SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1969

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00364R000100180044-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2002
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: May 20, 1969
• Content Type: OPEN

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May 20, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE
SECOND SUPPLEMEkTAL APPRO-
PRIATION BILL, 1969
Mr. MA_ OISpeaker, I move that
.the House resolve itself into the Com-
mittee of the Whole House on the State
of the 'Union for the consideration of the
bill (H.R. 11400) making supplemental
appropriations for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1969, and for other purposes;
and pending that motion, Mr. Speaker,
I ask unanimous consent that general
debate thereon be limited to not to ex-
ceed 3 hours, the time to be equally divid-
ed and controlled by the gentleman from
North Carolina (Mr. JONAS) and, myself.
The SPEAKER.. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from
Texas?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER. The question is on the
motion offered by the genleman from
Texas.
The motion was agreed to.
IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE
Accordingly the House resolved itself
into the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union for the con-
sideration of the bill 1i.R. 11400, with
Mr. HOLIFIELD in' the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
By unanimous consent, the first read-
ing of the bill was dispensed with.
The CHAIRMAN. Under the unani-
mous-consent agreement, the gentleman
from Texas (Mr, MAHOIc) will be recog-
nized for 11/2 hours, and the gentleman
from North Carolina (Mr. JONAS) will be
recognized for 11/2 hours.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman
from Texas.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield
myself 10 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, we come to the con-
sideration of the second supplemental
appropriation bill for 1969, the first ma-
jor appropriation bill for the 91st Con-
gress. It deals with the : fiscal year 1969
insofar as the funds are concerned.. And
It contains an important provision-an
expenditure ceiling-with respect to fis-
cal year 1970.
I hope the items in the bill will be ex-
plored by the Members and that the
House will work its will. on this, bill. In
the Committee on Appropriations, we
think we have done the best we could,
Out we make no claim of infallibility. We
have cut the requests by some $581 mil-
lion. If there are further reductions
which are desired, Members of course,
are free to offer the amendments to
bring about the reductions.
SUMMARY OF THE PENDING BILL
We have reduced the budget estimates
which were before us by about 13 per-
cent. Most of . the items, and the bulk of
the total requests before the committee
were of a mandatory character and we
had no practical option to recommend-
ing approval of the necessary funds. We
had to provide funds, for example, for
pay increases which had been provided
in previous legislation.
It is an old refrain that Congress in
11 the regular appropriation bills reduces
the annual iijoney measures and then
early in the next session, restores the re-
ductions which were made, and that
therefore the ; reductions originally made
result in no reductions at all. This is not
correct. For example, in this bill less
than 1 percent of the new funds pro-
vided represent:,. a restoration of funds
which were reduced last year. And the
restorations--some ..S34 million-repre-
sent about one--third of 1 percent of the
approximately :512 billion cut last year in
new funds requested for fiscal 1969.
That, I think. is a rather good record.
There are many, many items in the
bill before us. and there is no way to be
fully familiar with the contents of the
bill other than to study the bill and the
report, so I would commend to all a
careful reading of the report on the bill.
There are innumerable items represent-
ing, I believe, practically every depart-
ment and agency of the Government.
The bill proposes new appropriations,
or budget authority, in the sum of about
$3,783,000,000. It is, as I said, about $581
million less than the budget requests, a
cut of about 1; percent.
Mr. Chairman, under leave to extend,
I include, for purposes of elaboration,
excerpts from ,he report summarizing
the main features of the bill:
SUMM.'LY OF THE BILL
The bill is divided into five titles: I-Mili-
tary operations ir=. Southeast Asia, II-Gen-
eral supplementals (various), III-Increased
pay costs, IV--Cooling on 1970 expenditures,
and V-General provisions.
The grand total of new budget (obliga-
tional) authority recommended in the bill
Is $3,783,212,768, ;1 reduction of about 13%,
or $580,794,190, from the revised budget re-
quests of $4,364,006,956 considered.
In addition, under title II there are pro-
posed increases of $82,500,000 in limitations
on annual contract authorizations involving
interest subsidies for homeownership and
rental housing assistance and college hous-
ing. 'The budget requests for these total $104,-
500,000, so there is a reduction of $22,000,000.
Also, numerous provisions in the bill would
release $82,766,000 held in reserve under the
cutback provisions of Public Law 90-364.
The amounts in the bill are within the
overall totals of budget authority for 1969
shown in the administration's budget review
released April 15th. That Is, they are well
within the totals contemplated in that re-
view. And they are also well below the sup-
plemental provisions contemplated for fiscal
1969 in the budget last January.
The January i'ndget projected fiscal 1989
budget authority supplementals of $4,813,-
000,000, inclusive of $198,000,000 dependent
on legislation which Is not yet enacted. Of
the remainder ($4,615,000,000), a total of $4,-
365,000,000 in new budget authority was sub-
mitted to the House and considered in con-
nection with the accompanying bill. An ad-
ditional $221,000.000 in new budget author-
ity requests for 1969-finalized after House
Committee hearings were closed out-was
submitted to the,, Senate (S. Doe. 91-18) for
consideration in conn?ction with this bill.
Thus the total of such budget authority re-
quests now indicated L. $4,586,000,000, or, in
round figures, $29,000,000 below the $4,615,-
000,000 mentioned above.
This is the way the total picture stands
on 1969 supplementals as of this date. It is
a net result; the new administration re-
viewed and revised many of the supple-
mental requests submitted by the previous
administration and m.4de a number of re-
ductions. But as the totals now stand, in-
creases submitted have offset all but $29,000,-
000 of the decreases from the January budget
that were projected on April 15 (again, not
counting the $308,000,000 that hinges on
legislation),
H 3829
Summary by titles
Title I, Defense'rnilitary, includes $1,234,-
000,000 for military operations in Southeast
Asia. This compares with the revised request
of $1,496,900,000, a reduction of $262,900,-
000, or about 17 percent.
Title II, for sundry general supplementals,
includes $1,365,914,312, a reduction of
$39,736,850, or just under 3% from the
budget requests of $1,405,651,162 in new
budget (obligational) authority. Some re-
leases of reserves and other non-add pro-
visions are involved. Increases of $82,500,-
000-a reduction of $22,000,000 from the re-
quest-are also proposed in limitations on
annual contract authorizations in certain
interest subsidy programs in the housing
field.
The details are set forth under the various
chapters in the committee report, but the
great bulk of title II relates to items not
subject to effective discretionary control In
the annual bills. Some 83% or $1,132,000,000,
of the total, for example, is involved in grants
to states for public assistance; veterans
compensation, medical, and other costs; un-
employment compensation payments; mili-
tary retired pay; and disaster relief.
Title III, for increased pay costs, includes
$1,183,298,454 in new budget (obligational)
authority, an overall reduction of $278,157,-
340, or about 19 percent from the revised
budget requests of $1,461,455,794. Release of
$62,277,000 of P.L. 90-364 reserves is also
involved, plus numerous transfers between
appropriations to enable greater absorption
of pay costs.
These supplementals relate to unabsorbed
portions of pay raises generally effective last
July 1 that were not taken into account in
the regular 1969 appropriations.
The Executive Branch had combed the es-
timates initially and the new administra-
tion had also reexamined them. Since the
estimates are for mandatory-type costs that
have been running all fiscal year, the Com-
mittee could not make drastic additional
cuts all across the boards this late in the
fiscal year without creating unacceptable dis-
ruption to operations.
Title IV, limitation on 1970 budget out-
lays, proposes an overall ceiling on expendi-
tures of the government during the fiscal
.year 1970 that begins on July 1, 1969. The
proposal is explained 4fl considerable detail
beginning on page 118 of the report of the
committee on the bill.
Title V, general provisions, contains gen-
eral provisions customarily carried.
Approximate effect on 1969 expenditures-
budget outlays
It is the committee's tentative estimate
that the reduction of $580,794,190 in new
budget (obligational) authority requests,
plus the relatively minor changes in re-
quested transfers between appropriations,
and reserve releases, will translate into a re-
duction of approximately $464,000,000 in
budget outlays previously projected for fiscal
year 1969, by titles of the bill roughly as fol-
lows: title I, $165,000,000; title II, $26,000,-
000; and title III, $273,000,000. The reduc-
tions in the interest subsidy contract au-
thorizations limitations Would not affect pro-
jected 1969 outlays.
The outlay effect of the remainder of the
reduction in new budget authority and in-
terest subsidy contract authorization limi-
tations would be of some consideration in
determining the impact of congressional ac-
tions on fiscal 1970 budget outlays; perhaps
to a minor extent, even on fiscal 1971 out-
lays.
I believe there will be a desire on the
part of the House to discuss some of the
military implications involved, and the
war in Southeast Asia. Some may want
to discuss the antiballistic missile pro-
gram and other controversial or semi-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE May 20, 1969
controverilal matters. We have agreed on
the 3 hours In which to discuss these
matters.
ZSPENDITDU C$aPO PE}POSa1,--3'ms lv
Mr. Chairman, I should like to claim
your attention, if I may, at this time for
the purpose of discussing a portion ofthe
bill whici. appears on page 61. The re-
port deals adequately with this proposal.
It proposes an expenditure limitation-a
spending ,eiling. I believe it Is important
that all Members be familiar with the
expenditure ceiling.
I should like to read the ceiling which
we propose to fix in this bill. Page 61 of
the bill, title IV:
Expenditures and net lending (budget out-
lays) of the Federal Government during the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, shall not
exceed $192,B0o,000,000: Provided, That
whenever xtlon. or inaction, by the Con-
gress on -equests for appropriations and
other budgetary proposals varies from the
President's recommendations' thereon, the
Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall
report to the President and to the Congress
his estimate of the effect of such action or
inaction orL expendiures and net lending, and
the limitation set forth herein shall be cor-
respondingly adjusted.
Mr. Chairman, that is the ceiling pro-
vision, subsection (a) of It.
Subsection (b) is the reporting pro-
vision, which I insert here for reference
purposes:.
(b) The Director of the Bureau of the
Budget shall report periodically to the Presi-
dent and .o the Congress on the operation
of this sec-ion. The first such report shall be
made at the end of the first month which be-
gins after the date of approval of this Act;
aubsequen: reports shall be made at the end
of each calendar month during the first ses-
sion of the Ninety-first Congress. and at the
end of each calendar quarter thereafter.
Mr. Chairman, under leave to extend,
and before porceeding further, let me in-
sert an excerpt from the report which
briefly str.tes the nature of the proposi-
tion:
The committee has included a provision In
the bill that would place an overall ceiling
on budget expenditures during the fiscal year
1970 that begins on July 1, 1969. The pre-
cise terini:iology is "Expenditures and net
lending"-which, taken togethter, constitute
"budget outlays".
The amount specifically stated In the pro-
vision, $192,900,000,000, is a beginning figure,
not an ending figure. It is the revised pro-
jection of 1970 budget outlays announced by
the President on April 12 and summarized in
the Review of the 1970 Budget released on
April 15. That summary appears in the Con-
gressional Record of April 16, 1969, at pages
E2993-299t:.
Coupled to the $192.9 billion figure is lan-
guage providing-"' * ' That whenever ac-
tion, or inaction, by the Congress on requests
for appropriations and other budgetary pro-
posals varies from the President's recommen-
dations thereon, the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget shall report to the President
and to the Congress his estimate of the effect
of such action or inaction on expenditures
and net le;Iding, and the limitation set forth
herein shall be correspondingly adjusted."
In other words. Congress would work from
the President's proposed total spending esti-
mate. It would do so through its actions, or
Its inactions, on requests for appropriations
and other budget obligational authority and
outlay prods in the various appropriation
bills and certain other 'bills affecting the
budget,
The language would operate continuously
to adjust the ceiling, as appropriate, to com-
port with the estimated expenditure effect of
specific congressional actions or inactions
having budgetary impact.
It is a flexible provision-but in terms oC
aggregate spending, flexible only on the ac-
tien of the Congress. not the Executive.
It does not seek to declare something of
the end from the beginning; It sets a begin-
ning point against which Congress would
work in deciding, through its various spend-
ing actions, what the ultimate total should
be, and supplies a mechanism for resetting
the ceiling accordingly.
Unlike last year's calling provision, it does
not Impose an arbitrary broad-axe type ceil-
ing cutback that would leave to the Execu-
tive the allocation of any congressional ex-
penditure reduction to specific agencies and
programs.
It would be the first ceiling ever to place
directly in the hands of Congress the specific
decision as to the maximum amount to be
taken out of the Treasury for payment of
the Government's bills in a given 12-month
period,
Mr. Chairman, we are at a moment
when for the first time in the history of
this Republic, Members of Congress are
being called upon to vote on an expendi-
ture ceiling which covers the entire Fed-
eral Government. This kind of legislation
has never been passed by the Congress
during the history of the country.
This Is an expenditure limitation which
is all inclusive. It includes the Veterans'
Administration. It Includes the Defense
Department. It includes the war In Viet-
nam. It includes interest on the national
debt. It Includes all expenditures. Noth-
ing is exempt.
POTEN'rLAL SEDUCTION t3'FECT AND COMPARISON
TO LAST TEAR'S CEIIiNe
We have an expenditure limitation for
fiscal year 1969 and we had an expendi-
ture limitation of sorts in the prior year.
But in the fiscal 1969 version we have a
series of exceptions and exemptions. In-
deed we exempted about $99 billion of
fiscal 1969 currently estimated expend-
itures.
The Congress reduced expenditures by
about $6 billion in the fiscal year ending
on June 30. However, we did not reduce
net expenditures of the Government sig-
nificantly due to increases in exempted
areas. In those areas where we had made
exemptions, expenditure increases totaled
approximately $6 billion. That offsetting
Increase left a relatively slight net re-
duction In the January 1968 budget esti-
mate of expenditures for fiscal 1969. On
the other hand, except for our action last
year, expenditures would no doubt have
increased by several billions.
Mr. Chairman, at this point I include
additional excerpts from the committee
report comprising title IV of the pending
bill with last year's ceiling and drawing
attention to the reduction potential of
the ceiling now proposed.
It is a rigid ceiling; it cannot be exceeded
except upon-action by the Congress. And as
indicated above, the ceiling would decrease
if congressional actions on the budget so
provide.
It lays the basis for potentially very sig-
nificant retrenchment in expenditures. If
such a ceiling had been adopted-and strictly
adhered to-over the last many years, billions
of expenditures would have been avoided.
More specifically, taking all 14 budgets for
the post-Korea fiscal years 1956 through 1966.
the projected expenditure totals In the origi-
nal annual budgets were cumulatively ex-
ceeded by about $50 billion.-in 11 of the 14
years, the overruns aggregated $53.3 billion.
In 3 years. there were underruns aggregating
$3.5 billion. But overall for the 14 years, the
government actually expended-for a variety
of reasons--about $50 billion more than the
sum total of what was projected in the origl-
nal budgets. That averages to about $3.4 bil-
lion a year. So the potential is great, if the
ceiling is adopted and adhered to.
Unlike the expenditure ceiling provisions
enacted in the last session applicable to fiscal
1969, nothing would be exempt from the ceil-
ing, Last year's ceiling provisions had a very
significant Impact on government spending
In fiscal 1969. They significantly restrained
the growth of spending that undoubtedly
would have otherwise occurred. And on the
latest figures. it seems beyond reasonable de-
bate that In the absence of the ceiling pro-
visions, a much needed budget surplus for
1969 would not now be in prospect. Buteven
with the ceiling and the $6 billion cutback
Congress did not, by its actions, diminish the
originally projected budget expenditure (out-
lay) total of $186.1 billion.
It did prevent that total from being ex-
ceeded. And It -did restrain growth of
spending.
More specifically, Congress exempted
50%-$92.6 billion-of the $186.1 billion
from the $6 billion cutback, and expressly
permitted overruns to the extent determined
necessary in the exempted programs. Those
overruns were reestimated in the April 15
budget review at $6.1 billion. The overruns
in exempted areas wiped out the $6 billion
cutback in non-exempt areas.
In its specific actions on the individual
appropriation and other spending bills, Con-
gress last year contributed roughly $3.7 to
$3.9 billion (depending on variable calcula-
tions) to the $6 billion overall cutback, leav-
ing the remainder to be allocated by the
Executive. The April 15 Review reflects a total
cutback of $7.3 billion from the original es-
timates for non-exempted areas, Offsetting
this gross cutback are the $6.1 billion over-
runs in exempted areas leaving a net esti-
mated cutback, as of April 15 of $12 billion
from the originally projected total.
Thus the latest estimate of spending for
1969 is $184.9 billion, $1.2 billion less than
the $186.1 billion projected In the original
1969 budget. But it should be noted that
about $1.5 billion of the $7.3 billion reduc-
tion now shown In non-exempted areas is
not a cut in the more conventional sense,
but rather financing adjustments because
the Banks for Cooperatives, the Federal In-
termediate Credit Banks, and the Federal
National Mort sage Association secondary
market operations, which were in the original
$186.1 billion budget total, subsequently be-
came 100', , privately owned and thus
dropped from the Federal totals.
Of course, the $7.3 billion reduction figure
Is a composite of the specific congressional
actions, the financing adjustments, actual
curtailments of outlays, and administrative
reestimates of expenditures-both up and
down-in many items as conditions changed.
There are signs that further reestimates up-
ward in certain programs will substantially
diminish the $7.3 billion figure and thus in
turn the $1.2 billion figure.
The ceiling proposed In this bill would af-
ford opportunity for maximum flexibility
within the overall total to meet, as fully as
reasonably possible, changed and changing
expenditure requirements In certain specific
programs that cannot be foreseen with great
precision. The new administration has vari-
ously indicated that it intends to seek, on a
continuing basis, economies in operations
and to look for lower-priority areas when it
needs room for increases within its stated
policy of strict fiscal restraint. An aggregate
ceiling would be facilitating in this regard-
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May 20, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD HOUSE
Of course, the President can seek supple-
mental relief to meet necessary but unfore-
seen and unavoidable outlay Increases which
he finds cannot be accommodated within the
overall total.
Setting a beginning ceiling in this fashion
should in no way discourage the Executive
Branch from its continuing commitment-
and responsibility-for seeking to conduct
the day-to-day management of government
programs at the very minimum cost con-
sistent 'with the public necessities, refrain-
ing from spending every dollar that can
reasonably be saved. Constructive economy in
public spending is not only a matter of leg-
islative decision. It is also a matter of ad-
ministration. The new administration has
attached high priority to quality of per-
formance in administering the government.
Wasteful and needless expenditures often
do not become to until funds are poorly
managed. The primary burden of getting a
dollar's value for every dollar justifiably ap-
propriated to the purposes of government lies
mainly with those who administer, not with
those who legislate.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman has expired.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield
myself such time as I may require.
Now, there was a good basis last year
for exempting agencies, but let me say
to you that there is, in my judgment,
based on presently available informa-
tion, no good basis for exempting agen-
cies this year. Last year, we were cutting
the estimate of expenditures by $6 bil-
lion and therefore we did feel some ex-
emptions were desired and these exemp-
tions Were proposed. Then, of course,
there were additional exemptions which
were provided' later. Last year, we pro-
posed a cut in the estimate of expendi-
tures, but in title IV of the pending bill,
we are not proposing any cut in the esti-
mate of expenditures. So it makes no
sense to exempt the Veterans' Adminis-
tration, or the interest on the national
debt, or any other item. It makes no
sense to exempt anything in this bill, be-
cause we are proposing an expenditure
limitation or ceiling at the exact and
precise limitations which have been esti-
mated in the revised budget of the ad-
ministration.
The budget this year ought to be more
accurate in many respects that it was in
many previous years, because ordinarily
a budget is put into shape to a very con-
siderable extent in the fall of the year
preceding the year for which it begins,
that is, the following January 1. How-
ever, we are now operating on an ex-
penditure budget which was refined, re-
designed, and reexamined since Janu-
ary 20. It is more up to date and should
be more trustworthy. The revised budget
of the administration on which this pro-
vision is based was submitted only a
month ago.
So I hope we will not at this time yield
to the temptation of trying :to make any
exemptions whatever.
THE ARITHMETIC AND MECHANICS OF THE
PhOPOSED CEILING
Mr. Chairman, let me hasten to add-
and I realize this is a dull subject, but
It is very important and will become in-
ereasingly more important-let me add
that we will change this ceiling if we
appropriate more money than was esti-
mated for appropriation in the budget.
In other words, if we increase appro-
H3831
priations and spending through appro- the appropriation bills would translate into
priations, then this will be translated to net downward adjustments to the $192.9 bile
the ceiling and increase the ceiling. If lion figure. And in this general connection,
this year we were to w we did last year some $38 billion of the appropriation budget
requests are first subject to processing
when we reduced the President's appro- through the various annual authorization
priation budget by about $12 billion, that bills.
would be translated inE o an expenditure In the area of proposed legislation for
reduction amount not of $12 billion but
into the amount that would be spent in
the forthcoming year fiscal 1970. That
might be half that stun or one-third of
that sum or some other percentage.
This ceiling is mandatory; It is inflex-
ible; it is the law of the land from which
the executive branch cannot escape. The
executive branch will of course have the
authority to make adjustments within
various programs ane within those pro-
grams accommodate to better manage-
ment and so forth. The administration
can come to Congress and say, "Our esti-
mates which we made as to spending last
April have proved. to be faulty and we
would ask you to make certain adjust-
ments to the ceiling." This would then
be a matter for Congress to decide upon.
So, if we increase appropriations for
various programs, then the budget ceiling
will go beyond $192.9 billion by whatever
figure might be mandated by the increase.
Mr. Chairman, so that the RECORD Will
reflect more preciseiy how the ceiling
would work, I include additional explora-
tory excerpts from the committee report:
THE ARITHMETIC AND MECHANICS OF THE
C'.EIL I NG
The ceiling begins by legitilating a net re-
duction of $2,372,000,Oe10 in budget outlays
projected for 1970 in the original (January)
budget-from $1953 billion. down to the
$192.9 billion April 16 revised projection of
the present admin.istr:ation. But the gross
ceiling reduction is $4.020,000,000; this was
offset by $1.6 billion in the recent budget
review by upward "c.orreetions" in several
specific projections in me original budget.
The $4 billion cutback in outlays includes
$1.1 billion in defense. $1 billion for a modi-
fication of the previously proposed $1.6 bil-
lion increase in social security benefits, and
$1.9 billion for prognuns ;,Stetting almost
every Federal agency-
In the April 15 review in which the $4 bil-
lion cutback in outlays was projected the
administration also proposed gross cutbacks
of $5.5 billion ($4.2 bi)jion, net after the
"correcting" adjustments of $1.3 billion) in
appropriation and other budget obligational
authority requests. $3 billion of this is in
defense and $2.5 billion in all other areas
of the budget. Budget bbligational author-
ity (appropriations, er:,entially) is the tradi-
tional basis on which appropriation and au-
thorization bills are stated and voted on re-
gardless of the year or years in which the
funds are to be actually disbursed in the
form of budget outlay:..
The gross total for new budget authority
for 1970 in the January budget is $210.1 bil-
lion, and in the April 15 revision, $206.9 bil-
lion-including so-called permanent budget
authority, such as interest, trust funds, etc.,
which does not actually appear in the annual
bills.
