Soviet Military Technicians Abroad

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70T00666R000100140020-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2001
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: September 20, 1962
• Content Type: MF

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20 SEP mid
SC No. 08172/62
'ru Craword
Technicians Abroad
usually are pra-
y aid on a con-
tamale contracts
aid agreement .
*unborn of
specific
are high-
aircraft
ion and
"LIAO"
trac-
t tech
d to Iraq
of
in
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the main arms shipments. Such procedures
n that the number of Soviet personnel
d is smaller than ,,hen large amounts of
ire prior to training for nationals of
country.
3. Just prior to the settlement of the West
Mow Guinea dispute, some Soviet equipment was
hastily delivered to Indonesia evidently to
bolster Djakarta's overall position Against the
Dutch during the cr40111 stages of negotiations.
Nawsl ysel? and aircraft were dispatched almost
immediate r the Soviets and Indonesians con-
cluded a supplementary contract in 1962 and thus
.bviously without prior training for Indonesian
*rum*. The large iaftux of Soviet personnel into
periodIndonesia in this Consequently involved many
to equipment rather than
and training personnel. In
Indonesian settlement, the
is still unclear, but they
to the USSR as training pro-
4. Aside from this a,ignUicant variation,
e in provigag military technical
been relatively consistent. A sub-
of technicians and specialists nor
a delivery of equipment. Some of
enough to put the equipment
hors remain for longer
raining in the use and main-
t. Until recently, however,
uipmcnt into Indonesia and
to Cuba made it necessary to
kmiat personnel to beadle
military aid missions abroad
y small. Afghanistan has re-
ef Soviet military personnel
an effort to reorganize the
ry establishment. In every in
appeare that these military
sent for a specified period of
h they depart.
presently available evidence sug-
the Soviets arriving in Cuba are
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with the establishment of air and
e systems employing guided
t information on technical assistance to
=tries is that dealing with the supply of
. Both Indonesia and Iraq are receiving,
things, the $A-2 surface-to-air missile
system now beim installed in Cuba. Iraq is to re-
soave equipment for 5 SAV sites, one of which is a
training unit, and Indonesia is receiving about
14 sites, including one training unit. Equipment
for the training unit was delivered to Indonesia
earlier this year and is due to arrive in Iraq later
in 19112. Around 100 Soviet military specialists are
being seat to each of these countries for setting up
these training sites and handling the instruction.
Equipment for the other sites will be delivered next
year, after nearly a year's training has taken place.
O. The personnel assigned to these training
units are scheduled to stay abroad for periods from
en e to 12 moat , after which they presumably will
return to the R. Some .may be extended to help
lastall operational SAX 'item. Many more Soviets
are expected to arrive when the other SAM sites are
met 0, but we have few indications of the total
number involved or the length of their proposed stay.
There is 'Vide e, however, suggesting that the USSR
I
tatends eventua ly to tura the systems overl;the host
**wariest and mos t all the Soviets will depart.
As in any military aid program, a certain number are
likely to remain behind to help maintain the equip-
ment and oversee training operations.
I however, the situation is consider-
-
on that In Iraq or Indonesia. The
of Soviet military aid is proceeding
and in apparently designed to set up
and coastal defense systems in the
his time. Soviet military personnel --
d at not less than 4,000 -- arriving in
these shlpments probably will not
assemble equipment, but, if necessary,
and operate the SAM sites while Cubans
'lined. It is likely this training will
in eventual takeover of all the equipment
but at present there is no firs indication
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long this will take. Based on information
Indonesia d Iraq, as well as on Soviet ex
9, not less than six months and probably
o a year will be required before the equip-
3d be operated largely by Cubans. The
I depend on the urgency of the training
d the degree of Cuban proficiency desired.
he USSR's commitments to Cuba, large
oviet personnel probably will stay in
time to ensure the effectiveness of
uPplied. Based on Soviet actions else-
ex', it is likely that most of them even-
ill, depart, leaving the equipment in Cuban
110 have o information on the number o
acccs*panytug the recent deliveries of
tO Cuba.
appears that this pro
hundred rsonnel at most. Some o
WAY A ring on the order of a h
likely to stay in Cara for a month or two but will
IMMO after assembly and checkout work is completedlt!
Others, however, probably will stay for a year or
mere to provide training in maintenance and flight
instruction on the new aircraft, and on the ground
eeutrol equipment associated with the 1110-2l. Such
training Is still being conducted by Soviet pilots
gad instructors on the older models of NIG fighters
provided to Cuba more than a year ago.
O. The number of Soviets necessary for the
eight Komar-class guided missile boats also is un
*maws
0.1
A
25X1B0a
0-3 & NSA
eral.
prob-
.?4
-- are
men probably will
while training is
both in the handling f the boats and in
the missiles.
Distribution:
Ori & I - Addressee
I - OChiBBA
v4 OAD/RR
I - St/CS Chrono
1-
25X1D1a
& NSA
Assistant Director,
and Reports
I - Ch/SSB/OCI
I D/I
I - OCl/SIDO
I -
mewl. ..gym; i aleywigifiglp Ray 00140020-8
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