jewish immi
tion to Israel. Arab leaderi are convhiced
that Israel is basically expansionist and that
large immigration will justify greater; ex-
pansion.
Israeli immigration officials expect 34,000
to 40,000 newcomers this year, most of tient
arriving with skills from affluent count es.
In speaking of Soviet Jews the 71-ye
old Mrs. Meir, herself a Russian-born Je
said of masses of young Soviet Jews ha
undergone an "awakening" as a result of the
1967 Israeli victory over the Arab states.
HOLIDAY RALLIES NoTen
She said no one could eXplain "in terms
of cold reason" how young Jews in the So-
viet Union, many of whose parents had tasted
prison life or experienced years in Siberian
work camps, now gathered by the tens of
thousands around synagogue.t on Simhat
Torah. This is a joyous holicIty that marks
the completion of the annual round of read-
ing of the Torah, the Jewish holy scrip-
tures. '
Soviet Jews have become More courageous,
Mrs. Meir said, and are nace declaring "that
their homeland is the static of Israel."
The Premier then read off the names Of
those Soviet Jews who had written abroad
in what she described as an attempt to
publicize their inability to obtain exit visas.
The hometowns of the writers included Mos-
cow, Kiev, Riga, and Leningrad.
She read an open letter to Premier Aleksei
N. Kosygin from Tina Brodetskaya, a 34-
year-old Moscow woman, who was seeking
to join relatives in Israel. The woman wrote
that her desire to emigrate stemmed from
Zionist feelings and not from hostility to
the Soviet Union.
PRESIDENT NIXON'S .i.RADE
MESSAGE TO CONGRESS
Mr, JAVITS. Mr. President, the Presi-
dent and the administration are to be
commended for the proposed trade pro-
gram forwarded to the Congress earlier
this week. This program, which must be
regarded as a holding action, is signifi-
cant in that it again commits the United
States to pursue a policy of freer world
trade?despite the considerable protec-
tionist pressures which are growing in
our land. OIL INDUSTRY MULTIFACETED
We in the Congress should support the Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, we
statesmanship of the President as shown recognize that the oil industry as an in-
by this message and give him the au-
thority he requests to make modest re-
ductions in U.S. tariffs. I would grant the
President such authority, however,
through June 30, 1972, rather than
through June 30, 1973, since more com-
prehensive action in the trade field
should be enacted before then. The last
tariff cuts of the Kennedy round nego-
tiations will have become effective on
January 1, 1972, and the administration
and the legislative branch should regard
this as the target date to enact new,
major legislation in the trade field.
At this time, the Joint Economic Com-
mittee of the Congress, of which I am
the ranking Senate minority member, is
preparing a ehensive series of
trade ngs, and, these hearings
sho dovetail nicely ..th the Com-
m' ion on World Trade, *hich the Pres-
ent has indicated he will appoint to
'examine the entire range of our trade
policies. The Commission's Report should
be available before the Joint Economic
Committee issues its report. Because of
this timetable, I would recommend that
the President's authority to effect tariff
reductions be extended only through
fiscal 1972.
The President's proposals of aid for
industries affected by imports?adjust-
ment assistance?are indeed welcome. In
my opinion, one of the major flaws in the
implementation of the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962 was the extremely difficult
.'teria which had to be met if trade ad-
jus -3.v.exe,....to be granted.
The liberalization of the critals, is wel-
come and needed.
Liberalization of escape-clause provi-
sions is also to be welcomed so long as
such liberalization is part of the phi-
losophy which recognizes?as the Presi-
dent's does?that "any reduction in our
imports produced by U.S. restrictions not
accepted by our trading partners would
invite foreign reaction against our own
exports?all quite legally" and that the
"need to restore our trade surplus
heightens the need for further movement
toward freer trade."
In my opinion, the President's request
of the Congress for a clear statemen
"with regard to nontariff barriers to asi-
sist in our efforts to obtain _reciprogl
lowering of nontariff barriers," is an
portant call for cooperation. We s
meet the President's request. In tl s re-
elimi-
a step
ng non-
mmend-
know of
this very
uld
gard, the President's proposal to
nate the American selling price
toward eliminating the prolif era
tariff barriers to trade is most
able?all of us in the Congre
the difficulty in putting forwa
needed proposal.
Finally, it is my hope that Western
Europe and Japan, too, will take such an
important step down the road of freer
trade?that such freer trade in agricul-
tural and industrial products indeed will
lead us "in growing and shared prosperity
toward a world both open and just"?and
that such an open world is, unattainable
if reciprocity is not forthcoming.
dustry is not composed of only major oil
companies, although they are the most
often heard from.
I have repeatedly spoken of the differ-
ence between the struggling independent
oilman and the major ail companies
which enjoy phenomenal profits. The
April 1969 newsletter of the First Na-
tional City Bank of New York indicated
that of the largest 2,250 manufacturing
concerns surveyed the 99 oil companies
had 25 percent of the group's total
profits. That should give you one indi-
cation of the disparity between the small
oilman who has to scrape and skimp to
raise the funds to drill one well and the
major oil companies who can afford to
put up almost $1 billion just for the right
to drill for ail in Alaska.
Another group has recently taken
heart and raised its voice, saying to the
American public and Congress:
Don't lump us together with the major
companies. We don't benefit from all the
federal subsidies enjoyed by the major oil
companies, yet we are part of the "oil
industry."
This group is called the Oil Marketers'
Committee. These are the small business-
men who market the oil to the public.
Although they exist at the will of the
major oil companies, they, too, have
finally had enough. They have shown the
courage of their convictions and pub-
lished an advertisement in the Washing-
ton Post.
I ask unanimous consent that the ad-
vertisement be printed in the RECORD.
Mr. President, it is quite clear from
the advertisement that the only ones who
really benefit from all these Federal sub-
sidies to the oil industry are the major oil
companies, the ones who need the
gigantic subsidies the least.
The time has come. Congress and the
President must take action. If subsidies
are necessary to insure a healthy oil in-
i.dustry, let us give these subsidies honest-
Let them pass through the same
budgetary process that school lunch sub-
sidies pass through. This will enable
Congress and the public to see exactly
who is getting what and how much. No
longer would the major oil companies be
able to skim off the cream of these Fed-
eral subsidies and leave the dregs to the
independent oilmen under the guise of
giving incentives to the oil industry.
The oil industry is not composed only
of the major oil companies. We must
recognize that and take action accord-
ingly.
There being no objection, the adver-
tisement was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
OIL MARKETERS SAY: MAYBE THE PUBLIC IS
RIGHT ABOITT OIL IMPORT QUOTAS AND DE-
PLETION ALLOWANCES
We want to make it clear to our govern-
ment leaders and the American public that
no single group speaks for the entire oil
industry.
For example, this committee of marketers
questions seriously whether the oil producers
and major oil companies have applied any of
their consumer subsidized gains to consumer
needs and benefits.
As oil marketers, we believe--
1. The present Oil Import Quota system
has the effect of subsidizing producers and
major oil companies at up to 3c per gallon.
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Interim Test Ban
On MIRV Weighed
By Warren Unna
Washington Post Staff Writer
The United States is consid- John Sherman Cooper (R-1y.)
and Clairborne Pell (D-R.I.).
Briefing them were Philip J.
Farley, deputy director of the
Arms Control Agency, Helmut
Sonnefeldt, Soviet and disar-
mament expert on the Na-
tional Security Council staff,
and William W. Hancock, gen-
ering an interim arrangement
With the Russians so that the
testing of the multiple inde-
pendently targetable re-entry
vehicles (MIRV) might be sus-
pended while the current mis-
sile talks are going on in Hel-
inki.
"The possibility of interim
agreements, such as stopping
the MIRV tests while the talks
are going on, is not ruled out,"
Sen. Clifford Case (R-N.J.) said
after a closed-door briefing of
the Senate Disarmament sub-
Committee by officials of the
Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency.
eral counsel for the Arms Con-
trol Agency.
Security was so tight that
the briefing not only was la-
beled "secret", but the sena-
tors were adominished three
times to keep specific matters
quiet.
Another briefing on the Hel-
sinki talks was given to Sen-
ate leaders from both parties
early Tuesday by Henry A.
Kissinger, the President's as-
sistant for national security af-
fairs.
Calms Apprehensions
The briefings seemed to
quiet last week's apprehen-
sions when Gore's subconamit-
tee first was promised a brief-
ing before the SALT talks
opened and then turned down.
President Nixon reportedly
was so concerned about antag-
onizing a subcommittee that
eventually may have to ratify
a SALT treaty that he assured
Congress, during his visit
there last week, that the brief-
ings would be forthcoming
after the U.S. negotiators re-
ported back from Helsinki.
Also yesterday, Sen. Jacob
K. Javits (R-N.Y.) issued a
statement terming it "unfor-
tunate that the administration
has set itself against the inclu-
sion of senatorial observers or
advisers to the SALT negotia.
tions."
Pleased by Briefing
Case and Sen. Albert Gore
(D-Tenn.), subcommittee chair-
man, emerged from the hour-
long eVening briefing seem-
ingly more assured that the
Nixon administration was pre-
pared to enter into meaning-
ful negotiations.
"It was a good briefing,"
Gore said "I was pleased with
the latitude available for ex-
ploration. What's going on
now are preliminary talks,
They are not intended to
reach any commitments."
Gore said he now did not
think _the U.S. negotiators at
the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks (SALT) in Helsinki were
being held on such a tight
string by either the White
House or the Pentagon that
results couldn't be hoped for.
'Taxiing Gore and Case in
yesterday's secret, unan-
lonneed briefing were Sens.
T. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), chair-
4 the parent Senate For-
aign Relations Committee,
John J. Sparkman (D-Ala.),
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November 19, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 14645
accordance with the standard procedure re-
lating to compacts.
PURPOSE
The purpose of S. 2734, as amended, is to
give consent of Congress to the Connecticut-
New York railroad passenger transportation
compact, adopted by New York on June 16,
1968 (sec. 1, ch. 824, laws of New York for
1968) and by Connecticut on April 21, 1969
(sec. 1, Public Act 46 of the laws of Con-
necticut for 1969) .
This legislation is sponsored by the Sen-
ators from Connecticut, Mr. Ribicoff and
Mr. Dodd and by the Senators from New
York, Mr. Javits and Mr. Goodell and rec-
ommended with a suggested amendment,
whi h has been adopted by the Secretary of
TraiznortatiOfl.
STATEMENT
The compact entered into by the two States
relates to the continuation and improvement
of railroad commuter passenger service over
the Penn Central Railroad's lines between
New York City, N.Y., and New Haven, Conn.
It authorizes the metropolitan Transporta-
tion Authority, a government corporation of
the State of New York, and the Connecti-
cut Transportation Authority, an agency of
the State of Connecticut, acting individually
but in cooperation with each other, and as
oonventures where they deem it advisable, to
do the following (where permissible under
the enabling laws of their respective States) :
(a) Acquire assets of the New York, New
Haven, & Hartford Railroad (and its suc-
cessors) where needed, (b) repair and re-
habilitate such assets, (c) dispose of such
assets where not needed, and (d) and oper-
ate the service or contract for its operation.
By its terms, the compact legislation lapses
I! Congress fails to consent by December 31,
1969.
A letter dated July 28, 1969 from the Hon-
orable Nelson A. Rockefeller, Governor of the
State of New York to Chairman Celler,
re-
questing the subject legislation reads as
follows:
"I am seeking your help in securing the
consent of Congress to a compact entered
into by the States of New York and Connecti-
cut relating to the continuation and improve-
ment of railroad commuter passenger serv-
ice over the Penn Central Railroad's lines
between New York City, N.Y., and New. Hav-
en, Conn. That compact is evidenced by the
enactment of two statutes, section 1 of chap-
ter 824 of the laws of New York for 1968
and section 1 of Public Act 46 of the laws
of Connecticut for 1969. A certified copy of
the New York statute is enclosed, together
with several uncertified copies of both acts.
"The Metropolitan Transportation Author-
ity for our State and the Connecticut Trans-
portation Atuhority for the State of Con-
necticut are hopeful of an early conclusion to
their negotiations with Penn Central relat-
ing to the modernization and improvement
program for this vitally needed commuter
service which Governor Dempsey and I en-
dorsed in late 1966. These negotiations were
delayed, seemingly interminably by a host
of complicated problems. Indeed, they could
not begin in earnest until this past January,
when Penn Central finally agreed to merge
with the New Haven.
"Federal and State financing for the $56.8
million priority capital improvement program
Is also assured. Moreover, we are hopeful that
additional Federal funds will be granted,
making possible the full $80 million capital
program which the two States originally con-
templated. To this end I am asking the MTA
and the CTA to reinstitute their 1966 re-
quest for funds under the Urban Mass Trans-
portation Act of 1961.
"If you or your staff needs any further as-
sistance relative to the details of the compact,
the status of our financing or the nature of
the projected relationship with Penn Central,
I would suggest that they be referred directly
to Dr. William J. Ronan, Metropolitan Trans-
portation Authority chairman.
"The State of Connecticut has asked for
assistance similar to that which we ask of you
from their congressional delegation. You may
wish to coordinate your efforts with them.
"Please note that if the compact is not ap-
proved by December 31, 1969, it lapses and
the legislative process would have to be
started all over again in both States.
"Sincerely,
"NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER."
The first section of S. 2734 grants the con-
sent of Congress to the compact. As noted in
the above letter the committee finds merit
in the compact and believes that Congress
should grant its consent thereto, subject to
the amendments herein made in article II of
the compact.
First, article II of the compact provides
that amendments and supplements to the
compact to implement the purposes thereof
"may be adopted by concurrent legislation of
the party States." Section 2 of S. 2734 makes
clear that the consent of Congress to the com-
pact does not constitute consent in advance
for any amendments or supplements to the
compact which may hereafter be adopted by
concurrent legislation of the party States.
Any such amendments or supplements would
be adopted subject to the consent of Congress
before being put into effect.
Second, section 3 of S. 2734 reserves the
right of Congress or its standing committees
to require submission of information and
data concerning operations under the com-
pact.
Third, section 4 of S. 2734 reserves the right
of Congress to alter amend, or repeal the
legislation.
Attached hereto and made a part hereof is
the report from the Secretary of Transporta-
tion to the Honorable James 0. Eastland,
chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
dated November 12, 1969,
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill
is open to further amendment. If there
be no amendment to be proposed, the
Question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill (S. 2734) was ordered to be
engrossed for a third reading, was read
the third time, and passed.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, as in
legislative session, I ask the Chair to
lay before the Senate messages from the
House of Representatives on S. 632, S.
499, and S. 757.
RELIEF OF RAYMOND C. MELVIN
The PRESIDING OFFICER laid be-
fore the Senate the amendment of the
House of Representatives to the bill
(S. 632) for the relief of Raymond C.
Melvin, which were, on page 1, line 4,
"2733" and insert "2733(b) "; and on page
2, line 3, strike out "July 4, 1964" and
Insert: "or about July 6, 1964".
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
move that the Senate concur in the
amendments of the House.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the motion of the
Senator from Montana.
The motion was agreed to.
LUDGER J. COSSETTE
The PRESIDING OFFICER laid be-
fore the Senate the amendment of the
House of Representatives to the bill (S.
499) for the relief of Ludger J. Cossette,
which was, on page 2, line 4, strike out
"in excess of 10 per centum thereof".
Mr. M_AnarIELD. Mr. President, I
move that the Senate concur in the
amendment of the House.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the Motion of tlia
Senator from Montana.
The motion was agreed to.
YVONNE DAVIS
The PRESIDING OFFICER laid be-
fore the Senate the amendment of the
House of Representatives to the bill (S.
757) for the relief of Yvonne Davis which
was, on page 2, after line 3, insert:
No part of the amount appropriated in
this Act shall be paid or delivered to or re-
ceived by any agent or attorney on account
of services rendered in connection, with this
claim, and the same shall be unlawful, any
contract to the contrary notwithstanding.
Any person violating the provisions of this
Act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor
and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in
any sum not exceeding $1,000.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
move that the Senate concur in the
amendment of the House.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the motion of the
Senator from Montana.
The motion was agreed to.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
THE STRATEGIC ARMS
LIMITATION TALKS
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, on Monday
in Helsinki the United States and Soviet
delegations met to commence the SALT
negotiations. While the occasion-"=".
day was largely ceremonial, there was a
note of high purpose in the statements
of both delegations. Serious discussions
began yesterday in what could be the
most portentous negotiations affecting
the survival of mankind. As Secretary
of State Rogers expressed it so aptly in
his speech of November 13:
The question to be faced in the strategic
arms talks is whether societies with the ad-
vanced intellect to develop these awesome
weapons of mass destruction have the com-
bined wisdom to control and curtail them.
Let us hope that the enormous diffi-
culties and complexities inherent in these
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE November 19, 1969
negotiations will be overbalanced by a
recognition on both sides of the mutual
and reciprocal advantageS to be obtained
from viable arrangements to stabilize
and control the strategic arms race. The
negative incentive to agreement is sim-
ilarly persuasive?the cost and the dan-
ger to both sides inherent in an escala-
tion of the nuclear arms race could cast
a most ominous shadow over the con-
tinued health and existence of both so-
cieties.
The immediate challenge to the United
States and Soviet negotiators, once sub-
stantive discussions begin, will be to seek
mutually agreeable arrangements for
containing the next generation of stra-
tegic weapons now under development
in both countries?ABM's and M1RV's.
In my judgment, it is regretable that
the U.S. negotiators have reportedly
been instructed not to offer a mutual
moratorium on the flight testing of
MIRV's. The clock is rimming out on
MIRV's, and if an agreement with re-
spect to this new weapons development
is not achieved prior to -the operational
deployment stage?expected some time
next year?hopes for a meaningful and
verifiable agreement will be diminished.
The clock is also running out with re-
spect to ABM systems, but fortunately,
the pace is slower in this instance be-
cause deployed ABM systems are easily
verifiable by aerial or satellite inspec-
tion, while deployed MIRV's are veri-
fiable allegedly only by onsight inspec-
tion.
The major address by Secretary Rogers
on November 13 is a most salutory in-
dication that U.S. policy with respect to
the life and death issues?inherent in the
SALT talks has not been defaulted to
military authorities by the concerned
civilian agencies of our Government?
especially the State Department. I ex-
press this view against the background
of numerous press reports and "leaks"
in recent weeks which have indicated
that efforts by the military authorities
have succeeded within the administra-
tion in curtailing the brief and the ne-
gotiating leeway of Ambassador Gerard
Smith and his colleagues in the SALT
talks.
In his address to the Senate on No-
vember 13, President Nixon assured us
that he would seek to work out an ar-
rangement for consultations with the
Senate respecting the SALT talks which
would meet our requirements and pre-
rogatives. The President's thoughtful
and cooperative remarks in this regard
merit our respect and appreciation. In
this spirit, I think it is imfortunate that
the administration has set itself against
the inclusion of senatorial observers or
advisors to the SALT negotations. The
implication in the administration's posi-
tion that the necessary secrecy and dis-
cretion might be comprised by the pres-
ence of Senators is not one which the
Senate could find acceptable as a reason.
Extensive and detailed consultations
regarding the U.S. negotiating position
have been carried out with the goverti-
ments of our NATO tallies. Virtually
without exception our NATO allies have
parliamentary forms of government.
Consequently, the implication that the
parliamentary leaders of Western Europe
and Canada are more discreet than the
congressional leaders of the United
States is paradoxical and unconvinc-
ing; especially in view of the history of
the congressional representatives and
committees handling the most secret
Information.
There is an invisible third dimension
to the SALT talks which is seldom men-
tioned?the specler of Peking. In the
period since the 1962 United States-
Soviet "eyeball-to-eyeball" confronta-
tion over Cuba?and the emergence of
Communist China as a thermonuclear
power?it is perhaps no exaggeration to
say that policymakers both in Wash-
ington and Moscow have considered the
potential future threat of nuclear war
with China to be as real a threat as a
United States-Soviet nuclear exchange.