The Committee on Appropriations and sev-
eral other committees have before them for
consideration these revised appropriation re-
quests and Other budgetary recommenda-
tions for fiscal 1970. What Congress does in
the bills dealing with there various budget
authority proposals plus a handful of other
proposals involving outlays but not budget
authority basically determines what hap-
pens to the $192.9 billion beginning ceiling
in the accompanying bill.
which the outlay budget includes specific
sums, several have the effect of holding the
outlay total lower than it otherwise would
be. Several, of course, involve additional out-
lays. For example, if Congress does not en-
act the proposed postal rate increase, the
outlay ceiling, according to the latest esti-
mate available, would be adjusted upward
by some $600 million. This is because postal
revenues are counted as offsets to expendi-
tures, not as budget receipts.
If the budget proposal to authorize the
Farmers Home Administration to make In-
sured rather than direct operating loans is
not enacted, the outlay ceiling, according to
the budget, would be adjusted upward by
$292 million.
If the budget proposal for legislation to
restrict public assistance medical. aid for
patients in mental institutions to 120 days
is not enacted, the outlay ceiling, accord-
ing to the budget, would be adjusted upward
by $126 million.
Several legislative proposals designed to
diminish budget outlays by the Veterans Ad-
ministration are priced in the outlay total to
save some $288 million in 1970. Failure of
those, according to the budget figures, would
be the basis for an equivalent upward adjust-
ment in the ceiling.
These four examples aggregate $1.3 billion.
On the other hand, again for example, if the
President's proposal for social security benefit
increases is not enacted, the $600 million (of
the original budget amount of $1.6 billion)
in the revised budget outlay figure would
not now be needed for that purpose, in which
case the outlay ceiling would drop by $600
million.
As to the mechanics for adjusting the ceil-
ing, timeliness in accommodating govern-
ment programs to congressional changes is
essential to orderly administration. Congress
will be processing budgetary recommenda-
tions in many different bills, passing through
various legislative stages over a period of sev-
eral months-virtually all after the fiscal
year begins. And it seems essential in the
interest of consistency and otherwise to cen-
ter responsibility in one place for at least
tentative determination of congressional ac-
tion impact.
The Director of the Budget is probably in
the best position to make such determina-
tions. The monthly reports submitted by the
Director under subsection (b) of the ceiling
provision can be evaluated currently. They
can be checked for consistency and reason-
ableness with tentative estimates frequently
made through the budget "scorekeeping" re-
ports of the Joint Committee on Reduction of
Federal Expenditures and with those of the
Committees on Appropriations. Amendatory
action can be taken-if that seems to be neces-
sary in the circumstances.
AUTHORIZATIONS AND APPROPRIATIONS: THE
KEYS TO SPENDING CONTROL
Mr. Chairman, for a long time, I
fought along with others the so-called
Bow amendment fixing a ceiling on ex-
penditures, and I do not apologize for
that. But, I have come to the conclusion
that an expenditure ceiling can be mean-
ingful, and that it will encourage greater
focus of attention by Congress and the
country and the press upon spending. But
in embracing this idea of an expenditure
ceiling as here proposed, I do not want us
for any means to delude ourselves. The
For example, net reductions made through and effective way to reduce Government
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE Ma 20, 1969
spending Is to hold the line on authoriza- deauthorized via the basic legislative route. which is not aimed at the administration
time and appropriations. That is a lead Fiscally, the cumulative result is increasing itself, as the gentleman will agree.
pipe cinch method of holding down Gov- demands on the Federal Treasury.
element spending. It is the surest and in the long range sense as distinguished Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. Certainly.
the safest. Ina limit on spending In a from any particular fiscal year. too much Mr. MAHON. We have set for the last
the s year-and this would limit emphasis is attached to controlling growth couple of years limitations of sorts, but
of government spending by applying the con- they have not been passed this early in
sfending only for the fiscal year. i year, trol at the end of the spending process. It is the year as this one would be, and they
w: deb begins on July 1-we do not more logically and effectively applicable at have been limitations predicated on cuts
rescind the money, we do not recapture the authorization and appropriation stages. below the budget. Title IV of the pending
the authority-we simply say that in Appropriations are not In order unless bill is quite a different matter.
fiscal year 1970 you cannot spend more there is first a legislative authorization. No Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. If the gentle-
than so much, but the funds which have funds can be withdrawn from the Treasury
been appropriated In prior years will re- but in consequence of valid authority granted man will yield further, we are here set-
been appropriated Inp prior years So b by the Congress to first create an obligation ting a flexible limitation at the very out-
lin y all in behalf of the Government. That is the key set on the Congress, which can be re-
means, the best way for us to achieve a to the situation. The most consistently ac- vised up or down, depending upon the
reduction in the cost of Governemnt and curate barometer to future Spending levels actions of the Congress.
effective control of Government spending is the dimensions of budget authority en- Mr. MAHON. That is correct.
Is to quit authorizing and appropriating acted by the Congress to enter into obilga- I want to say this in defense of the al-
so generously, tions on behalf of the Government.
But, there are reasons other than Authorize something new or enlarge an ministration, or of any administration:
those which I have stated for supporting obi g authority is almost ucertain tew It is o to predict In January or April precisely
an expenditure limitation. Government follow. what m be
Is growing bigger and more complex. Denial of authority to ob ay spent. It may be that ad-
a subsequent 1-gate precludes administration will find that certain d-
: ow, let me give this figure which may expenditure. justments cannot be made depending on
shock some of the public, but which may Curtail the input of new appropriations the trend of events In the war, or other-
not shock Members of Congress who are (and other forms of obligating authority) wise which might bring about a r
niure aware of fiscal complexities. and spending will come sow. equire-
L"f a Should today authority to obligate and the obit- lent for a change.
oday appropriate all of gation inevitably will follow In due time. The administration of course would
the money and grant all of the authority Once the obligation is made and the bill have the liberty, as It always does, to
requested by the administration in the comes due, the check to pay it (the outlay) come before us with a supplemental-
pending budget in fiscal 1970 on July 1 must also inevitably follow in due time. and the bill before us today is nothing
the Government would have $431 billion FLEXIBILITY or vies Paorosm Cxn ma but a supplemental presented to us by
available for expenditure. But it is not Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, will the the present administration, the Nixon
now projected by the administration gentleman yield? administration. It Is a supplemental, and
tbf,t more than $192.9 billion will be Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman we inevitably have to have supplemen-
sMF.nt. So, in this expenditure ceiling for from Pennsylvania. tals at times though they must be avoided
the first time in the history of the Nation Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, I direct wherever possible.
we are undertaking to say, "Yes, we fix the gentleman's attention to the report Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. Would the
the annual appropriations, but we are where It says that this will be the first gentleman point out further that this is
going a step further this year and are ceiling ever to be placed directly in the a flexible ceiling-I mean, this is a flexi-
going to fix the annual expenditures." hands of the Congress. This Is what the ble thing which can be revised up or
While we have previously authorized all committee says in the report. down, depending upon the actions of the
.the carryover funds Involved, we by this Mr. MAHON. Yes. It would be the first Congress.
limitation fix the overall rate of spend- overall ceiling placed In the hands of the UNEXPENDED CARRYOVER BALANCES AND THE
ing for a given year, namely fiscal year Cope and Congress can work its will, DIMENSIONS OP ANNUAL ACTIONS
1970. and what Congress can do today, of The gentleman further
points
:his limitation, this ceiling, has been course, It can modify tomorrow. his report to the unobligated and un
fixed in such a way that it ought to be, Some have said that the ceiling ought expended carryovers. I believe this is
it seas to me, palatable to the rank and to be inflexible on the Congress. If you very significant, as found on page 122 of
file of the Members of the Congress. We make it a mandate on the executive, the report. It says:
have drawn the limitation in such a way they ask, why not make It a mandate on For example, total unexpended carryover
as to get, we hope, majority support. the Congress? There is no power on earth balances at the beginning of fiscal 1970 will
Mr. Chairman, on the question of the to fix a ceiling or a limitation on expendi- approximate $226 billion-
mo:st effective means of controlling tures on the Congress itself. What Con- That is, $226 billion of money unspent
spending, I Include an additional excerpt gross can do today it can undo tomorrow. In carryovers from previous actions of
from the report of the committee. It re- Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. Mr. Chair- the Congress:
Sects a position long held In the cam- man, will the gentleman yield?
mittee Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman Mr.
. Mist glance This e226 billion fectly
while there are some grounds for doubt from Tennessee. may at first glance seem to be perfectly
that the outlay (bill-paying) stage of the Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. As the dis- outrageous and a reflection upon the
fiscal process is the most logical or the most tinguished chairman of the Committee Cord ress in makes available such large
effective point at which the Congress should on Appropriations has Slims that will be carried over in the
pointed
seek to control government spending, an out, and pipeline to the next fiscal year.
over Al ceiling on outlays in a given year has as I understand the matter, we have set But much of this money is in social
some usefulness as a short-run regulating a spending ceiling at $192.9 billion, security funds that have not been ex-
devi.:e, especially when the economic and about $193 billion, which is exactly the pended.
fiscal situations are under great stress as at Nixon budget, as a level.
prea'nt, But there is room for great doubt We have set the ceil Much of it is in military procurement
that such a ceiling can realistically be re- ins at this level, programs.
gard5d as an effective long-run control re- which means spending cannot go beyond Much of it relates to space and atomic
cedure. p this amount, but if Congress takes action energy and such things as I am about to
As today Is the consequence of yesterday, to increase the appropriations, by being relate in this unexpended category. It
so tomorrow is the consequence of today. a flexible ceiling, it goes up, or if the ranges over the whole Government,
Legir lative authorizations are the seedbeds Congress falls to take action which is really.
of Viture expenditure growth. Initial au- recommended in the budget it may go up For example, the Federal Deposit In-
thorization of a program or project is the or down, according to what the Congress surance Corporation has about $3 billion,
beginning point In the, legislative spending does. The committee has set the budget It is not, anticipated that this will be
process. If the program or project, whatever at the Nixon level, but what may be the expended, but it is available for expendi-
it mi.y be, is not authorized by the Congress, ultimate result will be dependent upon
then no appropriation is In order. But the tore It is an unobligated carryover.
facts are that virtually every year new pro- what Congress does in appropriations For example, the Congress passed a bill
grants and projects are authorized, and old and In authorizations. granting riot insurance and flood insur-
programs are often extended and expanded. Mr. MAHON. The gentleman Is cor- ance, and there are $500 million-a half
Seldcm are existing programs and activities rest, But this is going to be a limitation billion dollar' -iriv 1 ed in this fund.
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May -26, -1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE
In all probability they would not be ex- $107 billion. The remainder would be an bills. Interest on the debt and trust funds
pended, but they are within the $226 expenditure avoided in subsequent years. are examples.
' But to put the picture in sharper focus, Several programs that do pass through
billion. f I shall elaborate on that questionit must be noted that Congress does not the annual bill process involve mandated-
a little further in my remarks. annually act on anyw;rere near the entire type expenditures fixed in basic law, which
Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. Would the new budget authority teal. Some of it is in unless changed through legislation operate
gentleman say that this is a 'moderate the form of requests and some of it is in as a practical limit on the discretionary
limitation? Some have thought that it the form of estimates. Thoughly $66 billion, power to control them annually. Veterans
is a very small limitation, and it should net, of the new budget authority total is pensions and public assistance matching
go further. Would the gentleman char- estimated to go on the books in 1970 auto- grants are examples.
acterize his amendment as a moderate matically-so-called permanent appropri- Payments for prior year contracts and ob-
ations-under earlier ?aws, mainly trust ligations falling due cannot effectively be
One? funds, interest on the debt, and several avoided. These run across the whole govern-
Mr, MAHON. I would so characterize others. The other $139 -pillion goes through went.
It, and I thank the gentleman. I would the annual bill process, -mostly the appro- There are a number of others. The Jan-
say it is a moderate one. priation bills-but it involves projected ex- uary budget classifies some $98 billion, or
It may be too firm for the Director of penditures, as to 1970, of roughly only $90 about half of the 1970 outlay budget, as
the Bureau of the Budget. I can see why billion, more or less which means that Con- "relatively uncontrollable civilian outlays
the Director may prefer not to have to gress, in the various annual bills, normally under present law." The figure for the April
live with this amendment. But it will deals with new budget authority amounts 15 budget review under this classification
help the Director of the Bureau of the that, in total, relate to less than half of the is $100 billion, meaning that better than
- budget outlays projected for that same year. half of the outlay budget for the year is not,
hold the line with the Govern As noted, more than half of budget outlays as a practical matter, subject to the normal
ment agencies and Government depart- in.a given year now derive from carryover discretionary powers of appropriation with-
ments. If he gets into difficulty that is balances and from. new budget authority out changes in the basic laws that more or
in ally, manner unavoidable, he can seek that goes on the books automatically under less ordain them.
relief from the Congress. - various permanent appropriation arrange- Similarly, though he ik the $n detail,
There are also those who say it is ments enacted over tia years. does not exactly correspond,
The size of the unexpended carryover pipe- cutback provision of the Revenue and Ex-
It must that it has no teeth, line, of course, depenrfa on what is put in penditure Control Act last session, Congress
.it t be pretty good since we have ve and what is taken out. Addition of more new exempted from the ceiling and from the cut-
opposition from both sides. budget authority than ;s expended in a year back, programs involving about half of total
ipeline. During fiscal 1970, outlays, in effect recognizing their relative
Mr. Chairman, under leave granted, increases the pipeline-'
I include further exploratory material based on the recent budget projections, the uncontrollability without changes in the
from the committee report on the mat- total unexpended pipeline would Increase basic laws applicable or other compelling cir-
ter of carryover balances. And in this from $226 billion to $237 billion, but all of cumstances giving rise to them.
connection, I am inserting supplemen- the increase is more than accounted for in Looking at the matter in terms of increases
tary statistical material: trust fund accumulations of balances. In rather than totals, about 75% of the outlay
Federal funds, there Is a drop of $1 billion, increase, 1970 over 1969, projected in the
UNEX ENDED csaavovxn BALANCVS Ai THE from $126 billion to $125 billion. Depend- January budget was in these so-called rela-
DIMENSIONS OS ANNUAL ACTIONS ' ing on congressional as.cions, this could drop tively uncontrollable items. The proportion
The proposed ceiling provision, being all- further. applicable to the $8 billion outlay increase,
inclusive, covers expenditures in fiscal 1970 CONTROLLABLE VERSUS IIritONTROLLABLE 1970 over 1969, projected in the new admin-
from budget authority to be newly granted EXPEN,t'Tuux5 istration's budget review is even greater.
in this session; expenditures from so-called All expenditures are, of course, control- The outlay ceiling proposed by the com-
mamanly from earlier la that flow auto- mittee for 1970, while rigid and all-encom-
ttuxes s i from from unexpended la ; er expen f lable by controlled the by Congre Congress. -:r, All because they expenditures are flow passing, does not and cannot of course come
uxpended carryover balances o of from laws enacted by Congress. But as a very to grips with these fundamentals of basic
prior years. Very substantial portions of the laws. But by covering both controllable and
$192.9 billion beginning ceiling figure spring practical matter, not x,11 are subject to ef- "uncontrollable" outlays, it will focus on the
fective discretionary control through the
from each of these three general sources of total, and keep it in focus.
expenditure availability. normal annual budget and appropriations
process. It will tend to force attention on possible
For exa at h, total ng offisc $l a 1970 will carryover Very considerable expenditures arise from alternatives and substitutions when upward
appro is at the beginning but $10 billion so-called permanent appropriations that do pressures are exerted on the ceiling.
in social sity billion--about
not pass through the annual appropriation It will keep the hands of Congress on It.
and other othetrust funds s and nnd d
in social security e
$126 billion in Federal funds. But some $77 TABLE 8.-BALANCES or BUDGET AUTHORITY (FROM THE JANUARY 1969 BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970)
billion of the $126 billion of Federal funds [In millions of dollars]
will have been obligated for programs across
the government but not yet actually paid
out. The remaining $49 billion, not obligated
and not expended, is in many accounts across
the government; there is a comprehensive
and informative special analysis of it in the
January budget, Special Analysis Cl, pp. 78-93.
But'of the $226 billion total beginning car-
ryover, trust and federal funds combined,
roughly $86 billion is projected for expendi-
ture (disbursement, that is) in fiscal 1970,
and roughly that amount is thus counted in
the $192.9 billion ceiling figure. The re-
mainder-some $138 billion after a small
lapse amount-becomes part 'of the total
unexpended carryover projected into the fol-
lowing year, fiscal 1971.
Roughly then, it can be seen that only
about $107 billion of the newly projected
outlay total for 1970($192.9 billion, less the
$86 billion from carryovers) is estimated to
come from the $205.9 billion new budget
authority requested or estimated for that
Same year of l O. Funds appropriated in a
given year are 'expended partly in that year
and partly in subsequent years because of
long lead-times, construction time, and other
factors.
To put the relationship of budget authori-
ty and outlays In some better focus by way
of extreme illustration, If the whole $205
billion of new budget authority for '1970
failed, the expenditure outlay' reduction fn
1970, based on the budget, would be only
Obli- Unobli- Obli-
Department or other unst gated gated gated
Funds appropriated to the Presi,lent:
International financial instit,tions_______-_ 1,004 6,447 1,226
Military assistance----------------------- 2,114 2,764 1,804
Economic assistance__ - 3,790 860 3,685
Office of Economic Opportunity,,.. 1,140 6 982
Other_________________________345 112 645
Agriculture ------------------------------- 5,446 2,749 5,562
Commerce ----------------- .____..----------- 973 225 1,086
Defense-Military ---------------- _----------- 32,077 15,116 30,884
Defense-Civil------------------------- .------- 302 248 345
Health, Education, and Welfare--------------- 6,403 28,043 7, 820
Housing and Urban Development ---------------- 6,674 14,462 8,254
Interior_____________________________________ 845 609 947
Labor ---------------------------------------- 495 10,790 498
Transportation -------------- ________7,271 3,409 7,286
Treasury_____ __ __ ___ _ 102 26 103
Atomic Energy Commission-_ ___ 1,138 320 1,115
National Aeronautics and ;pacsAdmmitration__ 1,820 313 1,616
Veterans' Administration___-_ _ --- 1,034 8,139 1,030
Civil Service Commission---------------------- 642 17,690 701
Export-Import Bank-_ _ __ 2,367 3,749 2,996
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp __ __ __-- 248 6,340 257
Federal Home Loan Bank Board________ ______ 30 3,468 61
Railroad Retirement Board__- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 112 4,240 127
Other agencies______________ _------------ 2,195 4,740 2,306
Allowance_ _-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -for contingencies_
MEMORANDL;CA
Federal funds ----- _-------- ____ 69,839 54,095 72,043
Trust funds -------- _-------------- _--------- 8,728 80,769 9,293
Less than $500,000.
Note: Totals slightly revised in table that follows this table.
Unobli-
Obli.
Unobli-
Obli-
Unobli-
gated
gated
gated
gated
gated
6,427
1,591
6,633
1,880
6,633
468
2
1,737
2,393
1,767
2,193
,
690
3,248
391
3,364
622
8
1,018 -
5
1,207
0
111
563
-87
578
-18
2,680
6,464
2,111
6,869
2,177
258
1,241
209
1,254
122
829
14
32, 818
11,594
35,055
10,970
,
247
441
158
496
50
30, 778
8,669
35,729
8,908
42, 756
743
14
7, 050
13,495
8,076
12,139
,
612
1,141
359
1,175
234
11,919
478
12,709
656
13,680
4,154
8,531
4,679
9,070
5,102
24
87
25
94
22
385
1,563
56
1,486
----------
381
1,624
118
1,552
(I)
8
768
1,120
8, 341
1,181
8,3887
,
18,505
834
20, 522
981
21,936
2,687
3,638
2.387
4.585
1,026
6,590
3,697
33
4,033
17
4,447
4,375
130
4,525
137
4,596
6,804
2,494
1,985
7,694
1, 521
_______
50
----------
200
142,142
86,844
139,238
93,597
145,616
54,988
77,410
49,090
83,301
44,986
87,154
9,434
90,148
10,278
100,630
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c vtvUHLbblONAL RE(
BUDGET REVIEW OF APRIL 15, 1969-CHANGE IN UNEXPENDED BALANCES
P n bllllonsj
Federal
funds
]ntregovern-
Trust mental Federal
funds transactions Total funds
Intragovern-
Trust mental
funds transactions
Total
tines aided balance, June 30,
1968______________________
1969 Bud
t
th
if
127.0
96.4 -------------- 223.5 127.0
96.4 __------ ____-_
223
5
ge
au
or
lr..__?
Expiring authority in 1969,
et:--.--_----------- ____
L
'l
148.8
-1.2
53.3 -7.5 194.6 149.9
-7.! .-.?..__--?--- --&3 -1.2
53.3 -7.5
-7.1 ...........
.
.
195.7
-9
3
ou ou
ays -_--------------
148.2
43.0 -7.5 183.7 149.5
.
.
42.9 -7.5
.
184.9
Estimated unexpended
balance. June 30,
1969_______________
1970 B
d
t
h
126.5
99.6----- --.._.._ 11 126.2
99.8--------
226.0
ge
u
aut
ority.----.--
Expiring authorit
in 1970
158.2
60.0 210.1 154.3
59.5
205.9
y
,
eta_ __________________?.
L
-1.7 __......------------- -1.7 -1.7 ...... _......... __..
-
-1
7
ess oullays _________________
-
154.7 48.4 -7.9 195.3 153.8 47.1 -6.0
.
192.9
Estimated unexpended
balance, June 30,
1970------ _--------
128.3
110.9 .............. 239.2 125.0
112.2 ..............
237.2
BUDGET AUTHORITY
jFiscal years, in binionsj
1968
1969
'1970
actual
estimate
estimate
Avallable through current action by the Congress:
Preriouny enacted------- ----- ------------------------?--.- --- $134.4
P
5128.9
rolosedin this budget------?---------------------------------------------- .._..
$134
4
To La r uested
eq separately:
For supplemental requirements under present law-----------
U
4.5
.
0.1
pon enactment of proposed legistation--- . _ ......... ------------ ..... .. . ..
Allo vanes:
Civilian and military lay increase-_... ....
0.2
1.2
7
8
Contingencies
.
0.4
Subtotal, available through current action by the Congress....- ...... 134.4
133.6
138
9
Available without current action by the Congress (permanent authorizations):
Trust funds (existing [aw)------- ----------------------------- ---------- 47.8
53.5
.
59.1
Intceatonthepublic de 1. ..........................?-_-----.......---- 14.6
O
16.3
17.3
ther -------------------?----- -- - ....... 5.4
5.4
4,3
Deductio s for offsetting receipts:
Inte.land and intregovernmental transactions _.. - _ _. _ _ _ _ ..... - 6.7
-4.3
-4.5
ProGrietary receipts from the public.......--------- --------- .. ....... --4,7
--4.3
-4.5
Tctag budget a u t h o r i t y . _ _ _ .. _ . 190.6
195.8
205.9
ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES (BUDGET OUTLAYS)
FISCAL YEARS 1969 AND 1970
Mr. Chairman, we have been referring
to the beginning ceiling figure of $192.9
billior. representing budget outlays pro-
jected by the administration in its budget
review of April 15. I include a table
based on figures in that review, showing a
breakdown by departments and agencies
of the $192.9 billion:
T7.BLE 8,-BUDGET OUTLAYS, 1969 AND 1970
[In millions of dollars]
1969 1970
current revised
estimate estimate
Agriculture ---------------__- 8,409
7,197
CCC----------------------------- (5,492)
(4,482)
Commerce:..--_-.-
?------__---__.
