INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS EXCHANGES OF SCHOLARS WITH THE SOVIET UNION: ADVANTAGES AND DILEMMAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00364R000100230001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 288
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 25, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

c? D_.,_.. .1. I 10ep1 L- IL10 e L.. Ce._ r .A rd, - .
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
91st Congress
1st Session
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION
EXCHANGES OF SCHOLARS WITH THE
SOVIET UNION: ADVANTAGES AND DILEMMAS
MEMORANDUM
PREPARED AT THE, REQUEST OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
(Pursuant to S. Res. 24, 91st Cong.)
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
Printed for the use of the Committee: on Government Operations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
35 395 WASHINGTON : 1969
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
+AM J. ERVIN, JR., North Carolina
EDMUND S. MUSKIE,.Maine
ABRAHAM RIBICOFF. Connecticut
FRET) It. HARRIS. Oklahoma
LEE METCALF, Montana
EUCFENE J. McCARTHY. Minnesota
JAMES B. ALLEN, Alabama
KAR1, E. AIUNDT, South Dakota
JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
CHARLES H. MERCY, Illinois
TEL) STEVENS, Alaska
EDWARD J. GURNEY, Florida
CHA RLES AtcC. MATHIAS, JR., Maryland
J AniEa It. CALLOWAT, CAfr/Counard and glaff Direior
ARTHVR A. SHARP, Stag Ed ta-
HENRY M. JACKSON. Washington, CAairman
EI)MIUND S.MUSKJE,.Maine KARL E. ML'NDT, South Dakota
ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Connecticut CHARLES 1-1. MERCY, IllinoL'
FRED R. HARRIS, Oklahoma EDWARD) J. GURNEY, Florida
EUGENE J. McCARTHY. Minnesota TED STEVENS, Alaska
DoROTaT FoaDICE, WfDirector
RoaERT W. Tuts, CltII! Conaullatt!
JUDITtn J. SPAHR, Ghlef Clerk
RICHARD E. BRowX, Research Aaatrlara
Wn LI O. FARBZR. Mfnorillr Conaullani
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
The subcommittee is pleased to be able to publish this original
paper by Professor Robert F. Byrnes in the record of its inquiry on
international negotiation.
We invited Professor Byrnes to prepare a memorandum covering
the main issues in negotiating exchanges of scholars with the Soviet
Union which he thought should be considered and reflected upon, and
he has responded with this discerning contribution to our record.
Now Distinguished Professor of History at Indiana University,
Dr. Byrnes was from 1959 to 1962 Director of the University's
Russian and East European Institute. For nine years, from 1960
to 1969, he served as Cha.irntan of the Inter-University Committee
which, until this past summer, had the major responsibility for U.S.
scholar exchange programs with the Soviet Union.
IIFENRY M. JACKSON,
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security
OCTOBER 7.7, 1969. an.ci International Operations.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
EXCHANGES OF SCHOLARS WITH THE SOVIET UNION:
ADVANTAGES AND DILEMMAS
By
Robert F. Byrnes
During the last quarter century, the role of the American univer-
sity and of the American schotar_ hn c quietly and gradually changed
almost beyond the comprehension of even those who have partici-
pated actively in the revolution. Expansion of higher education and
of access to it in every part of the country has brought more than
seven million students to AmericEm c-lJnpuses in the fall of 1969.
These students, their faculties, the libraries which serve them both,
and the entire college and university complex all face a continuing
"knowledge explosion," an increase of information in most fields of
study so rapid that most of what is noea taught in some fields was not
known as recently as ten years ago.
The role of the university in American life has so changed that the
ivory tower has been demolished. M any Americans instead believe
that the university, while con.tiwal.g its usual functions for the
rapidly growing student body, should also be the principal instrument
for resolving our social problems. Indeed, many are now convinced
that new knowledge generated and spread by the university is the most
important factor in social and ecorn,anuc change.
The appearance of new fields of shad , of new knowledge, especially
in the sciences, and of new respo1isibilities is matched by growing
interest in the rest of the World, e-specially the so-called non-Western
areas, which were neglected before the Second World War. The tech-
nical revolutions in communication and in transportation, the growing
appreciation by Americans of the position their country occupies in.
international affairs, and the general shrinking of the world have all
contributed to an increase of research and instruction in areas as
different as the Soviet Union and Africa. This revolution in our view
of the rest of the World has been especially reflected in the increased
emphasis devoted by the American educational system to the Soviet
Union, largely because of the growth and outward thrust of Soviet
power. As a consequence, thousands of Americans have learned Rus-
sian, have become interested in Russian history, literature and govern-
ment, and have sought to analyze -fviet power and policy. Inevitably,
just as American libraries have increased their resources to enable all
to study the newly-discovered universe, so American universities have
attempted to enable those intere, 1.ed in the Soviet Union to study
there. This effort to encourage study within the Soviet Union has
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
2 INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION
directly involved American universities and scholars in official ex-
change programs with the Soviet government and has therefore
created both problems and dilemmas.
l`articipatiou by American universities in formal exchange pro-
rmrarns with a country as ideologically and politically different from
otus as the Soviet Union is only one of the Ways through which they
IIave developed close relationships with agencies of our own govern-
sent and with other governments as well. This position of the uni-
vrt:sitirs is, of course, not new, because the state universities in par-
ticular. and American colleges and universities in general, have never
-wparateel themselves from the concerns of the people and their gov-
criuuent at the local, state, and national level. However, the ties with
our national government in particular have changed since the Second
World War to such a degree that a quiet revolution has taken place,
and few American universities dealt with even friendly foreign gov-
erunients before the Second World War. In recent years, most Amer-
ican uutivorsities have done extensive work overseas through organi-
zations such as AID, largely to help universities and other educational
organizations in underdeveloped countries. They have also helped to
train young men and women for work in organizations such as the
Peace Corps, and many of our large universities have as many as a
thousand foreign students on campus, many on grants from their
governments or from the American govertunent. Scientists oil cam-
piises throughout the United States have undertaken research projects
for agencies such as the Atomic Energy Commission, NASA, tai the
National Institutes of Health. Many institutions maintain study
centers or student centers abroad, and Horny have direct exchange
relationships with colleges-and universities in other parts of the world.
In short. the role of the American university within our society and
the relationships the university has with other pare of the world have
both changed rapidly. The participation of American universities and
their scholars in academic exchanges with countries like the Soviet
t'nion fits into this framework, one in which the university serves its
own purposes and at the- same time participates in international ac-
tivities which directly involve the national interest. The university's
role in cultural exchanges with countries like the Soviet Union is
simply more complicated and more difficult thtun the other kinds of
Work for or with governments in Which many educational institutions
are now engaged.
The phrase "cultural exchanges" is difficult- to define. It means "an
exchange of accumulated knowledge and methods which forms the
present outlook of mankind nand reflects best on the problems of the
past. the present, and the future." Ordinarily, of course, scholars and
'indent, travel freely without any concept or framework of reciprocal
!_riving and receiving, with an American scholar going to an institution
in France about as easily as he would to one in this country, and with a
French scholar coming to the United States or going to Japan with no
special formalities or difficulties and with neither government- involved
or even informed.
Research for foreigners in the Soviet Union, however, is quite a
different matter, because opportunities for Americans to study there,
or for Soviet scholars to continue their work in the United States are
possible, at Soviet insistence, only as print of an official cultural ex-
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 BOO364ROOO1OO23OOO1-1
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 3
change agreement negotiated between the two governments. Under
this agreement, specified numbers of artists, dancers, bands, athletes,
delegations of specified types, movies, special publications (such as
Amerika), and exhibitions are exchanged between the two countries,
who also agree on specific forms of scientific cooperation and on partic-
ipation in congresses held in the two countries. The number of men
and women involved in these exchanges is small, only a few hundred
each way each year, and the number of dollars or rubles involved also
is not large. (In fact, the total cost [including actual cost of instruction
for Soviet graduate students and scholars in American universities]
of all the academic exchange programs with the Soviet Union since
1958 probably does not exceed $20,000,000.) However, the importance
of these developments for the scholars and the universities, and for
the national interest, far outweighs their apparent significance in
numbers and in funds.
The fall of 1969 provides an especially appropriate time to review
exchanges of scholars with the Soviet Union because American uni-
versities have just completed their first decade of such exchanges and
because ominous repression in the Soviet Union and the uneasy situa-
tion in Czechoslovakia and in Eastern Europe may raise questions
in the near future about whether and how these relations can be
continued.
Moreover, in the summer of 1969, the Inter-University Committee,
a private organization founded by seven universities in 1956 which
grew to fifty-five institutions in 1969, presented its responsibilities for
exchanges with the Soviet Union and some of the countries in Eastern
Europe to a new organization, the International Research and
Exchanges Board, which also assumed authority for the Ford Founda-
tion programs in Eastern Euro pe and for the small American Council
of Learned Societies senior scholar exchange programs. The experience
of the Inter-University Committee provides a fine opportunity for
review, since the Committee was the earliest, the largest, and most
important private organization involved in academic exchanges with
any Communist country. Financed originally by the Carnegie Corpo-
ration and then supported in approximately equal parts by the Ford
Foundation, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the
Department of State, and the participating universities themselves,
the Committee has helped to bring about an extraordinary improve-
ment and expansion in American research and instruction concerning
the Soviet Union, which was precisely its goal. Moreover, the experi-
ences which the Committee enjoyed were not notably different from
those of other private organizations, such as the American Friends
Service Committee, semi-public organizations, such as the National
Academy of Sciences, or government agencies, such as the Public
Health Service and the Atomic Energy Commission.
The year 1969 is an a pro priate time for a review also because we
have apparently reached a plateau in our exchanges with the Soviet
Union and some of the countries of Communist Europe, after a peak of
interest in 1963 and 1964. In fact, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in
August 1968, which crushed high hopes for expanding exchanges with
that country and with some of the other countries of Eastern Europe,
may instead mark a sharp demarcation of possibilities for peaceful
exchanges of all kinds with the Soviet Union and its associated states.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 BOO364ROOO1OO23OOO1-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
At the same time, while no one can estimate the time or the cir-
cumstances, we will certainly one day establish exchanges of scholars
With Mainland China. Official Chinese suspicion and hostility towards
the United States are similar to those in the Soviet Union, so the cir-
rurnstanc:es under which any exchange program will be established
and conducted will probably resemble those which have prevailed in
the last few years. However, Chinese history and tradition, and Chinese
interests, are somewhat different from those of the Soviet Union, and
Attericatt attitudes are even more confused, so some differences in the
attitudes and arrangements on both sides will surely appear. In any
case, those in the universities and in government who will be respon-
sible for cultural exchanges with Mainland China can clearly benefit
substantially from analysis of the principles and problems involved in
our exchanges with the Soviet Union.
Finally, our review of exchanges of scholars with the Soviet Union
should illuminate the relationships between the two countries during
n 'cry critical and dangerous period because the exchange is both a
model and as symbol of the difficulties we have in dealing with each
tither. it helps to explain some of the criticism from the New Left of
the universities for their relaationship, or even partnership, with the
,,overnnaent, in Washington. It also helps illuminate the curiou, drift
towards isolationism which has been at prominent feature of the last
few years of our political life, its the American people have shown
increasing resentment over the war in Viet \anm and increasing
weariness over the lone burden of high taaxation, as-istancc 'o foreign
ctiuntrie:s. and constant international tension.
holars and Their Universities
_ nierican universities and their scholars would naturally prefer
that those interested in continuing their study in the Soviet Union be
:as free to travel there as they are to France or Mexico, just as they
'.could prefer that Soviet scholars be able freely to come to this country.
In fact. during the 1930's, a small number of men, including John
Curtiss. John Hazard, Calvin Hoover, Philip'Mosely, G. T. Robinson,
:anti Ernest J. Simmons. were able to study in this way in the Soviet
t`nion. Indeed. the inability of our scholars to continue their work in
the Soviet. Union as they did thirty years ago under Stalin is one
evidence of an increase in restrictions, and in isolation, introduced
there since even the grim 1030's. Because of Soviet insistence, the
only 'Way in width Soviet and American scholars can study in the
ether country is tinder a formal exchange agreement, the first of which
was signed oft January 27. 195S, and others of which have been si ned
in saaceeeding years after increasingly prolonged negotiation-. Cot1-
settuently. while these agreements cba provide some protection or
security for Americans studying in the, Soviet Union, they are directly
responsible for bringing Atuerican universities into close relations with
their own government and with the Soviet government its well.
Our academic institutions and their scholars have agreed to par-
ticipate in the exchange agreement. because of the significant ad-
vantages they offer, the primary one, of course, the opportunity for
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 5
American scholars to increase their knowledge and understanding
of Russia. In 1956, the United States had less than ten scholars who
had spent an appreciable period of time in the Soviet Union. In
1969, while many scholars whose professional interest is the Soviet
Union have not visited that country, approximately a thousand
have spent from a month to two years studying in the country in
which they are professionally interested. We have not yet produced
a de Toequeville, but our research and instruction have improved
considerably because of the opportunities our scholars have had to
work in Soviet libraries, to become acquainted with Soviet students
and scholars, and to get some taste of the spirit and quality of Soviet
society. In fact, the exchange program is now far less important
to the American academic community than it was in 1958, a fact
which should be made clear to the Soviet authorities.
This improved understanding of the Soviet Union has been spread
throughout American society through teaching and publications,
which have contributed an increasingly realistic appraisal of Soviet life
and Soviet policy, one quite remote. from that produced by the glories
of Russian literature of the nineteenth century or by the extraordinary
heroism of the Soviet soldier and Soviet citizen during the Second
World War. Those who have studied in Itussia have a confidence about
their work from having seen and felt the element about which they
teach. In the universities in particular, they have also participated in
educating many of those who constitute the core of our specialists on
the Soviet Union in the various branches of our government. When one
considers that the military intelligence staff concerned with Russia in
the summer of 1939 consisted of a colonel and a sergeant, neither of
whom knew Russian and both of whom relied substantially upon the
American press for information, one can appreciate the progress made.
A subsidiary benefit has been an increased understanding of Ameri-
can history, tradition, values, and shortcomings. This improved
understanding of other cultures and of ourselves has helped American
universities to contribute more effectively to help educate minorities
who in the past have been denied equal opportunities. In sum, the
exchange programs have helped us to provide a new definition of a
liberal education and to widen educational opportunities here at home.
In an age afflicted by nationalism and by the dreadful. consequences
of a series of destructive wars, the exchange programs have also
helped American scholars to recognize the special obligations our
blessings have bestowed upon therm as citizens of the world and as
responsible members of a universal scholarly community. We are, in
short, beginning to see the universe as a whole, as did the middle ages,
when the foundations of the modern university were being laid and
when the traveling scholar was even more common than today. The
medieval scholar recognized and acted upon the conviction that all
share the same interests and have an obligation to work together.
Today, we have learned again that we have a special obligation to
assist scholars in other countries u-ho are living and working in less
comfortable and free circumstance:, than we, a most important truth
which the circumstances of our age could. easily smother. In fact, the
growing sense of responsibility among many of our scholars and the
treatment which American universities have provided Soviet scholars
in this country have constituted one of our glories.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
Study in the Soviet Union has contributed in still other ways to
changing American education. For example, the enthusiasm of our
returning scholars, those in fields such as history as well as those who
specialize in language teaching, for improving and expanding instruc-
tion in Russian has been one of the important factors in the foreign
language revolution which has swept the colleges and even the high
schools of the United States in the last, fifteen years. Similarly, study
of a society quite different in every way from ours has contributed to
the expansion of area programs designed to encourage the student
to study every aspect of a society, rather than just the history or the
literature. This development has been one of the most important
forces weakening the departmental boundaries which have tradi-
tionally separated scholars in universities. It has therefore contributed
to a new, more wholesome approach towards the nature of knowledge
and the field of study. In short, the openness, the excitement, and the
quality of those involved in Russian studies have helped to change the
nature and character of the university and to increase its involvement
in world affairs.
At the same time, the organizational arrangements which American
universities made to help resolve the problems which the exchange
programs created have helped improve relationships among scholars
and among universities. In short, bringing a dumber of universities
together in a delicate and difficult task, with the institutions assigning
administrative responsibility to one university and with the various
tasks assumed by committees of scholars from many universities in
different parts of the country, has helped to create new patterns of
cooperation among American institutions of higher education. This
has aided in breaking down the barrier which have separated Amer-
ican universities from one another and which had Client so conscious
of their sovereignty that. they were self-isolated in ivory towers in an
Anglo-Saxon world. Since the educational revolution has placed heavy
strains upon even our resources and since American universities must
learn to cooperate more, both within the United States and abroad,
the experiences of this exchange program have been of considerable
significance, affecting the development of joint programs towards
improving libraries, administering overseas centers, and selecting and
educating scholars and students from foreign countries.
American scholars who have, participated in the exchange program
have also increased their understanding of the Soviet sy.Lem and of
Soviet, foreign policy, whether their main concern has been linguistics
or history or government. A happy consequence of this knowledge
and understanding of Soviet totalitarianism is the growing apprecia-
tioti among specialists of the problems which the Department of State
faces in dealing with the Soviet Union. This may in fact be one of
the most important national benefits from the exchange program,
because it has reduced the likelihood that unknowwing scholars, oper-
ating only oil what they read and ty=pical of American "transc.endell tal
populism" and of American suspicion of our own government, would
heavily criticize officials engaged in negotiations with the Soviet
gove itcnent in circumstances which scholars who had not left the
library or the "Intourist world" could not understand.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 7
The National Interest
From the point of view of the American government and of the
American public, perhaps the greatest contribution of the academic
exchange programs has been their success in maintaining a tie with a
group of important Soviet citizens at a time of high tension and
great hazard. In fact, the great paradox of the exchange programs
has been that the universities and the scholars, by seeking primarily
to advance knowledge and their own special interests, have in fact
served the national interest supremely well by the effectiveness with
which they have maintained this narrow bridge between the two
countries. This opportunity for dialogue reinforces the tendency
within the higher levels of the Soviet government towards peaceful
relations with the United States and provides whatever influence we
have "towards rationality, permissiveness, and openness." One
should not overestimate the impact of programs such as this, but
they do constitute a positive addition to the containment policy.
They do to some degree soften the Soviet Union by opening a window
in that closed society to the rest of the world. They do persuade the
Soviet government to engage in relationships with the United States
on peaceful grounds under conditions which are of mutual advantage,
a practice which is regularly condemned in the Soviet Union as
"ideological coexistence."
The academic exchange programs also contribute to the national
interest by increasing Soviet understanding of the United States. The
handful of Americans who live in Soviet dormitories and who come
to know well Soviet scholars and Soviet students, the future elite
of their society, inevitably provide them some understanding of the
quality and of the friendliness of our society. Similarly, those Soviet
scholars who work in the United States must acquire an increased
understanding of the nature of cur society and must have the Marxist-
Leninist glasses with which they view the rest of the world to some
degree cleaned. In fact, in 1964, seven Soviet alumni of the program
who had each spent an academic year in an American university were
serving their government in the United States, in their embassies in
Washington or at the United Nations or in organizations such as
TASS. This will in the long run contribute to reducing misunderstand-
ing and fears on both sides and will help the Soviet elite to see more
clearly the wider one world in which we all live. In fact, as Mr.
Toynbee long ago recognized, the Soviet Union may now be learning
that it is impossible to borrow Western efficiency without borrowing
Western values, that it is impossible to import only a part of the West.
Finally, the exchange program provides a, kind of index or barometer
of the atmosphere in which Soviet decisions are made. Identifying or
defining Soviet policies and the considerations underlying these posi-
tions is a difficult task complicated by lack of information and the
problems we face in penetrating the Soviet mind. The exchange
program, one of the few direct, constant, measurable ties we have with
the Soviet government, therefore serves as an effective touchstone of
larger Soviet policies. Thus, recent, increased harassment of American
scholars by the Soviet KGB reveals a change in the temperature or
atmosphere within which all Soviet policies are decided. Moreover,
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
S I TERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION
the established history and the symbolic importance , of the exchanges
are such t.lint it Soviet decision to reduce them sharply or end them
would constitute it most. important signal about basic Soviet goads and
policies.
Tarr; PROBLEMS, AND DILEMMAS
Like any complicated new program, the aacademic exchange is an
expensive one in the time and intellectual energy of scholars and
udaninistaatoas it consumes. Soviet nclminisiraative rigidity and
etficienr v are so vast, and Soviet ability to create and to magnify
problems so great I lint the exchange programs probably devour more
administrative tittae and energy per individual involved than any
other academic enterprise in which an American university has ever
ennnged. Oniv intense interest and resolute good will have triumphed
over these Soviet quaalit.ies, which are apparently eternal and which
deserve ai new Gogol.
Great universities have been especially hampered because they are
not properly organized to identify their own interests in such it pro-
grain or to work effectively with other universities in ra national
organization. Thus, it is ease to identify the specialists in Russian
history or literature or government who should be encouraged to
study in the Soviet Union, but few universities have recognized the
other fields of study which would offer benefits for Americans.
However, the unitiersity's principal problem has clearly been its
transformation into an art ion :agency. and the main dilemma is it simple
one. Should the university accept: it share of responsibility for
t'xchaumge, of scholars with (orimiuuist countries taaad in so doing deft-nd
it, integrity as a free institution, while art- the same time developing
elose relations with agencies of our own government and of the foreign
2ovt'rnrnent. and exposing itself to domestic and foreign criticism and
to the whim, of international politics". Or should it instead allow our
tttveranuent to conduct the programs, with the great likelihood that
inroads npou the aurivet`sity's integrity % ould occur? Or should the
uuit-vi:sity declare that the problems are so complicated and so alien
to its experience that it should not participate in a any way?
']'he university's decision to accept responsibility has helped break
down and destroy the ivory tower and bring it into the middle of
public life, and even into international politics, positions which the
university and scholar have not sought and which it is hazardous for
thorn to share. Work for the Peace Corps, for AID, and for other
government agencies, and especially programs involving foreign
?rovernmeaats, has drastically changed the nature and character of
the relationship between the university mad the government. Thus
far, the principles and procedures established have recognized the
,pecial role free universities must a1 vmi.ys play, and the main hazards
have been avoided. Moreover. everyone agrees, first, that the nrai-
a ea,ity today cannot be removed front the society in which it functions
vivid which it, serves, and, second. that the university in a free country
roust remain true to its primary educational goats if it is to serve
ociety effectively and remain truly independent.
In the exchange programs, for example, even though the university
often plays an important political role in at front- line capacity, it. must
at a II tunes remain a privileged sanctuary of freedom. Our educational
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 9
institutions are free and independent, suspicious of government, and
accustomed to their own ways in their assigned areas of responsibility.
They must remain sovereign, conduct their work of research and in-
struction as they see best, and have a large share in the direction of
cultural relations, in which they have always had an abiding interest.
In brief, "political warfare" use of the universities and of the arts
is useless and in the long run destructive, even though universities,
artists, and scientists operating independently, doing their own work
in their own best way, do have a very powerful impact.
Relations between the Department of State and the universities
have been remarkably effective and amicable because the men and
women involved have so well understood the others' purposes, quali-
ties, and problems. However, tension between American universities
and the Department of State over exchange programs is natural,
because the State Department has the primary responsibility for
critical, delicate, and highly involved relations with the Soviet Union,
which cannot be separated from relations with our allies and with other
countries in the world. Moreover, while the universities are interested
basically in only a small part of the cultural affairs agreement with the
Soviet Union, the Department of State has responsibility for the
entire agreement, which it naturally sees as a whole and which it
wishes to administer in a, coherent and coordinated way, keeping in
mind our total foreign policy towards the Soviet Union and with other
countries as well.
The particular issues of disagreement are obvious and will continue.
Thus, the Department controls admission to the United States and
has on occasion denied visas to Soviet scholars nominated in fields
which have military significance, such as microelectronics or new types
of computers, or in subjects in which the Soviet Union has refused to
accept American scholars. In addition, in retaliation for travel restric
tions imposed on all Americans in the Soviet Union, Soviet participants
in the United States must inform the Department of State of intended
travel four days before they can leave their home campus. In cases
such as this, American scholars who are not informed concerning
Soviet policies or concerning the larger framework in which the
academic exchange resides, or who have a special personal interest in
one person or one aspect of the program, frequently denounce the
Department for policies Which seem to them petty or senseless.
The Department of State is also vulnerable to domestic political
pressures and critics, some of whom denounce the Department because
"the Soviets send scientists to work on important problems in
American laboratories while we send scholars to work in ancient
Russian history in Soviet libraries." Some Americans and their
representatives believe that the programs should be curtailed or
abolished because they are convinced that the Soviet Union obtains a
significantly greater advantage from them than we do. Others on
occasion believe we can and sh.orrld. send ten thousand each year,
bringing the walls of Moscow down by turning pages. The State
Department, in short, is constantly vulnerable to critics and serves as a
perpetual target for all Americans, some of whom have some influence
on the annual appropriations for the Department and therefore for
exchange programs. These pressures often cause disagreements be-
tween the Department and the universities, which resent any apparent
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
10 INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION '
Departmental Weakening before popular pressures and who resist
suggestions from the Department Which would help .satisfy the most
responsible of the public criticisms.
t'nfortunately, Lite Departn-cnt of State is not the only American
government agency with which universities engaged in academic ex-
change programs have to deal. Some of these government institutions,
such as the National Academy of Sciences and the Atomic Energy
t'oIrImission, have exchange programs of their otivn, which tire financed
by Lite government but which rely on American universities to provide
most. of the American participants and the laboratories and libraries
in Wlricla Soviet participants continue their studies. The AEC and the
NAS tend to be quite independent because they are within the govern-
ment, and because their programs involve scientists, iii whom the
Soviet. Union is particularly interested and for whom, therefore, it
vrecates more comfortable arrangements and fewer problems than it
does for scholars in the ordinary academic exchange program.
however, thes!n a,i In I I1i Agency and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation have raised greater pro ems for the American uni-
veisities and their constituents, who tend to be critical of much of
the government but especially critical of these two organizations.
I'fac~,`j11 and the FBI, which have important national responsibilities,
are interested in information concerning Soviet strengths and weak-
nesses, policies and practices. On the Soviet side, officials of the KGB
almost, inevitably evaluate all academic exchange programs with the
Soviet Union in this context and, above all, in the perspective of their
eternal suspicions and of their own extensive efforts. In fact, the
universities' emphasis upon selecting young men and women of high
intellectual quality with good coiUimand of Itussian, considerable
knowledge of the Soviet Union, and great interest in learning about
Soviet society has no doubt increased Soviet suspicion.
The American scholarly organizations engaged in exchanges with
the Soviet Union have done their utmost to insure that, their programs
provide no grounds for suspicion, but they are essentially powerless to
affect Lite Soviet attitude. These organizations, such as the Inter-
I Iniversit:y Committee and the International Research and Exchanges
Board, are interested exclusively in scholarly activities. They have no
ties With the Centro'] Tnt.pflit1PnceAgeney or any other intelligence
organization. They receive no funds from any intelligence organization,
and they provide them no information. The Jitter-University Commit-
tee in addition warned every candidate for study in the Soviet Union
not only to reject any approaches that might be made by intelligence
or other government agencies, but to report any, such incidents should
they occur. Finally, every participant. in the Committee's exchange
program signed a pledge that he would undertake no activity other
than the scraolau?Iv ones for which he was selected.
Even so, the existence and the activities of these government
ag=encies have created difficulties for the American universities in their
dealings with Lite ever-suspicious Soviet government. They have also
created problems within tae American academic community, in spite
of the efforts of the academic organizations and in spite of the genuine
care, discretion, and propriety with which these organizations have
carried out their activities.
Another kind of dilemma which the universities and all of those
concerned with the national interest. face reflects the advantages
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 11
which the Soviet government derives from academic exchange pro-
grams. In fact, it has been evident throughout the discussions and
bargaining over -cultural exchanges, that tough-minded Soviet diplo-
mats and officials have taken advantage of the abiding American
concern about the international crisis and of our efforts to persuade the
Soviet Union to adopt more peaceful policies. In short, they use our
efforts to launch and to maintain. these programs to obtain vast op-
portunities for themselves. American diplomats have sought not only
to advance our own national interests, but have also recognized legit-
imate Soviet objectives, because they perceived that any agreement
would have to provide benefits to both countries. However, above all,
they have sought to create an international framework and atmosphere
in which the two countries together could :reduce the tensions which
afflict us both. Basically, the Soviet leaders have taken advantage of
this spirit and approach and have concentrated on their own restricted
interests, while seeking to minimize our benefits and to prevent our
joint escape from the present hazardous situation into a new structure
and a new atmosphere. For every apparent step towards a freer world
and greater international amity, they have insisted upon a parochial
Soviet advantage which has not affected the commonweal, except in a
divisive way, and which has indeed exposed the Americans involved to
substantial criticism.
Here one must recognize that Soviet scholars, artists, and intellec-
tuals have almost no influence on Soviet policy or on Soviet adminis-
tration of exchange programs. These men and women share many of
our scholars' interests. They seek to increase their knowledge within
their own special field. They are eager to cooperate with other scholars.
They seek the recognition and respect of other members of the inter-
national community of scholars. Above all, they look forward to
opportunities to leave the Soviet Union, to go "out," for a few months
or a year.
Those of the Party and the government who make the decisions
are different people and have different goals. Basically, they seek to
strengthen the Soviet system and to weaken ours. Their primary
concern has been to obtain scientific, technical, and military informa-
tion from the United States. They have, in short, sought to use the
exchange programs to strengthen their economy and to obtain impor-
tant information and techniques from a more advanced country.
Almost eighty percent of the Soviet participants in the basic program
administered by the Inter-University Committee have been scientists
or engineers, while somewhat less than ten. percent of the Americans
have been in science or technology. Thus, the Soviet Union has
obtained a significant increment to its scientific and technical knowl-
edge from these programs, from basic knowledge concerning polio
vaccines to training in econometrics and new systems of business
management to the latest work in biochemistry.
In addition, the Soviet government has acquired a kind of respect-
ability both at home and abroad., especially among the large and
important class of intellectuals or intelligentsia, who have been per-
suaded in part by these programs that the Soviet Union is a peaceful
and responsible member of the family of nations. It also believes it
derives recognition, prestige, and propaganda advantages from the
presence of carefully selected Soviet scholars in American universities,
and the impact which life in the Soviet Union presumably has on
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
12 INTERNATIONAL 'NEGOTIATION
American scholars. Finally, it utilizes the exchange program to train
specialists on the United .States for work in various parts of the Soviet
-o vernnen t.
'I'lte difference hetween our goals mach tlae Soviet -oal,, is at the root
of our problems, but there are even more essential factors involved.
The principal one is the Soviet system, which differs in almost every
way from ours, particularly in its values and in its political organize-
tion. Recognizing and accepting this st'stvm in the atmosphere of the
IE1(O's apparently reflects the willingness of many Americans also to
accept Soviet control of Eastern Europe and the permanence of Cona-
ouunist control wherever it exists. In addition, we have difficulty-
dealing with the Soviet Union, because the economic and political
levels of the two countries are different., one an advanced industrial
soriety with it political and social democracy. and the other basically
an underdeveloped society under authoritarian rule, with a highly
developed military system. and motivated by suspicion and hostility
towards the rest of the world.
Relations with the Soviet government and with its controlled nni-
versities therefore create a series of problems for American inst it utions,
which are participating in formal, highly organized and even sanitized
exchange arrangements with it totalitarian government, which natu-
rally takes advantage of its negotiating position. One of the dangers
is (fat we accept this primitive system of barter its it permanent, prac-
tice. in violation of the wiry., in which we live and believe scholars
caught to work. Moreover, the constant compromises which we have
to make with the Soviet Union concerningthestatus of the participants,
fields of study, travel opportunities. and essentials of life may weary
the Americans responsible to the point that they will accept these
temporary compromises as permanent. In short. it will be very diffi-
cult in the long run for Americans to be firm towards the Soviet
government but gentle and humane towards the Soviet scholars. and
we may drift into a type of moral demobilization.
Another great hazard for American universities is the degree of
influence they surrender to the Soviet government over the direction of
American scholarship. Thus. the Soviet Ministry of Higher and
Specialized Education, and other Soviet officials, have denied the
opportmtity for study in the Soviet Union to Americans highly
cfatalified for study there, on the ground that thin subject, such as the
allocation of labor resources, is not one studied in Soviet universities,
or that political theory in the sixteenth century is a religious issue and
therefore unworthy of study, or that every thing important in Soviet
agricultural problems and policies had already been enunciated by
Khrushchev. whose speeches the interested American scholar could
examine in the United States. In other words, the Soviet Ministry has
denied admission to most Americans who wish to study the Soviet
economy, modern or recent history. Soviet politics, Soviet foreign
policy, and many scientific fields, w vile American universities through
1968 placed every Soviet scholar nominated in a field in which lie
could work in an American university and for which lie could obtain
at visat.
This Soviet practice has also led American scholars, who are
uiaiiily interested in seeing the Soviet Union, to, change their research
projects so that they might Obtain admission under conditions dictated
by the Soviet government. This has helped create an imbalance among
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 13
the fields of study within Am.erica.u universities which may become
permanent. Thus, we have sent eighty-three historians to study
Russian history, but no Americans have been admitted to analyze
Soviet foreign policy or the relations between the Party and the
government. The Soviet government has therefore been able to have
a profound influence in fields which are important to it and has suc-
ceeded at the same time in deflecting the direction of American
scholarship.
The Soviet government may also have some influence over Amer-
icans who have studied in the Soviet Union and who wish to return
to the country of their special professional interest as scholars in
Russian history, literature, or government. Soviet denials to some
scholars of the opportunity to return for further study because of
their publications or speeches can induce cautious behavior both
within the Soviet Union and. within the United States by American.
scholars. This may tend to restrict the freedoms of Americans, and
it will also assist the Soviet government to keep its scholars and other
intellectuals isolated and under control, which is one of its main
concerns.
Another serious problem has been what one American has called
the "eternal indecencies and inequitiez" of dealing with the Soviet
Union. American scholars in most programs are not allowed to bring
their children, which naturally reduces the number interested, and the
Soviet government even has a ouo;.a for the number of wives allowed
each year. Almost all of the Americans (295 of the first 300) who
went to the Soviet Union were placed in Moscow State and Leningrad
State Universities and were denied opportunities to study in research
institutes of the Academy of Sciences, while at the same time, Soviet
scholars have been placed in that American institution most qualified
to serve them, wherever in the United States that institution might be.