There is no doubt that calculations
with respect to the potentiality of Chi-
nese nuclear capabilities will be factored
into the negotiating postures of both the
United States and U.S.S.R. I regard this
as prudent and unavoidable. Nonetheless,
we must guard vigilantly against military
hard-liners on both sides attempting
to exploit the Chinese "threat" as an
instrument to prevent agreements and
controls on advanced weapons systems
that are the very purpose of the SALT
negotiations.
Moreover, the SALT negotiators bear
the additional responsibility for attempt-
ing to shape agreements resulting from
the SALT talks in such a way as to en-
courage, rather than discourage, Peking
from eventual cooperation with interna-
tional nuclear arms control agreements.
The U.S. negotiators bear an additional
responsibility with respect to Communist
China in the SALT talks. Our negotiators
must scrupulously seek to avoid agree-
ments with the Soviet Union which will
create the impression of a United
States-Soviet nuclear "ganging up"
against Communist China. In my judg-
ment, agreements of such a nature could
serve to exacerbate the grave tensions
between Moscow and Peking, as well as
between Washington and Peking?rather
than making nuclear war on the Asian
mainland less probable.
In this respect, I commend to my col-
leagues' attention Harrison Salisbury's
new book "War Between Russia. and
China," which sets forth the dangers
and implications of a Sino-Soviet war
to the nuclear security of the United
States in a most persuasive and sobering
fashion.
My purpose today is to hail the be-
ginning of the SALT negotiations. I wish
to conclude on a high note rather than
a low note, for I am an optimist on the
future of mankind. Accordingly, I be-
lieve it is altogether fitting to close with
a most sincere and' deserved tribute to
President Nixon and the U.S. delegation
led by Director Gerard Smith for the
diligence of preparation, the dignity, and
high seriousness of purpose with which
these landmark negotiations have been
opened. I believe they have every right
so long as this attitude and atmosphere
In the U.S. delegation persists to be con-
fident of the support of the Senate in
their crucial and urgent search for a
viable means to cap the volcano of the
nuclear arms race.
CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSI-
NESS AS IN LEGLISLATTVE SES-
SION
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, has morn-
ing business been concluded?
The PRESIDING OFFICER.. Is there
further morning business as in legisla-
tive session? If not, morning business is
concluded.
MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE
As in legislative session, a message
from the House of Representatives by
Mr. Bartlett, one of its reading clerks,
announced that the House had passed
the following bills, in which it requested
the concurrence of the Senate:
H.R. 1453. An act for the relief of Capt.
Nelvin A. Kaye:
H.R. 1865. An act for the relief of Mrs.
Beatrice Jaffe; and
H.R. 14794. An act making appropriations
for the Department of Transportation and
related agencies for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1970, and for other purposes.
ENROLLED BILL SIGNED
The message also announced that the
Speaker had affixed his signature to the
enrolled bill (S. 92) for the relief of Mr.
and Mrs. Wong Yui.
HOUSE BILLS REFERRED
As in legislative session, the following
bills were severally read twice by their
titles and referred, as indicated:
H.R. 1453. An act for the relief of Capt.
Melvin A. Kaye; and
H.R. 1865. An act for the relief of Mrs.
Beatrice Jaffe; to the Committee on the
Judiciary.
H.R. 14794. An act making appropriations
for the Department of Transportation and
related agencies for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1970, and for other purposes; to
the Committee on Appropriations.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES
The Senate, in executive session, re-
sumed the consideration of the nomina-
tion of Clement P. Haynsworth, Jr., of
South Carolina, to be an Associate Jus-
tice of the Supreme Court of the United
States.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, the Sen-
ate will soon decide whether to approve
the nomination of Clement F. Ilayns-
worth to the post of Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court. For over 2 months
this man has undergone an examination
of character, ability, and philosophy
which has not been duplicated since the
inquisition. In an attempt to find some
reason to justify opposition to Judge
Haynsworth's nomination, critics have
invoked a standard of behavior that, if
applied to all future nominees to the
Court, would guarantee that the Su-
preme Court membership shall remain
at eight until the millennium.
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The Nuclear A.rsenals:74. Balance of Terror
By WILLIAM BEECHER
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Nov. 17? a surprise attack, the third
As the United States and the
Soviet Union began preliminary
arms-cOntrol talks today in Hel-
Strad, rmland, their respective
nuelear arsenals were believed
"zero to be in rough equilib-
riuM. That is a condition many
American officials say they
hOpe to preserve.
- The oviet Union, after a
rather a1ljtious effort to catch
More and bigger land-based in-
tarcontljleJ,aI ballistic missiles
than tile jjnited States and is
the first to have actually de-
ployed a working, though urn-
fted defense.
The United States still main-
jain substantial lead over
the Russians in submarine-
based missiles and in long-
range strategic bombers.
In the expression often used
by armaments experts, the two
powers have achieved a bal-
.! ariCe Of terror: If either were
to stage a surprise attack, the
rother would have enough sur-
viving nuclear weapons to dev-
astate the attackers.
Thu.S.* by the premise on
,Agtierican nuclear strat-
is based, both should be
rred from initiating nu-
ar war, for such a move
could be an act of national sui-
cide.
An Early Question
United States officials say
they are not sure whether So-
viet officials share this prem-
ise. That is one of the first
questions they hope to answer
at Helsinki.
Soviet strategic writings, al-
most exclusively by military
men, frequently scoff at the no-
tion that if deterrence fails no
one wins. Some Russian gener-
als insist that the country with
the most and best offensive and
defensive systems will do the
Malt damage to the enemy, pro-
tect more of its population and
thio win slich a war. Whether
Riiosan political leaders share
this view is unknown in the
West.
On the answer to that ques-
tion hinges much of the hope
for an agreement to limit arms.
If the Russians, ultimately,
Vfil agree that deterrence is
all they really want, then an
4rderrierit may be possible to
limit bah offensive and defen-
sive _nuclear weapons, Ameri-
cah,affigals say. ut a limita-
tion agreement could prove elu-
sive if the Russians insist on
maintaining the potential to
fight and survive a nuclear war,
in case deterrence fails. Such a
potential is known as "damage-
limiting capability" or "war-
fighting capability."
A comparative look at the
size and character of the two
countries' nuclear stockpiles
provides an insight into the na-
ture of the arms race and of the
task before the negotiators in
trying to stop the arms mo-
mentum caused by mutual fear.
The American strateglearse-
nal comprises three different
gystems=1,000 Minuteman and
54 Titan II la.,41-base,cl inter-
continental ballistic missiles, or
ICBM's, 450 IA:52 and :86 B-58
bombers, and 41 Polaris sub-
Marines carrying a total of 656
missiles.
The stated purpAPitrPii,cgI4=i1-
taining multiple offensive sys-
tems is that if any one or two
were substantially destroyed in
could still retaliate overwhelm-
ingly against the attacker's cit-
ies.
The United States has tested
and is beginning to deploy a
limited missile defense system,
called Safeguard, around two
Minuteman complexes in the up-
per Midwest. The first of these
defensive missiles, however, is
not expected to be ready for
operation until 1974.
.A principal argument that the
Nixon Administration used in
winning a very close Congres-
sional fight to permit this ini-
tial deployment was that a
larger - than - expected Soviet
build-up of the giant SS-9 in-
tercontinental missile, togeth-
er with Soviet tests of multi-
ple warheads for that missile,
posed a serious potential threat
to the Minuteman force in the
event of war.
Another illustration of how
the actions of one country can
speed the arms race by caus-
ing a counterreaction by the
other is in the case of the
American MIRV, or multiple
independently targetable re-en-
try vehicle.
In 1964, the Soviet Union be-
gan deploying a new surface-to-
air missile system across a wide
arc in the northewestern part
of the Soviet Union, passing
through the city of Talinn.
This was athwart the path that
any missiles fired from the Un-
ited States would have to travel
in attacking Russia's cities in
Europe. American planners con-
jectured that since the United
States was obviously concen-
trating its efforts on missiles,
not bombers, the Tallinn sys-
tem must be a system to defend
against ballistic missiles.
The United States then de-
termined to develop and deploy
MIRV warheads that could
overwhelm by sheer numbers
even a heavy Russian anti-mis-
sile system. While there is still
much argument within the
American intelligence commu-
nity over whether the Tallinn
system could easily be upgrad-
ed to provide a good defense
against intercontinental mis-
siles, most analysts now agree
that the existing system ap-
pears designed to knock down
bombers and missiles fired
from bombers, not interconti-
nental missies.
Russians Were First
While the Russians in the
middle fifties were the first to
develop and stress interconti-
nental missiles over bombers as
a fast, efficient system for de-
livering nuclear warheads, an
intense American effort in the
late nineteen-fifties and early
nineteen-sixties ? spurred by
"missile gap" alarms ? far out-
stripped the Russians.
For comparison's sake, the
Soviet Union had about 250
working intercontinental mis-
siles in June, 1966, when the
American arsenal stood essen-
tially where it is today. But in
the three and a half years since
then, the Russians are said to
have achieved a fivefold in-
crease, with about 1,350 mis-
siles, including some that are
still being installed. This repre-
Lents._ about 30,Qor.e... la*
taws-mastic-448m tittiAlks
than the United States pos-
sesses.
About 280 of these Soviet
The New York Tones
Nov. 111;1969
Equipping most strategic missiles with separately target-
able multiple warheads (MIRV's) could nearly triple war-
head totals; 250 level indicates number needed to destroy
50 largest cities if attack were a surprise and unopposed.
missiles are of the SS-9 type,
which could carry a single war-
head of up to 25 megatons
(equivalent to 25 million tons
of TNT) or three warheads of
about five megatons each.
Defense Department offi-
cials have testified before Con-
gress that 420 SS-9's ? if each
carried a three-warhead MIRV
with an accuracy of a quarter
mile ? could destroy 95 per
cent of the United States' Min-
utemen on a first strike.
Thus one objective of Amer-
ican negotiators at Helsinki will
be to freeze SS-9 construction
before it reaches such poten-
tially threatening proportions.
The Soviet Air Force includes
about 150 Bison and Bear long-
range bombers. It has, in addi-
tion, about 750 medium-range
bombers that could be em-
ployed against targets in the
United States, either on one-
way missions, or round-trip
tuanteittOniMigN
includes 28 nuclear-powered
missile vessels, including a new
type that resembles the Ameri-
can Polaris and carries iqnis
siles instead of the three mis-
siles carried by earlier models.
All told, this force mounts
about 200 missiles. Some 120
more short-range missift Ihre
carried by diesel-electric vsub-
marines.
On missile defense, the Rus-
sians have 64 operational mis-
siles deployed in a semi-
circle about 50 miles outside
the western reaches of ,Nlos-
cow. They are known to be
testing a much-advanced defen-
sive missile. ? ?
American analysts believe the
current balance between the
two countries represents a
standoff, with neither having
the ability to disarm the other
with a surprise attack.
But if either country moved
to deploy heavy missile de-
fenses, together with much
larger numbers of accurately
deliverable offensive war-
9thtlasnciendec
eoC11.1dItt
this possibility that the Helsinki
negotiations are aimed at avert-
ing.
NEW YORK TIMES DATE tbieN PAGE N2
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COMPARISON OF U.S. AND SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS
OFFENSIVE ?r- DEFENSIVE-1
ANTIMISSILE
MISSILES
1.400
LAND-LAUNCHED
MISSILES
z 1,3504
1.100 ?U. S.
I .
1,054?
Low
$OO
SOVIET
loo
:7
200 1111111b
01 1 II1
1966 1967 1966 1969
SUB-LAUNCHED
MISSILES
S.
' 656
SOVIET 205
NIB MI IIII 1111110111
1 III
1966 1967 19611 1969
INTERCONTINENTAL
BOMBERS
336
SOVIET
1 1 1 1501
1966 1967 1968 1969
30
NONE 1 644
.4
SOVIET SOVIET
25
_AV
0 II?
1966
)96?
The New York Times
These charts, showing U.S. ahead in submarine-launched
missiles and intercontinental bombers and Soviet ahead
In land launched and antimissile missiles, depict rough
balance of strategic nuclear power. In the talks begun
_
elev. 18, 1969
In Helsinki, U.S. hopes to freeze these weapons systems,
except antimissile missiles, at about present levels. To
defend against the bombers, both sides have numerous
jet fighter planes and antiaircraft missiles and guns.
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Nov-ember 18 , AR?roved F 1-0S 14591
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. AIKEN. I would suggest that a
time which would be satisfactory to
everyone would be 1 a.m. on Friday.
Mr. MANSFIELD. 1 a.m.?
Mr. AIKEN. Yes.
Mr. MANSFIELD. No; I know one
Member of the Senate who would be very
much put out.
Mr. AIKEN. Make it 6 a.m. on Friday.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the request?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
withdraw my request for the time being.
I understand the distinguished Senator
from Indiana has a request to make.
Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, so that we
may "sense" the sense of the Senate
and move forward on this matter, with
2 further days of debate, with what is
remaining of today as well?and I would
think we could go on as long this evening
and tomorrow as the leader and both
sides thought necessary to accommodate
those of our colleagues who have not
been heard?let me propose a unani-
mous-consent request that we consider
voting at the end of the day on Thurs-
day, 6 p.m.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the request that a vote be
had on Thursday next at 6 p.m.?
Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, I would
be constrained to enter an objection, not
on my own behalf, but on behalf of Sen-
ators who want to speak, together with
other Senators, at least one of whom
comes from the other side of the aisle.
As far as I know, he is not going to favor
the position very meritoriously favored
by the Senator from Nebraska, but be-
fore he departed the Nation's Capital he
said that if he were present, he would
object to voting at any time on Thurs-
day.
So I do hope the Senator from Indiana
will withdraw his suggestion so I will not
be put to the duty of entering an ob-
jection; and I do not think the Senator
from Indiana wants me to do that.
Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, it is difficult
for me to imagine my friend from Ne-
braska being objectionable in any way.
I am glad to withdraw the request, faced
with the cold facts as they are.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I re-
new my request.
Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, what is
the request? May we have it repeated?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the request that the vote
on the nomination be set for Friday at
1 p.m.? Without objection, it is so or-
dered.
The agreement reduced to writing is
as follows:
Ordered, That at 1 p.m. on Friday. Novem-
ber 21, 1969, the Senate proceed to vote on
the nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth,
Jr., of South Carolina, to be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States.
[The following proceedings were con-
ducted as in legislative session.]
LEGISLATIVE ? PROGRAM?AN-
NOUNCEMENT ON A POSSIBLE
ADJOURNMENT SINE DIE
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if I
may have the attention of the Senate,
this may be as good a time as any for me
to make this announcement with respect
to the rest of the year.
During a recent discussion with the
distinguished minority leader, an under-
standing was reached that adjournment
sine die would occur between December
15 and 23, probably closer to the 23d,
1969. Further, the second session of the
91st Congress will not convene before
January 12, and possibly a few days
thereafter.
Legislation to be considered prior to
adjournment includes the following: Six
appropriation bills; a tax reform and tax
relief measure; draft reform; a drug bill;
a crime bill, a pornography bill; a gun
bill?the Lesnick bill; and, if possible,
elementary and secondary education.
It is our intention to call the Senate
into session early and stay late during
the weeks ahead in order to finish this
schedule. All Senators are advised that
Saturday sessions will be scheduled dur-
ing the deliberation of the tax bill.
This information is provided in order
that Senators may plan their schedules
between now and the beginning of the
second session of this Congress.
And on that merry note, I will con-
clude.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Will our leader ad-
vise us about next week? As I understood
earlier, there had been an announcement
that there would be some kind of recess
over Thanksgiving.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes.
May I say it is the hope of the joint
leadership, in addition to disposing of
the Haynsworth nomination this week,
to take up the draft reform proposal,
which should not take too long; the Les-
nick gun bill, which was reported unan-
imously?
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, if the
Senator will yield?which bill?
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Lesnick gun
bill, to provide that if one carries a gun
in the perpetration of a crime, the carry-
ing of the gun itself is a crime.
Mr. McCLELLAN. That bill was re-
ported today.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Unanimously.
Sentences would be mandatory, to a
degree, and a sentence imposed in such
a case would be in addition to the sen-
tence imposed for the crime itself.
Then it is my understanding that the
Finance Committee may well place the
tax reform-tax relief bill on the calendar
Friday. It is the hope of the joint leader-
ship to make that the pending business
and to get started on the tax reform-tax
relief bill on Monday, hopefully to finish
it within two weeks or so.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, do I
understand there will be a session this
Saturday?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Not this Saturday.
At the conclusion of business on
Wednesday next, the Senate will have
Thanksgiving Day off and Friday as well.
Mr. McCLELLAN. And Saturday and
Sunday?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. DODD. I did not hear all the
Senator said about the gun amendment.
We did not report the amendment until
this afternoon.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, and I appre-
ciate the efforts of the Senator and the
other members of the Committee.
Mr. DODD. I wanted to make that
clear.
Mr. HART. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. HART. I hope to make it clearer
that the majority leader is not quite ac-
curate when he says the gun bill was
reported out of the committee unani-
mously. I rise only to correct the RECORD.
Mr. MANSFIELD. When we get with-
in one of unanimity, I think that is pret-
ty fair shooting.
Mr. HART. The Senator did not come
that close, but he came one step shorter.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, would
the Senator consider bringing up the
draft bill and disposing of it prior to the
end of business on Friday?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Hopefully, if condi-
tions permit. I would like to see it dis-
posed of this week. I would hope, when
we take it up, that Senators would not
spend too much time expounding their
views, but would allow the matter to
come to a vote as soon as possible, so
that the matter could be sent to the Pres-
ident as expeditiously as possible.
Mr. BROOKE. If the debate on the
Haynsworth nomination were concluded
by Thursday, at the end of the day, would
it be possible that the `draft bill would
be taken up on Friday and laid before
the Senate?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, or possibly be-
fore, if conditions permit.
Mr. HRUSKA. Or after the vote.
Mr. BROOKE. Or after the vote;
either.
Mr. MANSFIELD Yes
HELSINKI: A HOPEFUL BEGINNING
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, the most
momentous arms control discussions in
history have opened. The United States
and the Soviet Union have come together
in Helsinki, Finland, to consider how best
to promote their mutual security and
the peace of the world through agreed
limitations on strategic arms.
Yesterday's opening statements by
Finnish Foreign Minister Kaljalainen,
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Semye-
nov, and US. Ambassador Smith offer
clear testimony to the sober determina-
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CQNGRESSIONAL RECORD r 18, 1969
tion with which the parties approach
these discussions and the profound con-
cern which all nations have for them.
As the Finnish leader put it, the so-called
SALT talks "will largely determine, not
only the prospects of further progress
in the field of disarmament and arms
control, but also the future trend of in-
ternational relations as a whole."
I believe that both Moscow and Wash-
ington have conle to the negotiations
with the most serious intentions to reach
viable agreements. A broad variety of
understandings may be feasible, espe-
cially if it is made clear in these prelim-
inary talks that the two States recog-
nize that the only stable strategic bal-
ance open to them is one founded on a
clear recognition of the fact of mutual
deterrence.
While the urgency of the issues for
negotiation is great, and heightened by
the quickening pace of weapons tech-
nology, there is yet time to address the
problem of halting another spiral in the
arms race. As Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko declared some months ago,
"The arms race has long become sheer
madness." On that conviction, which is
certainly shared by Americans, a saner
foundation for peace and security can be
erected.
All men can be heartened by the open-
minded approach voiced at the opening
' session. In his charge to the American
delegation, President Nixon left no doubt
that the United States is ready to con-
sider reasonable limitations on all major
strategic systems, including the menac-
ing new weapon known as MIRV and the
planned ABM system. In the President's
words:
We are prepared to discuss limitations on
all offensive and defensive systems, and to
reach agreements in which both sides can
have confidence... . We are prepared to deal
with the issues seriously, carefully, and pur-
posefully. We seek no unilateral advantage.