___ 872
1,079
Defense-- military d military assst-
a n
i
ance__ _ _______________________..? 78,400
77,903
Corps oftngineers_---_....._.._._-_-_ 1.192
1,159
Health, Ec "cation, and Welfare. .------- 46, 259
50,551
Trust funds______________________ (32,981)
(35,324)
Housing aid Urban Devetopmen,_____ 2,017
_
2,823
Interior-- ---------------- -....... '
.. 689
830
ustice........ _____________.--_---- 517
730
Labor--- ___ ___ __ __ _______ 3,503
--
----
-
3,690
Unemployment trust lands..
-
-
2, 749)
(2,866)
Post Offcr..----------------------- -- 929
412
State---- -----------?------------- 434
428
Transportation ------------- 6,211
6,753
Treasury_ ........................... 16,603
17,559
tnteri st on the public debt-..------ (16,300)
(17,300)
Atomic Energy Commission__________ 2,451
2,504
General Si rvices Administration-------- 413
407
NASA- ..--_______................... 4,247
3,897
Veterans' 4dminlstration-------------- 7,719
7,'554
All other:
Foreign economic assistance....... 1.925
1,760
Office of Economic Opportunity---.-1,880
1
870
Other agencies___________________ 5,136
,
6,538
TABLE 8.-BUDGET OUTLAYS, 1969 AND 1970-Continued
I In millions of dollars]
1969 1970
current revised
Agency estimate estimate
Allowances for:
Civilian and military pay increases-...........
2,800
Contingencies
_.._.__ ______ __________
200
go
Undistributed intrantro vernment al Irans?
actions---------------------------- -5,105
-5,745
-~ Total_________________ $4,9111
192,899
ee, in its wisdom
,
has acted
,
and I
wou
ld
Note: Detail may not add due to rounding. like to say that if there is anyone for
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the whom I have a higher regard than the
gentleman yielyield? chairman of the Appropriations Com-
Mr. MAHON . I yield to the distin- mittee, I have not found him. But let me
guished gentleman from South Carolina say this: We cannot approach it in the
(Mr. RIVERS), chairman of the Commit- manner proposed with any degree of
tee on Armed Services. accuracy. We cannot have all the pro-
grams. SPENDING FROGRAfdb grains. I have enumerated unless we have
sufficient funds. I am afraid we are going
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I wonder to come up short In our commitments to
if the gentleman realizes that the Con- our own people, and to the security of
gress is not acting-but that we are re- America and our commitments with
acting. The gentleman knows, of course, whatever other friends we have, if we
that whenever we get ready to reduce have any.
expenditures, everybody looks to the I want the gentleman to know that
military. I do not agree with this approach. We
Now you have the terrible situation of should act on each program instead of
the people assigning the worst sort of reacting to the entire budget. The Con-
conduct and motives to the so-called stitution specifically provides that the
military-industrial complex, I am sure one arm of our Government that has the
the gentleman knows that on Mr. Mc- direct responsibility of the Congress is
Namara's procurements for ships there the military. Yet we are neglecting this
was a cost overrun and Secretary Pack- responsibility by provisions of the sort
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and tells inc that it will be an overrun
of $100 million.
This morning and on Thursday we are
trying to find out what caused an inac-
curate estimate it is not all overrun-
on the C-5A aircraft. There are a num-
ber of factors involved. The gentleman
knows as well as I do that thi C n
s o
guess
has not got the courage to stand up
here and stop some of these crazy pro-
grams that we have, for instance, the Job
Corps and the OEO and a lot of these
things we are spending money on all over
hell's half acre. But they will go to the
military and cut them to smithereens.
This is what it is coming to.
We have inaccurate estimates all over
the lot in the military and when you
superimpose that on the escalation
caused by the increased cost of living,
our military is going to come up short
and we are going to have half a defense.
It would be far better to abolish cer-
tain items for the military and come
clean with the American people and say,
"W d t
e ono want you to have the Polaris
program-we do not want you to have
new bombers-even though the B-52's
are 15 years old. We do not want you to
modernize your navy yards. We do not
want you to have a good merchant ma-
rine program. We do not want you to go
on with the new fighter needs that were
denied us under the McNamara pro-
grams. We do not want you to have a
moon shot.."
This is where these things are coming
to. That is the weakness of provisions
such as the one to which the gentleman
referred. Why do we not cross each
bridge at the time we come to it?
Barr MAHON Th t
h
i
a s w at we pro-
pose to do. We will cross each bridge at
th
e time we come to it as each appro-
priation bill is before us, or each bill
from a legislative committee which
mandates certain expenditures is be-
fore us. Action on these bills will in effect
maintain, or lower, or raise the expendi-
ture ceiling.
Mr. RIVERS. We probably hold longer
hearings in our committee than any
committee of the Congress. We have a
number of subcommittees going now.
They are trying their best to save money.
The distinguished chairman's commit-
t
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proposed, and I am afraid it is a mis-
take.
Mr. MAHON. According to the esti-
mates-and we are, for the time being,
accepting the expenditure estimates of
the administration-the military will
expend about $78 billion this fiscal year
and a similar amount for next year. The
full amount so estimated for next year-
fiscal 1970-is provided for in the pro-
posed spending ceiling in the bill before
us.
If our military people, those with stars
on their shoulders and those in civilian
capacities, will run the Defense Depart-
ment in a businesslike and efficient way,
I would think ,that sums available and in
prospect would be adequate. I would hope
that the sums are more than adequate.
One of the things that disturbs me is
that there have been so many mistakes
made by the military. This has tended to
generate a lack of confidence. I grant
that the problems have been of great
magnitude and complexity.
Let me say. that I have confidence in
the military. I do not have unlimited con-
fidence in their managerial ability.
Mr: RIVERS. I do not know anybody
who does.
Mr. MAHON. Let me give an example.
I joined in cutting the military budget $5
billion plus, last year. I am not beholden
to any department of this Government. I
want to make that clear. I am sure the
gentleman from South Carolina shares
this attitude completely.
With respect to management, just
think of the humiliation we suffered a
few days ago when the Navy, through
neglect, let a submarine in a Navy ship-
yard go to the bottom. And what is that
going to cost. us? _$25 million. Of course,
if we are going to let the defense dollar go
down the drain in any such irresponsible
manner as that, it would not be possible
to supply the military with adequate
funds.
? I would say this: I have confidence in
the administration and feel that expend-
itures in the military area will not be cut
without any regard to the welfare of the
country. I am aware that the Secretary
of Defense served on the Committee on
Appropriations of the House and the De-
fense Subcommittee for many years.
I cannot think of him in a role of an
appeaser or a nonspender when it comes
to necessary defense expenditures. So I
would, say, let us take the Pentagon at its
word as a starting point on the amount
of funds needed. When our hearings on
Mdefense programs are completed we can
reduce or increase the budget figure and
the final figure, agreed upon by Congress
and enacted Into, law will determine
what can be spent in fiscal 1970.
Now, before I yield to my good and dis-
tinguished friend, my able colleague, let
me say that.I believe in the ABM. I be-
lieve in a strong military program. I de-
plore the low estate in which the military
finds Itself, I want to see confidence re-
stored in this area. We need to have re-
spect and to have reason to have respect
for all departments and branches of Gov-
ernment.
I yield to the gentleman from South
Carolina.
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, the gen-
tleman gave wings to the very things I
was talking about. I do not wear any-
body's collar either. I am looking for
encomiums, and 1 do not get them
around Washington, as the gentleman
knows.
I want to say this, that the military
now has reached deplorable conditions.
We have 60 percent of our fleet which is
not fit to live on or in because someone
budgeted too low. The chairman has not
heard the last of t1re results of McNa-
mara's systems anliiyjt crowd. We have
not heard the last. of that. They are
bringing disrespect rand derision on mili-
tary men who have not made a decision
over there since Mc: 'amara darkened the
doors of the Pentagon. We have deficits
coming up day in arni day out, day in and
day out, over which the military men
had no control.
We cannot think we-can just put a
hard, hidebound ceiling on any kind of
restrictions and think we can let each
tub sit on its botlsim. That is, in my
opinion, a mistake.
Mr. MAHON. There are some leaks in
Government tubs and we are trying to
close some of them.
Mr. RIVERS. I d-) not deprecate the
efforts of the chairman, but I am sure an
enlisted man did nest puli the seacock on
that submarine. It could have been sab-
otaged.
Mr. MAHON. I do not know who is
responsible, but the Navy should find out
who is responsible and see that he is
adequately disciplircd. If they want to
gain higher respect, this kind of action
must be taken.
Mr. RIVERS. I agree. We must re-
store responsibility in the military-and
then hold them responsible. And let me
tell the chairman, e ?Ir committee is go-
ing to investigate that incident and, for
whatever it is worth, we are going to re-
port to the Chairman on this.
THE SO-CALLED PEACE DIVIDEND IN FEDERAL
rL DS
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I thank
the gentleman. The chairman of the
Armed Services Committee has made a
statement which makes it appropriate
at this time for me to discuss a further
situation.
Many of the programs and ships and
weapons of the military are obsolete or
are becoming obsolescent. There is no
doubt of that. Large programs are go-
ing to be necessary to outfit the Navy
and the other services. with modern ships,
aircraft, and other weapons. Defense
spending is not going to toboggan down-
ward when the war ends in Vietnam.
There will be reductions but the costs
will remain high.
Military spending is going to have to
remain high because survival is the first
law of nations. It is iciescspabie that the
military programs a_,-e going to remain
high and we are going to have to sup-
port them. That is one of the reasons
we want a better job done by the mili-
tary-by civilians and those in uni-
form-in order that we may get more
for the dollar.
But those who are writing in the pa-
pers and saying to their speeches, "Wait
H 3835
until the war is over, and then we will
have unlimited resources for all the so-
cial programs," are too optimistic. Some
seem to think that Secretary Finch will
have all the money he wants for educa-
tion, for health, and the poor, and the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment will have all the money he wants
to for housing and related needs.
That is incorrect, They are not going
to have all the money they want. There
is not enough money in the Nation to
meet all these demands.
Besides that, money is not the only
answer in defense, and it is not the only
answer in our social programs. I think it
Is a little bit cruel for us to make state-
ments which would lead the cities and
the mayors and the poor and others to
believe that when the war is over we will
have unlimited funds for all purposes
which may be desired. We just will not
have that kind of money, and let us tell
the people that now.
Mr. SMITH of Iowa. Mr. Chairman,
will the gentleman yield?
Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman
from Iowa.
SUPPLEMENTALS FOR INTEREST SUBSIDY
PROGRAMS
Mr. SMITH of Iowa. Mr. Chairman,
the gentleman said he does not want any
exceptions to his limitations provision
but, in fact, by not including some of the
practices or programs under the limita-
tion, there are exceptions. For example,
there is no limit on the amount that they
can obligate for interest subsidies. And
now it is proposed, instead of having cur-
rent expenditures within the fiscal year
for a direct loan program and grants for
college facilities, they will have a pro-
gram to pay only $11 million this year
and obligate us for $440 million, which
does not show up in this year's budget.
So in effect the limitation is no limita-
tion so long as that is permitted, is it?
Mr. MAHON. I wish the gentleman
would let his own statement stand as he
made it. I am not quite sure of the import
of the statement.
Mr. SMITH of Iowa. But it does not
limit them from obligating us to pay for
the next 35 years under these programs.
Mr. MAHON. Oh, I see what the gen-
tleman means and his point is well
taken.
I call the attention of the gentleman
from North Carolina (Mr. JONAS) to this
matter. Under the housing programs
there is a provision in the bill providing
authority for $80 million for subsidies for
1 year. We provide a certain amount for
1 year, but when we do this we obligate
ourselves for 40 years.
I believe the gentleman from North
Carolina has tabulated the total amount
of money in these housing programs that
will be mandated as a result of this bill
if we pass it. Will the gentleman give
that figure?
Mr. JONAS. If the gentlemen will yield,
it will be 40 times 80, and that is $3.2
billion we will be obligating the taxpayers
to pay over the 40-year period.
I remind the chairman that already in
this fiscal year, we have provided $50
million for those two programs, so we
have to add that to the $3.2 billion. You
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE May 20, 1969
will find in these two programs, sections
235 and 236 of the housing law as
amended, we will be obligating the tax-
payers of this country to the amount of
$5.2 billion over the 40-year period.
Mr. MAHON. About $5.2 billion. It
looks ', ery minimal when one looks at the
bill, rut when one looks at the costs
which we are obligated to pay over 40
years it Is about $5.2 billion.
Mr. JONAS. Mr. Chairman,
gentleman yield further?
Mr. MAHON. I yield.
Mr. JONAS. This has been said, but
needs to be emphasized. This spending
limitation does not purport to remain in
effect beyond next year. It is only for i
year, is that not true?
Mr. MAHON. It is only for 1 year. It
might be for only 30 days, if we change
it, but this is not proposed for more than
1 yea:-. Next year we can do something
similar with respect to fiscal 1971 if we
so determine.
Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman
from Illinois.
Mr. MICHEL. If I might make a fur-
ther point with respect to the institutions
of higher learning and their construction
needs, there is $3.9 million in this bill for
interest subsidy, which will construct
$145 million worth of college facilities.
If you do not want that, then just wipe
out t:-ie interest subsidy. It all depends
on hcw much we appropriate In this bill
for tl.e Interest subsidy, as to where that
ceilin goes.
As he gentleman from North Carolina
says, this is an expenditure ceiling for
just the 1 year, not for 30 or 40 years.
Mr SMITH of Iowa. Mr. Chairman,
will the gentleman yield?
Mr. 11?AHON. I yield to the gentleman
from Iowa.
Mr SMITH of Iowa. This illustrates
my point very well. If they get the $3.9
million interest subsidy, they will with-
hold the $150 million already appropri-
ated for direct loans. That $150 million
would be under the limitation, whereas
the $3.9 million isall of the $145 million
that shows up in the fiscal year. This is
a big loophole.
Mr. MICHEL. It is not a permanent
loopl ole if you choose to use that word.
It is effective only for this year.
What we are saying is that since we
a?- is such a bind, instead of a direct
appropriation of $1.45 million for direct
loans let us do it by the interest subsidy
route, and finance the balance through
the private sector.
SCOPE OF PROPOSED EXPENDITURE CEILING
FOR 1970
Mr. DE LA GARZA. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman
from Texas.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. I should like to com-
mend the gentleman from Texas for a
most interesting and enlightening state-
ment. I should like to ask a question on
a problem I have dealing with appropria-
tions.
An item in my district which was nec-
essary was not included in the Nixon
budg 3t. Under this limitation would It
preclude the Nixon administration from
amending the budget and providing an his views. The ceiling should help but
item that is not In the present budget? holding down authorizations and appro-
Mr. MAHON. There is nothing In this ?priations Is the surest way to cut spend-
limitation that would preclude the Nixon
administration from amending the
budget and placing the item in it. There
is nothing in this limitation which would
preclude Congress from providing the
funds for theunbudgeted items. So there
is nothing inflexible Insofar as the gen-
tleman's problem is concerned in the
resolution now before_ us.
Mr. BE LA GARZA. Therefore, if I un-
derstand the gentleman correctly, the
limitation goes only to the amount and
the Congress can act independently or
the executive can revise Its budget. Is
that what the gentleman stated?
Mr. MAHON. I think the point Is clear.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. I thank the gen-
tleman.
Mr. ROGERS of Florida. Mr. Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman
from Florida.
Mr. ROGERS of Florida. I do not think
this is such a novel approach. The Con-
gress considered it before and in effect
we have done it before.
Mr. MAHON. I believe we have never
done it before. I will say to the gentle-
man. Not quite.
Mr. ROGERS of Florida. I think we
have put a limitation in effect before
when we put a limitation, for Instance,
on the national debt. In effect, we said
that there was a limitation on the bor-
rowing budget.
The gentleman will recall that the
Hoover Commission recommended and
this Congress debated the proposal that
limitations on spending be placed upon
each governmental department. In other
words, taking the overall limitation
which you are now proposing and
breaking it down. The reason for the
spending limitation was that the Con-
gress could then control the expendi-
ture budget, which we do not now
control. All we can do here is appro-
priate the money, and the executive
controls the rate of expenditure. The
Hoover Commission's proposal, which
you are proposing to carry out now, was
to put a limitation on what the Congress
itself might control. It does not mean
that you cannot vary that figure if con-
ditions change which call for it. Congress
can vary It. But it is a restraint on ad-
ditional spending. It also advises the
Congress, the way it was originally pro-
posed, and if there were slippages, we
could find out why there were, and if
there were overages proposed, we could
find out why. So it is not so novel.
Mr. MAHON. The gentleman in effect
is In favor of the limitation?
Mr. ROGERS of Florida. I certainly
am. And I think it should be done even
more. We should do it on each depart-
ment. I wish the chairman had agreed
some years ago, along with some other
members of the Committee on Appro-
priations, to place expenditure limita-
tions on Government departments be-
cause we could have been doing it all
these years and prevented a great deal of
the wild spending that we have had.
I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. MAHON. My friend is entitled to
ing. No one can predict just what Con-
gress will do, but I hope that the pro-
posal here will be well supported by the
House and by the other body.
COMPARISON OF TITLE IV OF PENDING BILL WITH
THE LEGISLATIVE BUDGET PROPOSAL IN THE
1946 REORGANIZATION ACT
Mr. Chairman, in elaboration, may I
add that the discussion recalls the efforts
of the Congress, some 22 years ago, to en-
act a legislative budget, an important
and really key feature of which was to
put a ceiling on Government spending.
I think it might be useful to insert an
analysis comparing that effort with title
IV of the pending bill:
By proposing a ceiling on the aggregate of
government spending for fiscal 1970. title IV
of the pending bill would secure something
of what the framers of the legislative budget
plan In the 1946 Reorganization Act had
in mind, but which Congress in fact never
accomplished. It would be useful to recall
briefly what that plan was about, refer to
the experiences in attempting to carry it
out, and make some note of the similarities
and dissimilarities between the provisions
of the 1946 plan and title IV of the pending
bill.
THE 1946 LEGISLATIVE BUDGET PLAN
The legislative budget plan was spelled out
in the 1946 law, It is now a part of Rule
XLSI of the Rules of the House, and reads
as follows:
"(a) The Committee on Ways and Means
and the Committee on Appropriations of
the House of Representatives, and the Com-
mittee on Finance and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate, or duly au-
thorized subcommittees thereof, are author-
ized and directed to meet jointly at the
beginning of each regular session of Con-
gress and after study and consultation, giving
due consideration to the budget recommend-
ations of the President, report to their re-
spective Houses a legislative budget for the
ensuing fiscal year, including the estimated
over-all Federal receipts and expenditures for
such year, Such report shall contain a recom-
mendation for the maximum amount to be
appropriated for expenditure in such year
which shall include such an amount to be
reserved for deficiencies as may be deemed
necessary by such committees. If the esti-
mated receipts exceed the estimated ex-
penditures, -such report shall contain a
recommendation for a reduction in the pub-
lic, debt. Such report shall, be made by
February 15.
"(b) The report shall be accompanied by
a concurrent resolution adopting such
budget, and Axing the maximum amount to
be appropriated for expenditure in such year.
If the estimated expenditures exceed the
estimated receipts, the concurrent resolu-
tion shall Include a section substantially as
follows: 'That it is the sense of the Congress
that the public debt shall be Increased in
an amount equal to the amount by which
the estifnnted expenditures for the ensuing
fiscal year exceed the estimated receipts, such
amount being "
In other words, the joint committee, after
study of the budget and consultations other-
wise. was 10 bring in, early In the session, a
concurrent resolution proposing an expres-
sion of the judgment of the Congress as to
the probable budget revenuesfor the com-
ing fiscal year and fixing a maximum budget
expenditure goal for the year.
There wsa nothing mandatory or compell-
ing about any ceiling so fixed upon.
It was not an enactment requiring approval
of the President.
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May 20,.1969 _ CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
it was to be not a binding statute but only which Congress would work in its actions on establishments have prevented world war
a target for the guidance of the Congress in the various spending bills. III, which was and is the great cata-
processing the spending and revenue bills. The earlier "ceiling" was not really a ceiling strophic threat that has confronted us
It was not directed to the Executive spend- because it was not enacted as a law and was since World War II. Our military have
ing agencies, but only to the Congress. In its not binding on either Congress or the Exec- won their wars insofar as they were able
individual actions in the appropriation and utive. Title IV would set a binding statutory to do a uwars the t eys and able
the other spending' bills, and on the revenue ceiling. The ceiling figure, insofar as con-so all of f
mstances
concerned, is a begin-
But whatever euThey have refle tedtgeat credit upon
which cipes i could either hue to the dis- gressional ted by the ceiling ning, not decision is
t lin implicitly suggested . this country and they have also shown
thus es thus set, or or it could ignore the ceiling. figure Congress would wluc3 up setting, that
managerial ability.
In the first effort-ln 1 19447-tto put ut the plan would become a maximum on the he- Executive some considerable
into effect, both Houses adopted a concurrent Branch, changeable cnly bar subsequent ac- It was Admiral Raborn who headed
resolution. The House proposed an overall cut tion of Congress. That was not the case in this Polaris
program. . In In leadership
of $6 billion from projected fiscal 1948 budget the 1947 and 1948 efi eerts. Up program the e Polaris demonstrated
expenditures. The Senate proposed a $4.5 bil- Unlike the earlier efforts which sought to pro am incomparable.
lion reduction. The conferees did not resolve declare at the beginning teat h ess spthan ending a It was er who headed Adminral the differences and the resolution died in budget "should" be cat b not the dthe atomic sub-
The conference. Thus no target ceiling was set. pre-determined, arbitrary amount but up marine development velo program. t has performed a
The next year, Congress, on February 27, which was cast in such a way as not to en-
1948, did adopt sudh a concurrent resolution sure it, title IV would not impose any reduc- magnificent job in that field.
with respect to fiscal 1949, setting-for it- tion in advance-either as a "goal" for Con- It was Gen. Ben Schriever who headed
self-the goal of a $2.5 billion reduction' in gress or as a "ceiling" that would leave to the intercontinental ballistic missiles
budgeted expenditures by expressing the Executive the allocation of an arbitrary cut program up p the to the Air Force.
judgment, "based upon presently available to specific agencies and prugrams. the Many good jobs have be n done by our
ing such fiscal year shall not exceed 37.2 bil- tide not to come fr but was powerless countless
lion dollars * * *". ensure It, title IV, unlike the earlier efforts military and civilian leaders. We cannot
Actual budget expenditures in fiscal 1949 "commands" that expenditures shall not look only at shortcomings. We must look
were $40 billion; they exceeded the target by exceed a certain suns and carries the mecha- at the successes also, and we have rea-
$2.8 billion, in effect wiping out the reduction nism to ensure the result. Of course, Con- son to be proud.
goal of $2.5 billion. They exceeded the original grass can change tomorrow what it decides taken more time
budget projection of $39.7 billion by some today, but that power, as to expenditures, Mrthan. I had Chairmaann, I have anticipated but I believe i
$300 million. is reserved to Congress by title IV.
