ASSESSMENT OF THE BOMB DAMAGE INFLICTED ON NORTH VIETNAM'S ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70S00385R000200190053-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2004
• Sequence Number: 53
• Publication Date: May 19, 1967
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
20 May 1967
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Status of North Vietnam's Electric Power Indust
15 May 19 7*
Summa
Air strikes through 15 May 1967 against 13 of the 20 JCS-tar-
geted electric power facilities in North Vietnam have put out of
operation about 131,000 kilowatts (kw) of power-generating capacity,
or 70 percent of the national total. Loss of generating facilities
has created a severe shortage of power and has disrupted activities
that normally depend on a central power supply, particularly those
activities in the small modern industrial sector of the economy.
Most of the industrial operations that are closely related to North
Vietnam's support of the war in the South are of the type that can
be operated by small diesel units.
The city of Hanoi is now dependent on one local powerplant that
is believed capable of supplying about one-half of the city's normal
needs. Haiphong is without a central power supply and must rely on
available diesel-generating equipment and the limited amounts of
power that may be sent along the transmission line from Hanoi.
This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by
the Office of Research and Reports; the estimates and conclusions
represent the best. judgment of the Directorate of Intelligence as
of may 1967.
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For all practical purposes power supply to non-essential con-
sumers has been eliminated. Although there is a lack of positive
intelligence on the impact of the power shortages, a system of
rationing seems imperative. A recent report indicates that Hanoi
may have inaugurated a rationing syste
North Vietnam has had, little success in restoring damaged
power facilities. The slight progress made during 1966 was set back
by later restrikes. The North Vietnamese seem willing to make sus-
tained efforts to restore facilities to partial operations when
limited damage permits equipment to be readily salvaged. They
are willing, however, to abandon plants when a major reconstruction
effort would be required. Reconstruction efforts are highly depen-
dent on foreign technical assistance and equipment.
The major countermeasure adopted by the North Vietnamese has
been the import of around 2,000 diesel-driven generating units
during the past two years. These units have.limited practical
applications and can replace only 10-15 percent of the generating
capacity currently out of operation.
With the exception of the powerplant at Hanoi, the seven
remaining powerplants which have not been struck make only a-small
contribution to North Vietnam's modern industry or to the war
effort. Three of these facilities are located within the buffer
zone along the Chinese border.
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Effects on the Electric Power Industry
1. Through the middle of May 1967 the Rolling Thunder program
had attacked 13 of the 20 JCS-targeted electric power facilities
in North Vietnam. (See the Figure) The air campaign has put out
of operation 131,000 kilowatts (kw) of capacity in the main Hanoi-
Haiphong power network and in two smaller power systems in the
southern part of the country. (See the Table) The loss represents
70 percent of total national installed capacity of 187,000 kw.
The cost of restoring these facilities is estimated at
20.5 mil-
2. The air attacks have reduced capacity in the main network
from eight plants with a total capacity of 136,000 kw to a single
plant at Hanoi with a capacity of 32,500 kw, or about 2i percent
of the pre-strike level. Severe damage has been inflicted on power-
plants at Uong Bi, Hon Gai, Haiphong East, Haiphong West, Thai
Nguyen, Viet Tri, and Nam Dinh. Damage inflicted by strikes on
the Dong Anh substation, the most important substation in the net-
w ork, will prevent integrated operation of the network for at
least 2 to 3 months.
3. An additional powerplant at Bac Giang, which is outside the
main network, was put out of operation for a minimum of 3 months.
In addition, central powerplants in the southern part of North Viet-
nam also have sustained damage. All four plants in the small power
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systems around Thanh Hoa and Ben Thuy were already out of service
as a consequence of damage inflicted during 1965 and 1966.
4E. Loss of the generating capacity at Hon Gai, Uong Bi,
Thai Nguyen, and Viet Tri has eliminated the supplementary supply
of power formerly received by Hanoi and Haiphong from the main
transmission network. Hanoi now is dependent on one local -_,ower-
plant with a capacity of 32,500 kw that is believed capable of
supplying about one-half of the city's normal needs. Haiphong is
without a central power supply and must rely on available diesel-
generating equipment, and the limited amounts of power that may be
sent along the line from Hanoi.
Other Effects
5. The neutralization of most of North Vietnam's electric
power industry is having widespread effects throughout the country.
The loss of generating facilities undoubtedly has created a severe
shortage of power and disrupted activities that normally depend on
a reliable central power supply. The precise extent to which the
supply of electric power is being curtailed is difficult to quan-
tify. It is probable that non-essential consumption by residences
and commercial establishments, and most street lighting have been
eliminated. Curtailment of industrial power supply almost certainly
has caused fragmentation of industrial processes in some cases, and
in others has caused complete shutdowns. The few heavy or con-
tinuous-process industries, such as the Viet Tri chemical and
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paper complex or the Haiphong cement plant,* probably will be forced
to stop operations unless some provision for power has been made
by the installation of diesel-generating units larger than those
currently estimated to be available. No ready substitute for indus-
trial process-steam is available to industries formerly dependent on
steam furnished by the central powerplants. Industrial or manufac-
turing processes that can be divided into small segments (such as
machine shops, truck repair facilities, coal mining, or port loading
operations) can probably be furnished sufficient power by small
diesel generating units, but not without some loss of efficiency.
Most of the industrial operations that are closely related to North
Vietnam's support of the war in the South are of the type that can
be operated by small diesel units. Thus, the curtailment or shut-
down of modern industry would have little impact on North Vietnam's,
ability to continue the war.