NOT do we seek arrangements which could
be prejudicial to the interests of third par-
ties. We are prepared to engage in bona fide
negotiations on concrete issues, avoiding
polemics and extraneous matters.
I take these assurances to mean that
the administration is willing to consider
any sensible proposal of mutual interest
to the Soviet Union and the United
States, including such suggestions as a
moratorium of MIRV tests and a freeze
on deployment of both offensive and
defensive weapons.
The Soviet Union seems to bring a sim-
ilar willingness to the conference table
and does not appear to view the effort as
another propaganda exercise. Moreover,
in recent discussions with American par-
ticipants in the so-called pugwash con-
ferences, a number of prominent mem-
bers of the Soviet technical elite ex-
plicitly stressed that the priority task
for SALT should be an early limit on
both MIRV and ABM. Since Soviet com-
mentatoks have long resisted any hint of
aclmowlFdgement that ABM systems
might have destabilizing implications for
the strategic balance, their forthcoming
stand in these conversations may herald
a basic modification in the official Soviet
position. That would be a hopeful de-
velopment indeed, since the prospects for
halting the insidious MIRV technology
will certainly perish if there is no chance
for an agreed limit on the anti-ballistic-
missile systems they are designed to
penetrate.
Every informed person will be looking
to Helsinki for the signs which will
emerge there. The encouraging words I
have cited are mere straws and the hard
bargaining is yet to come. But the straws
are bent the right way and all of us must
pray that they point toward the historic
agreements that will ultimately save
mankind from the awesome weapons it
has wrought.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the opening statements of the
Helsinki conference be printed in the
RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the opening
statements were ordered to be printed in
the RECORD, as follows:
STATEMENT BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER or
FINLAND, DR. ANTI KARJALAINEN
Ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of the
Government of Finland it is a great pleasure
for me to welcome to Finland today the dis-
tinguished leaders and the members of the
delegations of the Soviet Union and the
United States.
We are today witnessing a historioal occa-
sion. Two major powers, the United States
and the Soviet Union, have decided to begin
negotiations on a question whicfh has the
utmost importance and urgency, not only for
themselves, but for mankind as a whole.
Never has the need for putting an end to the
nuclear arms race been so universally recog-
nized as it is today. By starting these discus-
sions the two powers which are in control of
the major part of the nuclear arsenal of the
world have on their part acknowledged their
supreme responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security.
Even as we realize the complexity of the
task, we believe that the starting of discus-
sions between the two leading nuclear powers
Is an encouraging sign of their willingness to
advance in the field of disarmament and
thus to continue along the road of arms con-
trol in the spirit of the treaties on a partial
test ban and on the non-proliferation of nu-
clear weapons. There can be no doubt that
the outcome of these talks will largely deter-
mine, not only the prospects of further prog-
ress in the field of disarmament and arms
control, but also the future trend of inter-
national relations as a whole.
Ladies and gentlemen, as a neutral country
which maintains friendly relations, with all
nations across the dividing lines of military
blocks and ideological alignments, Finland
is ready to make every effort to serve the
cause of peace. We are proud that you have
chosen Helsinki as the site for your discus-
sions. We wish to do our utmost to facilitate
your efforts. As a spokesman for the host
country I would like to express the hope that
the arrangements made will meet with your
approval and that the neutral ground which
we offer you will be beneficial to the impor-
tant task that you have before you. We will
now give you the privacy that you will need.
We wish you the best of success.
Thank you.
ADDRESS BY MR. V. S. SEMENOV, HEAD OF THE
U.S.S.R. DELEGATION
Esteemed Mr. Karjalainen, esteemed Mr.
Smith, ladies and gentlemen, permit me first
of all to express our sincere gratitude to Mr.
Karjalainen, Minister of Foreign Affairs, for
his warm welcome and wishes for success in
OUT work.
The Government of the U.S.S.R. attaches
great importance to the negotiations on
curbing strategic arms race. Their positive
results would undoubtedly contribute both
to improvement in the Soviet-American re-
lotions and to the consolidation of universal
peace.
Unswervingly guided by the principles of
ensuring lasting peace and international se-
curity, laid down by V. I. Lenin into the
basis of the foreign policy of the Soviet
State, the Soviet Union hnA always been a
proponent of the implementation of the
principles of peaceful co-existence, of effec-
tive measures to end the arms race and of
general and complete disarmament. The So-
viet moves aimed at this goal are widely sup-
ported by peace-loving states and peoples.
It is our desire to see this meeting in Hel-
sinki successfully solving its tasks.
Curbing of the strategic arms race, limita-
tion and subsequent reduction of such arm-
aments?this is an important goal the
achievement of which would meet the vital
interests not only of the Soviet and Ameri-
can peoples, but also of other nations of the
world.
Given genuine desire on both sides to seek
mutually acceptable agreement without
prejudice to the security of our states and
all other countries it is possible and impera-
tive to overcome obvious complexities and
obstacles and to bring about reasonable
solutions.
As regards the Soviet delegation, our ef-
forts at the talks will be directed towards
this very end.
On behalf of the U.S.S.R. delegation we
extend greetings to Mr. Smith, Chairman of
the United States delegation, to all its mem-
bers and staff. We are hopeful that an ex-
change of views between us will develop
in a constructive manner and create the
necessary foundation for further negotia-
tions.
In conclusion may I on behalf of the Soviet
Government express our appreciation to the
Government of Finland for providing oppor-
tunity to hold this meeting in Helsinki. We
regard it as an expression not only of the
traditional Finnish hospitality but also of
the active peace-loving foreign policy of the
Government of Finland which has won re-
spect throughout the world.
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GERARD C. SMITH,
HEAD OF THE U.S. DELEGATION
Foreign Minister Karjalainen, Minister
Semenov, ladies and gentlemen, on behalf
of the United States delegation, I want to
thank you, Mr. Karjalainen, for your kind
words of welcome. I would also like to express
the appreciation of delegation for the hos-
pitality and cooperation of the Finnish Gov-
ernment in providing such a fine site for the
preliminary talks on strategic arms limitation
between the Soviet Union and the United
States. May I thank you personally, Mr.
Karjalainen, for your part in making avail-
able the accommodations for the United
States delegation in this lovely city of Hel-
sinki, the capital of a neutral country of
friendly and stouthearted people.
I also wish on this occasion to extend
greetings to you, Minister Semenov, and to
the other members of the Soviet delegation.
We look forward to working with you on the
complex tasks before us. The start of these
preliminary talks on strategic arms limita-
tion is an historic occasion, for as the Secre-
tary of State of the United States said last
Thursday, the United States and the Soviet
Union open today talks "leading to what
could be the most critical negotiations on
disarmament ever undertaken."
Mr. Foreign Minister, Minister Semenov, I
have a message from the President of the
United States, which I would like to read at
this time.
"You are embarking upon one of the most
momentous negotiations ever entrusted to an
American delegation.
"I do not mean to belittle the past. The
Antarctic Treaty, the Limited Test Ban
Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, and most re-
cently the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which
we hope will soon enter into force, were all
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important steps along the road to interna-
tional security. Other tasks remain on the
agenda of the United Nations and the Con-
ference of the Committee on Disarmament.
Today, however, you will begin what all of
your fellow citizens in the United States and,
I believe, all people throughout the world,
profoundly hope will be a sustained effort
not only to limit the buildup of strategic
forces but to reverse it.
"I do not underestimate the difficulty of
your task: the nature of modern weapons
makes their control an exceedingly complex
endeavor. But this very fact increases the im-
portance of your effort.
"Nor do I underestimate the suspicion
and distrust that must be dispelled if you
are to succeed in your assignment.
"I am also conscious of the historical fact
that wars and crises between nations can
arise not simply from the existence of arms
but from clashing interests or the ambitious
pursuit of unilateral interests. That is why
we seek progress toward the solution of the
dangerous political issues of our day.
"I am, nevertheless, hopeful that your
negotiations with representatives from the
Soviet Union will serve to increase mutual
security. Such a result is possible if we ap-
proach these negotiations recognizing the
legitimate security interests on each side.
"I have stated that for our part we will
be guided by the concept of maintaining
'sufficiency' in the forces required to pro-
tect ourselves and our allies. I recognize
that the leaders of the Soviet Union bear
similar defense responsibilities. I believe it
is possble, however, that we can carry out
our respective responsibilities under a mu-
tually acceptable limitation and eventual
reduction of our strategic arsenals.
"We are prepared to discuss limitations
on all offensive and defensive systems, and
to reach agreements in which both sides
can have confidence. As I stated in my ad-
dress to the United Nations, we are pre-
pared to deal with the issues seriously, care-
fully, and purposefully. We seek no uni-
lateral advantage. Nor do we seek arrange-
ments which could be prejudicial to the in-
terests of third parties. We are prepared to
engage in bona fide negotiations on con-
crete issues, avoiding polemics and extrane-
ous matters.
"No one can foresee what the outcome of
your work will be. I believe your approach
to these talks will demonstrate the serious-
ness of the United States in pursuing a
path of equitable accommodation. I am con-
vinced that the limitation of strategic arms
is in the mutual interest of our country and
the Soviet Union."
The United States delegation is deeply
conscious of the responsibility we have in
these talks to try to limit strategic arms in
the United States and the Soviet Union.
This objective concerns not only the United
States and the Soviet Union, but the whole
world.
AUTHORIZATION FOR COMMITTEE
ON THE JUDICIARY TO FILE ITS
REPORT ON S. 849 BY MIDNIGHT
TONIGHT
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, as in
legislative session, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the Committee on the Judici-
ary be authorized to file its report on
S. 849, known as the Lesnick gun bill,
by midnight tonight.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(Subsequently, as in legislative session,
Mr. DODD, from the Committee on the
Judiciary, reported favorably with
amendments, the bill (S. 849) to
strengthen the penalty provisions of the
Gun Control Act of 1968, and submitted
a report (No. 91-539) thereon.)
NEWSPAPER PRESERVATION ACT?
REPORT OF A COMMITTEE?IN-
DIVIDUAL VIEWS (S. REPT. NO.
91-535)
Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, as in
legislative session, from the Committee
on the Judiciary, I report favorably,
with amendments, the bill (S. 1520) to
exempt from the antitrust laws certain
combinations and arrangements neces-
sary for the surviVal of failing newspa-
pers, and I submit a report thereon. I ask
unanimous consent that the report be
printed, together with the individual
views of the Senator from Nebraska (Mr.
HRUSKA).
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The re-
port will be received and the bill will be
placed on the calendar; and, without
objection, the report will be printed, as
requested by the Senator from Missis-
sippi.
AMENDMENT TO H.R. 13270 TO END
THE INCOME TAX SURCHARGE AS
OF JANUARY 1, 1970
AMENDMENT NO. 287
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President,
as in legislative session, I sent to the
desk an amendment to H.R. 13270, the
tax reform bill. I ask that this amend-
ment be printed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be received and printed,
and will lie on the table.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. My amendment
would end the surcharge on income
taxes as of January 1, 1970.
When the surtax first was imposed, it
was described as a temporary tax. At the
end of this year, it will have been in effect
for 21 months for individuals and 24
months for corporations.
It already has been extended once be-
yond its original expiration date. In my
opinion, extension of the tax beyond the
end of 1969 would take it out of the
"temporary" category.
I give full credence to the President's
good intentions in his pledge that the tax
will be allowed to die as of July 1, 1970,
but I fear that the temptation to extend
it beyond that date will be very strong?
just as was the temptation to extend it
beyond its previous termination date of
June 30, 1969.
Each extension of a tax makes the next
extension easier.
Sooner or later?and I suspect the
time is at hand?the Government begins
to regard the temporary tax increase as
a permanent part of the tax structure.
I think that this must be avoided. I
think that the Government must keep
faith with the people.
The way to keep faith with the people
is to kill the surcharge on income taxes
as of the end of this year.
There is evidence that many Senators
have serious misgivings about extending
the surtax. When a vote was taken on the
question in the Senate Finance Commit-
tee, the count was only 9 to 7 in favor of
extension.
I recognize that there is a pressing
need to combat inflation in this country.
But I submit that the best way to fight
the war on inflation is by reducing spend-
ing?not by increasing taxes.
During the recent debate on the mili-
tary procurement bill, I remarked that
it was essential to cut the fat from the
military budget, but that we dare not cut
the muscle. That statement applies with
equal force to the whole budget.
I am convinced that, despite the com-
mendable efforts of the administration
to reduce the budget, there remain sig-
nificant areas of fat that can be trimmed.
For one thing, the proposed budget for
foreign economic aid is $2.2 billion. That
is almost double last year's authoriza-
tion?an increase of a billion dollars.
I do not believe that the American
people should be called upon to pay a
surcharge on their income taxes to help
finance this kind of increase. As a matter
of fact, I am strongly inclined to vote
against the entire appropriation for for-
eign economic aid, for I know that there
is $5.2 billion available in the pipeline
to take care of contingencies.
The anticipated revenue from the sur-
tax at the proposed rate of 5 percent for
the first 6 months of 1970 is approxi-
mately $1.7 billion, according to the
Budget Bureau's September estimate.
Elimination of the foreign aid authori-
zation would more than compensate for
the loss of this revenue.
As a matter of fact, if the surtax were
to die on next January 1, foreign aid
could be funded at a reduced level with-
out changing the administration's budget
goals.
Foreign aid is not the only area of the
budget in which there is considerable fat.
I feel sure that reductions can be made
without damage to the Nation in the
antipoverty program?in which there
has been much waste and inefficiency?
and in a number of other domestic fields.
Furthermore, the $2 billion reduction
made so far in the military budget prob-
ably is not the limit of what can be cut
without risking our security.
I admit that, if the surtax is elimi-
nated, it will make the budgetary choices
ahead of us more difficult. But I feel that
we must undergo necessary discipline.
We must control spending.
In the long run, controlled spending?
and not repeated extensions of tax in-
creases?will best combat inflation.
ORDER 'OF BUSINESS
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
GRAVEL in the chair) . The clerk will call
the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
SENATE RESOLUTION 285?RESO-
LUTION AUTHORIZING SENATE
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMIT-
TEE TO STUDY POSSIBILITIES
FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERA-
TION IN SPACE EXPLORATION
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, in
recent years, a number of Senators have
been concerned over the high costs of
the U.S. space program. Unfortunately,
efforts to reduce these costs have been
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENA1 t ivovember .18,1969
consistently met with the argument that
man's thirst for knowledge and the ad-
vancement of science compel us to keep
our space program fully funded.
However, a way does exist to sharply
cut our costs on the space program with-
out reducing advancements in this area.
It involves sharing the benefits and
costs of space exploration with the in-
ternational community.
Accordingly, Mr. President, as in leg-
islative session, on behalf of myself and
? Senators GOODELL, HART, MCCARTHY,
MCGOVERN, MONDALE, MUSKIE, NELSON,
PACKWOOD, PASTORE, SPARKMAN, TYDINGS,
and YARBOROUGH, I am today submitting
a resolution which would authorize the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee to
undertake a comprehensive study of all
possibilities for international coopera-
tion in space exploration.
The resolution reads as follows:
Resolved, That the Committee on Foreign
Relations or any duly authorized subcom-
including those in the solar system and
those beyond the solar system, and no
one would maintain that there is any
national value in our taking that long
step for mankind. Yet, we all know that
it is going to be taken.
Unless we move, and move soon, to be-
gin to get an understanding of the possi-
bilities of involving tries, our
taxpayers are g to be o heavily
burdened thaje ither they ar going to
refuse to gd" ahead, understandably, or
we are going to have a Very heavy
burden of space exploration1 which, as
I have said, will benefit all mankind, but
the cost will be on the American tax-
payer.
Achievements in space inure to the
benefit of all mankind, not just to citi-
zens of any one nationality. Moreover,
any psychological lift or entertainment
value generated by space spectaculars is
shared equally by the world community.
If the benefits are shared on an equal
mittee thereof, is authorized under sections basis, why not the costs? Hundreds of
134(a) and 136 of the Legislative Reorgani- millions of dollars could be saved?and
zation Act of 1946, and in accordance with should be saved?by encouraging other
its jurisdiction specified by Rule XXV of
nations to join us in the space venture.
the Standing Rules of the Senate, to make
a full and complete study of the possibilities In the past, NASA has repeatedly asked
for international cooperation and cost shar- the Soviet Union if they would cooperate
lug in the exploration of space, including\ and share expenses on various aspects of
but not limited to, the desirability and ..,, the space program. A list of these efforts
rough the end of 1967 was included in
th earings on the NASA authorization
bill fiscal 1970, and I should like to
read thi "st because I think it sheds
some light big., the way NASA has ap-
proached this dupstion in the past:
feasibility of?
(1) establishing an international con-
sortium for space missions, or
(2) utilizing the United Nations Organ-
IZation, or a subsidiary organization thereof,
for securing international cooperation and
participation in the exploration of space.
SEC. 2. The Committee shall report its
findings upon the study authorized by the
resolution, together with such recommenda-
tions, including recommendations for addi-
tional legislation, as it deems advisable, to
the Senate at the earliest practicable date,
but not later than January 31, 1971.
SEC. 3. For the purposes of this resolution
the committee is authorized, through Feb-
ruary 28, 1971, (1) to make such expendi-
tures as it deems advisable; (2) to employ
upon a temporary basis, technical, clerical,
and other assistants and consultants; and
(3) with the prior consent of the heads of
the departments or agencies concerned, and
the Committee on Rules and Administration,
to utilize the reimbursable services, infor-
mation, facilities, and personnel of any of
the departments or agencies of the Govern-
ment.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, such
a study has been sorely needed for a
long time. The benefits from space ex-
ploration are certainly international in
character.
We ought to realize that the moon
flights, for example, are going to be just
as beneficial to a person in West Ger-
many or in England or in France or in
Russia, for that matter, as to an indi-
vidual American. The benefits are the
satisfaction in seeing men in space and
on the moon and the knowledge of how invitation.
the moon, the earth, and the sun November 16, 19657---NASA inquired about
evolved. Nobody is saying that we should
the possibility of United States/U.S.S.R. com-
munications tests via Molniya I. On January
keep these secrets or that we are going 23, 1966, the Soviets replied that it was not
to do so. possible to consider joint experiments "in
So everybody is going to benefit almost the present conditions."
equally, throughout the world. January 6, 1966.?Administrator Webb
asked Academician Blagonravov, Chairman
We all know that the space explora- of the Soviet Academy's Commission on the
tion has no military value. This particu- Exploration and Use of Outer Space, for a
lar space effort certainly does not. Of description of experiments on Soviet Venus
course, we have to recognize the multi- probes then in flight in order that NASA
billion dollar cost of future explorations, plans for Venus probes might emphasize ex-
December 7, 195.,-NASA Administrator
Glennan offered 'U.S. -&ssistance in tracking
Soviet manned flights. The Soviets replied
that they would be in touch if the need arose.
March 7, 1962.?President Kennedy pro-
posed an exchange of tracking and data
acquisition stations. The SoViets did not
accept.
September 20, 1963.?Presidekit Kennedy
suggested in a speech to the U.N.'Greneral As-
sembly that the United Stat4 and the
U.S.S.R. explore the possibility o joint ex-
ploration of the moon. Presiden Johnson
later reaffirmed this offer. There ha been no
official Soviet response.
December 8, 1964.--NASA proposed, an ex-
change of visits by NASA and Soviet teams
to deep space tracking and data acquisition
facilities. The Soviets replied on August 13,
1965, that such visits were not then possible.
May 3, 1965.?NASA suggested United
States/U.S.S.R. communications tests via the
Soviet Molniya I. There was no Soviet
response.
August 25, 1965.?At the request of Presi-
dent Johnson, Administrator Webb invited
the Soviet Academy of Sciences to Send a
high-level representative to the launching of
Gemini VI. At the same time, the President
said that "we will continue to hold out to all
nations, including the Soviet Ungil, the
ation in the exciti
lie al
periments which could complement rather
than duplicate Soviet work. Magonravov
replied informally that he did not have
authority to describe the experiments.