In 1949, a move was made to set the date Unlike the earlier effort, nothing in title has given the members of the committee und for action on the legislative budget for fiscal IV calls on Congress so vote for a reduction- an opportunt programs pot which they
1950 back from February 15 to May 1. Noth- either as a ""goal" or a "ceiling"-below the questions about
ing further happened. Nothing further has President's announced spending budget in are interested.
UNEXPENDED CARRYOVER t3ALANCEs
been done in direct response to the legislative advance of individ ial item consideration,
budget plan. The mechanism is there to a;.djiist the initial
Many post-mortems have been rendered ceiling figure--up or down-to comport with Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. Mr. Chair-
on the experiment. It was said that the joint what Congress decides co each spending bill man, will the gentleman yield.
committee of 102 members was unwieldy. and proposition. Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman
It was said that the time limit of February Not unlike what the majority report- from Tennessee.
15 was too short. quoted above-said about final results under (Mr. EVINS of Tennessee asked and
It was said that to name an expenditure the 1947 resolution "goal", what happens un- was given permission to revise and ex-
reduction total in advance in the manner der title IV (which adopts the budget figure
proposed approximated a court rendering a as a starting point)--. . "depends entirely tend his remarks.)
verdict without evidence. It was said that to upon the final actic-n of the Congress upon Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. I alluded
vote for a blanket reduction in advance of budget estimates, eidivid.ually and collec- aearlie to bater The nexptnre d carryov
$226erillial-
hearings and consideration of the individual tively".
budget proposals was a vote to cut without Like the words. used in both the 1947 and I will ask if it is not correct that this
knowing what is to be cut, how much is to be 1948 resolutions, title IV is "based upon
out, or where the cut is to be made. presently available infornia.tion". The legis- $226 ante, if billion added to the unexpended Nixon carryover budget bal-
al-
new spending re-
It was said that no legislative budget, lative budget effort was based on the initial lso based on the
total of $431
logically premised, could precede a detailed p dget. tle IV theinew administration,initial bill on,owould not make athority
for
study of the estimate. availa The majority report accompanying the first Like the earlier s?ifQ]-tr=, title IV encom-
Nixon billion budgeble
app ~ ved raslfsube
concurrent resolution submitted to the House passes expenditures ' rom unexpended care
in February,t1947, suggesting the goal of a over balances of previous appropriations to mitted?
$6 billion cutback, had this acknowledgment: well as expenditures from appropriations P Mr. MAHON. This is right. This $431
"of course, If the accompanying resolution be newly enacted to this session for fiscal bilion would be, technically, available
be adopted there is no commitment as to any 1970. for expenditure in 1970. If we adopted
reduction in specific items contained in the And unlike the noble but ineffective and
budget. The resolution expresses an overall impractical plan of i946, title IV is a proposal the appropriation or obligational budget
objective and its realization depends entirely logically based and practical of operation. proposed by the President, there would
upon the final action of the Congress upon If adopted and adhered to, it will not only be about $431 billion available in fiscal
budget estimates, individually and collec- focus on the total of government expendl- 1970. But this requires a. lot of under-
tively." but will keep the hands of Congress on standing and analysis before it is Intel-
y" the total. And the petea~tial for retrenchment ligible to the average citizen. It is a very
THE 1946 PLAN AND TITLE IV-SIMILARITIES in expenditures is considerable. Complex matter.
AND DISSIMILARITIES
CONTRIBUTIONS; O5 ,vrn.IT4RY PROGRAMS AND Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. If the gen-
There There ere t;iADERS
? e tleman will yield further, it is a very
the a 1946 plan number an and title differences
between There are
are also some similarities. Now, Mr. Chairman, I wish to return flexible budget and it is not really put-
Of course, title IV does not deal with the to a matter I men ,ioned earlier, which is ting a crimp on the Bureau of the Budget
revenue side. The 1946 plan did. But Con- the business of military spending. the $192.9 billion spending figure is the
grass knows what the revenue estimates of As I said in the colloquy with the gen- full amount projected by the Nixon
the d be Branch up--dating the it tleman from South Carolina (Mr. Rlv- budget review.
January should be itotedthat p-dat the ng 1ERs), I believe in military strength. I Mr. MAHON. I thank the gentleman
bdgiews are needed; e
ly believe we can negotiate with the Soviet for his contribution.
budget review of President Nixon dealt only
with appropriations and spending,' not with Union better if we have military strength. (Mr. BOW (at the request of Mr.
revenues- The budget surplus of $5.8 billion I believe our main opponent in the world JONAS) was given permission to extend
projected by President Nixon is subject to is not Korea or North Vietnam but the his remarks at this point in the RECORD.)
revision on that account. Soviet Union and Red China. I think we Mr. BOW. Mr. Chairman, H.R. 11400
Perhaps the most basic difference between have to keep ourselves militarily strong. is the usual supplemental appropriation
title IV and the spending ceiling in the I do not think we ought to permit those bill which we have each spring for those
of 1947 and to succeed who are trying to destroy the items not provided for in our regular
c48 is that 1948 is ttitle budget r IV wauld lions r a rigid
e
ceiling into law, whereas s the earlier resolu- Image of our civilian and uniformed mill- appropriations bills approved during the
tions merely sought to set a goal against tary personnel. It is true our military preceding calendar year.
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O:eraii, I think this is a good bill. estimate of a year ago and farm price However, there are a few points that I
The committee considered appropriation support outlays have risen $1.6 billion would like to make primarily by way of
requests totaling $4.3 billion, and ap- above the original estimate of last year. emphasizing what the gentleman from
proved appropriations of $3.8 billion, thus Of the $192.9 billion of proposed spend- Texas has said. Actually, this bill con-
we cut almost $600 million below the re- Ing for fiscal 1970, some $106.3 billion tarns four separate titles. They will be
quested amount. Moreover, the $4.3 bil- is in the relatively uncontrollable cate- discussed. undoubtedly, by the chairmen
lion request was reduced some $250 mil- gory. That includes $81.1 billion for un- of the various subcommittees that han-
lion by the Nixon administration under controllable civilian programs and $25.2 die those topics and by the ranking mi-
the amounts requested in the Johnson billion for special Southeast Asia support. nority members who work with them.
bud? et before we considered the request. Of the $81.1 billion for relatively uncon- In summary, it can be said that in this
While I shall not repeat the detail pre- trollable civilian programs $49 billion is supplemental bill the committee con-
sented by our distinguished chairman, for outlays in the social security and sidered budget requests amounting to
the ? entleman from Texas (Mr. MAHON), public_ assistance programs. $4.364 billion, reduced that total re-
I do want to point out that of the $3.8 Thus It seems to me that the admin- quest by $580,794,190, and recommend
billicn provided $1.2 billion is for military Itration will have serious difficulty hold- to the House a bill providing for $3,-
operations in Southeast Asia; $1.2 billion Ing expenditures in fiscal 1970 at $192.9 783,212,766, a reduction of 13 percent.
is for pay increases resulting from the billion since there are no exemptions for Mr. Chairman, it is not unusual to
Pay Act of last year; and the balance the uncontrollables such as the war in hear remarks to the effect that the
of $1.4 billion is for a variety of programs Vietnam, interest on the public debt, and House Committee on Appropriations
throughout the Government service. so forth. marched up the hill last year and cut
Significant among the amounts pro- While It is true that expenditures may the budget by $14 billion and now it is
video. are the funds requested by the ad- rise above or fall below the $192.9 bil- marching down the same hill and re-
ministration to fight crime throughout lion ceiling depending upon action or in- storing nearly $4 billion of that cut.
the United States. This effort to cope action by Congress on requests for appro- But, as the chairman has pointed out,
with organized crime should be welcomed priations, the ceiling is indeed rigid and only about l percent of the funds con-
by all law-abiding citizens. It is my hope leaves little leeway for unexpected tamed In this bill amount to restora-
that substantial inroads can be made changes in budget outlays. tion of funds that were eliminated in
by the Department of Justice and other As the ceiling is written in the bill it the regular bills last year.
Investigatory and regulatory agencies in provides the following: The remaining part of the bill covers
coping with the criminal problems which That whenever action, or inaction, by the mandatory Increases that have been
face us. Congress on requests for appropriations and made necessary because of action taken
Although each of the individual chap- other budgetary proposals varies from the by the Congress subsequent to the en-
ters in the bill will be handled by the President's recommendation thereon, the aetment of the appropriation bills last
zespeAive ranking Republican Members, Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall
I do want to point out that this bill pro- h repo east to
tthe o ofPtthe effect ofsucheaction eo year
would like to discuss briefly the title
vides for a spending limitation in fiscal Inaction on expenditures and net lending, of the bill which covers independent of-
1970 which will restrict budget expends- and the limitation act forth herein shall be flees, and with particular reference to
tures to $192.9 billion. This $192.9 bil- correspondingly adjusted. the Department of Housing and Urban
lion figure is some $4 billion below the If, for example. Congress fails to ap- Development, because that subject was
adjus:ed amounts projected by the
Johnson budget. prove the postal rate increase in the raised in the colloquy between the gen-
As we all know, President Nixon bad amount of some $600 million, budget tleman from Texas and a member of
the departments and ag enciees conduct expenditures will rise by that amount the committee.
th eaepartm is and of enci financ conduct since postal receipts are treated as off- It is customary to read in the press
needs earlier this year, and the President sets against spending. Similarly, the that Congress has been very remiss in
was E,ble to reduce projected expendi- $192.9 billion c; illng will rise by $600 mil- looking after the problems of the cities;
tures by the aforementioned $4 billion. lion since the postal rate proposal is ac- that we have neglected them and that we
As all members of the Committee know. counted for In the expenditure total. have spent a lot of money on farm pro-
for more t3 of
years I have offered But, it also follows that where other un- grams and allowed the cities to grow up
so-called ore than h Bow expenditure ears have offered Brecontrollable expenditures exceed current In slums and what-not. I believe at times
for m
amendment on most appropriation limitation budget estimates, then expenditures for such as these that it is appropriate to
and dine it was most
bills. pn a number controllable programs would have to be remind those who read the RECORD, and
adopted
of whiin some number cut below current estimates. who report on these deliberations-be-
of w unanimously, he ptHouse, was never an- Mr. Chairman. I think this is a good cause it is not necessary to remind the
proved by the Senate on an individual bill in terms of the reductions which we Members of the House, because I am
prove dir by th bill. However, n ndi d year have made in obligational authority, and sure they are all familiar with the facts-
app lat onin the Rev- I urge favorable action by the House on but to those who are not familiar with
u such limitation was
c Control Act of it. I am somewhat distressed, however, the facts, I believe they need to be re-
senu and Expenditure Included and it has had the Contr of reduc- of by the rigid ceiling on spending since minded occasionally that Congress has
1968
1
rojected Federal effect o in the history clearly shows a wide variation been pretty generous in spending the
g pre :,t fiscal year by some spending
In
cur
billion. between actual expenditures and those taxpayers' money on urban problems,
The provision before us which would projected In a budget document some 18 For example, we have been hearing a
limit budget expenditures In fiscal 1970 months before the close of a given fis- lot this afternoon about unexpended bai-
eal year.
to $192.9 billion is much more rigid than there; and the budget does reflect that
was the expenditure limitation of last Mr. JONAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield my- there will be on hand at the end of
year because a number of budget ex- self 10 minutes. 1969 $226 billion in unexpended funds.
penditure items wereexempted from the (Mr. JONAS asked and was given per- But I do not believe it has been men-
provisions of the limitation last year. mission to revise and extend his re- tioned-and this is the most significant
Expenditures in the current fiscal year marks.) part of that figure-that $139,238,000.000
for the war in Vietnam, expenditures for Mr. JONAS. Mr. Chairman, we have of that total is not even obligated. The
Intere; t on the public debt, those for just listened to 50 minutes of what I be- total of $226 billion includes unspent and
veterans benefits and compensation, and lieve to be as interesting a discussion of unobligated funds, but there Is approxi-
so forth, were excluded from the limit budget problems that I have ever heard in mately $140 billion in the hands of the
and their exemption had the effect of this Chamber. The gentleman from Texas executive branch of the Government in
Increasing spending for exempted pro- has handled this subject In a masterful previously appropriated funds which have
grams and in the so-called uncontrol- way and in my opinion has covered it ade- not even been obligated, or will not be
lable tress by approximately $6 billion quately. Actually, I see no real reason why obligated at the end of fiscal 1969.
above original estimates. I should extend the discussion, because I The Department of Housing and Urban
For example, interest on the public doubt if I can add anything that he has Development has on hand-or will have
debt Is up $1.1 billion above the original not already covered. at the end of this year-$20 billion of
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May 20, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE
previously, appropriated money which
has not been spent. Some of'it has been
obligated, but it will have $13.5 billion
of unobligated funds at the end of this
year.
We have appropriated to that Depart-
ment nearly. $1 billion since 1967-$948
million, to be exact, for the new model
cities program, and very little of it has
been spent. They announced nine grants
a few months ago, and over the last week-
end three more were announced.
I do not know what causes the delay.
I know it took the previous Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development 7
months after he had all of the plans in
to even select the first group of cities.
So I do not 'believe Congress can be
justly charged with any lack of a sense
of urgency about these problems. I be-
lieve much of the delay can be attributed
to paper shuffling, foot dragging and
bureaucracy in the department.
Let me tell you in brief capsule form
some of the programs Congress has
funded for the aid of cities.
Urban renewal is one of the important
ones. Do you know that,through 1969
the Congress has provided HUD and-its
predecessor with $4.6 billion for urban
renewal? Through 1969 the Congress
has provided nearly $3 billion public
housing subsidies? Let me show you how
the cost of the subsidy for public housing
is increasing as the years go by.
The total was $208 million in 1965.
It went up_to $241 million in 1966.
It went to $261 million in 1967.
Then to $295 million in 1968.
It went to $350 million, plus a $16 mil-
lion supplemental or to $366 million in
1969.
The 1970 budget calls for $473 million.
New -public housing starts are sched-
uled at 130,000 in 1970.
We have the rent supplement program.
We have the homeownership program,
and we have, the rental subsidy program.
We have the housing for the elderly
and the rehabilitation program.
We have the below-market interest
program and we have the community
facilities program; the open-space land
programs.
You name them-there are about 70
different programs in the Department
of Housing and Urban Development be-
ing funded by the Congress from funds
extracted from all of the taxpayers of
the United States-70 different programs
operated by one Department of the Gov-
ernment, in various aid to the cities.
Yet we are accused of doing nothing.
The truth of, the matter is, that we
are spending about $3,0 billion a year on
urban problems.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from North Carolina has
expired,
Mr. JONAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield
myself 5 additional minutes.
Mr. Chairman, in a colloquy with the
chairman earlier, I responded to the
question as to what brancdilew programs
we are funding in this supplemental and
what they will cost-and I refer now to
the programs under section 235, that is
the homeownership program, a program
under which. the Government will sub-
sidize the interest fpr a homeowner who
,
g
wishes to buy a house and cannot pay contract authority, we know how long We cannot just adopt this spending
the Interest charges, that authority is to extend and the total limitation and then it back and rub-
- -
Approved
The subsidy wi'l -amount to the in-
terest which exceeds 1 percent. So if the
current interest rate is 71/2 percent, the
Government will subsidize it at no more
than 61/2 percent.
We put in the regular bill last year
$25 million in cont~actsguthority for that
program, and we are including in the
supplemental an additional $40 million
in contract authority; That is $65 mil-
lion that is being voted this fiscal year
for this new program which is just get-
ting under way. That contract author-
ity simply means that we give the de-
partment authority to commit the Gov-
ernment to spend $65 million a year on
homeownership interest subsidies for 40
years-or $2.6 billion.
There is a companion program under
section 236, known as the rental hous-
ing assistance pi-s-gram, which carried
the same figure of $25 million in the
regular bill and another $40 million in
this supplemental. So under these two
sections, these two new programs, in
addition to public homing and in addi-
tion to urban area and in addition to
community facilities and in addition to
all of these other programs-here are
two additional programs that are going
to cost-even if we do not ever give them
another dime in future years-that are
going to cost the taxpayers $5.2 billion.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. JONAS. I weld to the chairman of
the committee.
Mr. MAHON. The gentleman is pursu-
ing a very interesting aspect of Federal
spending. I hope that he will place in
the RECORD in connection with his re-
marks, if the figures have been as-
sembled-and I k. now the gentleman's
subcommittee has asked for them-the
continuing costs that are mandated by
previous actions on all these various
housing-type programs, rent supple-
ments, and so forth.
The reason I make this request is that
there are those Rho feel that Congress
is losing control of the purse. I think we
are not losing cont?o1 of the purse at all.
When we appropriate money, we expect
it to be spent for the programs which we
have endorsed. In the past we have not
tried to fix a rate of expenditure of the
funds which we have provided for vari-
ous programs except to a limited degree,
which we discussed ea=Tier. But if you
approve a series of long-term programs
and you grant the first down payment on
a 40-year program, then for 40 years
the Government is committed to that
particular expenditure, because it is fixed
by an action of the Congress. It is done
by Congress. It is not a loss of control
by Congress in the beginning, but we
lock just that much more into the fixed
and subsequently uncontrollable area of
expenditure.
I would like to have the gentleman's
views on that matter.
Mr. JONAS. I certainly agree with
the chairman, ano- I believe he would
agree with me that we ought to begin
giving closer scrutiny to requests for
contract authority. That is where the
process begins. We cannot keep up with
what is going on unless
as we
rant
H 3839
amount that will be involved, because
when we grant contract authority, what
we do is to pile up mandatory appropria-
tions over the period of the contract.
Some of those contracts go for 35 years,
most of them for 40 years. What we are
doing here, in funding Sections 235 and
236, is a clear example of the mistake we
make when we talk about appropriating
$80 million when the cost of the program
is $3.2 billion.
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. JONAS. I yield to the gentleman
from Iowa.
Mr. GROSS. Between the statements
of the distinguished chairman of the
committee and the distinguished gen-
tleman from North Carolina, we are al-
most drowned In figures concerning this
bill, and it is proper that the chairman
and the gentleman from North Caro-
lina give us the figures contained in this
bill. But let me see if I can get a small-
sized handle on this big spending pro-
posal in this way: This bill provides for
a ceiling of $192,900,000,000, is that cor-
rect?
Mr. JONAS. That is correct.
Mr. GROSS: What are the total esti-
mated expenditures for this fiscal year?
In other words, this bill would fix a ceil-
ing of $192.9 billion for fiscal 1970. What
will be the amount spent in this fiscal
year which ends on June 30?
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. JONAS. I yield to the chairman
of our committee.
Mr. MAHON. The expenditure for this
year will be about $185 billion. So, under
the administration's expenditure pro-
jection, expenditures would go up by $8
billion, 1970 over 1969, and appropria-
tions would go up by about $10 billion.
Mr. GROSS. The gentleman refers to
the $192.9 billion. Does that include the
expenditures that he is giving the House
now for the present fiscal year? Does
that include the $3.8 billion in this sup-
plemental?
Mr. MAHON. Yes; the $3.8 billion is all
within these figures.
Mr. GROSS. They definitely include
the $3.8 billion in this supplemental?
Mr. MAHON. The gentleman is cor-
rect.
Mr. JONAS. Mr. Chairman, I am glad
the gentleman from Iowa made that
point, because .I did not want to forget
to remind the committee that if we adopt
the recommendations of our committee
with respect to the spending limitation,
that will not be the end. We are going
to have to. work hard on every single
appropriation bill to make reductions,
because otherwise any reductions that
are made will have to be made by the
executive branch of the Government.
There are Members of this body who
do not want to give him the discretion
or authority to decide where cuts shall
be made. So we reserve the right, if we
do our duty and live up to our respon-
sibility and do not abdicate to the Pres-
ident the authority to make these cuts,
to make the cuts in subsequent appro-
priation bills for fiscal year 1970 as they
 H384
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE May 20, 1969
berstamp all the appropriation bills, and
we do not intend to do it, but we have
to have some support on this floor.
I have already heard rumors that ef-
forts are going to be made to increase
the Nixon budget. While the majority
leader in the other body is making state-
ments that spending should be reduced
$10 billion below the Nixon budget. And,
there are people on this side of the Capi-
tol who are saying already that the
spending cuts are too deep. I think it Is
true, as it has been in all but 3 of the
last 14 years, that spending has been
underestimated by whoever was in the
White House, and I think spending this
year in the 1970 budget is under-
estimated. I am sure it is underestimated
in the interest on the national debt and
in some other areas also.
I agree with the Chairman that this Is
not going to be any sweet pill for the
administration to swallow. It is some-
thing that the administration would like
to avoid, I am sure. I certainly would not
want to have to live under this limitation
if I were the Executive or if I were his
Director of the Bureau of the Budget, but
they understand full well that they have
the responsibility of trying their dead-
level best to live up to these spending
limitations, and they are going to have
to live up to them unless Congress
shoulc. unwisely I think exceed the bud-
get requests on some appropriation bills.
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. JONAS. I yield to the gentleman
from Iowa.
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I thank
the gentleman for yielding. I do so merely
to make the point that I agree again with
the gentleman from Texas (MT. MAHON)
and the gentleman from North Carolina
(Mr. JONAS) that we cannot emphasize
too strongly the necessity for watching
the authorization bills as they come in.
In that regard, I am not aware of a
single authorization bill that has been
approved so far in this session of Con-
gress-.hat has not carried an increase in
spending. Is the gentleman aware of an
authorization bill that has not been in-
creased?
Mr. JONAS. I am aware of the fact
that one adopted on the floor of this
House a few days ago was substantially
above the budget.
Mr. GROSS. I do not know of a single
one that has not provided for an In-
creased outlay of money.
Mr. JONAS, The gentleman from Iowa
is correct. That is the first place to start.
The second place to start is within the
Appropriations Committee, and I think
we are going to bring some substantial
cuts here for the consideration of the
House, and we are going to ask for the
Members' cooperation as we undertake to
make some substantial reductions this
year.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to
the gentleman from California (Mr.
Ln'scoMa).
Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, the
need for supplemental appropriations for
the Department of Defense for fiscal year
1969 has been recognized as needed and
requited for many months.
The Committee on Appropriations in
their report dated July 19, 1968, No.
1735 on the Department of Defense ap-
propriation bill for fiscal year 1969, dis-
cussed the budgetary effect of the war In
Vietnam and the possibility of added
funds. The report stated:
It is probable that the funds provided will
not be entirely adequate through the end of
the current fiscal year and that a supple-
mental request will be made In the next sea-
slon of Congress. This has been the case in
the past several years.
The committee In their report also in-
formed the House that funds were not
included for military or civilian pay in-
creases which became effective July 1,
1968. The committee report when dis-
cussing other fiscal considerations stated :
In accordance with longstanding custom.
this bill does not include funds for the mili-
tary and civilian pay Increase for fiscal year
1969, which became effective this month.
There will be. as has been the case in the
past, a supplemental estimate presented to
the next session of Congress covering such
costs government-wide.
