PROPSPECTS FOR THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY
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Publication Date:
November 27, 1968
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
PROSPECTS FOR THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY
MORI/CDF
Secret
Secret
70
27 November 1968
No. 1582/68
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
1.8, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
27 November 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Prospects for the Nonproliferation Treaty
Summary
The Nonproliferation Treaty is still far short
of receiving the number of signatures and ratifica-
tions required to bring it into force. For a variety
of reasons the momentum required to bring about the
treaty's speedy acceptance has failed to develop.
Some of the holdouts retain their earlier reservations
that the treaty will impede their access to peace-
ful nuclear technology. Others are dissatisfied
with the security assurances provided. Many coun-
tries believe that, so long as progress is not made
toward actual reduction of nuclear arsenals, the
treaty aggravates the imbalance between the have and
have-not countries. Moreover, the world situation
generally--particularly the continuing uncertainties
in Eastern Europe and the Middle East--is not a
propitious one for disarmament. Early US ratifica-
tion of the NPT would give a boost to its prospects,
but inertia and delay have already taken their toll
of support and will be hard to overcome.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by the
Central Intelligence Agency. It was prepared by
the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated
with the Office of Strategic Research and the Of-
fice of National Estimates.
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1. On 1 July 1968, the Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) was simultaneously opened for signatures in
London, Washington, and Moscow. By 27 November 1968,
some 83 countries had signed the treaty and four
(the UK, Ireland, Nigeria, and Mexico) had ratified
it (see Annex), By its terms the treaty will enter
into effect when 43 nations, including its three
nuclear-weapon-possessing sponsors (US, UK, and USSR),
have signed and ratified it. A substantial list of
countries have signed the treaty, but have since
adopted a wait-and-see attitude before ratifying.
Of the three nuclear sponsors, only Britain has rati-
fied. So far no momentum has developed to speed the
ratification process, and the treaty is a long way
from entering into force.
Obstacles to the NPT
2. The nonsigners have raised a number of
specific objections to the treaty's provisions.
These fall mainly into three groups: security guar-
antees against nuclear attack or threat, guarantees
that national programs for peaceful uses of atomic
energy will not be impeded, and imbalances in favor
of the nuclear countries in the machinery to admin-
ister the treaty, Underlying these stated objections
are deeper political concerns. Some holdouts are
unwilling to renounce a nuclear option because they
regard it as a bargaining weapon against a hostile
neighbor. Others are disturbed because the treaty,
by formalizing and freezing the distinction between
haves and have-nots, seems to discriminate against
them. Some, particularly West Germany, fear that
the NPT seems to point toward a developing Soviet-
American partnership to which their national interests
will be sacrificed.
Security Assurances
3. Naturally, the sine qua non of the non-
nuclears for yielding the nuclear option has been
freedom from nuclear blackmail and a credible se-
curity arrangement in case of nuclear attack. The
security assurance scheme of the NPT contemplates
that the UN Security Council will act upon threat
or use of nuclear weapons, calling upon the US, UK,
and USSR to counter the danger to world peace, with
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force if necessary. In addition, each of the three
sponsoring nuclear powers has declared its willing-
ness to act through the Security Council to counter
such aggression.
4. The have-nots have pointed out bitterly
that these arrangements are not credible since any
proposed future Council action could be thwarted
by a permanent member's veto. Among the demands for
additional guarantees, India has sought explicit
undertakings that the US or Britain would use its
nuclear capabilities to defend India. Several na-
tions have demanded international agreements, or
promises from the Great Powers that they will not
use their veto.. Brazil and others have tried to
convene an international conference on security as-
surances, apparently on the theory that one more
attempt to embarrass the nuclear powers publicly can-
not hurt.
5. Most proposals to "harden" security arrange-
ments have sought to eliminate the UN as the imple-
menting mechanism. The nuclear powers, however, con-
tinue to see the Security Council's peacekeeping
machinery as a protection against commitments and
circumstances that might prove catalytic to nuclear
war. As a substitute for the security assurances
they have requested, the non-nuclea.rs.have also
sought from the Great Powers either progress toward
nuclear disarmament or commitments not to use nu-
clear weapons,
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
6. Another major concern to the non-nuclears
has been the possibility that safeguards might de-
prive them of access to the equipment, material, and
technology essential to the development of their
peaceful nuclear industries. Germany has inter-
preted the treaty as obliging nuclear countries to
disclose all technology not strictly weapon-oriented,
including the technology involved in isotopic separa-
tion and enrichment. Several countries have requested
express commitments between haves and have-nots cov-
ering the non-nuclears' requirements. The idea of a
"fuel bank" funded by the US, UK, and USSR has been
pressed. Many countries have complained that the
safeguards requirements are unduly burdensome.