Thus, the great majority of American scholars have been restricted to
two universities, while Soviet scholars have worked in fifty-two
different American institutions.
In the largest and most. important, exchange program, that for
graduate students and young scholars, each American participant
has been treated as an aspirant stazhor, or probationary graduate
student, regardless of his qualifications, achievements, and age. He is
therefore directly subject to his So- iet professor and needs his approval
for his program, for access to libraries and archives, and for study
related travel. One associate professor from the University of California
who had already produced an excellent book was thus denied the right
to study in Leningrad State University and to work in the Leningrad
libraries on the ground that the Soviet specialist in that field in
Leningrad was too busy to direct his work.
American scholars also have great difficulties obtaining access to
archives, to living sources, and to some kinds of publications in Soviet
libraries, such as doctoral theses. At the some time, Soviet scholars
have the same access to information in this country that any American
scholar does. Americans are seriously restricted in their opportunities
to travel for study or study-related purposes from Moscow and Lenin-
grad, and they ordinarily travel only in groups and accompanied by
Soviet "guides," when they do travel. One young American spent
forty hours obtaining permission to go to Leningrad from Moscow to
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
14 INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION
work in Leningrad libraries.. even though the Soviet Ministry of Educa-
tion in admitting him to the Soviet Union had assured him of this
opportunity. At the same time, Soviet, scholars are allowed to travel
freely throughout the United States, although they do have to inform
the Department of State four days in advance of leaving their campus.
Life in the Soviet Union itself constitutes a kind of permanent
inequity, because of the living conditions, the frustrations, annoyances,
iraclignities, and inefficiency, the assessment of discriminatory prices
for inicrolilming research materials and for hotel rooms, the effort in
recent years to segregate Americans from Soviet scholars and students,
and the harassment to which Americans are subject.
American-, have come to consider the Soviet postal system as "the
opened mail" and to realize that diaries have official readers. They
are never certain who their Soviet friends are and which are invol-
untary informers or agents provocateurs. Some had close friends
regretfully discontinue relationships because the friends were fright-
ened by police interrogation, and all have learned never to mention
one Soviet friend to another. Some were followed frequently, par-
tirularly just before they left the Soviet Union or during trips, and
all of tlhetn. and their Soviet friends, came to believe that the rooms
in which they lived, which often were rooms in which other Americans
!rail lived in previous years, had listening devices installed in the
walls, and that their telephone conversations were monitored. Many
became Justifiably suspicious of officials in the university foreign
study offices, some of whom they crime to know had responsibilities
it) tire. KGB. the Soviet Secret Police, as well as to the university.
in addition, it small percentage of the American participants had
direct and unpleasant experiences with the KGB. Seven were ex-
pelled from the Soviet, Union, so far as we can determine Without
ague find also without consultation or advance notice to the par-
r icipant's Anierican university or to the Committee. Eighteen left
early because of fear caused by Secret Police interest in their work
or were urged to leave by the American Embassy because KGB
interest in them had been so visibly expressed. More than twenty
tither participants in our major program have been criticized crudely,
viciously. and without foundation in the Soviet press as spies or
"ideological saboteurs."
There is no dignified or proper response to these Soviet policies and
practices, which create it serious dilemma and which have been ac-
c, later! in part because they do educate American scholars concerning
the nature of the Soviet system. All of the Soviet actions have been
annoying and irritating, and some of them have been hazardous.
I lr,wever. they have all been spaced in time and in quality in such a
way that neither the American universities nor the Department of
State considered that- the threshold poin6 had been passed.
'I'll(, responsible Soviet officials who have decided that the Soviet
union -should participate in exchange programs with the United
`Mates and who have determined to continue them are thoroughly
aware of rho advantages wo obtain and of the challenges which
exchange programs pose for them. They obviously recognize the sig-
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
INTERNATIONAI. NEGOTIATION 15
nificant advantages which accrue to the Soviet Union, and they must
believe that these advantages outweigh those we gain and the hazards
to them. At the same time, there is an eternal "great debate" within
the Soviet ruling group about the utility and wisdom of continuing
academic exchanges. In this discussion, clearly those who decide have
concluded that the benefits to the Soviet Union justify the risks
taken; they would otherwise have ended the exchange program.
However, this discussion continues on almost a daily basis, the
"score" changes often, and those who favor exchanges may not always
triumph and may not control actions taken at every policy level.
The main problem for the Soviet leadership is the challenge this
new "window to the West" poses for the Soviet political system,
especially the Communist emphasis on a political monopoly, on abso-
lute control, and on carefully monitored relationships with other parts
of the world. This system rests not only on Communist suspicion of
others, but also on the suspicion which'is a traditional and even in-
herent part of the Russian view of the rest of the world. The police
and other members of the ruling class have become increasingly fearful.
of Soviet intellectuals and of West ern influences upon them. Indeed,
the Soviet rulers apparently believe the greatest internal threat to
their system is from the intelligentsia and those most highly trained.
They seem to agree with Louis XlV that "nations touch only at the
top" and that outside influences, which can penetrate the Soviet
system best at its upper level, must be contained and destroyed. They
aiie convinced that "we are betrayed by what is false within." The
government now headed by Brezhnev and Kosygin very much re-_
sembles that of Nicholas I in the suspicion with which it views all
peoples, including its own, and in the "plot mentality" which corrodes
its approach towards everyone, native or foreign, in the Soviet Union.
These beliefs and Soviet "ideological sensitivity" are reflected in
the constant vigilance campaigns and in press attacks upon Soviet
intellectuals, especially writers, for their alleged vulnerability to
foreign ideas and influence. The Communist political system and
philosophy, and the. suspicion with which they view even the most
loyal servitors-and the Soviet intellectuals are by and large loyal-
therefore help explain the Soviet dilemma and resultant Soviet
policies. The presence of Americans and other foreigners in Soviet
universities, where the future elite are being trained; the published
materials which they bring with them and on occasion share with
their Soviet fellows; the conversations they have in their dormitories
and in class; everything which Americans and others do in the Soviet
Union is considered a threat. As one American expressed it: "We are
propaganda, simply because of our presence here." In short, the very
nature of the exchange program raises very difficult problems for
the Soviet Union and places it on the horns of a fearful and continual
dilemma. To obtain gains which it thinks important, even crucial,
it must risk contamination of its intellectual elite and of the ideologi-
cal future of the country. To obtain the advantages it seeks in the
West, it must open up the Soviet Union to some degree to foreign
scholars. To obtain scientific and technical and military information,
and some political advantages, it must expose itself to criticism from
Chinese Communists and at the same time to tolerate similar policies
from the East European governments, which are even more interested
than the Soviet Union in exchanges with the United States. In sum-
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
16 INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONT
nary, just- as the Department of State and the universities ever ponder
the wisdom of continuing to endure the inequities and hazards created
by the Soviet govermment, so the Soviet rulers constantly discuss
the balance between the advantages they acquire and the "infections"
which may constitute the price.
Most of the adt anta;,res and the disadvtuitages academic exchanges
provide are clear, but perhaps some of the achievements of the past
twelve or fifteen years should be emphasized because they are not
visible. One important accomplishment. is the simple survival of pro-
grauis between two suspicious and hostile states, through a series of
international crises, at a time when failure, cancellation, or a breach
of one kind or another might have produced it great crisis. American
iaastit utiolis involved have demonstrated great skill and wisdom in the
election of mature and able young men and women and have ignored
t lie occasional dramatic. calls for sending massive numbers. The
universities have retained their responsibility and control in it pro-
gratah which must be of. by. and for the universities if it is to be
,neces_s!ul and if they are Co survive as free institutions. Thev haave
honored themselves and their traditions in the way* in which they have
treated all Soviet scholars on their campuses. At the same time. they
have successfully avoided art taint of relationship with the Cent sal
litt_ll or any other intelligence organization, they have
skillfully avoided taking direct part in political warfare between tine
rh%o countries, and they have escaped such Iragie affairs it, that of
`arttelot. The Departihtent of State has shown the same degree of
wisdom, restraint. and skill iii its work with the universities and
.,chobirs, who are acutely sensitive concerning their rights find re,spun-
,ihilit.ies. and with the Soviet Mini_,try of Foreign Affairs and of-her
Soy let government agencies, which have been vigorous and deniand-
tuuz iii pursuit of what they consider Soviet interests.
At- the same time, the exchange programs in ninny ways hay a been
a failure. We are following die principles and working within the
franttenork established in 1958 and are now more than ever committed
to a program which is Lite antithesis of the way in which Americans
believe research in other countries should be arranged. Soviet scholars
:utd other Soviet citizens are no more free to obtain Aiiierican and
other Western publications than they were when the exchanges began.
Ill fact, we have made no prog ?ess towards the hopes which Ainba,-
saalor Lacy expressed in 1947 for "removing, barriers currently ob-
st rnrtiug the free flow of information tabu idea," and providing benefit
to hot.h people -of free discussion, criticism, awl debate lilt the vital
issues of the day." We have not succeeded in exchanging teachers,
eveu teachers of language-; there are no joint research projects, even
fill subjects of common, concern, such i-, air poollution: the exchange of
radio and television programs is extremely limited and directly con-
[rolled by the Soviet government, and all American proposals for
espunding the exchange program even iii the present framework, such
it, through summer study and summer seminars, have been bratsduely
rejected by the Soviet government-. Indeed, the programs in progress
in 1969- 1970 are just half as large its those the American universities
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 17
anticipated when they made their budget estimates for 1065-1970 in
the spring of 1964.
In short, there has been more continuity than change in Soviet
policy and practice. The stone wall of the closed society still exists,
even though the powerful magnet of Western ideas and Western
progress still attracts, perhaps more strongly than ever, the Soviet
intellectuals still isolated behind those barriers.
Even so, the exchanges on balance have been an advantage to us,
and we should continue them. In fact, both we and the Soviet Union
have little choice but to continue, because ending them now would
be such a dreadful blow at a time of high crisis. They constitute,
in fact, a valuable opportunity to continue to work with the Soviet
government and to reach Soviet citizens. We should rejoice over this
opportunity, particularly because the exchange involves ideas and
information, and therefore a kind. of competition with the Soviet
Union on grounds congenial or favorable to us in areas where freedom
has given us great advantages it, cultural vitality.
However, we should also appreciate the new and to some degree
dangerous role the American university and scholars now occupy.
For those who believe that the work of the college should be "rele-
vant," American educational institutions in this case at least have
placed themselves on the firing line. This shift places a very heavy
responsibility on the universities and on all those who wish them to
accept such a role.
The experience of the past fifteen years suggests that the American
universities and the American government together have identified the
correct principles for administering scholarly exchange programs with
governments which have different ideologies and philosophies. Ad-
ministrators and scholars in particular must ensure that universities
remain centers of free inquiry; that they maintain the clear distinction
between scholarship and political warfare and espionage; and that
they be eternally vigilant in their relations with our government and
with other governments as well. Above all, they should insist that our
scholars are treated with the decency and dignity all men and women
deserve, especially when they are guests in another country. We can
achieve no great purpose by tolerating procedures which undermine the
principles for which we stand.
Moreover, the role of the university, and of the scholars, scientists
and. artists, should be preeminent in those fields in which they have
particular concern and responsibility; academic quality should be the
primary factor in the selection process; the Americans selected for
study in a Communist country should be men and women of maturity
and stability; the selection process should be on a national basis, with
recognized and competent scholars making the decisions and with
scholars and graduate students in all fields of knowledge encouraged
to participate.
At the same time, we have learned that academic exchange programs
of this kind require the reorganization of individual universities and
increased cooperative efforts among educational institutions. Uni-
versity administrators and scholars must maintain a high degree of
sophistication if programs like this are to be successful. We must pay
more attention to educating the American public concerning the sig-
nificance of academic exchanges and the problems which they in-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
IS INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION
evitably raise, if the public is to understand them and provide the
necessary support in the long future.
Above all, we should have learned that the universities, the other
scholarly organizations involved, and the government should work
together to create a new kind of organization of public and private
institutions, including the foundations, to coordinate the work in-
volved. Our resources for exchange programs with Communist
countries are too scarce to allow us to continue in a kind of free-fur-all,
highly competitive, and dangerous basis. Ideally, this "American
('ocuicil" should be a semi-public organization, with the Board of
Directors composed of private citizens nominated by the President
and approved by the Senate, and with funds contributed in part by the
federal government. and in part by private organizations, such as
foundations, universities, business and labor groups, and organizations
especially interested in the arts and sciences. It should possess full
authority for all cultural exchange programs with all countries ruled
by Communists, and it should speak for the universities and other
cultural organizations in its dealings with the Department of State and
rith foreign governments.
if it should prove impossible to establish such an organization--and
recent unsuccessful efforts have identified a number of compliecitions--
the organizations involved in and responsible for such exchange pro-
grains should at least form a loose federal organization to pool infor-
ination, to consult concerning plans and programs, and to coordinate
activities. After they have learned to cooperate and to work together,
they should consider combining their operations and then coordinating
American programs with those of other countries in an open way so
as to persuade the Soviet Union that no conspiracy was beig directed
against it.
Such an organization and such a program should reduce the invisible
costs which academic exchanges involve, eliminate some of the friction
and tension among American organizations, and reflect the pluralistic
approach which Americans traditionally adopt. At the same tinge,
they should guarantee the necessary political sensitivity. Such an
organization should also serve as a shock absorber, on one side for
the universities, and on the other side for the federal government,
reducing the pressures to which both are now subject.
The long term goal of everyone involved in academic exchanges
with the Soviet Union and with other Communist countries should
remain, of course, the free movement of people and materials. In
fact, the new coordinating organization should be established with
the expressed hope and goal that it wither away when free movement
becomes possible.
China has isolated itself, and has in general been isolated from, the
rest of the world for the twenty years during which Communists have
had control over that enormous country. This isolation will end one
clay, with new problems and new opportunities for the Chinese and
for the rest of the world. Clearly, American scholars and American
government officials should begin to phin now for that day, benefiting
from the experiences provided by our exchanges with the Soviet
Union. In particular, we should recognize that the first steps will be
decisive, as they have been in our arrangements with the Soviet
Union, because they will establish the structure, principles, and
procedures which Communist rulers will be most reluctant to change.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 19
We should, therefore, seek to ensure that all institutions and all
fields of study be open to scholars of both countries, and that the entire
area of both countries should be freely accessible. We should seek
equity, not reciprocity. We should insist upon, or ,it least always
retain the opportunity for, arrangements for exchanges of all kinds,
short and long-term, of specialists and of teachers, of senior scholars
and of graduate students. We should guarantee that scholars from
both countries receive appropriate status and recognition, possess
the right for study-related travel, and have the same access to research
materials in libraries and laboratories as do natives. Finally, we
should ensure that the academic exchanges not be restricted to men
and women; the free flow of published materials between the two
countries should be an integral part of the agreement.
The nature of the world in which the Americans, the Chinese, and
the Russians live suggests that relations among these states and their
peoples will remain delicate and hazardous. We shall no doubt remain
locked in a shrinking world, suspicious of and hostile towards each
other, unable on one hand to conquer or overthrow the other but
equally unable to disengage and flee into some kind of armed security.
Cultural relations in this situation will remain of considerable im-
portance, but can never be decisive. In such a position, we in the
United States should maintain our economic, political, and spiritual
vitality and our military strength, cooperate with other peoples who
share our general goals and who are committed to peaceful progress,
and continue to demonstrate that we are as resolute as in 1776 or in
1942 to defend our interests. At the same time, we should try further
to define and understand the nature of the political and economic
systems with which we are engaged, to persuade them of our goals and
of the kind of world we seek, and to make effective use of cultural
exchange, of trade, and of other peaceful instruments to bring these
goals within reach.
The situation we face is very much like the Eastern Question,
devilishly complicated, deeply rooted in the past, involving numbers
of peoples, and beyond easy or quick solution. Intellect and strength,
grace and perseverance will both be required and expected of us.
Scholarly exchanges in these circuiastanees provide us an opportunity
to use some of our enduring strengths to assist our rivals and ourselves
together to make a step towards peace.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 (b)(3)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000119MGM1-1 1)(5)
FOIA
Next 14 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
:J, k. I J uZ 69 :i 0 iii A N i A
KA^tUShEV ACTTINYTIES IN i 0BANIA REPORTED
Katushev-Ceausescu ?ee'ring
Bucharest AGERPttES International Service in English 1900 CMT 9 Aug 69 L
[Text) Bucharest AGERFRES 9 August 1969--Nieclae Ceausescu, general secretary
of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist 'arty,/, received in the afternoon
of August 9 K. F. Katushev, secretary of Central Co:ntittce of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union, leader of the delegation of the Comurunist Party of the Soviet
Union that participates in the proceedings of the 10th congress of the Romanian
Communist Party. The talk held during the interview proceed in-.a warm, comradely
atmosphere.
Bucharest AGERPRES Iriternatlonal Service in English 1903 GMT 9 Aug 69 L
[Excerpt] Bucharest AGERPRES 9 Aug 969--0n August 9, the delegation of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union led by K. ..::Katushev, secretary of the CC..
of the CPSU, visited the resorts on the Romania: 311-.e -Sea shore where they
thm of construction,
y
were informed about the development of these local1 ies, the r'p
and the prospects of the Littoral as an important tourist base of Romania.
Machine-Tool Works VS.sit
Bucharest AGERPRES international Service in English 201,15 GMT 8 Aug 69 L
[Text] Bucharest, AGERPRES. 8 Aug 69. In the mo;;ing of August 8, the delegation
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Unicr, lea by K. F. "i{acushev, secretary of
the CC of the CPSU, now attending the 110th corLresv or the Romanian Communist
Party, paid a visit to the machinem,tool and aggrag,.."te works in Bucharest., The
,members of the delegation were accompanied by Eng ",:sajot Almasan, member of the. CC
of - the RCP, and by Dimitru Lazar, deputy heat. of :ye=n tion at the -CC of the RCP.
During their visit, the guests conversed with "ae'Yus itoraers. The members of the
delegation had a meeting with the workers of t-( Mice. Greeting the guests,
Nicol.ae Popa, secretary of the party co,-?mitts. uhe works briefly outlined the
achievements of the works.
"For us"--he said--"that is an opportunity tr.o note with satisfaction that lasting
and many-sided links of friendship and Elate ,a1 cooperation are developing
between the peoples of socialist Romania and of the Soviet Union. These relations
are based on the community of social system, of the Marxist-Leninist ideology,
on the unity of our fundamental aims and aspirati.o^.s in the strivinw for the
building of socialism and communism, in the struggle against imperialism, in defense
of peace."
The secretary of the party committee of the works conveyed'a heartfelt message of
fraternal friendship to the Soviet communists, the wor-irLg class and to the entire
Soviet people.
The K. F. Katushev addressed the audience. After cordially greeting the works,..
staff, and through it the entire working class, all working people of socialist
Romania, K. F. Katushev stated that chic visit left a fine iwpreasirn upon t'?1:a
Soviet delegation.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
Iv. 11 Aug 69 H 2
The fact that in Romania such modern enterprises are being built, is more tellingly
illustrating than figures the successes recorded by the Romanian people, on its
path towards socialism. The successes achieved in your country are the outcome of
the selfless work of workers, peasants, intellectu&ls, of the fraternal alliance and
cooperation of the socialist states, of the mutual assistance, that give the
opportunity to the fraternal peoples to speed up the progress of the entire
socialist camp.
Showing that 25 years ago when the working class became a ruling class in a series
of countries, the first problem it faced was the ensuring of state independence,
without which the revolutionary changes could not be achieved, K.F. Katushev
stressed that this problem was settled precisely due to the fact that the young
socialist states, together with the first world socialist state--the Soviet Union--
created a lasting defensive alliance materialized in the Warsaw treaty, in
bilateral friendship and mutual assistance treaties. It is precisely that alliance
which ensured the state independence and sovereignty of the socialist countries
against the imperialist plots, and it is precisely due to this fact that the
peoples have acquired the possibility of working unhampered, changing the look of
their countries, and building a new life.
We can state the same about the economic problems. We have at our disposal a
ratified mechanism of economic and technieo-scientific cooperation that allows for
ampler and more complex problems to be put and solved, related to the development
of the national economies and of culture in each of the socialist countries.
Referring then to the economic links between the Soviet Union and Romania-, the,
speaker pointed out that during this year the exchanges of goods will surpass 800
million roubles.
This mutual advantageous cooperation, he said, will develop and deepen in the future,
too, because it corresponds to the vital interests of our peoples., After speaking
about some successes and present day preoccupations of the Soviet people on many
fields, K.F. Katushev said:
We hold dear the friendship uniting the communists, the working class, and all the
working class, and all the working people of the Soviet Union and of Romania. Let
this friendship. strengthen and develop to the welfare of our countries and of world
socialism.
The speeches delivered during this meeting were repeatedly punctuated by loud
applause. K.F. Katushev handed over to the host the bust of V.I, Lenin and.a
dummy of the Moscow television tower. The meeting of the members of the CPSU
delegation with the workers of the Bucharest machine-tool and aggregate works was
an enthusiastic manifestation of the friendship between the RCP and the CPSU,
between the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Soviet Union, friendship which
has deep roots in. the historic past of the two countries.
Moscow in Romanian to Romania 1600 GMT 8 Aug 69 L
[Speech delivered at the 7 August session of the 10th Romanian Communist Party
Congress by CPSU delegation leader Konstantin Katushev--read by announcer and
identified as full text]
[Text] Dear comrades, the CPSU Central Committee has entrusted our delegation
with the mission of gre'ting the 10th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party
and conveying to all communists and working people of socialist.Romania?_thel~.fraternal
--- ?o e.,..ae+- nnmm?nipt'A andT the Soviet neoDle.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
...v. 11 Aug, try
The CPSU is linked with the Romanian Communast Party by decades of joint struggle
against imperialism and fascism and for the ideals of the working class. Our
countries are united by relations of alliance within the framework of the Warsaw
Pact and CEMA. For the Soviet people the Romanian people are friends and
comrades in arms in the lofty work of creating a new social order.
Your congress, Konstantin Katushev added, is reviewing the results of party
activity carried out with regard to the guidance of all spheres of the country?s
life and to planning its future prospects. The work of the congress has revealed
the multilateral activity unfolded by party organizations and the sustained labor
of the working class, peasants, and intelligentsia in constructing the socialist
society.
After the liberation from the fascist yoke, Romanian working people have, in a
short period, transformed their country into.a socialist state which possesses a
developed industry and agriculture and advanced science and culture. The successes
achieved by your country and by other socialist countries also represent a result
of fraternal mutual assistance, of close cooperation in the political, economic,
and military spheres. The friendship and collaboration of socialist countries
protect the independence and sovereignty of each from any attempt made by
imperialism, assuring them of all necessary conditions-for peaceful and constructive
work, for rapid advancement along the road of socialism and communism.
At present, the world socialist system exerts tremendous influence over the
development of all mankind, representing the decisive force in the anti-imperialist
struggle.- This fact was unanimously recognized once again at the recent inter-
national meeting in Moscow of communist and workers parties. We all know what a
fierce struggle the imperialists are waging against socialist countries on all
fronts. in this fight our class adversariez do not hesitate to use any method
beginning with the perfidious tactics of bridge-building, aimed at undermining the
unity of socialist countries, at sowing discord among them, to overtly supporting
all antisocialist forces and organizing counterrevolutionary plots, from attempts
at economic penetration to direct armed intervention.
By showing political vigilance and proletari.ar solidarity in defending socialist
gains, the communist parties and working people from fraternal countries not only
repulse these imperialist attacks, but also t+F'' heavy blows aimed at continuously
increasing the balance of force in their favor. hi"~~ teaches us that the successes
scored in the struggle against imperialism e ;i direct proportion to the unity
of socialist countries, of the fraternal co,-!;In ,.i parties and of all progressive
forces of our epoch. The example set by thy, iei:'oic Vietnamese people, who have
inflicted defeats on the U.S. aggressors cu,-pel_..ng them to come to the negotiation
table, strikingly demonstrates that a peopI lung up to fight for their indepen-
dence, and relying on the support of fratern:l socialist countries, on the
solidarity of the world communist movement, are invincible.
The communist and workers parties which toe.--,i. part in the international conference
have resolutely stressed that the defense of socialism is an internationalist duty
communists.
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
li7? 11 Aug 69 H 4
For communists from the socialist countries this primarily means the necessity to
show major concern for continuous and close political and economic cooperation between
socialist countries, for strengthening their collective defense potential.
The efforts of the socialist states, members of the Warsaw Pact,. are particularly
important in consolidating their defensive organization,, which dnsures.,the.,s,ecurity
of o?ir countries in conditions of the existence of the,a.ggressive NATO bloc,in,;Which
U.S. imperialism plays the main role,, in conditionw.of the intensification ofi
mi1i.t~;rist circles and neofascist forces from the.Fedtial-Republic of Germany who
want to revise the results of World War II.
Our cohesion and unity of actionplay an extremely important role in supporting the
national liberation movement, the just struggle waged by the Arab peoples against
Israeli aggression, which is encouraged by international imperialism.
The watchword, unity of action of all revolutionar.V,-ant.i...imperialist forceg,'' is 'the
most militant, most topical slogan of our time. Precisely because of this the problem
of unity represented the main theme at the international conference of communists,
a remarkable event in the life of the world communist movement, an important stage
in the work of cementing its ranks. The conference made possible a profound
analysis of the present world situation, defined the methods of peoples, struggle
against imperialism, for peace, democracy, and national and social progress.
Comrades, Konstantin Katushev added, today, when socialist states have laid a strong
foundation for multilateral economic development., they set themselves even greater
tasks in the area of,continuous economic development, technical progress to increase
the people's standard-of life, development of science and culture.
To solve these problems, the decisions unanimously adopted at the 23d Special Session
of CEMA are of particular importance. The complex program outlined by the session
on developing mutually advantageous cooperation and socialist economic integration,
based on principles of socialist internationalism, respect for the principle of
free consent and state sovereignty, coincides with the fundamental interests of
our peoples..
One can say with certainty that communist parties from the socialist countries,
promoting a consistent Marxist-Leninist policy and approaching present problems
from positions of strength, will further (?strengthen) the force of the world system
of socialism and its impact on world events and will consolidate the unity of world
communism.
Closely rallied around the CPSU Central Committee, Soviet communists and working people
warmly approve the results of the international communist meeting, the line promoted
by our party in foreign policy and in the world communist movement. They unanimously
support the statement made by Comrade Brezhnev, general secretary. of the CPSU Central
Committee, who said that our party will spare no efforts in order to strengthen the
unity of the communist movement and will fully carry out its international duty.
The CPSU and all Soviet people concentrate their efforts on constructing communism,
on maintaining and consolidating peace. Each step along this path lead to further
realizing the development of the country's economy, for the real improvement of living
conditions of Soviet people, the enhancing their cultural standard, and the
accumulation of new scientific and art assets.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
IV. 11 Aug 69 H 5
After reaching advanced positions concerning a -amber of important areas of scientific
and technical development, our country is presently building the largest electric
power systems in the world, unique electronic apparatuses, great nuclear power
centers, and supersonic airliners, while realizing a vast program of space explora-
tion. The industrial production of the USSR has more than doubled in the last'8
years, and agricultural production is more than a third greater. The system of 5
work days and 2 days off has been introduced in the country. Over 10 million
people are moving into new flats each year, improving their housing conditions,
Nearly 1.5 million specialists graduate yearly from Soviet teaching establishments,
after higher and medium studies.
While exerting leadership over the construction of communism, the CPSU attaches
great importance to problems concerning the continuous development of socialist
democracy, bringing the broad people's masses into the country's management,
consistently insuring the principle of comradeship in work and of other Leninist
rules regarding party life, development, ani: strengthening the brotherly friendship
between peoples of our country, educating working people in the spirit of socialist
internationalism and attachment of communism.
At present, our party and all Soviet people develop their activity under the sign
of preparations for the birth centenary of Lenin, the founder of our party and state,
the leader of the international communist movement. The Lenin centenary will be'
greeted with fresh realizations in the construction of communism. We consider attach-
ment to glorious Lenin's teaching, the realization of Lenin's teachings as a guarantee
for remarkable victories in the struggle for the cause of peace, democracy, national
independence, and socialism.
In conclusion, Comrade Konstantin Katushev read the text of the CPSU Central
Committee message to the 10th Romanian Communist 1[ arty Congress.
The message reads: The CPSU Central Committee, on behalf of Soviet communists and
all Soviet people, conveys to the delegates to the 10th Romanian Communist Party
Congress, and through you to the communists and working people of the Socialist
Republic of Romania, fraternal greetings ana good wishes for success in the work of the
congress.
.In a short historic period, within the framework of the fraternal family of the
people of the socialist states, the Rcmanftar, working people have achieved remarkable
successes in constructing the new life. Currently the 10th Romanian Communist Party
Congress is discussing a program for the continuous and multilateral development of
socialist society.
We are certain that the Romanian Communist Party' and all Romanian people, consistently
guided by the glorious Marxist-Leninist teaching, will succeed in achieving new
victories in completing the construction of socialism, in. the development of economy,
science, and culture, in the continuous development of the material well-being of the
working people.
The present international situation, the aggressive schemes of imperialist circles,
the intensification of the'arms race, and the activities of imperialist blocs,'the
sharpening of the ideological struggle in the international arena, all this requires
.a well-defined class stand, the strengthening of the cohesion and unity of action
of socialist caauntries, of the communist movement, and of all anti-imperialist
forces.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
The international meeting of communist and workers parties played an important
.mobilizing role in strengthening this militant, international cooperation. The
conference documents contain a program for a deployed struggle, at the present stage,
against imperialism, for peace, democracy, national independence, and socialism..
The collective experience of the fraternal parties shows in a telling manner that the
combination of national tasks and international development of brotherly cooperation and
mutual assistance, within the.Warsaw Pact and CE?A; increase the forces of each socialist
country, contribute to the general consolidation of the positions of socialism in Europe
.and.the world.
The USSR consistently promotes a policy toward developing relations of friendship with
the Romanian people. The strengthening of ties between the CPSU and Romanian Communist
Party and the continuous development of mutually advantageous multilateral cooperation
between the USSR and Socialist Republic of Romania coincide with the fundamental
interests of our peoples.
Guided by Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism, Soviet communists are
constantly militating for deepening and developing fraternal relations between our
parties, for the good of the Soviet and Romanian peoples, in the interest of the great
.cause of socialism and communism.
We wish Romanian communists new successes in the construction of socialism, in assuring
a peaceful and happy life for the Romanian people.
Long live the unity and cohesion of the socialist carp of the international communist
and workers movement! Long live Marxism-Leninisml signed: the CPSU Central Committee.
CEAUSESCU ACCEPTS IRAN'S INVITATION TO VISIT
Bucharest AGERPRES International Service in English 1902 GMT 10 Aug 69 L
[Text] Bucharest AGERPRES 10 Aug 69--Taking into consideration the relations of friendship
between Romania and Iran, His Imperial Majesty Slhahinshah Aryamehr and Her Majesty the
Empress of Iran have invited Nicolae: Ceausescu, president of the State Council of the
Socialist Republic of Romania, with his wife, to pay a formal visit to Iran.
The President of the State Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania and his wife have
accepted with pleasure-the invitation. The Iranian visit will proceed' between 1 ani.
8 September 1969.
CEAUSESCU MEETS ITALIAN PARTY LEADER PAJETTA
Bucharest Domestic-Service-in Romanian 14.00 GMT-. 9 Aug 69
[Text] Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, secretary general of the Romanian Communist Party Central
Committee, this morning received Comrade Giancarlo Pajetta, mewber of the Politburo and
,of the Directione of the Italian Communist Party Central Committee, leader.of the Italian
Communist Party delegation to the 10th Romanian Communist Party Congress. The talks which
took place on this occasion were held in a warm and comradely atmosphere.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 (b)(3)
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1 (b)(5)
OGC/LEGL
FOIA
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Q0'
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
A 3' USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Those parties in power devote ixnceasirg attention to increasing the efficiency
of the economy and to developing the scientific-technical revolution. In ;,
resolutions adopted by the 23d CEMA session, socialist countries reaffirm that
they -consider the pooling of their efforts and economic,integration necessary for
increasing the efficiency of the people's economy and for developing the economic
strength of the entire socialist community.
As an analysis of the latest American concepts for East Europe (?shows), the
United States is not giving up its attempts to weaken the socialist community.
.In their own interests, the imperialists are using--and continue to try using--
even the smallest difficulties which appear,in the development of individual
countries or the entire world socialist system. At the same time they ignore
that socialism has deep roots in East Europe and that relations between socialist
countries are firm and indissoluble.
IZVESTIYA ARTICLE LAUDS BRATISLAVA STATEMENT
Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1626 GMT 4 Aug 69 L
on 3 August 1968 in Bratislava, was "an important step along the road to
strengthening the unity and cohesion of the socialist countries. and a considerable
contribution to the struggle for reinforcing the positions of socialism and against
the undermining activity of imperialism." The author stresses that the participants
of the Bratislava conference expressed the will of the peoples of the socialist
countries'for a further rallying.of their ranks for the sake of the triumph of
the great cause--the building of a new and just society on earth.
conference of representatives of communist and workers parties from Bulgaria,
Hungary, the GDR, Poland, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia, which took place
...'[Text] Aloscow--.Nikolay Novikov, writing in IZVESTIYA today, says that the
The spirit of Bratislava, the article says, is socialist internationalism in
action. It is the effective political cooperation of socialist states and a
lofty responsibility for the destinies of socialism in not just their own countries
but also throughout the world.
Recalling that in Bratislava the six fraternal. -parties called for a further
development of the economic cooperation of socialist countries on a bilateral
and multilateral. basis and for an improvement in CEMAos activity, Novikov says
that "the Soviet Union and other socialist states have achieved historic successes
,in their economic and political development thanks mainly to mutual aid and
cooperation." The participants of the Bratislava meeting, the article continues,
,stressed in their statement that the present situation requires unrelenting
effort to raise the defense capacity of each socialist state and the entire
socialist community and to strengthen political and military cooperation within
the Warsaw Pact. This question became a subject of particularly close scrutiny at
the meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee in March 1969 in
Budapest.
The communist and workers parties that participated in the Bratislava conference
and signed the statement, Novikov says, regarded as their paramount task
implementation of all conditions contained in the unanimously adopted document.