On September 11, 1968. when the fiscal
year 1969 bill was before the House of
Representatives. I remarked on the need
for added appropriations as follows:
It should also be noted that the Depart-
ment of Defense will require additional fiscal
year 1969 funds in order to meet present re-
quirements, particularly in Southeast Asia. A
supplemental request will be required. This
has been the case in the past several years.
known increases already Indicate constimp-
tion of certain specific ammunition items
has greatly increased. Pbrce deployments al-
ready approved are In excess of those upon
which the budget was based. If the war con-
tinues at the present rate of expenditure of
material, other costs will rise. The military
and civilian pay Increases which went into
effect July 1, 1968, are not included In the
budget now before the House.
The additional new obligational au-
thority recommended In this second sup-
plemental appropriation bill for fiscal
year 1969, H.R. 11400, now before the
House, for the Department of Defense, In
titles I, II, and III Is a net total of
$2,312,068,000.
These additional funds are required to
support United States and our allies mili-
tary operations in Southeast Asia. Funds
are included for the pay of military per-
sonnel, for operation and maintenance,
and for procurement of items to replace
combat losses. The total request also in-
cludes funds for military and civilian pay
Increases already implemented under
provisions of previously enacted laws and
mandatory increases in military retired
pay.
The supplemental budget estimates for
fiscal year 1969 for the Department of
Defense as proposed and transmitted to
the Congress by President Johnson, Jan-
uary 17, 1969 totaled $3,011,900,000. A
reassessment by President Nixon's ad-
ministration was completed in April and
the revised estimate to Congress totaled
$2,871,200,000 a reduction of $140,700,-
000. The Appropriations Subcommittee
on the Department of Defense after de-
voting considerable time to analyzing
the request, recommended a further re-
duction of $559,132,000. The $2,312,068,-
000 total recommended in this bill rep-
resents a total decrease of $699,832,000
below the January 17, 1969 estimate.
For title I the revised estimates for
military operations in Southeast Asia
totaled $1,496,900,000. The committee
reduced this amount by $262,900,000 and
recommends appropriations totaling
$1,234,000,000.
In title R the committee recommends
appropriations totaling $226,050,000, a
reduction of $23,632,000 below the revised
request of $249,682,000. The largest part
of the funds requested in this title, $175,-
000,000, is for "Retired pay, military."
The requirement for additional funds
results from increased benefits paid in
accordance with cost of living allow-
ancespreviously authorized by law.
The balance of the appropriations in
title II is funding for increased per diem
costs for reservists in travel status based
on a new law, Public Law 90-168, prem-
ium pay and employee benefits for Na-
tional Guard technicians, depot overhaul
of Guard equipment and aircraft, and
funds for training and other operational
costs.
Under title III there is recommended
$852,018,000 for military and civilian pay
increases. This is a reduction of $272,-
600.000 below the revised request. The
subcommittee reduced all requests for
funds to. meet increased pay costs as the
requests were estimated on the total an-
nual requirements which were based on
first quarter obligations. Many of the
estimates have been proven to be over-
stated at this point in time.
The gross amount recommended for
the Department of Defense in this bill
for military and civilian pay increases
under titles I and II is $903,768,000. Of
this amount $678,950,000 is for military
pay and $224,818,000 is for civilian pay.
The additional pay costs and added
funds stem from the second phase com-
parability pay adjustments effective last
July 1. These increases were authorized
in Public Law 90-206, the Federal Salary
Act of 1967, and Public Law 90-207, in-
creasing the basic pay for members of
the uniformed services.
The Appropriations Subcommittee on
the Department of Defense spent con-
siderable time in analyzing the request
for the funds requested to be assured
that only those additional funds actually
required were recommended. We feel
that the funds which are included in this
bill are needed and the appropriation
should be approved,
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN souvass r ASIA
President Johnson's budget for fiscal
year 1969 submitted in January, 1968,
proposed defense expenditures for sup-
port of Vietnam operations in the
amount of $25.8 billion. It was known
during 1968 that figure was a low esti-
mate.
The present estimate for military oper-
ations in Vietnam for fiscal year 1969
is $28.8 billion In expenditures. This
amount includes the estimates submit-
ted in connection with the pending bill.
In January of this year the supple-
mental requirement for fiscal year 1969
in support of military operations in
Vietnam was estimated at $1.632 billion.
The reassessment which the new admin-
istration completed in April confirmed
the validity of the requirement but re-
duced the funds requested to $1.497
billion.
The committee, in the bill before us,
recommends $1.234 billion in funds for
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
ployees chose to use the compensation
route rather than choosing sick leave.
But today that figure is practically re-
versed to 57 percent of the employees
using compensation rather than sick
leave.
In the area of higher education the
first item of interest is that of interest
subsidy grants in the amount of $3,-
920,000. This will initiate a new program
of debt service grants authorized in the
higher education amendments that we
passed last year.
That was Public Law 90-575, signed
into law October 16, 1968. It re-
places the same amount of direct Federal
loans permitting a substantial reduction
in Federal expenditures for fiscal years
1969 and 1970, as we pointed out earlier
in our colloquy on the subject with the
gentleman from Iowa (Mr. SMITH). The
Federal Government in this program
pays the difference between the 3-percent
interest rate and the going rate-and
incidentally, in the fiscal year 1970
budget there is an item for interest
subsidy in the amount of $10,670,000,
which will provide for an increase then
of $6,750,000 for fiscal year 1970. Obvi-
ously this manifests itself in a greater
construction of facilities at our institu-
tions of higher learning in the years to
come.
Incidentally, they told us in our hear-
ings that there are applications on file
for in excess of $200 million worth of
construction. As I said, this $3.9 million
will give us $145 million of construction
this first year.
Mr. JONAS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. MICHEL. I yield to the gentle-
man from North Carolina.
Mr. JONAS. I believe the gentleman
is approximately correct. We have the
same problem in our bill in our subcom-
mittee in funding HUD's requests. It is a
lot better, I believe, to provide assistance
with interest payments than for the
Federal Government to go into the money
market and compete with business en-
terprises and individuals for the available
credit, and thus put our fiscal house more
in disorder than is already the case.
Mr. MICHEL. I believe the gentleman
from North Carolina makes a good point.
Of course, Congress so expressed itself
when we passed this law in October of
1968 providing for this.
I might say that this year we have
about 6 million college students, and the
projection is that in 1970 we will have
10 million students at our institutions of
higher learning, so the need for the
construction of facilities is paramount.
There is also an item in here of $7,241,-
000. This is for the Federal City College,
a direct payment, or a one-lump-sum
payment to the Federal City College in
the District of Columbia. This was the
amount authorized in Public Law 90-
354 as a one-time lump-sum appropria-
tion in lieu of a land grant for the Fed-
eral City College in the District of Co-
lumbia. We were told that this sum will
at the moment be invested in Govern-
ment bonds to realize a return of some
$360,000 for the Federal City College
of the District of Columbia to be used
military operations is Southeast Asia We must welcome the effective as-
which provides: sumption by South Vietnamese forces of
tZZtons a larger share of combat operations for
For additional personnel pay coets__ $239.5 certainly our overall national interests
For operational support and mainte- do dictate that we begin reductions of
nance of equipment ------------- 354.4 U.S. forces as soon is is feasible and
For pr round' fo ient rce of ammunition that our forces not remain in substan-
and ground equipment____ 640.1 tial number indefinitely if a negotiated
Total -------------------- --- 1, 234. o settlement proves uriatt thable.
These additional requirements result It is clear the administration requires
These from factors re an events not the additional defense funds to meet our
directly from when the and a ent 1969 commitment in Southeast Asia and other
contemplated already incurred obligations as provided
budget was when
in bill
First, in January 1968 the Communist this .
Tet offensive required the deployment of Mr. C Chhairman, the committee has
additional forces to Vietnam and re- itss every effort deleting unessential Soth
quired increased support operations, tems and funds related ths
operations as as well as
additional equipment, ammunition, and east Asia military not
other consumables. Losses sustained were correcting estimaiRs which were over-
great and material had to be repaired or stated.
The funds recommended are necessary
replaced.
Second, the seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo
and other aggressive actions by the North
Koreans resulted in the callup of Reserve
Forces to meet the possible military
threat, deployment of additional air and
sea forces to the area, additional equip-
ment, and other requirements.
This request now before us does not
provide for increases to our current force
levels which are somewhat below the
presently authorized deployment of 549,-
The committee procurement recom-
mendation provides equipment and con-
sumables for American and Allied ground
forces and also to upgrade our produc-
tion base. More than 65 percent of the
procurement funds-$419.5 million is
for ammunition.
The operation and maintenance ap-
propriations require supplemental ap-
propriations for Reserve callup and addi-
tional deployment, maintenance of ma-
terial, aircraft fuel and oil and increases
and modernization of the Armed Forces
of the Republic of Vietnam.
Included in, this supplemental are
additional funds for the modernization
and upgrading of the South Vietnamese
Armed Forces. This is a very significant
part of this supplemental bill.
President Nixon on Wednesday, May
14, said that the strengthening of the
South Vietnamese forces has been
speeded up and the President said:
That time is approaching when South
Vietnamese forces will be able to take over
some of the fighting fronts now being
manned by Americans.
The funds in this bill will directly aid
the speed up of the strengthening of the
South Vietnamese forces.
Significantly this bill as recommended
b the committee includes a total of
and should be appropriated.
Mr. JONAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10
minutes to the gentleman from Illinois
(Mr. MICHEL).
(Mr. MICHEL asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Chairman, there is a
portion of this bill to which I would like
to address myself, and it is that having
to do with the Departments of Labor,
Health, Education, and Welfare. This in-
volves $700 million of the bill, broken
down as follows: $35.9 million for the De-
partment of Labor and $677 million for
the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare.
The first item having to do with the
Department of Labor is a $20 million
item for unemployment compensation for
Federal employees and ex-servicemen.
The members of the committee will
recall that earlier in the year we passed
a supplemental in the amount of $36 mil-
lion. This will be in addition to that in
order to rectify those faulty estimates
that were submitted to us at the begin-
ning of fiscal year 1969.
Then, too, there is also an item of $15.9
million for employees' compensation,
claims and expenses. Now, both of these
items are mandatory payments required
by law. Both were seat up by the Nixon
administration, because the previous
estimates, as I said, were too low.
Mr. Chairman, I think it should be
borne in mind that compensation benefits
paid to surviving children. are involved
in this particular Rein. Back in 1966 when
we amended the law we provided that
full-time students could receive pay-
ments until the age of 23; whereas, before
they were cut off at the age of 18. We were
told in our testimony that these pay-
y
$246.4 ments to these children average $110 a
million in funds which are for
purposes which will enable the South month or $1,320 per year per child. This
Vietnamese to eventually defend them- is one of the factors which goes into this
selves and thus to gain the opportunity increase.
to determine their own future. Then, too, there is an item for the cost-
Funds are included to procure for the of-living increase, and an increase in the
South Vietnamese Armed Forces ammu- maximum monthly allowance from $525
nition and equipment such ' as armored to better than threi times that amount,
cars, trucks, rifles, communications, and $1,600. That amount has led to many of
electronic devices. Also included are our Federal employees choosing work-
funds for South Vietnamese training, as men's compensation instead of sick
well as general supplies, spare parts, leave. An injured employee has the
transportation, and depot operations as- choice or option to use sick leave or re-
sociated with the major end items pro- ceive compensation. Twelve years ago
vided the South Vietnamese. only about 37 percent, of our injured em-
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H 3842 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE -- May- 20, 1969
for salaries and other expenses of the adjustments have been made in the Carolina. May I add that In the regu-
university. States and that is is a bona fide figure. lar hearings of the committee for fiscal
I- might say, too, that over and above If you add this supplemental to what year 1970, volume 3, on the U.S. Forest
this the Federal City College will also we have appropriated in the 1969 regu- Service, you will find an excellent discus-
receive a share of the annual appro- lar bill of $3,051,900,000, you have a total sion between the U.B. Forest service and
priation for land-grant colleges under amount of payments to States for public the committee on timber requirements
the Bankhead-Jones Act, and that al- assistance for maintenance alone an ag- and the funds that need to be spent in
I
t
t i
l
men
o
n fisca
year 1970 will be ap
-
proxdmately $168,000, out of a total fig-
ure of something like $12 million for the
entire country. So here we are for fiscal
year 1970 giving the District of Columbia
a proportionate cut of the shares that
normally go to the other 50 States.
Then too under the second Morrill. Act
the Federal City College would come in
for another share of $50,000 out of the
total allotment of $2,600,000 for the
country.
In the Item of the public health service,
comprehensive health planning and serv-
ices, there Is an item of $128,000 for
Increased pay under Public Law 90-206
and 207. $9,600,000, the biggest item
here, Is for a program to combat German
measles, better known as Rubella, the
8-day type of measles. We have now been
told that an effective vaccine has been
developed and Is expected to be licensed
Within the very near future.
'What we are doing here is actually a
forward funding so that we will not have
to wait to get this program underway
until the normal appropriation bill can
be massed later In the year.
Incidentally, to give you some idea of
the proportions of the problem here,
there is expected to be another epedemic
eJther this year or next year. if we look
back to the last Rubella epedemic that
we had in 1964, there were some 20,000
children born with defects. The testi-
mony before our committee states that
this will cost us in the end some $2.8
mlll:.on in medical costs without even
considering the rehabilitation costs for
these poor children, the 20,000 or more
who were born with deformities of one
kind or another as a result of that Ru-
bells. epedemic in 1964.
So It is a very worthwhile project and
one which should go forward Immedi-
ateb'.
Then for District of Columbia medical
facilities there is an item here of some
$15 million. This is a portion of the
amount authorized under Public Law
90-457 for grants and loans to construct
hospitals and other medical facilities in
the District of Columbia.
The Item was included in the 1970 ap-
propriation bill but we moved it forward
here in this supplemental to enable hos-
pitals In the District of Columbia to
move ahead with their construction
which is already underway.
We have been told there are some very
serious financial troubles among the vari-
ous hospitals here in the District of
Columbia.
This is a very worthwhile item.
The biggest item in this supplemental
consists of HEW and has to do with
grants to States for public assistance.
This is a total of $651,546.000. This fig-
ure merges together three appropria-
tion requests-maintenance payments to
States in the amount of $343,524,000 and
this is $30 million under their request.
Although we were told in the testimony
that this is a legitimate figure now that
-
-
--
--
The second item Is for medical assist- similar discussions with the Bureau of
ante in this supplemental for $278,022,- Land Management and the Bureau of
000. Indian Affairs in our 1970 hearings.
If you add that to the original appro- The funding in this supplemental bill,
priation in 1969 of $2,118,300,000-we $610.000, Is just "a piece of adhesive
have a total in this Item for the fiscal tape" to meet the total problem before
year of 1969 of $2,396,322,000 or a grand us. I assure you the committee in its
total in this fiscal year 1969 in grants to consideration and markup of the regular
the States of $5,791,748,000. For the fis- 1970 bill intends to provide the maxi-
cal year 1970-and hold on to your mum funds possible for the increased
hats-it is going up again-the projec- production of timber.
tions are that it will be $6600,000,000. Mr. JONAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to
The reasons they gave us for the in- the gentleman from Minnesota.
creased payments are--end these are all (Mr. LANGEN asked and was given
required b
la
th
d
f
l
y
w-
e
e
erra
of the
AFDC-that was pushed back as you
will recall; the increased average pay-
ments; the increases in the number of
recipients; the increased use of inter-
mediate care facilities; then finally the
rising medical costs.
So this is an astronomical figure that
we are talking about here in these grants
to the States for public assistance and
something certainly has to be done to
reorient this whole program or else we
are going to have to shoot the moon in
the future to come up with sufficient
funds to cover these programs that have
been authorized.
Mr. ANDREWS of Alabama. Mr.
Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gen-
tlewoman from Washington (Mrs. Hax-
SaN).
Mrs. HANSEN of Washington. Mr.
Chairman, Inquiries have been made
about chapter VI, the Interior and
related agencies section of the supple-
mental bill, particularly in regard to ad-
ditional funding for the increased pro-
duction of timber.
There is $610,000 provided in chap-
ter VI to accelerate timber production In
the fiscal year 1969 on national forest
and Indian lands as part of the national
effort to increase the timber supply and
thus ameliorate the current shortage
which has contributed materially to the
increased price of lumber. Of that
amount, $150,000 is provided for the
Bureau of Indian Affairs and $460,000
is for the U.S. Forest Service. It
is estimated this will produce an addi-
tional 75 million board feet from the
BIA forests and an additional 270 mil-
lion board feet from the U.S. Forest
Service lands.
Mr. JONAS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentlewoman yield?
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. LANGEN. Mr. Chairman, I take
this brief time merely to call to the atten-
tion of the House the items that are in
the supplemental bill relating to the De-
partment of Agriculture. There are just
four items, each of which is demanded
because of an emergency, or because of
mandatory provisions which require the
expenditures, which is the true purpose
of the supplemental appropriation bill,
in my estimation.
The first item is a matter of $1,400,000,
which is needed in order to combat a
very serious outbreak of screw-worm in
the Southwest part of the United States,
which we were unable to forecast during
the course of the regular appropriations
for the fiscal year 1969. This amount of
money has actually already been spent.
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget
has the authority to authorize these ex-
penditures in order to meet the emer-
gency, and for that reason they have
to be reimbursed at this time.
In addition, there is an item of $218,000
which is to meet the mandatory Federal
contribution to the retirement fund for
the State extension personnel. These
payments are related to the increased
funds provided by the Congress in the
regular 1969 appropriation bill to place
the extension jobs on a salary basis more
comparable with other agricultural per-
sonnel.
Then there is an item of $7,500,000,
which is necessary in order to meet the
regular sugar beet payments, which Is a
mandatory payment that must be made.
The increased moneys become necessary
because the crop last year was greater
than the estimate.
There
l
i
are a
so
ncreased pay costs
Mrs. HANSEN of Washington.
I yield necessary to be paid. They total more
to the gentleman from North Carolina. than approximately $28 million, but
Mr. JONAS. I am very glad that the there is only $12,900,000 which is
gentlewoman from Washington made $ by supplemental pns.
that explanation, because the timber $10 appropriations.
shortage, I am told, Is quite acute. It is Public Law million is 90 reserves, by
, and another
very appropriate that we open up these Public 84 reserves, and another
lands for the scientific production of tim-
ber. I am very glad indeed that the funds within the Department.
record will show that these steps are Probably the most significant item
being taken and that additional tim- within this supplemental appropriation
ber will be made available. as it relates to the Agriculture Depart-
Mrs. HANSEN of Washington. I thank ment is the transfer of $25 million out of
the distinguished gentleman from North unobligated funds from the FHA direct
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE
loan account to the emergency credit Although the committee is recom-
revolving fund. This becomes necessary mending the approii7 iation of most of
in order to meet the emergency needs this request, I think =t would be well to
for credit. Some very unusual demands point out the rapidly increasing cost of
have been placed upon this emergency the Cuban refugee program. In fiscal
1968, Congress appro)riated $49 million
curr bthroug floods that have oc- for this program; in fiscal 1969, includ-
throughout the Midwest, Min , ing this supplemental, this figure had
nesota, North
Illinois, i, Dakota, Sliforniaouthh Dakota, l increased to $70.7 million; and the com-
thy riplaces. The sTdemands and several that mittee now has pending before it a re-
are necessary ondsr to are keep such arm quest for fiscal 197(; of $87.3 million.
t the
oiler operations going g in during this mThis represents a.n_ increase of $38.3
ocal year. going during coming m million, or 78 percent. for the Cuban ref-
fiscal year. ugee program in only 2 years. The Amer-
In view of the fact that the Depart- ican people have been very generous with
ment is out of money in this category this program through the years, and our
now, it becomes most essential that these country has benefited from the influx of
moneys are provided by a transfer from these energetic and enthusiastic immi-
the direct loan account, and requiring grants. At the same time. we should be
also that the ,account be repaid as the aware of these growing costs. In an ef-
loans are repaid. fort to insure the Yrost' efficient opera-
I am sure it will be provide much tion possible for this program, the com-
needed relief to a great many farmers mittee has recommended a decrease of
who otherwise, would find themselves in $153,000 from the request for new obli-
economic distress were it not for this gational authority. It is expected that the
appropriation.
In conclusion, let Inc say that each of
these items Is essential and necessary to
the proper operation of the Department
of, Agriculture. I can very heartily rec-
ommend them to the House for approval.
Mr. JONAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5
minutes to the gentleman from Kansas
(Mr. SHRIVER).
(Mr. SHRIVER asked and was given
permission to revise and' extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SHRIVER. Mr. Chairman, as the
ranking minority member on the Sub-
committee on Foreign Operations, I sup-
port and the minority members support
administrators of this program can pro-
gram these cutbacks to continue the ef-
fectiveness of their coerations.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield
10 minutes to the gentleman from Flor-
ida (Mr. SIDES).
(Mr. SIKES as.ke l and was given per-
mission to revise vmd extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, first let
me touch on the immediate thrust of the
military sector of this bill. It is designed
to provide weapons and equipment to
strengthen the South Vietnamese forces;
to permit these forces to assume a great-
er share of the burden of battle. This is
The South Vietnamese
ortant
st im
.
p
the committee's recommendation for mo
supplemental appropriations for the forces are spaying greater capability
and their battle effectiveness is much
Cuban refugee program. The committee more encouraging. It would appear that
recommends the appropriation of $2,- American forces wi l no longer have to
700,000 of the $2,853,000 requested carry such a great part of the conflict
requested and significantly, the South Vietnamese
new of $35,00 obligational of the $38,authority,000 in and the re-
lease eas will be in stronger position to enforce
transfers from the Revenue and Ex- peace when it comes. This is a very mean-
penditure Control Act reserves. ingful change in the overall picture.
The requested increase for this pro- As we consider overall additional ex-
gram will fund the following activities: penditures for defense purposes, we find
there is $1,254,000 for unanticipated ourselves buffeted by conflicting winds
welfare costs of refugees resettled out- from many sources. There is a taxpayers'
side the Miami area, due to the higher revolt against high levels of spending
number of refugees requiring such as- by Government and of course the prin-
113843
ceivable that such carelessness in work-
manship could have or would have been
permitted.
There is the usual flap about the
dangers of chemical and biological
weapons which always is good for col-
umn after column of horror stories in
the liberal elements of the press. What
they do not print is that the Russians
have seven or eight times our capability
in this field, and that we could be dan-
gerously exposed in time to a Russian
attack with these weapons as an altern-
ative to a nuclear confrontation. In the
field of nuclear weapons, we can at least
trade destructiveness.
The question of the ABM has been
greatly overplayed. It is a simple case
of survival for our nuclear weapons ca-
pability. I have felt that at least equal
protection should have been provided
for people in cities but apparently in an
effort to negate the antivotes, the ad-
ministration has cut back on the scope
and purpose of the ABM. Both aspects
should have been approved.
In other words, we in America find
ourselves completing the cycle we have
seen on so many other occasions in our
country. The commentators tell us that
people are getting, tired of war-that
they want it ended-and that they want
no more involvement in foreign affairs.
They are saying in effect that we want
to retreat to the security of our own
continent. All of this is more than a lit-
tle disconcerting. I do not believe this
fallacy is reflected in the thinking of
the average American. I believe that a
substantial majority of the American
people know why we are fighting in Viet-
nam. They want this war won. They do
not want us walking away from Viet-
nam with our tail between our legs, set-
ting the tragic stage for another war
when the Communists get ready for an-
other takeover of territory and peoples.
