1970 A CHALLENGE TO PLANNERS SUMMARY REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00584R000100100001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
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• Document Page Count: 66
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 25, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 31, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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GE O
A CHALLIE'
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Hilton P. Goss
Editor
Environmental Factors Project
TMP-AB-068
Harry O. Paxson
Project Leader
TECHNICAL MILITARY PLANNING OPERATION
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
SANTA BARBARA, CALIFORNIA
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Planning Philosophies
No one can properly dispute the need for planning. It is a need which will
develop even more forcefully in the next decade than it has in the last,
because of the increasing rates of change in the factors influencing human
life. In totalitarian states, such as those now calling themselves the "peo-
ples' democratic replublics," planning is carried out on a highly centralized
basis. By contrast, in the United States planning is carried out in many com-
petitive, decentralized units. Both techniques have advantages and disad-
vantages. In centralized planning,. great singleness of purpose and exped-
iency are easier to attain, but the possibility of desirable innovations is
extremely limited. In decentralized planning the agreement on common
purposes and common strategies is hard to achieve, while innovation is
emphasized. In Industry, the US has long recognized the need for decentral-
ization and competition. In government, our policy is less clear; our
maintenance of a number of competing agencies for most government
functions seems to show that we practice decentralized planning here
whether we approve of it or not.
To secure a high rate of progress among decentralized planners, and
therefore to get as much as possible of the benefit of innovation as well
as of speed, we must emphasize the development and communication of
common purposes and the rapid communication of planning data among all
of the planners involved. Old techniques of forecasting based on the extra-
polation of trend lines must give way to new techniques based on a deeper
insight and better relationship among the planning factors which are
involved. Here at TEMPO -- the Technical Military Planning Operation
of the General Electric Company -- we are trying to establish a systematic
approach to planning involving three major phases. These are: (1) estima-
ting the future environment in which our plans are to be carried out;
(2) inventing or synthesizing technological developments which are called
for by the environment; and (3) evaluating and comparing competing plans.
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It is evident that in addition to being a risky process, planning is also
cyclic. A plan of any magnitude which shows up well after evaluation can
have a very importan effect on the future environment against which it
was originally conceived and evaluated. In. this sense it is essential that
t1a planning organization itself be a relatively small and well-knit group.
We see not only a great deal of interplay among the various kinds of
scientists needed to make reasonable environmental predictions -- we see
also that these people must meet frequently with those who are inventing
the new systems and those who are carrying out the comparative evalua-
tions so that the results of any significant invention or the suggestions
naming from any rela:iv'e evaluation may be brought into their thinking
and made a part of the intuitive background against which they make their
major predictions as rapidly as possible.
1W iile the primary purpose of planning at TEMPO is to develop military
systems plans, it is essential in this process to give a great deal of con-
sideration to non-militant factors. This necessity is supported by the von.
Clausewitz statement that "war is an extension of policy by other means,"
or the more current communist doctrine that "peace is an extension of
conflict by other means." Our way of saying it is that the farther we look
toward the future the harder it becomes to distinguish between a purely
military and a purely civil enterprise. Both have strong influences on our
na:aonal defense.
There are as many ways of expressing a forecast as there are forecasters.
From a business standpoint we find it interesting to organize the forecast
around three major items: (1) the demand in terms of world population,
de:nography., and human desires; (2) the available resources in terms of
living space, energy sources, materials, facilities, and knowledge; and
(3) the relationships in terms of organizations, political considerations,
mi dtary force, and ideologies.
Factors in Planning for 1970
By far the dominant factor in determining the degree of peace and well-
bei zg which we may expect in the next decade is the explosion of human
population in relation to the growth of resources. The effect of the growth
In copulation is compounded by increasing literacy and speed of com:muni-
cat on, so that the world-wide demand for food, clothing, shelter, trans-
portation, communication, security, love, and respect may be expected
to 'row even faster than the population.
ill
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Technological growth in the decade ahead will bring about greatly in-
creased productivity of the inhabitable areas of the earth and will make
some regions now sparsely settled able to take care of more people.
But it seems unlikely that the developments in energy production and
distribution, in agriculture, manufacturing, transportation, and commun-
ication will be able to keep up with the spiraling demand rate, unless
progress in bioscience and education make possible a significant step
toward matching the human birth rate to the death rate. This seems im-
probable at this time.
An inevitable result of the failure of the race to meet new demands from
available resources will be continued change in relationships. Much of
this change will be made by military rather than by peaceful methods.
The great desire by the growing numbers of people for improved stand-
ards will couple with the strong trend toward nationalism to produce
violence in many areas. In furtherance of their cold war aims the communist
governments of Russia and China will try continuously to exploit these
conflicts. But true support of nationalism is not consistent with their
objectives for the long term, and it may backfire against them elsewhere
as it has in Yugoslavia.
In terms of military significance to the US, these changes do not reduce
the need for us to maintain continuously an inexorable force capable of
dealing a crushing blow to any aggressor nation no matter what has
happened first. Beyond this we must shoulder our responsibility as leaders
of the Free World and continue to maintain highly mobile forces both
at home and abroad to deter local aggressions, to restore situations where
these have started, and, perhaps before the end of the decade, to take
initiative action in support of friendly populations who have started some-
thing they have not the strength to finish.
Another element in our military posture which could be decisive is our
ability to defend our homeland both actively and passively from long-range
strategic attack. With the growth of military forces in several countries
during the next decade capable of bombing the US and each other, we shall
find that our large strategic deterrent force, designed to prevent all-out
war, will buy us less and less in terms of the day-to-day negotiations of
diplomacy. Continental defense is an activity in which a goal cannot
readily be defined. The rapid growth in the size and variety of the threats
which may be brought to bear against us, the great complexity of the
defense action, and the problems of countermeasures mean that we can
never spend "enough" to guarantee an airtight defense posture. Even the
v
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process of obtaining a reasonable level of active and passive defense will
be very expensive. At the same time, we must not lose sight of the advantage
which could come to us in negotiation if we were able to be more sanguine
about the risk of all-out: war. We may well be the only nation which can
afford a reasonable defense in the next decade. If so, it would be a step
toward restoration of the great military advantage whichwe frittered away
ir, the late 40s and early 50s.
Tie course of development of the inexorable retaliatory force, discussed
above, seems fairly clear through 1970. To be inexorable, this force
must survive any possible attack in strength sufficient to penetrate enemy
defenses and destroy his major cities. We now depend on long-range
aircraft as the principal vehicles of this force. We are gaining relative
security for this force by improving our attack warning devices and by
increasing the speed with which the force can be sent on a war mission.
But Soviet development of a ballistic missile capability could quickly
ncutralize our strategic advantage., Our own developments in ballistic
missiles are currently aimed at a deterrent force which will be secure
against attack by virtue of its being stored in underground shelters rather
than by being quickly launched. By the late 60s it will be technically
possible for a force in underground shelters to be damaged quite effect-
iv ply by pre-emptive attack. Hence we shall then probably adopt the
,submarine launching platform as the principal location of our deterrent
retaliatory force. Sometime beyond 1970, but probably before 1980, wog
may be compelled to take another step to secure our deterrent force.
Quite logically we might put: our force on standing alert out in space. Our
ability to take this step will depend on our solution of numerous problem.,:
associated with operations in space; . these in turn will depend upon our
diligence in aggressively pursuing basic research and upon our adoption
of a national policy that supports continued progress in all of the needed
t:ec:hnologies.
R. C. Raymond
Manager TEMPO
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1970 -- A CHALLENGE TO PLANNERS
This report is a summary of results attained in the first year's work
aimed at an interdisciplinary environment prediction. To make the problem
manageable within the manpower and resources available during 1958,
it was limited in time to the 1965-1970 period; a number of significant
omissions in scope have been inevitable. During 1959 It is planned to
extend the study in time and scope to reach out to 1975 and to fill some
of the major areas of uncertainty. As the investigation proceeds during
1959, the results of concomitant studies in system synthesis and evalua-
tion will be incorporated in the final product. By the end of 1959 a much
improved forecast can be expected, both in breadth and depth. Some of the
significant conclusions developed in the 1958 study are the importance
of:
The growing responsibility of the US public, industry, and govern-
ment to understand, evaluate, and plan during the next decade for
the living conditions resulting from a significant population increase
* The continuing need for more and better education, based on future
estimates more than on past performances
* The great need for innovations in the biosciences which will make
it possible to match death control with birth control on a world-wide
basis
* The continuation of severe international political competition and
conflict
* The growth in intensity of international economic conflict
* The tremendous growth and change in nature of the energy industries
* The continued rapid growth in electronics, for both civilian and
military purposes
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The need for training at all levels and for continuous management
reorganization in both government and industry in response to
improvements in data processing for decision-making, and for
other improvements, in technology
The need for public understanding of the dominance of technology
in the military defense of the nation and to the decision-making
aspects of defense
The continued need for a secure, inexorable retaliatory force for
deterring total war
* The decline in the unilateral strategic air power supremacy of the
United States
* The importance of both active and passive defense of the US from
air and missile attacks
* The continued importance of intelligence and reconnaissance activities
* The continuing high probability of limited wars and military "police
actions"
The importance of logistic aircraft and air transportable ground
forces for limited war use
The growth in importance of the submarine for both civil and military
purposes
* The importance of the development of basic capabilities in space
travel.
This TEMPO Report represents a combination of the findings of a
number of individual contributors to TEMPO Project 068 -- Environ-
:mntal Factors, and of the review of these findings by staff members of
th3 Environment Operation. A listing of the studies prepared in support
of this Project will be found at the end of this publication. The review
wt-s accomplished by a panel composed of Dr. Richard C. Raymond,
Manager -?- TEMPO ex-officio chairman, Brig. Gen. Harry O. Paxson,
(USA-Ret.), chairman, Dr. Hilton P. Goss, Dr. James W. Moyer, and Capt.
David B. Young (USN-Ret.).
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Page
FOREWORD
SUMMARY
LIST OF CHARTS
Vii
Xi
1 GUIDELINES FOR LONG-RANGE PLANNING
1.
2 A WORLD OF 305 BILLION INHABITANTS
5
3 THE PHYSICAL FACTORS SHAPING THE FUTURE
19
4 INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COMPETITIONS
AND CONFLICT
27
5 POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS AND THE COLD WAR
39
6 UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY
REQUIREMENTS
51
TITLES OF PAPERS PREPARED DURING 1958
59
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CHART NO.
Page
I
Estimates of Population of Selected Areas
6
II
Population Increase 1955 - 1970
9
III
Scientific and Professional Manpower
Requirements 1955 - 1970
11
IV
The War Spectrum
52
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1970 -- A CHALLENGE TO PLANNERS
1
GUIDELINES FOR LONG-RANGE PLANNING
In looking ahead to the 1965-1970 period, the first task should be to
assess the various factors against which planning must be done. Some
of these factors include areas that will remain constant no matter how
the inhabitants of the world are aligned politically, economically, socially,
culturally, scientifically, or in any other way. Every planner must make
some basic assumptions and go forward from them. Perhaps we may believe
that there are forms of life on other planets much like on our own -- or
forms much different from the varieties to be found on earth. But we should
probably reach early agreement that, even if by 1965-1970 we discover such
beliefs to be well-founded or illusory, the basic facts of life on our own
planet will not be appreciably changed by that date.
We take it that many of the relations that have obtained between human
beings and their physical environment on earth for the past dozen centuries
will not have altered unrecognizably by a decade from today. Food, shelter
well-being, and social acceptability will still be the major concerns of the
earth's human population. Mankind will still be attempting to control, to
subdue, or at least to meet on comparatively favorable terms, what we
choose to call nature -- the elements, the animal and plant life, the re-
sources of the soil, and the air, and the water -- and the uncertainties of
existence that surround it. Neither an invasion from Mars (or some other
planet), nor the conquest of man by insects is apt to have occurred by 1970.
Therefore we can be concerned with the equally serious, but much more
probable struggle for survival on terms that we already know and with
which we have had some experience.
More than ever before, the American people must be concerned with the
future world into which we are moving with unrelenting swiftness. If it
was ever true that we, as a nation and as individuals within a nation, could
ignore the future of places and peoples outside our own continental bound-
aries, it is no longer true.