Consistent and unswerving implementation of these conditions is aimed at a still
greater strengthening of the positions of socialism in each country and in the
entire socialist community. This was convincingly borne out by the recent events
in Czechoslovakia.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
T:I.I. 5 Aug 69 A 4 USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIR.
The author notes that the correctness of the assessments and conclusions made at the
Bratislava conference by the six fraternal parties has been confirmed by subsequent
developments. The Bratislava statement has been supported by communist and workers
parties.
The experience of the struggle and a realistic appraisal of the situation in the world,
Novikov concludes, clearly show that the communists and the peoples of fraternal social
countries?carry,high above their heads the banner of socialist internationalism and con
stantly strenghthen cohesion and solidarity of the countries of the socialist community
the raople61 reliable bulwark in the struggle against imperialism and for peace, democr;
and socialism..
Moscow TASS International Service in English 0717 GMT 5 Aug 69 L
[Text] Moscow, August 5, TASS--A delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
led by Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party Konstantin
Katushev left Moscow today by air for Bucharest. The delegation went,to.Romaria at the
invitation of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party to attend the
party's 10th congress.
Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0800 GMT 4 August 69 L
[Text] A delegation of the Prague national committee has ended its visit to the Soviet
Union. The delegation, led by Prague Mayor Ludvik Cerny, stayed in our country at the
invitation of the Moscow Gorispolkom. They left for home today. The week we spent in
the Soviet Union was interesting and eventful, Comrade Cerny stated before his departure-
We acquainted ourselves with the work of the Moscow and Volograd gorispolkoms. Volograc
a city of valor and heroism, made a great impression on us. Our visit to the USSR was
very useful and the experience of Moscow construction workers has been very valuable fog
us. Here high-quality construction is being carried out and construction work is being
widely industrialized. We are grateful to the Muscovites for their fraternal assistance
in solving a number of problems and inparticular to the specialist who are helping us
to construct the Prague subway. Close fraternal relations between the capitals of our
countries are successfully developing.,
NIXON TRIP FAILS TO RESOVE VIETNAM IMPASSE
Moscow in English to the United Kingdom 2100 GMT 4 Aug 69 L
[Text] The Sovd.et parliamentary paper IZVESTIYA calls President Nixon's Asian tour disal
pointing. It revealed that Washington's course aims at hammering together aggressive
.communities that differ in no way from the old pacts, and at continuing the military
venture in Vietnam.
The paper says that in Saigon, the President did not take a single. step towards a real
peace settlement. The paper stresses that this course has no future. It adds that the-
only way to break the deadlock is to accept the proposals advanced by the National
Liberation Front and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South
Vietnam. These proposals are dictated by the actual situation' in. Vietnam and by common-
sense, and the United States should. heed them, the paper advises.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
III. 5 Aug 69
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES' STRUGGLE DEMANDS UNITY
USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Moscow PRAVDA 3. Aug 69 p 4 L
(Editorial article: "The Defense of Socialism Ids the International' Duty of Communists")
[Text] The peoples of the socialist community under the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist
communist and workers parties are confidently creating a new society. By their labor
and their glorious achievements they are steadily multiplying the socialist countries'
gains in developing the economy, science, and culture, improving the people's standard
of living, and strengthening the state order. The Polish People's Republic has just
celebrated the 25th anniversary of the establishment of the new power. The Bulgarian
People's Republic and the Socialist Republic of Romania are preparing to meet the jubilee
of the 25th anniversary of their entry onto the socialist road of development. The GDR. ::
is preparing for the 20th anniversary of the proclamation of the first worker-peasant
state on German soil. In a short period these countries, like the other fraternal states,.
have,gained important victories in all fields of.building a new life.
During these years, these European socialist countries have created a mighty industry,
implemented important reforms in the countryside, and insured the flourishing of national..
culture and a continual increase in the people's well-being. In the last 10 years alone,,.,
the national income of the countries belonging to CEMA has increased by 93 percent. The
CEMA countries occupy only 18 percent of the earth's territory and only 10 percent of the,.
world's population; live in them, yet they produce roughly one-third of world industrial
output. These victories are eloquent proof of the inexhaustible life forces of the
STATOTHR socialist order and the. triumph of Marxist-Leninist teaching. The socialist order is
the advantages of its ec-
full
y
becoming increasingly more mature and reveals ever more
onomic and socio-pol.itical organization and the true democratism inherent in it. The
socialist countries international authority and their role in resolving the fundamental
questions of world politics are continually growing. The Soviet Union and the other
socialist states, by their example, are inspiring the working people of the capitalist
world to struggle for their rights and a bright future.
The historic successes of the socialist countries are the result of the heroic efforts
and selfless labor of millions of workers, peasants, and intellectuals, the communist
and workers parties' skillful direction of the processes of socialist building, and the
t 1 lementation of Marxist-Leninist teaching in the concrete conditions of
consl.s en mp
each country. At the same time, it is the result of the fraternal countries, comprehen-
rinciples of mutual aid and sup
the
t
i
'
p
on
l
is being bu
sive fruitful cooperation which
port and principles of socialist internationalism. This cooperation, embracing all as-
pects of life, facilitiates the resolution of important issues and helps the fraternal
peoples to better fulfill the tasks set before them.
The achievements of each socialist country are the common property of the whole social-
ist system and each people's concrete contribution to strngthening the positions of world
socialism.. The support, consolidation, and defense of these gains is the international
duty of all socialist countries. This conclusion, dictated by life and steming from
the interests of each socialist state and the entire socialist community, permeates the
whole content of the statement of the socialist countries',oommunist and workers parties.,,
adopted a year ago at the Bratislava conference. ~.E
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
III. 5 Aug 69 A 25
The representatives of the conmunist and workers parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR,
Poland, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia, in convening the Bratislava conference,
proceeded from fact that-the complex international situation and imperialism's subversive
activities directied against the people's peace and security and the cause of socialism
demanded the further unity of the countries of the socialist s$rstem. They also took into
consideration the fact that the development of socialism raises new problems, the
solution of which requries the unification of the socialist states efforts.
The participants in the meeting expressed the inflexible determination to develop and
defehd socialist achievements in their countries and to achieve new sucesses in
strenghthening of socialism's positions and rebuffing imperialism's intrigues is steadfast
loyalty to Marxism-Leninism, education of the masses in the spirit of socialist ideas,
proletarian internationalism, and an uncompromising struggle with the bourgeois
ideology and all antisocialist forces.
The Bratislava statement says: "The fraternal parties firmly and decisively oppose
their unbrea"able solidarity and high vigilance to any attempts by imperialism all other
anticommunit forces to weaken the leading role of the working class and the communist
parties. They will not permit anyone anywhere to drive a wedge between the socialist
states and to undermine the bases of the socialist social system. The fraternal
friendship and cohesion in this direction meet the vital interests of our peoples and
form a reliable basis on which to resolve the socioeconomic and political tasks, on which
our countries communist patties are working."
The entire development of events in the world this past year has shown us the vitality
and importance of the conclusions drawn in that document and their great theoretical,
political, and practical significance. Time has quite manifestly confirmed that the
measures being implemented by the fraternal countries for strengthening the positions
of socialism and for collective defense of socialist achievements are absolutely correct
and timely. Imperialist reaction has again been convincingly taught that the peoples
of the fraternal countries are standing firmly on guard of socialist achievements and
that any intrigues by the enemies of socialism are doomed to failure.
iSpeaking at the celebrations in Warsaw, CPSU Central Committee Genral Secretary L.I.
Brezhnev said: "Let our class enemies harbor no illusions about finding an opportunity
of cancelling out the historical. achievements of socialism. Such a thing will not happen!
The guarantee of this is the ~'(.creative,) conscious labor of the peoples of the socialist
countries, their majestic plans, and their general determination to develop their
fraternal cooperation in all spheres, and to strengthen the Warsaw Pact which reliably
insures the sovereignty of its participants and the security and inviolability of the
frontiers of socialism in Europe. . . ."
The fraternal parties are doing great work to strengthen the might of the countries
of socialism and for the broad, comprehensive coordination of efforts directed toward
resolving tasks facing them and for utilizing all the capabilities contained in the
new social system.
The development of the countries of socialism is characterized by an increase in the
political activity of the working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, and all
the working people; by the comprehensive progress of the socialist social system; by
the further development of socialist democracy; and by the improvement of the
style and methods of party, state, and economic works.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
ITT. 5 Aug 69 A 26 USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
The leading role of the working class and its vanguard--the communist and workers
parties--is growing stronger in the fraternal countries.
The socialist.countries' deepening and improvement of economic cooperation on a
bilateral and multilateral basis is continuing. These questions were widely discussed
at the 23d a9 cial CEMA session, in which the leaders of the communist and workers
parties and tt,:,e heads of government of the CEMA moimber countries participated. Its
decisions aimed at further widening comprehensive economic cooperation have great
significance in strengthening the might of each country and the entire socialist system,
in consolidating the positions of the socialist'countries,'and in strengthening the
unity of the socialist community.
The socialist countries' close fraternal ties also find expression in their foreign
-o'.icy cooperation, in the collective examination of the key problems of international
.life. The Budapest conference of the Warsaw Pact member states, Political Con-
sultative Committee represented a major contribution to the struggle for peace and
security. The appeal adopted in Budapest to all European countries concerning the
preparation and conducting of a general European. conference on',questions of security
and cooperation is receiving understanding and support among broad circles of the
public on our continent. The Budapest conference decisions are carving a path for the
settlement of urgent international problems in the interests of insuring peace and
security in Europe and throughout the world.
Socialism's enormous contribution toward accelerating historical progress and to the.
common cause of the anti-imperialist forces received a high evaluation at the internation;
conference of communist and workers parties. The conference noted that the world
socialist system is the decisive force in the anti-imperialist struggle. Every liberation
struggle finds absolutely irreplaceable support from the world socialist system,
primarily from the Soviet Union. Relying upon its,own constantly growing economic
and defense might, the world socialist system is fettering imperialism and restricting
its opportunities for exporting counterrevolution. In fulfilling their international
duty, the socialist countries are rendering increasing assistance to the peoples
struggling for freedom and independence and are strengthening peace and international
security.
The emergence and development of the. world socialist system is
part of the class battles in the international arena.
The victories of all revolutionary forces and the new wrorld's successful opposition to
the old depend to a decisive extent upon the further achievements of the socialist system
upon its cohesion, and upon the ability and capacity of the ruling parties of the
socialist countries to utilize the opportunities built into the new social system. Hence,
it follows that concern for strengthening the world system of socialism is simultaneously
a concern for the world revolutionary process' development and concern for an effective
struggle against imperialism. The conference confirmed that the chief orientation in
the cause of the socialist system's cohesion is represented by the unswerving
implementation of the principles of socialist internationalism, the correct combination
of the socialist states' national and international tasks, and the development of.
fraternal mutual assistance and support. Life is demonstrating with the utmost
clarity the ever-increasing significance of the principles of socialist internationalism
which lie at the..basis of relations between the countries of.the socialist community.
an integralandorganic
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
111. 5 Aug 69 A 27 USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
The enemies of the new system are not ceasing their attempts to undermine the bases
of popular state power in the socialist countries, to frustrate the cause of the
socialist transformation of society, and to reestablish their dominion. Thus, the
conference stressed with all force that the defense of socialism is the communists'
international duty. A break with internationalism, rejection of the socialist
countries' coordinated actions, and a retreat from Marxism-Leninism are all inflicting
harm upon the cause of socialism and upon the interests of the revolutionary struggle.
The policy of the present CCP leadership is ari example of this. The Mao Tse-tung
group's splitting, great-power chauvinist activities on the international arena give
voice to the fact that China's foreign policy has to all intents and purposes broken with
proletarian internationalism and has lost its class socialist content. This ruinous
.course by the Mao group is meeting with a decisive rebuff by the overwhelming majority
of fraternal communist and workers parties.
The establishment of the new type of international relations and the development of the
socialist states' fraternal alliance is a complex historical process during which
difficulties and differences can arise. The communists believe that these difficulties
and differences must not break the socialist states' united front in the struggle
against imperialism. The socialist system is founded upon the community of
socioeconomic system and upon the coincidence of the fundamental interests and aims
of the countries belonging to it. This community is the guarantee of overcoming
existing difficulties and the further strengthening of the socialist system's unity
on Marxist-Leninist and proletarian internationalist principles. Our Leninist party,
.our country, and our people have always been true to their international duty. As the
CPSU Central Committee June plenum stressed, the USSR's foreign policy is playing and
will continue to play a most important role in the common struggle by the anti-imperialist
..forces and in strengthening the might and cohesion of the community of socialist
countries. It will serve as an effective instrument for frustrating imperialism's
aggressive plans, preserving peace, confirming the principles of the peaceful cooperation
of states with different social systems, and for supporting the peoples' liberation
struggle.
Socialism's successes, its influence upon the course of world events, and the
effectiveness of its struggle against imperialist aggression depend to a considerable
degree upon the socialist countries' cohesion. The socialist countries' unity of
action is an important factor for the cohesion of all anti-imperialist forces. Our
party and the Soviet state have exerted and are exerting all efforts to insure that
socialism's achievements are strong and inviolable, that the cause of socialism is
consolidated and developed, and that the successes of the revolutionary forces and of the
entire anti-imperialist front in the struggle for peace, democracy, national
independence,.and social progress, are multiplied.
MAO CONTROLS ALL FIELDS OF LIFE IN CHINA
People's Inspection Units
Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to China 1430 GMT 3 Aug 69 T
["Comment on China Events"]
[Text] Dear listeners, of course, you understand clearly that the upper echelon in
Peking is untiringly bragging about the results and achievements of the so-called
cultural revolution.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 (b)(3)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1 1)(5)
OGC/LEGL
FOIA
Next 8 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
25X1
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Results of the World Communist Conference
Secret 9
No. 1579/69
26 June 1969
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1 -,Xi
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
26 June 1969
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Results of the World Communist Conference
Summary,
If the final outcome of the world Communist con-
ference came near to satisfying Soviet goals, it was
only because those goals had been progressively re-
duced throughout the years of haggling that preceded
the conference. In the end, Moscow probably hoped
to achieve little more than to convene a conference,
to gain a high attendance of parties, to obtain con-
demnation of the Chinese, and to produce a document
that would serve as a new doctrinal "reference"
point and demonstrate the ideological unity of the
world's Communist parties. The conference failed,
however, to infuse a new sense of discipline into
world Communism or to chart a coherent course of
action for the national. parties. The conference
record and the conference documents can and will be
quoted in support of views that remain divergent.
Note: This memorandum has been produced solely by
CIA. It has been prepared by the Office of Current
Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Na-
tional Estimates and the Clandestine Services.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
Convening the Conference*
1. Many parties had feared from the beginning
that Moscow would manipulate the China issue to re-
strict their independence at a conference, and these
misgivings increased following the invasion of Czech-
oslovakia The Soviets, however, did what was re-
quired to bring the conference off. In November 1967,
as the campaign to organize a consultative meeting was
getting under way, they publicly disclaimed any inten-
tion of condemning China. At the consultative meeting
in Budapest in February 1968 they further buried the
China issue by rallying the parties to the single
theme of "anti-imperialism," which might be expected
to unify them if nothing else could. In the effort
to prevent the issue from beclouding preparations for
the conference, Moscow went so far-as to propose a
new method for working out a conference document.
The document was to be formulated and approved by the
parties before the conference took place.
2. These tactics might have made it possible
for the Soviets to convene the conference as planned,
on 25 November, despite the golden opportunity given
certain parties to protract the process by criticizing
Soviet-approved drafts of the document, had it not
been for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The adverse
reaction of the western European parties, chiefly
Italy and France, caused the conference to be post-
poned twice until it was finally set for 5 June at
a meeting in late March. Romania took a particularly
dim view of the doctrine of "limited sovereignty"
promulgated by the Soviets to justify the invasion.
The Soviet Union sought to counter the reaction in
Europe by applying financial and other pressures
where it could, These measures worked, and the con-
ference was assured.
*See Intelligence Memorandum 1570/69, 4 June 1969,
"The Road to the World Communist Conference," for
a fuller treatment of thZs subject.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1 5X1
A High Attendance
3. From the outset, it was clear that Chinese
participation in the conference was out of the ques-
tion In March 1965, when the 26 original drafters
of the 1960 conference document were called to Mos-
cow to organize a new conference, the Soviet Commu-
nist party might well have judged from the incomplete
response that Albania, North Vietnam, Indonesia,
Japan, North Korea and possibly Romania would be non-
participants. Yugoslavia, which had been condemned
at the 1960 conference, was undoubtedly written off
by the Soviets early in their calculations. Cuba
failed to respond to the next organizing call to
the same 26 parties in November 1967, and was added
to the list. As a result of the preparatory meetings
in 1968, to which all parties were invited, it ap-
peared that Romania would be a likely participant,
but it became virtually certain that China's satel-
lite parties (Burma, Cambodia, Malaysia and Thailand)
would not be represented in Moscow. This meant that
there were around 80 parties left that Moscow could
hope to attract to the conference.
4. Ultimately, 75 parties officially partici-
pated, including Cuba and Sweden, which sent observers,
and two "underground parties," reportedly Nepal and
the Philippines. The appearance of Cuba gave a de-
cided boost to the Soviets. The only significant
nonruling parties that did not attend were Japan
and the Netherlands. Although the Soviet party un-
successfully sought the participation of North Viet-
nam and North Korea, the number of parties on hand was
probably satisfactory from the Soviet point of view.
Asia was underrepresented, but otherwise the gather-
ing was truly world-wide. Attendance by the absent
parties would only have further strained the already
shaky facade of unity.
Condemnation of China
5. During the years of increasing difficulty with
China, the Soviets have sought by various means to get
a condemnation of China and an expression of solidarity
from other parties. They realized, however, their ef-
forts to humble China aroused fears in other parties
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
for their own independence. It was also apparent
that any attempt formally to expel China from the
movement would cost Moscow a meaningful interna-
tional conference.
6. By late March the Soviets were in a posi-
tion to take a realistic reading of the strength of
the opposition. Up to that time dissent had been
expressed mainly over the wording of the draft docu-
ment, notably by the Italians and Romanians. The
French party, previously a pleader for its independ-
ent status, had caved in by the March preparatory
meeting, when it not only supported but also report-
edly had a hand in formulating the draft of the docu-
ment that emerged from that meeting. Smaller par-
ties in opposition to the draft document were Great
Britain, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, San
Marino, Mexico, Dominican Republic and Reunion. The
opposition of the smaller parties on an issue like
China was obviously of little concern to the Soviets,
but that of Italy and Romania was more serious.
7. By the time of the final May preparatory
meeting, growing tension on the Sino-Soviet border
and the conclusion of the Chinese party congress
led Moscow to introduce the China issue on the floor
of the conference,
8. Brezhnev's keynote speech of 7 June included
a major section devoted to the China question, and
placed Moscow's anger with China on the conference
record, In a rough box score of speeches by the 75
delegates, some 51, including the Italians, condemned
the Chinese leadership explicitly; two, including
Romania, adopted a neutral stance; and 19 avoided the
issue, though several alluded to it by condemning
"left opportunism." This was probably the single
most important issue of the conference for the Soviets,
and they received the show of solidarity they sought.
The Czechoslovak Issue
9. Moscow hoped to avoid discussion of the inva-
sion altogether, and shortly before the conference
the Czechoslovak party went on record urging that the
matter not be raised. Nevertheless, ten parties ex-
plicitly criticized the Soviet-led invasion. Presumably
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
at at Soviet instigation, four parties responded by de-
fending the action, and some 60 parties did not men-
tion it. Although this minimized what could have been
a very embarrassing situation for the Soviets Moscow
was forced to water down references in the conference
documents to the international responsibilities of
individual parties.
The Conference Record and Documents
10. The conference of 75 parties ran 13 days,
5 to 17 June. Except for the main conference docu-
ment, other documents on the centenary of Lenin's
birth, Vietnam, peace, Israeli aggression and soli-
darity with Communists under repression, ran into
little opposition. The conference, apparently de-
ferring to the insistence of parties like the French,
Italian and Romanian, adopted a proposal to explore
the holding of a broad-based world "anti-imperialist"
congress, but significantly did not specify a target
date. The main document on the imperialist threat
and the "unity" of the Communist world, which had
been the subject of controversy for over a year, under-
went revision up to the final days of the conference.
Its language was generalized and made vague enough
to permit the parties to find in it words or phrases
to support differing views.
11. The main conference document was adopted
on the last day of the conference. The Dominican
Republic delegate did not support the document as
a whole, and did not sign. The Cuban and Swedish
parties, as observers, also did not sign. The Brit-
ish and Norwegian delegates withheld their signatures,
referring the decision whether to sign or not to their
central committees, The parties of Australia, Italy
and San Marino agreed to sign only one of the four
sections of the document, the section in anti-imperial-
ism. The parties of Switzerland, Sudan, Romania,
Spain, Morocco and Reunion are reported to have signed
with reservations,
12. Section one of the main document is a lengthy
indictment of "imperialism," with the United States
singled out for special condemnation. Section two de-
scribes the three forces of world revolution: the
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1 -~X1
Communist countries, national liberation movements, and
the international working force. The third section
calls on the parties to struggle against imperialism,
which it describes as especially rampant in Vietnam.
It also names those familiar "imperialist threats":
NATO, West Germany and Israel. In the context of
"the struggle for peace," however, this section en-
dorses the principle of "peaceful coexistence" which
permits a wide range of activity by the militants and
more peacefully oriented parties. As it did in Khru-
shchev's formulation, the principle does not contradict
the right of any oppressed people to fight for its
liberation "by any means it considers necessary." At
the same time, "peaceful coexistence" allows for the
development of "fruitful" economic, scientific, and
technical cooperation with non-Communist countries;
and requires support of disarmament measures and the
nuclear nonproliferation treaty,
13. The final section of the document on the
relationship among the Communist parties is the short-
est, but it proved to be the most controversial in
the drafting process. It argues that the community
of Communist nations, especially the Soviet Union,
is the decisive factor in the "anti-imperialist strug-
gle." It stresses that cohesion of the Communist coun-
tries will largely determine the progress of Communism
and the effectiveness of its efforts to combat "im-
perialist aggression." Above all others, this section
shows the effect of many committee redrafting sessions.
It defends the need for "proletarian internationalism,"
mutual assistance and support, but it also speaks of
the need for equality, sovereignty and noninterference
in the affairs of other parties. While it is explicitly
stated that there is at present no leading center in
the international Communist movement, special praise
nevertheless is directed to the Soviet union as the
main force of the movement and for its efforts on be-
half of the Communist cause,
Conclusion
14. Given the scaled-down objectives of the So-
viets,, they probably can take satisfaction in having
brought together 75 parties, in having produced a
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 25 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
final document elastic enough to be signed by the
great majority of participants, and in having put
on the record a series of speeches that can be cited
as evidence of "overwhelming" support for Soviet
views, especially on China. Moscow cannot escape
the fact, however, that the conference show of unity
is marred by the absence of most Asian parties, and
that the 61 parties that signed the main document
without reservations represent only about one third
of the estimated number of party members in the
world.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 25 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
Action Taken on the Main Document by Attending Parties
Signed without reservations (61): Signed with reservations (6):
Austria
Algeria
Argentina
Belgium
West Berlin
Bolivia
Brazil
Bulgaria
Hungary
Venezuela
Haiti
Guyana
Guadeloupe
Guatemala
West Germany
East Germany
Honduras
Greece
Denmark
Israel
India Paraguay Morocco
Jordan Peru Reunion**
Iraq Poland Romania
Iran Portugal Spain
N. Ireland Puerto Rico Sudan
Ireland Salvador Switzerland
Canada Syria
Cyprus Soviet Union
Colombia United States
Costa Rica Tunisia
Lesotho Turkey
Lebanon Uruguay
Luxembourg Finland
Martinique France
Mexico Ceylon
Mongolia Czechoslovakia
Nigeria Chile
Nicaragua Ecuador
E. Pakistan S. Africa
Panama Nepal*
Philippines*
Signed only part (3): Did not sign at all (5):
Australia Dominican Republic (ideological)
Italy Cuba (observer)
San Marino Sweden (observer)
Great Britain (referred to CC)
Norway (referred to CC)
* Apparently the two parties not officially identified, but
carried as "underground" parties in the list of participants.
** First reported as signing only section three of the document.
Non-attending (18):
Ruling parties:
Non-ruling parties Non-ruling parties
(Asia) : (other) :
Albania Burma
China Cambodia
North Korea Indonesia
North Vietnam Japan
Yugoslavia Laos
Malaysia Iceland
New Zealand Malagasy
Thailand Mauritius
The Netherlands
Senegal
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 (b)(3)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1 1)(5)
OGC/LEGL
FOIA
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
17 June 1969
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: The Effect of the Cuban Missile Crisis
on Soviet Strategic Force Planning
1. In October 1962 the leaders of the USSR were
faced by a substantial US superiority in operational
intercontinental strategic strike force and the pro-
spect that the margin of superiority probably would
continue to grow for at least another two or three
years.
2. Earlier--perhaps a year or more before--the
Soviet political and military leaders had probably
come to the view that the limited capabilities of
their intercontinental strategic forces compared with
those of the US would, if not redressed, provide the
US with a potential first strike capability. Soviet
defense planners in making a prudent assessment of the
strategic balance had probably concluded that, although
the considerable Soviet strategic forces targetted
against western Europe provided some measure of deter-
rence, the USSR would have no assured retaliatory
capability with respect to the US until about 1966. By
the fall of 1962, the Soviet leaders were also aware
that US intelligence collection capabilities ruled out
reliance on bluff and bluster.
3. These factors probably caused deep concern in
the Kremlin. From the Soviet point of view, the US
strategic posture not only posed a serious potential
threat to the national security of the USSR, but also
severely circumscribed Soviet foreign policy options
,throughout the world. Khrushchev probably viewed the
emplacement in Cuba of strategic systems capable of
reaching the US as the quickest way of redressing at
least partially the strategic imbalance. Successfully
carried out, it could have other immediate political
returns as well. Khrushchev's Berlin objectives were
probably closely intertwined with the over-all strategic
goals.
SI]s5a~$ii:w ii
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
8. The comparisons of forces outlined above
illustrate the vastly inferior strategic position of
the USSR which probably provided the major motivation
for Khrushchev`s decision to place nuclear strike forces
in Cuba in 1962. It seems likely that the Soviets de-
cided not to deploy their second generation ICBM systems--
the SS-7 and SS-8--on a large scale not only because of
the shortcomings of these systems, but also because a
crash program probably would have delayed the deployment
of their third generation ICBM systems--the SS-9 and
SS-11. Thus, it appears that Khrushchev decided to de-
ploy existing medium range systems in Cuba as a stop-gap
measure which would quickly and cheaply improve the re-
lative strategic position of the USSR.
9. The attempt to convert Cuba into a Soviet stra-
tegic nuclear base can be interpreted as an admission of
the inadequacy of the Soviet strategic deterrent and as
a measure of the Soviet concern about the possible mili-
tary and political consequences of this inadequacy. By
1961 the USSR probably was aware of the growing US capa-
bility to detect and monitor Soviet strategic force
deployments and knew that it could no longer represent
its strategic capability as being much.greater than it
actually was.
10. In addition to causing genuine apprehensions
about the security of the USSR, the US superiority pro-
bably was viewed by Khrushchev as a restriction on his
political flexibility in international relations--e.g.,
in resolving the Berlin question. The failure of his
bold move probably reinforced the Soviet conviction
that the USSR could not afford the military risks and
political penalties of, not competing with the US in a
strategic arms race. .
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
Gai,~.$ti Y
4. The confrontation with US strategic power in
the Cuban crisis probably confirmed the Soviet belief
that anything less than a rough strategic equality
with the US would leave them vulnerable both political-
ly and militarily. Apparently the experience also
persuaded the Soviet leaders that in order to avoid
another period of strategic inferiority they would have
to react more rapidly to future US plans for force im-
provements.
5. The failure of Kirushchev `s gamble in Cuba
probably did not alter the Soviet goal of achieving and
maintaining a credible deterrent, but it may well have
,been an important factor in determining the pace, timing,
and dimensions of the Soviet effort to build a strong
strategic offensive capability. The Cuban experience un-
doubtedly provided strong support for those in the Kremlin
who advocated large scale deployments of the SS-9, SS-i1 25X1
and new SLBM strategic systems then under development in
the USSR.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
f4 . , v-, M_I
11. A review of military programs and expenditures
indicates that there was no abrupt redirection of Soviet
effort immediately following the Cuban missile crisis.
The relative stability in expenditures for strategic and
general purpose force programs (excluding research and
development expenditures) during the 1963-1965 period
suggests that the Soviets decided to wait until the ad-
vanced systems then in development--e.g., the SS-9, the
SS-11, and Y-class SLBM systems--would be available for
large scale deployment to.redress the strategic imbal-
ance . The general size of the deployment for these
systems probably was determined during this period.
Continuation of the rapid rise in expenditures for re-
search and development programs--which began in the
1950's--is an indication of the Soviet determination to
pay the price of running a strategic arms race with the
US. The large R&D programs undoubtedly were designed
to provide the Soviet leadership with sufficient flexi-
bility to fulfill their requirements for strategic forces
under any foreseeable contingencies.
12. The Cuban missile crisis may have provided the
USSR with an important lesson on the nature of a strate-
gic.arms race. The US reacted to the "missile gap" of
the late 1950's with plans for major strategic programs,
principally Minuteman and Polaris. The USSR, however,
did not immediately respond to the US force improvement
plans so that by the fall of 1962 it found itself in a
worsening strategic position. Since the Cuban crisis,
it appears that the USSR has attempted to anticipate the
deployment of new US weapons systems and moved to offset
them.
l 13. The expressed Soviet interest in discussing
strategic arms limitation is probably prompted at least
in part by their desire to preserve their current stra-
tegic position in the face of US improvements in stra-
tegic capabilities planned for the Seventies. Extension
of SS-9 and SS-11 deployment and continued Soviet ABM
testing may represent other-Soviet responses to US plans
I for the deployment of MIRVs and an ABM system.
J of
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 (b)(3)
S1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1 1)(5)
Q
Next 12 Page(s) In Document Denied
OGC/LEGL
FOIA
STATI NTL
STATI NTL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 BOO364ROOO1OO23OOO1-1
9 May 69 A 11 USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Moscow i Vietnamesocto Vietnam 2230 GMT 8 May 69 B
[Text] Spe king at yesterday's session of the Paris talks on Vietnam, Tran Buu Kiem,
head of the LSV delegation at the conference, pointed out new realistic proposals
aimed at sebtl ng the Vietnam problem.
Once more, h~ sup orted the proposal to form a provisional coalition government which
will include repre ntatives of all the strata of the people.
The chief of the NFLS delegation expressed hope that, during the lapse of the time
from the restoration of eace to the holding of the elections, neither party will
carry out measures aimed t forcing the people to Follow its own political platform.
Tran Buu Kiem declared that he provisional government should carry out a policy
based on the principles of pe eful coexistence. This means that this government
should establish diplomatic, ec nomic, and cultural relations with many nations in the
USSR, EGYPT FAVOR 1967 UN MIDEAST REUTION
Malik\UN Letter
Moscow TASS International Service in Englis'K 0801 GMT-'9 May 69 L
[Text] New York May 9 TASS--The permanent sov t representative at the United Nations
Ya;.A;;Malikpresented to the U.N. Secretary Gene3~4l U Thant a letter in connection with
his report to ,the Security Council on the situati6,p in the Suez Canal zone.
The. letter runs, among other things: The of the situation in the Middle
East cannot be the cause of serious concern and anxiet The situation was aggravated
Underlying this policy is their, striving to prevent a peace ul settlement in the Middle
East, calked for by the Security Council's resolution of Nov ber 22, 1967.
The top Israeli leaders are known to declare openly that the co ultations of our
powers--permanent members of the Security Council--in a bid to fi d ways and means to
help reach a political settlement in this area do not at all suit em.
The SoVIet Union believes that these consultations may become an effi ent means of
putting into life the Security Council resolution of Novemberr:22, 1967. Owing; the
consultations we are ready to exert every effort to have a political set ement in the
M.rdax
^-
e
st
What is now required is to eliminate obstacles, raised on the road towards a
and durable peace in the Middle East. The interests of normalisation of the si uation
in th
t
a
part of the world also call, undoubtedly, for strict compliance with the
.....9Y Y.... -.. ___ n_ _. a e. __
The Soviet representative asked to circulate this letter as an official:'document
of the Security Council.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 BOO364ROOO1OO23OOO1-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 BOO364ROOO1OO23OOO1-1
III. 9 May 69 A 12
I
Moscow TASS International Service ir. English ;725 GMT 9 May 69 L
[Text`kMoscow May 9 TASS--"The Israeli extremists May Pay through the nose for their
underesjmation of the changes which took place in the Middle East and the world over
in the pa~two years. The Israeli extremists are trying tc wreck just peaceful
settlement ih the Middle East which would take into account the interests of all
peoples In that area," PRAVDA Cairo correspondent Ysvgeniy Primakov writes today.
The correspondent p)a,tnts out: Analysing the i-creased aggressiveness of the Israeli
military and the succ sful counteraction of the Egyptian defense, one of repre-
sentatives of the top tiara circles told him that the United Arab-Republic
realizes the danger of and estimation of the e-em y forces and will allow to draw it-
self into no ventures. Actid* defence actions should by no means be mixed up with
this. The Arabs intend to buildup their active eefence, giving up no possibility to
Israel to consolidate its positi6tp on the ..ccupi~,d land."
The favcurable response in the Cairo press to the statement of the U.N. Secretary
General U Thant is indicative of the United Arab Republic's continued-efforts in a
bid to find a political settlement of thb~,,crisis. Primakov point out; U Thant again
reaffirmed that he did not intend to withd y U.N. observers from the Suez Canal Zone.
The correspondent stresses that settlement of t Middle East problem depends on the
Israeli leadership, first of all. In this connectkon, Primakov recalls President
sasir's statement at a May Day meeting in Cairo. Tits, president stressed that "if
the U.N. Security Council's resolution of November 22,` 967, was complied with, and
~ie rights of the Palestinians ensured in keeping with o er U.N. resolutions, there
would be no more outstanding problems." `.
PODGORNYY TO MEET CPR REPRESENTATIVE IN DPRK
Seoul Domestic Service in Korean 0600 GMT 9 May 69 B
This will be the 'r-. visit by a top leader of the Soviet Union to Pyongyang since
P-emier Kosygin v 4':ed Pyongyang in 1965 an route to Hanoi.