March 24 and May 23, 1966.?Administra-
tor Webb suggested to Academician Blagon-
ravov that the Soviets propose subjects for
discussion with a view to extending coopera-
tion between NASA and the Soviet Academy.
Blagonravov replied informally that the So-
viets were not ready for further cooperation.
September 22, /966.?Ambassador Gold-
berg, speaking in the U.N. General Assembly,
said that if the U.S.S.R desired tracking cov-
erage from US. territory, we were prepared to
discuss with the Soviets the technical and
other requirements involved "with a view to
reaching some mutually beneficial agree-
ment."
March 27, 1967.?President Seitz, of the
National Academy of Sciences, proposed to
President Keldysh, of the Academy of Sci-
ences of the U.S.S.R. that the U.S.S.R. pro-
vide the United States with some results of
the Luna 13 soil meter experiment in ad-
vance of Soviet normal reporting to the
world scientific community in return for
comparable data from future flights in the
Surveyor series. President Keldysh replied
4 nionths later on July 28, forwarding data
which had already been reported at the In-
ternational Committee on Space Research
(COSPAR) meeting in London.
hand of co
space exploratio
us." The Soviets did
years of
for all of
n6E accept this
March 27-31, 1967.?Dr. Kistiakowsky,
during the visit of a National Academy of
Sciences delegation to Moscow, suggested
small United States/U.S.S.R. meetings to
consider such topics as cooperation in
weather prediction, lunar and planetary re-
search, and orbiting telescopes. At the same
time, Dr. Brown proposed that representa-
tives of the two academies consider joint
space efforts in basic science, excluding rock-
etry. The Soviets have not replied to these
proposals.
April 4, 1967.?Administrator Webb said in
his statement on the death of Cosmonaut
Komarov that NASA wished to make every
realistic effort to cooperate with the Soviet
Union. The Soviets have not responded.
June 2, 1567.---Administrator Webb pro-
posed to Academician Blagonravov that they
meet in July at the time of the COSPAR
meeting in London to review progress in
the exchange of weather data as required
every 6 months under bilateral agreements.
Blagonravov replied on July 3 that he had
been unable to arrange for the presence of
the necessary Soviets experts. The required
semiannual meetings had not been held since
October 1965.
October 10, 1967.?President Johnson,
speaking on the occasion of the entry into
force of the U.N. Outer Space Treaty, listed
previous U.S. offers of cooperation and said
"We again renew these offers today. They
are only the beginnings of what should be
a long, cooperative endeavor in exploring
the heavens together."
October 18, 1967.?President Seitz of the
National Academy of Sciences, in a telegram
congratulating Academician Keldysh on the
success of Venus 4, spoke of the need to
further full and prompt exchange of data
on planetary exploration. Keldysh's telegram
of acknowledgement made no reference to
data exchange.
December 15, 1967.?President Seitz of the
Nation-al Academy wrote to Academician
Keidysh proposing a small working meeting
between the Soviet Venera IV experimenters
and the American Mariner V experimenters
to compare results of the two Venus probes
and to assist each other in understanding
the significance of the measurements.
Keldysh replied in a letter of January 24,
1968, that he would be sending proposals
on this matter shortly. The proposals never
came, and there has been no further Soviet
response.
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In addition, Dr. Panofsky notes that in
terms of policing an arms control agree-
ment the physical activity which we
would undertake in deploying other kinds
of weaponry, such as bomber defenses,
probably cannot be readily discerned
from the early steps in deployment of
such provocative systems as ABM's and
MIRV's. Hence, where inspection is con-
cerned, he points out that?
The more far-reaching the prohibition of
the SALT treaty, the less important the
question of cheating becomes . . . A freeze
of the "status quo" at present levels of stra-
tegic armaments is easier to police than a
treaty specifying agreed numbers of com-
ponents (missiles, radars, etc.) of permitted
strategic systems. It is easier to recognize
changes than to interpret in detail what is
discovered.
Approved F
A bullet-pierced American helmet is half-
covered by the sand. A tank track, churning
over one of the execution trenches, has
left a deep depression.
The trench to be exoavated is clearly rec-
ognizable; a long, three foot wide depression
overgrqwn with bright green grass standing
out amid the coarse scrub of the dunes.
Women distribute surgical gloves and face
masks. From a bottle they pour alcohol over
the gauze.
Eight grave-diggers, mostly barefoot and
wearing shorts, begin to open the length of
the trench.
Three feet down, they find the corpses,
stacked against each other in a straight line.
With small shovels, sand is removed right
and left of the line.
With their hands, the workers lift the
bodies from the graves onto plastic sheets.
The grave-diggers lift the skull of every
body out first, gently brushing away the
sand.
Two men check the dental structure and
the length and color of the hair. They re-
port the results through their facemasks to
four young men and girls registering all
identifications in pads. A number for fu-
ture identifications is put on each skull.
One unidentified victim is found to have
a plastic image of Buddha on a slyer chain
clenched between the teeth.
The torsoes of the corpses, with arms and
legs huddled in the crouching, kneeling posi-
tion in which the victims were killed, are
lifted out by grave-diggers.
In monotonous voices, officials announce to
the waiting men and women what they find
as they rip clothing apart, search pockets for
identification papers and military tags.
Militiaman Nguyen My, who has stood be-
side the trench for two hours, suddenly falls
to his knee, howling like a wounded animal.
Then his voice becomes a whimper and he
touches a piece of uniform with the name
tage of his brother Nguyen Due. With trem-
bling hands he pulls his dead brother's pic-
ture from his wallet, showing it around.
The brother's remains are wrapped in a
plastic sheet. The package looks like the
mummy of a child.
Two black-clad militiamen carry the corpse
away on a makeshift bamboo stretcher. Sol-
dier Nguyen My, crying, stumbles behind.
The day before he had found his other
brother, Nguyen Doan, in another mass grave.
All three had been captured during the Tet
offensive. Only Nguyen My escaped.
As the hot day wears on, almost every yard
of trench yields a body.
The grave-diggers run short of plastic
sheets and bodies are laid out in the sand.
A woman, digging with her fingers through
a heap of bones, shrieks and collapses, tears
streaming down her face. She wails and beats
her hands on the ground, rocking back and
forth. After her husband's body is wrapped
she embraces the bundle. Other women drag
her away and support her as she follows the
stretcher-bearers.
Some of the women return after burying
one relative, looking for others. One peasant
woman found her husband and two sons
within two days in different execution
trenches.
Such scences are repeated along the road,
to which the bodies are carried and again at
the schoolhouse where they are laid out and
lists of identification marks are tacked to the
walls.
More than 300 unknown victims await a
mass funeral unless relatives can identify
and bury them in family plots.
The number of persons waiting
graves has become larger each day.
Many citizens of Hue have tried to believe
their relatives were taken away by the Viet
Gong to serve as soldiers, laborers or just to
be indoctrinated for the Communist cause.
Now they know that the Viet Cong meant
death.
at the
PRESIDENTIAL WORLD TRADE
MESSAGE
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, President
Nixon has presented a balanced approach
to world trade. He has recognized the
need for open markets but, more im-
portantly, he has also recognized the
hardship now faced by some of our
domestic industries, such as textiles. Of
additional importance to my own Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania is the rising
level of shoe imports which I hope can
be curtailed, or at least remedied, by
means of effective legislation.
The President's proposed Trade Act of
1969 will provide some remedy for those
industries which are adversely affected
by rising import levels. Whenever in-
creased imports are the primary cause of
serious injury, relief will now be avail-
able to both the industry involved and
its employees. I believe that the essence
of the President's proposals lies in his
assertion that?
U.S. trade policies must respect legitimate
U.S. interests, and that to be fair to our
trading partners does not require us to be
unfair to our own people.
Free trade will not mean much to the
working man who is out of a job. I hope
that the President's plan will help to
remedy the serious situations some of our
industries now face in addition to holster-
ing our position o siwo arket.
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, on
November 10, Dr. Wolfgang K. H. Panof-
sky, one of this country's most eminent
scientific authorities, delivered what I
consider to be an immensely important
address at the University of Chicago,
dealing with the Strategic Arms Limita-
tions Talks?SALT?between the United
States and the Soviet Union.
Dr. Panofsky noted that several of the
major strategic weapons systems which
are coming of age at the present time
have the inherent tendency to justify dif-
fering Soviet conclusions about our in-
tentions. Thus, while the Safeguard ABM
is described as a means of preserving our
deterrent, it is also consistent with a plan
to develop a first-strike capability. While
multiple independently targetable reen-
try vehicles have been offered as a device
for penetrating a Soviet ABM, they, too,
can be viewed as a threat to the Soviet
Union's deterrent forces?particularly
when they are described as enhance-
ments of our ability to strike hard tar-
gets. The fact that we are moving ahead
on both in combination gives special
force to the arguments of those elements
within the Soviet Union who ascribe war-
like intentions to the United States.
From this he draws a conclusion with
which I heartily agree that?
A small step in arms limitations may be
harder to negotiate and be in fact more dan-
gerous to U.S. and also Soviety security than
a large step: Because of the multiple stra-
tegic roles of these systems impeding devel-
opment of just one of them may be danger-
ous to ether side. The more restrictive the
SALT treaty can be on the further evolution
of MIRV's and ABM, the more substantial
will be the success of the treaty in achiev-
ing stability.
It is my fervent hope that the Nixon
administration recognizes the signifi-
cance of these arguments, and that it is
moving into the SALT discussions with a
firm determination to achieve far-reach-
ing agreements.
I must say in this respect, however,
that recent disclosures of the opening
posture to be taken in Helsinki are most
discouraging. I have been unable to see
any Justification for the continuation of
our MIRV testing program during the
months immediately preceding the talks,
and I am even more alarmed to note that
our negotiators do not plan to seek a
mutual moratorium on MIRV tests as
the first order of business. This latter,
minimal step has been urged by no less
than 42 Members of the Senate who are
sponsoring the resolution submitted by
the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr.
BROOKE).
Mr. President, because I believe it
offers a high level of understanding on
the relationships between weapons now
under congressional consideration and
the prospects for meaningful arms con-
trol agreements, I ask unanimous consent
that the statement be printed in the
RECORD.
There being ho objection, the address
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION
(By W. K. H. Panofsky)
After World War II represenetatives of the
United States and the Soviet Union have sat
down together 5,000 times to discuss the
limitations of armaments of their two na-
tions. In spite of these efforts to do some-
thing about the arms race both countries
combined have spent $1 trillion, that is one
thousand billion dollars, on military ex-
penses. This sum is so enormous that it is
difficult to visualize: It represents approxi-
mately the total productive effort of the
U.S. for a period of two years.
Why can't we do better? It is obvious that
both countries have over-riding interests to
do something about this madness; both
countries could have used this enormous ef-
fort on more constructive pursuits than
escalating the threat of one against the other.
Both countries would have in fact greater
security if neither had engaged in this arms
race.
The achievements stemming from these
5,000 meetings have been woefully inade-
quate, although not totally negligible: We
have the Limited Test Ban Treaty, we have
the U.N. resolution banning nuclear weapons
in space, and we have the beginnings at least
of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nu-
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clear weapons. Yet all this is very small rela-
tive to the rate at which the arms race is
progressing, and it does not take much
mathematics to predict that the further we
go along the road of military build-up on
both sides the harder it will be to turn back
without disaster.
Most arms limitation negotiations involv-
ing the Soviets and Americans have involved
many other nations also; however the
"strategic" arms race, that is the build-up of
those weapons of mass destruction involving
long-range nuclear weapons, is the province
of the Soviet Union and the United States
only; America and Russia possess a nuclear
arsenal greatly in excess of any other nation
and an arsenal vastly more than they would
need to inflict total destruction on one
another. It should therefore be more produc-
tive to hold bilateral talks, that is directly
between the Soviet Union and the U.S., to
limit the strategic arms race rather than to
negotiate in as complicated a forum as the
18-nation disarmament conference (ENDC)
which has been going on in Geneva for several
years.
The idea of bilateral talks between the
Soviet Union and the U.S. was first proposed
over three years ago and personally intro-
duced to Mr. Kosygin by President Johnson
and Mr. McNamara at their meeting in Glass-
boro, New Jersey. It appeared the talks on
strategic arms limitation, generally known
as the SALT talks, would have a good chance
to materialize before the end of the Johnson
Administration, but the cooling off of rela-
tions brought on by the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia intervened and the Nixon
Administration has taken its time to formu-
late plans of its own. Now the U.S. officially
had been prepared to start talking for some
time but the Soviets have just now agreed to
a specific time and place for preliminary
talks, to begin at Helsinki in mid-November.
All this delay has occurred in the face of the
formal treaty obligation assumed by both
nations in connection with the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty to pursue seriously steps
to limit their strategic weapons.
Clearly all this hesitation in the face of an
overriding common interest to get rid of the
burden and dangers of strategic weapons
must be the result of some serious indeci-
sion and infighting on both sides of the Iron
Curtain. What the conflicts are in the Soviet
Union in arriving at definite plans we can
only surmise?on the other hand from Con-
gressional Hearings, public statements and
newspaper "leaks" it is becoming fairly clear
how the sides are drawn in the United States
in trying to influence the U.S. position in
the forthcoming SALT talks.
Both sides in the strategic arms race suffer
from the lack of a clearly defined policy on
their strategic objectives, and how each side
is willing to modify its strategic objectives
as a result of the SALT talks. U.S. strategy
has been described in many public state-
ments and Congressional Hearings by such
jargon as deterrence, damage limiting capa-
bility, first strike capability, second strike
capability, counterforce, countervalue, etc.
What does all this mean? All this jargon is
really a symptom of a dilemma. All military
planners know "in their hearts" that should
nuclear war break out, prediction of the out-
come is really a hopeless task. The amount of
destructive power available to both sides is
so enormous that will all the computers and
"think tanks" in the world one has little
confidence in most conclusions of "war
game" calculations. Therefore the primary
stated policy of both nations has been pre-
vention of nuclear war through deterrence,
that is maintaining armaments at such a
level that, should the one side attack first,
then the other could strike back and destroy
the opponent's society. Yet the lingering
problem remains?what should be done in
case deterrence fails, that is if war should
break out anyhow by accident, by gradual
escalation, or by inadvertent involvement of
the two super powers in conflicts stirred up
by third parties. To counter this possibility
the strategists have invented "damage limit-
ing" as a strategic objective, that is they
would like to be prepared to minimize dam-
age to the home country if deterrence should
fail.
What does a strategy of "damage limiting"
imply? It means that we attempt to protect
our population through Civil Defense and
ABM, and that we direct some of our air-
planes and missiles to destroy those few air-
planes and missiles which have not yet been
launched against us.
But here we have the dilemma: the very
things we would have to do to limit damage
to the U.S. in nuclear war are qualitatively
the same steps we would take if we planned
a "first strike" against the USSR. As we in-
crease the "damage limiting" forces we pos-
sess, the Soviet side would conclude that we
would be more difficult to deter from a sudden
attack against them; in other words, if we
protect our population if war should break
out, then the other side would have to raise
its total destructive power in order to be
convinced that we would be "deterred" from
striking first. Clearly this argument applies
equally whether you discuss it from the point
of view of the Soviets or the Americans.
Therefore the strategy of deterrence and the
strategy of damage limitation effectively
countermand one another, yet in all official
pronouncements both ourselves and the
Soviets espouse both.
This ambiguity in official attitude reflects
of course an internal struggle on both sides
of the Iron Curtain among the traditional
military men who want to retain the ability
to "fight a war and prevail" even in the
nuclear age, and the group of advisors, among
them the majority of civilian scientists, who
see sanctuary only in prevention of nuclear
war. It is clear that one can not hope for
much progress in the SALT talks unless both
sides implicitly or explicitly agree that re-
ducing strategic arms to a minimum deter-
rent level is the common objective worth
striving for at this time. Both even with such
a consensus there can be a wide margin of
opinion as to how large a "minimum deter-
rent force" should be.
The current, much publicized debates on
ABM and a moratorium on testing of MIRV's
directly reflects the ambiguity of U.S. think-
ing. Let me elaborate on these controversies
and how they relate to SALT.
As you know, ABM was first discussed as a
defense of the cities and their population
against Soviet long-range ballistic missiles.
The opponents of massive deployment of ABM
to defend cities, and I among them, have con-
cluded that such a defense would be an
enormously expensive technical enterprise
and would buy very little; the protection
offered could be negated by an increase of
Soviet offensive forces at lees cost than what
we would have spent in prOviding the de-
fense; therefore the result would simply be
another step in the arms race with no in-
crease in protection for anyone, and with
much greater destruction, should war break
out. This type of criticism had apparently
been accepted by the Nixon Administration
and accordingly the President withdrew the
Johnson "Sentinel" city defense plan and
instead substituted the "Safeguard" system
which is intended primarily to protect the
Minuteman land-based missile forces in
North Dakota and Montana. In this new
role ABM would increase U.S. deterrence by
defending our Minuteman forces: a first at-
tack by the Soviets could not result in de-
stroying the ability of Minuteman to strike
back. Unfortunately this strategic decision
was not paralleled by a corresponding shift
in engineering of Safeguard?the actual sys-
tem which is now approved for deployment
will do very little in protecting Minuteman,
and also can easily be interpreted to be
actually a first step for a city defense. Safe-
guard Phase II actually is intended to be a
"thin" city defense against China, but its
configuration is such that the Soviets may be
forced to conclude that their deterrence
against the U.S. is to some extent impaired.
This situation illustrates that ABM can
and does have an ambiguous role: It can
either serve a purely deterrent role such as
defending Minuteman, or it can assist in a
damage-limiting role if It defends cities, and
it is very difficult for an opponent to tell
which Ls which.
Our view of Soviet ABM is even more con-
fusing since we can only interpret the limited
information which we have; the only ABM
system which we definitely know about is a
very marginal deployment around Moscow;
there have been "on again, off again" systems,
and there are anti-aircraft defenses which
may or may not also have a potential ABM
role.
The situation with MIRV is similarly am-
bivalent as we shall see. The term MIRV
stands for "Multiple Independent Re-entry
Vehicles." This is a fancy way of saying that
a single missile can carry a number of in-
dependent warheads carrying nuclear weap-
ons Which can be targeted against several
objectives at once. MTRV's again have a dual
function: On the one hand they can be used
us a "penetration aid" against the enemy's
defenses: the enemy's ABM can be penetrated
if he has too many incoming warheads to
shoot at. For this particular mission MIRV's
would not need high accuracy. On the other
hand if MIRV did have high accuracy then
it would become a threat 'against the other
side's retaliatory force; high accuracy would
make it possible to take out simultaneously
such a large number of the other side's im-
placed missiles in a single strike to keep most
of them from striking back. It is for this
reason that widespread deployment of MIRV,
combined with high accuracy raises a spectre
of a first strike.
This MIRV threat was pointed out by Sec-
retary Laird when he advocated the Safe-
guard as a defense against the Soviet SS-9,
which he described as a potential MIRV.
Actually the SS-9 missile, as far as we have
observed, lacks essential elements to make it
a MIRV; some versions of the SS-9 carry
three separate warheads, but there is doubt
whether each can be independently directed
at separate targets. Nevertheless, because of
the high explosive power of the SS-9 it would
become ,a great threat against the U.S. Min-
uteman silos should it be developed into a
full-fledged MIRV. A halt on MIRV testing
would eliminate this danger.
The U.S. position in relation to its MIRV's
has been far from unambiguous also. His-
torically the decision to develop MIRV's in
the U.S. came as a response to penetrate a
surmised Soviet ABM system which, however,
did not make anywhere near as much prog-
ress as we had feared; yet our MIRV plans
continued. U.S. MIRV tests appear further
advanced than those of the Soviets?we have
successfully tested MIRV's both for Poseidon
and Minuteman; if forced to discontinue
MIRV testing as a result of SALT, or a MIRV
moratorium, we could still produce these
devices with sufficient performance to serve
in a deterrent role, i.e. to penetrate Soviet
defenses.