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We need cite only such phenomena as super-high-speed air travel, essent-
ial ly instantaneous global communications, the widespread image of modern
information media, expanding populations,and -- in some areas - - shrink--
ing natural resources, to indicate why today's American must think about
to-morrow's world. That world is crowding in on him and its presence is
.more evident and more real every day. Politically, we may be a long way
from a federation of the world and the parliament of man. But physically
and socially we are already one people. The earth is, de facto, "one world"
and we -- along with the inhabitants of the other 125 or more national units
mapped on the globe -- are citizens of it*.
So, for reasons of simple existence, we must know our way into the future.
Some things may be left to chance, to accident -- or even to predestination.
Bit planning is too important to be treated in this fashion.
In order that we may be able to picture the future we must possess know-
;etige of the present and the past to the degree that they form a bridge for
progressing into the future. Not all the lessons of the past can be applicable
in planning for tomorrow. Many things are changing rapidly, even some of
th, most stable and constant factors are showing signs of alteration. We
:must be able to grasp the significance of change without becoming mesmer-
iz::d by our observation of this phenomenon. Our look into the future must
not blind us to the eternals that give us guidance or to the stepping stones
th it keep us out of the torrents. The planner must keep moving ahead,
attractive and beguiling as it may seem to linger over the events and
le-rends of the past.
T::-anslated. into more practical terms, we have an immediate and a con-
tinuing need to sketch --? and in many instances to delineate fully -- the
form of things to come. What suffices for today's needs will by tomorrow
bE outmoded, obsolete, and unwanted.
*ELcknowledgment should be made at this point of the omission from the
series of studies prepared for this Project of detailed reports on such
g?:ographical areas as Europe (West, Central, and Satellite), the Soviet
U'iion, the British Commonwealth, and that in Latin America. These, and
other political units will be treated in subsequent studies, most probably
during 1959.
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The enormous costs and technical complexities of weapon systems are
compounded by the lead time required to put them into effective employ-
ment for national defense. What we design and what we build must be the
product needed and one that can be utilized when it is ready for delivery.
To be more certain of this, we have to know for what environmental
situations the planners are scheduling the products we manufacture.
We are faced with the requirement to do more than state the specifica-
tions for the weaponry of the future -- we must also furnish the most
probable specifications for the future.
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A WORLD OF 3.5 BILLION INHABITANTS
Among the many factors that will influence the future into which we are
moving, the tremendous growth of the world's population will probably
be the single most significant development that will affect planning for
the next decade. Demographers tell us that by 1970 there will be some
three and a half billion people on this earth. There are approximately
2.69 billion today. This means an increase of 30 percent -- at an average
rate of 2.5 percent each year -- with no more land and no more resources
than we can expect to see made available in the immediate period ahead.
Geographically we may take several areas of the world and show figures
for expected population growth in a graphic manner. (See Chart I).
Whenever new advances in medicine, sanitation, food supply, and control
of natural impediments to population expansion are introduced in any
extensive fashion, the average death rates are even further reduced.
Decreases in infant mortality, extension of life expectancies, new horizons
for migration and settlement, all combine to populate new areas and to
crowd further the already closely inhabited portions of the globe.
As average death rates are reduced, and as average birth rates increase,
population growth becomes both absolute in the numbers of persons alive
at a given time and relative in terms of the discrepancies between the
birth and death rates that are used for the basis of calculations and those
that actually may prevail in the future. Simultaneously, ignorance, relig-
ious customs, and economic and social Indifference operate to limit any
substantial reduction in the birth rates of many of the regions of the earth
least able to support greater populations.
We see, therefore, in the world of 1965-1970 multitudes requiring land
for living, food for sustenance, and facilities for mobility that will bring
new demands upon governments to provide the outlets for this burgeoning
host. Even in periods of plagues, famines, great wars, or other disasters
some quarters of the globe not directly affected by these agents of. reduc-
tion have seen population expansion. Such devices of governmental decreases
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1955 1965 1970
650 800 894
5~ 5~ 5*
386 456 504
100
NON - RUSSIAN
EUROPE
4051 440 457
Chart I. Estimates of Population of Selected Areas
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of populations as genocide, liquidation of the Kulaks, massacres of the
Armenians, the slaughter of the innocents in Biblical days, are not likely
to be repeated on any considerable scale in the future -- because they are
politically dangerous and do not make more than a momentary dent in
the population growth curve. Any marked decrease in population growth --
except by devastating all-out war -- must take place primarily in terms of
positive controls of the birth rate. By 1970, or even for a decade or more
after that date, the use of such controls to affect appreciably the expected
population explosion is quite improbable.*
What this population explosion portends in terms of material needs alone is
obvious. New developments in agricultural processes, land utilization,
soil conservation and improvement, distributive facilities, and the like
will tax the ingenuity as well as the financial resources of many nations.
Ten years from today it may be incumbent upon some international organ-
ization such as the United Nations to enter the arena of worldwide control
of food resources for purposes of insuring adequate standards of survival
and health for all the people of the globe. This will not be primarily a
political matter -- it will be mainly a necessity in an age of rapid inter-
communication and movement of peoples to guard against the spread of
communicable diseases that thrive on malnutrition and lowered bodily
resistance because of insufficient nourishment.
The expected population explosion may also mean that relocation of peoples
from overcrowded areas will become imperative and that this will have to
be accomplished on an international basis rather than on a basis of
aggressive pushing out by imperialistic design on the part of individual
powers. What this signifies, politically, economically, and demographically
in the cases of such expansion-minded governments as that of Communist
China, and even of India, Egypt, Indonesia, and others, indicates the serious-
ness of this problem. Although the urge to embark upon imperialistic
ventures may not always be the accompaniment of population pressures
at home, as is illustrated by the example of the Soviet Union where there
*C.G. McClintock's studies in this series, especially RM 57TMP-3 (1958
Re-issue), give consideration to these factors. See also his RM 58TMP-24
and RM 58TMP-58, as well as portions of the political and economic
studies relating to India, Communist China, Japan, and Southeast Asia.
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I s room for internal expansion, it is a probable result of overcrowding.
E o, as world population grows, we may see new imperialistically inclined
cowers ready to follow the patterns set by Hiropean nations in the past.
The role played by population pressures in the ill-fated experiences of
Laly in Libya and Ethiopia, of Japan in the Far East, is well known.
Jut nations, like individuals, are not always apt to learn by a study of
history.
We must also be concerned with the future of the natural resources avail-
able for the expanding population of the world. Where and when will adequate
water supplies be available for the millions who will inhabit both the older
and the newer lands of the earth in 1970? Present consumption of water is
already creating problems in many areas. Lack of sufficient water is today
hampering the development of numerous overpopulated regions and is
denying other regions to those who would move in if water could be
brought to the points of need.
Yet, even where water is at present sufficient for today's requirements,
,,he (and other peoples) are using it with a prodigality that endangers the
future of millions. New methods of obtaining water -- by more efficient
topping of existing resources, by conservation, by desalinization of sea
water, etc. -- must be utilized, or many sections of the world will be on
the edge of aridity, and growing populations will be contending over water
s-:)urces as they have in the past over gold, spices, oil, or other desired
items. The beginnings of international strife over water resources are
a.'.ready exemplified in the tensions plaguing the Middle East.
As if the problem of water were not enough, the quest for available lands,
the search for mineral necessities for an industrial-technological civilil-
zation and the demand for adequate sources of food will magnify the
r:.valry of peoples. All these will be the very roots of the need to survive
it the population explosion is not accompanied by, or preferably preceded
k ,v, efficient and courageous planning on an international scale.
Because the coming population explosion will directly affect the United
Si ates, we should examine some of the indications for this country. By
1970 -- based on an average annual increase of 2 percent -- the population
of the United States should reach about 209,000,000. (See Chart II).
14
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Our population lives essentially in family groups. Trends in family
formation indicate the likelihood of some 11,000,000 new family groups
being added to the numbers now current. While combinations of various
members of a family grouping account for some of the new groups, the
maiority of the additions to the family group count will come from mar.-
riages and will reflect as well as cause an increase in birth rates. To-
gether with the growth in family groups there will be a rise in the demand
for new households. Forecasts indicate that this demand will require about
one million new households per year within the next decade, rising to 1.5
million per year by 1970.*
It is clear that the radiating effects of population growth are comparable
to a chain reaction. However, it is more pertinent to interpolate the effects
in terms of the demands that will be created by 1970 for educating one-third
more children in the elementary schools of our country than we are
enrolling today. At the higher levels of education, similar increases in
the number of students will take place, not only as a result of population
growth but also because of social, industrial, and national security
pressures.** Some of the projected requirements in respectto educational
facilities are presented in. Chart III. We submit that the significance of
this information for planners is abundantly evident -- whether they plan
in terms of future customers for their goods or for future manpower and
skills to manufacture those goods.
*The implications of this increase in terms of needs for appliances,
power, utilities, etc. are impressive. A. B. Nadel in his study RM 58TMP-
51 discusses some of these implications. See also his RM 58TMP-52. See
also "A Billion People in U.S.?" U.S. News and World Report, XLV: 72-84,
28 November, 1958, which indicates that appliance sales may triple
after 1970.
**Dotail analyses of the expectations in educational requirements will be
found in C. G. McClintock, RM 58TMP-57, and A. B. Nadel, RM 58TMP-
51 and RM 58TMP-52. See also D. H. Webster, RM 58TMP-46.
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As in the United States, so in many other areas of the world the coming
population explosion will bring demands for more education, more conven-
iences, more material advantages.. But it will bring other demands as
well.
What, the, will be the life of man ten years from now? How can he cope
with the problems that will be crowding in upon him wherever he may live?
How will he survive the inevitable disappearance of the older, more
independently-managed type of society? What can he contribute as an
individual to the highly complex and integrated modern social order?
Tho amazing resourcefulness of the human race is the intangible factor
of the future, as it has been the wonder of the past. Whatever we may
expect of man -- what he will be like a decade hence, what he will accom-
ptiyh or fail to accomplish, what he can endure, what he can imagine, and
what he can demonstrate in the way of ingenuity, resiliency, and mobility - -
we can safely say that he will both surprise and confound us.
We can attempt to chart some of the resources man will have to build
within himself and will have to put at the disposal of the future. It seems
obvious that with increased industrialization In many hitherto agrarian
regions of the earth multitudes of men, and especially of women, will
enter the labor forces of most countries. Even in such an advanced nation
as the United States, for example, average annual employment is expected
to rise from 60 million in 1955 to more than 76 million in 1970.* The
increases in nations where the disparity between them and the US has been
gre.tt will clearly be much more spectacular. Communist China is a good
example of what may occur in this respect.**
*A. B. Nadel, RM 58TMP-52, discusses this point in some detail.
*See L. Krader, RM 58TMP-56, and F. Michael, RM 58TMP-42 for
some facts on this point.
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As this growth in the labor force, to serve increasingly industrialized
economies, manifests itself -- whether here at home or in areas abroad --
the equally obvious fact that millions will become concentrated into urban
areas, confronts the planner. How this concentration will be reflected in
greater needs for transportation, housing, health, and welfare facilities
is a commonplace. But, it must also be emphasized that much of this
growth will be at the expense of formerly agricultural areas, although the
movement will be slower in some regions than others. Proportionately
there will be fewer people left to farm and to raise the food that will be
required for the growingly urbanized multitudes that have neither the
ability nor the resources to survive without this supply. So, it becomes
plain, the urban dweller of the 1965-1970 period will be more than ever
dependent upon a social system that causes him to rely upon a structure
over which he has little control.*
At the same time, this urbanized civilization will compound the problems
of vulnerability to all the uncertainties of a complex series of threats.
These threats will be more than those of security from armed attack.
Too great concentrations of population -- and especially concentrations
that are brought about by increases in the technological intensities of the
present and future -- will present targets for wars and strategic attack
that cannot be ignored -- and, in truth, cannot be tolerated if national secur-
ity is to be achieved. We shall hear more and more as we move into the
coming decade of the need for areal and urban planning, for dispersion,
for civil defense, for evacuation planning, and the like. Unfortunately, too
little attention is being devoted to this problemby planners on every level.