-fonwyang, on the Sino-Soviet boarder conflict, according to a source from Mos ov
yesterday.
[Ef arpt] Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Poddorny will
corner with the CPR ambassador to Pyongyang or a special envoy, who will be ent to
KOMMUNIST EDITORIAL ON MARXISM-LENINISM
Moscow KOMMUNIST No 6, Signed to Press 21 Apr 69 pp 3-14 L
[Editorial: "A Great International Teaching"; words in slantlines published in italics]
[Text] Leninism is the scientific, theoretical expression of the fundamental, universal
interests of the working class and of all workers in the modern era. Continuing and
developing the eaus- of ti-- founders of the scientific ideology of the proletariat,
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engel?, Leninism consistently expresses the cherished hopes
of the working class and of working people and corresponds profoundly and comprehensively
to the chief questions dictated by life and modern historical development. The cause
of the revolutionary renewal of the world and the theory and practice of socialism
in our day are inseparable from the name of Valdimir Ilich Lenin.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 BOO364ROOO1OO23OOO1-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
One of the widespread methods of struggle against Leninism is denial of its international
character and international significance and the portrayal of Leninism as particularly
"Russian," phenomenon, as a teaching allegedly corresponding only to Russian conditions.
This slander of the bourgeois ideologists against scientific communism has acquired
the force of a rooted prejudice among them; it is even shared to this or that extent
by certain figures callil-ir themselves socialists and even Marxists. For example,
Ernst Fischer's latest booklet, "What Marx Really Said," which is graphic proof of
the author's revisionist positions and of the coincidence of his views with the ideas
of traditional bourgeois, anti-Marxist pr paganda, asserts that Lenin, "proceeding from
Marxist considerations,` only "adapted t I" ieory of revolution to the problems of
tsarist Russia" (E. Fischer, "Was Marx;i_rklich Sagte." Vienna, 1968, page 157).
This book defines Leninism as the sum of the views "of that group (Bolsheviks) which
was led by Lenin within Russian social democracy and under the leadership of which the
1917 October revolution occurred." (Ibid, r1Re 158). Thus, Fischer propounds the
ideas of the applicability of Leninism only in the background countries of the East
with a predominance of peasant population and a>pir s to depict Leninism as one of
the varieties and one of the trends of Marxism.
It is common knowledge that Leninism is the Marxism:. our day, the creative development
of Marxist teaching applicable to the hi:s...,rical cc_,,..tions of the period of imperialism
and the transition from capitalism to socialism on a universal scale, the theory of the
revolutionary activity of the communist parties: in the modern era, and the theory of
building socialism and communism. Leninism is becoming increasingly widespread. Ruling
the consciousness of the masses. It is difficult to find a place on the globe now
where the name of Lenin would not be known--the name of the ,eat continuer of the
cause of Marx and Engels--where one would not see in the prir: iples of his teaching
and in the Leninist method the key to the solution of the ur;o-nt problems of social
development. The international content of Marxist-Leninist teaching is determined
primarily by the fact that it represents a theoretical generalization of the experience
of the revolutionary struggle of the international working class and the workers of
the entire world and of the achievements of progressive science, and that it reveals
the general patterns of social development and arms the working class and all workers
of the globe with a mighty weapon of struggle for the victory of socialism and communism,
It would be absurd to consider Marxism "a West European doctrine" simply because its
founders lived in West Europe. Naturally, in creating their theory of social development,
the founders of scientific socialism --lied primarily on the experience of the most advanced
countries of the 19th century from the ew of the level of social life and the
revolutionary process. At the sam time, Ivforx and Engels made a profound study of
and generalized universal history and the aggregate international experience of the
revolutionary movement and took the gains of progressive science and culture into
consideration. This made it possible forthem to accomplish an extremely great change
in man's social consciousness and to reveal the objective laws of the historical process,
outside which it is impossible to understand the specific features of the development
of individual countries. Russia, to where the center of the revolutionary movement
was transferred at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries by force of
objective causes, became the motherland of Leninism. However, it would be absurd to
consider Leninism a peculiarly "Russian" teaching on this basis. In creatively
developing Marxism, V.I. Lenin was -bided by profound research into social relations
not only in Russia but in the dove_:oped capitalist countries of West Europe and. the
United States, and he studied and generalized the new processes in the Asian countries
and the experience of the international working class and national liberation movements
and the achievements of progressive science.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
Leninist ideas exert the most profound influence on the entire course of world develop-
ment. Lenin's name has become the symbol of proletarian revolutions and of socialism
and progress and the symbol of the communist transformation of the world.
In the struggle for the victory of communism, and constantly imbibing strength to
inspiration from Leninist ideas, the communist parties,--loyal to the principles
of proletarian internationalism-- the workers of all countries and continents and the
working people of all nations and peoples, color of skin, and race express feelings
of boundless love and respect for Ilich and ascribe their best thoughts and
aspirations to him. The theory and method of Leninism has been confirmed comprehensively
by historical practice. Consideration of Marxist-Leninist teaching, comprehensive
generalization of the practical experience of the revolutionary struggle and socialist
building and of the achievements of modern scientific knowledge, and on this basis
further creative development of theory--this is the law of action of all true
revolutionaries and all Marxist-Leninists.
Leninism, which has an international dharacter--the ideological foundation of inter-
national unity and the brotherhood of the workers and their joint struggle against
imperialism and for socialism and communism--obliges all communists to give a crushing
rebuff to any revisionist sallies in whatever form and wherever they may manifest
themselves. This is natural, for when it is a question of the principles of Marxism-
Leninism, of the international ideological property of the working class, and re-
volutionary theory, there are no and cannot be any "indifferent" communists. The
meaning and significance of any philosophical teaching and of any sociopolitical
doctrine are determined by their contribution to the general progressive development
-f knowledge and by the extent and nature of their influence on social life. Leninism
bias passed a comprehensive historical test in the very midst of mass historical
movements, firmly entering the consciousness and the flesh and blood of the peoples
and of hundreds of millions of people. The most outstanding revolutionary achievements
?f the 20th century are connected with Leninism.--the Great October Socialist Revolution,
which marked a fundamental change in the history of mankind, the complete and conclusive
victory of socialism in the USSR. the formation of the world socialist system, and the
magnificent social and national liberation battles and victories over capitalism won
by the working class and the workers. Marxism-Leninism has become the ruler of the
minds of all progressive mankind and the reliable compass of scientific knowledge and
the revolutionary confirmation of the new, higher forms of social order.
For this very reason the bourgeois and the rlghtwing socialist ideologists are aspiring
to belittle and emasculate the scientific content of Leninism and to put. their own
"interpretation" on it. The anticommunists are aware that in the middle of the
e')th century it is no longer possible to reject scientific sociili`sm'out of hand and
t oppose Marxist-Leninist teaching openly. Hence their attempts to find "contradictions"
in the integral theory of Marxism-Leninism, to split up Its component parts and various
-rages of development artifically and to counterpose them to one another. A
..~nsiderable army of bourgeois ideologists--from the Trotskiyite S. Hook and the
professional. anticommunist A. Meyer to the official American sociologist W. Rostow,
Gather J. Bochenski, and the Jesuit A. (Shambra) as transliterated 3--are concerned
c?~unterpose Marx to Lenin. They are leaning over backward, attempting to "prove"
f-nat the ideology of modern communism is not only not related to the authentic views
;.f Marx, but is a "radical distortion of true Marxism." Revisionists of various
stripes have chimed in actively in this numerically strong choir of outspoken`
bourgeois ideologists. Acting on behalf of "true scientific communism," they are
preverting and discrediting the great Marxist-Leninist teaching, theory, and practice
of scientific communism. Here the enemies of scientific communism are concentrating
tie fire of their criticism against Lenin and against Leninism.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
Marxist-Lenin1sts there can be no doubting the truth of the fact that the defense of
the fundamental principles of the proletariat's scientific ideology and its subse-
quent, development in accordance with r'ew historical conditions represents a single
process. The very formulation of the question of the possibility of breaking down
this process--ovren more so that of the counterposition of its elements--is a false
and artificial problem. Unfortunately, a number of authors who consider themselves
Marxists are .conducting an extremely fauitless discussion as to what is most important
the preservation of the purity of theory, or its development.
One has only to submit to this metapkbys'.cal formulation of the question, and any answer
to it is ddomed in advance to one-sidedness fraught with incorrect political and
theoretical. conclusions. historical. expel,:':ince shows that any underestimation of the
necessity to observe the principles of revolutionary theory, the ngcessity to protect
them against any distortions, loads to a "ccreative" development of Marxism-Leninism
in which its very essence is emasculated. Te,principles and, method of scientific
communism have been verified and corroborated by historical expos'iences, In emphasis
zing the se*ientIfic substantiation of Marxist teaching, as far back as the ehd of the
last centuryV.I. Lenin said that this had been demonstrated strikingly since the time
of the appearance of "Dams Kapital," when on the basis of the dialectical materialist
method a profound scientific analysis of tie structure and development of the capitalist
formation was made. Now the correctness of scientific communism has been confirmed
by the entire experience of the period of ~;c:>ansition from capitalism to socialism and
the experience of the development of the world socialist system and the new socioeco-
nomt:c formation. Al]. the successes of the world communist movement were made possible
by the fact that its path was illumina,id by proven Maracjst-Leninist, theory, reliably
guarding against a possible descent to the positions of reformism and leftist
revolut.ionar?,im.
The great Lenin taught that without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary
movement. Xn all their activity the QP,SU and the fraternal parties, adhering to the
principles of proleta.?ian international ism, are guided by the single doctrine of
Marxism-Leninism. Marxism-Leninism represents an integrated and harmonious system of
scientific principles and conclusions; it is a monolithic teaching which must constantly
guard itself both against attempts at reformist "softening" and against nationalist
and "leftwing"-opportunist, dogmatic distortion. Marxism's theoretical principles,
which constitute the indestructible bads of the entire domestic and foreign policies
of the communist party and the socialist state and the scientific foundation of
socialism and communism, were defended indefatigably by V.I. Lenin. Let us recall,
for example, his ardent speech against the Second International's opportunist theoreti-
eaLans? who distorted the Marxist ideas on the state, revolution, 4n he dictatorship
of the proletariat, and against the Trc tskiyites and rightwing opportuni$ts in our
countr^yo
The necessity for the defense of the fundamental principles of Leninism is felt
particularly sharply now. Many extrenvily important theoretical tenets of scientific
communism--on the+-proletariat's historic mission, on the dictatorship of the proletar-
iat and the communist party's leading a',l(, In the revolution and socialist building,
on proletarian internationalism, on the content and tethods of building a new society,
and others--have become the object of persistent attacks by bourgeois and revisionist
ideologists, endeavoring in one way or another to emasculate the very principles of
Marxism-Leninism. In these attacks the reformist ideologists generally speculate
on the natural necessity to take new conditions into consideration, although it is
perfectly obvig)us that a comprehensive generalizatioia of new phenomena of scientific
knowledge and accial practiat is only possible tro Marxist-Leninist positions.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
III. 9 May 69 A 15
All this explains why Leninism, which took shape in the bitter struggle on the
international scene against the dogma:: of the theoreticians of the Second International
and against rigntwing and "leftwinf,? opportunism, became the banner of the world
working class movement in the era of the downfall of capita-ism and ti.e transition
to socialism and communism.
V.I. Lenin studied the development of capita-is.: not only in Russia, although by
analyzing the contradictions of Russian reality he showed that their characteristic
features are in principle inherent in the entire capitalist system. On the basis of
a profound study of the trends of social development on a universal scale and of
an analysis and generalization of the enormous factual material of the leading
bourgeois countries, V.I. Lenin revealed the essence of imperialism as the highest
and final stage of capitalism and also its features and natural patterns. Guided by
the ideas of Marx and Engels and the practical experience of the Soviet state, V.I.
Lenin: gave a Comprehensive substantiation to the p-tterns of the formation of the
communist socioeconomic formation.
Leninism is a new, higher stage in the development of Marxism and all its integral
parts: Its philosophy, political economy, and scientific communism. V.I. Lenin
developed and specified the most important ideas of Marxism on the leading role of
the working class and its revolutionary port and on the dictatorship of the proletariat.
V.I. Lenin enriched and specified the Marxist theory of revolution, drew a conclusion
about the possibility of the victory of socialism initially in a few or even in one
country alone, formulated the theory of the development of the bourgeois-democratic
revolution into a socialist revolution, and developed the idea of the combination
of the proletarian revolution with the national liberation struggle. V.I. Lenin
revealed the natural patterns and principal features of the transitional period
from capitalism to socialism and formulated the principal problems of building
socialism and communism. Leninism is the property not of a single country, but of
the entire international liberation movement, Under the banner of Marx:.sm-Leninism
an enormous period of world development has passed which cannot be ignored and even less,
excluded from world history.
In their time Kautsky, 0. Bauer, and other socialist renegades in the West and the
Trotskiyites in Russia mode fierce attacks on Leninism, attempting to represent it as
a product of Russian "backwardness" and peasant narrowmindedness, as a theory allegedly
unsuitable for the developed capitalist countries. In opposition tothe socia- reformist
and Trotsklyite views, and in the course of a principled ideological struggle with them,
the world communist movement has provided comprehensive grounds showing that the
proletariat's scientific world outlook is a single, integral teaching formulated by
Marx and Engels and subsequently developed comprehensively under the new historical
conditions by V.I. Lenin.
In our day scientific communism is being developed creatively by the CPSU and the
other Marxist-Leninist parties. Leninism today is the combat banner and the guide
to action of hundreds of millions of people creating a new life and fighting for peace,
freedom, Independence, and socialism. Marxism-Leninism is the inexhaustible ideological
wealth of the present-day communist movement. At the same time Marxist-Leninists do
not regard their teaching as something invariable and ossified. The creative essence
of Marxism-:.,eninism and its revolutionary core--dialectics--are aimed atta timely comprehension
of new phenomena and processes in accordance with changing objective conditions.
The further creative enrichment of Leninism is effected by the collective efforts of
the world communist movement. However, this development does not proceed apart from
the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism, but is accomplished on their pasis.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
III. 9 May 69 A 18 USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
awareness into the workers of the socialist society. The CPSU is making an important
contribution to resolving the urgent problems of present-day world development and of
the international communist and workers movement.
One example of the struggle against Leninism in our time is the slanderous accusation
that it is of a "dogmatic" character. Those who hold these views propose that the
"closed" (they have in mind class and party) character of Leninism must be overcome
and transformed into some kind of "opek" or "general" (that is, supraclass]doctrine.
Bourgeois and revisionist ideologists are of" the opinion that only this kind of
manipulation is capable or insuring the so:_;,ific character and authenticity of the
proletariat's ideology, Although there ..re certain differences in the views of
propagandists of "opene? Marxism-Leninism, they are united in. their offensive
againtt'the fundamental principles of Marxism-LEEninism.and against its precise
class bases.
Communist Party spirit is a most important princlpl~ of Marxist-Leninist ideology,
a principle that conditions its strength and effect ness. Scientific communism
appeals directly and immediately to the working cla. and to all workers, expresses
their real interests, and shows the way to the revo., ionary transformation of
society. To what other social forces must elarxism-".. nism be "opened?" It is politi-
cally naive to count on symiithy from the exploiter ola.sses. The popularity of and
the degree to which an ideological system is speead among this or that social group
or class depend primarily on the ideology=s social meaning and objectives and on how
completely it expresses their real interests. Mai?xism-Leniniapc is the militant
revolutionary teaching of the working class and of ~.ll worker~ll and its whole
existence is aimed at the revolutbtonary overthrow of the bourgeoisiets
domination and at the destruction of each and every kind of e,eploitation and repression.
On the other hand the ideology of the exploiter classes is siarply directed at Sup-
pression of the working masses and it serves the cause of justifying exploiatation,
Here is its scoial purpose, its class objective, and its party spirit, Therefore, th
clash between communist and bourgois ideologies is an expression of ,the elassbtrugg e
in the world arena and of the struggle by the proletariat and all working people for
the liquidation of exploiter relationships, the struggle for the social and national
liberation of the peoples. As it is impossible to reconcile opposing classes and
eliminate the antagonism between them, so too it is impossible to effect a
synthesis of mutually opposed classes. Since the struggle for the minds and hearts
of men is one of the basic forms of the class struggle, there can be no compromise,
V.I. Lenin wrote, "People always have !en ,,z always will be the foolish victims
of deceit and self-deception until they .ieu,:i to seek out the interests of this or
that class are behind the moral, religious, political, and social phrases,
statements, and promises" (Complete Collected Works, Vol 23, p 47).
The class interests of the present-day imperialist bourgeoisie condition the
tendentious, false, and mystifying character of its ideology. The fundamental
divergence between the interests of the bourgeoisie--a historically doomed class--
and the objective requirements of social progress prompt the theoreticians of imperialism
to misinterpret reality and distort the real trends of its development. On the
other hand Marxism-Leninism is the scientific ideology of the working class, which
is interested in a strictly object: 1e analysis of reality, in the liquidation of an
form of social injustice, and in t::v cohesion of all democratic forces for a bright
future.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
Marxist-Leninists are enjoined to defend and protect these positions and to guard
revolutionary theory resolutely and uncompromisingly against revisionist, reformist,
and dogmatic distortions and the incorporation into it of all kinds of ideological
substitutes purporting to be the "latest achievements" of scientific thought.
The stanch defense of Marxist-Leninist principles inherently entails the need and
ability to apply and develop revolutionary theory creatively. V/I. Lenin's activity
represents a model of the genuinely creative enrichment of theory
Lenin liked to say that K. Marx's principal work, "Das Kapital," was the result of the
study of real processes, of a wealth of facts; the same can also be said Of other
4orks by Marxism's founders. Indeed, this applies fully to the works of V:I. Lenin,
who relied constantly on a meticulous analysis of social reality, the generalization
of revolutionary practice in the imperialist period, and the practice of socialist
building. Leninism's Strictly scientific method is profoundly hostile to the
revisionists' constructions which are divorced from life, a distortion of reality,
and speculative.
"irelessly struggling to preserve Marxism's purity and liberating it from foul
-;ppcrtunism, V.I. Lenin not only reinstated Marx's and Engels' true views, but also
developed them creatively in complete accordance with the new, specific conditions
and with the achievements of science and social practice. It was precisely in this
way that he formulated the integrated teaching of the new type of proletarian party,
enriched the Marxist theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist
state, and developed the teaching on the strategy and tactics of the proletariat's
class struggle on the alliance between the working class and the peasantry in the
revolutionary struggle; the ways of creating a socialist economy; the content and
.-r.ethods of the cultural revolution; and the ways of building socialism and communism.
Marxist-Leninist ideology is linked inseparably with life, with the practice of build-
ing socialism and communism, and with the struggle of the international working class
-ra =f all workers and oppressed peoples for their social and national liberation.
:.pity of theory and practice, a creative appraoch to theory, consideration of changing
circumstances, and the ability to generalize new phenomena--herein lie the fundamental
-haracteristics of Leninism--the theoretical basis for the solution of the most
complex questions of the revolutionary struggle and the building of a new society.
The CPSU Central Committee resolutions on the preparations for Vladimir Ilich
Lenin's birth centenary" emphasises that "the unfading active force of V.I. Lenin's
ideas consists precisely In his creative development of Marxism. The Leninist
attitude to theory combined in itself revolutionary creativity and loyalty to the
principles of Marxism and the connection of theory With life and revolutionary
practice."
This Leninist tradition is continued by all Marxist-Leninists. Taking into account
oa specific character of the different countries, Marxist-Leninists throughout the
t,.or-ld are developing and improving collectively a single and integral Marxist-Leninist
theory.
r?ollawing Lenin's principles and creatively generalizing Marxist-Leninist theory,
the CPSU shows the Soviet people the way to the victory of communism. In revealing
the regu.;ar law-governed development from socialism to communism, the party has
ubstantiated the primary significance of creating the material-technical base
-f communism which insures the victory or the new system, has developed scientific
t.r-incipiaS for the organization and control of the national economy at Its present stage
tr- development, and has theoretically substantiated specific paths for the gradual
,teveloument of socialist statehood into a communist social self-governing state and
ls: potrts for improving socialist social relationships and instilling a communist
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
The anti-Marxist fabrication that Leninism is only suitable for economically
undeveloped countries is refuted graphically by life. These days any unprejudiced
person can see that Leninism, its revolutionary theory, its strategy, and its
tactical principles are suitable andobligatory for the fraternal parties of all
countries, taking their specific conditions into account.
It is well known that communists are --!ways in favor of the comprehensive consideration
of the specific circumstances of one country or another and of their social,
economic, and cultural traditions and conditions and against the mechanical
transference of the experience of certain countries to others. It stands to
reason that one cannot replace this Marxist-Leninist attitude with the idea of
the necessity fdr creating "a new variant of Marxism" for this or that country,
for Marxism-Leninism is a single system of scientific views expressing laws of
social development which are common to all countries and peoples and the whole
of mankind. There cannot be Chinese, Russian, or Yugoslav Marxism. To assert
such a thing would mean surrendering to oblivion theinternational essence of
Marxism-Leninism and the universal significance of Marxist-Leninist theory and
adopting the position of nationalistic ideology. Let us remember how passionately
V.I. Lenin opposed those who strove to "tear" socialism "asunder" into "national
compartments" and how hewarned against nationalistic distortions which cause
colossal damage to the interests of the world socialist revolution.
The following fact is graphic evidence of the pertinence of these warnings of Lenin1s.
As everyone knows, Mao Tse-tung began with the absolutization and dogmatization
of Chinese experience, counterposing it to the revolutionary experience of other
peoples. Thus he tried to give substantiation to Chinas particular path to
revolution and to its ideological expression--"Sinicized Marxism." It could be shown
originally that it was a question of applying Marxism to specific Chinese
conditions. However, with the passage of time it became clear that under the
flag of "Sinicized Marxism" Mao Tse-tung and his group had embarked on the road of
anti-Sovietism and great-power chauvinism. Matters even reached the point of
armed provocations by the Chinese authorities on the Soviet-Chinese border, which
seriously damage the cause of socialism. andpeace, the common front of the anti-
imper-alist struggle, and the. friendship of the Soviet and Chinese peoples.
Our people constantly nurture feelings of respect and friendship for the great
Chinese people. They are firmly convinced that in the final analysis the difficulties
in Soviet-Chinese .r.1atons will be overcome. The Soviet people are confident of the
very great power o.L pr.,le.tarian internationalism, which expresses the vital interests
of the peoples of a_i countries. Naturally, every couhtry'whieh is guided by a
Marxist-Leninist par :y will contribute something new to the forms and methods of
socialist transformations. The practice of the socialist countries has enriched
and specified the concept of the general natural laws, forms, and methods of
socialist building and has shown the rich, complex, and multiform nature of the
formation and development of a new system under one set or another of historically-
specific conditions. The time taken for solvine:socialist'tasks and especially
for the formation of mature socialism having the appropriate material and technical
base and developed social relationships is not uniform for different countries;
it depends considerably upon the socioeconomic level at which the socialist
transformations begin. But the basic natural laws for building and organ izing
socialist life are common to all. This is acknowledged by all Marxist-Leninists
and is recorded in the declaration and statement of the 1957 and 1960 conferences
of representatives of communist and workers parties.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
I-I. 9 May 69 A 19 USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
The very nature of the working class--the wave of the future--a class whose interests
coincide completely with the objective course of social development--conditions its
interests in a true, all-round, and deep recognition of reality and in accelerating
social progress. Only with a scientific understanding of the objective laws of
history is It possible to implement the worldwide historic mission of the working
class--the overthrow of the final exploiter system and the building of a new society
on wise and just principles--and to direct grandiose construction consciously in all
spheres of human activity under socialism and communism. Thus, any attempt to find
social truth outside Leninism is a fruitless undertaking that has nothing in common
with the interests of working people or of socialism and communism. The theoretical
treasure house of Marxism-Leninism as a single international teaching is open to all
the modern achievements of progressive scientific thought and to all Marxist-Leninist
parties, each one of which makes its own theoretical contribution on the basis of its
own experience in the revolutionary struggle. However, there are bourgeois and
revisionist theoreticians who by hiding behind their demands for "openness" in Leninism,
try to change it into a conglomeration of different ideas and concepts borrowed from
the antiscientific social and philosophical doctrines that exist in our time. Those
who love to introduce into Marxism-Leninism views and proposals alien to it suppose
that in this way they are insuring the "up-to-dateness" of Leninism,
Of course, Marxist-Leninists are constantly analyzing 'theoretically and generalizing
the greatest achievements of science and technology and the process of present-day
social development. Marxist-Leninists also reveal what new phenomena of social science
and practice are being subjected to analysis and, moreover, falsification by the
bourgeois thinkers. Here Marxist-Leninists have waged and are waging an implacable
struggle against the attempts of revisionist authors to replace Marxism-Leninism with
an eclectic hodge-podge made up of the latest "achievements" of reactionary bourgeois
philosophy, sociology, political economy, and legal and other concepts. And the
attempts in this direction are being undertaken relatively intrusively by the
revisionists. Periodically schemes are proposed which are calculated to cause a
sensation among people who are unexacting in the theoretical and political sense: To
"supplement" Marxism-Leninism with abstract humanism, to replace the materialistic
understanding of history with a "systemo-structural approach," to uncritically introduce
into scientific communism sociological concepts, methods, and research principles, and
so forth which have been borrowed from bourgeois theoreticians.
Such an interpretation of the "openness" of the theory is rejected resolutely by
Marxist-Leninists; the theory of Marxism-Leninism is /closed,/ categorically and forever,
to all enemies of Leninism, whether they stand openly on the bourgeoisie's positions, or
whether they hide behind socialist phraseology. Any weakening, any yielding to the
ideological enemies of scientific socialism would be fraught with losses for Leninist
revolutionary theory--the greatest ideological asset of the international working class.
These days even many bourgeois figures have been forced to admit that socialism,
created on the foundation of Marxist-Leninist theory insures accelerated economic and
cultural development for all countries which embarked on its path, regardless of
whether in the past they were at the stage of capitalism or precapitalism. All this,
in its turn, predetermined the enormous effect of world socialism on the course of
social development and the growth of the communist, workers, and national liberation
movements. And now the veritable nature of the theory of Marxism-Leninism has been
proved in the experience of many nations, large and small, living in various parts of
the earth and the general natural laws governing the formation and development of
socialist society have been elucidated.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
111. 9 May 69 A 22 USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Those actions were directed toward defense of socialist Czechoslovakia's national
sovereignty and against the encroachments of internal and foreign enemies on the
social and national achievements of a fraternal people and toward insuring the
conditions for the free development of a sovereign socialist country.
The strength of the international communist and workers movement lies in its unity.
The effectiveness of the struggle against the common enemy of all peoples- imperialism--
depends on the cohesive actions of all present-day revolutionary forces. Marxist-,
the positi.pn
L?nix#i. t 99 Weir i tI.r tonal duty i.n defending ani ptpCp
of world socialism and in waging a 4ptermined struggle against imperialism and on
behalf of the basic interests of the working people. The international conference
of communist and workers parties, which opens in. Moscow on 5 June, is destined to be
an important milestone in the mobilization of the popular masses for a more active
and effective struggle against imperial .sm. The recent session of the working group
for preparation of the draft documents for the forthcoming conference and discussion
in the preparatory commission of the draft of the main document for the conference
showed the firm desire of communists of all continents for comradely cooperation and
again demonstrated the growing aspiration of the communist and workers parties toward
cohesiveness in the struggle against imperi-alism and on behalf of common aims on
the principled basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.
The course of preparations for the forthcoming conference shows that, given a sincere
striving toward cooperation, even the most ,,omplex questions can be solved, and this
is what the vital interests of the broadest popular masses imperatively demand.
The objective community of interests of the communist parties and all ranks of the
world revolutionary movement are stronger than those factors causing disagreement
and divergence. The condition for the coming victory of the international communist
movement is loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and to the ideas of the recognized leader of
the world proletariat, V.I. Lenin, who made a enormous contribut on. to formulating
the communist movement's strategy and tacti-,s. Lenin raised high the banner of
internationalism and educated communists and all working people in the spirit of
,international solidarity. With his characteristic revolutionary passion V.I. Lenin
fought opportunism, adventurism, and narion.lism in the international workers move-
ment and warned the communist parties of the danger of nationalist and revisionist
ideology and policy for the fate of the revolution and socialism.
Recalling their leader's behests, Marxieit-Leninists of all countries are striving to
strengthen the 'unity of their ranks on the basis of proletarian internationalism.
Objective-preconditions of the necessity for unity are to be seen in the fact that
the ;. 27 -2Ft1.
.L.seph Stalin, Mar:eam and the 3 ational Question, pp. 104-105.
10 V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. 8. li. 284.
1. Te?nin? soehineaiyy0. 3d ed., Foi. 26. ?. I1.
"V-
F. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. 8. p. 321.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NEGOTIATION 15
2. When an attempt by the enemy, or by the Party, to advance by
violent means has failed, the. conditions for an effective agreement
between the Party and the enemy come into existence.
In 1920, Lenin said :
. . . every attempt to start war on us will mean for the states
resorting to war that the terms they will get after and as a result
of the war will be worse than those that they could have got with-
out war or before war. This bas been proved in the case of several
states. . . And thanks to this our relations with neighboring
states are steadily improving.. . . Peace on such a basis has
every chance of being . . . durable. . .. e
3. The Party must always expect outside groups to violate agree-
men ts.
In 1920, Lenin said about the policy of granting economic
"concessions" to foreign entrepreneurs:
Of course, the capitalists will not fulfill the agreements, say the
comrades who fear concessions. That is a matter of course, one
must absolutely not hope that the capitalists will fulfill the agree-
ments??
These attitudes imply that a "settlement" with the Western Powers-
that is, an agreement sharply reducing the threat of mutual annihila-
tion-is inconceivable to the Politburo, although arrangements with
them, codifying the momentary relationship of forces, are always
considered.
16 V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. 8, p. 230.
20 V. I. Lenin, Sochinenipa, 3d ed., Vol. 20, p. 22.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
From Chapter 10 by Philip F. Mos('ly in Rnyniond t enm?tt and Joseph L. Johnson
I eds.). Xcgotiating With the Iturtxianx. ('opyrigbt Q 11151 by World 1'ta(-e i"ouu-
tbu ion. Reprinted by Ix-rmi ion of the author. I
SOME SOVIET TECHNIQUES OF NEGOTIATION*
By Philip E. Mosely
(I'roft'ssr,r of International Relations and Director of the
Yurnpean Institute. ('ohunbiat University, former Ulrexetor, Rus~:ian
Institute. Columbia university)
There is a deep-seated tradition in western diplomacy that an Wee-
the diploluatt, should he a two-way interpreter. Ile must present his
own ,roves?nmellt's policy forcefully to the government to which he is
accredited and defend the essential interests of his country. If he is to
give intelligent advice to his government. he must also develop it keen
insight into the policies of the government witth which he deals and
become skilled in distinguishing basic interests and sentiments which
it cannot disregard from secondary ones which it may adjust or limit
for the broader purpose of reaching agreement. Occasionally, as in-
stanced by Woodrow Wilson's criticism of Walter Mines Page, it has
seemed as if individual ambassadors become too much penetrated by
the viewpoint and interests of the country to which they were sent and
less able to press contrary views of their own governiiients.
No such problem of delicate balance in functions arises to plague
the Soviet negotiator. This has been especially true since the great
purge of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in 19:8-:9 and the
replacement of Litvinov by .lfolotov in 1939. The new foreign affairs
stall' was recruited among the iniddle ranks of Soviet officials, whose
entire training had been based on rigid adherence to centralized deei-
sions and who had rarely had inforliial contacts with life outside the
Soviet, Union. The present-day Soviet representative can hardly be
called a ``negotiator" in the custoniarv sense. Ile is rather treated is a
nteclianical mouthpiece for views and demands formulated centrally
in 'Nlostxv, and is deliberately isolated from the impact of views, in-
terests and sentiments which influence foreign governments anti peo-
ples. Probably the Soviet representative abroad, through fear of heinrr
accnsetl of "frilling captive to imperialist and cosmopolitan influences,"
serves as a block to the transmission of foreign views and sentiments,
rather than as a channel for coniniunit?ating them to his igoverli-
m eat....
?\nTP. aY Sracnatxlr'r STAFF.-Wrlttt?n in 19:.n- this elnenlc article deacrlbes exnert-
enera with the Soviets hetww'n 1942 and 191:1. Though dated in some rc=~ncrt1. much of the
analysts Is still relevant. For example: While Sovlet diplomacy has ecrtainiv become better
Informed abort the nntsi le world, the rnntinutug effects of dogmatism on education. on the
view of the no tside world. and on inter-tM?ronnol aril inter-national relations remain a Ms.
tinetive feantre of Soviet holler making and Sorlet negottaIIon.
prom 1942 t.. 11146 Mr. 31osply serve.i ns an nffi??er of flip nruartmrnt nr Stete In vari..na
ealarittes inc-ading that of Advisor to the t'nited States Delegation at the Jinsenw (',in-
ference, 194.1 : PallIleal Advisor to the Ameri van Dclerttlion oa the Rurnoean Advisory C..tn-
misslon. 1944-1945: at the Potsulam Confer.?nce. 1945: and at the meetings of the t'ound-
of For-lm Ministers at London and Parts In 194 and 194G. TT,- was the T nit.'d States
Representative on the Commission for the Investigattmt of the Yugoslav-itatlan Itonndarv
n 1946.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
THE SOVIET APPIIOACIf TO NEGOTIATION 13
revolution, during which our objective is the overthrow of the
international bourgeoisie. . . We shah witness a succession of
ebbs and flows in the revolutionary tide. For the time being the
international revolutionary movement is in the declining phase;
but . . . this decline will yield . to an upward surge which
may in the victory of the world proletariat. If, however, it should
not end in victory, another decline will set in, to be followed in
its turn by yet another revolutionary surge. Our defeatists main-
tain that the present ebb in 1 he revolutionary tide marks the end
of the revolution. They are iiuistaken now just as heretofore . . .
the revolution does not develop along a straight, continuous and
upwardly aspiring line but along a zigzag path . . . an ebb and
flow in the tide, . . .1i
In 1927, Stalin said:
The fact that the Chinese revolution has not resulted in direct
victory over imperialism, this fact cannot have decisive signifi-
cance for the perspective of the revolution. Great popular revolu-
tions never win through to the end on their first appearance. They
grow and strengthen these elves by ebbs and flow. So it was
everywhere, and in Russia too. So it will be in China''
That is, major successes are often preceded by repeated failures: "We
know that the transition front capitalism to socialism involves an
extremely difficult struggle. But we are prepared. . . . to make a thou-
sand attempts : having made a thousand attempts we shall go on to
the next attempt." ". . we shall act as we did in the Red Army:
they may beat us a hundred times, but the hundred and first time
we shall beat them all." "Not one of the problems that we have had
to solve could be solved at one stroke; we had to make repeated
attempts to solve them. Having suffered defeat, we tried again.. . . "
2. It is not possible to predict how strong an "ebb" will be, and
how long it will last.