As I mentioned above, if penetrating Soviet
defenses remained the only motive, then low
accuracy for U.S. MIRV's would have been
sufficient. However, last year the U.S. not only
undertook extensive tests of its MIRV's but
also proposed a program to increase the ac-
curacy of U.S. missiles. This would be very
difficult to justify if penetrating Soviet de-
fenses were really the only objective. In fact
Secretary Laird candidly testified in the Sen-
ate that the purpose of increasing accuracy
was to improve our efficiency against "hard
targets." This is clearly inconsistent with the
strategy of deterrence and unquestionably
will give rise to Soviet fears of U.S. intent
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against striking first against their missile
force.
Dr. John Foster, Director of Defense Re-
search and Engineering, tried to back-paddle
from Secretary Laird's statement that up-
grading of MIRV accuracy was intended
against hard strategic targets: He testified in
Congress that this increased accuracy was
needed against such items as industrial tar-
gets such as steel mills. This statement is
technically insupportable. Even if one gives
Industrial targets a rather substantial re-
sistance to blast, the presently programmed
yields and accuracy for both Poseidon and
Minuteman III are fully adequate to give a
very high probability to destroy such targets.
The first slide shows a picture of the dam-
age to a machine shop at Hiroshima caused
by the first 20 KT nuclear bomb at a miss
distance over half a mile. The presently pro-
grammed MIRV's for Poseidon and Minute-
man have explosive power considerably larger
than that of the Hiroshima bombs and are
designed for accuracy higher that the "miss"
which caused the devastation in the picture.
It appears difficult to justify an improved
accuracy program to do better than this!
What does all this discussion of MIRV and
ABM have to do with the problem of formu-
lating a U.S. position for SALT? The next
slide summarizes the conclusions from the
previous discussion about the ambivalence of
ABM and MIRV. We can now understand
that, depending on how MIRV's and ABM's
are deployed, and depending on their phys-
ical characteristics they can be viewed either
as protecting the domestic deterrent forces
or as threatening the deterrent forces of the
other side. Specifically deployment of ABM
by the Soviets has given the incentive for
U.S. development of MIRV, deployment of
multiple warheads by the Soviets has given
an excuse for U.S. deployment of Safeguard,
the possible role of Safeguard in protecting
cities will give rise to Soviet fears of being
able to maintain their deterrent against us,
the possibility of improving the accuracy of
American MIRV's appears to threaten Soviet
missile silos etc. In short, because of this am-
biguity, the whole ABM and MIRV complex
becomes an inextricable part of the next large
step of the arms race and the world would be
better off without either.
It is much easier to assure compliance with
treaty terms which prohibit a weapons sys-
tem entirely than with a provision which
permits a specified number of weapons. A
"zero ABM" provision in SALT would be
much easier to enforce than an agreement
limiting both sides to a level corresponding
to to the U.S. Safeguard. Since ABM and
MIRV's pose an inter-related set of prob-
lems we can see that the Safeguard decision
greatly complicates the SALT talks.
It is this interwined situation which
makes the conclusion clear that a small step
in arms limitation may be harder to nego-
tiate and be in fact more dangerous to U.S.
and also Soviet security than a large step:
Because of the multiple strategic roles of
these systems impeding development of just
one of them may be dangerous to either side.
The more restrictive the SALT treaty can be
on the further evolution of MIRV's and ABM,
the more substantial will be the success of
the treaty in achieving stability.
Starting from this conclusion we are im-
mediately thrown into the complex question
of policing the terms of a treaty. We are liv-
ing in an era of mutual mistrust between
the Soviet Union and the U.S. This circum-
stance, combined 'with the long-standing
tradition of the Soviet Union for secrecy,
raises both the question of cheating by the
Soviet Union against the provisions of a
treaty, and of abrogation of such a treaty fol-
lowing clandestine preparations. We know
relatively little about the decision-making
processes in the Soviet Union's military stra-
tegic issues; although our technical infor-
mation on Soviet systems is remarkably good,
it is nowhere as detailed as we think the in-
formation is which the Soviets have about
our systems. Most people are quite pessi-
mistic that we will be able to negotiate into
the SALT treaty a substantial amount of
"on-site inspection" of Soviet installations,
although this possibility cannot be excluded;
most of you know that lack of agreement on
such inspections proved to be the stumbling
block which prevented the partial nuclear
test ban treaty to become a Comprehensive
treaty, including prohibition of underground
nuclear explosions. Therefore a great deal
of attention has been given to evaluating
the extent to which the SALT treaty could
be verified on the basis of "unilateral in-
telligence," that is from information which
we gather through our miscellaneous sur-
veillance techniques of Soviet activities. How
effective these techniques are in detail is
impossible to discuss in public; suffice it to
say here that even in private there is sub-
stantial disagreement as to how good a job
we can really do in verifying Soviet activi-
ties. The opponents of a far-reaching SALT
treaty tend to emphasize the ease by which
the Soviet could clandestinely develop and
test forbidden military systems and then
suddenly "trot out" completely developed
military systems which would endanger the
strategic balance between the Soviet Union
and the U.S. The spectre of "instant ABM"
and "instant MIRV" suddenly appearing, fol-
lowed by a Soviet ultimatum, is being raised.
The fear of a superhuman clandestine effort
on the part of the Soviets resulting in a sud-
den shift in the strategic balance under a
treaty, has caused our more conesrvative
military planners to oppose far-reaching
arms limitation moves in the past and they
are expected to do so in relation to SALT.
Yet it is true in general that under the
more restrictive arms limitation agreements
cheating will be much less dangerous toward
upsetting the strategic balance than if the
arms race continued with only small re-
straints. This point was illustrated above in
relation to ABM and MIRV.
If one carries conservatism in military
matters viewed in isolation to the extreme,
any basis for a negotiable position is, of
course, destroyed. The degree of absurdity
to which this kind of thing can lead became
apparent recently when one compares the
testimony given by the Defense Department
witnesses in support of the Safeguard ABM
system with the testimony given to justify
continued MIRV testing and deployment as
needed to penetrate certain Soviet air de-
fense systems (the SA-2 and SA-5 systems)
In a possible ABM role. Specifically the SA-2
system is a very simple but very extensively
deployed anti-aircraft defense in the Soviet
Union; it has also been used in Viet Nam.
The possibility was raised that the SA-2's
would have some potential of shooting down
incoming U.S. ICBM's and thereby would
protect Soviet cities; the U.S. deterrent would
then be endangered. At the same time when
justifying the Safeguard System Defense De-
partment witnesses maintained that a system
as complex as the one proposed would be
required to carry out the much simpler task,
namely the job of protecting the hardened
Minuteman sites.
Next I am showing a comparison of the
qualitative features of the Soviet SA-2 sys-
tem and the U.S. Safeguard ABM. Clearly, in
trying to be conservative our Defense De-
partment is giving the Soviets credit for an
incredible performance with a very primi-
tive system which we deny exists for the
much more sophisticated devices which we
are proposing should be built.
A similar degree of "one way" conservatism
pervades the argument relating to our ability
to verify possible Soviet violatilms of a SALT
treaty. One of the frequently propOsed meas-
ures to control the further evolution of
mrav technology and deployment would be
to prohibit testing of intercontinental bo.-
listic missiles which appear to carry MIRV
warheads, or even to prohibit or severely re-
strict the test firing of such missiles entirely.
The question then naturally arises as to how
well we can monitor the firing of such vehi-
cles by the Soviet Union, both in regard to
the total number of firings and in terms of
the characteristics of the devices under test.
Naturally the experts differ in their assess-
ment of our ability to find out what the
Soviets are doing. However, as was again re-
vealed in recent Congressional testimony,
most of the debate deals with the wrong
subject, namely whether we can correctly
identify a few single test firings carried out
clandestinely or specifically designed to hide
their true purpose. What is ignored in these
discussions is the total picture in which such
"cheating" would have to be carried out: The
Soviets would have to make a deliberate de-
cision in the face of their treaty obligation
to man a large-scale program starting from
design and engineering, through a clandes-
tine test program and leading to secret de-
ployment, and they would then have to have
the confidence that the resulting system
would be reliable enough that it could be
used in a first strike role against the U.S.
to inflict so much damage that the U.S. could
not retaliate. Even if single tests escape de-
tection, the likelihood that this long se-
quence of events will remain unnoticed and
will have an important military consequence
is very, very small.
Focusing these discussions on the physical
detectability of a single test tends to ob-
scure the basic issue: Are the kind of risks
which would be involved in pursuing cheat-
ing on the scale required affecting the stra-
tegic balance acceptable to the Soviet Union?
What we face here is a symptom of the
wrong avenues we are apt to pursue when
purely technical reasoning, combined with
highly conservative military planning, are
being considered in isolation. We are con-
triving situations in which the Soviets could
accomplish technological feats which we
could not conceive of performing ourselves
and we are visualizing complex scenarios
where the normally conservative Soviet mil-
itary planners are pursuing a long-range,
clandistine course which would shift their
strategic pattern overnight once the covers
were removed.
Any decisions on arms limitations involve
a balance of risks to the survival of the U.S.
and the World. We cannot rationally pursue
a course where we are willing to take no
military risks at all in-pursuing arms con-
trol negotiations, while we are willing to
expose ourselves to the ever-increasing risk
of war and annihilation which the un-
checked growth of the arms race implies.
A debate similar to the "MIRV" cheating
controversy centers around possible Soviet
evasion of limitations on ABM deployment.
ABM's are complex systems: they require
radars, computers, interceptor missiles, con-
trol centers and communications. Yet many
such facilities are also common to other mil-
itary installations, in particular those con-
nected with Air Defense: I mentioned pre-
viously that in Congressional Hearings
Defense Department witnesses raised a pos-
sible threat that the Soviet SA-2 and SA-5
anti-aircraft defense systems could be "up-
graded" into ABM. Without arguing about
the technical feasibility and costs of such
a move, it is clear that revamping of Soviet
Air Defense into an effective ABM would be
a very large scale undertaking. Such an ac-
tivity would be almost impossible to con-
ceal; to prevent evolution of ABM by these
means under the guise of improvements of
Air Defense installations it would be good
if SALT would prohibit new or modified
Air Defense installations also. This conclu-
sion is again part of the general pattern
demonstraed before: The more far-reaching
the prohibition of the SALT treaty, the less
important the question of cheating becomes.
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A second, equally important conclusion is: t
A freeze of the "status quo" at present lev-
els of strategic armaments is easier to police i
than a treaty specifying agreed numbers of
components (missiles, radars, etc.) of per-
mitted strategic systems. It is easier to rec-
ognize changes than to interpret in detail
what is discovered. 1
A "freeze" would tend to perpetuate for the
time being many of the asymmetries between
the U.S. and the Soviet Union: the Soviets
are "ahead" of the U.S. in terms of total
megatonnage of nuclear arms; we are ahead
of them in number of bombers and missiles.
Both nations could destroy the other's civi-
lization many times over; neither side could
hope to attack the other without risking its
own survival. The strategic arms race would
be halted and the way might be paved for
future reductions. Yet only the future will
tell whether in the present atmosphere of
mistrust and under the spectre of large scale
Soviet clandestine programs, agreement on
such far-reaching, but simple, treaty terms
can be reached.
The spectre of sudden emergence of hith-
erto secret Soviet ABM or MIRV systems de-
veloped clandestinely under a treaty has
given rise to another debate which is possibly
of even more far-reaching significance than
the debate about the SALT treaty itself. This
is the controversy about the controls on the
growth of technology. All of you have been
exposed to the increasing clamor about man's
need to put reins on the technology of his
own creation lest technology control him. We
have become painfully aware that when we
make decisions to improve our standard of
living through new technological devices we
are often very short-sighted in assessing the
consequences of each new step. We are apt
to balance the short-range benefit of a new
device only with the immediate monetary
cost. What we tend to ignore are the long-
range social as well as financial costs of many
of our decisions in terms of disturbing the
environment through pollution, through
ecological damage, etc. In the military area
we are now being faced with the claim of
some of our military spokesmen that we must
not impede development of new military
technology in order to be prepared to cope
with unexpected clandestine military devel-
opments of an opponent. To put it in blunt
terms?the military technicia.rs maintain
that evolution of military technology is in-
exorable and that we must adjust our lives
and political and strategic decisions to live
with that evolution. I claim that such an
assumption is both dangerous to man's very
existence and is also insupportable on its
own merit. Our knowledge of science will in-
deed increase continuously?the facts of na-
ture are there to be explored and they will
not remain hidden, nor should they remain
hidden. However, the step from science to
military technology involves a protracted
series of planned deliberate steps extending
over many years; man can decide through
his political processes to either undertake
such steps or not to.
Although the Limited Test Ban prohibit-
ing atomic explosions in the atmosphere and
in outer space has been only a relatively
minor move in the field of arms control it
nevertheless is a major milestone in demon-
strating that a barrier against unchecked
evolution of military technology can be
erected. This, of course, was the real reason
why the Limited Test Ban was fought so
vigorously. I see no reason why we should
acquiesce to the development of the ever-
increasing lethality of our weapons; if we
subscribe to the belief that technology has
a life of its own and that its progress in any
direction, however anti-social, cannot be im-
peded, then it is indeed true that man has
lost control over his own destiny.
I have gone far afield in discussing the
specific issues underlying the debate in-
volving the U.S. preparation for the SALT
alks, and of course I do not know in detail
what the issues are which are being debated
n the Soviet Union and which keep the
Soviets from responding to the U.S. requests
to establish a firm beginning date for the
negotiations. Part of the controversial issues
within the Soviet Union, I am sure, are simi-
ar to the ones debated in the U.S.; some of
them may well have to do with the special
problems which the Soviets are facing in re-
gard to China, that is, how to design a pos-
sible treaty which reduces the level of arma-
ments in the bilateral race between the
Soviet Union and the USA while leaving the
Soviet Union freedom of action against
China. Maybe the Soviet military planners
are quoting Lenin who said:
"Everyone will agree that an army which
does not train itself to wield all arms, all
means and methods of warfare that the
enemy possesses, or may possess, is behaving
in an unwise or even in a criminal manner."
This sounds disturbingly similar to the
philosophy of some of the U.S. military
spokesmen; if such views prevail in either
the USA or the Soviet Union, we will see the
Arms Race continue unabated by the results
of SALT. Whatever the real conflicts are on
both sides of the Iron Curtain, it is clear
they involve questions which both societies
have to resolve internally before meaningful
negotiations can result.
I hope I have demonstrated to you that
the nature of the questions underlying SALT
is very profound; although many technical
factors entering the decisions each nation
faces are basically political. We must not
identify narrow military planning with the
"National Interest"; we should not confuse
superiority in arms with "Security." SALT
offers a new opportunity to redirect our na-
tional priorities from an unproductive and
dangerous technological contest to the solu-
tion of urgent problems at home. At stake
is the survival of civilization on this earth.
There is very little time.
In another quotation, Humphrey said:
If the media are going to broadcast the
emotional appeals of the Stokely Carmichael's
and the other agitators, it is like throwing
gasoline on the flames.
This certainly indicates the then Vice
President's displeasure with media cover-
age. At any rate, I believe the articles
referred to will be of interest. I ask unan-
imous consent that they be printed in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the items
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Birmingham (Ala.) News, June 25,
1968]
HUMPHREY SAYS TV "HAS SPREAD THE MESSAGE
OF RIOTING AND LOOTING"
NEW Yoax.?Vice President Hubert H.
Humphrey says television, "in particular,"
has "served as a catalyst to promote even
more trouble" during riots.
In an article in the current issue of Look
magazine, Humphrey is quoted as saying: "I
am convinced that just as the media can tell
the facts to the people, they can also exag-
gerate and inflame the situation.
"I am not a wise enough man to make a
judgment as to how the media should re-
spond to this situation. But I do know that
TV in particular has spread the message of
rioting and looting, has displayed the carry-
ing out of televisions, home appliances,
groceries, etc., and has literally served as a
catalyst to promote even more trouble."
Discussing other phases of dealing with
riots, the vice president and Democratic pres-
idental hopeful, says "there must be rapid
introduction of sufficient manpower." He
adds, however, "The emphasis must be on
men rather than guns."
Humphrey also urges police to "use mini-
mum force, but make arrests rapidly . . ?
arrests rather than shooting." He says police
should be trained in riot control and there
must be "preplanning for the integration of
state, local and federal forces" to enable
them to work together efficiently.
THE MEDIA
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, it appears
that former Vice President Humphrey
has a short memory when he criticizes
Vice President AGNEW for his statements
concerning the news media.
A story by William Chapman in today's
Washington Post states:
Humphrey's charges stressed that he con-
siders Agnew's remarks and others' comments
part of a premeditated and concentrated ad-
ministration plan.
In another portion of the story, Hum-
phrey accused the Nixon administration
of mounting a "calculated attack" on the-
right of dissent and on the news media.
Just to keep the record straight, I ask
permission to have printed at this point
in the RECORD excerpts from an article
Published in the Birmingham News of
Tuesday, June 25, 1968, and an article
from the New York Times of June 25,
1968.
It is not unusual for the former Vice
President to be on both sides of an issue,
but in this particular case his statement
concerning the news media, particularly
network television, makes Vice President
AGNEw's statements mild in comparison.
Former Vice President Humphrey
charged that TV in particular has been
used to spread the message of rioting and
looting. Senators will note in the New
York Times article that the Vice Presi-
dent is quoted as saying that it was es-
sential that television in particular, "and
radio and press secondarily," accept re-
sponsibility in riot situations.
[From the New York Times, June 25, 19681
HUMPHREY CALLS TELEVISION A CATALYST Or
RIOTS
(By Val Adams)
Vice President Humphrey charged yester-
day that television "has spread the message
of rioting and looting" and "has literally
served as a catalyst to promote even more
trouble."
His comment was contained in a profile
of Mr. Humphrey published in the July 9
issue of Look magazine which goes on sale
today. The article included his views on how
to control civil disorders and the responsi-
bility of television, radio and the press in re-
porting such events.
The Vice President's criticism that TV
added fuel to civil disorders was much more
unfavorable than the recent report by the
President's National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders, which analyzed the riots of
last summer. That report, noting instances
of sensationalism, inaccuracy and distortion
by newspapers, radio and television, con-
cluded that the media "on the whole tried
to give a balanced, factual account of the
1967 disorders."
Asked to comment on Mr. Humphrey's
charge, the National Broadcasting Company
said it was essential to cover the news even
if it were "unpleasant and unattractive." The
American Broadcasting Company said it
sought to televise balanced, objective reports
that would not "inflame any situation."
The Columbia Broadcasting System de-
clined direct comment but referred to an
earlier statement of policy that it must re-
port any "significant trends in our society."
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December 2, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? HOUSE
For example, the 020 lawyers in 1967
forced California Gov. Ronald Reagan to re-
store a $16 million cut in the state's Medicaid
program.
Sen. Murphy and his oohorts think the
taxpayers should not have to subsidize suits
against themselves through the legal services
program. On the other hand, the law is sup-
posed to treat everyone equally, and if the
poor don't know their rights they can't re-
ceive equal treatment.
This is not a question of subsidizing
troublemakers to harass public officials. This
is a question of guaranteeing an individual
citizen the rights that are supposed to be his.
The Amencan Bar Assn. calls Sen. Murphy's
amendment "oppressive interference with
the freedom of the lawyer and the citizen."
The head of the National Legal Aid and
Defender Assn. says the amendment could
cause the poor to look on the legal services
program "as a paternalistic handout, meant
to deceive . . . not to lielp effectively."
0E0 Director Donald Rumsfeld opposes
the amendment and says he'll work against
it in the House.
If we're going to have law and order in
this country, those virtues are going to have
to apply across the board. That means the
same law for rich
THE ARMS TRADE?PART IX
(Mr. COUGHLIN asked and was given
permission to address the House for 1
minute, to revise and extend his remarks,
and include extraneous matter.)
Mr. COUGHLIN. Mr. Speaker, today I
have introduced a bipartisan resolution,
cosponsored by 29 of my colleagues, call-
ing for the curtailment of the global
trade in conventional weapons of war.