It is a matter for serious future investigation and analysis on a scale we
have not been able to undertake in this project.**
*C. R. Nixon, RM 58TMP-38, D. H. Webster, RM 58TMP-46, and A. B.
Nadel, RM 58 TMP-51, treat this subject at some length. Other papers
in the series make particular mention of specific areas in connection with
the trend toward urbanization.
**See A. B. Nadel, RM 58TMP-51; D. H. Webster, RM 58TMP-46, etc.
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Aside from the physical vulnerability to attack, these urban concentrations
are open to a number of other possible dangers. Concentrated population
areas will be vulnerable to natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes,
tornadoes, and unusually severe storms -- in greater or lesser degree as
planning for such events has been neglected. Likewise they will be in peril
from health hazards such as epidemics, air pollution, contamination of
water or food resources, etc. In addition, all the ills of economic de-
pressions, financial panics, shifts in economic roles, mechanization and
automation, obsolesence, and the rest will fall heaviest upon the Popu-
lations of metropolitan or single urban centers. As if this were not enough,
such areas will be always vulnerable to the political hazards of poor
government, demagoguery, inadequate intergovernmental cooperation, and
similar dangers that will mean higher taxation and less return in the form
of public services.*
There are advantages in urbanization provided sufficient planning and
foresight accompany the trend. We may suggest here that, in general,
urban growth has heretofore been too haphazard to be healthy and that we
do not see sufficient signs of improvement at a rate that will overcome the
disadvantages by 1970. :But every effort that is expended to avert the dire
consequences of too great and too rapid urbanization will increase the
outlook for future adjustments.
We see that urban man in 1965-1970 will be more dependent upon what we
may call "social security", at the same timehe is less able to withdraw
from the system and "go back to the farm", as was possible in earlier
generations when adjustment to the vicissitudes of industrial life seemed
simpler. We doubt that things were actually easier in the past -- the
difficulties were probably made less apparent by conditions of the time.
But the certainty exists that life for a far greater proportion of mankind
will be more complex in the future and that more complex methods will
be required to simplify the problems of living.
*'Many of these factors are discussed in D. H. Webster, RM 58TMP-56,
C, R. Nixon, RM 58TMP-38, A. B. Nadel, RM 58TMP-51, etc.
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Concurrently, we cannot afford to look at the plight of the man still on
the land with any less concern. His lot, in spite of mechanization and
improvement in agricultural processes, will not be materially better than
that of his urban brother. Unless discovery paces itself faster than rural
deterioration, the agrarian population will find it more and more difficult
to feed itself as well as to grow sufficient foodstuffs for the human and
animal life so dependent upon it. Whatever methods and moves there are in
the future to redistribute surpluses and to reinvigorate marginal lands they
must be instituted promptly and universally.
We must also consider those parts of the world where exploding nationalism
is combined with the population explosion. There seems too little hope that
reason will rule in these places when peasant peoples try to create new
states and industrial societies in almost the same instant. Here again cau-
tion should be exercised and the pace of industrialization geared to the
competencies of the peoples and the physical capacities of their lands to
make the transition from underdeveloped area to industrialized community.
Combined with other human needs for the 1965-1970 era are the tremendous
needs for education in all its aspects. We speak of education, of course, in
the broadest sense. It, more than almost anything else save air, water,
and land, will be in short supply in the future. For only through education
at every level and on increasingly demanding terms can mankind hope to
keep itself from committing universal suicide. But we do not mean mass
education, if by that is understood a common denominator of literacy for
all and wisdom for none. The goal of universal literacy should be before
us, and it will be increasingly nearer as we move into the 19708. However,
widespread ability to read and write will be of little avail unless there are
materials worth reading and discriminating readers for whom to write.
This whole subject of education calls for far more thorough treatment than
we have been able to accord it... We need to examine more closely the
competition for men's minds that is touched upon in several studies of
this project.* Important as it is to look at the conflict between the US and
the USSR in terms of the educational habits and attitudes of the people of
each of these great powers, it is equally necessary to try to see what needs
to be taught and learned in the future.
*See C. G. McClintock, RM 58TMP-57, A. B. Nadel, RM 58TMP-59, etc.
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This is doubly true when one considers the influence that will be brought
to bear on the future course of international dealings by the capacity of
peoples to understand and to evaluate the information they are given by all
the media of communication available to governments and peoples in a
rapidly contracting world. * 4 Education for living" maybe an unfashionable
phrase just now, but it will be an essential of the decade to come. In our
view it will have to prepare the man of tomorrow for his role in the new
age with a discipline and a purpose that may be lacking today. It is clear
that more and better technological education will be required. But we see a
need for education for leadership as more important. This implies educa-
tion of a sort all too rare today -- even in the half dozen countries where
the standards are highest. If Sputnik had done nothing else, it would have
been important because of the revulsion it caused in the US toward the type
of educational myopia under which we have been operating for nearly a
quarter of a century. The worldwide competition for the minds of men will
net end with the new decade, nor will it result in a clear-cut victory for
one side or another. It will continue and become intensified.
We shall need to know before we go on into the 1960s what are the differ-
ences between the purposes and goals of education throughout the world and
the accomplishments. We can suspect that education in the Communist
bloc countries is primarily materialistic in its aim, that the intent is to
train technological and political tools that can be manipulated and used at
the whim of the totalitarian leaders. We can likewise support that the
purpose of universal education in the countries of the Free World is to
raise the level of all the peoplesandto equip individuals to play significant
roles in the development of their own destinies. But we shall be blind If
we allow ourselves to succumb to unfounded emotional needs of the future.
W a must not guess; we must know.
The stultifying effects of enforced and voluntary conformity are having their
toil on the vitality of the human race. It appears to us that the population
pressures of the next decade will result in localized revolts by the 11 common
man" against the constraints of his environment. In fact, where such revolts
are most vigorous -- as they may be in the underdeveloped areas of the
world -- we may see before 1970, and almost certainly before the year 20001,
events as significant as the American and French revolutions of the 18th
century, the mid-European upsets of the 19th century, and the Communist
developments from 1917 to the present day.
A. B. Nadel, RM 58TMP-59, devotes attention to this factor.
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We conclude this section of the report by saying that in a world of 3.5
billion people, the individual may not seem to bulk large. Nevertheless,
this is in its very essentials the era of the common man and, to put it
literally, the addition of just one more person to an already crowded earth
figuratively may be all that is needed to upset an uneasy balance of power,
the sufficiency of food, the space requirement for housing, the numerical
superiority of a military force, or the militant membership of a religious
or nationalistic group. We do not exaggerate when we point to the problem
of population expansion as the premier concern of the world today and
tomorrow. If we are fortunate, that one more individual may be another
Einstein, another Lincoln, another Shakespeare, or another Buddha.
Unhappily that is just what the world may have been thinking when the
recorder registered the birth of Adolf Hitler, Josef Stalin, Torquemada,
Pontius Pilate, or even Beelzebub himself.
It has been one of our purposes in making this study to call attention to
the fact that right now is not too soon to face the challenge of the popula-
tion explosion, so we may prevent irreparable damage from the results
of the detonation we have neither the means nor the wisdom to avoid.
We can guess the damage an atomic bomb can do. The population explosion
is more likely -- in fact, it is certain -- and we are not yet prepared to
calculate its cost to the world. The burden of our argument here is that
we had better be about the business of organizing a sort of "civil defense"
against the probable effects of this inevitable "bomb-shell".
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In a world of rapidly increasing population, the requirements for scientific
and technological advances will grow ever more urgent. We have long been
familiar with the assertion that this is the age of science; that, of all the
ages of history, this is the era most dependent upon scientific discovery
and technological progress. These truisms are nonetheless impressive
because they are reiterated. This is the day of science, and tomorrow will
be just like today, only more so.
As we move into the coming decade, there will be an even greater emphasis
upon the need to marshal our scientific knowledge and our technical com-
petence for the conquest of the physical environment and for the explora-
tion of the further frontiers of the universe around us. This period,
in which we already see the importance of the scientific aspects of life,
will be but a preface to the era that will see even greater emphasis given
to the needs of the human race for scientific knowledge. How great will
be the demands upon scientists and for scientists can only be estimated.
But we can be certain that they are destined to play more crucial roles for
decades to come. The problem, as we see it, is to ascertain the optimum
conditions for producing scientists of demonstrable proficiency.* Perhaps
we shall find that frantic efforts to produce scientists have a marginal
utility -- a crash program may put quantity above quality. But until the
proper analyses are made, we are likely to witness a continued prolifera-
tion of scientific manpower.
Surely there will be a plenitude of problems on which to work. Here we
can merely suggest some that cry for attention as well as some of the
results that are likely to be visible in the period we are examining. One
of the greatest tests of our claim to maturity as a people -- and in fact
as a species of life on this earth -- will be how we apply the knowledge
the scientists will produce in the years ahead.
*C. G. McClintock, RM 58TMP-57, gives some consideration to the need
for educating scientists, as well as of the methods employed in both the
US and the USSR.
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Because the subject is so large and so complex, and because the tasks
before our scientists are so great, we are arbitrarily choosing only a few
topics to discuss here. Our recognition that scientific research and
applications will bulk so massively in the future of the world's progress
should give assurance to those who find in such a limited discussion a
lack of adequacy.
One of the most pressing needs of the decade ahead will be for greatly
increased energy -- in its more familiar forms as used commonly today,
and in types of energy that are only beginning to become available, as
well as from new sources as yet untapped. We believe that current planning
for power production is not likely to satisfy the 1970 demands for approxi-
mately 2-1/2 times the present world output. This will of necessity require
consideration of sources of energy that should be susceptible of much
greater development in the near future. The three sources regarded as most
possible in this respect are nuclear power, chemical sources, and solar
energy.
We see in these three potential sources of greater energy both advantages
and disadvantages. By 1970 nuclear power will attain its greatest usefulness
in land-based power stations and for ship propulsion, but in much less
measure for other projected uses -- such as in nuclear aircraft. The
degree to which we in the United States encourage and support research
and development will determine how rapidly we move forward toward
a realization of the potentials in this sphere. We are not likely to see, in
the framework of the cold war, the sort of emphasis upon a number of the
so-called civilian usages of nuclear power that have been voiced in the
"atoms for peace" declarations of our governmental leaders. However,
regrettable as this may lbe from a viewpoint of idealism and national
prestige, attention to the defense utility of such developments often con-
tributes to purely civilian usages.
Nevertheless, there will be appreciable advances in the nuclear fission
generation of power in the decade ahead. The employment of relatively
small, semi-mobile, packaged fission reactors for strategic military
purposes in isolated areas is already a fact. As costs are reduced, we
may expect greater non-military utilization of portable or semi-mobile
fission reactors for remote regions. We also foresee that nuclear fission
power generation will probably prove itself economically competitive
with fossil fuels before 1970 in many areas of the world now dependent
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upon imports of such fuels. Large scale production elsewhere at econom-
ically acceptable costs will probably be delayed until well beyond 1970.*
As for chemical sources of energy we see them utilized mainly for power
generation, transportation, and heating purposes. Advances in the applica-
tion of known principles and refinements in present practices should produce
more efficient use of such sources. There will be increased requirements
for discovery and development of new fuels as well as for improved
processes for the more efficient use of existing fuels. Especially as we
move further into the era of missiles, rockets, and space vehicles the
demand for new chemical fuels will spur this search.
The whole field of development of solar energy sources will also become
more active in the period we are examining. While solar energy will find
only limited application for purposes of heating, we shall witness an
accelerated development of this source for many other uses, particularly
in the area of space exploration.
On the topic of the direct conversion of various types of energy to electricity
it should be sufficient to indicate that we expect an increase in the use of
converters in the decade ahead.** The great growth in converter use will
lead to higher proportionate development and production of portable elec-
tric equipment of all types. Thus, we can forecast increased emphasis upon
those devices and mechanisms that provide readily transportable energy
sources for the operation of a variety of mobile units under their own power,
or where energy is easily available on a small scale to provide power at
the spot where it is needed to serve individually crafted or mass-produced
instruments alike.