3. To achieve a major advance or final victory requires a length of
time commensurate to the historical importance of these events :
" the aim . . . [of the Party I is radically to transform the con-
ditions of life of the whole of humanity, and . .. for that reason
it, is not permissible to be 'disturbed' by the question of the duration
of the work."
4. A Bolshevik must always control any tendency to act inexpedi-
ently after a setback : ". . a Marxist must be able to reckon with
the most complicated and fantastic zigzag leaps of history. . . ."
"Whatever the . . . vicissitudes of the struggle may be, however many
partial zigzags it may be necessary to overcome (and there will be
very many of them-we see from experience what tremendous twists
the history of the revolution is making . . .), in order not to get lost
in these zigzags and twists of history . . . in the periods of retreat,
retirement or temporary defeat,, or when history, or the enemy, throws
us back . . . the . . . correct tiling is not to cast out the old basic
programs.". . .
1. The Party must never show "adventurism" in its attempts to
advance; that is, it must never risk already conquered major positions
for the sake of uncertain further gal us.
1s Joseph Stalin, Leninism, Vol. 1, pp. 220-222.
It Joseph Stalin, Sochineniya, Vol. 10, p. 283.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
14 THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NEGOTIATION
On January 20, 1918, Len in said:
It would be a quite Impermissible tactic to risk the already
begun socialist revolution in Russia simply because of the hope
that the German revolution will break out in a very short time. in
a few weeks. Such a tactic would be adventurist. We have no right
to assume such a risk.'"
On January 24, 1918, Lenin discussed the proposal that
war against Germany should be resumed in order to
maximize the chances of the German revolution :
But Germany is still only pregnant with revolution, while with us
a perfectly healthy child has already seen the light of the world.
a child which we may kill by beginning the war." .. .
1. 'Mastery in the skill of retreating is as necessary as mastery in the
skill of advancing.
In 1922, Lenin said:
When It was necessary-according to the objective situation in
Russia as well as the whole world-to advance, to attack the enemy
with supreme boldness, rapidity, decisiveness, we did so attack.
When it will be necessary, we will know how to do this again and
again. . . . And when, in the spring of 1021, it appeared that the
advance guard of the revolution was threatened by the danger of
becoming isolated from the mass of the people ... then we resolved
unanimously and firmly to retreat. And for the past year we have in
general retreated In revolutionary order. Proletarian revolutions
will not be able to fulfill their tasks without combining the skill
in ... attack with the skill in retreating in revolutionary
order.'. .. .
1. Any agreements between the Party and outside groups must. be
regarded as aiding the future liquidation of these groups and as bar-
riers a ainst the liquidation of the Party by them. Thus," 'Reformism,'
,the policy of agreenietit' and ` particular agreements' are different mat-
ters . . . with the Mew -s agreements are transformed into a
system, into a policy of agreement, while with the Bolsheviks only;
particular concrete agreements are acceptable, and are not made into a
policy of agreement."
Thereforethere is no essential difference between coming to an osten-
sibly amicable arrangement with an outside group or using Violence
against, it; they are both tactics in an over-all strategy of attack.
In 1920, Lenin said, with reference to Soviet plans for
granting economic "concessions" to foreign entrepre-
neurs:
The major theme of my speech will be the proof of two points,
namely, first, that every war is the continuation of the policy con-
ducted in peace, only by other means; second, that the conces-
sions which we grant, which we are forced to grant, are the con-
tinuation of war in another force, by other means. . . It would
be a great mistake to believe that a peaceful agreement about
concessions is-a peaceful agreement with capitalists. This agree-
ment is equivalent to war... .
u V. L Lenin, Sachineniya, 4th ed., Vol. 26, p. 407.
M rbid., 3d ed., Vol. 22, lpr. 201.
'I V. 1. Lenin, Sochineniya, 3d ed., Vol. 27, p. 271.
V. I. Lenin, Sochincniya, 3d ed., Vol. 26, p. 6.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
In opening negotiations with any Soviet representatives except Stalin
the first problem is to discover whether the representatives have any
instructions at all. To discover ii-hat those instructions, if any, are
requires sitting out the whole course of the negotiation, with its de-
mands, insults, and rigidities and its always uncertain outcome . .. .
Soviet experts and diplomats caimot participate in an informal day-
to-day exchange of information, comments and tentative recommenda-
tions concerning policy. Until Moscow has sent. instructions they can
say nothing at all., for they may ia-il to express the exact nuance of
thinking or intention which has not. yet been formulated at the center,
and transmitted to them. After Moscow has spoken they can only
repeat the exact formulation given- to them, and no variation may be
introduced into it unless Moscow has sent the necessary further in-
structions. The "western" habit of continuous negotiation is baffling to
the Soviet diplomats, who cannot undFarstand that their western col-
leagues have both the opportunity and the responsibility for present-
ing and even advocating policies within their own governmental
operations and that, within a broadly agreed pattern of interests and
purposes, they have considerable leeway in finding the most effective,
and usually informal, methods of influencing their "opposite num-
bers" in foreign. ministries or ernb~cssies .. . .
The important network of in Formal communication among the
"western" powers, as well as the moderate latitude given to their repre-
sentatives, makes for a swift pace of negotiation which arouses bewil-
derment and suspicion among their Soviet colleagues. Since western
foreign ministries are receiving daily a flow of confidential comment
on foreign views and intentions, they are forearmed with current anal-
yses and can often ive necessary decisions rapidly. "Western" diplo-
mats also have a substantial latitude to work out agreed positions and
drafts, at least on secondary and procedural matters. Thus, their minor
differences are often resolved with wh at seems to their Soviet colleagues
like suspicious speed.
Not believing in or not unders#andi n g the system of informal com-
munication and limited individual latitude, the Soviet representatives
readily fall back on the theory of "A merican dictation." It is easier for
then to assert that the United States government has exerted political,
military and financial pressure to force its will upon other governments
than to take the trouble to analyze the. complex and, to them, unfamiliar
and unbelievable system of informal communication which usually lies
behind the "automatic majorities" assembled around United States
proposals. They are incredible when told that such pressure is exerted
only rarely and that more often agreement is reached through give-
and-take of views, by which no side gets its full position and each gets
a part of it.
Sometimes the sole instructions with which a Soviet delegation en-
ters a conference are that it is not to commit itself to anything or sign
anything. . . . In some negotiations it became clear, after delivery by
it of numerous charges and accusations, that the Soviet delegation had
no instructions except to "report back." . . .
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
is THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NEGOTIATION
Ilti far the most frequent situation is one in which the Soviet negotia-
tors are bound by detailed instructions rigidly pressed. Each point. at
issue, large or small, then becomes a test of will and nerves. Instead of
striving t4i reduce the number of points of friction and to isolate and
diminish the major conflicts of interest, the Soviet negotiator often
appears to his exasperated "western" colleague to take pride in finding
the maximum number of disputes and in dwelling; on each of them to
the full. Even during the wartime period of relative cooperation it
was noticeable that each decision to convene a three-power conference
was followed by the piling up of disputes and grievances, as well as
by the rapid fabrication of Soviet accomplished facts. Thus the decision
to hold the Yalta Conference was followed swiftly by the unilateral
Soviet recognition of the Lublin Committee as the legitimate govern-
ment of Poland. While arrangements were being made to hold the
Potsdam Conference, at which Poland's territorial gains in the west
would presumably be determined by three-power decision, the Soviet
goarernnient proceeded to turn over to Polish administration a large
part of the Soviet zone This action was, of course, all assertion of the
Soviet Union's exclusive role in eastern Europe, in disregard of a
political agreement to determine the western boundary of Poland
jointly, and in violation of the three-power agreement defining the
zones of occupation in Germany.
The closely related technique of playing up grievances was also well
illustrated at Potsdam. Bitter and prolonged Soviet attacks upon the
presence of British troops in Greece, the Dodecanese, Syria and Leb-
auaon took up much time and energy. When the western negotiators
had been worn down by these wrangles the Soviet negotiators could
fare with greater equanimity the American and especially the British
protests against the brutal assertion of Soviet hegemony in IIungary,
Rumania and Bulgaria. By their tactics the Soviet, leaders had encour-
aged their militant supporters in Greene, had upheld their reputation
for hostility to "colonialism- in the 'Middle East, and had fought off
any coordinated western program for loosening their grip on the three
satellites.. .
The treasuring of grievances, real or imaginary, within a cycle of
themes for negotiation is paralleled within the individual negotiation
by the use of disconcerting ripostes and of accusations of bad-faith.
One of the most important issues which confronted the Moscow Con-
ference of Foreign Ministers in October 1943 was whether the Czecho-
slovak Government-in-Exile should conclude a twenty-year defensive
alliance with the Soviet Union alone, or whether the building of any
regional systems of postwar guarantees against a revival of German
aggression should be postponed until the three major allies could re-
solve the problem by joint decision. . . . Early in the discussion a con-
crete issue of fact arose between Eden and Molotov. In a conciliatory
fashion Eden began by saying, "I may be mistaken, but ..." Before
lie could complete his sentence Molotov broke in harshly, "You are mis-
taken," His abrupt riposte was effective. Eden's presentation was dis-
rupted. By this tactic, and by constant accusations that the western
powers were trying to rebuild a cordon Ranitaire in Eastern Europe,
Molotov succeeded in evading any probing discussion of the nature and
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NEGOTIATION 19
purpose of the Soviet program of building up .a security belt of its own
and won British approval and American acquiescence for the first step,
the conclusion of the Soviet-Czechoslovak alliance, which was signed at
Moscow two months later.
During the course of negotiation it is often clear that the Soviet nego-
tiators are under compulsion to try for a certain number of times to se-
cure each Soviet point, no matter how minor. After trying up to a cer-
tain point and finding that the. demand cannot be put through the
Soviet representative has often given in, only to turn to the next itein
in dispute, over which a similarly prolonged period of deadlock ensues.
What is not clear, however, is whether the number or duration of these
tries has been prescribed in advance by instruction or whether it is left
to the judgment of the individual Soviet negotiator to decide when he
has built up a sufficiently impressive and protective record of having
beat his head against a stone wall,.
A good example of the "head-against-stone-wall" technique de-
veloped rather early in the ilegot i atioris of 1945-46 over the Yugoslav-
Italian boundary. At the first meeting of the Council of Foreign
Ministers, held at London in September 1945, almost the only item of
agreement was a brief instruction to the Deputies to the effect that the
boundary "should be in the main the ethnic line leaving a minimum
under alien rule,." When the Deputies began their work at Lancaster
House, in January 1946, the Soviet delegation began a strong cam-
paign, lasting for some six weeks of almost daily argument, to re-
move the words, "in the main." The issue was fought over in long
meetings of the four-power Commission for the Investigation of the
Yugoslav-Italian Boundary, and from there it was carried into long,
numerous and even more tense meetings of the Deputies.
The three words which aroused Soviet ire were extremely impor-
tant. If the boundary was to follow "the ethnic line" it would reach
the sea between Monfalcone and Trieste, leaving Trieste with its large
Italian majority and the coastal strip of Western Istria within Yugo-
slavia. In the triangle Monfalcone-Gorizia-Trieste the ethnic boundary
between Italian and Slovene villages is clearly marked and has hardly
varied in several hundreds of years. On the other hand, if the bound-
ary was to be "in the main the ethnic line," the Commission would
have to give considerable weight to the claims of the Italian majorities
in Trieste and in the coastal strip of Istria, offsetting against them
the Slovene national character of several small villages in the coastal
strip between Monfalcone and Trieste. If the words "in the main" were
omitted it was hardly necessary to send out an investigating commis-
sion at all, with its attendant. wave of turbulence, terrorization, kid-
nappings and murders, and the "ethnic line", pure-and-simple, could
be drawn in Lancaster House.
During the weeks of intensive debate tension mounted around the
green-topped table. As usual, Soviet intransigence turned the dispute
into % test of staying-power. In view of the fact that public opinion still
continued to regard any failure to reach speedy agreement with the
Soviet government as primarily the fault of American or British "reac-
tionaries," rather than attributing any part of it to the "all-or-nothing"
Soviet attitude, it was not clear how long the western delegations would
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
20 THE SOVIET APPROACH TO 'NEGOTIATION
hold out against the Soviet demand that the boundary issue be pre-
judged one-hundred-percent in favor of the Soviet position. In an
effort to win the Soviet delegation over to a compromise the Western
delegations offered to remove from the purview of the boundary com-
mission Fiume, the islands of the Quarnero and the primarily Yugo-
slav-inhabited parts of Venezia Giulia; they did insist that the formula
"in the main" be retained and that the commission be free to investigate
the Italian and mixed areas within the region. Finally, "enough was
enough," even for Soviet negotiators enamored of indefinite repetition,
and the Deputies suspended their meetings without agreement on the
terns of reference.
Now, at last, the Soviet delegation had, reluctantly, to inform Mos-
cow that the Western Deputies refused to budo-e on this basic issue of
rewriting the formula which had been aapprovec by the Council of For-
eig'rn Ministers. This put up to the Soviet government the question of
taking the responsibility for an indefinite deadlock in the negotiation
of the peace treaties. After two days of marking timethe Soviet delega-
tion asked to have a meeting of the Deputies and proceeded, without
outward resentment., to a )prove the final western-backed version of the
commission's terns of reference, retaining the key words, "in the main
the ethnic line." One basic factor in the Soviet decision to recede from
its stubbornly pressed demand must have been that Anglo-American
forces were stationed in Trieste, Pala and the Isonzo valley. If 1 ugo-
slav or Soviet forces had been in possession the deadlock would prob-
ably have been allowed to continue indefinitely... .
One of the. main pitfalls in wartime Anglo-American negotiations
with the Soviet. Union was the tendency to rely upon reaching an
"agreement in principle," without: spelling out in sufficient detail all
the steps in its execution. After long and strenuous debates, studded
with charges, accusations and suspicions, it was undoubtedly it great
relief to reach a somewhat generally worded agreement and to go
home. Prodded by manifold public and party duties, anxious to prove
to thernselves and to their people that current agreements and post-
war cooperation with the Soviet Government were genuinely possible,
faring "deadliness" with respect, to the expectations of legislatures and
of public opinion, flit' western leaders often approached these negotia-
tions under serious disadvantages. Wooed rather than the wooer, able
to deal at leisure with the manipulation of their public opinion at
bonne. faring no deadlines, the Soviet leaders had many advantages.
In this situation the western powers sometimes gained the "principle"
of their hopes, only to find that "in practice" the Soviet government
continued to pursue its original aims.
At Yalta the Soviet Government agreed, after very lengthy argu-
ment and stubborn resistance, to participate in a reconstruction of the
Polish Government which would, it appeared, permit the survival of
some political freedom for the great non-Communist majority of the
people. By delays and (]uibblings over the execution of the "agree-
ment in principle" during the next few months, the Soviet. Govern-
merit secured about ninety percent of the original position with which
it had come to Yalta and thus strengthened beyond challenge the small
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
THE SOVIET APPROAC?3 TO NEGOTIATION 21
Communist minority in its dominant control of the country. At Yalta
the Soviet Government also agreed, in return for sweeping territorial
and other concessions, to deal only with the Chinese National Govern-
ment as the representative of China. By turning over territory, ad-
ministration and Japanese arms to Chinese Communist forces, the
Russians nullified, in the areas where their forces were dominant, the
principal and vital quid pro quo which they had promised at Yalta.
When British, Canadian and A merican negotiators come to an "agree-
ment in principle" they often haggle to a fare-thee-well over the
implementation of an arrangement which may still be distasteful to
each of them. However, they remain within the framework of the
principle to which they have agreed, or else they frankly ask to reopen
the agreement in principle and to renegotiate it on the grounds that
further consideration has shown that they cannot carry it out. It has
remained for the Soviet representatives to assert that they are carry-
ing out "an agreement in principle" by doing just the reverse "in
practice." .. .
In numerous instances Soviet negotiators, even when under some
pressure to reach agreement, have shown that they are in mortal terror
of violating any part, minor or major, of their instructions, and are
extremely reluctant to report to Moscow that they cannot get every
point and every wording in their own drafts. Making recommenda-
tions for even slight changes in their instructions exposes them to
serious risks. It means that they consider their own superiors slightly
less than omniscient. It may mean that they can be accused of giving
undue weight to the viewpoint of another government and thus of
"falling captive to imperialist insinuations." The result is that, even
when, in a given question, the Soviet negotiator is committed to the
desirability of achieving agreement, lie is unable to take any initiative
in finding a reasonable meet,i n,g~ ground of viewpoints and he is usually
extremely reluctant even to present to his own government suggestions
for compromise or reconciliation of differences which originate in
other delegations.
A widespread lack of ease in using Eno-lish or French commonly
adds a good deal to the difficulties of the ?oviet negotiator. One of the difficulties of Soviet-Russian vocabulary is that the word
"compromise" is not of native origin and carries with it no favorable
empathy. It is habitually used only in combination with the adjective
"putrid." "Compromise for the sake of getting on with the job" is
natural to American and British people, but it is alien to the Bolshevist
way of thinking and to the discipline which the Communist Party
has striven to inculcate in its members. To give up a demand once
presented, even a very minor or formalistic point, makes a Bolshevik-
trained negotiator feel that he is losing control of his own will and is
becoming subject to an alien will. Therefore any point which has finally
to be abandoned must be given up only after a most terrific struggle.
The Soviet negotiator must first prove to himself and his superiors
that he is up against an immovable force. Only then is lie justified in
abandoning a point which plainly cannot be gained and in moving
on to the next item, which will again be debated in an equally bitter
tug-of-wills... .
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
22 THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NEGOTIATION
The western negotiator is usually able to envisage a series of minor
shifts in his own and other positions. Ile is "pluralistic" in his ap-
proach to a solution, in the adjustments of democratic decision-making
at home and in seeking adjustments of interests and views among na-
tions. The Soviet negotiator is worried, puzzled, scornful, and sus-
picious when the western negotiator tries out a series of minor varia-
tions to see if the opposing positions cannot be brought closer together.
To him it means only that the western representative was "not serious"
in the first. place. If'he is willing to shift so quickly from his original
position it must mean that he did not hold it in earnest. to begin with
and than he can eventually be forced all the way over to the Soviet posi-
tion, provided the Soviet negotiator will only display "principled
steadfastness" long enough and vigorously enough.
The western representative tends to assume that a minor concession
here or there will facilitate achieving the common aim of cooperative
action. He does not necessarily look for an immediate quid pro quo for
each minor concession. At a later stage in the negotiation his partner
will remember the facilitating concession and will yield something in
turn. To him "goodwill" is both a lubricant of the negotiating process
and a valuable intangible by-product. The Soviet negotiator takes a
minor concession as a sign that his principles are stronger and his will
is firmer than those of his opponent. He does not believe in "goodwill."
Ile is trained to assume the ill-will of the "capitalist environment." If
an "imperialist" negotiator asserts his will for peace, it means, at the
best, that he is consciously in favor of peace but is unconsciously a tool
of uncontrollable forces which work for war and for the final clash be-
tween "two worlds." At the worst., it means that he is trying to deceive
and gain time while mouthing words of "peace." To a Bolshevik even a
momentary "loss of vigilance" may have fatal consequences. The So-
viet diplomat feels himself like a traveler by night in the forest who
must be constantly on the watch for the smallest sound or sight of
treachery. He must be unceasingly on guard against his own human
tendency to "fall into complacency" and thus to underestimate the
dangers which surround both him and the regime which he serves.
Soviet diplomacy is also monolithic in its method of operation and
in its reactions to outside events or internal changes of stress. 'lime
American practice is to subdivide authority extensirveiy, both it home
and in foreign dealings.:' military mission in Moscow, trying to work
out plans for military coordination, would have nothing to say about
the arrangements or conditions for lend-lease.. political negotiation,
aiming to preserve the freedom of choice for an East European nation,
would have no relation to another mission which might be deciding
which German ships should be transferred to the Soviet Union, and
all of them would have no relation to a decision concerning military
and economic aid to China. No such autonomy or fragmentation of
authority is felt in the Soviet conduct of its foreign policy. While it is
probable that little background information on policy is comimini-
cated by Moscow to its representatives abroad, beyond that which they
need individually in order to carry out their instruemions. it is pretty
clear that underlying attitudes are communicated rapidly to them.
Thus, a negotiation over the statute of Tangier bogs down in Paris:
this may be a repercussion cf a crisis which has arisen in Vienna or
of a note delivered in Warsaw. Bolshevist mythology is full of "chain-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
reaction" concepts of causality. With the clumsy force of centralized
wisdom it attempts to meet this .assumed universal causal interdepend-
ence ("nothing is accidental") with its confidence in its own ability to
manipulate events in accordance with its own Leninist-Stalinist dia-
lectic, which it regards as a unique instrument for both foreseeing and
bringing about the future.
This is a grim picture. The Soviet negotiator is tight as a spring,
deeply suspicious, always trying to exert the Soviet will-power out-
ward and to avoid reflecting non-Soviet facts and aspirations inward,
a rigid agent knowing only the segment of policy which he must carry
out with mechanical precision. Does this mean that "negotiation" in
any real sense of the term is impossible? Admitting that negotiation
under these conditions is a very limited affair and very difficult and
unrewarding, it may still be both possible and essential. But it requires
a special approach. Naturally, a knowledge of Russian in its Soviet
nuances is important. It is equally important to understand the role
of the Soviet negotiator in relation to his own government and to its
ideology. The Department of State has carried on a farsighted policy
of equipping a substantial number of its representatives through lan-
guage and area training and through service in missions in the Soviet-
dominated areas to deal with Soviet problems, and as these young
men mature in experience they will fill an important need. The Army
and Air Force have also done a good deal along this line.
In the absence of informal channels of communication with Soviet
representatives it is important for an American delegation to be able
to determine whether the Soviet negotiators have no instructions, have
definite instructions, or merely have instructions to build up a propa-
ganda position. A well equipped negotiator can go much more thor-
oughly into the range of Soviet intentions if he follows the discussion
in the original, without being handicapped by the opaque veil of trans-
lation. In addition he should review each document exchanged or each
statement made in the light of its clear rendering into Russian. It is
unfortunate, for example, that many American public figures con-
tinually speak of the need for an "aggressive policy" to counteract
Soviet pressures, when they mean an "energetic" or "vigorous" policy.
In Russian "aggressive" means only "intending to commit or engaged
in committing aggression," and the colloquial American use of "ag-
gressive" inevitably receives a sinister meaning in Russian translation,
which is the form in which documents must be utilized by all but a
handful of Soviet negotiators and policy-makers.
In conducting negotiations with Soviet representatives it is impor-
tant to adopt in the beginning a single clear position, one which can
be upheld logically and politically during long discussions. The Soviet
delegation will not report this position as the final and strongly held
one until they have had a chance to attack it from all sides. Indefinite
repetition of arguments must be accepted as an inevitable preparation
to negotiate. The American negotiator is inclined to male a single
presentation and then to become impatient when the Soviet response
makes it plain that the Soviet representative either has not understood
it or does not believe it. The Soviet negotiator, of course, does not be=
lieve what he hears, but he listens for undertones of firmness or un-
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
24 THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NEGOTIATION
certainty which tell him whether or not he is slinking the determina-
tion of his adversary. Strong but controlled feeling, rather than im-
patience or anger, is an effective way of giving him his answer to this
question. 1lrlren a position is firmly established it is often advantageous
to prepare a. special inemorandtlru, accompanied by a clear and iclio
niatic translation into Russian, in Order to be sure that one's Own posi-
tion is adequately reported to Moscow, the only spot at which new
instructions are likely to be initiated. Oral statements of position may
or may not be r-ejxn?te(l, but it is probable that every bit of written
material is carefully transmitted. If some part of the' English nienio-
randunr does not lend itself to clear rendering into, Russian, it is useful
to rewrite the English version until it can he rendered without am-
biguity, for while Russian can express any thought, it, does not lend
itself flexibly to a literal rendering of ill English concept or phrase.
Once a position has been worked out, the iron-Soviet negotiator must.
be prepared to uphold it in detail, and for a long time. The technique
of constantly trying out variant, versions, which works well in the
western style of negotiation, only confuses the Soviet representative,
who suspects some new trick in each new variant and must. subject each
in turn to exhaustive interpretation. Constantly modifying one's posi-
tion of- the way in which it is expressed menus also that. the Soviet
negotiator is at a loss to know what version is based on bed-rock and
should therefore be reportedto Moscow. Even slight shifts in position
or wording increase his belief that the adversary's position is a shaky
one and thus encourage him to hold out that much longer for the full
Soviet position. Western negotiators are usually in a position to accept
slight adaptations, but even the slightest variation must be reported
back to Moscow for decision there.
Since western negotiators are generally free, in the light of previous
instructions and their knowledge of their governments' overall policies,
to comment at once on new proposals or statements made during the
course of negotiation, they often assume that Soviet negotiators have a
similar latitude and accordingly press them to express their views.
When so pressed, the Soviet negotiator is always free to raise innuiner-
able objections and criticisers. He is not free to express concordance
with any part of a proposal on which lie has not received instructions
from Moscow. Even the "program statements" of Soviet negotiators
must be reviewed or written in Moscow before they can be delivered,
and therefore Soviet statements at conferences often seem to have little
relation to the immediately preceding statements of other delegations.
When It negotiation is actually under way, it is useful to avoid press-
ing the Soviet delegation to commit itself on a new proposal or draft.
During the active negotiations carried on in the European Advisory
Commission. whenever a new proposal or even a redraft was first, pre-
sented, it was my habit to ask questions which would clarify its mean-
iirg and implications and then to take the Initiative. even if I had
adequate instructions, in saying that, I would have to consult my gov-
ernment before commenting on it, thus relieving the Soviet delegation
of the onus of either declining to comment on it or else of building up
a whole series of negative statements against. the proposal. Then, out
occasions when I had instructions on the new point at issue, I would
go at once to the Soviet delegation and inform its members in detail of
the American position. This meant that .Moscow had before it, at the:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
TIIE SOVIET APPPOACI TO NEGOTIATION 25
same time, the proposal and the American position on it. When there
was a certain underlying desire to reach agreements, this procedure
was often effective, or so it seemed, in reducing the number of diver-
gences by providing full. background on the problem before Moscow
had taken a firm position, which could later be modified only by a long
and exhausting tug-of-wills. Such informal discussions, conducted in
Russian, also offered an occasion for learning or sensing the often un-
foreseen Russian objections and suspicions and for attempting to
remove or alleviate them at an early stage.
When stating a position it is well to be sparing in the use of gen-
eral or broadly stated principles, and when such principles are an
essential part of the position it is necessary to remember that they
are not shared by the Soviet negotia+tor. Broad statements of prin-
ciple can, however, be effectively anchored in the historic experience
of one's own people and, expladiied in that setting, they can have a
certain impact on Soviet thinking. Soviet policy-makers may then
accept them as a fact which mu,4 be taken into account, even though
they do not believe in them or share theirs.
Wherever possible it is more useful to state one's position in terms
of a definite material interest, is in the case of the question of Bul-
garia's obligation to provide reparation to Greece and Yugoslavia.
Soviet-trained negotiators pride themselves on identifying material
interests and can therefore more readily visualize them as facts to
which a certain adjustment can be made.. . .
Is it worthwhile to dwell - on these experiences or to talk about
negotiating at all? Even during the wartime alliance against the
common menaces of Germany and Japan negotiations with the Soviet
government were extremely dif tcult and frustrating, and, aside from
the advantage of having established the United Nations, even before
the end of the war, as a "forum for the opinions of mankind," none
of the wartime agreements on postwar cooperation has worked out
as was hoped, even against hope. Since the war the Soviet govern-
ment has striven by all the means in its extensive arsenal to gain and
retain every advantage for its sidle, regardless of the fact that thereby
it quickly dissipated a very large reservoir of good-will and aroused
the deep alarm of all nations which lay beyond its direct control.
In a period of Soviet expansion and of hope for further expansion,
negotiation could have only the purpose of confusing and dividing the
nations which opposed its pressure, and since the war the Soviet
purpose in negotiating has not been to reach agreements with strong
opponents but to intimidate weaker and adjacent countries and to
undermine the stamina of its principal potential adversaries.
Protected by two oceans and remote from the direct origins of
previous world wars, Americans have been accustomed to ignore the
rising storm and then, once it had burst upon them, to work solely
for victory over the immediate menace. Thus, they tend to feel a
sharp dichotomy between "war" and "peace." When at peace they
are reluctant to think of the possibility of war. When at war they
concentrate solely on winning the war, as if it were a grim football
match, and refuse to worry about the peace which is the goal of
war. Through Lenin and Stalin Soviet thinking has fully absorbed
the Clausewitz maxims that ivitional strength and strong alliances
determine the effectiveness of national policy in peace, and that in
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
26 THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NEGOTIATION
war one must never lose sight of the aims of policy for which it is
waged. To the Soviet -way of thinking, conflict is inherent in the
development. of "capitalist." society, and cannot be wished out of exist-
ence byy "subjective good-will."
within this ongoin * history of conflict, however, Soviet tactics and
techniques are not inflexible. Soviet policy towards the outside world
has varied markedly during the past thirty-four years. True, the out-
ward pressure of Soviet power has marked and !;eared the post-194-5)
Sears and the building of a reliable counterforee is only now under
way in Europe. The outline of It similar counterforce cannot yet be
discerned in Asia. In western policy the building of "positions of
strength" and the use of negotiation must go hand-in-hand. Building
of strength and negotiating cannot be regarded as alternatives or as
opposites. They must be teamed. Negotiation without strength and
determination behind it is frustrating, dangerous and may be suicidal.
On the other hand, when strength has been built, refusal to negotiate
may precipitate a colossal struggle, which would be fought as it cruel
civil war in many parts of the world.-the very conflict which western
strength is beinm fashioned to avert.
For the tinie%eing negotiation of those issues which are negotiable
between the Soviet Union and the west is, generally speaking, in
abeyance. But the art of policy will be to recognize, from a position of
strength, future potentialities of negotiation, not with an expectation of
bringing about a lasting or worldwide relaxation of Soviet ambitions,
but as a means of alleviating individual sources of tension and thus
of strengthening the free world. And if negotiation must go in harness
with consistent and purposeful building o? strength, the art and to_ch-
nique of international dealings must also he broadened to take full
account of the peculiar character of the Soviet approach to negotiation.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
[From Sketches From Life Of Men I Have Known. Copyright Q 1959, 1961 by
Dean Acheson. Harper and Brothers ; and from "On Dealing With Russia :
An Inside View," The New York Times Magazine, April 12, 1959. Copyright Qo
by The New York Times Company. Reprinted by permission.]
ON DEALING WITH RUSSIA
By Dean Acheson
(Former Secretary of State)
ROLE OF NEGOTIATION IN SOVIET STRATEGY*
Why is it that so many of us who have dealt with Russian officials
find that personal recollections are pretty much restricted to anecdotes,
sardonic or ridiculous, to discussions, frustrating and boring ? It is, I
think, because no real personal relations are possible. Either those
Russians with whom we have had to deal do not dare open their
minds, or those who dare have nothing in them to disclose.
Sir William Hayter, formerly British Ambassador in Moscow, has
come to the same conclusion. With individual Russians, he has written
in the London Observer (October 2, 1960), it is not "possible to estab-
lish any kind of lasting or genuine personal relationship," and with
"the real rulers of Russia ... it was the distressing experience of
all Ambassadors that these great men had no more to say in private
than in public; the same series of gramophone records was played
on every occasion; nothing emerged from these private conversations
that could not just as well be gleaned from the pages of Pravda."
It seems almost as though Russians going abroad went to a school
of dialectics, where naturally coarse manners were made intentionally
offensive, and where the students were trained in a technique of in-
tellectual deviousness designed to frustrate any discussion. For in-
stance, if one is inexperienced enough to be involved in discussion of
the merits of free thought, free expression, and a free press, the riposte
is that our information media are owned and used by the imperialist-
monopolists to poison and misinform the masses. How much better the
wise parent who forces his children to speak the truth by punishing
them when they tell falsehoods. Even better, we are told, is the Soviet
government which makes the truth so abundantly available to all
citizens that there is no need or place for private versions and perver-
sions of it. This same pattern of thought can be applied to elections,
in which the same benevolent Soviet system safeguards the ingenuous
elector from the misguidance of self-interested and ambitious men, by
permitting only one candidate--- -in other words "the best man." After
a few evenings of this sort of talk, anything is preferable.
In official negotiations the methods employed have a common root.
My discovery of it, and consequent saving of my sanity, I owe to
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
28 THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NEGOTIATION
Averell Harriman. Toward the end of the war I found myself the
head of an American group negotiating with a Russian group for the
delivery and payment of some war surplus property when hostilities
should sto . After the third meeting it dawned on me that the Russians
were merely repeating the same things and that we were getting no-
where. I disclosed m ? frustration to Averell, our Ambassador then to
Moscow, who was in Washington for consultation.
"Take a few days' recess,"-he advised, "then meet., give them a paper
with your proposal, explain it, and recess again. This will enable them
to cable Moscow and get instructions." Ile explained that none of our
oral proposals had been sent to Moscow, since to have done so would
have opened the sender to charges of being impressed by what we said,
but that a written proposal was another thing. This had to be reported.
To suppress it would be to assume responsibility which also could lead
to criticism. This advice worked. The negotiations got nowhere ; but
they ended, of which there had seemed to be no possibility before.