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Arguments over Appropriate International Agencies
7. Several key "threshold" countries, for ex-
ample Italy and Japan, have expressed fears that
international politics could influence implementa-
tion of the treaty, with the nuclear countries oc-
cupying an unduly strong position.,, These countries
have exerted great influence to create new inter-
national bodies, balanced in favor of the non-nuclear
countries, to administer the treaty, instead of de-
pending upon existing machinery which is more or
less controlled by the nuclear countries. Italy,
for example, fears that the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), overbalanced with nuclear powers,
might be prejudiced in their favor in administering
safeguards. Italy has therefore fought to expand
membership of the IAEA's governing body to include
more non-nuclears (and particularly Italy). The
Italians also seek a permanent committee to carry
on the work and to implement the recommendations of
the non-nuclear conference, an idea unpleasant to
the nuclear powers,
Positions of Princi2aal Non-Signatories
8. The following paragraphs discuss the pros-
pects for signature in the major countries now hold-
ing out. Each of these countries will probably
defer a decision until the US ratifies. In most
of them, US ratification would generally encourage
the proponents of signature, but in important in-
stances early US action would not decisively tip
the scales. The failure of a US ratification ef-
fort, of course, would finish off the tr?e,aty.
West Germany
9m The key country in Europe obviously remains
West Germany. The decision for Bonn has been an
agonizing one, with strong feeling running both pro
and con. Under present circumstances there is no
prospect for early action.,, The Czechoslovak invasion
has aggravated German suspicions of the Soviets,
and the continuing Soviet verbal broadsides against
West Germany have further thinned the ranks of NPT
supporters. 7777 1
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10. Of special importance to Bonn has been
the Soviet contention, following Czechoslovakia,
that, under Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter,
the USSR has the right to intervene in West German
affairs if the Federal Republic engages in acts
of provocation. Some Germans have linked this
obviously strained construction of the Charter with
ratifying the NPT, Naturally, any such intervention
would be of overwhelming international import, which
leads to the conclusion that the Soviet claim was
probably an effort to regain the propaganda initia-
tive after the Czechoslovak invasion. This, how-
ever, does not eliminate concern over the issue
among the Germans.
11, West German action on the NPT is thus un-
likely for the time being., Disarmament specialists
in Bonn have said that there certainly will be no
action until next year at least, very possibly not
until after elections in late 1969, and maybe not
in Bonn will be following the treaty"s progress i.
the US Senate, Ratification by the US, particularly
if it creates momentum toward ratification by other
countries, will in the end probably lead to West
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German accession, but Bonn will be in no hurry
and will probably require further urging by the
major powers
Japan
12. Japanese leaders basically support the
NPT, but have reservations on certain points. The
Japanese wish to see further progress toward nu-
clear disarmament, security guarantees of a higher
order than those proffered, and equal treatment
under the safeguards provisions for all countries.
The latter point is of special importance to busi-
ness leaders, who seek protection from "commercial
espionage" and fear that the relative freedom the
US and the USSR have from safeguards gives them a
commercial advantage.
13, The government would like to have a speci-
fic bilateral guarantee of protection against nuclear
attack from one or more of the NPT's nuclear spon-
sors--a guarantee of more assured duration than the
US-Japan Security Treaty--and Japan ma not sign
unless it obtains such a auarant-PP_
14. Policymakers will continue to follow closely
the decisions of other major powers, particularly
West Germany and India, before making any decision.
Ratification of the NPT by the US would not, by it-
self, have an overriding impact on Japan.
E
it will probably take favorable action by the US and
major non-nuclear holdouts like West Germany and
India to build up enough internal pressure for Japa-
nese signature and ratification.
India and Pakistan
15. When the Security Council passed the se-
curity assurances resolution as part of the NPT pack-
age, India--a member of the Security Council at the
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time--abstained. India has refused to sign the
treaty, and there is no indication that it will
change its policy in the foreseeable future. Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi reaffirmed this decision in
early November, citing popular opposition as a ma-
jor factor. Additionally the government still takes
a dim view of the security assurances arrangement
in view of India's proximity to China, and Indian
policymakers remain dubious that the treaty will in
fact retard proliferation. The safeguards provi-
sions are unpopular with the nuclear establishment
in the country. Also, the government is quite pos-
sibly taking a second look at the weapons option.