The political and economic overtones of these requirements will have to
concern the scientist as well as the statesman and economist. In this and in
other areas of the future, the scientist will be called upon more and more to
exercise his judgment and contribute his intelligence to the solution of
political and economic problems. Therefore, we see here as elsewhere the
need for wide-visioned individuals ready to cooperate with men of other
training and talents.
*H.C. Mattraw and J.W. Moyer, RM 58TMP-47, deals in some detail with
these aspects of the probable development of nuclear fission power
generation.
**See especially H.C. Mattraw and J.W. Moyer, RM 58TMP-47, for a
detailed discussion of this point.
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Another subject of immediate concern is the demand for global communica-
tions that will mark the oncoming decade.* We estimate that this demand
will more than double in this period. The resulting congestion in com-
munications media will cause an additional doubling in the amount of
t:?affic to be handled. Compounded upon these factors will be ionospheric
and scatter phenomena -- both natural and artificial. This will further
double the traffic density. The total effect will amount to an eightfold
multiplication in traffic density during the time between now and 1970.
The significance of such a situation must be clear to the planner -- he
must count on an order--of-magnitude increase in difficulty in getting his
message through from what he is now experiencing.
We have the technological resources for hurdling this communications
barrier in the coming decade. But it will require an increase of at least
two orders of magnitude in communications planning and facilities.
Happily, we see in probable modulation and detection techniques, emission
control, path management, and allocation administration a three hundred-
fold multiplication in resources for global communications by 1970. Before
we can be sure of this estimate, however, we must investigate predictive
techniques, artificial scatterers, modulation methods, and other communi-
cations and radio services. If our calculations are correct within tolerable
limits, we can then project our studies further into the future. What is of
paramount concern to us at this point is that we recognize the onrushing
complexities of this communications problem and work energetically to
make use of existing scientific knowledge as well as to strike boldly into
the unknown.
Another specific area of study we have entered is the field of trends in
electronics research. Demonstratively this field is one that must of
necessity be examined for its significance to TEMPO and for the General
Ei.ectric Company in particular. Our survey of current electronics research
indicates that the future technology in electronics rests chiefly on materials
research and upon a greater understanding of the principles and properties
of ionized gases. Moreover, we must consider the development of devices
that will be operable at the extremes of high and low temperatures.
'-J.E.Hacke, RM 58TMP-62, treats in specific terms with the many facets
of this problem of communications.
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It is our belief that the decade ahead will see the realization of a greater
influence on the part of chemical electronic and bio-electronic phenomena.
Likewise, local control of the ionosphere may, in all probability, cause a
revolution in high frequency communications. This will be especially
significant if, as suggested above, advantage can be taken of the technical
improvements in communications techniques.*
When we come to consider the salient characteristics of electronics devices
and procedures likely to be ready by 1970, we can state with some assur-
ance that this date will usher in a period of ultraminiaturization, portability,
and of greater use of segments of the electromagnetic spectrum currently
employed. In addition, it will be possible to utilize entire new families of
instrumentation at extreme temperature ranges. Part of this development
will result from requirements put upon electronics for use in the explora-
tion of space. And, concurrently, such exploration will result in the appli-
cations of the principles discovered through this endeavor to other develop-
ments in the electronics area.
By 1970 we can expect greater use of computers and information storage
devices in the fields of education, finance, commerce, and in adminis-
trative procedures of various types. The entire span of electronics possi-
bilities in the computer field will open wider the potentials of this form of
automation with all its significance for the social and economic environ-
ment of advanced regions of the world. Not only will there be a greater
dependence upon electronic devices of this nature, in enterprises involving
manufacturing and control, but advances in electronics mechanization will
also make an impact on many hitherto laborious manual operations in
other sectors of life. And, as a point of particular importance for national
defense calculations, an airborne radar with the capability of detecting,
identifying, and tracking low -altitude and ground-level military activity
can be expected to have been developed by the end of the next decade.**
*J.E. Hacke, RM 58TMP-62, should be consulted in connection with this
topic.
**H.C. Mattraw and J.W. Moyer, RM 58TMP-63, contains information
on this and related points.
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In the geophysical realm, there has been increased activity and interest In
exploring (in all senses of that word) some of the more remote environments
such as the polar regions, the ocean depths, outer space, and the planets.
It is clear that each of these significant frontiers will receive increasing
emphasis in the decade ahead. The impetus given explorations in several
of these areas by the IGY will undoubtedly be reflected in efforts to enlarge
our knowledge of the potentialities in each of the newer realms. And, for
good or ill, the polar regions, the oceans, and outer space have become key
areas in the political and economic conflicts that underlie the cold war.
That these areas will become more and more crucial as scientific advances
tell us more about their properties and resources is an evident factor for
long-range planners to take into account.
We are very conscious of the importance of the polar areas and we foresee
an acceleration of the present movement of population into the Arctic
regions. New knowledge of ways to overcome the problems associated with
living and working in formerly forbidding territories will hasten the move-
ment of peoples, trade,and Industry into the northern regions. Arctic
routes for shipping promise to develop rapidly enough to permit access to
many portions of the polar and subpolar terrain now closed to surface
vessels. The recent examples of submarine navigation of polar seas shows
that development of this means of transportation will likely receive
increased attention in the future.*
The utilization of Arctic air routes is already a commonplace, and both in
commercial and military aeronautics the conquest of the polar regions will
lead to a much greater employment of these areas for refueling and service
stops, bases, weather stations, communications relay points, and defense
outposts. By 1970 we foresee the Arctic as a portion of the globe increas?-
ingly familiar to the leading military and commercial powers of the
Northern hemisphere.
*F. E. Bronner, AM 58TMP-61, has a very full discussion of the known and
expected significance of the polar regions.
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As for Antarctica, the time is more distant when the South polar regions
may experience the influx of peoples and the multiplication of transport
routes which we foresee for the opposite end of the globe. However, we
must not lose sight of the fact that important targets in Australia, South
America, and South Africa are within missile range from Antarctica. If
present indications prevail, the decade ahead will see intensified explora-
tion of Antarctica for useful resources of a mineral nature. And the possi-
bility that deposits of extractable minerals will be found there indicates
that the 1965-1970 period will witness an accelerated interest on the part
of nations capable of developing and exploiting mineral resources in an
adverse environment.
In general terms, we are only beginning to appreciate the significance of
the world's water areas to the future of science, of commerce, of defense,
and of life itself. The advances promise to be spectacular in the years to
come. In more than one sense, we have scarcely gone below the surface
of the seas, and have merely commenced to plumb the depths.*
The discoveries and developments of the past two decades have put the
seas to work for mankind in ways that greatly increase their utility over
the days when they were mainly a source of fish for food, of whales for oil,
and as highways for trade and warfare. Now we are recognizing some of the
properties of the oceans as aids to military operations, communcations,
and economic resources beyond the familiar potentialities of the era
before World War H. In the 1965-1970 period we foresee a much greater
appreciation of the new knowledge we are gaining about the oceans. And
we shall come closer to the day when seawater can be converted in an
economically feasible manner to supplement the increased demands upon
fresh water resources for industrial, agricultural, and purely human
requirements in a more crowded world.
All we have said merely serves as an indicator of how small our knowledge
is, comparatively, of the role of the oceans in our world environment. The
stringency of our need to know more will operate to intensify our activity
on this score. And, concurrently, we may expect the other great powers of
the. world, as well as some smaller nations peculiarly dependent upon the
oceans for life and livelihood, to move in the same direction and with
equally motivated urgency.
*Reference is made to F.E. Bronner, RM 58TMP-60, where some of these
factors are discussed in detail.
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It does not seem an exaggeration to say that the cold war of the coming
decade in large measure will be an economic competition. While it will
continue to be a war for the minds of individuals, it will also take the form
of intensified economic rivalry between the major adversaries. And even
the uncommitted nations will use economic weapons to maintain their
neutral status, or to avoid entanglement with either or both sides in the
struggle. This continuing conflict will be more than the old-style imperial-
istic grab for raw materials and overseas markets. In fact, in aims,
strategies, and tactics it will be just short of total global war itself in
its severity and magnitude.
This condition would apply even if the United States were not directly
involved. However, with the international envy of the richness of the United
States as a goad, the Soviet Union has recently sent forth a challenge in
unmistakable terms -- Khruschev has declared that the USSR will outstrip
the United States economically before the end of the decade, and, paren-
thetically, will do it without resort to Soviet armed might. There are other
nations in the world that, while they might not fancy having the Russians as
the economic leaders of the future, would not be overly sorry to see the
United States weakened economically through a long and costly competition
with the USSR.
The comparison in probable growth between the two chief adversaries in
this economic cold war -- the United States and the Soviet Union -- is
our primary concern. We visualize that the Soviet economy will continue
to grow at a rate approximately twice that of our own.* Implicit in this
*D.J. Hekhuis, in both RM 58TMP-55 and RM 58TMP-1 (1958 Re-issue),
deals at some length with the competition and contrasts between the econo-
mies of the US and the USSR.
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Expected growth rate of the Soviet economy is the effect this will have
upon underdeveloped countries in terms of the impact of Communist propa-
ganda. While the economic facts of life indicate that the advancing Soviet
economy will not overtake that of the United States by 1970, many peoples
cf the world will be impressed by the evidence that the Soviet economy
will be growing at a faster rate than that of the Western democracies.
Therefore, they may conclude that victory inevitably will rest with the
Soviets in this economic: race and that this will be a demonstration of the
superiority of the Communist system. The Russian propagandists can be
depended upon to foster this belief, as well as capitalize on any indications
of Soviet gains.
The Soviets will become increasingly a more significant figure in world
t taade, challenging us both in the market place and in the minds of men.
Pere again we refer to the totality of this competition, since we see the
Soviet effort not only as a reflection of the internal drive of Russia to hoist
itself up by its bootstraps, but also as a manifestation of the threat of
International communism against the power of the world's leading demo-
c ratic stronghold. One salutary note can be seen here. So long as the Rus-
s ~.an leaders believe they will be able to achieve these twin aspirations
they are not likely to resort to total war, or to become involved in more
than small scale indirect. armed conflict with the Western powers.
Another significant instance of economic competition will be evident in the
pitting of the economies of India and of Red China one against the other in
the years to come. Both economies are growing at what are prodigious
rates for these hitherto "backward" nations. In relative terms the current
economic growth of mainland China is about double that of the Indian rate.
There seems little likelihood that India will appreciably reduce this margin
1r; the period before 1970. But, in the cases of both of these nations, the
absolute growth rates are Impressive. This adds significance to the
expected competition between their respective economies.* There is more
*Several studies in this series give detailed attention to the economies of
these two Asian nations. See W. C. Neale, RM 58TMP-49, and M. R.
Goodall, RM 58TMP-39, on India; and L. Krader, RM 58TMP-56, and
F Michael, RM 58TMP-42, on Communist China.
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in this rivalry than strictly economic aspects. There is an ideological
undertone as well. Communist China is in a sense a model of the Soviet
type of economic advance -- the rapid industrialization of a huge and potent-
ially resourceful land where all is subordinated to the direction of every
facet of individual and community life from a single source and for a single
purpose. India, on the other hand, represents a start from somewhat
similar base lines, but with a different spirit of direction and of purpose.
There the design is a socialistic economy, with areas of free enterprise
within the planning sphere to take into account the aspirations of a people
for self-rule and for individual appreciation of the role of an economic
pattern as a servant of the population rather than as its master.
While we must not overestimate the propaganda value of these two models
in their impact upon the underdeveloped areas of the world -- especially
in Southeast Asia and Africa -- we necessarily should call attention to the
fact that much of the "colored" areas of the globe will be watching intently
in the years to come to see the results of these two experiments. And we
cannot ignore the fact that in both India and Red China the significance of
this outside attention to the respective actions of these two great powers
does not escape the economic and political leaders who are basing their
plans on these contesting concepts.
Combined with this importance of the competition between India and China
is the realization on the part of boththe Communist and the non-Communist
world that we in the United States have, to a degree, become committed
to aid the Indian economy. This assistance can have great significance,
especially for the private sector of the Indian economy. As several writers
point out, India is at a period in the development of its economy where such
outside aid can exert a potent influence upon the expansion of heavy industry
in areas where internal governmental programs cannot take on the task in
sufficient degree to insure continued growth.* With aid from the United
States, the recent drains on Indian foreign exchange reserves can be offset
to some extent and the momentum that has been threatening to lose much of
its vitality can be preserved.