Our first mistake was in trying too
hard to fight this war without incon-
veniencing anyone-to fight it so that
we could have both guns and butter. It
is never possible to fight a war without
inconveniencing someone. The fact of
35,000 being killed in a war which is not
yet resolved attest to the fallacy of this
approach in the Vietnamese conflict. The
people should have been told why we
were fighting. They should have been
shown that it is in America's best inter-
ests to fight now and win rather than to
risk having all of the Pacific fall into
Communist hands in the years to come.
We should have been told that it is pa-
triotic to wear the uniform, patriotic to
be proud of the flag, patriotic to stand
up for our country. Because this was not
done, the antiwar crowd has had a field
day, with the Communists happily at
work stirring up anti-American senti-
ment at every point.
As a part of this pattern, attacks are
now being leveled at our military leader-
ship. Unfortunately, this too has always
been a part of the American way of con-
ducting its affairs. When those in uni-
form are winning wars for us, they are
our heroes. When we no longer need
them, we pick them to pieces. The fact
that many people now believe it is ad-
ministration policy to get out of Vietnam
regardless of the cost in strengthening
sistance. The Federal Government has a cipal offender from the standpoint ofcolri3nitment to reimburse the various the number of d'd1ars involved Is the States for these welfare expenditures. military. This is an inevitable part of There is $755,000 for increased per- the inflation that we in Government pupil rates far Cuban children in the have helped to bui'd; have almost per-
Dade County,Fla., school increased system. This mitted to get out of hand. The cost of increase is due to operating weapons and equipment is fantastically
costs to the 15ade County system because high and the cost.; of development of a
of higher teacher salaries and other new weapons system is even higher be-
costs . These per-pupil rates will be cause of the unknown factors which are
studied again when the committee con- encountered. There have been a series ofalders the fiscal 1970 budget requests. blunders, some of them colossal, which
There is $844,000 for costs of transport- have shaken the faith of the people in
ing refugees from Cuba to Miami. Last the military and indeed in Congress andyear, Congress included language in the the Government. There was the TFX-
fiscal 1969 appropriation bill to fund this the F-ill series- which was to be Mr.
expense from this account, instead of McNamara's great contribution and a
the case in the past. It was hoped it cost about twice as much as had been
at the time that these costs could be anticipated and, in some phases, has
absorbed by the program, but this has been junked. Just a few days ago, a newnot occurred, thus these funds are neces- submarine sank at its dock while being sar5, fitted for service. It is absolutely incon-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD = HOUSE May ' 20, 1969
the efforts of every person who seeks the
eventual downfall of the American sys-
tem of government.
The uncertainty which is sweeping
America is not confined to defense. It
goes much broader. It involves the whole
specs:lum of national security, and in
this I include all of the unrest which is
refle,,ted in the news media day after
day acid which in too many instances is
promoted by them.
We here in the -House of Representa-
tives have our responsibility. It has not
changed because there is wholesale at-
tack upon the military, or because there
is concern about the cost of spending,
or llecause people are tired of taxes. We
have a responsibility to insure that those
who fight our battles in Vietnam, under
whatever orders they fight. receive inso-
far as it is possible for us to do so, every
single item that they need. We have the
responsibility of demonstrating to the
work. that we are determined that this
Nation shall not, If we can avoid it, be-
come defenseless in the years ahead. We
have a reesponsibility to demonstrate
that there is solidarity in Government.
and that we will confront conununism
everywhere with determination. Don't
think for a moment that the Communists
are not watching what is happening here
on the floor of the House of Representa-
tives today. Do not think for a moment
that they are not noting loud and clear
what we say and what we do. I do not
think I need to remind those here today
that ;re could, by responsible action, help
set the stage to throw away in Paris
what the uniformed services have fought
for on the battlefields of Vietnam. We
could throw away whatever chance is
left for success in this long, terrible and
costly struggle.
These who say that America has lost
the war or cannot win it, do our country
a great disservice, for neither is true.
By th-.4r steadfastness on the battlefield,
America's fighting forces have brought
the Communists to the point where they
want peace. Now they are trying to
achles e at the corlerence table what
they could not achieve on the battlefield.
More :han ever, there is reason for unity
at home and for a show of strength for
America in this body, which really speaks
with the voice of the American people.
One of the items of great interest is
the ABM. The question of deployment
of thL3 system should be resolved with-
out further controversy. I hope the House
will follow with me some comments from
informed sources on the real function
and the need for an ABM system. For
instance there are those who urge con-
tinuing research and development-
and not deployment- The principal pur-
pose of ABM under the present proposal
is to offer protection, as needed, to our
deterr,>nt forces.
As Secretary Laird points out:
Simply continuing research and develop-
ment c?n the ABM without any initial de-
ployment, would leave us with no option to
provide defense to our deterrent on the
schedu:e that might be required by the So-
viet threat if we do not reach an agreement
with the Soviets on limiting strategic forces,
tem, there has been a substantial body of
testimony supporting the effectiveness
of this type of deployment.
Dr. Harold Brown said in testifying be-
fore the House Armed Services Commit-
tee in 1967:
Because our missile sites are small hard-
ened targets, they are much easier to defend
than cities. The exchange ratio Is favor-
able to us for the defense of this type of
target.
Dr. Edward Teller said in a recent U.S.
News & World Report interview:
Twelve years ago it seemed that a missile
defense was 30 times as expensive as an of-
fense. Today the ratio is estimated at 3 to 1,
although still in favor of offense. In some
respects It is even estimated at 1 to 1. The
main point is we don't really know. We
can't find out except by actual deployment.
In rebutting recent unfavorable com-
ment on the feasibility of defending
Minuteman sites against a heavy threat,
Dr. Foster made the following comment:
Various estimates of the cost of an Inter-
ceptor including its assigned fraction and
the radar andother systems costa have varied
between $2.5 million and $7 million. The
present cost to the U.S. and probably the
Soviet Union for an offensive R/V is in ex-
cess of $10 million. The advances which we
expect In our forces over the next few years
may reduce these to about $3 million... .
In other words, the cost to attack and to
defend in the 1970 time frame are roughly
one to one,
Moreover, those who are responsible
for our national defense have said that
now is the time to get on with the deploy-
ment of the Safeguard system to defend
our Minuteman sites. I agree.
Secretary Laird said before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on March
21 of this year:
We cannot delay the decision beyond this
budget that we presented to this Congress,
covering the program for fiscal year 1970.
which begins on July 1. 1969, We must in.
clude this deployment on two sites In this
particular budget.
He had earlier said:
We have sufficient strength today In the
combination of our strategic forces-our mis-
siles, our bombers, and our Polaris capabil-
ity-to respond to any attack that might be
launched against the United States.
As Secretary of Defense, it is my obligation
and my Intention to keep it that way beyond
any reasonable doubt. This Is what the ABM
discussion is all about.
And that is why we have no alternative but
to protect our options to safeguard our deter-
rent forces. If the Soviet threat turns out to
be, as the evidence strongly indicates, an at-
tempt to erode our deterrent capability, we
must be in a position to convince them that
a first strike would always involve unaccept-
able risks.
In addition, and again quoting Secre-
tary Laird:
Safeguard ... offers protection, as needed,
of the entire country from a small attack,
such as the kind of attack that could be pos-
sibly delivered by the Chinese Communists
during the decade of the 1970's or from an
accidental launch.
The estimate of our intelligence commu-
nity is that the earliest the Red Chinese
could have this kind of capacity would be in
the 1972-73 time period, and the estimate is
th
t i
th
ti
n
a
e
me period of 1976 and beyond,
Before and since Secretary McNamara
first included defense of our strategic de- that the Iced Chinese could have the -
and the capability to have 15 or more ore m rateie-
terrent as an option of the Sentinel sys- apes.
Dr. Edward Teller, in U.S. News &
World Report, said:
A small nuclear force such as they will have
in a few years could wreak real havoc on an
undefended United States. We might have to
give in to Chinese demands affecting not only
South Vietnam but also Taiwan and even
Japan, rather than take the slightest risk of
their not bluffing.
In regard to the Sentinel system as a
defense against the Chinese threat, Sec-
retary McNamara stated July 1967:
This austere defense could probably pre-
clude damage In the 1970's almost entirely.
Dr. Foster stated more recently-on
May 12, 1969:
The Safeguard system has been designed by
competent people, and the best that are avail-
able. Its design has been reviewed by outside
experts. Those who do, In fact, study the
aspects of the system that are within their
area of technical expertise are convinced it
will do what it is designed to do. There are
some eminent scientists who, for one reason
or other, claim it won't work. On that I'd
like to say . that they have offered no
problem which we have not long since ad-
dressed and resolved."
Finally Under Secretary
stated on March 14, 1969:
Locating sites away from major cities
should make clear to the Soviet Union that
the American defense is designed to preserve
our deterrent-not to change the strategic
balance.
It has been suggested in some quarters
that the administration has somehow
misled Congress about its intentions in
deploying the Safeguard system.
I think it is useful to review the letter
of the law here.
The current authorizations for the
ABM defense system for procurement,
research and development and military
construction for the Army read as
follows:
Public Law 90-500, for procurement:
SEC. 101. Funds are hereby authorized to be
appropriated during the fiscal year 1969 for
the use of the Armed Forces of the United
States for procurement of aircraft, missiles,
naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, as
authorized by law, in amounts as follows:
... For missiles: for the Army, $956,140,000.
Public Law 90-500, Tor resarch and
development:
SEC. 201. Funds are hereby authorized to
he appropriated during the fiscal year 1969
for the use of the Armed Forces of the United
States for research, development, test, and
evaluation, as authorized by law, in amounts
as follows: For the Army, $1,611,900,000.
Public Law 90-408, for military con-
struction:
SEC. 101. The Secretary of the Army may
establish or develop military installations
and facilities by acquiring, constructing,
converting, rehabilitating, or installing per-
manent or temporary public works, including
site preparation, appurtenances, utilities, and
equipment for the following projects:
UNITED 9TArES ARMY AM DEFENSE COMMAND
CONUS, var Ous locations: Operational and
training facilities, maintenance facilities,
supply facilities, medical facilities, adminis-
trative facilities, troop housng, community
facilities, utilities, and real estate, $227;
460,000,
The defense and Military construction
appropriation acts contain even broader
language,
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Clearly both the Safeguard and Senti-
nal systems fit under the language of the
law.
In fact, there is an understanding in
the Congress and in the Defense Depart-
ment that funds must be spent for the
purposes for which they were authorized
and appropriated.
In the case of the. ABM system, the
purpose for which they were authorized
and appropriated was to provide a de-
fense against ballistic missiles. To accuse
the officials of this administration of bad
faith for deploying the best balanced
ABM they can design is simply to dis-
regard the previous actions of Congress.
Congress should not get into the busi-
ness of trying to design the anti-ballistic-
missile system either in its minute tech-
nical details or in its tactical deployment
configuration. These decisions should be
left to defense planners. I suspect that
much of the agreement we hear, includ-
ing many of the technical arguments, are
being put forth by people who are already
over their head or who are not apprised
of all the facts.
Congress has in the past given rather
broad authority for the construction of
the ABM system. If it wishes to change
this method of operation, it can do so
when the additional funds which will be
required for the deployment of phase I
of the Safeguard system are authorized
and appropriated for fiscal year 1970.
There are other items of more than
average importance which are likely to
escape specific attention because they are
not sensational and because there ap-
pears to be no pressing need that they re-
ceive other than casual consideration.
Yet these may be of very great impor-
tance.
For instance, there is the problem of
maintenance of real property facilities.
The taxpayers should be very directly
concerned with this problem. So should
be the military officials. So it would seem
would be the Congress.
Nevertheless, this subject presents an
increasingly aggravated picture which I
want to discuss at this point.
The Committee on Appropriations has
for many years been urging that the mil-
itary services properly and adequately
maintain the extensive real property
holdings within their jurisdictions.
Some 15 years ago this interest was
manifested in the appropriation of funds
above the budget estimates for the then
existing backlog of deferred mainten-
ance. The committee found that much
of this claimed deferred maintenance
either did not rest on valid estimates or
the need was subsequently ignored by
the services and the practice of appro-
priating over the budget for real property
maintenance ceased.
Indeed, during the ensuing several
years it became apparent that moneys
Justified to Congress for the mainten-
ance- of real property facilities were be-
ing diverted to other uses=in the absence
of any restrictive law or legislative his-
tory. Consequently in recent years, the
committee has recommended, and Con-
gress has agreed to, language in the a-p-
propriation acts establishing floors or
minimums in the amounts of money
which must be devoted to real property
maintenance. In the current Appropria-
tion Act for the fiscal year 1969. for ex-
ample, the language reads for the Navy:
"of which not less than $155,600,000 shall
be available only for maintenance of
real property facil i ties."
In the case of the Marine Corps the
language reads similarly: "of which not
less than $22,661,000 shall be available.
only for the m.ainenance of real prop-
erty facilities."
House Document No. 91-50 proposed
revisions reducing those amounts. Tes-
timony in the hearings on the second
supplemental appropriation bill indi-
cated that reductions were made in the
floors on real property maintenance
based on "congressional intent." It ap-
peared from the txstimony that this in-
terpretation of congressional intent was
based on the Revenue and Expenditure
Control At of 1968 and its effect on
Government expenditures generally.
It would seem to me, Mr. Chairman,
that we have here a situation of either
ignoring, or violating, congressional in-
tent by the militsry.
I should like to point out that the Rev-
enue and Expenditure Control Act of
1968 was enacted into law on June 28,
1968, Public Law 90-364. While its terms
and conditions allowed some flexibility,
some considerable flexibility in the exec-
utive branch, there was not in connection
with its enactment- at least to my
knowledge --any discussion of an intent
to cutback on the maintenance of real
property facilities of the Department of
Defense. Congress does not want these
cutbacks.
Now I should like to,point out that the
appropriation bill for the Department of
Defense for the kcal year 1969 was en-
acted into,law by virtue of the signature
of the President on 11 17, 1968,
Public Law 90-580., The appropriation
bill contains as. a matter of law the
phrases which I have previously quoted.
I do not believe it likely that the Depart-
ment can find a -hred of evidence in the
debate or in the committee reports on
the defense appropriation bill indicating
that the language of the law was intend-
ed to be set aside by any assumed or
presumed interpretation of congressional
intent stepnming from the earlier en-
actment of the l venue and Expenditure.
Control Act of 1968, On the contrary, it
could be presumed that the enactment
of the floors on maintenance of real
properties in specifie numbers and at a
later date ,indicates the precise opposite,
namely, that it is the intent that such an
amount must inf.s.ct be expended for the
purpose.
It is clear that much of the difficulty
that we encounter in Congress, in the
academic world, and through all facets,
of our society, stein from misinterpreta-
tions of honestly presented sets of facts.
It is further cleat that. in most instances,
if not in all instances, those who so mis
interpret do totally and completely es-
cape any remonstrance, much less
punishment, for their willful acts.
Although I, do not wish to magnify
the incident out of all proportion, it is
safe to say that the taxpayers of the
country will at some future date have to
shoulder the burden of new construction
143845
prematurely or unnecessarily because of
failure to adequately maintain facilities
that are now in being. Certainly, some-
one should be called to task for permit-
ting such a situation to exist.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from Florida has expired.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield
5 additional minutes to the gentleman
from Florida.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from
Florida is recognized for 5 additional
minutes.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. SIKES. I yield to the gentleman
from Texas.
ANTI-BALLISTIC-MISSILE SYSTEM
Mr. MAHON. The gentleman from
Florida made reference to the anti-
ballistic-missile program, The gentle-
man is aware that in the fiscal year 1970
budget which is before Congress, but
which is not under consideration in this
bill, there is about $860 million for a
continuation of the ABM program.
In my opening remarks, I took the
position that we should go forward with
the ABM program. I would like to am-
plify that by giving, in part, some of the
reasons why we have been working on
this program for years. The Soviet Union,
our most formidable opponent, has a
somewhat limited anti-ballistic-missile
system deployed. It seems to me that it
would be militarily and politically un-
sound and indefensible for use not to
undertake to have a defense against the
intercontinental ballistic missiles of the
Soviet Union and of Red China.
My opinion is that we must proceed
now with the anti-ballistic-missile pro-
gram. It is my feeling that the Members
of Congress, generally, will approve of
this view, and -I am convinced that the
American people will approve of this
view. I do not believe the American
people want to be completely defenseless
with respect to the intercontinental bal-
listic missiles of the Soviet Union or of
Red China. This would be illogical while
the Soviet Union 'is prgviding some de-
fense for its people. Whether or not their
system is very far advanced begs the
question. Therefore we should undertake
to provide--some. defense against the
possibility of attack by intercontinental
ballistic missiles of either nation.
I believe the gentleman's opening re-
marks should be read by all Members of
Mr. SIKES. The gentleman from
Texas has stated the situation precisely
and he has stated it very well.
We are trying to assure at this point
that we can retaliate if the need should
develop-we are seeking to insure for our
country a capability which at least par-
allels the development which has been
proceeding on an ABM system within
Russia for a number of years. I feel that
the American people demand that this
be done. I feel that their voice is not
really being heard in the quarters where
protests are raised against the ABM sys-
It is my opinion that we would be
making a most serious mistake if we
should not proceed with at least the
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small ABM program that has now been
proposed.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, if the
gentleman will yield further, I would ask
the gentleman further if an article in
the U.S. News & World Report, by Dr.
Teller, one of the great scientists of the
country, and a discussion by Dr. Weisner,
another great scientist, who are both
very familiar with this problem, has been
called to his attention.
We are aware that there is much dis-
cussicn of the ABM in the scientific com-
munity, but as I see it this issue is one
of jucgment, and that is not an issue to
be settled by the scientists alone. I would
hope ':hat those interested in this matter
will probe deeply enough to understand
what the fundamental issue is, and that
is whether or not we shall let our chief
opponent have a protection against our
missllrs and have none ourselves against
his.
Mr. SI ES. The gentleman has stated
the situation perfectly.
Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. SIBS. I yield to the gentleman
frgm California.
Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, I con-
cur completely with the gentleman from'
Florida and the gentleman from Texas
in the need for the Safeguard ABM. I
believe that It is absolutely necessary
that yr a go ahead on this modified pro-
gram as recommended by President
Nixon.
The decision of President Nixon an-
nounced on March 14, 1969, calling for
the deployment of the Safeguard anti-
ballistic-missile system was made only
after n searching and exhaustive analysis
of the clearly emerging threat to the
Nation and its people in the mid-1970's.
All the available options and alternatives
were thoroughly examined leading to the
determination that Safeguard would pro-
vide a beginning toward the best protec-
tion against those threats.
In the judgment of the President, and
of others within the Government who
are charged with the direct responsibility
tar preserving our national security, the
initial deploynltnt of Safeguard repre-
sents the minimum action which must
be taken now to preserve the credibility
of our nuclear deterrent in the immedi-
ate years ahead.
The decision to deploy Safeguard is
remarkable for the controversy which it
has generated. Some members of the
Congress and some persons within the
scientific community have taken Issue
with tie President's decision. They have
been joined in their opposition by others
who find in Safeguard an excellent op-
portunity to give vent to their frustra-
tions over the course of events in Viet-
nam, thereby injecting an emotionalism
into a debate which, because of its cri-
tical importance to national security,
should be governed only by rational and
reasoned factual presentations.
Becr.use the President is Commander
in Chief of our military forces and, more
than f.ny other one man charged with
the awesome responsibility of providing
for the national defense, many Members
of Congress, in the exercise of their con-
stitutional responsibilities, have normal-
ly followed the practice of according
great weight to such momentous deter-
minations by the President. The Pres-
ident has immediately at hand the most
sensitive intelligence information upon
which these vital decisions must be
based.
For my own part. I would have to be
absolutely convinced that I was right
and the President was wrong before I
could, in good conscience, oppose him
on a national security matter of this
magnitude. Moreover, in cases where the
issue might be described as somewhat
doubtful, my conscience would dictate
that such doubts be resolved in favor of
the President's determination that his
recommended action is necessary for our
country's protection. This has been my
position with respect to all Presidents,
of either political party.
It is obvious that all the people of the
United States have a vital stake in the
decision we make as to whether or not
we should attempt a ballistic missile
defense. It Is appropriate to determine
the desires of the people. And I mean
all the people-not just those with the
resources to publish and circulate their
views, nor Just those who participate in
organized letter-writing campaigns to
Congress.
When President Nixon assumed office
in January of this year, be inherited from
his predecessor the beginnings of de-
ployment of an ABM system, the Sen-
tinel. The decision of President Johnson,
announced in September 1967, to begin
deployment had been endorsed by Con-
gress in 1968 and funds had been pro-
vided for a start on the system. Produc-
tion of the various components of the
system had been initiated, sites acquired,
and, at some sites, work had commenced.
The Nixon administration suspended
work on Sentinel deployment while It
conducted a broad and thorough review
of the general problems of ballistic mis-
sile defense including specifically the
basic possible missions of such defenses
and an analysis of the actual and poten-
tial Soviet and Chinese nuclear threat
capabilities to our cities and to our stra-
tegic retaliatory capability.
An important part of the review in-
cluded an analysis of the many alter-
native ways of accomplishing the bal-
listic missile defense missions. The alter-
natives examined included :
First, not building any ballistic mis-
sile defense at this time, maintaining the
research and development program, and
relying on improvements in our retalia-
tory weapons to deter Soviet and Chinese
attacks on our cities and strategic retal-
iatory forces:
Second, defending our strategic retal-
iatory forces-our second-strike capa-
bility-by hardening our missile silos and
further dispersing of our bomber bases;
and
Third, several alternative ABM de-
ployments, including: a "heavy" defense
against Soviet nuclear attacks on our
major cities, ballistic missile defense of
our strategic retaliatory forces, the
Sentinel defense against the expected
Chinese threat and accidential attacks,
a sea-based anti-ballistic-missile inter-
cept system-SABMIS-and various
combinations of these alternatives.
Finally, the review included a careful
evaluation of the technical and opera-
tional feasibility of ballistic missile de-
fense. systems based on current tech-
nology and current intelligence.
After a careful consideration of the
alternatives, President Nixon reached
the following conclusions: First, the con-
cept on which the Sentinel program of
the previous administration was based
should be substantially modified; sec-
ond, the ,safety of our country requires
that we should proceed now with the
development and construction of the new
system in a carefully phased program;
third, this program will be reviewed an-
nually from the point of view of tech-
nicial developments, the threat, and the
diplomatic context including any talks
on arms limitation.
The Safeguard system has been de-
signed so that its defensive intent is un-
mistakable. It will be implemented not
according to some fixed, theoretical
schedule, but in a manner clearly re-
lated to a periodic analysis of the threat.
The Safeguard system provides for the
phased protection of our land-based
forces and the light, overall protection
of population. This deployment will per-
mit a shift of radar and missile sites
away from major cities.
Both the Nixon administration and
the Johnson administration agree on
the capabilities and limitations of the
ARM system which technology permits
us to deploy at the present time.
Both administrations agree that our
ABM system at its present stage of de-
velopment cannot be expected, no mat-
ter how deployed, to provide an effec-
tive defense of all our Nation's popula-
tion against a heavy nuclear attack.
Both administrations agree that our
ABM system does have the capability,
in several types of deployment, of de=
fending all our population against a
light nuclear attack.