This resolution urges the President to
institute a thorough and comprehensive
review of our military aid programs, par-
ticularly those aspects concerned with
arms sales. It also asks the President to
take the necessary steps to have the
trade in arms brought up as a topic for
debate in the United Nations, to initiate
multilateral arms control talks among
the major conventional arms producing
nations of the world, and to use the
power and prestige of his office to signify
the intention of the United States to
work to check and control the trade.
This resolution is not designed to pro-
hibit arms sales to nations, such as West
Germany and Israel, for reasons of self-
defense; the purpose is to eliminate un-
necessary oversupply of arms, particu-
larly to underdeveloped nations. This
oversupply constitutes much of the trade
today, and contributes heavily to the
current high level of international ten-
sion. It is also my hope that this resolu-
tion will, if passed, bring this entire
problem to the general attention of the
public.
I am pleased to note that strategic
arms limitation talks are currently tak-
ing place in Helsinki between the United
States and the Soviet Union. These talks
offer, in my opinion, an opportunity for
initiating discussions on controlling the
rapidly growing trade in conventional
arms.
Mr. Speaker, since Hiroshima, man-
kind has been rightly preoccupied with
devising ways in which atomic weapons
will never again be used. Yet, while we
have focused our attention on this most
worthy goal, we have all but ignored the
critical need to control the vast prolifer-
ation of conventional arms that has been
a stark fact of life ,for the past 24 years.
There have been 56 wars of significant
size in the world since 1945, 54 of which
have been fought in the underdeveloped
areas of the world. The nations doing
most of the fighting do not have the ca-
pacity to make their own arms. Thus, the
weapons they use to fight these wars
have been imported from the major in-
dustrial powers.
Fifteen years ago, the worldwide vol-
ume of the trade in arms was $2.5 billion
yearly. Today, the trade has doubled to
$5 billion a year. It is estimated that
within the next decade the trade will
double yet again to $10 billion a year.
This trade is carried out today largely
unimpeded by any international agree-
ments or restraints. "
The United States is the world's larg-
est arms merchant. Through an .office
in the Pentagon, it currently distributes
in excess of $2 billion in arms a year
to some 70 countries. The Soviet Union
is the next largest arms merchant; it is
distributing some $1 billion in arms a
year, mostly to the Middle East. Its aid to
Arab States, in fact, has been so great
that these excessive arms have led the
Arab states to provoke two wars in the
last 13 years and now threatens to pro-
voke a third. Vying for third are the
British and French, each of which is
selling $400 to $500 million in arms a
year. Also intimately involved in the arms
trade are Belgium, Canada, Italy, West
Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Czecho-
slovakia and Red China.
In addition to these government arms
merchants, there exist quite a few large
private arms traders who buy and sell
weapons for personal gain. Collectively,
their volume of business runs to approxi-
mately $100 million a year, only a frac-
tion of what governments purvey. The
largest private dealer in the world is the
International Armament Corp., or In-
terarms for short, which is located just
across the Potomac River from Washing-
ton in Alexandria.
Since 1945 some $66 billion worth of
armaments have been pumped into the
world markets by both government and
private arms merchants. This is a stag-
gering figure. Of this total, the United
States alone has been responsible for $50
billion. We often forget that in the
Atomic Age it is these conventional arms
that are doing all the killing, and virtual-
ly nothing is being done to stop the
proliferation of these weapons of death.
There are virtually no international
regulations or agreements controlling the
international trade in arms today. The
few domestic rules each country has on
its book are breaking down, partly be-
cause the trade is growing so fast that it
is overwhelming the existing machinery,
and partly because there has developed
an excess of bureaucratic obscurantism, .
intellectual rigidity and sheer human
Ignorance and greed.
Beyond the horror of the conventional
wars that it has helped to induce, the
real danger of the conventional trade in
arms lies in the fact that it may be just
these arms that will trigger a nuclear
war. An atomic war could break out,
because a conventional war, being fought
among developing nations with pistols,
H 11641
rifles, tanks, and jet planes, escalates out
of control and involves the super powers.
I am also concerned that the arms-
selling nations are involving themselves
in the trade less for real reasons of na-
tional security and more in support of
sions have become less important con-
nomic reasons. In other words, nations
are selling arms these days for expedi-
ence and money. The fact that a nation
does not need certain sophisticated
weaponry and that such a transaction
may have serious long-term repercus-
sions have become less important con-
siderations than the short-term advan-
tage and the international balance of
payments. This is a long way from the
days when we provided allies with a rela-
tively small quantity of arms strictly for
military reasons.
Selling arms, some say, is good for busi-
ness, it brings in gold, keeps people em-
ployed, strengthens international rela-
tionships, keeps our friends up in the
state of the art, and promotes the inter-
national flow of technology. To me and
many other people, this reasoning is not
only specious but ultimately self -
defeating. I can think of no more mis-
guided policy than selling arms to ap-
proximately 70 countries for the money?
if that policy may result in either local
killing or nuclear war.
Equally important is the question of
long-term national security versus short-
term political advantage. Does the huge
1969 increase in our arms sales to Greece,
Chile and Morocco, for example, result
in increased national security or repre-
sent an over-supply which may even-
tually be used against our own interests?
Has anyone asked what these arms are
really for or who is their enemy? Are
Greece, Chile, and Morocco under im-
minent threat of attack, or are these
arms to curry temporary favor with a
government and more likely to be used
for suppression or military adventures?
It is time, therefore, that a full-scale
review of our policy be initiated, that the
subject be debated not only in Congress,
but in the United Nations and, hope-
fully, in other arms-selling countries
as well. We want to see our arms aid pol-
icy returned to the point where it is once
again subordinate to our overall, long-
term foreign policy, and that, in all cir-
cumstances, it be flexible, reasonable and
minimal. Today, it is none of these. To
do this we need international under-
standings.
I have been in responsive contact with
the administration on this question and
have urged that useful discussions about
controlling the international trade in
conventional arms could take place at the
SALT talks.
This resolution will strengthen our
Government's position and could be the
beginning of a long and necessary proc-
ess of re-examination. The resolution
reads in full as follows:
H. Its. 735
A resolution urging new initiatives to stem
the escalating $5 billion yearly interna-
tional trade in conventional weapons of
war
Whereas, the House of Representatives
finds there exists a $5 billion yearly trade
in conventional weapons of war throughout
the world that threatens to double to $10
billion within the next five years, and
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE December 2, 1969
Whereas, the House of Representatives finds
that sold, bartered or given away arms have
figured prominently in 56 wars of conse-
quence since 1945, 54 of them fought in un-
derdeveloped countries, and
Whereas, the House of Representatives
finds that the United States Government
sells more than $2 billion worth of conven-
tional arms each year to some 60 to 80 na-
tions while the remaining $3 billion are sold
by 25 nations including major powers such
as the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France,
West Germany and Italy, and
Whereas, the House of Representatives finds
that the United States Government should
supply arms to other nations only to the
extent necessary for their self-defense and
that over-supply fosters military coups d'
etat, promotes economic and fiscal insta-
bility and encourages military adventures
that endanger peace, and
Whereas, the House of Representatives
finds that the expanding trade in armaments
fuels regional and localized conflicts that
could escalate out of control to involve the
nuclear powers in a catastrophic worldwide
atomic war: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, it is the sense of the House of
Representatives that
(1) the President should immediately in-
stitute a thorough and comprehensive re-
view of the military aid programs of the
United States, particularly with respect to
the military assistance and sales operations
of the Department of Defense, and
(2) the President should take such actions
as may be appropriate?
(A) to initiate multilateral discussions
among the United States, the Union of So-
viet Socialistic Republics, Great Britain,
France, West Germany, Italy and other coun-
tries on the control of the worldwide trade
in armaments, and
(B) to commence a general debate in the
United Nations with respect to the control of
the conventional arms trade, and
(C) to use the power and prestige of his
office to signify the intention of the 'United come these additional retirements be-
States to work actively with all nations to cause they undoubtedly would eliminate
check and control the international sales and distribution of conventional weapons of the need for a part of the reduction in
force which is already starting to take
death and destruction.
Joining me in this Resolution as co-spon- effect.
sors are: I hate to see anyone lose his job, par-
John B. Anderson, Republican, of Illinois. ticularly when it happens as a result of
George E. Brown, Jr., Democrat, of Cali- circumstances over which the employee
fornia. has no control. The Congress in this in-
stance has control. I propose today a way
Daniel E. Button, Republican, of New York.
George Bush, Republican, of Texas.
Shirley Chisholm, Democrat, of New York. through which we can exert a portion of
John Conyers, Jr., Democrat, of Michigan. that control and in so doing give certain
John R. Dellenback, Republican, of Oregon, employees a second opportunity to gain
Don Edwards, Democrat, of California. maximum retirement benefits, permit
Donald M. Fraser, Democrat, of Minnesota. others to retain their jobs, and still ac-
Thorns S. Foley, Democrat, of Washington. complish the cutback in personnel cell-
William J. Green, Democrat, of Pennsyl-
ings which the administration has called
Frank Horton, Republican, of New York. for.
Albert W. Johnson, Republican, of Penn- The bill which I offer today would give
sylvania. to all civil service employees who retire
Edward I. Koch, Democrat, of New York. within 6 months after October 31 the
Robert L. Leggett, Democrat, of California. same 5-percent increase in their retire-
Paul N. McCloskey, Republican, of Call- ment annuities.
fornia.
Joseph M. McDade, Republican, of Penn-
sylvania.
Thomas J. Meskill, Republican, of Con-
necticut.
Abner J Mikva. Democrat, of Illinois.
F. Bradford Morse, Republican, of Mas-
sachusetts.
Lucien N. Nedzi, Democrat, of Michigan.
Richard L. Ottinger, Democrat, of New
York.
Edward J. Patten, Democrat, of New Jersey.
David Pryor, Democrat, of Arkansas.
Henry S. Reuss, Democrat, of Wisconsin.
Donald W. Riegle, Jr., Republican, of Mich-
igan.
Herman T. Schneebeli, Republican, of
Pennsylvania.
Charles W. Whalen, Jr., Republican,
Ohio.
G. William Whitehurst, Republican,
Virginia.
of
of
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT
BILL
(Mr. DOWNING asked and was given
permission to address the House for 1
minute and to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. DOWNING. Mr. Speaker, the Con-
gress provided a great benefit to numbers
of Federal employees this year with the
passage of legislation which enabled
them to retire on the basis of the "high
3" years of their employment. This be-
came law with the President's signature
on October 20. In order to gain maximuni
benefits under the new law, employees
had to retire no later than October 31
in order to take advantage of a 5-percent
cost-of-living increase in retirement an-
nuities. This gave theft a scant 11 days
to make the decision, make their plans
and retire.
On October 29 a different complexion
was added to the status of many em-
ployees when the Department of Defense
announced the first of sweeping cutbacks
in its work force. Although additional
reductions were announced November 14,
it undoubtedly will be several months be-
fore the full impact is known.
There are numbers of employees today
who would welcome the opportunity to
reconsider retirement if it still were pos-
sible for them to take advantage of the
5-percent increase which expired on Oc-
tober 31. I am certain that administra-
tive and personnel officials would wel-
Now that he has accepted President
Nixon's appointment as Director of the
Office of Economic Opportunity, it is
gratifying to see that, as his friends ex-
pected, he has already taken positive
action to assure greater local participa-
tion in 0E0 programs.
For example, the Director has had pre-
pared, and is circulating for comment, a
revision of 0E0's regulation on the
Green amendment which is intended to
make it easier for local governments to
designate community action agencies of
their choice and to improve the quality
of broad representation. Some of the
changes would:
Ease the requirements relating to CAA
program capability;
Provide for waiver of certain personnel
policy requirements where public agen-
cies are restricted by civil service laws
and regulations;
Heighten requirements for private
sector group representation on commun-
ity action boards;
Reduce the minimum
standard; and
Elimination of the restriction that
changes in designations of community
action agencies will take effect only at
the ends of program years.
In addition, 0E0 is planning specific
program activities to increase communi-
cation between 0E0 and local govern-
ments throughout the Nation. For ex-
ample, work already Is underway to fund
innovative programs designed to find
better ways for local government to serve
the poor. Rumsfeld also has ordered the
development of training programs for
0E0 personnel so that they get a better
understanding of the problems faced by
public officials at the local level in their
attempts to find solutions for the diffi-
culties faced by the poor.
In my mind, these few examples dem-
onstrate clearly to me that Don Rums-
feld is fully attuned to the need for more
local government involvement in the ac-
tivities of the 0E0. He plans to be re-
sponsive to local elected officials and
their problems, and has, in fact, already
taken significant steps in this direction.
I commend him for his efforts in this
regard.
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITY
(Mr. BROWN of Ohio asked and was
given permission to address the House
for 1 minute and to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker,
Don Rumsfeld, when he was our colleague
here in the House, was convinced of the
need for increasing the involvement of
local governments in the conduct of com-
munity action and other antipoverty ac-
tivities.
population
POSTAL PROGRESS
(Mr. OLSEN asked and was given per-
mission to address the House for 1 min-
ute and to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. OLSEN. Mr. Speaker, all the major
recommendations that came out of the
Kappel Commission, after that Commis-
sion spent a million dollars and an en-
tire year, were embodied in an internal,
administratively confidential task force
report?of the O'Brien era?headed by
Ronald Lee, Tim May, and Ira Kapen-
stein. Mr. Kappel could have foregone
the more than 2,000 pages and five vol-
umes comprising the report if he had
handed the Commission staff this 38-
page internal report and said, "Gentle-
man, this is it."
In fact, the many similarities between
the Kappel Commission million dollar
tome and the task force report are so
great that, as I recently compared the
two, I could not help but think that Mr.
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E 10168 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks
eningh people care about their terrible
plight?starvation, despair, and almost
inevitable death.
Yet, Mr. Speaker, I have faith in the
natural goodness of the American people.
I believe they will respond and help the
children of Biafra. I hope that every per-
son who reads the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
will send a post card or letter with the
words "End the Starvation" to: Post
Office Box FOOD, Somerset, N.J.
I also want to insert a story from New
Brunswick, N.J. the Home News: "Sim-
ple Plea Snowballs To Aid Biafran Kids."
It touches my heart and I hope it will
touch the heart of every reader:
The article follows:
SIMPLE PLEA SNOWBALLS To AID BIAFRAN
KIDS
If the fact that one Biafran child dies
every five minutes doesn't provoke some ac-
tion from the nation's leaders, maybe a mil-
Hon imploring letters on the Senate floor
will,
Jack Ellery, who does the morning show
for WCTC radio station in New Brunswick,
had that idea in mind last Thursday when
he launched a write-in campaign that he
hopes will snowball into a nationwide ex-
pression of sympathy and concern for the
war-torn people of Biafra.
Ellery reacted to an Associated Press re-
port last Thursday that claimed that "over
300 Biaf ran children die every day of starv-
ation." On his show the following morning
he asked his listeners to write the words
"end the starvation" on a post card and send
it in to WCTC.
"We got a fantastic response," Ellery said
later.
Jack Sutton, a Franklin State Bank exec-
utive, and Pete Sears of the Bound Brook
Chronicle volunteered to help from a com-
mittee with Ellery to organize the campaign.
The Biafran Children Committee has now
established a post office box, dubbed "FOOD,"
in Franklin. Over 400 letters a day stream
into the box, and the number increases
daily, according to Ellery.
"Letters are starting to come in from New
York and from Massachusetts, where we have
our sister stations," Ellery added. "Our slo-
gan is, 'Will you invest six cents of your
money and five minutes of your time to save
a life?' "
"We're not political, we take no sides,"
Ellery explained. "We have no money and
we seek no money. Some of our secretaries
at WCTC and some listeners have volun-
teered to handle and sort the mail."
Ellery said he thought of advertising to
help publiciZe his campaign, but that it was
impossible since "New York radio stations
are asking $180 per minute and the New York
Times wants $7,800 for a full page ad."
He has contacted a special representative
from Biafra to the U.S., who labelled Amer-
icans as "apathetic to the most tragic situ-
ation since Nazi Germany."
According to Ellery, only the French Red
Cross has been successful recently in sneak-
ing food past Nigeria's Russian Migs, but
that even the nightly haul of 180 tons or
food falls short of requirements. "The mini-
mum starvation rate in Biafra is 2,100 tons
of food a night," Ellery said.
Ellery's volunteer staff sorts the mail geo-
graphically, and will eventually mail each
letter to the proper senator.
"If I walk into the U.S. Senate with a mil-
lion letters, someone's going to do something
about it," Ellery promised.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION
HON. ROBERT PRICE
OF TEXAS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, December 1, 1969
Mr. PRICE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I
wholeheartedly support the international
biological program?IBP?and I am
pleased that the Congress also express
its support. I trust all Federal agencies
and interested organizations will assist
the IBP in its activities.
As a member of the House Science and
Astronautics Committee, the committee
which provided the primary legislative
review of IBP, I am familiar with its or-
ganization, its operation, and its goals.
The international biological program
is a worldwide effort by more than 50 na-
tions to provide a truly international
basis for managing the environment and
preventing its further deterioration.
At present, U.S. involvement with
IBP is limited. Through joining in
certain of its activities, we are attempt-
ing to achieve a better understanding of
the impact of: The population explosion,
the effect of population increases on na-
ture, and the effects that any changes in
the balance of nature would have on
mankind.
Mr. Speaker, while our present in-
volvement with IBP is an important one,
I believe we should expand it to include
the entire spectrum of environmental
control. Pollution is a lethal menace to
all mankind, and its eradication can best
be accomplished if the world works to-
gether. Pollution cannot be stopped on a
nation-by-nation trial and error basis.
The nations of the world must work to-
gether; the stakes are too high for any
other approach.
The responsibility of the United
States for environmental control is
great. As a nation and as people, we
have carelessly and thoughtlessly set in
motion forces that threaten to ruin the
air we breathe and the water we drink.
In our Nation's cities, the menace is par-
ticularly deadly. In New York, for ex-
ample, badly polluted air frequently
causes 10 to 20 deaths a day. In Buffalo,
the number of children hospitalized with
asthma and skin inflammation increases
significantly when the air is particularly
dirty.
Environmental contamination is grow-
ing worse all the time. Our cities are be-
coming more smog-filled. Our streams
are becoming more ridden with pollut-
ants. Our air carries ever increasing
amounts of chemical and industrial
waste.
Unfortunately, as a people, we seem
to have adopted a wait-and-see policy.
However, I fail to see what we are wait-
ing for. Are we waiting until the streets
are littered with corpses before the gen-
eral public is mobilized in defense of hu-
man health and survival? I certainly
hope this is not the ease.
Fortunately, certain Members of Con-
December 1, 1969
gress, with the encouragement of inter-
ested private and public organizations
have spoken out on the issue, and intro-
duced various legislative proposals to
combat environmental pollution. In my
view, many of these proposals, although
motivated by high purpose, have been
hastily conceived and poorly drawn. As
a result, the Congress stands in sore need
of coherent thinking and careful guid-
ance on this issue.
I have discussed my concern with
President Nixon. He has advised me that
he is preparing a comprehensive legisla-
tive program to combat pollution. In
concept, his program will provide the op-
erating continuity which many of the
present attacks on pollution so clearly
lack. In addition, it provides a funding
mechanism which will enable our Na-
tion to conduct a long-term fight against
this lethal menace in a reasonable
manner.
Mr. Speaker, I am looking forward to
the President's environmental quality
control program with great anticipation,
and I know many of my colleagues share
in my enthusiasm. While we are waiting
for the President's program, I urge 111
my colleagues to lend their support to
the IBP and to both publit and private
appropriate domestic efforts that have as
their goal, the restoration of a quality
environment far all manki d.
THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE
HON. WALTER FLOWERS
OF ALABAMA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, December 1, 1969
Mr. FLOWERS, Mr. Speaker, the total
amount of all goods and services pro-
duced by the entire world in the year
1900 was less than military spending
alone in the year 1968: Of the $173.4 bil-
lion spent on the world's military in 1968,
the United States accounted for $79.6
billion and the Soviet Union $39.8 bil-
lion, or a combined total of about 70 per-
cent of it all. Mr. Speaker, lam informed
further that the rate of such spending
has been accelerating drastically in the
last 3 years due to the increasing costs
of sophisticated and highly technical
modern equipment.
Therefore, Mr. Speaker, as the United
States and the Soviet Union opened their
arms control talks in Helsinki on Novem-
ber 17, there was .understandably great
hope on the part of people everywhere
that real progress would be forthcoming.
For the first time since the advent of the
cold war and the arms race, there seems
to be at least a near meeting of the minds
of the great powers to cope finally with
this challenging problem. Failing this,
the specter of the strategic arms race
could overshadow the national life of
both nations for years to come. It is in-
deed encouraging that the first of these
preliminary meetings has not set a stage
for the Usual gesturing and desk pound-
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1, ii8Prc"reallgffirdimilreRiT9--'?- FElusliaoso34402,349040001-0 E 10167
all Government bonds with a maturity
of more than 5 years at a substantial loss.
This loss is so substantial that it would
remove hundreds of millions of dollars
from the members of the Federal Home
Loan Bank throughout the country and
actually throw this money away. The re-
sulting loss can only mean that the as-
sociations could make less home loans
for our constituents. It seems obvious
that we want to avoid this.
This loss would be so substantial that
it could cause many of these associations
to go into bankruptcy or at the very
least, deep indebtedness. This amount of
money going down the drain would re-
move an equal amount of money from
the liquidity reserves of these associa-
tions and force them to somehow furnish
additional money for liquidity, thus tak-
ing many more millions of dollars from
its intended purpose of helping home
owners acquire and keep their homes.
Is it not true that long-term bonds
can be sold and converted into cash in
exactly the same time that it takes to
sell short-term bonds? Of course that is
true. Accordingly, the money invested in
long-term bonds is as readily available
for liquidity purposes as short-term
bonds would be. Then why does the Home
Loan Bank Board wish to enact, promul-
gate, and enforce such a harmful regula-
tion?
When the savings and loan industry
was required to furnish liquidity, the in-
dividual associations were told that
liquidity would be carried on their books
at cost price until sold or until maturity.
Any deviation from this promise would
be very close to bad faith with the mem-
bers of the savings and loan industry.
Any losses taken on the sale of these
bonds would be wasting the money at a
time when cash is so vitally necessary to
the country and to the industry.
We should each make it or business
to check on this situation and vigorously
protest what appears to be a ridiculous
and dangerous board decision. It would be
very simple, I believe, for the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board to provide any
addition to liquidity to be in the form of
short-term maturities, and in a few years
the old bonds would have matured. Ac-
cordingly, the problem, if any, will have
been solved without this terrific wasting
of reserves and traumatic damage to the
associations of the industry.
This resolution also provides, in con-
formity with Public Law 90-505, that
liquidity be required also on the amount
of short-term borrowings by the savings
and loan industry, and "short-term bor-
rowings" is defined as "notes due in 5
years or less."
Of course, we all have some responsi-
bility for passing Public Law 90-505, yet,
it would seem to me that we might have
been a little hasty. Certainly there is no
reason whatsoever for a 4- to 8-percent
liquidity on borrowed money. If a person
wishes to make collection on borrowed
money, he does not want to collect 4 to 8
percent of this money; he wants to collect
100 percent to this money. Four to eight
percent is not a "drop in the bucket"
toward paying off borrowed money.
I am giving some thought to the possi-
bility of our changing Public Law 90-505
and eliminating liquidity against bor-
rowed money. Somehow, liquidity does
not seem to be necessary. Resolution No.
23-377 is also being considered by the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and this
resolution, simply stated, would en-
courage the savings and loan industry,
after it has "thrown this money down
the sink," to carry this wasted and lost
money as an asset on their statement for
10 years, charging off 10 percent every
year. I do not believe that it is healthy
for the industry to offer to the public a
statement which comprises as assets
moneys which have long since become
substantial liabilities.
I have personally written to the
The Mounties received a standing Virnon
from the 53,000 fans in attendance at the
game. It was the first time such an honor
had ever been accorded to a visiting outfit
in the Atlanta stadium.
Semicek noted that Robert Beierschmitt,
leader of the Mounties, was shown on NFL
television network program on Saturday and
Sunday. Beierschmitt, one of the most color-
ful scholastic band leaders in the East, was
caught in action as he led the Mounties in
Atlanta.
. An appreciative community is planning to
make it a big day for the Mounties
tomorrow.
eral Home Loan Bank Board wi
ence to these matters, an
of their reply I will be i
to discuss it with e
you. Meanwhile,
any attention
fellow Congre
on receipt
better position
and every one of
ill deeply appreciate
d assistance you, my
men, can give to this most
tragic situa n.
MOU
CARMEL, PA., AREA HIGH
SCHOOL BAND
HON. RMAN T. SCHNEEBELI
8F,.ENNSYLVANIA
IN THE HOUSE 6114,13,EPRESENTATIVES
Monday, Decemb 1969
r, dur-
ely
Mr. SCHNEEBELI. Mr. Spe
ing recent years a young but ext
talented group of musicians has b
distinguishing itself as a high school
band?namely, the Mount Carmel, Pa.,
Area High School Band, more popularly
known as the "Mounties." Under the ex-
pert direction of Mr. Paul Semicek, the
Mounties have performed around the
United States and Canada, bringing
fame and publicity to their home com-
munity. Recently they performed at
half time at the NFL football game be-
tween the Atlanta Falcons and the Chi-
cago Bears, and were lauded by CBS
television sports for their performance,
which brought the football fans to a
standing ovation. On November 25, the
proud and appreciative citizens of Mount
Carmel honored the Mounties by cele-
brating Mounties Day. The following -e-x---
cerpt from the Shamokin News-Item of
November 24, will point up the high es-
teem in which this outstanding high
school band is held and the fine reputa-
tion they have earned. I should like to
join in saluting all of the Mounties and
their director, Mr. Semicek:
Congratulations are still being received by
the Mounties on their excellent showing in
Atlanta where they put on a half-time show
at the NFL football game between the At-
lanta Falcons and Chicago Bears.
Typical of the greetings was one received
by Paul Semicek, high school band director,
from Howard Reifsnyder, producer of CBS
television sports. The letter said:
"Dear Paul:
"Half time show featuring the Mounties
of Mount Carmel Area High School for the
Chicago vs. Atlanta telecast on November 16,
1969, was by far the best show I have seen
this year and one of the best I have ever seen.
The music was great as was the visual
presentation.
"Thanks for all your cooperation and it
was good seeing you again.
"Regards,
"Howard Reifsnyder."
A TRULY GREAT HUMANITARIAN
CAMPAIGN: THE COMMITTEE TO
HELP BIAFRAN CHILDREN
HON. EDWARD J. PATTEN
OF NEW JERSEY
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, December 1, 1969
Mr. PATTEN. Mr. Speaker, the starva-
tion of Biafran children is one of the
most shocking and appalling tragedies in
the modern history of mankind.
When an Associated Press story re-
ported in late October 1969, that "over
300 Biafran children die every day of
starvation." Jack Ellery, who does a
popular morning show on radio station
WCTC, of New Brunswick, N.J., decided
to do something about it. He started a
truly great humanitarian campaign.
Jack Ellery asked his radio listeners
write the words, "End the Starvation"
on . sost card and send it to WCTC. The
respo e has been fantastic. With the
help of k Sutton, a bank executive,
and Peter ears, of the Bound Brook
Chronicle, ck Ellery organized "The
Committee TiHelp Biafran Children,"
Post Office Bo FOOD, Somerset, N.J.
More than 40 i letters a day are being
received and th number is increasing
every day. -
Mr. Speaker he Biafran war is now
30 months oh d the human toll is un-
believable. ousands of children have
died fr? starvation and thousands
mor ill die unless something is done
elp them. Jack Ellery, a young man
of deep compassion for people and great
love for children, believes that if the
post card campaign produces 1 million
cards or letters and they are delivered
to the U.S. Senate, the pressure of pub-
lic opinion will become so great, that
there is a good chance action will be
taken to finally stop the starvation of
children in Biafra.
This is not a campaign that is seeking
money. Only post cards or letters are
needed with the words "End the Starva-
tion" and the sender's name and address
included.
Mr. Speaker, when many of us think
of childhood, we often think of Samuel
Woodworth's poem:
How dear to this heart are the scenes of my
childhood,
When fond recollection recalls them to view.
The orchard, the meadow, the deep-tangled
wildwood,
And every loved spot which my infancy
knew.
There will be no "fond recollection"
for the children of Biafra, because they
probably will not live long?unless
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big by the Soviets. Each side has seemed
gentrinely eager to get down to the essen-
tials of the long bargaining bound to pre-
cede any arms agreement. Although more
time will undoubtedly be spent by each
side in testing the intentions of the other
before thorough appraisals can be made,
it is hoped that the substantive talks
might begin in early 1970.
Mr. Speaker, there have already been
over 3 years of preparation and mostly
unnecessary delay in getting these talks
started. Under the guise of displeasure
over our Nation's policy in Vietnam, the
Soviet Union first delayed its endorse-
ment. After their approval was finally
given and plans were in the works, then
came the Soviet invasion of Czecho-
slovakia in August 1968, forcing cancel-
lation by our Government. The new ad-
ministration then delayed until June of
this year while it reviewed U.S.
policy and our bargaining position. And
on October 25, the Soviet Union finally
agreed to the present preliminary talks.
Early this year, the head of the U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Mr. William C. Foster, said:
The technological stars and 'planets are
now in favorable conjunction, so to speak?
and they will not stay that way for long.
I think it can safely be said that the
arsenals of the United States and the
Soviet Union are in somewhat of a state
of balance at this time, although in dif-
ferent areas one country or the other is
dominant. This relative balance causes
concern by those who feel that we should
have a clear-cut arms superiority, but the
present status may be the "favorable
conjunction" that provides the-conducive
climate for arms talks.
Mr. Speaker, perhaps the most en-
couraging factor of the new found in-
terest of the Soviet Union in looking for
a solution or alternative to the arms race
is the suggestion that the voice of the
people of Russia is being heard over the
hard line Communists. The situation, in
my opinion, has gotten entirely too criti-
cal for either nation "to keep on keeping
on" as we have been doing. I know that
many citizens of the Fifth District of
Alabama, that I have the privilege of
representing, join in the hope and prayer
that these preliminary talks will be the
solid beginning of productive negotia-
tions at an early date.
REASONED WORDS OF GOOD
COUNSEL
HON. JAMES HARVEY
OF MICHIGAN
IN 'THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, December 1, 1969
Mr. HARVEY. Mr. Speaker, at a time
when this House is again considering
vital legislation to proclaim its collective
viewpoints as to the absolute need of
unity in behalf and for our country in its
involvement in South Vietnam, it is my
privilege to bring to the attention of all
Members an excellent speech delivered
recently by our colleague, the Honorable
F. BRADFORD MORSE, Of Massachusetts.
My remarks are somewhat slanted in-
asmuch as I have long admired and re-
spected Congressman MORSE'S good judg-
ment and sound thinking. I think, when
you read over and study his remarks
made on November 13, 1969, at the Lowell
Memorial Auditorium, Lowell, Mass., you
will agree that he has masterfully clari-
fied the hopes of all Americans?peace in
Vietnam.
He has, I believe, narrowed and elimi-
nated false differences among Americans
as to our Nation's hopes and desires. We
all seek peace; we all want peace. The
difference now is by what means do we
achieve that goal. Congressman MORSE'S
remarks fellow:
REMARKS OF CONGRESSMAN F. BRADFORD MORSE,
LOWELL MEMORIAL AUDITORIUM, NOVEMBER
13, 1969
I come here tonight filled with respect?
for you whose convictions about our involve-
ment in Vietnam over the past several years
have demonstrably hastened the pace toward
peace?for others like those to whose memory
this building is dedicated who died in battles
not of their own choosing, for ideals which
they may not fully have understood?who
gave their lives for a cause to which all men
of goodwill, of all times, have aspired.
And I bring a growing measure of respect
for a country?our country?whose national
processes have been capable of changing the
direction of our involvement in a tragic and
ill-advised war in but a few months?fl coun-
try strong enough, confident enough, indeed
good enough to insure that the voices of
those who disagree with national policy may
be raised and indeed may be heard.
I speak to you, not with any sense of
chauvinism?for that concept had relevance
only in an earlier, less complicated day.
I do not urge unity for its own sake, for
that unity would deprive our nation of the
vitality that has given it strength in other
difficult moments.
I seek with you only rationality rather
than irrationality; I plead only for thought-
fulness rather than passion; I search for
reasoned counsel which will lead to peace,
rather than exercises which may delay?even
thwart?its achievement.
And I address my entreaty not only to
those who are gathered tonight in this place
and to the thousands of other like-minded
Americans, with whom I have proudly iden-
tified, who have sought for years to explain
the error of our involvement in the war and
have sought to correct it, but also to those
other highly motivated people in our land
who have supported the national leadership
throughout the days of escalation and sup-
port it now in these days of de-escalation.
I trust that my comments will not be con-
strued as a defense of the present Adminis-
tration, which has been organized by my
party according to the slim mandate of the
American people a year ago, nor as a con-
demnation of any previous Administration.
For the hour is too late for partisanship.
The storm is too near the horizon for any-
thing less than an objective assessment of
where we are and where we are going.
The time is upon us when we must realize
that the issue at stake is not Vietnam, but
the United States. The time is approaching
when the issue shall not be?in spite of any-
one's rhetoric?the integrity of Vietnam, but
rather, the integrity of America.
To deny that polarization has been taking
place in our society would be to deny that
today is Thursday, November 13, 1969.
To assign responsibility for that polariza-
tion in this heated moment would be an ex-
ercise in destructive futility. But to fail to
recognize that that polarization can paralyze
our society and have shattering effects on the
hopes of people throughout he world who
have found meaning in the basic values
shared by all Americans, young and old,
black and white, rich and poor, would be ir-
responsible myopic.
The time is upon us when we must recog-
nize and reject demagogic posturings?be
they the postures of the left or the right, of
the hawks or the doves.
The time has come when we must recognize
that the differences among Amercans about
Vietnam are today more illusory than real,
in large measure because of the efforts of
devoted Americans like you.
You seek an end to the war?so does your
government.
You seek a withdrawal of American combat
troops from Vietnam?so does your govern-
ment.
You seek an end to any American military
presence in Vietnam?so does your govern-
ment. '
You seek no American bases in Vietnam?
nor does your government seek any.
You want the people of South Vietnam to
have the opportunity to choose their own
leaders and to reject the leadership of the
present regime if they so choose?so does
your government.
You want the casualties to cease, be they
American, North Vietnamese or South Viet-
namese?so does your government.
You want our national attention and our
national resources devoted, not to war, but
to improving the quality of our own society?
so does your government.
You seek peace?and so does your govern-
ment.
So there is little division on goals; only the
means to achieve those goals are the subject
of debate.
Let us therefore recognize that upon which
our people agree. Let us all contribute to the
attainment of peace?not by angry name-
calling, nor by simplistic sloganeering, not
by efforts that may frustrate and weaken the
only institutions through which peace can
be achieved. Instead, let us apply intellect,
creativity and practical idealism to find those
steps by which the common objectives may
be earliest achieved.
For free men to do otherwise would be
a denial of their freedom?for compassionate
human beings who cherish human life to
do otherwise would be a denial of their
compassion.
It is my privilege to represent the five
hundred thousand people who reside in the
Fifth Massachusetts District in the Congress
of the United States. You are among them.
I ask of you, and the other Americans who
have given me this trust, for reasoned coun-
sel and thoughtful advice. I pledge to all of
you that your voices shall be heard and your
voices shall be heeded.
SCHOOL INTEGRATION HAS ITS
LIMITS
HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI
OF ILLINOIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, December 1, 1969
Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, one of
the difficulties discussing an issue as
emotional and complex as school integra-
tion is that the gap between theory and
facts is rarely bridged by the proponents
of artificial integration.
An editorial in the Monday, November
24 Chicago Tribune objectively states
views which should be reviewed and
properly calls attention to the inherent
limitations of school integration.
The editorial follows:
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SCHOOL INTEGRATION HAS ITS LIMITS
The futility of court decrees and adminis-
trative plans for racially balanced public
schools in cities with large concentrations _
of Negroes has been demonstrated by ex-
perience. Accumulating evidence to this effect
includes the board of education's 1969 racial
headcount of students in the Chicago pub-
lic schools.
Residential movements in Chicago, as
shown by the 1969 and previous headcounts,
tend to integrate all-white schools and then
resegregate them as all-black schools in a
few years.
Chicago's public school enrollment of 580,-
292 is 53.9 per cent black, 41 per cent white,
4.3 per cent Puerto Rican, and 0,8 per cent
others. In 1968, the black enrollment was
52.9 and the white was 42.2 per cent.
Theoretically, this racial division would
permit city-wide integration according to the
board's definition of an integrated school, one
with between 10 and 90 percent enrollment
for each race. Actually, in spite of the board's
integration efforts, only 10.3 per cent of the
city's black elementary school pupils and 26.9
per cent of its black high school students
are enrolled in schools defined as integrated.
Thus Chicago's schools are more segregated
than those of the south as a whole. The best
available estimate is that thruout the south
this year between 30 and 40 pr cent of the
Negro students attend formerly all-white
schools.
In the south, of course, the schools were
segregated by state laws, which the United
States Supreme court declared unconstitu-
tional in 1954, whereas Chicago's "de facto"
segregation is the result of housing patterns.
The federal government, however, has suits
pending in half a dozen northern cities to
end de facto segregation, and the govern-
ment's position has been upheld by federal
District Judge Julius J. Hoffman in an order
for the integration of schools in district 151,
comprising most of Phoenix and flout ii Hol-
land and part of Harvey.
Judge Hoffman held that segregation, re-
gardless of its cause, has the effect of stigma-
tizing Negro pupils and retarding their edu-
cation, a conclusion that is disputed by many
competent authorities, including Negro edu-
cators, Hoffman ordered district 151 to re-
structure its grade organization and to bus
about 55 per cent of its total enrollment to
achieve racial balance.
District 151 has appealed from this deci-
sion to the 7th United States Circuit Court of
Appeals, Which ruled in a similar case in-
volving the schools of Gary, Incl., in 1963,
that nothing in the Supreme court's decisions
or the Constitution itself requires racial mix-
ing. The appellate court held that the Con-
stitution "does not require integration, it
merely forbids racial discrimination," and the
Supreme court refused to review the case.
On Oct. 29, in a case involving 33 school
districts in Mississippi, the Supreme court
said "the obligation of every school district
is to terminate the dual school systems at
once and to operate now and hereafter only
unitary schools." The court has not said,
however, whether de facto segregation is a
dual or a unitary system, or what if anything
can be done about it.
In its 1951 decision, the Supreme Court
held that segregation by law denies Negro
children the "equal protection of the laws"
in violation of the 14th amendment. But de
facto segregation is a result of the facts of
life, not of the laws. Racial discrimination is
unconstitutional, under the Supreme court's
ruling but it does not follow that racial inte-
gration is compulsory or even possible.
If children are assigned and transported
involuntarily to schools far from their homes,
solely on account of their race, black or
white, they too are denied the equal protec-
tion of the laws. A Constitution that is color
blind protects not only the right of blacks
to move into a neighborhood but also the
right of whites to move out Enrollment in
the public schools of Washington, D.C., be-
fore the Supreme court's 1954 decision was
only 40 per cent black; now it is 95 per cent.
Drastic measures to integrate the schools of
Chicago could produce the same results.