*See especially W.C. Neale, RM 58TMP-49, pp.26-27; and M.F.Millikan
and W. W. Rostow, "Foreign Aid: Next Phase, Foreign Affairs, XXXVI:429,
April 1958.
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It appears evident that, in order to utilize the potentials of the Indian
economy for a growth that will increase the likelihood of India's chances
of meeting the competitive challenge successfully, the United States will do
well to increase its economic aid to this area of South Asia. Whereas we
know that this aid represents no semblance of imperialism on our part,
we shall be constrained to demonstrate forcefully to the doubting and the
suspicious that aid to India is just that, and it is in no way a levy upon India.
for favors and subservience in political, military, or ideological fashion.
The important consideration for the future is that however Indian economy
grows -- and our aid is only a part of the sum that will foster that growth.
-- the increase in India's economic standing must be achieved on terms
sa?!Lisfactory to the Indians themselves. No one will be blind to the assis-
tance Red China has had from the USSR. The comparison between the
achievements of India and those of China will be viewed as a part of this
continuing competition in economic warfare between the United States and
the Soviet Union.
Another nation of Asia whose economic growth and stability will necessarily
concern us in the coming decade is Japan. The heavy dependence of Japan
upon foreign trade will influence her political future as well as her economic
well being.* As mainland China becomes further industrialized, Japan will
find itself in closer competition with the Chinese Communists for markets
in South and Southeast Asia. For a time the two competitors may be able
to share the wealth, since Japan is and will remain substantially ahead of
her continental rival and the Chinese will not be in a position to produce
the variety of manufactured goods with which Japan can hold its present
customers. But, before the decade is out, we shall likely see this balance
shifting and Red China becoming a real threat to the Japanese international
position in economic terms.
*M. Bronfenbrenner, RM 58TMP-44, deals with the significance of foreign
trade for the Japanese economy. See also R.E. Ward, RM 58TMP-41
for political implications of this subject.
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ON
While this competition is growing in intensity, a concurrent problem will
face Japan. A great deal of Japan's commercial stability depends upon the
possibility of trade with mainland China. So long as political impediments
of any type stand in the way of full realization by Japan of the potentials
of the Chinese market, we are likely to see tensions in this area. These
political impediments can come from within either or both of these two
countries, or they can come from the outside. In the latter case they may
have the effect of drawing Red China and Japan closer together economic-
ally and politically so that the combined -- or associated -- strength of the
sophisticated and highly industrialized Japan and the growingly advanced
civilization of mainland China would act to form an Asian power center of
concern not only to the free nations of the Western world, but to the Soviet
bloc as well.
We must also consider the growing foreign aid program which the Com-
munist Chinese are undertaking. Their efforts to institute projects in
support of technical and agricultural assistance to the underdeveloped areas
of Southeast Asia are already bearing fruit. Moreover, for political
reasons, the Red Chinese leaders will find it quite feasible to divert
resources from domestic projects to foreign aid programs without reckon-
ing precisely the cost of details in the over-all objective of subverting
neighboring nations or of winning propaganda wars.
If Red China extends her economic program into substantial grants of aid
-- either in the form of funds or material goods and. technical help --
to areas of the Asian and African sphere in the next decade, we may see
several results. There may be a split between the USSR and Chinese
Reds on this issue. At the same time the United States, the Soviet Union,
Red China, India, and Japan may enter into a race to see which nation can
woo the underdeveloped countries with promises of aid. And we may have
these hitherto "underprivileged" countries playing one big power against
another, or against several others, on a scale that resembles blackmail.
One speculation is that Red Chinese assistance to foreign areas will be
more for propaganda purposes than as a real demonstration of China's
ability to enter into competition with the USSR and the US in these matters.
In the decade ahead we do not see the emergence of Africa as an economic
unit of major consequence in world affairs. Certain countries and possibly
limited areas of that continent will show rapid growth as technology and
improved agricultural methods are spread into the former colonial areas
and in such portions of Africa as remain under the guidance of France,
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Britain, and Belgium. Certainly, the economic future of Africa is impressive
in its implications, but the greatest promise is still in the future, and that
future lies beyond 1965-1970?
Something the same might be said of Latin America, but with greater
caution, for a number of nations south of the Rio Grande are closer to the
threshold of significant economic development than are the newer countries
of Africa. It would appear that certain countries of Latin America can be
looked upon as most likely to develop rapidly in an economic sense in the
period under consideration. The population explosion already referred to
shows an expectation of, a rise of the number of inhabitants of Latin
America in the next decade on a ratio considerably in excess of the increase
predicted for the United States. This will mean much in terms of the growth
of industrialization in Latin America and much in terms of the role Latin
America will play in the world economic scene.
Another area calling for attention is the Middle East. Here the "economy
of petroleum" has made the region a tension point for several decades.
And, both politically and economically, the Middle East is destined to
remain a trouble spot for years to come.* The fact that oil resources are
being exploited in currently less controversial regions -- such as the
French Sahara, the Argentine, Alaska, etc. -- does not remove the Middle
East from the list of potential centers of competition. But new developments
do indicate that the nations of the Middle East are not likely to use their
possession of oil resources as a weapon of economic warfare. Middle
Eastern nationalism is becoming more and more imbued with the deter-
mination to embark upon large-scale developmental programs. To do this,
they will have to depend upon the sale of their oil to Western Europe -?-
presently their logical customer. So, we believe, that the emphasis on the
competition over the Middle Eastern region will shift from the economic
sphere to the political one, although the changes will be slow and the current
ore-product economy of the region will continue to keep the Middle East
*:;ee H.P. Goss, RM 58TMP-4 (Revised Edition), for a discussion of the
factor of Middle East oil In international political and economic competition.
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"underdeveloped" until advances in some such technique as low-cost
desalinization of seawater permits a diversification of the area's economy.
The economy and the growth potential of Europe -- especially Western
Europe -- is a subject for future investigation. When we stop to consider
that Western Europe was the center of modern economic development and
for many years represented the world's most advanced society, economic-
ally speaking, we realize how important it is that TEMPO devote consider-
able attention to European economies in its future environmental studies.
The development of such cooperative enterprises as the European Coal
and Steel Community, the European Common Market, and similar joint
undertakings will have a definite impact upon both European and world
economic progress in the decade ahead. The very recent monetary reforms
in several countries of Western Europe, beginning with France and extend-
ing to much of the industrial and commercial area of this significant region,
are an indication of the determination of Europeans to regain some of the
stability and the economic leadership that have been lost since the days of
World War Y. We can see in this new spirit of unity clear implications for
the future, not only in terms of international economic competition, but
also in portents for European political unity.
We must take increasing cognizance of the overriding significance of the
possible future course of our own economy -- both in domestic and in inter-
national terms. As a matter of fact, in an economy such as has developed in
the United States during the last half century it is both difficult and unwise
to compartment the over-all design into domestic and international seg-
ments. As a nation we have become so involved in world affairs that practi-
cally everything we do or plan economically has an aspect of interrelation.
While this intermixture could be carried too far, we believe that, in the
decade to come, there will be very few facets of our national economy that
will not be affected by this international economic competition and conflict
we have indicated is a manifestation of the cold war.
We have separated our present discussion of the American economy into
probabilities in the area of expenditures for defense purposes and for
goods and services that will be purchased by all levels of government in
this country for what we consider are non-defense purposes. We have left
untouched the immense problem of non-governmental expenditures for two
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main reasons. First, a great proportion of the business of the national
government in 1965-1970 will continue to be in the defense or national
security area -- probably in terms of 50 percent or more of our annual
federal budget. Secondly, whatever is to be estimated, appropriated, and
spent out of the national income for defense requirements must take into
account the other needs of all levels of government and the demands that
our society -- acting through political pressures -- will put upon govern-
raent to include such goods and services in what is made available to the
populace as a whole. Of course, governmental expenditures -- for defense
and non-defense -- must come out of government revenues. And these
revenues must be predicated upon the ability of the economy to sustain
them in the first place, and upon the willingness of the taxpayers to accept,
politically, the tax bills that are presented to them for payment.
There is in a democratically-based society a close relation between what
is (lone governmentally and what is done privately to plan and carry out the
economic destiny of a nation. An investigation into the levels of defense
and non-defense governmental spending that are likely to be possible in
the 1965-1970 period leads us to some general conclusions about the ability
of the American economy to sustain a high-figure demand to meet the
challenges of the cold war. .. Projections of existing capabilities indicate
that the United States can carry heavy governmentally-supported burdens
in both the defense and non-defense fields, without endangering the econo-
mic health of the nation. An expected GNP of $700,000,000,000 (in terms of
1957 prices) by 1970 could permit a defense budget of something like $ 65
billions and, at the same time, could permit all sectors of the national,
state, and local governments to meet demands for goods and services at
levels upward of $80 billions.*
These elements of our economy can be geared to the necessities of the
future without dislocation. of our economic structure. Enough evidence
exssts to make a good case for a continued high level of defense expenditure,
while the governmental traits of our nation increase the services they
perform for the citizens of the United States. This is not to forecast a
*These over all figures are arrived at from a consideration of W.J.Mead,
RM 58TMP-45, and D.J. Hekhuis, RM 58TMP-1, plus some further
estimates made by Hekhuis in his RM 58TMP-55. See also D.H. Webster,
RM 58TMP-46, for substantiating information on non-defense needs.
34
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socialistic or welfare-type of state in any sense, since we are certain
that the greater expenditures for national security and individual well-being
will be accompanied by a surge of economic growth in terms of private
enterprise that will run parallel with this increment in governmental
expenditures. Until we can study more deeply the potentialities of non-
governmental activity we cannot say categorically what this parallel
development will look like. But we suggest that an increase in the GNP
from its present annual rate of around $445 billions to the estimate of
nearly $700 billions in 1970 indicates a comfortable margin for the
operation of private enterprise without fear of its being overwhelmed by
governmental spending.*
Naturally, with an expanded population and with increased governmental
commitments -- especially on the local and state levels -- there will be
some augmentation of what government Is doing today in the way of under-
taking to supply the needs of the people. In spite of dire warnings, the
United States is not likely to enter the 1970s as a socialist democracy,
any more than it is apt to turn to an oligarchic rule based on the aspirations
of a day long past.
The greatest danger to our economy comes not from this expectation of
much greater governmental expenditures. Rather we shall experience in
the future what we have so often seen during several periods in our history.
This is the alternation of efforts of high resolve and great purpose with
times of indolence and niggardliness where the spending of money for
governmental needs is involved -- whether those needs are the direct
costs of national security in terms of missiles, planes, bases, and ships,
or whether they are the less evident contributions to our national strength
in the form of schools, roads, health, foreign aid, and the physical and
human resources necessary to make these items useful to the people who
pay for them.
*Some further considerations of the implication of this factor are found in
A.B. Nadel, RM 58TMP-51, as well as by implication In portions of his
RM 58TMP-59.
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In this era of international rivalry we are competing with our chief
adversaries on a fundamentally unequal basis. The Communist system
holds a far different attitude on resource priorities than does our own.
This is of greater moment than the familiar "guns vs. butter" equation,
although there are aspects of this present as well.. We need to examine
further what should be the basis of our own priority considerations. This
becomes more than a problem of stock-piling, allocations of materials,
apportionment of defense contracts, etc. It goes to the questions of what
we as citizens of a free democracy want our nation to be. However, before
we can determine fully the goals toward which our economy should be
directed, we shall need in the decade ahead to survey the extent of our
basic resources and decide to what ends we want to direct their utiliza-
tion.
So often in the cold war, and in other days as well, we have responded
to stimuli from an adversary and for a time gone all out to provide the
funds needed to build up our strength. Then, as soon as the direct effects
of that stimulus have worn off, we have cried for economic relief, for cuts
in taxes, for removel of restraints, for services without cost to us, and
for budget balancing without regard to what is really important in order
to bring outgo more in keeping with income.* This we shall likely do again
in the decade ahead. Herein lies the great danger, for as the cold war
situation has demonstrated -- where we have reacted to outside stimuli
the cost to us has been high and our reaction has been inefficient and
wasteful of our resources. On the other hand, where we have pursued a.
realistic course, buttressed by planning, we have accomplished much and.
the cost has been relatively less.