Both administrations agree that our
ABM system does have the capability of
providing a strong, although not preclu-
sive, defense of a specific target of lim-
ited area against a heavy nuclear attack.
This evaluation, concurred in by both
administrations, is extremely important.
It was not made lightly, nor by any one
person, or by any persons specializing
in one field. This is not just a weapon,
but a weapon system. It consists of a
number of components, including nu-
clear warheads, which were and con-
tinue to be designed and tested under-
-ground by our nuclear physicists; mis-
siles, which have been designed, con-
structed, tested, repeatedly improved,
and tested further; data processing
equipment, which has also been built
and tested; missile site radar, which has
been built and tested; and perimeter ac-
quisition radar, all the components of
which have been tested. In addition, the
system utilizes technology dealing with
such diverse areas as component harden-
ing and command and control.
An evaluation of the ABM system is a
complex matter, requiring the participa-
tion of many specialists from various
and sundry science and engineering
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When I speak ' F ?f 'a threat to our se-
curity, I am not engaging in specula-
tion about the intentions of any foreign
power. As we ,h(d.ad have learned from
the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, it is dan-
gerous to base our policy on assumptions
relating to intentions. Anyone who is not
privy to deliberations in the Kremlin
can hardly speak with assurance about
Soviet intentions at the present time.
Even certain knnwledr;e of present in-
tentions would be a poor basis for judg-
ing the intentions of those who may be
in power in the Soviet Union 5 years
or more from now.
We would be darelict in our responsi-
bility to the people if we failed to base
our policies on an estimate. of the ca-
pability that the Soviet Union or Com-
munist China will have in the future if
they continue on their present course
and if we failed tcs take timely action to
thwart that capability,
Projecting into ,he future the current
rate of construction and deployment of
the SS-9, we arrive at a figure of 600 such
ICBM's in operation in the Soviet Union
-9 is equipped with
by 1976. If each :3S-
three independently aimed. warheads-
a capacity which is technically feasible
and on which the Soviet Union is work-
ing-our force of 1,000 long-range Min-
utemen would be in danger of annihila-
tion from the 11,800 Soviet warheads. Let
me quote Dr. John S, Foster, Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering, on this point:
A missile system having a 20 percent failure
rate and carrying 3 re-entry vehicles per
missile, would requ re only 420 missiles to
attack 1,000 silos. Jr the yield of each re-
entry vehicle was a reasonable 5 megatons
and the accuracy a reasonable 1/4 of a mile,
about 951, of the silos could be destroyed.
This would mean 50 of ti:e 1,000 Minutemen
survive.
Our present strategic offensive force
includes, of courts?, not only land-based
long-range missiles but missile-carrying-
manned bombers and Polaris submarines.
Can we not be rompiacent about the
future, some may ask, since two of the
three elements oh' our deterrent force
would still be in existence after an SS-9
attack on Minuteman sites thereby en-
abling us to inflict retaliatory devastation
on an attacking nation?
There are two answers to this ques-
tion. First, if prudence had not required
that we keep three elements in our de-
terrent force, we `would not have devel-
oped and mainta'nel three in the past.
Our security is as ureu with three, The
loss of one would leave us considerably
less secure. We might get by with two,
but that involves risks ghat we have been
unwilling to take in the past. Further,
we should remember that our bombers,
even today, are to some degree vulner-
able and that our submarines may be-
come vulnerable in the future. We must
now plan for our defense through the
next decade. We Know that the Soviet
Union is at work on, afractional orbital
bombardment system and other weapons
which could make both bombers and sub-
marines vulnerable to attack in the fu-
ture. To assume that both will continue
to be safe from attack would be sheer
folly.
I do not want to overstate the case.
In order to achieve, in fact, the capa-
bility of eroding our assured destruction
capability in the future, it will be neces-
sary for the Sov iets to do a number of
things, but all are things which they
have demonstrated a competence to ac-
complish. They would have to equip their
SS-9 missiles with multiple, individually
target reentry vehicles and improve
their? accuracy. They would have to con-
tinue to increase the number of such
ICBM's deployed. They would have to
continue their ambitious submarine pro-
gram and possibly add a submerged
launch missile utilizing a depressed tra-
jectory., They could improve and deploy
a more effective ABM system around
their cities. The accomplishment of these
improvements in forces, or combinations
of these programs, on all of which they
are now engaged, could create doubts of
the effectiveness of our assured destruc-
tion capability, provided we take no steps
not already programed to prevent, or
to prepare to prevent, such an erosion.
Because the Chinese ICBM develop-
ment program has not progressed as rap-
idly as estimated a year or two ago, there
has been a tendency to overlook this
potential threat in the present debate
on the ABM issue. Today, the intelli-
gence community is indicating that the
Chinese Communists may have an oper-
ational ICBM within 3 to 4 years. If that
happens; it will be incumbent on the
United States to have an adequate pro-
tective force.
There are a number of factors which
point out the need for Safeguard to
counter this growing Chinese threat.
Most of them have to do with demo-
graphic factors. The United States has
63 percent of its population living in
the 1,000 largest cities. The Chinese, on
the other hand, have only 11 percent of
their population living in China's 1,000
largest cities. One can conclude that the
Chinese population is widely dispersed
throughout her large land mass. Fur-
thermore, as Mao Tse-tung has pointed
out on numerous occasions, China, with
its population of 800 million, could sur-
vive even with a loss of 200 million peo-
ple from a nuclear attack. Thus, it is
reasonable to conclude that our ability
to deter Communist China with our stra-
tegic offensive forces is considerably less
certain than in the case of the Soviet
Union, whose population is much more
concentrated than China's.
The population concentration factor
has a vital bearing on our decision to
proceed with the Safeguard program.
The Chinese, with only a few, relatively
crude ICBM's could inflict a great deal
of damage on the United States. For the
United States to retaliate against such
a strike might require a greater portion
of our deterrent force than we could
safely commit. For, by responding to a
Chinese provocation, we could leave our-
selves naked to a Soviet attack.
These reasons, I believe, point out that
Safeguard is a good investment for pro-
tecting against a possible Chinese at-
tack as well as insuring the credibility of
our deterrent against any possible So-
viet attack.
. The second question which we must
ask to reach the decision about deploy-
ing Safeguard has to do with its effec-
fields, who base their evaluations on the
results of the tests performed. This, how-
ever, is the very type of careful evalua-
tion which enabled the Johnson admin-
istration and, thereafter, the Nixon ad-
ministration to conclude that our ABM
system would work, and would do the
job proposed for it.
Obviously, no one scientist, however
learned, can credibly assume personally
to evaluate the entirety of the system,
particularly if he has not, been privy to
the testing accomplished with the com-
ponents of the system. An impressive
number of :scientists, however, believe
that it either will work or can be made
to work. -
The Johnson administration, based on
an evaluation of the limitations and ca-
pabilities of the ABM system, devised a
proposed deployment to provide a defense
of our cities against the potential Chi-
nese Communist capability to launch a
light nuclear attack in the mid-1970's.
This is what the Sentinel system, as de-
signed by the Johnson administration,
would have done; and this Safeguard
will continue to do.
The preceding administration was
also very much aware of the possibility
that the Soviet Union might seek to
develop a capacity to overwhelm our
land-based missiles and bombers. It
continued to watch the missile buildup
in the Soviet Union, believing, however,
as Secretary McNamara said in January
1968 that the growth of the Soviet ICBM
force would decelerate instead of con-
tinuing at a high rate.
The Sentinel system of the Johnson
administration has three purposes, ac-
cording to Secretary Clifford:
First, to "prevent a successful missile
attack from China through the late
1970's."
Second, to "limit damage from an
accidental launch from any source."
Third, to _"provide the option for in-
creased defense of our Minuteman force,
if necessary in the future."
Safeguard will provide for the first
two purposes as enumerated by Secre-
tary Clifford, but most importantly, it
also will provide for the defense of our
Minuteman force which under Sentinel,
had been only optional.
Neither Secretary McNamara nor Sec-
retary Clifford believed that the relative
invulnerability of the missile forces of
the United States was assured for the
indefinite future. Both warned that ad-
ditional steps might be required if that
invulnerability was to be maintained in
the 1970's. Just before leaving office, Sec-
retary Clifford expressed his "increasing
concern" about "the continuing rapid
expansion of Soviet strategic offensive
forces." He went on to warn that-
We must continually re-examine the vari-
ous ways in which the Soviets might seek to
strengthen their strategic forces beyond what
now seems probable, and take appropriate
actions now to hedge against them.
The decision on whether or not to de-
ploy the Safeguard system,turns, it seems
to me, on the answer to two questions:
First. What is the nature of the threat
which there is reason to believe will con-
front our Nation in the mid-1970's?
Second. Is Safeguard an effective way
of coping with that threat?
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE May- 20, 1969
tiveneess. Of all possible courses of action
which we might take to guard against the
potential threat of the mid-1970's, Safe-
guard Is the most effective, the least
costly, the least provocative.
There is strong support among the
most respected scientists who are famil-
iar with all aspects of our ABM program
for the conclusion that safeguard will
provide effective protection to enough
of our offensive force to make an attack
upon that force unprofitable for any
aggressor.
Among the eminent scientists who
have publicly expressed support for de-
ployment of Safeguard are: Dr. Edward
Tellei, Livermore Radiation Laboratory,
recognized as one of the world's fore-
most nuclear physicists: Dr. Eugene P.
Wignor, Princeton University nuclear
physicist, elected to the National Acad-
emy of Sciences 1945. Atoms for Peace
Award 1980, Nobel Prize for Physics,
1963; Dr. William Ci. McMillan, Univer-
sity of California at Los Angeles, profes-
sor of chemistry, noted specialist on
strategic nuclear matters such as reentry
vehicle vulnerability, penetration aids,
nuclear weapons effects, and missile
vulne::ability.
If we could delay our decision on Safe-
guard until we determine whether or not
the Soviet Union continues to increase
its capability to threaten our security-
or whether success comes of negotiations
to limit arms, r would be In favor of
deferring the decision. Unfortunately,
we cannot wait. It will require more than
4 yea:As to complete phase I of the Safe-
guard system, the deployment of pro-
tection for two missile sites in Montana
and North Dakota. In the absence of
authorization from Congress for fiscal
year 1,970, the Defense Department would
be required to stop the activity in which
It has been engaged under authority
granted last year. It would have to close
down developmental production lines,
discharge skilled personnel, and cease
engineering on sites. If Congress then
gave authority to proceed in the next
year, the program would be delayed 2
years and the first two sites would not
be In operation until 1976. Time would
be lost in the search for personnel with
the necessary skills and in the training
of a :few force to begin the work anew.
If we are not ready at the time a
threat to our secur.ty comes into being,
we w,ll be no better off than we would
have been if we had done nothing at all.
As Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird
has said:
Too little and too late has been the epitaph
of mcre than one great nation in history.
It mw:t not be ours.
If, :.n fact, the decision to deploy Safe-
guarc. imposed an obstacle to fruitful ne-
gotiations toward arms limitation, this
might well give us pause. But let us re-
member that Premier Kosygin In 1967,
speaking of the embryonic ABM system
which the U.S.S.R. had already begun
to deploy, said:
I believe that defensive systems, which
prevent attack, are not the cause of the arms
race, but constitute F. factor preventing the
death of people.
Let us remember, too, that President
Johnson's decision to deploy the Senti-
nel system, instead of hampering nego-
tiations, was followed 4 days later by a
statement of the Soviet leaders that they
were interested in beginning talks on
arms restrictions.
Safeguard is an inducement to arms
limitation and a building block toward
peace. We will go forward with talks on
arms control with a better chance that
these talks will result in effective agree-
ments if it Is clear to all the world that
the United States does not intend to
stand Idly by while Its capacity to defend
its people Is undermined. Indeed, an im-
portant inducement toward agreement
Is missing if the U.S.S.R. Is lead to be-
lieve that we will unilaterally limit our
defensive capacity.
Safeguard is purely defensive. It is not
an escalation of the arms race. It does not
increase one whit the capacity of our
country to inflict damage on any other
nation. It is far more moderate step than
the alternative some of its opponents
propose--an increase In the size of our
offensive missile force, or the reckless
launching of our missiles upon a warn-
ing, that may or may not be valid, that
we are about to be attacked. Increasing
our offensive forces would step up the
arms race and might give Soviet leaders
some plausible ground for fearing that
we were seeking a first-strike capability.
If the threat that may confront us In
the mid-1970's fails to develop, whether
because of international agreement on
arms control or a change in the pace or
character of the Soviet buildup, or for
any other reason, Safeguard can be
slowed down, altered, or abandoned al-
together. Deployment is divided into
phases so that our defensive precautions
will match the threat and not become an
overreaction to it.
President Nixon clearly made these
points in his announcement of his de-
cision on Safeguard on March 14 of this
year. He said:
I have directed the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board-a non-partisan
group of distinguished private citizens-to
make a yearly assessment of the threat which
will supplement our regular intelligence as-
sessment. Each phase of the deployment will
be reviewed to insure that we are doing as
much as necessary but no more than that
required by the threat existing at that time.
Since our deployment is to be closely re-
lated to the threat, it is subject to modifi-
cation as the threat changes, either through
negotiations or through unilateral actions
by the Soviet Union or Communist China.
To keep In perspective the decision
which the Congress will be called on to
make this year. It is important to keep
in mind the phased program of deploy-
ment that Is proposed. This year, we de-
cide only whether to begin on phase
I so that by 1974 we may have in being
an antimissile defense of two of our
missile sites. We do not commit our-
selves to go beyond that, and the Con-
gress will have ample opportunity to
check on the progress of deployment
and to reassess periodically the con-
tinued need, for the system.
If in fact Safeguard deprived us of re-
sources needed to deal with our pressing
domestic problems, that fact might give
us pause. But Safeguard Is not short-
changing any program designed to cure
domestic Ills. The decision to deploy this
system involves spending in fiscal year
1970 only $250 million more than would
be spent if we limited ourselves to con-
tinuing with research and development.
But a decision to defer deployment would
add $250 million to the total cost now es-
timated for deployment. The expenditure
proposed for deployment in the next fiscal
year amounts to three-tenths of 1 per-
cent of the outlays proposed for defense.
It amounts to a little' more than one-
tenth of i percent of proposed total
Federal outlays. In its initial costs, it will
be substantially less expensive than Sen-
tinel would have been.
The estimated expenditure for the
total Safeguard program is in the neigh-
borhood of $8 billion, including the war-
heads. This expenditure would, of course,
be made over the course of many years. It
is unlikely that in any year Safeguard
will demand spending that would equal
even one-half of 1 percent of the budget.
To my mind, the basic issue which the
Safeguard proposal presents is the degree
of risk to which we are willing to expose
the American people. I am not inclined to
gamble when the stakes are the survival
of our Nation and the safety of its people.
I would rather be wrong by providing a
measure of defense that the future might
show we did not need than be wrong by
failing to provide the protection required.
I hope that all Members of Congress,
when they vote on Safeguard, are con-
scious that they may well be voting on
the survival of the United States.
(Mr. LIPSCOMB asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield further?
Mr. SIKES. I am happy to yield to the
chairman of the committee.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, there is
the feeling on the part of many-and
that includes myself-that if we move
forward with our own ABM system, and
we can move forward only at a certain
rate of speed, that if we move forward
with this program the likelihood will be
enhanced that we can sit down at the
conference table with the Soviet Union
and arrive at some arms control agree-
ment, not on disarmament, which I be-
lieve is unobtainable, but some agreement
for a limitation on armaments. But so
long as the Soviet Union goes forward
with the deployment of its ABM and we
take no steps at all, we are placed in a
position in this particular field of de-
fense-and this is defense, and not of-
fense-of dealing from a position of
weakness.
Mr. SIKES. It was after it was an-
nounced that we in this country were go-
ing ahead with the ABM system that the
Soviets first agreed to hold a discussion
on disarmament. This in itself is indica-
tive of the validity of the statement the
gentleman has just made: if we have a
basis of strength from which to nego-
tiate the Russians are much more in-
terested in negotiating. There is no rea-
son for them to negotiate if they have
the field for themselves.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen-
tleman from Florida has again expired.
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Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield the
gentleman 'from Florida 5 additional
minutes.
Mr. SIXES. I thank the gentleman for
yielding the additional time.
CANCELLATION OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS
Mr. MASON. Mr. Chairman, if the
gentleman will yield further, the com-
mittee was advised yesterday of the
cancellation of the procurement of the
'Cheyenne helicopter. It was canceled
because it had not been possible for the
contractor to solve the problems involved
in developing this system. Of course, this
program is subject to investigation by
various appropriate committees. The
Appropriation Committee intends to take
a look at it.
The military from time to time, in
their sincere desire to provide superior
Weapons programs attempt to stretch the
state of the art. They undertake to do
things which are highly desirable by way
of weapons development, but some of
these things are not within the state of
the art and cannot be accomplished.
Many years ago, we spent $1 billion
on a nuclear-powered aircraft, and fi-
nally we agreed that the state of the
art had not progressed to where it was
feasible to produce an acceptable plane
of this type
It is unfair and improper tc condemn
those who try to stretch the state of the
art in order to improve our weapons.
They make great efforts to add to the
Nation's protection and to the budgeting
capability of our servicemen.
Is It not understandable that in a
stretching of the state of the art it is
from time to time necessary to admit
defeat? We are prone to call that "money
down the drain," but if it is in the in-
terest of trying to provide better defense
it is not in the truest sense always money
down the drain,
Mr. SIKES. This is of course the only
way we can perfect our weapons sys-
tems. There must be trial and error. It is
through this procedure that we have been
able to develop the highly effective sys-
tems that we have. Fortunately most of
them have not encountered problems as
Serious as the Cheyenne did.
In the case of the Cheyenne, unfortu-
nately, hopes did not work out. Defense
officials were seeking to develop a more
effective weapons capability in a fast
helicopter. The helicopter is largely a
defenseless aircraft and yet is has been
tremendously useful and ,has filled an
extremely important need in Vietnam.
But it is highly vulnerable and the
military were simply trying to provide a
faster helicopter with an improved
Weapons capability that would enable it
to stand off enemy attack and to provide
greater support for the troops on the
ground.
The thought was good. It would have
been an extremely important develop-
ment had It -worked out-end eventually
'it probably will work out.
But in the effort to develop within a
short time something that would be use-
ful in the Vietnamese war, considerable
Moneys were e*pended. It has not been
possible to develop the capability that is
needed and rather than to continue to
i#pend money on top of this already
costly program, the military has decided
to cancel the Cheyf one.
Mr. MAHON. L it not true that the
object of producing the Cheyenne was
an effort to makeour miiitary men more
effective and to save the lives of Ameri-
can soldiers in Vietnam?
Mr. SIKES. Yes. the purpose is to save
lives-that is the primary purpose. It
would have reduced the vulnerability of
the helicopter, which is a very important
vehicle, and made it into a gun ship.
Mr. MAHO'. 'Pursuing the matter
further, reference was made today to
the so-called Tli'X and the Navy version,
the F-111B.
Here was an effort to produce an air-
plane which would be suitable for all of
the services. The objective was highly
desirable. A great effort was made to
achieve it, but a: we look. back with
20/20 hindsight, a~7d I am sure the gen-,
tleman from Florida would agree, it was
a mistake to undertake to make the
F-111 conform to the Navy's require-
ments, which are in some ways quite dif-
ferent from the Air Force requirements.
Mr. SIKES. Yes, but we did not realize
that at the time. The defense officials
again felt that this was a way to save
money. They made.. a very determined
effort. The effort failed and we have to
share in the blame because we financed
what we thought would be a workable
concept.
Mr. DAVIS of 'Wisconsin. Mr. Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SIKES. I yield to the distinguished
gentleman.
Mr. DAVIS of Wisconsin. I think all of
us are indebted. tci the chairman of the
committee and to the second ranking
member of the defense subcommittee
and the ranking minority member of the
committee for this colloquy which is
putting some of these things in the
proper perspective, particularly with re-
spect to the AEM system. I think this
colloquy has made it clear that we do not,
as a practical matter, have a choice be-
tween the development of the ABM sys-
tem on the one Y?and and some agree-
ment or other limiting arms on the
other. Quite to the contrary, if we were
to unilaterally make the decision and
announce to the world, as some of our
colleagues would have us do, that we are
not going to defend ourselves against the
ICBM, we would. thereby destroy our
capability of reaching any meaningful
agreement with reference to either the
ICBM or the ABM.
Certainly, if we announce beforehand
that we are not in a position to defend
ourselves, and that we do not intend to be
in a position to defend ourselves, then
we would be going to the conference
table with no cards at all.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from Florida has expired.
Mr. MAHON, Mr. Chairman, I yield 5
additional minuil s to the gentleman
from Florida.
Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I take this
additional time, f?rst, to thank the dis-
tinguished gentleirr-zn from Wisconsin for
this contribution ,,khich is sound, logical
and meaningful..
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
1-73849
Mr. SIKES. I yield to the gentleman.
Mr. MAHON. It seems to make news to
be against a major defense program, at
this time the ABM, but it does not make
iiewgto be in favor of providing this bar-
rier against an attack which might come
from China or from the Soviet Union.
There has been so much talk in the
country and so many news columns writ-
ten in opposition to our building a de-
fense system designed to help to protect
the lives of American citizens and to
avoid World War III, it occurs to me
that it is well for the world to know that
there are many-and in my opinion the
overwhelming majority of people in this
country who believe that this kind of
protection, as imperfect as it may be, is
something we must seek to attain.
I wish to thank the gentleman and my
colleagues for making reference to these
matters. No one can convince me that
the people of the United States want to
be second best when it comes to self-
defense. I do not think that we want our
country to be second best, and I predict
it will not be second best. I thank the
gentleman for yielding.
Mr. SIKES. Let me add that the de-
ployment of the ABM system, which is
now proposed, does not mean that we
will have an imperfect system. We will
have a system which has the benefit of
years of research and development, and
as deployment progresses, it will be pos-
sible to build into it any improvements
which the state of the art permits, to
insure that we will have a fully work-
able and an effective system.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield further?
Mr. SIKES. I yield to the gentleman
from Texas.
Mr. MAHON. Is not one of the prin-
cipal obectives of those of us who support
the ABM to bring about a situation which
will enable the United States and the
Soviet Union-and other countries, we
hope-to make some reduction in arms
expenditures? That, after all, is our ob-
jective. I would hope we can join to-
gether in this effort and eventually
through these procedures bring to a low-
er figure the vast resources we have to
provide for defense.
Mr. SIKES. That is our objective. It
is what we are working toward, and I
believe it is a meaningful step in that
direction.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from
North Carolina (Mr. JoNAS) is recog-
nized.
Mr. JONAS. Mr. Chairman, I have no
further requests for time.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 8
minutes to the gentleman from New York
(Mr. RYAN).
(Mr, RYAN asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, it is un-
fortunate and regrettable that the sup-
plemental appropriation bill before us
lumps together funds which are neces-
sary and essential for important domes-
tic programs with a request, as set forth
in title I, for some $1.2 billion for addi-
tional support for military operations in
Southeast Asia.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE May 20, 1969
Once again we are faced with a choice
of either approving the entire package
recommended by the Appropriations
Committee, and thereby allocating still
more funds to the prosecution of the war
in Vietnam, or having to vote against the
entire supplemental appropriation bill.