.6. There are few eye-witness reports about the impact of power
shortagesa The first positive indication that generating capacity
now falls short of meeting demands was a reported announcement that
power rationing was instituted in Hanoi on 10 May 1967. A few other
reports have suggested intermittent restrictions on power supply over
the past year.
* This plant also sustained bomb damage in April 1967.
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Restoration of Damaged Facili
damaged in ..UC';ust 1966, showed little sign of reconstruction in
7. The electric power industry has been the major exception
to North Vietnam's demonstrated ability to recuperate from the air
attacks . Although complete restoration of the damaged facilities
T-.ould require from 18-2~- month3, most of thcrr could be restored to
o rtisl operation within a period of 2-1 months.
8. There arc signs of strain and bottlenecks in North VictnemcL..e
attempts to rebuild the danac;c'? power facilties. Most of the recon-
struction requires foreign technical and riaterial assistance. "..lch
of the progress made during '966 u.-s- eliminated by later restrifes
against the power facilities. There is considerable variation in
a,Then
ii~irgra s. :i?_ _.
the ited
ef-Forts nut into reconstra,-tion lim
permits equipment to be readily salva ed, the North Vietnamese
made persistent efforts to restore facilities to partial operation.
They are z? sling to abandon plants, however, when a major recon-
struction effort -:CU-la b'i-: rc,~~u_rcd. Repair of 1; Thai Ng;.?.,c
plant for excrpl e ,?ras rapidly accomplished in the latter part of
1966 after moderate damage inflicted in July. The Uong Bi plant,
January 1967
The Thank Hoa and Ben Thuy plants which
d in 1965 were still unserviceable in April 1967 although
reconstruction Work on both now is in progress. Restoration of the
1'am Dish plant progressed steadily until late 1966, and then apparently
halted before the plant was ready for service. Reconstruction of small
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plants at Co Dinh and at Ban Thach apparently has been aban_daned.
Construction of the large hydroelectric plant at Thac Ba, ? ,.: ah we.:.
being built with assistance from the USSR, was halted in mid-1966
probably to forestall damage from air strikes. The status of possi-
ble reconstruction efforts at po??rerplants struck during the last
few months is not known.
Other Countermeasures
9. Other than the measures discussed above the major counter-
measLLre used by the North Vietnamese has been the development of
alternate po??rer-generating capacity. This has been done principally
by importing diesel-driven generating units.
10. North Vietnam is ? :.imated to have importea around 2,000 diesel-driven generating units during the past two years. The largest
units imported were two from the USSR with a capacity of 600 7C7 ea.c
_iiteen from Czechoslovakia th a capacity of 320 I T Eac i, =d ....
- r>?r units also imporaed from CzechuItovU.__sa.
LL spc if number of 500 '' or ak:
The remaining units imported have capacities ranging from 5 kw to
-' t~'? ..~,u.~t.li. 7) perCr.;il:; having i:a~oaGl`G1.v^S of less than 20 >.?i.
100 t
The aggregate capacity
ey:inert kno??r_: to have been imported amounts to an estimated 25,000
a:_LL,~,~
kw to 30,000 kw.
11. Those diesel units are well-suited for supplying power to
small independent consumers, but they cannot be readily operated in
Parallel with a transmission network, nor are they large enough to
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cover the demands of heavy, continuous-process industry. Moreover,
the usable capacity of these units will be substantially less than
their rated capacity. When power is supplied independently to
separate consumers each consumer maintains reserve capacity. Some
consumers undoubtedly will be assigned generating units larger than
needed. Thus the diesel generating units will not supply dispersed
consumers with as much power
and will not fully compensate for the lose of an equivalent amount of
central generating capacity. The diesels known to have been imported
probably could not supply more than 15,000 kw to 20,000 kw of usable
power. This amount is roughly 10 percent to 15 percent of the
central generating capacity currently out of operation.
12. Almost nothing is Known about the location of diesel units.
However,, it is reasonable to assume that some units have been
l
allocated for use in the areas of Thanh Hoa, Ben Thuy, and Hon Gaii
where central plants are out of operation. Some undoubtedly have
been assigned. to supply power for irrigation and drainage of agri-
culture, and some will be assigned a standby role for emergency
power. Although a number of alternatives are open to the North
Vietnamese in the use of diesels, it seems clear that available
generating capacity falls so far short of meeting demands that some
system for rationing electricity is imperative.
Unstruck Targets
13. The seven JCS-targeted electric power facilities not
attacked by air strikes are shown in the following tabulation:
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Capacity
Plant Names (kilowatts)
Thac Ba (incomplete)
114,000
Hanoi
32,500
Lao Cai
8,000
Na Ngan
2;000
Phu Ly
1,200
Thai Nguyen (Steel plant)
1,200
Ta Sa
1,000
If these facilities were attacked, North Vietnam would be deprived
of all but 10,000 kw of its central power generating capacity. The
most important target not struck as of the date of this report is, of
course, Hanoi. The other targets are remote from the main power
grids, and make only a small contribution to North Vietnam's modern
industry or to the war effort. The largest facility, that at Thac
Ba was from 18-24 months from completion when construction activity
was abandoned in 1966. Three of the remaining plants -- Lao Cai,
Na Ngan and Ta Sa -- are located within the buffer zone along the
Chinese border. The Lao Cai plant supplies power to the apatite
mining and processing facilities. The Na Ngan and Ta Sa plants
serve tin mining enterprises in Cao Bang Province. The;powerplant
at Phu Ly serves a sugar refinery. The Thai Nguyen power facility
is carried in the JCS-target list as a possible powerplant serving
the Thai Nguyen iron and steel complex. Air strikes have not been
directed specifically against this facility but it has been
neutralized as a result of strikes directed against the iron and
steel complex.
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