One of the first steps in the process of striking an equilibrium should be
to examine the values of long-range planning. While the need for such
planning is becoming more often recognized with respect to industrial
operations, there is still much that could be directed toward the require-
ments for federal budgetary reforms along this line. We need not imitate
the methods or the plans of our adversaries, but we do need to understand
that the short-range view we take in national governmental expenditure
*See D.J. Hekhuis, RM 513TMP-55 for a discussion of the economic and
budgetary determinants of defense spending during the period since
World War II.
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processes is most costly in the momentum we lose each year as budget
making time occurs. To the extent that we can cultivate a long-range
perspective in fiscal matters we shall help to insure the perpetuation of
the values we cherish. In a cold war competition, where we face deter-
mined opponents who pride themselves on their ability to plan for the far
future, it would seem axiomatic that we develop long-range strategies and
goals of our own. Not to do so, in our opinion, would be an admission that
our nation lacks the capability to lead.
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POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS AND THE COLD WAR
When it comes to forecasting the possible and probable political develop-
ments of a period so far in the future as five to ten years, the prognosti-
cator undertakes his most hazardous task. To venture a prediction as to
what nations and peoples will do politically lays his reputation wide open
for anyone to destroy. Partly this is because everyone is his own political
forecaster and everyone is an expert in this area, and partly it is because
the political behavior of nations and peoples defies reduction to figures,
formulae, and even good common sense.
The world society of the future appears to us as one in which the manipu-
lation of political power, whether on a local, a national, or an international
level, will have to be accomplished more in consonance with requirements
for the totality of man's development than often has been the case in the
past. Herein lies one great value of inter-disciplinary projects of this
type -- each discipline has something to teach another and all may both
learn from and contribute to the planner's experience and knowledge. But
at the outset of this section of the report, let us reach the conclusion that
the energy behind. the employment of political force has never been tapped
for its greatest usefulness for long enough to perform what should be its
proper function.
The cardinal feature of the political climate of the next decade, as we see it,
will . be the increasing use by nations of psychological and economic
approaches to the political accomplishment of their desired ends. These
devices have always, in their way, been a part of the stock in trade of the
political leader. Sometimes he has used them instinctively and without
realizing his dependence upon them. At other times astute political leaders
knew they were taking advantage of the interrelations of these aspects of
mankind's efforts to arrive at a way of life. But we shall see an intensifica-
tion of their use in a conscious fashion in the years to come.
Our view of the future indicates that the cold war will continue much as it
has for the past dozen years. The principal alignment of political forces
on an international scale will be much. as it is today in general, although
there may be a number of changes in detail. How far apart or how much
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closer together the two great power blocs of 1958 will be poses some
problems. We would venture to estimate that there is not much in the
present scene that would enable us to forecast more than a moderate easing
of the tensions that have characterized the decade since the Marshall. Plan
ard the subjugation of Czechoslovakia. In fact, it would be more accurate
to see in the future a repetition of the past -- with the United States and
Scviet Russia as the leaders of their respective blocs alternating between
in'ransigence and cautious dealings w~th one another. And, following more or
:less in the lead of these two colossi, there will be a host of nations on either
,side pulling and straining in the manner of members of a tug-of-war team,
Finally, on the side lines we can expect the customary collection of specta--
to-,'s, now shouting in favor of whichever group seems to be gaining the
advantage, now appearing disinterested in the whole spectacle and, possibly ,
quarreling among themselves over trifles. And the entire contest will be
proceeding without umpire, without much in the way of rules, and with no
clearcut victory for anyone.
On the international scene, the United States will continue to build much
influence by virtue of its great wealth, its military strength, and its moral
st.ndards -- even if these latter attributes of power are not always clearly
apparent and adequately demonstrated. But we do see some political changes
within the United States that may have an impact upon our standing as a
world leader. Among these changes, most will be domestic in character --
such as have already been discussed in touching upon the greater urbaniza-
tio a, the increase in mobility and composition of the labor force, the further
dependence of the aged upon social security and other welfare resources,
and the problems connected with schooling housing, transportation, etc.
A few other possible changes in our political system also will seem to be
purely domestic in nature, but will have implications for our international
position. These are likely to be some method of the direct election of the
President, limitations upon the practice of the filibuster in the Senate, a
lessening of the power of seniority to hamper action on legislation in
Congress, a more realistic reapportionment of Congressional and State
Legislature representation to reflect population shifts, improvements in the
budget process, and administrative reforms in various departments of the
fed 3ral government.* The reason these changes may have some effect upon
* Scme of these possibilities are discussed in C. R. Nixon, RM 58TMP-38;
D. 11. Webster, RM 58TMP--46; H. P. Goss, RM 58TMP-35; etc.
40
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our conduct in international affairs is that they will free the policy-
makers from some of the unpredictable and often arbitrary restraints upon
their ability to act with continuity and direction.
Among the changes we are likely to experience in the decade ahead, several
seem to us to be portentous. We may take it for granted that the United
States has come to realize the interdependence of the nations of the world,
one upon another. It is true that in an era of cold war we shall be tempted
to draw back into our own homeland, but the temptation will not result in
action, although there may be a generation of a good amount of talk. Much
pressure may be brought by conservative and reactionary groups upon
Congress, the President, and upon other segments of our political society,
but we do not see on the horizon any indication that the United States will
abdicate its role as leader of the Free World, or will adopt some of the
policies of isolation that weakened the nation in the 1920s.
Likewise, we can expect a continuing and considerable commitment to the
principles of foreign aid -- both through assistance to our allies and through
programs of financial, technical, and other forms of subvention to under-
developed areas of the globe. Again, vociferous and sometimes influential
groups and individuals may effectively limit or halt particular programs,
but the principle and the practice will prevail. A great deal of political
ingenuity and wise leadership will be required to promote and administer
foreign aid during the continuing cold war.* It is our estimate that some of
this leadership will be available from among the members of the industrial
community where experience with and understanding of large scale, long-
range planning can be found. More and more the interrelation of political
and business judgment will become apparent in this area of our national
life. This change in climate has been taking place gradually over the past
decade and we see it having a growing influence in the future.
Concurrent with these developments we foresee a slow, but certain improve-
ment in the quality as well as in the intent of our policies relating to
American representation abroad. This will come about partially as a result
of the intensified competition between our way of life and the Communist
style of rule. However it will occur also because of the evolutionary process
that is taking place in the United States today. As a people we are more
keenly aware of the need for extending our ingenuity in the trades and
professions beyond our purely domestic requirements. The way will not be
easy, but we have the belief that the criticism and the obvious short-comings
of our existing system will begin to make themselves felt within the next
*Some of the political problems of aid programs are discussed in H. P.
Goss, RM 58TMP-40. See also the same author's RM 58TMP-37 and
RM 58TMP-35.
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decade. How cheeful we may be about this factor of our international
political situation will depend upon a number of intangibles. But we can see
3ause for optimism here and would submit as evidence the analysis of the
iistance we have traveled in this respect from the days of "Dollar Dipl.o-
nacy" and the propaganda machinery of World War I to the examples of
.he Marshall Plan, Point Four, and the concept of the USIA. Set-backs
will occur, but the direction seems forward and we can hope for measu.r-
ible Improvements now that the American nation has begun to recognize
:hat competence at home may easily be diluted by lack of purpose and
expertness abroad.*
We would suggest that the military elements of international competition --
;dignificant as they are -- have received too much attention. We may have
neglected more productive means to accomplish political goals. This Is not
1o say that preparedness is unnecessary or that military strength has not.
been worth Its cost to the peoples of the Free World In Its deterrent Value.
Probably the Soviet Union would have made satellites out of more of
Central and Western Europe had not NATO stood In the way with its
military shield.
We shall see in the next decade Increased political pressures being brought
L pon areas of the world where we have friends, as well as upon so-called
neutral nations. We cannot resist these political pressures by purely
military means without endangering the whole fabric of alliances and even
v'orld peace itself. We shall also be called upon to institute programs that
f )restall these pressures before they assume proportions that demand
riilitary action on our part or on the part of some one or more of our
allies. The examples of the Suez affair of 1956 and the crisis In Iraq in 1958
ehould be fresh enough in mind to suggest that we might have been better
prepared politically so that we (or our friends) did not have to act militarily
at great risk to our prestige and in peril of unlimited war.**
* These points are examined more fully in H. P. Goss, RM 58TMP-35; and
A. B. Nadel, RM 58TMP-59.
* That the military success in Lebanon came off so well and did probably
doter the Communists from overt action does not alter the fact that we
r:_sked much because of lack of general political preparation in the Middle
East over a period of years.
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How we are to achieve and hold the initiative politically in the future is a
subject to which all serious attention should be devoted. There are means at
hand in the form of a strengthening of the realistic bonds of our alliance
system; of appealing to the minds and hearts of the peoples of the uncom-
mitted nations rather than to their pocketbooks;of harnessing the enthusiasm
and vigor of expanding nationalism for the good of the former colonial
subjects as well as for the preservation of the values they already hold; of
enlisting the support of the forces of freedom that still exist in satellite
countries; and of so living our own assertions of democracy that our deeds
and our words are not contradictory in the eyes of the world. All these we
can set as goals for our international policies, and we must make progress
toward these aims in the decade ahead.*
When we come to a consideration of how we might accomplish such a
program and what effect its realization might have upon our chief adversary,
we see as a basic fact of this cold war the oft-stated determination of the
Communists to master the world. Even the Soviets are not likely to believe
that mastery will be achieved by 1970. But, certainly, they intend to be well
on their way to their announced goal by that date.
Looking ahead, it appears to us that here is our greatest challenge. We
of the United States, and we of the Free World must undertake to demon-
strate clearly the place that our system creates for the individual man.
Politically this has great implications for the planner. He must calculate
that, in order to formulate his plans, he has to take into account this
atmosphere of undirected freedom of choice. In a totalitarian government
planning has its place, but its delimitations are much more clearly marked
than in the free society. The planner in a dictatorship may not be free to
suggest alternatives, but he is likely to find his planning task more simple
so long as he matches his plans to what his superiors want and is able to
side-step nimbly when his leader or his plan is changed.
We would suggest that this difference is bound to grow greater between the
totalitarian state and the free society. And, perhaps, it will grow more
quickly within the framework of the non - Communist world than behind the
Iron Curtain. We think we see the beginning of the end of close associations
*Some more specific suggestions on these topics are contained in H.P.
Goss, RM 58TMP-37; RM 58TMP-35; and RM 58TMP-36.
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Between the United States and non-Communist totalitarian powers that have
been erected on the basis of expediency. These terminations will come about
for two reasons and from. various causes. First, the totalitarian regimes
we have bolstered in various quarters of the globe are "old" regimes, not in
terms of maturity, but in terms of the ages of the men who lead them. In
sight, it seems to us. are the end of the personal rules of such caudillos,
jefes, kings, sheiks, sultans, presidents, and premiers as have been pre-
served in office by support from Washington or from other Free World
.apitals where American funds and assistance were redirected by "middle-
man" countries. Very few totalitarian regimes long survive the demise of
the leaders who inaugurate them. Besides, exploding nationalism is more
-.;han likely to bring into being new countries all over the world who want
:o try "neutralism" for a period, and the influence of the United States will
be only one of the influences to which these emerging states are subjected.
to, we see a series of readjustments of our own alliance system and' a
~?ealignment of the world's peoples that will be markedly different from the
trouping that we have currently among the non-Communist powers.
As for the Communist bloc, we cannot forecast where or when signs
(-f aging will first be displayed. We have a suspicion that these signs will
appear initially in the USSR itself, but that the coming decade will not
witness a breakdown of the totalitarian pattern in the Soviet Union. There
iaay be some deterioration around the periphery -- in Poland, Hungary,
East Germany, for example -- and the most dramatic rupture may occur
between Communist China and the USSR. But to forecast precisely how and
when this break will come would be to indulge In wishful thinking. To
our minds, the period 71980-2000 would be a more realistic estimate of
the time when the two great Communist nations may part company.