There seem to be few arguments that could enhance
the chances of Indian adherence to the treaty at
this time. And, as a prime example of the regional
balance required to secure NPT ratification, unless
and until India becomes a party to the NPT, Pakistan
will not sign or ratify.
Italy
16. Italy is expected to sign the Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty during the first few months of 1969 if
the United States has ratified by then. At present,
government preoccupation with domestic political un-
certainties is a factor against immediate signature
of the treaty. However, the most important element
influencing Italian leaders to go along with popular
feeling and sign will probably be the attitude of
the United States as shown by its own actions on rati-
fication. Popular sentiment as reflected by most
parliamentary delegates strongly favors the treaty.
Once the treaty is signed and presented to the Par-
liament, ratification should follow quickly,
17. The Israelis continue to resist signing
the treaty, and so long as conditions in the Middle
East do not improve, there is little likelihood of
a change in their position. Prime Minister Eshkol
said recently that he saw no reason for Israel to
rush into the pact. He raised the issue of possible
Soviet-Arab supervision, under the safeguards provi-
sions, of Israel's nuclear program, a spurious issue
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since the IAEA's nuclear procedures will permit a
state in effect to choose the nationality of the
inspectors assigned it. He also argued that Is-
rael could ill afford to relinquish the nuclear
option without ironclad security assurances, since
the Soviets might give nuclear weapons to the Arabs
in violation of the treaty at any time. In the
meantime, the Israelis' nuclear program proceeds
apace.
18. All of the Arab countries have signed the
treaty. Among them only the UAR has a peacetime
nuclear program of any significance. They have
leveled verbal barrages at the Israelis, and are
clearly concerned that Israel's inaction on the NPT
is indicative ofa nascent Israeli nuclear weapons
development program. it is doubtful whether US
ratification would have much bearing on Arab will-
ingness to ratify.
Other Countries
19. Among other nonsigners are France, Commu-
nist China, Indonesia, and Australia. France has
never participated in the ENDC, it has said it will
not sign the treaty, and there is no indication
that this attitude is changing. It no doubt wants
Germany to adhere to the treaty, however, and prob-
ably will not prevent EURATOM's negotiating a safe-
guards arrangement with the IAEA.
20. Peking has regarded the NPT from the out-
set as an effort to perpetuate the "US-Soviet nuclear
monopoly" and will not become a party to the treaty.
Indonesia and Australia are both bothered by their
proximity to Communist China and have not yet, made
up their minds. If a substantial landslide of sup-
port should develop for the treaty, however, it is
quite possible that both would ultimately decide to
affirm the pact.
21. South Africa, a producer of fissionable
material, is dissatisfied with the extent to which
safeguards under the treaty would encroach on its
industrial operations, even though South Africa as
a member of IAEA has always cooperated with safe-
guards requirements. The South Africans, never
strongly in favor of the NPT, have seized upon the
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Czechoslovak occupation as a reason for not agree-
ing to the treaty. They have used this as an ex-
cuse to keep available the privilege of beginning
a nuclear weapons program, should it appear necessary.
They would probably hold fast to this position de-
spite a timely US ratification.
22. In Latin America, three key nations--
Brazil, Argentina, and Chile--are closely linked
as indefinite holdouts against signing the treaty.
Rio, which has assumed a role of leadership among
the three, has consistently opposed the NPT on
grounds that the potential restrictions impinge
on Brazil's "sovereign right" to develop its own
national nuclear programs. It also points to the
allegedly inadequate security guarantees and the
absence of a binding commitment among the nuclear
powers to limit their arsenals of nuclear weapons.
These attitudes reflect the traditional national
sentiment that Brazil is destined for "Great Power"
status, and the government will probably not
alter its view that the NPT is an obstacle to this
national goal. Foreign Minister Magalhaes Pinto,
who has formulated the Brazilian opposition, is
probably reflecting accurately widespread Brazilian
nationalist sentiment.
23. Argentina has taken an almost identical
position and in fact is following the Brazilian
lead. With traditional ambitions for leadership
in South America, it apparently will not modify its
policy until Brazil has done so. Chile, a tradi-
tional rival of Argentina, in turn will probably
not sign the NPT until both Argentina and Brazil
have become signatories. Cuba is adamantly opposed
to the treaty and will not sign.