Mr. Vyshinsky was not a formidable opponent. He was not equip ed,
as is Khrushchev to use debate, discussion, and negotiation for their
chief function in Soviet strategy. Unfortunately what this function is,
is ill understood in non-Communist countries. I have heard people who
should know better, including a head of government, say happily. "As
long as we keep them talking, they're not fighting." Nothing could be
more untrue: they are fighting. They are adopting a tactic specifically
prescribed by Lenin to delay the crises while demoralizing and weak-
ening the enemy. To our minds international conferences and interna-
tional negotiations are so completely means for ending conflict that we
are blind to the fact that they may be and, in the hands of experts, are
equally adapted to continuing it. In the present century the Soviet
state s perfected the use of negotiation, including negotiation by
mass conference, as a method of warfare. this use long antedates the
Communists. A classic example is the negotiation conducted at Canton
by the Chinese with Lord Napier of Merchiston, representing the
British government, in the 1830's, as brilliantly told by Maurice Collis
in Foreign Mud.' The similar use of negotiation by the Communists at
Brest-Litovsk in 1917-1918 and Panmunjom in 1951-1953 was worthy
of the model.
negotiation, in the classic diplomatic sense, assumes parties more
anxious to agree than to disagree; parties who are, therefore, willing
to make concessions in determining what shall be agreed upon. But, as
a friend put. it, Americans in recent. years have come to see three ele-
ments in the process of negotiation. There is the element of the high
school debate, in which the judges are the newspaper columnists and
the Asian and African leaders are the audience. In other words, this
element stresses the impression made by the negotiation, often a con-
trived impression, as in the Geneva Summit Meeting of 1955, rather
than its outcome. The second element is the Yankee horsetrade. Here
the emphasis is on outmaneuvering the opponent, on the game, rather
than on any importance of the game.
The third element is the evangelical one of a revival meeting. Take
the sawdust trail to salvation or suffer damnation in the fires of a nu-
clear hell. "There is no alternative to negotiations with the Russians''
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NEGOTIATION 29
is the constant theme of a well-known columnist and a prominent polir-
tician in this country and of a large section of the British Labour
party. This is, of course, silly. For if there is no alternative, and if the
Russians will only negotiate, as is now the case on their own terms,
then there is no alternative to surrender. But there plainly is an al
ternative, which is by action to change the attitude of the other party.
Negotiation should not be, as some conceive it, mere talk apart from
action. Negotiation and action are parts of one whole. Action is often
the best form of negotiation.. It affects the environment, which in large
part is likely to determine the outcome of negotiation. The sputniks
were powerful moves in negot.ialion; so was the Marshall Plan. Mr.
Khrushchev at the 1960 Paris Summit Meeting, as at the New York
General Assembly, was affecting the environment of international rela-
tions. He was using conference and the forms of negotiation as an
instrument of war.
True negotiation with the Russians, when and how it can occur, has
been admirably summed up by Sir William Ilayter in the excellent
article already mentioned :
Negotiation with the Russians does occur, from time
to time, but it requires no particular skill. The Russians
are not to be persuaded by eloquence or convinced by rea-
soned arguments. They rely on what Stalin used to call
the proper basis of international policy, the calculation of
forces. So no case, however skilfully deployed, however
clearly demonstrated as irrefutable, will move them from
doing what they have previously decided to do; the only
way of changing their purpose is to demonstrate that
they have no advantageou alternative, that what they
want to do is not possible. Negotiations with the Russians
are therefore very mechanical ; and they are probably bet-
ter conducted on paper than by word of mouth.
POSSIBLE PITFALLS ON TtFE WAY TO TIIE SUMMIT *
There is a good deal of folklore, about on the subject of negotiating
with the Russians... .
We are told, for instance, that since only Mr. Khrushchev can make
decisions for the Russian Government, meetings at lower levels are
foredoomed to failure; therefore, on to the summit. Again, that "the
tragic experience of Geneva in. 1955" came from "a grandstand con-
ference," and that this summer's meeting should be held in
private. . .
Is it true that the only way to work anything outwith the Soviet
Government is by conference with the. top man and his staff?
The answer is that it depends on what one is trying to work out. Mat-
ters as complex as the concerting of military and supply operations
on a vast scale during a world war did require this method. Yet the
method, as method, contributed nothing to real agreement on the
solution of Eastern European questions. On the other hand, in 1949,
arrangements for the ending of the blockade of Berlin were agreed
to without meetings at any level. It depends on what the Russians.
find it in their interests to do.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
30 THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NEGOTIATION
Let us have a closer look at the events of 1949. After the coup in
Czechoslovakia, Stalin had decided in Khrushchev's later phrase, to
cut out the "cancer" of Berlin. So, ?ollowin the reform of Vest. Ger-
man currency, a serious problem for East Germany, the blockade of
Berlin began in 1948. The United States r ponded with the airlift
(which probably would not work today) and by a counter-blockade
of East Germany. The Russians became the losers both in Germany
and in their general propaganda position.
Then, at the end of January, 1949, the Soviet Government published
answers by Stalin to questions submitted by a newspaper correspond-
ent. One of these questions and its answer were most interesting. The
question was whether the Soviet Government would raise the block-
ade if the Western powers agreed to postpone the formation of a West
German state. pending a meeting of Foreign Ministers to consider the
problem of Germany as a whole. The answer given to this is worth
quoting in full :
Provided the United States of America, Great Britain
and France observe the conditions set forth in the third
question, the Soviet Government. sees no obstacles to lift-
ing the transport restrictions on the understanding, how-
ever, that transport and trade restrictions introduced
by the three powers should be lifted simultaneously.
Officers in the State Department believed that this might be a signal
that the Soviet Government was ready to discuss an end to the blockade
and counter-blockade. It was decided that the Secretary of State, in a
press conference, should give a signal back.
This took the form of a bland discussion of the questions and
answers in the Stalin interview. No great importance was attributed
to them. It was pointed out that the formation of a West German
Government could hardly be a cause of the blockade since it had not
been thought. of when the blockade was imposed and was not immi-
nent at the time. Certainly the measures taken in response to the
blockade would end when it did. Finally, there were these two para-
graphs :
There are many ways in which a serious proposal by
the Soviet Government to restore normal interzonal
communications and communications with and within
Berlin could be made. All channels are open for any sug-
gestions to that. end. The United States, together with the
other Western occupying powers, wold, of course, con-
sider carefully any proposal made to solve the Berlin
problem consistent with their rights, their duties, their
obligations as occupying powers.
As I say, all of the normal channels are open. I hope
you will not take it amiss if I point out that if I on my
part were seeking to give assurance of seriousness of pur-
pose, I would choose some other channel than the channel
of a press interview.
At the same time, a senior diplomatic officer attending a United
Nations meeting was instructed to say quite casually to a senior Rus-
sian officer at the same meeting that he had been interested in the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NEGOTIATION 31
answers recently in the press and wondered whether they suggested
anything more than the strict words of the text. The Russian officer
had no information; but if he learned anything he would pass it on.
In a week he did, equally casually. The answer had been very carefully
prepared in Moscow. If the American officer had any specific question
the Russian would do his best to get an answer.
Thus began a protracted and highly secret negotiation. The very
fact that secrecy was preserved was to each of the parties a sign of
the good faith of the other. In the end, it was agreed that the blockade
measures on both sides would be ended, a Foreign Ministers meeting
convened on the German problem, and no obligation incurred to post-
pone action on a West German Cove?nment since there was plenty of
time for the meeting to be held before, in the normal course of events,
any further steps would be taken. As the negotiations finished, other
parties were brought in; they approved the plan and joined in the
announcement.
The conference of Foreign Ministers which followed took weeks
and accomplished almost nothing. It was an exercise in propaganda
over Germany. The Russians had exhausted their capacity for adjust-
ment, and further progress must -await the development of new
realities.. .
This brings us to the second of the illusions we have mentioned
about negotiating with the Russians. This is contained within the be-
lief that it is possible to have "private" and not "grandstand" confer-
ences of heads of governments.
President Eisenhower does not share this illusion. "It is rather dif-
ficult," lie said recently, "to visualize such a thing. If you meet with a
group of world leaders, it is rather hard to keep the spotlight off of
it." And how does one talk informally with "batteries of interpreters
and recorders and all that sort of thing? It would almost inevitably
change, I think, into something rather formal."
The illusion, however, goes deeper than the belief that it is possible
to keep these meetings private and out of the spotlight. It goes to a
misconception of the role of these meetings in the Russians' strategy
of negotiation. The purpose of these meetings to them is not, through
discussion of a subject, to reach a resolution of it or an accommodation
regarding it. These meetings are acts in themselves which are intended
to affect the relative positions of the parties.
The Soviets negotiate by acts and not by debate, offer and counter-
offer. Their purpose may be to separate allies, or to undermine gov-
ernments with their people, or to win over uncommitted peoples. Or it
may be, as in "the tragic experience of Geneva in 1955," to bring a
sense of relaxation, goodwill and security, before some energetic of-
fensive such as Soviet intervention in the Middle East.
Publicity is the lifeblood of such an operation. It is not merely, as
President Eisenhower thinks, that a meeting of world leaders attracts
the spotlight. It is that the purposes of the Russian leaders demand
the spotlight, for the spotlight makes an act out of a speech.
Here, too, the Soviet leaders have built-in advantage, for the spot-
light shines brilliantly throughout the Free World and stops at the
Iron Curtain which rings their own. Their opponents and all who may
support or sympathize with them are open and eager to be worked
upon. But the Communist people are immune from any counteroffen-
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
32 THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NEGOTIATION
sine, and hear only what their rulers wish them to hear. The dice are
loaded in this game.
The conclusion is not, of course, that the Western powers must not go
to these conferences. But it is an illusion to expect much from them,
or to identify them with the process of negotiation. in the usual sense
of the word. They should be recognized for what they are: dangerous
and highly mobile adversary operations .. .
We can and should be ready, as we have been on occasions in the
past. to use ingenuity in devising ways to give the Soviet Union rea-
sonable assurance. of its own security and demonstrate our willingness
to remove causes of anxiety, if an, there really are. The [arms con-
trol) negotiations at Geneva over the past years have had this purpose.
But one thing we should never do. That is to undermine the security
of Western Europe-and with. it the best hope we have for avoiding
resort to nuclear war-by destroying the possibility of developing
such a strong defensive position on the ground in Europe that any
aggressor contemplating a move against it must contemplate an at-
tack on so large a scale that nuclear war would almost certainly re-
sult. Only such a situation makes strategic nuclear power a credible
threat and an effective deterrent....
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
[From Soviet Policy Towards International Control of Atomic Energy. Copy-
right ? 1961 by University of Notre Dame Press. Reprinted by permission.]
THE GAMESMANSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL
NEGOTIATION
By Joseph L. Nogee
(Professor of Political Science, University of Houston)
The problem of international control of atomic energy is distinctly
propitious as a case study in Soviet diplomacy. Not ony is it a prob-
lem that is now a closed subject, but it is one which permits examina-
tion of Kremlin policy on a vital issue from beginning to end. The
choice between a national or international atom, so important in the
middle and late 1940s, was a dead issue in the early years of the next
decade : Soviet science and the cold war had permanently nationalized
the atom.
Secondly, the topic is one that contains more than its share of the
drama that is inherent in any problem of such magnitude. The Baruch
Plan was almost as revolutionary in its political implications as the
plan for controlled atomic fission-a formidable challenge which had
to be faced. Whatever course of action Premier Stalin followed in-
evitably portended momentous consequences in view of the key position
of the Soviet Union in world affairs.
Thirdly, a relatively complete body of documentary evidence on
this subject is both available and accessible to the scholar at the present
time.. .
One of the most important features of Soviet policy toward inter-
national control of atomic energy was its duration and consistency.
Given the deep-rooted nature of the Soviet aversion to internationaliz-
ing any segment of Russia's economy, it remains a question why the
Soviet Government did not reject the proposals in toto in 1946 instead
of engaging in an eight-year debate with the object of defeating the
proposals? In other words, why was the Soviet rejection of interna-
tional control of atomic energy an indirect instead of a direct one? To
broaden the question, of what importance was the prolonged series of
negotiations in the Atomic Energy Commission, General Assembly
and Disarmament Commission in the promotion of Russian national
interests?
Along with the leaders of every major nation, the Soviet elite recog-
nized the world-wide pressure of public opinion for some form of
control against use of atomic bombs. Premier Stalin himself com-
mented that "the desires and conscience of people demand that the use
of atomic energy for war-like purposes be prohibited." 1 Andrei
Gromyko gave expression to this same force in his opening speech be-
fore the Atomic Energy Commission when he said :
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
34 THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NEGOTIATION
If we continue to use these discoveries for the production of weapons of macs
destruction we may intensify mistrust between states and keep the people of
the world in continual anxiety and mistrust. Such a position would work against
the aspirations of the pace-loving peoples who are thirsting for the establishment
of a solid peace and who are making every effort to endure that their aspirations
shall be transformed into reality.'
The Soviet Union, which purported to bare its foreign policy upon
popular aspirations for peace and security could no more afl'or(l to
neglect world opinion on this subject than could any other major
nation. At the very least it had to pay lip service to this popular ex-
pression. .
The negotiating techniques of the Soviet Union in the United Na-
tions were, however, considerably more complex than merely paying
lip service to a universally accepted ideal. And Soviet objectives in
negotiating control of atomic energy were more ambitious than solely
digging the grave for international control. Considerable. attention, in
fact, was given by the Soviet Government to the United Nations debate
to promote Soviet interests. While Soviet atomic energy policy did
vacillate at times and appeared at moments confused and inconsistent.
there was a broad pattern of objectives and tactics which over the
eight-year period of atomic energy negotiations was both consistent.
and positive. Over the past decade, as negotiations for disarmament
replaced negotiations for international control of atomic enery, these
same objectives and tactics have dominated Soviet diplomacy'-'
The over-all motivation of Soviet behavior in atomic energy negotia-
tions was to mobilize world public opinion favorable toward the Soviet
Union. For their purposes the Soviet leadership divided world opinion
into roughly three segments : the communist world, the Western world
and that segment not encompassed by either, which can be labeled
neutral public opinion. Each segment, of course, required the use of a
different set of tactics, or more accurately, a stress of one particular
technique over another to meet the requirements of the different objec-
tives for the communist, Western and neutralist segments.
Broadly speaking, the Soviet objective in atomic energy negotia-
tions vis-a-vis the communist world was to reinforce anti-Western
feeling by emphasizing the aggressive intention of the United Stites
and England. Toward the Western nations the Soviet representatives
were more. concerned with using the negotiations to put pressure on
the United States to renounce use of the bomb. Soviet efforts to in-
fluence the neutralist nations were primarily aimed at justifying the
Soviet proposals and seeking United Nations approval-at least in
principle-of Soviet atomic energy policy.
Some of these objectives and the tactics used to achieve them were
incompatible and there were times when Soviet policy did not seem to
be consistently seeking any recognizable objective. For example, many
of Miolotov's or Vyshinsky's vitriolic speeches, which were directed
primarily to the ears of the pro-communist world, so irritated the vast.
majority of United Nations representatives that some neutralist na-
tions which might have given some support to the Russian proposals
were alienated ; and, some of the Soviet propaganda eharzes against
the United States were so palpably untrue that they had the effect of
discrediting some of the more reasonable Soviet claims.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NEGOTIATION Jv
The major proposals advanced by_the Soviet Government were not
meant to be taken literally. They were too extreme to be accepted by
the majority. They exceeded even Soviet expectations. Their purpose
was to put the Soviet Union in a position from which it could bar-
gain-i.e., in a position from which it could gain concessions by offer-
ing concessions. Many of the Soviet resolutions and speeches had no
relevance at all to negotiating in the conventional sense of a give-and-
take in negotiation. These were designed only to convey and reiterate
a propagandistic theme-e.g., that the Soviet Union stood for the
absolute prohibition of atomic weapons or that the United States was
planning to attack the Soviet Union. The Soviet representatives were
not directly concerned about the truth or falsity of their statements
before the various United Nations commissions and committees. What
concerned them was the effect of what. they said on the attainment of
their objectives. They were interested in creating attitudes. They were
not interested in sounding out the extent of Western demands and then
attempting to reconcile these demands with those of the Soviet
Government.
The distinction between communist, Western and neutralist areas
of opinion which the Soviet representatives sought to influence is par-
tially arbitrary. Rarely were Soviet propaganda efforts at any one
time directed at only one area. The differing demands of each area
had tobe met continuously in every organ of the United Nations where
international control of atomic energy was under debate.
One of the important features of the way Soviet atomic policy in
the United Nations was carried out was the general uniformity of
presentation before all the various orggans where the subject was de-
bated. In general, there were no significant differences in the content
and tone of Soviet speeches made before the General Assembly and
its committees, the Security Council or the Atomic Energy Commission
and Disarmament Commission and their various working committees.
One might have expected a difference in approach to correspond with
the different functions of the various United Nations bodies. The
smaller working committees of the Atomic Energy Commission and
Disarmament Commission, for example, were designed to facilitate an
exchange of information and to reconcile conflicting points of view.
When issues came before the larger United Nations organs-including
the Atomic Energy Commission and Disarmament Commission-these
objectives ordinarily gave way to attempts to enlist general support
for or to justify a nation's policy. However, the general procedure for
the Soviet representatives was to present the same kind of speeches
before every body, large or small. Wherever they had the opportunity,
the Soviet representatives utilized the smaller working groups to give
the same long, tendentious, and hostile speeches that they gave before
the Security Council or General Assembly.
It is, therefore, possible to analyze the over-all objectives sought by
the Soviet representatives without identifying these objectives with a
particular United Nations body or limiting them to a particular period
of time. Soviet representatives used the atomic energy negotiations
principally for the attainment of five objectives. They were:
(1) To reject the American atomic energy proposals without
appearing to do so.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
36 THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NEGOTIATION
(2) To link Soviet policy with popular aspirations throughout the
world.
(3) To portray the policies of the Western bloc-and the United
States in particular-as aggressive.
(4) To prevent the United States Government from using its atomic
superiority to gain political advantages.
(5) To stall for time.
' oward the attainment of each of the objectives the Soviet repre-
sentatives utilized a specific set of tactics which they considered most
relevant. Often one particular tactic served more gran one objective.
One such case was the Soviet use of parliamentary tactics of diversion
which served not only to stall for time, but fitted in with the Soviet
goal of rejecting proposals without appearing to do so. As noted
above, some of the taut ics designed to facilitate one particular objec-
tive hindered the attainment of other objectives. .
These five objectives constituted the esoteric goals of Soviet atomic
energy negotiators in contrast to the exoteric 3 goals stated on the face
of the Soviet proposals. It is not likely that these objectives were for-
mulated at one time in any systematic manner; but the postwar record
of atomic energy negotiations reveals that the Soviet representatives
worked priniarify and consistently toward these ends. Moreover, it is
quite clear that These same tactics have been an integral clement of all
Soviet disarmament negotiations over the past fifteen years. With the
changing subject matter of course, some goals have changed. No
longer, for example, do the Soviets need to stall for time to build an
atomic stockpile. New objectives have replaced some of the old. More
recently Soviet negotiations have been directed toward a weakening of
the NATO alliance system by encouraging dissension among the
Western powers and by preventing the arming of NATO forces with
nuclear weapons. It is clear that the lessons of the first eight postwar
years apply to the east decade and a half.
"Gamesmanship' is perhaps too facetious a term to describe the
intensely serious contest in propaganda and psychological warfare
that. characterized Soviet-Western negotiations toward international
control of atomic energy. But it does serve to emphasize several ele-
ments of this contest. Like most contests atomic energy negotiations
were undertaken for stakes. In this case the stakes were political gain.
Also like most contests there were certain rules to the game. . . . Un-
like most contests, the rules by which this diplomatic contest was
carried on were rarely-if ever-publicly delineated. Nor were the
Soviet objectives ever publicly described.
If the Soviet Union had announced that its primary objectives were
not prohibition and international control of atomic energy, but a re-
jection of control proposals, a discrediting of the United states and
a stall for time, the attainment of these unexpressed goals would have
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
[From No J. Lederer (ed.), Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Per-
spective. Yale University Press. Copyright ? 1962 by Yale University. Re-
printed by permission.]
TECHNIQUES OF NEGOTIATION
By Gordon A. Craig
(Professor of History, Stanford University)
Despite the relative lateness of their admission to the Western dip-
lomatic community, Russian rulers and their ministers were not slow
in appreciating the importance of negotiation and mastering its tech-
niques. Thera is no entirely satisfactory history of the origins and early
evolution of Russian diplomat .y ; but it is clear from what accounts
we possess that at an early stage the court of Muscovy carried on
negotiations with the khans of Asia and the caliphs of Bagdad; and
in the time of Ivan III diplomacy was as frequently used as war in
adjusting Russia's relations with the Golden Horde* and the Tartars
of the Crimea. That prince was, ilideed, engaged throughout his reign
in continuous negotiation, not only with his nearest neighbors but also
with the papacy, the Hapsburgs, the king of Bohemia, and the Danish
court, and he was reputed to be skillful in negotiation with ambas-
sadors from abroad, a reputation supported by the successes of his
diplomacy.'
Russian relations with the West in this early period were inter-
mittent but of increasing scope; and by the middle of the sixteenth
century the court of Moscow found it expedient to coordinate the
activities of the many Greek, Italian, and other agents working for
it in the West by establishing a primitive foreign office, the Bureau
of Ambassadors. As the ambitions of the rulers grew, and as their eyes
began to turn to areas dominated by the Turks and the Swedes, they
availed themselves of those coalition-making capabilities of negotia-
tion of which Callieres was later to write, and sent envoys to seek
alliances and other forms of aid in Vienna and Berlin, in Venice and
Madrid, and in London, Paris, and the Hague.2 Before the seventeenth
century was over, the obvious advantages of continuous contact with
foreign courts had led to the establishment of the first permanent
missions abroad,3 and this process was pushed further by Peter the
Great and by Catherine, whose policy was oriented to the West and
who participated actively and profitably in the complex play of dip-
lomatic maneuver that filled the eighteenth century... .
' J. L. I. Fennell, "Russia, 1462-1583," New Cambridge Modern History, 2 (Cambridge,
1958), 5361!.
2Histoire do la Diplomatie, ppublide sous le direction de M. Potlemkine [Potemkin] de
I'Acaddmle des Sciences de l'U.R.S.S., trans. from Russian, 3 vols. (Paris, 1946), 1, 220 f.
S Otto Krauske, Die Entwickelung der etiindigen. Diplomatic vom 15. Jahrhundert big zu
den Beechiilseen von 1815 and 1818 (Leipzig. 1885), p. 144.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
been jeopardized.4 The Soviet "game" then, was for the most part
subtly played. It had to be subtle to be convincing. Where Soviet tac-
tics were not subtle, they risked exposure and thus the defeat of the
Soviet objectives.
? An incident reported by Frederick Osborn. concerning America's atomic energy negotia-
tions during 1947-1949, provides an interesting example of the Soviet attitude toward
atomic energy negotiations. Before Andrei Gromyko was scheduled to return to Moscow In
1949, Osborn asked him if the two of them could not sit down together and go over atomic
energy matters before Gromyko left, in order to break the deadlock that had developed over
the past few years. The American representative expressed the opinion that Gromyyko was
sincere in his desire to find a solution and that the Soviet representative trusted Osborn's
sincerity. Together, said Osborn they might be better able to explore both their govern-
ments' positions than in the public debates on the Atomic Energy Commission. Gromyko
looked at Mr. Osborn quietly for a moment and replied, "Mr. Osborn, you may be sincere,
but governments are never sincere." They never had their talk. Osborn "Negotiating on
Atomic Energy, 1946-1947," in Negotiating With the Russians, 1951, p. 236.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
39
The characteristics and negotiating techniques of Russia's diplo-
matists in the early years of this association were a source of contempt,
amusement, or exasperation to Western statesmen. The first Russians
who visited Western countries as, special envoys struck at least one
observer as very little more than "baptized bears." 4 Certainly they
comported themselves as something less than human, and they made
Muscovite grossness proverbial in the West by ruining the apartments
assigned to them, breaking the furniture, and "leaving behind them
unsupportable odors and indescribable filth." 5 When Peter the Great
led his "Great Embassy" to the West in 1697-98, his suite virtually
destroyed the house in which they were quartered in London. The
floors were left covered with grease and ink; the curtains, quilts, and
bed linen were torn to rags; fifty chairs were broken or had disap-
peared entirely ; twenty fine pictures were slashed and the frames
destroyed; and 300 window panes were broken..6 Damage of this nature
could not be attributed wholly to inadvertence or to lack of breeding.
Much of it appeared to be a deliberate flouting of Western convention
in order to demonstrate Russian superiority. It accorded with other
unpleasing traits of these first embassies: rudeness in matters of
protocol, scornful disregard for the laws of the land to which they
were accredited, and studied incivilities in their relations with their
opposite numbers.'
Negotiation with the Russians was always a difficult and indeed tedi-
ous business. Envoys sent abroad were provided with detailed instruc-
tions prescribing how they should act, what they should say, what
tone they should use, what persons they were authorized to meet, and
much more. They were never given full powers and could decide noth-
ing without reference to higher authority. The introduction of new
subjects into the course of a negotiation in train, or a suggestion that
the discussion be turned to a differeiit level, invariably led to interrup-
tions while the Russian representative sought new instructions. Nor
was the tempo of negotiation appreciably faster in Moscow on those
occasions when foreign envoys were given an opportunity to deal with
the tsar through his chief ministers. All too often the envoys would
learn, after interminable delays, that they were expected merely to
accept fiats from the tsar; and demurrers on their part were met with
pressures, menaces, and expulsions that showed little respect for the
accepted code of diplomatic etiquette.,,
Finally, negotiation with the Russians was hampered by certain char-
acteristics of Russian intercourse that always delayed and sometimes
defeated understandin. Perhaps because they had gone to school in
Byzantium before they- established a firm relationship with the West,s
the Russians retained Eastern habits of thought and discourse that
were irritating to Western negotiators. What John Wheeler-Bennett
has called "the incalculable capacity of the Slav for interminable con-
versation" 10 tried their patienc.o to the utmost, while Russian arts of
mystification often surrounded negotiations with impenetrable fogs
' Tan Grey, Peter the Great: Emperor of All Russia (New York, 1960), p. 101.
P. Milloukov [Mi iukov], Charles Seignobos, and L. Eisenmann, Histoire de Russie
(Paris, 1932-33),.T, 229.
6 Grey, Peter the Great, p. 117.
7 Potiemkine, Diplomatic, I, 226 1.
Ib1A, 1, 228; wildner, Technik, pp. 29 f.
wildner, Technik, pp. 28 f.
10 John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace, new ed. (London,
1956), pp. 138 f.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
40 THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NEGOTIATION
of confusion. Even such a pronounced Westerner as Peter believed
that dust should be thrown in the eyes of his Western rivals and that
obfuscation should be considered an important instrument of Russian
Policy. Peter's servants followed this injunction. Of A. I. Ostermann
it was said that foreign ministers could sometimes talk with him for
two hours and, on leaving his cabinet, be no better informed than when
they entered it...
.
It
Russian diplomacy in the nineteenth century was virtually in-
distinguishable in method and technique from that of the states with
which it dealt; and the outstanding Russian diplomats could have
been put to work in other services without causing the slightest. incon-
venience or disruption and with no need for re-training in the instru-
ments and techniques of their craft. Their values, their language, their
methods, in a word, their style was that of Western diplomats in gen-
eral.. .
It may be noted that in the latter half of the nineteenth century the
Tsarist regime had every reason to put a higher valuation upon nego-
tiation than upon such other instruments of foreign policy as war and
propaganda. If in other countries the complaint was sometimes heard
that the diplomats were always surrendering what the soldiers had
won, in Russia it often appeared that the main function of diplomats
was to make good the mistakes of their military coll es, The skill-
ful tactics of Orlov and Brunnow at the Paris conference of 1856
tempered the demands of the victors in the late war and freed Russia
from a diplomatic isolation that might have been dangerous in the
ensuing period. In 1878, the masterly diplomatic campaign conducted
by Peter Shuvalov in London and Berlin extricated Russia from
the insupportable position to which it had been brought by a Panslav
ppoolicy. And in 1946, in the Portsmouth conference that ended the
Itusso-Japanese War, Witte and Rosen won a success that few would
have pr edreted before the negotiations be n...
All in all, the conduct of Russian diplomacy in the nineteenth
century was marked by competence and occasionally by brilliance, and,
especially in conference negotiation, Russian m
di ~oatists showed .c
special talent for making the most of bad cases. There was, however,
nothing particularly original or distinctive about Russian practice. It
was reserved for the Soviet reggime to devise new techniques of negotia-
tion, while at the same time challenging the patience and ingenuity of
the West by the way in which it adapted the traditional techniques to
its own purposes.
The Bolshevik regime began its career by announcing, in effect, that
it was withdrawing Russia from the Wrestern diplomatic community,
that it intended to repudiate all legal ties made with other nations by
the Tsarist. government, and that it would refuse henceforth to con-
form to the rules and procedures that had obtained in international
relations. All this was made clear to the world by the Bolshevik Decree;
on Peace, passed by the second All-Russian Congress of Soviets on
November 8, 1917,11 and by Trotsky's statement two weeks later, at the
" Jane Degrag, ed., Soviet Dorlunenta on Foreign Polk-y, I (London. 1931). I-3.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
THE SOVIET APPEOACH TO NEGOTIATION 41
time of the publication of the secret treaties, when he announced the
abolition of the old diplomacy and "its intrigues, codes, and lies" and
promised the inauguration of an "honest, popular, truly democratic
foreign policy." 12 From now on, the Peace Decree stated, negotiation 11
would be conducted "absolutely openly before the entire people ;
and it was implied that intergovernmental negotiation would be mini-
mal, especially after the restoration of peace, and that the Bolshevik
regime, as a people's government, would henceforth direct its appeals
and its messages to peoples rather than to their rulers. This would
presumably make even the old diplomatic apparatus unnecessary,
which is probably what was in Trotsky's mind when he spoke of issuin
"some revolutionary proclamations to the peoples and then [closing]
up the joint [i.e., the Foreign OfTice].7 74 . . .
Trotsky himself [later] became the most eloquent advocate of a
resumption of normal relations with other powers, using his influence
in 1921 to conclude a final peace with Poland and to settle the bound-
aries of the Baltic countries and, as early as 1920, urging Lenin to
conciliate Great Britain.15 To maintain contact with the bourgeois
states seemed the best way of detecting, and even influencing, their
intentions. Moreover, as long as Russia was an isolated power girded
about by possible coalitions, it seemed expedient for Soviet diplomats
to be versed in the methods of their adversaries. Before long, the
classical handbooks on diplomacy and such modern studies as Satow's
Guide to Diplomatic Practice and Jules Cambon's Le Diplomate were
being translated and read in the Soviet Union; and at the Genoa Con-
ference of 1922 and subsequent high-level meetings Soviet delegations
demonstrated that they could, when they wished, be scrupulously cor-
rect in matters of protocol and that they had also acquired considerable
facility in the use of orthodox procedures and tactics.
This return to normal methods paid dividends, as is shown by the fact
that, although the Soviet Union often faced the possibility of complete
isolation in the years following the Brest conference, it always escaped
it. Between 1920 and 1924 it was able to establish its reputation for
reliability sufficiently to win recognition from most of the Western
powers, and this was accomplished in large part by patient negotiation
and by the skillful use of the. techniques of classical diplomacy, especi-
ally the art of playing upon the differences of the powers and appealing
to their greed or their fears.
At the same time, even in this defensive period of their diplomacy, the
Soviets were hesitant to commit themselves entirely to the values and
procedures of the bourgeois West. If they learned to play the tradi-
tional game as well as their bourgeois colleagues, their methods were
on occasion apt to be startlingly unorthodox. They frequently advanced
their objectives not by direct talks with other governments but by
means of their contacts with individuals and groups whose pressure
might move the governments in question. Something new was certainly
added to negotiating form when Karl Radek held levees for German
soldiers, businessmen, and politicians in a cell in the Moabit prison in
12 Ibid., 8-9.
13 Ibid., 2.
"Soviet Diplomacy : G. V. Chicherin " in The Diplomats,
14 Quoted in Theodore Von Laue
,
1919-1939, ed. Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton, 1953) p. X35.
16 Deutseher, Prophet Armed, pp. 463 f.; and The Prophet Unarmed: Trotsky, 1921-
1929 (London, 1959), p. 56.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
42 THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NEGOTIATION
Berlin where he had been placed after the Spartacist rising of January
1919, and whence he sought to induce his guests to use their influence
in favor of a Soviet-German entente. 18 and the Treaty of Rapallo,
the revelation of which exploded the Genoa Conference. 'had been pre-
pared by other talks like Radek's conducted by agents of Leon Trotsky
in the previous two years.11 The tendency to avail itself of multiple
channels of negotiation, some (like the various Comintern links) lead-
ing to groups whose activities inside friendly states were clearly sub-
versive in nature, was one of the characteristics of Soviet diplomacy
after 1920; and in the late twenties this sometimes weakened or de-
stroyed work patiently achieved by more orthodox approiv'hes.
In its forma negotiations with bourgeois states, Soviet diplomacy in
the interwar period bore some resemblance to Ru-sian diplomatic
behavior in the sixteenth and venteenth cent:u ries. The Soviets had
become participants in the affairs of the Western diplomatic com-
munity reluctantly and only because it was in their interest to do so.
but they never became members of it in any real sense. A British
negotiator wrote in exasperation in 193:3 that one could get nowhere
with the Soviets because they were "completely unable to see themselves
in any other light than that of an a grieved Power struggling for
their noble ideals against a world of political, financial and commercial
conspirators." 18 In all of their dealings with Western powers, their
attitude was one of inveterate suspicion-, which took various forms. As
in the earliest period of Russian diplomacy, rigidity and legalism be-
came hallmarks of Soviet negotiating technique, and Soviet, diplomats
were as tightly bound to their instructions as were the envoys of Peter
the Great anc his predecessors. Their suspicion was often extended
even to the framework of the negotiations, and I have written elsewhere
of the way in which the Soviet representative in talks on the possibility
of resumption of diplomatic relations between Great Britain and the
Soviet Union in 1929 stalled the negotiations until his own agenda was
accepted instead of that. drawn up by the British Foreign Office, al-
though the differences between the two seemed inconsequential even to
the expert eye.19 Aside from this, the stoutness with which Soviet rep-
resentatives held to their positions in negotiation became proverbial.
They were far less inclined to make concessions to their opponents'
point of view than their opponents were to theirs; and, indeed, when
their opposite numbers made concessions, they viewed this with un-
easiness and distrust, as showing that their adversaries had been in-
sincere in adopting their original positions and were probably
plotting some dark anti-Soviet stroke.