Eecause the Communist bloc will not remain static, it is very probable
that attempts will be made by the Soviet leaders to make up for losses by
v mtures into other areas. The possible defection of a Hungary or a Poland
ndght be matched by an intensification of Russian activity in the Middle
East or in Africa. Tensions between the Moscow and Peiping Communists
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might be relieved by directing Soviet ambitions toward Latin America and
Chinese attentions toward Indonesia, or Malaya, or Burma.* In short, the
Communist bloc has the advantage that we do not possess -- it can shift
its emphasis more quickly and can be on its way to new goals while we
debate the wisdom of doing business with a dictator or of encouraging the
development of democratic institutions in a recently freed nation. And
the Soviet moves are more likely to be political and economic in purpose
than they are to be military -- although some of their probes may be cloaked
in military terms as were the threats to send "volunteers" to Egypt in
1956 and to atom-bomb Western Europe then and on several later occa-
sions. The great danger, as we see it, in the Communist bloc strategy is
that Red China may be willing to make its thrusts strongly military,
realizing that total war, if it comes, will be less damaging to mainland
China than to the Soviet Union, the United States, or to Western Europe.**
For these, and many supplementary reasons the United States will find
itself in an ever more involved position as the decade advances. The
deterioration in our international position in recent years has been marked
by increasingly widespread misunderstanding and misrepresentation of
our goals and our methods. We have not been blameless in this develop-
ment. Moreover, even our most sincere critics often neglect to make
allowances for the image of the United States created in foreign minds by
Hollywood film extravagancies, ill-bred behavior of individual Americans
abroad, and the inevitable gaucheries of a people relatively new to the
practices of international politics. Nevertheless, we cannot escape the fact
that we have fallen short of our potentiality for leadership by displaying
ineptitude in international affairs. To our credit, it must also be said that,
on a number of occasions in recent years, our representatives abroad --
both official and quasi-official, have displayed real talent for acting in the
best interest of our country. The picture is neither all black nor all white
in these matters. All democracies find it difficult at times to reconcile
deeds with words, and vice versa. Controls are much more lax than they
are in totalitarian systems and friends and foes alike are quite ready to
point out discrepancies between announced ideals and the execution of
policies.
*G. J. Pauker, RM 58TMP-34, devotes considerable attention to the
threat of Communist expansion in Southeast Asia.
**F. Michael, RM 58TMP-42, discusses this point.
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I i the coming decade we shall have to move more certainly to spread among
tie peoples of the world -- our own as well as outsiders -- the knowledge
teat we really mean what we profess. This will call for a greatly increased
effectiveness in our information practices and performances. But a success-
fil propaganda effort will have to be based upon a clearer understanding
all along the line of what it is we hope to achieve and of how we propose to
reach the goals we have set for ourselves. We hear a great deal about how
successful the Communists are in appealing to the underdeveloped areas,
in subverting the younger intellectuals, in mesmerizing the masses.
Certainly, the vigor and imagination that were responsible for the creation
aid development of the world's leading democracies have not evaporated
through exposure to the heat of Marxian argument. Nor can we believe
that only the Communists know the ways to win friends and influence
people. As we see it, what will be required of the United States in the
decade ahead will be a renewed faith in its own ability to lead, a charting
of new directions in which to advance, and a determination to march, not
it response to the tunes played by the Communists but in step with the
themes by which we have so often made our most inspiring progress.*
D-iring this era of cold war ahead we can see no hope of world disarmament
or of real peace. To forecast either of these wished-for conditions would be
to let our sentiment rule our judgment. However, we do see in the United
Nations an agency for the discussion of means toward the achievement of
cc ntrolled disarmament and as a vehicle for keeping the peace. As has been
indicated in one of the papers in the series supporting this project, the UN
will be a greatly enlarged international forum by 1970.** The UN will
have nearly 100 members by that time, twice the number it began with in
1c45.
*Some suggestions along these lines will be found in A. B. Nadel, RM 58
TMP-59, and in the several studies in this series written by H.P. Goss.
**See L. Bloomfeld, RM 58TMP-48, for a detailed discussion of what the
UN of the future is likely to be in terms of size, function, and effectiveness.
Some considerations of controlled disarmament will be found in H. P.
Gcss, RM 58TMP-36.
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To the extent that it will be more representative of the world as a whole,
this is encouraging. But a 100-member UN will verge on unwieldiness
except in the sense that its debates will reflect in miniature world opinion
on questions of great moment. As Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., said recently,
this is a favorable situation for us and our allies. The UN has become so
clearly a part of the international political scene that the Communist bloc
dares not ignore it and cannot afford to leave it. Yet, every time the Soviets
or their satellites impede the functioning of the UN by vetoes, abstentions,
or intransigence the rest of the world has a clear display of what nations
stand in the way of world peace.
This is not to suggest that the United States should accept without debate --
or without veto or abstention itself -- the weight of numbers when it is
against what we believe is our own best interest. But it does indicate to us
that in the future we should use the UN and its public forum, as well as its
less publicized committees, to further our determination to secure a world
in which peace, justice, and sincerity of purpose are possible. We shall
have to educate our own people more thoroughly to the potentialities of the
international security organization, and we shall have to pursue more
vigorously our announced policy of working within the UN for the further-
ance of the aims of its Charter -- which, incidentally but not accidentally
are similar to our own.
We do not believe that the United Nations as now constituted, or as it will
operate in the next decade, can prevent total war. It may help materially
to delay such a catastrophe, if the world is slipping into situations that
will make such war inevitable. The real role of the UN in respect to keep-
ing the peace will be in cases where limited wars have broken out or are
imminent. In the former instance the UN will be of significance in restoring
peace and of performing patrol functions as it has in the Sinai penninsula
since the Suez crisis in 1956. In the latter case, the UN's function will be
all the more important, because the prevention of wars -- even of limited
ones -- will serve to build up the forces of peace in the world and will
act as a further safeguard against widespread involvement in armed
conflict.
Nothing in our researches indicates that the UN of 1965-1970 will achieve
the stature that ideally it should possess. By way of encouragement, we do
see that the United Nations has accomplished much during the thirteen
years of its existence. 1965-1970 will be a further testing time for the
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pr nciple of international security through international organization and the!
expectation is that the UN is now firmly enough established to endure in all
but the most disastrous of circumstances -- a total war.
In our concern for the factors which have some roots in the events of the
past several years, we may tend to overlook the possibility of a new element
in the world political environment. This is the potential emergence of
power centers that will rival or, at least, supplement those we have in our
m. dst today. There is a. fair likelihood that the 1965-1970 period will
witness the creation of one or more combinations of states that will have
to be reckoned with in planning for the future. We can state negatively our
betiefs on this score with more certainty than we can make our forecasts
definite as to where these new power centers will be located. We do not
bedeve they will emerge in Southeast Asia.* Latin America, Africa south
of the Sahara,** and Australasia are also unlikely to be the sites of
developing strength to that extent. As for the Arab states of the Middle East.,
the possibility is there, but the lack of economic resources beyond oil and
the low levels of health. education, and political experience indicate to us
that the 1965-1970 period is much too soon to see in that area a development
of the degree necessary to challenge the leadership of either the NATO
posers or the Communist bloc.***
May we suggest that one area to watch is India for the reason that in
Southern Asia there is both the civilization and the manpower to erect a.
strong competitive society with something specific to offer in the way of
political leadership to other nations of the region, as well as to some of
*G. J. Pauker's paper, RM 58TMP?-34, indicates why Southeast Asia is;
not apt to develop into a power center in the decade ahead.
* *li. P. Goss, RM 58TMP-8 (1958 Revision) deals with the power potential
of Africa.
**-H. P. Goss, RM 58TM.P-4 (Revised Edition), analyses the importance
of the Middle East in world politics.
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the emergent countries of Africa, where there are considerable popula-
tions of East Indian ancestry. Under the guidance of India there might
develop a political philosophy that could unite a number of these countries.*
Such a union would require much adjustment on the part of some of its
adherents, but these adjustments would be easier to make than those
necessary to join them to Western power alliances or to Communist pacts.
A less likely power center might be found in the Far East through a com-
bination of Japanese and Red Chinese components for economic reasons.
This does not seem possible by 1970. But we must admit that Communist
China is the real political enigma of our time, and a break between Peiping
and Moscow might bring a realignment of the Far Eastern nations with
Japan and Red China including Malaya, Burma, Indonesia, both sections of
Indo-China, and North Korea in a new Greater East Asia Co-prosperity
sphere.**
We shall have to await developments growing out of the recent events in
France to judge whether they portend a renaissance of that nation as the
nucleus of a power center. The combination of a resurgent France and her
associated overseas territories might well create a strong bloc with
economic and political unity whose influence would be felt in many ways.
But the French will have to resolve the problems of Algeria and Tunisia,
as well as those inherent in French relations with Morocco, before much
progress can be made toward rekindling the light that France held before
the world in the days of its cultural and political eminence. This is an
area of significance to watch, and to examine in detail in future programs.
*M. R. Goodall, RM 58TMP-39, and W. C. Neale, RM 58TMP-49, discuss
the possible emergence of India as a power center from the political
and economic viewpoints, respectively.
**Compare the studies by F. Michael, RM 58TMP-42; R. E. Ward,
RM 58TMP-41; M. Bronfenbrenner, RM 58TMP-44; L. Krader, RM 58-
TMP-56; and G. J. Pauker, RM 58TMP-34, on the possibilities of East
Asian developments. The positions of Thailand and South Korea, should
such a combination occur, would be especially perilous .
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Likewise, we should give future attention to the Commonwealth of Nations,
aid especially to those vigorously democratic elements of it promising
stability -- Canada, Australia, New Zealand, as well as the aging but still
influential United Kingdom. The Commonwealth may lose India, South Africa,
Pakistan, and several of its newer members in Africa. But the health of
the core nations that make up this loosely-linked union may be improved
thereby. And there is a possibility that the 1965-1970 period may see a
reoriented power group of English-speaking democracies.
With the likelihood of thils emergence of one or more new power centers
in the world, both the USSR and the United States would find their tasks
of political leadership complicated. Soviet Russia would find it more
difficult to achieve its ambition of world domination if there was a strong
power group, gathered around India, standing in its way of penetration into
Southeast Asia and Africa. The United States would find its responsibilities
and tasks increased, since it would have to rely more on example and
pE:rsuasion than on wealth and generosity.. And the world might see a
greater reliance upon negotiation than upon threats,boasts, and bluffs.
In other words, there may be ahead some decades wherein a rather delicate
balance of power will exist in international politics. The arbiter of the
world's destinies may be neither the Soviet-directed Communist bloc nor
the American-led Free World alliance, but a new great power combination
brought into being by an ideal and an imaginative recognition of the
principle of standing clear of association with either the Communists or
the Free World in the continuing cold war.
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UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY
REQUIREMENTS
When we consider that the period of 1965-1970, as we foresee it, will at
once be an era of no real peace and of no total war, we are constrained to
assess what will be the likely national security requirements for the United
States in such a circumstance. All that has gone before in this survey
indicates the gravity of the situations that will face American policymakers
and planners in the decade to come. They must be able to strike the proper
balance in understanding of and preparation for the needs of national
security.
This difficult task is further complicated by the injection into problems of
security of two elements that pose tremendous challenges to planners: First,
the ever-changing nature of weapon systems -- their components, purposes,
effectiveness, and rapid obsolescence; and Secondly, the political commit-
ments and expectations that exist without close relation to the military
capabilities to fulfill them.
When we place these elements against the varied circumstances in which
nations find themselves at odds with other nations, we realize the series of
possible combinations -- some of them calling for no armed conflict,
others for all-our war -- as shown on Chart IV.* Our planners may be
called upon, in the decade to come, to be ready with programs and weapon
systems to fit situations anywhere along this war spectrum.
*This chart is taken from N. Precoda, RM 57TMP-7 (1958 Revision).
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J
uA
z
w . 3
c~ -,>
OO uu
U ZQ
Qz
J
U> Zu
"0 Q z
ao
z-
1--N iuz in
Z
INCREASING INTERNATIONAL EMBITTERMENT
;hart IV. The War Spectrum
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If we posit the assumption that within the coming decade our military forces
will not be called upon to fight a total, global atomic war against the one
adversary able to engage us in such a war, we immediately ask the question,
"What type, size, and distribution of military forces do we need for the
period ahead?"