WHO SHOULD PAY FOR
CONSERVATION
HON. DURWARD G. HALL
OF MISSOURI
IN THE HOUSE OF REP NTATIVES
Monday, Dece ger I, 1969
Mr. HALL. Mr Speaker, at various
times during th past few years, I have
presented to t e House of Representa-
tives Commit on Agriculture, a pro-
posal designe to elevate the economy of
this Nation' farmer, while at the same
time, doing uch toward giving him more
freedom in unning his own farm opera-
tion.
The pro sal called, the cropland and
water rest' 'ation bill, has as one of its
key featur the proper care and man-
agement of ur precious topsoil.
A recent tide, "Who Should Pay for
Conservatio 9" which appeared in a
magazine cal The Furrow, details in
a most interest way, some of the prob-
lems caused by p soil management.
The article follows:
WHO SHOULD PAY FOR CON TION?
Soil erosion is bad for farmers, bu
modern fertilizers it's not the horror it use
to be. Rich, black dirt Is still precious but no
longer priceless on much of North America's
deep-soil farmland. At the same time, from
the standpoint of the population in general,
soil erosion is becoming ever more serious
and costly.
Sedimentation of rivers is a problem that
will worsen even if levels of sediment don't
increase. That's because of ever-greater and
more-intense use of our available water. The
cost of muddy water is already staggering. It
includes direct cash outlays of $250 million
per year in the U.S. to dredge harbors, lakes,
and rivers. Every year silt displaces about a
million acre-feet of storage space in reser-
voirs?space that costs at least $100 per acre-
foot to build. Add to this the cost of remov-
ing silt from water for municipal and
industrial use and you get an idea of the
cash price everybody pays for dirty water.
But there's more: many soils contain dura-
ble pesticides that cling to soil particles. As
soil erodes these enter into streams, rivers,
and lakes, polluting the waters. Perhaps the
biggest coat of dirty water is the immeasura-
ble loss of aesthetic value in terms of natural
beauty, fish, fowl, and wildlife.
When soil erodes everybody loses, and when
soil stays on the farm everybody gains. This
is a key point because it appears that farmers
are now expected to pay more than their
Share of the cost of preventing siltation of
waters.
Under modern farming systems (which are
necessary if we are to feed ourselves), some
erosion is inevitable. This loss can be greatly
reduced, however, through such practices as
strip cropping, contour plowing, and main-
taining year-round cover, along with use of
grassed waterways, terraces, water channels,
and check dams to store water, All these cast
a farmer something in time, effort, conven-
ience, and money, and they don't necessarily
increase profit.
Government funds have long been used in
a cost-sharing arrangement to stimulate soil
conservation. For certain erosion-control
practices in the "preferred" category, the
stated U.S. government share Is 60 percent.
But it never quite works out that Sseil and
farmers usually end up paying about half the
cost. For some projects, farmers are quick to
see the benefits to their business and glad to
pay a 50-percent share. Other worthy proj-
ects go begging because farmers can scarcely
be expected to spend hard-earned cash if the
main beneficiaries are several hundred thou-
sand guys downstream.
What's needed is a rebirth of the soil con-
servation fervor of 25 years ago, along with
recognition of this new reality; farmers have
relatively less to gain now, so they should
bear a relatively smaller share of the cost of
soil conservation. A cost-sharing formula
that doesn't take this into account isn't
likely to salve the problem of muddy waters
in our rivers and streams.
CITY OF SANTA FE SPRINGS?BEST
SISTER CITY AWARD
HON. CHET HOLIFIELD
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, December 1, 1969
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, it gives
me great pleasure to call the attention of
my colleagues to the splendid achieve-
ments of the officials and citizens of
one of the cities in the 19th Congres-
sional District of California, which I am
proud to represent. I am speaking of the
city of Santa Fe Springs which has won
the Reader's Digest Foundation Award
for the best single sister city project for
'ty under 25,000 population in the
Um States, 2 years in a row.
In 19 as a result of the vigor and
cooperatio of its officials and citizens,
Santa Fe Sp ngs was awarded a prize
for the donati of a badly needed fire
truck and fire in e to its sister city, Nay-
ojoa, Sonora, Me ico.
In 1969, Santa e Springs was award-
ed the prize for t e previous year's work
in designing an building the interna-
tional trophy w ning float for the 1969
Pasadena tou ? ment of roses parade.
This float, wring many long hours of
planning and work, was in honor of the
city of Santa Fe Springs' sister city,
Mersin, Turkey. This float, based upon
the theme, "hands across the sea,"
viewed by millions of people on television,
was an admirable action helping to ce-
ment the bonds gf international friend-
ship.
I would like to have the text of the
Santa Fe Springs award submittal print-
ed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:
1969 READER'S D/GEST AWARD SUBMITTAL
As part of the Santa Fe Springs Sister City
Committee objective of planning and con-
ducting projects which will foster mutual
understanding and goodwill not only between
our citizens and those of our sister cities but
between people of all the world, the Santa
Fe Springs Sister City Committee undertook,
in conjunction with the City of Mersin, Tur-
key, the ? Honorable Talat Kulay, Consul
General of Turkey, and members of the com-
munity to plan and construct a float to be
entered in the 1969 Pasadena Tournament of
Roses Parade.
The parade, which is viewed by millions of
people around the world, would be, we felt,
an appropriate vehicle for expressing our
regard not only for our Sister City of Mersin,
but for the entire Sister City program. It was
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December 15, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL, RECORD? SENATE
tary personnel, which can be used else-
where.
The basic issue was debated at great
length on the authorization bill and
ended in a 504o-50 tie vote.
So this debate is not going to change,
anyone's mind. If there has been any
change of mind, that change has come
before this debate.
The purpose of this amendment is the
opportunity for those of us who oppose
the Safeguard ABM system to register
our continuing opposition.
An incidental use will be gained in that
the vote will offer an opportunity for
some to record their change of mind on
this issue in changing their vote from
their vote on authorization of the system.
I want to clearly record the fact that
I have not changed my mind. In fact,
from what I have been told by some
working on the Safeguard system?told
since the authorization vote?I am all
the more convinced that spending funds
for the Safeguard ABM system is a tragic
waste of funds and resources.
I am confident that the very near
future will demonstrate the tragedy of
the Safeguard ABM system and in con-
trast the superiority of a laser defense
system.
In short, I simply cannot vote to spend
money and resources on what I consider
to be a defective system.
THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO
SECRETARY ROGERS
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I had
meant, during the morning hour today,
to make a brief statement on the situa-
tion in the Middle East. Since that op-
portunity was not available to me earlier
in the day, I take the liberty of detaining
the Senate for a few minutes to make the
statement now.
Today's reports of the Pravda article
commenting on Secretary Roger's con-
troversial speech of December 9 clearly
reveals Soviet intentions with respect to
the Middle East?intentions that are
most disquieting. While the world looks
for a spirit of cooperation and respon-
sibility in the SALT talks, the Soviet
Union can hardly make a good impres-
sion when it continues to take the low
road in Cairo and Damascus, while seek-
ing to appear to take the high road in
Helsinki.
Secretary Rogers' speech contained
strong overtures to the moderate Arab
governments and foreshadowed a tough
U.S. stance vis-a-vis Israel's substan-
tive position on the outstanding issues
concerning a peace settlement. The ma-
jor effort by the Nixon administration to.
go the extra mile to bridge the gap in the
Mideast?even at the cost of undermin-
ing Israel's position?was motivated, I
have no doubt, by a genuine desire to
promote peace.
A Soviet diplomatic offensive against
the U.S. Middle East policy, which seems
now to have been inaugurated, presents a
challenge for debate on the international
level, which the United States should
not forego. The Soviet Union is either
preaching to us or scolding us on our
policy without itself making any contri-
bution to peace in this area. The whole
world agrees that there is a great danger
in the Middle East, But the danger, I feel,
is not so much between the great powers
as it is in the possibility of the whole area
once again plunging into flames with re-
percussions which no one can predict.
While the United States announced a
policy of "balance" and sweet reason-
ableness?a policy which I feel is well-
intentioned but misguided?the Soviet
Union engages in nothing more than
pandering to the most intransigent posi-
tions of its radical Arab clients.The ex-
ercise is strictly one of seeking to dis-
credit the United States without making
any contribution to peace in the area.
Whatever may be the Soviet Union's
intentions elsewhere, it obviously intends
to play a strictly opportunistic, irrespon-
sible and power-grabbing role in the
Middle East.
The U.S.S.R. has now made It clear
that its policy in the Mideast is to take
a mile every time the United States gives
an inch. Secretary Rogers' detailed state-
ment of U.S. differences with Israel has
not been paralleled by any Soviet indi-
cation of any differences with the un-
relentingly extremist position of its Arab
clients. In fact, the U.S.S.R. in the few
days since Secretary Rogers' speech has
alined itself even more closely?if that
is possible?with the straight propaganda
line of President Nasser's United Arab
Republic, even to the extent of backing
the guerrilla movement in the Middle
East.
The U.S. concessions in Secretary Ro-
ger's speech have been attacked in
Pravda as "tricks" of "Washington prop-
aganda" designed to "split" the Arabs.
The new U.S. policy is described as one
of "support to the Israeli ruling circles
in their aggressive actions, in their stub-
born attempts to annex territories."
The 'U.S.S.R. obviously is seeking to
draw the United States into a policy of
entrapment there?one of extracting
one U.S. "concession" after another?
by constantly raising the bidding price.
What is at stake is the very survival of
Israel. No one can expect Israel to go
back to the pre-June, 1967 situation, with
Syrian guns firing down its throat from
the Golan heights, with Jordanese me-
dium artillery able to interdict the 12-
mile waist of Israel and cut the country
in two, and with Egypt able to cut the
entry to Elath and to mobilize in the
Sinai desert.
It is a matter of gravest concern and
regret that the Soviet Union continues
to pursue such a dangerous and irre-
sponsible policy in the Mideast. It is a
real understatement to say that the
U.S.S.R. Is not proceeding in the Mid-
east with the spirit of cooperation and
responsibility that we have some reason
to suspect may be in the offing regarding
the SALT talks and other overall U.S.-
U.S.S.R. issues. In my judgment, it is
time for the Kremlin to realize that if
it does want to move?in President
Nixon's memorable phrase?from the
"era of confrontation to the era of ne-
gdtiation" it cannot make an exception
of the Mideast. The issues are too seri-
ous there.
It is clear that the Soviets are not
prepared at this time to respond in any
S 16771'
reasonable, just, or responsible manner
to Secretary Rogers' high-minded?but
in my judgment misguided?effort to
place the United States in an "even-
handed," "balanced," and intermediary
posture in the Mideast. The only visible
results thus far have been a strong So-
viet reiteration of down-the-line support
of the radical Arab position. Also, the
Soviets have for the first time expressed
overt support for the Arab terrorist
guerrilla movement.
In this context, the low-keyed request
of Prime Minister Golda Meir to Presi-
dent Nixon, during her recent visit to
buy additional defensive arms?hope-
fully on less onerous terms?assumes a
new urgency.
If the United States does not lose
its nerve and does not allow itself to be
maneuvered into pressing Israel to ac-
cept measures which could compromise
its security, current radical Arab and
Soviet policy will fail, the bankruptcy
and total negativism of its premises will
be exposed and a new era of opportunity
and enlightenment can open in the Mid-
dle East, But if Israel loses her viability
as a free state?either because we unwit-
tingly encourage her enemies to think
they have a chance to wage one last
holy war against her, or because our
"balanced" policy forces Israel into
bankruptcy to maintain her military de-
fense against such a war?it would pose
the gravest implications for the United
States and for the peace of the world.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. JAVITS. I yield.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I asso-
ciate myself with the remarks of the
Senator from New York and congratu-
late him for bringing the matter before
the Senate today.
I have also been interested in these
developments. I have read with great
concern the apparent further attempt at
appeasement, which is exactly the thing
that the representatives of Israel have
worried about from the beginning. They
were afraid that it would happen in the
U.N. They asked to meet with the Arabs.
The Israelis and the Arabs are the
ones concerned.
We seem now to be in the position of
helping the real troublemakers in provid-
ing them with the side entrance, so to
speak, so that the real meeting between
the Israelis and the Arabs could not take
place.
I think this is a great mistake. I think
that the attempt is badly taken. And I
think that the wisdom of it is very ques-
tionable.
I am certain that the position the Sen-
ator from New York and the Senator
from California have taken from the be-
ginning is a proper position.
I sincerely hope that the remarks the
Senator has made today are transmitted
forthwith to the Secretary of State so
that he will know that some Senators
are listening to this and are watching it
and are knowledgeable and have some
judgment as to the matter.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr, President, I am very
grateful to my colleague.
. I will yield to no one in my desire for
good relations with the Soviet Union.
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However, I also feel that we have to be.,
very clear in our own minds about certain
things. We should realize that it has long
been the practice of the Soviet Union to
convey an attitude of cooperation and
detente in one place?apparently there
seems to be that kind of attitude in
Helsinki?and at the same time to play
the very dangerous game of brinkman-
ship with peace without responsibility in
another place?the Middle East.
I have made my remarks today so that
we may be conscious of the fact that the
U.S.S.R. can carry on both kinds of poli-
cies and that our policy must be adjusted
accordingly.
We cannot allow ourselves to be taken
in by a cooperative atmosphere in an-
other policy area so as to jeopardize the
security of a very effective and durable
ally. The adoption by the Soviet Union
of an intransigent position, with which I
have confidence the administration thor-
oughly disagrees?that is the position of
the Arab States?should not induce us to
make unwarranted concessions.
I think that under the guise of trying
to be balanced and fair, we could be
taken in.
I have made my remarks today to call
the matter to the attention of the Senate.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
APPROPRIATIONS, 1970
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of the bill (H.R. 15090) mak-
ing appropriations for the Department
of Defense for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1970, and for other purposes.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I rise
to support the amendment offered by the
distinguished Senator from Maine (Mrs.
SMITH) . I will be very brief here today
because, as my colleague has pointed out,
I think that most everyone has made up
his mind and each has heard all of the
arguments on the .ABM question.
However, I should like to introduce a
subject that was not involved in the
previous debate?something that has
come to be recognized as a new term by
the Defense Department, called "cost
growth." We used to call it "overruns"
or the other terms that were given to it.
They were meant to indicate that there
was a change from the original estimate
of a weapons system to the kind of figure
we were dealing with when it finally
ended up, or when we were making con-
tinuing appropriations.
Mr. President, I read from the state-
ment of Mr. Packard, Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense, when he indicated last
spring, as appears in the RECORD of De-
cember 12, 1969, on page S16601:
Neither the Department of Defense nor the
Congress will continue to tolerate large cost
overruns which relate to unrealistic pricing
at the time of award, or to inadequate man-
agement of the job during the contract.
The chairman of the Armed Services
Committee, the Senator from Mississippi
(Mr. STENNIS) , on December 1, issued a
statement which included 35 weapons
programs and the differences which we
could expect to find with between the
original cost estimate and the current
cost, because of any "cost growth."
In the 35 weapons systems, the ABM
Safeguard was included. The chart which
was released by the chairman indicated
that the current estimate for the Safe-
guard was the same as the original esti-
mate?namley, $4.1 billion?and that,
therefore, there had been no cost growth
from the time of the original estimate to
the time of the release, which was De-
cember 1.
Mr. President, I made some inquiries
and I would like to report to the Senate
some of the results of those inquiries.
The total cost estimate of the Safe-
guard ABM system has risen by $277 mil-
lion since we last considered this issue.
Although the Senate Armed Services
Committee reported, as I have said, on
December 1, 1969 that there had been no
increase in the original $4,185,000,000
cost estimate, the Pentagon informed
me Saturday, after persistent inquiry,
that the cost had escalated , by this
amount.
The Defense Department has claimed
that this 6%-percent increase has taken
place since its last program status re-
port of June 30, 1969. I do not know why
such a cost growth was not reported on
December 1, unless an increase of more
than a quarter of a billion dollars has
taken place in the 12 days since then.
Increasing at a rate? of 6% percent
every 5 months, the phase I deployment
of the Safeguard system will not cost the
taxpayers $4,185,000,000, as orginally
claimed, but rather $13,700,000,000 by its
completion in 1976. Such a projection is
not at all unrealistic, for recent history
has witnessed the cost of weapons sys-
tems growing by such proportions.
Further, the Pentagon's $4.185 billion
estimate was only for phase I of Safe-
guard, or deployment at just two sites.
Should we proceed with phase II of the
system, the original cost estimate of $10.3
billion could well rise above $25 billion.
These are the expenditures that are ulti-
mately at stake by our decisions today.
We all know of the financial crisis
within our land. All of us are alarmed by
seemingly unchecked inflation. During
the debate on the tax bill last week, time
after time, colleagues have spoken about
the absolute need for fiscal responsibil-
ity.
For instance, some argued that we
could not give a deduction for the medi-
cal expenses of those over 65 and not
covered by medicare; we could not afford
the $255 million this would have cost us
in fiscal year 1970, it was said. But the
increase in the ABM during just these
past 5 months exceed that, and the total
ABM funds in this appropriations bill
are more than three times as much.
In explaining the reasons for this cost
increase to me, the Pentagon stated that
Ws percent was due to "stretchout," 2
percent was due to "design and estimate
changes," and VA percent due to infla-
tion. I find this last cause to be some-
what ironic.
All of us would agree that a certain
step toward the control of inflation is
the reduction of Government expendi-
tures. But the truth is that the most
fiscally irresponsible Government spend-
ing today is defense spending.
One reason why the cost of weapons
systems increases, then, is simply because
massive funds are spent for them dur-
ing this time of economic instability,
becoming a primary cause of inflation.
The reasons for not proceeding with
ABM deployment at this time have been
clearly set forth in the past. Today, in
light of this new information, I wish
to emphasize only one: We cannot af-
ford it.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the fact sheet given to me on
Saturday by the Pentagon confirming
this cost increase be inserted in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the fact
sheet was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
FACT SHEET
1. Secretary Laird has placed great stress
since coming into office on making the Pro-
gram Status Reports submitted to the Armed
Services and Appropriations Committees an
accurate reflection of the major weapons
system acquisition programs, characteris-
tics, and costs. The last Program Status Re-
port submitted to you with regard to the
Safeguard program was as of 30 June 1969,
and showed the DOD acquisition, or DOD
investment costs, expected for the Safe-
guard program as $4185 M. These costs in-
clude the DOD RDT&E, PEMA and MCA for
Safeguard Phase 1 for the period FY 68
through deployment of the last site.
2. The next Program Status Report on the
Safeguard program is now in its final stage of
review. It is expected to be forwarded shortly
to the Chairmen of the Armed Services and
Appropriations Committees. The Report on
Safeguard will show a cost increase over the
earlier Safeguard reports and we wanted you
to have this information as early as possible.
The total increase shown in the new report
will be $277 M, or a percentage increase from
the earlier reported total of about 6% per
cent. This increase is brought about by three
basic causes.
a. The largest cause is the inflation that
has occurred. In this regard, initial estimates
of March and those of the 30 June report
were based on the price levels as of 31 De-
cember 1968. We have now updated those
costs to a 31 December 1969 level so that they
will be in agreement with the budget and
authorization submissions for FY '71 now
being prepared. Approximately $136 M of the
$277 M is due to this price level change, or
31/3 percent of the earlier reported total pro-
gram investment costs.
b. Then, too, as you realize, we have held
back on major commitments for construc-
tion and PEMA until after passage of the
authorization and appropriation bills. This
has necessitated our delaying the Equipment
Readiness Dates of the two site complexes
by 3 months each. Completion of deployment
of the second site complex is now delayed
from the earlier scheduled July 1974 to Oc-
tober 1974. In other words, it has stretched
out the deployment and the period over
which our production/engineering base is
maintained. This stretch-out has caused an
increase of $55 1VI, or Ws per cent of the
earlier reported total program investment
costs.
c. Finally, and the second largest, we have
had certain changes in the estimates of sev-
eral line items brought about by further
estimation and study and a few necessary
design changes. These together account for
$86 M of the increase, or about 2 per cent of
the earlier reported total investment costs.
d. In summary, then, the total cost in-
crease shown in the next Program Status
Report will be one of about 6% per cent: of
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