I regret that the Appropriations Com-
mittee has put us in this situation again.
There is strong and conscientious oppo-
sition to continuing to fund the war, and
Members should have an opportunity to
vote separately on the $1.2 billion for
milita y operations in Southeast Asia.
When the bill is open for amendment
under the 5-minute rule, I intend to of-
fer an amendment to strike title I of this
bill, in order to eliminate the $1.2 billion
earmarked for Southeast Asian military
operations. This would permit us to have
an opportunity to vote on this question.
However, of course, we know under the
parliamentary procedure followed, there
would be no opportunity for a rollcall
vote. It my amendment does not prevail,
then I intend to offer a motion to recom-
mit if have the opportunity.
I believe that as long as these funds
remain in this bill, it should be defeated.
I have pointed out that one-third is al-
located for the prosecution of the war in
Vietnam. We have already allocated for
this fiscal year some $27 or $28 billion for
the war in Vietnam. Now we are con-
fronted again with another supplemen-
tal request.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. RYAN. I am happy to yield to the
distinguished chairman of the com-
mittee. .
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, one of
the things that has been undertaken in
this bill is to provide additional funds
for the equipping of the South Vietna-
mese military forces, so that a lesser ef-
fort will be required by the U.S. forces.
I believe that this portion of the plan-
of transferring to the Government of
South Vietnam a greater responsibility
for fighting the war and maintaining the
peace when the war comes to an end-
probably would meet with the approval
of the gentleman from New York.
Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, I would
appreciate it if the gentleman from
Texas, the chairman of the committee,
would spell out exactly how much of the
funds in the bill is for equipping the
forces.for South Vietnam. But it is clear
also from the testimony, as I read it, that
the supplemental provides funds for ap-
proximately 17,400 more American serv-
icemen than were planned originally in
the fiscal year 1969.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, in the
Army procurement portion of the bill be-
fore u:,, of the $640 million, there are
$393.7 million for U.S. forces and $246.4
million for the South Vietnamese Armed
Forces modernization and improvement
program. So a quarter of a billion in this
bill is for the improvement and modern-
ization of the equipment of the South
Vietnamese forces. It is this quarter bil-
lion that the gentleman from Texas had
in mind in propounding the inquiry of
the gentleman. There are additional
Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate
the explanation of the chairman. Never-
theless, that does leave for U.S. Southeast
Asian military operations approximately
$1 billion-a little less perhaps. And It
raises a further question about our over-
all policy in Vietnam in relation to the
forces of South Vietnam.
In any event, let me point out that
according to the testimony, on page 361,
of General Taylor. the supplemental
also provides funds for 17,400 more
troops, that is U.S. troops, than had been
originally intended.
It also provides funds for a 50-percent
increase in bombing by B-52's in South
Vietnam. I should point out that in an-
swering a question raised by the distin-
guished gentleman from Alabama (Mr.
ANaREws), General Crow said that the
effect of the B-52 bombings was to make
certain areas of South Vietnam look like
the surface of the moon. The gentleman
from Alabama then observed that the
United States has used more bombs in
Vietnam than in World War II and
asked:
I wonder how it is going to look when we
get. through over there. Will it be habitable?
(Hearings, p. 296).
I think that Is a good question: Will it
be habitable? Will anything be left? Or
will we continue to destroy the country
in order to save it?
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. RYAN. I am happy to yield to the
gentleman from Texas.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, as the
gentleman knows, this bill doesnot pro-
vide funds to send additional American
fighting men to South Vietnam. It pro-
vides for the payment of the men who
were sent over there as a result of the
Tet offensive which caused us to in-
crease our forces. It is not the Intent of
this bill to increase our manpower In
South Vietnam.
Mr. RYAN. I understand the gentle-
man's argument. The impact, neverthe-
less, is to provide funds for a higher level
of troops there than had been budgeted
for fiscal year 1969.
Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. RYAN. I yield to the gentleman
from California.
Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, on the
point the gentleman is making and the
point the chairman of the Appropria-
tions Committee made, the planned
strength for U.S. forces in Southeast Asia
has not been reached as yet, but the
reason we are implementing funds in this
supplemental bill is because the Tet of-
fensive did extensive damage over there
and made It necessary for us to commit
more troops and more ammunition and
other equipment.
Then, the seizure of the U,S.S. Pueblo
by Communist North Korea took place.
It caused us to supplement our efforts In
the Korean area.
It was aggressive action by North Viet-
nam and North Korea which made this
supplemental which is before us neces-
sary. We are Just supplying additional
Mr. RYAN. I do not quite understand
how funds for the Korean situation come
under title I, which is entitled "Military
Operations in Southeast Asia."
Mr. LIPSCOMB. If the gentleman will
yield, I will explain it.
Mr. RYAN. I do not have sufficient
time.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield
the gentleman 2 more minutes.
Mr. RYAN. I yield to the gentleman
from California.
Mr. LIPSCOMB. At the time of the
Pueblo incident, the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate, in the appro-
priation bills, had included funds for
Korea with funds for Southeast Asia.
I might point out to the gentleman
that there are South Korean troops who.
are helping the United States and the
South Vietnamese effort in South Viet-
nam.
Mr. RYAN. This supplemental appro-
priation bill Is before us because of an
underestimation of the cost of the war in
Southeast Asia. Each year for the past
5 years Congress has been asked to ap-
propriate supplemental money for the
war in Vietnam.
I have pointed out on each one of those
occasions-in 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, and
now 1969--that the only means the
House has to change the Vietnam policy
is to exercise the power of the purse. This
bill presents us with another opportunity
to vote on the conduct of the war.
Since last May, when the Paris peace
talks were started, over 12,000 American
servicemen have been killed in this war.
There is no end in sight. The only way
that the Congress, if it feels that this war
must be ended, as I do, can exercise any
influence on the direction of our foreign
policy In Southeast Asia, is to vote "No"
to these funds.
Therefore, I will offer an amendment
under the 5-minute rule to strike title I.
I hope it will have wide support so that
we will be able to separate out the money
for Southeast Asia military operations
from the very essential funds contained
in this bill for domestic programs.
Almost one-third of this appropria-
tion is for military operations in South-
east Asia. H.R. 11400 provides total ap-
propriations of $3,783,212,766. Of this,
$1,234,000,000 or about 31 percent is al-
located for Southeast Asia. This Is above
and beyond an estimated $27.6 billion
which Congress has already appropri-
ated for Vietnam for fiscal year 1969.
Although President Nixon said in his
nationwide television address last Wed-
nesday that he intends to seek a mutual
withdrawal of American and North
Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam,
testimony from officials of the Depart-
ment of Defense suggests an increase in
the size and scope of our military opera-
tion in Vietnam. The testimony of Gen.
A. B. Taylor, director of the Army
budget, reveals that approximately 17,-
400 more soldiers were deployed in
Southeast Asia then were originally
specified in the fiscal year 1969 budget.
According to General Taylor, these
troops were not sent as replacements but
as additions to the existing force Gen-
sums related to this procurement, such funds for those two aggressive actions by eral Taylor went on to say that addl-
as $50 million for the transportation of the Communists. That is the purpose of tlonal troops would be deployed during
equipment, and so forth. this supplemental, the next fiscal year. Hearings on second
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 Approved For Release 2002/08/01 CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0
May 20, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE
supplemental appropriations bill, 1969,
page 361.
For 5 years supplemental apbropria-
tions bills have been used to escalate the
war and to deepen our military commit-
ment in Southeast Asia. Although the
appropriations sought in this bill may
not result in the dramatic escalation
that has occurred in, thep ast, they will
nonetheless be used to increase still
further the killing and destruction that
continues in Vietnam.
Each year the costs of the war have
been underestimated in the initial
budget. This happened in 1965, 1966,
1967, 1968, and now again in 1969. But
each year the Congress has chosen to
abdicate its responsibility to pass judg-
ment on the war and has, instead, chan-
neled more money into the quagmire in
Southeast Asia.
For 5 years now, the critics of the war
in Vietnam have been urging that we
pursue alternative policies In Southeast
Asia. In 1964, I urged a specific strategy
for the neutralization of Southeast Asia
to avoid broadening the conflict. But the
conflict was Broadened. In 1965, I argued
against the Americanization of the war
and against escalating our military com-
mitment. But the war was Americanized
and our commitment escalated. In 1966,
I tried again to point to the policy alter-
natives available to us. But the choice of
continued escalation was made. In 1967,
I called again for renewed diplomatic
efforts and an end to the bombing in the
north. But diplomacy was secondary to
the continued attempt to impose a mili-
tary solution.
As I pointed out earlier in my remarks,
the request for supplemental funds for
Southeast Asian'military operations has
been tied in to other appropriations for
some vital domestic programs which I
support and, in some cases, have even
proposed.
On January 30, I introduced an omrii-
bus supplementary appropriation bill,
HR, 5562, to fully fund several important
programs established under the Housing
and Urban Development Act of 1968.
Later, I reintroduced this legislation with
29 cosponsors-H.R. 7760, H.R. 7761. This
legislation would provide supplementary
appropriations to bring the section 235
homeownership program, the section 236
rental and cooperative housing program,
the rent supplement program, the urban
renewal program, and the urban renewal
component of the model cities program
to the full amount of funding authorized
by Congress.'
The bill before us today includes sup-
plemental appropriations for three pro-
grams-section 235, section 236, and low-
rent public housing program. Both sec-
tion 235 and section 236 would receive an
additional $40 million for fiscal year
1969-which still leaves each program
$10 million less than the amount author-
ized by Congress. The low-rent public
housing program-which remains the
only effective way to reach low-income
people in our larger cities-would receive
an additional $7,168,000 for fiscal year
1968 and $16 million for fiscal year 1969
in contract authorization.
While I all} pleased that the Appropri-
ations Committee has recommended sup-
plementary appropriations to these three
programs, I am disappointed that the bill
does not provide additional funds for the
rent supplement program, the urban re-
newal program, or the urban renewal
sector of the model cities program. Each
year the rent supplement program has
been starved for funds; the current fiscal
year is no exception. While the adminis-
tration recommended $65 million for rent
supplements for fiscal year 1969, Con-
gress appropriated only $30 million. Sim-
ilarly, urban renewal in model cities, al-
though it was authorized to receive $500
million, has appropriated only $312
million.
These programs must be funded to the
full amount authorized by Congress if
we are to mount an effective attack on
the crisis in urban homing which con-
fronts this Nation. As has been the case
so often before, the appropriations pro-
vided for Southeast Asian military
operations in H.R. 11400 alone are
greater than the amount which would
be required to fully fund these vital
housing programs.
I am also disturbed that a request from
the Department of Housing and Urban
Development for an additional $2 mil-
lion to carry out f.,.ir housing activities
under title VIII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968 was denied by the committee.
As Housing and Urban Development Sec-
retary Romney stated in his testimony
in support of this approoriation:
"It is simply impossible to attain this goal
(providing a decent home in a suitable liv-
ing environment for every American family)
without a major and -continuing effort in.
pursuit of fair housing for every person in
this country." (Pareentbesis added) (Hear-
ings on Second Supplemental Appropriation
Bill, 1969, p. 570.)
At present, the fair housing program
has received only Y.2 million to carry on
that effort from. Congress. If fair hous-
ing is to be guaranteed in this country,
we must allocate more resources to pur-
suing that goal.
No doubt the ar,-,ument will be made
that, since the pending bill contains
funds for several av:encies which require
supplemental allocation:: for their oper-
ations, as well as for programs, such as
section 235 and section 236, it should be
supported despite the title I appropria-
tion for the war. I can not accept that
argument, which ignore., two basic fac-
tors.
First, if the House refused to approve
this bill as long as it contained war ap-
propriations funds earmarked for mili-
tary operations in Vietnam would be re-
moved; and the or -ter parts of the bill
would come back to the floor.
Second, and mc)?-e basic, it must be
recognized that vital domestic programs
will not be funded adequately until the
bloody and costly war in Vietnam is end-
ed. So long as appropriations bills con-
tinue to allocate one-third of our avail-
able resources to Southeast Asian mili-
tary operations--as this one does-our
cities will continue to rot, and the social
fabric of our Nation will continue to be
ripped apart. We ,will never mount the
concentrated attack on the multitude of
domestic problems facing us-including
housing, education, discrimination, and
H 3851
pollution-so long as these programs re-
ceive only leftover scale allocations. The
solution of our domestic crisis, in other
words, must be preceded by an end to the
war in Vietnam.
For 5 years the Congress has acqui-
esced in a disastrous policy. Some 35,000
American servicemen have been killed,
and many more wounded and crippled.
The country which we supposedly set out
to save today lies in chaos and ruin. For
5 long years the resources of this country
have been poured into an ill-conceived
war, only to see our policyrnakers return
the next year with requests for still more
funds.
How long will this war go on? An-
other year? Another 2 years? Another
3 years?
If we are truly concerned with the con-
tinuation of this war-after it was
thoroughly and roundly repudiated in
the elections of last year; if we are con-
cerned that after 1 year of negotia-
tions in Paris we have not achieved
peace; if we are truly desirous of termi-
nating the death and distruction which
continue to be wreaked on a small and
unhappy nation-then let us now call a
halt to this war through the only power
the House possesses: the power of the
purse.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I should
like to state to the Members of the House
that it is the purpose of the committee
to have read the first paragraph of the
bill, which deals with "Military person-
nel, Army," lines 6 and 7 on page 2, and
then I expect to move that the commit-
tee rise. Of course, amendments will be
in order, but I expect to be recognized
by the chairman to move that the com-
mittee rise, and then the amendment
period would come tomorrow.
I should like to say further that it
is proposed on tomorrow before we begin
further consideration of the bill, that
the Rules Committee will offer a rule
which will make in order the expendi-
ture limitation, which is carried in title
IV of the bill.
So, if the rule is adopted-and, of
course, we hope it will be adopted-we
will proceed with the reading of the bill
under the 5-minute rule.
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman
from Iowa.
Mr. GROSS. The language that you
would have read this afternoon, do I
understand, goes to line 7 on page 2?
Mr. MAHON. Yes. It would end at
the figure $110 million in line 7 on page 2.
Mr. GROSS. That includes no lan-
guage, then, that is subject to a point
of order?
Mr. MAHON. No.
Mr. GROSS. The rule
waive points of order.
Mr. MAHON. The rule is designed to
protect against points of order only in
title IV, which relates to the expenditure
limitation. It will not protect any other
part of the bill than the expenditure
limitation.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen-
tleman from Texas has expired. All time
has expired.
The Clerk will read.
The Clerk read as`follows:
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 H 3552
H.R. 11400
Be it enacted by the Senate and House
of Representatives of the United States of
Amer ca in Congress assembled, That the fol-
lowing sums are appropriated out of any
money in the Treasury not otherwise appro-
priated, to supply supplemental approria-
tions (this Act may be cited as the "Second
Supp: emental Appropriations Act, 1089") for
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969, and for
other purposes, namely:
TITLE I
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-MILITARY
MILITARY PERSONNEL
MILrrARY PEasoNNEI.. ARMY
For an additional amount for "Military
personnel, Army", $110,000,000.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I move
that the Committee do now rise.
The motion was agreed to.
Ac--ordingly the Committee rose; and
the Speaker having resumed the chair,
Mr. HOLIFIELD, Chairman of the Com-
mittee of the Whole House on the State
of the Union, reported that that Com-
mittee. having had under consideration
the 3iii (H.R. 11400) making supple-
mental appropriations for the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1969, and for other pur-
pose::, had come to no resolution thereon.
GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unan-
imous consent that all Members speak-
ing on the bill this afternoon may be
permitted to revise and extend their re-
mafts and that I may be permitted to
revis3 and extend my remarks and insert
certain tables and excerpts relating to
the bill.
T ..e SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from
Texas?
There was no objection.
SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATOR
AVI'EMPTING TO COVER UP
FUENTES AFFAIR
(Mr. PATMAN asked and was given
permission to address the House for 1
minute, to revise and extend his remarks
and '. nclude extraneous matter.)
Mr. PATMAN. Mr. Speaker, on
April 26, Mr. Hilary Sandoval, Jr., the
Administrator of the Small Business
Administration, appeared before the
Banking and Currency Committee to dis-
cuss an SBA loan to a New York com-
pany with alleged underworld ties.
Shortly before the hearing, I received
a te:egram from the Honorable HENRY
B. GONZALEZ, a dis.inguished member of
the committee, concerning "an alleged
shakedown" of a small business loan ap-
plicant by Mr. Albert Fuentes, special
assii tart to Mr. Sandoval.
The telegram follows:
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
April 25, 1969.
Hon. WaIGHT PATMAN,
Wasl fngton, D.C.:
Affidavits In my possession and on file with
the Federal Bureau of Investigation show
that there is reason to believe that Albert
Fuentes, special assistant to the Administra-
tor, Small Business Administration, has en-
gaged in or attempted to engage in shake-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE May 20, 1969
downs of SBA loan recipients. I have re-
quested the administrator to suspend
Fuentes pending full investigation and re-
quest that you join In this action. I request
that the committee under your able leader-
ship investigate all loans either made or
pending in Texas offices of SBA since Fuentes
entered his position and that investigation
be made particularly in the San Antonio area.
Sincerely,
HENRY B. GONZALEZ.
Member of Congress.
When Mr. Sandoval appeared before
the committee, I asked him to look into
the Fuentes situation and to report his
finding to the committee. Mr. Sandoval
agreed to this request: The transcript of
the hearing clearly spells out what in-
formation Mr. Sandoval was to provide.
The transcript states:
The CHAIRMAN. Now I will ask you to take
this telegram and give me a report on Mr.
Fuentes. You can do that, I assume?
Mr. SANDOVAL. Yes, air. _
The CHAIRMAN. And also to give me all the
information about the loans in the San
Antonio area.
Mr. SANDOVAL. Yes, air.
The CHAmsAN. And if any of them pro-
voke your thinking along the lines as not
being regular. call them to our attention,
Mr. SANDOVAL. Yes, W.
Following Mr. Sandoval's appearance,
I learned that SBA investigators had vis-
ited the San Antonio SBA office and
looked into the Fuentes situation. After
allowing a reasonable length of time for
the investigators' report to be forwarded
to Washington, I wrote to Mr. Sandoval
on May 12. The letter asks Mr. Sandoval
not only to provide the Fuentes report
but also to furnish the committee with a
document that is extremely important to
the committee's investigation of the New
York loan to the alleged criminal con-
trolled company. The letter follows:
MAY 12, 1969.
Mr. Hn.ARY SA inovAL, Jr.,
Administrator, Small Business Administra-
tion, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SANDOVAL: It has come to my
attention that a memo dated January 6,
1967, from Mr. William Bowling to then
Small Business Administration Administra-
tor. Bernard Boutin, contains a great deal
of background Information concerning SBA's
involvement with A.N.R. Leasing Corpora-
tion. This memo is of vital importance to
the Committee's examination of the A.N.R.
loans and because of this, it is imperative
that the Committee be given a copy of the
complete memo immediately.
It Is my understanding that there may be
a problem In releasing the memo in that it
contains FBI and Justice Department in-
formation. In this regard, it would be ap-
preciated If you would take action to secure
the release of the memo from the Justice
Department and immediately forward It to
the Committee.
In addition, you will remember that dur-
ing your appearance before the Committee
on April 26th, I asked you to make a com-
plete investigation of the charges made
against Mr. Albert Fuentes. While I realize
you have turned the matter over to the FBI,
It is my understanding that SBA Investi-
gators have been looking into Mr. Fuentes'
relationship with the San Antonio office. Be-
cause of the importance of this matter, it
would be appreciated if you would Immedi-
ately Inform the Committee as to the re-
sults of your Investigation of this incident
and also If any other loans involving alleged
improper action on the part of Mr. Fuentes
have been uncovered. Your earliest reply
would be appreciated.
Sincerely,
WRIGHT PATMAN,
Chairman.
It is quite clear from even a most
casual reading of the letter that two dif-
ferent subjects are covered in the letter.
The staff of the Banking and Currency
Committee had been informed by SBA
officials that the memo from Mr. Bowling
to Mr. Boutin contained information
from the FBI and Justice Department
and that permission would have to be
obtained from these departments to re-
lease the memo. Because of this, my let-
ter specifically asked Sandoval to take
zction to secure release of the memo to
the committee because of its important
nature to our investigation.
The last paragraph of the letter deals
solely with Mr. Sandoval's promise to
supply the committee with the report on
the Fuentes case.
It does not suggest that the Fuentes
report, promised the committee by Mr.
Sandoval, should be turned over to the
Justice Department, nor does the letter
make any reference to the Justice De-
partment in connection with the Fuentes
case.
After the letter was sent to Mr. San-
doval, a member of the Banking and
Currency Committee staff called SBA to
find out when the- Fuentes report would
be made available. He was assured that
the report would be In the committee
office the following morning, along with
some other material that the committee
had requested. The following morning,
SBA did send information concerning
its lending activities in cases under study
by the committee, but did not send the
Fuentes report. The SBA official who
brought the material to the committee
stated that he did not have a copy of the
Fuentes report but that he would call
back to his office and make certain that
the report was placed on his desk and
that he would personally hand deliver the
report that afternoon. Later in the day,
still another SBA official reported to the
committee staff that the committee
would not be able to get a copy of the
report that afternoon because, "I do not
know where a copy of the report is and
even if I did, I do not have authority
to release it."
He said that Mr. Sandoval was out of
town and could not be reached. The fol-
lowing day, several members of the
Banking and Currency Committee staff
attempted to obtain copies of the report
but were unsuccessful. The reason given
at that time for the report not being
made available was that Mr. Sandoval
was out of town and the report could
not be released without his approval.
When the committee staff attempted to
locate Mr. Sandoval they were told by
his office that-
He is in New York but I don't know where
to get in touch with him or exactly where
he is,
The following day, Mr. James Reed,
congressional relations director for SBA,
called the committee staff to state that
the Fuentes report had been turned over
to the Justice Department and would
not be made available to the committee.
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 WASHINC~T ON POST DATE 001 (01' _ PAGE
pprove or Release 2002/08/01---C A=_ 180044-0
Improvement
.Of Russian
Missile Seen
A-)dated Press
U. S. military experts pre-
diet Russia. will have a long-
, mulli51e warhead mis,
ale-with sal accuracy of one-
qu ter of i rnile by the raid-
1970s.
The mi.ile is the 5;5.9,
Which Secretar - of Defense
lin R. Laird said, last May
1. Gen. Alfred D,.
der if the 9-afeguard
ioi 'ballist v -missile defense
m, in sUmonv_b arP a
missile #nstallati tt s._
that time Laird
per cent 'If the U.S. Minute-
qan missyes could be de-
ti~ed by a for"e of multiple
fniteci. States wo .-
re similar accuracy with its
ri a warhead missiles. was
lei were .
accuracy of this 9
vas` so mentioned in House
iel to Wednesday on the 21-
41 n m#-itai ary Procurement'
firmed' Sr rvices Committee,
aid.tht! Sviet missile earl de-
.vea: a warhead "with great
couracy."
A efZls aid Russia's Aevel-
Left of its weapons system
one of the-main reastlia'the
rnited States needs the ABM.
"The SS-9 does not seem
)gical un!,zsg III is designed as
first str_ie capability," he
aid.
.Lei~tie C Arends(Rhl'i.)
11-publican obi the
l(
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