To compound the problems of this glimpse into the future, we have only to
add the mention of the words "limited war". Shall we, in a paraphrase of
George Washington's warning, say: "in time of `no peace', prepare for
total war -- and the limited wars will take care of themselves"? We have
already witnessed, in the cases of Korea, Indochina, Suez, and the like,
that limited wars do not "take care of themselves". They require special
emphasis in terms of forces, objectives, safeguards, and compromises.*
Yet, if we were to devote our major attention to preparation for the likeli-
hood of limited wars, we should soon find our strength fragmented and our
security menaced because of our inability to meet the threat of total war
without adjustments, delays, and reversals. One thing our emergence into
the atomic age should have taught us above all else -- when total war
threatens, delay means disaster.
This suggests that our national security requirements for the decade ahead
will call for planning talents and techniques sufficiently mature to assure
us of two principal safeguards:** First, a weapon system of a design and
composition that will serve as a continuing shield against the threat of total
war -- whether that war seems imminent, remotely probable, eventually
inevitable, or highly unlikely;and, Secondly, a companion system of a design
and composition that will afford a ready reply to the requirements of
limited wars (large, medium, or small) anywhere in the world -- and at
the same time, will provide a system that will be instantly adaptable for
use in total war, if that occurs.
We would suggest further that this duality of our response to the require-
ments for national security should not be taken as a program for compart-
mentation of our defense forces. We see the need for a highly integrated
weapon system which has this dualness of purpose we contemplate, but which
*See N. Precoda, RM 58TMP-32, for some logistic problems related to
limited war.
**We leave for future investigation and report the very great problem of our
organization for national defense. This area of examination is so extensive
that it could be an early requirement for study by TEMPO.
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has, also, a diversity of components. Yet, the design and the administration
of this weapon system should be such that its flexibility and its adaptability
will make it responsive to any imaginable situation likely to occur in the
period ahead.
We know the capability of the Strategic Air Command and its preparedness
for action. It would seem evident that SAC will remain into the coming
decade a leading element of our security posture. As ICBMs and ICBMs
phase into the scheme of deterrence and retaliation, SAC Is manned bombers
will assume a lesser position on the scale of national power. But the spirit
of readiness developed so whole-heartedly by SAC commanders and their
units must not be allowed. to disappear.
The proper distribution of weapon system emphasis during 1965-1970 in
SAC, TAC, and the Navy, with attendant supporting systems involving early
warning, surveillance, continental defense, and the like will involve a
great deal more than the technical state of the art at that time. Economics
and politics will enter into the calculations, also. And this is why the planner
will have to concern himself not only with the particular weapons on hand,
on order, and on the drawing boards, but also with the wise allotment of
funds for their procurement and operation.. At the same time -- and here
the planner must be practically omniscient -- he will have to know the
political reliability of the territories where he has or proposes to put
bases, the political climate of his homeland he is planning to defend, and the
political future of those portions of the world likely to survive the impact
of the first blows of total war.
We foresee an intensification of the responsibilities placed upon the
military commander and his civilian superior in standing alert for the
possibility of total war, even if no total war is forecast for the decadle
ahead. In a society that commits suicide by the thousands each month on
the highways one would expect a callousness toward the burdens it places
upon its military and political leaders.. Yet, we shrink from investing
these individuals with the power they need to meet these duties.
Here again, the planner will be faced with the necessity to factor into his
program the indefiniteness with which we as a nation and a people approach
this vital aspect of decision-making. We shall no longer have the luxury
of time -- except possibly in the short supply of seconds or minutes
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In reaching a determination to act in the event of an enemy attack. However,
we do somehow expect that alertness and military readiness will be with us
in high degree with little or no effort on our part. And we further assure
ourselves that an aroused nation will inform Its elected representatives of
Its desire for them to act in support of our chosen leader when he requests
the power to carry the country into war. We have gone part of the way in
consenting to Presidential commitment of troops under certain conditions.
But we fail to realize that minutes after the initiation of unexpected total
war there may be no representatives and no President left to act. Decision
to act may rest upon someone quite far down the echelon. For this reason,
as well as for other equally cogent ones, our planning for 1965-1970 must
include facilities for educating the American people to the need for a
virtually automatic, "fail-safe" mechanism for military decision-making.
Involved also in these questions of preparedness for total war is the problem
of whether IRBM s are a proper part of the national arsenal for such
conflicts. We shall have to place questionable dependence upon these
intermediate range missiles for some time into the future, and a goodly
proportion of them would have to be fired from foreign soil, where they may
be subject to actual sabotage or to political impediments to their instant
use. Until the ICBM is available in quantity and at relatively invulnerg.ble
installations, SAC bombers and the IRBM would have to bear the burden if
all-out war came upon us. There would be the additional possibility that
both these elements of our strength might not survive the initial enemy
onslaught. It appears that planning for the national security poses some
questions as to the suitability of the land-based IRBM as a retaliatory
weapon after 1965, and these questions should receive more consideration
than has been given them. The FBM (Fleet Ballistic Missile) appears to
have the greatest potentiality as a dependable retaliatory weapon system
for the period we are considering.
Planning for future weapon systems and their employment calls also for
much more study on such topics as early warning measures, the proper
utilization of tactical atomic weapons, the role of nuclear-powered naval
vessels, the potentialities of nuclear-powered aircraft, and the consideration
of space vehicles for military use. Each of these topics should be treated at
length in future studies so planners may assess the place and function.
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of these and various other elements in the weaponry with which they will
have to deal in their programs for national security.
In considering preparation for limited wars we will have greater assurance
of latitude in our response to the particular situations we may face. In
essence, there is just one type of total war (although there may be slight
variations in its prosecution depending upon the state of our weaponry at
the date of its onset). But there may be many types of limited wars, each
of them requiring different approaches and flexibility in action. To give
specific examples of what we have in mind would illustrate the diversity
of the problems that would arise.
The Middle East is viewed as a most likely area in which limited war may
occur. The character of the region -- at the edge of a land-locked sea;
relatively sparsely populated land areas; a one-product economy, but that
one product highly important; indigenous populations, except in Israel, of
limited reliability; religious and cultural complications overshadowing
political divisions; and the significance of the area as a bridge between the
Communist bloc and one of its prime targets for future expansion -- Africa.
Limited wars fought in such a region will certainly call for different plans,
different weaponry, and different emphasis from ones occuring, say, in the
island territories of Southeast Asia.
Or, if we can contemplate the possibility of a limited war in Western
Europe -- an East German attack on West Germany with the Soviet Union
y learly holding itself aloof -- the situation would require very special
action on our part under the NATO agreements to resolve the problem with--
out expanding the war into a total one. With the action would come a quite
different requirement for the types of weapons, the attitude toward con--
centrated civilian populations, the preservation of Industrial andtranspor--
tation resources, etc.
What about limited wars in our own hemisphere? Latin American nations
tinder the terms of the treaty of the Organization of American States (OAS;-
are not supposed to make war upon one another. But the likelihood is that
during the 1965-1970 period we may see several outbreaks in the area south
of the Rio Grande. In such instances the United States will become involved
both as a member of OAS and as the guardian of the hemisphere under the
"Monroe Doctrine in its 20th century application. We shall have to plan and
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move quite carefully to restore peace in the event of such wars without
embittering the Latin Americans and turning them toward dependence upon
a non-American power for support and sympathy.
Enough has been suggested to indicate that planning for limited war involves
logistics, force compositions and strengths, political attitudes, and specially
designed weaponry quite different from the requirements for total war.
We cannot afford to create and maintain two separate military establish-
ments to answer possibly dissimilar requirements. We can afford, however,
the luxury of an integrated national security program that keeps us
organized to meet the challenges that will come before us in the decade
ahead. This topic of the requirements for limited wars vs. the requirements
for total war demands much greater study than has been possible thus far
in this TEMPO project. The specific requirements are individual in them-
selves -- but they are part of a whole that must be faced sometime in the
1965-1970 period because unplanned-for limited wars will almost certainly
endanger our national security to a degree that we could be quite unready
for total war.
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TITLES OF PAPERS PREPARED DURING 1958
IN SUPPORT OF
TEMPO PROJECT 068 -- ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
TEMPO No.
Merrill R. Goodall
Hilton P. Goss
Hilton P. Goss
H i l ton P. Goss
Hilton P. Goss
Hilton P. Goss
Hilton P. Goss
The Future Course of Inter-
national Organization During
1965-1970
The Political System of
India: 1965-1970
Africa -- Present and
Potential
RM 57TMP-8
1958 Revision
Changing Patterns in the
U. S. Alliance System
Through 1970
Factors Influencing
America's Position as
a World Leader
International Alignments
--Allies, Neutrals, and
Adversaries: 1965- 1970
The Middle East --
Dilemma and Challenge
The Political Problems
of U. S. Aid to Under-
Developed Areas
Scope and Character of
U. S. Foreign Policy
Approved For Release 2001/05/07 : CIA-RDP70B00584R000100100001-2
RM 58TMP-36
RM 58TMP-35
RM 58TMP-54
RM 58TMP-4
Revised Edition
 Approved For Release 2001/05/07 : CIA-RDP70B00584R000100100001-2
Franz Michael
Charles R. Nixon
Guy J. Pauker
Robert E. Ward
Donald H. Webster
Martin Bronfenbrenner
Dale J. Hekhuis
Dale J. Hekhuis
Lawrence Krader
Walter J. Mead
The Role of Communist RM 58TMP-42
China in International
Affairs
The Mobilization of Political RM 58TMP-38
Demands Upon the American
Governmental System,
1965-1970
Southeast Asia as a Problem RM 58TMP-34
Area in the Next Decade
The Position of Japan in the RM 58TMP-41
Far East and in International
Politics: 1965-1970
Problems of Political Man- RM 58TMP-46
agement of Land, Water, and
Human Resources in the United
States Through 1970
Long-Range Projections of the RM 58TMP-44
Japanese Economy: 1962-1975
Economic Goals, Resources, RM 58TMP-55
and Attitudes -- American
and Soviet Aspects
The Economics of US-USSR RM 58TMP-1
National Security Expenditures: 1958 Re-issue
1965-1970
The Economic Status of RM 58TMP-56
Communist China: 1965-1970
Non-Defense Government RM 58TMP-45
Purchases of Goods and
Services
Approved For Release 2001/05/07 : CIA-RDP70B00584R000100100001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/05/07 : CIA-RDP70B00584R000100100001-2
Walter C. Neale
The Economic Status
of India
SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS
Charles G. McClintock The Competition in
Education: U. S. vs USSR
Charles G. McClintock
The Demography of the
Asian "Big Three"
Charles G. McClintock
Charles G. McClintock
Aaron B. Nadel
Aaron B. Nadel
Aaron B. Nadel
U. S. Population (1970)
World Population
Pressures
Changing Patterns in
Social Communications
and Pressures
Population and Industrial.
Mobility in the United
States -- With Consider-
ations of Vulnerability
United States Manpower
Requirements and
Resources
PROSPECTS IN THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES
Finn E. Bronner
Finn E. Bronner
James E. Hacke
Harold C. Mattraw
and
James W. Moyer
The Atlantic Ocean Environ-
ment in Future Warfare
The Polar Regions
Communications
Energy: Sources, Conversion
and New Applications
RM 58TMP-49
RM 58TMP-57
RM 58TMP-58
RM 58TMP-24
RM 57TMP-3
1958 Re-issue
RM 58TMP-59
RM 58TMP-51
RM 58TMP-52
RM 58TMP-60
RM 58TMP-61
RM 58TMP-62
RM 58TMP-47
Approved For Release 2001/05/07 : CIA-RDP70B00584R000100100001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/05/07 : CIA-RDP70B00584R000100100001-2
Author Title
Harold C. Mattrow
and
James W. Moyer
Frontiers of Technology RM 58TMP-63
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES
Norman Precoda Logistic Support in RM 58TMP-32
Limited War
Norman Precoda
National Security and RM 57TMP-7
Military Missions 1958 Revision
Approved For Release 2001/05/07 : CIA-RDP70B00584R000100100001-2