TARGET STUDY OF NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70T00666R000200020030-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: June 11, 1965
• Content Type: STUDY

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TARGET STUDY OF NORTH VIETNAM
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
11 June 1965
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1. Nature of the Economy and its Vulnerabilities
The North Vietnamese economy is basically one of subsistence
agriculture with only a small modern industrial sector concentrated
in a few centers, including Hanoi, Haiphong, Nam Dinh', Viet Tri, and
Thai Nguyen. This small industrial sector is heavily dependent on
Imports of machinery and raw materials, primarily from Communist China
and the USSR; on the other hand, North Vietnam generally imports little?
food, depending very largely on domestic production to feed its
population of about 18 million. The main transportation links with
other countries are via the port of Haiphong and the rail line to
China via Dong Deng., North Vietnam's capacity for producing military
items, many of which are crudely fashioned, is restricted to grenades,
mines, mortars, and ammunition for small arms. All of North Vietnam's
heavy military equipment and most of its small arms and ammunition
are obtained by imports from Communist countries.
Hencey'the Viet Cong military effort is not primarily dependent
upon the North Vietnamese economy fprequipment and supplies. Nor
are Viet Cong operations in South Vietnam significantly dependent
upon the major military installations in the north, such as airfields.
and military headquarters. The Viet Cong logistic requirements
are relatively small; it obtains food and SOMB military supplies in
South Vietnam.
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Potential vulnerabilities, translated into possible target systems,
are discussed below and in the annexes appended to this report. The
neutralization of key industrial, transport and military targets
could constitute a serious blow to the Hanoi regime and adversely
affect its determination to carry on the present conflict in the face
of mounting escalation of the conflict. Of the potential target
systems discussed, wenote;that the crippling of the key transport
and military facilities (discussed in Part III of Annex 1 and in
Annex 2) would complicate the problems of (continuellogistic support
for large-scale operations in South Vietnam, reduce North Vietnam's
defensive capabilities (particularly air defense) and markedly slow
down the level of operations of the modern industrial sector in
North Vietnam.
However, we have not been able to identify a target system in
North Vietnam which, if successfully attacked, would carry with it
a higher degree of assurance of crippling the effectiveness of Viet
Cong ground forceresentlideployed in South Vietnam.
2. Potentialjndustrial and Transport Ta4....aet Systems
Electric power generating facilities, heavy industry, transportation)
petroleum storage depots, and the port of Haiphong are discussed as
possible target systema in Annex 1. The principal conclusions are:
a. Eight powerplants account for nearly 8o percent of electric
generating capacity and serve about 90.percent of North Vietnam's
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industry. Severe damage to these plants would have an immediate and
long lasting effect on industrial production and would impair
.operations at the port of Haiphong.
b. Five heavy industry plants account for North Vietnam's steel
capacity (presently under construction), virtually all cement and
fertilizer output, and the only large modern machine building
capacity. All of these facilities represent key Soviet or Chinese
aid projects and they have military significance apart from their
symbolic value.
c. Six rail/highway bridges and the port of Haiphong are the
major transportation targets because the flow of supplies from China
and the USSR flows over these routes. Interdiction of the key
bridges together with the entrance to the port of Haiphong would not
only slow down the importation of military supplies, but also greatly
reduce imports of those taw materials on which North Vietnamese
industry depends. There is also a major petroleum storage area in
.Hanoi and one in Haiphong. Loss of POL stocks and severe damage
.to the country's largest storage facilities would curtail motor,
air and water transportation and could therefore affect military
Activities as well as the operation: of the economy.
3. Potential Military Targets
There are four major airfields in North Vietnam which normally
accomodate military aircraft (MIG fighters and 1L-28 bombers) as
.well aa transports for military and civilian use. Effective..
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neutralization of these facilities and aircraft would temporarily
cripple the North Vietnamese tactical and air transport capability,
as well as their ability .to strike targets in South Vietnam. Replacements
could be provided by the USSR and/or Communist China; after repair
a fighter defense and bomber offense could be reconstituted quickly.
Hence, repeated interdiction would be required. (See Annex 2)
Neutralization of airfieX-ds;the Hanoi SAM sites and other key
military facilities would have two predictable effects: (1) It
would serve notice of U.S. determination to attack military targets
anywhere in North Vietnam, and (2) It would reduce U.S. and South
Vietnamese aircraft losses if follow-up air attacks were planned
on key industrial or transport targets, since most of these key
installations are in the Hanio-Haiphong area.
4. Vulnerability of Rice Crop to Flooding
The probable consequences of attacking North Vietnamese rice
supplies by flooding the Tonkin delta as a consequence of breaching
its levees is considered in Annex 3. We have not made a study of
the operational feasibility of breaching the levees in the Red River
(Tonkin) delta. However, a successful attack might severely flood
as much as half a million hectare's,* and losses could run to
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* A hectare is 2.471 acres.
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three quarters of a Million tons of rice. If only the main levees
were breached, and the secondary levee system remained, rice losses
probably would be on the order of 200,000 tons. We believe the
Communist Chinese could make up this deficit from their own
production of 75-80 million tons of rice and supply their own
people by additional imports of wheat. Wheat is freely available
on the world market, and the Chinese (as well as the Russians)
have ample foreign exchange to purchase the quantities required
by North Vietnam.
If a completely successful attack were to achieve a significant
reduction in rice supplies in North Vietnam, which the Chinese or
Soviets were unsuccessful in making good for some unknown reason,
the Hanoi regime would undoubtedly impose selective rationing.
The military forces and essential industrial and government workers
would continue to be fed adequately. It would be the least important
sectors of the population, such as the old people, who would suffer
deprivation. Hence, an attack on the rice crop by flooding the
Tonkin delta would be unlikely to achieve a significant military
impact. Further, it would almost certainly incense world public
opinion against the United States as the perpetrator of an inhuman
act and could strengthen the determination of the North Vietnamese
to resist.
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5. Other Target Studies
Annex 4 is a brief annotated bibliography of other target studies
on North Vietnam, including possible sabotage targets. Additional
details on certain potential target systems are available in these
studies, particularly the 7 April 1965 analysis ititled, Location
and SignificarlQ:Oof Electric Powerplants in the Hanoi-Haiphong Power
Network of North Vietnam.
ORB/ERA (11 'Tune 1965)
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