In 1939, when the Western powers were seeking an agreement
with the Soviet Union in order to check Hitler's march of aggres-
sion, this attitude toward compromise proved an almost insupera-
ble barrier to profitable exchange,. The Soviet negotiators in-
variably stressed the necessity of Western concessions on the very
points on which the West was most reluctant to yield; and attempts
to conciliate them by giving way on lesser points merely encour-
14Ruth Fischer, Stalin and German Communism (Cambridge, Mass.. 1948), pp. 204-os.
17 Deutacher, Prophet Unarmed, pp. 66 f.
' Documents on British Foreign Pottccyy 1919-1939, ed. E. L. Woodward and iloban
Butler (London. 1949 ff.). 2nd aeries, 7, 316.E
It Gordon A. Craig, "Totalitarian Approaches to Diplomatic Negotiation." In Easaya on
Diplomatic History in Honor of George Peabody Gooch, ed, A. 0. Sar isstan (London,
1961), Ch. 4.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NEGOTIATION 43
aged them to belive that, if they persisted, the West would give
way on the major ones too.2e At one point in the negotiations,
Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, asked the Soviet am-
bassador "point-blank whether the Soviet Government wanted a
treaty at all; to which M. Maisky said that of course they did, and
why did I ask the question? Because, I replied, throughout the
negotiations the Soviet Government had not budged a single inch
and we had made all the advances and concessions ... Saying `No'
to everything was not my idea of negotiation." 21
The difference between Soviet and Western negotiators here and
on other occasions was not, of course, merely one of tactics or even
of understanding. At the root of these difficulties of negotiation was
a fundamental incompatibility of purpose, which the Soviets, as long
as they needed economic aid or security from foreign intervention
or assistance against National Socialism or material help in the Fascist
war, were careful not to admit, and which the Western powers were
reluctant to see. It was only after the Second World War, when the
Soviet Union, confident in its mission as it had been in 1917 and
conscious of its strength, once more announced its inflexible. opposition
to bourgeois society, that the real difficulties of negotiation with the
Soviet Union were appreciated in the West.
In a melancholy survey of post-World War II diplomacy, the for-
mer British Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Lord
Vansittart, wrote a few years ago: "I have `done' many conferences
in my life but never went into one without some hope of a fairly quick
result. No one could say the same today. Results are often not expected,
and often not even desirable." 22
One has no difficulty in admitting the relevance of these words
to negotiations on major issues between the Soviet Union and the
West since 1945. In these encounters the Soviet Union has very often
appeared to be returning to the tactics that characterized its conduct
of negotiations at Brest-Litovsk in 1918 and for much the same rea-
sons that prompted its behavior there. Once more it has seemed to be
confident that the victory of Communism on a world scale could not be
long delayed and that all confrontations between Soviet and Western
negotiators must be used to encourage the forces of revolution. Once
more negotiation has been used not as a means of promoting agree-
ment but as a weapon to discomfit enemies and reveal to the world
their weaknesses, the falseness of their professions, and the injustice
of their claims. Once more the very act of negotiation has been trans-
formed into a dramatic performance designed to entertain and instruct
a wider public with a spectacle of enlightened Soviet representatives
battling manfully against the forces of capitalism and imperialism..
In promoting this kind of negotiation, the Soviet Union has shown
a great diversity of effective tactics. Not the least important of these
has been the practice of universalizing its own position in the hope that
the peoples of colonial areas, the uncommitted world, and significant
20 An expression of Lord Strang's concern over the effectiveness of Soviet tactics is to
be found in Documents of British Foreign Policy, 3rd ser., 6, No. 376.
21 Ibid., No. 135.
22 Lord Vansittart, "The Decline of Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs, 98 (1950). 184.
25-064-69-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
44 THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NEGOTIATION
parts of the populations of Western nations would identify themselves
with it. This is in accordance with the advice given by Marx and Engels
in The German Ideolog t where it is written that, since "increasingly
abstract ideas hold sway' in the modern world, the revolutionary class
is compelled to "represent its interest as the common interest of all the
members of society, put in an ideal form; it will give its ideas the form
of universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally
valid ones," and it will seek to speak "not as a class but as the represent-
ative of the whole society." ' 23 The Soviet Union has carried this idea,
over to the sphere of international politics and, by doing so, has sought
to invest its views and proposals with infallibility.
The diplomatic advantage of this posture is that it can be used
to make the traditional approach of Western diplomacy-the assump-
tion of a com.meree d'avis reciproque and the search for agreement
through compromise--seem somehow morally reprehensible. At the
outset of the negotiations of the foreignt ministers in Geneva in 1959,
Premier Khrushchev made a speech in Tirana, Albania, commenting
on the Western case before it was presented. This kind of intervention
into negotiations that were supposed to he private would in itself have
been considered extraordinary in an earlier age, but .what Khrushchev
said was even more remarkable. The Western proposals, Khrushchev
said,
do not contain it single element for negotiation. These pro-
posals are not based on a desire to find a correct solution
with a view to achieving that relaxation of international
tension which all peoples so anxiously await .. .
The USSR sincerely wishes to come to an agreement.
But we reject the principle that one party should force its
conditions on the other party. Mr. Adenauer and his
foreign minister, Mr. Brentano try to force such a prin-
ciple on the foreign ministers. Thtey say, : "With the L SSR
one must negotiate as follows: concession for concession !"
But that is a huckster's approach ! . . . We do not have to
make any concessions because our proposals have not been
made for bartering. We act on the principle that sensible
solutions must be found which would not damage any
country . . . Those who really strive for peace must not
use methods of petty bargaining in the talks.2
It is the studied inconsequence, of these statements that makes them so
formidable. Our position is correct, Premier Khruslichev says, and is
in the interest of people everywhere. To attempt to make us give up
any part of our claims betrays both the false values of the bourgeois
West (the mercantile rather than the statesmanlike approach) and its
indifference to the cause of peace.
Once formal negotiations get under way, .Soviet, tactics are de--
signed to keep the image of a virtuous TLS.S.R. contending with
cynical and unscrupulous adversaries before the world audience. Since
coming to grips with concrete issues is not vital to negotiators in-
terested largely in the dramatic potentialities of a given meeting,
Quoted in Arm. J. Mayer. Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917--1915 (New
Haven. 1959). P. 58.
"Department of State, Foreign Ministers Meeting, May-August 1959, Geneva, Inter-
national Organisation and Conference Serles 8 (Washington, 1659). p. 307.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NEGOTIATION 45
Soviet delegates disregard the spirit of Talleyrand's advice to ne-
gotiators : "On s' arrange phcs facilement sur an fait que sur un
pri:ncipe." 25 Instead, they keel) the conversations on the level of
general principles just as long as possible, knowing that this makes
for endless debate and gives fre}yIOIAHX pC111f-
rH031ILIX 06L0AHHOHHi3 (n rpeipiu) HJIH
K c03AAHUl0 60nee HJfH Menee mapomix
HOJIBTU'OCKHX 06,LOAIIHOHH4i Ana 6opL-
61.1 C Hp0THBUHKOM H T. A. fttaito pa-
60BnaAenLgeCK00 06HjeCTBO He BbJpa-
6oTaJ10 Hit OAHI1006PA3HLIX 4IOPM opra-
fII3a11HH AHltn. AOHTCnbHOCTH, IIH e;jH-
uoo6paaHLIx MOTOAOB A.
11 ()COjlalLIIOM 060 OCTB0, ilanp. D
CPCASICBCI(OBOII Eupone, B yCJIOBHf(X
(JieoAanbuou paaApo6neHHOCTu rocy-
AapH Benn nien(Ay co6oli HOHpO L1BHble
KgaCTIIhJO BOAHLIU paAH yBeaHtteIIHII
3eMe11LUhIX B11aAe11H11, rpa6elua, yM-
HOHICHUa gnd is no;IAauul,IX, 0611ara0-
MIJX IIOBIIIIHOCTaMU KpOCTLmi. 11 11p0-
McN(yTKax MO)KAy BOHHOMH 01111 BO11U
((VBCTIIyJO A.)), T. 0. DCTyUOJ1H B nope-
ronopLl, oaBnlOgaim MHpiLIe AorOBOpbi,
BOOHIILIO C0103LI H Hp; CpaBIIHTenbnO
peAKHe BPCMOHHLIO 'Ipo3BLlgaIllllde nO-
COnbCTBa COCTaBnanHCL o6LIgHO H3
IIpoACTaBItTeJIeif AyXOBOHCTDa, I(aI( IIaU-
6oneo o6paaoBanhIOii D TO BpOMf
'la('TH o6ujocrDa. 11000nbCTBa 0(DOPM-
Ji)IJIII CBOII A111101. Ae1ICTBUa C HOMOII(1,10
pelTUrHO31iLIX 061)111108 (gononaano
J(pOCTa H T. A.). BpCMOHaMI (JICO)1aJIL-
1114(' rOCyJlapl! 061.OJtIIIIIJlItCl, IIOI Or"-
;A011 11aTOn1lgecl(Olf Itepl(lllf j(iu CoiI-
MOCTIILIX 130011110-IIOIIITH'IOCKUX Mepo-
IIpHaT11Lf (1(aup? I(peCTODLIO IIOXOAbI),
It B IIOAPOTOBI(O 3TIIX MO OnpI1IITBft
1(rpana H3BOCTIIyIO pOJIb A. Ilan -
)ia]i6oJieo pa3mHTan /1. Toro DpOMOHJi.
I1a8(IIbJMn A!HIJ1, 1(OH(Ope1t1111fM1f'IOCTO
IIBJllIJlllcb i[Op1(OBIILIe 0060111, 11a
11-plaX IIOjCA1(0 Up11CyTCTDOBUJID CBO'C-
CKHe rocyAapH H 0
THgeCKHe BOB OCL1.
11o CpaBHOHHIO C (
AapCTBaMH 3anaAH(
THa HOAAep)KnBaJII
Alien. CBa311 (e KOpOJ
Pycaio, rocyAapCTI
BH3aHTHH coaAarioc
AOMCTBO HHOCTpaHB
pa3pa6oTaHHLIII Aui
3Ua911TenLIION MOT;
OT ApeBBero PIIMi.
HaJOB Bii3aHTHA pal
nOJIHTH'ICCKoe 11111101
'Jepe3 XpIlCTIIaHCKH.
TOIOKO IIOCpOACTBOM
CBoeo6paamalf
AB1I11. 9OfTOnb1OCTb
piiOA (IeOAanbIIOR
3A0Cb B Ka'JOCTBO (10:
roBopaMH 0 C01030
110IIHU It T. 11. Ba)a
Cb03A61 KHa3eI1, no
paapememiuCnopoB
Ha HexoAo 1eojf
'1111FACT 3ap0)KAaTbcf
11111101'0 Jjilan. UpO.
upe)KAO Deero B II
Kyp11H, Bn3alITHH
pecny6nu lit.
ConpeMelluan 6yp;
3apo,ttAaTbcn npH I
AanU3Ma K I(anwTa.
3anajj0 H IIa DOCTOR
Ba11HCb Kpynnleo I
a6COnIOTIICTCKIJO ro(
1,1011 HOnfTlll(a 3THX
DflJIaCI, AIIIlaCTIigOC1
MOIIapXOB, IiX CT1)Or
'101111I0 cloero MOryIII
a TalOKe It nOn1Tit9
IIIITOPCCAMII ABOpf(IIC
J1 encn 6yp)Kyasn}f,
Ita11uoItainuomy obi
Utl(peu11I0 roeptapei
11111, it 3axBaTy 'iy
I) l.npon0, I'm( it B
IHOACTBy 11a Mopnx if
i`Oal,lx nyTHx. ;Jill
DTI(X 1111TOpe0On it
1110TIICTCK110 rOCyAa
I(OCTOHIIHIle apMHll B
cJ1y)1(6y. BpeMeltmilo
IIOJOT McCTO IIOCTOD
IIJOTH)KCItHiI XV1-
IlpoeTpalulic1Tra 110
CTaaOB11TCI1 11CCI.f a l
roeyAaPCTBU1u(oii A(
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
it.t), i13 apllC-
-I (PttM). OT-
0 1111
C0IO3111tfOn,
paay3HauaTb
J(p. npann-
lix JtO11TOJ1b-
.1a cop ,e3noo
Itii OpaTOP n
-tan a acnn-
yTBCp7I{ARJI,
'ITT 6oJtt,11te,
D;teu. Jjllffir.
_mt pa6onJra-
, cnoAltJlncr,
11n11 IIOJIHTH-
immuxen Ao-
10 B nOJIIiTII-
-IOntlix peJllt-
rpeltTil) 'Tan
,Hee n1HpoHKx
-tiiii JtJlir 6opb-
1. OAHai(o pa-
?BO Ito BLIpa-
-tx (j)OpM opra-
1OCTn, 1111 CJtII-
-,TBO, nanp. B
B yenOBnnx
HHOCTit rocy-
nenpepLlBnbio
4. yBenn,tout H
rpa6enta, yM-
-Hlix, o6narae-
eCTWIll, B npo-
ann onii Bean
ynaaH B nepe-
7HLI0 J.tOFOBOpbI,
CpanHnre.ibno
-3Bra.gaiinrlo no-
b - 06u' IO J43
TICTBH, Hal Halr-
B TO BpOMH
^n6CTBa o(J)OpM-
ini e nOMOIItL1o
B (ixeJroBalnno
3HaMIt (JICOAaJIb-
rnnncb IIoA arII-
pitBn Ann con-
TH9ccHHx Mepo-
TOBble noxoJbt),
x MOpOflpnfTHii
Onb . frail -
. Toro Bpomenn.
3peHitHHMH YacTO
a eo6opii, na
WTCTBOBaJIII CBOT-
crtito rocyiapu n o6cymAanncb noJIH:-
T11110CHiie HO1IpCCLI.
Ll:o cpantte]inl0 c (J)eoAa;TT umMn rocy-
AapcrnflMn 3aniJtnoii Enpoitii Bnaa11-
TKH Hoiu op uiinaiia 6once nlnpoitne
9IrI1JI. C13n3I1 (C HOpOnoncrnim it EBpOnbl,
Pyc:Lro, rocyAapernnin BocTOlta). B
Bu,!aBTIII C03AanOC1. cnC]Inflnbllo0 Be-
AOT1CTBO JlfoCTpairnidX JiOJI B HMCJICH
paapa60TaHHhri1 Apiun. uepeMOllnaui, n
3I1a ltITOJi6ItOtt MCpO yllaenegOBaT1111,9ii
OT ;tpenltero Puma. HoMIIMO' Anlln. na-
nanoD Bn3a)iTag pacnpOCTpaHHna cBOO
HOJ]IITn'1OCK00 BnnnHHO Ha Jtp. CTparLi
'Jepea XpnCTnanCI{nX MIICCHOHOpOB, a
TBIUII{o IIOCpoACTBOM TOprOBLIX CBR8OH.
Cnoeo6pa3II6iH xapai(Tep HOCBJia
ABnn. JtenTOJILHOCTm H IIa PyCH. B ne-
pBoA ~ooAaJiinoit pa3Apo6JIeHHOCTH
BAeCb B Ka'ICCTne 4)OpM A J. IlapiAy c AO-
roBopaMH 0 C0103e, TOproBJIO, noce-
J1OI1IIn B T. it. Hantnyio pOnb Hrpa.in
C'bC A6l f1in3eH, nOCp0Ann9eCTHO npn
pa3 enleHnn CnOpOB Me7HALy HHMH II T. A.
I la ncxolAo (IeoAanbnon anoxH na-
glinaeT aapoH{JtaT1,Cn HIICTBTyT TIOCTO-
AIIIIOrO Alinn. npOACTannTCnLCTBa -
11p07HAe neoro B npanTHHe ITancioi
icypnn, BnaaIITHU H BCRCtHaHCKOli
pecny6nnltn.
ConpeMCnnan 6ypH ya3Han A. CTana
aapOJHAaTLCH npu nepexoAe OT (00-
AaJlH3Ma H i(aIIHTaJlH3My, HOrJ[a Ha
3anci e H Ha BOCTOIte EBponar o6paao-
BanBC6 HpynnLJo ueHTpaJlnaonanlible
a6c0.anOTncTCHH9 rocygapcTBa. Buem-
1111n HOJIHTHHa UTHX rocy1apCTB AHKTO-
BonaCb AHnacTnTJoCHHMH HIITOp0C0MH
MoItapxOB, IIX CTpOMJICnHCM H yBenlr-?
,iouni0 cnocro MOryuteCTBa B 60raTCTBa,
a Tai}Ho K HOanTngIecuoii rereMonnn,
II1ITCp000MT ABOpiIIiCT1a H HapOMAaro-
II[Oilen 6.yp)Hya3Hil, CTpeMJOHBOM H
Haworranb1OMy o6wAnneonio n paC-
ulllpetiHlo, rocy1apcTBennoil TeppHTO-
pnn, it 3axBaTy 4y7HBx 3eMenb HaR
it EBpono, TAIL H B I(onolrnicx, H roc-
noytcTBy na Mopllx H fill MHpoBblx Top-
roBLix nyTnX. JInH OCYIILOCTBnOHHii
OTHX 1THTOpecoe II TeHA01111 3 a6co-
nIOTHCTCHI(0 rocyAapcTBa CO3ABBanf
HOCTOnHHEJO apMHH H o6tnnpnyio AHnji.
CJ1y7K6y. I3pomenu IO IIOCOJIbCTBa yCTy-
HaIOT MCCTO IOCTOBIIHMM, H-pbre Ha
HpOTHJKeHIIT XVI-XVII BB. paC-
ripocTpaHHIaTC.n no Beef EBpono. A.
CTanoBHTCH BOCLMa Ba itHOii OTpacJiblo
rOCyAapCTBOHItOt AOHTeNbBOCTH. HO-
HCOMCCTHO C03AaroTC17 CIJOr fanbHldo no-
AOMCTBa HilOCTpaHIILIX J(CJI, H-pLtO py-
KOBOAnT BC013 A11173I. ACHTOJILHOCTJ,IO
rocyAapcTna H no rnaBO H-pLix o6ia'IHO
CTIIHOBHTCB ilepBliO MKHKCTpaI, a Be-
pCAHO iTla'HTit20cI{H H eaMti Mol{apxn.
BnelnnenOJtltTHliccttno TtonH, I(-pram
CJly7KHJIa A. a6COJ1I0TK3Ma, OKaaa'tH
lienocpeJ[CTBelfIt00 H rJly6oI{00 BJIHilHHo
Ha xapal(Tep no MOTOAOB. Ma/n Ito It
3nrenbc xapanrepnayloT R. 06c0JII0-
TIICTCHHX i ocyAapcTB C1OAYIOIWHMH
CJiOBaMH: (IHaTpaBJIHBOTL HapOAbt Apyr
Ha Apyra, HCHOJIbUOBATh OATH HapOA
AJIH yrneTenan Apyroro, 4To6bI TaRHM
06pa3OM npOAJIKTb Cy11;e0TBOBflHHO a6-
COJIIOTHOH BJIaCTH, - BOT It 'TOMy CuO-
AHJiOC1 BCKyCCTBO H AOHTOJIbIOCTb
BCex cyntecTBOnanHIIIx AOCOJ1O Irpa13n-
TeJ1OJi H BX ,QHHJIOMOTOBN (I(. Mapitc n
d1. 0nrcn1c, Coq , T. 5, CTp. 100).
IleManoo BJBHIIBO Ha XapaiTep J
OKaat.IBaJIO II TO o6CTOBTenbCTBO RTO
pyiCOBOAcTBO BHemnOH 11OJ111THHO1 a6-
COn1oTHCTCKIIX rocyAapCTB 000p@AOTO-
i1aBanOCb B pynax o'ienl, yattoH Bop-
Xy1H1{II rocnOACTnyIOUtero KnaCea: It0-
ponoH, Hx nplAnopiroro oxpy7KoHBn,
rOpCTlctt Bbletluix *ITHOBHHI(OB. Boa-
AeltcrnHe Ha OTAenb oaix JH9 H3 aTOrO
orpaHH901IH0,ro, aaMKHyToro H K TOMy
we cojibno Moppynaponainoro Hpyra,
Bo3AeiCTBBe, H-poe OCynjeCTBJIHnOCb
nl06bIMn, A11H{0 eaMbTMH 6eaaacTeu-
*IHBLIMH, CpOACTBBMH, 6LIno Heo6xo-
ABMon opraHo'ecHoR 'raCTbro Anna.
AebTOnbHOCTII.
BCnoACT13$0 BCeX BTHX HpHwlnH B
ABnn. AenTenbfOCTH a6COJIIOTHCTCHHX
rocyAapcTB mHpol{o npHMenirnncb o6-
MaH, BOpOJTOMCTBO, HOAKynbI, HHTpH-
rB, y6HTCraa, ABOpll;ontle aaronoptl
H T. B. A. aanaAHo0BponefrcI{oro a6-
COJIIOTK3Ma 'iepnaJta o6paartbl in
CHOHX MOTOAQB H I1 IOMOB B A. cenepo-
lTanbnscnnX ropogennx pecrly6nnH,
OJTIIrapxH'Of,Han Bepxyymlta K-pMX Bona
07r(CCT09eHHymm 6opb6y as Topronoo
ipeo6na1anno II HOJIHTHwJCciyIo rero-
MOHHIO. 06 9TOA A. 0AMB Ha 00 BnA-
aoii itX AOHTe91013 H TeopeTBKOB, Ma-
13HaBennH, rOBOpHJl, 'ITO 00 HeityCCTBO
COCTOHT B TOM, 4T06M dCKpblBaTb CHO-
BaMH AefiCTBKTeJIbHOCTJ, . MaHAaBOJI-
JIII3M CTaJI i osiarHYeCKOI (/HJIOCO(1Hei
a6COn10THbix1MOHapxH'*, it-pbie B CBOHX
AeiCTBHHx pytOBOACTHOBa3iaci AOItT-
iHROA ((rOCyAapCTB0AH0ro HHTOpeCa*i
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
Raft BLiemerO HpHTOpHA B fOJIHTHKO,
npe06maAaloutero HaA-ApyrHMH - Mo-
panbliblMH, upaBOBMMH H np. L-- KpH-
TepHflMH. CaMH AHIHIOMaTbI Td1O Bpe-
Mciu 603 CTeCHOHHH OTBLIBaJ1HCb a A.
HaR o6 HCKyCCTBO o6MaHa. AHrJ)Mli-
CKHH AHhIJIOMaT XVII B. renpH VOT-
TOH, AaBas onpeAemOHne nocma, nut am:
J10COm OCTb `IeCTHbII3; MlJB , HOCLIJiae-
MI18 sa rpaaauy, 9T06Lt nraTL'B H)iTe--
pecax cBooro rocyAapcTBaa. Emt' MI'000
IOCTHO OT3LIBanhcb ' 0 AunmoMwrax
y4euue H micaTeJIH. (Dpanuy3ef cl LIU-
caTOJIb XVII B. ?Ilan Jla6pioEep uH-
can, HTO BCH AOHTemLHOCTL A$I1moMa-
TOB HaupasneHa u OAHOH noati: He
6LITL o6MaHyTLIMH H O6MOHbIBaTL Apy-
rHx.
PaByMeOTCa, HenT3fl CBOAHTL H o6-
Many H JDKH ucio XapaMTepHCTMKy
AHIIJI. HCK CCTBa a6cOJIlOTHCTCIfIIX 1'O-
CyAapcTB. A, a6cOJIIOTHBMa BLIpa60Tama
Taltue McTOALI, Halt CoaAauue ioanH-
IIHIi nog Hp0AJOrOM noAAepfKa11H1{
(IIOJ11TH9eC1{OrO paBHOBecnnN, aaKJIIO-
NOHHe HUCTyIIUT0naII61x H 06opOIIHT6JIb-
IILIx c0I03oB H AoronopoB 0 Apy ff O C
IteJIL1O C06HpaHHn CHfl I HpOTHB 6yAy-
nterO npoTHBHHHa, 3AHm1o9CHIIe HaK-
TOB O HO1tTpanHTeTO C IOJIb1O noAro-
TOBI{H BMrOAHOPO cOOTnomemla Cliii
B rOTOBuI1jeaCn BOHHe, paaMthl'aHHe
peJHrUOaHb1X, HaunouanbHblx ii HOnH-
TH'leCKHX pa3Aopon H CMYT B HHOCT-
paHHLix rOCyAapCTBax, BCAOHHO B HHx
no)IHTH'IOCHOH npoHaraIIALI. H nOCJIeA-
neMy MCTOAy y?Ke npi16oran KapAHiiaJl
Pumembo, o6pantaBm1Ia 60m1,u100 BHB-
MAHIIO Ila COCTaBJICHItO liOJIHTnge(:,HHX
n&M(J)JIOTOB It. Ha MX paCIIIOCTPUHOH$e
an rpaHHuea. OAIIaHO Hp} BCOM )TOM
JIM'rHOO BOaAeACTBHO Ha Koponai3, ax
IIepBLIX MIIUICTpOB, (laHOpIiTOB, upH-
ABOpHLIX 11 T. A. C IIOMOnkLIO noAHYIIa,
o6Maita, HHTpilr, BarOBOpOB 3aHMMBmO
Ito HOCJIPAHOO MOCTO B ASlnm. a COIIanO
a6COnlOTHCTCKHX rocyAapCTB. ,OBOnL-
HO 60mbUtOeMOCTO B A. a6eO'IIO'rHt1X
MOIIapXHf 3allManK BOnpOCLI, CBII-
aatiHIlo C upeCTOJOHacneAneM It C
AHBaCTH'IOCI{IIMH 6pa1aMii.
B ?noxy 110111 TaAHBMa rJIQBHLlM CO-
AepniaIIHOM MON(AyuapOAHLlx OTHO-
mOHHIi CTUIIOBHTCA oph6a MallHT11-
nMGTH'1CC'{HX rocyAapCTB 3a BaBOOBU-
11110 pLIH1fOB, as 3axUUT ((CCJ)Op );,IM1I-
Bof1N, as pa4Aom, a 3UTOM, B ucp0OA
WMuel)UaJi lJMa, as uei)wAwd1 Mop.1, as
MHpOBOO DKOHOMHHeCHOe H HOJCHTH-
'iecuoe rocnOAcTBO. Ha cmyx{6y aa-
Aa9aM aTOlt 60pL6bl CTaBHTCU H A.
IIpaBAa, 6ypncyaanan A. Ha AoMOHO-
HOJIHCTH9CCKOH MAIM pa3DHTHF1 Ma-
IIMTamH3Ma Cny3KHJla H' upOi'pOCCHB-
HLIM aaAagaM. B XIX H. oua Hrpana
HoMamyio pomb B yenemaoM 3anepIIlo-
HH11 HauoonambHO-ocBO6OAHTOJIBHLIX
ABHIHOHHJ H o6pa3onaollli IiaunUHaJlb-
HLIX rocyAapCTB B JIaTMHCI(0U AMC-
p1THO, Ha BamHanax, B natjioHaJIblIOM
o6'beAIiuenuH I'OpMUHHH It I'lTaJIMH.
Taicyio me npOrpecclBHylO poma HrpaOT
B HaCTOHIIICO BpOM1I A. HOBLIX IIe3UBH-
CHMLIX rocyAapCTB Aaiui H A(S)puint.
C Apyro%i cTOpolal, B anoxy KauHTa-
nW'IMa McHJUOTCII co itambliUII ocnona
H IIOnnTWICCHIlH CITpOn roeyiapCTBa.
(I)OpMI1 H MOTO)1LI J IIo)nepraIOTCn BU-
MOTHOA MOAepnu3aI[nn. A. CTama iuH-
pOHO nomb3oDaTLCn aMOIIOMH9eCi{Oa
aaHHTepeconaHHOCTb1O BJHITenLHblx
KanHTaJIHCTn9eCKHX rpyIln, IIpOAOJf-
fHaeTC11 IICIIOJIb3OBUI1110 BIIyTPOHIIIIX
IIOJIITH9eCiiUX pa3HOrnaCHli B AP. CTpa-
HaX. O6ey1KAeHl10 BOHpOCOB BHCllIIIOII
IIOJIiITHHH B napnaMOHTaX It Ila CTpU-
Hituax npecebl no6yac u1eT A. eTpe-
MHTLCa C03AaTL ce6e onopy cpeAli 6omeo
IHpoKHx Icpyron roCuoACTByioluoro
KnaCCa D HHOCTpaHHLIx rocyAapcTBBX,
IIO)IACPHIHBOTL CBn3H C TCMII Hn31 HHbhMIi
uOJUTn'ICCKHMH napTtiflMII, C I1pOA-
CTaBHTennM11 HpOCCLI. A. flIIIOT HOBL10
CII0006LI B03ACI1CTBHn Ha BHemiHOlO 110-
JIHTUI(y HHOCTpalhtuux rocyAapCTn It
Ha BOMITII'IOGI(HO HacTpOOHBf B C06-
CTIICHIIOII CTpalIe. 110 KOp01111MI Cy'IlI-
IIOCTI, A. OTIlIOAb He MOIIBCTCH. AilllJl.
HCTyCCTBO 3nOXII HanliTa0I13Ma, Tait
)He I{aM H Allen. HCKyCCTBO IIepHOAa
B6COJIOTH3MU, IIBJIIOTCfi A111IJI. HCKye-
CTBOM 3HCIIJIyaTaTOpCHHX rOCyAapCTD,
T. 0. CODOKynuOCTaIO CIIO(,O6OB It
C peACTB OCyllLCGTBJIOI1UB IIOnHTIHTH,
9yfHAoa 11 Bpa)ICAe6HOn HapO)IaM it
lICne)ICTBIIO UTOFO npOI)OAIIMOI1 nyTOM
oIM((tia llapOAnblX MUCC MUM 3U rpa-
HB1LeU, Tai( It D C06CTBOIIIIOII CTpaHO.
B. it. Jleniin no paa y60AHTOJILIIei1BI11M
o6paaou llouttabI l(Idl, 11aN Tol)IMUCTHe3l-
Hble uapaAHI10 AoiimapalthH 11 ()pa3bi
IBCerAa CmyIf llnn it CnyHihT B ycTax
6ypa{ya3fbIX AllIlJIOMUTOD AJIII 06-
MUlla )kOBOp'IHBI.IX H Iiaiiauulx mace
yrneTelntorO IIapOAtl') (COIL, T. 24,
(;Tp. 3'J). Tal(UI) AUUJIOMUTLI, IIUK Ta-
JIeIipaH, Hma
a TaHme 6yp
b A. mio6Hnn
CTpOMHTCf1
611TL IIpaBAnH
CHUM cnoBapoi
TH9eCI{Olt ala)
JIOCL, 'ITO IG
BOHIILI lB A. H
UICIIHO 11001111
1[ull)>. O)t1l(I1o
HBnf11OTCn JIM
BCAJIHDOMy 3a1
BeTCKoro HCTOI
6LI HH 1130HIPF
TOphi, OHH He
'ITO IJOJIU GypB
CBOAfITCJI Ii I
iiaiepenili II
11011, If-phix 11
HIccTByeT. lie
'ITO B 6ypacyl
IICMaJIO THItn9C
TI13Ma. B 9
OTOmma B IIPOIII.
A11nnOMaTH'1CCI{
ablBaeT B. II. .
CDIITO B COMLI:
JIHCTH'ICCIf11X CT
Iy10HppaTH9ec1(11X
T 25, CTp. 67). m
Tpomb,) IIapnaMc
JIIITIfItOII IIBJIfTO'
HUM, Icai{ H
rapaHTlnli B 6y1
B. Ii. Jiel m r
B0IIpOCl1: Boiil
'IeCHHC BOnpOCM
rOpcTI(OH IialIH7
Ma111,IBaIOT HC T,
'TUCTO 06MaIILIBa
T. 30, CTp. 4E
B110IIIIIOI1 1IOJIIITI
HpfBIITC:ILCTB I
ToJLIIGIX rpylll
oJlur...lp "Jill.
a)Ta 'ICpTa 6
GOJI1,111o yCnnltmf
311311a Ila IIO'1B
palllIi roeyAape
yBeJ1119HBaioH er
ml(ipl'.l'IlelinOro III
9eciinn MOIIOHOJ
aJlloll A. B
OnpeAenn1ocH
MOllollomill H 6ai
11011 I(aIIIITanIICT
)UUHe1hU1I MoltOl
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
lI0.In1Tn-
.l(6v R;.r-
)I it /1,.
)kOMOnO-
ITItn IunOrr 0771 ttTrr9Gar(rr0 1(07717, H-p1.11
,T7. a6COJIIOTISaMa, 0FCa311.III
C.I1y>i(3fJla
IICnO('.pel(CTDCI1I100 if r7iy6oicoo BJlnnllna
1011 xrlpaTTep CO MICTO))OII. ?1111 , 31
3111'(711,0 Xapfl(TCp113y1OT A. a6 ua'COJIIO-
TIICTCHIIX POCy7OPCTB CJIOJIyIOII(IIM1f
0 11 0 13 0 1(111: MaTpannIIBaTL napo)ua Jtpyr
up. J)pyra, 1TCIIOJIb30D1Tb 07[1111 IlapoJ),
J(nn yI'Herennn Jipyroro, 9To6bo TaHIIr
o6pa30M IIpOJ(7I11Tb Cyr1(CCTDOB11IIIT0 a6-
COJIIOTII0IS DnaCT11, - DOT IC 90My C130-
J131.IIOCI, nCI(yCCTBO 11 A09TOJTLHOCTL
BCCX CyI7)0CTDODaI31IIIIX 7(0(0700 IIpE1Dn-
TCn011 11 11X J?IIIIIOMaTOB)) (H. MapICC it
(1). 31Ir0JIbc, Co'I., T. 5, CTI>. 1611).
I-IeMa7IO0 112111111110 IIa XapaHTCp ,),.
0Ha3r,rl3aJlO 11 TO 06CTOIIT0JI1,CTBO, 'ITO
pyrHClT10,
ropeTHD DI,ICIIIIIX '11111oBr1111(OD. Bo3-
J(e1rCT13110 ITa. OTJ(COI.IILIX 77111( 113 1TOr0
OrpaIlll'ICIIITOCO, 3aMr(1IyTorO 11 H TOM
11(e 01071.110 i(oppynnponarinoro I(pyra,
B03JjOiiCT13110, H-pOe OCyII(CCTBJInJIOCb
7110601101!, J(ax(e (&101311010 6C33aCT011-
9III1biMIS, CpOJ(CTDaMI(, 6bino rreo6Xo-
77;11M011 OpraHn90CH0ri '1aCT1,10 7(111171.