24. Mexico is the one major country of the
hemisphere which has taken an active role in sup-
port of the NPT and the only one in the area to
ratify it thus far. Its stance is a logical pro-
jection of its leading role in the formulation and
promotion of the Treaty of Tlaltelolco of 1967,
which designates the southern half of the hemisphere
a nuclear-free zone.
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Soviet Position
25. The Soviet Union is clearly disturbed by
the NPT's loss of momentum. Moscow fears that any
additional delay invites further efforts by the
non-nuclear countries to create obstacles. Like
the US, the Soviets have pushed hard, in public
and in private, for signatures, although the in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia has impeded success.
26. The Soviets themselves have not yet
ratified the NPT. Early US ratification would
reduce uncertainty and would probably give pros-
pects for early Soviet ratification a boost.
Expectations
27,. The NPT has become so integrally tied
to other international issues that to bring it
into effect at an early date will be difficult
under the best of circumstances. With the pas-
sage of time, attrition of support could be fatal
to it. It is probably safe to say that the treaty's
prospects depend upon accession by West Germany
and at least one or two of the other prominent
holdouts. Unless a trend of ratification can be
started by these countries, the effects of the in-
ertia of delay which have already rendered the
treaty moribund could finish it off entirely.
28. There appear to be several contingencies
which could produce substantial new interest in
ratifying the treaty. If the French could be per-
suaded to assume some of the obligations of the
treaty--such as voluntary acceptance of safeguards,
West German receptivity would probably be enhanced.
If the Soviets toned down their anti-Bonn diatribes,
it would assist those Germans who favor the treaty.
Support from a number of countries would grow if
Moscow should make a token acceptance of safeguards.
And naturally, easing of major international ten-
sions over Vietnam and the Middle East would be
helpful.
29. Many countries have tied their willingness
to agree to the NPT to US-USSR progress in disarament;
yet, ironically, many of the same countries are ex-
periencing unprecedented apprehensions that the Great
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Powers may "get together" too readily. Although
it is quite possible that US ratification of the
treaty would give a boost to its prospects, inertia
and delay have already taken their toll of support
and will be hard to overcome.
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STATES WHICH HAVE SIGNED THE NPT
(On 1 July 1968 unless otherwise gated)
1. U.S.
2. Afghanistan
3. Austria
4. Barbados
5. Belgium - Aug. 20
6. Bolivia
7. Botswana
8. Bulgaria
9. Cameroon - July 17
10. Canada - July 23
11. Ceylon
12. Chad
13, Republic of China
14. Colombia
15. Congo (Kinshasa)- July
16. Costa Rica
17. Cyprus
18. Czechoslovakia
1.9. Dahomey
20. Denmark
21. Dominican Republic
22. Ecuador - July 9
23. El Salvador
24. Ethiopia - Sept. 5
25. Finland
26. Gambia - Sept. 20
27. Ghana
28. Greece
29. Guatemala - July 26
30. Haiti
31. Honduras
32, Hungary
33. Iceland
34. Iran
35. Iraq
36, Ireland (ratified)
37. Ivory Coast
38. Jordan - July 10
39. Kenya
40. Republic of Korea
41. Kuwait - Aug. 15
42. Laos
43. Lebanon
44. Lesotho - July 9
45. Liberia
46. Libya - July 19
47. Luxembourg - Aug. 14
48. Malagasy Republic - Aug. 22
49. Malaysia
50. Maldive Islands - Sept. 11
51. Mauritius
52. Mexico - July 26 (ratified)
53. Mongolia
54. Morocco
55. Nepal
56. Netherlands - Aug. 20
22 57. New Zealand
58. Nicaragua
59. Nigeria (ratified)
60. Norway
61. Panama
62. Paraguay
63. Peru
64. Philippines
65. Poland
66. Romania
67. San Marino
68. Senegal
69. Somali Republic
70. Sweden - Aug. 19
71. Syria
72. Togo
73. Trinidad & Tobago - Aug. 20
74. Tunisia
75. USSR
76. UAR
77. UK (ratified)
78. Upper Volta - Nov. 25
79. Uruguay
80. Venezuela
81. Vietnam
82. Yemen Arab Rep. - Sept. 23
83. Yugoslavia - July 10
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