A HARD AND REALISTIC LOOK AT FUTURE REALIGNMENT AND REORGANIZATION OF OSA AS A RESULT OF THE PLANNED TERMINATION OF THE OXCART PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00501R000100070038-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2003
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: January 3, 1967
• Content Type: MFR

Approved For Release 2003/09/3QCgASR7P_E100501 R
3 January 1967
SUBJECT: A Hard and Realistic Look at Future Realignment and
Reorganization of OSA as a Result of the Planned Termination
of the OXCART Program
1. This paper was prepared making the assumption and basing the
recommendations on the premise that Higher Authority approves the
continuation of CIA in the covert manned reconnaissance business.
2. Following the disapproval for deployment of BLACK SHIELD to
Okinawa in the summer and fall of 1966, I strongly suggested to the
Director of OSA that the continuation of the OXCART program should
be carefully reviewed with the strong possibility of removing the program
from the Agency. In addition it was recommended that we should take
the initiative now to draft contingency plans and a recommendation for
shedding the OXCART program should be formulated immediately since
the continuation of the program, in my opinion, was questionable from a
political and budgetary viewpoint. The future of the OXCART program as
the result of a recommendation by the Budget Director was officially
determined by Higher Authority on 28 December 1966 specifically directing
the Agency to close out the program by December 1967, however, main-
taining an operational capability up to that time. I believe the rationale
behind this decision generally is valid and realistic in most respects and
furthermore prompts on our initiative the immediate review of the IDEALIST
program to determine the Agency's role in the future.
3. During my tenure with the Agency since 1960 OSA has continued to
expand in size both internally and in the field. This expansion was due
initially to deployment but principally in the 25X1
long run as a result of the impending operational readiness of the OXCART
program. Some of the facilities constructed by OSA are used jointly
either by IDEALIST. and OXCART or other such compatible projects ?
outside OSA. However, OXCART justified the majority of the expansion
and in turn should account for a sizeable decrease in the overall size of
OSA. Now for the first time OSA should take advantage of having to give
up the OXCART program and concentrate its efforts on the U-2 and U-2R
programs devoting all its professional talent in that direction.
NRO review(s) TOP SECRET
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4. We have received little guidance to date on how best to carry
out the termination of OXCART and maintain the spirit of the directive.
If we are expected to maintain a real operational capability even though
reduced in size by mid year, there is difficulty in predicting the number
of man hours and costs involved. However, we do not expect to see any
significant personnel or costs savings in the immediate future; and the
real personnel and cost adjustment cannot be appreciated until we receive
some additional guidance. In the meantime, further tightening of money
is predictable as evidenced by a recent suggestion that we look into
moving the U-2 facilities at Edwards Air Force Base to Davis-Monthan
Air Force Base.
5. The Executive Committee noted in December 1966 that a study to
effect savings would be performed to determine the feasibility of moving
the U-2 assets presently at Edwards to Davis-Monthan. It is my opinion
that no significant savings would be accomplished by this move and that
the Agency would jeopardize its method of operation, security and
ultimately the program in effecting such a move. I firmly believe that
rather than have other agencies such as the NRO, Air Force, BOB, etc.
make recommendations to anyone as to how this program should be run
that DDS&T should initiate and act on a few of its own recommendations
firmly and realistically, in light of the economic situation that exists
presently and the possible future applications of the U-2 from both an
historical record and a hard look at future operational prospects. Since
OSA presented the concept of the establishment of Edwards, it should also
review periodically and realistically the rationale behind the continuation of
this establishment rather than let other agencies do this for us and dictate
our methods of operation because of our own default. It is my firm belief
that we must take immediate action to review the need for the base at
Edwards and if the results dictate, follow up this review with immediate
plans and action to pre-empt the NRO or some other agency from directly
or indirectly effecting the change for us.
6. The facility at Edwards has been visited by many outside individuals
and is of particular concern to the BOB and NRO at this time due to the
questionable need or at least our inability to convince them that it is
really necessary. I honestly see no reason why the facility at Edwards
cannot be phased out in the near future with the IDEALIST program
concentrating on the base Flight testing ,could be performed
and to some degree at Van Nuys for both the U-2 and the U-2R.
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Once the U-2R becomes operational, there should be even less need
for continuation of active Agency participation uin calendar 25X1
1968.
7. The dual mission concept should also be reviewed for practicality.
Should this concept continue to be desirable from an operational stand-
point, I believe it could be realigned and effected much more realistically
I I This would eventually mean the deployment of probably
two additional aircraft on a permanent basis in addition to
those two now present. Construction of additional quarters and facilities
I o accommodate the personnel increase which would occur
could be done economically. The addition of some assets to the base at
could also be done economically with the idea of using the
latter base to a greater and more effective extent than employed in the
past. The need for a U-2 in some other part of the world ("dual staging")
could be accomplished by deploying almost as easily as 25X1
from Edwards. The projected savings in cost and manpower would be
significant.
8. I appreciate that present plans for test facilities for the new U-2R
would be affected by the above recommended relocation of the Edwards
assets; however, I am certain none of these problems are unsurmountable
and would ultimately affect a more secure operation for the Agency as
well as a significant savings in money and manpower. 77
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9. It has been my experience that particularly in the manned aircraft
reconnaissance business guidance is not automatically provided by the
more senior Agency and NRO officials and that DDS&T should make
recommendations to the Director as soon as possible before the BOB,
the NRO or anyone else pre-empts those actions which we could accomplish
now on our own, or at least be the initiating Agency for the change in re-
organizing our own programs.
10. The Agency U-2 program has never had a charter and any role or
mission that we employ has never been established in writing. I believe
this is another action that should be accomplished as soon as possible,
having the Director approach Higher Authority himself to reconfirm the
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continuation of the Agency's role in the U-2 program. Once we have
obtained the administration's approval for the desirability for the
continuation of this program, functions should be considerably easier
and we should be less vulnerable in the future to sniping and forced
realignment which recently has occurred even more frequently than
in the past.
RE COMMENDATIONS/PROPOSALS:
1. That OSA/DDS&T be provided soonest firm guidance on
terminating the OXCART program, including interpretations
of the BOB intent vis a vis timing, funding, mothballing, etc.
2. That the Director of Central Intelligence confirm with Higher
Authority the Agency continuing in the manned reconnaissance
business and specifically the U-2 program.
3. That OSA/DDS&T be directed to -olan now to moy out of
Edwards AFB and carry on as the
central location for all U-2 operations, assets and training.
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4. That NRO approve use for U-2R development and 25X1
fli ht test through 1968. (The possible basing of TAGBOARD
atiImay have some favorable impact.)
5. That OSA submit a plan by 15 March whereby it will reduce its
present overall compliment of personnel at least 60 percent by
March 1968. OSA will further review its organization at that
time and level off by August 1968 with the most efficient number
of personnel commensurate with their mission.
6. That administration and responsibility of certain offices now in
OSA such as the Comptroller, Research & Development, Contracts,
etc. be moved to DDS&T to continue to support OSA but assume
additional functions for OSP, ORD, OEL and others as the
Directorate's needs arise. This action would permit OSA to
better concentrate on its primary mission.
Executive O icer
Office of Special Activities
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