71,0TTOJI1311 OCT11.
BCZICACTBIIC BCCX BTITX npu'111II 13
AMID. 7OnTCJTbIIOCTH a6coBIOTIICTCI(IIX
rocyoapcTB nllipol(0 IIp1IMeHnJ111cb o6-
Man, BCpo7IOMCTBO, 1OJ)Hy11bI, nr:Tp:I-
rn, y61liICTBa, J(BOpf)OBLfo 3aronopm
11 T. H. A. 3alra)II0013p0IIC11CI(Or0 a6-
COJIIOTIS3Ma 'Ieprrana o6pa3liLl 31,31 f1
CBOIIX MCTOJ1Q11 it IIpnCMOB B A. COBCpO-
HVIJIL111ICHIiX rOpOJ(CHi1X pecny6J1n1,
o77lrrapx11'Iecxan BOpxyml(a H-pb1X 1307)11
o>IIOCTO'lC11IlyIO 6opb6y as Topro1Oo
npco6oa7taIirc II IIOJInT11'7CCHy1O rorC-
MOI1n10. 06 3TOii . 0711411 H3 ee BiI7)'j-
HCIirHIIX Ji011T071011 H TeopCTHROD, Ma-
011aDC7IJT11, I'OBOprlJI, 'ITO CO 11CICyCCTBO
COCTOIST B TOM, '1T06br (1CHpbIBaTb CJIO-
B11M11 J(03SCT13IITOJIbnOCTL1i. MaHHaDC7i-
7III311 071171 IIOJI31Tn9eCH07'1 (`)Hnoco(J)neIi
a6COJ11OTTLIX1MOHapx>nr, I(-pLle D 013011)1
)CiiCTDfTR I)yl(OBO)CTDOBOM)1Cb 7I0HT-
p11n011 irocygapcTBOHHOrO IIIITODOCa?,
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
IiaK umemero BpMTepUH B 1.OJ'~'IT-1l;C,
Hpeo6naAaion(0ro Isar' lipyri}.:u - afo-
paHbHlaMlI, upaBOIIBMO it IBL -
(81,1111 jjt uJI0.4aTLi ': OrO Ilt)U-
MCHU 603 CTCCHC1il1H LT3LI13a::1LCL 0 ).1.
Hate o6 I1CHyceTBC o6Maua. AItr:11311-
C1(HII J(MHnOMaT XVI1 B.
TOH, JZu 3 5I OUp0P0.1CI:11C 17003:11; 11110 121:
((HOCOJI OCTL 'ICCTHLIII 1.11'111, lIOGLil?aC-
ML3A 3B rpaH11uy, 'ITOU3-B Ira'1: 'u C11'r0-
pecax 010010 rocy;lapcTBi1D. 1' llje 1)11100
JIOCTHO OT3LI11i1J1HCb 0 ;1It IJI(,MtTaX
Y110111,10 11 H IIOaTenl:. (1).pa 111(y':;cx:11 l11L-
CaTOnb XVII B. 't1:ali JIa6p.olup 11u-
can, '1TO BCH j(OHTCJIL110CTb ;(LI3!JiJSia-
TOB uallpanJleIfa M o;uio 1 1(03.11: 110
6biTL o6MaiIyTLlMli 11 u6ma blaT!O ;(py-
ruX.
PaayMeeTCII, 110331811 CBOj(i.Tb B o6-
Many it 31)1111 BGIO xapUIi'1Cp11C':':)1(y
punIn. IlCI(yCCTBa 0000n1GTlic lclca1 1'0-
cyJ(apCTl3. ~~. a600.JIUTH3Ma 1)h pa6utUJla
TOlu110 MCTOALI, 1(aa 1:031(11111.0 1103.111-
IJ,ISII Hoj( 11pe){noro.a HOj1?;(Cpa(AUUH
010BuT13'iccl(oro p u B LOBeCIII1..,
'I011u0 HUCT)'IIaTCJLLLILIX 11 060 )011WI(:1L-
IiAIX C01030B 11 J(01'OllopOI3 0 ,l1),, i uo C
LLenalo eo6HpaH1]H clr'1 uuo i1B 0,:y;i)'-
I1(0r0 I1pOT1III iLt, SaHJI1U41.1110 iial(-
TOB 0 ueaTpanIlTeTu C 17,1331-1U 1103 00-
TOBI(11 131,1ro;(HOlO COOT1IOB) 111;3 01131
B rOTOD1111WnCH 001:110, p11.:)1(111':0)I10
peJlurllO3111AX, Ha11H011aJ11,11b1( It uuJ111-
T1PiCCHI1X p(13j(op013 11 0113'T B B]!OCT-
paHI1bIX rooyJ[apcTBax, D0J(131 110 B 1131X
n0J111T119CGICOII upOllai't,u Io, .'i 11oC11ep-
lItIIfy MOTO!(y }'1100 IIp1A)L to . a ;Glean
1 IIIICJ11.0, o61)0141131111111 11033 111110 BHII-
L31111130 lilt COCTLLBIOHHL' 1031 L'ru'10.11;Hx
I11 M(])iIOTOB H Ha 1:X p11C11pu("rp:1B3)1110
an rpauiii&oi1. OAllai o lip" ooear ]TOM
3111'11100 1303J10110M13110 1111 1301.033311, liX
HopbblX MIIHIlCTpOB, 1 iL1i0p0I01 , upH-
jjllopHldX 11 T. J(. C ILUMOI:_(Llo 00,111110,
06M1lua, IIIlTPlll', sa0UB01 lMJ 3a)ll1:1NIO
110 IIOCJIOj4IICC M(!CTO 11 41 )1JI. apCC;l.In0
a60OJlI0T11CTC1(lix roey;tllj)CT,l, ;J,01.0.11-
no 6on11)LO0 MOO'. L' u. uu.: O1110';IIWX
MOilapxiiIf 301111Ma0I1: 110)11p,cb), CJ)1-
Jill]11130 C IlpOlIT'0J1lit1ii C'Ji Oj=, LOM 11 0
Jjli Ha0Tll'1001(1WII i, pL)1i::1.; 11.
11 O]IOxy LI)IIOT)INL.I)sas 1'41aJI11u1 CO-
4ep)lia1H10M MO)1SJ(y 111 l4?EIW 0,FIIO-
1ll0H1111 CTUIIO1311TCH 001)1011 )Oil.ILra-
n1I0TUflCC1(uX I'OCy411 lOT)) 311 3aJ1)u1 1
11110 pOilll(Oll, all 310 1;al, ?('),U1) I-Illi1-
I111)13, 30 pa34011, 11 3111031, !1 1131,1)0;(
u1+IULl1)uaJ111'J;4U, 3i( IIC1)L4CJ1 M11p.i, 1111
MupoBOO aI(01I0MH'1CC1(03 11 HOJIIITI
'1001(00 10033401011. Ha cnya 6y 311-
J(a'IaM 3TOH OOpb61,t CTaBHTCJI 11 A.
ifpanua, 6ypnIya3llan A. lla J(OMO1I0-
IlOJ111CTU'1CCHOH UTap,l1H pa33lIlTHH Ila-
1111TAnu3Ma Cny11(J1Jia 11 I3porp000liI)-
HL31 3aJ(a'IaM. B XIX B. will. Hrpana
noMaarylo ponL B yClICm11OM 3i1llCpllle-
IIIII1 11131 j110Ili1JLbllO-OCBOUOj(11TCJ IL 1111X
)1,B171KCIIUII 11 O6pa30B111Ii111 Hal1,l3OllaJ16-
HLIx r0Cy4(L)pCTB B JIaTIIHCIioil AMo-
pHHC, Ha 1)111)I0111aX, a 11H] (IlOll an i,11011
06'1,0J1,11110311Ill I cpMIIIiII11 It I1TaaI1u.
Tuaylo me 11p0rp000liB11yI0 ponL Ilrp)LCT
B 11aeT01114CC BpCMU A. I10BIdX 11C3.U1L1-
(I1MLIX 000 )LapCTB A31111 it AIl)p::l(:1.
C Jlpyroii cTopOIILI, B 311O1.y H:IUATa-
31113',MC1 MOHHLOTCH CO1(ItaJlJ,Ila)I UCIIOL'a
11 lI0n11T11'IeCI(1111 CTp0i1 r0CyJ1t1pOTna.
(I)OpMLI 11 MCT0J(LI J(. IIOJ(BCp1'aIU'l'0)1 31)-
110TH011 MOJ(Cpllll3al(u11, A. CTa71a 111H-
pOICO IIOnh30BaTLCH JIi011OS113'1CCimil
3a11HTepO00DalIiIOCTLIO . DJr1111T0JIL1111x
HUIIIITUJIUCT1P10C1(11X rpylltl, 11pu;(0.1-
)1(aCTCH 110110311,30111)11110 1)11 T1)0111111X
IIOJIIITHY0C1(ui pa31101`JIaCI61 B J{p. C'rpa-
Hax. 060y214033110 110111)011011 1)1)011111011
1IOJIIIT3]K11 B HapJIaMCIITaX 11 I111 cTp
IIIIIIUX llp0COLI IIOUy)il;(aCT A. Copo-
MIITLCH c03j(aTb ci6C olf0py Cpe;111 003100
mapol(Hx 3(pyrOB roeno4eltIyloB(L1'u
'110001 B 11HOcrpa111LLIX I'OC.y;(iipCTL'11X,
1104J1(1 pncH13aTL 01311311 C T0M11 113111 111)1 IM11
1102! n'ro'1CC 11111111 uapTI1HM11, 0 111)0,1-
OTUBIIT'OJ3IIMII IlpeeC11. A. 1111(01 11001)0
01/000611 1103401 CT1311H lilt 1311C111t11010 110-
2111T111(y HuOCTpalll1LlX rocy;(aPGTB H
lift ILOJIIi'r1I'1CCLC110 liaCTpO0,1!)III B COO-
M101111011 CTpaHO. 110 1131)3011!11 01'll(-
IIOGTI, j k. OT11101(L 11O M01111CTC11.
11C1CyCCT30 31103311 Ii01111T11311131111, Tali
)ISO MIN 11 AIIIIA. IIC1iyCCTBO 116p110.a
a6COJIIoTH3Ma, 11BJBOTCH 41HIn. IIC1(yC-
0T110M OHOIIJIyaTaTOpGlUIX 1'0Cy;011}01'13,
T. 0. 001101Cy111LOCTI10 01100..00011 11
Cp1;ICT'B OCyH(L'1T13J10uBi1 11031111111(1),
'ly)I(',oi 11 Bpa)HJ(C6I)oii llap0;(a11 11
13)'211140'1'11110 8101'0 up011U;1H910i1 11} Toll
00110)1)1 ILUpo;lm,IX JIa00 1(1111 3) rp i-
111I1(eil, Tall 11 11 000CTUU1111011 CCTplll!C.
1S. 11. J1C)1113I 110 11a3 y 01411TUA lAlUIi111)101
()l}p(I30M 110)(U:11,11)1IJ), 101111
111J0 I1api1j(]lLlo J(OIiJIlipal(llll 11 (ilpa;11.I
(0Ii001'J(11 OnynI1t)111 11 Cny)](OT B ye'!iOX
6y p)1(yi1311111 4I111Jl OIILITOI) )(111 oU-
MilHa J(O11Up,1111l)IX 11 11il11DllLIX 11)100
yrl1CT'alulUr( 1111po;111.) 'i'. 2/1,
0'1'11, .1iJ). 'i'tliu11J {llll.'IU\111'1'11, Kali 'I'a-
JLll'l',L((a '
rau11II'))).)
ii .
I)0 1 is
1'0,. III .1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
00 13 IIO; I11Tlr-
a IIII'rl'f4 Il iI,.
~? 13,1 ;(0'10110'
il? 1111('11)11 011
13 IIp1)3'; )'l'cllll-
'3. OHa )11'p;laa
1iO1~~1 it:nin('lilC-
it oI!();II1111:11,113,IX
1 1 1 3 1 I I 1 1 ( 4 1 Olt A . ' I
11;11 kit 011,1. 11, 114,13
III it IITa:111 11.
:y K1 00111, III pI1et'
31011111% 33L13i11ll1-
;1t11 It A(1)p1IHII.
alluxy 1(aB11Ti1-
loJlh11a11 0011011)1
)I1 1.'0( v;(aI3CTI3a.
(3311' 1)1-11(1 3('01 ;la-
JI. CTIO111 11111-
arCOH0;11II11e('3mii
111:111
1)\')IlI. II pU;1lC1-
330 1311} TpCDD1tX
ac.11ii B ;(p. (IT 1 l
11
I pO11o13 1(11011100
iT11X 11 Ha ('Tp;i-
1(',(aCT ,il. C'rpC-
IOpy Cpl1;Pi 60)100
03'!)0; (CT B\T lOIl O'1)O
S 1'01'-y'J((1 pC.TBIIX,
TC1r1) 11J133 11116111711
11111111, C
J 1111(CT 110133.10
IIIO 111101l111101() 110-
C roCy';(ap(.r1i 11
;TpOClltlll 11 COG-
I(Op('llHall Cy11I-
,tC13II OT,' ll. i 1111.1.
nflTAJ111:31Ia, 'ral(
(yCCTDO IuepliO)(11
'C. I ((11101. I1cOyC-
1(11X 1'OCy)(apCT13,
0 CI)OG00o11 11
I311 It 110510111101,
33011 ltapo)(alt It
Oilo lIM011 lly'rcoo
11(10 IO1H 3a r11a-
;TI3CIIHOii CTpar.O.
'6 CJIHTOJIh1iCI;1131i'
Hai( TOI)JHOC.113C13-
apal(11I1 H (T)pll311
cry)i(aT B yeTax
1Ir1ITGB 313111 o6-
11a1IDIIl,1X MaCC
1,. (1.;011., T. 24,
:3101,00101, Hate Ta-
:IOiipall, I 10p(:11;(al Ii.')).. '.01fl:J'
it Tom m, 6\'p)1(ya:1[161^ ..-?' it Ii!,I I: L;'~,
f) ,1,. 100611.1111 rOBOpllTh fl TM(, CTpCIfIITCII 311130CBL1)31Ti, ; (S 130pUt' 11
0(1TI, I1pa11J(1ll0ii. B l 1,)l1LIOAiaTn'lC
c1)011 CJlOBape)) IiaplillO'((oll )(11B,OM
TII'3001)OII aFaJICMBII )(3331((1 3TDO[11)i .1-
3300I,, 'ITO 1114(,*r(' 1301 (1 'ii 7111 I,ri1+.a
13OIIIILI (,I3 A. 11(I'IIIIIIICT UXO;01T1- (Oily /-
1110(1110 110111,111 )(1'X, M0pa.7i,11)li llplt 1-
1(11111). 0)(1131(0 110;T(10111,10 if
JIB:1)I1(T(`9 ]1111(0ATCT)1l LIM l1. (Ill ('II!)1-
1l(3J(,III)OM)1 3aMC9a1111I0 HalCCT1I(VO 1'11-
110TCI(OI'0 )ICTOpuICa E. B. Tapne, x, iR
61,T 1111 133on(pfTOHCb 6ypOlyi,31I110 '...-
TOPbT001111 110 MOCYT CHpbITI, TOCC),
'ITO 1(03111 Gypa ya:3DOlr A. 3:0113MC11110
CI30;IITC(1 F MaCJC11pODI{0 OCTIIH11r IX
I1amcpCIIImm IT 1( C.IIMy31H1kill" H8110j (I-
111(1r, I4-p31x I111 Ci1MOM ;(e3IC 1:0 Cy-
110010E- V,
H(OCTBYOT. ITC YaIlD11TCJIbII0
ITO IT Gyp)Hyaailoli A. 000palIlTOr :H
110Ma310 TO))21ICCHIIX 'ICp: A. (16COt1.o-
TIIOMa. B 'I1C.TIIOC.TII, 0711I001, it0
oToHl31a B 111)(3111,100 Till i3iaiT A.
J(IIIIJI OMaTJl'1 ME 11 X C110DI011 III), - Yl~;i-
31,I000T B. 11. .110111111, - 0063110,1110:.'11
CDTITO B Ci111LIX CIl000AJfJ, X 1(,1111:0;I-
JIIICTII'ICCI(IIX CTpahlax, B 11111160,00 ;;c-
MOHraTn'1ocI(IIX I>CCHy6JIl1H;iX)> GO I.,
T. 21), CTp. 67). uAc1lol;pars'ICCxaii Hr 11-
TP0,6? IIapo1aMCHT013 rlajj 131IC-1111101f LO-
3111T11I(OIr 1I13IHCTCn CTOJTL ;EC I131311(.Y.11.I)
IILIM, I(aI( It )(p. 4)(CM0lip(TH'le01{li0
rapaUTIIID) B 6yp)I{ya31ToM rocy)Itlpc,:3e.
B. II. JIcH11H uH[H1eT: 4113111.0 Ba)I(111,le
no1TpOCLT: 130(1113, MITI), J).111JI0liL.;'ti-
'I0CIiIIe noITPOCLI p0111(IOTC1I BII'ITO)I(ll0i1
ropc.TICOII OaIIIITal11ICTOB, HOTOpb10 O6-
MaH1.tnaloT HC TOJILI(0 Ma0CLI, lit) ;(:1:3(0
'IaCTO 06Ma111,TDaiOT llpap,aMOIIT3. (C04.,
T. 30, CTp. 454). IPJIat1HLle pl,l'Jir13
11Her1lleii ITO,IITIII(II OC.TIIIOTC.I B pylaX
IIpaBIITCJI1.CTD 11 HX x00900 - 1371119-
TCJrL11LTX rpyllD Ha HHT(1313rCTII'rCC 1'M npiieMaM J,JIB OCj-
Y0CI(1iX CBH301i C op. HanH'raJ111C'rlI-
110(:'111, 0;11;
IQOCTBnOIIIfn U).SrIe PliaJI11 C'L HYCC1::i.X
YCCHHMH roCyIapCrnaMI1, if Ra)ICO TOII-
J1DLifi0"'C11 CO
D1[OIHneHONUT111IaCIilix nen Ol- Wr:(-
RelI1jIIH OTJ3CnLH1,IX Ha11HTanHCTH'1CC1C11X
it C' pall LOf, I
canCL MHpHOrO CopeLHoEa11n1_ C Co-
rocyRapcTn it, yI(ponJI01111I0 IIOJ1f3T3i-
3103-11. 1L: ,>
I13raJIHCTUY0CHIlMlf CTI1a1.aLIII r y1CT7Clt-
YCCHIIX 11 3HOIIOMHYCCIC1IX cllmeli C C0-
ryajnuers.IC _
N01111n IIOBLIX I103aBIICn`tSLIX r0['"'Ra')( TH,
1faJIlICT1fYCCI(1I11H I'OCyoapCTBaMii Ii
110CII0,0311,1; . -
13031IH1CU111X D UOOLOO 1100133 HOJiU-
DIM 3TOM 1I0aI3y0TCn TCMII (S)O)M11MH
111 O(ill>,'."r
IHSaH1I3Ma, CTPOMBCL H ffbJ11.3n.?an;:io
eoJ uarUCTIfgecI(fx ii R(:/,Olipa'r ICCJHIx
co i no BCCM MH0e, A. S. 3nep1.UJI tcT::-
If MCTOJj3IM11, IT-pOIO CRO)I(11JIl100 B 11011-
C0J3HCllII017 11paiCT11HO M1l IIOrO Me)lC)ky-
HapoRlloro CorpyJH1J'1eeTna. 0Jj:IIIIO
GT W.,
neemfX RCp3H&B MaCIti.pyb'r C lot: al'-
p0003in111,10 IjOJri 1100-))C9CTB031. OOsf:-
HeHHn MIlpo:1I0oUDIIX GOTjIIa31.iCT:117C/G'-
.HIiX CTpUH B aI'pcce.iBI1LIX iIa-1erie-
HI1HX 11 060CHOBaTllln TOliO fly C.1
11pCCnOBYTOIT 11OJIIITIIi(}I 113 ;308:H;i3ti
CJL'ILI?, 110)111T111CU ((6:1JII,I1Cl.T)CM:H1:11 Ha
rpaffI3 11011ul.l 11 T. H. OHa COSRcto'r
arpOCCIIBI3l1o DOe71HLI0 OJIOiCit 111,0'.11[1
001j1fa1HCTHYCCItItX ("TpaJ 11021 (j)J1aroM
06op011UTCJILHLIx 06'LC/{3ffiCI'IIIi. naowld
COOTBCTCTByIUJ111X J/CTOIIy 0011. CT1e-
Mf3CD COXPAHIITL HOBOnIlO 1L1:fie rJC-
IIORCTBO, A. H1.fnepifaJII`.CTH'ICCI::!X R~p-
)1SaB o611(NaUT oTEOIHeHI:ff .iORH:li-
YCCIColl if 3ICOIIOMIIYOCI611 3anlCI1MOCiv,
,ram rRe MOnouu3aTOpaM y;tU. l IL
cOxpaI131TI., 13 (?IOpM .1Im IC pull' 0-
11PaDIiLIX 1100I1110-U OJI lITII'ICCIa'1 C0:0-
3013, [1001111011, 31SO110Sll:'I 1 11- :1, T-1-
111TYCCI(OiI 11 T. H. (ul01d(1111i),. f :111, 1')ju
110 y/jaOTCI COXpaHHTL '11111110 ;TIiOIaIC-
11113!, n11H0 pni1H lien 34C.;harl
6eraCT Is CTIIpLIM, 113nl,iTain.I' : I,p:10-
MaM III1TOPBe11I11111, p 133)1(Bra I Ui.: F0.:ilC-
/ja1ICHOH [10111161, I. ?raII}i3ailll .
BupoB, Teppopa, )annC111111, yrpo3,
illl'i?1>Ilr, 11ORIiyfOB Ii T. 11. 111. T0:11.ICO
no B3aUMOOTIIOIHCII1II(X c 313 Bit AV,: LIMI
rOCYJjapCTDaMII, 110 If 110 13;13i1_]OOT;10-
IIICIIIIHX CO :iCCMl1 /if). tOi YR,ip.'T-
Bi11I1f 1131n0LILIJIl eYn'ICC I(aH ~~. I'. ;;
JIl1CT C}IOIIX ~'r1>11/jtn[1:1,11IILI . Hp.10-
MOB. Cultpcalu1111.'l ll li x)41+'1 11 (1 D- 1131.31.'.:,1
M IIUI'Ulwpluillil, 11:111111.:11 11, 111-H
pyIf1>, 11pI1311111. r:.1...'O
JluraIlnoil CILIA H:; eCeeHa . :'D.ic-
paJILHOH Accal,i6ne:i 0011 .. u,,Ic-
'Ial1 3331 MCXIIL.IHC1 >(J.~IJi D;1l..1.1
DOii11L1)>, DnHOrI R0 CyO( 1,ln -,ODde:UI
l1ORHOJ1 I,H:.Ix IC OUI'l' p poUO.13O11111)1:.11.1 X (.0
ra11H3alunif, 11CJ1y1ljI3x P. C1/30111[171 ,'IO
TCJIOI1OCTL Up0T1113 COL'?11BJI11('1 :'IOeI:.:x
CTpali. Pa3 00TCH, COIIpCMCILO11 6""
-
113ya3111131 `.11 B TO )Iii' C-0.100 Br 'M)1 )U-
cnyxtlinac'r TOHROHIIIIH TeX 11.10 1111!;1:1
Hpli0Mhl, C n0M0HwLI0 It-pLrx C011p0MeH-
Hail 6ypx yaauan R. o6cJnyH(HBa0T ar-
peCCHBHLIO H 3IC611aZICIf0II11CTCli1IC
TOIIRCHIIHH DII01111031 HOJIIITIIICIl MAX IfPyI1-
1IMHOpManHCT11'I0CICHX RCpLcll B,
11BJ1f1IOTCn B U01I rOCnOJc'1'nyIO-
IIjHMI1.
4/111 OIIpanpanIfn IIITIII}ap0;U101I
13I10111I10II IIOJIIIT}IICH B rJraaax ilap0/loi
B o6CTaIlOIHe 1103poC3110L1 IIOJI11TIIYCCI(0U
alerHnnoCTU TpYJjingIXC11 MaCC 6yp-
iICya3nafi A. 06palljaOTCII H Cr1C1j31aJlb-
HUM CpOJjCTBaM H cnOCO6aM, MIlcmlpylo-
njHM Ra11IIyiO non31Tlllty H IIp11J(iIIOu1311M
RHnJ1. Re11TeJ1LnOCT11 1111RHMOCTL 103i-
poxoil rnaCHOCrII. 3TOMy Cny)ICHT ony6-
J11IICOBaIIH0 B ne9aTlt coo611jeiiiiii c
Jj1HIJI. noperollopax, 11111131. n7000-Hi1U-
(110pel1131f11, 111I0Tyf1Jf01uffl )31llI AO1ifi001
Ill( 110JI 11T11'ICCICIIX COUpItlllflIX, 11 Ile-
4aT11, 110 p.U31l0, TCJI01)Il)(0lll!O1 A T. ;3.
)1,2311 3TOI'o )ICO 111111 /(1111)1. 130)3(1:1h:191:1X,
a 111101'/ja 01)301!LIi0 OT MIX, 11 Ha'ICe'r130
COMOCTOIITCHL11LI X y'ip(3),(RL 111111 C03-
RBCTC1l 000000 cjiyO(6a lie /1UII1IM lie-
'jamm11 H 061I61pJJLlll 11 Poll ara ll/UICT'CIUI ii
arirlapaT. A. 111111)01(0 11p1l601'a e'r 11 1(
11OMOn311 1100111110113231.1111 X C pe)j,37.11 11I)0-
11a1 all)ILI. 13 ye.lonnax 6yp)1(ya3HOro
c port BCO n13'HOylk131Il11ll,le CpCJCTBa
It C1100061,1 ((OTICpI.1TO11 4 . 110 CVTll
J3CJIll A13,111 lOTC11 CpOJjCTll>1Ef11 H CII0-
000a1d11 1111013111)01111li RC1i>'/l'O il'I'CJiLIILIx
110111111 B 11(M1'11'DUii uPauurr?nLr'ru.
1131(')) II S,u)3Y I.11111nlylu ]7111('[11)3'31. C>-}-
)liya:3HoI 31(., HeH-plde 6y p0i 13:(111110
IlyUJ111H1ICTlI 11 LlITOpLI );11111' 0
(uaup., /'0/1.1111) J1H1111Ma11, 1'131)0/:1,/1
11f11COJ1LCOlf, Calt'J111 X13/3JICT01l) eTa:IH
ne21,1BIITI, CO 3110130W> 11 /31331(0 (p1113pO,j-
110113 4. lilt Ca310M )10!10 OTO CTapOH
no DCOI{ 3[10011 CYII31IOCTI1, HO 130031y
CBOCUy J3yxy if rmry6o1to alITUnapo)3Ba11
4., nL111y)H901111 in TOJI6IC0 11p:1601'1ITL
1C HCIC-pldM llblblM Mal10DpaM, ylloull ll
H Rwl opaljHf1M.
CT )1111 3
IIIi10
.::13:011 1131:':
i;lle 13131('11 H 01
001)1311 11130110'
...:1)1:3100 e0C.,
C 1)333)i'(1)0133
:111..111 c1:31C11..
11:)110 3aa11a.
/1311113:1
11001(0:3:,
11( lIe> ?.1)1 :'J, fI
;10.113013 p1 111_>
2)'1' 11011 I/o_ U- .`
JI11CTli'.:'i liu:]
ii Pi';ly(u IhL!1'0'
!11113 CI30;1C?i;,i.-_
CC {11111I>Ij11U11,,''.
1133311/ I' HIM
Ur:t
_hlii 01,1 ?,u ,.n
li{1,111111 1;(0011 -
1111"1111101! Ilv.>. I1
10,33 3 /1. rB o
/1(?1 all ..:;P1> I,i
41(101 0u'I> I:,
1103'0 40:10:R"..1
110:1111'111'0', -
HOIlCTIlTI P".1
(1(11. 11:11(11().1
1'p0M 11:uicii1117,-f
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
Z i i)CT I
7 'll r
p, ?d;3llid:~11l ;II'
:[-
TI ;u N X
110 .I liL. I - 01X
I::CIi Ii I~) 110111TII-
V. ro-
1;".' 111ati111 II
{; ,,"111 5 OpAc 00,17?[
0111111.: IIf. 1, IT II OII^
lJ;Iilalio
- )1,IV CO iii1 {CH-
iY: :1}"rii SiBa CT ar-
Cala:lC.i(0000TCIi 10
,I O. 1010 i11i11 IHMIOX 3af1B-
IIX OuIIICCTI30I111OlO 11000 yOaiICI 0'1111010 11.1111111 (Cod., T. 31, CTp: 250). ((3TOT
CTI)011. 13 COII11aJIHCTiPI0 c- X CTp3II11S C' )1101 Mlfp 11MCCT (MOTO CTapyrC )111-
BCT 11111C.Coll 11 ITapTilli, :fail t0nf- ((ill. - IU . 011111110, HOTOpafl 110 MO)HCT rlOBC-
Ol iX li 13011111X 11;111 It rOCH03(a11(1111,1, it )? 311111, 'ITO M011,? ,{.1> U., .10 yllG
TpconeHO 11p0311)3011071 CCllir. J. 'Pa=(11-
. TOll B 1912.
((h, A.>> I1iip0IC0 IICHOJIL3yer ua:i
TOJ{I>I BOeIIHO-HOJIIITI3TIeCIiorO 30031011153
It T1pYIMOIf 13OOpy)IICHIIO1I 11I1TepI3eIIIulll,
Ta11 H UPOJkOCTaBJI0a110 Ita6anLHUx 3a.i1-
MOB, (I)Hlfallconoii H a1(0110MH'leCIi011 ((110-
It1O1I1I) B II;CnfIX yCTa1IOBJICITHH rOCUO)3-
CTBa aMCPI1ICa0CAIIX 114f1IeplfaJIHCTIP.'0-
CICILX Hpyron D jzp. cTpaiJax. 14parr.Htue
upyro C111A 0006CH110 IUflpolto np1lMe-
1151I0T ((A. 3.? (B CO'ICTaHHH C 3p. cpc;j-
CTBaMH 3anneini11, B T. 'I.. 01 0MH011 Ali-
HJ10MaTHCll) 1IOCJIC IITOpOH MIIpO13011 BOU-
liLT. A.>> CJIyiICI1T Opy)IllICM 9.153
00PL0L1 C rifi4iLOUanL1I0-OCBo6OA'iTCSLL-
IH?f1H1 ){BHHC0IIIIIIM11 y1711CTCHIILIX IIa3)O-
)10B 11 33111 HOJ,Jl,epIC0CI1 pcalil{IlolillhIX
pencinfOD BO Deem Mope; 11rpa0'r L......-
931TCJILUYI0 90711. B 31C)
npoapa.uma; ((Ilnan Mapucan.q as; 5 03J-
lupuna Tpijr,caxai)).
j(i1I'1' C1:I1, Pep6epT (1882-1949)-
II0MOI1TiUI1 JSHHJIOIMUT, IipyfnuT111 HO1fe-
1311Ii. B 1928-33 - rCpMallcliliii l:c-
con B CCCP. C c0HTi6p1T 1933 110
Ij)CBpanL 1938 - Hocon n finollIlIf,
lIpilIIIMan y'IaCTHO D HO3r0TOBICC
(lal>01u1;o.M llUmcpuooc.oao na).)na)>, 13
Ma9TO 1938 60111 IIa311a'1CH 110071001
B AHroIIIO. 3aaII001I 3TOT LIOCT 110
CCHTfIOpfl 1939. I-jaxovici, B 3101T-
j1;0110, DOn C01CPCTIILIC uep0POBOjpLi C
IIPe;{CTaBHTOnfIMII i1T1rn1111CTCOIO rlpallH-
TOJILCTr0 0 pa3M0i(0Ba1III11 C(A)Op DJI11-
0llllii 11 0 3aICJ1 I0'l oil III, HIUpoiiorO 01SO-
HO11H'IeCICOrO 11 TIOn11T11'I0CIC0ro au1.10-
rOpMa1LC1COr0 corJIaiiiLa HII (cm. .A0.ar0-
eopoLal fcl.ue nepeaoeoprl ('0>063> we) 1939).
~(liltn. apXiIB ., 11011013 010111 B I'0)3L1
BTOpO1i M11pOnOii BOl6IIILJ B py1111 CO-
DCTCICOrO HpaBIITCJILCTDa H OIIy6J1111CO-
Baf11IL1H B CCCP (C1i. ((lo1yLl01ITL1 II
MiITCplfanol ICaayua BT'opoll mifpoB01i
1103301.1)), T. 2, 1948), 0OAep)ICUT 6oJiL1uo1i
Lli1TepIfan, pa306naVa1011{1l1L LlMIlCplla-
3111CT11'10CI0'10 HOJ1I1TlIlly pa3Bf13LIll 011110
111090113111 p01>011 1)011111,1, 119 0110)(1111111y10-
Cu 11 p3111101101113111 I1011llTAJ1l1CT11'1C'C30ll 1113
3(0 9>1S:I B R %f 1I .
J,I1CNI'll 311111A1]11IL 13 11 a 111 3( 3'-
11 a p 0 'All L! X 0 '1' it 0 111 0 11 11 II X-
yC'rauOB:1011110 ){Jiff I11)0J3CT11D11YCIl1111,
Op3'aH113 RI)111I 111111 rpa)1C){a11 0;{1301'0
roCy){apCTBa 11011LUIIIX IIpaB, '10:.1 3(1013
11 pe){CTa1311'I'0JICIl, opraiulaaltDi'I 117111
rpa)lcyau 3{p. rol>y33apCTI1a. 13 1101)Hj(110
.. :iy
C
po'1Lloro ,
Cc60ii fI?
00113:11>LT;
5i'T
10>0 S1; 1
11 50.11:,,.
lo.:.. 1' 1 r,'
3)53::3Ai lid:
..._., ll
lJn.,i'llli.33:
1)1 ~,i
111 [:11111>'
11101105110: I
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1
 (b)(3)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1 1)(5)
OGC/LEGL
FOIA
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100230001-1